

**FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

**1969–1976
VOLUME XXXII**

**SALT I,
1969–1972**



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

Washington



**Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969–1976**

Volume XXXII

**SALT I,
1969–1972**

Editor Erin R. Mahan
General Editor Edward C. Keefer

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The subseries presents in multiple volumes a comprehensive documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the administrations of

Presidents Nixon and Ford. This specific volume documents the U.S. policy on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks from January 1969 until October 1972. While the editor believes this volume and its annotation stand on its own, it is best read in conjunction with several other volumes: *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971; volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972; and volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXII

This volume is organized chronologically and divided into eight chapters. The first chapter documents the nine-month period of preparation before SALT began and documents the obstacles created by the Soviet SS-9 and MIRV controversy, as well as the potential conflict between SALT and ABM. A preponderance of the documents printed were generated in the National Security Council, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the White House. The first chapter also documents the first meetings of NSC Verification Panel, created in July 1969, to evaluate the feasibility of monitoring Soviet military activity under any agreement. In time, the Verification Panel's mandate broadened to become the principal forum for reviewing all technical aspects of SALT.

The subsequent chapters coincide with the numerous SALT rounds that alternated among Helsinki, Geneva and Vienna and document internal U.S. policy discussions as well as breakthroughs in the talks. Because there were nearly fifty Verification Panel meetings (with the meeting minutes averaging between 12–20 pages) during the period covered by this volume, the editor chose to account for all the meetings by printing either extracts in editorial notes or by printing only the summary of conclusions. The seventeen National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) on instructions for the SALT delegation, which contained the results of the interagency deliberative process documented by the Verification Panel, Review Group, and NSC, are printed in full.

Throughout the volume, the editor included extracts from memoranda of conversation between Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that pertain to SALT, demonstrating not only how heavily President Nixon relied on Kissinger to move the negotiations forward but also how Nixon and Kissinger viewed SALT as a *détente* tool for achieving policy linkage, or diplomatic and political leverage with the Soviets. Chapters four through eight are enriched by a unique source—the White House tapes—and the twenty-five transcripts included in the volume reinforce the view that Nixon and Kissinger sought to control

SALT. In many respects, however, the White House transcripts reveal as much about the personalities and bureaucratic politics of SALT as they do about the substance of the negotiations.

To offset the NSC and White House-based perspective on the SALT negotiations, the editor made a conscientious effort to include as many relevant ACDA records as possible. Chapters two through eight contain numerous telephone transcripts and meeting memoranda prepared by chief SALT negotiator, Gerard Smith, as well as backchannel messages between Smith and Kissinger. These exchanges often show a dialogue of miscommunication, if not outright misunderstanding.

Much of the documentation for chapters seven and eight on the period covering Kissinger's secret trip to Moscow in April 1972, culminating with the Moscow Summit at the end of May 1972, is printed in extract in this volume and printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972. This volume ends with the Nixon administration's securing congressional approval of the SALT agreement and ratification of the ABM treaty.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words repeated in telegrams to avoid garbling or provide emphasis are silently corrected. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where

possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 USC 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the oppor-

tunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All *Foreign Relations* volumes that include materials from NARA's Nixon Presidential Materials Staff are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Nixon White House Tapes

Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the PRMPA and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon Estate. In February 1971, President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the President's Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, other White House aides, Secretary of State Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of Congress, and key foreign officials. The clarity of the voices on the tape recordings is often very poor, but the editor has made every effort to verify the accuracy of the transcripts produced here. Readers are advised that the tape recording is the official document; the transcript represents an interpretation of that document. Through the use of digital audio and other advances in technology, the Office of the Historian has been able to enhance the tape recordings and over time produce more accurate transcripts. The result is that some transcripts printed here may differ from transcripts of the same conversations printed in previous *Foreign Relations* volumes. The most accurate transcripts possible, however, cannot substitute for listening to the recordings. Readers are urged to consult the recordings themselves for a full appreciation of those aspects of the conversations that cannot be captured in a transcript, such as the speakers' inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as well as the larger context of the discussion.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department

of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2004 and was completed in 2010 resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excisions of a paragraph or more in 9 documents, and minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 60 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the record presented in this volume presented here provides an accurate and comprehensive account of the U.S. foreign policy on SALT.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The editor wishes to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. The editor is also grateful to Donna Lehman and Helmi Raaska at the Gerald Ford Presidential Library for informing her about the Melvin Laird papers and providing guidance in their use. John Haynes of the Library of Congress was responsible for expediting access to and copying the Kissinger Papers. The editor was able to use the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of telephone conversations, with the kind permission of Henry Kissinger. The editor would like to also thank Sandy Meagher for her valuable assistance in expediting the use of files of the Department of Defense. Finally, special thanks are given to Daniel Sanborn of the National Security Council for his kind assistance.

Erin Mahan collected the documents, made the initial selections, and annotated the documents she chose. The volume was completed under the supervision of Division Chief Louis Smith and Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the series. Chris Tudda and Dean Weatherhead coordinated the declassification review, under the supervision of

Susan C. Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Kristin Ahlberg, Aaron Marrs, and Carl Ashley did the copy and technical editing. Juniee Oneida prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs
September 2010

Ambassador Edward Brynn
Acting Historian

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Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have full access to the papers of President Nixon and White House foreign policy records, including tape recordings of conversations with key U.S. and foreign officials. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project housed at the National Archives and Records Administration include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies, including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Library of Congress, and other U.S. Government agencies. Although all the material printed in *Foreign Relations* volumes have been declassified,

some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The Nixon Presidential Materials Staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1972, Volume XXXII, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, January 1969–October 1972

In compiling this volume, the editor relied heavily on the Nixon Presidential Materials Project housed at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland (Archives II). The collection of most value within the Nixon materials is the National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), a collection within the National Security Council (NSC) Files. The National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files) contain the minutes of the meetings of the NSC and its various subgroups, such as the Senior Review Group, which reviewed major foreign policy decisions, and the Verification Panel, created in July 1969 specifically to deliberate SALT issues. In addition to the minutes of these meetings, the memoranda, studies, and correspondence prepared in advance of, and in response to the meetings, provide the skeleton of this volume. Most crucial were the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) and National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs). Given page constraints, the full minutes of many of the Verification Panel meetings could not be included; instead, the summary of conclusions are printed. All of the aforementioned records are in the National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), which are part of the NSC Files but are not to be confused with the NSC Institutional Matters File.

The editor also made extensive use of other Collections within the NSC Files at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. A full list of relevant files is provided below, but among the most valuable are the SALT files, which contain memoranda generated by the NSC staff and various executive agencies charged with handling SALT-related questions, as well as telegrams sent to and from the SALT delegation in Vienna and Geneva. The ABM–MIRV files document the Nixon administration's decision to pursue an anti-ballistic missile defense system amidst congressional controversy, and the issue of multiple independently targeted warhead capability (MIRV). The Backchannel Files provide a comprehensive record of exchanges between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Gerard Smith. The Agency and Subject files include messages between the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the White House, as well as documents touching on all aspects of SALT. Other useful records within the NSC Files include the Trips File, containing memoranda of Kissinger's conversations with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, and the Haig Chronological File, which in-

cludes telegrams sent from Moscow during Kissinger's secret trip in April 1972 and telephone conversation transcripts between Kissinger and Haig.

Nixon presidential recordings, housed in the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, are used extensively in this compilation.

The records of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, housed at the Washington National Record Center, provides a unique documentary perspective on SALT. In particular, the Director and Deputy Director files of Gerard Smith and Philip Farley, as well as the Chronological File are used here. Although these two files are used most extensively, a host of additional ACDA records were consulted and are listed below.

The Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were strong bureaucratic players in the SALT deliberations but were not the key voices. Many of these records were therefore of secondary importance for the preparation of this volume. The Central File of the Department of State contains records of discussions between the United States and Soviet SALT delegations and a list is provided below. The records of Chairmen of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Earle Wheeler and Admiral Thomas Moorer, located in the National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the JCS, provide valuable documentation on the military's involvement in the preparation of the Nixon administration's SALT position and on verification issues. The Melvin Laird Papers at the Gerald Ford Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan contain select copies of Department of Defense papers and correspondence with other government agencies. Laird kept copious SALT records and his papers are rich source for this volume. The records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the Washington National Records Center contain the original copies of the SALT documents found in the Laird papers, as well as many other SALT-related materials. The Central Intelligence Agency records are valuable for intelligence on Soviet policy generally, but the CIA collections most relevant for this volume—the DCI Helms and DCI Executive Registry files—contain primarily duplicate memoranda and papers found in other collections, especially the NSC Files in the Nixon Presidential Materials Project and the ADCA records. The editor found the National Intelligence Council (NIC) Files productive for national intelligence estimates and special estimates.

The Eliot Richardson Papers contain a handful of documents relating to the ABM-MIRV controversy of the spring of 1969. The Henry A. Kissinger Papers in the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress largely replicate documentation found in other collections, especially the NSC files already declassified in the Nixon Presidential Materials. Copies of the most important source—the Kissinger Telephone

Conversations Transcripts—have been deposited at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at the National Archives.

The following list of unpublished and published sources identifies files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of Department of State records is underway and some of these collections and files are available for public review at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. The declassification review of other records is proceeding in accordance with the provisions of Executive Orders 12958 and 13142, under which all records over 25 years, except files series exemptions requested by agencies and approved by the President.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. *See* National Archives and Records Administration below

Lot Files. For other lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, *see* National Archives and Records Administration below

INR/IL Historical Files

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1980s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Files

DEF 1 US, U.S. defense affairs, policy, plans, readiness
DEF 1 US-USSR, U.S.-USSR defense affairs, policy, plans, readiness
POL 1 US-USSR, U.S.-USSR political affairs and relations
POL 1 US, U.S. political affairs and relations, general policy

Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer
Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wheeler

Nixon Presidential Materials Project

National Security Council Files

ABM MIRV
Agency Files
Backchannel Files
Country Files, Europe
Haig Chronological File
Haig Special File

Kissinger Office Files
Name Files
NSC Secretariat, Unfiled Materials
President's Daily Briefings
President/HAK Memoranda of Conversation
Staff Files
SALT
Subject Files

National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files)

National Security Council Meetings
National Security Council Minutes
Senior Review Group Meetings
Senior Review Group Minutes
Verification Panel Meetings
Verification Panel Minutes
Study Memoranda (National Security Study Memoranda)
Policy Papers (National Security Decision Memoranda)

White House Central Files

Staff Members and Office Files: President's Daily Diary

White House Tapes

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

See Washington National Records Center at Suitland, Maryland

Central Intelligence Agency

DCI Files: Job 80-BO1285A, files of Directors of Central Intelligence John McCone and Richard Helms

DCI Executive Registry: Jobs 80B01086A, 80M00165A, 80M01048A 80R01284A, 80R01580R, 86B00269R, executive files of the Director of Central Intelligence

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

Papers of Henry Kissinger

Chronological File
Geopolitical File
Memoranda of Conversations
Memoranda to the President
National Security Council Meetings
Senior Review Group Meetings
Telephone Records

Elliot Richardson Papers

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD Files: FRC 330-75-0089 FRC 330-75-0103

Top secret and secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense and their assistants, 1969

XVIII Sources

OSD Files: FRC 330-76-0067 and FRC 330-76-0076

Top secret and secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense and their assistants, 1970

OSD Files: FRC 330-76-0207 and FRC 330-76-0197

Top secret and secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense and their assistants, 1971

OSD Files: FRC 330-77-0095 and FRC 330-77-0094

Top secret and secret subject decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense and their assistants, 1972

RG 383, Records of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

FRC 383-98-003, Office of the Director, Subject Files, 1969-1977

FRC 383-97-010, Office of the Director, Smith/Farley Chronological Files, 1962-1977

FRC 383-97-031, Office of the Director, Executive Director Subject Files, 1962-1969

FRC 383-97-054, Office of the Director, Congressional Correspondence, 1969-1971

FRC 383-98-004, Office of the Director, Executive Director Subject Files, December 1969-December 1970

FRC 383-98-005, Office of the Director, Executive Director Subject Files, 1971

FRC 383-98-009, Office of the Director, Executive Director Subject Files, 1970

FRC 383-98-016, Office of the Director, Executive Director Subject Files, 1972

FRC 383-98-060, Office of the Director, Gerard Smith's Files, 1969-1972

FRC 383-98-096, Office of the Director, Farley Subject Files, 1969-1973

FRC 383-98-162, ACDA Central Depository of TS, 1955-1983

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Abbreviations and Terms

AAM, air-to-air missile
ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACDA/D, Office of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACDA/DD, Office of the Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACDA/IR International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AD, assured destruction
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AG, Attorney General
AP, Associated Press
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ASA, anti-submarine aircraft
ASD (A), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)
ASD (I), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
ASD (SA), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)
ASM, air-to-surface missile
ASW, antisubmarine warfare

backchannel, a method of communication outside normal bureaucratic procedure; the White House, for instance, used “backchannel” messages to bypass the Department of State

BOB, Bureau of the Budget
BMD, ballistic missile defense
BMEWS, ballistic missile early warning system
BNSP, basic national security policy
BR, biological (bacteriological) research
BRDP, Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
BW, biological (bacteriological) warfare

CASP, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
CBW, chemical and biological (bacteriological) warfare
CC-CPSU, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CCD, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CCP, Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CDIP, Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy
CIP, Consolidated Intelligence Program
CL, classified
COMINT, communications intelligence
Comite, committee
COMSEC, communications security
CONUS, Continental United States
CPR, Chinese People’s Republic
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban
CW, chemical warfare
CY, calendar year

XXII Abbreviations and Terms

- D/DCI/IC**, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community
- D/DCI/NIPE**, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation
- DEFCON**, defense readiness condition
- D/INR**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- D/NRO**, Director, National Reconnaissance Office
- DCI**, Director of Central Intelligence
- DCID**, Director of Central Intelligence Directive
- DCM**, Deputy Chief of Mission
- DD/P**, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
- DD/S&T**, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency
- DDC**, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- DDCI**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- DDI**, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
- DDO/IMS**, Deputy Director for Operations/Information Management Staff, Central Intelligence Agency
- DDR&E**, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense
- Del**, delegate
- Dept**, Department
- Deptel**, Department of State telegram
- DG**, Director General of the Foreign Service, Department of State
- DIA**, Defense Intelligence Agency
- DIRNSA**, Director, National Security Agency
- DIS**, Defense Investigative Service
- Dissem**, dissemination
- DOD**, Department of Defense
- Dog House Radars**, large phased array radars deployed near Moscow at Naro-Fominsk that functioned much like the Perimeter Acquisition Radar of the U.S. Sentinel/Safeguard ABM system.
- DOS**, Department of State
- DPRC**, Defense Program Review Committee
- E**, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State; John Ehrlichman
- ELINT**, electronic intelligence
- ELR**, Elliot L. Richardson
- ENDC**, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
- ENDC/CCD** Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
- Endo-atmospheric penetration aid**, type of interceptor that distinguishes a target in the endo-atmospheric range
- EOB**, Executive Office Building
- EPA**, Environmental Protection Agency
- EST**, Eastern Standard Time
- EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EURATOM**, European Atomic Energy Community
- Exdis**, exclusive distribution
- Exo-atmospheric penaid**, type of interceptor that distinguishes a target in the exo-atmospheric range.
- FR.*, *Federal Register*
- FBA**, forward based aircraft
- FBIS**, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FOBS, fractional orbital bombardment missile systems

FonMin, Foreign Ministry

FonOff, Foreign Office

FRC, Federal Records Center

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany

FSO, Foreign Service Officer

FY, fiscal year

FYI, for your information

G, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

GAC, General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament

G/PM, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs

GC, General Counsel

H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations

HAK, Henry A. Kissinger

Henhouse, Soviet large phased-array, early warning radars

HSD, hard site defense

HUMINT, human intelligence

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM, inter-continental ballistic missile

ICC, International Control Commission

ICJ, International Court of Justice

IDA, Institute for Defense Analysis

IG, Interdepartmental Group

IG/EUR, Interdepartmental Group for Europe

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/IL, Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IOC, initial operational capability

IPMG, Interdepartmental Political-Military Group

IR, intermediate range ballistic missile

IRBM, intermediate range ballistic missile

IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group

ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

J/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

K, Kissinger

L, Legal Adviser, Department of State

LANFZ, Latin American Nuclear Free Zone

Limdis, Limited Distribution

LOC, lines of communication

LTBT, Limited Test Ban Treaty

M, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State

MARC, modern ABM radar complex

MBFR, mutual balanced force reductions

Mbr, member

XXIV Abbreviations and Terms

ME, Middle East

memcon, memorandum of conversation

MIRV, multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle

Misoff, Mission Officer

MM, Minuteman Missile, a land-based ICBM deployed in hard silos

MMIII, Minuteman III, improved version of MM, capable of carrying MIRVs

MLBM, modern large ballistic missile

MLF, multilateral force

MR, memorandum for the record; medium range ballistic missile

MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile

MRV, multiple reentry vehicle

MSR, missile site radar

Mtg, meeting

NAC, North Atlantic Council

NAS, National Academy of Sciences

NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCA, National Command Authority

NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

NIRB, National Intelligence Resources Board

Nodis, no distribution

Noform, not releasable to foreign nationals

NPG, NATO Nuclear Planning Group

NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty

NRO, National Reconnaissance Office

NRP, National Reconnaissance Program

NSA, National Security Agency

NSC, National Security Council

NSC/OCB, National Security Council, Operations Coordinating Board

NSCID, National Security Council Intelligence Directive

NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum

NSF, National Science Foundation

NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum

NUF, non-use of force

O, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

O/DDI, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

OAS, Organization of American States

OASD, ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

OASD, SA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis

OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness

OLPARS, other large phased array radars

OMB, Office of Management and Budget

ONE, Office of National Estimates

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSI, Office of Scientific Intelligence; on site inspection

OST, Office of Science and Technology

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

P, President

P.L., public law

PAR, perimeter acquisition radar
Para, paragraph
PDB, President's Daily Brief
Pen aids, penetration aids
PFIAB, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PHOTINT, photo intelligence
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PM/ISP, Office of International Security Policy and Planning, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PMG, Politico-Military Group
PNE, peaceful nuclear explosion
Polad, political adviser
Poseidon C-3, submarine launched ballistic missile designed to carry twice the payload of the Polaris A-3 with improved accuracy
PPBS, Planning-Programming-Budgeting System
PRC, People's Republic of China
Pres, President
PSAC, President's Science Advisory Committee

R&D, research and development
RDT&E, research, development, test, and evaluation
reftel, reference telegram
RG, record group; review group
RMN, Richard M. Nixon
RN, Richard M. Nixon
RV, reentry vehicle

S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/P, Policy Planning Council or Staff, Department of State
S/PC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-I, Information Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM, Surface to Air Missile
SBBM, sea-based ballistic missile
SC, Security Council
SCI, Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State
SEA, Southeast Asia
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
Septel, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SG, Safeguard
SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group
SIGINT, signals intelligence
SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Skybolt, air-launched ballistic missile
SL, submarine launcher
SLBM, submarine launched ballistic missile
SLCM, submarine launched cruise missile
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOP, standard operating procedure
SOSUS, sound surveillance undersea system

XXVI Abbreviations and Terms

SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State;
Country Director, Soviet Union, Bureau of European Affairs

SRG, Senior Review Group

SS-9, Soviet ICBM the high accuracy of which made it a threat to U.S. ICBMs

SS-11, Soviet ICBM; Soviet counterpart to the U.S. Minuteman system in quantity, size,
and purpose, believed effective only against soft targets

SSBN, nuclear ballistic missile submarine

SSN, nuclear submarine

SSR, Soviet Socialist Republic

SU, Soviet Union

SUBROC, submarine rocket

SWWA, Stop-Where-We-Are proposal of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
on SALT

SYG, Secretary General, United Nations

Tallin, a system of radars and interceptors believed to have had ballistic missile defense
capabilities. Named for the Estonian capital where it first appeared

TASS, Telegrafnoye Agentsvo Sovetskogo Soiuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)

TEL, transporter-erector-launcher

TIAS, Treaties and other International Acts Series

Titan, a family of weapons and the first U.S. two-stage ICBM and first underground silo-
based ICBM

Try Add Radars, mechanically steered battle-management missile guidance radars; A
component of the Moscow ABM-system

TS, Top Secret

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State; Under Secretary of State

U/SM, Under Secretaries Memorandum

UK, United Kingdom

ULM, undersea long range missile

UN, United Nations

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

US, United States

USA, United States Army

USAEC, United States Atomic Energy Commission

USAF, United States Air Force

USC, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

USG, United States Government

USIA, United States Information Agency

USIB, United States Intelligence Board

USIS, United States Information Service

USMC, United States Marine Corps

USN, United States Navy

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VOA, Voice of America

VP, Verification Panel

WDC, World Disarmament Conference

Z, Zulu time (Greenwich mean time)

Persons

Abrams, Creighton W., General, USA, Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam until June 28, 1972; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army from October 12, 1972

Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States

Allison, Royal B., Lieutenant General, USAF, member, delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Alekseyev, Nikolai, Soviet Deputy Minister of Defense; member, Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Anderson, George W., Jr., Admiral, USN, Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1970

Beam, Jacob D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union from March 1969

Behr, Robert M., Colonel, USAF, member, National Security Council Operations staff, Scientific Affairs from 1969 until 1971

BeLieu, Kenneth, Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations until 1970; thereafter, Deputy Assistant to the President for Senate Relations

Bennett, Donald V., Lieutenant General, USA, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from September 1969 until August 1972

Brandt, Willy, Foreign Minister, Federal Republic of Germany from December 1, 1966 until October 21, 1969; Chancellor from October 22, 1969 until May 6, 1974

Brezhnev, Leonid I., General Secretary, Communist Party, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

Brooke, Edward W., Senator (R-Massachusetts)

Brosio, Manlio, Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization until 1971

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Buchanan, Patrick J., Special Assistant to the President

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Butterfield, Alexander, Special Assistant to the President from January 1969 until January 1973

Cargo, William I., Director, Policy Planning staff, Department of State, from August 4, 1969 until July 30, 1973

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Chafee, John H., Secretary of the Navy from January 31, 1969 until May 4, 1972

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Chapman, Leonard F. Jr., General, USMC, Commandant, United States Marine Corps until 1972

Cheprov, I.I., Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

Chernyakov, Yuriy Nikalayevich, Soviet Minister Counselor until 1970; thereafter, head of the Press Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry

Clarke, Bruce, Director, Office of Strategic Research, Central Intelligence Agency

Cline, Ray S., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from October 1969

Connally, John B., Secretary of the Treasury from February 1971 until June 1972

- Cromer, Earl of (George Rowland Stanley Baring)**, British Ambassador to the United States from February 8, 1971
- Crowe, Colin**, Sir, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1970 until 1973
- Curran, Robert Theodore**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from August 1970 until September 1972; Deputy Director of Personnel for Management from September 1972
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- Davis, Jeanne**, Director, National Security Council Secretariat from 1969 until 1970; thereafter, National Security Council Staff Secretary
- De Palma, Samuel**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
- Dobrynin, Anatoly F.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States; member, Central Committee of the Communist Party from 1971
- Doty, Paul, M.**, Ph.D., Professor of Biochemistry, Harvard University, Consultant on Arms Control to the U.S. Government
- Douglas-Home, Alexander Frederick**, Sir, British Foreign Secretary from June 19, 1970 until March 4, 1974
- DuBridge, Lee A.**, Ph.D., Science Advisor to the President from 1969 until 1971
- Duckett, Carl**, member, Verification Panel, Central Intelligence Agency
- Eagleburger, Lawrence**, member, National Security Council staff until September 1969; Chief, Political Section, U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until August 1971; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
- Earle, Ralph II**, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs until 1969
- Elliot, Theodore L., Jr.**, Executive Secretary, Department of State from August 1969
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- Farley, Philip J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs until August 1969; Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency until 1973; member, delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
- Fessenden, Russell**, Charge d'Affaires to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany until July 22, 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission from July 1969 until July 1971; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
- Fisher, Adrian S.**, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency until March 1969
- Flanigan, Peter**, Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy
- Foster, John S.**, Ph.D., Director, Office of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense from 1969
- Froehlke, Robert F.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration from January 1969 until June 1971
- Fulbright, J. William**, Senator (D-Arkansas); Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Garcia Robles, Alfonso**, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico until 1970; Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1971; Leader of Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

- Glennon, Keith, T.**, Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency from July 1970
- Goodpaster, Andrew J.**, General, USA, Deputy Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam until April 1969; thereafter, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
- Gore, Albert, Sr.**, Senator (D-Tennessee)
- Grinevskiy, O. A.**, Deputy Chief, International Organizations Division, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; participant, U.S.-Soviet technical talks on peaceful nuclear explosions, April 1969; member, Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
- Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Soviet Foreign Minister; member, Central Committee of the Communist Party
- Guhin, Michael A.**, member, National Security Council Operations staff, Scientific Affairs from 1969 until 1971
- Haig, Alexander M., Jr.**, Colonel, Brigadier General from November 1969, Major General from March 1972, USA; Senior Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from June 1969 until June 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1970 until January 1973; Army Vice Chief of Staff from January until August 1973
- Haldeman, H.R.**, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff from January 20, 1969 until April 30, 1973
- Halperin, Morton H.**, member, National Security Council staff, Assistant for Programs from January until September 1969
- Harlow, Bryce**, Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations
- Hartman, Arthur**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State; Staff Director, National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee
- Heath, Edward**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from June 1970 until March 1974
- Helms, Richard M.**, Director of Central Intelligence
- Hillenbrand, Martin J.A.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from February 1969 until April 1972; Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from June 27, 1972
- Hixon, Robert C.**, Colonel, USA, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1969
- Holloway, Bruce K.**, USAF, General, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
- Hyland, William G.**, member, National Security Council Operations staff, Europe from 1969 until 1972
- Ignatieff, George**, Ambassador of Canada; Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva until 1969; Ambassador for Disarmament, Canadian delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
- Irwin, John N., II**, Under Secretary of State from September 1970 until July 1972; thereafter, Deputy Secretary of State
- Jackson, Henry M. (Scoop)**, Senator (D-Washington); Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Johnson, Nels C.**, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 19, 1970
- Johnson, U. Alexis**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Keeny, Spurgeon, Jr.**, member, National Security Council staff until 1969; thereafter, Assistant Director of the Science and Technology Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
- Kennedy, Richard T.**, Colonel, USA, member, National Security Council staff; member, NSC Planning Group from 1970; Director, NCS Planning Group from 1971
- Kissinger, Henry A.**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1969

- Kornienko (Korniyenko), Georgi M.**, Chief, U.S.A. Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Korologos, Thomas**, Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs
- Kosygin, Alexei N.**, Chairman (Premier), Council of Ministers, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Kranich, Robert H.**, Chief, Political Affairs Division, International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1969
- Kratzer, Myron B.**, Assistant General Manager for International Activities, Atomic Energy Commission until 1971
- Kuznetsov, Vassily V.**, First Deputy, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Laird, Melvin, R.**, Secretary of Defense
- Lake, W. Anthony**, member, National Security Council staff; Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until April 1970
- Lebedev, Anatoliy**, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy to the United States
- Leonard, James, F.**, Assistant Director, International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Ambassador and Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
- Lincoln, George A.**, Director of the Office of Emergency Planning from 1969
- Lord, Winston**, member, National Security Council staff; member, NSC Planning Group until 1970; member, National Security Council Operations staff, United Nations Affairs from September 1969 until 1970; member, Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs staff from 1970
- Luns, Joseph**, Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1971
- Lynn, Laurence E.**, member, National Security Council staff, Assistant for Programs from 1969 until 1970; Director, NSC Program Analysis staff from 1970 until 1971.
- Macomber, William B.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from March 2, 1967 until October 2, 1969; thereafter, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (title changed to Management after July 12, 1971) from September 26, 1969 until April 4, 1973
- Malik, Yakov Alexandrovich**, Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations from 1968
- Mansfield, Michael**, Senator (D-Montana); Senate Majority Leader
- Martin, Joseph, Jr.**, General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission from 1970 until 1971; Special Assistant to the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament from 1971 until 1973.
- McCloy, John J.**, Chairman, General Advisory Committee, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- McConnell, John P.**, General, USAF, Chief of Staff, Air Force until August 1969
- Miller, Robert H.**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State from 1971 until 1973
- Mitchell, John**, Attorney General from January 20, 1969 until February 15, 1972
- Moorer, Thomas H.**, Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations until 1970; thereafter, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Moose, Richard M.**, Secretary, National Security Council staff until 1970
- Morris, Roger**, member, National Security Council Operations staff, Africa, from January 1969 until April 1970; member, NSC Planning Group from September 1969 until April 1970
- Myrdal, Alva**, Swedish delegate to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
- Nitze, Paul**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1967 until 1969; member, delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
- Nutter, Warren, G.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
- Odeen, Philip A.**, member, National Security Council staff; Director, NSC Program Analysis staff from November 1971

- Ogarkov, Nikolai**, Colonel General, First Deputy Chief Soviet General Staff; member, Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
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- Packard, David**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 1969 until December 1971
- Palmer, Bruce Jr.**, General, USA, Chief of Staff (Acting), U.S. Army, from June 1972 to October 1972
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- Percy, Charles**, Senator (R-Illinois)
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- Pleshakov, Petr**, member, Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
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- Pollack, Herman**, Director, Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State
- Pranger, Robert J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia, 1970; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs, 1971
- Pursley, Robert E.**, Brigadier General, USAF, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
- Ramey, James T.**, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission
- Read, Benjamin H.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State until February 14, 1969
- Richardson, Elliot L.**, Under Secretary of State until June 1970; thereafter, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
- Rogers, William P.**, Secretary of State
- Roshchin, Alexei A.**, Soviet representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
- Roth, Hellmuth**, Colonel, Chief of the Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany from September 1969
- Rush, Kenneth**, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from July 1969 until February 1972; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Ryan, John D.**, General, USAF, Chief of Staff, Air Force, from August 1969 until July 1973.
- Schlesinger, James R.**, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget until June 1970; Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget from July 1970 until August 1971; thereafter, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
- Schumann, Maurice**, French Foreign Minister from June 24, 1969 until March 28, 1973
- Seaborg, Glenn T.**, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission until August 1971
- Seamans, Robert C., Jr.**, Secretary of the Air Force from February 15, 1969
- Semenov (Semyonov), Vladimir**, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Shakespeare, Frank J., Jr.**, Director, United States Information Agency
- Shchukin, Aleksandr**, Soviet Scientist; member, Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
- Shultz, George**, Secretary of Labor from January 1969 until June 1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget from July 1970 until May 1972; thereafter, Secretary of the Treasury

- Sisco, Joseph J.**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from September 1, 1965 until February 9, 1969; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
- Smith, Gerard C.**, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from February 1969; Ambassador and Chairman, delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
- Smith, K. Wayne**, member, National Security Council staff; Director, NSC Program Analysis staff from January 1971
- Smith, R. Jack.**, Deputy Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
- Smyth, Henry DeWolf**, Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency until August 1970
- Sonnenfeldt, Helmut**, member, National Security Council Operations staff, Europe, from January 1969
- Spaak, Fernand**, Belgian diplomat, Director General for Energy, European Community, from 1969
- Spiers, Ronald I.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from August to September 1969; thereafter, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; Chairman, Interdepartmental Political-Military Group
- Springsteen, George S., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from October 1966 until June 1972; Acting Assistant Secretary from June 1972 until August 1973
- Stennis, John C.**, Senator (D-Mississippi); Chairman, Armed Services Committee
- Symington, Stuart**, Senator (D-Missouri): member, Committee on Foreign Relations; member, Committee on Armed Services
- Taylor, Maxwell**, General, USA, Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Board until April 1970
- Thant, U.**, Secretary General of the United Nations until 1971
- Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union until March 14, 1969; member, delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks from 1969 (died February 1972)
- Timerbaev, R.M.**, Deputy Head of Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Deputy Head of the Soviet delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and Conference of the Committee on Disarmament until 1969; member, Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks from 1971
- Timmons, William**, Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations from January 1969 until February 1970; thereafter, Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations
- Tomkins, Edward**, Sir, Ambassador of the United Kingdom to the United States
- Toon, Malcolm**, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from July 1969 until October 1971; thereafter, Ambassador to Yugoslavia
- Trend, Burke**, Sir, Cabinet Secretary, United Kingdom
- Tucker, Gardiner L.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis from January 30, 1970
- Van Doren, Charles**, Deputy General Counsel, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from March 1969
- Vogt, John W.**, Lieutenant General, USAF, Director, Joint Staff, Joint chiefs of Staff from July 20, 1970 until April 7, 1972
- Vorontsov, Yuli M.**, Soviet Minister Counselor
- Waldheim, Kurt**, Secretary General, United Nations from 1972
- Walsh, John P.**, Acting Executive Secretary, Department of State from February until October 1969
- Walske, Carl**, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy until 1973

- Walters, Vernon A.**, Lieutenant General, USA, Military Attaché, Paris until March 1971; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from May 2, 1972
- Ware, Richard A.**, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- Warnke, Paul C.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until February 15, 1969
- Watts, William**, Secretary, National Security Council staff from 1969 until April 1970
- Weiler, Lawrence D.**, Counselor, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1969
- Westmoreland, William C.**, General, USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army until June 1972
- Wheeler, Earle G.**, General, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 1970
- Wilson, James Harold**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from October 16, 1964 until June 19, 1970.
- Yost, Charles**, Representative to the United Nations until February 1971
- Zablocki, Clement J.**, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin); member, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
- Ziegler, Ronald L.**, White House Press Secretary from January 1969
- Zumwalt, Elmo R. Jr.**, Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations from July 1970

SALT I, 1969–1972

Preparations for SALT, January 27– November 12, 1969

1. Editorial Note

During President Richard M. Nixon's first press conference on January 27, 1969, he was asked about the possibility of starting strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union. The President replied that he preferred "to steer a course between those two extremes" of waiting until there was "progress on political settlements" and moving forward without such progress. He declared that "what I want to do is see to it that we have strategic arms talks in a way and at a time that will promote, if possible, progress on outstanding political problems at the same time—for example, on the problem of the Mideast and on other outstanding problems in which the United States and the Soviet Union, acting together can serve the peace." The full text of the press conference is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pages 15–23.

Despite his unwillingness to rush into SALT, on January 31 the President not only submitted Gerard Smith's name to the United States Senate for confirmation as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency but also designated him as the future chief negotiator for SALT. Smith was confirmed on February 7.

On February 4 the President reiterated his concerns about "linkage" and strategic arms control in identical letters to Secretary of State William Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird:

"I am convinced that the great issues are fundamentally interrelated. I do not mean by this to establish artificial linkages between specific elements of one or another issue or between tactical steps that we may elect to take. But I do believe that crisis or confrontation in one place and real cooperation in another cannot long be sustained simultaneously."

The President's letter concludes: "Without attempting to lay down inflexible prescriptions about how various matters at issue between ourselves and the USSR should be connected, I would like to illustrate what I have in mind in one case of immediate and widespread interest—the proposed talks on strategic weapons. I believe our decision on when and how to proceed does not depend exclusively on our review of the purely military and technical issues, although these are of

key importance. This decision should also be taken in the light of the prevailing political context and, in particular, in light of progress toward stabilizing the explosive Middle East situation, and in light of the Paris talks. I believe I should retain the freedom to ensure, to the extent that we have control over it, that the timing of talks with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons is optimal.”

For the full text of Nixon’s letter to Rogers, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 10. For the full text of the letter to Laird, see *ibid.*, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 10.

2. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

Washington, undated.

Military Consequences of a Delay in Opening Strategic Talks

This paper evaluates the military effect of a delay of six months in starting strategic talks with the Soviets and the impact of such a delay in our FY 70 strategic force options. Based on this examination the following major points emerge:

(1) The trend in relative military postures between the United States and the Soviet Union argues the desirability to the United States of a freeze on strategic nuclear forces at current levels, in preference to a freeze at levels programmed for the US and projected for the USSR six months later, if there is to be an agreement to limit arms. This is principally due to the projected deployment of new Soviet launchers compared to our program which keeps US launchers constant. The United States is judged to be ahead of the Soviets in qualitative aspects of missile technology.

(2) Our capability to inflict damage on the Soviet population is essentially unchanged during the time period. The trend in US damage

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 22, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret. Laird transmitted this paper to Kissinger under cover of a February 13 memorandum for discussion at an NSC meeting scheduled for February 14. Laird also attached a JCS paper of the same title, which he noted contained a few modifications from the Department of Defense paper. Another copy of this paper indicates that it was drafted in ISA and SA with the Joint Staff in response to a request at the February 6 NSC Review Group meeting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-0103, USSR, 388.3) See footnote 2, Document 12.

limiting capabilities is adverse to us because of the projected growth in the Soviet missile force during the period of the delay.

(3) If we delay initiating talks, the Soviets could cross certain thresholds (land mobile missiles, MIRVs) in their strategic programs which might foreclose certain options for limitations and create complications for verification.

(4) The longer the delay in initiating talks and arriving at an agreement, the greater the pressures are likely to be for both sides to make decisions to increase or improve their strategic forces. Anticipation of an agreement could pressure us to defer or cancel programs pending outcome of negotiations.

(5) A six-month delay in initiating talks would not impact on events scheduled under the current US strategic program. Even if FY 70 budget decisions were made to modify the current strategic program, a difference of six months in initiating talks would not affect cost or technical milestones in implementing alternative programs.

I. Background

US strategic offensive nuclear forces are stabilized quantitatively at the present time. There are currently 1054 ICBMs, 656 SLBMs, and 576 bombers. The Sentinel thin ballistic missile defensive system has been programmed for deployment to be operational starting in 1973 with 672 interceptors by 1975. Improvements involving MIRV in the Minuteman and Poseidon forces are programmed for incorporation starting in 1970, increasing the number of US missile warheads substantially by the mid-70s; test programs started in the latter part of 1968.

Soviet forces are projected to continue the numerical buildup of ICBMs, SLBMs and SA-5 (Tallinn) defensive systems. Operational ICBMs have increased by 110 from 1 July 1968 to 20 January 1969 and are estimated to increase another 70–154 before 1 July 1969. Three Polaris type submarines have been added in the last half of 1968 and an additional one is forecast by mid-1969. SA-5 launchers have increased by 72–252 from July 1968 to January 1969, with 108–288 more forecast during the period from January 1969 to July 1969. Construction of the operational Moscow BMD launch system has been arrested, but developmental work and the construction of associated radars (longest lead time construction item) continues. Table I, Soviet Offensive and Defensive Strategic Forces, is enclosed.² The USSR initiated MRV testing in the latter part of 1968; it is not yet known whether these multiple warhead tests are a precursor to MIRV development.

Since the current US force is fixed in numbers of launchers, our position relative to the increasing number of Soviet launchers is di-

² Not printed.

minishing over time. The current US program calls for increased numbers of missile warheads, but there are no approved plans for deployment of additional numbers of Minuteman/Poseidon launchers or new systems presently in developmental stages. The effectiveness of the currently programmed US offensive missile force, which is pay load limited relative to that of the Soviets, is dependent upon the planned application of technology. The United States is judged to be ahead in the qualitative aspects of missile technology, notably MIRV and accuracy.

II. Force and Effectiveness Implications of a 6-Month Delay

If it is assumed that we make the decision now to proceed with talks, they could be initiated on 1 March 1969; a six-month delay would therefore lead to talks being initiated on 1 September 1969. For the military analysis it is assumed that there would be a six-month delay after initiation before an agreement took effect in freezing deployed forces and construction starts. Thus, 1 September 1969 and 1 March 1970 were chosen as representative of the cutoff dates when the forces might be limited.

Table II³ makes a static comparison of our forces with DIA estimates of Soviet forces for the two alternative cutoff dates. As shown, the US force posture does not change, while there is an increase of up to 80 in numbers of Soviet missiles between the two cutoff dates. It should be noted that the last six-month incremental increase of Soviet offensive missile systems is larger than that which was projected in last year's intelligence estimate (110 vs 53) and should be taken into consideration with regard to current projections.

Under the current program, the US capability for retaliatory assured destruction changes little between the two cutoff dates, remaining at about the 40 percent Soviet fatality level under conservative assumptions of a Soviet first strike; however, there would be a decrease in the damage limiting capabilities of US forces commensurate with the buildup of Soviet forces. Their additional missile deployments during the 6-month delay would increase Soviet strategic capabilities against the United States by expanding the number of offensive systems which must be considered in US targeting plans. The Soviet ability to inflict retaliatory assured destruction on the United States would remain approximately comparable to our capability.

If it can be assumed that there will be an agreement which limits launchers at programmed and projected levels so that the United States cannot increase its forces beyond this level, each month's delay puts the United States in a relatively poorer position. If there is a possibil-

³ Not printed.

ity that the current review of US strategic posture may determine the need for modification of basic strategy with a resultant ultimate upward adjustment of strategic force levels, early talks might foreclose these options. On the other hand, early talks could improve our understanding of Soviet strategic intentions and prove beneficial to a US posture review.

A major military objective of an arms limitation agreement would be to minimize the effects of Soviet efforts in the development and deployment of a significant BMD system, production of mobile land-based offensive missiles and increases in the SLBM fleet. As delays in an agreement develop, these Soviet programs pose an increasing and more complex threat to US security and make attainment of a viable agreement more difficult.

An important issue related to delaying talks is the increased chance that with the passage of time the Soviets might deploy land-mobile ICBMs and MIRVs earlier than now estimated, as well as resume the deployment of ABM launchers. These actions would represent thresholds, which if crossed, would be for all practical purposes irreversible, and would have to be taken into account in formulating agreements. In particular, a total ban on land-mobile systems would be easier to verify than a limit on numbers. Under a total ban, detection of only one Soviet mobile ICBM would be a violation, but accurate assessments of agreed levels would be more difficult to attain.

III. Impact of 6-Month Delay on US FY 70 Programs

At this time or even after talks had been initiated, the specific terms of a final agreement would be difficult to predict. However, as a result of analyses, there are several considerations that we could expect to affect the constraints which an agreement would impose and which can be used as a basis for estimating the likely impact of initiating talks on our force posture:

- (1) No constraints on R&D and production.
- (2) Freeze on number of launchers and construction starts as of cutoff date.
- (3) Prohibition on land or ship mobile missiles or mobile ABMs.
- (4) ABM launchers (and reloads) and possible radars would be limited.
- (5) Possible limit on bombers and air defenses.
- (6) No constraints on bomber or missile pen aids (chaff, decoys, SCAD, SRAM, etc).
- (7) Possible provisions for transfer of missiles to new harder silos or hard point defense.
- (8) Possible limits on flight testing or deploying MIRVs.

During the 6-month time-period between 1 March 1969 (possible early initiation of talks) and 1 September 1969 (possible delayed date of initiation), there would be no impact by the above constraints on

milestones scheduled under the current US strategic force program, with the exception of possible constraints on MIRV testing. If early talks resulted in a MIRV test ban, we would not complete the test program. If talks were delayed, the fact that considerable MIRV flight testing (for both sides) had occurred might make agreement on a verifiable MIRV ban less likely.

The ongoing FY 70 budget and strategic posture review might modify the current program and early talks could foreclose options that might be developed. Early initiation of talks would not necessarily preclude us from proceeding more rapidly with development of new systems or improving currently programmed systems. However, given the constraints of likely agreements and recognizing that new systems could not reach the deployment phase or probably even the production phase over the six-month interval a delay of this length would have little significance in terms of cost or technical milestones.

The longer the delay in initiating talks and the more protracted the period of negotiations once talks begin, the greater would be the pressures to make decisions for improvements in and additions to the strategic forces. There also would be opposite pressures to delay force decisions pending an outcome of negotiations. In the event of a protracted delay, controversial force additions and qualitative improvements to systems which may ultimately be affected by an agreement could be jeopardized.

The initiation of strategic talks could influence our decisions on strategic programs in two ways: (1) There may be less interest in taking steps towards deployments of systems which eventually might be limited by an agreement. (2) There could be more emphasis on systems which would not be expected to be constrained and which could be used as hedges or safeguards under an agreement.

Initiation of talks could result in near term reprogramming of Soviet resources. Current indications suggest the likelihood of continued acceleration in Soviet strategic force buildup. The incremental additions to the current forces during this time period, however, would probably not be significant in terms of current relative strategic capabilities.

3. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

Summary of Paper

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

Arms Limitation Talks

Recent interest in pursuing strategic arms limitation talks is motivated not only by the present state of the strategic balance but also by the likely outcome of attempts by either side to increase its relative capabilities in the absence of an agreement.

1. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union can launch a massively destructive attack on the other after absorbing an all-out attack on its strategic forces.

2. Neither side in the foreseeable future can hope to be able to alter significantly this ability to damage the other.

3. The present costs of strategic forces are large and will get significantly larger if additional programs go unchecked.

Therefore, negotiating a strategic arms limitations agreement can have at least three objectives in terms of the strategic balance:

1. By reducing the strategic arms competition, an agreement could reduce many of the uncertainties which now influence our programs.

2. Just by talking, we might gain valuable information and improved understanding with the Soviet Union on how each side sees nuclear forces and strategy.

3. In the long run, the costs of our strategic forces will probably be lower with an agreement than without one.

The primary question on strategic grounds is, should we go forward with strategic arms limitation talks in the near future or delay a decision pending completion of the military posture review (in six months or, if the strategic portion is accelerated, in two months)? Regarding this issue, there are two questions:

1. What would be the consequences of waiting six months in terms of the strategic balance?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-020, NSC Meeting Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Top Secret. This summary of a 21-page paper, entitled "Strategic Policy Issues" was included in the President's briefing book for the February 14 NSC meeting. The full text of the summary is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 6.

2. What might the conclusions of the military posture review suggest concerning the U.S. position for possible talks with the Soviets? How soon could enough of the review be completed to reach these conclusions?

Attachment

Sentinel ABM System

The approved program calls for the deployment of a system designed to protect the U.S. against a light ICBM attack from China in 1975. The system has been called “anti-Chinese” because (a) most of its radars face only in the direction from which Chinese ICBMs would be launched, (b) the area defense is vulnerable to effective penetration aids which the Soviets, but not the Chinese, could develop by 1975, and (c) the system emphasizes area defense; an anti-Soviet system of this size would emphasize terminal defense of cities. On the other hand, the system can save 10–20 million U.S. lives in a Soviet attack if the Soviets do not install penetration aids on their missiles, and it can be expanded for defense of our ICBMs, defenses for our cities against Soviet attacks, or both.

The system is funded at \$1.8 billion in FY 70, and the total cost is estimated at \$8.5 billion. The Defense Department has delayed all Sentinel construction activity pending a review of the program. The options include: (a) proceeding with the approved program, (b) further delaying the program or stretching it out for FY 70 savings of \$340–550 million, (c) redirecting the deployment to the defense of Minuteman sites and continuing Research and Development for a total cost of \$4.7 billion (FY 69–70 savings of \$1 billion, \$3.8 billion overall), (d) cancelling the Sentinel deployment and continuing research and development.

Continuing Sentinel would be consistent with three options—Dominance, Improving the Balance, and Maintaining the Balance. Further delaying or cancelling Sentinel might be consistent with a policy of Maintaining the Balance, Stable, or Minimum Deterrence. However, the overall implications depend largely on whether an ABM defense of Minuteman or an anti-Soviet ABM defense of our cities or both are chosen instead, either now or later.

a. The arguments for proceeding with the approved program are:

(1) The planned deployment schedule would provide virtually complete protection in the early 1970s when the intelligence community estimates that the Chinese could have as many as 10 ICBMs. Without Sentinel U.S. fatalities could be as high as seven million in a Chinese first strike with 10 ICBMs.

(2) The planned deployment provides a basis for a larger anti-Soviet system. If the Soviets do not react to Sentinel, the thin defense might reduce U.S. casualties in a nuclear war with Russia by 10–20 million, or about 8–15 percent.

(3) Moving ahead on schedule would increase Soviet incentives to engage in negotiations on strategic arms limitations.

(4) Moving ahead would also provide early protection against accidental or irrational launch of ICBMs against the U.S.

(5) The Soviets could have a Sentinel-like system deployed by the mid-1970s.

b. The arguments for further delay or cancellation are:

(1) We have an effective deterrent against China in our strategic offensive forces for the foreseeable future. Since Sentinel would contribute only marginally to increasing the credibility of our deterrent, a delay would not endanger our security.

(2) Few believe that an anti-Chinese system justifies the current cost of Sentinel; currently estimated cost is significantly higher than when the decision was made and costs are rising.

(3) The Chinese ICBM program appears to be slipping. We now estimate that the Chinese will have 12–21 ICBMs in 1975.

(4) Delay would permit a careful evaluation of the real issue: should we look on Sentinel as a down payment in a defense of Minuteman (in which case we could save \$3.8 billion), on a larger anti-Soviet ABM system (in which case we would need to spend \$10–20 billion more), or both?

(5) Work on the Soviet Moscow ABM system has slowed down considerably and the Soviet system is a primitive one. Thus, we have no reason to believe that the Soviets may get very far ahead of us in ABM capability.

4. Editorial Note

On February 14, 1969, the National Security Council met to discuss the ongoing review of U.S. strategic policy pursuant to the issuance on January 23 of NSSM 3, “U.S. Military Posture and Balance of Power.” After a detailed discussion of force levels and research and development issues, the meeting turned to strategic arms limitation talks (SALT):

“[Secretary of State] Rogers: On SALT, delay can be made 2–3 months, beyond that we will be hard pressed to resist pressures.

“[President] Nixon: We should get our ducks in a row. Three months from now we should be ready. In the meantime maybe we can make progress in other fields.

“[President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger] HAK: Option that we may not have talks should be left open.

“Nixon: We would be foolish not to explain possibility of getting something going in other fields. Shouldn’t just react.

“Rogers: Isn’t easy to find out what other admin[istration] represented to the other side. [Former President’s Special Assistant Walt W.] Rostow gave them a paper, but we can’t get a copy of it.

“Nixon: Not content.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969) Documentation on NSSM 3, including the full text of the notes of the NSC meetings printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 7.

On February 17 Nixon raised the question of timing for opening strategic arms limitation talks during his first meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin. Nixon stated: “It was not his view that the initiation of such talks must be conditioned on the settlement of larger political issues. We both recognize that the principal purpose of strategic arms talks is peace, but there is no guarantee that freezing strategic weapons at the present level alone would bring about peace. [. . .] It is incumbent upon us, therefore, when we begin strategic arms talks to do what we can in a parallel way to de-fuse critical political situations such as the Middle East and Viet-Nam.”

Dobrynin replied that “he was not pressing the President to set the exact time for beginning arms talks. He wanted simply to clarify his own understanding of the linkage between arms talks and negotiations on political issues. His government, of course, would be interested in having a more precise idea as to when the President would be prepared to begin an exchange of views on the missile problem, even if preliminary and at the level of experts.”

Nixon explained that his administration would soon decide but would first review the issue. He also reminded Dobrynin that Gerard Smith had been appointed Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The full text of the memorandum of conversation between Nixon and Dobrynin is printed *ibid.*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 14.

5. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, February 19, 1969.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon asks Packard for types of things you are looking at.

Packard:

Purposes and choices of ABM.

Neither side has dominance.

Soviets deploying additional missiles. They will be superior in number of missiles. We are now superior in SLBMs but they want parity. We have substantial superiority in manned bombers.

Two extremes: What is required for Dominance?

a. Destroy enemy's offensive force so he can't strike back.

Tough, can't destroy subs. We would need more accurate, heavier missiles; bombers can't be used in timely way.

b. Other side: Provide very good protection of targets.

Problems with ABM.

1. New *substantial* amount of protection—very efficient; but Soviets can keep up by proliferating, MIRVs. They can counter at low cost. ABM is ineffective protection. HAK: against full-scale Soviet attack.

2. Use of tactics effective against ABM; Soviets can concentrate and overwhelm parts. ABM not attractive at this time.

What is required for deterrence?

1. Protect second strike capability.

Situation is fairly good now. Land-based missiles in hardened sites, vulnerable to bigger more accurate missiles.

Bombers are vulnerable except those on alert. SLBMs bring our bombers under attack.

Our own SLBMs are excellent deterrent.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes Originals 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 10:26 a.m. to 12:26 p.m. and was attended by: President Nixon, Kissinger, Agnew, Rogers, Laird, David Kennedy, Lincoln, Wheeler, Helms, Packard, Gerard Smith, and Ellis H. Veatch, Director of the Bureau of the Budget's National Security Programs Division. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The participants were continuing the discussion of strategic policy issues initiated during the February 14 NSC meeting; see Document 4. The full text of the minutes of this meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 8.

2. We can use ABM to protect missile & bomber forces. Fact ABM isn't perfect isn't so troublesome; you complicate Soviet problem, aren't losing people.

You could increase deterrence by building up offensive forces. But you don't need this for second strike capability.

Not sound to say we will protect cities; is sound to say we will protect second strike capability.

This deployment doesn't threaten Soviets.

Nixon: Neither one does or does cities' protection threaten them psychologically?

Packard: They would see cities' defense as prelude to other offensive build-up.

Nixon: Suppose you could defend cities. Really means credible threat of first strike would be much greater if they are screwing with Allies.

Packard: Wouldn't really give you first strike.

Smith: Population protection is historically a signal of going for first strike. Would be more threatening.

Nixon: We say glibly we will fire on warning. Who's sure. As soon as you do, you are risking great destruction.

Laird: Issue is that we can't move toward defense of cities. Impossible to solve this equation. We shouldn't assure our people of this. We can handle other threats, adding to our deterrence. Shouldn't care about what Soviets think, but what's best for our security, security of our nation.

Nixon: It is important to game plan it from their point of view. Important for arms control discussions.

Laird: They have ABM, but they may be protecting other targets.

Packard: We don't know why their ABM. Use of ABM to protect our offensive forces would be stabilizing, would help with strategic arms limitation talks.

Nixon asks Smith what he thinks.

Smith: Doesn't make much difference one way or other as far as talks. Ongoing program isn't decisive on talks issue.

Rogers: Isn't having option good negotiating point?

Smith: Best posture is ABM connected with signs of progress on SALT and with signal they aren't going for first strike capability.

Parochially I am against ABM. I would urge at same time as ABM decision, say we have reviewed last proposal—approved by Chiefs—we are now in position to begin talks. Announce we will limit number to say Moscow's number, not deploy them in first strike mode.

Wheeler: If I thought technically, fiscally feasible to ABM defense which gave first strike capability, I would advocate it, destabilizing or not. Wouldn't bother me.

Nixon: Wouldn't bother me either. Nuclear umbrella in NATO a lot of crap. Don't have it.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Lincoln: Proposition: by starting but not stating how far we will go will aid Gerry.

Smith: No, would prefer number. We could increase it if we had to.

Rogers: Art[icle] VI of NPT²—says parties will enter into arms limitation agreement. Important to non-nuclear powers. With NPT notified, we should proceed in good faith. I was asked this yesterday. We are obligated to go ahead with talks, in good faith, language of treaty is clear.

Nixon: But not what and when. We're not tied down.

Rogers: Of course, but we must proceed in good faith. If Soviets say let's talk, we have to. We're under the gun.

Wheeler: Haven't we been under that obligation for a long time in representations to U.N.?

Rogers: This is treaty obligation.

Smith: We are already in negotiations. Public statements have a meaning. Gore³ thinks we should start just on ABM. I think Soviets want talks both on offensive and defensive missiles.

Laird: Soviets don't want to negotiate defense.

Rogers: We should have total offensive/defensive.

Nixon: For trip,⁴ I want to be kept as flexible as possible. Same with decision on ABM. It would be unhelpful to make it appear that we are leaning (don't debrief Depts and have it appear in papers) though arguments appear convincing. Then if we decided to move, that could be important gesture in arms control problem. We're not sure what affects them; then let's not appear too precise until we get some leverage.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

² On July 1, 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow. Ratified by the U.S. Senate in March 1969, it entered into force on March 5, 1970 after 81 other nations signed the treaty. (21 UST 483)

³ Senator Albert Gore, Sr. (D-TN).

⁴ On February 23 Nixon left for an 8-day visit to Europe on his first foreign trip as President.

6. Editorial Note

In a March 10, 1969, memorandum, President's Assistant for Congressional Relations Bryce Harlow informed President Nixon of the Congressional status of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system. Harlow stated: "Careful analysis of the *immediate* situation in the Senate strongly indicates: 1) the ABM system advanced by LBJ [President Lyndon B. Johnson] has no chance whatsoever; 2) even a modified system can now be passed only with maximum effort, including all-out Presidential participation." Harlow speculated that a modified ABM plan would lose by a vote of 58–42 in the Senate with a third of the Republican Senators in opposition. Harlow stated that a modified ABM system would likely pass in the House of Representatives. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 843, ABM–MIRV, ABM—Memoranda)

In a March 11 diary entry, Assistant to the President H.R. Halde-
man described the atmosphere at the White House:

"Well, the first crisis appears to be building. ABM decision will be tough. P felt that the construction of an anti-ballistic missile defense system was a crucial bargaining chip in the forthcoming Soviet arms control talks. The doves hated it though, and many moderates were disturbed by the cost. It was shaping up to be a real donnybrook. He has to go ahead from defense viewpoint but pressure against is enormous and growing under great pressure, i.e., DuBridge was in today to argue scientist's viewpoint that small increase in defense doesn't justify huge expenditure and popular and political risk. Harlow has advised P that Congressional passage is in real doubt, and will require all-out battle on part of P. Question whether he's really willing and ready to fight." (*Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

On March 14 the President announced his decision to approve an ABM program that included a Safeguard system, a modified version of Lyndon Johnson's Sentinel system, designed to provide area defense against a relatively small nuclear attack by China and an accidental, irrational, or unsophisticated attack by the Soviet Union. Safeguard called for 12 separate sites for area missile defense, 19 radars, and several hundred interceptor missiles. Nixon's stated objectives were similar to Johnson's: "protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union"; "defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade"; and "protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source." Nixon also decided to continue testing for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). On March 14 the decisions about ABM and MIRV testing were announced in a White

House press release. The text is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pages 216–219.

In nationally televised hearings on March 20 and 21, Secretary of Defense Laird testified before the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee and explained part of the rationale behind the administration's decision to pursue an ABM system. He declared that the Soviet Union had initiated a nuclear forces build-up aimed at eliminating U.S. defenses in a single blow. Laird supported his assertion with information about the SS-9, which was a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). He stated that the SS-9 threat could be countered only with an ABM system. Extracts of Laird's testimony are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pages 125–131.

On March 27 Secretary of State Rogers testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Extracts of his testimony concerning U.S. preparations for strategic arms limitation talks are *ibid.*, pages 138–139. The following statements from Rogers's testimony concerning the relationship between the ABM decision and strategic arms talks disturbed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger:

"Suppose we start our talks in a few months and the first thing that is said by the Soviet Union 'let's do away with you (sic) defensive missiles.' We would have no problem. We would be delighted. [. . .]

"I can imagine that we might be able to say, 'If you have no interest in defensive missiles and you want to take your ABM out around from Moscow, why, we will stop our Safeguard development'."

In Kissinger's view, the Secretary's statements contradicted the administration's line on an ABM. As Kissinger pointed out to Nixon: "You said that we would proceed with subsequent phases of Safeguard in the light of the threat, the state of technology, and diplomatic considerations, including talks. You also said we hope to talk to the Soviets about both offensive and defensive systems, but said nothing specific about whether we would give up the ABM." There is no indication that the President saw Kissinger's memorandum analyzing Rogers's testimony. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, April 3; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 279, Agency Files, Department of State, Vol. II)

On March 28 Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Gerard Smith prepared a memorandum for the file about his conversation with Rogers concerning the Secretary's testimony:

"I talked to the Secretary today. He said there had been no change in the SALT situation. He gave me to believe that he was thinking that the linkage question was more related to the carrying out of the SALT negotiations and less related to the starting of the negotiations. He is thinking in terms of June for starting the SALT talks. He stressed the importance of talking first with our allies. He said that he had said

nothing new in his testimony except that he had not said it in a belligerent voice. He said he felt that we should say that we hope that the climate will be good, that the total climate will affect the outcome. He asked me when we could be ready, and I told him I thought between May 15th and June 1st. That seemed to suit him fine. He said that he had gotten a very good reaction on the Hill, that a number of the Senators had congratulated him. I told him that I thought from our point of view, what he had said had come out just first-rate." (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383–97–0010, Director's Files, Smith/Farley Chronological File, 1962–1977, Smith telcons with US officials, February–October 1969)

7. Memorandum From the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Foster) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)

Washington, March 15, 1969.

[Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0103, Box 16, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret. 3 pages not declassified.]

8. Memorandum From President Nixon to Acting Secretary of State Richardson¹

Washington, May 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

SALT Talks:

- (1) Procedural Approach to Soviets
- (2) NATO Consultations

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 873, SALT, Volume I, January–May 1969. Secret; Nodis.

At the NSC meeting on NSSM 28,² now scheduled for June 18, I also wish to consider the approach to be taken with the Soviets on the timing of the talks. Any proposal we make for a date must take account of (1) the likelihood that several NSC meetings will be required before I will be able to approve a substantive position, and (2) my commitment to have a full round of consultations with our NATO allies before substantive negotiations begin with the USSR. An appropriate scenario should be available on June 18 for my consideration and approval. This will serve as guidance for the Secretary's further procedural discussions with the Soviet Ambassador.

In view of public speculation about our intention to propose a date in July and the concern that has been expressed at NATO about adequate time for substantive consultation, would you please prepare for my approval an instruction to Ambassador Cleveland, for early use in the NAC, including the following points:

- that no date for opening SALT talks has been fixed with the Soviets;
- that NSC consideration of our substantive position is scheduled for mid-June;
- that any opening date arranged with the Soviets will allow ample time for NATO consultations.

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² NSSM 28, issued March 6, "directed the preparation of a U.S. position for possible strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union." It asked that a study be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by May 15. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-139, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 28)

9. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 22, 1969.

SUBJECT

MIRV Testing

The Problem

Our MIRV flight testing program is reaching a crucial stage. Fifty-two flight tests in all are scheduled, with the first Minuteman III missiles scheduled to be operational at the end of FY 1970, and the first Poseidon in January 1971, with actual deployment to be spread out over several years. Only 11 of these tests had been conducted in the nine months from the beginning of the test program in August 1968 through April of this year. From now through November, the tests are scheduled to run at a rate of three a month. Even before the completion of these tests, MIRVs could on a crash basis be introduced into our missiles—or the Soviets may think so.

If, by the time SALT talks begin, we already have—or the Soviets think we have—substantially completed MIRV testing, any limitation of MIRVs will be difficult to achieve: While MIRV testing is observable by national means, the only way you can tell whether or not a missile is a MIRV is through on-site inspection.

The delay in initiation of SALT talks combined with entry into a period of sustained and even accelerated MIRV testing, could therefore operate to reduce significantly the options, flexibility and leverage you have to make these talks productive.²

Discussion

One of the major options under study in NSSM 28³ is a reciprocal leveling off in additional missiles, with introduction of MIRVs excluded

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 845, ABM–MIRV, MIRV Test Program, Vol. I, Closed June 30, 1969. Secret. The date is handwritten at the bottom of the last page. The memorandum was forwarded to Nixon on May 27 under a covering memorandum from Kissinger explaining that it outlined the relationship of the MIRV program to the forthcoming SALT negotiations. Kissinger also sent Richardson's memorandum to Laird with a request for comment by May 30. (Ibid.)

² In a June 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig summarized the political aspects of the problem: "The MIRV issue surfaced on April 16 through a letter from Senator Edward Brooke to the President in which Brooke indicated that he might support the Safeguard if the President were to reciprocate by supporting Brooke's resolution for a US moratorium on the testing of MIRV's. No definite reply was given to Senator Brooke; instead, Sonnenfeldt and Lynn briefed Dr. Fry, Senator Brooke's legislative assistant, on the difficulties and disadvantages of a MIRV test moratorium." (Ibid.)

³ See footnote 2, Document 8.

on both sides. This is a complicated option, but it may be a key one. If the Soviets are to forego construction of more land based hard-site ICBMs and SLBMs and *any* mobile land based ICBMs, they could understandably ask for some quid pro quo from us. It is hard to see anything in our current programs but the MIRVs which we could offer.

If we press ahead in this period with an aggressive program of MIRV flight testing, we may appear to the Soviets to have passed the point of no return. To the Soviets as well as to our Congressional critics, we may then seem vulnerable to the charge of having deliberately stalled on the negotiations to permit us to prove out our MIRVs and thus put them beyond the realm of negotiability.

The simplest way of preserving our options would be to stretch out U.S. MIRV flight testing. For example, the Services might be directed to conduct not more than one more Minuteman III and one more Poseidon flight test between now and the establishment of the U.S. position on SALT, with whatever guidance that decision may contain regarding subsequent testing. The action would have the advantage of leaving us maximum freedom of maneuver. By not actually suspending tests in advance, we would avoid playing our trump card prematurely and keep it for the best moment in the negotiations.

A second possibility would be to propose an immediate moratorium on all multiple warhead testing—both of U.S. MIRVs and Soviet MRVs. This would be dramatic, require a quid pro quo from the Soviets, and place the U.S. in a favorable position before world opinion. However, this course could in itself complicate the negotiations and might risk limiting our flexibility of choice.

Recommendation

My purpose, however, is not to urge any particular course. It is, rather, to make the point that our decision on whether or not to stretch out or propose a moratorium on MIRV testing should not await the conclusion of discussion on NSSM 28.

If you agree that a decision on the issue of MIRV testing should be separately considered and reached, I suggest that:

(a) You ask Mel Laird to prepare urgently a memorandum for you setting forth the facts regarding our program of MIRV flight testing, the schedule in coming months, and the effects of a suspension or a major stretch out of testing in this area where we have a significant lead over the Soviets.

(b) You then meet with Mel Laird, Bus Wheeler, Gerry Smith, Henry Kissinger, and myself to consider our course of action.

ELR

10. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**¹

Washington, May 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

Chronology of Recent Developments on Strategic Arms Talks with the Soviets

Attached (Tab A)² is a chronology of recent developments relating to Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) with the Soviets. From this compilation I believe it is fair to conclude that

—the Soviets and the public remain under the impression that we will shortly be prepared to agree to and announce an opening date for the talks and that this will be some time in July;

—our allies, on the other hand, have been told that no date has been set and that we will allow ample time for consultation;

—the allies are showing mounting concern that sufficient time will indeed be provided before talks open with the Soviets; and

—the allies, notably the British, French and Germans, are beginning to sense that SALT talks could have far-reaching security implications for themselves and that consultations must therefore be more than a formality.

The memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State which you signed on May 21³ will enable you to examine at the same time our negotiating options and the scenario for consultations with the allies and to make an integrated set of decisions after NSC consideration now scheduled for mid-June.

In the interim we will probably encounter some impatience from the Soviets and from critics here at home.

It will be desirable to make clear to both that we are not deliberately delaying but that preparations for this major enterprise require care and time.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 873, SALT, Volume II, June–July 1969. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Another notation indicates it was returned on June 2. Haig asked Sonnenfeldt to prepare this memorandum for the President "to keep him abreast of this fast moving epic." (Memorandum from Haig to Sonnenfeldt, May 19; *ibid.*)

² Tab A, dated May 21, is attached but not printed.

³ Document 8.

11. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith)¹

Washington, May 26, 1969.

Dear Gerry:

In response to your note of May 22nd,² I am sorry to have to disagree with you about the testing of MIRV. I am convinced you will be in a much stronger position in your discussion with the Soviets if the MIRV testing is not discontinued. Our deployment schedule is far enough off that you will have ample time to discuss this matter at an early stage of the talks, and hopefully get a quid pro quo response from your discussion.

While we are on this subject, I am concerned at the rate of progress in approaching an opening position for these talks. I am going to encourage our people to prepare some alternate proposals with the thought that it might make more progress if a small group of us spent some time together for a discussion of the issues. A large meeting, such as we had the other day, is not conducive to progress. Furthermore, we have the problem of the serious leak which occurred from that meeting. Leaks like this could jeopardize the whole program, and should be avoided at all costs.

If you have any alternate suggestions as to how I could be helpful, so that you can proceed with your very important job, I will be pleased to have you let me know.

Sincerely,

Dave

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-98-0089, Box 1, Director's Files, Smith Files, Correspondence for and by Smith on MIRVs, ABM, and other Arms Control Issues, February–December 1969. Secret.

² In his letter to Packard, May 22, Smith wrote, "I have been thinking about the points that you made at the last NSSM 28-Steering Group meeting to the effect that our on-going MIRV program is probably the main factor in generating Soviet interest in the SALT—and that moderating the pace of MIRV testing in advance of SALT would be like playing a trump card too early in the game." Smith agreed that MIRV was a trump but noted that "with SALT still unscheduled and MIRV testing proceeding apace, how long will Soviet interest persist—unless it is for an arrangement in which both sides MIRV their forces—an outcome which may not be of special interest to the United States." (Ibid.)

12. Minutes of a Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 29, 1969, 2:05–5:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Review of U.S. Strategic Posture

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger	OEP
State	Haakon Lindjord
Arthur Hartman	USIA
Philip Farley	Henry Loomis
Donald McHenry	ACDA
Defense	Gerard Smith
David Packard	BOB
Richard Ware	James Schlesinger
Ivan Selin	Treasury
CIA	Anthony Jurich
R. Jack Smith	NSC Staff
JCS	Helmut Sonnenfeldt
LTG F.T. Unger	Laurence Lynn
	Morton Halperin
	Winston Lord

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The Review Group went page by page through the revised summary paper of NSSM 3 distributed May 26² and agreed to a large number of drafting changes. These were to be incorporated in the paper by the NSC staff and redistributed to Review Group members for their approval before forwarding to the NSC for its consideration. It was

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room at the White House. The full text of the minutes and documentation related to NSSM 3 are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 32.

² The paper, entitled “U.S. Strategic Posture: Basic Issues,” was drafted by the NSC Staff and distributed to Review Group members. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-37, Review Group Meetings, Strategic Force Posture, 5/29/69). The paper, as revised by the Review Group, served as the basis for discussions at the NSC meeting held on June 13 and June 18. See footnote 2, Document 32, *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972. The final version is printed as Document 34 (*ibid.*).

agreed that this NSSM 3 on strategic forces and NSSM 28 on SALT³ would be considered closely and consecutively in coming weeks. The NSC will devote more time to these two subjects than the usual two-hour sessions. There was general consensus that doctrinal decisions on how we should shape our strategic forces will heavily influence and guide our positions on SALT. However, strategic force decisions will not represent inflexible theology for SALT positions, particularly with regard to possible developments once arms talks are underway.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

³ See Document 14.

13. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

MIRV Test Program

The following are my comments, which you requested, on the memorandum, dated May 22, 1969, to the President from the Acting Secretary of State.²

With respect to the discussion on page 1 of the memorandum, I submit that the quid-pro-quo for the Soviets to forego construction of more land-based hard-site ICBMs and SLBMs and any mobile land-based ICBMs is for the United States to forego the same options. Proceeding as planned with MIRV testing could serve to put pressure on the Soviets by indicating that only an agreement will lead the United States to alter currently planned deployments. Thus, our overall negotiating position could be strengthened, and having MIRV clearly

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 22, SALT, Chronological File. Secret; Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates Laird saw it on August 1. Foster drafted Packard's letter after receiving concurrence from the Director, Joint Staff and the Department of Navy.

² Document 9.

established as an in-being U.S. capability might prove ultimately beneficial in protracted negotiations.

With respect to the discussion on page two of the memorandum, I have two misgivings. One is the assumption that a MIRV deployment ban might ultimately be desirable. The U.S. MIRV is intended to penetrate defenses, thus preserving our deterrent posture. In the face of an increasing Soviet ABM capability, this should result in an increase in stability of the strategic balance between the U.S. and USSR. The other concern I have is the second possibility mentioned in the discussion. An immediate moratorium on all multiple warhead testing—both U.S. MIRV and Soviet MRVs. During the period of a voluntary moratorium, our confidence in our deterrent will erode. For example, the moratorium could result in cessation of operational testing of the now deployed Polaris A3³ system which contains non-MIRV multiple warheads. Our confidence in the performance of this system is maintained by such tests. In addition, our confidence in penetrating Soviet defenses would degrade in the event Tallinn⁴ were converted to ABM or the Moscow deployment were expanded. Also, a voluntary moratorium would be an encouragement to the Soviets to delay the conclusion of negotiations since some of their objectives would be achieved short of a formal agreement or treaty. There could also be a difference in behavior of the U.S. and USSR during a moratorium.

They might get ready to test while we probably would not. The United States and USSR voluntarily refrained from conducting nuclear tests in the atmosphere for a period of 34 months prior to September 1961. Suddenly, without warning, the USSR conducted 113 tests in the atmosphere over a period of approximately one year. The high test rate and the complex nature of their high altitude tests leave little doubt that they had been carefully planned for about two years prior to initiation. [*4 lines not declassified*] This is an example of the undesirable effects of a recent costly experiment in voluntary restraints. Voluntary changes in our plans might lead the Soviets to believe that they can prevent U.S. strategic deployments without committing themselves to any restraints, thereby compromising early U.S. bargaining positions. Moratoriums and understandings of this nature tend to become de facto treaties and to circumvent constitutional processes.

³ The Polaris A-3 missile first became operational in September 1964 and was the first missile to have a range of 2,500 nautical miles.

⁴ Code-named Tallinn because it first appeared near the Estonian capital city of this name. This system of radars and interceptors was believed in the 1960s to have had ballistic missile defense capabilities.

With respect to the recommendations made on pages two and three of the memorandum, there is serious question as to whether a ban on MIRV testing is technically sound. Consequently, I believe it is unwise to go ahead with a MIRV testing moratorium without due consideration of the merits of a potential future MIRV deployment ban.

The recommendation states that we have a significant lead over the Soviets in MIRV testing. Such a conclusion must be treated with reserve. Whether or not we consider the three warhead version of the SS-9 to have a MIRV capability now, its potential is evident and the testing of this missile has great significance for us.

There have been seven flight tests of Poseidon⁵ and seven of Minuteman III⁶ to date. The remaining R&D flight test schedule on these two systems is attached.⁷ The initial flight tests on both systems have experienced failures, partial successes and successful flight tests. The full R&D flight test programs are believed necessary to have good confidence that the new booster stages, the post boost vehicles, the new re-entry vehicles and the penetration aids are adequately reliable to permit production for operational use. [*1½ lines not declassified*] This successful test flight to about 4400 miles was observed by the Soviets, [*4 lines not declassified*]

David Packard

⁵ The Poseidon C-3, which began development in 1965, was longer and heavier than the Polaris missile but could fit into the same launch tubes as the latter. Modifications to the launch tubes and to the fire control system were needed to overcome complex MIRV targeting problems. The Poseidon was designed to carry twice the payload of the Polaris A-3 with the advantage of improved accuracy.

⁶ A land-based ICBM deployed in hard silos.

⁷ Not printed.

14. Paper Prepared by the Interagency SALT Steering Committee¹

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY OF NSSM-28 REPORT

I. Introduction

In response to the NSSM-28 directive,² we have approached the problem of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the USSR from three separate but related perspectives. We have considered (1) general considerations relevant to any negotiations; (2) specific issues arising from peculiarities of different weapons systems and their interrelationships; and (3) several illustrative packages of arms restrictions which might serve as the basis for a U.S. position.

Many of the issues to be decided in connection with this report are closely linked to the issues raised in NSSM-3, Review of U.S. Strategic Posture.³ Indeed, decisions on certain weapons systems for our posture will affect which specific weapons systems could be controlled under an agreement with the USSR.

II. General Considerations

A. U.S. Objectives

There is general agreement that the primary military purposes of our strategic forces are:

- to reduce the likelihood that nuclear war will occur;
- to protect ourselves and our Allies from the destructive consequences of nuclear wars, in so far as we can; and
- to be capable of controlling strategic nuclear conflict so that the possible outcomes leave the United States and its Allies in a relatively advantageous position.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-139, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 28. Top Secret. Sent under a May 30 covering memorandum from Smith to Kissinger. The full report is *ibid.* The SALT Steering Committee was under the chairmanship of ACDA and included representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the AEC, the President's Science Advisor, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The first meeting of the SALT Steering Committee was held on March 19, and meetings were held bi-weekly until the report was issued. Memoranda about those meetings are in Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-98-098, Director's Files, Smith Files, NSSM 28, Preparation of US Position for Possible SALT Talks.

² See footnote 2, Document 8.

³ See Document 4 and footnote 2, Document 12.

These objectives are also, in part, criteria for judging a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. This report recognizes that these basic objectives can be pursued unilaterally, without any agreement with the USSR. Certain arms control measures in the realm of strategic systems, however, could help achieve some of our objectives at lesser costs. They might contribute to a reduction in political tensions and some of the uncertainties surrounding strategic competition. Depending on the nature of the agreement, however, some new uncertainties might be created.

B. The Scope of an Agreement

A basic issue is whether it is in our interest to aim for a measure limited in scope, perhaps only symbolic in nature, or whether we should seek a more comprehensive agreement designed to stop as much of the strategic arms competition as possible. Stated another way, what restrictions would we be willing to accept on our own ongoing programs and future options in order to inhibit Soviet programs and future options. The principal implications of each approach are:

1. Limited Measures

Should we decide to seek a minimum agreement affecting only one or two systems, leaving aside more complex problems and excluding some weapons systems or future programs altogether; as examples we might propose:

- a. a freeze on the number of fixed land-based ICBM's only, *or*
- b. a freeze on the total number of ICBM's, plus a freeze on the initiation of further construction of submarine-launched ballistic missiles; *or*
- c. a limit on land- and sea-based ICBM's to total numbers now under construction, but with freedom to vary the mix.

These and other variants are discussed and analyzed in Section V of this summary (Alternatives I and II).

2. Intermediate Measures

Should we decide to go beyond the kind of agreements outlined above, we could consider the following:

A proposal (Alternative III), which not only freezes land and sea-based systems at existing levels (including those under construction), but also bans enlarging, modifying, or relocating missile silos or launchers, and prohibits mobile missiles.

3. Comprehensive Agreements

Should we decide to seek more comprehensive coverage of qualitative as well as quantitative aspects, we could add a prohibition on MIRVs to the intermediate type program outlined above (Alternative IV).

Or, we could go still further and base our position on a quantitative and qualitative freeze on all aspects of strategic offensive and defensive systems that are subject to adequate verification by national means. In effect this would mean that we would stop where we are and the Soviets would do likewise.

In order to choose among these alternative approaches, several specific issues will have to be resolved. The main ones are:

- (1) what level of ABM defenses we would agree to, under whatever offensive limitations we propose;
- (2) whether to retain or prohibit MIRVs;
- (3) what level of confidence we consider prudent in our ability to verify agreements.

Also, depending on our ultimate negotiating objectives, we should decide what moratoriums, if any, we will seek during negotiations.

C. Moratorium

With regard to the issue of what will be permitted while negotiations proceed, the approach we adopt will be affected by decisions on which systems we hope to control in a final agreement. In addition, we would have to decide how long to maintain a moratorium. We have several choices:

1. No moratorium;
2. A moratorium on offensive deployments only (i.e., construction of offensive systems—land-based ICBMs and/or ballistic submarines);
3. In addition, a moratorium on ABM construction;
4. In addition, a moratorium on flight testing of new offensive systems, including MRVs, MIRVs etc., or MIRVs could be treated separately.

The principal arguments are:

On the one hand,

- negotiating a moratorium might prove as complicated and contentious as negotiating a final agreement;
- without any moratorium, the U.S. would be free to continue programs which may be necessary should talks fail;
- a moratorium could prove difficult to terminate.

On the other hand,

- a moratorium could restrict some of the Soviet buildup in offensive systems;
- if we want to ban some systems, especially MIRVs, a moratorium on testing might contribute to the achievement of a final agreement;
- if negotiations are protracted, continuing deployments could make an agreement unlikely.

D. Verification

The basic issue is whether we should rely solely on national means to verify an agreement or should insist on some means of on-site inspection.

An intelligence estimate⁴ concluded that there are aspects of potential agreements that can be verified by national means with high confidence. While some Soviet violations could get underway without our knowledge, detection in most cases would be assured prior to the creation of a substantial Soviet buildup.

Our confidence in Soviet compliance in certain areas could be increased if we could obtain some form of on-site inspection or other additional means of assurance. For example, inspection could be very helpful in dealing with problems such as illegal upgrading of a defense system (Tallinn), retrofitting of ICBMs and IR/MRBM launchers, and deployment of MIRVs on operational missiles. Such inspection could not only provide hard evidence of violations but more important would act as an additional deterrent to attempts at evasion.

It should be noted that national means of verification involve highly sensitive intelligence sources and methods and for a U.S. administration to be able to demonstrate publicly that the Soviets were complying with, or evading an agreement could involve compromising these sources or methods.

Insistence on on-site inspection, however, could pose a major obstacle to an agreement. At a minimum, efforts to obtain on-site inspection would probably lead to prolonged negotiations. Nevertheless, the Soviets might accept token inspection if this were the only obstacle in the way of an agreement they considered highly favorable. They might accept a mechanism for examining or adjudicating problems, which, in time, could lead to an informal, but not institutionalized, inspection system.

In addressing the verification issue, we should assess the extent to which the range of uncertainties in our national verification capabilities, and their associated risks, would affect the net military posture of the U.S. and Soviet Union.

The areas in which there may be verification problems are:

1. *Destruction of Silos and Relocation of Launchers.* There is no way national means can determine that a silo has been deactivated unless there is an agreed procedure for doing so, such as cratering.

⁴ See also Annex B to basic study report. [Footnote in the original. Annex B, attached to the full NSSM 28 report, is entitled "Verification of Possible Alternative Options for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks." It summarizes a report by the Verification Panel Interagency Working Group. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-98-0162, Verification of Possible Alternative Options for SALT—NSSM 28, May 1969)]

2. *Mobile Missiles*. If mobile missiles were permitted up to a prescribed total, they could not be counted accurately, although we could estimate the general magnitude of the force. The extent of possible violation before detection would be dependent upon the agreed limit. Since detection of a single mobile missile would indicate a violation, we could verify a ban with considerably greater confidence, although the Soviets might be able to deploy as many as 200–300 before we would detect the violation. Thus, a ban would constitute a greater deterrent to cheating than would limitation to an agreed number.

3. *ABM's*. Stationary ABM launchers can be detected with high confidence; mobile ABM's would present the same problems described above. Depending on how defined, verification of ABM-associated radars could pose problems. However, if there is no limit on ABM-associated radars, warning of violations of agreed limits on launchers would be greatly reduced, particularly if mobile launchers are not prohibited. We would have high confidence of detection and probable identification of the conversion of a surface-to-air (SAM) system to an ABM prior to IOC. Lesser modifications to give a SAM system a limited ABM capability (e.g., for a point-in-space intercept) would be more difficult to detect, and some might escape detection completely.

4. *MIRV's*. If flight-testing continues to the point where either side feels that the other might be able to deploy MIRV's without further flight-testing, verification of a MIRV ban by unilateral means would be impossible. Verification of a ban on MIRV deployment could then be accomplished only by highly intrusive inspection of the missile itself. Notwithstanding the net judgment of the Intelligence Community that MIRV tests would be detected, some argue that our assurance in verifying a MIRV prohibition through a ban on MIRV flight-testing could be uncertain. They argue that such uncertainties would result because of the question of defining exactly what is an MIRV, since the Soviets may have a system different from ours; they believe that to reduce such uncertainty it would also be necessary to ban flight-testing of all systems related to MIRVs, including some penetration aids which the U.S. might want to develop as a hedge against cheating or abrogation of an agreement, and including flight-testing of systems which the U.S. has already deployed.

5. *IR/MRBM Upgrading*. We might not be able to detect the deployment of ICBM's in the existing 135 hard IR/MRBM silos.

E. Soviet Objectives

Soviet objectives in arms limitation talks are probably to determine if it is possible to obtain an agreement which preserves and perhaps improves their present relative strategic position and which enables them to avoid being drawn into a costly round of strategic procurements in response to reprogrammed and potential U.S. offensive and

defensive deployments. There is reason to believe that the present balance of Soviet leadership favors such talks and sees value in a possible agreement. However, they may also hope that talks by themselves would serve to delay the introduction of new U.S. weapons systems and perhaps weaken Allied unity and concern for strengthening NATO. Thus, the Soviets may well have several objectives which are not mutually exclusive and which could be realized simultaneously.

F. Negotiability

Little is known of Soviet views as to the details of a strategic arms limitation agreement. They have agreed that it should apply to both offensive strategic delivery vehicles and ABM's, and that the first step should be a limitation and not a reduction of armaments. From our past experience with them in arms control negotiations, we can expect them to advocate an agreement of broad coverage. This does not mean that they would never accept a limited measure, but at least they are likely to insist that any limitation placed on their ongoing or planned strategic weapons programs be matched by comparable restrictions of our own.

In this connection, the alternative packages we have considered contain a number of features that may be challenged by the Soviets. Principal among these are: that bombers should not be included in an agreement; that Soviet mobile missiles should be banned or limited; that IRBM's and MRBM's should be limited, but British and French weapons and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe should not be included.

G. U.S.-Soviet Political Relations

The conclusion of an actual agreement to limit strategic arms could have far-reaching effects on U.S.-Soviet relations. Most of these changes would be of a long-term and intangible nature, so precise predictions are not possible.

H. NATO Reactions

Our NATO allies favor the initiation of SALT. Doubtless, the majority of Europeans would welcome an actual agreement as heralding a more meaningful détente in East-West relations. However, our allies will have certain specific concerns, which they would expect to be resolved in the course of consultations and negotiations. They will be primarily concerned with those elements of a possible agreement directly affecting their security interests; e.g., its effect on the U.S. deterrent, the restrictions it places on Soviet IR/MRBM's (frozen under all packages), and its effect on third-country nuclear forces and U.S.-controlled tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (none under any package). Our allies would also be concerned that an agreement not adversely affect our capabilities against Soviet weapons systems targeted

upon them. Given a satisfactory answer to these questions, our allies would probably prefer a comprehensive agreement, though they would probably welcome an agreement which was at least a significant first step toward curbing the strategic arms race.

The SALT talks will focus attention of the NATO Allies on serious strategic questions, such as the effect of a SALT agreement on the deterrence of conventional war in Europe and the implication of a U.S.-Soviet condominium. Such concerns may grow as the negotiations proceed.

I. Cost Savings

It is difficult to estimate with any precision what cost savings, if any, would result from the various types of agreements we have considered (in Section V, Alternatives I–IV). Rough calculations, comparing planned U.S. strategic budgets with the various illustrative agreements indicate that savings would probably not exceed \$0.5–1.0 billion a year for the first five years after an agreement. Budgetary savings beyond that time could be greater, depending on whether the U.S. could forego deployments of certain systems that we might otherwise have to make and on what programs were adopted as hedges against abrogation.

Estimates for the USSR also do not show major savings in the short-run.

III. Weapons Systems Issues

The following major specific issues related to weapons systems or elements strongly influence the nature and scope of positions which the U.S. would find preferable or acceptable. These issues are discussed more fully in Section IV of the basic study report.

A. ICBM's and SLBM's

1. We have no plans to develop land-mobile ICBM's, while the Soviets may be close to a capability to deploy them. Even though the Soviets may oppose a ban, we should attempt to ban, rather than limit, these systems since their deployment could create large uncertainties in the strategic balance, and an agreed limit would be considerably more difficult to verify than a total ban.

2. The potential vulnerability of fixed ICBM's to counterforce attacks in the 1970's will need to be addressed. Alternative considerations which could alleviate this problem include the following:

- a. a MIRV ban would substantially delay and mitigate, but not necessarily eliminate ICBM vulnerability (because of the possibility of improvements in missile accuracy and payload).

- b. ABM defenses of ICBM sites could help maintain ICBM survivability, but ABM's could also adversely affect our retaliatory capability by providing protection for Soviet cities.

c. Superhardening of silos could be permitted, but we would have to work out replacement procedures relating to verification of destruction of old silos.

d. Limiting throw-weight of offensive missile forces, in which the Soviets have a current lead, could help reduce future threats to fixed ICBM's, although improved missile accuracies could still lead to problems. This measure would pose problems of definition and verification.

e. If practicable, preventing significant improvements in missile accuracies could minimize future threats, but this is a limit on technology, and verification would be complicated, if not impossible. Development of high accuracy probably can be verified, but the degree of accuracy attained may not be known.

3. We may want to allow freedom to mix land- and sea-based missile forces within an agreed number of total launchers. If greater fractions of each side's forces are moved to sea, this could have the effect of reducing potential instabilities, principally of fixed ICBM vulnerability, and decreasing incentives for both sides to pursue counterforce options but, unless there were agreed procedures for substitution, could create verification problems and lead to uncertainties as to ultimate force levels.

4. Since we are well ahead in numbers of SLBM's, we may want to impose limits to check the current Soviet buildup. As a means of simplifying an agreement or on the grounds that these are stabilizing retaliatory weapons, we could choose to impose no limits on SLBM's, but this would leave the arms race wide open in one important area.

B. MRBM'S and IRBM'S

The Soviets have about 700 MRBM's and IRBM's, and we have none. We want to freeze further construction and prevent them from being further hardened, made mobile, or converted to ICBM's. This is clearly in NATO's interest as well as our own, since it would limit a targetable threat.

C. ABM'S

1. Although there could be some tactical negotiating benefits in not offering an ABM level initially, it is necessary for the U.S. to establish a minimum and maximum ABM level which it would prefer or be willing to accept in the context of an overall agreement. The Soviets already have a small ABM system, which complicates prospects for a possible total ABM ban.

2. Under an agreement, the higher the ABM level the more tendency there is for each side's retaliatory capabilities to be eroded for a given set of offensive limitations.

In general, however, this erosion of capabilities is more drastic for the USSR than the U.S., with or without MIRVs.

A decision on acceptable levels of ABM is closely related to a corresponding decision on whether both sides are free to deploy MIRV's and

develop penetration aids. In general, our analysis indicates high ABM levels rule out banning MIRV's, and lower levels of around 200–500 or so ABM interceptors would be compatible with a ban on MIRV's.

3. The possibility that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union may wish to deploy an ABM for defense of their population against Chinese ICBM's or accidental launches could establish a lower limit on the acceptable levels of ABM's.

4. To the degree that the potential vulnerability of ICBM's may require ABM's also for defense of ICBM sites, the overall ABM level may have to be raised or else separate limits placed on ICBM defenses to the extent practicable.

5. If ABM associated radars were limited, it would increase our confidence in our ability to verify limits on ABM systems. If not, they could contribute significantly to a capability to execute rapidly a planned abrogation of ABM limits or to provide clandestinely some ABM capability for Soviet surface-to-air missile systems.

6. The implications of alternative ABM levels can be summarized as follows:

a. *Low Level (0–500)*. Limiting to low levels will be necessary under a MIRV ban which also bans sophisticated penetration aids, with a level of around 200–500 being preferable in order to reduce the sensitivity of our retaliatory capability to possible Soviet cheating. Might not be sufficient for damage denial against potential Chinese ICBM threat. Could protect a significant fraction of ICBM sites if MIRV's are banned.

b. *Medium Level (500–1500)*. With MIRV's, the U.S. could maintain its retaliatory capability over this range, but the Soviets might find the upper levels unacceptable because their retaliatory capability with missiles would be sharply reduced. Would allow damage denial against Chinese ICBM's. At upper range, could provide reasonable defense of ICBM sites.

c. *High Level (1500–2000)*. With MIRV's, the U.S. could maintain its retaliatory capability, but such high ABM levels could create uncertainties in hedging against Soviet evasions and make the U.S. retaliatory capability more sensitive to Soviet cheating. Probably less acceptable to Soviets, at least on military grounds, since their retaliatory capability would be severely degraded. Would permit damage denial against Chinese ICBM's and extensive U.S. ICBM site protection.

D. MIRV Limitations

1. The conditions, if any, under which the U.S. might prefer or accept a ban on MIRV's involve complex judgments. A MIRV ban has implications for related technology (such as penetration aids and maneuvering reentry vehicles), the consequences of which must be taken into consideration. A MIRV ban could delay or diminish the potential threat to ICBM survivability. With a low ABM level, this could enhance stability. However, there could be greater sensitivity of our retaliatory capability to possible levels of Soviet cheating or abrogation compared to cases

in which MIRV's are allowed. This sensitivity would be minimized if Soviet ABM capabilities were tightly constrained. The Soviets may prove unwilling to stop their offensive missile buildup without a MIRV ban.

2. The urgency associated with a U.S. position on MIRV's stems from the fact that continued U.S. MIRV flight-testing and possible Soviet MIRV testing before or during negotiations could make it difficult, if not impossible to reach an enforceable MIRV deployment ban. Actual MIRV deployment cannot be verified without intrusive on-site inspection of the launchers and examination of missile components. We may, therefore, want to consider proposing a moratorium on MIRV testing either prior to or during negotiations in order to keep open the option of an effective ban. This step could greatly increase our chances of obtaining a moratorium on ongoing Soviet programs, particularly ICBM and SLBM construction.

3. A number of considerations suggest that a MIRV ban may not be desirable or negotiable even if desirable.

a. The Soviets may not be interested in a MIRV ban, either because they want MIRV's themselves or are willing to let us have MIRV's in exchange for something they want, such as mobile ICBM's or more SLBM's.

b. Notwithstanding the net judgment of the Intelligence Community, some argue that our assurance in verifying a MIRV prohibition through a ban on MIRV flight-testing could be uncertain.

c. There may be complications in determining what is to be banned since the Soviets may have a system somewhat similar to one which we have already deployed (the Poseidon A-3).

E. Bombers and Air Defense

1. The Soviets may well raise this issue and as a minimum we need a contingency position. The issue is whether the U.S. should be prepared to accept limits on bombers or air defense if the Soviets insist, and if we could reach agreement on the definition of the systems to be included.

2. Bombers can provide a stabilizing hedge against cheating. However, limiting bombers would close a loophole in the arms race. In the absence of undetected Soviet cheating, a freeze on bombers could preserve the U.S. position in an area in which we have a major advantage. It would, however, also open the complex air-defense problem, which may be non-negotiable with the Soviets. At the same time, a ban on new or upgraded air-defense systems could increase our confidence in verification of limitations on ABM deployments.

IV. Results of Strategic Analysis

Analysis using war-gaming techniques and a range of scenarios produces the following game results concerning the effects upon programmed U.S. and projected Soviet forces of the various arms control proposals through 1978. (For a fuller discussion, see Section V-C and

Annex A⁵) The results of this type of war-gamed strategic analysis provides one of the tools for arriving at strategic force judgments but not an exclusive means.

A. Under all the cases considered, U.S. retaliatory capability remains over 30% except in the cases where a MIRV ban is combined with area ABM levels over 500. In these cases, U.S. retaliatory capability remains over 25%. At these higher ABM levels, U.S. retaliatory capability is increasingly dependent on bombers, and is entirely so above ABM levels of 2000.

B. Under all the cases considered, Soviet retaliatory capability remains high except for area ABM levels above 500. At levels above 500, there are points at which Soviet retaliatory capability declines to levels presumably unacceptable to the Soviets. For Package I, this point would not be reached until somewhere between 1000 and 2000 ABM's, because of the high level of SLBM's it is assumed the Soviets would deploy under this option. For the other packages, the point would probably be reached between 500 and 1000 ABM's. Based on these calculations, we believe the Soviets would prefer a lower limit on ABM's, and should favor the more comprehensive packages, including a prohibition of MIRV deployment. Other, non-military factors would also be involved in determining the Soviet position.

C. At the higher ABM levels examined in the strategic analysis, the U.S. could save a significant number of fatalities by striking first, but would still suffer unacceptable fatalities. In all cases examined, the Soviets could not appreciably reduce fatalities to themselves by striking first. Based upon these considerations, neither side would have an incentive to strike first.

D. Predicated on U.S. estimates of our intelligence capabilities and hedges available, Soviet cheating could be overcome in every case. However, under a MIRV ban the U.S. might be more sensitive to substantial Soviet cheating than it would in the absence of such a ban. In case of Soviet substantial cheating on ABM's under a MIRV ban, the U.S. might have to deploy MIRV's in order to retain a confident retaliatory capability that does not rely on bombers alone.

V. Illustrative Arms Control Packages

We have studied several illustrative arms control restriction packages consisting of four options with three variants. These packages range from relatively limited to relatively comprehensive agreements, and the analyses in Sections IV and V of the basic report also permit the selection of other combinations which may be preferable to any of

⁵ Annex A, attached to the full report, provides "Strategic Exchange Results."

these packages. (Not yet studied is the Alternative of both sides stopping where they are.)

While all of the packages contemplate some limit on numbers of ABM launchers, none of them includes a specific designation of ABM level; a range of different ABM levels was analyzed for each package. None of the illustrative packages restricts bombers, air defense, or missile throw-weight and accuracy improvements, and none of them calls for force reductions. All of the packages limit numbers of ICBM's, prohibit mobile IR/MRBM's, and limit the numbers and hardness of fixed IR/MRBM launchers.

Advantages and disadvantages of each package are summarized briefly below, and more fully in Section V of the basic study report.

Package I: Freezes ICBM launchers to number now operational and under construction, and bans land-mobile missiles. No restrictions on SLBM's nor on missile or launcher characteristics or location.

Pro's

- a. A first step, without disrupting present U.S. programs;
- b. Each could build more survivable systems (SLBM's), which would reduce incentives for first-strike capability and thus increase stability;
- c. Could lead to quick agreement;
- d. Easy to verify; little incentive to cheat.

Con's

- a. Could channel arms competition to other areas, such as MIRV's, SLBM's, more SS-9's, and new generation of ICBM's;
- b. Could permit Soviet Union to catch up with the U.S. in area in which U.S. presently has a substantial lead (SLBM's);
- c. Might not be negotiable because Soviets would have to limit ABM's and two of their key offensive programs, ICBM buildup and land-mobile missile development, without limiting current U.S. offensive programs;
- d. Not convincing politically as an arms control measure;
- e. Verification procedure for launcher replacement necessary, thus increasing negotiating difficulties.

Package II: Similar to I, but SLBM's limited and land-mobiles permitted within total number of ICBM's.

Pro's

- a. Limit on SLBM's would preserve U.S. lead;
- b. Might appeal to Soviets since it permits land-mobile ICBM's;
- c. Possible quick agreement.

Con's

- a. Probably less negotiable than other packages;
- b. Only marginal effect on arms race;

- c. Hard to verify agreed number of land-mobile missiles;
- d. Verification procedure for launcher replacement necessary, thus increasing negotiating difficulties.

Package II–A: Permits varying the ICBM–SLBM mix within agreed total. Except as noted below, pro’s and con’s similar to Package II.

Pro’s

Could enhance survivability of retaliatory forces and reduce incentives to strive for first strike capability, thus promoting stability.

Con’s

- a. Would permit Soviets to reduce U.S. lead in SLBM’s;
- b. Land-sea mix would add verification problems;
- c. Would introduce additional strategic uncertainties, since future force structures would be less predictable.

Package III: Freezes numbers of all offensive missile launchers; bans land-mobile, offensive missiles; prohibits enlarging silos or changing launcher configuration or location; bans land-mobile and sea-based ABM’s.

Pro’s

- a. More comprehensive than I and II, since it affects all categories of strategic launchers;
- b. Would allow U.S. to proceed with all ongoing offensive programs, but stops Soviet buildup in offensive launchers;
- c. Could be acceptable to Soviets as permitting them to maintain an adequate strategic posture;
- d. Could be step to broader agreement;
- e. Would allow application of new technology to each side’s offensive missile force to enhance its effectiveness in target coverage and penetration and provide hedges against cheating and abrogation.

Con’s

- a. Would permit MIRV’s and other missile improvements leading to possible future counterforce threat to Minutemen, depending on the agreed levels of ABM’s;
- b. The responses to MIRV’s would probably lead to a continuing qualitative arms competition within the constraints of the agreement;
- c. Soviets might reject because would limit their program, and because Soviet retaliatory capability is degraded at higher ABM levels;
- d. Difficult to keep ABM low because of MIRV’s.

Package III–A: Permits superhardening, enlargement, and relocation of silos. Otherwise, pro’s and con’s similar to Package III.

Pro’s

- a. Make counterforce attack more difficult;
- b. U.S. would have greater opportunity to increase throw-weight and reduce present Soviet advantage than in Package III.

Con's

- a. Soviets could replace smaller silos with large ones for SS-9's or new missiles;
- b. Verification procedures for silo replacement necessary, thus increasing difficulties of negotiation.

Package III-B: Similar to III but permits varying the ICBM–SLBM mix. Since Package III places more restrictions upon offensive systems than does Package II, the advantages of the freedom to mix are greater under Package III–B than under Package II–A. Otherwise, pro's and con's similar to Package II–A.

Package IV: Same as III, except for addition of ban on MIRV's.

Pro's: In addition to arguments given earlier for MIRV ban,

- a. Would do most to curtail the strategic arms race, particularly the MIRV–ABM escalatory action-reaction cycle;
- b. Would be possible for both sides to accept low ABM levels and maintain confident retaliatory capabilities;
- c. Assuming the Soviets want a MIRV ban, would make them more willing to accept the other limitations proposed;
- d. U.S. budgetary savings could be greater.

Con's

- a. MIRV ban would reduce freedom to hedge against Soviet cheating by restricting U.S. capabilities to penetrate ABM's;
- b. Would give up what might be a significant U.S. technological advantage;
- c. Would prevent attainment of U.S. capabilities to cover all Soviet time-urgent nuclear-threat targets which threaten the U.S. and our NATO allies;
- d. Soviets may want to develop their own MIRV capability;
- e. Initial U.S. proposal to ban MIRV's might forego significant bargaining card.
- f. A MIRV ban could be an initial step in placing controls on further development of technology for strategic systems, which some consider neither desirable nor verifiable.

15. Editorial Note

On June 11, 1969, Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin met in the afternoon prior to the Ambassador's departure for Moscow. Although no memorandum of conversation has been found, according to Rogers's evening report to President Nixon, the following exchange took place about the modalities of initial strategic arms limitation talks:

"SALT—I told Dobrynin that we would be prepared to begin the strategic arms limitation talks July 30 or 31, and that we are flexible on the site of such talks. While Dobrynin and I had on past occasions discussed Geneva as a possible site, it was our view that perhaps this was not the most desirable place because of other activities going on there, and we might consider other alternatives, possibly Vienna or Helsinki. It might be that the most suitable way to proceed would be for a U.S. team to visit Moscow, or a USSR team to come to Washington, for a couple of weeks of preliminary talks in order to gain a clearer idea as to how the talks might proceed and how long they might last before fixing on a permanent location. I emphasized to Dobrynin that the proposed date was for his government's information only at this time, and I would hope there would be no preliminary leaks since we had our own consultation processes to complete before any public announcement. It was my thought that if his government should respond favorably to our proposal, we could then agree on a simultaneous announcement. Dobrynin said that he understood the problem, would report to his government immediately after his arrival on both the proposed date as well as our ideas on how the talks might begin, and get word to us probably through Ambassador Beam in Moscow." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 8, President's Daily Briefings, President's Daily Brief, June 2–16, 1969)

On June 20 Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith provided Rogers a paper on the advantages and disadvantages of alternative sites for SALT. In his covering memorandum, Smith explained that he had "been searching for some site that would tend to diminish the 'circus' aspects of SALT." He concluded that the best alternatives, in order of preference, were Washington and Moscow, Vienna, Geneva, and Helsinki. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383–97–0010, Director's Files, Smith/Farley Chronological File, Smith/Rogers Correspondence, February 1969–May 1971)

In his memoirs, Smith explained the final decision on the location:

"The Soviets naturally pounced on the idea of Helsinki, almost at Leningrad's back door. As time passed and no date for the negotiation was set, I made a nuisance of myself with Rogers and the White House stressing that Helsinki had been my last choice. It was unfit for winter negotiation. I even enlisted security people to point out the danger to the delegation from the many Soviet agents known to be operating in Finland. . . . Rogers felt that we had offered the Soviets a choice. They had accepted one and that amounted to a contract. I didn't at all like losing this first trick in the SALT game. Once located in Helsinki, it would be hard to switch. [. . .] I did manage to obtain guidance from the White House that the United States would not accept Helsinki as the site for subsequent phases of the negotiation. Later we had to compromise." (Smith, *Doubletalk*, page 78)

16. Paper Prepared in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency¹

ACDA-3356

Washington, June 11, 1969.

A “Stop Where We Are” Proposal for SALT²

I. Introduction

This paper examines the implications of a quantitative and qualitative freeze on all aspects of strategic offensive and defensive forces that are subject to adequate verification by national means. In view of the extent of our present and projected national intelligence resources, this essentially amounts to a proposal to “Stop Where We Are” (SWWA) with respect to strategic forces.

This proposal is more comprehensive than any of the alternative packages of constraints specifically covered in the NSSM-28 study.³ The detailed examination of the more limited packages considered in NSSM-28 focused attention on the potential advantages of a more comprehensive proposal. More limited proposals tend to deflect the strategic arms race to other permitted channels. Moreover, a more comprehensive approach would improve U.S. security by removing uncertainties associated with various aspects of the more limited proposals.

For example, the SWWA proposal would supplement the most comprehensive NSSM-28 Package IV (MIRV ban) by placing the following additional constraints on potential Soviet developments that could reduce our retaliatory capabilities:

1. Prohibition on improvements in the throw-weight and accuracy of present ICBM's and SLBM's; and
2. Prohibition on completion of the approximately 300 Soviet ICBM silos and 250 SLBM launchers currently under construction.

The SWWA proposal was not included in the original choice of NSSM-28 packages in an effort to simplify the scope of the study. By

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 22, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret. Smith sent this paper to Packard under cover of a June 12 memorandum. He also sent Kissinger a copy on June 12. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 873, SALT, Volume II, June–July 1969)

² In his memoirs, Smith summarized this proposal: “My MIRV ban proposals soon merged into a broader position called SWWA, ‘Stop Where We Are,’ which involved not only stopping MIRV testing but cessation of Soviet ICBM and SLBM launcher construction programs. [. . .] SWWA was based on a simple concept that the way to stop arms competition was to stop strategic construction programs on both sides.” (Smith, *Doubltalk*, p. 160)

³ See Document 14.

the time its full potential advantages were better understood as a result of the NSSM–28 study, it was decided that it was too late to undertake fundamental reorganization of the study to include this proposal, but that it should be studied in parallel as a separate exercise. This paper, therefore, examines the SWWA proposal in the general context of the NSSM–28 study so that it can be available for consideration as an additional possible alternative.

II. Description of “Stop Where We Are” (SWWA) Proposal

In this proposal, the numbers of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers would be frozen at present operational levels. Construction would be halted on all launchers which are verifiably not operational. ABM launchers and associated radars would also be frozen at present operational levels. Verifiable strategic offensive and defensive missile and launcher characteristics would also be frozen. For this purpose, all strategic missile flight testing would be prohibited, except for an agreed number of preannounced confidence firings of present types of missiles on agreed ranges. Numbers and external characteristics of strategic bombers and air-defense missile launchers would also be frozen at present levels. (A more precise description of the SWWA proposal and several possible variants appears at Tab A.)⁴

III. Rationale for SWWA Proposal

A SWWA agreement would preserve the present stable strategic balance, in which both sides have a confident second-strike capability and are far from achieving a first-strike capability. While the Package IV MIRV ban with a low ceiling on ABM levels would reduce the most imminent threats to this stability, the additional provisions of SWWA would block other destabilizing potential future developments and would minimize arms procurement pressures arising from uncertainties as to how an adversary might choose to utilize loopholes and hedges available under an agreement. More specifically, a SWWA arms control agreement would have the following implications:

1. A SWWA agreement would virtually eliminate the potential Soviet counterforce threat against the U.S. Minuteman force by preventing substantial improvements in missile throw-weight and accuracy. A MIRV ban (Package IV) would help to delay this potential Soviet threat but would not eliminate it, since the Soviets would still be able, sooner or later, to improve the accuracy and throw-weight of all their offensive strategic missiles. Although U.S. SLBM's and bombers would still have a large retaliatory capability, this path of development could permit the Soviets eventually to attain a capability to destroy most of the

⁴ Attached but not printed.

undefended U.S. Minuteman ICBM force as it is now constituted. A SWWA agreement, however, would effectively prevent the Soviets from making significant improvements in the throw-weight of their ICBM's. It would also preclude their testing, and hence deployment, of a new generation of less-blunt reentry vehicles which are necessary to achieve high accuracy. For reasons explained below, this restriction would prevent the Soviet Union from improving their large force of SS-11's to have sufficient accuracy to threaten the bulk of the U.S. Minuteman force.

2. By prohibiting missile flight-testing (other than confidence-firing of present types), SWWA would improve our confidence that the Soviets were not developing MIRV's or other missile improvements. It is highly unlikely that any nation would deploy a major new strategic weapon system which it could not flight-test, and even more unlikely that it would have the confidence to rely on such an untested weapon system for a counterforce first-strike. Thus, the verifiability of any agreement limiting missile characteristics is directly related to the degree that flight tests of improved systems can be restricted. Our ability to detect any illegal testing would be enhanced by our being able to focus our national means on the limited number of pre-announced confidence-firings and the space shots. Furthermore, diversion of a significant number of the limited quota of permitted confidence-firings in any attempt at illegal developmental flight tests would necessarily reduce the Soviets' confidence in the reliability of their deployed, permitted missile systems.

3. The Soviet Union now has approximately 300 ICBM silos and 250 SLBM launchers under construction. A SWWA agreement would prevent the Soviets from completing these launchers; such completion would increase the total Soviet strategic offensive missile force by about 45 percent.

4. Freezing the number and verifiable characteristics of SAM systems would increase our confidence that existing Soviet SAM's would not be clandestinely improved to acquire an ABM capability and would preclude the possibility that new SAM systems with a possible dual ABM capability might be introduced. If SAM's are frozen, a strategic bomber freeze would also appear desirable to the U.S. since the U.S. now has a major quantitative and qualitative lead over the Soviet Union in strategic bombers—an advantage that it is in our interest to maintain. There may, however, be some difficulty in negotiating mutually satisfactory definitions of such terms as "strategic bomber" and "external characteristics".

5. A SWWA agreement would prevent both sides from building a strategically significant ABM system, but under such an agreement neither side would need an ABM system to defend its ICBM force. Conversely, the assurance that ABM levels will be kept very low removes both sides' incentive to deploy MIRV's. A variant to the basic SWWA

proposal which would permit a small U.S. ABM system against Chinese or accidental attacks, could be considered.

6. It is difficult to predict what the Soviet reaction to a SWWA proposal might be. While SWWA favors the U.S. in terms of the strategic balance, it might appeal to Soviet desires to ease their economic burdens.

7. While a SWWA agreement would preserve the present U.S. lead in numbers and characteristics of most strategic weapon systems, it would preclude many U.S. plans and options to improve these systems. We would, however, still be able to carry out a number of hedges or safeguards for those threats the SWWA agreement did not remove, including the threats of abrogation or evasion of the agreement. For example, we could very effectively hedge against any clandestine ABM deployments by developing improved exoatmospheric penetration aids and by further hardening of ICBM and SLBM reentry vehicles. As a further example, we would improve the reliability of our missiles and reduce their vulnerability to a variety of threats such as nuclear pindown.

8. If a SWWA agreement were abrogated, and the USSR had kept its ABM or MIRV production facilities in a higher readiness state than did the U.S., the Soviets might be able to improve their relative strategic posture to some extent, at least temporarily.

9. A SWWA agreement should provide the U.S. with far greater budgetary savings, both short-term and long-term, than any alternative which permits substantial new strategic weapons programs. If such an agreement were reached this year, FY-71 savings alone could amount to as much as \$5 billion.

IV. Verification

The CIA estimates that a SWWA agreement could be verified with high confidence (see Tab B).⁵ Because all strategic systems would be constrained under SWWA, there would theoretically be a broad spectrum of possible types of violations. The verification task, however, would in fact be eased considerably in many respects under SWWA, since *detecting changes* in Soviet deployments or tests would be much easier than *distinguishing* between the permitted and prohibited changes that would be involved under the other packages. For example, in monitoring flight tests, we would only have to watch for departures from the well-documented signatures of present Soviet missiles; we would not need to try to deduce the purpose of a new test program, which might be accompanied by efforts at concealment and deception from its very beginning. Furthermore, the limitation on the number of flight tests, in addition to presenting the potential violator

⁵ Attached but not printed.

with the formidable problems mentioned earlier, would ease the problems faced by the verifier. The significantly smaller number of pre-announced tests on agreed ranges would allow considerable focusing of U.S. intelligence collection and analysis capabilities.

Our capabilities to verify the significant new provisions of SWWA deserve special attention:

1. The restrictions on flight testing can be monitored with our present collection capabilities if Soviet tests are carried out at existing test ranges. Were the Soviets to attempt such tests at new and remote launch facilities today, we could not assure detection of shorter range tests. We are confident, however, that no unidentified flight-test ranges exist or are under construction in the Soviet Union, and we would probably become aware of them within a very few months if such construction were started. By the time a new test range attained operational status, our planned collection sources would provide high-confidence assessments of the activity involved. In any event, our planned systems would give high confidence of detection of any unannounced strategic missile launchings.

2. [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

3. [1 paragraph (17 lines) not declassified]

4. Freezing the number and verifiable characteristics of SAM systems would increase our confidence that Soviet SAM's would not be clandestinely improved to acquire an ABM capability or that new dual-purpose systems might be deployed.

5. While the need to detect land-mobile missiles and possible retrofitting of ICBM's at IRBM launchers exists under all the alternative packages, the SWWA constraints on testing would somewhat reduce the difficulties of these tasks.

V. Strategic Analysis

A. Strategic Exchange Calculations

Strategic exchange calculations were carried out to determine retaliatory capabilities of U.S. and Soviet forces under this agreement. Assumptions regarding scenarios, alert rates, reliabilities, effectiveness of penetration aids, etc., were consistent with those used in the NSSM-28 report. Detailed listings of U.S. and Soviet force levels and characteristics assumed are given at Tab C.⁶ It should be noted that we assumed modest improvements in the CEP's of Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's in spite of the fact that efforts to achieve such improvements would be contrary to the agreement. It was assumed that neither side relied upon pen-aids in either first or second strikes.

⁶ Attached but not printed.

1. Deterrence

Table I shows the retaliatory capability of the U.S. and USSR under SWWA and under Packages III and IV.

Table I
Retaliatory Capability in 1978

	Percent Soviet Fatalities	Percent U.S. Fatalities
Option III (0 ABM)	40	43
Option IV (0 ABM)	38	54
SWWA	42	45

If both sides had 500 area ABM's or a Safeguard ABM system, the U.S. retaliatory capability would drop to about 37 percent Soviet fatalities and Soviet retaliatory capability would be slightly less. A fall-back from SWWA that allowed the Soviets to complete all ICBM and SLBM launchers now under construction would cause a decrease of less than 1% in U.S. retaliatory capabilities and would improve slightly the Soviets' retaliatory capabilities.

2. Damage Limiting

Under SWWA neither side would have any incentive to strike first, since both would incur over 125 million fatalities in retaliation from a preemptive attack on the opponent. Essentially, SWWA preserves the damage-limiting capabilities of both sides at their present levels and thereby inhibits either from attempting to achieve a credible first-strike capability.

3. Survivability of U.S. Strategic Forces

One of the most striking effects of SWWA is the greatly enhanced survivability of our present ICBM force compared to the other packages as shown in Table II.

Table II
Percent of Land-Based ICBM's
Surviving a First Strike (1978)

	U.S.	Soviet
Package III	4	24
Package III with hard-rock silos	25	77
Package IV	30	62
SWWA	79	71

These figures assume that there is no ABM protection for ICBM's. For comparison, in Package III with an ABM defense consisting of 500

area interceptors and 2000 hard-point interceptors, only about half the U.S. ICBM force would survive.

The reason for the greater survivability of U.S. ICBM's under this package is the absence of Soviet MIRV's and the restrictions on significant improvements in the accuracy and throw-weights of Soviet ICBM's, particularly the SS-11 and its follow-on missile. Some people have urged that a limitation on throw-weights alone should be a part of an agreement. While this would serve to lessen the Soviet counterforce threat somewhat, it would not do so sufficiently unless the development of high accuracies was also restricted, since accuracy is a more significant parameter in determining counterforce capability. The SS-9 is now a potentially effective counterforce weapon, but there are less than 200 currently operational. The numerous SS-11's, on the other hand, already possess the throw-weight needed to become a counterforce threat *if* CEP's on the order of 0.25 nm. are achieved. The Intelligence Community estimates that such accuracies are within future Soviet capabilities, but that they would require significant improvements in guidance and RV characteristics. SWWA is the only proposed approach which would preclude such improvements.

The high survivability of the U.S. ICBM force under SWWA would mean that U.S. retaliatory capabilities could be maintained without reliance upon missile penetration aids or bombers for ABM levels up to about 1,000 interceptors. In fact, under SWWA at present ABM levels, ICBM's alone could kill 35 percent of the Soviet population after absorbing a Soviet first strike.

Finally, the survivability of U.S. bombers could also be improved because of the truncating of the Soviet SLBM program.

4. Sensitivity to Soviet Violations

Under such a comprehensive measure, the question of cheating must be considered carefully, since one might expect that the sensitivity to cheating would be greater than under less restrictive measures. However, it must be recognized that cheating would be much more difficult to carry out successfully under a comprehensive measure as discussed in Section IV above.

We have examined the case in which the Soviets violate the agreement by adding 300 ICBM's to their force (SS-9's and SS-11's)⁷ and found that the U.S. retaliatory capability remains above 40%. We also examined the case in which the Soviets violate the Basic SWWA Agreement

⁷ The SS-9 and SS-11 were Soviet ICBMs. The high accuracy and yield of the SS-9 made it a threat to U.S. ICBMs. The SS-11 was the Soviet counterpart to the U.S. Minuteman system in quantity, size, and purpose. It was believed to be effective only against soft targets.

by adding 500 area ABM interceptors. In this event, the U.S. retaliatory capability would drop to 35 percent (26 percent with ICBM's alone).

VI. Safeguards

Since one of the purposes of SWWA would be to reduce Soviet options for increasing their strategic capabilities, it is not surprising that the number of hedges available to the U.S. would also be less than under other measures. Nevertheless, several important hedges would still be available to us, such as the following:

1. MIRV's

The SWWA freeze would leave the U.S. with a lead in MIRV technology. MIRV production lines could be kept available on a standby basis. In the event the Soviets cheated on ABM restrictions, the U.S. probably could deploy MIRV's for ABM penetration with little or no further flight testing, depending upon when the agreement took effect. Such deployments could be made fairly rapidly on Minuteman. Poseidon retrofits would take considerably longer because of the extensive launcher modifications required.

2. Penetration Aids

Improved exo-atmospheric penetration aids could be tested and deployed. This would be sufficient to give us high confidence that we could penetrate an area ABM defense or an SAM air-defense system which had been upgraded for point-in-space RV intercepts.

3. Increased Missile Hardening

Missile guidance systems and reentry vehicles could be further hardened so long as external characteristics remained unchanged. This would be a hedge against both ABM cheating and possible pindown counterforce attacks.

4. Bombers

The number of strategic bombers currently deployed could be maintained rather than cut in half as now planned. Bomber alert rates could be increased, and bombers could be dispersed to additional bases. Bomber performance and armament could be improved, as long as the external appearance of the bomber remained the same.

VII. Negotiability

Little is known of Soviet views concerning the preferred scope of a strategic arms limitation agreement. On balance, we believe that the Soviets would probably favor a simply defined agreement with broad application and would tend to be suspicious of any significant loopholes which the U.S. wanted to keep open.

Chairman Kosygin told Robert McNamara on November 11, 1968, that it would be absurd for the two superpowers to continue to accumulate strategic armaments. "Both sides have enough", he said.⁸ While this statement probably should not be interpreted too literally, it does seem plausible that a relatively simple agreement to "stop where we are" may be easier to negotiate than one with loopholes which permit significant new strategic weapon developments by either side.

If, as seems likely, the Soviets hope to achieve some easing of the economic burdens of the strategic arms race through SALT, they would have an additional incentive for favoring an agreement like SWWA (see Section VIII).

VIII. Economic Implications

NSSM-28 estimates the annual cost of Packages I-IV during FY 70-74 at \$15.5 billion. Implementation of certain "safeguards" permitted under these packages could cost an additional \$3.3 billion annually, raising the total annual cost to \$18.8 billion.

Under SWWA, the estimated annual cost during this period would be \$13.9 to \$14.4 billion, thereby saving a total of \$4.4 to \$4.9 billion per year. The total five-year savings would be approximately \$22 to \$25 billion.

IX. Moratorium During Negotiations

Some of the advantages of a SWWA agreement to the U.S. would be reduced if the Soviets continued to build ICBM silos and SLBM submarines and carry on MRV or MIRV flight testing during the SALT negotiations. The Soviet Union is currently building about 250 ICBM launchers and 100 SLBM launchers per year, [*1½ lines not declassified*].

Therefore, the U.S. may wish to propose, early in the negotiations, a temporary moratorium on construction of strategic missile launchers and on certain types of flight testing during the SALT negotiations. In addition to providing an earlier halt to Soviet strategic missile launcher construction and MRV testing, such a moratorium would have the added advantage of minimizing Soviet incentives to prolong the negotiations in order to improve their strategic position.

⁸ See *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, Document 314.

17. Minutes of a Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, June 12, 1969, 2:05–3:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

NSSM 28—Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State	AEC
Richard F. Pedersen	Allen Labowitz
Philip Farley	USIA
Donald McHenry	Henry Loomis
Defense	ACDA
G. Warren Nutter	Gerard Smith
Ivan Selin	Spurgeon Keeny, Jr.
Yuan-li Wu	OST
CIA	Vincent McRae
R. Jack Smith	Treasury
JCS	Anthony Jurich
Maj. Gen. Royal B. Allison	NSC Staff
OEP	Morton Halperin
Haakon Lindjord	William Hyland
	Winston Lord
	Laurence Lynn
	Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

It was agreed that the first NSC meeting on SALT would focus on the scope of an arms limitation agreement and on exposure to major issues, such as ABM, MIRV, verification, and bombers/air defense. Certain optional arms control packages shown in the Summary Report,² plus ACDA's Stop Where We Are proposal,³ would be used as illustrations of limited, intermediary, and comprehensive measures. Based on the first NSC examination of this topic and Presidential guidance, an executive committee would then draw up two or three concrete SALT packages for further NSC consideration. The Review Group went through the Summary NSSM 28 Report and agreed to several drafting

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes Originals 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Halperin forwarded the minutes to Kissinger under a covering memorandum on June 16.

² Document 14.

³ Document 16.

additions and changes. The NSC staff would incorporate these modifications and check them with ACDA. The revised summary paper would then be recirculated to Review Group members for their concurrence for forwarding to the NSC.

General Discussion—NSC Handling

Kissinger had a general observation at the outset. He said that the NSSM 28 Report should represent a continuation of the NSSM 3 study,⁴ and was not competitive nor an alternative. The basic principles that govern consideration of our strategic force posture should govern our SALT preparations. Our general security objectives should be valid for both subjects. Some principles that are settled in the strategic forces discussion should be considered with the imminence of arms talks in mind. While we should not foreclose arms control options, neither should we construct two different frameworks. NSC meetings on these topics should lead logically from one to the other. He had considered inserting these points in the NSSM 28 summary report, but was not insistent upon this.

He then suggested that the group focus on what we were trying to achieve in the NSC meeting so as to make the paper more useful for NSC discussion. What decisions did we want the President to make, what issues should he principally focus on? He wondered, for instance, why the four options in the summary were selected when there could be many others. He asked G. Smith whether the intent was to give two illustrative options for a limited agreement and two for a comprehensive one.

G. Smith replied that the Steering Group had considered a broad spectrum of options,⁵ especially comprehensive ones, but the JCS had been convincing that it was preferable to concentrate on a more modest approach. Fewer options made strategic analysis an easier task. He had not thought of the four options as representing two limited agreement packages and two comprehensive ones, since he considered the first three rather limited and only the fourth one could be called comprehensive.

Allison believed that the third package was reasonably comprehensive, while the fourth one went further by banning MIRVs. He thought that the mix of the four packages raised most items for examination one way or another and constituted a fair document for analysis.

⁴ See Document 4 and footnote 2, Document 12.

⁵ All references to options and sections are to those set forth in the NSSM 28 report, the summary of which is Document 14.

G. Smith pointed out that none of the packages should be labeled negotiating positions; they were purely illustrative. Kissinger said that this answered one of his questions, for he did not believe that the President could be asked to pass on these options as negotiating packages. G. Smith thought that the first NSC meeting would be largely educational and would produce no specific negotiating decisions.

Kissinger agreed that the first meeting would treat fundamental issues in order to focus a second meeting on decisions. The question was which issues should be highlighted. He thought that the summary report's packages were useful if they served to illustrate general principles, the sorts of packages that might come under a limited, intermediary or comprehensive agreement. He believed this gave G. Smith more flexibility, using the packages not as directives but rather as illustrations of general objectives. This would give G. Smith more room for varying the mix of the packages.

G. Smith responded that after the first NSC meeting he would like to see an executive committee focus on negotiating positions. These would not just be broad options, but rather two or three real life possibilities which the executive committee would take as long as was necessary to develop. He believed that with some Presidential guidance the committee could put together such real life proposals. In response to Kissinger's question, he thought that the four options in the summary paper served the purposes of focusing discussion and illustrating the principles. He agreed with Kissinger that these should not be construed as negotiating positions but rather were examples,—e.g., option 1 illustrated a limited agreement, option 3 an intermediary one, and the Stop Where We Are (SWWA) proposal a comprehensive one.

Kissinger said that he had seen SWWA but understood that it had never been formally addressed in the interagency machinery. G. Smith said that there had been strategic and CIA analysis of this proposal. Kissinger commented that he had not seen this analysis and Keeny confirmed that SWWA had not been considered in the NSSM 28 machinery. G. Smith said that it had been tabled at the Steering Group. It could be one document to be considered as an option by the executive committee that he had proposed. Pedersen suggested that it could also be treated at the first NSC meeting, and G. Smith rejoined that this depended on how detailed a discussion the NSC would get into.

Kissinger did not want to throw at the President options on specific systems. The mind boggles at the possible combinations of negotiating positions, and it was not fair to ask the President to make specific choices. He himself did not fully understand the rationale of all the options in the paper. SWWA was a concern all by itself and should go before the President at some point. In addressing a fluid arms situation (as opposed to a complete halt) he believed we should think in

terms of general criteria, using the study's packages as illustrations to demonstrate what we mean by comprehensive and limited agreements. Once the President decides the scope of agreement he wishes, then the executive committee study could come up with realistic proposals.

G. Smith found this procedure satisfactory, and, if the JCS agreed, he suggested option 1 to illustrate a limited agreement, option 3 an intermediary one, and SWWA a comprehensive one. Selin interjected that the distinction between options 1 and 2 was quite arbitrary—if one limited a few weapons systems, there are many possible choices. However, he thought the distinction between options 3 and 4 had a certain logic. Option 4 was basically the SWWA proposal. Nutter believed, and Kissinger agreed, that these questions could not be considered separately from verification problems. Kissinger repeated that the options could be used as illustrations of general principles. Selin believed that options 3 and 4 were quite close to being negotiating positions (in structural terms) as opposed to the first two options.

Kissinger summarized that the first NSC discussion would center on general principles which would guide the composition of concrete proposals, while the second meeting would focus on the positions developed in the interim. Farley agreed; he noted that option 4 was closer to SWWA than it was to option 3. Allison also agreed that the first meeting should expose issues and examine certain critical features and then the executive committee could draft proposals. With regard to G. Smith's suggestions on which options to use as illustrations, he did not believe that SWWA should be part of NSSM 28, for it had not received the same type of examination as the other packages.

Kissinger wondered what decisions should be made in the first meeting on the basis of the summary report. He suggested the scope of the agreement desired and MIRV and ABM-type questions as suitable subjects. G. Smith agreed that the first NSC meeting should resolve ABM levels and the question of a MIRV ban, for otherwise the executive committee could not develop proposals. Pedersen noted the importance of relating the ABM and MIRV questions to the different approaches. G. Smith added that verification should also get a great deal of attention. He had found it paradoxical that the verification problem was more manageable the greater the scope of the agreement. He would have thought that it might be just the opposite. Kissinger said that he was not surprised.

Kissinger summarized the group's consensus that the first NSC meeting would examine the scope of an arms control agreement, and would expose the principals to the major issues, including ABM, MIRV, and verification. Selin declared that bombers and air defense should also be considered. With regard to this point, Kissinger wondered whether we knew what subjects the Soviets are likely to raise. G. Smith

said that the Soviets last year had indicated an interest in bombers by saying that they wish to discuss “armaments” rather than merely “missiles”. Halperin remarked that this referred to offensive systems only. Selin agreed, and noted that we believed that if bombers were to be discussed, then air defenses would have to be also.

US and Soviet Objectives (IIA)

Kissinger asked the group whether it believed that the summary report provided an adequate basis for NSC discussion. Nutter replied that he had a problem with the discussion of US objectives. He believed that there should be mention of Soviet objectives in the summary report; this subject was covered in an annex. He passed out a suggested paragraph⁶ (to go between IIA and IIB) concerning Soviet motives and interests. He had some problems with the annex’s discussion of this subject, believing that a number of assumptions concerning the Soviet position were more positively stated than he would have thought possible. Perhaps there may be more than one Soviet objective and that these were not necessarily mutually exclusive. They might share our concerns but also have other objectives as well. This topic was important as negotiations go forward, so that we have a means to probe their intent. Kissinger commented that he was going to make the same point on Soviet objectives and asked G. Smith whether he had problems with Nutter’s suggestion. G. Smith replied that he did not, but J. Smith wished to reserve on this question. He wondered about the symmetry of the paper, with Soviet concerns getting fuller treatment than our own in the Nutter paragraph. The summary report deals with objectives, while the suggested additional paragraph delved into interests and motives. G. Smith thought that it was useful to recall that the Soviets have a number of objectives and interests, not all of them cooperative with us. He was not sure about the precise language but thought it was useful to make this point. There followed a brief discussion of this question which included Selin’s observation that the Soviets would save much money under arms control while we would not and J. Smith’s rejoinder that this depended on whether one considered the short term or long term. Nutter felt that his paragraph was necessarily asymmetrical with the one in the summary report, since we know our own objectives, but we do not know Soviet ones. J. Smith did not believe that the suggested language constituted a full analysis of Soviet interests, and Nutter replied that it purported only to be a summary. J. Smith said that he was happy to join OSD in drafting some language, and Pedersen said that State should have a look at this also. A balanced view was needed—it was more accurate to say that the Soviets do not want the

⁶ Not found.

relative strategic position to change in our favor rather than stating, as in the recommended paragraph, that they seek to improve their position. Nutter repeated that he did not agree with the Annex's treatment of this question. Pedersen doubted that the Soviets were really striving to improve their position along the lines of Nutter's language.

Kissinger preferred to show real differences of opinion rather than coming up with agreed language. He believed the paper should show that some believe that the Soviets want to improve their position while others interpreted their motives as stated in the Annex. Selin believed that the differences of view were not so great; in treating Soviet objectives one must compare the situation to one without an arms agreement. Kissinger said that one school believed that they wished to improve their relative strategic position through arms talks rather than an arms race, while a second school believed that they had essentially the same motives as we do. It was better to state this issue clearly than to fudge it.

G. Smith did not believe the issue was that serious. If the Soviets enter arms talks, it will be because they hope to improve their absolute position, whether strategic or economic. He thought it was useful to flag the fact that they might have interests that are not necessarily constructive for us, that we should be alert to the possibility that they are masking their real motives. J. Smith wondered what was the operative point in this issue. He believed that the principals had already considered these points. Allison thought a cautionary note about Soviet interests would be useful and was not necessarily inconsistent with the Annex. Nutter said that his language looked forward—it was more important for the negotiations themselves than for this paper. In considering the various packages we should keep in mind that the advantages we see in them won't obtain if the assumptions prove wrong. Selin noted one operative difference—if the Soviets sought a better relative position versus us, then there would be a big problem.

Kissinger said that our analysis of the implications of arms control packages was more important than possible Soviet motives. He said that either disagreed positions on Soviet objectives could be inserted for the consideration of the principals or perhaps State/ACDA could accept the OSD language. G. Smith believed that stating disagreed positions would appear more mysterious than the issue really warranted. In response to Pedersen's question, Keeny said that the treatment of Soviet motives in the Annex was done by State and then reviewed by the Steering Group. Sonnenfeldt did not believe that it was fruitful to speculate on Soviet motives. If the US and USSR agreed on a package and our analysis demonstrated that it was acceptable to us, we would not need to care about the Soviet motives. The latter perhaps affects their reason for entering into arms talks, but it does not

really affect our analysis or the desirability of various options. Nutter suggested that you cannot assume that if the Soviets talk to us they will reach agreement with us. Selin relayed Packard's view that no one really knows the Soviets' objectives and we need not speculate on them. We should agree on an arms control package and then we can find out their motives.

Kissinger said that he would like in the paper a complex set of Soviet motivations. Although it made no operative difference, it would reflect a greater rigor in the analysis. It was then agreed that Nutter and J. Smith would work together for agreed language on this issue.

Scope of Agreement (IIB)

Kissinger said that the first two pages of the report covered the issues that had been outlined earlier in the discussion, i.e., what scope of agreement we want. He wondered whether it would be useful to insert in this section language that related it to options found at the end of the paper, in order to illustrate criteria. He thought the present version read abstractly without the concrete illustrations later on. G. Smith suggested language like "limited measure, *such as* option 1" etc. Kissinger believed there should also be some discussion of criteria, and Pedersen wondered whether these could be stated in a shorthand way. Kissinger repeated that it would be helpful to have some criteria to illustrate what one means by limited or comprehensive and, he would add, intermediary settlements. This need not be conclusive treatment but would suggest what limited and other measures attempt to accomplish. G. Smith suggested, and Nutter agreed, that he could provide language on criteria for this section. Kissinger noted that he should add an intermediary option to limited and comprehensive measures. Kissinger suggested that SWWA be considered separately, for this section considered negotiations while an arms race continued. G. Smith pointed out that arms talks could take place during a moratorium. Kissinger replied that, from G. Smith's point of view, it would be preferable to use option 4 as an example of a comprehensive agreement, and not only SWWA which would not be favorably received by some. G. Smith agreed that it seemed sensible to offer option 4 as an example as well as noting SWWA.

Moratorium (IIC)

Having reached agreement on page 2, Kissinger asked whether the section on Moratorium was a fair statement of the issues. G. Smith noted that the Soviet missile force was 55% completed and 45% under construction. In this situation, moratorium has a powerful logic, which had not occurred to him till he had studied the figures. In response to Pedersen's query whether a moratorium included a halt of construction, G. Smith said that we could propose this. Allison believed that

there could be substantial negotiations just on the specifics of a moratorium, e.g., at what phase construction must cease, at what level you could continue, etc. This was a complex question.

Kissinger said that he had problems with the moratorium section and that it would help the President to list the pros and cons of various moratorium options. SWWA would constitute a complete moratorium, and one could also discuss a moratorium on MIRVs, ABM construction, etc. He thought that these moratorium options, with their relation to one another and pros and cons, would be helpful to focus the discussion. Keeny said that this would have to be selective, since there were a multitude of combinations. Kissinger agreed that not all variables should be listed, but believed that there should be illustrations of the general principles. Certainly a MIRV moratorium should be addressed. Selin remarked that even stopping MIRV was a complex question, and Farley noted the importance of the length of the moratorium. Kissinger asked whether a moratorium paper could be produced quickly. After a brief exchange it was agreed that a few paragraphs without elaborate discussion could be provided in a few days. Kissinger stressed the importance of showing pros and cons. In response to G. Smith's suggestion that the relationship of a moratorium to the negotiations be treated, Allison said that it would be difficult to produce a paper promptly on this question. Kissinger believed that if the moratorium issue were presented to the President in the form presently used in the paper, he would probably rule against it. It was finally decided that the section would be revised and ACDA would produce a page or two on the moratorium issue, with pros and cons, to go at the end of the paper.

Verification (IID)

Kissinger then took up this section. Allison said that the JCS were not in complete agreement with this part of the paper. Kissinger said that he preferred stated differences rather than agreed papers. Allison noted that the disagreement on verifying a MIRV prohibition was covered under the cons on page 11, but believed it would also be useful to state it here on page 3. J. Smith said that there had been much discussion on this issue and that there was virtual agreement. Selin said that there was a substantive question concerning definition. There was a flat statement that we would know if the Soviets started testing MIRVs, but this rests on the assumption that other systems were banned. A MIRV ban to be effectively policed depended on what else one was willing to give up in an agreement. J. Smith said that the statements of our intelligence capabilities have been thoroughly worked over and related to arms agreements. The judgments rested on the assumption that an arms agreement would permit us to use our intelligence tools effectively.

Kissinger said that two types of papers were possible. There are those with which everyone is happy through subjective interpretation—

thus vagueness was helpful. He believed a second type of paper was more useful to the President, one that let him know what issues were behind vague phrases and let him see disagreements on judgments. He suggested that one could state here that the vast majority thought that we could verify a MIRV prohibition through a ban on flight testing, while a minority disagreed.

It was finally agreed that in addition to this being mentioned on page 11 it would also be included on page 3, so that all the main points on verification would be in one place. Kissinger asked Sonnenfeldt to keep track of these and other drafting changes.

Keeny noted the extensive efforts of the intelligence community on this question. Selin noted OSD agreement with CIA's evaluation of the verification of a MIRV ban, but repeated his point that a flat statement rested on the need to have other systems banned which might be unacceptable.

Lynn questioned the emphasis of this section which appeared to be that national means of verification are adequate to protect our interests. He wondered what positive results might come from inspection, and Kissinger said that this was covered on page 3. Lynn replied he was not clear what "on site inspection" meant. Kissinger suggested that this was considered an end in itself. Selin stated that the importance of inspection had changed greatly since last year, for we now understand the Tallinn system. Allison declared that on site inspection does increase our confidence in an agreement. Hyland noted this general point about increasing confidence, and suggested putting in specific examples of where inspection would be helpful in this regard. Sonnenfeldt said that this was an important consideration and that there should be examples of where we would have greater confidence. He added that some forms of inspection also increase deterrence. Kissinger noted that inspection therefore was not just an end in itself but in some areas would objectively increase our confidence. J. Smith said that this was true of only some weapons systems. Sonnenfeldt declared that inspection would be useful to prove Soviet compliance with agreements to those who are skeptical about national means of verification. This will be a difficult issue at some point.

Kissinger wondered what the NSC should address, for everyone is in favor of on site inspection. The problem arises if one poses the choice between inspection and no agreement at all. Therefore if this question was to be discussed we need first of all examples of where inspection is useful, and secondly discussion of what price we would be willing to pay for inspection. G. Smith said that he should have ready by Monday (June 16) a technical analysis of where on site inspection would be useful. Selin thought that Sonnenfeldt's excellent point about proving Soviet compliance should also be included.

J. Smith said that we now know with some degree of confidence what we can and cannot verify with national means.

Kissinger summarized that verification is a question of the principle itself, deterrence, and public opinion; a paragraph or two was needed to explain this. Selin suggested also the insertion on page 3 of the page 11 language on MIRV verification, while J. Smith suggested adding a consideration of how verification is linked to various packages. There was further brief discussion during which Kissinger repeated that language was needed to explain inspection, why the issue was raised, and to what end inspection might be useful.

Kissinger wondered whether there was sufficient explanation of the possibility of converting IRBMs to ICBMs (D5). Selin said that this was explained elsewhere, and Kissinger suggested adding a sentence at this point. There was a brief discussion on the implications of IR/MRBM upgrading and its possible impact on our European allies. G. Smith wondered whether an ICBM could be fired, e.g., for 1500 miles, and Selin said that it depended on the design. This could be done through inefficient designing of ICBMs so that two stages would be used for Europe and three for the United States.

Other General Considerations (II E–H)

Kissinger wondered what evidence we had that the Soviets would want a comprehensive agreement. G. Smith mentioned their past positions on General and Complete Disarmament, a total nuclear test ban, and complete demilitarization of the seabeds. Kissinger noted that in certain cases they had settled for less than comprehensive arrangements. He thought it would be more accurate for the paper to say that we expect the Soviets “to ask for an agreement of broad coverage”. Loomis noted the propaganda element in past Soviet positions on comprehensive agreements. He thought that they might back off in certain cases if we indicated a willingness to conclude a comprehensive measure.

Kissinger thought that the first sentence in Section F (*US-Soviet Political Relations*) constituted a circular argument (with regard to our starting talks indicating our desire to negotiate). Selin commented that the second sentence (concerning a US decision not to begin negotiations) had more meaning. Halperin believed that both sentences concerned an incongruous issue not raised in the paper, namely, should we start arms control talks? He wondered whether this was really an issue in the government. Kissinger noted that there seemed to be a definite trend in the US government toward initiation of talks.

Sonnenfeldt felt that the last sentence in F (suggesting the positive effect of an arms agreement on US-Soviet political relations) was troublesome. The assumptions used for the various options in the paper, i.e., that the Soviets would do the maximum permissible under each

agreement, were not consistent with predictions of détente in this section. The paper should at least allow for a variegated pattern of US-Soviet relations that could leave the military dangers as great as they would be without an agreement. Selin noted that the Europeans' perceptions may change when an agreement confirms rough parity. Sonnenfeldt repeated that prospects for détente were not borne out by the analysis of the options. Kissinger noted that they were also not borne out by history. G. Smith suggested, and the group agreed, to eliminate this last paragraph in section F. Sonnenfeldt suggested that the whole paragraph was expendable, but Pedersen disagreed.

Kissinger then raised *NATO Reactions* (Section G). Lindjord suggested language underlining the importance of consultations with our allies. Selin noted that the net effect of a MIRV ban would be less total coverage for European targets, though not necessarily less relative coverage. Sonnenfeldt believed this was an important point. G. Smith said that the allies had been told this for years. Kissinger believed that there was the same problem here as there was in the strategic posture paper, namely weighing what the Europeans say versus what they actually think. He did not believe that there was that much unanimity on SALT. He felt that it was at least open to question whether a comprehensive agreement would be that welcome to Europeans once it was a fact of life. G. Smith commented that the next 20 days should inform us on this question. Kissinger recalled that when the President was talking with NATO foreign ministers, Dutch Foreign Minister Luns said that the prospect of parity was one of the most shocking things he had heard. This was an illustration of the differences between general public statements and gut feelings among many Europeans. SALT will create problems, even though it is only making explicit what is already a fact and thus does not create a new military equation. These were not arguments against arms talks but merely point up a problem that we should be aware of and that G. Smith would encounter. He believed our allied consultations will surface many problems, and that therefore this paragraph in the paper was misleading.

Farley thought that the paper's language was more balanced than that. There are many others on the European scene besides those, like Luns, who have come through past wars. For the younger generation which has not shared the same experiences, SALT is a crucial issue. Kissinger said that he was not completely against the paragraph, but merely wished to introduce another perspective. Farley thought that the problem was covered in the discussion of specific problems. Pedersen believed that specific weapons issues might cause European concerns, but from an overall point of view they would still want a comprehensive agreement. Kissinger believed that the paper should call attention to the fact that SALT raises delicate problems in NATO rela-

tions without prejudging the outcome of our consultations. He thought that we should come out alright with our allies if they are handled well.

Nutter remarked that at the NPG meeting he attended the Europeans were concerned about what subjects would be discussed in SALT, including MIRVs. Kissinger said that visitors to the President express disquiet about SALT, although they do not oppose going ahead. In response to G. Smith's suggestion that there was more curiosity than disquiet, Kissinger said that disquiet was more accurate. G. Smith said that our consultation experience to date in 1969 had exposed no real problems except for the possibility of a US-Soviet condominium. Kissinger believed that there would be trouble once serious consultations got underway. Farley agreed that Europeans would be concerned about possible outcomes on various issues.

Kissinger then raised the subject of *Cost Savings* (II H). G. Smith said that SWWA would result in substantial savings. Kissinger wondered what adjectives like "significant" savings really meant. Sonnenfeldt said that for all the options discussed in the summary report there would be about one billion dollars in savings. Hyland noted that this was the average per year over the 10 year period under the most comprehensive arrangements. Kissinger thought that the paper should state concretely what we might save. Keeny noted the difficulties of ten year projections, and Kissinger replied that no figures at all would make the paper less satisfactory than approximate figures. Lynn believed that, given the current great interest in the DOD budget, the paper should clearly state the facts to dispell the presumption that great savings would occur through arms talks. Selin agreed that arms control was not the way to resolve money allocation problems. G. Smith thought that SWWA was an exception to this, but Selin believed that even under this arrangement, expenditures on larger warheads would mean that there would not be great savings. Kissinger said that the paper should make a point that there would not be major savings and indicate the order of savings that would accrue, except for SWWA which would be higher. Keeny said that there would not be any great immediate savings because present programs would not be affected. But SWWA would result in a couple of billion dollars saved. G. Smith said that this could be stated as one or two percent of the defense budget. Pedersen wondered whether savings referred to budget reductions or to avoidance of future spending. Keeny repeated that one cannot generalize over a ten year period. Sonnenfeldt noted the basic point that savings would not be large, but Pedersen referred to the possibility of substantial savings by avoiding major programs. Sonnenfeldt wondered how much the intelligence budget would go up under an arms control agreement. Kissinger recalled that the strategic budget was not a large part of defense spending. He concluded that the report should

state savings in concrete terms rather than using adjectives. G. Smith mentioned some possible figures for SWWA, but admitted that he did not have high confidence in them. These range between 4.4 and 4.5 billion dollars per year or 20–25 billion dollars over 5 years. Kissinger asked that the drafters get together for concrete figures to be used, except for SWWA which should result in greater savings.

Weapons Systems Issues (III)

Selin believed that the last sentence on page 8 linking ABM levels and MIRV decisions was misleading. For example, one could allow MIRVs and low ABM levels. There followed a brief discussion between Selin and Kissinger on the effects of various levels of ABM defenses, with Kissinger inquiring about the significance for stability of high ABM levels. Selin noted the importance of how countries get to high ABM levels and the factor of uncertainty concerning their effectiveness. He said that without MIRVs one had to begin worrying when the other side's ABM levels reached somewhere between 500 and 1000. Kissinger concluded that at higher ABM levels the capabilities of both sides suffered.

Kissinger questioned the use of the specific figure of 200, e.g., instead of 500, in the discussion of a low level ABM on page 9.

Selin replied that this was approximate and referred to a system that might be deployed around Moscow or other high value targets. We would have less worry about Soviet cheating in this situation because they would need new radar and information systems before being able to deploy a large ABM complex. With 500 ABMs they might reasonably spread them around the country with associated radars, and this would shorten the lead time that we would have to detect their cheating and suddenly deploying, e.g., another 1000. Without these necessary radars on the other hand, we would have 3 to 4 years lead time on possible Soviet cheating. Kissinger thought this should be explained in the paper, for the figure 200 looked arbitrary. The 500 level looked crucial with regard to the need for MIRVs, if you set aside the question of cheating. Hyland noted that the strategic analysis showed that the significantly dangerous ABM level for us would be in the range of 750–1000 rather than 500. Selin said that there was analysis underlying these figures. Hyland said that the 500 level was about the cut-off point, for between 500 and 1000 we would begin to cut into Soviet retaliatory capabilities. G. Smith suggested labeling 200 as the approximate ceiling with regard to the associated radar problem that Selin had outlined.

Kissinger summarized that 500 represented our strategic sensitivity while 200 raised the problems of cheating. Lynn believed that we would need a detailed paper on ABM levels sooner or later, both for follow-on to Safeguard and questions of area defense. Selin noted that much analysis had been devoted to ABM levels, and Lynn replied that

this was more in the abstract rather than keyed to Safeguard. J. Smith saw the objective of clarifying these numbers, but wondered how the explanation might be compressed for purposes of the paper. Selin said this was a complicated topic and to fully explain it might be more than the President needs. Allison said that he was generally satisfied with the wording. Selin concluded that he would try his hand at a paragraph explaining the 200 and 500 levels and give this language to Kissinger.

Kissinger asked Sonnenfeldt to work with various people and do a redraft of the summary report. He should then check this redraft with ACDA, and it would subsequently be sent around to Review Group members for their concurrence. In response to Nutter's question, Kissinger confirmed that the NSC would focus only on the summary paper and not attempt to address the complete study.

Kissinger asked whether there were any other substantive problems or objections with the rest of the paper. There being no further comments, the meeting was adjourned.

18. Editorial Note

During mid-June 1969 Congressional opposition to the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system requested by the Nixon administration intensified. The ABM debate was closely tied to a controversial new weapons system, the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), which would neutralize an opponent's ABM, increase second strike capability, and improve accuracy in wiping out missile sites. Congressional opposition was led by Senators Clifford Case (R-NJ) and Edward Brooke (R-MA) who urged the administration to postpone MIRV testing pending U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations. In their view, MIRV would escalate the arms race by necessitating Soviet ABM deployment to reestablish deterrent balance. Moreover, once deployed, MIRV was impossible to inspect. On June 17 Brooke introduced a resolution sponsored by 41 Senators that urged President Nixon to propose a joint suspension of MIRV testing to the Soviet Union. (*Congressional Quarterly*, June 20, 1969, pages 1067–1070)

In his memoirs President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger explained the administration's view: "All of this [Congressional opposition] was being advocated while the Soviet missile arsenal was growing at the rate of two to three hundred missiles a year. If the Soviets were building while we abandoned our programs, what

would be their incentive to negotiate limitation in an agreement? Our unilateral restraint would be an incentive for the Soviets not to settle but to procrastinate, to tilt the balance as much in their favor as possible while we paralyzed ourselves. To abandon ABM and MIRV together would thus not only have undercut the prospects for any SALT agreement but probably guaranteed Soviet strategic superiority for a decade." (Kissinger, *White House Years*, page 212)

On June 19 President Nixon gave a televised press conference at which he stated his position on MIRV testing. Referring to the Brooke resolution, he declared that "it is certainly a very constructive proposal insofar as they, themselves are thinking about it. We are considering the possibility of a moratorium as part of any arms control agreement. However, as far as any unilateral stopping of tests on our part, I do not think that would be in our interest. Only in the event that the Soviet Union and we could agree that a moratorium on tests could be mutually beneficial to us, would we be able to agree to do so." (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, page 474)

In his memoirs Nixon described the ABM vote as "the first significant congressional vote on defense measures in my administration, and I wanted the signal to go out that we had not lost our national sense of purpose and resolve—because I did not think we had." He concluded that "I am absolutely convinced that had we lost the ABM battle in the Senate, we would not have been able to negotiate the first nuclear arms control agreement in Moscow in 1972." The administration did not lose, but it was a "cliff-hanging one-vote margin of victory." (*RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, pages 415–418) On August 6 the Senate approved the Safeguard ABM system by a vote of 51–49. Vice President Spiro Agnew cast the tie-breaking vote. Congress passed the bill authorizing spending on defense projects, including ABM, on November 19.

19. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, June 18, 1969.

[Omitted here is discussion related to the U.S. strategic posture printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 36.]

*Smith Briefing*²

RN: Are their subs under construction as good as ours?

Laird: They are Polaris type. They could be developing quieter subs.

RN: Civil defense should be included in the evaluations of capability. This is related to political warning. Not decisive, but should be there.

Major new factor is our verification capability.

Lincoln: Could capability be neutralized?

Helms: Sure, very easily.

RN: On-site inspection should be raised, and if you give it away get something for it.

Rogers: We would want to avoid making this a major issue. They would question our good faith. (Laird disagrees: don't bring it up later on.) Smith: Depends on what our proposal is.

RN: You must assume they will cheat.

Doubts "good faith" assertion, but discuss it later.

Smith: We should try for "old-fashioned" on-site inspection. But also seek supplemental measures. But some agreements would require neither.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes Originals 1969. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 10:14 a.m. to 12:48 p.m. (*Ibid.*, White House Central Files) Among the briefing materials he sent to Nixon on June 17, Kissinger included a summary of Presidential decisions that he recommended should result from the meeting. These included obtaining NSC endorsement of the four criteria of strategic sufficiency presented in the NSC Staff paper "U.S. Strategic Posture: Basic Issues" (see footnote 2, Document 12). The paper listed four conditions that defined strategic sufficiency "maintain high confidence that our second strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out Soviet surprise attack on our strategic forces; maintain forces to insure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis; maintain the capability to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States in a nuclear war than they themselves would suffer; and, deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level" (see Document 34, *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972). Kissinger explained endorsement of the criteria was "important because it will establish clear guidelines for the SALT talks and for consultations with our allies." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 873, SALT, Volume II, June–July 1969)

² No other record of this briefing has been found.

RN: SWWA³ is propaganda point, a gimmick. Neither side will negotiate on that basis. But it could be used as propaganda. Reserve it for later consideration. It's like a cease-fire in VN. Not serious.

RN: What will they ask for?

They will ask for flight test limits, because they have done so much of it to us.

What's purpose of Soviet MRV? (to Helms) Is it first-strike weapon or not? (Helms: oh, yes sir, it is.)

With cities, they don't need it. They aren't stupid.

Laird, Packard: Poseidon really isn't a hard target weapon. Subs can't navigate that well; we can't achieve the necessary accuracies.

RN: On Intelligence reports:

1. Strict separation between fact, opinion.
2. Intelligence information has been used to prove conclusions, rather than draw conclusions. Around this table, I don't want that kind of talk. We're here to learn the facts. In 1965–1968, Intelligence Community was 50% too low. We must be hard-headed in looking at the facts. (He laid line down hard to Helms.)

Helms: More than half of our search areas are continuously covered by clouds.

Maintaining arms control agreement would *not* be easy. We can probably give timely warning of cheating on a scale that would alter the strategic balance.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*]

*Packard Briefing*⁴

Get Wheeler's talking points on targeting considerations

1. *Today*, our capability gives you *limited* capability in other than A.D. situations.
2. Option IV—MIRV ban—would not be in our best interests, because of targeting limitations.⁵
3. Desirability of having an ABM of undetermined size.
4. 2-1 advantage in Soviet throw weight.

RN: Who would benefit from MIRV moratorium?

Wheeler: I don't think we would. Soviets might like to stop both our MIRVs and ABMs.

RN: Why not stop testing for a year? Would it bother you?

Wheeler: Yes sir, it would. We can't be satisfied with ours. They might be OK. We would be constrained to stay with single RVs.

³ See Document 16.

⁴ No other record of this briefing has been found.

⁵ The options are those set forth in Document 14.

RN: Why is MIRV important? Forget payload; enough is enough. Is it because we can hit the additional targets? Is that what it comes down to?

Wheeler: Targets. We can get good accuracies on MM III.

RN: Do we tie MIRV & ABMs together because of defending hard sites? Is ABM help against their MRV?

Wheeler: Spartan (4 MT) will kill all 3 RVs.

Our MIRV's clusters can't be killed with one warhead.

Laird: They can't read our program as having hard target capability.

Rogers: WRT⁶ payload, doesn't freezing numbers put us at a disadvantage?

Laird: Throw weight will make big difference in long run. We have to consider this point.

Smith: In 10 years, will we both be better off with MIRVs? With payload problem, we will both be worse off.

Laird: We only have 40 Titans⁷ with hard target capability.

RN: If we can maintain 30% a.d. how can we talk of Soviet first strike?

Laird: We would have to remain reliant on bombers.

Rogers: Who would benefit from MIRV ban?

Laird: Could make a case it would be about even. They believe all tests have been successful. If so, they have moved ahead of us. They've had "confidence firings."

RN: Charts show that MIRV ban is our worst option. Is that right? What are charts up there for?⁸ (Maybe for fun.) Is option III worse or not?

Packard: Depends on whether we limit ICBMs. Gives us extra targeting capability. Should couple MIRV band with ICBM limits. Must work out numbers problem.

Rogers: Point is that Soviets can target our missiles.

Packard: We couldn't deploy and have it unknown. They can.

Smith: Wouldn't we see their confidence firings?

Wheeler: Test it in an IR/MRBM.

Smith: Upgrade our detection capabilities.

Wheeler: It will increase the force we can apply against them.

RN: It all comes down to diplomacy as we all know. First strike, counterforce can be an asset.

⁶ With Respect To.

⁷ A family of weapons and the first U.S. two-stage ICBM and first underground silo-based ICBM.

⁸ These charts apparently illustrated the various options. They were not found.

RN: Shouldn't tell the whole truth. Could talk about MRVs, however.

Rogers: Get something reapproach. They're testing, we're testing.

HAK: Develop a single answer and clear it. (Party line.)

1. Who gains from deployment ban?
2. Who gains from testing ban?
3. Can you be sure? What about clandestine testing?

SALT Options Paper.⁹

⁹ In Nixon's briefing materials, Kissinger included a summary of the options described in the NSSM 28 report (see Document 14), but recommended that Nixon postpone discussion of SALT issues until the Review Group considered it at a meeting scheduled for June 19. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 873, SALT, Volume II, June–July 1969)

20. Minutes of a Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, June 19, 1969, 2:10–3:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

NSSM 28—"Stop Where We Are" Proposal

PARTICIPATION

Henry A. Kissinger—Chairman

State	AEC
Richard F. Pedersen	Allen Labowitz
Donald McHenry	USIA
Philip Farley	Frank Shakespeare
Defense	ACDA
G. Warren Nutter	Gerard Smith
JCS	Spurgeon Keeny, Jr.
Maj. Gen. Royal B. Allison	OST
CIA	Donald Steininger
R. Jack Smith	
<i>[name not declassified]</i>	

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-038, Review Group, SALT "SWWA" 6/19/69. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. On June 23 Halperin forwarded these minutes through Lord to Kissinger. A notation on the covering memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it on June 26.

OEP
Haakon Lindjord

NSC Staff
Morton Halperin
William Hyland
Winston Lord
Laurence Lynn
Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

It was confirmed that a directive was going out for the Steering Group to prepare specific SALT negotiating proposals in time for a June 25 NSC meeting on this subject. The Review Group agreed that this paper would include a fuller discussion of verification problems, to the extent possible in the limited time available. This discussion would cover for each negotiating option such questions as how easy it would be to violate the agreement, what sort of violations would concern us, and what choices we would have when we spotted violations. With regard to the paper on the “Stop Where We Are” proposal,² it was agreed that, instead of attempting to weave counter arguments into it, OSD and JCS would prepare a counter paper that would set forth the major problems with this proposal.

Kissinger said that the purpose of the meeting was to go over the “Stop Where We Are” (SWWA) paper that had been completed after the SALT summary paper³ had gone through the Steering Group. The SWWA proposal suggests the option for the arms talks of the US and USSR staying where we are in strategic deployments, construction and development, either now or when agreement is reached, although the former probably makes more sense. From many points of view, this was the most comprehensive of the proposals that had been put forward. He thought the paper was very good. It leads one to the conclusion that this type of agreement would operate to the net advantage of the United States—this could pose problems of its negotiability. He was struck by the fact that there were not many counter arguments in the paper and wondered whether it had received the same type of analysis as the rest of NSSM 28.

G. Smith replied that Systems Analysis (OSD) and others had told him that it had received comparable analysis. Kissinger stressed that the purpose of his questions and the meeting was to review this paper, to ascertain whether other views should be included, and to see that the option is stated fairly. He assumed that ACDA’s intention was to have SWWA considered as one of the options rather than to be chosen the best option. G. Smith responded that this was correct, at least

² Document 16.

³ Document 14.

at this point. Kissinger then confirmed that the discussion would center on whether the SWWA paper presented a fair statement and not whether this option should be selected versus the others. He asked G. Smith whether he had any general comments on the paper. G. Smith said that he thought the paper spoke for itself and was glad to answer any questions. Kissinger then asked whether anyone wished to raise counter arguments or concerns not covered in the paper.

Allison said that he had some problems. The proposal had not been treated like the other NSSM 28 options and there was a need for pros and cons. SWWA was more comprehensive than the other options. The JCS had difficulties with a proposal this comprehensive because of certain specific aspects. He had gone over the subject in detail with General Wheeler and he wished to state that from a military standpoint, the JCS were quite concerned.

He then proceeded to mention some of the problems. First, the ban on MIRVs or MIRV testing involved the control of technology. This was neither feasible nor desirable. Secondly, there were great difficulties in controlling bombers and air defense which the paper did not adequately recognize. This problem had been looked at closely in the past and for many reasons, including the problem of defining bombers, might well present the most difficult aspect of an arms control agreement. For example, the proposal does not include the question of weapons, which illustrated an extreme example of the definition problem. One could be allowed to put Skybolts⁴ on bombers, for example. Thirdly, the JCS were very concerned about the verification aspects. The JCS representative had expressed these concerns in the Verification Panel's report.⁵ There were uncertainties in new verification capabilities which were neither operative now nor had the full confidence of some military technical experts.

Kissinger wondered whether these objections were peculiar to this SWWA option or whether they applied to all the options. Allison replied that he was directing his remarks at this particular proposal. When Kissinger referred to the Skybolt example, Allison replied that the other options did not control bombers. Kissinger noted that this option controlled the number of bombers while others left open the possibility of increasing the number. Allison did not wish to forecast whether more bombers would be built under the other options.

Allison then mentioned a fourth aspect, throw weight, which was of great concern to the military. This was a problem under an arms agreement for which a good solution had not yet been found. Here as

⁴ Air-launched ballistic missiles.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 14.

elsewhere the JCS objective was the common government-wide one of finding a solution which was of net advantage to the United States. He then concluded that this constituted a brief rundown of the JCS concerns about this option, which had not gone through the same process as the other SALT proposals. He felt that more work was needed on this proposal. In summary, he repeated that the Chairman, JCS, was quite concerned with SWWA from the military standpoint.

Nutter commented on the moratorium question. The moratorium could have some very attractive features but we should not put forward the type envisaged in this proposal if we were really looking for a more limited arms control agreement. This could lead to difficult problems, both political and otherwise. Kissinger noted that a small group, on which all concerned agencies would be represented, was working on the MIRV issue. In response to Allison's query, Farley confirmed that the JCS would have a representative once the group is functioning. Kissinger said that the purpose of this group was to explore the various aspects of this question and that therefore the kind of moratorium problem that Nutter had raised was getting a detailed look. He then asked G. Smith to comment on Allison's remarks.

G. Smith said that he was concerned with the principle that we should not control technology. The Steering Group had gone over this problem at some length. The ACDA position was that if the principle were accepted, arms control would make no sense, for that is what arms control is all about. He cited the Limited Test Ban Treaty⁶ as an example of controlling technology, and continued that we were kidding ourselves if we attempted to get arms control agreements that do not control technology, for then the arms race could continue and even be more expensive. He thought this was a central issue—were the Joint Chiefs correct in saying that we should not control technology? It was important to clarify this point, for if that is our position, we were off on the wrong track. A related question the government should ask itself is: are we willing to control as much of the arms race as we can verify with confidence? The answer to this question determines the direction of our policy. He did not believe that there was clarity within the government on this point.

Kissinger wondered whether this was not the same issue as whether or not we chose to go for a limited, intermediate, or comprehensive agreement. G. Smith rejoined that the reasoning behind our decision was important. If the President chose a limited agreement but made it clear that he did so even though we could verify more, this

⁶ The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was negotiated in July 1963 and entered into force in October 1963. (14 UST 1313)

would answer his question. He believed the answer should be in the other direction, that in 1969 governments should get as much as they can included under arms control agreements. In response to Kissinger's query, he did not believe that this question was fully spelled out in the other SALT paper. Kissinger thought that this was a new point worth covering.

Sonnenfeldt assumed that we wished to have under an arms control agreement as much as would be in our interest—verification was not the only criterion. G. Smith questioned this assumption. Since 1945–6 we have said that we wanted arms control but that we could not trust the other side. The principal obstacle has been inspection. To some extent this problem has been dissipated through development of national means of verification. Therefore, we should now see whether we still agree with this principle or whether, even with sufficient verification, we would not want a comprehensive agreement. Sonnenfeldt said that he was referring to individual measures rather than the overall arms control concept. He envisaged some systems that it was not in our interest to control even though we could have complete verification. G. Smith rejoined that we would not be able to split out those systems which would be to our advantage. Kissinger suggested an ABM versus third countries as a system that we might not wish to include in an agreement even though we could verify compliance. In response to G. Smith's comment that it would be difficult to pick out exceptions, Sonnenfeldt envisaged the possibility of trading off marginal systems with the other side. G. Smith agreed that we could attempt this but would face very serious negotiating problems.

G. Smith then referred to Allison's concern about a complete freeze on bombers. He thought that perhaps we could reach an accepted definition with the Soviets. There was no reason not to try, especially in this field where we hold a substantial advantage. He would like to see a freeze on bombers. As for adding Skybolt, we and the Soviets could both accomplish this now. He thought it would be to our advantage, not to our disadvantage, to be able to take our bomber force and use it in the most technologically advanced fashion. As for the question of throw weight, this had received extensive discussion. The SWWA proposal attempted to get at this problem by controlling all tests, and from what he had heard recently, this should be a plus for this option. Concerning Nutter's point about a moratorium, he agreed that the President should be able to accept in reality anything that we would propose. We should not make proposals that we could not live with or up to. Once we are committed to a moratorium, it may be very difficult to get out of it. In this regard he disagreed with the general mythology that we had taken a licking during the nuclear test moratorium. We were the first to say that we felt free to resume testing at any time. Kissinger noted that we did not resume testing and G. Smith responded

that we were free to go ahead. We made a voluntary, unilateral decision not to do so. Kissinger did not see how G. Smith's comments added to the argument for a moratorium. Our actions were a ploy to put the pressure on the Soviets to keep from testing. G. Smith said that we were attempting to reach an actual agreement at that time.

Concerning SWWA, it was a serious proposal and not just a public relations effort. It had been given to the Steering Group on May 14 and all agencies had had a chance to study it. Since it had been open for review for five weeks, ACDA was not vulnerable to the charge that it was a last minute effort. Kissinger said that its status had never been clear; it was now being looked at systematically. G. Smith said that the Strategic Analysis Panel had reviewed it and had been urged to complete their studies. There had also been CIA consideration. Thus the report was not in any sense an "illegal" added starter. It had been formally sent around to each agency. Allison said that although the proposal had been tabled, it had not gone through the full NSSM 28 process. He recalled that G. Smith had tabled it as "just an idea". G. Smith rejoined that he had said that he hoped that it was an idea that had reached its time.

Shakespeare agreed with G. Smith that SWWA was the most attractive option for people here and abroad. It seemed to connote a self-evident fairness. However, there could be problems with public opinion both here and overseas, particularly concerning the "verification with confidence" problem. Western Europe and others in the free world depended on US military strength. There would be great pressure concerning the confidence of our verification capabilities and people would not be willing to live with risks. Kissinger wondered whether this consideration did not apply to all the options. Shakespeare replied that it did but was most relevant for this one. This agreement could fall apart if serious public relations trouble developed here and abroad. G. Smith said that it was the judgment of the intelligence community, with some JCS dissent, that this sort of approach was the easiest to verify. J. Smith confirmed this point. Kissinger questioned why it was the easiest to verify, and J. Smith replied, because of its comprehensiveness. Any deployments or testing could provide grounds for suspecting violations. Kissinger wondered whether verification problems were necessarily more difficult if, for example, bombers or submarines were not covered by the agreement. He agreed that these exceptions would complicate the question of strategic balance, but he was not sure they would increase the intelligence problem. J. Smith underlined the testing moratorium aspect in this regard. He agreed with Kissinger's observation that a moratorium on testing would make it easier to verify the agreement. G. Smith added that if all moves in a game were prohibited, it would be easier to detect violations than if some moves were allowed. Kissinger noted that each one of the various options controls

different weapons systems and that one adds categories as one went from a limited measure to a more inclusive one. The intelligence problem concerned whether one could verify the systems being controlled under the agreement. This verification issue should be distinguished from the issue of the impact of various agreements on the strategic equation.

G. Smith cited a land mobile missile system as one example of easier verification under SWWA and Kissinger agreed. In fact, Kissinger wondered why land mobile missiles were included in any of the options.

Keeny said there were other examples of where SWWA helped the verification problem. For example, a freeze on air defense simplifies the problem of controlling ABMs by limiting SAMs which might have dual capability. J. Smith said SWWA helped verification both of deployments and of identifying on-going systems, for under a complete moratorium any activity would be suspicious.

In response to Shakespeare's query on how one verifies all activities, J. Smith replied through monitoring of testing. G. Smith noted that there would be no ban on research and development under SWWA. In response to Kissinger's question, G. Smith said that IRBMs could not be upgraded. Keeny noted that these were frozen under all the SALT options. He agreed with Kissinger that the fact that the Soviets could upgrade some of their IRBMs to ICBMs would cause a problem, but this problem was common to all the options. Under SWWA we would be able to check new types of missiles.

Lynn said that the phrase "verify with confidence" implies that we would have enough confidence in our capabilities not to make a response or to worry about abrogation of an agreement while monitoring the other side's activity. The difficulty with SWWA was that by banning all activity on both sides, anything that the other side began to do could worry us, for we would be forestalled in our own programs (i.e., we would not be able to respond without violating the agreement ourselves). He was thus concerned about the degree to which we would be nervous about our intelligence capabilities with regard to Soviet activities.

J. Smith responded that verification with confidence meant verifying those actions which could significantly alter the strategic balance. Secondly, there was the assumption that there would be some sort of machinery to implement and monitor an arms agreement, not unlike that which existed for the test ban. There had been a steady stream of US-Soviet messages concerning activities that either side did not understand. This had proven helpful, even though, of course, it fell short of inspection.

Kissinger noted that by examining an option separately it was apt to carry an undue burden of critique. For example, the Review Group was devoting more care to this option because it stood alone. G. Smith rejoined that he was glad to have it closely surveyed.

Lynn repeated his point that the more vulnerable an agreement was to changes, the more rigorous the demand on our intelligence capabilities. J. Smith agreed that there would be more questions for the intelligence community to handle. Kissinger believed that it was a larger problem than this. It was important to distinguish between the ease of controlling systems from the demands on our intelligence capabilities concerning the dangers of violation. G. Smith felt that the more systems that were allowed under an agreement, the greater the requirements for intelligence. He referred to page 11 in the SWWA paper concerning our sensitivity to cheating. In the case where the Soviets violated the agreement by adding 300 ICBMs, our retaliatory capability would remain above 40%. If the Soviets cheated and added 500 area ABMs, the US retaliatory capability would drop to 35%, which was still above the magic McNamara figure. Kissinger noted that this was one figure which he thought should be abolished. G. Smith agreed that concentrating on this number alone was unfortunate. Allison added that this sort of calculation represented only one of the tools for judgment. One also had to examine how a nuclear exchange was fought, whether military targets were hit, damage limitation, etc. He therefore agreed with Kissinger that this type of figure was insufficient. G. Smith noted that all the options had used this criterion and that was why he was also referring to it.

Keeny returned to the question of stability. He believed that the SWWA proposal represented the most stable type of agreement (as opposed to permitting MIRVs for example), since all three strategic force components were now invulnerable and assured a high level of survival. G. Smith believed that strategic analysis bore this out and pointed out page 9 of the paper which showed that under SWWA 79% of US land-based ICBMs would survive a first strike in 1978. In response to Halperin's question, he believed that 44% would survive without any arms control agreement. Keeny thought this figure could drop, but Hyland recalled that Safeguard could keep the figure up.

Lynn used the illustration of the Soviets discovering a technological problem with their SS9s or SS11s. He wondered whether they might test to solve this problem and at the same time improve their accuracy. He wondered what our reaction would be if we had evidence of this and if we would be worried. Keeny thought that we would, and noted this was an example of a possible slow erosion of an agreement. In response to Lynn's query about our reaction if it appeared that SS11s were being developed for hard targets, Keeny noted that SS11s seem inaccurate. He added that SS11s would never have high accuracy against hard targets unless a new reentry vehicle were developed. This would not be permitted under SWWA. They could test for confidence the present reentry vehicle, but they could not test

new ones. J Smith noted that this was a broad question which applied to all options.

Lynn said that this option assumed no qualitative improvements. This opened up a whole range of potential ambiguities in the agreement that could cause much worry in the future. There followed a brief exchange concerning the accuracy of the SS9 and the SS11 and the importance of reentry vehicles.

J. Smith recalled that the intelligence community, those charged with the NIEs on verification, and the Verification Panel had arrived at unanimous views on these questions, except for some footnotes by the JCS representative which reflected DDR&E opinions. He was not saying that there was no room for other points of view, but was only underlining the consensus opinion of the intelligence community. Allison agreed, but said there were still those in the world who would take a different view. G. Smith thought it was very significant that the very people who would be charged with the responsibility of monitoring arms control agreements have confidence in our verification capabilities while those people who would not have this responsibility saw problems. Shakespeare commented that there would nevertheless be difficulties with public opinion if the military authorities in this country were unsure of our verification capabilities. G. Smith agreed with this observation.

There followed an extensive discussion, primarily involving [*name not declassified*], J. Smith, Hyland and Allison, with regard to very sensitive intelligence capabilities for monitoring Soviet testing.

Shakespeare wondered whether we could state to the Western world that without on site inspection in the Soviet Union we could be absolutely certain that there would be no violations of the arms control agreement. He believed that such an unequivocal statement would be necessary. G. Smith responded that whatever we said about this question would be challenged. In any event, we could not state that we would be absolutely certain that there would never be undetected cheating. What we could say would be that we would have high confidence that there would be no major undetected violations that would affect the strategic balance. In response to Shakespeare's question, G. Smith said that we had not yet taken a position on whether we should ask the Soviet Union to agree to on site inspection. Pedersen noted that even with on site inspection we could not give categorical assurances about violations. Shakespeare rejoined that we would, however, have more confidence. G. Smith felt that absolute assurances would be deceiving the American people. For example, we would never be certain about land mobile missiles.

Kissinger interjected that about two thirds of the discussion seemed to apply to all options and was meaningful primarily in terms

of all the proposals. He reported that as a result of the NSC meeting⁷ a memorandum was going out directing the Steering Group to prepare a number of negotiating packages, including one or two for each major category of agreement. He believed that if the SWWA proposal was to go before the NSC it should include the considerations that Allison had raised. G. Smith replied that he was prepared to put in any language that Allison wished to have represent the JCS position. Kissinger believed this was a good arrangement. For all the options the NSC should be told what work was still going on, if analysis was not completed on all the proposals. There should be a discussion of such problems as how easy it would be to violate each of the proposed agreements, what sort of violations would concern us, and what choices we would have when we spotted violations. He thus wished to see a more comprehensive treatment of the entire verification problem for each of the options. This would help the NSC to get a clearer picture of what it was getting into when it considered each option.

Nutter cited a Vietnam example with regard to our reaction to violations of agreements. He noted that one of the conditions of the bombing halt was the understanding that there would be no attacks on populated areas by the other side. These attacks have since occurred, but we have not yet admitted violation of the understanding, preferring to qualify each individual incident. Kissinger said this illustrated the problems of what we should do when an arms control agreement is violated. Nutter suggested that we didn't wish to determine that an understanding had been broken. G. Smith said that this consideration applied to any of the arms control options.

Allison did not agree that two thirds of the discussion applied to any of the options. For example, not all of his problems with SWWA applied to the other proposals. Kissinger believed that many of the questions in the discussion did apply to all the options, although the degree of concern may vary from proposal to proposal.

Allison said that it would be difficult for the JCS to weave their views into the SWWA paper. Perhaps it would be better if their views were set forth comprehensively. Other options had received a balance of pros and cons. It was not clear to him how these would be inserted into the present paper. Nutter agreed, and G. Smith thought that Allison's suggestion was a better way of approaching the problem than attempting to list pros and cons in the ACDA paper.

Kissinger agreed with this procedure. He said that in developing negotiating options for next week's NSC meeting, the drafters should

⁷ See Document 19.

draw upon the SWWA paper and the JCS/OSD submission.⁸ Sonnenfeldt noted that the directive that was going out to prepare negotiating options instructed the Steering Group to state the advantages and problems for each proposal. Kissinger said that he wished to have a complete joint OSD/JCS paper on SWWA in addition to seeing their arguments in the negotiating paper. Allison confirmed that this paper would identify difficulties and describe the reasoning behind these concerns.

J. Smith made three points with regard to the discussion on verification. First, Kissinger and others had heard Helms' presentation at the NSC meeting which was carefully moderated and made no undue claims. Secondly, there was a remarkable degree of unanimity among the intelligence community on this question, especially compared with the large disarray that existed only 18 months ago. Thirdly, he believed the JCS problems needed much further investigation. They concern important questions but were not really at the heart of the verification problem. When Kissinger asked why they were not, J. Smith replied because they dealt with specific singular aspects rather than the overall question. G. Smith noted that the JCS representative dealt with the overall problem when he said, in a page 3 dissent in the Verification Panel's Report, that the assessment of verification confidence with regard to SWWA was optimistic. J. Smith responded that this was a reference to a specific point on page 8 and concerned the MIRV problem.

Kissinger posed the following type of question: would the Soviets be permitted to conduct operational testing with regard to the SS9 and its reentry vehicle? Would this be considered an operational system or would one need to call it a MIRV and place it under the MIRV ban? G. Smith replied that for confidence purposes we could test our A3 and they could test their reentry vehicle. Kissinger believed that we would have considerable disagreement on this question. Some would claim that what they were doing with their SS9 was not comparable to our testing of our A3. G. Smith thought this was a more manageable problem. The Soviets could not go ahead with new R&D testing without our noting it as a violation and calling the deal off. He did not wish to settle this question now, but it was not self-evident that it would necessarily work to our disadvantage.

⁸ Reference is to a memorandum from Wheeler to Laird, JCSM-377-69, June 17, entitled "Preparation of U.S. Position for Possible Strategic Arms Talks," in which the JCS position on the NSSM 28 paper was delineated. Wheeler concluded that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that, with appropriate modifications as discussed above, the range of options outlined in the NSSM-28 Report, except Option IV, could provide the basis for development of a strategic arms control proposal for discussion with the USSR. The foregoing is based on the understanding that the options and variants would not impose limitations on application of technology or force modernization and would include provisions for verification, replacement criteria, safeguards, and withdrawal." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-0103, Box 16, USSR, 388.3)

Farley believed that if we went into SALT with the SWWA position, we would need to develop with the other side a careful identification of where they are and where we are. Nutter referred again to the specific question of the MIRV versus MRV capabilities, and the need for testing on both sides. Kissinger repeated his view that there would be much discussion concerning a comparison of our A3 with their RV. G. Smith acknowledged that it would not be a simple negotiation. He agreed with Kissinger's observation that we would need a MIRV ban for high confidence in SWWA. Kissinger wondered whether the A3 would have to come under a MIRV ban. Keeny believed that it would unless we were able to make ad hoc trade-offs of exceptions with the other side. Kissinger recognized that it would not be possible to have the answers to such questions for next week's NSC meeting, but he thought that the uncertainties in each of the packages should be highlighted for the principals.

In response to Halperin's question whether SWWA would ban A3 testing, there followed a brief exchange among Keeny, Halperin and G. Smith. Keeny believed this question was fudged in the proposal, but that under a strictly legal definition A3 testing would not be permitted. The intent of the SWWA proposal was that the A3 would be banned unless we negotiated a trade-off with the other side. There was some discussion of whether flight or development testing would not be allowed while confidence firing would be, and whether one could distinguish between these types of tests. Keeny believed that the Soviets probably could distinguish between testing purposes. He repeated that the SWWA proposal tried to leave open this question for further study. For example, we might wish to rule out FOBS testing and the Soviets might maintain that FOBS was an established system. Lynn envisaged situations where we might even have to strip warheads off missiles. Allison pointed out that this discussion illustrated the complexities of SWWA, and Kissinger noted that these complexities had borne in on him in recent weeks. Keeny believed that we might be able to keep the A3 without testing, with some degradation in our confidence in the system.

Nutter said that it was one thing to have confidence in our verification capabilities and another question whether this meant anything. What would we do if we detected violations by the other side? We could be in the same fix as we have been with regard to the Vietnam bombing halt. Pedersen said that he did not believe that this type of question could be answered in advance. Kissinger wondered how much we would care about the other side's violations, for example in a situation where it needed 45 tests to develop a system—would one or two illegal tests be acceptable to us? Although it was difficult to answer this type of question in advance, the answers will not be any easier in the future if we fly blind, not having examined this problem beforehand.

Keeny said that with regard to the A3 we might try to get the Soviets to accept it as a unique system, one of long standing development. The Soviets in turn might ask for exceptions for themselves, e.g., with regard to the SS9. We might then have to drop our attempt on the A3. Halperin wondered how important the A3 would be if ABM levels were frozen; he didn't have the answer.

Kissinger summarized that OSD and JCS would state in their own paper their concerns with the SWWA proposal. ACDA and the other Steering Group agencies would prepare negotiating models for tentative consideration at the next NSC meeting.

21. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

June 25 NSC Meeting on SALT

Following last week's NSC meeting the agencies concerned were asked to prepare a paper for the June 25 meeting,² laying out major SALT options for discussion with our allies (Tab A).³ Because of the short interval between the two meetings, this paper will not be completed until the afternoon of June 24. I will send it to you at that time with my comments, so that you can review it before the NSC meeting.

Meanwhile, I would like to suggest the following approach for the NSC meeting:

1. *Style of US Consultations with Allies.* We shall want to guard against having the presentation made to the allies appear as a brief for one particular position. I believe you should emphasize that you

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-023, NSC Meeting 6/25/69 SALT NSSM 28. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² See Document 19. On June 19 Kissinger informed Rogers and Laird that the President wanted a paper on alternative options for SALT to be prepared by the NSSM 28 Steering Committee before this meeting. (National Archives Ibid., Box H-023, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), NSC Meeting, 6/25/69, SALT NSSM 28)

³ Attached but not printed is a June 24 memorandum to the President, in which Kissinger provided a 3-page summary of the negotiating options, describing them as limited, intermediate, and too comprehensive. Kissinger stated that the paper was "adequate" for discussion at the meeting but not a finished document and did not include his recommendations.

- want consultations to be genuine, not pro forma;
- want the allies to get a feel for all the relevant issues associated with various SALT options, including implications for their own security interests;
- want to give the allies a chance to voice their own views and reactions;
- do not want to single out a particular negotiating option until the allies have been heard from.

2. *Going Slow on the “Stay Where We Are” Option.*⁴ This has a lot of supporters but raises several issues not yet fully discussed. I believe that you should stress that you want

- this option studied intensively to bring out clearly its advantages and problems;
- to withhold this option from the allies for the time being, until it has been more fully ventilated within the Government;
- in any case, keep this option in reserve for possible use in a way you will determine, at a time you will determine.

3. *Communication to Allied Heads of Government.* With the opening of the consultative process, I believe it would be desirable for you to send a message to all NATO heads of government (and possibly the Japanese Prime Minister) setting forth your approach to the consultations. An outline of major points to be included in such a communication is at Tab B.⁵ At the NSC meeting you may wish to cite these points and ask Bill Rogers to undertake to draft an appropriate communication in the next day or two and submit it to you for review. Such a communication would not only tell your allied colleagues how you would like to proceed but would also serve as guidance to our own bureaucracy.

4. *Opening Date for SALT with Soviets.* There has not so far been a Soviet response to Bill Rogers’ proposal to Dobrynin that talks begin July 30 or 31.⁶ Meanwhile, you have referred to July 31 as no more than a “target date” and suggested that the actual opening may fall somewhere between that date and August 15. With your absence from Washington in the week immediately before July 31, it will be desirable not to have SALT open until you have had an opportunity fully to review our negotiating position. Moreover, I believe it will be psychologically and politically helpful for you to talk with Chancellor Kiesinger before SALT begins. (The original date for his visit was a week before July 31 and for that reason was particularly agreeable to him.) This argues for starting SALT no earlier than Monday, August 11. If you agree, you

⁴ See Document 16.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

⁶ See Document 15.

may want to mention this at the NSC meeting so that all concerned will be guided accordingly, including in conversation with the Soviets, if and when they reply to Bill's previous proposal.

5. *Consultations with the Congress.* There will have to be consultations with interested Committees in both Houses. These should probably not take place until the second half of July. At that time, a presentation could be made of the several options that we have under study. Further briefings on our opening approach could occur after you have reviewed it following your trip, in early August. We should have a detailed scenario for this operation.

6. *John McCloy's Role.* With your approval, I have contacted Jack McCloy to tell him that you have approved the approach to his role contained in his recent letter to you.⁷

At the meeting you may wish to

—say that you want McCloy and his committee to familiarize themselves with the SALT preparations;

—indicate that you want that committee to function in an independent advisory capacity (on the model of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB)), rather than as an adjunct to any one section of the Executive; and

—that you expect McCloy to provide you, the Secretary of State and the Director of ACDA with his comments, suggestions and advice both at his own initiative and when asked, including any divergent views that may exist among his committee members.

7. *Personnel for Consultations with Allies.* You may wish to stress at the NSC meeting that you are personally concerned about the composition of any US group that consults with the allies. You want to be sure that they are persons who are

—of stature in our government;

—fully equipped to deal substantively with issues that may arise; and

—fully in tune with this Administration's approach to strategic issues.

You may wish to add that you wish personally to approve the membership in any US contingent.

⁷ John J. McCloy, who had served as an official or unofficial adviser to every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt, was chairman of the General Advisory Committee for Arms Control and Disarmament, which was established by the same statute that created ACDA in 1961. The GAC, also known as the McCloy Committee, included other prominent officials such as General Lauris Norstad, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and former ACDA Director William Foster. McCloy's letter to President Nixon was not further identified.

22. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, June 25, 1969.

Smith: What are we trying to do? What guidance do we get?

Four possibilities:

Continue consultations
Propaganda
Détente
Improve U.S. Security

NSSM-3² showed we had security interest in talks.

We can improve chances for peace.

We should approach SALT positively.

RN: How does it happen, when? Where? Who? Agenda?

Smith: Procedures at a low level, perhaps not public.

1. Public relations level
2. Formal
3. Sub-rosa
4. Presidential, private participation

Laird: Thinking now formalized

1. Some against better than none
2. Pres. retaliation capability
3. Soviet reading parallel to ours
4. Sovs have 20 economic restraints
5. Retaliatory effects of strategic posture can be calculated with confidence.
6. Agreement can be monitored with ease and confidence.

Laird: We have to create our package based on our thinking or revise our thinking.

RN: I don't agree with 3 of them. Let's not be naive. Sovs same as ours? Objective is retaliatory? It is diplomatic.

Laird: Retaliatory capacity is supreme with us. We can lose our ICBMs and have enough left. I can't accept that.

RN: I have responsibility. Defense estimate must be able to conduct effective diplomacy when I am through. When I lay it down it must be followed.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes Originals 1969. Top Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room from 11:02 a.m. until 12:48 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

² See Document 4 and footnote 2, Document 12.

Smith: Our position should be exploratory, not rigid at outset. Should be flexible.

RN: I agree with that. "Getting to know you."

Smith: We should table a proposal we can live with.

RN: Will they put out a proposal? I think they will say stop where we are, then disarm.

Smith: Shows arms control options. Analysis results.

RN: NAC paper should be exploratory, not selling. Consultation should be therapy.

Laird: Remember that NAC materials will get into Soviet hands.

RN: Congressional briefings should be sanitized. Papers will lobby us into most comprehensive.

HAK: Must recognize importance of our forces to Allies, importance of consultations to Alliance relationships.

RN: Put ridiculous options at either end. Same with Congress.

RN: I will prepare for myself a Q&A.

Important thing is success of the negotiation. Consultations should not impair that.

Wheeler: A, B and C³ would be used with Allies. ICBM freeze would not be negotiable. I am not satisfied by results of verification panel. Opposed to unverifiable restraints on technology. Helms' assessments don't jibe with other presentations. He was moderate. Tests of confidence in peacetime different from covert evasions.

RN: Technical people think with their hearts not their heads.

Initial position in talks should not be known to Congress and Allies in advance. Should be something new, not initiatives already discussed.

You feel we should make substantial proposal, will they respond with propaganda proposal?

Smith: Yes.

RN: Why should we be serious?

To demonstrate that we are really in good faith?

Smith: Yes.

RN: I don't agree with Thompson thesis. There are other reasons. We have to worry about opinion in U.S. Main reason for being substantive is to appear serious and in the end it might work. More for U.S. public opinion than for showing good faith to the Soviets.

³ Option A was the limited proposal; Option B, the intermediate; and Option C, the comprehensive. See Document 14.

Real negotiations will be long and tenuous. Soviets don't care about world opinion. They are worried about their security.

Proposals in steps. What is your thinking on that?

Smith: Hard to see how we could talk about ICBMs, submarines. We aren't doing anything, they are.

RN: You should explore taking it in smaller bites.

Laird: "Thrust" i.e. payload is easier to check than multiples.

Smith: Easier to fall back from comprehensive position. Maybe ask for more verification than we will settle for.

HAK: Verification always gets whittled back. Pressures build up in this country.

RN: Area defense against China should not be negotiable.

HAK: We shouldn't gear our approach to look reasonable to American people.

RN: Can't satisfy fashionable opinion.

Concerned about broad public opinion.

RN: If we mention IR/MRs, don't we have to discuss our tac nucs.

Laird: Only a very few of our tac nucs can be used against them.

RN: Important thing in NATO is Q&A.

Say here's what we're not talking about.

Say here's what we are talking about.⁴

⁴ On June 26 Nixon sent a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, and Smith that set forth the guidance to be used in preparing for NATO consultation on SALT. The main points were the following: give Allies a sense of participation in SALT options; reassure their security concerns; avoid discussing any specific negotiating position; provide a series of questions and answers; and avoid leaks. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-023, NSC Meeting 6/25/69 SALT NSSM 28) The first round of consultations with the allies took place June 30–July 1.

23. **Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, June 26, 1969.

SUBJECT

The SWWA Proposal

You requested receiving the views of the Department of Defense on the potential disadvantages of the SWWA proposal. The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is contained in the attached JCSM dated 23 June 1969.²

In general, I share the view that it is neither necessary nor desirable to delay efforts to formulate a US SALT position in order to address SWWA, and I agree with the JCS that, because of the nature of the SWWA proposal, it would not be in the US interest to propose a negotiating package along its exact lines. Most of the features of SWWA are discussed as issues in the NSSM 28 report (e.g., bomber limitations, throw-weight limitations, missile flight test restrictions). Thus, I would suggest that a decision could be made to modify a selected US proposal to incorporate one or more of these features if judged to be feasible and desirable, perhaps at a future time. While I agree that SWWA as a complete package would be precluded in terms of its overall objectives if the US position rejects a MIRV ban, I do not at this time support the position that a refusal to consider SWWA necessarily indicates a rejection of a MIRV ban.

In considering the Stop Where We Are proposal, it is important that we not lose sight of the distinction between those issues which must be decided now and those which need not be. The only urgent issue raised by the SWWA proposal is the question of a moratorium. A bilateral moratorium during negotiations need not constrain as many systems as does the SWWA proposal. A comprehensive moratorium seems neither necessary nor practical. But a moratorium on MRV and MIRV testing and on ICBM/SLBM and ABM deployments during negotiations could be useful in several ways. It could constrain Soviet deployment and testing which is of concern to us, and it could keep the possibility of agreements such as SWWA or Package IV alive in the long run. We need not decide now whether we *prefer* such agreements,

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, Box 1b, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret. This memorandum was in response to Kissinger's request made during the Review Group meeting on June 19; see Document 20.

² Attached but not printed is JCSM–390–69.

but there are good reasons why we should not intentionally *foreclose* the possibility of such agreements until we see what the Soviet attitude toward talks is. We should discuss now only those aspects of the Stop Where We Are proposal which are relevant to the question of whether we could, under some circumstances, eventually accept a MIRV ban. If we decide that a bilateral moratorium during talks is acceptable, then the other issues raised by the Stop Where We Are proposal can be dealt with later.

We would like to note that these remarks are addressed only to SWWA as a proposal, and not to fundamental issues on SALT that we have raised before and will raise again.

Melvin R. Laird

24. National Security Study Memorandum 62¹

Washington, July 2, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The President's Science Adviser

SUBJECT

Follow-on to NSSM 28 (SALT)

The President has directed preparation of specific alternative negotiating positions for the strategic arms limitations talks, based on the NSSM 28 Report and NSC discussion thereof.

This further report should be prepared by the existing NSSM 28 Steering Group and should be structured in accordance with the guidelines set forth below.

1. The report should contain a set of negotiating positions including, in each case, the language that would actually be used with the Soviets and a precise description for internal US use.

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-154, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 62. Top Secret; Nodis.

2. There should be at least two examples of a proposal for a limited agreement, and one or more proposals each for intermediate and comprehensive agreements. The SWWA proposal should be included as one of the proposals for a comprehensive agreement.

3. Each alternative should have a full statement of advantages and disadvantages.

4. Each alternative should be assessed in terms of its compatibility with the Criteria for Strategic Sufficiency established in NSDM 16.² In particular, each alternative should be evaluated in terms of the following factors:

- retaliatory capability
- crisis stability
- war-waging capability below massive assault
- ability to limit US fatalities
- potential for the United States to emerge from a strategic exchange in a position relatively better than the Soviet Union
- confidence level of verifying Soviet performance under the agreement
- susceptibility to safeguards against Soviet violation or sudden abrogation
- effect on our alliance commitments.

5. Each alternative should be compared with the situation that would exist without agreement.

6. Each alternative should state specifically whether we should seek to negotiate means of verification other than national, and whether such means are required.

7. Each alternative should state specifically the ABM levels involved.

8. Each alternative should state specifically how MIRV would be affected and precisely what operational or development testing would be precluded in the event a ban on flight testing designed to eliminate MIRVs is included in the alternative.

9. Each alternative should state what, if any, moratoriums it might be desirable to propose; the effective date of any such moratoriums; precisely what would be included; and the level of confidence we would have in verifying Soviet performance.

² President Nixon formally endorsed the four Criteria for Strategic Sufficiency (see footnote 1, Document 19), in NSDM 16, issued June 24. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 1–50) For the full text, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 39.

10. Each alternative should outline hedges against possible Soviet cheating or sudden abrogation.

11. Agency differences on any of the foregoing should be fully set forth.

The report of the Steering Group should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by July 11, 1969 and should include a set of Questions and Answers for use with the public, the Congress and the Allies.

Henry A. Kissinger

25. Minutes of a Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, July 17, 1969, 2:25–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Richard F. Pedersen

Erik Ronhovde

John Shaw

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

Yuan-Li Wu

CIA

R. Jack Smith

JCS

Maj. Gen. Royal B. Allison

USIA

Frank Shakespeare

Advisor

John McCloy

ACDA

Gerard C. Smith

Spurgeon Keeny

AEC

Allen Labowitz

OST

Donald Steininger

OEP

Chris Norred

NSC Staff

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Morton Halperin

William Hyland

Winston Lord

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-039, Review Group SALT 7/17/69. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Before the Presidential trip,² Kissinger would forward to the President a summary paper of the five SALT options³ and an issues paper⁴ which he would show to the other agencies principally involved. In addition the President would have a session with Gerard Smith to go over the entire subject. These procedures should provide sufficient guidelines for ACDA to begin drafting an opening position for SALT. The principal issues that would be delineated for the President would include whether we should open the talks with an exploratory phase or whether we should embark on specific negotiations from the outset. If we choose an exploratory phase the alternative ways include going in without a proposal, beginning with a specific proposal that would not necessarily represent our ultimate position, and setting forth optional proposals in order to elicit Soviet response. If we choose to begin talks with a concrete proposal, then the issue turns on whether we table a more limited one like alternatives 2 and 3 or a more comprehensive one like alternatives 4 and 5. ISA preferred an exploratory phase first in the talks while ACDA and State wished to negotiate from the outset. With regard to the optional proposals, ISA, without being fully satisfied with any of them, shared the JCS preference for more limited proposals, alternatives 2 or 3. ACDA and State preferred a more comprehensive proposal, alternatives 4 or 5.

There would be no NSC meeting before the President's trip, but there probably would be one on SALT after his return. Before the trip there would be a high level meeting of concerned agencies on the verification problems, including the MIRV ban question.

Kissinger opened the discussion by pointing to the exception to options 4 and 5 which said both that they were undesirable and that they were acceptable only under carefully defined conditions. He found these two clauses not fully compatible. He asked if the conditions had been defined. Allison responded that these conditions had not yet been spelled out, but the basic JCS position was that alternatives 4 and 5 were unacceptable militarily and could be harmful to US security. Shaw pointed out that the language Kissinger had mentioned was the ISA and DDR&E position. Nutter said that the ISA position was that in order for options 4 and 5 to be acceptable, there would have to be very

² Nixon's trip abroad, July 26–August 3, included stops in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, South Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Romania, and the United Kingdom.

³ The summary of the paper on SALT negotiating positions, prepared in response to NSSM 62, is Document 27.

⁴ The issues paper was an undated memorandum to which the summary options were attached. See footnote 1, Document 27.

stringent conditions attached. They were working on defining these conditions. In response to Kissinger's question, Nutter said that he would provide such conditions if OSD positions on them could be worked out in time. This was a difficult task. He said he could indicate some of the conditions that he had in mind and proceeded to read some of the elements that would be required with high confidence.

Kissinger then asked whether other views were not reflected in the paper or if there was anything in the paper that unfairly stated an agency's position. Nutter said that his response depended on whether Kissinger was referring to the specifics of the paper or broader problems that he did not feel were addressed. Kissinger doubted that there would be a formal NSC meeting before the President's trip. The President would review the subject with Gerard Smith and wanted a study. In transmitting a paper Kissinger wished to state the views of the various agencies, including the alternative options, relevant conditions, and other considerations. McCloy noted that his views would be tentative since he was not yet confirmed by the Senate and had only seen the paper for a short time.

Kissinger then asked G. Smith to sum up where he thought the government stood on SALT.

G. Smith recalled the NSSM 28 exercise which produced a summary paper with a number of options. Now the NSSM 62 exercise had added two new alternatives. He believed that we had gone about as far as possible in spelling out illustrative alternatives. The basic problem now was to choose one of three ways for the US to enter SALT. First, we could have no specific position and conduct a fishing expedition through exploratory conversations. Secondly, we could propose one or more specific arrangements which would not go so far as to ban testing or deployment of MIRVs or qualitative improvements in missiles. (Kissinger noted that this covered alternatives 1, 2, and 3.) Thirdly, we could make a proposal that included MIRVs, like options 4 or 5. Unless we choose to begin SALT with no proposal, we could not progress much further in defining our position until there was a better feel for the problems of policing MIRVs. He understood that this question would be looked at again at a fairly high level. Some people felt that no matter how exploratory our approach is, we would need a specific proposal to demonstrate our seriousness. He believed another reason for a concrete position was the hurdle of Congressional commitments. We could get a very negative reaction from some elements in Congress if we informed them that after six months of study we could only point to a number of illustrative possibilities. It would be curious to say that we had no definite position after six months, but this would not be intolerable if the Administration were willing to take the Congressional fire. He believed that everyone's positions were as clear as day and that no more papers were needed to clarify the views

of the various departments. He noted that the Secretary of State had not yet committed himself to a particular position.

As for the ACDA position, he was in favor of as broad an arrangement as verifiable, and he was more optimistic than the JCS concerning what could be verified. He hoped to get guidance from the President before the latter's trip so that he could begin to draft the opening statement. He also hoped for an early high level meeting of the MIRV verification group which would sit down and continually study this problem. Kissinger thought that he would want the group to focus on the whole panoply of verification problems. He noted that there was already a good paper on MIRVs.⁵ G. Smith replied that the group would concentrate early on the MIRV question. He added that the paper had been discussed at the experts level. He would like to see high level officials meet for a day or two if necessary to soak up the facts, calculations, estimates, and doubts on this question and thus come up with a sharper focus on this issue. Kissinger said that the President had approved this idea and that the group would get together soon. G. Smith believed that a substantial amount of time should be blocked out, for the question had only been treated in bits and pieces to date.

Kissinger queried what was new in the NSSM 62 exercise. He noted that two options had been added. G. Smith replied that some language and modalities had also been added. More detailed refinement was needed. Kissinger wondered whether anything had come up in NATO consultations which would affect our judgments on the alternatives. G. Smith believed that the State Department should brief the President on the consultation exercise. The allied consensus seemed to favor a broad, comprehensive agreement. The consultations went surprisingly smoothly. There was not even much concentration on verification or a need for the planned US briefing on this question. All our allies' questions were anticipated, and we detected no great note of urgency from them. It was a professional rather than a political exercise.

Pedersen agreed with this summation and suggested that Kissinger read Ambassador Ellsworth's report. The latter's fundamental conclusion was that by and large our allies favored as comprehensive an agreement as our security interests permit. They recognize the importance of US judgments on this question. In response to McCloy's question, G. Smith said that consultations had taken place at the Permanent Representatives' level. Pedersen noted that there had been time for careful consultations with their home governments. Kissinger asked Sonnenfeldt's impressions of the NATO consultations. The latter agreed that these were the general conclusions, but there were some specific

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 27.

problems that needed to be discussed. G. Smith noted that Farley would be back the next day with a first hand report.

Kissinger said that the SALT paper was a model of fairness in the sense that there was no clear basis for choosing one alternative over the others. There was some treatment of how comprehensive an agreement we should propose. He wondered what the reasons were for choosing the most comprehensive agreement over more limited ones. G. Smith replied that there were two fundamental reasons. First, when you leave weapons systems in the open you divert the arms race into the permitted channels. You might fool yourself that you have accomplished something. He added that a very limited agreement gave the large plum to the Soviets of the recognition of parity, a moral equivalency, a mutual sufficiency. To grant this we should get more than just a freeze on ICBMs. Secondly, the more weapons systems that are restricted, the more signals we get earlier that cheating is going on. Under a regime prohibiting further missiles of any sort, any change in the status quo would alert us.

In response to Kissinger's question whether all agreed with these thoughts, Nutter replied that his agency had no strong position yet. OSD did have some problems. For example they were uneasy on the status of preparations with regard to points 1 and 11 in the NSSM. Re point 11, he believed that agency differences were well stated with regard to the packages; however, what was not addressed were those differences concerning the whole approach to SALT. Also DOD was not yet satisfied on the verification problem. In the first three packages there were elements of a possible acceptable proposal, but there were large questions because so much depended on the Russian attitude as well as on our own. The last two options were not acceptable to OSD without some very stringent conditions and not acceptable to the JCS under any conditions. He confirmed to Kissinger that the OSD conditions were not yet defined and that they were trying to accomplish this difficult task. Kissinger noted that the difference between options 3 and 4 was the MIRV ban and the difference between options 4 and 5 was the qualitative improvements. Nutter replied that, in that sense, OSD's problems increased with the comprehensiveness of the agreement, unless we were able to specify very clearly the conditions needed to cover verification and other ancillary problems.

Kissinger noted that he was trying to get a feel for agency positions; he asked for the JCS preference between options 3 and 1, for example. Allison said that the JCS were focusing on alternatives 2 and 3 and did not see much merit in alternative 1. He commented that option 2 mixed land mobile, sea-based and land missiles and was somewhat different from the previous option 2. He had some doubt about mixing totally all three of these missiles; it would make for a very tough

verification job. He repeated that within packages 2 and 3 there were elements which could be used to work out an acceptable proposal.

Nutter commented that with regard to verification we should think about such problems as what conditions we needed and where we would want on site inspection. He then raised a broader question, referring to the first point in the NSSM. He thought that there would be broader guidance on the strategy of the negotiations as well as the tactics. He was not sure that we knew exactly how we wished to proceed. His agency was moving towards the line of splitting the talks into two phases. The first one would be a phase of probing Soviet intentions, objectives, and strategy. This could be done in a number of different ways and not just through a general discussion. Perhaps we would make a specific proposal designed to produce treatment of different concepts. We might perhaps even propose a moratorium. We would not necessarily be prepared to accept these positions ultimately. We would try to find out Soviet positions before getting down to the business of reaching an agreement. Maybe such agreement would be impossible if the first, exploratory phase proved unpromising.

Kissinger asked Nutter what kind of principles he envisaged our discussing with the Soviets in the exploratory phase. Nutter mentioned their attitude toward linkage of offensive and defensive systems, whether or not they have a concept of parity and what it was, their views toward superiority, either overall or with regard to specific systems. He agreed with Kissinger that it was doubtful that the Soviets would announce a concept of superiority in a meeting with us. Kissinger suspected that the Soviets would announce parity and we would only know what they had in mind when we began to examine specific aspects of their position. Pedersen noted that parity would be a political plus for the Soviets. Nutter mentioned that we did not know the Soviets' position on intermediate missiles. He could not help but believe that the Soviets would raise the tactical nuclear issue. We would have problems with this question.

Nutter pointed out that our current alternative packages might look quite different after we had had preliminary discussions with the Russians. Kissinger asked if he was suggesting that we start without a concrete proposal. Nutter replied that this was not the only method. We might put forward one not for ultimate agreement, but in order to elicit a response from the other side. Kissinger wondered what we would do if the Soviets then accepted our proposal. Nutter said we would have to be prepared for this eventuality. Perhaps we would not wish to put forward a concrete proposal but rather begin merely with general talks.

Shakespeare asked how strongly OSD and JCS weighed on-site inspection. Nutter said it was very important for MIRVs and Allison added that it was also important for other problems. Kissinger noted

the importance of on-site inspection for a MIRV deployment ban but wondered whether it was needed for a ban on MIRV testing. Allison responded that it would be required for a variety of systems, not just MIRVs. We would need it for any items which posed doubts, e.g., MRVs, submarine construction, etc.

G. Smith asked whether any study had been done on how much of our own classified information we would have to expose if we were to pursue this “screwdriver” approach toward on-site inspection. Allison said that a study had been done, and McCloy noted that this was an old issue. G. Smith commented that in testifying before Congress he would want to know what he would have to say with regard to the weapons design data we were showing the Soviets. Shakespeare asked whether we would be prepared to grant on-site inspection in this country to the degree that we would need it in the Soviet Union. Allison responded that personally he would agree to this. He believed that we could have sufficiently intrusive inspection to achieve our purposes but not so intrusive as to give away the farm to the enemy.

McCloy recollected that this issue was studied for many years. We had started with elaborate proposals for on site inspection and the “open skies”⁶ suggestion to improve mutual confidence. We had put great emphasis on an elaborate verification system. We found that the Soviets resisted this violently, considering it espionage. The more they resisted the more we pressed this issue. At about that time we studied what we would be prepared to do with regard to inspection on our territory and found that we were reluctant in many respects. This was especially true for the AEC and among members of Congress. Fortunately, we never had to resolve this issue. The Soviets were so obdurate that we picked up some kudos without having to be put on the spot. Shakespeare wondered why the Soviets were so obdurate. Was it a question of general Soviet xenophobia? McCloy believed it was their general secretive disposition. In his experience he was always impressed with their secretiveness in all aspects. He was not sure that it was a definite determination to reserve the right to cheat. He added that there was also the element of political psychology. They were a closed, not a free, state, and they did not wish inspection to intrude upon that situation.

Kissinger noted that for every option the JCS were against ABM-associated radars but not against fixed ABM levels. Radars required a

⁶ An “open skies” treaty was first proposed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the Geneva Conference of 1955. Eisenhower’s proposal, which was rejected by the Soviets, would have given all participating countries a direct role in gathering information about military forces and activities of concern to them by permitting aerial observation flights over the territory of the signatories.

longer construction time than missiles; if there were no ban on radars, missiles could be deployed fairly quickly. Allison gave several JCS reasons for this position. There was the verification aspect first of all. There was the difficulty of defining ABM-associated radars. There are a variety of uses to which radars are put. The Soviet Union is radar-rich; through inter-netting they could get around a ban. Thus a ban on ABM-associated radars would restrict us and have little impact upon them. Kissinger wondered if the ban were limited to missile components whether it could be evaded. One might deploy many missiles all at once if radars were already available. Allison replied that an ABM could be evaded if a country really wished to do so. In any event the JCS preferred not to have a ban on the ABM radars.

Kissinger wondered how these issues should be presented to the President so that he could give G. Smith enough guidance to do some preliminary drafting during the Presidential trip. G. Smith believed that a summary paper had been prepared, and he was willing to leave for Kissinger the setting out of the key issues for the President. Kissinger suggested that the material for the President could cover the question of the type of agreement that we wish, whether we might put forward one or several illustrative proposals, and whether we should discuss principles or specific proposals first. He did not believe there was a need to resolve the verification issue. A group would meet on this subject before the President left. He asked whether this was a fair statement of what the President needed to decide before his trip.

G. Smith generally agreed but added the necessity of focusing on Congressional consultation. There seemed to be a possibility of no consultations until August 10. Congress adjourned on August 13. Thus we could be involved in talks with the Soviets without any Congressional consultation. This would be most unfortunate. He had hoped that some consultations would be undertaken by the President before his trip. This was now not possible. He thought it was poor tactics for people involved in this question in the government to move ahead too far before the President was involved. To treat consultations seriatim would produce confusing news stories. He believed the President should assemble in one room selected Congressional leaders. Responsible officials below the President could talk to specific points. In short, in thinking about the substance of SALT preparations, the President should not overlook his Congressional clients. Decisions on our positions could be affected by the consultations.

Kissinger then summed up the disagreements that had been surfaced. First, there was a disagreement whether we should begin with any specific proposal. The OSD position was that on the first go-around we should concentrate on general principles, using them in an exploratory way. Alternatively, we might use a specific proposal to elicit

Soviet response. Nutter said that we might use a specific proposal but it would not necessarily be what we would ultimately aim for. Kissinger noted that we would have to be prepared for the other side to accept our proposal. It was difficult to distinguish between a probing proposal and a serious proposal.

McCloy saw some advantages in exploratory talks about general principles without tying ourselves to one proposal. Kissinger understood this approach. On the other hand he was not clear about what would be told G. Smith with regard to a proposal for probing purposes. This would amount to staying flexible. He had assumed that we would not put forward any proposal on a take it or leave it basis. We can expect complicated negotiations. He understood the McCloy concept of exploratory conversations. As for a Presidential decision, if we decide we must put forward a proposal, the difference between the G. Smith and Nutter approach would seem to be a nuance of attitude.

G. Smith said that there would not be too much difference between these two approaches if we tabled something concrete. The big difference lay between tabling a position and merely exploring with the other side. If we begin with general exploration, the Soviets would soon be talking about German revanchism. He added that the last Administration had decided to table a specific proposal. It had already gone through the phase of laying out principles and objectives with the other side. He did not see any great prospects of getting much material from the Soviets in discussions which would help us to fashion our concrete positions. And he saw a very large Congressional problem with the merely exploratory approach. For example, if the ABM issue were still being decided, and we were to inform the Congress that we were only exploring principles with the Soviets, we would get a very sharp negative reaction from all those who had believed in commitments on ABMs or a MIRV test ban and moratorium. Kissinger wondered whether Congress would be happier if we came out against a MIRV test ban. G. Smith acknowledged that they would not. However, we would at least be sticking to the President's commitment to seriously consider a MIRV ban in the negotiations, although we would not be agreeing to it in advance. Nutter said that he would not push for an immediate concrete proposal unless that were the only way to get the Soviets to talk. In response to Kissinger's question as to what kind of elements we might wish to put forward to probe the Soviets, Nutter mentioned on site inspection.

(Kissinger left the meeting briefly at this point and asked G. Smith to take the chair.)

McCloy said that he was trying to sharpen the issue of exploratory talks. He thought that a purely exploratory approach would get fuzzy with a quasi-proposal. He thought that at this stage in history there was some advantage in having a very thorough go-around with the Soviets

on the strategic relationship as a basis for then deciding where we wish to come out. However, he was not necessarily arguing for this position.

Shakespeare asked whether we had had any contacts with the Soviets since the President's June 19 press conference.⁷ G. Smith said that he had heard nothing substantively, only reports from lower level officials which were probably nothing more than irresponsible chit-chat. He had heard, for example, that the Soviets had said that we could get a MIRV test ban quickly but that all other agreements would take a good deal of time. Also he had heard that their response would be forthcoming soon and would probably shoot for August 15 in Vienna as the opening venue. In response to Shakespeare's question, G. Smith said that we should wait and do nothing until the Soviets respond to our proposal. There was a good chance that when Ambassador Dobrynin returned to Washington next week he might carry with him such a response. In any event, there was little disposition in the US government to push the Soviets or to appear too eager to begin the talks.

G. Smith then commented on McCloy's suggestion that we might not wish to table a specific proposal at the outset. He noted that Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson felt that it was important that we put something on the table if we expect to launch serious talks. Even a quick and dirty proposal would be better than nothing in order to get movement in the talks. He noted McNamara had held the view that we should get into a dialogue on strategic principles rather than starting with a specific proposal. Shaw said that this had changed. The McNamara concepts had been discussed, but it was decided in preparing for the talks to begin with a concrete proposal. He added that there had been general discussion with the Soviets on two occasions about strategic principles and these had produced little information. McCloy interjected that he was not necessarily arguing for a purely exploratory opening, but was just trying to sharpen the issue. Pedersen felt this approach carried considerable risk. The Soviets might come up with a large package and we would then be in a difficult position with a limited response. McCloy noted that they might even try to blow us out of the water with a return to General and Complete Disarmament.

Shakespeare asked J. Smith about the strain on the Soviet economy of strategic forces. J. Smith said that strategic forces took a bigger bite out of the Soviet economy than ours. It was an enduring strain which cut into their investment and consumer goods. But strategic forces remained the Soviets' first priority. They were not a burden which they could not carry or increase if they wished to, but they do have to pay a price. Shakespeare wondered what the economic pres-

⁷ See Document 18.

tures would be on the Russians if there were to be an arms race. J. Smith acknowledged that this was very worrisome for them because an escalation of heavy weapons would be a very expensive undertaking. G. Smith believed that the only safe assumption was that the Soviets will pay whatever is necessary to maintain their strategic position. There is no evidence that they would not be willing to pay this price. Nutter thought that this subject affected the degree to which they were willing to negotiate. J. Smith agreed that it increased their negotiating willingness. McCloy noted that the recent arms build up by the Soviets really began after the Cuban missile crisis. At that time the Soviets said that they would never allow themselves to be in an inferior position again. Since 1962 they have been building up steadily, and not only in nuclear field. He noted the Czechoslovakian invasion and the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. He believed the major purpose of all this activity was to make Western Europe more accommodating to Soviet policy. They would not give up their recent military gains lightly. J. Smith noted that it had been a long, tough haul for the Soviets since 1962 and they would not wish to have to do this again. McCloy commented that therefore this was not just an issue of money; we should also keep an eye on Soviet objectives.

G. Smith believed that this discussion suggested that the Soviet attitude on on site inspection might be different than in the past. They might approach this subject differently if it were clear to them that an agreement could save them billions of rubles to use on general purpose forces or housing. McCloy was convinced that in the past they had refused on site inspection because they believed that they could get all that they wished from the US while the Soviet society in turn was a closed one. They saw no reason to lose this advantage. In our country the *New York Times* would report an ABM deployment the day after it took place. Perhaps now however, the Soviets might be willing to make a gesture in this field. G. Smith thought this was more likely now since they know that we have better unilateral surveillance capabilities and that their society is no longer so closed.

Shakespeare asked whether on site inspection was important for substantive reasons and not just psychological ones. Allison said that both considerations were significant. Shakespeare believed that if it were important for substantive reasons then we needed to have on site inspection for our national security. If it were a question of psychological desirability, then it was a political decision. Pedersen noted that the question of necessity was relative. The more we could improve our verification capability, the better off we were. G. Smith thought, for example, that the JCS could accept option 1 without on site inspection. Allison said that the JCS would always wish for on site inspection, but each case should be looked at on its merits.

(Kissinger then returned to chair the meeting.)

Nutter thought that it was easy to set forth the disadvantages of beginning talks by just discussing principles. He thought, however, that we also should be clear on the disadvantages of plunging blindly ahead with a concrete proposal. We were uncertain concerning Soviet intentions and interents.

Kissinger saw that we had two choices: We could begin by discussing general principles, as McCloy had suggested, or we could make a proposal that we could accept. If we put forward a proposal that was not designed to be acceptable to us, we would get fantastic pressure from disarmament groups and certain senators. We would spend as much time on domestic battles as we would eliciting views from the other side. He thought therefore that he could tell the President that there were two possible exploratory approaches. Either we could begin probing the Soviets with principles (which could be fairly specific) or we could put forward two or more concrete packages. He believed Nutter's idea was to have two or three proposals for each category of weapons in order to elicit a Soviet response. Nutter said that we should be prepared to accept any one of them. Kissinger wondered whether anyone else saw merit in putting forward proposals that were designed not to be acceptable. Nutter interjected that he would not characterize his suggestion in that fashion. We should be willing to accept elements of the proposals, but they should not be intended to be a full package. When Kissinger asked him whether OSD had such a package for exploratory reasons, Nutter replied that this was a difficult problem. This approach had not received adequate attention. Kissinger wondered what directive on this subject could be given to the Steering Group.

Pedersen believed that we would have to know our real negotiating aims among the five options before proposing something specific. Nutter suggested that we needed only a tentative goal. This approach might not work, he acknowledged, but attention should be paid to it.

Kissinger said that there were two questions with regard to the exploratory approach. First, do we start in this fashion? Assuming the answer is yes, then how do we proceed? One view, suggested by McCloy, was to talk about principles. The other view was to put forward a quasi-proposal in order to elicit Soviet thinking. Nutter repeated that he was not wedded to this second approach. McCloy thought that the exploratory concept should be set down on paper and could look persuasive, but he recognized that it was late in the day for this. Pedersen repeated that he thought that we must know roughly our final position and that our exploratory position would be determined by our final one. He thought we should decide on our objectives first and then we could decide whether we start talking about principles, or part of our package, or our whole package.

Kissinger suggested, in light of all the work that had been done, that if we decide upon the exploratory route we might wish to put forward

several options as we had done with our NATO allies. Thus we could put forward options 2 and 3 and perhaps 4—it depended on Presidential willingness to override objections. G. Smith noted the time problem with the exploratory approach. This could take months. McCloy noted that it could take a couple of years. G. Smith suggested a possible stormy Congressional reaction when we were asked if we were trying to get a MIRV ban, and we replied that this would come later after exploring principles.

Kissinger, noting that it was his duty to try to represent Presidential thinking, said that he did not believe that the President had committed himself to trying to get a MIRV moratorium. G. Smith responded that the President was committed to seriously consider this question. Kissinger replied that he had expressed willingness to consider this problem within the government, but was not committed to putting forward a MIRV moratorium proposal.

G. Smith then asked Nutter a series of questions designed to clarify the exploratory approach. He wondered whether DOD would allow him to explore a MIRV moratorium or a zero ABM level, for example. Nutter replied to these questions by saying that his department would have to think about them. They were working hard to determine what conditions would be acceptable. They had not had time to address these questions. G. Smith noted that this added up to SALT beginning at Christmas rather than in August. Nutter repeated that the strategy for the talks had not been really addressed. Pedersen underlined the importance of the implications of G. Smith's questions. Nutter said that a piecemeal approach to the talks might not work. In response to G. Smith's query what he would ask of the Soviets, Nutter replied that he would have to think about this problem. He had not been able to study it.

McCloy suggested going to the Soviets and asking them to explain what they were doing with their strategic and general purpose forces. Where were they headed in these fields? Could we cut across the board and stop these buildups? How about the position of Europe and our NATO allies? What were their intentions? etc. G. Smith replied that the Soviets would respond with surprise for they thought that they were going to talk about strategic arms. They would be most happy to talk about Western imperialism and German revanchism. He thought getting into this kind of debate would not advance the cause of strategic arms control. McCloy said that we could then call for a halt to the arms race, and G. Smith said that this was his objective.

Kissinger said that it was necessary to move this issue to a point where G. Smith could get some guidance by Tuesday when the President's trip began. G. Smith acknowledged that he needed enough guidance to keep him busy, if not happy.

Kissinger said that the disagreements should be stated to the President. He said that the first decision to be made was whether we should structure the initial phase of the talks toward explorations or toward

negotiating an agreement right from the beginning. If the President decides that he did not wish to negotiate from the outset but rather wanted to find out more about the Soviet position, we would then face the question of how best to elicit Soviet response, recalling the cautions that had been expressed. For this route, there were the McCloy suggestion of exploring principles and Nutter's idea of a specific proposal, which would probably be different than the ones under consideration. This latter approach would mean designing a new proposal to meet these conditions. Nutter commented that he did not disagree with McCloy's approach, but rather was suggesting another way.

Kissinger then suggested a third way of exploring. Like the NATO consultations, we could have 3 or 4 schemes, and be ready to live with them. The President would have to decide on the MIRV moratorium question. If it were not included in our proposals, we could tell Congressional critics that we had considered this problem and decided that such a moratorium would not be in our interests. He thought this method of putting forward several proposals would be a way of exploring with the Soviets while at the same time answering the charge that we had come up with nothing after all this time. In sum, the President could decide that he wished to negotiate right away or that he wished to begin with explorations. As for the latter, he could choose either to talk about principles, or to put forward a series of options like the NATO consultations, or to table a new option designed to elicit response from the other side.

J. Smith believed that the formulation of the issue of exploration versus negotiations suggested a greater difference than there really was in substance. All talks were somewhat exploratory. The real essence of the problem was whether we had committed ourselves in our own mind to our objectives, whether we had decided that we must have certain elements or we would not conclude an agreement. When Kissinger asked him for specific examples, J. Smith cited the ABM as just one of many. Kissinger asked G. Smith whether he wanted to have objectives without which we would not conclude an agreement. G. Smith replied that he hoped we would not start talks without some idea where we wanted to come out. Pedersen agreed with J. Smith's view that the two approaches might not be so different. If we were to explore without any specific proposal, we should still know about where we wanted to come out. If we went ahead with a concrete proposal it would fall into the general area that we were looking for but we could end up with possible variations. Kissinger asked Pedersen whether he thought that if the President could live with two or three options we could put these forward to test the other side. Pedersen believed that this approach was consistent with his concept of variations in our basic objectives. J. Smith said that it was important to have our objectives clearly defined. Nutter cautioned that we should not get locked into positions. Some of the packages under consideration

seemed livable, but we did not know how the Soviets would react. We could have some notion of our objectives, but they should be hedged. We might find some surprises.

Kissinger wondered how the President could decide other than through one of the alternatives that he had laid out. J. Smith asked how we would go about proposing two or three packages if we decided to negotiate on substance. Kissinger said that, assuming we were entering the talks prepared to talk substance, we would have the tactical question of whether or not to move toward substantive outcomes in an exploratory fashion and attempt to find out the other side's response without locking ourselves in. Pedersen suggested two ways of doing this. We could put forward a concrete proposal, whether or not we were locked into it. Or we would not put forward one, but rather elements of it. Kissinger suggested this might be a fourth alternative to the routes he had listed. Allison said that this approach was like option 3 which could be presented with modifications. Many elements would still have to worked out, but that's what negotiations were for.

Kissinger said that the group had just discussed the preliminary phase, whether or not it should be exploratory or substantive. He now turned to the substantive phase and which options agencies preferred. He asked whether anybody was behind alternative 1. Nutter replied that he did not wish to say which option his agency would choose, but elements in package 1 could lead to a possible outcome. Allison noted that there also were likely elements in option 2. Nutter added that he did not believe that any one of the alternatives was the correct one. Kissinger said that he had detected that option 1 had less support than the others, and he wished to flag this point for the President.

He saw the basic disagreement on the options as follows. Those who were in favor of a comprehensive agreement argue that a more limited approach would shift the arms race into the permitted areas of arms build up. Those opposed to the comprehensive approach stressed the verification problem and other uncertainties. Alternatives 2 and 3 were relatively more limited than 4 and 5. He thought that if these were the only available options, OSD and JCS would consider that 2 and 3 were more desirable than 4 and 5 in terms of national security. He thought that ACDA preferred a more comprehensive approach, subject to the judgment of the senior verification panel.⁸ He repeated that

⁸ In a June 30 memorandum to Kissinger, Smith recommended that "since verification capability is central to SALT and doubts have been raised about the verification panel's findings, I suggest that the President call for a higher level verification review panel charged with trying to get a better understanding of what US unilateral capabilities are." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-024, NSC Meeting 10/8/69) Nixon approved a memorandum dated July 15 in which Kissinger recommended that the President establish an NSC Verification Panel and appoint him as chair. (Ibid., Box 845, ABM-MIRV, MIRV Panel Meeting 2:30 p.m., Situation Room, July 16, 1969)

there would be a meeting of such a panel with high officials of all the agencies concerned before the Presidential trip. Pedersen noted that the State Department, as an institution, sided with ACDA, subject to discussions with the Secretary.

J. Smith pointed to the idea of a US-Soviet review commission, mentioned on page 113 of the report, and said that this was very important for the verification problem. Depending on its modalities, such a commission had great potential for easing or increasing the difficult verification problems. It provided a forum for explaining anomalous or disturbing data. If it were a court of inquiry, there could be more difficult problems. In any event, the existence of this commission and its type of mechanism had important implications. The thrust of the idea in the paper was to provide a place to blow the whistle on suspicious events.

With regard to the verification problem, Kissinger said that there had been a review of our unilateral capabilities and the panel was defining our uncertainties. There was a policy disagreement. Some believed that our unilateral capabilities were not sufficient and that we required on site inspection. Others were willing to rely on our national capabilities.

G. Smith believed that everyone agreed that we should make a hard try for some direct observations no matter what option we choose. We should not assume that on site inspection was out of the question. His agency was working on specific methods for direct observation.

Kissinger suggested that radars and a ban on MIRVs were examples that needed on site inspection. Allison said that MIRV bans were the best example. J. Smith said that all agreed that it was not possible to verify unilaterally a MIRV deployment ban. There had been a careful review and delineation of areas where national means of verification would work.

Kissinger thought that the verification issue should be treated in specific terms. On site inspection versus national verification should not become a theological issue. It should be treated practically, in terms of concrete negotiating issues. G. Smith commented that we should have the following issue in mind. If an agreement looked advantageous to us and we decided that we did not need on site inspection for monitoring purposes, then would we nevertheless refuse to go ahead without on site inspection because of its value in confirming Soviet motives? He believed our past positions on this question were wrong. We should try to get on site inspection, but be prepared to fall off if the rest of the deal looked advantageous to us. Kissinger noted that it was hard to decide this question in the abstract. G. Smith responded that we could decide that we would not accept any deal without on site inspection. McCloy cautioned that we could rationalize away on site in-

spection when we were under pressures for an agreement. G. Smith said that this depended on the deal in question. We had resisted such pressures since 1961 on a comprehensive test ban. McCloy noted that we had succumbed to such pressures with regard to the partial test ban that was actually negotiated. G. Smith rejoined that some observers thought that we were doing more testing under the limited ban than we had before. In any event we should not proceed on the assumption that this government could not resist such pressures. Pedersen noted that the factual situation had changed in view of the improvement of our national detection capabilities. McCloy agreed that the old formulas for inspection had been modified by our satellites. Nevertheless, he would not wish to see the whole objective swept away without even a remnant of the principle of on site inspection. Perhaps we would not be so weak against pressures this time.

Kissinger noted that with respect to verification there had been much technical discussion on what we could and could not observe. There had been less discussion on the more troublesome question of what we would do about suspected violations. J. Smith saw an analogy with the test ban. If an anomalous event occurred, we would ask the Soviets about it and say that we did not understand what they were doing. McCloy commented that the review commission might be a good idea, and J. Smith repeated that it could have a big impact.

Kissinger then closed the meeting by saying there would almost certainly be no NSC meeting on this subject before the Presidential trip. The President would have a good session with G. Smith before he left. Kissinger said that he would check with the principals of the agencies primarily concerned to see that the alternatives and issues of SALT were correctly stated for the President.

26. Letter From President Nixon to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith)¹

Washington, July 21, 1969.

Dear Gerry:

Following our discussion today,² I wish to convey to you my thoughts on the forthcoming talks with the Soviet Union on strategic arms. You and your associates will be dealing with a subject of crucial significance to the safety of this country. My purpose in these talks is to determine whether it is feasible to make arrangements with the Soviet Government that will contribute to the preservation and, if possible, the improvement of this country's security. Any arrangement with the Soviet Union, especially if it is to be in the form of explicit and formal commitments, must meet this test to my own full satisfaction.

When I speak of this country's security, I fully realize that we cannot expect to return to an era when our country was literally immune to physical threat. Neither our military programs nor any negotiation with our potential adversaries can achieve that. But I am speaking of a situation in which I, as President and Commander-in-Chief, have at my disposal military forces that will provide me with the best assurance attainable in present and foreseeable circumstances that no opponent can rationally expect to derive benefit from attacking, or threatening to attack us or our allies. I am determined, moreover, to pass on to my successor that same sense of assurance.

If the Soviet leaders operate on similar premises (which we do not know and which their current military programs give some reason to doubt), there could be, I believe, a prospect of reaching an understanding with them whereby, in the first instance, limits would be placed on the quantitative and qualitative growth of strategic forces. It

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 197, Agency Files, ACDA, Jan 69–Dec 70, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt. According to an attached note, Kissinger ordered no distribution of the President's letter.

² Nixon met with Smith and Kissinger from 11:37 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) According to a note Smith sent to Rogers on July 21, Nixon called the meeting to discuss SALT. During the meeting, Smith expressed views covered in a letter that he left with the President and also sent to Rogers. In that letter, Smith wrote: "I am now convinced that a comprehensive freeze at or near the present state of affairs would be more advantageous for United States security than more limited freezes or a continuation of unlimited competition." Smith also made the following suggestion about a negotiated MIRV moratorium: "It seems to me that if the USSR would agree to suspend starts of additional ICBM and SLBMs, the United States could safely agree to a mutual suspension of MIRV/MRV testing for a period sufficient to explore the possibility of a significant SALT arrangement. It would be clearly spelled out that if it develops that no agreement is in sight, or that a permanent MIRV/MRV test ban cannot be verified adequately, both sides could resume previous activities." (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383–97–0010, Director's Files, Smith Chronological File, Smith/Rogers Correspondence, 2/69–5/71)

will be your task to obtain evidence that will assist me in making a determination whether such a prospect is real and what the elements of such an understanding could be.

Any understanding, whatever the form, that places limitations on Soviet forces will obviously involve limitations on ours. I will judge the resulting relationship of US-Soviet strategic forces in terms of the criteria for strategic sufficiency that I have established.³

Moreover, I will accept limitations on our forces only after I have assured myself of our ability to detect Soviet failure to implement limitations on their own forces in sufficient time to protect our security interests. In this latter connection, you should know that I am determined to avoid, within the Government and in the country at large, divisive disputes regarding Soviet compliance or non-compliance with an understanding or agreement. Nor will I bequeathe to a future President the seeds of such disputes. In our open society and political system it is my duty to provide persuasive public evidence not only of any Soviet non-compliance with an agreement but also of Soviet compliance with it. Any agreed limitations must therefore meet the test of verifiability. I recognize that this may not be obtainable with 100 percent assurance; but the margin of uncertainty must be reasonable. I will make this judgement.

I have carefully examined the possible alternative arrangements that might be entered into with the Soviet Union, as developed through our National Security Council process. In the absence of any indications from the Soviet Union of the direction they propose to take, I do not find it possible to make a clear selection among them. I do not, therefore, desire to propose to the Soviet Government a specific set of measures corresponding to the five alternatives analyzed in NSSM 62.⁴ You should outline to the Soviet representatives the various approaches we have studied, as reflected in Alternative I, II and III of NSSM 62 and indicate our readiness to examine jointly with them these and any others they might advance. You may state that we are prepared to consider limitations on all strategic offensive and defensive weapons system, that our suggestions are not exhaustive but that we wish to hear their views before advancing any additional ones ourselves. Upon completion of the work of the MIRV verification panel, I may authorize presenting aspects of Alternative IV.

In short, your task in the initial phases of the talks is to explore Soviet intentions without yourself placing on the table the full range of alternative arrangements that we might consider. In the light of the progress of the explorations, and other relevant factors, I will determine the timing and contents of any specific limitation proposal that we might make to the Soviet Union.

³ See footnote 2, Document 24.

⁴ See Document 27.

Let me, in conclusion, outline my general approach to our relations with the USSR so that you and your associates will be guided thereby in your talks. I have conveyed to the Soviet leaders my view that our relations should be based on a recognition by each side of the legitimate security interests of the other; I have conveyed to them also my readiness to engage in bona fide negotiations on concrete issues. I have told them that I have no interest either in polemical exchanges or in the mere atmospherics of détente. Having propounded these principles and acted on them in practice since entering office, I believe the seriousness of this Administration in pursuing the path of equitable accommodation with the Soviet Union is being demonstrated. I consider that the approach to the arms limitation talks outlined above will serve to provide further such demonstration. The other side has the opportunity to respond in the same spirit. If it does so, arrangements to restrain the pace of competition in the field of strategic armaments should be within our reach.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon⁵

⁵ Printed from a copy that indicates Nixon signed the original.

27. Summary of Response to National Security Study Memorandum 62¹

Washington, undated.

ALTERNATIVE I

I. Description of Proposal

1. The number of fixed land-based launchers for intercontinental-range missiles (ranges of 5000 km or more) would be limited to those

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 873, SALT, Volume II, June–July 1969. Top Secret; Noform. Drafted by the SALT Steering Committee (see footnote 1, Document 14). Kissinger sent Nixon this summary of the response to NSSM 62 as an attachment to an undated memorandum with the recommendations that Smith be instructed to prepare an opening position for SALT that contained more than one alternative package based on I, II, and III in the summary and that the possibility of broadening the alternatives to include MIRV proposals be held open. Although Kissinger's memorandum bears the handwritten remark that the President saw it on July 22, Nixon did not initial either approval or disapproval of the recommendations. Nixon did, however, send a letter to Smith instructing him to follow this course of action in the SALT negotiations (see Document 26).

presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement on their number. Within this number, launchers could be replaced or relocated on a one-for-one basis.

2. The number of fixed land-based launchers for missiles of intermediate or medium ranges (i.e., 1000 km or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement on their number. Replacement, relocation, or conversion of such systems to those of intercontinental range would be prohibited.

3. There would be a ban on the deployment of mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems of ranges greater than 1000 km. Flight testing of land-based strategic offensive missiles in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited.

4. There would be a ban on the deployment on each side of more than an agreed equivalent number of fixed, land-based antiballistic missile launchers and associated antiballistic missiles (including reload missiles) and of ABM-associated radars. Land-mobile antiballistic missile systems would be prohibited.

II. Significant Features

Pros and Cons

- First step without affecting US force programs.
- Avenues are open to build toward greater counterforce capability.

Verification

—No major verification problems although limited Selective Direct Observations (on-site inspection) would be helpful.

Strategic Analysis

- Both sides maintain a high retaliatory capability.
- Neither side can avoid over 100 million deaths even by striking first.
- Both sides show an improved war-waging capability over the “no agreement” situation. Soviet capability improves more substantially than US.
- The number of US ICBMs surviving a Soviet Counterforce first strike would be less than without an agreement.
- No incentive for Soviets to cheat since US retaliatory capability would not be affected significantly.

Insurance against Soviet Violation or Abrogation

- Ample US safeguards against violation or abrogation.

Effect on Allies

- Should present no significant problems for allies.

Moratorium

—A moratorium would affect only the Soviets because the US is not building any additional systems controlled by this alternative.

III. Dissenting Views

—Science Advisor wants an agreed limit on number of missile flight tests (pre-announced and confined to known test ranges).

—DOD believes Soviets have developed a simple MIRV that can be tested without US knowledge and that US can deploy a MIRV system without further testing.

—DOD has reservations (on principle) about any moratorium.

—JCS opposes limitation on ABM-associated radars.

—DOD believes data insufficient to make judgments on cost savings.

—Re strategic sufficiency, DDR&E and ISA do not believe uncertainties with respect to both US and Soviet weapon systems have been sufficiently taken into account. JCS believe too much emphasis is placed on fatalities and urban/industrial damage as measurements of strategic capabilities.

ALTERNATIVE II

I. Description of Proposal

1. The total number of land-based launchers for intercontinental-range missiles (ranges of 500 km or more) and strategic offensive sea-based ballistic missile launchers would be limited to those presently existing or under construction. Within that overall ceiling, each side would be permitted to vary the mix of such land-based offensive missile launchers (fixed or mobile) and sea-based offensive missile launchers as desired.

2. The number of fixed land-based launchers for missiles of intermediate and medium ranges (i.e., 1000 km or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement on their number. Replacement, relocation, or conversion of such systems to those of intercontinental range would be prohibited. There would be a complete ban on land-based mobile missile systems of intermediate or medium range. Flight testing of strategic offensive land-based missiles of intermediate or medium range in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited.

3. Numbers of sea-based offensive cruise missile launchers would be limited to those presently operational or under construction.

4. There would be a ban on the deployment of more than an agreed equivalent number of antiballistic-missile launchers and associated antiballistic missiles (including reload missiles) and of ABM-associated radars.

II. Significant Features

Pros and Cons

—First step toward arms limitation but without disruption of present US military programs.

—Would have little effect in slowing the arms race or limiting strategic capabilities.

Verification

—The main verification problem is associated with the variable mix of systems—there would be difficulties in counting mobile ICBMs and submarine launchers.

Strategic Analysis

—Both sides maintain a high retaliatory capability.

—Neither side can limit damage below very high fatality levels. US can save 43 million at Safeguard ABM level by striking first but even then suffers 100 million deaths.

—Both sides show an improved war-waging capability over the “no agreement” situation. Soviet capability improves more substantially than US. (Note: This improvement is difficult to understand since the “no agreement” force levels in 1978 are higher than those for Alternative II.)

—The number of US ICBMs surviving a Soviet counterforce first strike would be less than without an agreement, although there would be more on-line SLBMs available than without an agreement.

—Soviet cheating (500 additional ICBMs or ABMs) would not have a significant effect on US retaliatory capability.

Insurance against Soviet Violation or Abrogation

—Ample US safeguards are available.

Effect on Allies

—Should present no significant problems for allies.

Moratorium

—A moratorium would affect only the Soviets since the US is not building any additional systems controlled by this alternative.

III. Dissenting Views

—JCS opposed to ban on ABM-associated radars.

—Science Advisor wants an agreed limit on number of missile flight tests (pre-announced and confined to known test ranges).

—DOD believes data insufficient to make judgments on cost savings.

—Re strategic sufficiency, DDR&E and ISA do not believe uncertainties with respect to both US and Soviet weapon systems have been sufficiently taken into account. JCS believe too much emphasis is placed on fatalities and urban/industrial damage as measurements of strategic capabilities.

—DOD has reservations (in principle) about any moratorium.

—DOD believes Soviets have developed a simple MIRV that can be tested without US knowledge and that US can deploy a MIRV system without further testing.

ALTERNATIVE III

I. Description of Proposal

1. The number of land-based launchers for intercontinental-range missiles (ranges of 5000 km. or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement on their number. Enlargement or relocation of these launchers would be prohibited.

2. The respective numbers of sea-based ballistic missile launchers and submarine-launched cruise missile launchers would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement as to their number.

3. The number of fixed land-based launchers for missiles of intermediate or medium ranges (i.e., 1000 km or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction. Replacement, relocation, or conversion of such systems to those of intercontinental range would be prohibited.

4. There would be a ban on mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems of ranges greater than 1000 km. Flight testing of land-based strategic offensive missiles in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited.

5. There would be a ban on the deployment on each side of more than an agreed equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles (including reload missiles), and of ABM-associated radars. Land-mobile anti-ballistic missile systems would be prohibited.

II. Significant Features

Pros and Cons

—Would place a numerical limit on all strategic offensive and defensive missile launchers, but would permit technological improvements as a hedge against loss in strategic capabilities.

—Would allow US to proceed with planned programs while denying further increases in offensive forces to the Soviets.

—Could shunt arms competition into other channels such as bombers, MIRVs, missile payload and accuracy.

—Could be difficult to negotiate because of greater adverse effect on Soviet programs.

Verification

—Most difficult verification task is monitoring ban on land-mobile strategic launchers.

—Some SDO would be of value.

Strategic Analysis

—Both sides retain a formidable retaliatory capability, although at high ABM levels the Soviet capability drops below what it would be in a “no agreement” situation.

—Neither side has a significant damage-limiting capability, and both sides would suffer over 100 million deaths after striking first.

—Both sides improve their war-waging capability over the “no agreement” situation, although this is difficult to understand because US forces remain the same for both cases and Soviet forces are greater in the “no agreement” case.

—The number of US ICBM’s surviving a Soviet counterforce first strike would be less than without an agreement.

—There would not be an appreciable drop in US retaliatory capability if the Soviets cheated, adding 500 ABMs or ICBMs.

Insurance against Soviet Violation or Abrogation

—Ample US safeguards against violation or abrogation.

Effect on Allies

—Should present no significant problems for allies.

Moratorium

—A moratorium would affect only the Soviets because the US is not building any additional systems controlled by this alternative.

Cost Savings

—None for either side, at least for the near term.

III. Dissenting Views

—Science Advisor wants an agreed limit on number of missile flight tests (pre-announced and confined to known test ranges).

—DOD believes Soviets have developed a simple MIRV that can be tested without US knowledge and that US can deploy a MIRV system without further testing.

—DOD has reservations (on principle) about any moratorium.

—JCS opposes limitation on ABM-associated radars.

—DOD believes data insufficient to make judgments on cost savings.

—Re strategic sufficiency, DDR&E and ISA do not believe uncertainties with respect to both US and Soviet weapon systems have been sufficiently taken into account. JCS believe too much emphasis is placed on fatalities and urban/industrial damage as measurements of strategic capabilities.

ALTERNATIVE IV

I. Description of Proposal

1. The number of fixed land-based launchers for intercontinental-range missiles (ranges of 5000 km or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement on their number. Enlargement or relocation of these launchers would be prohibited.

2. The respective numbers of sea-based ballistic missile launchers and submarine-launched cruise missile launchers would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement as to their number.

3. The number of land-based launchers for missiles of intermediate or medium ranges (i.e., 1000 km or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction. Replacement, relocation, or conversation of such systems to those of intercontinental range would be prohibited.

4. There would be a ban on the deployment of mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems of ranges greater than 1000 km. Flight testing of land-based strategic offensive missiles in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited.

5. There would be a ban on the deployment of each side of more than an agreed equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles (including reload missiles), and of ABM-associated radar. Land- and sea-mobile anti-ballistic missile systems would be prohibited.

6. The deployment of MIRV's and the further flight testing of MIRV's, FOBS, and related systems would be prohibited.

7. Flight testing of missiles would be preannounced and conducted on agreed ranges.

II. Significant Features

(Note: The only difference between this alternative and Alternative III is the addition of a MIRV ban. This alternative is opposed by JCS, ISA and DDR&E.)

MIRV Ban

—As defined in the proposal the ban on MIRV testing would meet most of the criteria considered essential in the MIRV Panel Report² to improve detection.

—Development, but not testing, of operational MRVs (Polaris A-3) would be permitted.

—If the Soviets choose to claim that the SS-9/MRV is operational it could be deployed but not tested.

—All strategic missile firings would be pre-announced and conducted on agreed ranges.

Strategic Analysis

—Without MIRVs, US retaliatory capabilities decline, especially for 500 ABMs and Safeguard (though not stated in the paper, almost half of the damage would be inflicted by US bombers).

—Soviet retaliatory capabilities are noticeably higher than in the “no agreement” situation.

—Neither side would gain a significant advantage by a first strike in terms of saving lives.

—This option is inferior to the “no agreement” situation in war-waging capabilities, though it is better than Options I, II and III. It is also worse for the Soviet Union at the Safeguard ABM level.

—Because of the MIRV ban about 230 more US ICBMs survive at the Safeguard ABM level when compared with the “no agreement” situation.

—At the Safeguard ABM level Soviet cheating (500 additional ABM interceptors) would significantly degrade US retaliatory capabilities.

Moratorium

—The MIRV flight test can to be made at the outset of talks as a matter of priority and for a fixed period (six months to a year).

Cost Savings

—Some likely in this option.

² On July 7 Lynn sent Kissinger a draft of the MIRV Panel’s “Report on the Technological Consequences of a MIRV Flight Ban.” Lynn’s covering memorandum described the report as “by far the best piece of work this Government has done to date on the MIRV issue.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box SCI 18, NSC Files, MIRV Panel) Regarding the revised report, see Document 29.

III. Dissenting Views

—JCS believe this alternative to be unacceptable because of our doubtful ability to verify a MIRV ban. Uncertainties regarding Soviet ABMs should not preclude US MIRVs. A ban on MIRVs would reduce coverage of time-urgent targets and would preclude development of penetration aids. There would be adverse effects on both US and Soviet space programs.

ALTERNATIVE V

I. Description of Proposal

1. There would be a quantitative and qualitative freeze on those aspects of strategic offensive missile systems that can be adequately verified.

2. The number of land-based launchers for intercontinental-range missiles (ranges of 5000 km or more) would be limited to those presently operational.

3. The respective numbers of sea-based ballistic missile launchers and submarine-launched cruise missile launchers would be limited to those presently operational.

4. The number of land-based launchers for missiles of intermediate or medium ranges (i.e., 1000 km or more) would be limited to those presently operational.

5. There would be a ban on the deployment of mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems of ranges greater than 1000 km. Flight testing of land-based strategic offensive missiles in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited.

6. There would be a ban on the deployment on each side of more than an agreed equivalent number of fixed, land-based antiballistic missile launchers and associated antiballistic missiles (including reload missiles), and of ABM-associated radars. Land- and sea-mobile antiballistic missile systems would be prohibited.

7. The deployment and testing of MIRV's, FOBS, and related systems; new types of missiles; or missiles incorporating new verifiable improvements (such as increased accuracy or payload weight) would be prohibited.

8. Flight testing of strategic missiles would be limited to an agreed number of preannounced tests of existing missiles on agreed ranges.

II. Significant Features

(Note: This is a modified "stop where we are" proposal. It is opposed by JCS, ISA and DDR&E.)

Pros and Cons

—It would, in effect, freeze the status quo, except for an agreed ABM level; thus preserving strategic stability based on each side having a sufficient assured destruction capability.

—It would mean abandoning a number of future programs, including MIRVs, in an agreement that included significant verification uncertainties and risks of cheating.

Verification

—Since almost all improvements in missile technology are banned this alternative is heavily dependent on intelligence capabilities, over which there is a controversy.

—The verification section stresses the necessity of telemetry.

—It acknowledges that telemetry could be denied by the USSR, but asserts we would detect this effort, and suspect an evasion.

—It acknowledges that while changes in existing missile systems would be detected, verification might be delayed until late in the test program.

Strategic Analysis

—Both sides could maintain a relatively high retaliatory capability (the US would decline, however, and be highly dependent on bombers at the Safeguard ABM level).

—The US would not be able to prevent very high fatalities. (Note: According to the statistics the US could save 45 million lives by striking first, at the Safeguard level).

—Damage potential of both significantly less than no agreement, but the Soviets suffer more than US.

—Almost 600 more ICBMs survive a first strike than under no agreement at Safeguard level.

—Addition of 500 ABMs clandestinely, at agreed Safeguard level would significantly degrade US retaliatory capability.

—Hedges—Main one is to keep MIRV production lines ready.

Moratorium

—Would include new construction of ICBMs and SLBMs, developmental flight tests of MIRVs etc., and developmental flight testing of new missiles or verifiable missile improvements (JCS and OSD oppose).

III. Dissenting Views

—In general the JCS position is that there are too many risks in verification capabilities to justify giving up US programs, that the

analysis is too optimistic in expecting the Soviets to give up launchers under construction, that bombers cannot be controlled, that throw weight limitation not desirable.

—They recommend it be eliminated from further consideration.

28. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, July 22, 1969.

HAK: Smith suggested panel.² Need systematic review, statement of disagreements, statement of capabilities and limitations.

This group would review MIRV Panel report,³ but charter would be broader.

Begin by outlining DOD's concerns with verification report.

Packard: Issues are:

1. MIRV question: Can we control deployment through controlling testing. Should wait for report.
2. Controlling their ABM, viz. Upgrading SAMs.
3. Comprehensive agreements which include aircraft systems.
4. Mobile systems. Hard to verify specific numbers.
5. Radars. ABM associated or not.
6. Verifying qualitative restrictions: accuracy improvements (not difficult) maneuvering RVs. throw weight.
7. Frequency and capability of recon to be sure they aren't doing something when we aren't looking.

Must take these matters into account in evaluating what agreements we can live with.

Smith: I would like to see examination of issue, broader the agreement, the more manageable the constraints, i.e. verification easier. I'm not certain of validity of this proposition.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969-3/8/72. No classification marking. Chaired by Kissinger, this was the first meeting of the Verification Panel, which included members from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Office of Management and Budget; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the NSC staff.

² See footnote 8, Document 25.

³ See footnote 2, Document 27.

HAK: Why start with any proposition? Why not analyze proposition.

Packard: I agree: Should analyze the problem.

Smith: Shouldn't fly blind. Should know what we are studying.

Nitze: Additional things like on-site inspection and our current national means, e.g., in having planes overhead at more frequent intervals.

Mitchell: You didn't mention submarines, Dave.

Packard: Less concern with verifying subs.

Allison: Purpose is to deal with disagreements, so we haven't made a point of it.

First step is, what can we do with unilateral means. Second, nevertheless, we want to seek some on-site inspection. We should determine what we can do now. Should focus our attention on this.

How can Soviets deceive us. Then, what are potential improvements?

HAK: I have concern with issues like PL-1.⁴

How can technical information be made politically meaningful?

Second, July 15 report on naval missile.

either no telemetry
or frequencies unmonitored.

We are uncertain about essential characteristics.

We need capability to determine what goes on out of range of what we are currently geared toward.

Then, principals should advise President on minimum time lag between detection and how he can act on it.

Therefore, in addition to analyzing evasion, we need analysis of what we would do about it.

Problem of not banning ABM associated radars.

Allison: The Soviets have lots of radars now that could be internetted.

HAK: We have developed possible terms of reference for a working group. [Passes out copies.]⁵

Richardson: Very lucid exposition of questions. Most important is clandestine development issue.

Without asking for new work, it would be useful to concurrently or in addition, to consider measures to enhance efficacy of national means, such as agreed use of test ranges. You reach residual problem of _____⁶ [requirement?] for on-site inspection or other means. Finally, you get to question taking into account:

⁴ A medium range air-to-air missile that was a Chinese copy of the Soviet AA-1.

⁵ Not further identified. Brackets in the original.

⁶ Omission in the original.

- a. adequacy of *national* means.
- b. degree to which this effectiveness can be enhanced.
- c. usual on-site requests.

What are possible combination of our control measures that lead to highest level of verification.

This is a more rigorous context. Only way analytically you can face issue squarely of risks you face, risks you are willing to undertake. So two other questions are:

1. Agreed measures to _____⁷ [enhance?] adequacy of national detection means.
2. Residual on-site inspection requirements. What can you learn from on-site inspection, what known or potential techniques.

HAK: You call attention to question, what would we like to have? We should use ingenuity in discovering new means.

Packard: We should examine possibilities of adding to existing capabilities.

Cushman: Should examine specific augmentations aimed at high risks.

HAK: Elliot also calls attention to deterring categories of what must be banned to improve verification. We examined this kind of question in MIRV panel, i.e. putting warheads in space, Polaris A-3 testing.

We need list of associated measures to make particular measure effective.

Also, MIRV ban must be related to ABM limits. Then we need a similar listing.

This may or may not leave residual on-site inspection.

If you agree this is a possible procedure, Elliott would look after panel.

Lynn look after technical report.

Hear report week of President's return, then have a a session on it.

Smith: I want it earlier. Should have before Aug 15.

HAK: End of next week, Larry?

Lynn: We can shoot for this.

HAK: We will aim for this.

Richardson: Want to work out schematic outline.

⁷ Omission in the original.

HAK: Couldn't we include these in report.

Richardson: I don't know types of work involved. Dealing with set of independent variables. On-site issue depends on other facts.

HAK: If we could get what it is we would want controlled, assessment of unilateral capabilities. If weaknesses, we can ask for additional controls within unilateral cap; or we can see whether we need new capabilities, or on-site inspection, or a combination. Then President could judge risks he is running.

Allison: We might want separate working group on paragraph 4.⁸

Both political and military issues.

Second, shouldn't we get at issues like relationship between MIRVs and ABMs?

HAK: Don't have to settle this issue.

Do MIRV/ABM relationship separately.

Gerry would these _____⁹ you problems.

Smith: Yes. Final product should clearly outline disagreements. Get beyond unidentified experts.

HAK: This is precisely purpose of panel. He was to weigh views of verifying agency against those who must live with it.

_____¹⁰ [Facts?] be stated fully and fairly as possible. President will take responsibility.

⁸ A Verification Working Group was formed and held its first meeting on July 23. According to an unsigned July 24 memorandum for the record, procedures for preparing the Verification Report were established. A team of "ramrods," chaired by Frank Perez, who also oversaw the MIRV Panel Report, supervised the work of teams of experts on each Soviet force and weapons system. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-004, Verification Panel Meeting—Review of Capabilities 7/22/69)

⁹ Omission in the original.

¹⁰ Omission in the original.

29. Memorandum From Frank Perez of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

The Technological Consequences of a MIRV Flight Ban

The attached assessment of the technological consequences for the U.S. and the Soviets of a ban on the flight testing and deployment of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's)² reflects the suggestions and recommendations made at the July 16 meeting of the MIRV group.³ The study now addresses the various types of MIRV concepts; the types of testing which must be banned for an effective MIRV test ban, as well as certain constraints which would assist in the verification task; the possibilities for circumventing a MIRV ban; the impact of a MIRV ban on existing weapons systems; the differences in view concerning the workability of a MIRV test ban; and the MIRV–ABM interrelationships.

Any agreement with the Soviets to ban the flight testing of MIRV's would need to be very specific in terms of what types of testing are prohibited. To minimize the possibility of cheating, it would be necessary to impose a ban on the testing of all multiple reentry vehicles, maneuvering reentry vehicles (including any post-boost maneuvering vehicle), multiple reentry vehicle dispensing mechanisms, and endo-atmospheric pen-aids.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box SCI 18, NSC Files, MIRV Panel. Top Secret.

² Attached but not printed is the July 23 report of the MIRV Panel prepared for Kissinger entitled "The Technological Consequences of a MIRV Flight Ban." Perez wrote the report with the cooperation of representatives from the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The paper contained five sections that addressed the following questions: "What are the various types of MIRV concepts? What collateral testing must be prohibited for an effective MIRV test ban? What other constraints would be desirable, if not mandatory? What are the U.S. and Soviet circumvention possibilities? What are the implications of a MIRV flight ban for U.S. and USSR weapon systems or space systems? and What are the fundamental differences in viewpoints concerning the workability of a MIRV test and deployment ban?"

³ The MIRV Panel was formed by Kissinger to examine issues involved in including MIRVs in an arms control agreement. It met at least four times between June 19 and July 16. Members of the panel, chaired by Kissinger, included Perez, representing the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and representatives from the Department of Defense's Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering, Central Intelligence Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NSC staff.

There are a number of tests or test-related restrictions which, although not essential, would ease the verification task if they were explicitly agreed to beforehand. Among these would be an agreement to conduct tests of strategic missiles only on agreed test ranges and at preannounced times and an agreement to continue to transmit telemetry. The banning of space tests which place multiple payloads in orbits would reduce the risk of the clandestine development of a MIRV dispensing mechanism. Prohibition of exoatmospheric pen-aids testing would ease the verification task; [*1½ lines not declassified*].

[*1 paragraph (15 lines) not declassified*]

[*1 paragraph (14 lines) not declassified*]

It is clear that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to covertly deploy MIRV's under a ban which prohibited deployment of such systems, and this would be evident to the Soviets. We could, however, take some steps to reduce the lead-time to a MIRV operational capability if the agreement were abrogated. An example is the conversion of Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines to carry Poseidon. Moreover, although we probably would not be confident enough to deploy our MIRV at its present state of development in other than an assured destruction role, it might be very difficult to persuade the Soviets that we had not already achieved a hard-target capability. As for the Soviets, should they achieve development of a MIRV system prior to a ban on MIRV testing, we see little prospect of determining the extent to which MIRV's had been incorporated in deployed missiles without highly intrusive on-site inspections.

Frank H. Perez

30. Editorial Note

The Verification Panel met on July 25, 1969, to discuss preparation of a report on a review of capabilities before the beginning of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). The minutes, which are less than half of a page, include brief statements by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and Carl Duckett from the Central Intelligence Agency on a flight ban of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in relation to MIRV testing by the Soviet Union. The participants also discussed the range of the Soviet SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which might allow the Soviets to exploit the greater throw-weight of its larger missiles and surpass the United States in numbers of ICBMs. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,

NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72)

When the Verification Panel met on August 8, it deliberated whether a report on U.S. capabilities to monitor a strategic arms limitation agreement should be prepared for President Nixon prior to the beginning of SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union. The participants listed what the President would want to know and how he would prefer to read it. Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson suggested that President Nixon would need to know “risks associated with agreements and ways of reducing risks [and] enhance unilateral verification capability.” Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith believed that the panel should “screen technical factors through top officials’ minds.” President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger added that the key issues should be supported by a discussion of the pros and cons of each. He directed the Verification Panel Working Group to prepare an evaluation of U.S. capability to monitor specific arms control options. The minutes of this meeting are *ibid.*

On August 18, acting on Kissinger’s request, Laurence Lynn of the National Security Council staff sent the Working Group team supervisors, known as “ramrods,” a memorandum with the instructions that “U.S. monitoring capability should be assessed under four separate assumptions: only the primary ban/limit is in effect; all mandatory/essential collateral restrictions are in effect; all desirable collateral restrictions are in effect; and desirable on-site inspection or other techniques are employed.” (*Ibid.*, Box H-004, Verification Panel Meeting—MIRV 8/8/69)

On August 29 the Panel met for 2½ hours in San Clemente, California. ACDA working notes are the only record of this meeting that has been found. According to these notes, five main questions were addressed in revisions of the Panel’s report:

“1) The ultimate question is: what risk—i.e., probability—is there that the Soviets will decide to carry out and will succeed in carrying out one or more concealed weapons development or deployment program which will not be detected by the U.S. in time for us to prevent a significant shift in the strategic arms balance?

“2) With respect to clandestine development/deployment of a given weapons system, and accepting a conservative estimate of the numbers that can be deployed before detection, what will be the effect on the strategic arms balance?

“3) What about clandestine development/deployment of more than one weapons system—does this change the ultimate risk?

“4) Assuming an optimum combination of bans, collateral bans, and opportunities for selected direct observations, what is the aggregate risk?

“5) What are the risks—and costs—reasonably attributable to a failure to achieve SALT agreement, including the present risk of clandestine Soviet weapons development/deployment?” (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383–98–0089, Box 2, ACDA/State Correspondence on Verification Panel, June–August 1969)

31. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

CM–4469–69

Washington, August 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

Proposal for a Moratorium on Certain Strategic Weapons Systems

REFERENCE

Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Secretary of Defense, dated 22 July 1969, subject as above, with attachment

1. In the attachment to Dr. Kissinger’s memorandum,² the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency proposes that a moratorium on missile testing be included early in strategic arms limitation talks, and, specifically, that a mutual suspension of MIRV/MRV testing be proposed if the USSR will agree to suspend starts of additional ICBMs and SLBMs.

2. While the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his memorandum to Dr. Kissinger, dated 30 May 1969, subject: “MIRV Test Program,”³ and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum to you, dated 23 June 1969, subject: “‘Stop Where We Are’ Option for SALT,” and which you forwarded to Dr. Kissinger,⁴ have expressed appropriate reasons for

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0103, Box 16, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates Laird saw it on August 4. A notation in an unidentified hand reads: “ASD/ISA has for appropriate action (Mr. Nitze has a copy).”

² On July 22 Kissinger attached a letter, dated July 21, from Smith to Nixon (see footnote 2, Document 26), to a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Helms, and Wheeler. Kissinger asked for their comments on Smith’s letter by August 4. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 197, Agency Files, ACDA, Jan 69–Dec 30, Vol. I)

³ Document 13.

⁴ See Document 23 and footnote 2 thereto.

opposing a MIRV test moratorium, it appears timely to reiterate the arguments against such a course of action.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their convictions that:

a. A MIRV test ban amounts to a limit on technology which is neither desirable nor feasible and could foreclose the ability to develop hedges against cheating and uncertain threats.

b. The potential adverse political impact of reaching an agreement which falls substantially short of the moratorium argues against this approach.

c. Any moratorium prejudices the outcome of uncertain negotiations and such arrangements may pose undue risk to the security of the United States and should be examined most circumspectly.

d. A moratorium implies trust, in this case of an unpredictable adversary, and foregoes the protection normally afforded by a treaty.

e. While comprehensive MIRV flight testing to full ICBM range could be detected if the Soviets perform such tests using procedures thus far observed, there is less confidence that different approaches to MIRV flight test techniques could be monitored unilaterally, and there is little prospect of determining the extent to which MIRVs have been incorporated in deployed offensive missiles.

f. Prudence dictates that a conservative view be taken of our future verification capabilities.

4. In addition, the following points seem pertinent:

a. The appropriate quid pro quo for a cessation of further Soviet construction of ICBMs and SLBMs would appear to be for the U.S. to forego the same option, rather than to cease testing MIRV.

b. It is unwise to go ahead with a MIRV testing moratorium without full consideration of the implications of its possible extension to a MIRV deployment ban.

c. The assumption that a MIRV deployment ban might ultimately be desirable may be erroneous because both MIRVs and certain related penetration aids are required to maintain high confidence in our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses, thereby contributing to our deterrent posture.

d. The sufficiency of our current strategic forces is dependent upon the timely deployment of MIRV in order to regain coverage of the increased Soviet nuclear threat, as well as to counter some 300 additional Soviet ICBM launchers now under construction, the completion of which would not be prevented by the proposed moratorium.

e. Operational testing of the Polaris A3, which makes up the bulk of our highly survivable deterrent force at sea, would be halted under the terms of the proposed moratorium, with consequent loss of confidence in the performance of that system.

f. Adoption of the moratorium early in the talks as proposed would encourage the Soviets to delay the conclusion of successful negotiations, since they would have achieved a significant relative advantage short of a formal agreement.

g. If the Soviets have concluded, as a result of their monitoring of successful U.S. MIRV flight tests to date, that the essential elements of MIRV technology have been proved, a U.S. proposed moratorium on further MIRV/MRV testing would be received with great suspicion.

h. International moratoriums and similar understandings tend to become de facto treaties which circumvent constitutional processes.

i. We have already experienced an unsatisfactory moratorium agreement with the Soviet Union on atmospheric nuclear testing, which the Soviets abrogated without warning in 1961 and conducted 113 tests within the next year; [*1½ lines not declassified*].

5. I can only conclude that the moratorium proposed by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency implies such risks and disadvantages that it would not be in the national security interests of the United States. I would suggest that a moratorium of such dimensions be eliminated from further consideration at this time.

Earle G. Wheeler

32. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 4, 1969.

SUBJECT

Proposal for a Moratorium on Certain Strategic Weapons Systems

REFERENCE

Your Memorandum of 22 July 1969, Same subject

1. This memorandum responds to your request for comments on the proposal of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, for a moratorium on starts of additional ICBM and ballistic missile submarine construction and on MIRV/MRV testing.²

2. With respect to the effect of a moratorium on Soviet ICBM and SLBM force levels, a freeze that began on 1 October 1969 would limit the number of ICBMs—operational and under construction on that date—to about 1,400. The total number of SLBMs, operational and under construction, would be stopped at about 480 launch tubes in 55 ballistic missile submarines (this includes 31 older boats with a total of 99 tubes). Assuming no moratorium and present rates of construction,

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 5, MIRV. Secret. Concurred in by Duckett and R.J. Smith on August 4.

² See footnote 2, Document 31.

the Soviets could have, by 1 August 1970, a total of about 1,580 ICBMs (including 302 under construction) and 560 launchers on ballistic missile submarines (including 272 launchers on 17 Y-class submarines in various stages of construction). The details on projected Soviet ICBM and SLBM force levels are given in the attached table.³

3. With respect to US capabilities to determine the status of these Soviet forces at the time a moratorium began and throughout its duration, we are as you know participating in a comprehensive inter-agency review of verification and monitoring problems. Without prejudicing the outcome of the review, it appears that a comprehensive freeze on strategic weapons would in general ease problems of monitoring. As the comprehensiveness of an agreement increases, the likelihood of detecting an intensive effort to alter clandestinely the strategic relationship would be greater.

4. In event of a moratorium, we would have confidence in our ability to monitor within narrow limits the numbers of ICBM sites and ballistic missile submarines. Monitoring MIRV/MRV testing is a more difficult problem and is one of those matters now under intensive review.

5. There are other matters relevant to a moratorium that remain to be studied. One of these is the question of how evidence indicative of a possible violation of a moratorium's terms would be handled. If a US-Soviet Review Commission were established, as some have suggested, we would have to study the potential risks in the use of intelligence information to support the US members of such a Commission.

Richard Helms⁴

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears Helms's typed signature and an indication that he signed the original.

33. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES IN VERIFICATION REPORT

1. *Land Mobile MR/IRBM and ICBM Launchers* (pp. 16–18)

If banned:

—with *normal Soviet practices*, we would detect deployments within 100 after 200 had been deployed.

—we would detect a *clandestine* build-up of fewer than 200–300 missiles if Soviets exercised force.

—Soviets could conceal 200–300 mobiles if they did not exercise force.

If limited:

—for limits on the order of 200, the Soviets might exceed permitted force by 200–400.

—for limits on the order of 1000–1500, Soviets probably could not exceed that by more than 500 and remain undetected.

Limit on dimensions of tactical mobile missiles is mandatory collateral constraint.

2. *Deployment of Additional Fixed Offensive Missile Launchers* (p. 18)

100 illegal launchers might go undetected.

100–200 illegal launchers might not be detected until first few were operational.

OSD/JCS doubt “suspicious new activity on large scale . . . could be positively identified as missile deployment” if concealed under buildings or in mines.

3. *Installation of ICBMs into MR/IRBM Launchers* (pp. 18–19)

We have no real confidence we could detect it.

4. *Substituting SS–9s for SS–7s* (p. 19)

Soviets might be able to do this without our detecting it.

5. *Ban on Suppression of Telemetry* (p. 20 footnote and Tab A, p. A–6)

“There may be difficulties in defining an agreement to prohibit telemetry suppression because the Soviet Union and the U.S. use vary-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-004, Verification Panel Meetings—Status Report 9/29/69. Top Secret. Lynn sent Kissinger the paper as an attachment to a September 27 memorandum that provided briefing materials for a Verification Panel meeting scheduled for September 29. The paper, which summarizes the Verification Panel’s report, was presumably prepared by the verification panel working group.

ing degrees of telemetry for different types of tests, ranging from no telemetry on some vehicles to numerous channels of telemetry data on a fully instrumented vehicle.” (p. 20 footnote)

OSD/JCS do not believe that telemetry suppression can be defined in a way that would satisfy the intent of the constraint. (p. A-6)

6. *Development of New Strategic Missiles* (pp. 21–22)

ICBMs (p. 21)

State/CIA/ACDA believe we can confidently monitor ban on the development of a new ICBM.

OSD/JCS disagree, believing Soviets could double missile payload and improve accuracy without our knowing it.

SLBMs and MR/IRBMs (p. 22)

Chances are “about even” that we would detect clandestine development of new MR/IRBM or SLBM.

7. *Accuracy Improvements* (other than by changing re-entry vehicle shape)

“It would be virtually impossible to determine that the Soviets were improving accuracy through guidance system improvements if they desire to do this clandestinely.”

OSD/JCS disagree with majority concerning potential accuracy of present 55–11 ICBM; they believe 55–11 can achieve better than 0.63 single shot kill probability on Minuteman silo with present reentry vehicle.

8. *MIRVs* (p. 26–28)

State/CIA/ACDA believe we can monitor Soviet MIRV developments even if the Soviets do it clandestinely. OSD/JCS do not believe we can confidently monitor a MIRV test ban.

OSD/JCS believe bans on multiple payloads in space and exoatmospheric penaid testing are mandatory collateral restrictions. State/ACDA/CIA believe these are desirable but not mandatory.

9. *ABMs* (pp. 28–30)

Mobile Launchers

100–150 mobile ABM launchers might escape detection for several years. (OSD/JCS believe the number could be substantially higher.)

Reload Capability

Might escape detection.

Radars

Disagreement over whether a clandestine ABM radar program could be detected.

State/ACDA/CIA believe problems of radar deployment, operation so complex that we would detect large scale 5–10 clandestine radar program. OSD and JCS believe implementing a clandestine radar program is not as complex and difficult as State/ACDA/CIA believe.

10. *Upgrading SAMs to ABMs* (p. 30–31)

Upgrading SAM systems to give them some form of limited ABM capability . . . primarily through netting with existing ABM radars would be difficult if not impossible to determine.

OSD/JCS believe Soviets could deploy clandestinely 5–10 new acquisition radars and take other actions to allow “covert deployment of a limited ABM capability.”

11. *Limiting ABM-associated Radars* (p. 32–33)

State/ACDA believe a limit on number of ABM-associated radars is a mandatory collateral restriction to an ABM launcher limit.

JCS believe that because it is not possible to differentiate unambiguously among radar types, an effective ABM radar limit is not practical.

12. *Ballistic Missile Launchers/Submarines* (p. 34–35)

Under conditions of maximum concealment, State/CIA/ACDA believe an illegal increase of 5–10 submarines could be detected within a year and certainly would be detected in a two-year period.

JCS/OSD believe this assessment is optimistic and that we do not know what size of illegal increase or what period of time would be required for detection.²

² On September 29 the Verification Panel met to discuss its final report on U.S. monitoring capabilities. According to minutes of the meeting, much of the discussion centered around clarifying specific language and terms such as “suppression of telemetry.” The Verification Panel also discussed at some length a MIRV moratorium. [5½ lines not declassified] Before the meeting ended, Kissinger brought up the question of tying a MIRV ban to a limit on ABMs. Packard explained it was related to ABM-associated radars, to which Helms added that the issue was technical, with “no simple explanation.” The Panel did not pursue the question further and Kissinger concluded that they continue revision of their report and “clearly understand that it may never acquire Presidential standing.” He added that an NSC meeting would soon be held. (Ibid., Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969-3/8/72)

34. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, October 8, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Vice President Agnew
Secretary of State Rogers
Secretary of Defense Laird
Attorney General Mitchell
General Lincoln, Director, OEP
Gerard Smith, Director, ACDA
Admiral Moorer, Acting Chairman, JCS
Director of Central Intelligence Helms
Under Secretary of State Richardson
Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard
Paul Nitze, Department of Defense
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Philip J. Farley (ACDA)
[name not declassified] (CIA)
Laurence Lynn (NSC)
Helmut Sonnenfeldt (NSC)
William Watts (NSC)

RN—I would like to begin the briefings in the following order—Director Helms, Dr. Kissinger, Under Secretary Richardson, Deputy Secretary Packard and Director Smith.

Helms—The final draft of the paper of September 19 on U.S. capabilities to monitor a strategic arms limitation agreement² is one of the most exhaustive analyses we have made. My briefing is based on Section II of the report. I will consider our abilities to monitor an agreement, Soviet capabilities to act, and the Soviet ability to act without breaking a treaty.

The studies were almost totally on technical capabilities.

Our intelligence activities are designed to collect information, interpret it, and satisfy the President's requirements.

Our photography program concentrates on new weapons development. Each mission covers a narrow swath.

[1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes Originals 1969 [5 of 5]. Top Secret; *[code-word not declassified]*. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 11:10 a.m. to noon. (*Ibid.*, White House Central Files)

² The September 19 paper is attached but not printed.

We have received fragmentary and ambiguous information.

The information we gather and our capabilities have developed gradually.

We have concluded that they are testing a new strategic system. They are developing a mobile missile system with a range of 4,000 miles.

RN—What was the time span?

Helms—From February 1968 to the present—18 months.

RN—When would they have had to start? Four or five years ago?

Moorer—At least.

Helms—Their decision would have been taken 3 or 4 years ago. New systems are on the way.

(Director Helms then reviewed the new systems described on pages 10–15 of the September 19 paper, which is attached.)

Problems will, of course, remain.

RN—Is Soviet secrecy an obsession?

Helms—It has been literally for centuries, from the Czars to the present. Our capabilities to monitor development will improve but they can act to improve their capabilities also.

Kissinger—I will sum up where we stand. We set up a panel, with Gerry Smith, the Under Secretaries and Dick Helms, and a working group under Larry Lynn.

(Mr. Kissinger then reviewed the current situation, based on his talking points in the attached NSC book.)³

RN—Couldn't we do the same? (This refers to Mr. Kissinger's closing remarks that the Soviets could cheat on a test ban.)

Kissinger—Their mode is more dangerous than ours. If we have a MIRV ban, there would be no way to get Congress on board.

RN—Should we just go ahead?

Rogers—[*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Kissinger—The optimists believe that the danger of Soviet deployment and subsequent crash testing is not realistic. They think that the Soviets have little to gain from clandestine testing. Thus, a MIRV test ban could stop deployment. If there were a MIRV ban there could then be a collateral ban which would ease the verification task or lead to earlier detection of violations.

We might have to ban all multiple releases.

The problem for us is that some intelligence satellites involved multiple release.

³ Attached but not printed.

We are refining the issues; this is a preliminary report to date.

With regard to ABM deployment, there could be a MIRV ban without ABM deployment. There could be restrictions on radar. The JCS are especially concerned about radar.⁴ Missiles can be quickly produced.

The Soviets are radar rich—they can be knitted together, and there would be a question whether they had an ABM or air defense role. Mobile ABM launchers are hard to distinguish from MRVs.

It would be hard to determine an upgrading of existing systems to produce ABM capabilities. Future studies will relate the verification problem to existing options.

We don't know what the Soviet position will be. We are creating building blocks for new options. We are working on categories of weapons and not a single negotiated position.

Our objective is to develop an overall Evaluation Report which presents:

- the different types of agreements that should be considered;
- the arguments for and against each of them; and
- the key judgments that must be made in making a choice among them.

It is quite possible that we may want to consider options other than those the NSC has already considered, and the Committee is holding open that possibility.

Rogers—We think the Soviets have a MIRV capability. They could deploy without detection. Then let's go to MIRV. They know we won't cheat.

Kissinger—They have a multiple warhead and could deploy it.

Rogers—If they know we can't detect it.

Kissinger—If we have a MIRV test ban, it would be next to impossible for Minuteman III.

Smith—Even if they can deploy an anti-city system, they would test further, unless you had something beyond a unilateral testing agreement.

RN—Pending our getting into SALT, why not just stop testing. It would show good faith. The answer is no. The national interest won't permit. It is insane to pretend that if we don't test, they won't. It is in our interest to find ways to verify.

⁴ On September 27 Wheeler sent Kissinger a memorandum, CM-4599-69, that outlined JCS reservations about ABM associated radars in SALT proposals. Those reservations were based on difficulties defining the terms for SALT negotiations, determining which radars have ABM capabilities, technological complications, equivalency issues with the Soviets, and verification problems. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-103, USSR, 388.3)

Rogers—There is no problem, since the Soviets have delayed the opening of SALT.

RN—The number of their tests is not insignificant. What they may have developed, how they have changed over the past months. We must lay this out to the Senate group, but not to the public or allies.

Laird—It will not be in private.

RN—It may be open.

Rogers—In executive session Gromyko raised the testing question in a private talk with me.⁵ I said that they are proceeding at a faster rate than before.

Richardson—The first question is to establish the risks and costs of the present uncontrolled situation against the risks and costs, including evasion, of a ban plus collateral bans.

The next question is the Soviet incentive to change the balance by clandestine efforts after a limitation is in effect. Director Helms says that we have a good monitoring capability.

Further consideration should be given to the following questions:

—the likelihood of cheating.

—the ability to detect and the effect of international opinion.

With regard to the first, at the conclusion of an agreement the Soviets would generally abide by it. They would cheat if it was in their interest. In other words, they could agree in order to cheat and they could agree in order to stabilize, which on the whole would be beneficial.

They might want to pause then resume. Or if the terms were more favorable to us, it would be a term which would promote cheating. They would be more likely to abrogate it openly.

They might want political gain after intensive secret efforts to show gains. Systematic concealment and deception would be required, with problems of exposure. What if they do cheat? They could:

—openly deploy fixed, land-based missiles, which would be caught by satellite photography.

—upgrade the SA-5 to an ABM system.

—carry on the clandestine development and deployment of MIRVs.

With regard to the latter two, we would have suspicions, but not early proof.

⁵ Gromyko and Rogers held talks on September 22, 26, and 30 while both were attending the UN General Assembly session. For documentation on their meetings, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Documents 81, 83, 87, and 89–91.

We might want to wait before moving. But this might have serious implications.

There would be controversy within the executive branch and leaks. It might justify an approach to the Soviets. First to dissuade them from the violation. If there were a Soviet/US mixed commission we would bring violation evidence to it, in private.

Second, we could get assurance that our suspicions were unfounded.

Third, we could get a record of their refusal to verify, and failure to live up to an on-site inspection agreement.

There would be the question of convincing the Congress and public. This could involve the revelation of sources of information, e.g., photo reconnaissance. Perhaps we should establish a national committee, to get Congressional action. There would be the option to denounce the treaty and move ahead.

RN—That was a well-balanced analysis.

Rogers—How much cheating would be needed before the balance shifts?

Richardson—That is the question. It requires weapon-by-weapon analysis, and how it would cumulatively affect the balance if they cheat on several lines all at once.

Rogers—If the Soviets cheat, then how successful could they be before they were caught. I have heard that there must be massive cheating before it is effective.

Laird—It is a question of lead time. If it is over a six-year period, they can disguise it for three years easily. If it is a question of 100%, then it would be serious.

RN—Do we know its diplomatic effect?

Smith—It depends on U.S. objectives, and the degree of confidence we want.

RN—If you MIRV a system, then it is four times as effective.

Packard—There are 12 missiles on a Polaris. On soft targets, you can put a large number of small warheads. If there are large warheads and missiles, then you MIRV a small number. This will give a counterforce capability.

Our MIRVs are little help on hard targets. Theirs are effective against hard targets. They are MIRVing heavy weapons.

Laird—The SS-9 goes from 25 to 15 megatons. They have heavy capabilities.

RN—The numbers game affects diplomacy.

Rogers—If they could triple their capability, the diplomatic yield would be great.

Moorer—Their weapons are heavier, so they have a greater MIRV capability.

Packard—I don't fully agree on all points.

The Soviets will ultimately shy away from confrontation.

They want to reduce the level of natural resources they are using. The survivability of deterrent forces, able to penetrate Soviet defenses, is uncertain.

There is a limit to what we can do. ABM will help.

We want survivable missiles. They may be mobile. There are sea-based missiles, MIRVs, ABMs, bomber force and air defenses against bombers.

We want to limit ABM and SAM upgrades.

We could consider force reductions.

There are five options:

The first three, as the Verification Panel saw them, would limit land-based missiles to those under construction and/or in place. There would be no limitation on size. This would not limit the Soviet attack ability, and might limit our defense ability. The 4th option would include no reduction and visible enlargements—ban MIRVs, FOBS and related. This would reduce our defense capability. It would be more extensive than the first three options. There would be greater verification problems. It would be difficult to achieve an acceptable agreement.

The fifth option is to stop those under construction. It would require still more extensive verification. There would be a potential loss of land-based capabilities. This option is more sensitive and risky.

It could give them the possibility of substantial damage to us. If we give up MIRVs, we would want a quid pro quo from them.

There is a new option which would be a reduction of Soviet numbers, plus throw weight and a MIRV ban. If there were agreement on numbers, size and [omission in the original] there would be less problem on land-based needs. We might use bombers for a trade. The verification problems are not yet analyzed.

Another option would be to reduce the total number and throw weight of both. It would reduce land and sea-based missiles. No MIRV ban gives alternatives. The bomber force could be reduced. There would be a Safeguard level of ABM against third countries. This may be best. It would lower force levels and costs. I would like to add these two options.

Was the verification go-around helpful?

Nitze—Essential.

RN—The Soviet verification problem is moot. How can you cheat? You can't.

Smith—The intelligence assessments, if not in agreement, are a great help. If verification is tampered with, then the deal is off.

Our interests are better protected under SALT than in an open situation. In the latter, it is a comparison of risks, and all uncertainties obtain anew.

Our capability to get Congressional approval for worst-case planning will be weaker in the future.

SALT and ABM are better now than later.

I don't believe any option should be thrown out because of verification.

RN—Does Defense rule out a MIRV ban?

Packard—No. Option 6 includes a MIRV ban. But it should be broader than just MIRV-for-MIRV.

Rogers—There could be a MIRV ban, beneficial to us or the Soviets.

Packard—I don't recommend that. Without MIRV, their large weapons would be the major strategic picture. We can live with present levels of the SS-9. We are already moving with submarine launched missiles. Their bomber capability is reduced.

Smith—Options 6, 7 and 8 are the best news in years.

Lincoln—Can our intelligence check on throw weight?

Helms—In a ball park range.

RN—We didn't learn from last week's test. Maybe they did.

We want to leave every possible area open. We don't want to restrict ourselves.

If we go to SALT, we want greater flexibility, and greater leeway; leave it fuzzy.

Rogers—We should be inclined to live up to the letter and the spirit. We should live up to the letter, letter by letter. There should be no spiritual contact.

Smith—The Soviets have told us they are ready to talk to the Secretary.

Kissinger—In the late fall.

RN—Vienna would be good.

Smith—We are working on a contingency paper for the Under Secretaries Committee. We are working on the first three alternatives under NSSM 62.⁶

We need clear guidance on the MIRV question—negative? neutral? positive?

RN—Is MIRV uppermost in the Soviets' mind?

Rogers—No. It must be on China. Gromyko said don't ask questions.

⁶ See Document 27.

Laird—Options 6 and 7 are just to be studied.

Smith—On ABM, we need a newer focus on numbers. We would like a number we could live with. The JCS wants the other package, and then numbers of ABM.

On verification, would we entertain negotiating a suspension?

Richardson—We must confront the Congressional impact on the talks in progress.

RN—We will go ahead (with studies and) later discussion.

35. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 20, 1969, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

Ambassador Dobrynin opened the conversation by handing the President a brief announcement suggesting November 17th as the opening of the SALT talks, and suggesting Helsinki as the place. The President asked why Helsinki—he preferred Vienna. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that it did not make a great deal of difference to the Soviet Union, but since Helsinki had been proposed as one of the places by the Secretary of State in June, they decided to go along with that. The President said the Secretary of State had been under instructions to point out the difficulties of Helsinki. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that all the Secretary of State had said to Gromyko was, “to hell with ‘Sinki,” which is not a diplomatic suggestion. If the United States preferred some other place, this should not be too difficult.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969 [Part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. On October 17 at 4:40 p.m. Dobrynin called Kissinger to arrange a meeting to deliver a message to Nixon from the Soviet leadership regarding SALT and U.S.-Soviet relations. According to a transcript of their conversation, “K[issinger] asked if Dobrynin had requested this [meeting] through the State Department. D[obrynin] said no, he has spoken only to K. K said then he would keep it that way.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) The full text of this conversation and the attached message from the Soviet leadership are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 93.

Dr. Kissinger asked the Ambassador what they meant by preliminary discussion. He replied that this meant only the first phase of the discussions, and had no particular significance. But Ambassador Dobrynin suggested that one possible way of handling it would be by beginning in Helsinki and then moving on to Vienna. Dr. Kissinger pointed out to the Ambassador that we had to consult some Allies, but that there seemed to be no insuperable difficulties.

The President then said it would be dangerous if the talks were only a series of platitudes. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that there would be specific suggestions, depending on the range of our proposals, and they would probably be put in the form of several options.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

36. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 31, 1969.

SUBJECT

Moscow's Linkage of SALT to Politics

Over the years both sides have made decisions on SALT that were obviously colored by political considerations. This memorandum shows how this has worked in the Soviet case.

When the US first broached SALT in late 1966 the Soviets were in the midst of a major build-up of their new ICBM force (SS-9, 11s) and beginning the Moscow ABM. They were evidently unsure of our motives, yet could not afford to reject the idea out of hand. In any case, Kosygin in agreeing to the idea of SALT negotiations tied them into Vietnam:

“More favorable conditions and business-like consideration of this and other problems of usual interest would be created if such hotbeds of tensions as Vietnam were liquidated.” (Kosygin letter Feb. 27, 1967)²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 874, SALT, Volume IV, October–November 16, 1969. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive; Kissinger Only. Sent for information.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 185.

To what extent the failure to move ahead was due to the Soviet desire to complete their ICBM programs will probably never be known. But in addition the Soviets may have felt that since we seemed to want SALT, they could by dilatory tactics exert pressure on us with respect to Vietnam. No movement was made on the Soviet side until after the bombing stopped.

By the summer of 1968, however, when agreement was reached on the NPT and SALT talks, the Soviet strategic position was considerably improved and Soviet conditions and motives had shifted because of the burgeoning Czech crisis.³ Then, SALT became a way of mitigating our reactions and SALT was dangled as a possible summit topic, with the underlying implication that all of this might somehow have a favorable influence on the Paris talks. Naturally the Soviets did not state this outright, but their propaganda complained that our “incendiary reaction to the Czech invasion” threatened to “sabotage” SALT.

With the change of administration, Soviet tactics shifted again. Now they were keenly interested in tying the President to early negotiations, which would symbolically wipe the record clear on Czechoslovakia, perhaps influence our policy on Vietnam, and affect pending weapons decisions. Thus, on inaugural day, the Soviets held a “press conference” emphasizing the virtues of SALT but warning that “subversive activities against the socialist countries” (Czechoslovakia), or expansion of “existing hotbeds of international tensions” (Middle East and Vietnam) “creates *new definite obstacles* in the search for agreed solutions in the disarmament field.”

When confronted with our statements on the interrelationships, however, they complained bitterly. Dobrynin raised this with the President and Secretary Rogers. In his meeting with the President on February 17,⁴ however, Dobrynin did acknowledge that the USSR was prepared to move forward *simultaneously* on a number of issues *particularly the missile problem and the Middle East*.

As for Vietnam, President Podgorny told Ambassador Beam that the lack of a settlement was a “block to understanding” between the US and the USSR.

As it became clear in Moscow that they would not succeed in rushing the new administration into SALT, the line began to shift to a sort of negative linkage especially because of the China problem. Thus, Kosygin’s letter to the President of May 27,⁵ warned:

³ On the night of August 20–21, 1968, 200,000 Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia. See *ibid.*, volume XVII, Eastern Europe, Documents 80–97.

⁴ See Document 4.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 51.

“. . . much of what could be done now, having the mutual desire to do so *and casting aside current considerations* may in the course of time become either totally impossible to realize, or much more difficult and complex.”

When handing over the letter to Beam, Gromyko added this cryptic reference following a discussion of China:

“In any case *all circumstances must be considered*, and first of all as they pertain to possible long range consequences of this or that decision with respect to US-Soviet relations and the situation in the world today.”

In the meantime, the Soviets have continued to reject any connection between their actions in Czechoslovakia and our response on other issues.

And, of course, the Soviets practiced their own linkage, in holding up their reply on SALT until they had worked out the immediate crisis with China, all the while complaining about US decisions on ABMs and MIRVs as forcing a Soviet review of their position (Soviet testing of MIRV continuing, of course).

Perhaps the most blatant example of the interrelationship of issues was Dobrynin’s aide mémoire given to the President on October 20.⁶ This document, accusing us of evading discussion on a “number of issues,” refers to a “number of cases” in which our actions differ from our statements and concludes that “*all*” of this cannot but “alert” the Soviet leaders.

In other words, Soviet policies and assessments are not determined by an examination of each and every issue on its merits, but conclusions are drawn on the basis of the overall state of relations. This is not surprising or novel. It simply points up that the Soviets would like us to accept their linkages, while reserving the right to reject ours.

⁶ See footnote 1, Document 35.

37. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

DESCRIPTIONS OF THE OPTIONS

Option I. This option would

—limit the number of land-based ICBM and IRBM/MRBM launchers to those operational or under construction at the time the agreement was negotiated;

—ban mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems;

—limit the number of fixed ABM launchers and the number of ABM-associated radars.

It would put no constraints on

—sea-based offensive missile systems;

—MIRVs or on any other improvements to ICBMs or their launchers;

—characteristics of ABM systems.

Option II. This option would

—limit the total number of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive ballistic missile launchers to those operational or under construction at the time the agreement was negotiated;

—permit land-mobile ICBMs within the allowed combined total of ICBMs and SLBMs;

—ban land-mobile IR/MRBMs;

—limit the total number of fixed, land-mobile and sea-mobile ABM launchers and ABM-associated radars;

—prohibit further construction or relocation of fixed launchers for IR/MRBMs.

Option III. This option would

—limit the respective numbers of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers to those operational or under construction at the time the agreement was negotiated;

—ban land-mobile strategic offensive missile systems;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-025, NSC Meeting 11/10/69 SALT (NSSM 62). Top Secret. Attached but not printed is a chart that provided the limitations imposed by each option. This paper is annex A to a briefing memorandum that Kissinger sent to Nixon for the NSC meeting scheduled for November 10.

—ban enlargement of existing silos, changing the basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and relocation of launchers;

—limit the number of fixed ABM launchers and the number of ABM-associated radars;

—prohibit land and sea-mobile ABMs.

MIRV testing and deployment would be allowed.

Option IIIA. This option is identical to option IV [III?], except that it would

—permit each side to substitute SLBM launchers for ICBM launchers on a one-for-one basis;

—limit the respective number of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers to those operational at the time the agreement was negotiated; i.e., launchers under construction could not be completed;

—limit the numbers of heavy bombers/tankers, medium bombers/tankers and SAMs to those existing in each category at the time the agreement was negotiated.

MIRV testing and deployment would be allowed.

Option IV. This option is identical to option III, except that it would

—prohibit deployment of MIRVs;

—ban further flight testing of MIRVs and MIRV-related systems.

There would be no restriction on the improvement or flight testing of other offensive missile system characteristics.

Option V. This option would

—limit the respective numbers of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers to those operational at the time the agreement was negotiated;

—ban mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems;

—limit the numbers of ABM launchers and ABM-associated radars;

—prohibit changes in verifiable strategic offensive and defensive missile and launcher characteristics, except that the testing and deployment of exoatmospheric penaids would be permitted;

—ban the deployment of MIRVs and the further flight testing of MIRVs and MIRV-related systems;

—limit the numbers of strategic bombers and air defense missile launchers to existing levels;

—prohibit verifiable changes in the size and external configuration of existing weapons types or systems;

—prohibit all strategic missile flight testing, except for an agreed number of pre-announced confidence firings of present types of missiles on agreed ranges.

Option VA. This option would

—limit the respective numbers of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers to those operational at the time the agreement was negotiated;

—allow replacement of deployed offensive strategic missiles by operational missiles of the same category whose throw weight was not more than twice that of the replaced missile (this would permit the planned deployment of Poseidon and Minuteman III but with single warheads only);

—permit each side to substitute SLBM launchers for ICBM launchers on a one-for-one basis;

—ban mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems and limit the physical dimensions of such tactical systems;

—ban the deployment of MIRVs and MRVs and the further flight testing of MIRV-related systems. Agreed procedures would permit the conversion to single RV systems of missiles which had been tested with MRVs or MIRVs;

—limit the numbers of ABM launchers and ABM-associated radars and prohibit mobile ABMs;

—prohibit changes in certain specified characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic launchers and missiles;

—prohibit all strategic missile flight testing, except for an agreed number of pre-announced confidence firings on agreed ranges;

—limit the numbers of heavy bombers/tankers, medium bombers/tankers and SAMs to those existing in each category at the time the agreement was negotiated;

—prohibit the introduction of new types of strategic bombers or SAMs and certain changes in the size and external configuration of these existing systems.

Option VI. This option would

—limit the number of fixed ICBM launchers and associated missiles to 1000 on each side;

—limit the total throw weights of these ICBMs to not more than 3,000,000 pounds for the Soviet Union and 2,000,000 pounds for the U.S. after January 1, 1972. By this date, the Soviet ICBM force would consist only of SS-11s, SS-13s and up to 120 SS-9s, all in silos.

—ban land-mobile ICBMs or, alternatively, permit them within the limit of 1000 launchers;

—limit the numbers of SLBM and SLCM launchers and submarines to those operational or under construction;

—prohibit flight testing of new ICBM or SLBM RVs or of new missiles of volume greater than 65 cubic meters or throw weight capability of greater than 2000 pounds;

—prohibit flight testing and deployment of multiple RVs except for the Polaris A-3.

The Soviets would be permitted 64 ABM launchers with 1 reload each at Moscow and the U.S. would be permitted 128 launchers at Washington, D.C. Each side would be permitted to have only the ABM-associated radars needed to support its system.

Option VII. This option would

—require the destruction of at least 100 ICBM launchers each year, beginning with launchers whose associated missiles are largest in volume, until each side has no more than 600 operational after July 1, 1975. The U.S. would destroy 1 B-52 bomber and 1 missile for each SS-9 launcher and missile destroyed by the Soviets;

—limit the total number of SLBM, IRBM, and MRBM launchers to 700 after July 1, 1971, and the total number of ICBM, SLBM, IRBM and MRBM launchers to 1300 after July 1, 1975;

—prohibit the deployment of additional land-mobile strategic missile launchers prior to July 1, 1975;

—require that new or modified offensive missiles not exceed 50 cubic meters in volume;

—permit each side to deploy a nationwide ABM system consisting of not more than 500 fixed land-based interceptors plus associated radars;

—limit the total number of SAM batteries deployed to 1200 after July 1, 1971;

—specify that no SAMs with a volume greater than 1 cubic meter could be deployed after January 1, 1970;

—limit the total gross take-off weight of operational strategic bombers on each side to 150,000,000 pounds after July 1, 1975.

38. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES

Where We Stand

The November 10 NSC meeting will be the first NSC review of SALT issues since last July.²

At last July's meeting, you reviewed several specific arms control packages or options—ranging from those emphasizing a simple freeze on the number of ICBMs to comprehensive "Stop Where We Are" proposals.

Following this meeting, on July 21, you wrote a letter to Gerry Smith containing interim guidance on how he should approach SALT.³ Your main points were:

—Any agreement must satisfy your criteria of strategic sufficiency so that our security will not be jeopardized;

—you were willing to consider both "quantitative" and "qualitative" limits on offensive and defensive strategic weapons; i.e., limits on both numbers of strategic missiles and on important missile characteristics, such as whether they carry MIRVs;

—any agreement must meet the test of verifiability to your own personal satisfaction.

There was divided opinion on which options were best:

—the JCS tended to oppose the comprehensive options because they would put too many limits on our programs, would be difficult to verify, and thus would be risky;

—ACDA tended to favor comprehensive options, and to oppose limited ones, because they would have the greatest impact on "the arms race" while still maintaining our security;

—virtually everyone, however, would have settled for the previous Administration's position, which we called Option III, which was a middle-ground option to which they were all previously committed.

Since July, the Government has done a substantial amount of additional analysis. Some believe that the work of the MIRV Panel and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-025, NSC Meeting 11/10/69 SALT (NSSM 62). Top Secret; Sensitive. This paper is annex B to a briefing memorandum that Kissinger sent to Nixon for the NSC meeting scheduled for November 10.

² See Document 25.

³ Document 26.

the Verification Panel—which you asked to be set up—is the most thorough work ever done on arms control issues.

We have learned a great deal from this work. For example, the previous Administration's option—Option III—now appears to be one of the weakest options, whereas a few months ago it looked to be one of the strongest. Option III freezes ICBMs and SLBMs, bans mobile ICBMs, the relocation or replacement of ICBMs, and changes in silos, but permits MIRV and sets ABMs at agreed levels. It thus precludes the US from taking measures that would improve the survivability of ICBMs (relocation and new silos) and prevents the development of mobile missiles to reduce ICBM vulnerability to a Soviet attack.

Because your letter to Gerry Smith does not reflect our improved understanding of verification problems, your guidance to the delegation should be revised in the light of our new understanding of the issues.

*What Are the Options: (Descriptions of the Options are in Annex A)*⁴

The various options which have been considered in US planning break down into three general categories.

1. Those options which limit numbers of missiles and provide for no MIRV ban and no reductions (Options I, II, III, III–A). In general, these options would stop the growth of some or all strategic missile forces. In most other respects, they would not change the strategic situation from what it would be without an agreement.

2. Those options which include, in addition to limits on missiles, a MIRV ban and other limits on the missile capabilities (Options IV, V, V–A and VI). These options would significantly change the situation from what it would be with no agreement.

—Some believe that we could significantly slow down the arms race without serious risk to our security.

—Others believe such options would create great uncertainties and risks because we could not verify compliance with confidence and because cheating or sudden abrogation could seriously threaten our security.

3. That option which provides for mutual reductions in fixed land-based missiles (Option VII).

—This way of reducing the offensive threat is an alternative to a MIRV ban.

—It has been offered as a substitute for a MIRV ban because options with a MIRV ban may not be verifiable; if force reductions can be agreed upon, it makes living with MIRVs more acceptable strategically.

⁴ Document 37.

The numbers of permitted ABMs under each option is an open question. However, it is generally agreed that:

—if MIRVs, which we used to penetrate defenses, are not banned, it is acceptable to have ABM levels equivalent to our Safeguard program on both sides;

—if MIRVs are banned, ABMs would have to be reduced to much lower than Safeguard levels if we are to have high confidence in our deterrent. Thus, if MIRVs are to be banned, we will probably have to give up Safeguard, particularly the area defense against China and other third countries.

What Are the Issues?

The Verification Panel has looked at these options in terms of the strategic issues they raise and of their verifiability.⁵

In general, and at the risk of oversimplification, each option can be analyzed in terms of:

- the constraints it puts on the strategic offensive threat;
- the constraints it puts on ways to counter offensive threats.

As a general rule, we should avoid options which put very few restraints on the threat but a great many constraints on ways of countering these threats. (This is the basic weakness, in my judgment, of Option III.)

Constraints on the Threat

There are several ways of constraining the strategic threat:

1. *We can seek to freeze strategic land-based and submarine-based ballistic missiles at the levels of those now operational and under construction.*

—There is general agreement that we can verify such measures and that they should be included in an agreement.

—ACDA believes such measures are one-sidedly in our favor because the Russians are still building missiles and we are not. ACDA asserts that to be negotiable an agreement would have to include more than these measures, including concessions on our part.

—Others believe that such measures (a) are not one-sided, because we would be limiting our freedom to deploy more missiles, too; and (b) would represent a fundamental step forward in arms control and thus should not be downgraded.

2. *We can seek to ban MIRVs.*

Proponents of such measures argue:

—MIRVs are the most destabilizing element in the strategic arms competition because they may make it possible for one side to use one missile to destroy several enemy missiles, thus shifting the strategic balance in its favor.

⁵ See Document 33.

—MIRVs are the most important program we have underway; if we don't include them in an agreement, the Soviets won't think we are serious about arms control.

—Very soon it will be too late to stop MIRV deployment; both sides will have tested MIRVs to such an extent that neither can have confidence the other has not deployed MIRVs already. (Some believe this point has already been reached.)

—We can verify a ban on MIRV flight testing.

Opponents argue:

—We cannot verify a ban on either MIRV testing or deployment except under conditions that are unacceptable to us, for example, with collateral constraints on tests of exoatmospheric penetration aids and of multiple objects in space.

—Both sides could already deploy their multiple warhead systems now without further flight testing for use against cities. If MIRV tests were banned in an agreement, Congress would not let us deploy ours, while the Soviets could deploy theirs and improve them clandestinely.

(Note: *Relationship Between MIRVs and ABMs.*)

If we give up our MIRVs, we will be giving up our high-confidence means of penetrating ABM defenses. There is general agreement that this makes it necessary to place low limits on Soviet ABM defenses which in turn means that we would have to agree to our ABM defenses being kept at a low level.

On this aspect of the MIRV argument, there is disagreement between those who would be prepared to give up much if not all of our Safeguard program and those who would wish to preserve at least the protection of our bomber bases and of the country as a whole against small attacks or against an attack from China.

There is a further disagreement between those who believe that we could detect Soviet cheating on an agreement limiting ABMs in time to take countermeasures and those who believe that Soviet scope for clandestine improvement and enlargement of their ABM defenses would be substantial.)

3. *We can seek to control missile accuracy, payload size or throw weight.*

—There is agreement that such measures would be useful, particularly because they would constrain counterforce threats.

—However, there are problems in defining these complex issues for purposes of an agreement, and there would be severe problems in verifying such agreements.

4. *We can seek force reductions, i.e. trade off our older Minuteman Missiles and B-52s, in exchange for reductions in Soviet SS-9s.*

—Proponents in OSD argue that since MIRVs cannot be banned with confidence, seeking force reductions is the only alternative approach to controlling strategic weapons that would be regarded in Congress and elsewhere as fundamental.

—Others believe that reductions, though desirable, would not be negotiable at this stage. Also, such moves might alarm some in NATO, who would worry that strategic threats to them—the IR/MRBMs—would be more serious because of the weakening of our offensive deterrent forces.

Constraints on Countermeasures to Offensive Threats

Most options now ban some or all measures to enable both sides to take actions to offset growth in the opponent's offensive threats. This may be unwise.

1. *Should we seek to ban land mobile missiles?*

Proponents of a ban argue that

—Unless we ban mobile land-based missiles, we will have difficulty counting how many the Soviets have [until?] we can verify a total ban with confidence.

—It is not necessary for the US to maintain an option to deploy land mobiles because the survivability of our strategic forces is adequate without them.

Opponents argue that

—The verification problems aren't significantly worse if land mobiles are allowed than if they are banned.

—The US should preserve the option to deploy land mobile missiles as a means of insuring the survival of its land based forces.

2. *Should we allow relocation of ICBMs into hard rock silos?*

—Proponents of a ban on relocations argue that if it were allowed, the Soviets could make the "relocated" missiles much larger and more capable than those they replace.

—Opponents argue that we need to preserve this option to insure that we have a survivable land based missile force.

3. *Should an agreement allow both sides to substitute submarine-based for land-based forces?*

—Proponents of a ban of such substitutions argue that unless we fix a separate limit on land-based and sea-based forces, we will not be able to determine with confidence how many missiles the Soviets have in total and whether or not they are complying with the agreed overall total.

—Opponents argue that the freedom to move our missiles to sea if we wished is an important way of insuring an adequate surviving strategic posture and that verification problems are not serious.

4. *Should an agreement allow for ABM defense of missile silos?*

—Current Safeguard plans call for the US to deploy about 260 ABM missiles to defend 300 Minuteman silos (out of a total of 880 Safeguard interceptors).

—There seems to be general agreement that this part of Safeguard is negotiable if other means to insure the survivability of our forces are assured.

These various individual measures are building blocks which could be combined in many different ways. The options the Government has been considering represent illustrative combinations of these measures.

The Moratorium Issue

Gerard Smith has recommended putting to the Soviets in Helsinki a proposal for a short-term moratorium—renewable if there is progress in the talks on (a) MIRV/MRV testing, (b) new ABM deployments—meaning in our case deferment of Safeguard Phase II and in the Soviet case stopping after the 64 launchers around Moscow, and (3) new construction starts on ICBM launchers.

The proposal has not been examined in detail in the Government.

Smith argues that

—we need to make an early effort to slow up the current momentum of Soviet strategic programs;

—we are sufficiently ahead in MIRV technology that we can afford to test the possibilities of agreement and would still be in a good position to resume our MIRV activities if no agreement occurs and the moratorium is ended;

—we would strengthen our hand with Congress.

Others argue that

—the terms of the moratorium would have to be defined in detail and thus would involve negotiations as complex as those for an actual agreement;

—there are serious verification problems;

—the Soviets would string us along and begin deployment of their MIRV while Congress would never let us proceed with deployment if testing were prohibited under a moratorium;

—by focussing on MIRV now, we would have to include it in an agreement which, in this view, would not be verifiable.

39. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, November 10, 1969.

The President opened the meeting and called upon Director Helms to give a run-through of the missile situation, on the basis of latest intelligence.

Mr. Helms' presentation is attached in his formal brief.²

The President then asked for questions on the basis of Mr. Helms' presentation. There were none.

The President then called on Mr. Kissinger to outline the issues for discussion. Kissinger set these forth as contained in the analytical summary and talking points contained at Tabs B and II in the attached NSC book.³

The President then turned to Ambassador Smith to open the discussion.

Smith—The problem is now one of proceeding on two tracks: (1) continue and finish the efforts of the Verification Panel; and (2) open explorations in Helsinki.

The President's letter of July⁴ gives extremely helpful guidance. I would, however, like to add to it.

First, you foreshadowed Options I, II, and III. I would like to add Option IIIa, which would be a mixture of land and sea based missiles.⁵ I would also like to raise a freeze on bombers. We have an advantage there.

Second, I would like to have permission to add some discussion of MIRV, with no commitment as to whether to ban or not.

Third, I would appreciate guidance as to whether negotiations for a suspension on MIRV are in the cards or not.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes Originals 1969. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room from 3:03 to 5:03 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The minutes are marked "draft" but numerous handwritten minor editorial corrections appear on the original and "OK" is written in the upper right-hand corner. No final version was found. The corrections have been incorporated in the text printed here.

² Attached but not printed is Helms's briefing, entitled "The Soviet Threat," which focused on three points: "a) Numbers of operational Soviet ICBM launchers and new groups of SS-9 and SS-11 silos; b) Soviet program to build their equivalent of U.S. Polaris submarine; and c) photography of a new strategic bomber prototype."

³ Attached but not printed. The analytical summary is printed as Document 38.

⁴ Document 26.

⁵ For a description of the options, see Document 37.

Tests on their and our part may soon go beyond the point of no return concerning MIRV. Alternatives include the following:

- (a) Soviets stop initial starts of new ICBMs.
- (b) Both the Soviets and the United States agree not to deploy new ABMs.
- (c) That there be an agreement of no flight testing of MRVs and MIRVs.

I would like to be able to talk in Helsinki as if these options had not been ruled out.

RN—How do you think the talks will work? Will this be purely a trial effort?

Smith—They will be private. There will be no daily press briefings.

RN—There has been speculation from someone in my office that the Soviets have found the subject far more complicated than they expected. Maybe they are not as far along as we are. Maybe the Soviets will not have as much to say as we will.

Smith—The nature of these talks will be unprecedented. On the Seabeds discussion,⁶ each time they go out for discussion, we go out.

RN—Dick (Helms), have you heard that they are not prepared?

Helms—No.

Rogers—It might be useful to ask Ambassador Thompson about that. Remember, we proposed the talks. They might say to us, “what do you have in mind?”

RN—Concerning MIRV, what is the relative standing?

Packard—That’s hard to answer.

RN—I’m not sure just what we have already tested.

Packard—We are ready with the Poseidon. Our Poseidon missiles go against cities.

RN—What is the Poseidon?

Packard—It is a submarine-launched missile.

RN—Can it do-in a city?

Packard—Yes. In addition, our Minuteman III is in good shape.

I would like to go for more testing on it.

RN—But in general, where do we stand?

Helms—Basically, we are well ahead on MIRV.

Packard—Our system is more sophisticated. The Soviet system is not as reliable.

⁶ Reference is to negotiations that began in March 1969 between the United States and Soviet Union for an arms control treaty for the seabeds.

Kissinger—Our system is targeted more for cities, and with ABM defense in mind. Their system, if accurate, is designed against our Minuteman. They are not the same things; there are different purposes.

Packard—That is correct. We are concerned over these differing purposes.

RN—When did we start testing?

Wheeler—In August 1968. We have conducted 25 tests.

Smith—Didn't they start just about one week later.

Nitze—The main purpose of the Helsinki meeting is exploratory.

RN—But how will they work? Who goes?

Smith—In addition to me, there will be Brown, Allison, Nitze and Thompson. The Soviet delegation will be headed by Semyonov.

RN—Will they have any lawyers?

Helms—They have two Foreign Service Officers, two Generals, and one electronics specialist.

RN—Do we know any of them? Were any of them at the Seabeds talks?

Smith—Korniyenko was there. Will you send a message to the first day of the talks?

RN—Yes.

Nitze—Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin has told us they will discuss substance. We want to get to know what the Soviets have in mind, and we want to give credence to our own position. We don't want to undermine our system.

Mr. Nitze then presented his views as contained in his memorandum of November 6, enclosed at Tab C of the attached NSC book.⁷

At the end, he said that the Soviets may ask if a MIRV ban is on the agenda, and they might raise the issue of a moratorium on further testing.

RN—Would this be in their interest?

Nitze—Yes.

Helms—I would think that would be unacceptable. Why go that way?

RN—What about a freeze on submarines, bombers and mobile launchers?

⁷ Nitze's memorandum discussed three categories of options: "1) those options which provide for no MIRV ban and no reductions (Options I, II, III, III-A); 2) those options which include a MIRV ban (Options IV, V, V-A and VI); and 3) the option which provides for mutual reductions of fixed land-based missiles, and thus reduces the significance of MIRVs as a counterforce threat (Opinion VII)."

Nitze—They might want an ABM freeze. Our ABM is more sophisticated, and they could suggest freezing deployment beyond what is now in place.

RN—Are MIRV and ABM interrelated? MIRV can break through ABM?

Nitze—Yes.

Wheeler—MIRV is important to us not only as it concerns penetration, but also as we have targeted at Soviet target system. We have 540–580 hard targets which we are not able to hit now.

Nitze—Put another way, when we talk of freezing the Minuteman force at 1000 and subs at 400, we had planned to MIRV that force. This would give us an extra capability. The submarines are in for conversion, and Minuteman III is about ready.

Smith—We could still deploy Poseidon with a single warhead. We must stop deployment of the SS–9.

RN—If the SS–9 is a first-strike weapon, is it not a weapon designed against cities?

Packard—While we have been developing MIRV since 1966, the Soviets have been continuing deployment of their SS–9. Even if they stop MIRVing, they can still threaten our Minuteman capability.

Agnew—Can SS–9s go against our Minuteman?

Packard—We are concerned that they would go against our hard silos. On the basis of data from testing, CIA says this is doubtful, while the Department of Defense is not so doubtful.

Mitchell—Do the last tests of the SS–9 give them any lead on accuracy?

Packard—No.

Helms—That is correct.

Nitze—Since 1966, our effort has been based on the assumption that Minuteman III and the Poseidon would balance their SS–11s and SS–13s. The Soviets have much greater throw weight. If we now give up MIRV, they may have as much as a 3 to 1 advantage in throw weight. We face a major decision, concerning both parity and assurance. We could build ABMs beyond what they have. They are not so strong now. But if they go further, or if they expand their radar, then that would be a major threat to us.

Helms—We don't know how much they have improved at this point.

Smith—What is the purpose of our defense against China?

RN—We want area defense.

Rogers—The Soviet estimate of Chinese capability is greater than our estimate.

RN—Maybe it is just a game on their part.

They might feel reluctant to give up development in submarines and aircraft. This gives them flexibility vis-à-vis others. The Soviets have 1/2 of the submarines in the world.

But we have an overall collection they don't have.

Nitze—They have 700 medium bombers which could go against the Chinese and Europe.

Allison—We find bombers useful in a wide variety of roles. They have good refueling capability.

RN—Henry (Kissinger), what about your point to Congress and the Senators that their thrust is more flexible, while we are on a plateau.

Kissinger—They have several missiles, capable of varying roles. We have one which is retaliatory. What if their SS-9 is MIRVed against our Minuteman? If they know what they are doing, then they intend to make the SS-9 more accurate. As accuracy improves, and if the SS-11 is accurate to within 1/3 of a mile, then they don't need to MIRV. This could mean a fundamental change in the situation, which had been unthinkable in the 60s.

RN—Let's come down to the point—what shall we give our negotiators.

Nitze—I don't see a moratorium, unless the long-term results are clear.

Can we live with a MIRV ban?

(1) We must have a high assurance that ABMs and SAMs won't expand. But how can we get this assurance.

(2) If we cannot get clear on how to control the radar networks, then what assurance do we have of launchers?

Kissinger—The radar problem is crucial.

Nitze—Their MIRVs are more dangerous than ours since they have greater throw weight, but the roles are different. We are particularly concerned about ABM and SAM upgrade.

Agnew—Strictly as a negotiator, can't we talk about payload limitations. This is just as disadvantageous to them. It may not be as sophisticated, but it is just as disadvantageous.

Nitze—They won't show us their payload.

Smith—We do have an overall advantage. What about airplanes?

RN—What do you think Andy (Goodpaster)?

Goodpaster—The caliber of discussion today is far beyond anything heretofore held. With the number of uncertainties that exist, we are held to exploration at this stage. We must assess carefully what the Soviets say, to narrow things down for the next step. The debate here makes it clear that we are not prepared to go beyond exploration. But going slowly may not be going bad.

We must take measure of these people and sense their concern. We don't know the degree of Soviet concern about the Chinese Communists. We don't want to take steps which Paul says would trap us.

Wheeler—I am utterly opposed to foregoing MIRV. A moratorium is equivalent to a ban. It would kill the Poseidon program, and we have no single reentry vehicle warhead for the Poseidon.

I think the first thing the Soviets would try to get would be whether we would be willing to accept parity in strategic forces—a parity which is not necessarily symmetrical. I base this on a conversation of a year ago with Dobrynin, who said don't talk to the Soviets on the basis of superiority. They want to talk at minimum on the basis of parity.

What is our ultimate objective—superiority or parity?

Goodpaster—There is the NATO aspect. My NATO colleagues are aware that an increasing number of targets on the nuclear list are left uncovered. It is important to have NATO consultations in advance. They will understand the meaning for them of any action proposals. We will have to be clear about the net balance before we consult with NATO.

Smith—I talked with Brosio this morning. I said flatly we would consult with NATO.

If we are not going to choke off the nuclear competition, then the land-based missiles only give us a short-run advantage. We have new missiles on the way. The Minuteman is a gone goose anyway. If MIRVs are not included in the negotiations, then an agreement is meaningless.

Nitze—I think it is important that we would be able to discuss MIRV if they raise it. But how would we handle such an issue, since I am reluctant to discuss a moratorium until we know the terms. Equalization of throw weights becomes increasingly important.

Agnew—Throw weight is more inspectable than MIRVing. If there is a throw weight agreement, then we don't need a MIRV ban. I think we ought to get away from MIRV discussions.

Rogers—There will be great international interest in this. We shouldn't get locked in. I worry about a moratorium we can't get out of. We should give our team flexibility.

RN—Gerry (Smith), do you feel we have to discuss MIRV or there is no game?

Smith—I think this is about 70% of the issue.

Nitze—It doesn't have to be so.

RN—We must rationalize our position. To say we have a moratorium which then locks us into a ban, is like saying let's just have a little bit of pregnancy.

Smith—That is so, as a moratorium automatically means a ban.

RN—I would like to prepare a memorandum on this business. I'll have it by Wednesday.⁸ I am keenly aware you can't go ask just what they have in mind. You have to have something to say. We must be prepared to talk about MIRV.

Smith—I don't want to highlight within the North Atlantic Council our thinking concerning reductions.

Nitze—But we should raise the possibility.

Rogers—There was great interest in having Congressional representation on the delegation when I testified. You might want to brief the Congressional leaders.

RN—That is an excellent idea. Be careful with the Senate.

Rogers—We might pick out a few of the leaders to brief.

Kissinger—We could give facts from the Verification Panel.

RN—We don't have to tell them about the MIRV business.

Smith—I have a press backgrounder right now. I leave for Helsinki Thursday.

Rogers—We can go slowly—we don't need to get in a trap quickly.

RN—Instead of options, can we go weapon by weapon? Will we talk the whole approach, parts, or what? Do we want to rule anything out? They might come in with some very simplistic suggestions. When I saw Alastair Buchan recently, he said he thought the Soviets were worried about SALT; that they are not fully ready.

The meeting adjourned.

⁸ November 12.

40. National Security Decision Memorandum 33¹

Washington, November 12, 1969.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Preliminary Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

The President has made the following decisions with respect to the preliminary strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union, which begin on November 17, 1969 in Helsinki.

1. During this phase of the talks, the primary objective of the U.S. Delegation shall be to develop a work program for the main talks and to acquire information concerning Soviet views in order to aid in the formulation of future positions. The Delegation shall therefore avoid statements that would prejudice these positions.

2. The United States is prepared to discuss (a) limitations on all offensive and defensive weapons systems, and (b) proposals the Soviets may advance for the work program. The Delegation should make it clear that in accepting subjects for further discussion the United States is not thereby committed to the inclusion of any given measure of limitation in a final agreement either individually or in combination with others. The President will make the judgment on what limitations are acceptable, and he will do so in light of the criteria for strategic sufficiency set forth in NSDM-16,² the evaluations of the Verification Panel, and other considerations he deems pertinent.

3. Furthermore, the Delegation should emphasize that any agreed measures must be subject to adequate verification. The verification issues associated with any measures should be discussed on the basis of the work of the Verification Panel.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-212, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 1-50. Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation. The memorandum bears President Nixon's initials in the upper right-hand corner.

² See footnote 2, Document 24.

4. As a contribution to the work program and in order to elicit Soviet views, the Delegation should draw on the elements in Option II³ as illustrative of a possible approach to limitations. At the same time the Delegation should indicate that this illustration does not exclude additions, modifications or other approaches. In the interest of exploring Soviet attitudes, the question of MRV/MIRV may be included in a work program. The Delegation should discuss it in the light of the prior examination of limitations on defensive systems and within the context of the verifiability of (a) limitations on defensive systems and (b) possible bans on MIRV flight testing and deployment and the constraints associated therewith. The President will judge the feasibility of restraints on MIRV in terms of their strategic consequences and their verifiability.

5. As regards limitations on defensive systems, the President is committed to the area defense component of the Safeguard program. Consistent with this commitment the Delegation may explore limitations on strategic defensive systems together with the related problems of verification. It may be useful to begin this part of the discussion with exploration of the minimum area defense requirements against third country threats.

6. The Delegation is authorized to discuss throw weight limitations as a type of qualitative restriction we are prepared to explore further.

7. As for other elements to be included in a work program, the Delegation is authorized to discuss quantitative and qualitative limitations raised by the Soviet Union.

8. Before engaging in a discussion of moratorium issues, or agreeing to their inclusion in a work program, the Delegation should seek instructions from Washington.

9. Issues related to numerical reductions of strategic weapons may be discussed and included in the work program after authorization from Washington and consultation with Allies, who have not yet been informed of this possibility.

10. The Delegation should take the position that tactical nuclear forces and strategic forces of other nations are not to be included in these talks.

11. The Delegation is not authorized to accept Helsinki as the site for the main talks.

³ See Document 37.

12. The President reaffirms his Directive of October 31, 1969, entitled "Avoidance of Leaks on SALT."⁴ The Chairman of the Delegation shall ensure that all activities dealt with in that Directive are conducted in conformity with it.

Henry A. Kissinger

⁴ The directive, based on an earlier one of September 11, issued at Colorado Springs, Colorado, stipulated that all public statements, press releases, and official communications "on matters of known or potential Presidential interest" be cleared by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Director of the U.S. Information Agency. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-025, NSC Meeting 11/10/69 SALT (NSSM 62))

Opening Round at Helsinki and Preparations for Vienna, November 17, 1969–April 15, 1970

41. Editorial Note

The first round of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) opened in Helsinki, Finland on November 17, 1969. The United States Delegation was led by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Gerard Smith. It also included five additional delegates: Philip Farley, Deputy Director of ACDA; Paul Nitze, who represented the Department of Defense; Lieutenant General Royal Allison, who represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson; and Harold Brown, President of California Technological Institute and an expert in the field of science and technology. The six-man Soviet SALT Delegation was headed by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov and included Colonel General Nikolai Ogarikov, who served as the principal military adviser; Aleksandr Shchukin, an authority on defense research; Deputy Minister of the Radio Industry of the Soviet Union Petr Pleshakov; Colonel General of Engineering-Technical Services Nikolai Alekseyev; and Ambassador Georgi Korniyenko, chief of the U.S. Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

In a November 18 letter to President Nixon, Smith communicated his first impressions of the negotiations:

“The first business session this morning went off slightly better than I had expected. Semenov’s statement had a minimum of polemic; and although it gives evidence of being designed for public consumption in the event the talks collapse, it also seems clearly intended to lay the basis for a serious exchange of views. The whole text will, of course, be available through normal channels, but I was struck with a few passages that seemed unusual. He spoke of nuclear war as a disaster for both sides—of the dangers of grave miscalculations—of unauthorized use of weapons—and of hostilities resulting from third power provocation.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 875, SALT, Volume V, November 17–30, 1969)

Smith continued to provide Nixon with summaries of the initial talks between the two delegations. In a letter sent to Nixon on November 24, Smith stated that the U.S. Delegation presented “Illustrative Elements” (from NSDM 33, Document 40) in an attempt to elicit Soviet thinking about various strategic systems and to set an agenda for discussing offensive and defensive systems. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 875, SALT, Volume V, November 17–30, 1969) Smith’s third report, sent to Nixon on December

1, was more detailed yet no more definitive on resolving issues between the two nations:

“Neither side in the full meetings or in private exchanges has so much as mentioned Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). I have no clear idea to offer as to the Soviet reasoning. My hunch is that they calculate that there is sufficient Congress/public pressure to cause us to raise MIRV and that they will not, therefore, have to take whatever small loss in bargaining power may go along with being first to raise MIRV. And it may be that feeling behind in the MIRV competition, they sense that they would be showing weakness by raising the subject and so prefer to wait us out. So far the Soviets have not reacted to our Option II illustration except to subtract MRBM/IRBM and add forward based and carrier aircraft. Semenov acknowledges they owe us a ‘debt’ on this score. Even though their ABM declaratory policy is likely not unrelated to the upcoming Safeguard Phase II decision, it is strikingly different from past Soviet declarations about defensive missiles.” (Ibid.)

42. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 3, 1969.

SUBJECT

Summary of Salto 58, Thinkpiece re Present Position of Preliminary SALT

Ambassador Smith has sent in the attached telegrams,² including separate memoranda from Nitze, Thompson, Allison, and Brown. Each comments on Soviet motives and where we may be headed in the talks. All seem to agree that the Soviets are “serious.” Most see their principal tactic as driving for a total ban on ABMs, which leads logically to a ban on MIRVs. All see certain political byproducts in the form of propaganda proposals designed to cause trouble in NATO, and in the US. Most comment favorably on the mutuality of views on strategic concepts, mainly acceptance of mutual deterrence, the interaction of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 875, SALT, Volume VI, December 1–31, 1969. Secret. Sent for information.

² Attached but not printed is telegram Salto 58, December 2, which was sent in six sections.

offensive-defensive deployments, and the threat of heavy ABM systems.

Nitze: He feels that the Soviets are laying the foundation for a plausible agreement to curb the arms race in a manner inconsistent with approved US positions, the logic of which, however, will be difficult to resist. The main points will be a zero level of ABMs, a ban on MIRVs, and simple flight test ban, with third country threats met by politico-strategic consultations. They may also have in mind a halt to further construction of offensive launchers, if the above conditions are met.

This position may be difficult, he feels, unless we lay foundation for limiting and reducing offensive launchers, while permitting MIRVs and nationwide ABM, or by guiding a MIRV test ban in the direction of the Option that provides for limit on number of SS-9 and throw-weight.³ If, however, we want to move toward a MIRV ban, then there may be advantages in raising moratorium now rather than postponing.

Thompson: The Soviets seriously wish to work toward an agreement, though some of their positions are propagandistic and for bargaining purposes. They will press for a low level of ABMs and this may well be a critical issue in the subsequent negotiations. Though the Soviets have not raised MIRVs, Thompson assumes we should do so in some form before we conclude; at a minimum we should get the subject on the work program and it might be helpful to know whether Washington believes the delegation should probe Soviet thinking.

Allison: The major Soviet purpose is to assess for Moscow how serious the US is. The Soviets have staked out areas they wish to develop (bombers, exclusion of IR/MRBMs, etc.), but without illustrating in any detail a proposal of their own. The Soviet presentations have been designed to encourage forthcomingness on the US side, and have been cast in a form we want to hear.

Brown: His memorandum is too long to summarize adequately. He sees the talks as serving various Soviet purposes: formalization of parity; freeze by agreement of those areas where we have momentum (MIRV, ABM) while allowing continued deployment in areas where their momentum exceeds ours (submarines, SS-9s); silence on MIRVs may mean they believe we are far enough along to deploy while they are not; or they may be trying to slow down our programs without agreement, or aiming at stabilization of strategic situation near the present level.

On the other hand, we gain by developing strategic picture for Soviets of the situation with or without agreement. They have come some distance in expressing common strategic concepts. We could use talks

³ See Document 37 for a description of the various U.S. options.

to impress on their establishment the disutility of strategic power beyond certain levels. They have not been negative toward elements of Option II. They may want equal numbers of missiles rather than equality in payload.

We should avoid the concept of parity; we should mention throw-weight, ask about reductions and note the MIRV question for inclusion in the work program, but not agree to stop our programs while theirs continue; we should plan to resume in early February somewhere else. Washington should look harder at low, including zero, ABMs; look again at options which allow MIRVs and those which do not. MIRVs may not be controllable after next spring, but some new agreements could be formulated which inhibit qualitative improvements. Perhaps an agreement that permits MIRVs, but stops higher betas, and any more RVs per vehicle than have been tested already.

43. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

Need for U.S. SALT Delegation to clarify U.S. Posture on ABM Levels

I am concerned that the statements made so far by our delegates, both formally and informally, may have given the Soviet side the misleading impression that Safeguard is negotiable down to quite low levels. This may lead the Soviets to miscalculate the strategy that they adopt for the main talks, thus at least prolonging those talks. I have at-

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 24, SALT, Chronological. Secret. On December 11 Sonnenfeldt forwarded this memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum that noted: "I think you should be aware that not only on the ABM issues, but on some other questions, the delegation seems to go beyond its instructions. We just learned that without formally asking for instructions they submitted to the Soviets a new version of a final communiqué without having discussed the first version in any detail. This first version had been cleared in Washington, and the delegation had been told we wanted to defer considering any fallback positions." Kissinger drew an arrow to that paragraph and wrote: "How could this happen?" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 875, SALT, Volume VI, December 1–30, 1969)

tached an analysis of the comments our delegation has so far made, to explain this concern.²

The President has made quite clear that he is committed to the area defense component of the Safeguard system, whose purpose is to reduce U.S. fatalities to a minimum level in the event of a Chinese attack or an accidental launch. He has also made clear that the total Safeguard deployment is subject to modification as the threat changes, so that if the U.S. reaches verifiable stable agreements with the Soviets, which increase or reduce the threat against which Safeguard is designed, then that portion of Safeguard which defends against the Soviet threat will be modified accordingly.

I propose that Gerard Smith be instructed to take an opportunity, before the close of the Helsinki talks, to clarify the U.S. position in this matter. One way would be for Smith, in the final presentation in which he plans to reaffirm our commitment to NATO security, to also reaffirm the U.S. commitment to ABM defense against China, and to include the quotation from the President's statement of March 14, 1969:³ "Since our deployment is to be closely related to the threat, it is subject to modification as the threat changes, either through negotiations or through unilateral actions by the Soviet Union or Communist China."

David Packard

² Attached but not printed.

³ On March 14 Nixon's decisions about ABM and MIRV testing were announced in a White House press release. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 216–219.

44. Letter From the Chief of the Delegation to the Preliminary Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to President Nixon¹

Helsinki, December 9, 1969.

Dear Mr. President:

This may be the last report from Helsinki giving my personal impressions, as we hope to wind up after this week's drafting of a general work program for the next stage and a communiqué. It is just possible, of course, that we may get some further Soviet views on substantive matters this week, and may also get some informal "messages to Washington" from Semenov as we wind up.

Although still unclear as to Soviet intentions re SALT (as they likely still are about ours), I think we have come upon a few points in this exploration which have made it a worthwhile operation.

First: They appear to be seriously interested in avoiding an ABM competition.² They explicitly recognized that ABMs can be considered "offensive" and a major stimulant to the arms competition. They have suggested the possibility of a zero ABM level which one Soviet official said could involve dismantling the Moscow Galosh System³ which he described as experimental.

Second: Their probing of my use of the term "initial" agreement may indicate some interest in a negotiating moratorium of some sort. When I explained that I did not use the term to mean an agreement reached at the beginning of the next stage, but one reachable perhaps in 1970, my colleague Mr. Garthoff (an experienced Russian expert) detected a flash of disappointment on Semenov's visage.⁴

Third: When we discussed verification, the Soviets stated (as expected) that national means would be sufficient. But Semenov went on to say that US ideas for cooperative verification techniques could be a subject for discussion. I take this to be a slight opening toward some

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 875, SALT, Volume VI, December 1–31, 1969. Top Secret; Nodis. Kissinger wrote on the letter: "All these letters must be acknowledged." He also wrote "Secretariat has action." No reply to Smith has been found. On December 17 Kissinger sent the letter to Nixon under a summarizing memorandum. Notations on the memorandum indicate that Nixon saw it.

² Nixon noted after this point on Kissinger's memorandum: "They are ahead."

³ The system consisted of eight launch sites near Moscow of the Galosh missile, an ABM interceptor.

⁴ Kissinger's memorandum summarized this point as the Soviets' expressing interest in "a simple agreement early in the next phase." Nixon wrote: "Not in our interest."

of the ideas we have considered between national means and on-site inspection. If so, it may be a sign that the Soviets are sufficiently interested in a SALT deal to change somewhat their past policy.

Fourth: Though I don't know exactly what to make of it, their MIRV *silence* seems significant. At least, I think one can assume that they are not ahead of or even abreast of us in the field. One Soviet official privately said, in effect: You have MIRV, we don't; so it's up to you to raise it. Related to this is their UN position opposing the Mexican resolution.⁵ At very least, they do not give the appearance of wanting a MIRV moratorium.⁶

Fifth: We find somewhat unexpectedly an apparent Soviet strong interest in the third country problem in its "provocative attack" context. The Soviets seem to be thinking here of US/USSR communication arrangements to identify rapidly the source of attack rather than aiming at an agreed level for an anti-Chinese ABM system.

Semenov has stressed that in such a new field, diplomacy must start with "hints." I trust we have identified and reported all the significant hints they have made.

It is worth speculating that the Soviets may be surprised at our illustrative elements which emphasize freedom to build improved missiles and missiles in less vulnerable configurations. It may be that the Soviet military are inclining to favor our Option II⁷ since it would permit a number of new strategic systems to be built, e.g.: a) land mobile systems, b) hardened fixed land-based systems, and c) more submarines. The more budget conscious Soviet civilians, however, may see trouble with such an approach.

My hunch at this very early stage of the talks is that Soviet purposes are a mix of at least three possible main ingredients:

- a) To see if an arrangement can be negotiated that would improve their prospects, or stabilize the strategic balance at lower cost,
- b) To "cover" their ICBM/SLBM build-up and hopefully to defer, if not defeat, a US reaction.

⁵ Reference is to a 15-nation draft resolution, A/C.1/L.490, introduced in the United Nations General Assembly on November 26, which urged the United States and Soviet Union to hold bilateral negotiations on the limitations of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons systems. (*Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, p. 595) On December 9 the Mexican Representative to the United Nations, Alfonso Garcia Robles, addressed the First Committee of the General Assembly on a moratorium on new nuclear weapons systems. His address is *ibid.*, pp. 644–648.

⁶ On Kissinger's memorandum, Nixon commented: "They are behind."

⁷ See Document 37 for a description of the various U.S. options.

c) To advance their general arms control image as well as their specific non-proliferation interests by appearing to meet the obligations of Article VI (NPT).⁸

Finally: I must say the Finns have exceeded all expectations as hosts for the talks and deserve, in my judgment, a vote of thanks.

Respectfully,

Gerry

⁸ Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reads: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." (21 UST 483)

45. Editorial Note

As the first round of the strategic arms limitation talks drew to a close in Helsinki, Finland, leaders of the United States and Soviet Union discussed possible venues for the second round of negotiations. On December 19, 1969, at 7:15 p.m., President Nixon and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed the issue:

"K: The SALT talks. N: They are going to change it? K: This is the problem. You remember our problems with Dobrynin. Bill [Rogers] was reluctant to raise the issue. You had given [Gerard] Smith the instructions and now the Russians had backed off. I thought just as a matter of discipline I ought to call Dobrynin and remind him of this conversation before. N: Tell him we gave in on Helsinki and why not Vienna. We don't have to be anxious but the point is that it ought to be either Geneva or Vienna." (Transcript of Telephone Conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

When Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on the evening of December 22, they had the following discussion concerning SALT:

"Dobrynin then made another effusive statement of the need for Soviet/American cooperation and of the good faith of his government and earnestness in trying to seek it. He said a good example was the rapidity with which they had agreed to the President's preference on the site for the SALT talks. He said, 'You know Smith had tried for two

weeks but when the President requested Geneva, we gave him Vienna even though he had not asked for it. This is what could happen in other areas if we understand each other.' "

On December 24 Kissinger sent the memorandum of conversation to Nixon under cover of a memorandum that described the discussion with Dobrynin. Kissinger remarked that "the Russians seem eager to talk on a number of substantive issues. They are probably trying to head us towards a summit meeting. This could be a reflection of a desire for real détente, or it could mean they are getting ready to hit China in the Spring. The latter interpretation—that they are repeating their Czechoslovakia drill—is reinforced by their choosing April 16 as a date for resumption of the SALT talks." Kissinger's memorandum and the attached memorandum of conversation are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 110.

On December 29 Kissinger and Dobrynin met for continuing discussions about SALT and other issues. In a memorandum of conversation prepared by Kissinger, he stated:

"We then discussed what subjects might be included and the order in which to take them up. Dobrynin suggested European security and the Middle East. I said that there might be some merit in discussing SALT—not from the point of view of technical solutions but simply to see what sort of an arrangement was generally conceivable, whether, for example, it should be limited or comprehensive. Dobrynin thought about this for a minute and then said that perhaps we should put SALT very high on our agenda. Moscow would undoubtedly be making decisions on how to proceed with SALT during February and March and it might be helpful if we could get our general thinking in harmony. The details could then be worked out by the negotiators." The full text of the memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, Document 112.

46. **Memorandum for the File by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith)¹**

Washington, January 9, 1970.

Kissinger called me on January 6 (from San Clemente to Easton) and said that the President did not have trouble with the approach on ABM that I had suggested.² He was quite open on this philosophy, but he felt that if a little money was appropriated for phase II, it would strengthen our bargaining position. Kissinger said the White House hoped that ACDA would cooperate in this approach. I told him that we certainly would and inferred that no ACDA people would lobby on this hill against this approach.

I got the impression that the President might agree to a zero level ABM if the Soviets would negotiate an otherwise reasonable agreement.

Kissinger also said that the President had no objection in principle to the idea of communicating with (as he put it Dobrynin) Semenov, but the President would like to see anything that we sent along. Of course, anything that we might receive in this channel from the Soviets could be very interesting.

GS³

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Director's Files, Smith/Farley Chronological File, Smith-White House Correspondence, January-December 1970. Secret; Nodis. Smith initialed the memorandum and added a handwritten "nodis."

² On December 30 Smith wrote Nixon a letter requesting an administration review of the relationship of ABM to SALT. Smith declared that "the question of ABM seems to be the central issue of SALT" and suggested that "it would be desirable to keep Safeguard Phase II in R & D status during FY-71." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 840, ABM-MIRV, ABM System, Vol. III, Memos and Misc., January-March 1970)

³ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

47. **Letter From General Lauris Norstad of the General Advisory Committee for Arms Control and Disarmament to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Toledo, Ohio, January 20, 1970.

Dear Henry:

As you know, Mr. McCloy has designated several rapporteurs to facilitate consideration of the questions posed by the President in the course of his recent meeting with the General Advisory Committee on U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament.² I have been asked to assist the MIRV–ABM study³ and, at the suggestion of Mr. McCloy, I am writing to you in that capacity since he was not present at our meeting last Saturday.⁴

Saturday evening, a group which included most, but not all, of the Committee members who attended earlier sessions that day continued a discussion of several levels of ABM's which might be considered in connection with the SALT conferences. As you would suspect, it developed that views on this subject cover some reasonable range of thinking. However, it was generally felt that evidence now of action leading substantially beyond Phase 1 of Safeguard might limit the scope of later negotiations, and the hope was expressed that this possibility would be given the fullest consideration, particularly in connection with the presentations the President will make to the Congress in the very near future. Although the Committee members present were sure this thought would have occurred to the President and his advisors, we did feel moved to bring our interest to your attention in this informal manner. We do this with some hesitancy because we recognize the difficulties and the dangers of offering suggestions on current matters involving decisions which may already have been taken or actions which may already be underway.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-026, NSC Meeting 1/23/70 Safeguard (ABM). Confidential.

² Nixon met with the GAC on December 16, 1969, to summarize the first round of negotiations in Helsinki. The President posed a series of questions for consideration by the GAC. Memoranda of conversation between Nixon administration officials and the GAC during the course of SALT I are *ibid.*, Box 197, Agency Files, ACDA, Jan 69–Dec 70, Vol. I.

³ On March 13 Kissinger forwarded the GAC's 21-page report, March 2, which addressed the multiple SALT-related questions. The report and subsequent GAC submissions are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383–98–0089, Director's Files, Gerard Smith's Files, Reports of GAC.

⁴ January 17.

It is my understanding that it is not the intention of Mr. McCloy or the Committee to attempt any substantive recommendations on weapons levels in the short time remaining before the President presents his messages to the Congress.

Sincerely,

Lauris

48. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

Safeguard FY 71 Budget Decision

At last week's DPRC meeting,² Henry Kissinger indicated that a paper from me in connection with the Safeguard "Annual Review"³ now under way would be in order.

I would like to stress the relation of this decision to SALT. If the Administration adopts the current DOD recommendation to start a nationwide area defense system under Phase II,⁴ there likely will be an-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 840, ABM-MIRV, ABM System, Vol. III, 1/70-3/70, Memos and Miscellaneous. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads, "Incorporated into NSC Books, 1/22/70."

² Notes of the January 15 meeting are *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-099, DPRC Meeting 1/15/70. The notes are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972, Document 118.

³ The Department of Defense had been reviewing ballistic missile defense since January 1969, specifically in relation to the FY 1971 budget.

⁴ Phase I of Safeguard permitted ABM deployment at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota and Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. Phase II called for construction at additional sites. On January 12 OSD prepared a memorandum on the Safeguard system. Included in its recommendations was authorization of two additional sites in FY 1971 to be chosen to: "a) extend area defense against the Chinese threat; b) broaden the base for Minuteman defense; and c) begin to implement the defense against the SLBM threat." Packard forwarded this memorandum to Smith on January 14 and invited him to attend the DPRC meeting on January 15. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, 110.01, January-May 1970) The memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972, Document 117.

other major Congressional debate, the outcome of which cannot be predicted for sure. Whether the Administration wins or loses, the results could prejudice SALT.

The USSR acknowledges that ABM levels are an important element in limiting strategic armaments. In stating that ABM systems could play an offensive (destabilizing) role by raising doubts about the inevitability of retaliation, the Soviets reversed their previous view as expressed at Glassboro⁵ that ABMs are acceptable since they serve the humanitarian purpose of saving lives. While we do not know what their position on ABM levels will be, I think that it is clear that the Soviets are concerned by the prospect of a nationwide area defense deployment, and so the existence of the US Safeguard program exerts a positive pressure on the Soviets to negotiate promptly an equitable SALT agreement. From this angle, the initiation this year of Phase II might increase the incentive to the Soviets to reach an agreement of interest to the US; but I question how much more pressure this course would raise over the alternative course of stepping up R&D and not this year making a Phase II deployment decision.

My main concern is that, if Congress does not approve the proposal to move now to a nationwide area defense system under Phase II, not only would any increased bargaining power not be gained, but we might also lose the pressure raised by Phase I. There is a risk that Soviet leaders would then conclude that a main Soviet objective of SALT had been achieved.

Some say that not to move now on Phase II would also put Phase I in doubt. My judgment is that keeping Phase II in R&D would not have this effect and likely would broaden somewhat support for Safeguard.

Even if by dint of a major effort the Administration obtains Congressional approval of a Phase II program, this likely will require taking such strong positions on the nature of the threat, strategic utility and technical capabilities of Safeguard as to reduce significantly our flexibility in future SALT negotiations. At this stage, I believe there is advantage in keeping the Safeguard commitment sufficiently flexible as to permit consideration of a SALT decision for a zero ABM level or for an ABM defense limited to the National Command Authority if this proves to be in the US security interest.

In these circumstances, I believe that from the point of view of SALT the most desirable ABM decision for FY 71 would be to continue

⁵ In June 1967 President Johnson and Kosygin held a summit at Glassboro, New Jersey. See *ibid.*, 1964–1968, volume XIV, Soviet Union, Documents 227–238.

Phase I as planned with increased R&D effort on the improved Spartan area defense and improved hard point defense for Minuteman and defer any deployment actions connected with Phase II.

I appreciate that this is a close decision involving expertise beyond the scope of my Agency, but I hope this viewpoint will be factored into the decision.

Gerard Smith

49. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Soviet Position on ABM Limitation in SALT

There has been increasing speculation and debate over the Soviet position on limiting ABMs in a SALT agreement. Some observers, including members of our delegation, feel there is a good chance the Soviets would agree to a complete ban. Others, however, feel that the Soviet preference is for a limited defense against third countries.

The record of the Helsinki conversations includes evidence to support both sides. The head of the Soviet delegation, Vladimir Semyonov, in his speech of November 28, shifted the Soviet position from a justification of ABMs—the line Kosygin had taken at Glassboro—to an admission that a heavy system could be destabilizing by threatening the ability of one side to retaliate. On this basis he outlined three possible approaches:

1. a complete ban; this is possible, he said, because “work on ABM systems is in an initial stage;”
2. “some kind of limited system,” based on agreed level determined by the size of the systems, nature of coverage, targets defended, etc.;
3. a heavy area ABM.

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon President Materials, NSC Files, Box 840, ABM–MIRV, ABM System, Vol. III, Memos and Misc., January–March 1970. Secret. Sent for information. Sonnenfeldt sent the memorandum to Kissinger on January 20, informing him that he had revised it as Kissinger suggested and recommending it be sent to the President.

He indicated no preference, but he did say (in oblique reference to Safeguard) that defending strategic offensive weapons with ABMs and other targets “a considerable distance apart” would create uncertainties because of the possibility that such a thin system could evolve into a system “facilitating a first strike.”

In private conversations the Soviets confused the picture by making contradictory interpretations. One Soviet official, a specialist on disarmament matters, confirmed that the already-installed Moscow ABM system could be dismantled if there was an agreement on a complete ban.

On the last day of the talks, however, a Soviet General clearly indicated that Moscow’s preference was for a limited ABM system for protection against third country attacks.²

One explanation of this discrepancy, of course, is that these two were reflecting differences between the Soviet arms control viewpoint and the military establishment (though the military is usually careful not to contradict totally the political line).

Conclusions

There is little doubt that the Soviets were concerned over Safeguard, and they apparently had instructions to draw us out by presenting three alternative “models.”

It is impossible to draw any firm conclusions, but it seems most likely that their preference is for a limited system capable of providing protection against third country attacks, as General Alekseev indicated.

The Soviets may have mentioned the “zero ABM” possibility to give ammunition to our Safeguard opponents.

² Nixon underlined most of this sentence and wrote in the margin: “K—This is what they will insist on.”

50. Editorial Note

On January 23, 1970, the National Security Council was scheduled to discuss issues that could potentially affect the strategic arms limitation talks, specifically Department of Defense proposals for the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program for fiscal year 1971. Talking points prepared by the NSC staff, which President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger sent to President Nixon, noted that

part of the discussion would focus on how further deployment of Safeguard beyond the Phase I sites of Grand Forks and Malmstrom Air Force Bases would affect SALT. An issues paper included in the President's briefing materials contains the following section about the implications for SALT of further Safeguard deployment:

"The *SALT argument* can be expected to receive greater attention at the meeting. Gerard Smith will presumably state his view that we should not go beyond Phase 1, plus continuing R&D, until we have a better idea how SALT is likely to turn out. As I understand it, his argument is:

"—In view of the stated Soviet interest in 'zero' ABM levels, a public U.S. commitment to a system as large as Phase 2 may make the Soviets unwilling to discuss meaningful limits on their offensive forces, because they would fear that we could use it as the base for a thick area defense which would threaten their retaliatory capacity.

"—Suspending U.S. ABM deployments, while retaining the option to resume, will:

"—be a sign of our seriousness in the negotiations which will favorably impress the Soviets, some foreign countries, and Congressional arms control advocates. It might even prompt reciprocal Soviet restraint;

"—give the Soviets an added incentive to negotiate seriously to forestall resumption;

"—avoid the possibility of a Congressional defeat, which would fatally undercut any bargaining advantage which might be secured by proceeding with deployment.

"The counterargument, which I find compelling, is:

"—In the first place, we must be prepared to live with the situation which would prevail if the talks fail to result in a constraint on Soviet offensive forces buildup. A year's delay in starting new construction apparently means two years' delay in completing sites, even if we were to start up again next year.

"—We may, even with a SALT agreement, want some ABM protection beyond what Phase I gives us:

"—In your instructions to the Helsinki delegation you stated that you are 'committed to the area defense component of Safeguard.' Whatever system may be needed to meet that commitment, it means more than the two Phase 1 sites.

"—Some protection of the deterrent, i.e., the Minuteman defense, will be needed whether or not we get an agreement.

"—In any event, additional deployments increase rather than reduce the chance of meaningful agreements. ABM is the U.S. weapons system the Soviets seem most anxious to stop. An actual on-going construction program is a far stronger bargaining counter than a sus-

pended one, especially if one takes into account the domestic political problems involved in starting up once we stop.

“—A decision to begin further deployments toward the full 12-site Phase 2 system is not irreversible, and there is no reason for the Soviets to think it is. If the prospect of a SALT agreement made it appear advisable, we would cancel all or part of the additional deployments. Indeed, if that were to happen in the next year, the financial costs of such cancellation would be modest, because the very long lead times involved mean that little is actually spent on new sites for some time after they are approved.

“There is also the consideration that Phase 1 standing alone is very vulnerable both politically and strategically:

“—The technical argument against further deployment of the Safeguard components for Minuteman defense applies equally to continuing with Phase 1, and we can expect that it would be made if we did not begin additional deployments.

“—Phase 1 was never intended to act as a separate system. The whole point of Phase 2 is that the system, including the two additional Minuteman defense sites would operate as a whole, enhancing the effectiveness of each part.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-026, NSC Meeting 1/23/70 Safeguard (ABM))

At 10:10 a.m. on January 23 the NSC met in the Cabinet Room to discuss Safeguard. The following attended: Nixon, Kissinger, Vice President Agnew, Secretary of State William Rogers, Attorney General John Mitchell, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler, Director of Central Intelligence Helms, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness George A. Lincoln, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, Under Secretary of State Richardson, and Lee DuBridge, Science Advisor to the President. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

Richardson’s handwritten notes are the only record of the meeting that have been found. After discussing the nature of the Soviet strategic threat and related technical developments, the participants turned to SALT. According to Richardson’s notes, the President declared, “SALT—that’s tough one. We must take into account men who are on the ground. My view is probably a minority one. [I] have never felt that what we did in this field had much to do with their willingness to negotiate. Editorials thought otherwise. I don’t believe [in] going ahead with area defense. I have decided we will go forward with DOD program. Whether to construct an ABM site near Washington, D.C. or in the northwestern part of the United States in FY 1971 can be decided later. I don’t want there to be any doubt that I’m committed

to area defense. In terms of negotiations, I feel we must go forward with the plan, etc.” Nixon concluded by stating, “I want to emphasize at this time, however, that I am determined to have the Government speak with a single voice on this issue. This year we not only may face a renewed fight on the Hill, but we have to be very careful that our statements here at home in defending the Safeguard program don’t interfere with our position in the negotiations with the Soviets.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 97, Memcons, January 1970)

On January 28 the NSC met to discuss Europe. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, and British Ambassador John Freeman also attended the meeting. At one point, Nixon asked Kissinger to “touch on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and, in particular the Soviet attitudes toward intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and NATO arrangements.” Kissinger replied that “the key problem is the definition of strategic weapons. We consider that IRBMs which are aimed at Europe are strategic, while tactical weapons are not. On the other hand, the Soviets take the position that weapons aimed at home countries are strategic and others are not. Under their definition, then, IRBMs are not considered strategic, and Polaris missiles are. This gives them an overwhelming advantage vis-à-vis Europe. In the next phase of SALT, the definition question will be crucial.” Secretary of State Rogers added: “One thing is clear and that is we will have plenty of time for discussion. There will be no quick decisions.” No further discussion about SALT occurred at the meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes Originals 1970)

51. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 9, 1970, 1:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT and CCD

PARTICIPANTS

USSR

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Yuly M. Vorontsov, Counselor

US

Gerard C. Smith, Director, ACDA

Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director, ACDA

SALT

Dobrynin questioned, along familiar lines, why, shortly after Helsinki, the Secretary of Defense started talking about the danger of the Soviet SS-9 buildup and the importance of going ahead even before a year was up with the second stage of ABM. The implication was that the anti-Chinese ABM rationale was just a cover for an anti-Soviet buildup. I stressed that one should look at the facts rather than the press treatment of the facts, and the Soviet SS-9 buildup was a fact that the United States had to take into consideration.

I stressed the asymmetry between the knowledge that American editors had of the US strategic program and what the Soviet editors who just visited Washington² have of their own strategic buildup. Dobrynin admitted that their editors were probably not knowledgeable about the Soviet strategic weapons buildup, except perhaps those who were members of the Central Committee.

Both Dobrynin and Vorontsov kept coming back to the ABM matter. I flatly stated that as long ago as five years, the United States had concluded that an ABM area defense system against the Soviet offensive missiles was not a practical proposition and that when the United States talked about a Chinese defense it was seriously referring to that. Dobrynin said that my answer did not jibe with what he had heard

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-98-089, Director's Files, Smith's Files, Memcons, January 1969–October 1970. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Smith on February 10. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

² Eleven Soviet editors, led by Lev Tolkunov of *Izvestia*, arrived in Washington on January 19 for a 3-week tour of the United States. The Soviet editors were reciprocating a visit made by 10 members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors to the Soviet Union in 1969. ("11 Soviet Newsmen Here for a U.S. Tour," *The New York Times*, January 20, 1970, p. 20)

from people in other parts of the Government. I pointed out that we also saw things in the Soviet press that did not seem consistent with a good negotiating atmosphere, and that “across the board” the Soviet press line was much more anti-American than is the American press anti-Soviet. I thought we ought to work on facts not on press lines.

I argued that the Soviets should not be concerned about a thin area defense oriented toward China, and that their people should not think this is provocative on the part of the United States. It was quite clear that the Soviets did not accept our Chinese rationale.

Vorontsov wondered why his Government put all of their public relations stress on ABM and did not talk about the American buildup of MIRVs. He demonstrated the truth of the proposition that Soviets know a great deal about our system from reading the newspapers, etc., by citing the “mark” numbers on both the Poseidon and Minuteman III. The subject of MIRVs was not otherwise mentioned.

I stressed the fact that the Soviets had a good knowledge of all American weapons systems at a very early stage in their development through the press and our Congressional process. Dobrynin pointed out that the recent evidence of very high cost overruns made it difficult for an outsider to assess the scope of American weapons systems, but I pointed out that I was sure their experts had good fixes on the numbers of American weapons regardless of how the cost estimates matched actual costs.

I pointed out that we saw no sign of the Soviets giving up any of their weapons programs in anticipation of a SALT agreement and we did not think that it would be rational for us to. Dobrynin seemed to say that he understood this but did not understand why our press output put such a strong anti-Soviet twist on it.

I made the point that although they seemed very displeased with Mr. Laird at the present time they might end up with a position analogous to what Semenov told me about McNamara: after having scolded McNamara for years in their press, they have come to have a very high regard for him. Dobrynin agreed that may very well be the case when history finally came to be written.

Dobrynin backed the advantages of a simple SALT agreement for a starter. After confidence had been built up, then one could think of more comprehensive arrangements. I asked him if on-site inspection was really ruled out as a matter of principle. He said “Well, for a first phase agreement, they were very strongly against on-site inspection,” but they did not rule it out for a subsequent agreement.

On the subject of a simple agreement, I pointed out the importance of not negotiating an agreement which would merely lead to a qualitative arms race with perhaps more uncertainties and suspicions than presently existed.

Dobrynin said that if we had any ideas to help the Vienna process get off to a good start he could get word to Semenov quickly and would get an early reply.

I told him that the Soviet suggestions about accident/unauthorized launch had been of interest and asked them what they had in mind. He ducked an answer to this. I asked if they had in mind communications. He agreed, plus other methods about which the Soviets would speak with more precision at Vienna.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Miscellaneous

He asked me what I thought of the Soviet Delegation. I told him we had formed a good impression of their Delegation, especially of Semenov, Ogarkov and Shchukin. He said that Kornienko was still in the hospital.

Dobrynin asked about our Vienna Delegation. I said it would be about the same as before, with Mr. Farley as my Alternate. He asked how long I would stay in Vienna, and I said it simply depended on the discussions and whether I would be needed back in Washington for a time.

We had a discussion before lunch of the importance of military and civilian sides of the house getting a better understanding of each other's problems.

There was some joking reference by the Soviets to the need for Soviet ABM against the Israelis.

52. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 18, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Dobrynin then turned to the issue of sufficiency² and said this was, of course, a very vague term on which further discussion might be useful. He wondered in what respect the ABM fitted into the sufficiency concept. He said that it was unfortunate that Helsinki was immediately followed by the ABM announcement.³ I told him that the ABM announcement came up, as he knew very well, as part of our regular budgetary cycle. It would have come up in January regardless of Helsinki, and nothing had happened in Helsinki that could affect our budgetary decisions. As he knew very well, we were engaged in a purely exploratory conversation.

Dobrynin then asked about the difference between area defense and point defense. I gave him a very crude explanation because I did not want to go into missile characteristics. With the President's authority, I gave him a brief account of what the request would be like for next year, and I told him it was a minimum request which would keep the program going but which would retain all options for SALT.

Dobrynin said that he simply did not understand how the Minuteman defense could also be useful for area defense and how, if it was useful for area defense, it could make any difference to the Soviets what our intentions were. I told him that the best thing would be if I would let one of my technical experts explain the system to him, and we arranged a meeting for some weeks ahead.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 1 [Part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The luncheon meeting took place in the Residence Library at the White House. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 135.

² On February 18, the White House released the "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s," which discussed the strategic policy of "sufficiency," as well as the role of ballistic missile defense. The full text of the report is printed in *Public Papers, Nixon, 1970*, pp. 116–190.

³ At his January 30 news conference, Nixon stated that he had decided to move forward with Phase II of further deployment of the Safeguard system. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 40–41.

Dobrynin then read a little note to me (attached)⁴ which did not, he said, represent a formal communication but some tentative instructions. The note reads as follows:

“At the time of the Helsinki meetings the American delegation emphasized that it displays business-like attitude toward discussing the problem of curbing strategic offensive and defensive armaments race. We would like to say frankly that further development raises questions on our side in this respect.

“We do not understand, in particular, what was that that guided the American side when despite agreement about the confidential nature of the talks it in fact released to the press through its various spokesmen many elements of the contents of the Helsinki negotiations. Such an approach can hardly make a favorable impact on the atmosphere of the talks in the future.

“We would also like to stress that in the light of the exchange of views in Helsinki we are puzzled by the position on issues of strategic armaments taken by certain members of the U.S. Government, in particular, by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Laird. Mr. Laird has recently come out demanding substantial speed-up in the deployment of the ABM ‘Safeguard’ system, as well as declared the intention to speed up the development of a new type of strategic bomber and underwater long-range missile system. The Pentagon also advocates development of a new ground-based intercontinental ballistic missile.

“The demands by members of the U.S. Government that the U.S. should expedite nuclear missile arms race make for some thought as to the intentions here with respect to achieving agreement on curbing strategic offensive and defensive arms race.

“It is known that earlier, when the U.S. Government was taking its decision on deployment of the ‘Safeguard’ system President Nixon connected its deployment with the course of Soviet-American talks. A question arises as to whether it should be understood that the Laird statement about speeding up the ABM deployment in the U.S. is connected with the position that the American side is going to take at the Soviet-American negotiations in Vienna?

“The Soviet Union in preparing for the Vienna talks proceeds from the assumption that statements by the American delegation at the Helsinki talks reflected the position of the Nixon Administration, and that that position has not changed during the time passed since the end of Helsinki negotiations. However, in connection with the Secretary of Defense Laird statement a question arises whether or not the American delegation is going to change its position?”

⁴ Not attached.

I told Dobrynin that the best way to proceed would be for us to schedule another conversation devoted primarily to SALT. I told him that we were serious, and that it was difficult to talk in the abstract. Dobrynin wanted to know whether we were interested in a comprehensive or a limited agreement, whether we were going to change our position in Vienna, and what approach we were going to take. I told Dobrynin that we should have a full discussion, and that we might set up two channels—one for the formal negotiations, and one between him and me to deal with general principles.

53. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 11–16–70

Washington, February 19, 1970.

SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD SALT

[Omitted here are a Note and table of contents.]

Discussion

[Omitted here are sections entitled “How the Soviets Saw Helsinki” and “Factors Bearing on Soviet Negotiating Tactics.” See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 137.]

Possible Soviet Positions At Vienna

17. It is unlikely that the Soviets will come to Vienna with a fully formulated package for negotiation. They will probably think of the next stage as requiring a further and perhaps lengthy “feeling out” period.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; Sensitive; Limited Distribution. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate, which was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all members of the USIB. This SNIE superseded SNIE 11–16–68, November 7, 1968, “The Soviet Approach to Arms Control,” which “dealt with the attitudes the Soviets might be expected to bring to talks on limiting strategic weapons (SALT). It discussed how such factors as the USSR’s economic position and its view of the strategic relationship with the US might be thought to bear on the Soviet approach to SALT.” For text of SNIE 11–16–68, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 291. On January 26 Kissinger reminded Helms that at the January 21 Verification Panel meeting they agreed that an SNIE would help prepare for the Vienna round of negotiations. Kissinger asked Helms to forward an estimate by February 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 876, SALT, Volume VII, January 1970)

Their aim at the outset will be to make a more precise assessment of what is negotiable. They would probably prefer to await a coherent set of proposals from the US side, hoping that they can then bring these closer to their own positions. And the Soviet delegation itself will be unsure as to precisely what its superiors in Moscow will accept or reject.

18. When the negotiations reach the stage of concrete formulations, the Soviets are likely to indicate a preference for a limited, quantitative agreement affecting only the principal weapon systems, as opposed to a more comprehensive and complex one. This approach would be based on a fear that a too comprehensive agreement might involve disadvantages they could not anticipate or foreclose developments by which they might eventually improve their relative position. Further, they would expect that the more complex the agreement, the more the US would be disposed to press for modes of verification unacceptable to them. In any case, they probably regard a complex agreement as too difficult to negotiate.

19. When they first come to Vienna, however, the Soviet negotiators will probably not be completely clear as to what the categories and content of even a simple, quantitative agreement ought to be. Their uncertainty will relate in particular to what scale of deployment of ABM and MIRV the US is committed to and to what extent these programs are negotiable.

20. *ABMs.* At Helsinki, the Russians showed much concern over this issue. They seemed to regard control of ABM deployment as a key to determining whether an early, limited agreement is negotiable. At Vienna, their probing in this area will undoubtedly be continued and probably intensified because of the US decision relating to Safeguard announced since Helsinki. Soviet interest in the ABM question probably rests not only on concern for the potentially destabilizing effect of any extended deployment but also on a fear that US technology could put it ahead in this field. The Soviets may be concerned as well about the cost of the effort they would feel obliged to make to compensate for any large-scale US deployment of an ABM system.

21. At Helsinki, the Soviets listed for consideration three possible levels of ABM deployment: zero, light, and heavy. Their apparent preference was for a light level of ABM defenses, but they did not rule out the zero level option, though obviously this would necessitate dismantling the Moscow system. They seemed to regard heavy ABM levels as the least acceptable. They pointed out that these would entail the "highest levels of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons," since each side would presumably wish to compensate for the defenses of the other by enhancing the capabilities of its own strategic systems in some way. They also noted, calling attention to similar US expressions of concern, that "the deployment by one side of an ABM system

to a level which might give it confidence in the sufficiency of its invulnerability to a retaliatory strike might generate a temptation to use strategic offensive weapons against the other side.”

22. It is not clear how the Soviets would define “light” ABM defenses in terms of the scale and coverage the two sides would be allowed to have. Their reference to the danger of third-country attack suggests that they might want the system to have a significant capability against such attack, but they did not make clear how widely-deployed a system they would want for this purpose. They may have in mind a system defending only the national capitals and possibly a few additional command centers.

23. It seems clear, in any case, that the Soviets will argue strongly at Vienna against arrangements which permit deployment by the US of a countrywide ABM system—even a thin one. They will register their concern that by moving into the second phase of Safeguard deployment the US could be laying the foundations for a heavy, nationwide system intended to defend its population against large-scale attack, and will argue that this would be destabilizing to mutual deterrence. They may indicate that if ABM deployment is held to a relatively low level, they might be prepared, in return, to hold deployment of their offensive systems, especially SS–9, to levels at which these would not be a serious threat to the US land-based retaliatory capability. We think that an attempt to probe US intentions concerning ABMs will be an immediate Soviet objective at Vienna, and that Moscow’s conclusions on this score will bear heavily on its positions on other issues.

24. *MIRVs*. Clearly the Soviets recognize the linkage between ABM and MIRV. Their failure officially to broach the MIRV question at Helsinki and their privately expressed interest in having the US do so may have represented no more than their customary caution in approaching critical issues. They must believe, however, that the US is ahead in MIRV development and must fear that an agreement could trap them into a situation in which the US was in a position to deploy and they were not. At present, they evidently believe that MIRV deployment, and perhaps even testing, cannot be monitored by any means of verification they could accept. On the other hand, they face the dilemma that, if MIRVs are not controlled, they could find themselves at some disadvantage, at least for a time.

25. If the Soviets do not see any way to bring MIRVs directly under an agreement, they may well argue at Vienna that the requirement for MIRVs is dependent on the level of ABM deployment and that the control of these linked systems can best be approached from the ABM side. They could argue that, if the ABM were held to a low limit and the number of ICBMs suitably limited to reduce each side’s counterforce potential, the deployment of MIRVs would add little or nothing

to each side's security; hence, there would be so little incentive to deploy them that a declaratory, i.e., uninspected, ban on MIRV deployment would suffice. In any case, it seems altogether unlikely that they would change their position on verification in order to allow inspection of MIRV deployment.

26. *Throw Weight and Accuracy.* Limitations pertaining to elements such as the throw weight and accuracy of missiles are unlikely to appeal to the Soviets. They would not want to be asked for concessions to compensate for the size of the SS-9 warhead, and, in any case, they would believe that approaches of this kind would present impossible problems of verification. They may not reject outright a US attempt to develop such approaches, but in the end they would probably find them too complex and uncertain to be negotiable at this time.

27. *Verification.* The Soviets have accepted the principle that there must be adequate means of assuring both sides of compliance, but have once again asserted that national means should suffice to monitor an arms limitation agreement. The Soviets probably are not sure that the US will be satisfied to rely on national means only. They would expect that the more complex the agreement, the more the US would be disposed to press for modes of verification unacceptable to them. It is not clear what the Soviets include in national means, or how they rate their own capabilities. It is likely, however, in view of dissimilarities in national means of verification, that measures which the US considers could be verified by national means would not appear in this light to the Soviets, and vice versa.

28. Although specific cooperative measures were not actually discussed at Helsinki, the Soviet attitude suggested that Moscow might be willing to consider some fairly simple measures that would increase the effectiveness of national means of collection (examples might be: tests only at agreed missile ranges or an agreement to prohibit the use of cover for certain weapon systems). In addition, the Soviets seem well disposed to the idea of supporting an agreement by continuous consultation which might, among other things, gradually lead to progress in developing new modes of verification.

29. *Combinations of Force Elements to be Limited.* The Soviets recognize that there are—and, for geographic and other reasons, are bound to be—asymmetries between the US strategic forces and theirs. The idea of allowing the two sides to have different combinations of forces under agreed ceilings and to vary them over time does not seem to cause them any trouble in principle. But they will obviously be very sticky when it comes to agreeing on an initial combination for the two sides, and perhaps even more so in agreeing on what construction can be completed or what improvements and replacements are permissible within an agreed total. On this subject, the Soviets

will probably not have firm proposals but will leave it to the US to take the lead.

30. *IRBM/MRBMs, SLCMs, and Air Defense Systems.* We see little chance that the Russians will alter the position that they took at Helsinki, namely that IRBM/MRBMs pose no threat to the security of the US but are an essential part of the USSR's defenses against third countries. They will continue to argue that US forward-based aircraft represent a more pertinent issue. They will probably contend that available means of detection give the US reasonable assurance against the possibility that IRBMs might be converted into ICBMs. The Russians will attempt to discover whether the US is willing to concede any of these points. If not, they may attempt to discover what US thinking is on alternatives, e.g., a trade-off which would exclude both IRBMs/MRBMs and forward-based aircraft from an initial agreement. With regard to SLCMs, the Soviets opposed their inclusion among strategic systems. We believe, however, that they would be willing to consider some trade-off here as well. We think it unlikely that they will agree to the inclusion of air defense systems, whether or not the US is willing to include its heavy bombers, and they are almost certain to continue in their refusal to discuss SAMs in an ABM context.

31. *Other Subjects.* A variety of additional issues were raised by the Russians at Helsinki. Among these were: measures to guard against accidental or unauthorized firing of nuclear weapons, or to deal with attack by a third party designed to provoke the USSR and US into conflict; prohibition on the transfer of strategic delivery vehicles and related technology to third parties; limitations on the operational spheres of nuclear-capable aircraft and submarines. The last of these has the earmarks of a mere bargaining point; although it is sure to be raised again at Vienna, the Russians are unlikely to press it, especially if prospects for progress in other areas seem reasonably good. They are likely, however, to press the subject of transfer with considerable vigor, in part because they may be concerned about the acquisition of ABM defenses by US allies. In connection with third-party attack, they may have in mind such things as additional "hot line" communications between the US and USSR, or even explicit understandings as to how to handle such a situation.

32. Whatever the course of discussions on these questions, the Soviets evidently see some value in preserving the forum which SALT provides for exchanges on a broad range of matters relating to the Soviet-American strategic relationship. They seem, moreover, to recognize that continuing talks might be useful to facilitate the execution and perhaps the eventual expansion of any SALT agreement.

33. *Concluding Observations.* Given the distances that will separate the two sides on most of the above key issues and the complexities that will need to be overcome, the Soviets have almost certainly not yet de-

cided whether, in the end, an agreement acceptable to them can be achieved. Nor is there a single view in Moscow at present as to whether Soviet long-term interests would be better served by stabilizing the strategic relationship under an agreement rather than by continuing a competitive situation. The play of group interest and personal ambition which will surround this choice is bound to be intense.

34. Clearly there is much in the traditional Soviet outlook which would generate negative attitudes toward the idea of agreed stabilization. Long-held premises about the inevitability of conflict, mistrust of American motives, fear of being duped, even ignorance of the relevant technical facts would help to sustain such attitudes. And it is true that conservative instincts seem to be dominant in the present leadership.

35. On the other hand, there are obviously a number of people, including some military men, who have the ear of the leadership and will be able to make a strong case for a serious try at stabilization by agreement. The argument for easing economic pressures is a strong one, particularly for those who want more margin to experiment with economic reform. It will be said that as the arms race enters a new technological phase Soviet chances of lagging seriously behind are high. Some will argue that at present levels of strength strategic weapons are no longer as critical to the power competition, that, in fact, if the strategic arms race can be contained by agreement, other factors, including conventional military power, could be enhanced and would better serve the security and ambitions of the USSR.

36. We see no way of forecasting how such arguments will net out. Obviously the concrete choices presented by the interaction of the two sides in negotiations will be more determining than arguments made in the abstract. We would judge, however, that at present the Soviet leaders have a consensus, perhaps a shaky one, that the option of strategic stabilization by agreement should be given a long, hard look through SALT.

54. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 24, 1970.

SUBJECT

Report on Safeguard II

General Haig received a call this morning from Mr. Jordan, Senator Baker's² Administrative Assistant, who stated that there is a general impression among the Senators who had been supporting the Safeguard Program that Gerry Smith is strongly opposed to ABM in any form. He stated that this impression was very worrisome to those members of the Senate who had been in the forefront on support for the Safeguard Program.

With your approval, I will instruct Gerry Smith to take immediate steps to come out on record in favor of Safeguard II in unequivocal fashion and in a forum which will insure that the impression described by Mr. Jordan is promptly eliminated.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 841, ABM–MIRV, ABM System, Vol. IV, Memos and Misc., February–April 30, 1970. Confidential. Sent for action.

² Senator Howard Baker (R–TN).

³ Nixon underlined most of this sentence, initialed the approval option, and wrote at the bottom of the page, "Do it—or resign." On February 28, in a transmittal note, Haig asked Kissinger when he wished to deliver the message to Smith. A notation at the bottom reads, "HAK would like to see him for 5 minutes after Verification Panel meeting tomorrow, Thursday, 3/12." No record of whether Kissinger and Smith spoke after the meeting has been found.

55. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 10, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Dr. Laurence E. Lynn

I met Dobrynin in the Military Aide's Office at the White House at 3:00 p.m. The meeting had come about because during our last conversation² Dobrynin had indicated some doubt about the relationship between the Safeguard components for area defense and the Safeguard components of point defense, and I told him that I would give him a briefing explaining the difference.

I took Larry Lynn of my staff along. We talked briefly about the problem of area defense and of point defense, the various types of missiles that were necessary for both, and why the area defense we were planning was not a threat to the Soviet Union. It was clear, however, that Dobrynin was not interested in that. He asked a few perfunctory questions which, incidentally, showed that he had studied the subject very carefully. He then said that he wanted to talk to me alone.

He made the following points:

I. *SALT*. Dobrynin said he had been asked by the Soviet Government to make three points with respect to *SALT*:

a. The Soviet Government agrees with our proposition that he and I might have an exchange of views both before and during the *SALT* talks with a view to coming to a conclusion between us on some of the principal outstanding issues.

b. The Soviet Government wanted the President to know that the Soviets were approaching the Vienna discussions very seriously and would try to find an area of agreement.

c. The Soviets were prepared to discuss either comprehensive or separate agreements. They believed that a comprehensive agreement would be better because it would lead also to a solution of other political problems. But they were prepared to make separate agreements, provided it was understood that the limited agreements would not preclude coming eventually to a comprehensive agreement.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 1 [Part 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the East Wing of the White House. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation to Nixon on March 11. For the full text, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 140.

² See Document 52.

Dobrynin said that the Soviet Government had some doubts about the seriousness with which we approached the negotiations and that it had some genuine worries whether we really meant to have a negotiation. I told him that we were extremely serious about the negotiations and that we were hoping to come to an agreement. I said that they should know the President well enough by now to realize that our approach was always concrete and detailed and that the way to find out whether we were serious would be for them to engage in serious discussions. I was sure they would not be disappointed.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

56. Memorandum From Laurence Lynn of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Radar Limit Problem

The principal outcome of today's meeting² is total disarray on the radar issue. You said something must be done to make it clear what specific provisions we would require to be confident we were getting a real constraint on Soviet ABM capability by a radar limit. However, no agreed procedure was set up for doing it.

OSD will no doubt grab the ball and run. There are two problems with letting this happen:

—Rather than doing careful analysis, they have consistently produced papers badly slanted toward their own views, so that instead of resolving disputes, they only set off a new round of differences.

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 841, ABM–MIRV, ABM System, Vol. IV, Memos and Misc., February–April 30, 1970. Top Secret. Sent for action.

² The Verification Panel met to discuss a Department of Defense paper on a SAM upgrade, a Y–1 task force paper on ABM/MIRV options, and a Y–13 task force paper on verification policy. Materials for the meeting are *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–004, Verification Panel Meeting—SALT 3/18/70. Minutes of the meeting are *ibid.*, Box H–107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72.

—Richardson, Smith, the Joint Staff, and CIA are disturbed that OSD can so easily preempt the discussion of controversial issues with poor, biased papers³ and get away with it.

The answer is to have the Working Group do a paper. The substantive material exists; it is a matter of getting a sharply focused presentation of its meaning for a possible agreement. We can get such a paper by Monday⁴ if we get agency cooperation.

Authorize Working Group to prepare paper. (Be firm that OSD must cooperate)⁵

Let OSD prepare paper

Other

³ For the Verification Panel meeting held on March 18, the OSD SALT Support Group prepared five papers: "NIE Position on SS-9 MIRV vs. MRV"; "SS-9 MRV vs. MIRV"; "Accuracy of the SS-11"; "Accuracy of the SS-9"; and "Bomber Drawdown Curve." Copies of these papers are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3.

⁴ March 23.

⁵ Kissinger initialed his approval of this option on March 20. See Document 58.

57. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 23, 1970.

Dear Mr. President:

As we approach the reopening of the SALT talks, I wish to submit for your consideration some views as to the stance the United States should take.

We have learned from some fourteen months of studying SALT problems that there are no clear cut answers to all the important issues. It seems to me that all decisions on these issues are close. There

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 876, SALT, 1/70, Vol. VII, Memos and Miscellaneous. Secret. On March 24 Kissinger sent copies of the letter to the Rogers, Laird, Mitchell, Moorer, and Helms. In a March 25 memorandum to the President, Kissinger summarized and commented on Smith's letter: "The Government is not fully agreed on what, if any, verification arrangements are 'necessary,' in the sense of adequate, for the proposal he endorses and this affects whether his condition is one that is likely to be met." (Ibid.)

are risks attached to each of the various possible courses of action, as there are risks to continuing on our present course of independent strategic arms development and deployment. Even if the approach best calculated to advance the United States interest could be clearly identified, one cannot foresee clearly what arrangement might be negotiated with the Soviet Union, or on what conditions.

In approaching the next phase of SALT, a central question is whether to try for (1) a relatively simple quantitative arrangement freezing numbers of launchers for major systems, or (2) a comprehensive arrangement including a MIRV ban and perhaps other qualitative limitations.

I think the security interests of the United States would be better served by a more comprehensive agreement if the necessary verification arrangements can be negotiated. The current strategic balance, while in process of change, rests on high levels and a variety of strategic weapons on both sides. A limited agreement would not remove a number of the concerns which we now have about the sufficiency of our strategic forces in the years to come. It might also leave unchecked a costly, risky competition in areas not covered by the agreement. Unless we make comprehensive proposals, we will fail to test fully the depth and nature of Soviet interest in agreements to constrain the strategic arms competition.

If a MIRV ban and low or zero ABM levels can be negotiated with the conditions which have been worked out in the Verification Panel, and for a short term of perhaps five years, I think that United States security would be subject to no greater risks than obtain under the present uncontrolled situation. There would be risks in such a controlled environment, but I believe that they are calculable, insurable, relatively short term, and reasonable ones to run. My suggestion is in line with the recent recommendations to you of the General Advisory Committee chaired by John McCloy.²

From an international as well as domestic political point of view, it strikes me that if a posture is adopted of not trying for controls over MIRVs or for ABM levels less than the full Safeguard program, there will be heavy psychological costs.

If SALT fails, Congressional support for strategic weapons programs in the future may depend in good part on the nature of United States SALT offers that the Soviet would not accept.

If you reach a similar conclusion as to how this nation's security interests might best be served, I believe from the negotiating point of view that it would be preferable for us to put forward proposals for comprehensive SALT arrangements at Vienna. This will help us to take control

² See footnote 3, Document 47.

of the negotiating process. We would, of course, retain the option of agreeing to simpler quantitative arrangements if that proves to be all the Soviets are interested in or all they will agree to on our conditions.

We would of course make clear at the outset that any comprehensive agreement would have to

(1) Cover Soviet systems which we want brought under control as well as excluding Soviet proposals (such as a no-transfer agreement or unacceptable restrictions on operations of our strategic forces) which are contrary to our interests;

(2) Include collateral restraints to make major limitations effective and verifiable;

(3) Provide for a short duration (e.g., five years) which reflects the experimental nature of any agreement in such a sensitive and unprecedented arms control area and limits our commitment to a period of time tolerable even in the event of unexpected technological change or unsatisfactory operation of the agreement without explicit proof of Soviet violation.

If your decision is that the risks and uncertainties leave you unwilling initially to authorize us to put forward proposals for a comprehensive agreement, an alternative would be to propose a simple quantitative agreement, coupled with explicit statement of our readiness to explore actively more comprehensive quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic arms—if the Soviets are interested and if we can reach agreement as to scope and equitable balance of commitments, verification, and other provisions such as duration.

Such a posture would still enable us to probe Soviet interests and positions without commitment on our part, and would in my judgment be accepted by the majority of Congressional and Allied opinion. If the Soviets indicated a positive attitude on such key issues as the collateral restraints we consider essential for verification of the MIRV test ban, or destruction of the major facilities associated with their Moscow ABM system, this might weigh importantly in your decision as to the risks and benefits of a broad strategic arms limitation. My concern is that, if we are not able to make specific proposals on key areas of limitation, such as MIRVs and ABMs, we may find it difficult to ascertain what conditions the Soviets might agree to.

On the question of a negotiating moratorium or some kind of temporary mutual restraint in strategic arms development and deployment, I recommend that our posture be that we recognize the possible value of such action, and would be prepared to consider it with regard to any equitable package of strategic systems on which the Soviets evidence a general interest in reaching agreements under conditions which would make them verifiable.

Respectfully,

Gerard Smith

58. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, March 23, 1970.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
SALT ISSUES AND OPTIONS

Introduction

For the past several weeks, the Verification Panel has directed a series of 15 analytical studies on the key substantive issues that must be resolved in deciding on the U.S. position for the next phase of SALT.

The results of these studies have been incorporated in the Panel's draft report on the "Evaluation of Possible Strategic Arms Control Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union,"² which has been distributed to the NSC members.

The Evaluation Report presents the issues in two ways:

—Section IV discusses and summarizes the issues *analytically*;

—Section V groups the substantive issues into the *three categories of agreements* you outlined in your recent Foreign Policy Report:³

—*limited agreements*, characterized mainly by concentration on numerical limits on major strategic systems;

—*comprehensive agreements*, providing important limits on the characteristics and capabilities of major strategic systems, as well as on their numbers;

—*agreements* going beyond numerical or qualitative limitations to embrace reductions in existing forces as well.

An unavoidable characteristic of the key issues is their extraordinary technical complexity. Unfortunately, the most complex aspects of these problems often have the most crucial bearing on whether or not a particular limitation would be consistent with the maintenance of our security. Therefore, the Panel has made every attempt to master them.

For the past two weeks, the Verification Panel has held a series of meetings⁴ to see, first, if we could develop an approach to the issues

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-027, NSC Meeting 3/25/70 SALT. Top Secret. Kissinger included the paper as part of the President's briefing materials for the NSC meeting scheduled for March 25.

² A copy of this paper, March 21, is *ibid.*, RG 59, Policy Planning Council Miscellaneous Records, 1969–72, SALT March 1970.

³ President Nixon submitted his first annual report on foreign policy to Congress on February 18. See footnote 2, Document 52.

⁴ The Verification Panel met on March 5, 12, 18, and 20. Minutes of these meetings are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72.

that would illuminate the basic decisions you must make without bringing in all the esoteric details that have held our attention, and, second, if we could reach some agreements on basic issues that would further ease the task of developing our position.

The Panel generally agreed that the best way to approach the question of which option or options we want to use as basis for our position at Vienna is, first, to review the basic substantive policy issues and, second, to see how decisions on these issues relate to the choice of an approach and to the various possible options within each approach.

ABMs and MIRVs

The Panel agreed that the best way to simplify the problem is to begin with the ABM issue.

The critical ABM question is, do we want to deploy a nationwide area defense of the magnitude planned in the Safeguard program no matter how such a decision affects the type of agreement we may be able to reach with the Soviet Union? The Safeguard area defense calls for 19 radars deployed nationwide and 633 interceptor missiles.⁵

This is the critical question because the Verification Panel is in full agreement on three major issues:

—*Maintaining the Safeguard area defense rules out a MIRV ban;*
 —*From the point of view of reaching a verifiable arms control agreement, the only practical alternative to maintaining a Safeguard level area defense is to ban ABMs altogether or, at the outside, to defend the National Command Authorities in Washington with a small deployment.*

In particular, the Panel agreed that it would be practically impossible to define an agreement which would allow both sides to deploy an intermediate level ABM defense of their land-based missiles *but no area defense*.⁶

The reason is that the Soviets have not developed a small ABM missile like our Sprint. If we allowed them to use their much larger ABM missiles for defending their ICBMs, (assuming they would have any

⁵ The 19 radars include 7 Perimeter Acquisition Radars [PARs] and 12 Missile Site Radars [MSRs]—including the ones authorized for deployment at Grand Forks and Malmstrom and the MSR at Whiteman; the 633 interceptors include 465 long-range Spartans for area defense and 168 short range Sprints for radar defense. (An additional 246 Sprints are required for Minuteman and defense of the National Command Authorities in the Washington, D.C. area.) [Footnote and brackets are in the original.]

⁶ However, we may well want to add Safeguard Minuteman defense to the area defense, giving a total of about 900 launchers, if we freeze SS-9s at near their present levels. Adding Minuteman defense to area defense might then be an efficient way to preserve Minuteman until the advanced sea-based missile system, ULMS, is available in the early 1980's and we can, in effect, move Minuteman to sea. [Footnote is in the original.]

interest in such a proposition) we would be conceding to them a significant area defense capability that we would not have for two reasons:

—many of their ICBMs are deployed near large cities, whereas ours are not, so missile defense is also population defense in the Soviet Union;

—they already have a radar network adequate for area defense; we do not and would not if we limited ourselves to Minuteman defense.

If we insisted that only small missiles were allowed for the purpose of defending ICBMs, we would in effect be denying the Soviets any ABM for the time it would take them to develop a Sprint-type missile, probably several years.

—An area defense system thinner than Safeguard would not give us enough capability to justify it.

Though these three conclusions seem harsh, the Panel reached them only after the most thorough assessment of the technical issues associated with defining ABM limits that would be verifiable without highly intrusive on-site inspection.

The problem with controlling ABMs is that, unlike a limit on offensive missiles, a limit on ABMs has two components:

- a limit on the number of ABM-capable missiles, and
- a limit on the number of ABM-capable radars.

A control on the number of ABM launchers would be ineffective if each side is allowed to have a nationwide network of large ABM-capable radars which could support a much larger number of ABM launchers than the agreement permits. The existence of this radar network would pose two risks to our retaliatory capability:

—The Soviets might build and stockpile ABM missiles that could be deployed rapidly following abrogation of an agreement using the already existing radar network;

—Again using the existing radar network, the Soviets might upgrade their extensive air defense missile systems—mainly the SA-5 or Tallinn system, which is projected to have about 2000 launchers and about 8000 missiles, more than half within range of populated areas—to give them an ABM capability which, though limited, might still jeopardize our second strike capability. This latter problem, which we refer to as the SAM upgrade problem, is one of the most complex and difficult we face.

In effort to resolve these problems, the Verification Panel grappled with two questions:

—Is the present Soviet radar network, let alone a larger one, capable of supporting a clandestine ABM build-up or extensive upgrading of SAMs or could it be made so without our knowing it?

There are disagreements about this issue:

—Some argue that the present Soviet radar network is not capable of supporting an extensive ABM or upgraded SAM system, and, further, that many of these radars are relatively undefended and thus highly vulnerable to attack.

—Others argue that, if it is not now, it could be made so without our knowing it and, furthermore, that 5–10 new advanced (phased array) radars could be deployed without our detecting it.

—The second question is, can we find ways of limiting the Soviet radar network so that their ABM capability is effectively limited to levels that would not pose unacceptable risks to us.

—*The JCS say the answer is no.* Because the Soviet radars are so numerous and can serve so many different purposes, the JCS argue that it is impractical to try and define effective and verifiable constraints on ABM-capable radars.

—Others believe that a fairly comprehensive package of limits on radars, SAMs, and ABMs could provide a verifiable constraint on ABM capability. However, as I read their argument, a simple numerical limit on radars is by no means enough, even to those who believe we can control ABM capability.

Thus, if one takes the view that the present Soviet radar network could support SAM upgrade and that practical and effective limits on ABM radar capability are difficult if not impossible to achieve, then an ABM level that allows the maintenance or increase of Soviet radar capability, which is true even of intermediate ABM levels, poses the two risks I mentioned earlier: a clandestine ABM build-up or SAM upgrade.

MIRVs are the best hedge against this possibility. They give us the highest confidence that we can penetrate future defenses and strike Soviet targets even if the Soviets violate an agreement to limit ABM defenses. That is why the Panel believes that MIRVs are required if Safeguard level ABM launchers and radars are allowed on both sides.

[There are other ways to penetrate defenses. However, last year the MIRV Panel agreed that the testing of many of them would also have to be banned if we were to be able to verify that MIRVs were not being tested, and the DOD representatives on that Panel believed that tests of virtually all of the alternative ways to penetrate defenses would have to be banned along with MIRV tests.]⁷

In deciding whether or not the Safeguard area defense should be non-negotiable, you should be aware that there are some sharp disagreements concerning both the technical capability and the political/diplomatic usefulness of the system against the Chinese threat.

The Safeguard system's design goal is to deny damage from a threat of 10–25 Chinese ICBMs, even if they have first generation

⁷ All brackets are in the original. See footnote 2, Document 27.

penetration aids. If the Chinese threat continues to grow, the system's goal is to reduce damage to 20% or less of that expected with no defense. Proponents argue that the system will work as planned. (The estimated performance of Safeguard Phase 2 area defense as now defined is to limit losses from the postulated 1980 Chinese threat to 1–3 million fatalities, compared to 30–40 million without Safeguard. There is, however, some chance it would prevent any losses.)

Others argue, however, that only a single three-megaton Chinese weapon leaking through and hitting one of the 6 largest U.S. cities would cause one million instant deaths and negate the damage denial capabilities the system must have for it to be credible. The Chinese will be able to insure this with simple penetration aids and by concentrating their fire on a single site and exhausting it.

As far as the diplomatic value is concerned, the question is whether a light area ABM defense of U.S. cities would permit the U.S. to take actions against a nuclear armed China which we would deem too risky in the absence of such a defense.

Proponents believe that even a small Chinese nuclear threat against unprotected U.S. cities could make a major difference in the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy in Asia. A Chinese ability to hold U.S. cities hostage against U.S. intervention on the behalf of U.S. and allied interests in Asia, leaving the President with the single option of a nuclear attack on China if he is to blunt the Chinese nuclear threat, could increase Chinese influence or adventurism in Asia, promoting instability or nuclear proliferation.

Others argue that our overwhelming nuclear superiority over China is an adequate deterrent to Chinese nuclear adventurism. For ABM defense to strengthen this deterrent, it would have to be perfect. But it won't be both on technical ground and because the Chinese can threaten Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. forces overseas or Asian cities instead.

Further, our NATO allies could interpret claims that the U.S. needs an anti-China ABM to make its deterrent umbrella effective in Asia as raising questions about whether U.S. deterrence alone is sufficient in Europe against the far greater Soviet threat, for which we have no ABM protection.

If we want to give up area defense and the strategic capabilities it provides, it is presumably because we want to keep open the possibility of:

—a MIRV ban aimed at reducing the SS-9 threat to Minuteman and, secondarily, at reducing the threat MIRVed SLBMs would pose to bombers and other time urgent targets in the U.S.;

—a ban or very low limit on Soviet ABMs, including radars, which would make it very difficult for them to build the ABM capability they would need to backstop a first strike offensive force.

Many of our technical people believe that an ABM ban would require *destruction of existing large radars in the Moscow area*, and, at the same time, that we should seek measures to increase our confidence that other large radars elsewhere in the Soviet Union (Hen Houses) could not be used to violate an ABM prohibition. Without such destruction and collateral constraints, we cannot be certain that Soviet SAM systems could not be given ABM capability using the existing radar network. [The measures suggested include prohibiting the defense of the Hen Houses with SAMs and devising a limitation formula based on the number, geographical orientation and technical characteristics of the Hen Houses. I do not believe ACDA would concur that all these measures are required.]

The Verification Panel addressed the question, *if you ban ABMs, can you safely ban the testing of MIRVs?*

In general, the answer was that if the ABM ban is accompanied by measures which reduce the Soviet radar network to the point where the risks of a clandestine ABM build-up or upgrading of air defense missiles to give them an ABM capability are minimal, *a MIRV test ban is feasible*.⁸

However, many Panel members, and I believe the JCS in particular, believe that even if we consider an ABM ban, we might want to permit MIRVs. [Paul Nitze believes this strongly. He thinks this might be Laird's view.]

—Unless we can achieve reductions, the Soviets will soon have at a minimum 1,400 land-based ICBMs, in addition to their submarine-based missiles. If they are made accurate in the next few years, they

⁸ You may want to point out the verification problems associated with a MIRV test ban. Both sides can now deploy their multiple warhead systems for retaliation against cities. However, we cannot verify the actual *deployment* of MIRVs, only their testing, without on-site inspection.

Thus, a MIRV test ban may have an asymmetrical effect: Congress wouldn't let us deploy our MIRVs in clear violation of the intent of an agreement, but we couldn't be sure the Soviets had not gone ahead and deployed their SS-9 triplet.

Also, we will have about 8 Polaris submarines being converted to the Poseidon/MIRV configuration; it would take two years or so to develop a single warhead for these Poseidon missiles. Thus a MIRV ban would leave up to 20% of our submarine force out of commission for a sustained period.

If we attempted to get Congressional authorization to stockpile our already developed MIRVs but not actually deploy them, as a hedge against Soviet violations of an agreement, the Soviets might well take the opportunity to accuse us of bad faith before the agreement had a chance to work; in fact such a move on our part, because it would become public knowledge, might lead to some of the clandestine Soviet activities we fear.

The issue is, if the Soviets deployed their SS-9 triplet, could they make enough improvements clandestinely so that, with a few quick tests following abrogation they would have a reliable anti-Minuteman system? We can make this possibility less worrisome by having the agreement permit the replacement of land-based missiles with sea-based missiles, "a point I will return to in a minute." [Footnote is in the original.]

could destroy our Minuteman force even without MIRVs. Thus, we want to preserve the capability to MIRV our submarines.

—Even now, the JCS believe we do not have enough nuclear warheads to cover all of the important strategic and other military targets in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet target system is growing. Therefore, MIRVs may be required for improved target coverage.

—We might not get the Soviets to destroy existing ABM radars such as the Dog Houses, though they might agree not to build more. Thus, we may want MIRVs as a hedge against Soviet use of their existing radar network to violate an ABM prohibition. [If the Soviets won't destroy existing radars, we might insist on Spartan protection of NCA and allow the Soviets the Moscow system.]

To summarize our conclusions concerning ABMs and MIRVs, we have three practical alternatives:

—Safeguard level area defense with MIRVs permitted;

—a ban on ABMs with MIRVs banned;

—a ban on ABMs (or possibly an agreement that the Soviets can retain the Moscow system and we would defend the NCA) with MIRVs permitted.

Force Survivability

The Verification Panel agrees that, regardless of the decision on ABMs and MIRVs, *we should seek to put a ceiling on the total number of offensive missile launchers and that, within the total, it is desirable to allow freedom to convert ICBMs to SLBMs.* The JCS (mainly out of deference to the Air Force) would also like to allow a shift from SLBMs back to ICBMs. The objection to this is that it would permit the Soviets to build new ICBM silos into which they could put SS-9s or even larger missiles, a possibility that would be to our net disadvantage.

The Verification Panel also agreed that, in connection with controls on ICBM numbers, we should seek a ban on land mobile ICBMs (The Soviets have active mobility programs; we do not.), a ban on the relocation of existing ICBMs and on changing the external configuration of existing silos, a ban on the construction of new silos for intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles (IR/MRBMs),⁹ and a ban on mobile IR/MRBMs with a range greater than 1,000 kilometers.

We believe that these measures could be verified with national means. However, there would still be uncertainties. For example, all agree that at least 100–150 land mobile missiles, about 100 fixed land based missiles, and 5–10 ballistic missile submarines (say 80–160 mis-

⁹ Many believe we should seek to limit the soft IR/MRBMs, but we should not get into concrete on this. If the Soviets insist on talking about NATO nuclear forces, we may want to drop discussion of soft IR/MRBMs as a quid pro quo for their dropping NATO forces. Our Allies wouldn't be disturbed if this occurred. [Footnote is in the original.]

siles) could be deployed without our knowledge. OSD and the JCS believe that if the Soviets practiced maximum concealment and deception, these numbers might be larger. Some 70 older SS-7 missiles could be replaced with SS-9s without our detecting it.

On the other hand, there is a possibility that we could detect their activities accurately, and this possibility might be enough to deter the Soviets from extensive cheating of the kind just described.

The Panel reached no conclusions concerning the desirability of seeking to control missile accuracy and missile payload. Such qualitative controls are a practical possibility mainly if we seek a MIRV ban. They are relatively hard to verify, and the Soviets showed little interest in such provisions at Helsinki because of the verification problems.

However, such provisions in conjunction with a MIRV ban would, if verifiable, greatly enhance the long-term survivability of our Minuteman force.

Force Reductions

The Panel's Report discusses two basic forms which reductions could assume:

—modest, largely symbolic, first step reductions of limited numbers of existing systems on a comparable basis by the two sides;

—ambitious reduction programs, with rather large reductions in some systems, possibly coupled with allowed increases in others, aimed at establishing a new and more stable strategic balance at a somewhat lower level in which the fixed, vulnerable land based ICBM force would be eliminated or greatly de-emphasized on both sides.

The Verification Panel reached no conclusions concerning the desirability of proposing force reductions. I think it is fair to say that:

—Some (mainly Paul Nitze) believe that reductions are the most dramatic, yet serious, proposal we could make other than proposing a MIRV ban and that reducing offensive missile potential on both sides would be advantageous for the United States because otherwise the Soviets will build up an enormous advantage over us in offensive missile payload.

Particularly if we choose not to propose a MIRV ban, proponents of reductions believe we should propose force reductions to convince the large number of Senators who believe a MIRV ban is the test of whether the Administration is serious about arms control¹⁰ that, though a MIRV ban is not in our interest, we are serious nonetheless.

—Others doubt that reductions are a negotiable proposition, at least in the initial stages of the discussions. They also point out that

¹⁰ See Document 18.

the strategic importance of reductions appears to be much less if the agreement leaves the U.S. free to shift its land based missiles to sea, a provision all agree should be included in any agreement.

I believe that the reductions issue should continue to be taken seriously even if it has no bureaucratic sponsors.

Other Issues

There are a large number of issues that will have to be resolved before the delegation goes to Vienna. The two most important of these are our position on limiting strategic bombers and our position on seeking limits on total Soviet intermediate range and medium range ballistic missiles.

The other issues essentially involve a choice of negotiating tactics rather than policy.

These issues can be discussed at a later time.

Options

We are now in a position to show how decisions on the basic policy issues relate to the choice of an option.

—If you choose to maintain Safeguard level ABMs and MIRVs, you rule out a comprehensive option covering both numerical and qualitative controls. Your choice is then between one of the limited options and an option calling for force reductions.

—If you are willing to seek a ban on ABMs, you could still choose a limited option, that is, an option which permits MIRVs, but you could also consider a comprehensive option involving a MIRV ban and perhaps other qualitative controls, as well as an option involving force reductions.

The Evaluation Report provides an illustrative option of each type and lists the variants and alternatives available within each type.

For example, the illustrative limited option includes the following major provisions:

—a ceiling on the total number of ICBM and SLBM launchers operational as of the date of the proposal, with later substitution of SLBMs for ICBMs;

—a ban on land mobile ICBMs and IR/MRBMs and launchers;

—a ceiling both on the total IR/MRBM force and on IR/MRBM silos;

—ABM missiles, launchers, and radars would be limited to agreed numbers, and some provisions relating to the upgrading of surface-to-air missile systems would also be included.

The illustrative comprehensive option includes all the provisions of the limited options and, in addition,

—a ban on the deployment and flight testing of MIRVs/MRVs, of new types of missiles, and of missiles with improved accuracy or throw weight;

—Flight tests of strategic offensive and ABM missiles would be limited to preannounced confidence firings of operational types of missiles on agreed ranges.

—Flight testing of MIRVs, MRVs, MRV dispensing mechanisms (such as that for the SS-9), maneuvering RVs, post-boost maneuvering, endoatmospheric penetration aids, and fractional orbit bombardment systems would be prohibited. OSD and JCS, but not State/CIA/ACDA, would add to this list flight tests of exoatmospheric penetration aids and the testing of multiple payloads in space flights.

A reductions option could be based on either of the two options just discussed.

For example, the combined offensive launcher ceiling could be set at 1,500 or 1,600 rather than the 1,700 that would otherwise be called for thus requiring each side to eliminate some of its operational launchers, presumably the older ones.

A more ambitious proposal would involve an agreement to reduce the number of offensive launchers by 100 per year until a total of 1,000 ICBMs and SLBMs is reached.

59. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, March 25, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Vice President Agnew
Secretary of State Rogers
Secretary of Defense Laird
Attorney General Mitchell
General Earle Wheeler, Chairman, JCS
Under Secretary of State Richardson
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Packard
Gerard Smith
Henry A. Kissinger
William Watts
Paul Nitze
CIA Director Helms

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room from 10:35 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

RN—This is the first of two discussions I want. Today should be general—then we can have another one prior to the departure of the delegation on the 15th of April.

I note that there is an honest and substantial difference of opinion on how to proceed. My own view is not fixed. I want to see what is possible within the range of national security interests. Whether or not agreement is reached remains to be seen. Everybody here wants agreement—let's get that out.

It is to the credit of the Department of Defense that it has been so forthcoming and flexible. It may look at times as if it is bent more toward security.

In both ACDA and State the views are more from a negotiating standpoint, which may seem less sensitive to the security considerations.

I want a solid basis for a negotiating position which has a chance to proceed in relation to national security interests. I want everybody today to feel free to express their views.

—The President then called on Mr. Kissinger, who set forth the basic considerations as contained in the talking points and analytical summary in the attached NSC book.²

RN—This was a superb job of pulling everything together. Please tell your staff what a fine job they did.

Kissinger—There are two ways of going at this subject—either options or issues.

RN—Are we talking about a “comprehensive” agreement?

Kissinger—This means not only number but qualitative controls. A comprehensive agreement goes beyond a limited one. Then there is a 3rd approach which involves reductions as well. Paul Nitze is strong on this.

RN—If we get too tied down on charts, and if the other side gets tied down as well, then the Nitze proposal can break some ground.

Kissinger—The major issue is ABM/MIRV. If Soviet missiles can be hooked into the system, then we need MIRV.

RN—Is a launcher easier to make, and more quickly deployed, than radar?

Packard—You can add missiles more rapidly than radar.

Kissinger—Also it depends on whether you keep the production lines going.

² The briefing book is attached but not printed. The analytical summary is Document 58. Talking points for Laird and Wheeler not included in the NSC book are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, USSR, 388.3.

Wheeler—It is easier to detect launchers. We know the Moscow system has a reload capability which we don't have—two missiles per system.

Kissinger—If we can limit the number of radars, this is the most foolproof ABM restriction.

RN—Is radar for the ABM the same as for other uses?

Kissinger—There is disagreement on this. But radar needed for ABM can be distinguished.

RN—Then it is different.

Kissinger—The Joint Chiefs say they have so many that they don't need it specially for ABM. Others say they don't need that kind for anything except ABM.

RN—But are they really different?

Packard—It takes the same radar for space tracking. We can tell the use [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. They will need those for space tracking.

RN—Then they are multi-purposed?

Packard—Yes.

Kissinger—If space coverage was all that was needed, then we could limit them. They can upgrade other radars, which also complicates the issue.

Helms—Where they are building against the Chinese, they are looking down the Polaris routes as well as the Chinese. They are increasing their construction. We estimate it will take two years for area coverage.

Smith—They must put in interceptors as well as radars.

HAK—Without missiles, it is not a full ABM system; but missiles go in faster, and there is also the possibility of SAM upgrade.

RN—We must take into account their fear of the Chinese.

Packard—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] It is bigger and more sophisticated.

RN—Then how are we on radars?

Laird—Better.

Packard—Ours is more sophisticated and better, but our program has been delayed. We can't have it fully until 1976–1978.

Laird—They have some capability, and we don't, concerning [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. They are moving more rapidly than we had thought.

Richardson—Concerning their capability [*less than 1 line not declassified*] there is a tie between the [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Taking into account the SAM upgrade problem over the next five years, do they have a system which is much more capable.

Packard—They need a 3-step system. We use a two-step. Their technology will move ahead, as they can presumably move toward a 2-step capability.

Kissinger—There doesn't seem to be a good intermediate level between zero level and national area defense.

If there are to be ABM limitations, then there must be large radar limitations as well to cover the SAM upgrade problem.

Wheeler—There are basic uncertainties in the radar field. One in the [*1½ lines not declassified*]. We have found the SA-5 radar deployed close to the Galosh missiles.

Laird—It isn't realistic to assume the Soviets will tear down their radars.

RN—Their radars have enormously more powerful capability.

Laird—They have ABM capability.

Packard—We don't have a comparable set-up.

Kissinger—If they don't destroy radars, they can go more easily to ABM. Thus, some radar limitation is needed.

If we agree to its ban, we agree to a deployment ban as well. We could never get money from Congress to deploy. The Soviets could cheat on this to achieve counterforce capability.

A deployment ban requires on-site inspection.

Rogers—At one point, didn't they agree to on-site inspection?

Smith—On the test ban treaty they offered 3 (per year) while we said 7.

Rogers—But can't we say that we can agree on on-site inspection?

Mitchell—Maybe we have abandoned too soon the on-site inspection thought.

RN—The problem is the Soviet obsession with secrecy. They should be interested in limitation too. Maybe we can make the honest point that we can do much more with on-site inspection.

Nitze—I doubt it. It is worth trying, but I doubt.

Rogers—Why won't they accept on-site inspection?

Nitze—This is what we said at Helsinki.

Laird—Do we want a MIRV ban even if we get on-site inspection? Maybe we would not want it then.

RN—We should hit hard at the on-site inspection idea, and push to open up their society.

Mitchell—There was a problem earlier wasn't there, concerning opposition between the Pentagon and military?

Laird—We don't want to tie ourselves to a MIRV ban.

Smith—I spoke to Dobrynin. He said he didn't rule out on-site in a comprehensive agreement, although it was out at the outset of any discussions.³

Packard—We were concerned about the SS-9 triplet. We still don't know whether they are MIRV'd or not. There are now over 1500 on their side. The accuracy of SS-11 is uncertain.

We are worried that they can hit our Minuteman without much new construction. They have 25 submarines and are building 8 more per year. They will have 40 operational by 1974. With these deployed, there will be a serious threat to our cities and airfields. Then our land-based force would be in jeopardy and the bombers would be in jeopardy. We must then rely increasingly on the Polaris. We have 20 Polaris subs on station with 16 missiles per sub. This means 320 warheads. If we assume 80% reliability, then we have 256 which are reliable. If they have ABM then that would be bad news for us.

We continue to need a MIRV since no President wants to face the limited choice without MIRV. We propose to put 10 warheads per missile, but with no more destruction capability. MIRV increases the destruction insurance, but not the amount.

Kissinger—When you convert you lose about 20% of the destruction capability.

Agnew—Then MIRV is a distribution device. There is no increase in the destruction factor. Isn't the factor with throw weight?

Packard—We want to get our reliance on land-based missiles down.

RN—Is Defense then suggesting “no” on MIRV?

Laird—Yes, “no” on MIRV.

RN—What about MIRV/ABM tied?

Laird—That is a different question.

RN—Can we buy a MIRV/ABM ban?

Packard—If we get a reduction in SS-9 or in total missiles, then MIRV is possible.

RN—We must look at the whole picture.

Smith—The Soviets must look at our MIRV system as something that permits the Americans to upgrade, make more accurate, and give a first strike capability.

Therefore, if we go to MIRV the Soviets will go to a new round. Also, if we ask them to do this and that, and yet we go to MIRV, then they would say this whole presentation is not interesting.

³ See Document 51.

Wheeler—Concerning MIRV, it is important to remember it is not just a destruction capability. MIRV provides flexibility for strategic targeting. An improved MIRV gives a counterforce, not a first-strike capability. In this sense I disagree with Jerry Smith. There are over 500 Soviet silos which are not targeted.

Nitze—Just reduction doesn't protect without MIRV capability.

Helms—We may know soon what the [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

RN—But the Soviets have outdone every intelligence estimate. This discussion has been extremely useful to me. We must know what is negotiable. I wish to set up another two hours again before we go. We must not talk loosely.

Richardson—I would like to make a few comments which, I hope, will clarify the issue.

Point I—Target Coverage.

The more limited the coverage, the more our strategy relies on fixed capability. Therefore, if we start with the premise that security needs full targeting, then there can be no MIRV ban or limitation. Only an assured destruction capability is adequate.

Point II—Numbers.

Sub-launched and bomber-launched might cancel out land-based missiles. If you have more land-based missiles, there could be a residual capacity.

Point III—Verification.

If we don't know whether they are MIRVing, then can we rely on what we know of their testing? State, CIA and ACDA seem to think we can.

To the extent that we don't feel adequate confidence, then we must rely on on-site inspection.

If Point I is fixed, then we can't even go to Point II or III.

Kissinger—That is a fair summary. I would like to add one point. If they have a substantial residual capacity, then they only need to improve some missiles and use others for bargaining.

Richardson—If they can thicken easily, then MIRV is needed.

Packard—Perhaps we can work out a one for one trade off. One Minuteman III for one SS-9.

Rogers—We need to get across the story on MIRVs.

RN—MIRV capability would be only for defensive purposes.

Laird—I am going through the Senate member by member.

Smith—To the extent to which we explain MIRVs, this way makes it harder to get a control on MIRV.

RN—In whose interest is it to get MIRV control?

Smith—It is more in our interest than in theirs. With their large missiles and throw weight, they are automatically way ahead.

Packard—In the short haul we need it. In the long haul it is disturbing.

RN—I want to hear Paul Nitze's argument.

Nitze—Last fall you approved several criteria for sufficiency⁴—second-strike capability; no temptations to strike first; no great disparity in damage capability.

RN—The United States is the first nation in the world in strength. In terms of diplomacy, I would not like to see the President of the United States in a situation with a significant Soviet advantage. I don't want them 2-1 over us, they with ABM and we not, etc., etc. We can't let the world know we are #2.

Nitze—To get assurance of destruction we need MIRV. They will go to MIRV. Then Minuteman and bombers would be vulnerable. Then the second criteria loosens. We would have to move to sea. When could this be done? By 1978. There would be an imbalance, and their numbers and megatonnage could come to a ratio of 10 or 20 to one.⁵

Kissinger—That is, if megatonnage is translatable at every stage.

Nitze—Politically, this would be difficult regardless of megatonnage.

Agnew—This brings us back to the throw weight problem again.

RN—Is there any real talk about reduction.

Kissinger—No.

Nitze—From our standpoint, only reduction can meet all three of your criteria. I am not at all sure it is negotiable. There is certainly no panacea.

RN—Reduction ought to happen. It is the right position. In diplomacy, it is a game of chicken.

I may want to suggest that we meet again on Friday.⁶

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 24.

⁵ On April 1 Farley sent Smith a table and note summarizing the NSC meeting that stated: "I understood Paul Nitze, when he talked about a 10 or 20 to 1 Soviet megatonnage advantage, to be talking about the worst case of a successful Soviet first-strike against our land-based missiles and bombers. In that case, he assumed about 250 non-MIRV'ed Polaris warheads or about 250 MT (or 150 MT for the A-3 version). This obviously gets pretty low compared to the Soviet residual megatonnage after whatever number of ICBMs and SLBMs they used for the first-strike have been deducted." (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-98-0089, Director's Files, Smith's Files, Trends in US Strategic Offensive Forces, 1961-1977: Missile Accuracy)

⁶ March 27. The meeting was held on April 8; see Document 65.

60. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State
(Richardson) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Desirability/Feasibility of MIRV Ban

After the NSC meeting this morning you asked me to give you in writing the points I made orally at the meeting on the elements which would influence our position on the desirability and feasibility of a MIRV ban.²

1. *Targeting*—If substantial counterforce capability in addition to assured destruction capability is an essential element of U.S. strategy, it follows that we have to (a) go ahead with MIRV deployment *and* (b) improve MIRV accuracy.

2. *Numbers*—Even if we do not seek substantial counterforce capability, we would still need MIRVs *unless* the Soviets agree to a limit on the aggregate number of SS–9s and SS–11s. The size of this number would have to depend upon whether and when the SS–11 will be accurate enough to knock out hard targets. The maximum limit we could tolerate is a number of Soviet hard-target warheads equal to the number of our Minuteman sites. If this number is not exceeded, the Soviets are unlikely to target all their land-based warheads against our Minuteman sites; if they do—and crediting them with 100 percent reliability—we would still have left the assured destruction capability of our SLBMs and bombers.

3. *ABMs*—Notwithstanding numerical limits on ICBM launchers, a MIRV ban is feasible only at low ABM levels. Safeguard and its Soviet counterpart would require so many associated radars as to be easily subject to thickening either by (a) adding ABM launchers or (b) tying SAMs into the radar system. State, CIA and ACDA believe that a limitation on the number of large radars could provide reasonable confidence in the observance of an ABM limit for the next five years at least. JCS doubt this.

4. *Verification*—Even assuming that we do not seek substantial counterforce capability, that we can agree on a satisfactory limit on the number of ICBM launchers, and that we can also agree on a low ABM

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret. On March 25 copies were sent to Laird, Packard, and Wheeler. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Laird saw it on March 27.

² See Document 59.

limit, we still cannot accept a MIRV ban unless we can also have confidence that it can be verified. Such confidence (aside, of course, from on-site inspection) depends on our ability to monitor a ban on MIRV testing by reliance on national means alone. State, CIA and ACDA believe that we would be justified in such reliance. JCS do not believe so.

ELR

61. National Security Decision Memorandum 49¹

Washington, March 27, 1970.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Preparation of Detailed SALT Options

As a result of the National Security Council meeting on March 25, 1970,² the President has directed that the Verification Panel prepare four options for his final review and decision concerning the U.S. position in Vienna. The options are:

- “limited”: Safeguard-level ABM with MIRVs permitted;
- “comprehensive I”: ABM at zero or NCA level with MIRVs permitted;
- “comprehensive II”: ABM at zero or NCA level with MIRVs banned;
- “reductions”: substantial phased reductions on each side; MIRVs permitted.

The President’s guidance for these options is as follows:

—The outline of the provisions which would be included under each option should be sufficiently precise and detailed to serve as the basis for a concrete U.S. proposal. Special attention should be given to verification provisions and requirements.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs, Nos. 1–50. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation. Initialed by Haig.

² See Document 59.

—The terms of the options should embody the conclusions of the Verification Panel in its review of issues prior to the NSC meeting of March 25, 1970. In addition, in preparing and reviewing each option, the Verification Panel will resolve outstanding issues about what terms should be included under that option, especially with respect to verification. However, if necessary, major disagreements will be referred to the President for decision.

The options should be submitted to the President by April 8, 1970.

The President has further directed that the Under Secretaries Committee should prepare a presentation for the next round of NATO consultations and submit it for his review by April 3, 1970.

The President has directed that detailed instructions to the Verification Panel and the Under Secretaries Committee be provided by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Henry A. Kissinger

62. Editorial Note

On April 6, 1970, the Verification Panel met to prepare strategic arms limitation talks options for consideration by the National Security Council at its April 8 meeting, as directed by NSDM 49 pursuant to the March 25 NSC meeting (see Documents 60 and 61). President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger began the Verification Panel meeting by stating that the Panel could not burden President Nixon with a host of technical issues in selecting a SALT option for the second round of talks opening in Vienna on April 16. Kissinger insisted that the "agencies must get some of these resolved without President having to decide them." The Panel members therefore focused on the numerous technical questions impinging on various negotiating options: the relationship of surface to air missile upgrades to anti-ballistic missiles; radar limitations as they affected ABM parameters; the implications of a flight test ban on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; the viability of mobile versus fixed ABM numerical limits; and on-site inspection capabilities for determining intercontinental ballistic missile throw weight and accuracy. During a debate over verification of qualitative limits on ICBMs, Kissinger reminded the Panel participants of the underlying problem of most of their technical debates:

"HAK: One problem is to pick out what is critical for President to *decide* from among this long list.

“[Gerard] Smith: I think it is a vital point whether we try to control weapons technology or not.

“HAK: But the fact it would be nice to control doesn’t mean you can control. And you would be more selective, or seek ways around the difficulty of controlling technology, e.g., numerical limits, reductions.

“Smith: But the issue of the OSD/JCS premise that you can’t and shouldn’t control technology is one of Presidential magnitude.

“[David] Packard: Why should we negotiate away our technological lead?

“HAK: Soviets would work on technology. Anyway, we don’t want to debate general abstract slogans, so President has to resolve theological disputes. The issue isn’t whether technology ‘has to’ be controlled or ‘can’t be,’ but what we can do concretely.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72)

In talking points prepared for the President for use at the April 8 NSC meeting, Kissinger summarized the four SALT options that the Verification Panel developed. Because members of the Panel continued to differ over major technical issues concerning the options’ provisions, Kissinger explained that the Panel was not recommending which option the President should choose. Instead, Kissinger wrote: “*The major purpose of the NSC meeting is to provide you with a basis for selecting one or more options as the ones to explore further with the USSR.*” Kissinger recommended that the President issue his decision through a National Security Decision Memorandum a day or two after the NSC meeting. (Ibid., Box H-027, NSC Meeting 4/8/70 SALT)

63. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation¹

Washington, April 7, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry Kissinger
Gerard Smith

I reported my conversation with Holifield² to Kissinger, who agreed that he would participate—but on a briefing basis. He is not going to testify before a Congressional committee, and there should be no record—just as they did it before.

He said that Laird would not be at the meeting tomorrow,³ that he thought they could “handle” Packard. He felt that Laird would not go along with the MIRV control,⁴ but the President would just have to “grasp these issues.” He said that Laird was against tabling any proposal for like the first ten days. He indicated that if I would go along with that, it would perhaps gain us some bargaining power with Laird on other things. I told him that I thought we could keep the thing going for ten days without tabling any specific proposal, but that there would be some sense of letdown in certain quarters which had expected a specific American proposal.

He said that on looking over our limited option he had begun to realize that there was nothing in it for the Soviets, and that perhaps we should propose a NCA/ABM level for the first option.

I told him I agreed with his judgment on the non-negotiability of the first option, but suggested that we not pursue the matter on the telephone since it likely was being tapped.

GS

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Director’s Files, Smith/Farley Chronological Files, Smith-White House Correspondence, January-December 1970. No classification marking. Smith initiated the memorandum and wrote “nodis” on it. A copy was sent to Farley.

² Congressman Chet Holifield (R-CA) was Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

³ Reference is to the April 8 NSC meeting. See Document 65.

⁴ Kissinger was scheduled to meet Laird at the Pentagon on April 8 at 7:45 a.m. No record of the meeting has been found but Haig sent Kissinger a memorandum on April 7 that covered items to discuss. Concerning SALT, Haig cautioned that “Laird may attempt some fancy footwork on the US SALT position similar to end runs already attempted.” Haig suggested that Kissinger take the position that the detailed work of the Verification Panel offered the “best hope for a constructive approach at Vienna.” Haig advised Kissinger to “point out that State and ACDA may yet try to ram down a modified version of Option C which would include a MIRV and ABM ban” and to “emphasize the difficulties which last-minute innovations will raise.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 224, Agency Files, Dept of Defense, Vol. VI)

64. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 7, 1970, 8 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Kissinger

The conversation took place at Dobrynin's initiative prior to his departure for the Soviet Union for consultations.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

SALT

Dobrynin said that he couldn't recall our beginning a negotiation in which the two sides knew so little about one another. He said perhaps we should have made some concrete proposal to him informally on which he could have sounded out his government. In the previous Administration, Foster always let him know the Administration's thinking.

I told Dobrynin that I had offered to talk to him but he had never picked this up. After some inconclusive fencing about who had been responsible for the offer not being taken up, Dobrynin said that his government was serious about these negotiations. However, my suggestion that he and I settle the matter in our channel presented a difficulty.² Semenov was a Deputy Foreign Minister and it was hard for a mere Ambassador to interject himself. It would help their deliberations in Moscow if I gave him some feel for what our position was likely to be. They would consider that as a sign of our good faith.³

I told Dobrynin that before he left I would indicate whether our position involved a comprehensive or a more limited option, but I would not give him the substance. I reaffirmed my willingness to settle a more limited agreement in this channel with him.⁴

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 36, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Chronological File, 3/69–6/70. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation was held at Dobrynin's residence. Kissinger sent the memorandum to Nixon on April 13 under a covering memorandum that summarized the conversation. For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 150.

² See Document 52.

³ Nixon highlighted this paragraph.

⁴ Nixon highlighted this paragraph. The conversation ended with discussion of a possible summit. Dobrynin suggested that Kosygin could head a delegation to the United Nations and meet Nixon in New York. Kissinger replied that he would consult the President. Dobrynin also stated that "the two most fruitful subjects for a summit were SALT and the Middle East." Kissinger suggested that they pursue the subject of a summit upon Dobrynin's return from Moscow.

65. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State William P. Rogers
General George A. Lincoln, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
Attorney General John N. Mitchell
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard
Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Gerard Smith, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Director
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
General Royal B. Allison, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Carl Duckett, Central Intelligence
Mr. Ronald Spiers, State
Dr. Gardiner Tucker, Defense
Mr. Paul Nitze, Defense
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, Arms Control and Disarmament
General Alexander M. Haig, NSC Staff
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
Dr. Laurence Lynn, NSC Staff
Mr. John J. McCloy, State
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, SACEUR

The President introduced the meeting and asked Mr. Helms, Director of CIA, to provide an overview of our current verification capabilities (Director Helms' briefing paper is at Tab A).² Mr. Helms stated we have concluded that in general the options presented for consideration by the National Security Council can be monitored within the following parameters: the technical systems are adequate within the state of the art; the human resources are not entirely predictable. Mr. Helms emphasized that the Soviets faced the same dilemma with respect to their limitations. Mr. Helms stated that verification systems must collect and interpret information, and, most importantly, be ca-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. According to the President's Daily Diary, this NSC meeting took place from 9:36 to 11:19 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

² Not attached and not found.

pable of informing highest authority of the results of this interpretation on a timely basis.

Included among our capabilities are satellites with accompanying photography. This system provides the most reliability. Specifically it can cover missiles in silos. [9½ lines not declassified]

Director Helms then listed the limitations on both of these satellite photography capabilities. These included: cloud cover, weather, and ambiguities resulting from hardware imperfections. He also pointed out that other [3 lines not declassified]. Much of our intelligence therefore remains ambiguous. The vastness of the Soviet Union is an additional limitation. Differences in individual interpretation all require exceedingly lengthy assessments by the most experienced personnel. Mr. Helms described new systems which are under development which will further enhance our verification capabilities.

The President then asked whether submarines and ICBMs were easy to verify, and Mr. Helms replied in the affirmative. He noted, however, that radars constitute a more complex problem. The President also asked about verification effectiveness against ABMs, and Mr. Helms replied that these are also fairly easy to verify. The President summarized that obviously the MRV/MIRV is the toughest problem. The President then asked whether or not our knowledge of Soviet MRVs is limited to their testing activity to which Mr. Helms replied, yes. He added that while it is relatively simple to verify the numbers of their tests we have not been able to verify definitively the exact characteristics of the MRV. Nor do we know how many of their missiles have a MRV potential with respect to individual armaments of systems which are in-being.³

At this point the President asked Dr. Kissinger to review the various options for consideration. Dr. Kissinger stated that we have several choices. We could adopt one or two or more of the options as our basic negotiating position. He pointed out that there are also differences of view on specific aspects of the option but that essentially we have developed four basic options. The first is a limited option (Option A) which is designed to establish controls on the total number of

³ Helms also made a comment unrecorded in this memorandum of conversation about the "inevitability" of the development of MIRVs by the Soviet Union. On April 8 Smith requested that Keeny check with Helms about his intent behind that statement made at the NSC meeting. In an April 10 memorandum, Keeny responded as follows: "Helms stated that he thought he was simply agreeing that it was 'inevitable' that the Soviets would develop a true MIRV in the *absence* of an effective flight test ban and that he was not reversing his position on our ability to monitor a MIRV test ban." (Both in Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files, FRC 383-98-0089, Director's Files, Smith's Files, Smith Correspondence: SALT Delegation Guidance on Conversations with Soviet Representatives, April-July 1970)

major strategic systems which are relatively simple and easy to verify. There is no ABM limitation visualized under this option. Specifically, we would limit the number of MR/IRBMs to numbers currently operational. This would mean that the Soviet Union would be held at its current level of 650 while we would be held to none. There would be no restriction of MRV/MIRV development and we would limit heavy strategic bombers to the numbers currently operational on both sides.

One implication of this option would be the freedom that would exist on mixing of ABMs. The JCS wants to retain two-way freedom to move sea-based missiles to the land and vice versa. Others, however, favor limiting our flexibility to moving missiles to the sea only. Under this option the US and the Soviets can have area defense and defense against accidental launch by other countries. The dangers involved in this option include ability of the Soviets to move SS-9s into SS-7 silos, the fact of 5 to 10 Soviet submarines with launch capabilities that could go undetected and also the uncertainties with respect to developed ABM capabilities. All of these risks appear to sit within tolerable limits however. In terms of negotiability this option would mean essentially that we would stop nothing currently under way but that the Soviets must halt several programs and this would undoubtedly appear inequitable to the Soviets.

Mr. Kissinger then turned to Option B which involved essentially a limitation on the total number of missiles with limitations on the deployment of a nationwide area ABM defense. It would also constrain the allowed network of ABM capable radars, possibly implying some destruction of existing Soviet radars, thereby reducing the threat that SAMs could be illegally upgraded to give them an ABM capability. In addition to the provisions of Option A, Option B would either ban ABMs or limit them to a comparable defense of the national command authorities on both sides. MIRVs would still be permitted. Under this option the strategic risks associated with significant SAM upgrades or rapid post-abrogation ABM deployments would be reduced because a smaller radar network would be permitted.

The other verification uncertainties of Option A having to do with the Soviets exceeding the limits on offensive launchers would remain. Concerning negotiability, Option B may appear more equitable to the Soviets because we would be giving up already initiated ABM deployments. On the other hand it might prove difficult to negotiate the kind of comprehensive ABM radar controls we would require in this sort of an agreement. The SAM upgrade problem, for example, would require the destruction of some of existing Soviet radar capabilities, such as their Hen-house Sevastopol complexes.

Mr. Kissinger then described Option C which visualizes limitations on both the ABM and the MIRV deployment. It reduces the coun-

terforce threat, especially the SS-9, against our Minuteman. It visualizes a ban on post-boost, endo-atmospheric penetration aids. The JCS feel that a similar ban should be applied against the exo-atmospheric pen aids and also want on-site inspection to monitor the MIRV deployment ban. However, MIRV verification is extremely difficult.

At this point Under Secretary of State Richardson interrupted and pointed out that he presented to the President some argumentations on this subject which essentially stated that if we need an improved counterforce capability we certainly need the MIRV.⁴ If not, we still need the MIRV against the Soviets' single warhead since our MIRVs provide us the capability of penetration of the Soviet ABM. Thus, the US MIRV is needed for the counterforce to prevent the clandestine buildup of Soviet capabilities. Mr. Kissinger continued that even if we do not consider target coverage crucial we need MIRVs if we believe the Soviets could have enough ICBMs to knock out Minutemen using single warheads alone and that they might use their ICBMs this way. US MIRVs reduce this threat by multiplying the penetration and target coverage capability of US ballistic missile submarine forces and such ICBMs as would survive a Soviet first strike.

MIRVs may also be required if we believe they are needed to hedge against substantial clandestine or rapid post-abrogation upgrading of Soviet ballistic missile defense. There is a crucial difference of view over whether Option C poses this particular risk. OSD and the JCS believe it does and therefore if MIRVs are to be banned they require on-site inspection of SAM systems and testing to guard against SAM upgrading. State, ACDA and CIA on the other hand believe we can effectively inhibit SAM upgrading without on-site inspection and that MIRVs are not therefore necessarily required to assure adequate US deterrents with zero ABMs. Finally even if the risk of SAM upgrading is thought tolerable with or without on-site inspection a MIRV ban is ruled out if it is thought that a MIRV ban cannot be verified.

Again there is a crucial difference of view. JCS and OSD believe that on-site inspection in addition to endo-atmospheric flight test restrictions is required for an effective MIRV ban. State, ACDA and CIA do not believe on-site inspection is required for effective verification because we could detect the tests the Soviets would need to develop a hard target MIRV. This then is the hierarchy of judgments that must be made in deciding on whether a MIRV ban is acceptable. Thus in terms of negotiability, Option C requires negotiations of the most extensive and complex collateral constraints on ABM, MIRVs, flight tests and SAM upgrading. DOD believes in addition that intrusive on-site

⁴ See Document 60.

inspection is required. On the other hand, extensive constraints are placed on both US and the Soviet programs enhancing the apparent equity of this option.

At this point Mr. Smith asked Dr. Kissinger to add the ACDA refinement to Option C. Dr. Kissinger stated that ACDA would also like to see additional constraints on testing.

Mr. Kissinger finally turned to a description of Option D. Option D is essentially a reduction option which provides for a reduction in overall throwaways [*throw-weights*]. It would require a reduction in numbers of Soviet SS-9 and 11s and assumes that our missiles become vulnerable and no solution is feasible. Therefore we should both be willing to accept mutually agreeable overall strategic force reductions. The main objective would be to insure the reduction of offensive missiles on both sides, thus eliminating the gross disparity between US and Soviet offensive missile throwaway [*throw-weight*]. The negotiability of this option is uncertain. It could provide the option of an alternative to a MIRV ban and would perhaps enable us to convince those in the US Senate who believe a MIRV ban is a test of whether the US Administration is serious about SALT.

Dr. Kissinger concluded his presentation by stating that the foregoing constitutes a presentation of the options, but he cautioned that the options cannot be fairly presented. It would be impossible to show what the cumulative effect of each would be. Those who favor a particular option point this out as do those who may disagree with a particular option. Each of the limitation options has a theory of collateral restraint. First, limitations on ICBMs cannot be just simply that. There must be limitations on the construction, and on the ability of the Soviets to move sites. There must be limitations on the external configuration of silos to prevent cheating. There must be constraints on the freedom to mix, and all of these limitations require ancillary agreements. A major concern is radar limitations, and these would apply to both civilian and military space uses. Mr. Kissinger also noted that MIRV testing is bound to generate strong disagreement and that a separate memorandum would be provided on that complex subject.

Another problem is SAM upgrade which is also related to radar deployments and to MIRV. These disagreements are eliminated with Options A and B, but they become very sharp with Option C. The Verification Panel is in the process of developing specific criteria on the SAM upgrade program. Our efforts will be to try to spare the President's arbitrating each technical dispute. These can be done separately. Today, Mr. Kissinger concluded by stating that we have to decide on one or several options. How to handle the key technical problems is particularly important should you decide to go for the more comprehensive option.

The President turned the floor to Mr. Smith who complimented Dr. Kissinger on his presentation and who pointed out that ACDA had no preconceived notion on all of the issues. Specifically, however, ACDA was strongly in favor of Option C, which Mr. Smith believed was also supported by State. Mr. Smith emphasized that ACDA thought it was important at the outset that the US adopt a comprehensive position with concrete proposals and with some reductions in our present ABM role. Otherwise, Mr. Smith maintained we look unbalanced. We must seek to explore controls over ABMs and MIRVs at the outset. Also the accuracy and throwaway [*throw-weight*] issue needs to be addressed with a view towards getting some controls on the Soviets in this area. Mr. Smith continued that if the Soviets show an interest on the broad agreement and in drafting the treaty we could go into a suspension while negotiating. If they would accept the verification provision, for bans on MIRVs and ABMs, we could have a freeze while we negotiate.

The President asked what would be the conditions for a MIRV suspension. Mr. Smith replied that there were two conditions. If we have Option A in our pocket, with a clearly expressed interest in a broader agreement, we could then go into some inspection. The President commented that it wouldn't be difficult until one got to that position. He asked if Mr. Smith felt the Soviets would accept some on-site inspection. Mr. Smith replied that at Helsinki they had shied away. The Soviets wanted verification by negative means.

The President interjected that he had seen something on the subject and Mr. Smith responded that they had talked about cooperative arrangements. Mr. Smith continued by noting there is also the question of bodies on the ground in the United States, the USSR checking on radars, contents of front ends of missiles, etc. You are thinking of my conversation with Dobrynin when I asked him if he would rule it out. He said, no, but for a comprehensive agreement not for an early limited agreement.⁵

The President then asked whether Mr. Smith would prefer a comprehensive agreement. Mr. Smith replied that he would because otherwise the horse would be out of the stable.

The Vice President then asked what are the arguments against on-site inspection. Mr. Smith answered that it opens us to Soviet agents. In addition, the Soviets don't accept foreign surveillance. The President interjected that the answer is that they are oversensitive. They have a closed society. They check us now; we don't check them. Why should they give in at little cost to us? They just can't accept an open society.

⁵ See Document 51.

The Vice President commented that it seems incongruous that you can make an agreement on good faith but they can't.

The President agreed but noted that we could do nothing without photography. Relying on good faith is very dangerous if they want to cheat, but it doesn't mean that you can't discuss the subject. But if we could get some give on the issue of on-site inspection it would be a great gain.

Mr. McCloy then commented that he agreed that we have always been too willing to give up. Zorin had told him that they did not need it. Mr. Smith commented that they are in a somewhat different position now. They are no longer inferior and they know our capabilities. Secretary Rogers stated that it differs somewhat if they agree to have a comprehensive agreement but you shouldn't be frozen in advance. If we table the comprehensive agreement in advance, this could happen. We must have a proposal we favor for a quantitative limitation and express willingness to discuss others. The President commented that we need to find a way to give the appearance of concreteness, but which also has a great deal of flexibility.

Mr. Packard then commented that the issues had been well presented and that he strongly felt that the limited proposal of Option A made a good starting point. Everyone assumes a 1710 ceiling and stoppage by them. This is a problem with Option A. If they finish what they have underway it will give them an edge. Option A would be a good starting point, however, since it limits their SS-9s. The President interjected that we know they will reject it.

Mr. Packard responded that Option B takes ABM out but it adds to our vulnerability. Option D is a good move as a fall-back from A. Mr. Packard then discussed Option C, stating that it was too uncertain with regard to cheating. If we could get on-site inspection Option C would make sense. Also, because of accuracy and throw-weight, it just isn't technically feasible. He went on to state that the MIRV problem is a big one. MIRV has been our main upgrade crutch. If we keep MIRVs we can live with more uncertainties. MIRV overcomes the SAM upgrade problem. He concluded by saying that he therefore favors Option A as a beginning point and then we could move from that position. The President asked if we couldn't obtain a ban and then go on? (The answer was no.)

Admiral Moorer commented that he considers first the security of the United States. We have looked at the intelligence symmetry. The Soviets have large areas and a dispersed population. This affects the mobile ABM problem and favors a flexible stance. But in general the Joint Chiefs favor Option A. We can then add on from that position.

The President injected that Option A only asks them to give. He asked the group why we did not put more out in a limited way and

then hit hard. Mr. Packard commented that maybe we could sweeten A by giving them some bombers. The President replied that it is not in what we put in. We must be forthcoming and get a deal not by a rigid initial position.

The President then asked Mr. Nitze if he had any comments. Mr. Nitze replied that with regard to Option A it doesn't seem to give up much but it limits our future flexibility and is a major concession to the balance of power.

Mr. McCloy interjected, this was crazy. We are giving up too much. Mr. Smith commented that some years ago we went the MIRV route instead of building more missiles. If we go to Option A we stop your proposed route but not ours.

The President then said, but they are going for warheads also, aren't they, Paul? Mr. Nitze said that under Option A our land-based missiles will be vulnerable. I agree with Gerry, but we have to know where we can end up. Only D seems to give the solution. They will have MIRVs and thus Option C is not good over time. They will upgrade their SAMs and therefore C is not good. D is the best option of all. We should go in with this as our objective; we should go in broad. The President asked Mr. Nitze if the subject of reductions came up at Helsinki. Mr. Nitze answered that it had not come up in this context.

General Lincoln then commented that we should consider Option D as worth thinking about because it will force them to go into the area they haven't considered.

Mr. Smith commented that if we could get Option D, it would be better. Our sea-borne systems enable us to do this but the USSR depends on their land-based missiles and therefore this is unbalanced. General Lincoln started to respond but he was interrupted by Secretary Rogers who asked why we didn't at least propose it? He noted that this would also get some public awareness of this meeting. Secretary Rogers went on to say that we can always say that this concept is our objective. As in the case of the nonproliferation treaty, the President can state our objective but ask how do you get it?

The Vice President then stated that because of public opinion he preferred more flexibility and a less definitive stance. Maybe we should emphasize verification at the outset. Thus, we would be emphasizing the importance. The President commented that US public opinion likes verification and reduction, but to sophisticates we are up against a more critical claim of just propagandizing.

General Goodpaster stated that to him a simple offer like Option A has benefits. He went on to say that thus far we have fared quite well on the NATO attitude. There is only one undertone. They know that this has enormous consequences for them. What would make this bad would be if we magnified the force withdrawal issue. Then there

would be real concern. We should avoid any possibility of implying that the US deterrent is being placed at a disadvantage. In such a case, force withdrawal would kill the United States. The President said, "Percy?", and then, "no, Mansfield."⁶ Secretary Rogers added that Mr. Farley had done a great job on consulting.

The President told Mr. Smith that he would give him something by way of instructions. He commented that Mr. Smith had done a tremendous job working out this position but he felt that we must stay somewhat cautious. What troubles the President is that the history of the 1960's, and he meant this not as criticism but based it on what happened, demonstrates that we fundamentally misjudged what the Soviets would do. We vigorously defended, but the Soviets violated. This doesn't mean that we should throw in the towel but we always underestimate what they will do. They cheat. Even this year they went beyond our estimates. This all suggests that we should be cautious and assume that they not only want equality but superiority. There are no constraints on cheating for them, but we have budget limitations which prohibit our cheating.

The President then said that the responsibility for where we go belongs to all of us, but, practically, it is the President's responsibility. He has the responsibility and he can't shift it. Your studies make it possible to get a good position. The President commented that the group would never all agree with what he decides. He has the responsibility. He wants discipline on whatever is decided. We want this agreement if we can get it, but what we want less is to make a mistake which puts us in second position vis-à-vis the USSR. The President instructed those present to get their people on board.

With these closing remarks the meeting adjourned.

⁶ Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT) introduced an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-121) requiring a large number of troops stationed overseas to be brought back to the United States.

66. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 9, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

Ambassador Dobrynin came in as we had agreed at the dinner on April 7th,² to get answers to two questions: (1) whether we wanted the summit talks handled through a visit by Kosygin to the United Nations as Head of the Soviet Delegation, and (2) how we proposed to handle the SALT talks. In the latter connection, Dobrynin had told me that it would help him if he could get some advance information so that he could show that he is in direct and close contact on SALT matters with the White House.

I told Dobrynin with respect to the first question that if a summit meeting were to take place this year, we would prefer to handle it outside the United Nations and as a separate initiative. Of course, we would not preclude the Soviet Prime Minister coming here but, on the whole, we would like to take it as a separate initiative.

With respect to the SALT talks, I told Dobrynin that we would present a very comprehensive proposal at Vienna, including qualitative as well as quantitative restrictions. On the other hand, we did not exclude a simple agreement this year. The best way to handle it would be for the Vienna talks to concentrate on comprehensive measures, while he and I would try to work out a limited agreement in the interval. One way might be for a recess to be taken after a few months in Vienna, during which time the President and the Soviet Prime Minister could break a deadlock and then meet to ratify it at a summit. Dobrynin said he understood and he would let me have an answer when he returned.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 36, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Chronological File, 3/69–6/70. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Printed from an uninitialed copy. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation to Nixon under an April 18 covering memorandum that summarized the conversation. The covering memorandum bears the handwritten comment: "This should have sensitive handling." For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 152.

² See Document 64.

67. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 9, 1970.

I have been filled in on your Wednesday meeting with the NSC on SALT.² I would like to add a few points for your personal consideration as you write the Decision Memorandum.

All agencies apparently expressed support for Option A³ as a starting point. I am concerned because we support Option A only as a possible first agreement to *result from* negotiations, and only if *all* of its provisions, or their strategic equivalents, are won. To reach such an agreement, the U.S. must *start* from a safer option, from which to compromise to Option A as it is currently formulated.

I support the view that reductions should be established as the ultimate U.S. goal, so that our negotiating positions and any initial agreements will be consistent with that goal.

I suggest:

That you establish substantial reductions of strategic offensive weapons as the ultimate U.S. goal.

That when the U.S. does table an initial proposal, it be considerably more favorable to the U.S. than the present formulation of Option A.

That the present formulation of Option A represents the furthest that the U.S. should compromise in an initial agreement.

That Option D is the most desirable basis for an initial proposal for the U.S. to table. It sets a good foundation for compromising towards Option A. It rationalizes our insistence on stopping the SS-9s at 250 and the total number of offensive missiles at 1710. It rationalizes the provision to substitute sea-based for land-based systems. It shows that the U.S. is prepared to reduce our forces substantially rather than stopping Soviet systems only.

Melvin R. Laird⁴

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret; Sensitive. On April 9 Haig sent this memorandum to Lynn with the following note: "I recognize it is too late for the work you have already done but it is sufficiently important that you consider this work in the light of this new memorandum." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 876, SALT, Volume VII)

² See Document 65.

³ Options A–D were described and discussed during the NSC meeting.

⁴ Printed from a copy that indicates Laird signed the original.

68. National Security Decision Memorandum 51¹

Washington, April 10, 1970.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Vienna Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

I have made the following decisions with respect to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks which will begin on April 16, 1970, in Vienna.

1. (a) The options which will serve as the basis for U.S. proposals and explorations are those in the enclosure to this Memorandum: "SALT Options," dated April 9, 1970.

(b) The Delegation is not authorized to discuss individual provisions of an Option without having made it clear that individual provisions are acceptable only in combination with all the provisions of the Option, including all corollary verification provisions.

(c) If the Delegation believes that alternative or additional provisions should be presented in order to enhance the possibility that agreement could be reached on the approved provisions of an Option, it must seek instructions.

2. I want the initial discussion to cover as broad a range of issues as possible. Therefore, the Delegation should first present Option C, including the measures specified as required for verification and using the provisions for the NCA level of ABM defense, as a framework for that discussion. The Delegation should also present Option D, using the provisions for the NCA level of ABM defense, as an alternative approach. On the basis of the discussions of these Options, and in the light of any Soviet proposals, I will judge whether an agreement acceptable to the United States is possible or whether other options should be explored.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 51–96. Top Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Haig. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation. At 2:45 p.m., before Rogers received his copy, Kissinger called to tell him that Nixon had chosen the position that the Secretary of State wanted. Kissinger asked Rogers to send him views on possible tactics at the Vienna round. (Transcript of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 362, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

3. Before engaging in any discussion of a suspension or modification of ongoing programs prior to agreement, the Delegation will seek instructions from Washington.²

4. The Delegation is authorized to discuss Item 5 on the Work Program concerning “Ways to reduce the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear missile war between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., including ways to guard against unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons” in accordance with the approach set forth in the summary Task Y paper, “Protecting Against Nuclear Accidents and Provocative Attacks.”

5. The Delegation should take the position that U.S. tactical nuclear forces, strategic forces of other nations and U.S. practices with respect to ballistic missile submarine and strategic aircraft operations should not be included in the talks.

6. I reaffirm my directive of October 31, 1969, entitled “Avoidance of Leaks on SALT.”³ The Chief of the Delegation will be responsible for assuring that all activities dealt with in that directive are conducted in conformity with it.

Richard Nixon

Enclosure⁴

Washington, April 9, 1970.

SALT OPTIONS

Option A: A “Limited” Agreement

1. *ICBMs and SLBMs*

Limitations

The aggregate total of ICBM and sea-based ballistic missile launchers would be limited to 1,710. At the present time, the Soviet Union

² On April 10 Nixon sent Smith a letter with instructions for Vienna in which he explained the political significance of the talks: “The Vienna talks are part of a larger effort I envisage in the development of our relations with the Soviet Union. On a number of different fronts we are dealing with sources of tension and conflict between us. It is my hope that there is a mutual interest in progress on all the major outstanding issues. Thus far there is little reason for optimism, but the Vienna talks may well be a major test of our basic assumptions.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Smith/Farley Chronological Files, Smith-White House Correspondence, January-December 1970)

³ See footnote 4, Document 40.

⁴ Top Secret. Nixon initialed the title sheet, the first page describing each option, and the last page.

has operational 1,272 ICBMs—of which 222 are SS-9s—and 288 SLBM launchers, for a total of 1,560. However, others under construction would if completed raise the total to nearly 2,000. A ceiling of 1,710 represents the U.S. total, and would mean that the Soviets could complete roughly half of what they now have under construction. In order to avoid Soviet completion of all its SS-9s under construction—60—we would seek an understanding that completion would be approximately proportional within classes of launchers under construction, so that the Soviet “SS-9 ceiling” within the 1,710 total would be 250.

Within the permitted ceiling of 1,710 launchers, the number of launchers associated with missiles of volume greater than 65 cubic meters (the size of an SS-11) would be limited to those currently operational (or permitted to be completed in reaching the 1,710 level).

Within the ceiling of 1,710 launchers, sea-based ballistic missile launchers could be substituted for existing fixed land-based ICBM launchers on a one-for-one basis. Existing sea-based ballistic missile launchers could be replaced by other SLBM launchers on a one-for-one basis.

ICBM launchers could not be relocated or modified in externally observable ways.

Deployment and testing of land-mobile ICBMs and their launchers would be prohibited.

Strategic offensive missiles mounted on waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited.

Retrofit of current launchers with missiles not previously deployed on the launcher would be limited to missiles whose volume does not exceed 65 cubic meters.

ICBMs are defined as land-based ballistic missiles which have a capability of ranges in excess of 5,000 kilometers. ICBMs, even if deployed for use against targets within MR/IRBM range, would be counted as part of the total number of ICBM/sea-based ballistic missile launchers. (The Soviets have deployed 40 SS-11 ICBMs in one MRBM and one IRBM complex, and are so deploying another 40 at those complexes.)

Testing of land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range and deployment of launchers for such missiles would be prohibited.

Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment missile systems (FOBS) would be considered as part of the allowed total number of launchers.

Corollary Limitations

Several supporting corollary limitations would be included in order to facilitate verification.

No additional MR/IRBM silos (beyond the 135 extant) would be allowed, since ICBMs could be retrofitted into such launchers, and this might elude detection.

Limits, e.g., size, would be placed on permitted mobile missiles (those with range capability less than 1,000 km) and their associated TELs in order to prevent claims that an ICBM was a shorter-range permitted missile.

There would also be agreed procedures for notification and implementation of permitted launcher destruction and replacement, in order to ensure verification of changes in the mix of launchers.

Use of covered facilities for fitting out, overhaul, conversion, and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

2. MR/IRBMs

Limitations

The number of MR/IRBM launchers would be limited to the number currently operational (the USSR has 650; the U.S. has none). Relocation of MR/IRBM launchers or externally observable modifications of such launchers would be prohibited. Deployment and testing of land-based mobile MR/IRBMs would be prohibited, and any operational would be destroyed.

Testing of land-based cruise missiles of intermediate or medium range and deployment of launchers for such missiles would be prohibited.

Missiles of medium and intermediate range would be defined as land-based missiles with a maximum range greater than 1,000 and less than 5,000 kilometers.

Corollary Limitations

Limitations would be placed on the size of mobile missiles in order to insure against evasion of the ban on mobile MR/IRBMs.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Fall-Back

If Soviet opposition to limitations on MR/IRBMs remains adamant, we should, subject to consultation with our NATO Allies on changing our position, be prepared to agree to set aside or defer limitations on MR/IRBMs, in exchange for appropriate Soviet concessions. Those re-

strictions on MR/IRBMs pertinent to insuring ICBM limitations are, however, separately specified as corollary limitations integral to the ICBM/sea-based ballistic missile limitations, and would continue to be maintained.

(New MR/IRBM silos would still be banned. Mobile offensive missiles below the size limits required for the ICBM corollary restriction would, however, be allowed if the MR/IRBM limitation were set aside.)

3. SLCMs

Limitations

Submarines and associated launchers for SLCMs would be limited to those currently operational (the USSR has 348 launchers; the U.S. has none).⁵ Substitution of sea-based ballistic missile launchers for SLCM launchers would not be permitted.

Corollary Limitations

Use of covered facilities for fitting out, overhaul, conversion, and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

Fall-Back

We would initially seek the above limitation on SLCMs, but would be prepared in the negotiations to set aside limitations on SLCMs in exchange for some appropriate Soviet concession.

4. ABMs

Limitations

The number of ABM launchers and interceptors would be limited to a total of 1,000 each of all types, and there would be agreed limitations on the number and location of ABM radars.

It would be necessary to negotiate precisely an agreed understanding with respect to existing radars which have or could have an ABM-related role. In the Soviet case, this would involve at least the Hen House, Dog House (and similar), and Try Add radar complexes. The location of future ABM radars would be declared in advance

⁵ We would initially seek an equal agreed number, so that the U.S. would have the option of building up to 348 SLCM launchers, but be prepared to bargain. [Footnote is in the original.]

through an agreed procedure. There would be agreement to consult in the future on non-ABM radar requirements and plans with a view to meeting legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitation. It would be agreed that ABM-associated radars would be distinguished from other radars by established criteria: location, orientation, elevation angle, power, frequency, aperture size, and antenna type (phased-array or mechanical-scan).

(For example, if the Soviets said they wanted to build a phased-array radar for air traffic control at Moscow, we would have the right to insist that it be located with an orientation away from any missile threat corridors; in that case, it would not be necessary to apply other criteria dealing with the performance characteristics of the radar. If, in another case, the Soviets said they needed a radar located within and facing a threat corridor, we would be able to insist on application of other criteria appropriate to the situation in order to rule out an ABM role for the radar; for example, a high elevation angle could limit the radar to a non-ABM space track role.) The Soviets, of course, could similarly insist we handle future non-ABM radar needs in ways which did not permit us to acquire ABM capabilities.

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual anti-aircraft and anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

Deployment and testing of mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems would be prohibited.

Definition

It is not necessary to develop an agreed definition of an "ABM," but there must be at least an agreed understanding on what constitutes a present or potential ABM. Each side would declare its ABM systems. The understanding would recognize as ABMs the Soviet Galosh ABM-1, Spartan, and Sprint, but would not include anti-aircraft systems such as the Soviet systems SA-1 through SA-5 and Nike-Hercules and Hawk.

Corollary Limitations

The testing of SAMs in an ABM mode would be prohibited.

There would be advance notification of the deployment of allowed ABM systems and of new SAM systems.

In the process of negotiation we would make it clear to the Soviets what specified indicators we would employ in deciding whether a SAM system had ABM capability. Those indicators include:

- relocation of sites;
- changes in radar average power levels, aperture configuration, antenna type, signal characteristics;

- addition of acquisition radars or introduction of phased-array site radars;
- changes in missile characteristics (range, acceleration, burn-out velocity, payload, propellants, exo-atmospheric capability);
- testing of SAMs in ABM role;
- introduction of new SAM systems;
- appearance of nuclear warheads at additional SAM sites.

Where feasible and consistent with security requirements, we will also indicate the specific numerical limits we will use in applying these indicators.

Verification

Verification would be accomplished by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the corollary limitations.

5. Development Testing, Training, and Space Launchers

Limitations

Missile launchers and platforms for research, development, testing, evaluation, and training with respect to all strategic missile systems, and for space missions, would be permitted, but their total number on each side could not exceed an agreed limit of 125 launchers.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

There would be agreement to provide a list of such launch facilities and their locations.

6. Strategic Bombers (and Defenses against Bombers)

Limitations

Heavy strategic bombers would be limited to the numbers currently operational. This category would be defined as presently comprising B-52, Bison, and Bear bombers. (The U.S. at present has 516 B-52 bombers (472 operational); the USSR has 195 Bison and Bear bombers.)

No limitation would be placed on substitution of new heavy strategic bomber types, nor would other qualitative limitations on these bombers be sought. There would be notification of intended deployment of new bomber types.

No limitation would be placed on armament of any kind carried by aircraft.

Corollary Limitations

The conversion of transport aircraft for use as strategic bombers would be prohibited.

No limitation would be placed on aircraft other than bombers; bombers used as tankers (about 50 Bisons) are, however, reconvertible to the bomber role, and are counted in the bomber ceiling.

No corollary limitations on defenses against bombers would be included, other than limitations on SAM systems specified in connection with preventing SAM upgrade to ABMs. Improvements in air defenses could be offset by improvements in bomber systems within the prescribed ceilings.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

7. MIRVs and Qualitative Improvements

Limitations

There would be no limitations on MIRVs, nor on qualitative improvements of strategic missile systems except as specified in provisions outlined above.

8. Verification

Verification of a SALT agreement comprising the provisions outlined in Option A would be accomplished by a combination of reliance upon national means and the provision of mandatory corollary limitations designed to make the over-all restrictions compatible with our verification capabilities.

There would have to be an understanding not to interfere with national means of verification, defined broadly as technical information collection systems necessary for verifying compliance with the agreement operating outside the national territory of the other state, or to undertake deliberate concealment measures which could impede the effectiveness of national means in verifying compliance with the agreement.

The agreement would also provide for consultations on issues arising out of the provisions of the agreement. A standing joint commission would be established to provide a forum in which the parties could raise issues about compliance and verification, as well as to receive timely notice of certain deployments (e.g., specific changes in the ICBM/SLBM mix, and deployment of new permitted strategic systems), and to discuss possibly necessary or useful adjustments within the framework of the agreement. Selective direct observation or "on-site inspection" on a challenge basis could be requested as a way to check on some suspicious situation.

The agreement would explicitly be predicated on the understanding that neither side would seek to circumvent the provisions and effectiveness of the agreement through a third country. It would contain

provisions for consultation in the event of suspected violations, as well as to consider basic changes in the strategic situation (including third-country developments). The agreement would include a clause providing for withdrawal in the event either party decided its supreme national interests were threatened by continued adherence. The agreement would be made subject to formal review at fixed periods (for example, for five years). This would create an opportunity for joint consideration of any changed circumstances, for modification of the agreement if deemed advisable, and reaffirmation. It would permit withdrawal without having to charge the other side with violation or to invoke supreme national interest.

Option B: "Comprehensive I" Agreement

[Omitted here are sections 1–3 of Option B, which are identical to those sections of Option A.]

4. ABMs

Two alternatives for ABM limitation under this option are considered: zero or NCA levels.

(a) *Zero ABM Level Limitation*

Deployment of ABM launchers would be prohibited, and existing ABM launchers and associated radars would be dismantled.

The Soviet Union would have to dismantle its existing Moscow Galosh ABM defenses. Specifically, the USSR would within three months of the time the agreement came into effect dismantle the Dog House radar, the radar under construction at Chekhov, the four Try Add radar complexes, and the 64-launcher complex around Moscow. (Radars would be dismantled by disassembly and removal of all structures supporting or mounting radar faces; launchers would be dismantled by removal of all interceptors and launch vehicles and observable destruction of launch pads. Interceptors could be used for R&D testing.) The U.S. would also propose that the Soviets dismantle the uncompleted Hen House radar near Sevastopol. The Soviets could keep the Skrunnda and Olenegorsk large early-warning and tracking Hen House radars, and the Sary Shagan and Mishelevka early-warning, test range and space-track Hen House radars in Siberia, some faces of which face the Chinese missile threat, including portions of those radar complexes still under construction. We would inform the Soviets that we regard the continued existence of these radars as tolerable only because of their vulnerability and that we would view increases in SAM defense of these radars as a violation of the agreement.

The U.S. would cancel Safeguard deployment. No existing U.S. radars would be destroyed. We could retain or replace the three large BMEWs early-warning radars, and the large phased-array

space-track radar at Eglin AFB, Florida (as well as the MSR ABM test radar at Kwajalein). (If the Soviets insisted on building the Sevastopol radar for early-warning, the U.S. would retain the right to build a radar or radars providing comparable additional coverage for early-warning.)

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual anti-aircraft and strategic anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

Limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role. Apart from agreement on the disposition of existing radars possessing technical capabilities for contributing to an ABM system, as specified above, there would be agreement to consult in the future on non-ABM radar requirements and plans with a view to meeting legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitation. It would be agreed that non-ABM-associated radars would be distinguished by established criteria: location, orientation, elevation angle, power, frequency, aperture size, and antenna type (phased-array or mechanical scan). For example, if the Soviets said they wanted to build a phased-array radar for air traffic control at Moscow, we would have the right to insist that it be located with an orientation away from any missile threat corridors; it would then not be necessary to apply other criteria. If, in another case, the Soviets said they needed a radar located within and facing a threat corridor, we would be able to insist that an application of other criteria appropriate to the situation rule out an ABM role for the radar; for example, a high elevation angle could limit the radar to a non-ABM space track role. The Soviets, of course, could similarly insist we handle future non-ABM radar needs in ways which did not permit us to acquire ABM capabilities.

ABM research, development, and testing would be permitted. All flight-testing would, however, be limited to (a) pre-announced flight tests, (b) not more than 25 per year, (c) on not more than 10 launchers, and (d) at agreed test ranges.

Definition

It is not necessary to develop an agreed definition of an "ABM," but there must be at least an agreed understanding on what constitutes a present or potential ABM. Each side will declare its systems. The understanding would recognize as ABMs the Soviet Galosh ABM-1, Spartan, and Sprint, but would not include anti-aircraft systems such as the Soviet systems SA-1 through SA-5 and Nike-Hercules and Hawk.

Corollary Limitations

There would be a ban on flight testing of SAMs in an ABM mode.

In the process of negotiation we would make it clear to the Soviets what specific indicators we would employ in deciding whether a SAM system had ABM capability. Those indicators include:

- relocation of sites;
- changes in radar average power levels, aperture configuration, antenna type, signal characteristics;
- addition of acquisition radars or introduction of phased-array site radars;
- changes in missile characteristics (range, acceleration, burn-out velocity, payload, propellants, exo-atmospheric capability);
- testing of SAMs in ABM role;
- introduction of new SAM systems;
- appearance of nuclear warheads at additional SAM sites.

Where feasible and consistent with security requirements, we will also indicate the specific numerical limits we will use in applying these indicators.

There would be advance notification of the deployment of allowed SAM systems.

Verification

Verification would be accomplished by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the above corollary limitations.

(b) NCA Defense ABM Level Limitations

Deployment of ABMs would be limited to those appropriate to a defense of the National Command Authority (Moscow and Washington). One hundred ABM launchers, and interceptors, of any type would be permitted, together with associated radars.

The Soviet Union would retain its present radars and ABM launchers, and could add up to 36 additional launchers with associated radars around Moscow—to serve a total of no more than 100 interceptors. (We would seek the dismantling of the Sevastopol Hen House, as in the case of the zero ABM level, with the same alternative fall-back of a comparable radar or radars for the U.S. as a counterpart if Sevastopol is retained.)

The U.S. would be allowed to deploy a roughly equivalent system, comprising 3–6 PAR faces, 4 MSR faces, and 100 ABM launchers and interceptors centered on a defense of the Washington, D.C. area (but covering a large area of the eastern United States).

The provision with respect to future non-ABM radars outlined in the discussion of zero ABM levels (on pp. 25–29 above)⁶ would apply.

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual anti-aircraft and strategic anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

⁶ Reference is to section 4(a) above.

ABM research, development and testing would be permitted. In addition, confidence firings would be permitted. All such ABM interceptor flight tests and confidence firings would, however, be limited to (a) pre-announced flight tests, (b) not more than 30 per year, (c) on not more than 15 launchers, and (d) at agreed test ranges. Testing of mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems would be prohibited.

Corollary Limitations

The same corollary limitations against the upgrading of SAMs, including the ABM radar limitations, would apply as in the case of the zero level ABM limitation. The advance notification of allowed defensive systems would be extended to include allowed ABM deployment.

Verification

Verification would be by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the corollary limitations.

[Omitted here are sections 5–8 of Option B, which are identical to those sections of Option A.]

Option C: “Comprehensive II” Agreement

[Omitted here are sections 1–3 of Option C, which are identical to those sections of Option A.]

4. *ABMs*

Two alternatives for ABM limitation under this option are considered: zero or NCA levels.

(a) *Zero ABM Level Limitation*

Deployment of ABM launchers would be prohibited, and existing ABM launchers and associated radars would be dismantled.

The Soviet Union would have to dismantle its existing Moscow Galosh ABM defenses. Specifically, the USSR would within three months of the time the agreement came into effect dismantle the Dog House radar, the radar under construction at Chekhov, the four Try Add radar complexes, and the 64-launcher complex around Moscow. (Radars would be dismantled by disassembly and removal of all structures supporting or mounting radar faces; launchers would be dismantled by removal of all interceptors and launch vehicles and observable destruction of launch pads. Interceptors could be used for R&D testing.) The U.S. would also propose that the Soviets dismantle all Hen House radars covering potential U.S. missile attack corridors. The Soviets could keep the Sary Shagan and Mishelevka test range and space-track Hen House radar faces. The U.S. would cancel Safeguard deployment and dismantle BMEWS. If agreement cannot be reached

on the above radar destruction, the U.S. would be permitted a radar network of equivalent capability for early warning. In that case, no existing U.S. radars would be destroyed. We could retain or replace with PARs the three large BMEWs early-warning radars, and the large phased-array space-track radar at Eglin AFB, Florida (as well as the MSR ABM test radar at Kwajalein). In addition, the U.S. would be permitted to add on the order of 3–5 PARs for coverage of SLBM and ICBM threat corridors.

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual anti-aircraft and strategic anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

Limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role. Apart from agreement on the disposition of existing radars possessing technical capabilities for contributing to an ABM system, as specified above, there would be agreement to consult in the future on non-ABM radar requirements and plans with a view to meeting legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitation. It would be agreed that non-ABM-associated radars would be distinguished by established criteria: location, orientation, elevation angle, power, frequency, aperture size, and antenna type (phased-array or mechanical scan). For example, if the Soviets said they wanted to build a phased-array radar for air traffic control at Moscow, we would have the right to insist that it be located with an orientation away from any missile threat corridors; it would then not be necessary to apply other criteria. If, in another case, the Soviets said they needed a radar located within and facing a threat corridor, we would be able to insist that an application of other criteria appropriate to the situation rule out an ABM role for the radar; for example, a high elevation angle could limit the radar to a non-ABM space track role. The Soviets, of course, could similarly insist we handle future non-ABM radar needs in ways which did not permit us to acquire ABM capabilities.

ABM research, development, and testing would be permitted. All flight-testing would, however, be limited to (a) pre-announced flight tests, (b) not more than 25 per year, (c) on not more than 10 launchers, and (d) at agreed test ranges.

Definition

It is not necessary to develop an agreed definition of an "ABM," but there must be at least an agreed understanding on what constitutes a present or potential ABM. Each side will declare its systems. The understanding would recognize as ABMs the Soviet Galosh ABM-1, Spartan, and Sprint, but would not include anti-aircraft systems such as the Soviet systems SA-1 through SA-5 and Nike-Hercules and Hawk.

Corollary Limitations

There would be a ban on flight testing of SAMs in an ABM mode.

In the process of negotiation we would make it clear to the Soviets what specific indicators we would employ in deciding whether a SAM system had ABM capability. Those indicators include:

- relocation of sites;
- changes in radar average power levels, aperture configuration, antenna type, signal characteristics;
- addition of acquisition radars or introduction of phased-array site radars;
- changes in missile characteristics (range, acceleration, burn-out velocity, payload, propellants, exo-atmospheric capability);
- testing of SAMs in ABM role;
- introduction of new SAM systems;
- appearance of nuclear warheads at additional SAM sites.

Where feasible and consistent with security requirements, we will also indicate the specific numerical limits we will use in applying these indicators.

There would be advance notification of the deployment of allowed SAM systems.

Verification

Verification would be accomplished both by national means and by on-site inspection of SAM sites. The on-site inspection provisions would permit examination by trained technical observers of any SA-5 or SA-2 site in the USSR and of equivalent air defense missile sites in the United States. Inspections would be limited to an agreed number each year. Sites to be inspected would be chosen by the inspecting party, with inspection to follow within no more than a few hours of designation. The inspectors would have access to site launch areas, assembly and service areas, and radar and/or battery control areas. Several interceptors should be available on their launchers, and all radar antennas must be available for viewing. Command and control and battery fire distribution equipment should also be available for observation. Throughout the inspection, pictures may be taken of the external configuration of all equipment; however, inspectors need not be authorized to physically operate any item, or mount sensors on the components, or view internal characteristics.

The inspection would include search for evidence of:

- storage or placement of nuclear warheads on air defense missiles not previously so equipped;
- changes in missile characteristics enhancing ABM potential (different warheads, nozzle changes, altered or detachable lift and control surfaces, presence of devices for improved endo and exo-atmospheric maneuver, changes in propellants);

—changes in radar characteristics enhancing ABM potential (increased power, or power generation facilities, changes in antenna size or configuration, increased numbers of radars).

(b) NCA Defense ABM Level Limitation

Deployment of ABMs would be limited to those appropriate to a defense of the National Command Authority (Moscow and Washington). One hundred ABM launchers and interceptors of any type would be permitted, together with associated radars.

The Soviet Union would retain its present radars and ABM launchers, and could add up to 36 additional launchers with associated radars around Moscow. (We would seek the dismantling of Soviet Hen Houses, as in the case of the zero ABM level, with the same alternative fall-back of comparable radars for the U.S. if agreement cannot be reached.)

The U.S. would be allowed to deploy a roughly equivalent system, comprising one PAR, one MSR, and 100 ABM launchers centered on a defense of the Washington, D.C. area (but covering a large area of the eastern United States).

The provision with respect to future non-ABM radars outlined in the discussion of zero ABM levels (on pp. 45–51 above)⁷ would apply.

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual anti-aircraft and strategic anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

ABM research, development and testing would be permitted. In addition, confidence firings would be permitted. All such ABM interceptor flight tests and confidence firings would, however, be limited to (a) pre-announced flight tests, (b) not more than 30 per year, (c) on not more than 15 launchers, and (d) at agreed test ranges. Testing of mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems would be prohibited.

Corollary Limitations

The same corollary limitations against the upgrading of SAMs, including the ABM radar limitations, would apply as in the case of the zero level ABM limitation. The advance notification of allowed defensive systems would be extended to include allowed ABM deployment.

Verification

Verification would be by national means and on-site inspection of SAM sites as outlined in the zero ABM case above.

[Omitted here are sections 5 and 6 of Option C, which are identical to those sections of Option A.]

⁷ Reference is to section 4(a) above.

7. MIRVs

Limitations

The deployment of MIRVs and MRVs would be prohibited. Any MIRVs or MRVs that were already deployed would be withdrawn from operational status. (There should be a specific exception permitting the present deployment and confidence firing of Polaris A-3 missiles, on the grounds that they are well known to have no multiple target capability.)

Corollary Limitations

Flight testing of MIRVs and MRVs would be prohibited. This ban would cover any type of system (e.g., bus, P-ball, rail) which could permit independent targeting of multiple RVs.

In order to prevent flight testing not distinguishable from MIRV-related tests or in which MIRV components could be tested, the following kinds of flight testing would be prohibited: post-boost and atmospheric maneuvering by ballistic missiles and RVs, multiple RVs, RV dispensing mechanisms, and endo-atmospheric penetration aids.

All strategic offensive ballistic missile testing would be restricted to pre-announced firings on agreed ranges.

8. Verification

Verification would be accomplished by national observation of flight tests and by on-site inspection of operational ICBM sites to insure that MIRVs had not been deployed.

The on-site inspection provisions would permit examination of any ICBM or sea-based ballistic missile in the Soviet Union or the United States by trained technical observers. Inspections would be limited to an agreed number each year.

The ICBMs to be inspected would be designated by the inspecting party and would be subject to inspection within one-to-two hours after designation. Visual access to the exterior of the re-entry vehicle or shroud when fully mated to the missile would be provided from all aspects, from a distance of less than five feet. Photography would be permitted, as well as the operation of detectors designed to determine the presence of multiple warheads under shrouds or aerodynamic covering. Nuclear components may remain covered during the inspection.

With respect to sea-based offensive strategic ballistic missiles, missile assembly areas and re-entry vehicle storage areas on board the basing vessel would be subject to on-site inspection at any time the vessel was in port. Inspection would take place within one-to-two hours of designation. Inspectors would not be permitted to enter other parts of the vessel, except as necessary for access to the missile assembly ar-

eas and re-entry vehicle storage areas. The procedures for inspection of the missiles would be as for ICBMs. The location of all tenders for basing vessels would be identified.

Missile and warhead construction facilities and test facilities would not be subject to on-site inspection.

9. *Verification*

Verification of a SALT agreement comprising the provisions outlined in Option C would be accomplished by a combination of reliance upon national means, the provision of mandatory corollary limitations designed to make the over-all restrictions compatible with our verification capabilities, and the on-site inspection provisions outlined above.

There would have to be an understanding not to interfere with national means of verification, defined broadly as technical information collection systems necessary for verifying compliance with the agreement operating outside the national territory of the other state, or to undertake deliberate concealment measures which could impede the effectiveness of national means in verifying compliance with the agreement.

The agreement would also provide for consultations on issues arising out of the provisions of the agreement. A standing joint commission would be established to provide a forum in which the parties could raise issues about compliance and verification, as well as to receive timely notice of certain deployments (e.g., specific changes in the ICBM/SLBM mix, and deployment of new permitted strategic systems), and to discuss possibly necessary or useful adjustment within the framework of the agreement. Selective direct observation or "on-site inspection" on a challenge basis could be requested as a way to check on some suspicious situation.

The agreement would explicitly be predicated on the understanding that neither side would seek to circumvent the provisions and effectiveness of the agreement through a third country. It would contain provisions for consultation in the event of suspected violations, as well as to consider basic changes in the strategic situation (including third-country developments). The agreement would include a clause providing for withdrawal in the event either party decided its supreme national interests were threatened by continued adherence. The agreement would be made subject to formal review at fixed periods (for example, five years). This would create an opportunity for joint consideration of any changed circumstances, for modification of the agreement if deemed advisable, and reaffirmation. It would permit withdrawal without having to charge the other side with violation or to invoke supreme national interest.

Option D: “Reduction” Agreement

[Omitted here are section 1, subsections “Limitations” and “Corollary Limitations” of Option D, which are identical to those of Option A.]

Reductions

The initial ceiling of 1,710 would be reduced by 100 launchers each year over seven years. After January 1, 1978 the ceiling would be 1,000 total ICBM and SLBM launchers.

Reductions within the ceiling would be accomplished by phasing out ICBM launchers in the order in which they became operational. (With this stipulation, the U.S. would phase out launchers in the following sequence: 150 silos at Malmstrom, Wing I; 54 Titan IIs and 150 silos at Ellsworth, Wing II; 150 silos at Minot, Wing III; 150 silos at Whiteman, Wing IV; 60 silos at Warren, Wing V. The Soviets would phase out launchers in the following sequence: SS-7s and SS-8s, then in parallel SS-9 and SS-11 launchers—approximately one SS-9 group of 6 launchers for every 20 SS-11 silos.)

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

[Omitted here are sections 2 and 3 of Option D, which are identical to those sections of Option A.]

4. *ABMs*

Either zero or NCA ABM levels with the provisions proposed could be combined with the ICBM reduction feature of Option D.

(a) *Zero ABM Level Limitation*

Deployment of ABM launchers would be prohibited, and existing ABM launchers and associated radars would be dismantled.

The Soviet Union would have to dismantle its existing Moscow Galosh ABM defenses. Specifically, the USSR would within three months of the time the agreement came into effect dismantle the Dog House radar, the radar under construction at Chekhov, the four Try Add radar complexes, and the 64-launcher complex around Moscow. (Radars would be dismantled by disassembly and removal of all structures supporting or mounting radar faces; launchers would be dismantled by removal of all interceptors and launch vehicles and observable destruction of launch pads. Interceptors could be used for R&D testing.) The U.S. would also propose that the Soviets dismantle the uncompleted Hen House radar near Sevastopol. The Soviets could keep the Skrunda and Olenegorsk large early-warning and tracking Hen House radars, and the Sary Shagan and Mishelevka early-warning, test range and space-track Hen House radars in Siberia, some

faces of which face the Chinese missile threat, including portions of those radar complexes still under construction. We would inform the Soviets that we regard the continued existence of these radars as tolerable only because of their vulnerability and that we would view increases in SAM defense of these radars as a violation of the agreement.

The U.S. would cancel Safeguard deployment. No existing U.S. radars would be destroyed. We could retain or replace the three large BMEWs early-warning radars, and the large phased-array space-track radar at Eglin AFB, Florida (as well as the MSR ABM test radar at Kwajalein). (If the Soviets insisted on building the Sevastopol radar for early-warning, the U.S. would retain the right to build a radar or radars providing comparable additional coverage for early-warning.)

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual anti-aircraft and strategic anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

Limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role. Apart from agreement on the disposition of existing radars possessing technical capabilities for contributing to an ABM system, as specified above, there would be agreement to consult in the future on non-ABM radar requirements and plans with a view to meeting legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitation. It would be agreed that non-ABM-associated radars would be distinguished by established criteria: location, orientation, elevation angle, power, frequency, aperture size, and antenna type (phased-array or mechanical scan). For example, if the Soviets said they wanted to build a phased-array radar for air traffic control at Moscow, we would have the right to insist that it be located with an orientation way from any missile threat corridors; it would then not be necessary to apply other criteria. If, in another case, the Soviets said they needed a radar located within and facing a threat corridor, we would be able to insist that an application of other criteria appropriate to the situation rule out an ABM role for the radar; for example, a high elevation angle could limit the radar to a non-ABM space track role. The Soviets, of course, could similarly insist we handle future non-ABM radar needs in ways which did not permit us to acquire ABM capabilities.

ABM research, development, and testing would be permitted. All flight-testing would, however, be limited to (a) pre-announced flight tests, (b) not more than 25 per year, (c) on not more than 10 launchers, and (d) at agreed test ranges.

Definition

It is not necessary to develop an agreed definition of an "ABM," but there must be at least an agreed understanding on what constitutes a present or potential ABM. Each side will declare its systems. The

understanding would recognize as ABMs the Soviet Galosh ABM-1, Spartan, and Sprint, but would not include anti-aircraft systems such as the Soviet systems SA-1 through SA-5 and Nike-Hercules and Hawk.

Corollary Limitations

There would be a ban on flight testing of SAMs in an ABM mode.

In the process of negotiation we would make it clear to the Soviets what specific indicators we would employ in deciding whether a SAM system had ABM capability. Those indicators include:

- relocation of sites;
- changes in radar average power levels, aperture configuration, antenna type, signal characteristics;
- addition of acquisition radars or introduction of phased-array site radars;
- changes in missile characteristics (range, acceleration, burn-out velocity, payload, propellants, exo-atmospheric capability);
- testing of SAMs in ABM role;
- introduction of new SAM systems;
- appearance of nuclear warheads at additional SAM sites.

Where feasible and consistent with security requirements, we will also indicate the specific numerical limits we will use in applying these indicators.

There would be advance notification of the deployment of allowed SAM systems.

Verification

Verification would be accomplished by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the above corollary limitations.

(b) NCA Defense ABM Level Limitation

Deployment of ABMs would be limited to those appropriate to a defense of the National Command Authority (Moscow and Washington). One hundred ABM launchers, and interceptors, of any type would be permitted, together with associated radars.

The Soviet Union would retain its present radars and ABM launchers, and could add up to 36 additional launchers with associated radars around Moscow—to serve a total of no more than 100 interceptors. (We would seek the dismantling of the Sevastopol Hen House, as in the case of the zero ABM level, with the same alternative fall-back of a comparable radar or radars for the U.S. as a counterpart if Sevastopol is retained.)

The U.S. would be allowed to deploy a roughly equivalent system, comprising 3–6 PAR faces, 4 MSR faces, and 100 ABM launchers and interceptors centered on a defense of the Washington, D.C. area (but covering a large area of the eastern United States).

The provision with respect to future non-ABM radars outlined in the discussion of zero ABM levels (on pp. 25–29 above)⁸ would apply.

Upgrading of SAMs to convert them into ABMs or to provide dual anti-aircraft and strategic anti-missile capability would be prohibited.

ABM research, development and testing would be permitted. In addition, confidence firings would be permitted. All such ABM interceptor flight tests and confidence firings would, however, be limited to (a) pre-announced flight tests, (b) not more than 30 per year, (c) on not more than 15 launchers, and (d) at agreed test ranges. Testing of mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems would be prohibited.

Corollary Limitations

The same corollary limitations against the upgrading of SAMs, including the ABM radar limitations, would apply as in the case of the zero level ABM limitation. The advance notification of allowed defensive systems would be extended to include allowed ABM deployment.

Verification

Verification would be by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the corollary limitations.

[Omitted here is section 5 of Option D, which is identical to that section of Option A.]

6. Strategic Bombers (and Defenses against Bombers)

Limitations

Heavy strategic bombers would be limited to the numbers currently operational. This category would be defined as presently comprising B–52, Bison, and Bear bombers. (The U.S. at present has 516 B–52 bombers (472 operational); the USSR has 195 Bison and Bear bombers.)

No limitation would be placed on substitution of new heavy strategic bomber types, nor would other qualitative limitations on these bombers be sought. There would be notification of intended deployment of new bomber types.

If the Soviets agree to remove SS–9s before smaller missiles in the process of reduction of ICBMs, the U.S. would agree to reduce its total number of operational B–52s by at least 40 by the end of each year for five years starting in 1971. Thereafter the total number of U.S. heavy and medium bombers would not exceed 325. The Soviets would not have to reduce their bomber force.

⁸ Reference is to section 4(a) under Option A above.

No limitation would be placed on armament of any kind carried by aircraft.

Corollary Limitations

The conversion of transport aircraft for use as strategic bombers would be prohibited.

No limitation would be placed on aircraft other than bombers; bombers used as tankers (about 50 Bisons) are, however, reconvertible to the bomber role, and are counted in the bomber ceiling.

No corollary limitations on defenses against bombers would be included, other than limitations on SAM systems specified in connection with preventing SAM upgrade to ABMs. Improvements in air defenses could be offset by improvements in bomber systems within the prescribed ceilings.

Verification

Verification would be by national means.

[Omitted here are sections 7 and 8 of Option D, which are identical to those sections of Option A.]

69. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 11, 1970, 10:50 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between SALT Delegation and the President

ATTENDEES

The President
Lt. General Royal B. Allison
Mr. Paul Nitze
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
Mr. Philip Farley
Ambassador J. Graham Parsons
Ambassador Gerard Smith
Brig. General A.M. Haig

The President introduced the meeting by informing the group that he had selected the broader option with the back-up to include Op-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Presidential/HAK MemCons, MemCon—Meeting of SALT Delegation with President, April 11, 1970. Secret. Initialed by Kissinger. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

tion D² rather than the more restricted option to provide a more flexible far-reaching initial U.S. position. He stated that it may be necessary to fall back to the more restricted options as the negotiations get underway.

Ambassador Smith then discussed the tactics to be used in Vienna and suggested that he would like to use the first two weeks or so to cover in detail all of the facets of the comprehensive option and to inform the Soviets that we had other ideas if this option was not acceptable. Ambassador Smith emphasized that he believed that our NATO allies might have some difficulties with Option D because it might appear to them that the Soviet MR/IRBM threat to them would not be affected by mutual US/Soviet force reductions. He therefore contemplated the need to go back to the NATO allies for further consultation before formally tabling Option D.³

The President commented that Option D may actually be the best solution and asked Ambassador Thompson if he agreed. Ambassador Thompson stated that he thought that the Soviets would have difficulties with Option D because it would be necessary under this option for them to abandon costly systems which they have just completed.

Mr. Nitze stated that he understood that Willy Brandt had registered some concern about the status of the Soviet IR/MRBM's in the forthcoming SALT negotiations. The President stated that it would be very important that we maintain absolute security with respect to our positions so that the fears of the NATO allies would not be unnecessarily raised due to press speculation before detailed consultations have been completed.

Ambassador Thompson stated that Option C appeared to him to be the most promising from the Soviet perspective although they will most likely react strongly against the inspection requirements.

Ambassador Smith then raised the question of Congressional briefings and urged that the President start these briefings on Thursday or Friday, pointing out that the President had approved a comprehensive negotiating position which includes willingness to accept bans on

² See Document 68.

³ On April 13 Kissinger informed Smith that Nixon had considered his suggestion and decided upon the following: "Your discussion in Brussels on April 14 [to NAC] should include a presentation of Option D sufficiently detailed to enable the Allies to study it and to lay the groundwork for more detailed consultations with them prior to your tabling the Option in Vienna. In this connection, it is important that Option D should be given no less weight than Option C and that it be made clear that the effects of Option D would be as much in the interests of the Allies as in our own." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 877, SALT, SALT Talks (Vienna), Vol. VIII, April 9–May 10, 1970)

MIRV and ABM's with appropriate safeguards. The President stated that he did not want Congressional consultation to start that soon and preferred that we wait until Monday, April 20. He added that it might be of value to call the Congressional Leadership to the White House and do the briefing here on Monday.⁴

The President asked Ambassador Thompson how he thought the Soviets would react in Vienna. The Ambassador replied that they will be extremely cautious because of the current turbulence in their leadership. Ambassador Smith said they may take the lead from our Congressional resolution by tabling a proposed freeze on offensive and defensive weapons. The President emphasized that he wished the negotiators to stick hard on the intricacies of our negotiating position and not to move away from them too quickly before they had been thoroughly discussed and understood.

The President asked Ambassador Thompson to comment on the Soviet fixation for secrecy in its society. Ambassador Thompson stated that they have moved slowly away from their extreme position in the early '50s but that there are signs that they are at least temporarily returning to a Stalinist type regime, although in the long run we can expect the Soviets to loosen up somewhat. Mr. Nitze added that Soviet secrecy was not so much a matter of distrust of other regimes as a deliberate policy of the Soviet elite which was used to control the government and permeate the regime within Russia. Ambassador Thompson added that it is always of value to bring Soviet leaders to the United States so that they could observe the advantages of an open society. The President asked whether or not McCauley's argument, which maintains that now that the Soviets are roughly equal to us in strategic strength they will lose that inward looking and overly secretive demeanor, has any validity. Both Thompson and Nitze discounted the McCauley argument on the grounds that Soviet secrecy is really party policy. The President replied that his reading of Russian history confirms that things have not changed very much over the years and that a recent book he was reading by Tolstoy confirmed that he had censorship problems of his own.

General Allison stated that he understood that the Soviets might ask him to visit Moscow, noting that General Twining was the last military man to have visited the Soviet Union. The President stated that he should accept such an invitation since it would help to break down Soviet suspicions. The President added that we should consider invit-

⁴ According to the President's Daily Diary, President Nixon held no meeting with the Congressional leadership on April 20, or in the immediate days before or after. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

ing some Soviet leaders here for the same purpose, perhaps for the VE-Day celebration. As the group broke up, the President emphasized the importance of their mission and his requirement to maintain the strictest security and to avoid the kind of press speculation which would raise Soviet suspicions as to our motives.

70. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 15, 1970.

SUBJECT

SALT Consultation in the North Atlantic Council (NAC)

Given your deep personal interest in and emphasis on consultation with our allies, I thought you would be interested to know that Gerry Smith's presentation in NAC in Brussels on April 14 was extremely well received. Ambassador Ellsworth reports that the atmosphere "was one of extreme appreciation for (the) comprehensive U.S. presentation, Boon (Netherlands) for example stating that in his nine years in Council he did not recall any presentation so complete on a position to be taken in negotiations, nor one which had shown such trust in alliance. Allies welcomed U.S. comprehensive approach to negotiations, one characterized as balancing caution and initiative, idealism and realism. Allies welcomed fact U.S. approach reflected previous comments in Council and some recalled their earlier statements of preference for alternative III which had now been selected. Canada, Italy, UK, Denmark, Norway and Netherlands made specific point of welcoming U.S. approach, and this was clearly view of Council as a whole with no dissent."

The full text of Ambassador Ellsworth's cable is attached.²

William P. Rogers

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. VIII, April 9–May 10, 1970. Secret. A copy was sent to Haig. Handwritten notations in an unknown hand read: "HAK: FYI" and "Action: S'feldt."

² Attached but not printed is telegram USNATO 1376, April 14.

Round Two at Vienna, April 18–August 13, 1970

71. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

SALT

I am deeply concerned about the manner in which the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Vienna are getting underway.² First, I was shocked to learn Friday evening, April 17, that Ambassador Smith had made an initial statement³ without clearing the statement in Washington. I am under the impression the presentation of the opening statement came as a surprise to others besides me. Second, I was dismayed to find that Ambassador Smith did not indicate in his opening statement, at least as I read the report⁴ of that statement, that Option D⁵ would be presented as part of our opening "package."

Other developments are giving me considerable cause for concern. I have received reports the U.S. Delegation is interpreting and molding Option C to fit preconceived notions which bear strong resemblance to the oft-expressed ACDA position. There are reports, too, the Soviets may be contemplating tabling a MIRV/MRV option which could put us at a considerable disadvantage unless our Option C/Option D plan has been offered in full. In addition, I find no clear system for reviewing the U.S. delegation's proposed statements.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation reads: "No release."

² The second round of SALT negotiations began in Vienna on April 16.

³ Telegram USDEL SALT 11, April 17, summarized opening statements by Smith and Semenov on April 16. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. VIII, April 9–May 10, 1970)

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Negotiating options A–D are set forth in the enclosure to NSDM 51, Document 68.

In my judgment, we must insure expeditiously that both the substance and administration of our negotiating effort are put in order.⁶

Mel Laird

⁶ On April 22 Nixon sent a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Helms, and Smith that expressed his discontent with press leaks concerning the desirability of a moratorium on MIRV and ABM deployment. "These arguments are inconsistent with NSDM 51," he noted, "and undercut our negotiating position at SALT." Nixon added a handwritten note that reads: "Any individual who gives any encouragement to this kind of speculation should be first reprimanded and then discharged." On Laird's copy of the memorandum is a handwritten message: "watch out—close hold; no release; stop; halt." (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 25, SALT, Chronological File) On May 4 Kissinger replied to Laird's concerns. Kissinger assured him that the Backstopping Committee would review future SALT Delegation statements. Kissinger also informed Laird that Nixon had approved supplementary guidance that made the reductions option equal with the MIRV ban approach. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3)

72. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Soviet SALT Proposal at Vienna

The Soviets presented on Monday a comprehensive proposal which is quite vague on details and one-sided in its terms.² It was

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. VIII, April 9–May 10, 1970. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A handwritten and stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "ret'd April 25, 1970." On April 21 Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger an analytical memorandum on the Soviet SALT proposals, upon which Kissinger commented: "Hal—This is a *superb job*." On April 13 Sonnenfeldt had written a letter to Kissinger threatening to leave the NSC staff in mid-1970 for the following reason: "For reasons which you undoubtedly consider valid you have excluded me from meaningful participation in the substantive preparations for SALT. [. . .] Moreover, because of your obvious disinclination to give me access to your views and to other relevant information, it has ceased to make sense for me to function as the NSC staff representative in the interagency bodies concerned with the subjects in question." (Ibid., Box 834, Name Files, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut)

² Smith reported the provisions of the Soviet proposal in telegram USDEL SALT 16, April 20. (Ibid., Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. VIII, April 9–May 10, 1970) Rogers wrote a less-detailed analysis of the Soviet proposal for Nixon in an April 24 memorandum, which Kissinger forwarded to the President on May 4. (Ibid.)

presented in writing, in treaty language, and Semyonov's introductory rationale, emphasizing that it was a "broad" approach taking into account "all aspects and factors," suggests that it was drawn up with an eye to eventual publication.

The key features are:

—a numerical ceiling (undefined) on the aggregate total of ICBMs, ballistic missile launchers on nuclear submarines, and strategic bombers, with freedom to mix all three systems under the ceiling (e.g., the Soviets would be free to build up SS-9s);

—agreed limits on ABMs, defined as those systems "specially designed" to counter ballistic missiles; the limitations would include guidance and detection radars as well as launchers (SAMs and multi-purpose radars are completely ignored);

—Semyonov's accompanying reminder that deployment of ABMs is in an "initial" stage suggests the Soviets may have a low level limit in mind;

—a prohibition of MIRV/MRV installations and production (the two aspects we cannot verify) but not on flight testing or developmental work;

—no other qualitative restrictions; full freedom to replace old missiles with new ones, to continue testing and research and development;

—a sweeping definition of "strategic offensive" weapons which would include any systems capable of striking the USSR; all such nuclear systems to be returned to national territory, withdrawn beyond range, or destroyed;

—there would be no deployment of these weapons to third countries, and no transfer of them to third countries (this entire approach would wreck our NATO arrangements and call for extensive pullbacks in the Far East);

—notable omissions were any reference to Surface-to-Air missiles and air defense, despite the restrictions on strategic aircraft, or any reference to mobile missiles, or the Soviet Intermediate and Medium Range missile systems;

—verification would only be by national means, provided that this was not "prejudicial to national security" and was consistent with international law, not further defined.

In short, there are many loopholes for the Soviets to continue their strategic buildup. The heart of the Soviet approach, however, seems to be based on their broad definition of strategic, so as to include most of our forward deployments and carrier based aircraft, plus their insistence on including control over operational deployments in the SALT context. Until this basic impasse is broken it will be difficult to take up individual provisions in our proposals or discuss theirs.

I am struck with the rather unsophisticated nature of the Soviet plan. The complete lack of details, as well as the crude and one-sided approach to some key issues, suggests a maximum opening position from which the Soviets may or may not be prepared to bargain. At the same time, the Soviet leaders—perhaps because of their internal pre-occupation—may not have really come to grips with the SALT issues. In any case, if there is a Soviet intention to publish their plan, I feel our detailed presentation of our two Options (C and D) will put us in a strong position and well ahead when compared with the vague and self-serving Soviet approach.

73. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 28, 1970.

SUBJECT

Impact of SALT on the Safeguard Debate

The options which we are tabling at Vienna, in accordance with NSDM-51,² both specify the NCA level of ABM. The U.S. is not presently authorized to table any option which permits the Safeguard level of ABM.

The Soviets said Monday,³ apparently after consultation with Moscow, that they “consider it possible” to limit ABM on each side to defense of the national capitals only. Some of our own delegation have interpreted those words to mean that the Soviets have “accepted in principle” limiting ABM to NCA levels.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “No Release.” On April 29 Sonnenfeldt forwarded this memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum that reads in part: “I do not think a response to Mr. Laird is needed. Farley has no present plans to brief Congress and he will check here before he does so.”

² Document 68.

³ In telegram USDEL SALT 34, April 27, Smith provided highlights of Semenov's statements on ABM levels and other issues from that day's plenary session. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. VIII, April 9–May 10, 1970)

A leak which reported that the U.S. had offered to limit ABM to NCA levels and the Soviets had accepted could impact very seriously on the debate in Congress on Safeguard.⁴

The best counter to such a leak, were it to appear, would be to point out that the NCA level of ABM is only one part of a total package which must be considered and assessed in its entirety and can only be strategically acceptable to the U.S. in its entirety. The Soviets have so far rejected major provisions of the package, including the prohibition on upgrading air defense systems to an ABM role. Moreover, they have not agreed to limit ABM to an NCA level, but have only said they consider such a limitation possible. Until we have some earnest indication that the Soviets will accept an equitable total package of verifiable limitations on offensive and defensive systems, we cannot base our actions on their comments on individual ingredients of that total package.

To avoid premature or misleading reports, I believe that no briefings should be authorized outside of the administration during the talks.

Melvin R. Laird

⁴ On April 23 Timmons sent a memorandum to the President that listed the Congressional status on approval of Safeguard II. According to Timmons, the House Armed Services Committee agreed to report Safeguard II as submitted on April 22. House Floor action was anticipated for the week of May 4 at the latest. On April 30 the Senate Armed Services Committee was scheduled to begin final hearings, and Senate Floor action was anticipated for May 30. The Department of Defense expected 49 Senators to support the ABM plan. (Ibid., Box 841, ABM–MIRV, ABM System, Vol. IV, Memos and Misc., February–April 30, 1970)

74. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, May 4, 1970.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Clarification of Provisions of the NSDM 51 SALT Options Paper

This memo clarifies three substantive issues which arose in connection with review by the Backstopping Committee of the Delegation's draft statement for the negotiating session Monday, April 20:²

1. *Volume limits on new ICBMs*: To make it clear that SS-11-type missiles are permitted, the volume limit should be 70 cubic meters, not 65. This affects all four options.

2. *Mobile ABMs*: The reference in the NCA-level ABM provisions of Options B, C, and D to "one hundred ABM launchers, and interceptors, of any type" being permitted means that no distinctions would be drawn between terminal and area interceptors, not that mobiles would be permitted. Deployment as well as testing of mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems would be prohibited under all options.

3. *Challenge inspections*: The challenge inspections referred to in the general verification section of Option C would be in addition to those explicitly provided for in connection with the ban on SAM upgrading and on MIRV/MRV deployment.

The attached pages should be inserted to incorporate these clarifications in the official text of the NSDM 51 SALT Options paper.³

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. VIII, April 9–May 10, 1970. Top Secret. Haig initialed the memorandum.

² See footnote 6, Document 71.

³ The pages are attached but not printed. NSDM 51 with the attached SALT options paper is Document 68.

75. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Verification Panel¹

Washington, May 4, 1970.

SUBJECT

Study of U.S. Programs Under Options C and D

To assist in the presentation of Options C and D and to prepare ourselves for detailed negotiations, the Verification Panel, through its Working Group, will prepare a study of the impact agreement to such options would have on U.S. strategic weapons programs.

The study should address both U.S. programs which are now programmed or under consideration which would have to be modified by reason of the agreement and new or additional programs which would be required as hedges against the uncertainties which would prevail under those options.

Among the issues to be addressed are:

—If there were a MIRV ban, what would we do with the Minuteman III and Poseidon programs? What are the technical problems, lead times, and costs of a program to develop and deploy a single RV for those systems? How, consistent with the terms of the agreement we have proposed, could we prepare ourselves to install MIRVs rapidly in the event of Soviet violation or abrogation? What provisions should the agreement include to insure that necessary U.S. hedge and single RV programs are permitted? Specifically, should deployment (but not testing) of MIRV/MRV dispensing mechanisms be permitted? What, if any, verification problems would be introduced by allowing the Soviets a similar program?

—What U.S. ABM development program (beyond construction of an NCA defense using Safeguard components) would be needed under either Option C or D? What contribution could such a program make to U.S. ability to hedge against Soviet violations or abrogation?

—What offensive missile and bomber programs would be required, either for our basic force posture or as hedges?

—What “quick fixes” would be available to the U.S. for prompt reaction to a violation or abrogation? What programs could increase such fixes?

—What are the problems of transition presented by implementing the provisions of the reductions option?

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 842, ABM–MIRV, ABM System, Vol. VI, May 1970–July 31, 1971. Top Secret. Haig initialed the memorandum.

The study should draw on previous work done on hedges under agreements, but should take advantage of work done since the earlier studies were completed and should be addressed specifically to the provisions outlined in Options C and D.

The study will be conducted under the supervision of the Verification Panel Working Group, by a special study group, chaired by a representative of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The detailed outline and schedule will be determined by the Working Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

76. Letter From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to President Nixon¹

Vienna, May 6, 1970.

Dear Mr. President:

This is my third Vienna report.²

1. The Soviet post-Cambodia May 6 SALT reaction³ strikes us as the minimum one could expect, and I think it evidences continued

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. VIII, April 9–May 10, 1970. Secret; Nodis. Kissinger sent the letter to Nixon on May 19 under a covering memorandum that summarized the report and concluded that “in short, we seem to have ended the first, formal phase and are now entering into a period of some behind-the-scenes probing and maneuvering.” A notation on the covering memorandum indicates that Nixon saw it on May 21.

² Smith also sent personal reports to Nixon on April 20 and April 29. In a May 4 backchannel message, Kissinger informed Smith that Nixon had appreciated his observations of the first session reported in the April 20 letter. Kissinger forwarded the April 29 letter to Nixon on May 6 under a covering memorandum that bears a notation indicating that the President saw it on May 19. (Ibid.)

³ On May 4 at 8:20 p.m. Kissinger and Nixon spoke over the telephone about the relationship between the Cambodia incursion and SALT. According to a transcript of their conversation, Kissinger stated the following: “I just got back a little while ago from the Soviet Embassy and I think we have their attention. They were falling all over me. That fellow Arbatov, who is close to Brezhnev said, ‘What did you think of the Kosygin statement [at his May 4 press conference]?’ I said we expected criticism. He said, ‘We wouldn’t break off SALT talks, [but] if you keep bombing, we may have to.’ I said we need some serious discussions. [. . .] I said you are a great country and what we do in Cambodia has nothing to do with you. It doesn’t affect our relationship unless you want it to.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

serious Soviet interest in reaching some kind of SALT arrangement. There must have been a temptation in the Kremlin at least to suspend the talks until the Cambodian exercise was passed.

2. The Soviet harsh criticism today of the substance of the US approaches is, I think, a reflection of their gripe over Southeast Asia, but more particularly a standard Soviet negotiation ploy for this stage of the talks rather than an indication of the ultimate Soviet attitude toward the two US approaches.

3. There may be some truth in Semenov's statement today that they are still uncertain about US intentions.⁴ That goes for us, too, in respect to their intentions.

4. Next week we plan to present views on the accident/unauthorized launch/provocative attack question⁵ and then go back to amplifying our two approaches.

5. Before the end of May, I think we should have some sense of what, if anything, we can with confidence report to you about Soviet reactions to our approaches and what the general dimensions of an advantageous arrangement might be.

Respectfully,

Gerard Smith⁶

P.S. Thank you very much for your birthday greeting which was most heartening.

⁴ Smith reported Semenov's statement in telegram USDEL SALT 53, May 6. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. VIII, April 9–May 10, 1970)

⁵ Smith summarized Semenov's statements concerning this question in telegram USDEL SALT 43, April 30: "Semenov stressed the need for agreement on 'organizational and technical measures,' taken jointly and individually, to guard against accidental and unauthorized launch, courses of action in the event of such a launch, and measures for diminishing the chances of the outbreak of war through provocative attack by a third party. The only concrete example cited by Semenov was a geographic limitation patrols of SSBNs." (Ibid.)

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears Smith's typed signature.

77. **Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, May 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

The New Phase of SALT

In the past two weeks there has been some interesting movement in the Soviet SALT position, which suggests that a phase of bargaining is beginning.

—On May 4, Semyonov made a tough speech rejecting our two proposals as the basis for negotiations;

—This was followed by a private conversation between Garthoff and a Soviet official, who suggested it was time for both sides to move away from their package proposals and look for areas of agreement; the NCA ABM level was cited as an example;

—At the first private session between Smith and Semyonov, the latter took a similar line; he rejected our proposals and suggested that we return to the work program, i.e., to proceed by categories, offensive, defensive, etc.; agreement on “all” problems would not be necessary;

—At the formal session on May 19, Semyonov claimed agreement to proceed in this fashion, and began to discuss the composition of offensive weapons (with the same old Soviet definition, however);

—At a second private discussion between Garthoff and his Soviet counterparts, the latter began to sketch a “narrow” agreement that backed away from the Soviet formal positions.

The Soviet Bargain

The first step in this tentative Soviet scheme would be some “understanding” on the question of our forward based aircraft. Such an understanding would indicate no augmentation by our side of present deployments; the “understanding” need not be specific, but should be reached *before* tackling specific limitations on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

—In other words, we would make the first concession, accepting the principle behind the Soviet proposal that our forward based aircraft are indeed part of the strategic balance and thus subject to some kind of limitations;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. IX, May 10–June 12, 1970. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, and a stamped notation indicates he saw it on May 23.

—Implicit but apparent from the remainder of the Soviet disquisition, is that in return for an understanding on a freeze, we would also drop our effort to control Soviet MRBM/IRBMs, and cruise missile submarines;

—The Soviets should be aware that one logical counter on our part would be an understanding not to augment these forces.

2. As for the main package, there are two variants:

—First, there could be an agreement limited only to ABMs; the Soviets recalled that we had broached this when we first proposed SALT some years ago; they cited you as telling Dobrynin that a “limited agreement” is possible;

—Second might be an ABM agreement plus some agreement on controlling the “central offensive systems” (our phrase picked up by the Soviets to mean ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers);

—Under this approach we would look at areas of agreement and would narrow differences and seek what the Soviets called a “balance of differences.”

3. The Soviets underlined the importance of an agreement at Vienna. If there were no agreement at Vienna, there was not much use in going back to Helsinki. Even if the agreements could not be final or formal, an agreed basis for a subsequent treaty could be drafted and signed by Kosygin and President Nixon.

4. In addition, the Soviets indicated that their proposals for controlling accidental attacks had no particular priority and should not divert attention from the effort outlined above.

5. Finally, on MIRVs, after a long hagggle over on-site inspection, and the claim that the Soviets had *no* MIRVs, the Soviet side said that in a limited agreement they did *not* believe MIRV could be included.

All of this is not especially surprising. As everyone expected, the Soviets did not intend to stick to their formal package, but will not negotiate on the basis of ours. Apparently, they are more interested in the approach of Option C than Option D. Moreover, it is tactically expedient for the Soviets to untie our package and pick what they want to talk about.

However, this general move toward a possible “narrow” agreement, is going to raise important policy questions about our future course. We can expect to receive shortly a plea from the delegation to be granted some bargaining power and flexibility.

The Soviet bargain is, of course, not a firm offer and there are serious pitfalls. For example, the Soviets are simply walking around the SAM upgrade issues, flatly rejecting any on-site inspections, and, as of now sticking to the idea of three way mix for missiles, submarines, and bombers. As some expected, however, they are not very seriously worried about MIRVs and probably want to develop their own; hence the lack of interest in a flight test ban or a moratorium.

As indicated above, the Soviets seem to be moving toward our Option B. And they are implying urgency, with the warning that if we do not agree now, all may be lost. This will have a powerful appeal to some in Washington and our delegation (Viz. your talk with Harold Brown).²

All of this suggests that it would be well worth convening the Verification Panel and reviewing the status of the talks and possible future courses. While we may not necessarily have to change our position, there is going to be growing pressure to begin what will amount to private negotiations on a step by step approach as Semyonov has proposed.

Finally, any suggestion of an “understanding” on our aircraft in Europe raises the most serious problems of relations with our Allies. While they have been well briefed on the formal Soviet proposals to remove these aircraft, they are unaware of these recent private suggestions about an “understanding.”

In sum, we are at the first important crossroads in Vienna, and it is time to review our next steps.

² See Document 78.

78. Letter From the President of the California Institute of Technology (Brown) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Pasadena, California, May 20, 1970.

Dear Henry,

Thank you for seeing me earlier today, and for the chance to discuss SALT. I will try to convey briefly my reactions to what has happened so far and suggestions about where we go from here.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 808, Name Files, Brown, Harold. Secret. Sent for the attention of Sonnenfeldt. There is no indication that Kissinger saw the letter, but a handwritten notation on the letter reads, “OBE per Sonnenfeldt.” Brown was a former Secretary of the Air Force.

1) I am convinced that the Soviets see advantages in reaching some agreement by the end of July, and I see some for us. But it is clear that neither U.S. approach comes close to being acceptable to them, and their 'basic principles' while still not so clearly defined, are very far indeed from being acceptable to us. We do not yet know whether they are flexible enough to accept an arrangement we could live with. I submit that they don't yet know that about us, either—I suppose this is what the Soviets mean when they question our 'seriousness.' Our next problem is how we and they find out whether agreement is possible.

2) Principal objectives and concerns of the Soviets are:

a) To keep U.S. from getting a country-wide ABM. Safeguard is their greatest concern, because they believe it could quickly be made thick. The possibility of our deploying it is our strongest bargaining point, so long as the Congress is willing to appropriate money for it at some level (e.g. a compromise for FY '71 which started the third site but delayed the rest would serve to keep the negotiating value of Safeguard).

b) They are genuinely concerned about our forward-based aircraft and would like to get them removed. But by now they should realize that this is not in the cards; we would not jeopardize even the current poor state of the NATO alliance so much even for an otherwise acceptable SALT agreement.

c) They are much less eager to stop MIRV/MRV where it is, because they are behind. Clearly there is strong Soviet military pressure to have it; this is responsible for their position to allow its development. They want also to ban production and deployment without inspection, relying on 'trust,' and noting (uniquely for any of the 'principles' in their list) that world opinion is against deployment. Their obvious annoyance at our MIRV positions may stem from a feeling that we played them a nasty trick by offering to ban MRVs (which they didn't expect) while coupling it with on-site inspection (which they thought we had agreed to drop) in one approach, while allowing MIRVs in the other, with the existing U.S. lead preserved though not frozen.

d) They continue to want numerical equality of an unspecified sort. Clearly, what they would prefer is to catch up to equality wherever they are behind while freezing an advantage wherever they have it (except for the NCA defense, where we could catch up—if Congress is willing to accept another change in ABM system); well, who wouldn't? We would like to do the reverse. More precisely, they may hope to fix numbers and allow qualitative improvement in principle, but count on anti-military sentiment to stop it in the U.S. in practice.

3) Where do we go from here? We should try to pin them down more closely, using as a framework the agreement between Smith and Semenov to take up the work program.

a) Beyond pinning them down, we can stick, and they can too, spending the rest of the Vienna phase in debate. I am concerned that in this case they, and we, may become increasingly suspicious and turn away without finding out whether there is a mutually advantageous and mutually acceptable agreement.

b) We can adopt fall-backs or new packages. Though this would get new reactions from them, it might well encourage them to believe we are more eager than they and that they should therefore ask for more and wait us out. In fact I think they have as much to gain as we in security, economy, and political benefit, and we should not give them signals encouraging them to believe otherwise. At the same time, I judge that the leadership in Moscow is in fact more disunited on this issue than is the USG, and therefore more likely to react to our initiatives than to come up with new ideas of their own.

c) We can try to find out where they will give, and how far, and in exchange for what. The ideal would be to do so without letting them know that about us, so that the President could make final choices freely on the basis of full information. But in fact the delegation will have to convey some information about U.S. attitudes on the negotiability of individual elements and about their tradeoffs. The kind of statement-question which needs to be exchanged informally and privately is,—
 “We can’t possibly accept A, but perhaps we could work out something involving B and C. I don’t know whether my government would be willing, but if you think yours might, I’ll pursue it at home.”

But to say even this much one needs to have one or more possibly acceptable outcomes in mind. These would be referents with respect to which the delegation would be trying to get Soviet reactions without revealing what these conceptual outcomes were until one was chosen later as the basis of a specific proposal. By probing Soviet attitudes toward characteristics of these outcomes, a picture of one or more possible Soviet minimum positions may emerge. They would probably get a corresponding picture of ours, but we would not have set our positions forth explicitly, much less made a choice among them.

I favor this third approach. It requires, however, construction of such ‘possibly acceptable outcomes.’

4) I think this construction should take place in Washington, not only in Vienna by the delegation. Let me give some examples, with comments, and without endorsing any of them.

a) First, there is a separable item. This is forward aircraft plus MR/IRBMs. We want the first unlimited, the second limited. They want the reverse. Possibly acceptable outcomes: both excluded from the agreement; both tacitly limited to present numbers (no new IRBM silos to prevent new SS–11s in IRBM holes). This can be attached to any of the other examples.

b) Option D without reductions; this is, option B. This allows MIRVs, and an NCA defense. By not reducing, it makes the forces more unstable than D, but less so than without any agreement. The Soviets must be negative about a reductions item which hits only their principal strategic force. This agreement, though less complex than D, would still be comprehensive and unlikely to be achieved this summer.

c) Option C without on-site inspection. This meets the Soviet stated desire to ban MIRV. By forbidding testing of MRV this approach gives us *some* assurance against their deployment. On-site inspection would provide more deterrent, but in practice the Soviets could store replacement front-ends nearby, deploy singlets and replace them on short notice. The SAM upgrade verification loses more by omitting on-site inspection, and this question is critical to a U.S. judgment on whether C without inspection is in fact an acceptable outcome. It would be most valuable to know whether the Soviets would accept a MRV test ban and tough collateral constraints if we would forego on-site inspection. To find out may require that we ask them, being as careful as possible not to commit ourselves, but recognizing that asking the question indicates some degree of U.S. interest and risks charges of bad faith if we later decide not to follow up a Soviet expression of interest.

This outcome would also probably take longer than summer to negotiate—and we would be negotiating a removal of some U.S. MIRVs which by that time have been deployed.

d) A simpler and more limited agreement, covering perhaps 4 a) above, NCA ABM, and an offensive force limit. The last item is a vital part of such a package, because the second is our big trading card and we must get a lot for it. Examples: i) Soviets to complete forces under construction up to a total of 1710 SLBM/ICBM (as in Options C, D). No mobile land-based missiles. No mixing. ii) Soviets can complete all presently under construction but phase out SS-7/8 (would give total of about 1800 SLBM/ICBM), or not phase out SS-7/8 (would give about 1900). This Soviet advantage would then compensate for the U.S. bomber number advantage. In (i) Soviets might demand U.S. bomber phasedown; we could respond by asking for selection of other than SS-9s for completion to the number 1710.

There are many other variations.

e) I believe that 4 a) combined with 4 d) is likely to prove the most promising line. But the Washington national security apparatus should explore all of the above, and others, to provide a framework for interrogation of the Soviets. And we must also try to work the negotiations so that we are not stuck with the onus of having drawn back from a MIRV ban (Option C) or reductions (Option D) and forced a narrow agreement (though what a great advance it would be) while the Soviets wanted something 'comprehensive' (their 'basic principles').

By virtue of my own past and present experience, I remain highly conscious of the difference between giving advice and having responsibility. Take the above thoughts for what you think they are worth.

I appreciate very much your willingness to convey to the President the statement signed by 1000 Caltech people. In turn I will continue to remind our academic community that, whatever criticisms of Government policy may be warranted, there is no other entity in the American body politic (or elsewhere in America) which can provide coherent leadership if the President's ability to lead is destroyed.

Sincerely,

Harold Brown

79. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, May 26, 1970.

Those in attendance:

Spiers, Richardson, Packard, Tucker, Wheeler, Helms, Farley, Mitchell, Kissinger, Demler, Hyland, Keeny, Duckett, Sonnenfeldt, Lynn, Slocombe.

HAK: Should review where we stand, where to go from here. Instructions to Delegation were: Present D and C, listen to Soviets, President would decide where we go.

Phil, would you give us a report.

Farley: Positions have been presented with a few exceptions:

B-52s for Bombers
Fallbacks on IR/MR, SLCMs
Technical details—OSI
Limit on ABM radar

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969-3/8/72. No classification marking. Kissinger called the meeting in order to discuss issues raised in telegram USDEL SALT 80, May 20, in which Smith asked for revised instructions allowing him more flexibility to explore Soviet reactions to modifications of the U.S. position. On May 22 Sonnenfeldt and Lynn forwarded telegram USDEL SALT 80 to Kissinger. (Ibid., Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. IX, May10-June 12, 1970) On May 25 Lynn sent Kissinger talking points, a copy of USDEL SALT 80, and related enclosures for the Verification Panel meeting. (All *ibid.*, Box 842, ABM-MIRV, ABM System, Vol. VI, May 1970-July 31, 1971)

The Delegation has raised question whether it is necessary or desirable to go much further in setting forth C & D to serve purposes of NSDM 51²—i.e., judge Soviet views, acceptability of C & D.

Generally a negotiation with good sense of direction, movement.

HAK: What movement?

Farley: All on the Soviet side.

HAK: Unique in post-war history.

Farley: Non-transfer: moved to Smith's Helsinki formula.

NCA level ABM.

Side-talks: may be only probes but significant:

—rather than withdraw forward-based aircraft, understanding not to increase.

—asked about setting aside both tactical air, IR/MRBMs.

—some receptivity to limit on size of missiles.

[LEL: Also MIRV ban not essential.]³

Farley: Indicate enough plausibility to think Soviets are interested in seeing if there can be an agreement. Soviets talking about their being great urgency, but feeling of total picture is pretty good.

HAK: Ron?

Spiers: Generally agree. Hard to tell if hints are authoritative, but Soviets don't hint unless there is some willingness to move in that direction. Talk of hurry is a tactic. Continued mutual discussion of positions is useful.

Mitchell: Are they trying to break out ABM?

Farley: Different things: one Soviet has talked of a separate ABM agreement, another that would have to limit both offensive/defensive but could start talking about ABM in detail, since there is some agreement there.

Spiers: Ready to jump either way.

Mitchell: Would they leak it ["agreement" on NCA] for U.S. domestic purposes?

Farley: Quite possible.

Packard: Encouraged by private conversations. Up to them, just probing. On ABM, we're in a box because NCA defense isn't Congressionally tenable. We're in a difficult position on that.

HAK: Depends on how you define NCA level.

Richardson: Do it like COSVN, could be anyplace.

HAK: You haven't got directive on taking a positive attitude.

² Document 68.

³ All brackets are in the original.

Packard: Should not get pushed, but have made some progress. Should talk ABM in terms of other levels, zero/Safeguard. See if there's any interest. I don't think C is on—too many issues. There are enough indications of their attitude that we should consider putting together another option which would represent what we think could be achieved at this time:

—put aside forward based MR/IR.

—OSI won't be acceptable; we should think about A or B or variations:

—e.g., They've indicated interest in mobiles—We could consider land-mobiles as alternative survivability measure for actions defense.

—one way mix: I don't see why we got on to that.

Wheeler: Because JCS opposed it.

HAK: To prevent them trading sea-based for SS-9.

Packard: If we get separate limit on 9s, that would be no problem.

HAK: You want to let them have land mobiles.

Richardson: Should look at it again. We should look again. Delegation should continue explorations while we re-assess U.S. position toward a more acceptable option.

C is not on. Rather than tinkering with it, should get new option.

HAK: D?

Packard: I'd push that some more.

Farley: Their categories are different from ours—They put strategic bombers in offensive mix. We could get them in in some way.

Packard: They are concerned about bombers, seem to be thinking of lower number.

HAK: Wheeler, your impression?

Wheeler: Three points:

—Time running out is a tactic. We should tell Delegation to settle down;

—Some value in issuing some search warrants,⁴ so long as it is clear that we aren't making new proposals;

—Re-assess U.S. position. We would get only a simple, quantitative agreement—no OSI, no qualitative controls, except maybe missile size.

⁴ In telegram USDEL SALT 80, May 20, Smith wrote: "if in the next phase we are to 'search and explore' for common ground between the several parts of each side's basic approaches, it is to be expected that the delegation will be seeking Washington support for 'search warrants' that go somewhat beyond the holy writ of NSDM-51."

HAK: Dick?

Helms: I agree with what has been said. Soviets would prefer to take it item by item, e.g., don't want to relate ABM to offensive. One of our decisions is whether we want to go on piecemeal basis.

Packard: Real dangers if you talk about individual elements without clearly reviewing final decision until see whole picture. Should explore all three ABM levels.

Farley: We have packages on table, that puts a background to protect us in individual discussion.

HAK: We are, then, agreed:

—Go 2–3 weeks on present packages.

—Don't let them get away on their proposal of a MIRV ban without either OSI or flight test controls. Are they serious?

—We will face same issues:

What is U.S. NCA level ABM? Does it give radars to expand to bigger ABM or strictly a defense of Washington.

We should address also:

—Where has there been movement on Soviet side; where are their categories different from ours.

Working group will do papers on these issues.

Wheeler: Seems a useful work program.

Richardson: You referred to getting WG to consider indications of movement.

1. Agree, but related exercise is a critique of position with each side: where are the logical weaknesses, signs of vulnerability? From this we could consider whether or in what ways we could modify U.S. position.

2. Also, what's a search warrant? Difficult job is going to be going from exposition of unilaterally proposed U.S. package to negotiated, bargained actual agreement. Need full chronological/tactical plan. Difficulty of negotiation process of this kind is that neither side is sure where other would give, tending to wait for other to act.

Several suggestions on additional work:

—mobiles; HAK: I agree.

—MIRV production ban: Their position is absurd now, with no OSI or test ban. But we're in effect proposing stockpiles—which could be hard to defend (domestically).

—trade off U.S. IR/MRBM position vs. theirs on forward-based aircraft. Tacit basis?

—strategic bombers in aggregate?

Main thing both here and in Vienna is the dynamics/the process of moving from general exposition to hammering out agreement.

Mitchell: First step is search warrants.

HAK: Two weeks from today, WG will have papers ready. Decision a week or so later.

Packard: What new instructions do we need to get to Vienna before then?

Farley: Delegation doesn't need too much. Understood they are to draw out Soviets without changing present position. Will tell them that.⁵ Two week time table is good idea; should be met.

⁵ In telegram 81896 to USDEL SALT, May 27, Richardson summarized the Verification Panel meeting. He informed the delegation that a list of assessments to assist in understanding the differences between the U.S. and Soviet positions would be forwarded after the Verification Panel Working Group had formulated them. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. IX, May 10–June 12, 1970)

80. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 6, 1970.

SUBJECT

SALT Status

As requested, the following is an outline of major developments, a summary of our position, plus detailed background on the Soviet position on individual items:

Outline of Main Developments

The first phase lasted roughly from the opening on April 16 to about early May, during which both sides presented formal positions.

We presented Option C on April 20 and the Soviets presented their "Basic Provisions" on the same day.

Soviet Basic Provisions include as first presented:

—aggregate limit on ICBMs, "nuclear" submarine launched missiles, and strategic bombers; freedom to mix among all three, mobile missiles permitted;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 877, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. IX, May 10–June 12, 1970. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

- withdrawal of forward based offensive and defensive nuclear delivery systems capable of striking the USSR;
- a limit (undefined) on ABMs;
- ban on MIRV/MRV deployment and production (but not flight testing);
- no transfer of technology to third countries;
- continuing consultations;
- verification by national means.

Note: Excluded are Soviet submarine launched cruise missiles, diesel submarines, medium bombers, and MR/IRBMs.

On April 27 Semyonov announced that having considered our proposals and consulted Moscow it was “possible” to agree to limit ABMs to insuring the defense of a single target—“the national capitals.”

On April 30 we presented Option D.

At the May 6 session, Semyonov, in effect, rejected both of our approaches: “The American delegation’s proposals taken as a whole evoke feeling of serious dissatisfaction in many respects.”

Interim Phase

In a private conversation on May 8 a member of the Soviet delegation (Grinevsky) told Garthoff that both US approaches were “quite unacceptable to the Soviet side.” The first because it includes on site inspection; the second because it allowed MIRVs. He suggested it would be necessary to get away from packages on both sides and recalled American comment in Helsinki on a possible “narrow” agreement to be followed by negotiation on other elements.

In the first private Semyonov–Smith conversation (May 13) the former took much the same line: that our comprehensive proposal was not really comprehensive since it excluded forward based aircraft. Since the two sides had failed to agree on a broad and comprehensive approach, Semyonov proposed returning to the Helsinki work program and proceeding with discussion of individual items to see if “points of congruence could be developed.”

Concentrating on Offensive Limits

In the plenary meeting of May 19, Semyonov proceeded on the understanding that the talks would follow the Helsinki program and take up offensive systems item by item. Their position is that we should concentrate on “central” strategic systems, a phrase we used first, and which the Soviets define as ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.

In private, however, the Soviets elaborated more freely on some of their positions. They hinted at some deal for forward based aircraft, rejected some illustrative aggregate of 2200 as too high, and began to play down the importance of MIRVs.

At the same time, in private they began stressing the urgency of some agreement in Vienna, without which resumption in Helsinki would not be worthwhile; they periodically implied that Cambodia might affect the talks.

On May 26 Semyonov, in effect, dropped the demand for control on forward based aircraft, on condition the USSR would be “compensated” in other strategic offensive systems (later defined as a bonus in ICBMs or SLBMs).

On June 1, in the second private Semyonov–Smith conversation, Smith said Washington was working on digesting and analyzing the situation in Vienna and in the meantime he could not alter our position. Smith pressed for clarification of specific numbers in Soviet proposals for limitation of offensive systems, but Semyonov wanted agreement in principle first.

On June 2, Semyonov was sharply critical of “actual start and speeding up” US MIRV deployment which raised doubts that the US wanted MIRV agreement; he has also cited Laird’s May 12 statement that “without preserving our strength there would be no need, no incentive for the other side to negotiate.”²

On June 2 Secretary Rogers saw Dobrynin³ and told him that Smith had asked him to impress upon the Soviets that it would be helpful if they would be more specific with respect to their SALT proposals and answers to our questions. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets were at a point of trying to sort out the proposals and attempting to ascertain whether it could be useful to concentrate on a broad approach or focus on items which might be the subject of initial limited agreement.

Option C (As presented April 20)

ICBMs and SLBMs

Aggregate total of 1710; completion of systems under construction permitted in proportion to systems now operational; SS-9s limited to 250.

Retrofitting of launchers with missiles not previously deployed limited to volume of 70 cubic meters.

Freedom to substitute sea based missiles for land based.

No relocation or modification of ICBMs in externally observable ways.

Deployment and testing of land mobile ICBMs prohibited.

No additional MR/IRBM silos allowed.

² Reference is to Laird’s statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

³ No record of this conversation has been found.

Agreed procedures for notification and implementation of launcher destruction and replacement.

Use of covered facilities for fitting-out and overhaul, conversion and berthing submarines and surface ships prohibited.

MR/IRBMs

Numbers limited to those operational.

Relocation or modification in externally observable ways prohibited.

Deployment and testing of mobile prohibited.

Limitation (e.g. size) would be placed on permitted mobile systems in order to assure compliance with ban on mobile MR/IRBMs.

Cruise Missile Systems

Testing or deployment of fixed land based or land mobile cruise missiles of medium or greater range prohibited.

Submarine and associated launchers for cruise missiles (SLCMs) would be limited to an equal number.

Bombers

Heavy strategic bombers limited to currently operational category composed of B-52 and Soviet heavy bombers.

No limitation on aircraft other than heavy strategic bombers.

MRV/MIRVs

Prohibition on deployment and flight testing of missiles bearing multiple re-entry vehicles (except Polaris A-3).

Flight test prohibition applies to any missiles with multiple re-entry vehicle dispensing mechanisms, and vehicles which could maneuver independently; missiles already deployed would be withdrawn.

Additional flight test prohibition including post-boost and atmospheric maneuvering RVs; endo-atmospheric pen-aids.

Tests preannounced; conducted on agreed ranges.

Verification by on-site inspection.

ABMs

Limited to that number appropriate to defense of national command authority; 100 launchers and interceptors permitted with associated radars.

Agreement on the retention, replacement or dismantling of existing radars possessing technical capabilities for contributing to ABM systems beyond that permitted for NCA defense.

Limitation on radars suitable for ABM role.

Agreements to conduct talks, in future, on requirements and plans for radars other than ABM radars.

ABM flight tests and confidence firings would be preannounced and limited to agreed number, at agreed test ranges.

Testing of mobile sea based, air based and space based ABMs prohibited.

Upgrading of SAMs prohibited. *On-site inspection.*

Option D (Presented April 30)

Reductions

Initial ceiling of 1710 ICBMs and SLBMs.

ICBM launchers destroyed at rate of 100 a year over 7 years.

After January 1, 1978 the aggregate total ceiling would be 1000.

MRV/MIRVs would not be limited.

Similar ABM limits as in Option C.

MR/IRBMs reduced at rate of 40 per year for 7 years down to agreed ceiling on January 1, 1978.

Background on Specific Soviet Positions

Tactical Aircraft

—They argue that any reasonable definition of “strategic offensive weapons” must include those systems capable of reaching the national territory of either side;

—their proposal is that such systems be withdrawn to geographical limits, returned home or destroyed;

—in several private conversations the Soviets tested our reaction to an “understanding”:

- a. understanding not to augment;
- b. finding “common ground” on assumption that US aircraft would remain under US control and overall US-Soviet balance would be preserved;
- c. consideration of trade off of IR/MRBMs and forward based aircraft;

—On May 26 Semyonov offered to withdraw this proposal on the condition that the Soviets receive “compensation” in other strategic offensive systems;

—compensation has not been precisely defined, but Semyonov privately made it clear that this would be a bonus in the form of number of ICBMs or SLBMs;

—we have rejected principle of compensation in such terms.

—we have rejected principle of compensation in such terms.

Aggregates and Mixes

The formal Soviet proposal is that “equal levels” (aggregate) should be established for the combined total of ICBMs, SLBMs (nuclear

powered only), and “strategic” bombers (undefined); within this total there would be complete freedom to interchange one system for another:

—The Soviets have indicated no numbers; Semyonov has said agreement on numbers should await agreement to the composition of the aggregate;

—in private the Soviets were critical of our use of 2200 as an illustration of their proposal, implication being that this is much too high; they indicated they were thinking of numbers “considerably lower” than those used by Secretary Laird; in a conversation on May 27, one Soviet used 2000 as a hypothetical illustration;

—all Soviets have insisted that strategic bombers be included in totals (defined as B-52, B-58, and FB-111 from US);

—General Gryzlov states, however, that bombers should be limited to numerical ceiling (presumably equal for both sides) *rather than* present level (Soviets may consider this a “reduction”);

—in defending 3-way freedom to mix, one Soviet suggested we should accept it if as we proposed there was a limit of 250 on SS-9s and limit on size of new missiles.

Qualitative Limits

The Soviet basic provision permits all modifications to existing systems; relocation, replacement, retrofitting:

—in private, however, the Soviets have hinted at receptivity to some special controls on SS-9s: Shchukin hinted to Nitze that he understood our concern about large missiles and thought agreement on this might be worked out on limiting size (we propose 70cm, in order to exclude new SS-9s);

—Kishilov told Garthoff that specific limitations could be discussed, e.g., SS-9s within context of offensive limits;

—as noted above, the Soviets have hinted that our proposal to limit SS-9s to specific number (250) was not ruled out.

Mobiles

No restrictions in the Soviet proposals, but we propose complete ban:

—there has not been much discussion; they claim there is no difference between permitting mobiles than in transferring land-based to sea-based platforms, would, in effect, make retaliatory capabilities more stable;

—they claim mobiles are so cumbersome and slow that verification is a simple matter of frequency of observations;

—they seem to recognize validity of argument permitting mobile MR/IRBMs to undermine limit on ICBMs because of verification difficulties.

MR/IRBMs

From the outset they have argued these systems are excluded by the Soviet definition that strategic offensive must be able to hit national territory:

- in private they have acknowledged question of relevance to verifying ICBM limits;

- they have also acknowledged in private US point that SS-11s are deployed in MR and IRBM sites but must be counted as ICBMs;

- as noted above, they have made some attempt to link our dropping MR/IRBM restraints and their “understanding” over our forward-based aircraft.

Reductions

Semyonov claimed that the Soviet “basic provisions” include reductions, but has not explained how:

- one Soviet said that reductions could be accomplished by destruction of forward-based aircraft, and by establishing a ceiling for offensive aggregate.

(Note: This latter statement if taken together with other statements about “equal level” could mean we must reduce bombers to get under 2000 aggregate; at the same time, the Soviets might ask for reduction of SLBM to their level; this might explain their rejection of our calculation of an overall total of 2200 (ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers) in trying to illustrate their three-way aggregate; they may envisage picking the lower ceiling for systems, where we outnumber them, e.g. about 300 SLBMs, 300 bombers, plus 1400 missiles=2000.)

MIRVs

The formal position is to ban the production of multiple warheads and their deployment:

- the Soviet explanation, as well as their attack on our position, is confusing;

- they acknowledge there is no way to monitor production;

- they reject on-site inspection because it would be ineffective; warheads could be put on missiles as soon as inspectors depart;

- they argue that in refusing to stop production we want to stockpile MIRVs, while stopping further Soviet testing;

- recently they have made it clear they have little interest in a MIRV ban; Pleshakov (the Minister of Radio Technology) argues that a production ban would be a “gentlemen’s agreement;” a ban on testing would be of little value, since both sides had done enough to deploy multiple warheads; the difference between MIRV and MRV was not sufficient to make a distinction; deployment of MIRV/MRV would

make ABM systems or an ABM agreement of little significance; lack of agreement on MIRVs would not alter present situation, however, since each side has about same technology, and relative situation remains unchanged;

—*another Soviet* said that the US had developed and flight tested MIRV but Soviets had not; US could produce and deploy;

—same official said that in limited agreement, he did not believe there could be MIRV limitations;

—Soviets have also indicated in private that our pressing time issue created difficulty in the way of an agreement.

ABMs

On April 27 the Soviets said that limitation to NCA level was possible:

—their position has been that numbers and other details (e.g. radar limitations) could be settled later;

—the Soviet “basic provisions,” by definition, rule out consideration of SAMs, which they contend have only “theoretical,” or marginal ABM capability;

—radar questions have not been discussed at length; but controls indicated for BMEWs and PARs;

—at one point the Soviets hinted that agreement on ABMs alone was possible but now have backed off of this idea;

—on two occasions the Soviets have indicated concern that agreement on NCA level was tied to our packages, and that if offensive mix was changed, we would want level of ABM changed; we have not denied this was possible;

—one Soviet official claimed that they had intended originally to propose zero level.

(Note: Much less discussion has occurred on the defensive category, but will begin fairly soon.)

Comprehensive and Limited Agreement

The trend of Soviet argumentation in private is running more and more in favor of limited agreement:

—this is roughly defined as ABM agreement (presumably NCA level) plus limits on “central” offensive systems: ICBMs, SLBMs, and “strategic bombers;”

—one Soviet official said that such a limited arrangement would have to be conditional on understanding on some limit on our forward-based aircraft (presumably the “compensation” idea);

—the Soviets have supported need for early agreement by references to increasing urgency; underlined by “grave” doubts about SALT;

—at one point (May 22) Semyonov and Kishilov expressed “serious concern” over the situation at Vienna, stressing that “time drawing short;” Moscow supposedly had “serious reservations;” General Ogarkov, who returned to Moscow, would tell Marshal Grechko and even “higher level” officials that the US was standing firm on “unacceptable positions;”

—both Soviets emphasized urgent need for two sides to seek lines of possible agreement;

—more recently, the Soviets have relaxed somewhat;

—they said they would wait for Washington to review its position;

—on June 2 Dobrynin told Rogers the Soviets were trying to sort out our proposals, and determine whether to focus on a broad approach or on items for an “initial, limited agreement.”

81. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 10, 1970, 7:30 p.m.–1 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

SALT

We then turned to SALT. Dobrynin said that he wanted to find out whether our understanding of April² was still adequate, i.e., whether we were still prepared to have a limited agreement, and if so, how we should handle business in Vienna. Should we tell our negotiators in Vienna that they had gone far enough or that we wanted them to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 1 [Part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The conversation took place on the Presidential yacht *Sequoia*. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum to Nixon on June 15 under cover of a memorandum, upon which Nixon underlined and wrote “very significant! China. Phase II” next to Kissinger’s statement: “The Soviet definition [of a limited agreement] consists of limiting ABMs to defense against third country attacks.” The entire memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 168.

² See Documents 64 and 66.

explore a little further; or did we want to charge them with making specific agreements?

I told him that it seemed to me that the negotiators in Vienna could go on for another three weeks, during which time he and I might discuss the specific principles of a settlement and agree on a general outline. We could then decide whether to have that taken up at Vienna or whether we should have it discussed in some other forum. Dobrynin said this was agreeable to him and that their delegation would be instructed accordingly.

He then asked me what I understood by a limited agreement. I said that to us a limited agreement meant a ceiling on offensive weapons and a limitation on defensive weapons to what we call national command authority levels. Dobrynin said this was not a very limited agreement because it encompassed the whole range of strategic forces.

I asked him whether the Soviets had another definition. He said that to the Soviets limited agreement meant that the Soviets probably would prefer a limitation on ABM deployment with some general agreement about protection against provocative attacks, which he explained meant third country attacks. I told him that this was almost certainly unacceptable to us. It would be more useful to explore some package that involved ceilings on all strategic forces.

Dobrynin then said that this raised a number of issues. Our package had been weighted against the Soviet Union. For example, we had established a ceiling of 1,710 missiles and a separate ceiling of the existing forces of bombers, giving us 500 and giving them 250. This established an inequality which was unfortunate, of course. There were some Soviet scientists who said both sides already possessed overkill and therefore it didn't make any difference. He did not want to argue that point, but he did wish to point out that the symbolic effect of the Soviet Union accepting inferiority in any category would be very bad and very hard to sell.

Another aspect of the bomber package was that the Soviet Union had no equivalent for our aircraft carriers and, therefore, there should be some limitation on their deployment. I pointed out that aircraft carriers did not play a significant role in our strategy against the Soviet Union, but that any limitation on their deployment would affect their utility against other countries. Dobrynin said that if we were concerned about aircraft carriers we had to agree to the principle of some form of compensation for the Soviets, either in the form of giving them additional units of missiles or in some other way. He also pointed out that we were counting their tanker planes as bombers while we did not count ours.

I told him that the way to advance this problem would be for him to give me some idea of what they meant by compensation. If it was a symbolic compensation, we might consider it. If it was a major one, it

would be difficult. I also pointed out to him that NCA levels involved limitations on radars and not just on missiles. He asked me to explain this, and I gave him a brief explanation of the differential lead time between missiles and radars. Dobrynin replied that radars useful for missile tracking were clearly distinguishable from others. He thought this was a proposition that could be entertained as long as it did not involve the destruction of existing radars and only limitations on building new ones. We summed up the results of this part of the discussion as follows:

1. The Vienna Conference would go on for another three weeks exploring the packages.
2. In the meantime, Dobrynin and I would work on the general principles.
3. He would give me some idea of what the Soviet Union understood by compensation.
4. I would explore whether there were other limitations available on the bombers. (I was thinking of the fact that budgetary reasons might force us to reduce our bomber force and that we might throw that into the equation.)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

**82. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(Packard) to the President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, June 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

SALT Objectives and Tactics

The Vienna SALT talks have come to the point at which we must assess our position and provide new instructions to the Delegation. I believe these instructions should take the form of a new proposal with which we can attempt to achieve an agreement at Vienna by mid-October or, at the latest, November. Negotiation of at least a limited agreement at Vienna which halts Soviet construction of offensive missile launchers, which possibly limits ABMs, and which forms the basis for discussion of a more complete agreement at Helsinki is important for three reasons.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached note indicates that copies were sent to Rogers, Helms, Wheeler, and Farley.

—Taking advantage of the Soviet delegation's apparent desire to reach some agreement at Vienna, it could place immediate constraints on their current deployment of SS-9s, SS-11s, and SLBMs and commit them to further discussion of specific issues at Helsinki.

—The squeeze on the national budget is getting tighter, as will become apparent by December, when the FY72 budget is in final preparation. The large reductions in Defense programs, including strategic forces, which likely will be necessary as a result of the nation's economic problems will be much more acceptable to the Congress and the public if there has been visible progress in SALT. The economic situation should not stampede us into either unilateral force reductions which endanger our security or a hasty and ill-conceived agreement with the Soviet Union. It does, however, have a significant effect on the timing of our SALT tactics.

—The public disclosure in December of unilateral strategic force reductions would decrease our bargaining leverage with the Soviets if no agreement had been concluded, but could be offered as a sign of good intentions if a limited agreement had been negotiated.

Several decisions are needed at this time.

1. Do we want to press for an agreement in Vienna by November?
2. If so, what new proposal should the Delegation be authorized to make?
3. What should be our tactics at Vienna? The alternatives include:
 - break for a few weeks now and reconvene at Vienna after we have a new proposal;
 - present a new proposal, then break in mid-July and reconvene in August at Vienna, after Moscow has considered our proposal;
 - press for an agreement at Vienna, with no break.

I have attached the outline of a proposed initial agreement with the Soviets. I would like to present this proposal at the Principals' meeting next Wednesday.²

David Packard

Attachment³

Outline for Proposed Limited Agreement

Mix of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers (B-52, Bear, Bison, Cass A) at total level of 1900 ± 100, with the exact limits to be negotiated within 6 months after the agreement is signed.

² June 24.

³ Secret.

Soviet SLCMs, Medium Bombers, MR/IRBMs set aside as is U.S. forward air.

No constraints on characteristics (i.e. mobility, payload, etc.) except missiles of SS-9 size cannot exceed 250. (Possibly require no new silo construction?)

The U.S. will reduce its Safeguard or other defense of Minuteman or bombers⁴ (about 400 interceptors) in proportion to the reduction the Soviets are willing to make in the 250 SS-9 force (9s can be replaced by other systems).

Area ABM Possibilities

Conditions on Soviets

U.S. System

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Destroy the Moscow System and those Hen Houses which observe U.S. threat tubes. Extensive SAM controls, but no on-site inspection.⁵ 2. Keep Hen Houses and Moscow system. Extensive SAM controls, but no on-site inspection. 3. Keep Hen Houses and Moscow system. Limited SAM controls. 4. Temporarily setting aside specific conditions on area defense component of ABM, but agree to negotiate these within one year of signing the agreement.⁶ | <p>Zero Area ABM</p> <p>7 site PAR network plus NCA defense</p> <p>7 site PAR plus MSR network with area interceptors whose level depends on extent of SAM controls and Soviet ABM.</p> <p>Continue present Safeguard program for one year at least.</p> |
|---|--|

Understanding that discussion of mutual reductions in both offense and ABM defense are to follow first agreement.

⁴ If a zero area ABM is agreed to, then the Minuteman or Bomber defense would have to be a system other than Safeguard. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁵ Preferred possibilities. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁶ Preferred possibilities. [Footnote is in the original.]

83. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 23, 1970, 6:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

The conversation came about in the following way. First, there were indications that the Soviet delegation wanted to wind up the SALT talks in Vienna. Secondly, Gerry Smith was pressing for new instructions authorizing him to offer a more limited option. Third, the President did not want the settlement to be arrived at in Vienna but, if possible, at a summit meeting. He asked me to find out from Dobrynin what the Soviet real intentions were, especially with respect to the conversations we had had in April prior to Dobrynin's departure for Moscow where it was agreed that, if possible, if there should be a deadlock in Vienna, we would break it at a summit.²

I saw Dobrynin in the Map Room of the White House and said to him that we were at a point where some decisions had to be made with respect to instructions for the Vienna delegation and that it would help us to understand Soviet intentions properly. I said Semyonov's suggestion of an early end of the Vienna phase could lead to three interpretations: (1) the Soviet Union did not want an agreement on SALT this year at all; (2) the Soviet Union wanted an agreement at Vienna and was using this device in order to elicit a different American proposal; and (3) the Soviet Union wanted an agreement but not at Vienna and was stalemating the talks there in order to permit the other leaders to settle the issue. I would appreciate Dobrynin's guidance.

Dobrynin, who was noticeably more businesslike and less cordial than at previous meetings, said the first interpretation was clearly out of the question. The Soviet Union did want an agreement on SALT even though our two positions were not yet close enough to set a definite date. As for Vienna, it was the Soviet Union's judgment that an agreement, including offensive and defensive weapons, could not be negotiated in the time available at Vienna. As for the third interpretation, he was without instructions and he would have to inquire in Moscow.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 1 [Part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in the Map Room of the White House. The memorandum of conversation is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 171.

² See Documents 64 and 66.

Dobrynin asked what I thought of an agreement confined to ABM. I said I saw no reason to change our position since the last time we met.³

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

³ See Document 81.

84. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 24, 1970, 11:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger
Royal B. Allison
Gerard Smith

SUBJECT

SALT

I asked the President if I could advise Semenov on Friday² about the general situation regarding a limited approach. The President wants such a move deferred until after the first of July because of the Cambodian situation. He seemed to have no doubt in his mind that we should go for a limited agreement. I stressed that an agreement was by no means a sure thing and that if any budgetary factors were injected into the picture, our bargaining power would be lessened, and asked him to instruct me not to allow budgetary matters to affect the negotiations. He did so in strong terms saying that the budgetary situation was another matter and should not influence our judgment about SALT.

I raised the question of whether or not we should shoot for something “substantial” to come out of Vienna and although this was not

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383–97–0010, Director’s Files, Smith Files, Smith/Farley Chronological Records, Box 1, SALT, Progress Reports with White House Officials, March–August 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Smith. The meeting was held in the White House. The memorandum of conversation is marked Part II; Part I was not found. On June 24 Kissinger sent Nixon a briefing memorandum for the meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 878, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. X, June 13–30, 1970)

² June 26. The “I” refers to Smith.

ruled out, the general attitude sparked by Bill Rogers was not favorable to anything that looked like an agreement in principle.

I pointed out that if we were actually to negotiate a full treaty, a very optimistic schedule would be by year's end. The President has in mind accomplishing something, if possible, before December because that is the budget crunch time. The Secretary wondered if we couldn't get the Soviets to table a limited proposal at the same time we did. I told him we could try to, but questioned whether it would be better for us if the Soviets table a proposal or whether the negotiation was based on our proposal.

The President gave me a letter expressing complete confidence and satisfaction in the way the negotiations had been handled.³

Kissinger opined there was not much difference between the agencies about the nature of a limited agreement. He felt that we should have it in detail a week from Monday.⁴ I said that we could keep the talks going until then but that if we didn't have anything by the 15th of July, I thought that the possibility of holding the talks together was slim.

I mentioned the question of a political approach on the accident question and showed the President the language of Soviet transmission in the fall of 1968 to Rostow.⁵ The President seemed quite intrigued and authorized me to pursue the matter to find out what Semenov had in mind.

There was some talk about the date of the Safeguard vote and the President seems clear that a negative vote on Safeguard would be very bad for SALT and that any straw about an ABM agreement would be grasped by the ABM opponents. The Secretary wondered if the ABM question could not be left for the last in the negotiations. I pointed out that this was the one area in which there seemed to be common ground.

I pointed out the time-consuming process that would be required to get agreement on ABM radar and the President agreed and said that that is the heart of the problem.

I pointed out that the Soviets had proposed recessing and resuming in Helsinki in November or December. I thought that a more reasonable tempo would be a two months recess during the summer but

³ The letter is attached to Kissinger's briefing memorandum of June 24.

⁴ June 29.

⁵ In a message handed to Secretary of State Rusk on October 2, 1968, the Soviet Government suggested some general principles and objectives for the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, including: "There could also be registered an agreement of the two sides, along with implementation of measures to limit and reduce strategic armaments, to study the question of taking steps to rule out the accidental appearance of conflict-fraught situations involving the use of strategic armaments." For the full text of the Soviet message, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 287.

pointed out that the Administration will have a difficult decision as to whether or not to try to get something substantial out of the Vienna round or merely a bland communiqué with an agreement to resume talks later on.

My hunch is that unless the Soviets bite hard on our limited proposal, we will spend say several weeks talking to them about it and then agree to suspend about July 21 and resume in Helsinki sometime after the first of September.

I said that although we are in the dark still about a number of aspects of Soviet thinking, I felt it safe to say that they are serious about trying to get an agreement.

85. Notes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, June 24, 1970.

ATTENDEES

OSD—Packard, Foster, Odeen
JCS—Moorer and Allison
State—Spiers and Garthoff
ACDA—Smith, Farley and Keeny
CIA—Cushman and Duckett
NSC—Kissinger, Lynn, Sonnenfeldt, Hyland and Slocum

Discussion

Kissinger: Purpose of today's meeting is to discuss:

1. Where we stand
2. What decisions we face

Have we explored every aspect of present options?

How about MIRVs? Perhaps we should explore production ban.

Smith: Soviets not interested in MIRV ban—Further discussion might confuse, complicate limited quick decision. This would lead to the OSI question—no future in that subject.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted in the Department of Defense. According to a memorandum for the record prepared in OSD, the meeting was held at 2:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. (Ibid.) Minutes of this meeting prepared by the NSC staff are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969-3/8/72.

Packard, Moorer and Cushman agreed.

Kissinger: Let's discuss OSI—what can we find out about MIRVs from OSI?

Foster: Can tell if a missile has a MIRV or not. But stockpiling is possible.

Kissinger: How long would it take to change warheads?

Foster: 6–12 hours.

Packard: We can forget about MIRV and OSI. No hope of agreement.

Foster: MIRV and ABM are related—need MIRVs to counter ABM—only real reason for MIRVs.

Packard: MIRV ban would be OK only if we could get a solid "Zero" ABM agreement.

Smith: From a public relations point of view we should indicate that the follow-on talks will discuss MIRV and reductions.

Spiers: Future MIRV ban impossible. Now or never and probably already too late.

Kissinger: Next question is what type of limited agreement should we consider? Does any one favor just an ABM agreement? *No!* Dave do you favor Minuteman defense unless the Soviets cut their SS-9 below 250?

Packard: First let me say NCA is not a very useful approach for us. We need to consider equivalency—but Nitze says this approach is not sellable.

Smith: Soviets are very concerned about MM protection. Fear it tempts us to a first strike—also concerned over the growth potential of such a system.

Foster: Can we sell a very limited MM defense?

Smith: They are concerned with a Safeguard-type system. They want to control spread of modern ABM technology.

Kissinger: NCA is more of a threat and provides more area coverage than MM defense.

Packard: I agree—much expansion potential.

Smith: Soviets may be willing to consider MM defense—but this will slow talks. It needs to be explored as we are unsure of their position. It will confuse matters since we already proposed NCA. Any asymmetrical proposal more difficult to negotiate. NCA has advantages for the USSR.

Kissinger: Do we need to justify NCA to Soviets?

Packard: No—to ourselves.

Kissinger: There appear to be two NCA approaches, an expansion system (launchers around Washington and several PARs) or a limited Washington system with only 2 PARs.

Packard: I prefer Zero but recognize problem of negotiation. Smith—What do you think about Soviet acceptance?

Smith: Soviets have said they will consider it, but my hunch is they will oppose any dismantling.

Lynn: Real issue is how do we treat Henhouse radars? OSD says we should demand dismantling.

Packard: We could build more PARs—e.g., 7 to give us full coverage.

Kissinger: I learned earlier during the pre-Vienna discussions that radar limits must accompany any ABM control. Is this so? What are our options? Didn't we agree that some Henhouses had to go? A limit on radars is to our advantage unless we also planned to build radars. Without control the Soviets will probably build more, but we won't. So aren't we better off with any control that will avoid more Henhouses?

Foster: Compared capabilities of PAR and Henhouse Radars—Henhouses can be considered early warning only if it is unprotected. If protected, then they pose a greater threat as part of an ABM system.

Kissinger: If we must insist on some reduction in Henhouses—how many should be destroyed?

Packard: Soviets see Henhouses as part of their early warning system. I doubt they will agree to any Henhouse destruction that won't give them 360° coverage.

Kissinger: The real issue is what is right—not what is negotiable. (Long involved discussion of NCA, Henhouses, BMEWS)

Kissinger: I see two options for NCA—are these all?

(1) NCA defense missiles including equivalent radars to Dog House, Try Add—Henhouse considered warning and therefore no destruction is demanded.

(2) Henhouses are considered to have ABM potential—so we should be able to build an equivalent number. Henhouses and PARs cannot be defended.

(Everyone agreed these were the only realistic options.)

Foster: The problem is you can't define no defense of Henhouses. SAM Defenses are very close to ABMs today. SAMs can destroy missiles.

Kissinger: Next let's define Zero ABM—what does it mean?

(1) No Try Add or Doghouse radars plus destruction of Moscow ABM defense.

(2) Henhouse—this is the real problem? Our options:

(a) Assume they are not a problem, e.g., early warning.

(b) Assume they are a problem because of SAM upgrade threat.

Packard: The most reasonable approach is let them keep Henhouses but say we could build PARs.

Kissinger: Zero ABM. Does everyone agree it is better than NCA, assuming:

- (a) Soviets destroy Moscow ABM.
- (b) No more Henhouses can be built, but no destruction.

Moorer: Yes, I agree.

Smith: Yes, *but*, we are on the NCA track at Vienna—we shouldn't shift (I believe Allison and Nitze agree—Brown prefers Zero). Raising the Zero ABM will confuse negotiations.

Foster: SAM upgrade remains a problem as long as Soviets have Henhouse radars. (Several others pointed out this is not an issue—An NCA level with Soviet Henhouse radars poses the same problem. Or with no agreement we have the problem, but worse.)

Allison: We shouldn't foreclose our option to build an ABM—USSR won't agree to Zero anyway. We need to keep the technology going.

Packard: An NCA defense may be a dead end—Congress probably won't agree to it.

Kissinger: Why don't we offer both NCA and Zero. This should help with Congress.

Smith: If we had a Zero level this might lead to cuts in R&D funding. Also we will lose any practical experience operating in ABM.

Packard: Perhaps we could merely agree to NCA or a lower level—matter to be discussed later.

Smith: I don't like this approach as we don't want to give impression of uncertainty.

Spiers: State feels we should offer both. This would look good to the American public, Congress, etc.

Foster: But you still have the Henhouse problem. We could face a threat in 5–10 years, if they get mobile SAMs. This is a risky path.

Packard: I share Foster's concern—but what can we do about it? My judgment is we can take the chance if we keep MIRVs.

Moorer: I agree about the potential problem. But the Soviets are defensive minded and they won't agree to Henhouse destruction.

Kissinger: Real issue is the difference in our security between a limited SALT agreement status and no agreement status.

Packard: There will be uncertainties—but we will be better off with an agreement. We need to put in prohibitions and some controls on SAM upgrade.

Duckett: We have always been troubled by the extra capability of Henhouses. What is the reason? Let's ask the Soviets about it.

Packard: There are lots of limitations and questions on SAM upgrading. We can live with the problem.

Kissinger: Let's turn to offensive systems. (He summarized the numbers in NSDM-51.)²

Smith proposes 2000 total offensive delivery systems, 1710 missiles and 250 SS-9s.

State suggests 1900, with no missile sub-ceiling but only 250 SS-9s, mobiles OK but no shelters.

OSD suggests 1900 plus or minus 100.

JCS says 2100.

So the range is from 1800 to 2100.

Packard: We should start with the lower figure—we can always back off.

Allison: Should not use too small a number for negotiating reasons as we have talked about 2000 before.

Packard: The key is the SS-9. We must limit it. Can't say what the exact total number should be now. We will have to examine that.

Kissinger: The President can't decide the number. We need to show different levels and what different impacts they would have. Lynn should prepare such a paper.

Packard: We also need to address mobiles and shelters—Shelters are a real problem for verification. Therefore, probably not a visible approach. Probably we should rely on sea-based missiles.

Smith: Also mobiles are costly. SALT should help us cut the cost of strategic forces.

Kissinger: Lynn will prepare issue papers for the President. Let's adjourn now (4:30 P.M.).

² Document 68.

86. Memorandum From Laurence Lynn and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 1, 1970.

SUBJECT

SALT: Accidental, Unauthorized and Provocative Attacks

From the very outset of the Helsinki phase and through the Vienna talks, the Soviets have stressed the particular importance they attach to the general category, "reducing the dangers of nuclear war." Under this rubric, they have listed accidental and unauthorized launches, as well as "provocative" attacks by third countries.

It was at Soviet insistence that this was put on the Helsinki work program, and the Vienna talks have now reached this point on the agenda. Semyonov privately made a strong pitch to Ambassador Smith on the importance of this topic emphasizing its "political" aspects. It would thus appear that in any agreement, whether limited or comprehensive, the Soviets will press hard to include something under this general heading.

In discussing the subject, the US has focused on the technical aspects of reducing the danger of accidental attacks and "catalytic" responses—the role of NCA defenses, better safety devices for bombs and missiles, improved US-USSR communication facilities. The Soviets have made it clear that for them the technical aspects of the subject are secondary to the political considerations. They indicated willingness to continue the discussion either in Vienna or "elsewhere." Semyonov told Smith that the subject was "very delicate" but of "major significance" for US-Soviet relations. He concluded that the question "really boiled down to whether or not our two countries were ready to work toward agreement on jointly coordinated measures . . ." Beyond this rather vague hint, however, the Soviets have avoided specifics in political aspects.

The concrete Soviet program was partly revealed on June 30;² (the question of "provocative" attack will be discussed on July 7). The proposal includes:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 878, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XI, July 1–19, 1970. Secret. Sent for information. Hyland initialed for Sonnenfeldt. On the first page of the memorandum, Kissinger wrote: "Please get answers to questions. HK."

² Kissinger crossed out "July" and wrote, "June."

—exchange of information by all means available in the event of an unauthorized missile launch or other acts that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons;

—mutual exchange of information on detection of unidentified objects by early warning systems, or notification of signs of interference with these warning systems or with corresponding communications facilities;

—notification of planned missile launches to points beyond national territories (the Soviets announce their tests to the Pacific, but not tests to Kamchatka);

—notification “under certain conditions” of mass take-offs of aircraft from airfields and aircraft carriers;

—such exchanges to use the “hot line.”

Soviet motives in emphasizing this subject and putting forward such a program are not difficult to discern. First of all, an agreement along the lines outlined by Semyonov would involve the US and the USSR in a continuing and extensive bilateral exchange of technical as well as strategic data. Almost every major exercise involving bomber flights would have to be registered, for example. Under the open-ended provision for providing information on acts which could lead to use of nuclear weapons, we might expect the Soviets to use it to inject themselves into NATO plans as well as other areas involving third countries.

Semyonov in his speech of June 30 emphasized the importance “first of all” to establish from a “political” point of view there is a common aim.³ The world at large and especially our Allies would perceive in such a new relationship, a sort of condominium. This is obviously one of the Europeans’ latent concerns, and a broad based agreement, as the Soviet propose, would feed their suspicions.

The second and probably more important aspect is the implication for the China problem. The Soviets rather gingerly walk around mention of China by using various euphemisms, but there is no doubt that the “third country” they are concerned about is China. Thus, the rather far fetched “provocative” attack they mention is clearly a Chinese attack on the USSR (though, of course, the Soviets have some concern over the independent capabilities of the French and British, and potentially the Germans). It is difficult to believe that the Soviets take seriously the contingency that the Chinese would launch a missile against the USSR on the calculation that the Soviets would then unload on the United States. But under a SALT agreement the Soviets might claim we were obligated to stand aside while the Soviets dealt with the danger of “provocative” attack (or even “coordinate measures”⁴ as Semyonov

³ Kissinger highlighted this section beginning with “Under the open-ended provision.” In the margin, he wrote, “How? Does it give Soviets greater possibility vis-à-vis NATO than as [illegible] part?”

⁴ Kissinger underlined “coordinate measures” and wrote “How?” in the margin.

indicated to Smith). Even without such far-reaching ambitions, the Soviets would use an agreement to brow beat and threaten the Chinese.

As part of a comprehensive agreement, an understanding on accidental attacks, etc., might be understandable and not arouse the reaction of our Allies or the Chinese. But for a more limited agreement, the question would command more attention and provoke greater interest. It would be more difficult to explain the importance of an extensive exchange of information in an agreement, that, for example, excluded several major weapons systems.

Our position thus far has been to allow the Soviets to take the lead, and to concentrate largely on the problem of accidental attacks, and the safety measures we have adopted. We have offered to consult on the question, but have not presented a detailed program. In this phase of the talks, we probably do not have to go much further than agreeing in principle to establish organizational measures to deal with the subject.

We have some bargaining leverage on this issue. The Soviets took the initiative in raising it; they have spelled out the program, and have appealed to us for continuing discussion *even outside Vienna*. If we want this as part of any agreement, it may be a card that we can play in connection with other elements in the package that we are more interested in. But in striking any bargain we should keep in mind that the Soviets have far more to gain from the political overtones of condominium than we do.⁵

⁵ Below this paragraph, Kissinger wrote: "What is it we should want?"

87. **Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, July 2, 1970.

We have given further consideration to some of the issues which need to be addressed in deciding on additional instructions to the SALT delegation. Here are my conclusions on the ABM and SAM upgrade issues.²

I have concluded that it would be better to have an NCA level of ABM rather than a zero level in a limited SALT agreement which would not ban MIRV. Although an NCA level would be expensive for us and politically difficult now, it would keep our options open for the future.

In the kind of an agreement I see possible, it is very important that we preserve our MIRV program. It will be easier for us to defend our MIRV before Congress if the Soviets have an NCA level of ABM.

SAM upgrade remains troublesome. I believe we should instruct our delegation to push this issue hard to establish two understandings.

(1) We should require an agreement with the Soviets that SAM systems would not be upgraded to an ABM capability.

(2) We should require agreement on specific indicators which would give each side some assurance that SAM systems were in fact not being upgraded. While we probably will not be able to achieve agreement on indicators which would be conclusive evidence, we might be able to agree on indicators which would justify bringing the subject up for discussion in the event the indicators were seen in the future.

David Packard

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret. On July 7 Lynn forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger with comments. He concluded that "Packard's views on SAM upgrade are generally consistent with the provisions of NSDM 51 and with the discussion at the Verification Panel meeting [see Document 85]. His change in position on the 'NCA or zero' issue should, however, be reflected in the memorandum for the President summarizing the deliberations of the Panel." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 878, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XI, July 1-19, 1970)

² Packard based his conclusions on a July 1 memorandum from Foster that provided comments on ABM limitations. Foster explained that Soviet Henhouse defense capabilities added to the capability of SA-5s and SA-2s if used in an ABM role. Because the SA-5 could protect the Henhouses, the United States would have to devote more forces to suppressing Henhouses, which even if reduced in number, did not eliminate the capability of Soviet SAMs using other sensors for early acquisition. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3)

88. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

San Clemente, California, July 4, 1970, 1822Z.

The President has asked that I share the following information with you on an exclusively personal basis. No one beyond the President and myself and now you is aware of this information and the President has given strict instructions that it remain that way for the time being.

The Soviets have, through Ambassador Dobrynin, indicated to the President on a strictly personal basis that they would be prepared, at Vienna, to have an NCA/ABM agreement coupled with a broad agreement on the prevention of accidental or "provocative" nuclear war (along the lines of the June 30 session).² The Soviets have reported that it would be difficult to go beyond these two agreements at Vienna.

The President, on a most urgent and personal basis, would appreciate having your reaction to this Soviet proposal before he decides on new instructions.

I repeat again that the President has directed that this information be held strictly to yourself, and President and me. It is not to be shared with the delegation. He has authorized me to inform Alex Johnson, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of State, on the same basis, of the Soviet proposal and I plan to do so Saturday, July 4, during a meeting which Alex will attend here in San Clemente.

Best regards.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. On July 3 Lord sent Kissinger a draft of this message dictated by Haig. In his covering memorandum Lord stated: "The attached draft gives Smith very few details but Al indicated that you did not feel this was necessary." Lord also reminded Kissinger that Alexis Johnson knew about the subject of the message. Kissinger made numerous revisions.

² In telegram USDEL SALT 200, July 3, Smith reported Semenov's proposal during the June 30 session on third country provocation. (Ibid.) Regarding Dobrynin's proposal, see Document 89.

89. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 7, 1970, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

SALT

The conversation came about because Dobrynin had sent me an Aide Mémoire while I was in San Clemente in reply to the conversation I had had with him on June 23, 1970.² In this reply, the Soviet Government indicated that they would be prepared to make an agreement at Vienna on ABMs and on the issue of accidental and provocative attacks, but that they did not think it likely that an agreement could be reached on the limitations of offensive weapons at Vienna. I wanted to get clarification on that point.

I deliberately conducted the meeting in a somewhat cool and aloof manner. I asked Dobrynin how he explained the first section of his Aide Mémoire. Did it mean that agreement on offensive weapons was impossible or that agreement would be very difficult? Dobrynin said that in view of all the important objections that they had raised, the offensive limitations would have to be dealt with in two stages—an agreement in principle to be followed by detailed negotiations. He did not believe that this could be accomplished in the three weeks that were remaining in Vienna. He did want me to know, however, that the Soviet leaders had shown their good faith by instructing Semyonov first, to stay in Vienna at least until August 1st, and secondly, to concentrate for a while on the provocative and accidental attack aspect in order to give us a chance to develop our position.

I said to Dobrynin that we were going to have a meeting the next day to consider various aspects of the matter, particularly whether we could agree to a separate ABM ban. I also told him that I noticed that the last two paragraphs of his Aide Mémoire explicitly established the concept of linkage which they had strenuously rejected the year before. Dobrynin replied that they had become convinced by the persuasiveness of my argument that this was a correct course. We left this part of

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Box TS 36, Soviet Union, Chronological File, 7/70-1/71. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in the Map Room of the White House. The full text of the memorandum of conversation and the attached Soviet aide-mémoire are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 177.

² See Document 83.

the conversation with my saying that I would let Dobrynin know after the meeting of our advisors whether we would agree to a separate ABM ban. Dobrynin added that, if that were done, the agreement could be signed later on this summer by the Foreign Ministers, perhaps at the United Nations. I said that this was a matter we could discuss after there had been an agreement in principle.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

90. Memorandum From Laurence Lynn of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

ACDA Views on Soviet Accidental War Proposals

ACDA has prepared the attached initial assessment of “the current status of SALT discussions” on nuclear accidents and inadvertent war (Tab A).² It takes a very much more roseate view of the Soviet “proposal” than does the analysis forwarded to you with your talking points for tomorrow’s Verification Panel meeting.³ The ACDA paper has been widely circulated and may be discussed tomorrow.

Its main points:

—Because of lack of Soviet interest, there is little to be gained from further discussion of exchanges of information on national nuclear safety programs, national capabilities to detect and identify unexpected nuclear events, or cooperative detection and identification. (These are three of the five points of the Y–12 Summary Paper.)⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 1 [Part 2]. Top Secret. Sent for information.

² Undated. Attached but not printed.

³ Reference is to a July 1 analysis entitled “The Soviet ‘Proposal’ on Accidental War,” which was prepared by the NSC staff. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–005, Verification Panel Meeting—SALT 7/8/70)

⁴ A summary of “Protecting Against Nuclear Accidents and Provocative Attacks,” March 6, prepared by the Y–12 Working Group of the Verification Panel, is attached but not printed.

—However, “the U.S. and the Soviets seem to be very close” on the possibility of exchanging information along the lines outlined by Semyonov on June 30:

—Agreeing to notification of “unauthorized missile launches or other acts which may lead to the use of nuclear weapons” and “detection of unidentified objects by missile attack warning systems, (Semyonov did not limit it to missiles) or signs of interference with these systems and with corresponding communications facilities” would “present no serious problems.”

(That may be true of the principle which we have advanced, but there are serious problems about the scope and details of the Soviet proposals.)

—The other items—notification of certain planned missile launches and of mass take-offs of aircraft from airfields or carriers—are said to “closely resemble” some 1962 U.S. ideas. They do, verbally, but they were proposed in the context of primarily multilateral arrangements, and included advance notification of major ground and naval force movements as well.

The ACDA paper notes the possible NATO complications of aircraft notification, but points out that NATO proposed “advance notification of military movements and maneuvers” as a subject for European arms control discussions. It is also said that most NATO “mass flights” are not in the direction of the USSR. (It is not clear to me that they would thereby be excluded from notification. General Alekseyev spoke of notification if the aircraft were to fly “in the direction of, or in areas close to or along borders of the other side.” The Soviets, given their view of the potency of NATO-based bombers and carrier air might say this covered much of Western Europe. They have said explicitly that notification would be required of “large-scale take-offs from carriers in the Mediterranean.” The paper also elides the difficulties with the way the Soviets would define missile launches which must be announced.)

—The Soviets seem interested in our ideas for improving the “hot line.” The paper notes that Smith suggested working out details through analogue to the system whereby the original “hot line” agreement was worked out by a “joint technical working group” in Geneva under ENDC auspices, substituting SALT for ENDC.

—“The foundation” exists for an agreement on accidental war covering these elements:

—recognition of “the necessity of exercising maximum restraint in responding to ambiguous incidents;” (As noted in the background paper sent you earlier, there is little echo in the Soviet statements of our emphasis on restraint in general. Rather their concern is with avoiding “automatic” U.S.-Soviet war. The difference is a subtle one, but one of substantial political importance.)

—mutual notification of unauthorized or accidental missile launches or other acts which might lead to use of nuclear weapons and

of detection of unidentified objects or interference with warning systems; (As noted above, the ACDA paper ignores the ambiguities and potential pitfalls of the Soviet formulations on these subjects.)

—advance notification of missile launches or aircraft take-offs “which might be interpreted as posing a nuclear threat to the other country.” (This is quite different than the standard proposed by the Soviets.)

—upgrading of the “hot line.”

—use of a “Standing Commission” to monitor these arrangements.

The ACDA paper does not consider in any way the political ramifications for our relations with other third countries of an agreement between the U.S. and the USSR on dealing with accidental war.

91. Memorandum From Laurence Lynn of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

Provocative Attacks

Yesterday Semyonov gave Smith (at a concert!) a paper expanding on Soviet views on “provocative” attacks and previously described as a “formula for agreement” on the subject (Tab A).² It makes it all the clearer that the Soviets’ sense of the “political” character of this problem is very far-reaching indeed.

The key passage of the Soviet paper is this:

“We advocate that the [two]³ sides, upon availability of facts about a provocation *being prepared*, inform each other of this in a timely manner, so that, if necessary, measures could be taken *to prevent* provocative use of nuclear weapons, and in the event that provocative acts take place, *both sides obligate themselves to take retaliatory action* against the country which committed the provocation.” (emphasis added)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 878, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XI, July 1–19, 1970. Top Secret; Nodis.

² Attached but not printed at Tab A is telegram USDEL SALT 212, July 8. Also attached but not printed at Tab B is telegram USDEL SALT 210, July 7, which provides the translation of Semenov’s plenary session statements of July 7 on provocative attacks.

³ Brackets are in the original.

Semyonov is speaking of nothing less than a U.S.-Soviet agreement to

- exchange intelligence on Chinese preparations for war;
- facilitate preventive strikes on Chinese nuclear installations if a Chinese attack seems imminent;
- take joint retaliatory action against a Chinese attack.

(Strictly speaking, Semyonov's proposals would apply only to "provocative" attacks, not "open" ones, but the distinction would be almost impossible to draw in practice.)

Indeed, other third countries than China are involved. Semyonov, in his plenary statement on provocative attacks yesterday referred to "the possibility . . . that in some country forces could come to power who would attempt to seek advantage for themselves by organizing military provocations for the purpose of causing a nuclear conflict between the U.S. and the USSR" and to "the well-known striving of this sort of adventurist forces to gain access to nuclear weapons." These could pertain to China, but they presumably also embrace "revanchist" forces in Germany and other "adventurists, e.g., Israel."

The implications of this proposal are immense and affect not only our relations with China but with our allies and friends as well as with the USSR. There is a need for a prompt decision on what course to follow in this area, in the light of these implications. Even if we make no affirmative response, the very act of listening to such proposals for very long may lead the Soviets (and the Chinese and other third countries, if they learn of these discussions) to assume a U.S. receptivity to these ideas.

From the point of view of SALT itself, if there is to be an effort to reach a fairly quick agreement on "central systems" limits, we may need to act promptly to make it clear to the Soviets that we don't want that effort linked to any such far-reaching measures involving third countries.

(One cannot help observe the coincidence in time between this rather vigorous Soviet pressure for a U.S.-Soviet deal on preventing catalytic war and what is happening on the Suez Canal.)

Hal Sonnenfeldt concurs.

92. Summary of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, July 8, 1970.

The Panel discussed four technical issues:

—unauthorized missile launches and other acts that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons;²

—missile launches beyond national territory;³

—mass aircraft launches;⁴

—detection of unidentified objects.⁵

With respect to each of these issues, Dr. Kissinger raised four questions:

1. Which events in the last ten years would have been covered?
2. What communication facilities are required?
3. What is the significance or relevance of the danger that would be controlled?
4. What are the main ambiguities in the proposal?⁶

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72. Top Secret. The summary was prepared by the NSC staff. According to minutes of the meeting, it was held from 3 to 4 p.m. and was attended by: Kissinger, Packard, Farley, Demler, Helms, Spiers, Von Ins, Odeen, Martin, Lynn, Slocombe, Clarke, and Sonnenfeldt. (Ibid.) A memorandum for the record and notes on the meeting, both prepared in OSD, are in the Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 25, SALT, Chronological File.

² According to the minutes of the meeting, the members discussed the ways, ranging from bombers, seizure of weapons by an ally, and improper notification by overload circuits, that an unauthorized launch could occur.

³ According to the minutes, the members discussed the implications, advantages, and difficulties involved but did not reach any firm conclusions. Kissinger called for further exploration by the Working Group.

⁴ The members discussed whether the Soviets would need to notify the United States and the converse. They briefly mentioned effects on international flight procedures and B-52 air alerts.

⁵ The members discussed the problems with existing warning systems used to detect unidentified objects. On this point and on the proposals generally, Kissinger stressed the need to obviate international fears of a U.S.-Soviet condominium if a proposal on preventing nuclear accidents and provocative attacks were linked to a SALT agreement.

⁶ Kissinger directed Lynn to have the Working Group examine the questions and prepare a paper for the Verification Panel meeting scheduled for July 15. According to a July 14 covering memorandum to Kissinger that sent him materials for the July 15 meeting, Lynn explained that, given the short turn-around time, the paper was an inadequate basis for decisions. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-005, Verification Panel Meeting—SALT 7/15/70)

93. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 9, 1970, 5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

SALT

After some desultory talk about my new office, I opened the conversation by telling Dobrynin that I had followed the reporting from Vienna with great interest. As a specialist in the Congress of Vienna,² I could only congratulate Semyonov on having learned some of the tactics. I referred specifically to the note he handed over to Smith at a concert which seemed almost to suggest a form of alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union against countries that had engaged in provocative acts.³ Dobrynin said he did not know how the note was handed over, but of course, he was familiar with the formulation.

I said that I looked at the accidental war problem on two levels: (1) the technical means of notification which we were studying and which I did not think would present any undue problem; and (2) the political implications of some of the cooperative arrangements that they were suggesting which represented a significant change in the international environment as it had developed since the war. I wanted to talk to him about that second aspect a little later, but I wanted first to turn to the overall issue of SALT. Dobrynin interjected to point out that the formulation handed by Semyonov to Smith had been prepared by the Delegation in Vienna. He could tell me frankly that he, Dobrynin, had had his doubts about it because he was afraid that too great significance was going to be read into it. If we wanted an agreement without that particular clause, this would not become a sticking point. Dobrynin indicated that the major political fact for the Soviet Union was an agreement on provocative attack, not individual clauses, and there would not be any undue haggling. I told Dobrynin that we should defer discussion of this until I gave him our general view.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 1 [Part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office at the White House. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 179.

² In 1957 Kissinger published *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822*, which analyzed the post-Napoleonic European settlement established by the Congress of Vienna.

³ See Document 91.

I said that the President had decided after careful study that it was not possible to separate the components of a SALT agreement—that it was necessary to have a limitation on offensive weapons together with a limitation on ABM's. We were prepared in principle to discuss accidental war limitations. I added that recent missile starts of SS-9 and SS-11 groups underlined for us the danger of an ABM limitation which would leave our Minutemen exposed to a Soviet first strike. Dobrynin said that I knew they didn't intend to make a first strike. I replied that I knew no such thing, looking at their weapons deployment; in any event, it didn't make any difference what I knew but what reasonable people could deduce from the weapons situation.

Dobrynin said that he didn't think it would be possible to come to an agreement under these conditions. I replied that perhaps the delegations could be instructed to emphasize the ABM part to get that out of the way. Dobrynin asked, "Well, why not then agree on the partial accord after all?" I said this was not possible for the reasons I had given to him. I added, however, that I would be prepared to continue discussions with him during the summer and that I was certain we could narrow the differences to a manageable form. Dobrynin said that he would be prepared to do this but he thought that SALT was in essentially good shape and that we could come to an agreement, if not this year, then in the early months of next year. He emphasized again that they would be prepared to drop any offending clauses in the accidental war part of the agreement, that these were not matters of principle with them. I said that this was not the issue—the issue to us was not to break out the defensive from the offensive parts of the agreement.

Dobrynin then raised the question of how long the recess should be, saying that the Soviet Government would prefer November 1st. I said we would prefer something like September 15th. When Dobrynin asked where that would leave us, I replied that it seemed self-evident to me that it takes two to start a negotiation. He said he wanted us to understand that the November 1st deadline was unconnected with any deliberate attempt to slow down the talks, but had rather to do with the internal operating methods of the Soviet government. Many of their key people would be on vacation in August, and they would not be able to do a systematic review until September.

Dobrynin also asked me what would be new in our package. I said it was hard to go into precise detail, but there would be a limit on offensive units and a sub-limit on heavy missiles. He asked me how we would handle the problem of compensation, i.e. the issue of the relationship between IRBM's on their side and forward deployed tactical aircraft on our side. I said it seemed to me the best way to handle it was through exclusion—that they would not be counted on either side. Dobrynin indicated that this would not present an insuperable difficulty. He again called my attention to the part of the Soviet Aide Mé-

moire which said that an ABM agreement could, in their view, be agreed on “without difficulty.”⁴ He said this was a very significant statement. I replied that I understood, and that we should, however, now proceed to work as expeditiously as possible on a comprehensive statement.

The conversation then turned to general subjects. I said that I wanted him to know that the President had read the article that Semyonov had handed to Smith at a concert with the greatest care. He had come to the conclusion that the most significant aspect of it would be the political one; however, such a politically important matter should not be handled within the context of SALT, but should be handled at a higher level. I therefore wanted to return to my conversation of April 12th⁵ in which I had suggested a specific procedure for coming to an understanding of fundamental issues so that major progress could be made. Dobrynin evaded the issue and said that he had thought that Cambodia had ended this concern and, in any event, he was prepared to discuss the Middle East with me.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

⁴ See Document 89.

⁵ No record of a conversation with Dobrynin on April 12 has been found. Apparently Kissinger meant his April 9 meeting with Dobrynin; see Document 66.

94. National Security Decision Memorandum 69¹

Washington, July 9, 1970.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

After considering the report of the Delegation on the talks to date and the recommendations of the Verification Panel, I have made the following decisions with respect to the U.S. position in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks:

1. It apparently being impossible to reach agreement along the lines of either of the two approaches I authorized in NSDM-51,² the United States will attempt to reach an initial agreement concentrating on imposing numerical limits on the most important strategic weapons systems, with the collateral constraints necessary to make such limits adequately verifiable.

2. The U.S. proposal for such an agreement will have the following main elements:

A—The aggregate total of ICBM launchers, sea-based ballistic missile launchers and strategic heavy bombers would be limited to an agreed number. We would initially propose 1900 as this number.

B—Within this aggregate total, launchers deployed after 1965 with a volume greater than 70 cubic meters would be limited to 250. (A separate limitation of this nature is absolutely essential.)

C—Within the aggregate total, ICBM and sea-based ballistic missile launchers would be limited to an agreed number. We would initially propose 1710 as this number.

D—Within these numerical limits sea-based ballistic missile launchers, land-based ICBM launchers, and strategic heavy bombers could be substituted for each other on a one-for-one basis.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 51–100. Top Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation. Haig initialed the memorandum.

² Document 68.

E—To enhance confidence in verification by national means, corollary constraints would be imposed on offensive systems, including a ban on relocation of existing ICBM silos or their modification in externally observable ways and a ban on construction of new silos for IR/MRBMs.

F—In addition we would initially propose a ban on land-mobile ICBMs and on other land-mobile ballistic missiles and launchers not externally distinguishable from them and a ban on all new ICBM silos (after a transition period for reaching agreed levels). (In the event the Soviets are unwilling to accept a ban on both land-mobile ICBMs and new ICBM silo construction, one or the other must be banned to avoid creation of substantial verification uncertainties.)

G—The substance of the definitions, procedures, and other more detailed corollary constraints and additional limitations in connection with limits on offensive forces, as set out for Option D in the April 9, 1970 Memorandum on “SALT Options” attached to NSDM-51 would apply, in so far as they are consistent with these elements.

H—There would be no limitation on substitution of new strategic heavy bomber types nor would there be other qualitative limitations on such bombers or their armaments.

I—Either of two alternative provisions, of equal status as United States positions, could be agreed for limitation on deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems:

—“NCA” level. Deployment of ABMs would be limited to a system appropriate for defense of the National Command Authority on each side (Moscow and Washington). One hundred fixed ABM launchers and one hundred deployed ABM interceptors would be permitted each side together with associated radars. The Soviet Union would retain its present Try Add and Dog House type radars and ABM launchers operational and under construction, and could add up to 36 additional launchers with associated Try Add radars around Moscow to serve a total of no more than 100 interceptors. The United States would be allowed to deploy a roughly equivalent system, comprising up to 6 PAR faces at no more than two sites, 4 MSR faces at no more than two sites, and 100 ABM launchers and interceptors. On each side, deployment of ABM acquisition and detection radars (PAR- and Dog House-type) would be limited to an area within 200 kilometers of the center of the capital city, and deployment of ABM launchers, interceptors and engagement radars (Try Add and MSR-type) would be limited to an area within 100 kilometers of the center of the capital city.

—“Zero” level. Deployment of ABM launchers and interceptors and radars would be prohibited. Existing ABM launchers and associated radars would be dismantled.

J—Under either of these alternative ABM levels limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role. Soviet Hen House-type radars configured for tracking of ballistic missiles would be limited to those currently operational or under construction. We would inform

the Soviets that we regard the continued existence of these radars as tolerable partly in view of their present vulnerability, and that we would consider increased SAM defense of such radars as inconsistent with an agreement. The U.S. would have the right to build additional early warning radars to provide equivalent capability to that provided by the Soviet Hen Houses.

K—The provisions of Option D of the Memorandum on “SALT Options” with respect to consultation on future radar needs, upgrading of SAMs to give them ABM capability, ABM R&D, procedures for required destruction, mobile ABMs and definitions would apply.

3. In such an agreement, there would be no limitations on forward-based aircraft, bombers of less than intercontinental range, submarine-launched cruise missiles, or intermediate or medium range ballistic missiles, except for those limits on IR and MRBMs which are necessary to insure adequate verification of the limits imposed on ICBMs. The Delegation is to take the position that any form of “compensation” for excluding forward based aircraft in the form of permitting the Soviets additional missiles of intercontinental range, sea-based ballistic missiles or strategic heavy bombers is wholly and absolutely unacceptable to the United States. If the Soviets raise the question of an exchange of statements or assurances with respect to systems excluded from an initial agreement, the Delegation is to seek further instructions.

4. The Verification Panel is to prepare a statement of the detailed provisions of a position embodying the elements outlined in paragraph (2) and (3). In general, the substance of the provisions on definitions, procedures, corollary constraints, space and other launchers, and verification, consultation, and duration, etc. of Option D as set forth in the Memorandum on “SALT Options” should apply to the new position as well, except where inconsistent with the elements outlined in paragraphs (2) and (3). However, they should be revised wherever appropriate to increase precision, specificity and clarity. This detailed statement is to be prepared on an urgent basis and is to be available for my consideration by 7 days after the date of issuance of this Memorandum.

5. Appropriate consultations with the NATO allies on the new position should be carried out as soon as possible.

6. Pending receipt of the detailed statement of the new position, the Delegation is authorized to present the main elements, as outlined in paragraphs (2) and (3), to the Soviets. After consultation with Washington, the Delegation may, in making such presentation, use a formal statement or less formal means, and may present all the elements at once or present them in stages, as it deems most advantageous from the negotiating point of view. In making any such presentation, however, and particularly in any presentation of the elements in stages, the Delegation must emphasize that the acceptability to the United States

of each individual provision is contingent on agreement on the other elements of the new position, including particularly corollary verification provisions and sub-limitations within the overall aggregate.

7. The Delegation is to make it clear that the United States continues to support a comprehensive agreement, along the lines of either of the approaches already outlined and that we will seek to have an initial agreement followed by further agreements, including if possible controls on multiple independently targetted re-entry vehicles, major mutual reductions in the principal forms of strategic weapons, and limits on IRBMs, MRBMs and submarine-launched cruise missiles.³

Richard Nixon⁴

³ In telegram USDEL SALT 221, July 10, the delegation acknowledged receipt of NSDM 69 and noted the following: "The delegation draws attention to the point that all provisions of the new proposal call for equal or equivalent levels of strategic weapons, with the single exception of modern large missiles. Such a differential would appear to freeze the U.S. into a position of inferiority in this respect. We believe it is important to retain for the U.S. the option to build large missiles up to the same number permitted for the Soviets." On the telegram, Kissinger wrote: "I agree—Larry [Lynn] please see that this applies." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 878, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XI, July 1–19, 1970)

⁴ Nixon wrote the date he signed the memorandum, July 4, beneath his signature.

95. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

Implications of a Limited SALT Agreement

A decision to conclude a limited SALT agreement—not simply "in principle" but embodying certain specific commitments—would reflect

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 878, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XI, July 1–19, 1970. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt and sent to Kissinger on July 8 by Lord, who wrote that "the forecast presented in this memorandum is sufficiently negative to make one wonder why we would want to conclude a SALT agreement at all." Handwritten and stamped notations on the memorandum indicate that Nixon saw it on July 24. In the upper right-hand corner, Nixon wrote: "K—a *very* thoughtful paper. I suggest *limited* distribution *only* to N.S.C. statutory members—(if at all)." A notation on the last page reads: "S'feldt noted that no further dist[ribution] is to be made."

not only conclusions by the Soviet leaders concerning strategic posture but some broader policy calculations.

Strategic Implications

It appears that the driving force behind Soviet interest in a limited agreement would have to be a strong Soviet incentive to head off the Safeguard deployment, U.S. MIRV deployment, or both. Since the Soviets are well behind in MIRV technology, the Safeguard system is probably their main target.

Under a limited agreement, as they have outlined it, the Soviets could still work toward an offensive posture threatening our land-based systems, for whatever psychological value that might carry. While they would recognize that any deal would have to include an SS-9 ceiling, the Soviets could develop and perfect MIRVs, and improve the accuracy of well over 800 SS-11s, and they could complete a sizeable ballistic submarine force. In short, the Soviets could be fairly confident that they would never again be in a position of strategic inferiority. Indeed, they would expect to derive considerable political gain from the formal ratification of strategic "equality."

We, in turn, might find that the world of a SALT agreement would be politically a difficult one in which to press for new strategic systems, even though agreement permitted them and force planners could make plausible cases for them.

Thus, we might find it hard to advance programs which are more or less implicit in accepting a limited agreement; for example, transferring our land-based systems to sea-based. (With the Soviet ABM limited, we would run into increasing pressure to curtail or terminate our MIRV programs.) On the other hand, we would be largely relieved of the most immediate concerns over Soviet capabilities for a neutralizing strike against Minuteman silos, and gain some time to adjust our posture.

It was an irony of the test ban treaty² that an Administration which anticipated domestic and international benefits from the détente it hoped the agreement would engender, instead found itself stressing the military pitfalls and the intensified programs which it was undertaking to offset those pitfalls. It is unlikely that this Administration will find itself obliged to operate under similar pressures from internal critics and Congressional skeptics. On the contrary, unlike the test ban treaty which served as a trigger for substantial increases in certain military programs, a SALT agreement is likely to add momentum to the general shift in priorities from military to civilian programs.

² Reference is to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibited nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. (14 UST 1313)

Europe

Apart from military considerations, it would be uncharacteristic for the Soviets to enter into a major arms control agreement without some underlying expectations relating to the general political situation. Their motives, first of all, probably relate to the impact of a SALT agreement in Europe.

Some European leaders appreciate that strategic “parity” should in theory increase the danger of sub-strategic conflicts. But the majority of our West European allies as well as a large body of our own opinion probably are not willing to consider this a serious contingency, nor appropriate resources to strengthen conventional defense. More likely, in the wake of SALT there would be a period of political relaxation and perhaps actual reductions in defense programs.

The leading European statesmen would be strongly motivated to use the umbrella of a SALT agreement to seek parallel understandings with the Soviet Union.

Of most immediate consequence would be the link between SALT and the German negotiations.³ One strong trend in Soviet European policy in the last 18 months has been to concentrate on Bonn as the key to gaining the basic Soviet goal of confirming the European status quo. One of the fundamental motives for Moscow in an “early” SALT agreement must be the estimate that it would greatly improve the chances of obtaining a definitive post-war settlement in Europe, based on a divided Germany, specifically acknowledged as such.

One of our principal problems, therefore, would be to manage the on-rushing European détente in such a way that our concrete interests are not virtually swept aside. This would mean a series of decisions (e.g. Berlin, the Oder–Neisse, a Security Conference) as we moved towards a SALT agreement.

One of the harder areas in which to judge the effect of a SALT agreement is that of West European defense cooperation. With Soviet ABM constrained (and U.S./Soviet parity confirmed) both the British and the French will judge their own strategic forces as having acquired new justification. With MIRV allowed—even if the U.S. should slow up its own programs because of budgetary pressures—the British and French may well be stimulated to push ahead into that region of technology. Given UK Conservative propensities for seeking cooperation with the French they may well develop new momentum for the notion of an Anglo-French force. Without discussing the numerous ramified issues involved, it should be noted in the context of the present paper

³ Foreign Minister Walter Scheel of the Federal Republic of Germany visited Washington July 17–18. During the visit, Scheel discussed the talks that would begin at the end of July between the FRG and the Soviet Union on the mutual renunciation of force.

that such a development could face us with tough choices. We might be confronted with requests for technical assistance and would certainly have an interest in coordination. Yet the SALT treaty, at strong Soviet insistence, would almost certainly contain prohibitions against circumventing its terms via third countries. The Soviets would construe any American role in an Anglo-French force—indeed any continued bilateral Anglo-American or new American-French relationship in the strategic area—as violating the SALT treaty. This is quite apart from the explosive problem of German association with a possible Anglo-French force.

In short, a SALT agreement contains seeds of American-European difficulties over strategic weapons which will need to be given careful thought well before they arise.

Current Crises

It does not follow that an improvement in relations with the USSR, implicit in a SALT agreement, restrains Soviet conduct elsewhere. The Soviets could calculate exactly the opposite; that they would gain relatively a free hand, while the U.S. would be more inhibited from sharp reactions, lest the tentative détente be jeopardized (such a Soviet calculation probably was made in 1968 when the NPT was signed and a summit dangled as the Czech crisis deepened).

This does not mean that the Soviets would necessarily become *more* aggressive in the Middle East. Risks and costs would remain still substantial with or without SALT.

SALT agreements create no new incentive for the Soviets to be more conciliatory in promoting a peaceful settlement, or be more willing to put pressures on their Arab clients. Relieved of some concern over the future strategic competition with us, and especially relieved of any concern that we might make a favorable SALT agreement dependent on their political performance elsewhere, the Soviets could conclude that continuing tension in the Middle East was on balance still in their interests.

Vietnam and the Far East

The willingness to conclude a major agreement with the United States, in the wake of the Cambodian crisis, and while the war continued in Indochina, might suggest to Hanoi that Moscow put its own strategic interests and European goals well ahead of the struggle in Indochina.

Such a conclusion would be the more likely in view of the almost certain aggravation of Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese would see in SALT an embryonic Soviet-American condominium. They would foresee a prospect for a general relaxation on the USSR's Western front,

and might suspect a tacit deal in which the U.S. granted a free hand to the Soviets to deal with China. A SALT agreement that precluded the development of area defense against China would heighten Peking's suspicions that both Great Powers meant to deal with China's incipient strategic force by adopting a pre-emptive strategy. Soviet emphasis in Vienna on U.S.-Soviet cooperation against "provocative" third country attack points in this direction.

Any immediate gain in Indochina because of SALT would seem doubtful. The Soviets would be freed of any leverage SALT might have given us to influence their posture in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the Soviets have been losing influence, in any case, and have not proved willing to exert themselves in our behalf.

Some Longer Term Consequences

None of the post war arms control agreements with the USSR have proved the turning point that their advocates hoped for. Yet a SALT agreement, even if limited, would probably have a much more deep-seated effect.

The Soviets are currently drafting the next five year plan, and preparing for the 24th Party Congress. In addition, there is considerable evidence that the top leadership will probably be reshaped. An agreement in these circumstances could not help but influence the general course of Soviet policies. There would be some greater certainty in strategic planning and the allocation of resources. (Indeed this may be one of the major Soviet interests in an early agreement.) Forcing through any agreement in a collective leadership, especially one in a process of shifting the balance of power, would more or less tie the new leaders to the softer more optimistic line implicit in a SALT agreement.

How durable such a line would be might depend upon the resolution of the Middle East and the Indochina war, but also how the U.S. chose to conduct relations with the USSR. The Soviets would believe that SALT implied a certain political presumption that we would act more in parallel with the USSR. For example, an active U.S. effort to open lines to China would raise great suspicions in Moscow. Our stand on European issues would also be carefully examined as a test of Moscow presumptions.

One area of new problems for us would be in *East-West economic relations*. We would find it difficult to reconcile a SALT agreement with a restrictive policy on both trade and technological exchanges. We could no longer argue persuasively that our purpose was to prevent the enhancement of Soviet strategic capabilities.

In sum, if we choose to move in a direction of more open cooperation with the Soviet Union we would, of course, find the Soviet leaders responsive. If we chose to act with more restraint, or felt obliged to

pursue interests in conflict with the USSR's we would find, as in the past, that the net gains from SALT over any long term might prove fragile.

If a SALT agreement produced a generally conciliatory American attitude, including more generous economic policies toward the USSR, the Soviets would have a strong incentive to keep us on such a course. For even if the Soviets see U.S. opinion as increasingly concerned with domestic affairs and tired of foreign entanglements and the cold war, they would still remain concerned about sudden and extreme swings in our attitude. They could not ignore the fact that the President's major political support comes from sections of our population that remain hostile to Communism and suspicious of the USSR.

At the same time—and we should be quite clear about this—this would not prevent Soviet leaders from moving drastically in Eastern Europe if they felt that the effects of “détente” undermined Soviet hegemony there; it would not stop the Soviets from seeking to advance their interests and to damage ours in Western Europe, the Middle East and Mediterranean and elsewhere. Moreover, the Soviet ruling elite would still remain highly sensitive to any contamination of their society through increased exchanges and the lowering of barriers to free movement of peoples and ideas. The Soviets would probably reason that our own stake in preserving the agreement is sufficiently great to oblige us to tolerate such a range of Soviet actions, especially if there were no plausible evidence that the USSR was violating the actual terms of the SALT agreement. For their part, having entered the agreement and having adjusted their plans to its existence, the odds are that the Soviets would not consciously adopt a policy intended to undermine the agreement itself or its political basis or jeopardize its continuation. They would only be likely to do so if they saw the clear prospects of obtaining a significant strategic advantage or of achieving a decisive political breakthrough in their contest with us.

96. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 20, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

SALT

Dobrynin then turned the conversation to SALT. He said that we had not yet presented our formal proposals and he wondered when they could expect them. I replied that they would have them certainly the next day, but they would be along the lines foreshadowed in my recent conversation.² He said he recognized that we would not split off ABMs as a separate agreement and asked about the accidental war question. I told him that Smith was under instructions not to split off anything, but that I would be willing to explore with him separating out of the accidental war question those issues which concerned only our two countries, such as unauthorized launches of missiles or mass flights of bombers, from issues that affected third countries, such as the note Semyonov had handed to Smith at a concert.³ I stated that there might be a possibility of a limited technical agreement along these lines, but that Smith was not authorized to negotiate it. This would have to be done between Dobrynin and me. Dobrynin said he would come back to me on that.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 1 [Part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting, which took place in the Map Room at the White House, was requested by Dobrynin. On July 21 Kissinger sent Nixon a copy of the memorandum of conversation as an attachment to a summary of his conversation with Dobrynin. (Ibid.) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 183.

² See Document 93.

³ See Document 91.

97. National Security Decision Memorandum 73¹

Washington, July 22, 1970.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Supplemental Guidance for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

After considering the Delegation's request for changes in NSDM 69² and the views of the Verification Panel, the President has directed that the following supplemental guidance be issued:

1. The limit in paragraph 2(B) of NSDM 69 would entitle the United States as well as the USSR to 250 launchers for modern, large missiles (i.e., missiles with a volume in excess of 70 cubic meters and of a type which first became operational in 1964 or later), within the overall limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the sub-limit on launchers for ICBMs and sea-based missiles. The force permitted each side by paragraph 2(B) could be obtained by retention of existing launchers already associated with modern, large missiles, by retrofitting such missiles into existing launchers not hitherto associated with such missiles, by basing such missiles on sea-borne platforms, or by building new silos for them.

2. The limits set forth in paragraph 2(E) and (F) on relocation of existing ICBM silos, modification of existing ICBM silos in externally observable ways, on construction of new silos for IR/MRBMs, and on construction of all new ICBM silos are particularly intended to enhance confidence in verification by national means of the limit of paragraph 2(B). (In conjunction with the ban on land mobile ballistic missiles set forth in paragraph 2(F), they are also important for verification of the overall limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the sub-limit on missiles.) These limits would be interpreted to mean that any silo whose construction was initiated after an agreed date would be counted against the paragraph 2(B) limit. Similarly, any externally observable

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 51–100. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation.

² Document 94.

modification of existing silos would require that the modified silos be counted against that limit. The Delegation is to explain that these provisions are required because, while we do not wish to interfere unnecessarily with the flexibility of each side to determine its own force mix, we regard it as essential that there be a verifiable and effective limit on modern, large missiles. We believe we could not by national means verify confidently that a new silo had not been designed so as to be able to launch very large missiles or that a silo modification did not have the purpose of enabling the silo to accommodate such missiles. Therefore, we must insist that any new or modified silos be counted as if they contained modern, large missiles.

3. Obtaining a separate limitation on modern, large missiles and assuring that such a limitation is adequately verifiable are absolutely essential. Preservation of particular possible means of building a U.S. force of modern, large missiles must not interfere with obtaining an effective and verifiable limit on the Soviet force of such missiles. This priority must be borne in mind in discussing with the Soviets the U.S. proposals with respect to offensive forces and in evaluating any possible modifications of the U.S. position.

4. The privilege of substituting among bombers, ICBMs and sea-based missiles set forth in paragraph 2(D) of NSDM 69 would be subject to the collateral and subsidiary constraints set forth in the subsequent paragraphs of the NSDM (and amplified above) as well as to the various numerical limits. The Delegation may, if it thinks it advisable, describe the United States proposal as allowing "expanded" freedom-to-mix or "full freedom-to-mix, subject to stated conditions."

5. It is recognized that the Soviets may not accept all of the collateral constraints on offensive systems set forth in NSDM 69 and that they may object to other provisions as well. However, possible changes in the U.S. position will be considered in the context of concrete situations and proposals as they arise through the negotiating process and in the light of possible Soviet counter-concessions.

Henry A. Kissinger

98. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, July 24, 1970.

SUBJECT

Report for the President's file on his meeting with Senators Jackson and Tower on Thursday, July 23 at 4:00 p.m.

The President met with Senators Tower and Jackson to discuss Safeguard vote count and strategy.² Present, in addition to the President, were Senators Jackson and Tower, Secretary of Defense Mel Laird, Chuck Colson and Ken Belieu.

After a brief discussion of Senator Jackson's campaign in Washington, the President began by giving a background on the ABM program, the increased USSR missile threat, what the Soviet buildup means and the importance of the ABM vote to SALT.

The various anti-MIRV amendments were also discussed. The President pointed out that it is interesting to note that the USSR won't discuss this subject at the SALT.

The President said those of us sitting here in the White House, at this time, have a very momentous responsibility because if we don't act with vigilance and strength we may see the United States become a second-rate power. Scoop Jackson said second-rate isn't good enough in today's world.

The President said, "Let's get down to the vote count." It was agreed that we had approximately 50 votes against 48 in the opposition depending whether Margaret Smith was present to vote. Several potential soft votes were discussed. Cotton being one and Anderson another.³

Consensus was that it would be helpful if the President called Cotton. He said, "Oh, I'd just as soon have him down." I pointed out that Cotton was in New Hampshire and the President said he would call him from California and also have him down later perhaps. (Chuck Colson has sent to San Clemente a telephone recommendation to the President reminding him of the call to Cotton.)

Scoop Jackson said Anderson's physical situation was such that we couldn't depend on his memory. He thought the President didn't

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XII, July 20–September 1970. Secret.

² From July 8 through August 6 the Senate debated the administration's request for a \$759.1 million authorization to begin deployment and continue research on the Safeguard system. On August 6 the Senate approved the request by roll-call votes of 50–51 and 49–51. (*Congress and the Nation*, Vol. III, 1969–1972, p. 197)

³ Senators Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME), Norris Cotton (R-NH), and Clinton Anderson (D-NM).

have to ask Anderson to the White House; but that a phone call from California would be sufficient. Scoop Jackson will talk to Anderson first and let us know when he thinks the President should call him. (Jackson says today, July 28 that he has talked with Anderson and that the President should not call him until just before the vote.)⁴

Tower said we have to check with the two Jordan's. Scoop will check with B. Everett Jordan of North Carolina and Tower will check Len Jordan of Idaho. The President said, "I could call them if you want me to." And Tower said, "Well, let us check first and we'll see."

The possibility of pairing Senator Mundt⁵ was discussed and considered to be most desirable in order to secure an additional insurance. The most likely possibility would be to pair Mundt with Percy (or perhaps Pearson). Tower is going to pursue this and Scoop is going to talk with Percy on SALT. (Percy has already approached Scoop on the subject of SALT.)

The President suggested that it would be desirable to have Bill Rogers also talk to Percy on the idea of pairing with Mundt. (Dave Abshire has been given this info.)

Both Jackson and Tower said that they would make sure that we had 48 hour notice before the final vote on Safeguard in order to insure Tom Dodd and Dick Russell's⁶ presence. Mel Laird agreed we'd need to send an aircraft for them if necessary.

Scoop Jackson brought up the possibility of an executive session and Tower said we might need an executive session in order to use the classified SALT information available within Scoop Jackson's Subcommittee. The President suggested that maybe the Gerry Smith memorandum on ABM could be used and would have an impact on Percy. Scoop said, "I think the information in my Committee is probably stronger than Gerry's but in any event if we go to executive session, I think we can emphasize to some of the doubting Thomases the importance of the Safeguard vote on SALT."

The President asked, "Why is it so difficult to convince some of these Senators of the facts that are so obvious to us?" Scoop responded that some of the opponents are just so pro-Russian that they are actually disappointed and feel that Russia let them down by building more missiles. One had come to him and said, "It just can't be true that the Russians continued building SS 9's and SS 11's."

Scoop further said that Russian personnel from the Embassy in Washington were all over the Hill probing Senators and Senator's

⁴ The statements in parentheses at the end of some of the paragraphs, which describe subsequent actions, were apparently added at a later date.

⁵ Karl Mundt (R-SD).

⁶ Thomas Dodd (D-CT) and Richard Russell (D-GA).

staffs—not looking for information on hardware but trying to ascertain the state of the Senate’s mind.

Tower pointed out that certain Senate Staffers were in a daily contact with Russian Embassy people and socializing with them.

One of the Senators suggested it would be good if the FBI could take a good look at this. (Chuck Colson to discuss w/Haldeman.)

Laird pointed out that it was not easy to understand why Defense personnel were challenged when they went on the Hill to explain Defense programs and yet no one challenged the Russian Embassy personnel when they lobbied for a foreign power on the Hill. For example, two Defense officers were recently called upon because they had tried to sell Defense programs on the Hill. Laird said, “Why don’t some of our Senators demand the resignation of Soviet individuals who are lobbying on the Hill?”

In discussing Scoop’s staff, Dorothy Fosdick’s strong and staunch support to the President’s program came up. And the President said to Chuck Colson, “Make certain that she gets invited to a social evening at the White House.”

The President emphasized that winning the ABM vote will not only have a salutary effect on SALT but also on the Middle East situation. He said it isn’t a question of being belligerent with Russia, it’s just the fact that the Russians, simply and only, understand strength and conviction. We have to show this.

There was discussion of when the ABM vote should come up and Laird pointed out that it would be good to have it over with before the argument started on McGovern–Hatfield.⁷ All agreed to this however Tower pointed out that the Democrats control the schedule and we’d have to play it by ear.

Jackson described his Committee amendment on the Mideast (see copy attached)⁸ and it was agreed that we should get it voted up or down—and on the record.

The President said this kind of a vote at this particular time would be helpful in the negotiations.

He also strongly emphasized that it would be folly, as some recommend, unilaterally to agree to limit ABM without an agreement on ICBM’s and other strategic systems.

⁷ The amendment proposed by Senators George McGovern (D-SD) and Mark Hatfield (R-OR) required the termination of military operations and the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam by December 31, 1971. On September 21, 1970, the U.S. Senate rejected the amendment by a vote of 55–39. (H.R. 17123)

⁸ Attached but not printed is Sec. 501, which stated in part that “in order to restore and maintain the military balance in the Middle East,” the President was authorized to transfer aircraft to counteract military assistance provided by the Soviet Union to countries in the Middle East.

There was general discussion on what part the Israeli Ambassador might play. Scoop will talk to the Israeli Ambassador and tell him informally, not for attribution, of Scoop's amendment and the importance of the ABM vote. He will impress on the Ambassador the fact that the credibility of the U.S. world-wide military posture is in itself a deterrent and has a major impact on the Mideast situation.

The meeting adjourned at 5:05 p.m.

Kenneth E. Belieu
Deputy Assistant to the President

99. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Washington, July 30, 1970.

Dear Gerry:

One of my most important responsibilities to you as head of the US Delegation in Vienna is providing adequate, accurate, and timely intelligence. As you know, we have recently discovered many new missile starts by the Soviets which include SS-9's, SS-11's, and SS-13's, as well as increased production of the Yankee Class SSBN.

To insure that you are fully briefed on the latest evidence of the continued Soviet momentum in the field of strategic forces, as well as other related intelligence matters, I am sending Mr. Robert E. Morrison to visit you and the members of your Delegation. He is the Executive Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I have directed him to check on the effectiveness of our intelligence support and to report back to me with recommendations on how we may improve this support.

This visit is intended as an assistance to you and the Delegation. I trust you will find it helpful and that you and your staff will find time to assist Mr. Morrison in this task.

Sincerely,

Mel

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret.

100. National Security Decision Memorandum 74¹

Washington, July 31, 1970.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Detailed Statement of the Provisions of U.S. SALT Position

Attached is the statement as approved by the President, of the detailed provisions of the U.S. SALT position as outlined in NSDM 69 and NSDM 73.²

The material in the Detailed Statement is intended for the guidance of the United States Delegation in explaining the details of our position to the Soviet Delegation. Before presenting its contents, the Delegation should undertake the usual clearance procedures.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 51–100. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation.

² Documents 94 and 97. On July 15 the Verification Panel discussed the SALT Delegation's proposed changes to NSDM 69 to allow U.S. large missiles and new ICBM silos. The minutes are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files, (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72. On July 20 Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum summarizing the meeting and analyzing proposed changes to NSDM 69. He ended the memorandum by offering Nixon two options: redrafting the NSDM to allow the United States, though not the Soviet Union, to build new silos for up to 250 large missiles; or leave the NSDM unchanged but draft a detailed statement so that the United States could build up to 250 large missiles for submarines or for retrofit into existing silos. After the two options, Nixon wrote: "The tougher position." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XII, July 20–September 1970)

Attachment³

Washington, July 31, 1970.

DETAILED STATEMENT OF NSDM 69 SALT POSITION
(OPTION E)

(all provisions apply equally to each side, except as otherwise specifically provided)

I. ICBMs, SBBMs, and Heavy Bombers

A. Limitations

a. The aggregate total of ICBM launchers, sea-based ballistic missile (SBBM) launchers, and heavy bombers would be limited to 1900 as of an agreed date. Against this limit would be counted all operational ICBM launchers, SBBM launchers, and heavy bombers (as defined in paragraphs I.A.j., k., l.). Missile launchers for research, development, testing, training, and space missions are covered by a separate limit under section V.

b. Within this aggregate total, the number of ICBM and SBBM launchers combined could not exceed a subtotal of 1710.

c. Within the aggregate total and the missile subtotal, the number of launchers associated with modern, large ballistic missiles could not exceed 250. A "modern, large ballistic missile" is one whose volume exceeds 70 m³ and which is of a type which first became operational in 1964 or later. The force permitted each side by this limit could be obtained by retention of existing launchers already associated with modern, large missiles, by retrofitting such missiles into existing launchers not hitherto associated with such missiles, by basing such missiles on sea-borne platforms, or by constructing new fixed, land-based launchers for them. [See also paragraph I.A.e., I.A.h., I.B.a.]⁴

(Obtaining a separate limitation on modern, large missiles and assuring that such a limitation is adequately verifiable are absolutely essential. Preservation of particular possible means of building a U.S. force of modern, large missiles must not interfere with obtaining an effective and verifiable limit on the Soviet force of such missiles. This priority must be borne in mind in discussing with the Soviets the U.S. proposals with respect to offensive forces and in evaluating any possible modifications of the U.S. position.)

³ Top Secret.

⁴ All brackets are in the original.

d. We would initially propose a ban on deployment, production, and testing of land-mobile ICBM systems and their components and of ICBM systems utilizing water-borne vehicles on inland waterways. (This provision would not, however, prohibit vessels with SBBM launchers from transiting inland waterways when proceeding into and out of ports or in connection with normal construction, repair, and overhaul.)

e. Any land-based ICBM silo whose construction is initiated after an agreed date, or which is relocated, or modified in externally observable ways, would be counted toward the limit of paragraph I.A.c. above.

(In the event the Soviets are unwilling to accept both the ban on land-mobile ICBMs and the controls on new ICBM launcher construction, we would be prepared to consider a fallback on one measure or the other, but not both.)

f. Within the constraints set forth above, ICBM launchers, SBBM launchers, and heavy bombers could be substituted for each other on a one-for-one basis within the aggregate total and missile launcher subtotal, under agreed procedures.

g. Existing SBBM launchers could be replaced by other SBBM launchers on a one-for-one basis, under agreed procedures.

h. Subject to the limits on numbers of launchers for modern, large ballistic missiles, one-for-one replacement of deployed missiles by missiles of the same or a different type would be permitted. Retrofit of launchers previously associated with modern, large ballistic missiles would only be permitted if the launcher continued to be counted toward the limit of paragraph I.A.c. regardless of the dimensions of the new missile.

i. There would be no limitation on the substitution under agreed procedures of new heavy bomber types for old heavy bomber types on a one-for-one basis, nor would there be other qualitative limitations on such bombers or their armaments.

j. ICBMs are defined as land-based ballistic missiles which have a capability of ranges in excess of 5000 kilometers. ICBM launchers, even if deployed for use against targets within MR/IRBM range, would be counted against the ICBM launcher limit. Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment missile systems (FOBS) would also be counted as ICBM launchers.

k. "Heavy bombers" would be understood to comprise at present U.S. B-52, and the Soviet Myasishchev Bisons and Tupolev-95 Bears. Aircraft of these types would be counted as "heavy bombers" regardless of service subordination, i.e., Bears assigned to Soviet Navy count. Heavy bombers used as training, tanker, or reconnaissance aircraft would be counted in the aggregate. (The U.S. would not propose count-

ing heavy bombers in storage. However, if the Soviets raise the issue, we would be prepared to consider counting them in return for an appropriate Soviet concession.) Inclusion or exclusion of future types of aircraft as heavy bombers would be decided through consultation on a case-by-case basis.

1. “Sea-based ballistic missiles” are defined as ballistic missiles with launchers on submarines or surface ships regardless of the nature of the propulsion plant of the vessel, including those on vessels undergoing overhaul or conversion. (If pressed for a definition in terms of range, we would suggest 100 km. initially. In any event, tactical systems such as SUBROC would be excluded while the SS-N-4 and 5 would be counted.)

B. *Corollary Limitations*

a. New MR/IRBM silos not distinguishable by national means from silos for ICBMs of any type would be counted against the limit on launchers for modern, large ballistic missiles.

b. There would be a ban on land-mobile systems of any range which are not distinguishable by national means from land-mobile ICBMs. (In the event land-mobile ICBMs are not banned, land-mobile systems indistinguishable from land-mobile ICBMs would count as ICBMs for purposes of the limits in I.A.a. and I.A.b., and, if their missiles exceeded 70 m³ in volume, as modern, large missiles for purposes of the limit of I.A.c.) The United States would, however, stipulate that a land-mobile missile with a volume of less than 9 m³ and associated with a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) of less than 14 meters in overall length (when equipped with missile container or pod) is presumptively not of intercontinental range. We would also be prepared to accept convincing evidence that identified types of land-mobile missiles, whose dimensions exceed these, lacked ICBM range.

c. There would be agreed procedures for:

(1) Exchanging declarations, within a specified time after signing of the agreement, regarding proposed programs for reaching the agreed aggregate total. These declarations would contain the numbers and types of ICBM launchers, SBBM launchers, and heavy bombers, which would constitute the initial aggregate total.

(2) Advance notification of intended permitted missile launcher and heavy bomber substitution or replacement, and of intended deployment of new heavy bomber types, in order to facilitate verification of changes in the aggregate mix of missile launchers and heavy bombers.

(3) Destruction or dismantling of missile launchers or heavy bombers which are to become excess in the process of reaching agreed levels and/or changing the aggregate mix, in order to facilitate verification of such destruction or dismantling.

(4) Advance notification of deployment of any permitted mobile missile systems. Such notification would include photographs (e.g., parade-type photographs) and statements of the dimensions of both the new missiles and their transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). (If the Soviets balk at providing photos or dimensional information, we should not insist on it.)

d. Use of covered facilities for fitting out and berthing of submarines and surface ships would be prohibited in order to increase confidence in verification. This prohibition would not bar normal overhaul, conversion, or other work on submarines or surface ships under cover, in accordance with current practices.

e. The conversion of transport aircraft for use as heavy bombers would be prohibited.

C. *Verification*

Verification would be provided by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with the corollary limitations and cooperative measures agreed upon.

II. *MR/IRBMs*

Fixed land-based MR/IRBM launchers would not be limited except for the previously listed provision on new MR/IRBM silos [paragraph I.B.a.]. Mobile land-based MR/IRBMs with a maximum range capability of less than 5000 kilometers which are not externally distinguishable from land-mobile ICBM systems would be counted as ICBMs if mobile ICBMs are permitted, and banned if mobile ICBMs are prohibited [paragraph I.B.b.].

III. *Cruise Missiles*

Testing of cruise missiles of intercontinental range, and deployment of launchers for such missiles, would be prohibited. Submarine- or surface ship-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) would not be otherwise limited.

IV. *ABMs*

Either of two alternative provisions, of equal status as United States positions, could be agreed for limitations on deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.

A. *“NCA” Level*

1. *Limitations*

a. Deployment of ABM systems would be limited to systems appropriate for defense of the National Command Authority on each side (Moscow and Washington). One hundred fixed ABM launchers and one hundred deployed ABM interceptors, together with associated radars, would be permitted each side. (The phrase “deployed ABM in-

terceptor" refers to any ABM interceptor located on or in the vicinity of an ABM launcher). Any other ABM launchers or associated radars existing or under construction at the time the agreement came into effect would be dismantled (except for those facilities permitted under paragraphs IV.A.1.b. and d. and IV.A.2.a.) Such equipment could be used in permitted R&D or operational sites.

b. The Soviet Union could retain or replace its present 64 ABM launchers deployed in the vicinity of Moscow, and could add up to 36 additional launchers within 100 kilometers of the center of Moscow, to serve a total of no more than 100 deployed interceptors. The U.S. would be allowed to deploy 100 launchers and 100 interceptors within 100 kilometers of the center of Washington, D.C.

c. It is not necessary to develop an agreed definition of an "ABM," but there must be at least an agreed understanding on what constitutes a present or potential ABM interceptor. The understanding would recognize as ABM interceptors the Soviet Galosh (ABM-1) and the U.S. Spartan and Sprint, but would not include anti-aircraft systems, such as the Soviet systems SA-1 through SA-6 and the U.S. Nike-Hercules and Hawk. [See paragraph IV.A.1.e.]

d. Radars would be limited as follows:

(1) The Soviet Union could retain the Dog House radar at Naro Fominsk, the phased array radar under construction at Chekhov, and the four active Try Add radar complexes around Moscow; and could have two additional Try Add radar complexes within 100 kilometers of the center of Moscow. (If the Soviets raise the issue, we would agree to allow the Soviets to build an additional face on the Chekhov radar, providing coverage toward China.) (In the event we eventually agreed to allow the Soviets any new or replacement radars analogous to the Chekhov or Dog House radars, they would have to be located within 200 km. of the center of Moscow.) The U.S. could deploy a roughly equivalent ABM radar system in a defense centered on the Washington, D.C. area, comprising up to 6 PAR-type faces (at no more than two sites) within 200 kilometers of the center of Washington and 4 MSR-type faces (at no more than two sites) within 100 kilometers of the center of Washington.

(2) Soviet Hen House-type radars suitable for acquisition and tracking of ballistic missiles would be limited to those currently operational or under construction. We would inform the Soviets that we regard these radars as tolerable partly in view of their present vulnerability, and that we would consider increased SAM defense of such radars as inconsistent with an agreement. The U.S. would have the right to build an agreed number of additional radars to provide capability equivalent to that provided by the Soviet Hen Houses. PAR-type radar components and technology could be used in the U.S. equivalent system.

(3) Limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role. It would be prohibited for either side to construct additional radars of the Dog House, Hen House, Try Add, MSR, or PAR types, or other radars specifically designed for ABM use, except as provided in paragraphs IV.A.1.a. and d. and in IV.A.2.a., or as agreed under the provisions of this paragraph. Possible eventual replacement of permitted ABM radars would be subject to consultation. Also, there would be agreement to consult in the future on non-ABM radar requirements and plans with a view to meeting legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitations. It would be agreed that non-ABM associated radars would be distinguished by established criteria: location, orientation, elevation angle, power, frequency, aperture size, and antenna type (phased-array or mechanical scan).

e. Upgrading of SAM systems (or other types of missile systems, whatever their original design mission) to convert them into ABMs, or to give them a dual anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missile capability, or the development of new SAM systems or other missile systems (apart from permitted ABM systems) with such capabilities, would be prohibited. [See paragraph IV.A.2.d.] There would be no limitations on SAM systems in their air defense role as such.

f. It would be prohibited to equip a deployed ABM launcher so as to give it the capability to handle more than a single ABM interceptor at one time or to give it the capability for rapid reload, through automatic, semi-automatic, or other similar reload mechanisms. Furthermore, there would be a prohibition on facilities, including storage facilities at the ABM sites, for reload interceptors. It would be understood, however, that this provision would not require any change in the present configuration of the Galosh system as now deployed or in the Safeguard system as now being deployed.

2. *Corollary Limitations*

a. ABM research and development would be permitted. Deployment of, as well as testing of, mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems or their components would, however, be prohibited. The testing of reload and multiple interceptor equipment whose deployment is banned by paragraph IV.A.1.f. would be banned. Launchers of ABM interceptors for research, development, testing, evaluation, and training from fixed launchers would be limited to (1) preannounced flight tests; (2) on not more than 15 launchers (in addition to those permitted under paragraph IV.A.1.a. and b.); (3) at current test ranges and agreed additional test ranges. (Training launches from operational ABM launchers would be permitted if preannounced.) Construction of radars for ABM R&D would be permitted only at current and agreed additional locations, chosen so as to restrict to a minimum the operational potential of such R&D radars.

b. Flight-testing of SAM systems or other types of missile systems (apart from permitted ABM systems) in an ABM mode would be prohibited [see paragraph IV.A.2.d.].

c. There would be agreed procedures for advance notification of the deployment of new SAM systems.

d. In the process of negotiation, we would make clear to the Soviets the specific indicators we would employ in deciding whether a SAM system had ABM capability. Those indicators include:

- (1) relocation of sites;
- (2) changes in radar average power levels, aperture configurations, antenna types (e.g., introduction of phased-array site radars), signal characteristics, or improvements in or additional numbers of acquisition radars;
- (3) changes in missile characteristics (range, acceleration, burn-out velocity, propellants, exo-atmospheric capability);
- (4) introduction of new SAM systems;
- (5) appearance of nuclear warheads at additional SAM sites;
- (6) testing of SAMs in an apparent ABM mode. Indicators of tests of SAMs "in an ABM mode" would include such activities as any use of SAMs to intercept an RV, any flight-testing of SAMs to altitudes significantly higher than those attainable by aircraft, or flight testing of SAMs in association with ABM radars, including R&D radars.

3. *Verification*

Verification would be provided by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with corollary limitations and cooperative measures agreed upon.

B. "Zero" Level

1. *Limitations*

a. There would be a ban on deployment of fixed and mobile ABM systems, to include launchers, interceptors, and associated radars.

b. Existing ABM launchers at all operational sites would be dismantled or destroyed. (For R&D launchers, see paragraph IV.B.2.a.) Within an agreed period of time after the agreement came into effect, and under agreed procedures, the Soviet Union would dismantle or destroy the existing ABM launcher system around Moscow. The U.S. would cancel deployment of the Safeguard system and, under agreed procedures, dismantle or destroy any ABM launchers already deployed or under construction. Launchers would be dismantled by disassembly and removal of all interceptors and launch vehicles and observable destruction of launch platforms. Launcher equipment and interceptors removed from operational sites could be used for R&D, subject to the limitations of paragraph IV.B.2.a.

c. It is not necessary to develop an agreed definition of an "ABM," but there must be at least an agreed understanding on what constitutes a present or potential ABM interceptor. The understanding would rec-

ognize as ABM interceptors the Soviet Galosh ABM-1 and the U.S. Spartan and Sprint, but would not include anti-aircraft systems such as the Soviet SA-1 through SA-6 and the U.S. Nike-Hercules and Hawk. [See paragraph IV.B.1.e.]

d. Radars would be limited as follows:

(1) Within an agreed period of time after the agreement came into effect, and under agreed procedures, the Soviet Union would dismantle the Dog House radar at Naro Fominsk, the radar under construction at Chekhov, and the Try Add radar complexes round Moscow, as well as any similar radars for any ABM system (other than R&D radars permitted under paragraph IV.B.2.a). (For Hen House-type radars, see paragraph IV.B.2.d.(2).) The U.S. would cancel deployment of the Safeguard system, and, under agreed procedures, dismantle or destroy any radar facilities (other than R&D radars permitted under para. IV.B.2.a.) for any ABM system already deployed or under construction, subject to possible retention of certain PAR-type radars under paragraph IV.B.1.d.(2). Radars would be dismantled by disassembly and removal of all structures supporting or mounting radar faces. Radar equipment removed from operational sites could be used for R&D, subject to the limitations of paragraph IV.B.2.a.

(2) Soviet Hen House-type radars suitable for acquisition and tracking of ballistic missiles would be limited to those currently operational or under construction. We would inform the Soviets that we regard these radars as tolerable partly in view of their present vulnerability, and that we would consider increased SAM defense of such radars as inconsistent with an agreement. The U.S. would have the right to build an agreed number of additional radars to provide capability equivalent to that provided by the Soviet Hen Houses. PAR-type radar components and technology could be used in the U.S. equivalent system.

(3) Limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role. It would be prohibited for either side to construct additional radars of the Dog House, Hen House, Try Add, MSR, or PAR types, or other radars specifically designed for ABM use, except as provided in paragraphs IV.B.1.d.(2) and IV.B.2.a., or as agreed under the provisions of this paragraph. There would be agreement to consult in the future on non-ABM radar requirements and plans with a view to meeting legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitations. It would be agreed that non-ABM-associated radars would be distinguished by established criteria: location, orientation, elevation angle, power, frequency, aperture size, and antenna type (phased-array or mechanical scan).

e. Upgrading of SAM systems (or other types of missile systems, whatever their original design mission) to convert them into ABMs, or to give them a dual anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missile capability, or the development of new SAM systems or other missile systems (apart

from permitted ABM R&D) with such capabilities, would be prohibited. [See paragraph IV.B.2.d.] There would be no limitations on SAM systems in their air defense role as such.

2. *Corollary Limitations*

a. ABM research and development would be permitted. Deployment of, as well as testing of, mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems or their components would, however, be prohibited. Launches of ABM interceptors for any purpose from fixed launchers would be limited to (1) preannounced flight tests; (2) on not more than 15 launchers; and (3) at current test ranges and agreed additional test ranges. Construction of radars for ABM R&D would be permitted only at current and agreed additional locations, chosen so as to restrict to a minimum the operational potential of such R&D radars.

b. Flight-testing of SAM systems or other types of missile systems (other than in permitted ABM R&D) in an ABM mode would be prohibited. [See paragraph IV.B.2.d.]

c. There would be agreed procedures for advance notification of the deployment of new SAM systems.

d. In the process of negotiation, we would make clear to the Soviets the specific indicators we would employ in deciding whether a SAM system had ABM capability. Those indicators include:

- (1) relocation of sites;
- (2) changes in radar average power levels, aperture configurations, antenna types (e.g., introduction of phased-array site radars) signal characteristics or improvements in or additional numbers of acquisition radars;
- (3) changes in missile characteristics (range, acceleration, burn-out velocity, propellants, exo-atmospheric capability);
- (4) introduction of new SAM systems;
- (5) appearance of nuclear warheads at additional SAM sites;
- (6) testing of SAMs in an apparent ABM mode. Indicators of tests of SAMs "in an ABM mode" would include such activities as any use of SAMs to intercept an RV, any flight-testing of SAMs to altitudes significantly higher than those attainable by aircraft or flight-testing of SAMs in association with ABM radars, including R&D radars.

3. *Verification*

Verification would be provided by national means, facilitated by and in conjunction with corollary limitations and cooperative measures agreed upon.

V. *Research, Development, Testing, Training, and Space Launchers*

Missile launchers and platforms for research, development, testing, evaluation, and training with respect to all strategic offensive missile systems, and for space missions would be permitted, but their total number on each side could not exceed an agreed limit of 160

launchers (in excess of the 1900 limit and the 1710 subtotal). The launchers counted against this limit would include all launchers at R&D test ranges and facilities, launchers on “test-bed” submarines and surface ships, and training launchers at operational sites. (Heavy bombers used for training would, however, count as operational heavy bombers.) (For ABM R&D, see IV.A.2.a. and IV.B.2.a.)

VI. Heavy Bombers and Defenses against Them

See Section I with respect to heavy bombers. As previously indicated, there would be no limitations on SAM systems in their air defense role as such.

VII. MRVs/MIRVs

There would be no limitations on MRVs/MIRVs.

VIII. Verification, Consultation, and Duration

A. Verification of a SALT agreement comprising the above provisions would be accomplished by a combination of reliance upon national means and the provision of corollary limitations and cooperative measures designed to make the overall restrictions compatible with national verification capabilities.

There would be an understanding not to interfere with national means of verification, defined broadly as technical information collection systems necessary for verifying compliance with the agreement operating outside the national territory of the other state, or to undertake deliberate concealment measures which could impede the effectiveness of national means in verifying compliance with the agreement. The prohibition on deliberate concealment measures would not require changes in present U.S. or Soviet practices.

B. The agreement would also provide for consultations on issues arising out of the provisions of the agreement. A standing Joint Commission would be established to provide a forum in which the parties could:

1. Receive timely notice of certain deployments of which advance notification is required in the agreement;
2. Raise issues about compliance and verification. Selective direct observation could be offered or requested as a way to check on some ambiguous situation;
3. Discuss possibly necessary or useful adjustments within the framework of the agreement; and
4. Consider basic changes in the strategic situation (including third-country developments).

C. The agreement would:

1. Involve an understanding that neither side would seek to circumvent the provisions and effectiveness of the agreement through a third country.

2. Include a clause providing for withdrawal in the event either party decided its supreme national interests were threatened by continued adherence.

3. Contain provisions for consultations in the event of suspected violations or basic changes in the strategic situation (including third-country developments).

4. Be made subject to formal review at fixed periods (for example, for five years). This would create an opportunity for joint consideration of any changed circumstances, for modification of the agreement if deemed advisable, and for reaffirmation. This review would also permit withdrawal without having to charge the other side with violation or to invoke supreme national interest.

101. Note for the File by the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Vienna, August 12, 1970.

RE

Phone Calls on August 11 from Senator Percy and from Senator McIntyre²

I talked to Senator Percy who called from the White House, as did Senator McIntyre. Both calls were preceded by a call from General Haig, who said that the two Senators were going to call me, that he hoped I could say that from the SALT point of view, the bill as reported out from the Committee would be best.³

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Director's File, Smith Chronological File, SALT, Box 1, Progress Reports with White House Officials, March–August 1970. Secret.

² Thomas McIntyre (D-NH). Transcripts of Smith's telephone conversations with Senators Percy and McIntyre are *ibid*.

³ On August 10 Haig forwarded to Kissinger a backchannel message from Smith that stated: "The delegation is not precisely informed on Cooper–Hart, Hughes, Brooke, etc., amendments. The delegation believes that Senate action having 'tread water' effect on Safeguard program or evidencing significant split between Executive and Legislative Branches, would prejudice prospects for SALT agreement." In Haig's covering memorandum, he suggested that Colson show the passage to Senators Pearson, Percy, Brooke, Symington, and Aiken and tell each to call Smith. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT)

Percy's approach was to see how much we are proposing to appropriate while not going the full route that the Administration had requested. Isn't that a dynamic enough approach? I told him that I was not precisely informed on the various amendments,⁴ that I only could make the gross judgment, that if the Senate action gave the image that some element of suspense was being put into the program it would not be good for SALT bargaining purposes.

He stressed how much they were trying to help the SALT thing in the Safeguard debate. I told him I would be glad to talk to him on my return.

McIntyre took the same approach, with a little more acerbity: Wouldn't you say a million dollars was a dynamic move? I repeated my arguments given to Percy. To both of them I stated that I assumed these were confidential communications. McIntyre said, "I will honor that."

⁴ The Brooke, Cooper–Hart, and similar amendments provided varied amounts of funding under Phase I, which permitted Safeguard deployment to the sites at Grand Forks and Malmstrom, funded continued R&D, but restricted sites to only Phase I.

102. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation¹

August 13, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Amb. Gerard Smith
Dr. Henry Kissinger

GS: Hello.

HK: Hello.

GS: Henry—Gerry Smith.

HK: How are you?

GS: Well, I am pretty sick about the Report.²

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383–97–0010, Director's Files, Smith Chronological File, SALT, Box 1, Progress Reports with White House Officials, March–August 1970. No classification marking. Smith was in Vienna; Kissinger was in Washington.

² In a backchannel message to Kissinger, August 13, Smith stated: "I understand that *New York Times* has it that as a result of White House circulation of a telegram I am cast in the role of lobbying for Safeguard. My understanding was that the telegram was to be used by you personally in conversation with a few Senators on a confidential basis." (Ibid.) Smith was referring to his backchannel message of August 10; see footnote 3, Document 101.

HK: About that—I have been sick about that all morning. My understanding is that I have requested written reports from everybody. That particular occasion was not to be, but that it was rather (but I don't want to do it on the open phone) that one of the Senators balled it up. In any event, I am looking into it. I know how you feel and you are right.

GS: Well, I don't care about this thing personally but it just seems to me highly destructive of any usefulness I have to have this public image. Is there no way that you people can correct this by some sort of a press release?

HK: What would you suggest?

GS: Well, I think that if you stated that, or someone stated that, my views were asked in the routine fashion as to the relationship of SALT and Safeguard and I passed them on to the White House in a private communication and I explicitly said I was not addressing my comment to any amendment and I concluded that the United States should not put into a static condition any strategic arms program in anticipation of an agreement and that was it. I think that would be better than having the appearance that I am slyly going around placing telegrams in proper places. Now at Gen. Haig's suggestion I talked to Senator McIntyre the other day.³ In these very same terms I told him I understood it was a confidential communication, and he said, "I will honor that". And I understand now he is going around on the Senate floor quoting me.

HK: McIntyre?

GS: Yes.

HK: Well that is the problem. He is the problem.

GS: Well I wish Haig would not expose me to people that are a problem—that can't keep a confidence.

HK: Well there was no reason. You know we obviously—if we had understood that this would happen we wouldn't have done it. I had kept it until the very end.

GS: Well it seems to me that somebody owes me an obligation to try to take remedial action here. I don't know who it is or what it is but I would like to think that something was done about it. I tried to help the President consistent with my responsibilities here, Henry, and I feel that I am getting a pretty shabby deal.

HK: I will do what I can in convincing them that you didn't initiate anything.

GS: All right, but I hope something can be done and I understand that the Senate is going to have another vote next Wednesday⁴ and we

³ See Document 101.

⁴ August 19.

certainly hope that steps can be taken to keep me out of any preparation for next Wednesday's vote.

HK: Right.

GS: See, this seems to me Henry to be compounded with that devilish advertisement that I brought to your attention that incorrectly quoted me, and then it was repeated again in the *Post*. I find it hard to believe that I am getting a fair deal here.

HK: Gerry, the trouble is that some of these things are not being done from my office.

GS: If you can bring your influence to bear on whoever is doing it I would appreciate it.

HK: You can count on that, Gerry.

GS: All right. Thank you very much.

HK: I hope that despite all of this you know that . . .

GS: I feel that my prospects of doing anything for you in the future are sadly diminished.

HK: I don't think so, but at any rate you deserve much better.

GS: I have a sense of what relationships are with the other side here and this sort of thing is very bad.

HK: I agree.

GS: Maybe you can find some other employment for me.

HK: Oh no, no, no, Gerry. We need you there.

GS: All right. I will see you when I get back to Washington.⁵ Thank you very much.

⁵ SALT negotiations in Vienna ended August 14.

From Stalemate to Breakthrough, August 24, 1970–May 20, 1971

103. Notes of Secretary of Defense Laird's Staff Meeting¹

Washington, August 24, 1970, 9:35 a.m.

ATTENDEES

Mr. Laird	Dr. Nutter
Mr. Packard	B/General Hayes (for Dr. Rousselot)
Mr. Beal (for Mr. Resor)	Mr. Gibson (for Mr. Shillito)
General Westmoreland	Dr. Tucker
Mr. Warner (for Mr. Chafee)	Mr. Buzhardt
Admiral Zumwalt	Mr. Wallace
Dr. Seamans	Mr. Prendergast (for Mr. Baroody)
Dr. McLucas	Mr. Capen
General Ryan	Mr. deRosa
Admiral Moorer	Dr. Walske
General Walt (for General Chapman)	Mr. Friedheim
Dr. Foster	Mr. Dickson
Mr. Froehlke	General Pursley
Mr. Henkin	Captain Murphy
Mr. Kelley	Colonel Boatner
Mr. Moot	Mr. Livesay

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT or ABM.]

6. *Safeguard ABM and SALT.*

Dr. Foster said we have an urgent matter with regard to Safeguard ABM Program. There is a tendency to think the battle is won.² Actually, from the political, military and technical points of view, the situation is a mess. We are talking with the Soviets on the establishment of ABM protection of the National Military Command Authority. In our case, it would be protection of the Washington, D.C. area. This is a big job. We have no carefully thought out technical program. It would be costly. While the defense of Minuteman is militarily and technically feasible, such a defense is not permitted in the U.S. negotiating proposal to the Soviets in the SALT Talks. The hard-point defense plan being developed by Army only aggravates the situation. Dr. Foster is encouraging the Air Force to develop their approach faster to see if some jointly agreed hard-point defense plan could be presented to

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-0028, Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, 1969-1972, Chronological. Top Secret.

² See footnote 2, Document 98.

Mr. Laird for decision. The U.S. proposal for the SALT Talks for a mobile system is one in which the Soviets are interested. However, there is no money in the Air Force budget to support vigorous Air Force action for a mobile system. We are in a terrible trap. The urgency is such that the Secretary may have to go before the Senate on a National Military Command Authority ABM system. Mr. Packard said the whole thing is in a complete shambles. Either we get a SALT Agreement or write off the Safeguard. Mr. Laird said we may have to accept Minuteman vulnerability.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT or ABM.]

104. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 18, 1970.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Attorney General
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT

Analysis of Form of Agreement for SALT

As a part of our preparation for the Helsinki round of talks, in addition to work already underway, the Verification Panel should consider the issues involved in deciding what form an agreement should take.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XII, July 20–September 1970. Top Secret. K. Wayne Smith and Sonnenfeldt forwarded Gerard Smith's August 18 "Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Vienna" to Kissinger, under an action memorandum dated September 11. Kissinger initialed approval of their recommendations to initiate a working group study of the form of a SALT agreement, to summarize Smith's report for Nixon, and to send Smith's report only to McCloy of the GAC. Kissinger wrote the following remark in the margin of the paragraph dealing with the form of an agreement: "The President wants treaty." (Ibid.)

This is a subject which has been little examined in our work so far. It is not merely a matter of translating the provisions of our proposal² into “treaty language,” but involves such substantive questions as:

—Should the agreement take the form of a formal treaty? What alternatives are there, including alternative ways to involve the Congress in the process?³

—If there is to be a treaty, should it include all the elements of the agreement, or only certain ones, with others dealt with by agreements in other forms? What supplementary forms of agreements are possible?

—How might the elements of the agreement be divided as between different instruments? What substantive and negotiating problems are presented by different divisions?

—Is flexibility actually served by inclusion in less formal agreements? Where is flexibility most important?

—What functions and procedures, beyond those set forth in NSDM 74,⁴ should be established for the joint commission?

—What procedures for handling new situations or possible violations should be established?

As a basis for Verification Panel examination of these questions, the Working Group should prepare a comprehensive analysis of the problems of the appropriate form of an agreement, outlining the major alternative courses of action and the substantive and negotiating implications of each. This study should be ready for Verification Panel consideration by October 9, 1970.

Henry A. Kissinger

² See Documents 94, 97, and 100. In Smith’s August 18 report, he summarized the presentation of the U.S. proposal: “The initial presentation of the U.S. proposal on July 24 was followed by detailed expositions of limitations on offensive and defensive systems the following week, and on August 4 a detailed written ‘Description of the U.S. Proposal for an Initial Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement’ was tabled. The Soviet reaction was reserved.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XII, July 20–September 1970)

³ On September 14 Smith discussed the issue of Congressional participation with Rogers: “I told him I thought the time had come for us to be more affirmative about Congressional advisers for SALT. He was concerned lest the Democratic leadership designate a certain Senator in a way that would help his election campaign, and suggested that I try to keep the matter in suspense, and say that after a few weeks in Helsinki we perhaps would know better and could take an affirmative move.” (Note of talk with Secretary Rogers, prepared by Smith; Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Director’s Files, Smith/Farley Chronological File, Smith/Rogers Correspondence, January–September 1970)

⁴ Document 100.

105. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

SALT Work Before Helsinki

This memorandum outlines the work I believe should be undertaken by the Verification Panel and the Working Group prior to the re-opening of the talks in Helsinki on November 2, explains the steps I have taken at the Working Group level to get it done, and recommends a schedule for the Verification Panel Principals to follow.

The Work that Needs to be Done

I start from the premise that we are not going to undertake a major revision of the U.S. position for the opening of the Helsinki round. We have had no real reaction from the Soviets to our latest proposal and surely should wait for such a reaction before we start making major changes.

Both ACDA and OSD have underway very comprehensive studies of the whole range of SALT issues,² including such questions as what modifications we could accept in the numbers we have proposed and a variety of other U.S. fallbacks. I believe it would be a mistake for the Verification Panel to initiate a similar study on an inter-agency basis, because it would imply that the current position is not a firm one, and, no matter how firmly we said that a comprehensive review was intended only to prepare for contingencies, would tend to re-open all the old conflicts.

Moreover, I doubt if such an exercise would help much substantively. We don't know very much about what changes in our position the Soviets may seek and trying to anticipate all possible Soviet attitudes would simply provide a vehicle for agencies to re-argue their old views.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XII, July 20–September 1970. Top Secret. Sent for information.

² On October 14 Smith forwarded to Kissinger a paper entitled "SALT Stand-Still Arrangement"; a copy is *ibid.*, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIII, October–December 1970. A summary of OSD studies prepared as a memorandum for distribution by B.T. Plymale of the OSD SALT Support Group for a scheduled October 27 Verification Panel meeting is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3.

As I see it then, the basic analytic job to be done for Helsinki II is to sharpen our analysis and understanding of the current position.

The major subjects where more work is needed are:

1. *The collateral constraints.* It doesn't require much speculation about Soviet views to recognize that these will be a major subject of discussion. As preparation, we need to know which of these it is most important to insist on. This involves knowing both what each one buys us in terms of verification and what each one costs in terms of limiting U.S. actions. We also need to know much more precisely what specific actions would be covered by the collateral constraints. The need for more precise statement of the collaterals was demonstrated late in the Vienna talks in connection with the ban on "externally observable modification" of existing silos, where some members of the Delegation gave off-the-cuff explications which, if accepted as the final and official definition of the ban, could seriously undercut its value for verification.

The Working Group has underway a study of these constraints. This study, which is a good start but in a somewhat dormant state now, should be completed, taking into account Soviet questions and views expressed at Vienna. Once this is done, it can serve as a basis for drafting more detailed explanations of the constraints for the guidance of the Delegation, as well as possible later re-assessment of our position in the bargaining process.

2. *The accidental attack problem.* We need more fundamental work, not only on the technical details—which is already going on—but on the basic problem of "accidental" war. I think there is some danger that we are letting ourselves be driven by the negotiating context and the Soviet and U.S. proposals and counterproposals instead of understanding the basic problem—how a nuclear war might start by accident—and deriving our position from that.

The current draft of the "technical" accidents paper³ does considerably better with the technical details than the earlier draft. In addition, a special study is being made of improving the direct U.S.–USSR communications link. We need to keep this work focused on the central questions: What events have the greatest potential for setting off an "accidental" response and what are the practical problems in

³ Not found. The summary of the OSD studies, cited in footnote 2 above, described the "technical" aspect of the provocative attack problem as follows: "Issue of the mutual capability of detecting the origin of an attack and exchange of information in event of an actual attack. OSD Position. SALT should cautiously pursue the Technical problem alone. Allies should be briefed on the U.S. position immediately. Guidance to the Delegation should be explicit in that any basis for the assertion that we have an understanding with the Soviets on provocative attacks is completely false."

assessing such events and communicating with the other side about them?

A specific problem, however, is to make sure that the technical work is connected to the policy problems involved, and that we take advantage of this opportunity to look critically at how our command and control procedure could break down in the face of a limited nuclear attack. There is some tendency in some of the work done so far to have the attitude, "If these regulations are followed, there will be no wrong reaction, and the regulations must be followed, because not to follow them would be a breach of the regulations."

Fortunately, some people in DDR&E are interested in addressing this problem in a somewhat broader context, and they should be enlisted in the work being done for the Panel.

3. *The "form of the agreement" problem.* This, as explained in my earlier memo to you recommending that you initiate a study of this subject (Tab A)⁴ involves not only the particular documents and words to be used in an actual agreement, but the substantive effect of choices of different approaches. In addition, this is the context in which to look at the procedures we would want to set up under the agreement for dealing with new situations and possible violations.

4. *Other details.* There are a number of other parts of the U.S. proposal which require further definition for us to understand precisely what it is we are asking for. Among these questions are:

—Destruction and dismantling procedures;

—The duration of the agreement; (We have used five years as a possibility, but we should be sure that is a sensible number. I believe, for example, that Mr. Nitze thinks it is too short and a somewhat longer period would be wiser.)

—Invitational inspections; (What good would these inspections do? When would we use them? If they are purely voluntary so that the Soviets could refuse without there being a violation, why make an issue of asking for the right to ask for them—which we would have in any case?)

—The U.S. radar equivalent to the Hen Houses;

—Forms and procedures for pre-announcement (e.g., of deployment of new types of SAMs, of ABM tests), and consultations (e.g., on new non-ABM radars, new types of bombers);

—Transitional arrangements to reach agreed levels;

—Procedures and implementation of non-interference with national means of verification.

⁴ Attached but not printed. See footnote 1, Document 104.

These seem to me to be the major areas of continued uncertainty in our position (in addition to those covered by the work on collateral constraints, accidents, and the form of agreement).

We need a relatively brief paper addressed to each of these subjects, identifying the major choices and the strategic, verification and negotiating implications of each approach, as the basis for preparing detailed guidance amplifying the present instructions.

Some of them are relatively straightforward (e.g., procedures for dismantling ABM radars), and all that is required is setting down in some agreed and authoritative form what is meant. Others we know will prove controversial, e.g., equivalent U.S. radar system, and some of the ones we think should be simple may prove controversial.

What I Have Done

On Thursday, September 17, I held a meeting of the Working Group where I laid out a schedule of work for Helsinki II. At this meeting, I:

—Directed that agency comments on the existing papers (i.e., those on collateral constraints, accidental attacks, and the paper on provocative attacks) be provided to the drafting agency by Tuesday, September 22 and that the drafting agencies have revised drafts completed by Friday, September 25.

—Directed certain of the agencies to prepare short papers on the other issues mentioned above (i.e., destruction and dismantling procedures, etc.). These papers are to be completed by Thursday, September 24.

A copy of my directive to the Working Group is attached for your information. (Tab B)⁵

Suggested Schedule

I suggest that a Verification Panel Principals meeting be set for about October 16 (that is, two weeks before the talks resume) to consider the papers now being done by the Working Group. That will allow sufficient time for referencing items of major policy importance for the President and for drafting any detailed guidance that is necessary.

I do not believe that an earlier meeting of the Principals is necessary nor would it be productive. The work mentioned is well in hand but it isn't far enough along to be considered in a high-level discussion. Accordingly, I think there is nothing for you to do at this time. Around the first of October I will prepare a memorandum scheduling the Verification Panel meeting for October 16 if that still appears to be the appropriate date.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

106. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

Gerard Smith's Memorandum on Soviet Provocative Attack Proposal (Tab A)²

Gerard Smith has sent you his own memorandum on how to deal with the Soviet proposal for an understanding on the question of "provocative attack." This is outside the Verification Panel channels, where a State paper is being circulated on the same subject,³ and which I understand will be on the Verification Panel agenda.

The Smith version is long, confused and as "opaque" as he claims the Soviet motives are. He argues that we really do not know what worries the Soviets, but that they do have legitimate security concerns since they are surrounded by nuclear powers. We should, therefore, consider this approach of the Soviets is a "deeply felt" *démarche*. However, he concludes that China "seems not to be the dominant preoccupation"!!

He offers two premises for dealing with the Soviet overtures:

1. We will do with the Soviets only what we would be willing to do with other nuclear powers on the same conditions; this avoids accepting the Soviet thrust toward institutionalizing condominium, and is crucial to preserve the possibility of improved relations with China.

2. Second, we would not give commitments to retaliate against provocative third country attack.

This leaves the following possibilities: improve technical facilities (hot line), exchange information and consult in the event of "indications of a possible provocative third country attack," stay in touch through a Joint Commission established at SALT. All of these could be done privately in SALT. In addition, we could agree to a general formula concerning action in event of nuclear attack or threat of attack on nuclear powers (A variant of the guarantees given non-nuclear powers in the NPT.) Smith advises against going this far at this time.

I find this a very ambivalent treatment of a massively important issue, perhaps the real heart of the matter in SALT. I have never been

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIII, October–December 1970. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.

² Attached but not printed.

³ The Department of State paper is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-006, Verification Panel Meeting—SALT 10/19/70.

very impressed that the Soviet motive in SALT was only to kill the ABM. This very sensitive bargain they have offered us—tantamount to an alliance against China—may be the most important Soviet political initiative in years. It is not inconceivable that the outcome of SALT will turn on our ultimate response.

What both Smith and the State paper want to do is somehow have our cake and eat it. We respond with a package of garbage that accepts the basic legitimacy of so-called provocative attack, and a commitment to consult over a “threat,” but circumvent the heart of the matter which is whether we will take joint action against China or remain neutral. We would then have the worst imaginable position. Having engaged the Soviets on this absurd subject, we would have to assure our Allies that they were not the object. We then end up with a half-baked anti-Chinese arrangement, which the Soviets could construe was just enough freedom to act against China. In any case, the Chinese would have to conclude that this was the implicit aim of any such provocative attack agreement. If this is our aim, why not go all the way and extract a very high price from the Soviets?

My own feeling is that this should be kept in the deep freeze and that we should not string the Soviets along. At a minimum, we should determine whether SALT will result in anything relating to hardware that we could accept before launching into the strictly political aspects, and this includes the non-transfer provisions proposed by the Soviets.

This is clearly not the route the Soviets want. They want to achieve the political understanding, first, and then fix up some hardware bargain. Logic may be on their side in some ways and it might be best to kill the anti-China concept from the start. We would then learn how much this counted in the Soviet SALT position. In any case, we cannot allow Smith much leeway in this sensitive issue, since his overriding concern is a SALT agreement. Whatever comes out of the Verification Panel meetings, I urge you to hold the line against any new instruction on provocative attack until we have had a full look at the Soviet position.

The State paper, which is much better than Smith’s, will be processed through the regular mechanism of the Verification Panel.⁴ It, too, leans toward playing with this issue. Both papers are biased in that they reflect Soviet-American considerations mainly, and it might be well worth obtaining the reaction of a few old China hands.

⁴ In an October 27 memorandum to Kissinger prepared after that day’s Verification Panel meeting, Smith argued that his proposal and the Department of State paper were essentially the same and asked for guidance to the SALT Delegation on how to proceed. Kissinger wrote “OBE” on a memorandum from K. Wayne Smith and Sonnenfeldt on providing instructions to Smith. (Ibid., Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIII, October–December 1970)

107. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, October 19, 1970, 11:05 a.m.–12:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger	Attorney General John N. Mitchell
State	ACDA
John N. Irwin II	Gerard C. Smith
Ronald I. Spiers	Spurgeon Keeny
Raymond Garthoff	Philip J. Farley
Seymour Weiss	NSC Staff
Defense	Dr. K. Wayne Smith
David Packard	Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Paul Nitze	Col. Jack N. Merritt
Gardiner Tucker	William Hyland
CIA	R. James Woolsey
LTG Robert E. Cushman	Jeanne W. Davis
Carl E. Duckett	
JCS	
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer	
LTG Royal B. Allison	

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed:

... that the next major step should be for the Soviets to react to our proposal² or to table a proposal of their own;

... to prepare a list of proposed adjustments to our proposal in three categories: (1) those the Soviets would construe as easing our position; (2) those they would construe as extending our position; and (3) those in the grey area in between;

... that the Working Group would: (a) prepare within the week a paper on the question of forward-based aircraft; (b) prepare a paper on transfers of weapons or technology to third countries; (c) consider whether an agreement on accidents could be concluded separately from

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A handwritten notation at the top of the first page reads: "Put in my SALT book."

² See footnote 2, Document 104.

a general SALT agreement,³ and whether Soviet interest in an agreement on accidents might help get the more comprehensive agreement;⁴ and (d) consider further the question of notification with respect to provocative attacks;⁵

... to continue to look into improvement of communications with relation to notification on provocative attacks;

... State would submit to the Working Group a paper on consultation with our allies.

[Omitted here are minutes of the meeting.]

³ In the margin next to point "c" is the handwritten comment: "No!!"

⁴ At the end of the phrase is the handwritten comment, "Part of this."

⁵ After point "d" the word "misstatement" is handwritten in the margin.

108. Memorandum for the File by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith)¹

Washington, October 21, 1970.

Before dinner on the 19th of October, the Secretary asked me to join him and Gromyko to talk about SALT.² The Secretary said that we were serious about SALT, that we had tabled a specific proposal, that there was no linkage between SALT and other political issues. Gromyko said they, too, were serious about SALT. He said if SALT was not linked to other political problems, that meant that other political problems were not linked to it (which seemed a rather obvious statement). The Secretary confirmed this.

Gromyko said they would prefer a broader agreement, but if we wanted to go for a narrow agreement they would cooperate.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Box 1, Director's Files, Smith/Farley Chronological File, Box 1, Smith-Rogers Correspondence, October 1970–November 1971. Secret; Exdis. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: "GS gave Dubs (Soviet Affairs) oral report."

² On October 14 Smith prepared a memorandum for the file of a conversation with Rogers that day about what the Secretary would discuss with Gromyko during their talks at the United Nations. According to Smith's memorandum, Rogers made the following comments: "He felt the President was not clear in his mind as to what our attitude toward the Soviets should be, and that perhaps an approach to Gromyko that sounded somewhat soft would not appeal to the President. He felt that the talks with Gromyko would be desultory." (Ibid.)

Gromyko questioned whether making speeches in plenaries was the most efficient way to negotiate, although he noted that great skill was being put into the preparation of speeches.

I told him that I had stressed to Semenov our wish to have more private meetings and that they would not find us blocking any such proposal.

Afterwards, in the open session, Gromyko said he had a feeling that both Semenov and Smith would prefer to switch to Vienna in the winter and Helsinki in the summer. I agreed.

GS

109. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 22, 1970, 11 a.m.–1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko
Soviet Ambassador A. F. Dobrynin
Secretary Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
William D. Krimer, Interpreter, State Department

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

SALT

The President said that it was his impression our two sides were rather far apart on substantive agreement on Strategic Arms Limitation. We did think, however, that it was a constructive phenomenon for the two sides to be discussing this major issue. On November 2, the conference would resume in Helsinki. We were prepared to enter these discussions in the same spirit as we had entered them last year. He was going to instruct the U.S. Delegation to SALT to explore all possibilities of agreement. He recognized that this would require some

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 23.

time because the vital interests of the two countries were involved here. He felt that hard bargaining on both sides would be involved, but that some agreement could result from this bargaining process.

Mr. Gromyko said the Soviet Union approached these negotiations in all seriousness, fully aware that the questions under discussion were extremely difficult. His side would do all in its power to reach agreement. While in their view, a broad agreement would be the most desirable, if for some reason such broad agreement could not be reached at the present time, narrower agreements could be accomplished. In the future, such narrow agreements would also serve as a basis for a broader understanding. His delegation would conduct the negotiations in Helsinki in this spirit.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

110. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, October 27, 1970, 10:30 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

John N. Irwin

Ronald I. Spiers

Raymond Garthoff

Seymour Weiss

Defense

David Packard

Paul Nitze

JCS

Lt. Gen. Royal Allison

Justice

John N. Mitchell

ACDA

Gerard Smith

Spurgeon Keeny

Philip Farley

CIA

Richard Helms

Carl Duckett

NSC Staff

Col. Jack N. Merritt

K. Wayne Smith

James Woolsey

William Hyland

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Jeanne W. Davis

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969-3/8/72. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed:

1. that CIA would prepare a map showing precisely what would be covered in an NCA defense and the relative protection of the Moscow and Washington systems;
2. to get an analysis of the relative importance of the 100 vs 200 kilometer zones;
3. with regard to a US equivalent to the Hen House radar system, to indicate only number of faces and approximate location;
4. that omission of a ban on the production of a mobile ABM system was an error, but that we should not raise it until the Soviets have responded to our proposal;
5. to include prohibitions on increases in depth, diameter, silo liners and canisters in the agreement itself and, in addition, to prepare and inform the Soviets of a list of indicators of possible violations;
6. to ask the Working Group to work on a definition of the components of a mobile ABM system;
7. that the delegation might discuss the purely informational aspects of the two sides assuring each other on accidental launches or unidentified objects, but that they should not discuss whether the two sides should undertake to cooperate against an accomplished or imminent attack.
8. that ACDA would prepare a formula for institutionalizing diplomatic exchanges if either side believes a provocative attack is imminent;
9. to keep open the possibility of a separate or independent agreement on accidental launchings;
10. that the back-stopping group would consider further the question of non-interference with national means of detection;
11. to undertake further study of the questions of forward basing and transfers.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

111. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 27, 1970.

Dear Henry:

As I indicated in our telephone conversation earlier today,² I am seriously concerned about the Minuteman survivability question and the tremendous cost implications associated with insuring its invulnerability in the face of the growing Soviet counterforce threat.³

In my view, it is particularly important for the President to address this question and be aware of its central importance with regard to our negotiating position at Helsinki and our overall strategic posture for the future.

The negotiating proposal defined by NSDM-74⁴ and tabled at Vienna contains provisions which, in their aggregate, preclude all effective measures by which the United States could provide fixed land-based ICBM survivability in the long term. At the same time, this proposal does not preclude the improvements to Soviet ICBMs which could result in a credible first strike threat to Minuteman.

Recent intelligence indicates that the Soviets are vigorously developing a payload for the SS-11 with three re-entry vehicles and the potential for improved accuracy. The character of this development, which was not specifically forecast last year, suggests it is designed to penetrate Safeguard. We cannot discount the possibility that this SS-11 program is intended to evolve into a MIRV capability against Minuteman.

The Soviets have also resumed testing of the triple re-entry vehicle payload for the SS-9, which we have regarded as a possible counterforce weapon against Minuteman. There is little doubt that the Soviets could deploy an accurate MIRV system with a greater number of warheads in the 1972-74 period which would give one SS-9 missile a clear capability to destroy more than one Minuteman silo.

The successful development and deployment of accurate MIRV payloads on the SS-9 and improvements in SS-11 accuracy, even with the limitation on the number of launchers in the NSDM-74 proposal,

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² No other record of their conversation has been found.

³ On October 27 Tucker sent Laird a memorandum concerning Minuteman survivability in response to an NSC request for a study of the vulnerability of all strategic offensive systems. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, ???????.)

⁴ Document 100.

could give the Soviets the capability by the mid-70s to destroy most of our Minuteman silos unless we take timely measures to increase their survivability or make a conscious decision to concede potential Minuteman vulnerability as a trade-off to permit acquiring additional offensive capability.

1. Improving Minuteman Survivability

Possible measures for long term improvement in Minuteman survivability include relocating Minuteman into hard rock silos, defending Minuteman fields with Safeguard or other ABM defenses (i.e., “hard point defenses”), or placing Minuteman missiles on mobile launchers. We do not yet have full technical confidence in the feasibility and adequacy of any of these measures. Some combination may be required. But the present formulation of the NSDM-74 proposal prohibits them all, except for the option to relocate 250 silos, or to replace Minuteman land launchers on a one-for-one basis with sea-based launchers or bombers. This proposal does permit the hardening of existing Minuteman silos, but this measure is only an interim solution which can be overcome by continued improvements in Soviet missile accuracy and MIRV payloads.

2. Other Alternatives

As noted above, NSDM-74 does provide for the replacement of fixed land-based ICBM capability with other systems within overall limitation on strategic delivery vehicles. This “freedom to mix” would permit the construction or retention of bombers, the relocation of Minuteman to a mobile platform afloat, or the substitution of other sea-based ballistic missile capability (surface or submerged platform), should such a path be indicated by developments in a threat to Minuteman.

3. Discussion

Under the current SALT options, there appear to be three ways to approach the Minuteman survivability issue. First, the most desirable to an arms control agreement remains the reduction approach embodied in our earlier Option D.⁵ This option provides for mutual U.S.-Soviet reductions in the number of land-based strategic delivery vehicles over the next five years and, therefore, would allow us to reduce our most vulnerable systems without incurring a numerical disadvantage. It could also result in reduced strategic force budgets, whereas savings are less likely under NSDM-74 provisions. Even though the negotiability of Option D is questionable, we should keep it as an active proposal.

⁵ See the enclosure to Document 68.

If we were successful in negotiating Option D, then the problem of Minuteman survivability would essentially be solved by negotiations.

On the other hand, if Option D did not serve as a basis for agreement, and we proceeded with Option E, we still retain the flexibility of adjusting our force mix, should the Soviets give indications that they are continuing to pursue a capability to destroy fixed land-based ICBMs. This is the second alternative.

A third approach is to modify NSDM-74 to permit land-based mobile launchers in addition to the other options noted above. Presumably, such an option might be acceptable to the Soviet Union, since its "basic provisions" would allow mobiles, but this would require modification of our negotiating position and severely complicate verification requirements. We could also propose other changes in our negotiating position such as permitting a hard-point ABM defense of fixed silos.

In sum, the issue revolves around our commitment to the invulnerability of fixed land-based ICBMs. If it is national policy to remain committed to the invulnerability of our fixed land-based ICBM force, then the provisions of NSDM-74 could cause us severe problems. If, on the other hand, we adhere to the "freedom to mix" concept of NSDM-74 and take steps to insure that we can preserve our offensive capability by this means, then we need not be overly concerned about a developing Soviet counterforce capability.

The concern about fixed land-based missile vulnerability can be viewed as a major trap or a major opportunity. Given the current situation—namely, approval of Safeguard for Minuteman defense only; recognition that such defense may not be adequate or justified in itself for only Minuteman protection; our SALT position; and the increasing threat—a continued commitment to the invulnerability of fixed land-based ICBMs could become a major trap. We could be faced with a situation of devoting substantial and scarce resources to preserving the current capability in Minuteman at the expense of added offensive capabilities in the face of a growing threat.

Convincing Congress of the need for devoting an ever-increasing percentage of scarce strategic dollars to defense of Minuteman alone with no apparent guarantee that the defense can keep up with the offensive countermeasures poses difficult problems indeed.

On the other hand, we could take advantage of the current situation and use it as a major opportunity to make carefully reasoned and politically acceptable adjustments in our forces; or we could take steps this year to preserve the flexibility to do so through appropriate options. Either course could be a clear signal to the Soviet Union, a signal that we recognize that they are developing such a counterforce capability, but that we can bypass the problem through appropriate

alternative force decisions which do not contemplate a defense of Minuteman at any cost. NSDM-74, as now written, does permit the latter action.

Henry, I have given considerable thought to this problem and several others relating to our broad National Security Strategy for the 1970's and beyond. I will be communicating with the President and with you on the broader aspects of our strategy in the near future but in light of the resumption of talks next week in Helsinki, I thought it important to bring this aspect of the problem to your attention at this time.

Sincerely,

Mel Laird

112. Memorandum From the Vice Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Freeman) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

JCSM-499-70

Washington, October 28, 1970.

SUBJECT

Study of the Potential Effect of SALT Option E

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 3 September 1970, subject: "Study of U.S. Programs Under Certain Options,"² which requested that the study on the effect of agreement to SALT Options C and D be completed to include additional analysis of Option E.

2. Forwarded herewith is a study,³ prepared by an ad hoc study group of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which illuminates the potential effect of agreement to the provisions of SALT Option E on US strategic force structure, strategy, and weapon systems.

3. The study, despite its limitations, indicates a need for continuing analysis in the SALT area. [*11 lines not declassified*]

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Laird saw it on November 3.

² Laird explained in the memorandum that a JCS study would assist the Department of Defense in assessing the impact on U.S. weapon programs of new comprehensive SALT options. (Ibid.)

³ The paper, undated, is attached but not printed.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the study provides useful background material with regard to SALT Option E. By their consideration of this study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not imply endorsement of the provisions of SALT Option E. It is noted that:

a. The threats postulated for the Soviet Union were extracted from the high technology base described by NIPP-70⁴ and did not take into consideration all the threats that might be possible within the state of the art. For example, maximum MIRV capability of the SS-9 was not considered in the study. The capabilities of the illustrative US Forces as shown in the study would be significantly degraded by feasible qualitative improvements in the Soviet strategic forces.

b. Those findings which serve to evaluate the US ability to meet the criteria for strategic sufficiency are judgmental and scenario/model dependent.

(1) The findings concerning Soviet incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis depends on a questionable judgment that the US retaliatory capability in all forces examined will inhibit this incentive. It is also possible that the Soviets may perceive value in a preemptive strike in a crisis despite the fact that the United States would still retain significant retaliatory capability.

(2) Assessment of the capability of US Forces to deny to the Soviet Union the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage to the United States than the Soviets themselves would suffer [6 lines not declassified].

c. [1 paragraph (10½ lines) not declassified]

d. The weapon systems of the illustrative US Forces, with the exception of the advanced intercontinental ballistic missile (modern, large missile), are those which are currently deployed or under active consideration for deployment. Since there is a provision in SALT Option E for the United States to deploy 250 modern, large missiles, it was necessary to postulate a hypothetical missile to examine this provision. Although the missiles were considered as land based in the study, it is equally possible that they could be based at sea. The level of each element of the strategic offensive forces in the illustrative US Forces was restrained at or below the level shown as the "constrained" level in the Joint Force Memorandum, Fiscal Years 1972-1979 (JFM-72), with the exception that in one force three undersea long-range missile system submarines are deployed. These illustrative US Force mixes do not represent the full range of force mixes permitted by Option E nor are they necessarily optimum. It is probable that, as the characteristics and potential of the Soviet force capabilities within the constraints of SALT Option E become known, there will be a need for significant changes

⁴ National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

to US weapon programs in order to preserve the United States as a viable society.

e. The nature of an agreed procedure for the destruction or dismantling of heavy bombers could require a modification to the procedures currently in use with regard to bombers which might become nonoperational.

5. The preparation of the study of the impact of agreement to SALT Options C and D was held in abeyance while conducting the study on SALT Option E. The results of the study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Options C and D will be forwarded upon its completion.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will maintain the subject of strategic arms limitation under continuing review and will provide their views on this topic, as may be appropriate.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Mason Freeman

Rear Admiral, USN

Vice Director, Joint Staff

113. National Security Decision Memorandum 90¹

Washington, November 2, 1970.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Instructions for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki (SALT III)

After considering the discussions and recommendations of the Verification Panel, the President has made the following decisions with respect to instructions for the U.S. Delegation for continuing discussions at Helsinki:²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 51–100. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation.

² Round III began on November 3 and ended December 18.

A. The principal aim of the U.S. Delegation will be to elicit a detailed Soviet response to the issues contained in the U.S. proposal tabled in Vienna. Accordingly, the Delegation should avoid volunteering any clarifications except for that in paragraph F below.

B. In the discussion of “accidental and unauthorized launch,” it should be made clear that this general issue is to be treated as part of a general strategic arms limitation agreement. A separate agreement on this issue cannot be considered at this time.

C. Should the Soviets propose further negotiations on the proposed agreements for exchange of information and notifications concerning accidental and unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons, the Delegation should take the position:

1. We can agree to an exchange of information on events (as indicated below) when it is judged that such an exchange of information would be useful in reducing the danger of an unintended war between the U.S. and the USSR.

a. Immediate mutual notification in the event of an unauthorized, accidental, or otherwise unexplained incident involving the detonation or probable detonation of nuclear weapons.

b. Mutual exchange of information in the event of detection of unidentified objects by missile attack warning systems, or signs of interference.

c. Advance notification of planned missile launches and mass take-offs of strategic aircraft.

2. We should make it clear that each Party would decide for itself which particular events would be subject to information exchange with the other Party. The Delegation should also make it clear that operational practices, such as missile submarine patrols and armed bomber flights, are not considered relevant to this topic.

3. While communication facilities appropriate to the urgency of specific events would be used, the Washington–Moscow direct communications link³ could be improved for use in critical situations as part of the agreement in this general area.

D. In response to Soviet queries on the constraint on externally observable modifications of silos, the Delegation should amend the U.S. position to delete the phrase “or which is modified in externally observable ways” and add the following provision:

“Any land-based ICBM silo which is modified in a manner which could provide the silo with a capability to launch a modern, large ballistic missile would be counted toward the limit of 250 launchers for

³ Commonly referred to as the “hot line.”

such missiles. Any increase in silo diameter or depth, any permanent removal of a silo liner, any replacement of a silo liner or missile canister with a larger liner or canister, or any other change which could provide the silo with the capability to launch a modern, large ballistic missile would require that the silo be counted toward this limit.”

In the process of negotiation, the Delegation should make clear to the Soviets the specific indicators which we would employ in deciding whether or not a silo could be modified. These indicators would include:

1. Excavation and/or construction at the external wall of the silo.
2. Installation of a new or modified missile suspension system.
3. Installation of a new or modified missile mount.
4. Prolonged construction operation within or about the silo.
5. Use of heavy construction equipment, such as cranes.
6. Activities of the types noted above occurring at a number of similar silos.
7. Testing of a new missile larger than 70 cubic meters.
8. Appearance at launch sites of ground support equipment or activities capable of supporting a significantly larger missile than heretofore associated with the sites.

Consideration will be given to dropping the limitations on silo liners and missile canisters from the provision and moving them to the list of indicators if deemed important to negotiations.

E. In response to Soviet queries on our proposal to retain the right to build a radar capability equivalent to the Soviet Hen House system, the Delegation should explain that the criteria for determining equivalency would include numbers, location and orientation of the radars. The Delegation should state that the detailed description within these parameters is a technical matter to be discussed after agreement is reached on the level of ABM defenses. If pressed, the Delegation can explain that the U.S. recognizes the requirement for each side to have a tactical warning system against ballistic missile attacks. Our concern, however, is the potential of such a system for use in an ABM defense. A limited number of sites, at peripheral locations with outward-looking orientation, helps limit the potential for such use. Considering the characteristics of the Hen House system, an illustrative U.S. equivalent system might be 11 or 12 phased-array radars, outward-looking, at seven or eight peripheral sites.

F. At some appropriate time, the Delegation is authorized to amend the current position to include a prohibition on production of mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems in addition to the prohibition on deployment and testing of these systems.

G. With respect to U.S. forward-based systems, the Delegation is instructed to continue to take the position directed by NSDM–69.⁴

H. Except where changed by these Instructions, previous Instructions to the Delegation, including the President's directive of October 31, 1969, entitled, "Avoidance of Leaks on SALT," are reaffirmed.⁵

Henry A. Kissinger

⁴ Document 94.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 40. In an October 28 letter to the President, Smith expressed concern about the effect of public statements on the negotiations: "I believe you know that I have felt at times in the past that our official line has been too optimistic. Optimism not only has raised expectations unduly, but it tends to reduce our bargaining power against an opponent whose public position is, for the most part, silence. [. . .] I am aware of important considerations other than SALT which bear upon the US public stance in the strategic arms context. Such considerations may lead to a different posture from the one I suggest, but I hope any public information decisions will be taken after consideration of the SALT points which I make in this letter." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIII, October–December 1970)

114. Editorial Note

During the third round of the strategic arms limitation talks in Helsinki, held November 3–December 18, 1970, Lieutenant General Royal B. Allison, the JCS representative on the United States Delegation, clarified Soviet objections about forward-based systems (FBS) and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). On November 13 in a memorandum to chief of the United States Delegation Smith, Allison remarked on Chief Soviet negotiator Semenov's contention that the United States had improved its FBS since the beginning of SALT. Allison noted that in Europe, the United States had conducted routine modernization of tactical aircraft, which resulted in a net increase of six aircraft over the past year. He pointed out that in the Pacific, there were 87 fewer land-based aircraft and possibly even an additional 76 if the temporary withdrawal of one attack carrier was counted. The United States had increased its Pershing missiles by 24 over the past year, and in West Germany, 48 launchers would be added by June 1971. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, OSD Files: FRC 383–98–0089, Director's Files, Smith Files, Smith/Allison Correspondence, April–December 1970)

On December 3 Allison sent Smith a memorandum in which he expressed the following concerns over SLCMs and the Soviet defini-

tion of “strategic” between the formulation put forth during the Vienna round and that proposed in the plenary session of November 10: “This reference to ‘ballistic missiles,’ as opposed to their earlier reference to ‘any types of missiles with nuclear warhead,’ has the effect of excluding SLCMs from consideration in SALT, even under the terms of their definition of ‘strategic.’ ” (Ibid.)

115. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 2, 1970.

SUBJECT

SALT ABM Proposals

Yesterday in Helsinki the Soviets proposed that “It would be useful to single out the question of limiting ABM systems and attempt to reach a separate agreement on it in the immediate future.” They said they will submit a concrete proposal on 4 December 1970.²

I believe the United States cannot consider a separate agreement on ABM only. Offensive weapons must be limited as well for any agreement to be acceptable. Otherwise we would give up a system to which we are presently committed without any corresponding Soviet concession and without constraining the threat for which our intended ABM system is a counter.

I am also concerned over the fact that we have formulated the proposal to limit ABM systems to the defense of National Command Authorities in such a way as to center the U.S. system specifically on Washington, D.C.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–076, Box 12, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret. According to an attached December 2 transmittal note by Tucker, this memorandum was prepared in response to Laird’s request for a memorandum to Nixon detailing the U.S. NCA proposal. Tucker noted that “we might at least persuade Henry to instruct the delegation not to discuss or define our NCA proposal further until after the 8th.” Another attached note indicates that the memorandum was to be sent to the White House on December 5.

² In telegram USDEL SALT 471, December 2, Smith conveyed Semenov’s position on ABM limits that Semenov gave during a post-plenary session on December 1. Smith explained that Semenov would formally state the position on December 4. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIII, October–December 1970)

I believe it is essential that we remove this restriction and regain the flexibility to locate our counterpart to the Moscow system wherever it can best serve national security.

We might well prefer a North Central location to one on the East Coast. Our major land based deterrent forces and their control centers are located in that area, or will be as we move bomber bases farther from our coast line to avoid the submarine based missile threats. We have met strong Congressional opposition to an ABM defense of Washington. A North Central system would better fit with our presently authorized Safeguard program.

A North Central system equivalent to the Moscow system would be too limited in number of interceptors to form an effective defense of our deterrent forces against heavy attack, but would provide a basic system which could be expanded if the Soviets were to cheat or abrogate an agreement.

I recommend that prior to the December 4 session in Helsinki:

1. The Delegation be instructed to make clear to the Soviets that the U.S. will not negotiate a separate limitation on ABMs apart from offensive weapon limits.

2. The Delegation be instructed to keep open the deployment location for the U.S. counterpart to the Moscow ABM system.

3. The NSDM-74 be amended³ to remove specific reference to Washington, D.C., and provide flexibility in location.

The above actions would maintain pressure on the Soviets to negotiate limits on offensive weapons, and would give us the flexibility to decide later where to locate the U.S. counterpart ABM system in order that it provide a maximum contribution to national security.

David Packard

³ In a December 5 memorandum to Nixon, Laird recommended language for an amendment to NSDM 74 concerning deployment of ABM systems limited to NCA (Moscow and Washington). Laird recommended retaining the option of choosing the location of an ABM system. (Ibid.)

116. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

SALT: The Shaker is Running Out

By no stretch of the imagination can the latest Soviet SALT proposals² be construed as a serious effort to bridge the growing gap in our positions in Helsinki. The two propositions are so patently unacceptable that they raise important questions about Soviet motives in presenting them and about the entire future of the talks, especially since Semyonov stressed that his proposals are the result of "profound consideration" in Moscow.

The Soviets had good reason to believe beforehand, on the basis of last summer's exchange, that a *separate agreement on ABMs* would probably be rejected if it was surfaced in the formal talks. It was reasonable to expect that if they decided to make a formal proposal, they would put forward as attractive a proposition as they could construct. Instead, the proposed treaty is merely a dressed up version of what was already proposed at Vienna as part of the Soviet Basic Provisions.³ Only the barest of frills were added—a ban on mobile land, sea and space based ABMs, lifted from our presentation and some window dressing on consultations.

As for the *new forward based aircraft proposals*, Semyonov's presentation was, if anything, far worse than might have been expected. To add to a partial withdrawal of FBA a unilateral US reduction in "central systems" is probably more unacceptable than the old formula that the Soviets be compensated with extra numbers of ICBMs for themselves.

Assuming that we also will turn down the separate ABM agreement, the net result is that SALT is stalemated, though the negotiators can probably continue to make speeches for two more weeks.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-006, Verification Panel Meeting—SALT 12/8/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for urgent information.

² See footnote 2, Document 115. In addition, in telegram USDEL SALT 484, December 4, Smith summarized the Soviet position, presented by Semenov on December 3, on forward based nuclear systems. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIII, October–December 1970)

³ See Document 72.

Soviet Motives

Why have the Soviet negotiators allowed the talks to reach this pass? As Smith noted,⁴ the Soviets were presenting a sort of comprehensive scheme, and they then suddenly threw in the ABM proposal. Had matters rested there, some further bargaining room might have been open, but adding the toughest proposals on forward based air could only persuade us that the Helsinki phase, at least, was finished.

A Deliberate Deception?

One school of thought will probably find this turn of events to be solid evidence that the Soviets have never really been very serious, and that SALT was little more than a holding action to impose some inhibitions and complications on American policy, while Soviet programs roared ahead. Evidence for this interpretation could be found in the ambiguous Soviet handling of MIRVs: (a) avoiding the moratorium questions, (b) proposing a production ban with freedom to test that was certain to be rejected, (c) hinting in Vienna that MIRVs were non-negotiable, and finally (d) beginning their own MIRV testing.

Additional evidence could be found in the heavy schedule of SS-11 tests with a new front end, either MRVs or, more likely, penetration aids. Likewise, the testing of the improved Galosh ABM missiles has proceeded at a rapid pace.

On the other hand, the actual deployment program does not seem to support the notion that SALT has been little more than a coverup. Only two SS-9 groups have been started since SALT began, and construction of them has been halted for some reason. True, only 12 missiles are involved, but more important the program could be leveling off at 294, which is far short of the counterforce numbers required with three independent warheads. Similarly, the SS-11 program is slowing down (the last new start was October 1969). True, the total Soviet force, even if they produce no more new silos will be 1445. But subtracting the older SS-7s and 8s, the total is not all that more than the US.

Moreover, our programs have not really been halted by SALT. The Safeguard has passed two Congressional tests, perhaps because the bar-

⁴ In backchannel message 68 from Helsinki, December 3, Smith advised Kissinger that "my personal objection to formal limit on ABMs, while offensive systems remain unchecked, stands; and I think we should in general terms continue to stress interrelation of defensive and offensive systems but not flatly reject Soviet proposal. (In view of large stakes here, President may want to direct a review of our policy against ABM only arrangement and would note that US/USSR positions appear to have switched 180 degrees since McNamara/Johnson/Kosygin meeting in 1967.)" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT) The 1967 meeting took place on June 23 during the Glassboro summit; see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, Document 231.

gaining chip argument was persuasive. The MIRV program has begun, even if its future will be under Congressional attack. In sum, if SALT were a deceptive operation it has not been all that successful, though we might find the situation in Soviet deployment suddenly change if they have decided to end the talks.

Bargaining Tactic?

Another possible interpretation is that all of the maneuvering in SALT is part of the “normal” Soviet negotiating process.

First, they put forward demands they knew to be patently absurd. After considerable debate, they finally disclose their true position and press for quick agreement. In this view, we might learn even before the end of Helsinki what the Soviets are really bargaining for.

There is not much evidence one way or another for this interpretation. If the Soviets do have a different position, it does not necessarily follow that they will present it soon. Their perspective might foresee a further period of stonewalling on either a separate ABM or a FBA concession, on the grounds that the record thus far in SALT suggests we will eventually look for ways to accommodate the lesser of the two evils. (We are, in fact, engaged in a feckless exercise to find a “formula” to buy off the Soviet forward based aircraft proposal.) The Soviets could easily believe that SALT is more important to us than to them.

If we do move to new compromise, it would confirm this basic assumption that they can continue to extract some concessions and should do so, before revealing their real terms for agreement.

If we accept this interpretation of Soviet motive as essentially hard bargaining tactics then our own policy should simply be one of patient and firm resistance to the Soviet ploys and insistence on our own position.

Paralysis in Moscow?

A third interpretation would be that the twists and turns in the Soviet position and tactical conduct of the talks is a reflection of a paralyzing debate in Moscow which results in essentially two positions. On the one hand, those that are suspicious of SALT and in effect oppose it, want the most severe terms put forward in the expectation that the talks will then fail. They would be strong for the FBA terms. On the other hand, another group fearing that SALT will collapse over the FBA question, more or less desperately press for an ABM-only agreement, which would be about the most they could sell within the Politburo as a compromise. For example, assuming the Soviet “military-industrialist clique” opposes SALT, they might on strategic and technical grounds still tolerate an ABM-only agreement, if the Soviet ABM is in fact a dud, and our own Safeguard threatens to undermine the rationale on which the SS-9 buildup was sold to the Politburo.

All of this may be too fanciful as the basis for deciding our own policies. But there is some evidence that SALT is a contentious issue. In an earlier memorandum we pointed out that before the resumption at Helsinki there had been a rare mention in *Kommunist* about the debate between “minimalists” and “maximalists” over the value of partial arms control agreements, and the article directly related this to SALT. Then we had two contrasting articles: one optimistic in its portrayal of SALT, and the other citing pessimistically from foreign sources. Gromyko made a brief but hopeful reference to SALT at the UN General Assembly, and broached the narrow agreement with the President.⁵ The main Soviet leaders, however, have been virtually silent on SALT, as if the subject could not be addressed without precipitating political controversy or without being identified with a faction or position.

All of this, of course, is against a background of internal dissension over the next five-year plan, which was reportedly thrown out and sent back for an entire reworking last spring. Soviet experience suggests that when the long-term allocations of resources is at stake the solidarity of the leadership is almost by definition undermined.

Finally, of course, the Party Congress will be the first real post-Khrushchev Congress. The 23rd Congress was too soon after the coup to reflect the alignment and preferences of the new leadership. But since about one year ago, personnel changes have been accelerated. Again, Soviet experience suggests that when key positions, even at the second echelon are being made, the power positions of the top leaders are affected, and therefore tensions rise.

In short, one could argue that the Soviet position in SALT has involved internal compromises and, in part, contradictory proposals, because of the situation in the leadership.

If this is so, the consequences for us are not much different than the previous explanation; i.e., we simply have to continue to stonewall in the hope of persuading the Politburo that we will not be provoked into breaking off the talks, will continue our own programs, and will not accept one sided propositions and that SALT is not more in our interest than theirs. The only nuance might be that we should turn down the ABM agreement somewhat softer than if we knew there were further Soviet fallback positions.

Soviet-American Standoff?

Some final thoughts relate to the general condition of our relations with the USSR. No one would claim they are very good and most would agree that they probably about reached a low point. There are some obvious reasons for this. From our vantage point, Soviet actions have

⁵ See Document 109.

been brazen and aggressive in the Middle East and Cuba. The combination of pressures and harassments and clever schemes in the Berlin talks do not inspire confidence. Yet, as I have previously suggested, there is probably also an exceptionally strong element of poor communication and understanding involved.

The Soviet leaders could well see trends in American policy they do not like. The visit to Romania, the flirtation with China in 1969, American intervention to stall a European security conference, plus backstage opposition to Ostpolitik, the trip to Yugoslavia, would all be part of a Soviet bill of particulars indicating our policy and leadership. At this stage they might also grind into their calculations some notions about the next election, and whether they should move to improve Soviet-American relations or let them slide, and await a new Administration.

The main point is that for various reasons, partly reflecting the ideological and psychological predilections of an aging and inflexible Soviet leadership, a major accommodation with the United States is difficult for Moscow to contemplate. Almost any SALT agreement, acceptable to both sides, together with Ostpolitik and a Berlin settlement, would usher in an era of good feelings. Such an atmosphere would be a difficult one for the Soviet leaders to sustain internally. It would also be a gain for those who would claim that more internal liberalization inside the USSR could, and should, proceed. In sum, it is not the sort of international circumstance that the present Soviet leaders would find compatible with their own preference for internal conservatism.

Except for the first interpretation—a major deception—the other speculations do not lead to any firm US course of action. We probably cannot really affect internal Soviet debates, without making a series of major concessions (or creating major confrontations) not only in SALT but in many fields. If the Soviets have fallback positions that are more attractive, we cannot expect them until we have provided the most persuasive evidence that we stand on our present position. Finally, if a SALT agreement is incompatible with basic policies of the present Soviet leadership, at a minimum we will have to await the Party Congress to see if any change in the regime occurs, or if the trend to stalemate is confirmed.

Recommendation

While you will have to go through the Verification Panel discussions on several issues, my own recommendation would be fairly simply:

—To turn down the ABM agreement without rancor or polemics, but turn it down on the principle that some controls on offensive weapons are indispensable.

—In addition, I would favor using the interim between now and the resumption to construct a counterproposal more to our liking than Option E; one that would abandon NCA for a hard point defense or Safeguard phase with a simplified restraint on offensive numbers.

—To reject out of hand the FBA question on the legitimate grounds that we will not negotiate our Alliance commitments with the USSR, and that “equal security” as defined by the USSR is a fraud. (We could, after all, ask for equal megatonnage and equal numbers of warheads per square mile of territory.)

—I would end the Helsinki sessions as soon as possible, lest the pressures for some more “forthcoming” position become unmanageable inside the government and force us into a very bad internal split, which will be leaked and picked up by the new Congress.

—An early end to Helsinki should *not* be followed by great pressure by us for early resumption. It is unlikely that in the weeks before the Party Congress the Soviets can do anything but stall. In doing so they will add to our own gloom and depression and might cause reactions that would not be warranted by the actual state of Soviet policy.

—In short, let us wait until after March. (The time can be put to good use in trying to find another Option.)

117. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, December 8, 1970, 3:05–4:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

John Irwin

Thomas Pickering

Frank Perez

Seymour Weiss

Defense

David Packard

Gardiner I. Tucker

CIA

Richard Helms

Carl Duckett

JCS

Adm. Thomas Moorer

Col. Paul Von Ins

ACDA

Philip J. Farley

Spurgeon Keeny

Justice

Attorney General Mitchell

OST

Dr. Edward David

Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson

NSC Staff

Dr. K. Wayne Smith

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Col. Jack Merritt

James Woolsey

William Hyland

Jeanne W. Davis

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

... the Working Group would try to find a new term to replace "non-limited nuclear systems;"²

... the Delegation's recommendation for a substantive position on non-limited nuclear systems should be rejected;

... the Working Group should prepare various formulations for rejection of the Soviet proposal on non-limited systems, for consideration by the SRG and presentation to the President;

... to propose at Helsinki a joint study looking toward improvement of the Hot Line;³

... the Working Group will prepare various positions to respond to the Soviet NCA ABM proposal.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

² The term refers to what the administration previously called forward-based systems (FBS). According to the meeting minutes, Kissinger asked: "Can we all agree to use 'non-limited nuclear systems' rather than forward based systems?" He then explained his reasoning: "Of course, if we accept a limitation on a non-limited system, it is immediately removed from the non-limited category—we have a major epistemological problem."

³ According to the meeting minutes, Kissinger made the following suggestion: "A new dedicated satellite would be the best and most secure, but use of a commercial satellite would reduce the vulnerability of the system and the delivery time. If we could agree on a specific proposal it might be a concrete outcome of the Helsinki talks. But we have to agree on what system to propose."

118. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 10, 1970.

SUBJECT

Status Report on SALT

The SALT talks will probably now close by December 18, and be resumed after the Soviet Party Congress now announced for March 30. As the talks draw to a close Ambassador Smith has sent you a report, giving his view and interpretation of the highlights (Tab A).²

—The Soviets have proposed a separate agreement on ABM,³ limited to the defense of Moscow and Washington. It is not fully clear whether negotiation on their proposal would proceed in parallel with negotiation of offensive weapons, or whether a separate agreement would be reached first on ABM. The latter seems to be the Soviet approach.

—The Soviets have stressed the importance they attach to their proposal and to our not rejecting it out of hand.

—The Soviets have also made a new “proposal” to deal with our forward based air and missile systems.⁴ They call for a partial withdrawal of these systems, dismantling of their bases, and, in addition, a unilateral US reduction of ICBMs, or submarine launched missiles, or heavy bombers. The Ambassador, who turned this down immediately believes this proposal was made only to make the negotiations on offensive weapons look so unattractive that the separate ABM agreement, by comparison, would look good.

On the basis of his instructions he has tried to elicit as much as possible of the general Soviet position, and he reports the following:

—The Soviets have not raised the issue of joint action to deter or to retaliate against the so-called “provocative” attack from third countries.

—They prefer agreement on ABMs to defend the National Command Authority (Moscow and Washington) to a complete ban, though they are careful not to rule this out.

—The Soviets have agreed to our definition of heavy bombers (though there remain differences on counting those in mothballs) and have agreed to include their diesel powered submarines in the total numbers of submarine launched missiles.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIII, October–December 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Urgent; Sent for urgent information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² Attached but not printed.

³ See footnote 2, Document 115.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 116.

—The Soviet position on national means of verification and the operation of a joint commission to police an agreement is close to our proposal.

—The Soviets have refused to disclose the numbers they attach to any of their proposals, nor have they been willing to accept our concept of sub-ceilings for missiles and a special ceiling for the large SS-9 type missile.

The Ambassador concludes that it is premature to make any recommendation before considering the significance of the Helsinki stage.

This report accentuates the positive aspects of the Helsinki negotiations; but we should not overlook the negative signs. For example, the Soviets made no attempt to deal seriously with our extensive proposals of August 4.⁵ Moreover, they presented a truncated counterproposal and then suddenly shifted to the entirely new concept of ABM only agreements and immediately started applying pressure for favorable consideration—though it was clearly agreed at the outset of the negotiations that the objective was to limit both offensive and defensive systems.

The Soviets expounded their general approach to a limitation which in effect amounts to a rejection, as “superfluous,” of most if not all the collateral constraints and limits that we deemed necessary for verification. The so-called proposal on a partial withdrawal of our forward based aircraft systems, the dismantling of their bases, and the unilateral reduction of our strategic system as a compensation for not agreeing to total withdrawal is so patently absurd as to raise doubts of their seriousness in SALT.

In short, one can argue as Ambassador Smith does, that we have made some progress, and on some points this is quite true. One must also recognize, however, that the points which divide us are more critical to final success than the areas of general and rather ill-defined agreement. Above all, it is not clear whether the Soviet price for any SALT agreement is some concession to their demands against our forward deployments, or acceptance of their separate ABM agreement.

The Verification Panel has been meeting this week to consider these very issues,⁶ and I will be submitting as soon as possible a report on these deliberations and recommendations on how to handle the issues in the brief remainder of the Helsinki session.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 104.

⁶ See Document 117.

119. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 11, 1970.

SUBJECT

Recent Soviet Hints on Tacit Limitations for Offensive Systems

Two cables in this morning from Helsinki (510—Tab A; 508—Tab B)² indicate that the Soviets are mounting a major campaign to interest us in possible tacit restrictions on offensive systems under an agreement dealing only with ABMs. Pleshakov has sought to convey a special sense of urgency about halting U.S. ABM deployments while Grinevsky indicated that Semyonov may have more to say on the question of “modern large missiles” during the trip to Leningrad this weekend.

As always, one can speculate about what the Soviets are up to.

—They may simply be trying to position themselves in an optimal position for the end of the Helsinki phase so that, if things become public, they cannot be properly accused of having made only one-sided proposals.

—They may be trying to arouse the interest of susceptible elements in our own Government and cleared community (some 100s of people) so as to complicate our internal debates while they have theirs.

—The Soviets may finally have woken up to the fact that the President won the last Safeguard debate in the Senate and that the newly-elected Senate will do even better. Thus, their pleas for unilateral restraint and hints of tacit agreements may be intended to do what the Safeguard opponents failed to do in the Congress.

—Most intriguing perhaps, but also most complicated analytically, is the possibility that the Soviets may in fact be approaching the end

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XI, December 1970. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it. This memorandum is attached as Tab B to a December 14 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger that recommended Kissinger send a backchannel message to Smith. Kissinger initialed his approval of this recommendation. The text of the proposed message reads as follows: “You will have received the formulations regarding ABM-only and FBS that were decided on over the weekend. The basic consideration was to leave our position sufficiently flexible for the next round as well as for any approach the Soviets may elect to make during the recess.” Kissinger continued, “We will want to give careful consideration to the significance of these approaches at an early stage after adjournment in terms of our intelligence regarding Soviet ICBM construction, the survivability study and other factors such as the situation in Moscow in this pre-Congress period.” For the new instructions to the delegation, see Document 120.

² Both dated December 11, attached but not printed.

of their land-based missile construction—or at least a point at which new decisions will be required if they are to continue—and that they are groping for some sort of a deal without tying their hands.

As regards this last possibility, which as you know has caught Gerard Smith's interest, it is not clear why, if the Soviets are actually levelling off on launcher construction and want to kill Safeguard they don't simply accept our Option E³ at least in principle. They could put in numbers that reflect their actual force levels and get us tied up hand and foot.

In any event, we should be extremely careful not to get in last minute temptations for deals whereby our programs are constrained explicitly "by agreement" and theirs only tacitly "by understanding." In particular, even if for the moment our intelligence indicates a slow-down or even halt in Soviet land-based missile starts, we should not allow ourselves to be drawn into restraints on our Safeguard program. For one thing, we do not know whether the Soviets have really stopped. Beyond that, we have not completed our survivability studies and therefore do not know our own best choices on various assumptions concerning Soviet warhead development, which distinctly has not stopped.

Soviet hints that our continuation with Safeguard may swing internal Soviet arguments in favor of more ICBMs and against SALT can hardly be credited. Although Soviet ICBM launcher numbers have some relation to our ABM levels, warhead development has more. And the arguments on SALT, whatever they may be in Moscow, are almost certainly affected by a host of factors quite apart from our snails-pace advance on Safeguard.

In sum, we are bringing these messages to your attention and want to alert you to last minute pressures to "break soft" in Helsinki by leaving dangling all sorts of enticing notions about tacit agreements and restraints.

Finally, if the Soviets really want to make a deal, they know our phone number after Helsinki breaks up. They have never been shy to use it when they really had something to communicate. It still might be worth while for Smith to suggest to them that if they have anything specific to say about limitations on offensive systems during the recess after the Helsinki phase has ended, they should do so because it would be useful for us to know about it and to be able to take it into account in our planning for the next phase of the talks.

³ See Document 100.

120. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 12, 1970.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Senior Members, U.S. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for Delegation at Helsinki (SALT III)

The President has decided that, in order to preserve bargaining leverage without indicating complete inflexibility on issues arising in the talks, the Delegation should inform the Soviets before the close of the Helsinki talks that:

—both sides have emphasized the need to limit both offensive and defensive systems in a Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement;

—with respect to the Soviet "Basic Provisions"² for an agreement on limiting the deployment of ABM systems, we continue to believe that to achieve the purposes of these talks an agreement should include limits on both offensive and defensive systems;

—we expect to continue to negotiate toward the objective of limitations on both offensive and defensive forces;

and that:

—only after all the main elements of an initial agreement on central strategic systems have been worked out, would we consider it possible to assess mutually satisfactory ways in which actions by either side relating to other nuclear delivery systems could be prevented from upsetting the strategic balance.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 336, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President, September 9–December 1970. Top Secret. A copy was sent to the Attorney General. The memorandum is attached to a list of items to discuss with the President, prepared by Richard Kennedy for Kissinger on December 18. Item 7, suggesting that Kissinger brief the President on the status of negotiations at Helsinki and on the Verification Panel meeting of December 8, was crossed out by an unidentified hand.

² See Document 72.

Our NATO Allies should be informed of these statements before they are given, if possible, or at about the time they are given.³ More complete consultations may be deferred until after the Helsinki phase of the talks is completed.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ Telegram USDEL SALT 531, December 17, contained the delegation's final report on the Helsinki talks for circulation by letter to the NAC following the conclusion of the third round on December 18. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 879, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIII, October–December 1970)

121. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 17, 1970.

SUBJECT

Political and Negotiating Implications of the Soviet ICBM Slowdown

The "official" revelation by the Pentagon of a slowdown or stoppage in Soviet ICBM deployments² may spell major public trouble in the coming months, because it could greatly complicate the next round of Congressional debate over Safeguard. More than that, the new intelligence will become a major issue in the preparation for the next SALT round, with a great debate over the interpretation of "signals." Finally, it has a considerable bearing on the survivability study and the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 405, Subject Files, USSR SS-9 Deployment. Top Secret; [code word not declassified]. Sent for information. Drafted by Hyland. There is no indication that Kissinger saw this memorandum before March 2, 1971, when Sonnenfeldt sent it to Kissinger under a note that stated, "In connection with the new data on silos and SS-9 warhead developments, I would like to call your attention to my memorandum to you of last December 17." On March 12 Kissinger requested that Helms continue a special study of the SS-9: "Now that the work on the NIE [11-8-70] has been completed, I believe the special study of the SS-9 should be restarted. It is still my desire that the study undertake an in-depth analysis of Soviet decision-making processes and illuminate the major factors that appear to have influenced decisions on the SS-9 program." (Ibid.)

² On December 16 a Department of Defense spokesman disclosed that the Soviets were slowing the deployment of SS-9 missiles. (The *New York Times*, December 17, 1970, pp. 1-2)

assumption we make about alternative Soviet force levels without an agreement. (The recent NIE 11–8,³ which I understand you have, offers some different Soviet force models, without committing the intelligence community to any single view.)

The SS–11

Though most of our attention and preoccupations are understandably concerned with the SS–9, the clearest, or least ambiguous, evidence relates to the SS–11. Though the coverage is not complete, it would appear that no new groups (of 10 silos per group) have been started in the USSR since [2 lines not declassified]. Moreover, construction has evidently ceased on a group started in [less than 1 line not declassified]. The fact that no new groups have been discovered is significant in that 80 percent of new starts have occurred during the first three quarters of every year.

It could be that the Soviet SS–11 force will level off at 850, almost all now operational, plus about 120 deployed in IRBM sites in Western Russia.

The main interest in the SS–11 will now shift to the new warhead. Since July of 1969 there have been 24 test firings of a new RV for the SS–11; it is a multiple of some kind, but no one can quite decide whether it is purely penetration aids or MRVs. As an indication of Soviet worst case assumption this is significant. Given the size of the force, if the SS–11, a soft target weapon, needs pen aids or MRVs, the Soviet leaders must have been persuaded to spend money to hedge against a thick US ABM system, or a US first strike capability. No evidence is available so far of efforts to improve accuracy, and the SS–11 thus remains a probable soft target weapon. Because of the intensive testing of the new RV, however, whatever it is, it could be operational late this year or early next (NIE 11–8 p. 50 covers this in detail but in none of the force projections through 1975 does the estimate allow for SS–11 MRVs/MIRVs).

The SS–9

The developments in this program are, frankly, quite puzzling and do not fit into any clear-cut analysis of motives. Whereas one could understand that a force of 850–970 SS–11s would make sense as a soft target capability for assured destruction, the present level of the SS–9 seems strange.

—In 1969, the Soviets started 10 SS–9 groups, with 6 silos group, more than the combined total of new starts in both 1967 and 1968; this

³ NIE 11–8–70, “Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack,” was released November 24. (Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 74–R01012A, Box 377, NIE 11–8–70) The NIE is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 160.

gave them a potential force of 288—far short of the magic 420 MIRVed SS–9s that worry us, but still a potential counterforce if armed with six rather than three MIRVs, or if intensive deployment continued.

—The triplet MRV testing finally showed signs of being independently targeted this fall, suggesting at least that it, rather than a followon MIRV would be deployed.

—If this were so, the force levels would seem destined to continue growing unless the Soviets decided to maintain a relatively truncated hard target force.

—But we noted only three new groups (18 missiles) thus far in 1970, and each of these groups shows some irregularity suggesting either abandonment or abnormally slow progress (construction probably suspended at two and little progress at the third group).

—The slowdown stoppage, however, has not been uniform. There were nine groups under some stage of construction earlier this year, but only the ones begun this year have been affected.

—Thus, sometime between May–June of this year and September–October there was a change of orders for the new sites.

—As yet unreported, because of uncertainties in interpretation, is a possibly related activity at the warhead handling facilities at some, but not all of the SS–9 complexes. We have noted excavations, in which large cylinders are placed, that could be replicas of the top of the silos. The troop training at the excavation could be training for replacing the warheads—thus suggesting the beginning of a conversion to MRV or MIRVs. (I hesitate to suggest that maybe crews are being trained for rapid changing of warheads following on-site inspections.)

In short, we have the weird phenomenon that the SS–9 may not be retrofitted with the MRV (the triplet), but the force has stopped growing at a level well below that which would give a real anti-Minuteman capability.

A note of extreme caution is in order. In the past we have been greatly misled by the erratic pace in some Soviet deployments. There was a confident estimate some years back that about 500 was the probable SS–11 level, based on the fact the new starts had peaked and the curve was turning down. Similarly about 240 seemed a probable SS–9 ceiling. (Bear in mind that in the last six months of 1969 there were no new starts of SS–9s, but in the following year there were 10.) What is significant now, however, is not only the absence of starts, which could eventually resume, but the actual abandonment of construction on the only sites deployed this year.

Is this a Soviet SALT signal?

The conversations, highlighted by Ambassador Smith in his recent cables, is the strongest evidence that the Soviets want us to believe that

they are in fact exercising some restraint. But some of the facts seem inconsistent. Thus, after the resumption in Vienna in April we noted the three *new* SS-9 starts, the first since the fall of 1969, which seemed to demolish the thesis, at that time, that there was some Soviet signal. (Arbatov claimed some weeks ago they had been signaling with the SS-9 slowdown but we then went ahead with Safeguard and lost a chance for progress.)⁴ As noted above, however, these new starts did not progress very far, and some went dormant by September or October. Assuming several months lead time in beginning excavation and silocoring, the decision to start three new groups would have been at least around January–February, while SALT was in recess. Assuming likewise that there is some lead-time in a decision to stop or abandon construction, the decision must have come in August–September. Yet at one group work was in progress as late as [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and three weeks later had stopped altogether.

In short, the “signal” is a rather ragged, uncoordinated one. Yet, since weather, supply delays, etc., can all be ruled out a “signal” cannot be discounted.

Another thesis might be that the three new groups this year were carried by the momentum of much earlier decisions, and that the Soviet bureaucracy took some time to catch up with the field. The military planners might have been awaiting a decision to stop the program or shift to a new one.

In this latter connection, we have noted completion of a new test group (six missiles) begun in 1969, which is probably the troop training site for the SS-9 MRV or MIRV. In addition, however, we have noted in recent photography, the very early indications (surveying) of still another probable SS-9 test group at Tyuratam. Since every model of the four warheads associated with the SS-9 has had a separate test-training group at Tyuratam, *this new construction might point to still another version of the SS-9 not yet seen at all*. Some confirmation of this could be found in the fact that one of the test firing pads used for SS-9s has been ripped up and is being reconstructed.

In sum, while the “signal aspect” has some merit, it is also possible that the SS-9 program is about to enter into a new phase while the MRV becomes operational.

⁴ According to a September 29 memorandum of conversation prepared by Smith, he and Arbatov had the following exchange: “I told him as far as on-going programs were concerned, our position was that we should not cut them back in anticipation of any SALT agreement. [. . .] I had heard it said that some quarters in the Soviet Union felt that they had signaled restraint in connection with SS-9 deployments. Anybody who had access to Soviet deployment rates of the past must have realized that no signal was being given. Arbatov denied this, saying that people in the Soviet Union felt they had been giving a signal.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-98-159, Director’s Files, Miscellaneous File, 1963-1980, Memoranda of Conversation)

All of this leads back to the basic defects of Option E.⁵ Whether negotiated formally, or reached through tacit arrangements, it is basically an ABM agreement. As this memorandum suggests, the Soviets could exploit a leveling off in sheer numbers as a strong incentive for an initial ABM agreement, but the fact remains that qualitative change in accuracy and especially the development of a 6-RV warhead will remain untouched. The evidence is simply too ambiguous to have a clear view at this point, but long before the intelligence can clarify what is happening, we will probably be faced with public and internal debates over the meaning of Soviet actions and our response. The problem can be easily misunderstood or manipulated and is difficult to explain to critics.

⁵ See Document 100.

122. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, December 17, 1970, 1600Z.

91. Dear Henry:

The Department of Defense announcement about the SS–9 development² may be the most important US input to the overall strategic arms limitation situation since the beginning of the talks. I think you agree that the ken of strategic arms limitation is much broader than the specific negotiation going on here. I trust that the timing of this announcement was a carefully calculated one in the light of the way the administration wants to orchestrate this whole business. I am bound

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971 SALT. Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. At the bottom of the page, Kissinger wrote: "To Gerry Smith. Re SS–9 story—we can't advise you about what we don't know. HK" The text of Kissinger's note was sent as backchannel message WH2230 to Smith after he left Helsinki. The following notation was written on a memorandum from McManis to Haig concerning delivery of Kissinger's note: "Message delivered by phone to Amb. Smith, 12/19/70. Please have copy delivered to his Washington office 'eyes only' on Monday, 21 December 1970." (Ibid.)

² See footnote 2, Document 121.

to say that I was somewhat surprised at the announcement as well as the fact that it would have been made without any check on the Delegation's views on the wisdom of the timing.

I am sure the Soviets interpret our moves as part of a carefully managed program involving SALT negotiation proposals, propaganda, etc. I have the impression that their SALT approach is far broader than the negotiation forum.

In the SALT Delegation the administration has an accumulation of knowledge of Soviet perceptions of the overall US/USSR strategic relationship³ which I hope will be put to good use.

Best regards.

Gerry Smith

³ On December 18 K. Wayne Smith sent Kissinger a CIA working paper entitled "Measuring Strategic Power: A Possible Soviet View." In a covering memorandum, Smith commented about the possible consequences of Soviet perceptions of the future strategic military balance. Assuming the Soviets were not seeking a first-strike capability, Smith concluded that "*if SALT did not result in an ABM limitation, the Soviet planner would seek increased force levels and/or systems which improve the penetration of ABM defenses.* (Possibly as a hedge against not getting an ABM agreement, the Soviets are now seeking to improve the penetration capabilities for the SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13 ICBMs.)" Assuming, on the other hand, the Soviets were seeking first-strike capability, Smith concluded that it was not clear that "the Soviets would view a SALT agreement for ABM limitation to be conducive to obtaining a first-strike capability whether they plan to cheat on the agreement or not." Kissinger approved Smith's attached memorandum to Helms initiating a follow-up study. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XI, December 1970)

123. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 22, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger and Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Summit: I then raised the Semenov conversation with Smith in which Semenov allegedly remarked that this would be a hot, political summer, and that SALT would have to mark time while the principals were negotiating.² I wanted Dobrynin to understand that Smith did not know about our Summit discussions and that I really had to be sure Soviet diplomats would not speak to other Americans about the content of our conversations. Dobrynin replied that he had read Semenov's reporting cable and it contained no such references. He wondered whether Smith might have made it up. I said it seemed unlikely since it was too circumstantial. But whether or not it happened exactly as reported by either side, special care should be taken that our channel would not be played back into any American net.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

SALT. On SALT, he said if we didn't like their proposal, maybe I could offer some compromise; but the major concern was to have some progress. Then, the Summit meeting in September would make real sense. I pointed out that it was essential, however, that we keep our channels straight. I had to tell him in all candor that when we proposed a Summit meeting in the summer and then never received an answer for six weeks, that this made an extremely painful impression in Washington. Dobrynin commented that this was based on a misun-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1970, Vol. 3. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in the Map Room at the White House during a 3½-hour luncheon. Kissinger summarized the conversation in an undated memorandum to Nixon. A notation on the summary indicates that Nixon saw it. (Ibid.) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 74.

² In backchannel message 90 to Kissinger, December 16, Smith reported the following: "In the December 16 post-plenary, while talking about the effect of a March 15th resumption in Vienna and in answer to my question as to whether such a relatively late start reflected a change in previously expressed Semenov interest in adjusting the phasing of our talks to permit a summer session in Helsinki, Semenov cryptically said that summers can sometimes be a hot time of year 'politically.'" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT)

derstanding and that they had never grasped we had made a concrete proposal. (This remark, of course, was patently absurd because when he came back from the Soviet Union, he gave an answer to the concrete proposal.)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

124. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 9, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

I told Dobrynin that in regard to SALT the President had decided the following: We were prepared to make an ABM agreement, provided it was coupled with an undertaking to continue working on offensive limitations and provided it was coupled with an undertaking that there would be a freeze on new starts of offensive land-based missiles until there was a formal agreement in limiting offensive weapons. There might be some special provision that would have to be made for submarines, but we would have to leave this to detailed negotiations. I told Dobrynin that if he were prepared to proceed on this basis, I would be prepared to talk to him about it on behalf of the President. We could settle the basic issues in February. Prior to the resumption of the SALT talks² there could be an exchange of letters or public statements between the President and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The SALT talks in Vienna could then concentrate on implementing the agreement in principle.

Dobrynin asked how I understood “limitations” on submarines to operate. I said I had no specific proposal to make, and I mentioned it

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive. The NSC staff extracted this discussion of SALT from a memorandum of conversation of the entire meeting, which covered a range of topics. Both the extract and the memorandum were sent by Kissinger to Nixon under a January 25 summary memorandum. (Ibid., Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4) The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 90.

² The fourth round of talks was scheduled to resume in Vienna in March.

only in case we wanted to raise it later so that he would not feel that he had been misled. I thought, however, that the question of equality was recognized in principle. Dobrynin said he would have an answer when he returned.

125. Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense¹

Washington, January 13, 1971.

FY 72 Safeguard Review

I. Introduction

This paper is in response to the President's direction to review the Safeguard program annually in accordance with his public commitment of March 14, 1969.² The review covers:

- technical problems and progress;
- changes in the threat; and
- progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

The President has asked that the review be considered by the Defense Program Review Committee prior to submission to the NSC.³

II. Summary

Principal findings of the review are summarized below:

—Safeguard supports the President's publicly announced defense objectives and the U.S. criteria for strategic sufficiency.⁴ In particular, an area ABM defense is required to satisfy the strategic sufficiency criterion—"deploy defenses that limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level."

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-007, Verification Panel Meeting Safeguard 1/16/71. Top Secret. Packard sent the paper to the White House under a covering memorandum requesting a meeting of the Verification Panel to discuss the inclusion of a Washington D.C. site in the proposed FY 72 program. Haig forwarded the paper to Kissinger on January 15.

² See Document 6.

³ No record of a DPRC meeting about Safeguard before the January 27 NSC meeting has been found.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 24.

—The technical progress on Safeguard has been very good. There are no technical problems which would affect a decision to proceed with the Safeguard deployment in FY 72.

—Construction of the Grand Forks and Malmstrom sites is proceeding on the authorized schedule with 30–40% of the Grand Forks radar construction completed and construction now being started on Malmstrom. Contracts for 50–60% of the equipment have been awarded for these sites. Construction for Whiteman, approved for the FY 71 budget, will begin in 1971.

—Of the \$3.8 billion approved through FY 71, \$3.1 billion has been obligated and \$1.9 billion has been expended as of December 31, 1970. Since last Spring's cost estimate to complete the total 12-site program the costs have risen by \$2.5 billion (from \$12.3 to \$14.8 billion) as a result of further stretch-out, inflation and revised cost estimates.

—The Soviet threat has continued to evolve both numerically and technologically since Safeguard was conceived (early 1969). During this period, the Soviets continued to test the 3-RV payload for the SS-9 and in recent months the testing has demonstrated a capability for controlled flexible targeting. Also, during this period, the SS-11 has been tested with new payloads evidently intended for defense penetration. Construction of Yankee-class submarines has continued at about 8 boats per year and a new long-range missile evidently intended for naval use has been test fired.

—During this period of rapid increase in Soviet offensive capability, Safeguard deployment has been stretched out because of difficulties in obtaining Congressional authorization.

—The U.S. tabled in SALT a proposed arms limitation agreement covering both strategic offensive and defensive systems. Included as a part of this package was the option to limit ABM deployments to either zero or an NCA defense level.⁵ This proposal has not been accepted by the Soviets. The Soviets have proposed an NCA only ABM agreement, without limitations on offensive forces. This proposal was not accepted by the U.S. because it did not include limitations on offensive systems.

—We have increased confidence in our previous estimates of Chinese threat developments that support the rationale for deployment of a light area ABM defense of the U.S.

—Because (a) successful technical progress has been made, (b) the Soviet threat has continued to grow over the past year, and (c) SALT has not given us reason as yet to reorient the Safeguard program, we are requesting in FY 72 a continuation of the 4-site program and au-

⁵ See Document 100.

thorization of advanced preparation for the Washington, D.C. site. Because the Soviet ICBM threat is currently at a numerical level such that technically feasible qualitative improvements alone could render the 4-site Minuteman defense insufficient by the time it could be deployed (1977), we are also requesting advanced development for a Hard-Site Defense to augment Safeguard protection of Minuteman if required.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

VI. Developments in SALT

The U.S. and Soviets began negotiations aimed toward limiting strategic arms on November 17, 1969 at Helsinki. During the summer of 1970 at Vienna, the U.S. offered two approaches, one aimed toward quantitative and qualitative limitations on offensive and defensive strategic weapons and one aimed toward strategic force reductions. When the Soviets failed to accept either of these approaches we put forward on August 4, 1970 a less comprehensive proposal in an attempt to achieve an early agreement. In effect this proposal would have given up area defense and Minuteman defense and limited ABM on both sides to defense of areas around the national capitals, if the Soviets would stop numerical increases in their strategic offensive systems. During the November–December 1970 round of talks in Helsinki the Soviet Union continued to re-emphasize their “Basic Provisions” on offensive and defensive systems and avoided discussion of specific numerical limitations on strategic forces. They did not accept the main provisions of the U.S. August 4 proposal and on December 4, 1970, proposed an agreement which would simply limit the deployment of ABM systems to defense of the the national capitals—Washington and Moscow. They stated that our negotiations could continue after such an ABM agreement, in an attempt to reach an “understanding” on strategic offensive systems. The U.S. did not accept the Soviet proposal, because it would force the U.S. to give up Safeguard but would not require any limitation on Soviet offensive systems which Safeguard was planned, in part, to counter.

Safeguard is designed to achieve a number of U.S. strategic objectives. Unless an acceptable SALT agreement is reached, which effectively removes the necessity for Safeguard, it is important to retain the momentum of Safeguard in order to satisfy strategic requirements and also to strengthen the chances of successful SALT negotiations. Continued orderly and timely prosecution of the program would make the system available at the earliest date to counter the Soviet threat to our retaliatory forces. Cutbacks in Safeguard could reduce the Soviet incentive to negotiate reductions or limitations on their offensive systems.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

126. Editorial Note

On January 16, 1971, the Verification Panel met to consider the Safeguard program and agreed that it was necessary to hold a National Security Council meeting in order to determine how to proceed with Safeguard. The participants also decided that they should meet again to discuss those issues, including hard-site concepts and the implications of such defenses for the Soviets, that the NSC would deliberate. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969-3/8/72)

When the Verification Panel met on January 25, the participants agreed to the following: "to formulate the issues for the President so as to get a decision on what our FY 72 Safeguard Program should be, and its relation to our SALT position; to put before him the full range of proposals, including Mr. Smith's views on the difficulties in changing our SALT position; to review our SALT position during the next month." (Ibid.) The full text of the minutes of both meetings are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972, Documents 167 and 168.

127. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 23, 1971, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger sent the memorandum of conversation to Nixon under a January 27 covering memorandum. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970-September 1971, Document 103.

SALT

Dobrynin then turned to SALT. He said that my observations had been studied with the greatest attention in Moscow. While no final decision had been taken he could assure me that there was considerable sympathy for the approach. He had been instructed, however, to ask a number of questions first. First, when I spoke of a freeze on deployment, did I mean quantitative only or did I include qualitative? I replied that since it would be impossible to verify qualitative freeze I meant quantitative only.

Secondly, Dobrynin asked, when I had spoken of an ABM agreement had I meant the Washington–Moscow system only or had I included zero ABM or perhaps stopping at the existing sites as I had already mentioned to him? I responded that frankly we had not made a final decision on this but that we were openminded on those three approaches.² We were prepared to negotiate a zero ABM agreement if they were prepared to tear down their existing installations. We had also proposed an NCA agreement and lately we had taken some interest in an agreement confined to three sites on our side and the Moscow system on their side. Dobrynin said that he had advanced this in Moscow. He had to tell me honestly that the political people found it easiest to have a Moscow–Washington agreement and that the military people had at first not understood the three site-Moscow-agreement but had now begun to study it sympathetically. All he could tell me was that none of these three possibilities was excluded and that the Soviets were prepared to be very constructive.

Dobrynin continued that the major problem in fact was the issue of forward-based aircraft. I said it was obvious that we could not upset the strategic balance by forward deployments of aircraft. This might be handled more easily under a tacit arrangement pending negotiations, although we could not accept limitations on carrier deployment under those circumstances. Dobrynin replied that he did not have any firm instructions but the tentative thinking of Moscow was that a SALT agreement along the lines of what I had proposed to him should be concluded at the Summit; that preparatory work for it should be done by Dobrynin and myself; and that the Vienna negotiations, in order to show some progress, might conclude an agreement on accidental war.

² On January 27 Kissinger informed Smith of Nixon's final decision. According to a memorandum for the file, prepared by Smith: "Kissinger told me today that the President was interested in the proposal that we announce publicly that we made a zero ABM offer and that he planned to do it sometime early in March. I told him I thought the timing was good." (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Director's Files, Smith Files, Chronological File, Reports from ACDA regarding White House Actions on Working with Soviet, January–March 1971)

I told him that we did not want the provocative attack issue handled in this forum and he said he understood. However the question of accidental war was simple and could be handled in that forum. I told him I would have to check with the President.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

128. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

1972 Safeguard Program

I regret that my commitment to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee precludes my attending the NSC meeting today on the FY 72 Safeguard program. Dave Packard will represent Defense.

In my view, there is a clear contradiction between the strategic sufficiency criteria of NSDM-16,² and the SALT guidance of NSDM-74.³

The sufficiency criteria call for area defense of our population against Chinese or other small missile attack. This criterion can only be satisfied by deployment of the full 12-site Safeguard (area defense).

The criteria also require that we give the Soviets no incentive to strike first in a crisis, and therefore require that we assure the survivability of our deterrent forces. The currently authorized 4-site Safeguard system would perform this function. We have another system in development (Hard Site Defense—HSD) which may prove capable of supplementing Safeguard to handle projected qualitative improvements in the Soviet threat, or of replacing Safeguard as a missile defense of Minuteman only.

NSDM-74 specifies our willingness to forego area defense of the country and any defense of our deterrent forces against Soviet missiles, if the Soviets will agree to limit ABM's to Moscow and Washington and to accept numerical limits on offensive systems.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-030, NSC Meeting—Safeguard 1/27/71. Top Secret; Sensitive. Haig sent this memorandum to Kissinger under a January 27 note.

² See footnote 2, Document 24.

³ Document 100.

These are in contradiction because the provisions of NSDM-74 allow improvements in the Soviet missile threat which could by the mid-70's make Minuteman vulnerable, and because these provisions preclude our area defense without limiting the Chinese or other threats identified in NSDM-16.

Abandoning area defense may be, on balance, a proper price to pay to achieve a strategically acceptable agreement with the Soviets. I believe, however, that we cannot tolerate a vulnerable Minuteman force. Therefore, I recommend that NSDM-74 be modified to make clear that the agreement described is an initial agreement which must be followed before the mid-70's by a further agreement which adequately fixes the vulnerability problem (for example, by mutual reductions in offensive forces), or else the U.S. must then proceed to deploy defenses of Minuteman.

The immediate issue to be presented at the NSC meeting is the FY 72 Safeguard program. There are two options:

1. Continue with the 4-site program already authorized at our Minuteman fields, and add advanced preparations for a site near Washington, D.C.
2. Slow the program to deployment at only 2 Minuteman sites and add "design study" of the Washington, D.C. site.

I support the first option for the following reasons:

- The NSDM-16 criteria must be satisfied unless we have an arms control agreement. We need to proceed at least this fast to keep up with projected threat improvements.
- With a strategically acceptable agreement, we may still need 4-site Safeguard on this schedule for defense of our deterrent.
- We need to determine Congressional willingness to support defense of Washington, D.C. before proceeding further towards a commitment to it in SALT.
- This is not the time, before the next round of SALT in Vienna in March, to back down from the Safeguard program already authorized by Congress.

Either option includes advance development of the Hard Site Defense system in FY 72 as a hedge against possible threat developments, but not a commitment to deploy the system.

There is no significant difference in FY 72 outlays between these two options.

Mel Laird

129. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, January 27, 1971, 10:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting: SALT and Safeguard ABM

PARTICIPANTS

President Richard Nixon
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
General George A. Lincoln, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
John N. Mitchell, Attorney General
David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense
John N. Irwin, Under Secretary of State
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. Gen. Royal B. Allison
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. Edward David, Science Advisor to the President
Paul Nitze, Department of Defense
Ronald Spiers, Department of State
Philip Farley, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Dr. Wayne Smith, NSC
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC
Colonel Richard T. Kennedy, NSC

[The meeting began with a 15-minute briefing by Director Helms (attached) on Soviet ballistic missile forces, the Soviet ABM, and the Soviet attitude to Safeguard.]²

RN: Thank you. As I understand it, the latest information is not clear about whether the Soviets are slowing down their SS-9 deployment purely for refitting them.

Helms: The information is not conclusive.

RN: It would take two years for them to develop a MIRV?

Helms: Yes.

Rogers: What significance do you attach to their abandonment of the sites? Have they done this before?

Helms: They may be trying to see the effect on us.

RN: What is the significance of the testing they've been doing?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Minutes Originals 1971 thru 6-20-74. Top Secret; Ruff; Umbra. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

² Attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original.

Helms: Our information on their testing is better now; thus our data over the past year may be a reflection on this. But the fact is that their testing has been heavy this past year.

RN: Would they know about our testing program?

Rogers: Yes.

Moorer: They have a trawler in the area.

RN: In sum they have not cut back their testing of new programs.

Helms: Yes. And with the 1400 launchers they have already, if they put in more it will cause us concern. They may be doing it.

RN: The submarine program continues?

Helms: Yes, they are going up to launching eight submarines a year. They have three on station now and we can expect an increase—they are about 1300 miles off our coast.

RN: What about Chinese testing?

Helms: There has been some. There have been some deployments of what may be an MRBM. They do it in the most secretive way; it's all hidden. Its range would cover Asia but they're mostly aimed at the Soviet Union.

RN: Henry, can you fill us in on where we stand?

Kissinger: The Verification Panel has discussed three issues,³ Mr. President, though we need a decision only on one of them.

—What kind of Safeguard ABM system would we want in the absence of a SALT agreement?

—Whether our position in SALT should be changed because of flaws in it?

—What is the right program for us for next year to keep open your options?

There is no consensus yet for a change in our SALT position. Nevertheless our present position has the following anomalies: Our ABM was originally justified in SALT as an area defense. We are now building four sites to defend Minutemen. And we have proposed an agreement to the Soviets on NCA, which we are not building. We will put this before you in February. We have a Defense concern as to Option 3⁴—it does little to defend our forces yet our forces become more vulnerable every year as Soviet numbers and accuracy increase. The Soviet threat is growing to the survivability of our Minuteman.

The problem we face today is what should we do in next year's programs. We asked last year for the construction of one site in Missouri

³ See Document 126.

⁴ Reference is to the third of the four alternatives listed below. See Document 128.

and advance preparation at four other sites. Congress approved White-
man in Missouri and one preparatory site at Warren but not the others.
The alternatives are:

Defense recommends we go ahead with the four sites approved
and request authority for Washington—the NCA site.

The second choice is to ask for four sites but have Warren and
NCA interchangeable and dependent on SALT progress.

Third, we could go ahead with only three sites and ask for ad-
vance preparation at Washington.

Gerry Smith's proposal is that we go ahead with construction of
the original two sites, and with advance preparation at Washington.

There are two issues: What effect will it have on our overall ABM
program? And what effect will it have on the SALT negotiations? Any-
thing other than the Defense proposal will mean a delay of a year in the
program. If Safeguard is not the best system to defend Minuteman—
which has been the justification to the Congress—Defense would prefer
to go to different radars and missiles. If we slow down, one view says,
the Soviets will see this as a sign of our serious intent in the SALT ne-
gotiations; it will show we are not sliding into the Safeguard program
and instigate suspicion that we are using SALT as a means to cover Saf-
eguard development. Others believe that the maximum incentive is given
by a full program go-ahead until they agree; they have an incentive then
to agree and not just to negotiate to hold us up. The judgment then is
between these two assumptions. In either event we need another discus-
sion of what the best ABM program is. These options keep your op-
tions open for another year. All here agree that we need to do something
on Washington to make our position plausible.

RN: What is the timing of the talks?

Kissinger: March 15.⁵

RN: Then we need not only a budgetary decision but also a posi-
tion for the talks. We have to decide what we do and also how we pack-
age it for the talks.

Kissinger: One argument for going for NCA this year is to find out
whether the Congress will approve it.

Rogers: The alternative Minuteman/NCA option looks like we are
going ahead with confidence but it wouldn't commit us. The fourth
site option is still open to the President.

Mitchell: But if we go for only three sites it's not.

RN: Dave [Packard], what is the status of our program?

Packard: Our progress in testing has been good. Our computer ca-
pabilities are coming along well. The status is as follows: In the con-

⁵ Vienna was designated the site for Round IV.

struction at Grand Forks, as of June 30 this year, 60% of the big radar construction will be complete, and 15% of the missile site. By 30 June 1972, it will be 95% complete.

We planned the schedule so that at Malmstrom the hard construction will be 10% along by June 1971. At Whiteman, there will be no construction by June 30 this year. About 5% of the hardware is under contract.

At Warren, there will be nothing by June of this year. The key dates are: At Whiteman, the main construction sites' contracts are to be let by August '71. At Warren, we have a full calendar year to decide; it's a March '72 contract date.

The cost picture looks like this: There's a \$1.8 billion added cost, due to inflation and accounting. There's \$0.6 billion added due to program changes, and \$0.1 billion in other costs. We are spending \$100 million monthly. 50–100,000 people are involved. Whether we go for four or three or four and NCA will make little difference in the fiscal costs in 1972. If you terminate the program there will be a significant effect in 1972.

The Defense Department recommends that we go ahead with the three sites already authorized; that we go ahead with the Warren site; and that we begin the advance preparation for the NCA site in Washington. We believe the original objectives of 1969 are still valid—that our own progress is good, that SALT is not moving, and that the threat continues to develop.

No decision is necessary now as to the hardsite program. The original plan could handle 1500 reentry vehicles, and this remains the goal. If the situation changes we can reevaluate it. We don't recommend going ahead with anything except hardsite components at this time.

Therefore, we believe we should go ahead on the program and we have provided funds for four sites and NCA plans and hardsite components research.

RN: How do you see the developments in the past two years?

Packard: The program has been going well, and except for the SALT issue I would recommend we go ahead with the original 12-site plan.

RN: If Congress allowed.

Rogers: Will the Congress see hardsite component research as an expanded program?

Packard: No, it is a supplement if you have more reentry vehicles—but this plan was meant as an area defense against light attack, accidental launch and bomber bases. For defense of Minuteman you would need some more.

RN: Thank you. Gerry?

Smith: I think the best program from the SALT point of view is to go ahead with construction of two sites, don't construct the third, don't ask for the fourth, and do the design of an NCA. A moderate pace is desirable. This is the diplomacy of restraint. The situation has changed since 1969 and we can afford a slower pace. Even a full SS-9 program would be near 300, rather than the 420 as we earlier thought. They could turn it on again, of course—but a moderate pace would deter them.

RN: Is there a public point before the March talks?

Smith: Yes, the budgetary decision.

The Soviets have accepted our view of an ABM at a low level or zero. This is evidence that the SALT process is working. They don't have a new program but they have the R&D to do it. We don't want to push them into it.

If our program is a bargaining chip, we will pass the point of no return: if we get beyond three sites the Soviets will question whether we would demolish it. Thus I conclude that the program I suggest gives us a better chance of getting a SALT agreement.

RN: Paul Nitze, do you have anything to add?

Nitze: No, I think the issues have been put well.

RN: I think we understand the issues.

Lincoln: We have to bear in mind the relation to the continuity of the government program. We would probably need to improve it over the next year. If there is to be a defense of Washington, we need to prepare. It would have a major impact on what we need to do to improve the reliability of the current program.

Packard: The area defense consists of 100 interceptors, a combination of Sprints and Spartans, with missile site radars and perimeter acquisition radars. The Spartan components would cover a defense from the Canadian border to Florida. But we would have only 100—which could be overwhelmed. It could handle a few submarines. The incremental cost would be within reason and would be worthwhile.

Rogers: Can you get into an NCA as fast as Warren?

Packard: No. We couldn't let the contracts until April 1973. That would put a hiatus on the program in manufacture and would be difficult.

Moorer: The Defense program gives the greatest flexibility. It gives the option over two years of moving in either direction.

RN: All of us are working to the same goals. We don't know what the results would be on the diplomacy. It has subtlety; it's a question of the thrust it would have.

Nitze: If the Russians would give us a real word on what they mean by slowdown, we could have money in the bank.

Rogers: Why don't they tell us?

Nitze: They are not authorized to tell us anything now.

Rogers: If we could give some gesture not affecting our security, it would be helpful, but Packard says the program would be set back a year.

RN: Thank you, gentlemen.

[The meeting adjourned.]

130. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 28, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

I told Dobrynin that we had not really had a formal reply to our proposition,² and yet it was quite important that we have one. We had to make Congressional presentations on SALT and the ABM and we had to prepare for the next meeting in Vienna. It was therefore quite important that we know Soviet intentions.

Dobrynin said, speaking off the record, it was important for me to understand that SALT presented the Soviets with tough bureaucratic problems. It was very hard for them to handle it since they have no lateral clearances in their bureaucracy. He therefore thought it would be helpful if I would formulate the proposition in the form of an unsigned Note Verbale which he could transmit to Moscow in order to elicit a response. I said to Dobrynin that, for a response to be helpful to us, it should be forthcoming in the next week or two. He said he would transmit the question to Moscow.

Next Dobrynin said that he had, however, a number of other questions of some interest. He said if he had understood me correctly, I was

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive. The NSC staff extracted this discussion of SALT from a memorandum of conversation of the entire meeting, which covered a range of topics. The memorandum of conversation, which was sent to Nixon under a January 28 memorandum, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 105.

² See Document 124.

proposing a freeze on offensive deployments—specifically, land-based missiles—in return for a formal ABM agreement. I said that was correct. Dobrynin then said that this might present some problem with respect to silos that had already been started but had not yet been completed. Would the Soviet Union be permitted to complete the silos that were started? It would be hard for the Soviet bureaucracy to accept the losses of resources involved in an unfinished silo. I said I could not give him a clear answer, but I was certain that this would be considered a reasonable question to which we would try to find some response. Dobrynin said it had occurred to him that one way of handling the problem would be to put the date at which no further construction could take place at some point in the future—say, January 1st of next year. If that were done, Dobrynin said, this would enable them to finish; they would simply have to pay the price for those that were not finished by then. I said as soon as he was authorized to discuss these issues concretely I would be prepared on my side with a formal position.

Dobrynin then asked me how we were going to conclude the SALT arrangement if he and I talked. I said if he and I could agree in principle to proceed along the lines that we had discussed,—that is to say, a formal ABM agreement coupled with an offensive freeze—then I would suggest that the President make a speech early in March in which he puts forward this as an idea and the Soviet Union could respond to it positively. Vienna would then implement the agreement. Dobrynin asked whether we would, together with the speech, plan a formal *démarche* to the Soviet Government. I said we had really not thought the matter through, and we would be very receptive to their suggestion. Dobrynin said that, given the way the Soviet bureaucracy worked, it would be helpful to have a formal record in addition to whatever the President might say publicly, and to have that formal material part of the record before the speech was made. I said I did not believe this would present an insuperable obstacle.

131. Memorandum From the Department of Defense Representative on the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Nitze) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms¹

Washington, February 2, 1971.

SUBJECT

Capability of the SS–11 Mod 2B Against Safeguard ABM Radars

Thank you for your memorandum of February 1 and its attachment;² the attachment appears to answer the question I had intended.

My question apparently was not clearly expressed; I had no thought that the SS–11 triplets were independently targettable. What I meant to ask was whether or not each RV of the SS–11 triplets would not constitute a sufficient threat to the Safeguard radars (MSRs) at which a triplet was aimed to necessitate attempts to intercept each of the three RVs separately.³

If this is so, as it appears to be from paragraph 3 of your enclosure, then the potential number of RVs the Safeguard system (or an HSD system) might have to contend with could be the aggregate number of RVs on the SS–9s or follow on hard target threats, plus those on at least a percentage of the SS–11s.

With the current number of SS–11 silos operational or under construction, this would give an upper limit of perhaps 1700 RVs more than the threat projected with single RV SS–11s. If you assume that the Soviet Union would devote no more than fifty percent of his SS–11s to such a purpose, the numbers would, of course, be correspondingly reduced.

The inference could then be that the SS–11 triplets are designed not just to counter a potential area ABM, but specifically to counter an active defense of our land-based ICBMs.

Paul H. Nitze⁴

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Subject Files, Job 80–B01086A, Box 15, #469. Secret.

² Helms's memorandum and its attachment are attached but not printed. In the memorandum, Helms stated: "My staff has considered your question whether the three warhead version of the SS–11 might be able to attack separate radars of the Safeguard system. They conclude from analysis of tests observed so far that the system does not have such a capability. This is because the warheads are not guided independently and because their impact points are separated by distances of less than two miles." Helms's attachment provided the technical data for the judgment.

³ On February 5, R.J. Smith drafted for Helms a follow-up memorandum that was not sent. A typed note from Helms on the routing slip attached to the draft reads: "D/OSR, Nitze told me on the phone he is satisfied and does not want to perpetuate the exchange." Both are attached but not printed.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears Nitze's typed signature.

132. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 10, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Dobrynin asked whether our proposal² foresaw only a numerical limitation or also a limitation on modernization. I said as I had presented it, I foresaw a limitation only on numbers. Dobrynin then asked whether we included land-based systems only or sea-based ones as well. I said we were prepared to do either. Dobrynin then asked me whether I had any particular length of time in mind if an agreement on ABM should include a commitment to negotiate offensive limitations. I replied we had no particular time limit in mind, but something like 18 months to two years would be reasonable for negotiating offensive limits.

Dobrynin then made the following statement. He said he had been authorized by the Politburo to convey to the President that the Soviet Union wanted a SALT agreement and the earlier the practical result, the better. The Soviet leaders agreed to a formal agreement on ABM. They preferred an agreement that was limited to capital cities, but they were willing to consider an agreement that included some missile sites on our side and the capital city on theirs. They wanted an agreement

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 79, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT, May 20, 1971 Announcement—State Dept. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The conversation took place at the Soviet Embassy. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger left the White House at 8:10 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976 Record of Schedule) The NSC staff extracted this discussion of SALT from a memorandum of conversation of the entire meeting, which covered a range of topics. The memorandum of conversation was sent to Nixon under a covering memorandum on February 16. The memorandum of conversation and the covering memorandum are *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 490, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4, and are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 110.

² Kissinger met with Dobrynin on February 2 and 4 to discuss several issues. On February 8 Kissinger sent the President a memorandum summarizing the meetings. According to the memorandum, on February 2 the following comments were made about SALT: "Instructions had not yet been sent by Moscow on the offensive weapons aspect of a SALT agreement. (I explained that our talks could not be very fruitful if they covered an ABM agreement alone.)" On February 4, according to Kissinger's summary memorandum, the following comments were made: "On SALT, they agreed to talk about *both* offensive and defensive limitations with the former being part of a tacit freeze and the latter being part of a formal agreement." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/ Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4)

that was confined to numbers and did not preclude modernization. They were prepared to include in this agreement a commitment to undertake serious negotiations to bring about offensive limitations, and they were open to proposals as to the length of time. They were prepared to discuss sea-based systems, but they preferred not to do so at this point. The Soviet leaders were also prepared to accept a freeze on land-based construction as part of a tacit understanding, and they wondered how that might be expressed. I asked whether the Soviet leaders might be prepared to agree to a zero ABM level. Dobrynin said he doubted this. Dobrynin said that the Soviet leaders would prefer an agreement confined to capital cities—(1) because it seemed more symmetrical, and (2) because if we were limited to three missile fields and they to the capital cities, the Soviet public would think we got the better of the deal, and there had to be something else involved.

I laughed and said that anyone who knew him and me would automatically assume that he had gotten the better of the deal. As to the intention to proceed with offensive limitations negotiations, I asked Dobrynin whether they were dealing conditionally—that is to say, would in his view the ABM agreement lapse if the negotiations did not succeed. He said no, it should be expressed not as a condition but as an expression of intention. I asked Dobrynin whether the freeze would lapse after 18 months or whatever limit was specified. Dobrynin said no; the freeze on offensive deployments could continue until an agreement on offensive limitations was signed. Dobrynin then asked me whether I had any ideas on how we could formalize the freeze. I said there would have to be something in writing lest it lead to a series of misunderstandings. Dobrynin suggested also that we come to an understanding prior to March 15 or the resumption of the SALT talks, so that the negotiators could be instructed to work out the detailed agreement.

I proposed the following procedure. Either the President would make a public speech to which the Soviet Union would reply or the President would write a letter to Kosygin to which the Soviet leader would reply, and the exchange could then become a statement of principles. Dobrynin said he liked the idea of the letter, and he suggested that we proceed at the next meeting by my giving him a draft of the letter which he could then transmit to Moscow and which we would then agree to settle on by the end of the month.

133. Editorial Note

On February 11, 1971, the National Security Council met to discuss President Nixon's second annual review of foreign policy. After Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger explained the organization of the report, Secretary of State Rogers remarked: "We had an opportunity to make comments on the SALT part. I support Mel [Laird] on this: I think we should drop the options. We can state our approach. Otherwise it's a target for attack. I'm sure we can work it out with Henry [Kissinger]." Nixon replied that "on the SALT part: the pathetic idealism on arms control in this country means it would be best to speak on it often. We know that cosmetics have a lot to do with how people see this, regardless of the substance. It's important to people." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Minutes Originals 1971 thru 6-20-74) The minutes of the meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972, Document 174.*

On February 18 Nixon and Kissinger discussed the arms control section of the annual report and how it was leaked to columnist Joseph Kraft. According to a recording of their conversation, which took place in the Oval Office sometime between 9:56 and 10:09 a.m., they had the following exchange:

Kissinger: "Well, what these guys want, they are afraid we—that this section is holding them to your position and they want a free hand to negotiate an ABM-only agreement."

Nixon: "Who? Who's 'they?'"

Kissinger: "The ACDA people. And today they have—they leaked a column to Kraft, which I'm afraid is going to blow up my negotiation with Dobrynin because they put in there that—they put the whole debate on the arms control section, which I thought was entirely editorial. I didn't take it seriously, in there. And they said, it's, the reason is that I want to hold them to an option which they want to change. And, in effect, they said Rogers, which isn't true, and Smith, but we've got to think it through. I don't think Rogers has studied the problem with our position, but Rogers and Smith want to give them—have an ABM-only agreement. Now here, the Russians have already accepted your proposal. And now, they get this column. I would bet they are going to back off now, to see whether they can't get more."

Nixon: "[unclear] the Russians very sanguine about what else but the [unclear]."

Kissinger: "But it's one of the most irresponsible things that I've seen—"

Nixon: "[unclear] been through it with the Senate."

Kissinger: "And now, I couldn't really give a damn about that section, but they've now turned it into a damned extra distraction. On the negotiating position, which I didn't even realize it, Kraft has more detail in his column in 3 paragraphs than we have in 10 pages. But I'm going to still try to because I, I don't want a huge fight on the report. But this—"

Nixon: "It's an act of spite."

Kissinger: "I thought, frankly, Mr. President, it was an issue of pure vanity. That they wanted to get credit, and they didn't want you to get credit."

Nixon: "Yeah. But you think [unclear]."

Kissinger: "That's right. [unclear] What is so revolting to me is that last August, when we could have had an ABM-only agreement, and when it could have helped you at the elections, they fought it, saying it was an election stunt."

Nixon: "Hmm. Yeah. That I did what?"

Kissinger: "Last August, we could have had an ABM-only agreement. The Russians offered it, and I checked with Smith. He said 'No, it would be an election stunt.'"

Nixon: "Huh. Whose side is he on?"

Kissinger: "That's what I'm beginning to wonder. I've got the correspondence—"

Nixon: "I'd just get Smith out of there if we can. I think we should send him to Vienna in the next few days. But, on this I want him out. And, uh, he—"

Kissinger: "No, what he wants is a completely free hand, so that he gets the credit for whatever is achieved. We've got the Soviet agreement to your secret memo, and—"

[Interruption by staff]

Nixon: "All right."

Kissinger: "But I'll just get out." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 451–4) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

On the morning of February 25 Nixon delivered a brief radio address on the "New Role of the United States in World Affairs," which coincided with his submission to Congress of the administration's second annual report on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The text of the address is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pages 212–218; the text of the report is *ibid.*, pages 219–345.

134. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 22, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

I said I was prepared to discuss the letter that Dobrynin had said we might send to Kosygin (copy attached). Dobrynin corrected my statement by saying I had proposed the letter. He had merely agreed to it. I said, it is true, I had proposed the letter, but he had suggested that at our next meeting—which was today—I should have a draft. Dobrynin agreed with that formulation.

Dobrynin read the draft very carefully and then asked me a number of questions; for example, with respect to paragraph 5.c., he asked what was the meaning of the phrase that there could be no new construction started after April 1. I said since there was a limit of no construction of any sort after January 1, it seemed to me that this was self-explanatory. Since the Soviet Union would not be able to finish anything that they started after April 1, it wasn't probable that they would start anything. Dobrynin said it would be easier for them to accept the terminal date than the starting date; in other words, they would agree not to do any construction of any kind after January 1, 1972. Dobrynin also questioned whether it was realistic to propose an agreement on offensive weapons be reached by July 1, 1972. I agreed that that could be extended to January 1, 1973. Dobrynin suggested that we eliminate the two paragraphs on MIRV's, since it was self-evident that these would be permitted. He also questioned paragraph 6.c. in its context because he thought that this would be a better explanation for paragraph 7, rather than it by itself and, in any case, it was up to the discretion of each side whether it wanted to give such a list.

Dobrynin also questioned whether it was better to have a five-year expiration clause or whether we could have it in the same manner as the nuclear test ban with both sides having the right to abrogate when

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 79, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT, May 20, 1971 Announcement—State Department. Top Secret; Sensitive. According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, the meeting took place in the Map Room at the White House from 7:15 to 8:25 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976 Record of Schedule) The NSC staff extracted this discussion of SALT from a memorandum of conversation of the entire meeting, which covered a range of topics. The memorandum of conversation, which is the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 490, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 121.

their supreme national interest was involved. I told him this would certainly be a fair counter-proposal to make by their side. Dobrynin did not question the three missile sites but suggested that the Soviet Union might come back to NCA limitations. He said he would have a massive translation job to do that night and promised me an early answer. He thought this should be well wrapped up before March 15.

Attachment

Draft Letter From President Nixon to Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Kosygin²

Washington, February 17, 1971.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

1. I have carefully reviewed the exchanges of our representatives during the past 15 months in regard to the limitation of strategic armaments. I have been struck by the serious and forthright manner in which these talks have been conducted. This properly reflects the crucial importance, both for the future of relations between our two countries and for the peace and security of peoples everywhere, of the responsibility we jointly share to work toward a safer and more rational world order.

2. I have studied your proposal for an agreement limiting ABM's and understand the considerations you have advanced in support of this proposal. I am sure that you have likewise examined the proposals and considerations which my representatives have advanced concerning the relationship between limitations on strategic defensive and strategic offensive weapons.

3. It seems to me quite possible to take proper account of the concerns and interests which underlie the proposals which we have each advanced. To achieve the breakthrough which we both desire and which peoples everywhere await, I propose to you that our respective delegations to the next session of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, beginning in Vienna on March 15, 1971, should be instructed to make maximum possible progress toward an agreement containing the following elements:

4. *Strategic Defensive Armaments*

a. As you are aware, the proposals which have been advanced by the United States hitherto have envisaged either a complete elimina-

² Secret.

tion of ABM deployments or a limitation of such deployments to the protection of National Command Authorities. These proposals are made in the context of the various comprehensive limitation proposals, covering both offensive and defensive strategic armaments, put forward by the representatives of the United States.

b. I would still be prepared to consider the complete elimination of ABM deployments.

c. However, in consideration of the situation in the negotiations to date, I now propose an agreement under which each of us would maintain, or complete, the strategic defensive (ABM) deployments we have already initiated. Specifically, in your case this would mean the ABM defense now being deployed in a circle around your capital city of Moscow. In our case, this would mean completion of ABM deployment for the protection of three of our land-based ICBM sites. I am convinced that a limitation thus based on actual programs already under way in both our countries would be both equitable and speedily achievable.

d. The agreement would stipulate the collateral measures, for example in regard to the deployment of various types of radar, whereby assurance would be provided that ABM deployment would be strictly confined to the agreed objectives.

e. Research and Development and certain agreed forms of modernization of the permitted deployments would not be precluded by the agreement.

f. Each side would inform the other side of the indicators by which it would judge the activities of the other side with respect to strategic defensive armaments after the agreement is in force and which could raise questions concerning the viability of the agreement.

g. The agreement would have an initial fixed duration, for example, of five years.

5. *Strategic Offensive Armaments*

a. I have taken note of the current status of the construction of fixed land-based ICBM launchers in the USSR.

b. I propose that the agreement to limit strategic defensive deployments, would include a commitment by both sides to negotiate by an agreed date (for example, July 1, 1972) an agreement to limit offensive strategic armaments.

c. It would also be understood that as of an early agreed date, for example April 1, 1971, all new construction of land-based ICBM launchers would cease. It would also be understood that work to complete launchers under construction could continue for another agreed period but would in any case cease as of January 1, 1972.

d. It would be a part of this understanding, reached in connection with the formal agreement on strategic defensive limitations, that mod-

ernization or replacement of land-based ICBM's would not be precluded, provided that these activities do not affect the understanding not to initiate new land-based ICBM construction as of an agreed date, and to cease work to complete previously initiated land-based ICBM construction as of January 1, 1972.

6. *Multiple Warheads*

a. I have carefully examined the record of the discussions on this subject that have taken place between our representatives.

b. It would appear that the understanding associated with an initial agreement in the form that I have proposed above could not include limitations with respect to the various types of multiple warheads which both of us are developing and deploying.

c. However, in connection with an initial agreement I would plan to inform you, as part of the associated understanding, of the indicators by which we would judge your activities and which, in our view, would raise questions concerning our security interests. You would, of course, be free to provide me with a similar list of indicators concerning the Soviet Union's judgment of activities on the part of the United States.

7. Apart from the inherent right to abrogate the agreement, each side would of course be at liberty to take such steps with respect to its own weapons programs as are not explicitly precluded by the agreement, or the understanding associated with it, and which it deems necessary to safeguard its security interests in the light of qualitative and other changes in the other side's strategic weapons programs.

8. Mr. Chairman: I consider that the foregoing basic approach to an initial agreement holds promise of being translated into a successful agreement this year. I will be prepared to instruct my representatives at the Vienna sessions in accordance with it on the assumption that you will similarly instruct your delegation. Our representatives will have a great deal of work to accomplish to translate this general approach into the terms of an agreement. I know that both our delegations will exert the utmost effort to achieve success.

9. I suggest that we examine the status of their work after approximately six to eight weeks and then determine what, if any, additional guidance we may wish to provide to ensure success for this significant endeavor.

10. I am deeply convinced that we have within our reach a mutually acceptable initial agreement, and I assure you that I will devote my full energy and authority to remove any obstacles that may stand in the way of a successful outcome. I know that your colleagues and you approach this historic task in the same spirit.

135. Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and President Nixon¹

Washington, February 26, 1971.

Nixon: I'm not ready to tell you, but I've been doing a little thinking about the SALT thing, and I'm—I want to, before they go back on March 15th, it may be that I may want to either say something or write a letter or something else, [unclear] to have some outcome [unclear]. Let me put it this way: I think the—I'm not as bearish about this as some who are willing to do something. I'm inclined to think that right now they want to do something. Now, let me say on that, for your information, I [unclear]. I want to talk, I want to think about it for a while. I just wanted to tell you about it now. It would have to be before March 15th, if anything I've said here that—but I would like to do it in terms of a, where, if I do it, here, where you inform [unclear] to tell [Gerard] Smith but on a, on a absolutely—I don't believe him, I don't have any confidence in him, basically, as a—and particularly his shop,² naturally. And, now, understand, I think he does as well as he can, considering the people that are there.

But I—But I, I feel that—I feel that he looks at this thing [unclear] but, as anybody who would be involved in long negotiations, are personally, sometimes in miniscule terms. And also that, he just has too much of a tendency sometimes, he doesn't want to fight with his own people.

Rogers: Hmm.

Nixon: Now, this is a big play, you know, when you really come down to it, if there's any agreement with the Russians, this might be it, you know, the ABM and something else. But if we do it, I think we've got to get the credit here. I don't believe it should be in Vienna. You know what I mean?

Rogers: Sure.

Nixon: So give some thought to that, but I sense he—I don't know what I'm going to do, but I would particularly suggest that we, we ought to keep that very closely held to ourselves, you know.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 460–25. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Rogers from 5:15 to 5:45 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² Reference is to ACDA.

Rogers: I was asking Bob Haldeman the other day, what you—I felt, sort of, basically, my own feeling is that if we could get an agreement which became effective at the end of this year. By “effective,” I mean “signed.” It would be effective some time this year or the beginning of the next, and as long as it didn’t cause us to have—be at any, be at any disadvantage, as long as we have—

Nixon: Right.

Rogers: As long as we have, we have the opportunity to develop all the things we would develop anyway.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Rogers: And really stop the things that we probably would stop anyway—

Nixon: Well, I’m on the same track. I’ve been thinking a lot about it. I’ve told Haig and Kissinger [unclear] the steps that I can think of, and yourself, and now we really have studied it, and—but I think something could come of it. I think something might come of it, because I think maybe they could use something, too. What the hell?

Rogers: It’s just a matter of saving some money. That’s all [unclear].

Nixon: Say that we do.

Rogers: Well, I’ve been thinking along the same line. As a matter of fact, I—

Nixon: But also, it could be an enormously good thing to have if we could get something said or done, or at least some indications of progress this spring, well, which would take the heat off some of this press thing, too [unclear].

Rogers: Well, I think—I really—I don’t think Mr. Brezhnev [unclear] these people left out. I think what we should—

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: [unclear] the damn television and, incidentally, they’re absolutely right. [unclear] I didn’t—I don’t look at it, but I read it and I know how horrible it is. Bill, the whole trouble is, I think you can’t blame Mel [Laird]. You can’t. The whole damned Defense Department is PR crazy.

Rogers: Hmm.

Nixon: And I—I personally think he felt, I would have been a lot more tough on this end. Let ‘em squeal. Let ‘em squeal. You—look, look at Woody Hayes after a football game.

Rogers: Yeah.

Nixon: Vince Lombardi—whenever he lost a game, he wouldn't let anybody in for 30 minutes. Ted Williams?³

Rogers: Of course.

Nixon: You know, he never lets the press in after the foot—the baseball players lose a game for a half hour. Oh hell, this is war.

Rogers: Well—

Nixon: And, so, the press squeals at Ted Williams. And most of the people say he's right. What do you think?

Rogers: Sure.

Nixon: I tell you, God, I just think we're just going crazy to get ourselves beat over the head, bloodied. I talked to Moorer afterwards, after you had, and I said, now [unclear]. And he's good. He said, "Now, I'm going to do everything I can." And he will. Jesus, you're absolutely right. In a war, you'd never let a guy talk to the press after he'd been in a battle, would you?

Rogers: No.

Nixon: When he's shell shocked?

Rogers: What we used to do is, afterwards, we took them—

[unclear exchange]

Rogers: [unclear] when I was in the—

Nixon: Naval Intelligence?

Rogers: Yeah. And what we used to do is, when we were ready, then we would let them go and talk to the press. You see, we didn't do it under orders, we just did it—

Nixon: Yeah.

Rogers: It made sense. I mean, that was the choice we had to make. So, we didn't—and we didn't—we just didn't go out and talk to the press until we were ready.

Nixon: Look, on the—on the SALT thing, let us—let us develop our own strategy. Let, let Smith continue to work on table support. We must do better, 'cause it has to be done that way. Well, I'll see you.

Rogers: All right, Mr. President.

³ Hayes was the head football coach at The Ohio State University. Lombardi was the long-time head coach of the National Football League Green Bay Packers and later the Washington Redskins. Williams played for the Boston Red Sox and was later manager of the Washington Senators.

136. Memorandum for the File by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith)¹

Washington, March 1, 1971.

SUBJECT

Conversation with the Secretary in his office on 3/1/71

In my conversation with the Secretary today, he told me he had seen the President, that the President definitely wanted an agreement. He doubted that the President would give me very much flexibility to negotiate until he had a better feel that an agreement was in sight. S. thought our ABM position was correct but for tactical reasons we ought to state it in terms of a preference. (I don't think this is any different from the position I have been taking.) He stressed the need not to give any sense of urgency. He cited one case in the past where he thought a mistake had been made. He went over a number of the proposed changes in the August 4th position² and did not seem to have any trouble. He agreed that we should try to get mobiles banned in return for surface ship deployments banned. I asked him if he would instruct his people not to disagree with me in the Verification Panel. He had Irwin come in and told him that he in general agreed with the position I was going to take. Irwin said that his one concern was on the vulnerability and instability of the agreement question. He ran through the list of fixes and said he thought perhaps the best bet was to negotiate for reductions in exchange for the Soviets being able to have mobile missiles. Both the Secretary and I took a dim view of letting mobiles run free.

I got the impression that the President would, if necessary, go for a ban on ABMs.

I told the Secretary about my draft of a letter to Kosygin.³ He seemed to agree with the notion, but suggested I strike out the reference to this year.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Box 1, Director's Files, Smith Files, Chronological File, Smith/Rogers Correspondence, April 1970–December 1972. Secret; Nodis.

² See footnote 2, Document 104.

³ On March 9 Sonnenfeldt sent to Kissinger a copy of Smith's draft letter, which suggested the possibility of initial SALT agreements in a non-treaty form. In his covering memorandum, which was marked "urgent information," Sonnenfeldt wrote: "I do not know whether you have solicited such a draft and whether a communication such as Smith suggests is under consideration. In my judgment, the idea of a letter of this kind would be worth considering somewhat later in the Vienna phase. Consequently, I recommend no further action at this time." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 880, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIV, January 1–April 1971)

After our talk I had a private talk with Irwin and pointed out that the procedure in this case had not been my idea. The Secretary had asked me some time ago to present a position. I had asked him if I should clear it in normal fashion with Irwin, and the Secretary said that he would prefer to see it himself first. The Secretary said he had shown the blue book to no one else, and gave it back to me.

I showed both Irwin and the Secretary my conclusions about Soviet ICBMs⁴ and the fact that there had been little or no deployment since Helsinki started in November of 1969. Neither of them had been aware of this.

The Secretary stressed that the President did not seem interested in an ABM only agreement.

GS

⁴ In a February 26 memorandum to the President, Smith provided his assessment of data taken from NIE 11-8-70 (see footnote 3, Document 121). Smith stated that the level of SS-9s and SS-11s that were operational and under construction had remained the same since November 1969. He further reported that while the SS-7 and SS-8 forces had decreased by 7 and 4, respectively, the number of SS-13s under construction had increased by 20. The net increase in the total Soviet ICBM force, he concluded, was 9 missiles. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Director's Files, Smith Files, Chronological File, SALT Developments, White House Views, February-June 1971)

137. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, March 8, 1971, 8:35–10:27 a.m.

NSC MEETING ON SALT
(also Laos, at end)

[Director Helms began the meeting with a briefing on the latest intelligence on Soviet programs. At one point he referred to four possibilities with regard to a Soviet program.]²

President: This is an example of the precision of our intelligence estimates.³

[Director Helms completed his briefing.]

President: It's clear there's a throw weight advantage to the Soviets. In nuclear submarines of the Polaris type, they will equal the United States by 1975. In aircraft, I see we still have a three-to-one advantage.

Laird: They have superiority in air defense.

President: In ABM, are the Soviets ahead of us or behind us in the technology?

Helms: They're ahead in deployment but behind us in the technology.

Rogers: What about MIRVs?

President: The Soviets have or have they not tested MIRV on the SS-9?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Minutes Originals 1971 thru 6-20-74. Top Secret. Nixon, Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Lincoln, Mitchell, Moorer, Helms, Gerard Smith, Spiers, Farley, David, Kissinger, K. Wayne Smith, Sonnenfeldt, Kennedy, Duckett, McCloy, Jeanne Davis, Connally, Packard, and Nitze attended the meeting (Ibid., Presidential Tape Recordings, Nixon Tape Log) A tape recording of this meeting. is *ibid.*, White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 49-12, 8:32 a.m. to unknown time after 10:27 a.m. On March 6 Kissinger sent Nixon talking points, an issues paper, a summary of ABM options, and data on ABM sites in preparation for the meeting. All *ibid.*, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-031, NSC Meeting SALT, 3/8/71.

² All brackets, except those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original. Attached but not printed is Helms's briefing. The four possibilities concerning the new Soviet silos included: 1) a new, large ICBM; 2) a modified version of the SS-9; 3) a new silo adapted to a variant of the SS-9; or 4) a unique configuration with greater hardening than for existing ICBM silos.

³ According to the tape recording of this meeting, the following exchange between Nixon and Helms occurred: Nixon: "This, gentlemen, is for the newcomers, an indication of how precise the CIA is in its intelligence appraisements, right? Pick one of the four." Helms: "Yes, sir. If you were to—" Nixon: "Right." Helms: "—give us a little time, we'll have the right one." Nixon: "You're never wrong, then." [Laughter in room] The editor transcribed the portion printed here specifically for this volume.

Helms: They have tried but they have not really tested a MIRV yet successfully. We have a picture of canisters sitting near the SS-9 silos which have clusters of three warheads instead of a single warhead.

Laird: They don't really need MIRV's as long as they're targeting our Minuteman fields. But it is clear they can get MIRV if they want.

President: In accuracy, are we far ahead?

Laird: We're not sure how far ahead we are. We can't make a claim that we are far ahead. They can acquire accuracy. They have the technology to do it.

Helms: We are ahead in MIRV accuracy.

Laird: But our missile systems in general are much more accurate.

Smith: In calculating the strategic balance we have to remember our forward-based systems in Europe. They add a great deal to our capability.

Laird: We should not believe that all our forward-based aircraft with nuclears could hit the Soviet Union. They could hit the Pact area but not necessarily the Soviets unless they're one-way missions. The Soviets have their IRBM's targetted on Western Europe.

Rogers: What would the penetration capability of the forward-based aircraft be?

Laird: Their penetration could be effective.

Smith: We have a calculation of producing 20% casualties in the Soviet Union by an attack with the forward-based aircraft. We have to take this as a plus.

Laird: Let's assess the threat. We have to be a little pessimistic in our assumptions. Their new silo work is a source of concern to us. So my recommendation is we have to be tougher in the negotiations. Success depends on the *kind* of agreement we get, not just that we get an agreement. I believe we need to modify our proposals. We must allow mobile sea-based and land-based systems. Because of new information we have on the Soviet momentum on their larger systems.

On ABM, protection of the National Command Authority is important because their attack should not reach Washington, D.C. Our proposals should allow us to decide where we want to have our system. The decision on location should be up to us; the numbers should be negotiable.

The major Soviet concern is our ABM system. They show some concern over the forward-based aircraft and other items but most of their concern is on our ABM.

We should not bargain on less than 250 large missiles—preferably 300.

There is little likelihood of approval of an NCA (Washington, D.C.) ABM system.

We should modify our proposal. This is my position.⁴ If an agreement is entered into, there should be a termination date if this is a limitation rather than a reduction. We'll never get funding if we are talking treaty. They can do it but we can't. No President can take action—he won't get support.

Moorer: Our great concern is that the potential is high for changing the strategic balance by an agreement. So we must look at it in detail. We should use the negotiations to determine the sincerity of the Soviets. There is indication that they want to build a superior position while we talk. Our ABM and forward-based aircraft are our key leverage in the negotiation. We should look at the ABM in the broader context—what is the best way of protecting our systems?

If we start negotiations on FBS posture, that will have a major effect on NATO. It will cause serious doubt among our allies. The nuclear capability we provide has been the cohesion to keep the Alliance together.

Packard: We should keep the overall strategic problem in mind: The Soviets have built land-based missiles in greater numbers and bigger than ours. There is no need to debate whether their accuracy can be improved; they can do it. We must therefore decide to move to control the numbers both of their large missiles and of all their missiles. They are concerned about Safeguard—but we should use this to get control of their numbers. An agreement limiting ABM only would be a mistake.

The forward-based systems have importance. They equate more to their IRBM and we should hold on this to put it in this context.

Moorer: The Soviets have raised it in the talks.

Rogers: But we've made no concession on that.

President: They may raise it, but then we should suggest that their IRBM's be discussed.

Smith: Yes, and their 1000 medium bombers and the cruise missiles. We said, "Let's not talk about the peripheral systems, let's concentrate on the central systems."

⁴ Laird elaborated on his position about the implications of the new intelligence for SALT in a March 9 memorandum to the President. Laird concluded that if a new missile of the SS-9 class was deployed at the Soviet rate of the past and with improvements that the Soviets would have to make to justify a new program, then Minuteman survivability would be undermined as early as 1973 or 1974. He recommended that the U.S. position put forth on August 4, 1970, be modified to allow termination by January 1974 of any agreement and to be superseded by a more durable agreement. He also recommended modifying the U.S. position on ABM sites so that it was not restricted to Washington, D.C. as the NCA. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 880, Subject Files, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIV, January 1–April 1971)

President: We will talk about that in the NATO context. The ABM is simpler to put into the negotiations than FBS, because of the NATO angle.

Smith: Britain and France would like to see an ABM deal because it would improve their nuclear capability against the Soviet Union.

President: Yes, it makes their forces more credible—it also makes the Chinese threat more credible.

Laird: But the Soviets have surface-to-air missiles.

President: That shows the complexities.

Packard: We need to have an agreement that is good for the security of the country, not just for agreement's sake. There's not much budget savings in it—only about \$1 million per year in ABM cost is saveable. All other costs would have to stay in.

Laird: It would be eaten up by the B-1 and ULMS anyway. Only 12% of our defense budget is in strategic weapons in any case.

President: When we announced our Safeguard ABM program in 1969, we said there would be three criteria for its continuation: the threat, progress in arms control, and developments in technology. How is the technology progressing?

Packard: It's coming well. We've had live intercepts in the past year. The test record is very satisfactory—in fact, above average. Construction is moving. There are no problems in the radar. The problem is to get the whole system working together with the computers. For this we'll need one full year at Grand Forks.

President: How about progress vis-à-vis other powers than the Soviets?

Packard: If there is a weakness, it is in the inability to deal with a large number of warheads. It's O.K. against a few incoming missiles. It would do O.K. against the Chinese threat.

President: Are the Soviets O.K. against the Chinese, too?

Packard: Yes, but their effectiveness is limited to a Chinese-type threat. We have many more interceptors. Despite all the criticism, our system is better than the Soviets' in capabilities.

Rogers: Mr. President, I want to comment on something Mel Laird said, about "we must be tougher in the negotiations." I think we may be farther away from an agreement—we have a long way to go. We have made no decisions that we hold back on anything because we thought an agreement was coming.

The reason we asked for limits on mobile launchers was we thought that's what DOD wants. The Soviets want them, so it would be easy to agree to go ahead with them. As for the limit of 250—I think this is to our advantage. As for the prospects of hard-site defense, we don't know whether we can develop it. Therefore, it would be wise to

set a five-year termination date with an option to renew. This gives us the chance to watch developments.

An agreement to “stay where we are” may be more negotiable than an ABM ban. I believe we should continue to negotiate and be restrained in public optimism. We should leave more to the negotiating team, subject to what the rest of the government wants. Our public position is good. We should proceed. Though if we don’t get an agreement in the next two years we may lose the chance.

President: It’s a very different situation now from the time of the Cuba missile crisis. Each side now has the capability to retain a position of parity if it desires, short of some remarkable technological breakthrough.

Smith: Helms’ news is not good. The importance of agreement is not less; it may be more, if we can get agreed limitations. I suggest we look at the balance: The Soviets went for large numbers of missiles; we went for more warheads. The Soviets see this as a great threat. Paul Nitze told the Congress in 1967 that a MIRV system would be more effective than a single large warhead against missiles. And on this we are moving—we aren’t just talking.

I believe we should talk about our forward-based aircraft. Some of our allies would like to see an overall reduction of the number of IRBMs targetted on them. There can be general language to prohibit circumvention. If we want an agreement, I believe our present proposals are too complicated. I believe in the talks we have to stop making speeches to each other. We—the delegation—should have authority to explore things privately at the meetings. A zero-ABM agreement in the context of a set of offensive-defensive limits has the best chance.

President: The big push on the Hill will be to ban ABMs completely. We have to fight this. The Soviets would go on regardless of what we agreed on ABM. Their MIRVing, their hardening would continue. Some say we are being too rigid.

Do you think the Soviets will propose ABM only?

Smith: Yes, they will, and the Hill will give it some support—Symington, for example. But we have been putting those arguments to rest.

Rogers: I don’t think we will have too much trouble. The new information we have offsets that argument.

Laird: Yes, but the fact is they have an ABM system.

Smith: If we treat Safeguard as divisible and then go to Congress for only an NCA, they will be skeptical. The problem would be that we couldn’t control developments. A total ban on ABM would be easier to verify. We could have high confidence in it.

Laird: We’d have to tear down the radars.

Smith: We have taken the position that radar should be scrapped.

Laird: Are the radars in or not?

Smith: Yes, along the line of the August 4 proposal,⁵ but not according to the JCS position that radars should be free in a given area.

Laird: But we have to control the radars. I don't agree with the JCS.

Smith: I think we can try for your view on NCA but not in Washington. Two is about what the traffic will bear.

President: We should go for four.

Rogers: We're not talking about defensive limitations only, but about both offensive and defensive limitations.

Smith: I would agree with an escape clause.

President: If we were to act on the escape clause, it would look like mobilization. That would be different from just acting because the treaty was ending.

Smith: We would want a real escape clause.

President: There's a difference between an escape clause and a limited-term agreement.

Smith: I doubt we could negotiate an agreement with a time limit. I doubt the Soviets would go into such an agreement. I think we should not try it. We could say that at the end of five years, either side could get out if it wanted.

Rogers: I think we should work out some specific terminating arrangement.

President: This is a long way down the road. [To Smith]: What do you think about the future of the talks? All of us here realize there will be some agreement some time, but when do we think it will come? Are you that pessimistic? We have political problems at home. We all know this.

So we have a double problem. We have to hold out hope that the talks are serious, but recognize that we have differences and we must still protect our interests.

Smith: To stop the negotiating process may be as bad as getting out of the agreement. Both sides want the negotiation to continue. Within a year we should know what can be worked out.

Rogers: It's more likely to get some understanding.

President: The less an agreement means, the more fanfare it gets. I want to do some thinking about this. I'll discuss it with you Wednesday or Thursday.⁶

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 104.

⁶ March 10 or 11.

We must realize—Jack McCloy understands this—that when the American people and others who rely on the credibility of the American word and on our nuclear deterrent—when they realize that we are only the second most powerful nation, there will be a serious effect everywhere. We must refer to the facts in “who is first.” We are a sea power and they are a land power. They have land threats, we don’t. What is sufficient for them is different from what is sufficient for us.

It is important—I say this to Mel—that we have some advantages. In our NATO strength we are better off than the Pact. We look good; they have problems on the other side. We must have adequate naval power.

Despite the Soviet Navy’s growth we have an enormous advantage in naval power around the world. So we can’t give the impression we are Number 2. Look at Japan, Germany, the Europeans—we must not talk in terms of superiority but must say that we have enough to deter any threat and to meet all our treaty commitments. And we must be sure our naval power is not eroded.

Laird: Their momentum is great but we are moving too. There is \$780 million in the budget for the Navy this year.

President: The Dutch Foreign Minister said that if the leaders of Europe knew, they would be worried. But we can take care of ourselves.

McCloy: Two years ago I was in Teheran; the Shah knew about the importance of our umbrella. When they realized what was happening he said there would be a race between Bonn and Paris.

My committee⁷ has been working under pressure but the problems are not insurmountable. We’re not naive—we’re not all doves—but on judgments and objectives, views differ. Zero ABM and a ban on MIRVs with limits on offensive weapons would be the right move to effect the conceptual balance of power. Such a move by us would be evidence of our sincerity and seriousness, and we would gain from it.

As to the prospects for agreement, I think they are good. It’s important to the Soviets to think they can reach parity. They want an agreement that would set parity. We could convince the world we are moving and convince the American people that we are not giving up anything in security but we would enhance the security posture in the world.

President: They didn’t seem to want a MIRV limit?

Smith: We wanted on-site inspection and they didn’t want that.

⁷ Following the meeting, McCloy wrote Kissinger a letter dated March 8 expressing concern that the GAC was not being given adequate access to the President or weight in the decision-making process. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-031, NSC Meeting SALT 3/8/71)

McCloy: A ban on MIRV testing would do the job. Full-range testing would be needed to make a system capable of a first strike.

President: I'll make a statement before Smith goes back. Once we get in a position to move, I want to stop all these stories on differences between the agencies. Too many around the breakfast table read the columns and believe them. We want to avoid public view of any differences.

Moorer: The Soviets' momentum is designed to limit our freedom on the seas and to limit our LOCs. We need more for ASW in the U.S. Navy.

President: I believe very strongly the British should do more. What Britain needs to do in South Africa should add to our capabilities.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

138. National Security Decision Memorandum 102¹

Washington, March 11, 1971.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Instructions for Strategic Arms Limitations Talks At Vienna (SALT IV)

After careful consideration of the issues set forth in the National Security Council Meeting on March 8,² the President has made the following decisions.

Part I

The United States Delegation should begin discussions in Vienna by attempting to get further amplifications of the Soviet position. The United States Delegation should continue to negotiate along the lines

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 97–144. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation.

² See Document 137.

of our August 4 proposal³ and in accordance with established instructions as modified by the following directions.

A. It should be made clear that the United States cannot accept a separate ABM agreement and continues to adhere to the principle that offensive and defensive systems must be linked. In this connection, the Chief of the U.S. Delegation should convey to the Chief of the Soviet Delegation that the United States is prepared to discuss the details of the ABM part of any agreement as a matter of priority to facilitate continuing negotiations on offensive forces. The U.S. proposal for a complete ban on ABMs remains valid and the U.S. Delegation should explain what this would involve for both sides. At the same time, we should discuss the requirements and constraints involved in an NCA system (Washington and Moscow). Until there has been a discussion of details, we cannot choose between zero or NCA levels.

B. The Chief of the U.S. Delegation is directed to propose in private to the Chief of the Soviet Delegation that the ABM portion of the agreement take into account existing systems or systems under construction. In this connection, the U.S. proposes limiting the U.S. to the authorized Safeguard defense of its retaliatory capability (e.g., four sites) and limiting the Soviets to the existing Moscow defense.⁴

C. The Chief of the U.S. Delegation is instructed to discuss in private the concept of a time limit on the agreement by pointing out the withdrawal and review provision in our proposal and probing Soviet views on the manner of dealing with the duration of an agreement.

D. The U.S. Delegation is authorized to agree to including U.S. B-52 bombers in storage within the aggregate only in exchange for Soviet agreement to include all bombers, however configured, of types included in the agreement.

E. The Delegation is authorized to respond as follows to the Soviet proposal of November 13 to ban strategic ballistic missiles on the seabeds:⁵ "The U.S. and USSR would undertake not to develop ballis-

³ See footnote 2, Document 104.

⁴ On March 16 Smith sent the following message to Rogers: "Phil Farley advised me by phone of the importance that Part I-B of NSDM 102 be forcefully carried out by me. I assure you and the President that this instruction (as well as all other SALT instructions) will be fully and forcefully carried out." (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Director's Files, Smith Files, Chronological File, Smith/Rogers Correspondence, October 1970–November 1971)

⁵ During autumn 1970 final revisions were made to a treaty prohibiting placement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone. In telegram 191560 to USUN, November 20, 1970, the Department forwarded the final text of the UN General Assembly resolution commending the Seabed Arms Control Treaty. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-6) The UN resolution passed on December 7, 1970. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty was opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow on February 11, 1971, and entered into force on May 18, 1972. (23 UST 701)

tic missile launchers for use on, nor to deploy such launchers on, the seabed within the 12-mile seabed zone or on the beds of internal waters, that is, waters between the baseline of the territorial sea and the coast and waters landward of the coast, including lakes and rivers. This prohibition would apply to the emplanting or emplacing of any ballistic missile launchers on the seabed or waterbed, or in the subsoil thereof, including ballistic missile launchers carried by vehicles which can navigate only when in contact with the seabed or waterbed.”

F. In discussing ways to increase the reliability and reduce the vulnerability of the Washington–Moscow direct communications link, the U.S. position is as follows:

1. Provision should be made for multiple terminals on each side;
2. Provision should be made for at least one communication link which would be independent of third countries. The Delegation should propose a primary link using Intelsat, while retaining the existing link as backup;
3. A joint U.S.–USSR technical study should be undertaken to assess the desirability over the longer term of developing and deploying a joint communication satellite system designed to provide an optimum Washington–Moscow direct communications link.

Any Soviet proposal for the establishment of additional communication links dependent on third countries should be referred to Washington for further study.

G. The Delegation is also authorized to discuss informally the following additional modifications to the U.S. proposal.

When the Delegation has determined informally the nature of a quid pro quo which the Soviets appear willing or likely to accept in return for the modification, the tradeoff must then be approved in Washington.

1. Drop the 1,710 sub-limit on missiles and raise the aggregate to 2,000.
2. Simplify corollary constraints on silo modifications by eliminating the associated list of indicators.
3. Subject to agreement on procedures for dismantling, destruction and consultation, drop the provisions for advance modification [*notification?*] of:
 - a. Deployment of new bomber types;
 - b. Deployment of new types of non-ICBM land-mobile ballistic missile systems;
 - c. Deployment of new SAM systems;
 - d. Substitution of missile launchers or heavy bombers.
4. Drop the requirement for advance notice of ABM R&D flight tests.
5. Drop explicit reference in the list of duties of the proposed Joint Commission which allows one party to “request” selective direct

observation. However, the reference to invitational inspections would remain.

Part II

A. The Delegation is directed to exert maximum effort to achieve progress in the talks on the basis of the August 4 proposals as modified by the provisions of Part I of this memorandum. In the event it becomes apparent after approximately four weeks that adequate progress cannot be made, the President will be prepared to entertain recommendations for alternative approaches. At that time the President will consider such modifications as reducing the number of Safeguard sites for the U.S. and increasing the modern, large ballistic missile limit to take into account the current status of Soviet deployments.

B. Previous directives concerning the privacy of the talks and public comment on them are reaffirmed. The President directs that any comment concerning prospects for agreement be strictly confined to the President's statements in his Press Conference of March 4, 1971.⁶

Henry A. Kissinger

⁶ During his March 4 press conference, Nixon stated that he would express neither optimism nor pessimism over when an agreement would be reached. He believed, however, "that there will be an agreement eventually between the United States and the Soviet Union" that included both offensive and defensive weapons. For the full text of Nixon's remarks, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, p. 394.

139. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Assistant to the President (Haldeman)¹

Washington, March 11, 1971.

Kissinger: I think, incidentally, that the Russians are feeling that. I read now the [Gerard] Smith record of the Dobrynin conversation.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 466–12. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger and Haldeman from 4 to 4:45 p.m. (Ibid, White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² On March 10 Smith sent Kissinger and Rogers a memorandum about his conversation with Dobrynin of 11 a.m. that morning. According to Smith's memoran-

That son-of-a-bitch is just taking your letter,³ without telling Smith he's got it, and feeling out whether Smith is willing to give more.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: Because Smith's nearly dropped his teeth, because Dobrynin had—he had always said the Russians will never accept trading Washington—and the Washington system in for, for ABM. Here, Dobrynin offered it to him yesterday for nothing. And that actually helped us, because if they do come back now with the letter, it doesn't look like an arbitrary decision of yours. We've positioned it at the NSC meeting⁴ with Laird—

Haldeman: And it's easy to cover now—

Kissinger: Dobrynin has come in, and you were—and it's much better for us. Scoop Jackson called this afternoon, and he said if we screw him on this Washington defense after all the pleading he's done for us on—

Nixon: We're not going to do that.

Kissinger: —on Safeguard, he'll never forgive us.

Nixon: Well, you told him we weren't?

Kissinger: I told him we weren't, and he should come in. I'm seeing him Saturday,⁵ And I'll—

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: —I'll tell him.

Nixon: Because after all, he is a decent man.

Kissinger: I think he's a decent guy.

Nixon: Oh, sure. He's—he's got to fight his own battle, and—

dum, Dobrynin pressed Smith for the possibility of an ABM only agreement, which could be negotiated in 1971, while a offensive/defensive agreement could not. Smith told Dobrynin that he must follow the President's guidance, which stressed the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons control. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Director's Files, Smith Files, Chronological File, Smith/Semenov Elements, May 1971)

³ Printed as an attachment to Document 134.

⁴ See Document 137.

⁵ March 13. Kissinger met with Jackson from 3:10 to 3:56 p.m. No record of their conversation has been found. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968-1976, Record of Schedule)

140. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 12, 1971, 8 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

Dobrynin set up the meeting urgently and it was held early in the morning because he was leaving for New York. Dobrynin began the conversation by handing me a draft letter from the Soviet Government (Tab A) in reply to the letter on SALT I had handed him on February 17 (Tab B).² Dobrynin asked me what I thought of it.

I replied that, of course, I would have to discuss it with the President, but my first reaction was that this was merely a restatement of the maximum Soviet position. We could not agree to an ABM-only agreement. We could also not agree to discuss a “freeze” only after an agreement had been made. It would seem to me that the only way we could make progress is by agreeing in principle on a “freeze”—then negotiating the agreement and then going back to the details of the “freeze.”

Dobrynin said that the best way to proceed would be for me to draft the version of what sort of a letter would be acceptable to us. I replied that I had trouble enough drafting documents for the U.S. Government; I could not draft them for the Soviet Government as well. Dobrynin then suggested that I perhaps redraft our original document in a more general way, keeping in mind that perhaps the Soviet Government did not want to commit itself now to any specific dates for implementing the “freeze.” I told him I would have to discuss it with the President.³

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Map Room at the White House. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 135.

² Printed as an attachment to Document 134.

³ Between 8:51 and 9:01 a.m. Kissinger briefed Nixon on his meeting. Kissinger summarized the letter and the following discussion took place: Kissinger: “They, of course, are driving their usual hard bargain. They say, ‘Let’s negotiate in detail the defensive first, and then we will discuss the freezing.’ I told him that I didn’t know your thinking.” Nixon: “Um-hmm.” Kissinger: “But that that was too vague. I think what we have to ask them is this, Mr. President, that they agree to the principle of the freezing of deployments, then we will authorize Smith to discuss ABM with them. And then, before the whole thing gets wrapped up, we will agree to the specifics of the freezing. I

Tab A**Draft Letter From the Soviet Government to President Nixon⁴**

“The Soviet Government has carefully considered the course of the exchange of opinion between the USSR and the United States delegations at the negotiations on strategic armament limitations. Proceeding from the situation shaping up now at those negotiations, the Soviet Government believes it expedient to concentrate in the current year on solving the questions related to the limitation of ABM systems in order to conduct, after conclusion of a separate agreement on ABM limitation, active talks aimed at limiting strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet Government proceeds in this from the mutual understanding to the effect that the ABM limitation will not only put an end to the competition in the field of strategic defensive weapons, but will constitute an important factor also in restraining the race in strategic offensive armaments.

In order to facilitate more favorable conditions for finding ways to reach an agreement on strategic offensive weapons limitation the Soviet side is prepared in principle to discuss subsequently the question of ‘freezing’ strategic offensive weapons raised by the American side. Concrete details will be discussed after a separate ABM agreement is concluded. We proceed from the assumption that a ‘freezing’ of strategic offensive weapons should not concern possible modernization and replacement of such weapons.

Guided by this, the Soviet Government will give instructions to its delegation at the negotiations with the United States delegation on strategic armaments limitations to conduct talks in Vienna, aimed at drawing up the text of an ABM agreement proceeding from the view that deployment of the ABM systems by the USSR and the United States must be limited to the systems needed for the defense of the capitals—Moscow and Washington.

In such an agreement the obligation of the sides to continue active negotiations on the limitations of strategic offensive weapons will be fixed.”

don’t think with this new Soviet missile buildup we can afford to sign an ABM-only agreement—” Nixon: “No.” Kissinger: “—that isn’t very specific.” Nixon agreed and encouraged Kissinger to reply to the Soviets, saying: “Just get it. Don’t hang around long. We’ve got to get something done before Smith gets out there—” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, March 12, 1971, 8:51–9:01 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 467–11) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

⁴ No classification marking. A notation on the letter indicates that Dobrynin handed the letter to Kissinger at approximately 8 a.m.

141. Editorial Note

On March 16, 1971, Nixon and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met between 9:30 and 9:50 a.m. in order to discuss the draft letter about a strategic arms limitation agreement from the leadership of the Soviet Union (Tab A, Document 140). According to a recording of their discussion, after Nixon read the draft, he and Kissinger had the following exchange:

Kissinger: "I think we may have better than a 50–50 chance."

Nixon: "I wonder if, well, if we put ourselves in the [unclear], saying that we shall reach an agreement before we know for sure."

Kissinger: "And then we have the freeze. Oh, you mean on the ABM?"

Nixon: "Well, on the both, Henry. You see, a freeze may—it's just a document. [Unclear] to cover MIRVs. I mean it's a—"

Kissinger: "We didn't ask for a MIRV even in our formal proposal."

Nixon: "I know, but I, I'm getting at—the point I'm getting at, the point here, is whether we just—puts us any worse off than we are now."

Kissinger: "I think it would show an initiative of trying to break the deadlock. If they then deadlock on technical—I have the impression that they want an agreement."

Nixon: "What we're doing is—say we negotiate an agreement in Vienna that has the opposite effect. It's still worth doing. With ABM we could still not get, get together on that. Then we would have a freeze on offensive weapons and agree to negotiate more at a later time."

Kissinger: "Well, what it would do, Mr. President—right now the deadlock is—for example, we have a long *New York Times* editorial again today, not that that matters, but in which they say we're being obstinate by linking offensive and defensive weapons. And this is your way to break that deadlock. Whatever we put in the letter would still—you couldn't possibly cover all the bases because—"

Nixon: "*The New York Times* just wants a SALT agreement [to] agree to an ABM limitation."

Kissinger: "That's right."

Nixon: "They want it, because that's the drive of everybody who's opposed to ABMs, is simply to go back and be done with it. Correct?"

Kissinger: "That's right. But in that case, we're doing better than what *The New York Times* recommended. They accept it because we're getting an offensive freeze also. You'll get an ABM limitation with a good chance of one different from what they want, which is Washington—"

Nixon: "Um-hmm. Do you see anything [unclear]—?"

Kissinger: "I mean, we were just—"

Nixon: "Do they want us to stop?"

Kissinger: "Yeah. We would instruct [Gerard] Smith to stick with—"

Nixon: "Three."

Kissinger: "—our present program. But, his present instructions are four, and we could let him fall back to three. Of course, what we really need is the radar, and the radar does the same for three and four. Only we'll get—three gets us fewer launchers."

Nixon: "Fine. Well, let's go on that. We'll do it that way."

Kissinger: "Ok, Mr. President."

Nixon: "Fine."

After discussion of unrelated subjects, they returned to SALT.

Kissinger: "I think that every time we've tried to meet, to placate these liberals, they've gotten nastier—"

Nixon: "A lot worse."

Kissinger: "As I see it, every time we've met them frontally, they've started wailing."

Nixon: "Damn. I don't think we need to worry about them now—"

Kissinger: "I don't think that's—"

Nixon: "—I think what the problem right now is this: I'm not so sure the SALT thing is going to be all that important. I think it's basically what I'm placating the critics with. Maybe it's just as well."

After discussion of unrelated subjects, they returned to SALT.

Nixon: "Now, about [Nguyen Van] Thieu, we have to remember that our view of the Russians, everything, is all tied into this, and we—"

Kissinger: "If we could—the advantage of a summit, even if it gets a sort of half-baked SALT agreement, whatever the SALT agreement is, it's a lot better than the nuclear test ban."

Nixon: "Of course. Of course. Of course."

Kissinger: "And it—"

Nixon: "I—I agree with you. It would stop—"

Kissinger: "—it would defuse people. They can't very well attack their President when he's getting ready for a summit meeting."

Nixon: "No."

Kissinger: "And that would get us a few months of, of, of, you know, of quiet here. One thing we might consider that's in the summer, a meeting with Thieu in which Thieu asks us to end our combat role. That would be an—"

Nixon: "Well, we've got to figure all those things out. The combat thing, no draftees—"

Kissinger: "Right."

Nixon: “—a whole series of announcements for the purpose of getting the thing cooled off.”

Kissinger: “That’s right.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 468–5) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

On March 16 Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in the Map Room at the White House at 12:30 p.m. in order to hand him a draft letter that incorporated elements of both the Soviet text and language discussed with Nixon. According to a memorandum of conversation prepared by Kissinger: “Dobrynin changed the language to substitute the words ‘strategic offensive weapons’ for ‘offensive strategic missile launchers.’ (The reason is probably to avoid limitations on hardening and perhaps building new silos in replacement of old ones).” The substantive part of their agreed-upon draft letter from Nixon to Kosygin reads: “To achieve the breakthrough which we both desire and which peoples everywhere await, I propose that our respective delegations to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks should be instructed immediately to draw up the text of an ABM agreement. The nature of the limitation would be settled by negotiation. The agreement will contain an obligation to continue active negotiations and to reach an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The agreement would be accompanied by an understanding that strategic offensive weapons would be frozen at the level of a fixed date to be agreed. Such a ‘freeze’ would not affect possible modernization of offensive launchers or their replacement by weapons of the same category so long as the total number did not increase. If you agree to this approach I am confident that an agreement can be reached this year.”

According to Kissinger’s memorandum of conversation: “Dobrynin then said he would forward the letter to Moscow and have an answer in a few days. There would be a government meeting on it on March 18th. He asked me whether the freeze had to be negotiated prior to the ABM agreement. I said no, that they should be handled simultaneously, but that it would not go into effect until both were signed.” After a brief discussion of China, the conversation returned to SALT:

“Dobrynin then asked me philosophically why we were so interested in limitations on offensive weapons. After all, the Soviet Union was offering us an equitable arrangement of defensive limitations. Why were we so interested in getting limitations on offensive weapons? We were greatly increasing the number of our warheads to a point where individual launchers were not really so significant. Dobrynin said that if several of our MIRVs were targeted on one silo, this would increase the probability of destruction of the silo considerably, even if the indi-

vidual warheads were smaller. Under those conditions, he did not see what advantage the Soviet Union gained by building a few extra offensive missiles. (He was presumably implying that these offensive missiles had only single warheads.)

“At any rate, I told Dobrynin that our assessment was that our MIRVs did not increase the destructive potential of our offensive forces while the large size of their warheads made their weapons a particular danger to our land-based missiles. I told him, however, that I would be prepared to discuss this as a philosophical issue when we met for lunch. However, I told him that the linkage between offensive and defensive limitations had to be maintained.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5)

Kissinger and Dobrynin spoke again on the telephone at 3:08 p.m. According to a transcript of their conversation, Kissinger told Dobrynin that he had just spoken with the President and that “I don’t want you to misunderstand that we will agree to ABM only. He will not unless it’s in the context of the letter.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT)

142. Letter From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, March 18, 1971.

Dear Bill:

There have been several disturbing indications that important past supporters of Safeguard in the Senate are hesitant to expose themselves this year by continuing their support if a SALT agreement could result in the tearing down of the sites already approved or being asked for. Such Senators as Jackson and Stennis have made comments to this effect.

For this reason, I want to stress the importance I attach to our new third ABM option, which was included in Gerry Smith’s instructions for the current Vienna phase of SALT.² It is essential that Gerry and his senior colleagues make to the Soviet representatives an early presentation of our Safeguard/Moscow proposal which conveys a sense of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 880, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIV, January 1–April 1971. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

² Document 138.

complete seriousness and conviction. I regard this proposal as having at least equal status with our two earlier ABM approaches.

In addition to strengthening our hand in the debate on the Defense Budget by bringing our SALT position in line with our budget requests, I consider our proposal important because of our uncertainty about the significance of the recent intelligence on Soviet ICBM construction.

I recognize that judgments have been expressed that our proposal may not be negotiable. But I am impressed by the apparent eagerness of the Soviets to stop our Safeguard from progressing to the point where they fear it might be developed into a heavier area defense. If this is really their fear, it should be in their interest to get an assurance from us that Safeguard will be stopped well short of the point from which it might be developed as an area defense. For this reason, I believe our new third alternative may well be of interest to them.

I have written a brief note to Gerry on this subject and would appreciate your sending it to him urgently and in a way that makes clear the great importance I attach to it.³

Sincerely,

RN

³ Attached but not printed is the March 18 note to Smith on the importance of the ABM option. On March 23 Smith sent backchannel message 794 to Nixon through Kissinger. Smith explained he was implementing the President's instructions and reported Semenov's reaction: "The new US ABM proposal including the number of complexes suggested—four ABM sites for the United States and only one for the Soviet Union—was in his view aimed at attaining unilateral military advantages. He could state that such a proposal was not acceptable to the Soviet Union." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT)

143. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

March 26, 1971, 8:20 p.m. PST.

K: You and I are going steady.² We should exchange telephone numbers.

D: That is right. I will give you my Moscow number, 290–2520.

K: I will not ask you what the area code is.

D: It is in Moscow.

K: I have talked to the President about it and do not completely understand it.³ Is this in response to our letter?

D: You do not? It is in connection with our last talk and your draft.

K: I will tell you how we are prepared to work it. We are prepared to agree in principle to separate ABM agreement. At that point they⁴ would begin discussing what sort of agreement. Simultaneously would discuss freeze.

D: I have to check but . . .

K: When they begin working on agreement they should talk about freeze.

D: They would discuss how many, etc. I don't know. It seems to be a little bit in the later stage. They will argue about [how many radars and all the little things.]⁵ What is your position?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente, California; Dobrynin was in Washington.

² When Kissinger met Dobrynin on March 22, according to a memorandum of their conversation, he asked the Soviet Ambassador whether he had received an answer to the latest U.S. proposal (see Document 142). Dobrynin explained that the delay in a reply stemmed from the complexity of the Soviet bureaucracy, and Kissinger insisted that the United States needed "to make some fundamental decisions between April 15 and May 1." (Ibid., President's Trip Files, Box 491, Kissinger/Dobrynin, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 1]).

³ At 4:10 p.m. on March 26 Dobrynin sent Kissinger the following note: "The Soviet side considers acceptable in principle the idea of 'freezing' strategic offensive weapons, having in mind that details will be discussed after an agreement on ABM systems limitation has been reached. As regards an ABM agreement, our position is well-known: we are for a separate agreement on ABM, but on equal terms without giving any advantages to either of the sides." Kissinger wrote the following note on the Soviet reply: "discussion of details will be concluded simultaneously with the conclusion of agreement on ABM limitation." (Ibid., Box 497, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 1 [Part 2])

⁴ Reference is to the Soviet and U.S. SALT Delegations.

⁵ All brackets are in the original.

K: They can start on ABM discussing the number of sites and so on but they must also discuss the freeze practically concurrently.

D: Simultaneously concluded on separate agreement and freezing at the same time.

K: Exactly.

D: I will pass this along to Moscow. I will be there myself on Monday.⁶ No, I cannot check it tomorrow because it is Saturday and no one will be there. You know it is the first week of the Congress to begin. For me it will be difficult to force members of the government to look at this. I will try to do my best and get an answer for you. I am meeting on Tuesday with Gromyko. Even he is involved with the Congress and lots of guests. You can understand the difficulty that this problem exists.

K: Yes. We are prepared to give instructions to start discussions on ABM—the nature of agreement and how many radars, etc but we must simultaneously discuss the freeze issue.

D: What to discuss. Yes. Freezing, I am just putting some thoughts down. . . . What kind of freezing. I will send a telegram to my government.

K: Let me ask you as long as we have this conversation. Next part of it. Not many people know about this in our government and we must think of how to get them started. It can be done in two ways. By an exchange of letters. The other is that the President at a press conference could respond to a question along the lines of, Do you still believe in the link between offensive and defensive weapons? Then he says something like, I am willing to make an agreement as long as freezing is in it. You could say through TASS that is a good idea.

D: I don't know. Yes I know you are giving an example.

K: This way we could get it into a formal channel.

D: Agreement on basis which you propose. It was our thinking I gave you on discussion after an agreement except for freezing. Do you have my note to you?

K: The one you gave me this afternoon. Yes. I have it.

D: . . . details that the negotiators will discuss simultaneously with the conclusion of the agreement.

K: With the conclusion—no that is a little late for the discussion. With the beginning of the drafting of the agreement.

D: It is very difficult to put in drafting [that we discuss freeze] from very beginning.

⁶ March 29.

K: Will be discussed prior to ABM agreement?

D: Discussion of the details will be discussed simultaneously with the conclusion of the agreement.

K: That would be fine. See how easy I am to get along with. The discussion of the details will be discussed simultaneously with the conclusion of an agreement on ABM systems. Yes. Something like that would go.

D: I will transmit this to Moscow.

K: The President could make the statement in a press conference—similar to the letter.

D: I understand. You could reply with what you just have given me.

K: . . . notification . . . immediately instruct my delegation to—

D: I could not give yes or no now on this. Just got it clearly to present your point of view to Moscow. The point of view of the President.

K: We will receive any counter proposals. That is no problem.

D: Major point is how to formulate this.

K: That formulation. The one you gave me.

D: You mean the one you gave me.

K: You are a good draftsman. You win every one of our discussions.

D: Everyone called you doctor. I could not get a doctors degree in 10 years. I would have to write a book and—

K: The trouble you have is that if you write a book everyone will be able to understand it.

D: You must give me degree of doctor.

K: When I am back in academic life I will see what I can do for you.

D: I will tell my government but you must understand it might take time.

144. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Vienna, March 30, 1971, 1722Z.

814. Dear Henry: Here are some personal impressions as we go into the third week of SALT IV.

There is a feeling that matters are in some suspense based, I think, on the following factors:

a) The Soviet Party Congress² is taking some of the play away from SALT.

b) Semenov's position in the first Smith/Semenov private conversation did not offer much of an indication of whether there will be movement in the Soviet offensive control position.³

c) We do not yet have Washington's details of ABM controls to take up with the Soviets. Thus, we cannot push much further in exploring the third option or in exploration in depth of what we have said we will give priority to: ABMs.

d) With three US ABM proposals on the table, there is some wonderment as to how and how long to maintain the position that all have equal status. In this regard, it is interesting that the Soviet reaction to the third option was not to reject the concept, but only the four-to-one ratio. But I think this will be as far as we will get in exploring this until we indicate flexibility on the ratio.

e) There is uncertainty as to what US policy will be about separate agreements on the Accident question and Hot Line Upgrade.

f) There is a speculative feeling in the air that with US political pressures for moratoria and acceptance of ABM only, the US position may become more flexible.

g) Uncertainties as to the extent and significance of the new Soviet silo construction program.

h) Uncertainties about how much latitude Washington wants the delegation to have in probing/negotiating.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Director's Files, Smith/Farley Files, Chronological File, Smith/Rogers Correspondence, October 1970–November 1971. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten note indicates the message was also read on the telephone to Farley for personal delivery to Rogers.

² The 24th Soviet Party Congress opened on March 30.

³ In telegram USDEL SALT 559 from Vienna, March 19, Smith reported his conversation with Semenov on March 15. When Smith expressed concern over the apparent buildup of Soviet ICBMs, Semenov replied that the development referred to by Smith had no bearing on the strategic relationship between the two countries nor on the SALT negotiations. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 880, Subject Files, SALT, SALT talks (Vienna), Vol. XIV, January 1–April 1971)

The Soviets are, I believe, unclear as to what we have in mind for this Vienna phase. We have said we will give priority to ABM discussions. We have also emphasized the large missile question. They may believe that we envisage a first agreement on ABMs (Moscow/Safeguard) plus a limitation on modern large missiles.

I do not see how we can learn very much about what can be done on offensive limitations until we can negotiate more on FBS, something I don't feel free to do under present instructions.⁴

The above is a list of some of the factors that I see at work here. I send it back not in any sense as a wail, but to permit you to get a somewhat better sense of the state of mind here at this time.

This message is also being sent to the Secretary of State.

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

⁴ See Document 138.

145. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Ellsworth) to President Nixon¹

Brussels, April 3, 1971.

Dear Mr. President:

As you consider the situation of your negotiators at the SALT talks in Vienna, may I offer some thoughts from the point of view of U.S. national interests in relation to our NATO Allies?

1. To hold back on an ABM-only agreement at this time, for lack of constraint on the Soviets' SS-9 force, would give too much political effect to the SS-9 force in comparison with its limited military effect (in view of our own submarine and bomber delivery systems). As you mentioned during the NSC meeting of November 19,² the Soviets

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-007, Verification Panel Meeting SALT 4/9/71. Secret; Sensitive.

² The NSC discussed NSSM 84 about NATO and NSSM 92 about mutual and balanced force reductions at the meeting. Minutes of the meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 37.

already say to the Europeans and Japanese that they have bigger (land based) missiles, and more of them, than the United States has. If we hold back from signing an ABM-only agreement because it doesn't provide for constraints on offensive systems, the Soviets will use that to highlight the power of the SS-9 force, with predictable political effects in Europe.

At the same time, after signing the ABM agreement, we would continue to negotiate limitations on offensive systems under the commitment-to-negotiate clause which is included in the Soviet draft ABM agreement.

Thus, your over-all effort to obtain limitations on offensive and defensive systems would have developed, procedurally, into two phases: first, a defensive systems phase, and second, an offensive systems phase. These two procedural phases would be linked by the commitment-to-negotiate clause.

2. To move a little bit further into the future (assuming the ABM-only agreement is signed, and negotiations are under way to limit offensive systems): the Russians have made it clear all along that they want to limit U.S. forward-based aircraft but do not want to accept limitations on their IR/MRBMs. At the same time, we have made it clear that we would not be willing to discuss such "non-central" systems until and unless general agreement had been reached on limiting "central" systems. Therefore, in this second phase of the over-all negotiations, we could say to the Russians that—invoking the precedent established in the ABM agreement—we should agree on central systems limitations, including in that agreement a commitment-to-negotiate clause. This clause would commit the parties to negotiate on ways to insure the viability of the agreement, and/or ways to avoid circumvention, and/or ways to limit non-central systems.

Thus, the over-all negotiations would have been divided into three procedural phases—each phase linked to the preceding one by a commitment-to-negotiate clause: a defensive systems phase, a central offensive systems phase, and a non-central offensive systems phase.

In the process, of course, we would succeed in deferring the forward-based systems problem by using a procedural device (i.e., the commitment-to-negotiate clause) which had first been suggested by the Soviets.

3. A possible side benefit, in terms of our European interests, from an ABM-only agreement: my British and French colleagues here have both made clear to me that such an agreement would be of direct benefit to the British and the French as it would relieve them of the necessity to spend more money on penetration aid development, or to explain to their publics why they are not doing so. In fact, we could

explicitly (but quietly) point out to the French and British that an ABM-only agreement, when made public, would give their Governments a useful peg upon which to hang a slowdown in their offensive missilery development and a reallocation of defense resources to more useful, and essential, conventional forces.

Warm personal regards.

Respectfully,

Bob

146. Conversation Between President Nixon and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz)¹

Washington, April 9, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion of the budget and economy.]

Shultz: Well, we were talking about the defense reprogramming. You mentioned this ABM—the SALT agreement. John [Connally] told me a little bit about your thinking afterwards.

Nixon: Here's what the situation is, in a nutshell, in case you never heard it: By the end of this summer—and we will know then, yes or no—by the end of this summer, probably we will have an ABM agreement. And also, we should know whether we will have, coupled with that—and, of course, this doesn't affect us; unfortunately, it will affect the Soviet—a freeze on their offensive deployment. See, the two have to go together.

Shultz: Uh-huh.

Nixon: It's very much—it's a very possible move. This is something that we have in reserve. We're not talking to all these damn doves. See, they're all talking about, "Let's just have an ABM agreement without something." In a very private way, I sent a message²—nobody knows this, except Rogers, Laird—Kissinger knows, nobody else. It has to be kept private because it may fail. [unclear] we'll make a deal for ABM only—I mean, an agreement on ABM, right here. There may be—

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 476–8. No classification marking. Haig was also present during the meeting, which, according to the President's Daily Diary, was held from 10:03 to 10:27 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² See Document 141.

I hope we don't have to go over the Washington site—maybe just finish the ones we've got where they are. I mean, their Moscow thing, plus, put a freeze on their offensive missiles. See what I mean? No more. So, if their numbers of offensive freeze, the ABM freezes. Now, that, of course, means if the ABM money does become available in future years, so you just put that in as a contingency plan. In other words, with ABM, and without ABM.

Shultz: Um-hmm.

Nixon: And that's what I wanted you to know. Now you'll know, and know in plenty of time. You see [unclear] we may know sooner than the next—at the end of next summer. We may know, for example, within a month, whether or not the deal will be made. We'll know it privately.

Shultz: Uh-huh.

Nixon: But we may—but we may not be able to say much about it. This is real—it's a big card we will play, if you can imagine it. The effect of that on this whole situation in this country could be great if we could have a—an agreement between Russia and Nixon with regard to not—you see, you see where, where most of the doves are making a terrible mistake, is to constantly say, "Let's just agree on freezing the ABM," which the Russians would do. Well, that's one—that's one for us and two for them. Because that means that you just leave the offensive with the lid off.

Shultz: Um-hmm.

Nixon: And then, we have to go down a few years from now, we'd have to look at our hole card and find that they've got a 2-to-1 advantage over us in offensive weapons. And though—so, then we'd have to be building those damn Polarises and all those other things, Minutemen, and that costs a hell of a lot more than ABMs. See my point?

Shultz: Sure.

Nixon: So we have got to tie—ABM is the only card we've got to get them to cut—to freeze in offensive. We've—And they have indicated they have problems, apparently. They'd like to freeze. They'd kind of like to get this down. If we pull this, this will be an enormous effect on this country. It'll have a psychological effect on the world. It's—it'll have an enormous effect here. But, just as a side note is, it will have a modest effect on your budget. I know it's not too much. Well, I guess it is in years ahead.

Shultz: The toughest part of these things is building them.

Nixon: So, so you can figure that out in your future budget plan.

[Omitted here is discussion on Defense spending.]

147. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

Safeguard–Moscow Fallbacks

You asked for a brief paper laying out some potential ways to “fall back” from our opening position of four Safeguard sites.² I have attached a chart which lays out some of the candidate positions in a very simple way and without analysis or argumentation.

There are several points which should be made concerning our discussion last evening:³

—To some degree we were mixing arguments in support of a four-site system with fallbacks. For example, we might *argue* that our 264 Sprint missiles are justified because of the 250 SS–9s allowed the Soviets. We might even give up our right to build 250 large, modern, missiles in this case.

—In considering a *fallback* on Safeguard, I think it is important that we determine conceptually the desired negotiating path. As I stated last evening, I believe that the relatively small strategic difference between four-site and, say, two-site Safeguard in combination with our concerns about Soviet ABMs dictate our reducing Safeguard in negotiation rather than allowing the Soviets more sites.

—Clearly there may be some point below which we are not interested, although it is not clear that we should not accept one Safeguard site with missiles, radars, etc., equal to the Soviet defense, given an appropriate offensive agreement. In any case, I think two sites is probably negotiable although we might have to allow equal numbers of missiles.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-007, Verification Panel Meeting SALT 4/9/71. Top Secret.

² Attached but not printed is Smith's paper on Safeguard–Moscow fallbacks requested for the Verification Panel, which met on April 9 from 2:50 to 4:10 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. According to minutes of the meeting, the following conclusions were agreed upon: “a) to defer any change in tactics until Gerry Smith has returned for a period of consultation in early May; b) the Working Group would prepare a more precise definition of our Safeguard/Moscow proposal, with some alternatives; c) to get a military assessment of the relative advantages of four Safeguard sites vs. three vs. two.” (Ibid., Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72) On April 8 Smith sent Kissinger a briefing memorandum for the Verification Panel meeting. (Ibid., Box H-007, Verification Panel Meeting, SALT 4/9/71)

³ No record of this discussion has been found.

148. **Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Assistant to the President (Haldeman)**¹

Washington, April 17, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Kissinger: Although if the Soviets don't make a major move with us, Mr. President—

Nixon: Ho!

Kissinger: I'm afraid we have to go hard on them. Because what they are doing now in strategic deployment is scary.

Nixon: Well, I was all set for that.

Kissinger: Of course, they've got—

Nixon: I think that, however, is about right. See, now, I—I'm going to have a press conference two weeks from Thursday,² this last Thursday.

Kissinger: Hmm.

Nixon: That'll be the time—

Kissinger: By that time we'll know.

Nixon: —we've got to know. And then, at that time, if they haven't moved then, Henry, I'm going to have to lay it out there. That's when we'll get the question on SALT.

Kissinger: I think that's right—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Kissinger: What they're doing is scary. Now, they've got 61 new large missiles.

Nixon: Um-hmm. I know.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 481–7. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger and Haldeman from 2:36 to 3:30 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² Nixon held a news conference on April 29 at which there were no questions directly related to SALT. However, in response to a question about negotiations over the future of Taiwan and relations with China, Nixon referred to SALT: "We are seeking good relations with the Soviet Union, and I am not discouraged by the SALT talk progress. I can only say that we believe that the interests of both countries would be served by an agreement there. We seek good relations with the Soviet Union; we are seeking good relations with Communist China." (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, p. 600)

Kissinger: They're putting them closer together than they were, from which you have to assume—

Nixon: Closer?

Kissinger: —that they are thinking of them for a first strike, in which case it doesn't matter how vulnerable they are. And secondly, that they're going to defend them. Because, then, it doesn't matter how closely-spaced they are. Also—

Nixon: Defend them with ABMs, you mean?

Kissinger: With ABMs. Also, this now gets technical, but they have asked, on this ABM agreement, that the ABMs be confined to the two capitals.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: Now, it so happens that the ABMs that protect Moscow would also protect those new missiles.

Nixon: I gather they—

Kissinger: They've put them into the ring, or close to the ring. Not into it, but within 50 miles of the ring. All they have to do is move the missiles 50 miles, and they've got them protected. And finally, they have now developed a new ABM missile. We used to think—ABM, uh—

Nixon: Warhead?

Kissinger: No, missile and radar. Above all, radar. We used to think that it was safe to make an agreement with them on ABM because it would take them 4 years to build the radars, and we could always see that they were building a radar, and then we could take countermeasures. Now, they've developed a radar that's almost as good as the big one, that they can build in 6 months. And, therefore, we don't—they could rapidly deploy an ABM system without our being able to do much about it in the time that's available.

Nixon: Why then are we even considering the submarines—?

Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, because it may put a—if they agree to the freeze on offensive missiles, then they will not be able to complete the ones they have started, and that would be a good trade for us. But, I have to tell you in all candor that we are at the absolute limit of what we can risk, now, with the Soviets.

Nixon: Well, who agrees with you on that? Who agrees with you?

Kissinger: I think Laird agrees with me. Packard, who is serious, would agree with me. The JCS will agree with me. And I think CIA will come to agree with me.

Nixon: Well—

Kissinger: I mean, this is ominous—

Nixon: So how do we get—how do we get it to the country? Huh?

Kissinger: I'd go—I think you could go on television and say this and—

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Kissinger: And he doesn't know about the new missiles. But if you analyze—I've become convinced, Mr. President, we cannot accept the Soviet proposal. Their proposal is Moscow versus Washington, and no offensive limitations—

Nixon: You haven't told him anything? Dobrynin doesn't know you're not going to accept it then?

Kissinger: No, I've told him we want Safeguard. He knows we want Safeguard.

Nixon: Oh, yeah. Yeah.

Kissinger: But the proposal that Smith is pushing is the following:³ we would have to tear down the only thing we're building with the right to build something that Congress will never appropriate, namely a Washington defense. And they can continue to keep what they already have.

Nixon: Which—which defends some of their missiles, right?

Kissinger: Which defends 500 of their missiles. Plus—plus, permitting them to continue their offensive buildup. Once the American people understand that, I think—

Haldeman: What, what do we get from them in this respect?

Nixon: Clever bastards, aren't they?

Kissinger: I mean it's a really ridiculous proposal. But of course—

Nixon: On our part, it's ridiculous? Oh—

Kissinger: Yeah. Well, what I've told—what I've told Dobrynin, what Smith doesn't know, is that we won't accept it. What we want is Safeguard. That at least enables us to keep what we've already got, and it protects some of our missiles. Next week, if—if they accept our—

Nixon: If we find that out next week, then we got to start the big push for more national defense. That also means, of course, then we've got to go for more taxes. It's a tough row.

³ In backchannel message 834 to Kissinger, April 14, Smith suggested the following: "If serious consideration were being given to attenuating or breaking [offensive/defensive] linkage, a different approach would likely be in order; e.g. an indication to USSR that for such a move in Soviet direction of ABM-only, an 'equivalent' Safeguard/Moscow deal might be in order. Perhaps one could leverage a move toward soviet ABM-only position in to a more advantageous Safeguard/Moscow arrangement that could be negotiated in context of offensive/defense deal." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT)

Kissinger: Well, of course, Buckley⁴ doesn't know even about these new missiles. [unclear] I told you they've restarted building ABMs.

Nixon: Yeah, I know. They're improved.

Kissinger: We know they're improved. They may not be—

Nixon: Well—

Kissinger: —as good as ours, yet, but—

Nixon: Doesn't that—doesn't that really—really, though, putting yourself in their position, it doesn't mean that we may not still get an agreement that we can take. Because they may be doing just exactly what we're doing. They know goddamn well that they've got to have something to give in order to get something—

Kissinger: That's right. No, that's why I say, we—if we get the agreement we proposed to them—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: —that will be tolerable. But we cannot give up much of our proposal. If they let us keep Safeguard, and if they stop—if they stop building offensive weapons after January 1st next year, then I think we have a pretty good deal for both sides. That would be a fair exchange. That's where we are—we are not too far from having that. If they accept anything, I think they may accept that.

Nixon: The real—the real point here, what you're talking—what we're really talking about here, though, is something different. And I know that this kind of an agreement isn't worth a damn.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: Any kind of agreement with the Soviet—

Kissinger: I agree.

Nixon: We're having it for political reasons.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: Because the American people are so peace-loving, they think agreements solve everything. If we can do it for political reasons—this is where I would disagree with Buckley, who won't understand it—if we can do this, and get sort of the peace issue going with us, we—the Democrats—

Kissinger: No, no. Buckley isn't against a SALT agreement.

Nixon: The Democrats—I know. But I am—but I'm—I'm a lot more hard-line than he is on this kind of thing. Once we get it in, and then, should we then survive in the election—

⁴ William F. Buckley, chief editor of *The National Review*.

Kissinger: Then it's separately—

Nixon: —then by God, we have got to lay the facts before the Soviet and before the American people and go all out—

Kissinger: I agree.

Nixon: —on more defense. That is really what—

Kissinger: That's how I see it, Mr. President.

Nixon: The whole point of this, as you know, that—

Haldeman: Well, and that's the argument to the defense, to the hard-line sophisticates, is that that's their only hope. Because—

Nixon: Yeah, Bob—

Haldeman: —if Nixon's defeated, you know damn well—

Nixon: Well, there the point is, the reason that we can't get the defense now is that the goddamn Congress won't give it to us.

Haldeman: It won't give us the money.

Nixon: That's right. We're having a hell of a time. They're going to be cutting this Defense budget—

Kissinger: But, what it may suggest, Mr. President, is that we'd be better off having the Democrats cut us than compromising with them ahead of time on some of these defense items.

Nixon: Oh, hell. I wouldn't compromise.

Kissinger: Simply as a strategy.

Nixon: That's right. And vote against the cuts.

Kissinger: And vote against the cuts and then accept them.

Nixon: And I'll simply say that the cuts in defense are, are—endanger our national security. Let them be against national security—

Kissinger: That we've already submitted the minimum budget. In other words, not going—

Nixon: I'll cover that in the next press conference, too. We'll lay that right straight out there, tough.

Kissinger: I mean, I—I would not—I think your reelection, and that's, I have—

Haldeman: Then you've got to get a few Republicans to stand with you on it.

Nixon: Yeah, well, we won't win.

Haldeman: No, but I mean—

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: We've got to stand up for a strong national defense, that's right. God, it's a—it's really a—

Kissinger: Well, we can afford the SALT agreement we are now discussing. That won't—

Nixon: Sure it won't—

Kissinger: That won't be a disadvantage. It won't mean a damn thing. But at this stage, we've got to defuse—we've got to break the back of this generation of Democratic leaders.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: The [Cyrus] Vances, [Clark] Cliffords—

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: —and company have to get out of public life. That is, the new ones, nowadays. We just don't have all [unclear].

Nixon: Well, the other thing, too, we've got to break, we've got to destroy the confidence of people in the American establishment, too—

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: And we certainly as hell will.

Kissinger: Well, if—

Nixon: If we succeed in these ventures. Now, on this China thing, that's why I say now, if it goes and the Soviet thing goes, we're not going to let these bastards take the credit for it. We've got to take credit every time we turn around.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Kissinger: But we'll know by Wednesday,⁵ I would think, what—where the Russian thing is going. I mean, if we know that the week after next we have a SALT announcement—

Nixon: Well—

Kissinger: —then that's going to be a tremendous thing—

Nixon: And, hell, that'll take—that will take care of China for a while? And—

[Laughter]

Kissinger: If we get this—

Nixon: If we could get—to be perfectly frank with you, Henry, maybe we want it after the demonstrations.⁶

Kissinger: I think it's better that way.

Haldeman: I would.

Kissinger: Well, we couldn't.

Nixon: Why is it better? Why have the demonstrations afterwards?

Haldeman: Let them have them. Let them run their course through May 5th. We can't make it by then anyway. Can you?

Nixon: Yes—

⁵ April 21.

⁶ Reference is to demonstrations protesting the Vietnam war.

Kissinger: No. I think you can get the SALT announcement, not next week; I think you could get it the week after next by around the 30th.

Nixon: You mean before the demonstration?

Kissinger: No—

Haldeman: No. No, you've got one demonstration—the big demonstration's on the 24th. Then you have—

Nixon: When's that—?

Haldeman: This—A week from today.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: That's—

Nixon: Well, it's my view that—it's my view, I've just decided—I told you, Henry—I decided, Henry, not to do—I was going to have an office press conference next week. Then, I decided not to—

Kissinger: I think—

Nixon: I think this serves as two press conferences. [unclear]—

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: Don't you agree?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: Now, two weeks, however, from now, I'll have a press conference.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I'm not getting frozen into it, but I—about the time, I'll want to hit television.

Haldeman: You won't be—we are just about getting to the point where you have to do one on TV.

Nixon: TV? That's right. You get back to TV leadership. Now—

Haldeman: And that'll have been three weeks after your—

Nixon: That's right.

Haldeman: —your troop announcement.

Nixon: Three weeks after the troop, which is about right. See, we're trying to hit about every three weeks.

Kissinger: No, that's—that fits very—

Nixon: Now, if that—by that time we might have SALT.

Kissinger: Yeah. Or at least we would know whether we won't have it—

Nixon: We'll know. We'll know if we won't have it.

Haldeman: If we do have it—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haldeman: —I sure wouldn't announce it at the press conference.

Nixon: Oh, hell no! Come to think of it, you know what I could do? [laughs] Well, we—it depends on how we want to play it. Rather than having a press conference, we may just go on—

Haldeman: TV.

Nixon: —go on TV for five minutes at night.

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: See, Henry?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Five minutes at night at prime time to, to make an announcement—

Haldeman: All from here.

Kissinger: Another possibility—but I think Bob is right. The more likely thing is that it would be around May 7th. This stuff probably will have to go back and forth once, and they [the Soviet Politburo] meet every Thursday.

Nixon: Okay. Right.

Kissinger: But we'll know all of this when Dobrynin is back.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: I think you can tell me when he [Dobrynin] gets back whether he's going to diddle you.

Kissinger: I'm not going to let him diddle me. I'm—My judgment, Mr. President, if you agree, is that we should go for broke with this fellow now. And then—

Nixon: Oh, hell yes.

Kissinger: I'll just tell him this is—I'll break the contact, I won't see him anymore, because if we can't settle a simple exchange of letters, then let him work with the State Department.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: I mean, that's a daring ploy, but they want this contact.

149. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 23, 1971, 1 p.m.

I invited Dobrynin to lunch when he called me for an appointment upon his return from Moscow. The conversation was cordial but businesslike. Dobrynin began the conversation by saying he had read the accounts of the Party Congress with great interest. He did not read in them a particular direction or new departure in foreign policy. On the contrary, he thought it in effect reaffirmed the direction of the previous Party Congress; that is to say, it stated a general proposition vis-à-vis the United States which would have to be given content by the Soviet Government later. However, it was in general to be stressed that the Soviet Union desired to improve relations. Dobrynin added that he thought the composition of the Politburo had not changed, contrary to what Western newspapers had said. The four new members had been candidate members previously and had attended the meetings. The fact that Kosygin followed Podgorny in the rank order was of no significance but reflected only the higher offices in the state that Podgorny occupied. It was clear that Brezhnev was the stronger figure but then the Party Secretary had always been strong. He had until recently not been as interested in foreign policy as some of his predecessors but this was beginning to change.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Berlin negotiations.]

We then turned to SALT. Dobrynin pulled out of his pocket a draft reply to a proposal of the President which conceded most of our points except for the Safeguard/Moscow arrangement. [A copy of the Soviet letter is attached at Tab (a)]² I told Dobrynin that we would have difficulty accepting a Moscow/Washington exchange.³ Dobrynin said that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President's Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 1. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The conversation took place during lunch in the Map Room at the White House. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 189.

² Brackets in the original.

³ On April 24 Haig sent Sonnenfeldt a note instructing him to prepare a response for Kissinger to this letter: "Henry suggested something along the following lines: the President appreciates the constructive reply to his proposal; discussion of the details of an offensive freeze are to concluded simultaneously with the conclusion of the ABM agreement. It is evident from this that Henry wants a very brief reply to the modified Soviet note in which the fundamental principle of simultaneity is emphasized as a non-negotiable precondition. In this regard I believe it is important that we consider what kinds of dates should be fixed for the framework of the freeze agreement. Henry had in mind perhaps 1 January 1972 for the completion of all on-going construction of any kind and 1 July of this year as the cut-off date for any new starts. Even the above gives me

it would be politically very difficult in the Soviet Union to accept it on any other basis. He said it would be hard to sell to the Politburo, that we could protect weapons while they had to protect their populations. He said that this might look like a cover for improving our ability to attack them.

I said this was wrong on two grounds. One, if we wanted to attack them we did not need to protect the missiles. The missiles were protected against an attack by them and therefore it was clearly a defensive intent. Secondly, the Soviet ABM ring around Moscow did protect 500 of their missiles. Dobrynin said this was nonsense, that no Soviet missiles were within a hundred kilometers of Moscow. I said I did not say they were within a hundred kilometers of Moscow, but that they were protected by the ABM ring within a hundred kilometers of Moscow. Dobrynin said that this was highly unlikely and even if it were true, it would be next to impossible to explain to the ordinary Soviet citizen. I said he was not doing justice to the ability of his government to convince their citizens. Dobrynin said it would be a really major matter to reopen the issue within the government. I said I would have to take up their reply with the President and let him know.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Tab A

Draft Letter From the Soviet Government to President Nixon⁴

Moscow, undated.

"The Soviet Government has carefully considered the course of the exchange of opinion between the USSR and the United States delegations at the strategic armaments limitation talks.

Proceeding from the situation shaping up now at those talks, the Soviet Government believes it expedient to concentrate in the current year on solving the questions related to the limitation of ABM systems in order to conduct after the conclusion of a separate agreement on ABM limitation, active talks aimed at limiting strategic offensive

some concern in light of the 50-plus new holes that have been initiated in the brief period of the last three months. I would appreciate having your ideas on this without your telling Henry that I brought you this far into his thinking." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President's Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. I)

⁴ No classification marking. A notation on the letter reads: "Delivered 1:00 pm, 4/23 to Mr. Kissinger by Amb D."

weapons. The Soviet Government proceeds in this from the mutual understanding to the effect that the ABM limitation will constitute an important factor also in restraining the strategic offensive armaments race.

In order to facilitate more favorable conditions for finding ways of reaching an agreement on strategic offensive weapons limitation the Soviet side considers acceptable in principle the idea of ‘freezing’ strategic offensive weapons and is prepared for reaching a basic understanding on this point having in mind that concrete details of such understanding—including questions related to the composition of strategic offensive weapons, as well as to the nature and dates of possible ‘freezing’—could be discussed before the work on the separate ABM agreement is completed. We proceed from the assumption that a ‘freeze’ on strategic offensive weapons should not affect the possibility of modernization and replacement of such weapons.

Guided by this, the Soviet Government will give instructions to its delegation at the strategic armaments limitation talks with the United States delegation to conduct negotiations in Vienna, aimed at drawing up the text of the ABM agreement proceeding from the assumption that deployment of the ABM systems by the USSR and the United States should be limited to the systems needed for the defense of the capitals—Moscow and Washington.

In such an agreement the obligation of the sides to continue active negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons will be fixed”.

150. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Assistant to the President (Haldeman)¹

Washington, April 23, 1971.

Kissinger: Hello, Mr. President.

Haldeman: Who won?²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 487–21. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haldeman from 2:52 to 3:36 p.m.; Kissinger entered the Oval Office at 3:20 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed specifically for this volume.

² See Document 149.

Kissinger: It was a draw. To sum it up, Mr. President, they've, to all practical purposes, given in on this SALT thing. They've come back with a letter from Kosygin, and they're willing to have the exchange of letters published. Up to now, they wanted it secret. There's still one point, which I will raise in a minute. On the summit, they reaffirmed the invitation, and they want it in September. I mean, they agreed with us that it should be in September. They do not want an announcement now. And, they say there has to be some progress in Berlin;³ they can never explain it to the Politburo. And I—when he said that, I blew my top. I mean, deliberately. I said "Now," I said, "you're making a terrible mistake." I said, "If we have a goal, then the President, who never plays for little stakes, would recognize that it has to fit into this framework. If you're trying to hold him up with Berlin as a means to get to the summit, you don't understand him. I'm not even sure if he'll let me continue talking to you on Berlin under these circumstances." I thought this—

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: This was the only way of doing it, because we really cannot promise to be able to deliver on Berlin.

Nixon: No.

[Omitted here is discussion related to Germany, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 190.]

Kissinger: Then he started explaining, "Oh, they're enthusiastic. Don't you realize what a tremendous thing it is for us, the first American President in the Soviet Union? That we had 4 new members in the Politburo. I tried." He said, "You have only one man to convince; I had to talk to all 15."

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: He said, "To sell this was almost impossible." That I even believe, because on this one they have yielded 98 percent. They've practically accepted our position on the SALT. They're—they're giving us a hell of a lot more than—

Nixon: What is left? Well, let's look at where we start from here. What about the SALT position? What's—

Kissinger: [unclear]—

Nixon: What is the timing?

Kissinger: Well, that we can settle next week. We could publish the exchange of letters within a week.

³ Talks about the status of Berlin began in March 1970 among the Four Powers and ultimately led to the Four Power Agreement, also known as the Quadripartite Agreement, of September 1971.

Nixon: Maybe it's better to publish the exchange of letters than have a press conference. That's what my view is.

Kissinger: Well, now, the only point is this, Mr. President: what they want, the only disputed point—there are some other nitpicks, which I'll explain to you in a minute—but the disputed point is on the limitation, Moscow against Washington, which will drive Scoop Jackson right up a wall⁴—

Nixon: Hell, that's true.

Kissinger: And, on the other hand, Dobrynin says that it is almost impossible to explain to their military that we can protect our missiles, and they have to protect their population. Well, I told him, "Well, they have 500 missiles protected by their Moscow system."

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: Well, he denies that. So, what I could propose to him on Monday⁵ is that they take out that one sentence which limits it to that, and that we throw that to the negotiators, with the understanding that if they can't settle it, we'll just have to yield. If that's what you want. I think if they freeze their offensive weapons, that's the big thing. If they freeze their offensive weapons, which they've agreed to do in this, then we can be—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —then we can agree to this. Then we can agree to this. If they don't freeze their offensive weapons, it's too dangerous.

Nixon: Um-hmm. Well, let—let me ask you this: the main thing is, the question right now, is the timing, you know. Something sometimes becomes more important.

Kissinger: Well, we can get this done within a week—well, if we accept this letter.

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: The trouble with accepting this letter is that we just beat the bureaucracy silly to move from the Washington position to the Safeguard position, and for us suddenly to reverse ourselves—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

⁴ On March 29 Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger a memorandum in which he summarized Jackson's proposal about SALT made that day on the Senate floor: "1) the US would immediately halt the deployment of MM III missiles with their MIRV warheads; 2) the Soviet Union would immediately halt the deployment of new ICBM launchers and missiles including those now under construction; 3) both countries would retain freedom to assure the survivability of their strategic land-based force so long as they did not add to their offensive potential; 4) neither side would deploy a population defending ABM." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-007, Verification Panel Meeting SALT 4/9/71)

⁵ April 26.

Kissinger: —is gonna—so, they have to make it possible—they have to give us three or four weeks.

Nixon: Why don't you get back to him now then in terms of let's just leave that to the negotiators.

Kissinger: My suggestion to him would be: let's leave that to the negotiators.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: With that one—

Kissinger: And I'll give him a private undertaking that—

Nixon: That's right—

Kissinger: —after a few weeks, you'll look at this.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: I'll say, "If they agree to have this freeze on January 1st, then we'll agree to the NCA—"

Nixon: Yeah, but don't—but, do not indicate what the situation is on, on the other. That's something that we will privately undertake.

Kissinger: That's right—

Nixon: I don't want anything in the public statement.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Nixon: Not that in the public statement, right?

Kissinger: Exactly. And I'll tell him—

Nixon: Why don't you—why don't you get back to him now, though, as time is of the essence here now? We've got to, you understand. We have a—we have a problem in terms of—

Kissinger: All right.

Nixon: —what benefit it is. Look, let me put it this way: all this is a bunch of shit, as you know. It's not worth a damn. But the point is that in terms of our public relations, we can use something like this at this time. I—

Kissinger: Right—

Nixon: —don't want to have anything wrong for public relations reasons, but I don't want to horse around and put it out three weeks from now when it doesn't make a goddamn bit of difference.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: See my point?

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: And so, I—you can work the thing out fine.

Kissinger: All right. I'll call—

Nixon: How could you—?

Kissinger: I'll call him. I said I'd talk to him—

Nixon: You could call him, and say, "All right, we've talked about it," and that I suggested a formula. Why don't you put it that way?

Kissinger: All right.

Nixon: That we'll have here—that I suggested a formula, whereby we'd move to a private undertaking on this, and keep it out of the—let's—don't get specific in terms of the Moscow–Washington thing.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: We'll have an answer right away. Now, how would it work, though, in the terms of the exchange of letters, and so forth? How do we—how do we explain that to everybody?

Kissinger: Bill [Rogers] is lucky they are in the city next week—

Nixon: Yeah. I'd just say that he's—

Kissinger: So, you just decided—

Nixon: I just decided—

Kissinger: —that you had to make some sort—

Nixon: I'll—I'll say Dobrynin came back.

Kissinger: If you said Dobrynin came back, and you decided this was a good time, your instinct told you to make a move—

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: —and that—

Nixon: That's right. See, I think it's good to make the move while he is out of the city for that. That's the reason—that's another reason I had in mind. Now, it's that then we don't have all the crapping around about Smith and all the rest. Just say I made the move and this is it. We've got this arrangement with Dobrynin, and, you know, that—we'll just say that I made a contact and we got the deal. That's it.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Your—you—your thought is that what—an exchange of letters is the deal, that's all—?

Kissinger: Well, that's what they want now, but they're willing to make it public, so it's the same as a new—

Nixon: Hmm. How do we exchange the statements? The simultaneous statements might be that [unclear].

Kissinger: They probably have to go back again.

Nixon: I see. Well—

Kissinger: Now, I can't guarantee you. Usually, they meet on Thursdays—whether they can settle it that quickly, but I think they probably can.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. [unclear] Well, understand, I understand if they can't.

Kissinger: But I'll call him this afternoon.

Nixon: But he is—My point is that this is now one of those things where time is important to us, for other reasons, and where it doesn't appear we're over-anxious. After all, we can call him back and say, "We discussed it, the President wants it, this is the compromise, and let's get it done."

Haldeman: In some ways, the week after next might do us more good than next week.

Nixon: All right. All right, Henry—

Kissinger: That we can almost certainly do—

Nixon: But don't—don't suggest a delay. It will take long enough.

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: My view is that I'd still call him back. I see that doesn't denote any eagerness, does it? As you said when you came in, and brought it into me, we talked it over—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: —and I said, "Well, why not this?" You know, you can just say—

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: —you can say, "You want to submit that to him? Here's the deal."

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: It's up to you.

Kissinger: That sounds good.

Nixon: Another thing, though, that Bob, I'd like to get—Well, I'd like to get it done while Rogers is gone if we can.⁶

Haldeman: He'll be gone for 2 weeks.

Nixon: All right.

Kissinger: See, he'll be gone for 2 weeks, Mr. President, and, and if he has any—I think he's got the authority to settle this. And . . .

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: And we can . . .

Nixon: Good. Well, except—

Kissinger: The way we do it—

Nixon: Except—except to take the Moscow thing—the Washington thing out. He probably doesn't have the authority to do that, but he may have. It depends. We'll work on it. Fair enough?

⁶ Haldeman recalled that "the P wants to announce this [exchange of letters about SALT] quickly while Rogers is away, and his idea is to do it next week instead of the press conference. My idea is to wait until the following week, when Rogers will still be gone and we can do it out of California." (*Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

Kissinger: I think he can take it out if I give him the assurance that after they—

Nixon: Give him the assurance—

Kissinger: —after they—

Nixon: You—

Kissinger: That they'll win on it.

Nixon: You—you can—you just give him a private assurance that [unclear]—

Kissinger: I'll just tell him the facts. I'll tell him we've just shifted our position—

Nixon: Yeah, you just tell him, then you can tell him what the message is. Well, you talked to the President; he's got my assurance.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: That's—that's it.

Kissinger: But I'll want from him an assurance, because you'll need that, I think, in time that they will stop building on January 1st. This year—

Nixon: Oh, yeah. Is that in there?

Kissinger: No. All they agree in here is that they'll stop building, but they didn't give the date.

Nixon: All right. Fine. And what we do is to have the negotiators work this out in Vienna.

Kissinger: In Vienna.

Nixon: And then, we agree to a time. And a summit—

Kissinger: [unclear] Oh, that will be agreed to. They'll settle that then fairly quickly.

Nixon: What do you have to talk about at the summit?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: What do you have left to talk about?

Kissinger: Oh, at the summit? Oh, the final agreement on this. And that won't be all straightened out. It will be signed at the summit.

Nixon: I see.

Kissinger: And we'll have—

Nixon: I—you see what I mean, Henry? I think we've got to have something that will come out of that, you know [unclear]—

Kissinger: I'll fix that. I'll guarantee you that it won't be settled before. You see, once we get this exchange done, Mr. President—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —the next thing, the next move you can make—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —is to separate out the accidental issue—

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: —and get that agreement signed this summer. They've already offered it.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: That you can get done in 4 weeks.

Nixon: Well, you feel then that they came out about like you expected then, right?

Kissinger: Yeah, I thought, they're—they're a cool bunch. I thought, they are dying to get you to Moscow, Mr. President, and I think it would be a mistake for us to promise them a Berlin agreement. In fact, what I'm inclined to say, when I see him, is to say, "Your reaction was just what I predicted." That you just make no commitments until then, when they are ready for the summit. I said, "You think you're doing the President a favor about the summit, you're absolutely wrong—"

Nixon: That's right—

Kissinger: "—we're not going to pay any price for the summit. We make agreements in our mutual interests or not at all." But they want you there. About that there's no doubt. Because as soon as I got tough—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haldeman: The sooner—

Kissinger: Because as soon as I got tough, he started pulling back. He said, "No, no, no, you misunderstood. You have to tell the President we are renewing the invitation. September is an excellent time. It's a good time, still good weather—"

Nixon: Yeah, but when do they—when do they want to announce it?

Kissinger: Well, then I said, "Look, we would like to make the announcement four months ahead of time. That's what we always do with state visits. He said, "Well, two months is a little better." I think they have a massive problem of getting their government to [unclear].

Nixon: Make it three months.

Kissinger: And I think they really want it. They probably may need some progress on Berlin. But I think—I'm seeing Bahr this weekend,⁷ and I think they know there'll be progress on Berlin, and they're using this to—

Nixon: Um-hmm [unclear]. So it came out pretty well? Didn't it?

⁷ Kissinger left at 8:30 p.m. for Woodstock, Vermont to attend the weekend-long Bilderberg Conference. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) The Bilderberg Conference is an annual meeting of a private group of about 120 of the world's wealthiest and most influential people.

Kissinger: Well, I think this one, I think the SALT agreement, Mr. President—

Nixon: Without China—without China, they aren't going to [unclear]—

Kissinger: The SALT agreement is going to drive Berlin.

Nixon: Let me tell you something: without China, they never would have agreed to the SALT.

Kissinger: Because this—

Nixon: Yeah—?

Kissinger: [unclear] SALT—I don't plague you with it. What they started with—

Nixon: I know. And a hell of a long way.

Kissinger: This is 90 percent of what we—

Nixon: Can I—but I just say I think you are absolutely right. Make the private commitment, like we did with the other. All right, leave Washington and New York out of it—leave Washington and Moscow out of it. We'll just work out an agreement on that at the proper time. Is that what we do?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Provided they agree to the freeze on January 1st.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: But he can put that date in, can't he? What the hell, you've got to have a date in it.

Kissinger: He can't put it in the letter.

Nixon: Huh?

Kissinger: It has to be negotiated.

Nixon: The date of January 1st?

Kissinger: Of the freeze.

Nixon: Oh, I see. But you want to have a private understanding—?

Kissinger: I want him to agree. We—we promised him we'll yield on this—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —and, we want them to promise—

Nixon: Yeah—

Kissinger: [unclear]—that what I had originally proposed—

Nixon: Right. And that when we agree to the summit, we will set that date.

Kissinger: Right. But, but otherwise [unclear]—

Nixon: Good. What is your feeling about [unclear]—

Kissinger: This will be completely your initiative.

Nixon: Right. Ok. Oh, I know, I know. And I think it's good to do it while [unclear]—

Kissinger: Oh, Bill.

Nixon: —while Rogers is gone and everything. In other words, let's—we've got the perfect reason. I just—I don't know. Should we say [unclear]? No. I called him in. Is that what we do? Is that what we say? We've got the letter? I sent a letter? I mean, you see what I mean? You've got to figure out how—

[unclear exchange]

Kissinger: We could say that Dobrynin called me—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —when Rogers was gone—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —and that he wanted me to know that his government is eager—

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: —to have a new approach.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah—

Kissinger: You then said that you were going to gamble and—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —write the letter and [unclear] do that.

Nixon: That's right. [unclear] they—and they're—and that they were ready to consider a new approach by their [unclear] wrote and suggested this exchange of letters, and he's agreed to it. Fair enough? Ok. Good luck at Woodstock.

151. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 26, 1971.

Kissinger: I think we're going to get the SALT thing, Mr. President.

Nixon: How'd you get along with Dobrynin?²

Kissinger: Well, I decided to follow—I mean, I did exactly what you told me.³

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Kissinger: To sum it up, I said, [unclear]—I said to him, “What about the summit? We've been to—you must be suffering from a mis—” I said, “You must suffer from a misapprehension. The summit must reflect mutual interests, or it isn't worth doing. So, we've talked to you about it for a year. There's no sense—your Foreign Minister⁴ said, ‘Let's not have fencing matches.’ We seem to be having a fencing match, so the President has said he's got to make—he's making his plans. When you are ready to have a summit, you let us know, but don't come to me unless you are ready to set a date, and announce it quickly.” He said: “Oh no, no, we are planning on it. September, of course, we're planning on it.” I said: “Well, it's all right. You, you come to us when you are ready.” He said: “Oh, we are not insistent on protocol.” Well, so we left it at that, then.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 489–17. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Kissinger entered at 3:56 p.m. as Ehrlichman and Shultz were leaving. The conversation ended at 4:12 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² Kissinger met with Dobrynin at noon. According to an April 26 memorandum of conversation, prepared by Kissinger, he made the following comments about SALT: “I told Dobrynin that the President had carefully studied the draft reply of the Soviet Government. I said from our point of view there were two major problems with it. Point one was it only offered to discuss the idea of a freeze, not to conclude it. This I did not consider a concession since they were already obligated to discuss offensive limitation under the SALT agreement. Secondly, we could not accept any exchange that we would confine the ABM deployments to Washington and Moscow, this had to be settled during the negotiations.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 491, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 1]) The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 192.

³ There is a tape recording of a conversation from 11:46 a.m. to 12:07 p.m. between Kissinger and Nixon about Kissinger's upcoming meeting with Dobrynin. The discussion of what Kissinger should say to Dobrynin is similar to what Kissinger describes in this conversation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 489–5). A portion of this conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 191.

⁴ Andrei Gromyko.

Nixon: [unclear].

Kissinger: Then I, I have worked out a—

Nixon: Your feeling there is that they want the summit [unclear] but that they don't want to announce it for a couple of months—

Kissinger: Well, they don't want to announce it for two reasons. One, they want to show that Brezhnev negotiated this thing—

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: —and he just took over. Second, they're thugs, and they always try to pick up some loose change along the way.

Nixon: Oh, yeah.

Kissinger: And they just ran up against the wrong guy.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: You just didn't give them any loose change.

[Omitted here is discussion of Germany, printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 193.]

Kissinger: And thirdly, I mentioned SALT.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I said, "Frankly the President wonders whether if we can't work this out, if there is any sense of having any further talks."

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: Absolutely.

Kissinger: —I said, "Here is the fact: you are asking us to tear down what we've built as the first step of a negotiation. How can the President go to the Congress, leaving aside his convictions, and say the Russians are dealing with us in good faith? We're doing this." So, I said, "Either, you take out that sentence,⁵ or we'll put in a sentence in the President's reply saying we disagree with it, in which case it's pointless. Also, we must have another sentence in that, your letter, that says—" They had said they will discuss simultaneously the freezing. I said, "You can't just discuss it, you have to agree to it, the limit on freezing of offensive weapons."⁶ Now, that second sentence, he agreed

⁵ The sentence in question refers to an agreement that limited ABM systems to NCA defense; see Document 149.

⁶ At their noon meeting, Kissinger read Dobrynin a note from Nixon that presented three main points: 1) the United States was prepared to negotiate on priority basis an ABM agreement; 2) the United States wanted an understanding on a freeze on offensive weapons completed simultaneously with an ABM agreement; 3) the United States agreed that an initial agreement should include an obligation to seek a permanent limitation of offensive strategic weapons. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President's Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 1)

to immediately.⁷ He said, “We’re willing to conclude that.” On taking out the Moscow one, he said he had to refer to Moscow, but he thinks he has an answer by the end of this week. And—

Nixon: Do you want to stay [unclear] to work on it?

Kissinger: No, I said, “Also, the President wants to announce it, if we exchange these letters.” So we could announce that probably. I—I—he was really chastened. I didn’t joke with him this time. I said, “Mr. Ambassador, this, this and this.” And, I think we’re going to get it.

Nixon: Well—

Kissinger: And I think we should then announce it—

Nixon: [unclear] How would it be? Who initiated the letter? He did, or—

Kissinger: No, the way it would go is you initiate the letter. The first letter is yours, and it’s a fairly short one.

Nixon: Hmm.

Kissinger: They come back with a fairly lengthy one—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: —of details. You lay out all the principles.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: They reply, and then you write a very short confirming letter saying you accept their reply—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: —and you’re instructing your Ambassador to proceed immediately.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: But it’s clear that you initiated it.

Nixon: Yeah. Good. Although, how the hell are we going to get that across to the—Rogers and Smith? It’s time we get all this done. I’m not worried too much about it. We’ll just do it, but—

Kissinger: Well, what you could say, Mr. President—

Nixon: Yeah—

Kissinger: —and this has a great advantage that Rogers is gone—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: You could say Dobrynin came back—

Nixon: And said he’d [unclear]—

⁷ Reference is to the second point in Nixon’s note that Kissinger read to Dobrynin at their noon meeting.

Kissinger: —and said they were ready to make some progress, that time was of the essence.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: So, you were torn, but you told me—

Nixon: Yeah. That's right.

Kissinger: —in Rogers's absence to write—to give him this very short letter. You—the first letter of yours has a lot of flowery words, but is rather short.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: They came back with the other. You concluded that he won't like it, but it's a—they'll just have to swallow—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Kissinger: Well, Smith is getting what he wants.

Nixon: That's right. He's just isn't getting as much credit as he wants. He'll get enough.

Kissinger: Well, he'll get the credit for having—you can build him up—

Nixon: I'll—I'll say that this is—

Kissinger: Grew out—

Nixon: —due to our negotiators, and so forth.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

Kissinger: Then, if things break right, we can have the SALT either next week or the week after.

Nixon: I'd prefer to have it next week.

Kissinger: Well, I would, too. [unclear]—

Nixon: Yeah, while Rogers is gone.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Well, when he gets back I'll simply say, "Look, something's going on here. I—a leak." You know, he won't leak it.

Kissinger: No, but by the time he gets it—what may happen, Mr. President, is that we'll get it so late next week that we can't announce it next week anymore and have to announce it the first or second day he's back.

Nixon: Well, maybe when he comes in [unclear] rather than trying to have it done long distance while he's out of the country. It may have a problem, too. Anyway, I don't think we'll probably be confronted with the problem. My guess is that Dobrynin will take a little time.

Kissinger: Well, I think it's so close. They are either going to do it now or not.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: There's no more in it.

Nixon: Yeah, yeah. Except, the really—the key point is whether or not they are willing to take out the sentence with regard to Washington only.

Kissinger: Right. They will be.

Nixon: They will be?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: But, he wasn't—he didn't have any authority to concede that, though?

Kissinger: No. But, I just cannot conceive them challenging you directly, particularly—even though I didn't say so to him, since they know we can screw up the Berlin negotiations to a fare-thee-well.

Nixon: That's right. We will.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 193.]

152. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

Negotiations on Accidental Attack

A dispute is brewing on our position in the special negotiations on the Soviet proposal for an agreement to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

—On March 26, the Soviets introduced a draft agreement/treaty-covering accidental, unauthorized usages;² it largely coincides with our presentation of last summer,³ but it is a separate agreement.

—Semyonov told Smith he hoped agreement could be reached before the Vienna phase was completed, and the “agreement or treaty” could be referred to capitals.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 880, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XIV, January 1–April 1971. Secret. Sent for action.

² Telegram USDEL SALT 581, March 26, reported the Soviet proposal. (Ibid.)

³ See Document 91.

—We have “reserved” our position on whether a separate agreement is acceptable (NSDM-90⁴ says it would not be).

—We have asked questions on the Soviet draft, and are now in the process of proposing amendments.

The issues pertain to the following Soviet language (which follows after clauses agreeing to advance notification of missile launches, detection of unidentified objects by early warning systems, and notification of unexplained nuclear detonations):

(1) Each party undertakes to act in *all other situations involving nuclear weapons* in such a manner as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other side.

(2) Each party may inform the other side or request information when in its view this is warranted *by the interests of averting the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war.*

Our Delegation proposes (a) to drop the first Soviet sentence, and (b) to revise the second as follows:

In other situations, each party undertakes to inform the other side and each party may request relevant information when, in its view, this is warranted in the interests of averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the two countries.

Frankly, I believe the subject matter of this clause goes well beyond the technical problems of reducing or averting accidental or unauthorized use. It is an invitation to the Soviets to “request” information on almost any activity in the “interests of averting the outbreak of nuclear war.” Moreover, it smacks of a political agreement that could well be directed against third parties, and no doubt in the Soviet view has some value in promoting the condominium concept of the two nuclear powers consulting on all matters involving nuclear weapons.

Thus, we have argued in backstopping channels that the US position should be to exclude the paragraph, rather than try to tinker with it. We were willing for the delegation to listen to Soviet explanations before proposing to exclude it.

Now, we learn that *State favors the Delegation’s proposals*, and will “escalate” the backstopping clearances. (This incidentally is the second time in a week that the working level at State has raised the question of “how high up” in the White House a position on SALT originates.)

In sum, we need to know if you agree that we should oppose this general clause. Second, I assume that our position is still to resist a separate agreement. If not, there is little doubt that the Soviets will wrap this up, and it will be the first major result of SALT—thereby stimulating all the political optimism without the slightest concrete result,

⁴ Document 113.

and incidentally, establishing the precedent of partial, piecemeal settlements.

Recommendation:

1. That we continue to oppose any general clause in an agreement on accidents/unauthorized use.
2. That the Delegation continue to oppose the idea of a separate treaty.⁵

⁵ Kissinger initialed his approval of both recommendations.

153. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and the Assistant to the President (Haldeman)¹

Washington, May 6, 1971.

Haig: I think a SALT agreement would be a substantial move—

Nixon: Well, well, but we'll have that soon, if we're going to get a SALT agreement. That—I agree, I agree. If we get that, and we announce it, and if we—that's a, that would be a [unclear]—

Haldeman: It will confuse them. It isn't gonna—it isn't going to undo your Vietnam thing—

Nixon: But it is—the point is, it'll confuse them just like China—

Haldeman: China did.

Nixon: —but it will not have the impact that's needed. The American people—we polled all this and so forth. It's too complicated. Intelligent people, it will confuse the hell out of them. We—but we must not ever confuse ourselves by thinking that that's the way that folks are.

[unclear exchange]

Haldeman: [unclear] as far as the people are concerned with the whole China thing.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 493–10. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haig and Haldeman from 11 a.m. to 12:10 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

Nixon: China—not a bit.

Haldeman: [unclear]—

Nixon: Public opinion is for China, and—

Haldeman: It might be in the intelligence community.

Nixon: Yeah.

Haldeman: As it did with the libs. And, for the long haul, it will make a lot of difference. [unclear]—

Nixon: It will make a tremendous difference in the long haul. But, you see—and the same on SALT—SALT will have more impact in China due to the fact that it will deal with ABM, and the rest. But, on the other hand, have you looked over the press conferences recently?

Haldeman: Yes, sir.

Nixon: In 6 months, shit, we didn't have any questions on SALT. I had to drag it in.

Haldeman: That's right.

Nixon: And these guys out here are reflecting, because they're not dumb, but they're reflecting like folks that we've seen.

Haldeman: There are keen intellectual columnists—

Nixon: That's right—

Haldeman: —who are concerned about SALT [unclear]—

Nixon: The people—the people that Henry sees—

Haldeman: —and know it's a hell of a [unclear]—

Nixon: —are obsessed with SALT, and the rest. I—we all know, you and I know, it's the most important goddamn thing. It's more important than whether we have eternal aid to Vietnam, or combat troops, or anything else. But you see, Al, in terms of the kind of clowns we're dealing with in the Congress, it just doesn't, doesn't have any time to sit. It'll help. It'll help. But what do you—what we do, on that one, we can appraise it. If my judgment is wrong we can embrace it. I can damn well assure you, in terms of—we'll have a chance to appraise it, because if we announce it next week, and it must be—incidentally, if we're going to do it, as I put in a note to you today, we're going to do it. It has to be done Wednesday² of next week, or then put it off two weeks. Now, there's a reason for that: there's a critical vote in the House³ on Wednesday. And, and otherwise, we should let it go two weeks. Screw it. I mean, there's no real reason to—no reason to get it out any sooner. We might as well drag it along and go through all the process, and in-

² May 12.

³ Possible reference to a scheduled vote in the House of Representatives on Nixon's proposal to direct \$5 billion in federal revenue to the states.

form all the Embassies and talk to all the columnists, and all that bullshit. By Friday—but, otherwise, get it out on Wednesday. Thursday's too late—Thursday or Friday. So, that's, that's where we have it there. To do us any good in Congress, you see, I would rather have SALT come out two weeks later to affect the Senate vote. But you see these things wash out. All of a sudden they're forgotten. So, we either have to do it Wednesday or just fart around, which we probably will do, and not do anything about it, and let it get screwed up in Vienna. You know it will be. It probably will be. Now, it could be ready next week, of course, if he [Dobrynin] comes back with some kind of an answer.

Haig: If he has an answer.

Nixon: If he has an answer. If he doesn't have an answer—it probably isn't going to be ready anyway for two weeks, so it's probably a moot question. Now, what could happen, what could have an effect. I will agree—I will agree what could have an effect is an announcement of a summit with the Russians. That would have an effect on this whole thing. However, they aren't ready to do much else—

Haig: They're not—

Nixon: —and we're not going to press them for an announcement. They're—we've told them already, "When you're ready, you tell us." Now, they'll tell us. If they should come in, unexpectedly, and say, "Look, we'd like to go forward with an announcement, and so forth"—because we're not going to ask; no more, no more; we can't appear anxious—that could have a very dramatic effect. See, that's the kind of announcement, though. And that's what an announcement will be with the Chinese—of a meeting, you understand, as distinctive from—well, that the President will receive the table tennis team when it comes over, and we're going to release some more items for trade with China. See? These—so, here's the things that will happen. The SALT thing can have a little blip effect on the Congress for a day or two, so if we can get ready for Wednesday, go Wednesday. If not, hold it for two weeks, and we'll do it then. Then the summit thing, if something comes on that it could have an effect. It could be the big play in early June, if they're ready to announce it. But if not, then let it go. Then, we might only have only one bow left, at this time, in the political field, and that's the meeting with Thieu and the combat troop thing.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT, portions of which are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 197; and *ibid.*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 204.]

Nixon: The other things—SALT—will help [with] some sophisticated people. It'll help, too, on the—to send our guys into battle. It'd be the at end of the game.

Haldeman: [unclear]

Nixon: Hmm.

Haldeman: We shall get it all right, then.

Nixon: Well, they'll, they'll then, they'll—

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: They'd have one hell of a time voting against ABM if we said we got an agreement, provided that, but then the sons-of-bitches won't have a problem—

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: The only other thing coming up is SALT. SALT isn't enough. I know that.

Haig: No—

Nixon: SALT is not enough, because it is not, you see, too directly enough related to Vietnam. A summit would be enough, because people would think that you'd, at the summit, you might talk about Vietnam. See?

Haldeman: The summit—summit—people understand a summit.

Nixon: Sure.

Haldeman: People don't understand SALT.

Nixon: SALT is way over their heads. They haven't the slightest idea what SALT is. It's too goddamned complicated.

Haig: Of course, the China thing, I think, has the greatest impact.

Nixon: It has an impact. But there, they're going to need [unclear exchange]. But the China thing, the China thing, which—a china—an open meeting by a Presidential emissary, or actually a Presidential visit. You see, the difficulty with our whole China thing, though, is that there we have the Russian game. We can't announce that, that, "Well, there will be a Presidential visit to China." First, there can't be a Presidential visit to China as long as they're supporting South Vietnam—North Vietnam. So that's the deal. It's got to be a straight cold turkey deal on that. Second, we don't want to throw the China thing, until we get the Russian thing, one way or the other. Because, once you do that, you knock off the Russian summit. And the Russian summit is more important. It may be that we don't want it, but my point is you've got to play, you've got to let both strings play out a bit.

Haldeman: The Russian summit is more important substantively. It sure isn't more important, I don't think, in public drama in this country.

Nixon: Could be.

Haldeman: We get more out of China, [unclear]

Haig: The China thing, I think, means more in terms of the war in Southeast Asia—

Nixon: To the postwar order?

Haig: Yes, sir.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT, a portion of which is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 204.]

Nixon: No question about it. It is the right position. It is responsible. And I'm going to continue to take it, you understand. And I—but don't think it won't have an enormous effect on the Congressional problem if you announce a summit with the Russians. It'll have an enormous effect. You could then take—you could take those bastards to task for undercutting the President when he's about to do this. You tell them this story [unclear]. "You're going to look awful bad, taking the President on, blah, blah, blah." Scare 'em.

Haig: That's right.

Nixon: That's it. But when you don't—but we don't have the card to play yet. See?

Haig: Right.

Nixon: I've got this Brooke⁵ coming down, for example. Well, I'll jackass him around a little, but, in fact, we may, by that time—that's next week—we may have a summit. I mean the SALT thing. SALT will come off to him—

Haig: Oh, it will mean a great deal—

Nixon: —[unclear]—

Haldeman: Turn—turn him off.

Nixon: The SALT and MIRV thing. But, in any event, he—he'll understand it, too. He's smart enough to understand it.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT, a portion of which is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 197.]

Haig: You know, I think your problems in the Senate, sir, are really your intellectual people.

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: And SALT does mean something to these men. These are—these are the leaders that are impressed by that.

Nixon: That's true. [unclear]

Haig: I think the popular problem we're having now is dialectic, as it was last year. It's a—the swing is a little higher, but it's gonna recede the same way. So, we have to hold these, these real conscientious

⁵ Nixon was scheduled to meet with Senator Edward Brooke (R-MA) during the week of May 9.

doves that are in the Senate. And I think the SALT would mean a hell of a lot to those people. I really do.

Nixon: But, we're going to—let me tell you, what we're going to play it like, though. We're going to have a hell of a time explaining it to Rogers, but that's all right. I'll do it. I'm just going to tell him that Dobrynin came in with a message. I'm not going to tell him I saw him. [unclear] they wanted to—if this works out. It may not. Dobrynin may come in with that National Command Authority again, and I'm just going to turn it down. To hell with it. Don't you agree?

Haig: I think—I read—I was encouraged by what Semenov said yesterday. I think what he was saying was, in effect, they will take the Moscow package; you can have ABM anyplace you want it; but, you'll have a ceiling on the number of missiles.

Nixon: No, I got the impression that the National Command was his concern.

Haig: No, I think they were talking about their own.

Nixon: Oh.

Haig: It could be either, but I think they're going to come back to it.

Nixon: Well, on the other hand, why does Semenov tell it to that asshole Smith? I mean, Henry's always so jealous of his channel, and I—and there are good reasons for it⁶—

Haig: Well, I think the reasons for that are just as simple, sir. To the degree they can keep you from getting the credit, they're going to do it. They don't want you to be reelected—not one goddamn bit.

Nixon: That's right, too. So, they may want to have it come from Smith, and all the rest.

Haig: That's right, sir.

Nixon: Well, that won't happen. They don't know how much I control it—

Haig: No, well, that's it. If we—that's the other reason why we have to move before then: the summit.

⁶ Reference is to an incident brought about by a May 5 message from Smith indicating that Semenov had told him that the Soviets were thinking of offering a halt to new ICBMs in connection with an ABM/NCA agreement. On May 5 Haig met with Dobrynin at Kissinger's instruction. According to an undated memorandum for the record prepared by Haig, he told Dobrynin the following: "Because of this turn of events and the apparent shifting Soviet attitude on SALT, both Dr. Kissinger and the President were beginning to seriously question the value of continuing with this special channel and wondered whether or not it might not be more advantageous to terminate this channel now." The memorandum and Smith's message are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 2].

Nixon: That's the reason, too, that they may be moving with the summit venture too late.

Haig: [Joseph] Kraft is back in town, and he's said that everyone he's talked to in the Soviet Union said that you're too tough. They don't want to deal with you. They want to get another man in.

Nixon: What's that? Did he write that or the Post has written it?

Haig: He hasn't written it. I got this from the cocktail circuit.

Nixon: Well good. Of course, he's a little— Of course, he knows that. Well, he's one of them.

Haig: [laughing] Exactly—

Nixon: For Christ's sakes. Of course. And he knows goddamn well I'm too tough. In this last two weeks is the first instance I've heard of that. This last month, they're showing it again. And they—this really must rub it. They're having their problems.

Haig: Right. I think actually, sir, you've got everything postured just beautifully in timing it, with the exception of this Senate—

Nixon: Yeah?

Haig: —Senate problem, which is where we have a short fuse on it. But, the other things are ideal.

Nixon: You just have to have something when it comes off.

Haig: They want a summit. I think they don't want us to move with the Chinese. We can't—that's the other reason why we can't move too quickly with the Chinese—

Nixon: Oh, now that's—you understand, I'm not saying we're going to move to the Chinese or the Russians. And on ABM, I'll delay that goddamn thing 'til hell freezes over, if necessary. But I do say that we have to do something—

Haig: We have to get it—

Nixon: —tangible on Vietnam. And since we don't have—if we can't do it with regard to the draftee thing, then we'll have to move the Thieu thing up to the 8th. That'll work, and that's good enough. It's the best we got. It'll help.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT, a portion of which is printed in Document 197, *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 197.]

Nixon: If we can get the SALT thing, that will set a warmer climate for the Thieu visit and everything else that comes among the intellectuals. I agree with that.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT, a portion of which is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 197.]

Nixon: Second, on SALT, if we can't do it Wednesday, then I don't care.

Haig: It will take time, though—

Nixon: There's no timing problem on SALT.

Haig: Yes.

Nixon: We'll do it on our own, deliver it at that time, and, if it suits our purpose to wait two weeks, wait two weeks. See? There's no—nothing in it for us to go the balance of that week that I can see. Now, on—

Haldeman: You know, Wednesday you're not doing much in the morning.

Nixon: Yeah.

Haldeman: For TV, you ought to do it Tuesday night.

Nixon: Well, hell, if at all, we could get the word out earlier than that. There are ways to hold them.

Haig: If that doesn't turn then, then the—that influences your timing and your—

Nixon: With China?

Haig: —the agreement with China.

Nixon: Sure.

Haig: It's that simple.

Nixon: Absolutely. We do have another card to play. That's the—

Haig: Yes, sir.

Nixon: That's the beauty of our situation today, which we haven't had before, and the Russians don't know this. And assuming the Chinese mean what they say, we just ought to accept the goddamn deal in the Senate, in a way that it helps with the—we hope—the prize it would be. Well, we see our problems developing, but don't move it. Move it in a way so that we think what we will do, make all the plays on our domestic thing. Now, the idea of—I'd much prefer, myself—I'd prefer to have the Thieu visit later in June. Press on the SALT a little. Don't assume that SALT will buy us the time we need. It will not.

Haig: No.

Nixon: SALT will help if it comes. But, you—we either have to have a summit announcement with the Russians, or an announcement of some kind of a visit with the Chinese, a public announcement of progress on the Chinese front, a significant thing. I don't mean the trade crap. Or, we have to have the meeting with Thieu by the 10th of June. See what I mean? There's our problem. So, if one of those three come off, fine. SALT alone will not build it. I've analyzed the whole thing—

Haig: Yeah, I think if you end up with SALT, then you end up with the Thieu meeting. It's going to be tight, because it's going to be tough. But you're going to have right on your side. Then, when you follow that with a summit or—and a high-level Chinese meeting—one or the other, or perhaps both if we do it very well, I think we've got it—

Haldeman: Created enough for a loop then—

Haig: I just think that—

Haldeman: If you've put all that together then you—

Haig: You just can't—

Nixon: Right.

Haig: Your foreign policy would have been absolutely revolutionary—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haldeman: But you've got to get it all done—

Nixon: The only trouble is, though, that how can you get both summits—the Chinese, and the summit with the Russians?⁷

[Omitted here is discussion not directly related to SALT.]

⁷ At 12:32 p.m. Nixon spoke with Haldeman alone in the Oval Office. According to a recording of their conversation, the following exchange took place in reference to his conversation with Haig: Nixon: "Well, let me put it this way—with this—you get this SALT thing. I was deliberately downgrading it more than I really feel about SALT, because Henry and Al both upgrade it far more." Haldeman: "That's why I think [unclear]. At the same time—" Nixon: "You see, you see, the SALT thing is enormously important." Haldeman: "It's true, however, it isn't going to make a lot of difference to people. People just don't understand what's SALT, SALT does, or care." Nixon: "No." Haldeman: "They don't understand the arms race really, except in the very—" Nixon: "[unclear] arms limitation, we're not going to build an ABM. Yeah, it, it'll be a peace move." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 493–15) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

154. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 10, 1971.

Kissinger: I'm seeing the head of the Institute of World Politics in Moscow²—

Nixon: Oh, I see.

Kissinger: And he's well connected at the Politburo. But—but they really are playing a rough game with us on that SALT business, and—

Nixon: Oh, I expected they would.

Kissinger: Because what they're doing now is, they've put into Vienna the proposal which we turned down. They made us a formal proposal.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: And, I had Haig call in Dobrynin and raise hell with him last week, as he probably told you.³

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And Dobrynin said, "Oh, it was all a mistake." But, of course, they're—what they may do is they may finally accept our proposal.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: But deprive you of the credit for it by putting it into Vienna.

Nixon: Huh?

Kissinger: I mean, they won't deprive—it's such a cheap little stunt.

Nixon: They'll try, and if anything happens at Vienna, they'll take the credit for it.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 496–9. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger from 12:57 to 1:30 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The Nixon Tape Log lists this conversation as taking place on May 19, presumably in error, since all other conversations listed under 496 are dated May 10. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² Kissinger met with Georgiy Arbatov, Director of the Institute for the USA, USSR Academy of Sciences, from 1:30 to 2:45 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

³ See footnote 6, Document 153.

Kissinger: My present—my instinct would be, Mr. President, that if Dobrynin diddles us beyond this week, on the SALT—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —we just ought to go public with our proposal. They've put their proposal in, and we have a very strong case.

Nixon: When would we go? How would we go about Vienna? Just a statement from here, or have it made in Vienna, or what?

Kissinger: If we have to, we can do it either way. Well, one of the things they have—

Nixon: We can just send new instructions to Vienna and have it done that way. It isn't going to be an awful big thing just going public with it.

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: You understand? It isn't going to be anything good for us in the United States to go public with it, except to—so it's just parts, so it doesn't make it in any case—

Kissinger: But—

Nixon: There's nothing in it for us.

Kissinger: But the second thing that we might seriously consider, because I think we are going to be bled to death on Vietnam, is at some point—I've now come to the view, if you still hold it, that June 8th is the best time for, for Thieu.

Nixon: Well, I do, unless we can have something before, and if you could—the way it looks, you're not going to get anything on SALT before, so the [unclear]—

Kissinger: Well, I'm—we're not sure yet on SALT. If we don't get anything by a week from today, we have to assume we won't get anything—

Nixon: You should have it by now, though, shouldn't you?

Kissinger: He said two meetings of the Politburo, which means we should have it this week.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: Of course, it will take them a few—if the Politburo met Friday⁴—

Nixon: Um-hmm?

Kissinger: —then it will take them 2 or 3 days to draft instructions. We—we should have it by Wednesday night—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

⁴ May 7.

Kissinger: —if it takes a normal course.

Nixon: Right.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT, a portion of which is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 200.]

Nixon: I don't think you're going to get anything from the Soviet on SALT. I think we—I think you could ask Vienna if they were—knew exactly what the hell they're doing. They don't make mistakes.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Kissinger: And, then, I think, Mr. President, if we know we are going to be in trouble with the Russians, you might consider—

Nixon: The Chinese thing?

Kissinger: Well, the Chinese anyway—going on television with, with the facts of the military situation and just put it to our opponents.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: And, and play very tough in SALT. What we mustn't do is yield in SALT—

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: —beyond the point, which we've already given them in my channel, because that will just encourage them to whipsaw us.

Nixon: What have they offered? Have they offered in—they offered in SALT—they offered in Vienna the National Command Center?

Kissinger: No, they're done two things in Vienna. They've offered the National Command thing.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: And they've offered the construction freeze after the ABM agreement, which while we—we have insisted on—

Nixon: Simultaneous—?

Kissinger: —on simultaneous, and on Safeguard. Now, we could conceivably give on Safeguard but we cannot do it—

Nixon: After?

Kissinger: —afterwards, because there'll be nothing left for us to negotiate—

Nixon: That's right. Yeah.

Kissinger: If they've not willing to give us a freeze before an ABM agreement, they sure as hell aren't going to give it to us after an ABM agreement.

Nixon: They've offered to discuss it afterwards. Is that it?

Kissinger: They've offered to discuss it afterwards. They're trying the Hanoi tactic.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: And that, Mr. President, I really think would be disastrous to national security—

Nixon: You're not going to do it.

Kissinger: Also, we have told—

Nixon: You told Smith not to do anything on it, am I right? Haven't we told him? Does he know?

Kissinger: We told him. He's coming back for consultation anyway—

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: Nothing can happen.

Nixon: Well, he'll understand.

Kissinger: Now luckily, the Russians have asked—what speaks on the other side, Mr. President, to make—to put a good case—face on it is that they have asked for a recess on May 28th.

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: And a re-assembly on July 1st.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: Now, that would be consistent with phasing it into the summit schedule. Well, it's—and it means they're not going to beat us over the head for 4 weeks.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: Secondly, you could argue that they've put forward their proposition—

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah?

Kissinger: .—for their own bureaucratic reasons; that they can't turn around 180 degrees—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: —without having made some bureaucratic record from which they then retreat.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: Actually, their proposal is making our bureaucratic position easier on the exchange of letters, if they still come through. If—if they don't come through by next Monday, then we know they're stonewalling us. Up to now, it's still a normal decision-making time. It does take them about—

Nixon: Why is that?

Kissinger: —2 to 3 weeks.

Nixon: You'll know next Monday. Don't fool—don't have any illusions. If they don't come through next Monday, then it's done.

Kissinger: Then it's done.

Nixon: And then I will let Dobrynin know, coldly, that, “That’s it. We’ve got our answer.”

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT, portions of which are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 206.]

Kissinger: One week, Mr. President, may be caused by this statement that Sino-Soviet disputes—I told—

Nixon: Rogers’s statement?⁵

Kissinger: Yeah. I told Bob right away that this might delay the SALT thing by a couple of weeks, because that—

Nixon: That has to—for both China and Russia.

Kissinger: Yeah. It was a disaster.

Nixon: The dividend statement. Is that the one?

Kissinger: The dividend statement.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: The Taiwan Straits one—that was, that was also [unclear]—

Nixon: But, we tried to clear it up.⁶ Do you think we could—

Kissinger: Well, you did it very—

Nixon: Yeah, but I mean it’s a—I mean, the point is that the damage is done. Four days later we tried to clear it up.

Kissinger: Because it happened, unfortunately, a day after Dobrynin told me that if we played them off against each other, there’d be a very tough reaction out of Moscow.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

⁵ Reference is to Rogers’s public remark, recorded April 28 for broadcast April 29, that increased Sino-Soviet tensions that might come about as a result of improved U.S.-China relations would produce a “dividend.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 31, 1971, pp. 686–691)

⁶ In his diary Haldeman explained that “I had to call Rogers this morning as a result of his speech flaps yesterday and the days before. Covered the point the P wanted to raise, using the press conference tonight [April 29] as the lead-in thing: the P, if pressed, was going to have to, in effect, say the Secretary didn’t mean what he said. This had the desired effect on Rogers, and he backed off completely from his point that any Russian-Chinese differences that arise from our initiatives would be a dividend. He said that isn’t what he meant at all. He was concerned enough that, after we’d discussed it thoroughly and hung up he called back in a few minutes to reiterate his view as to how the P should approach the question at the press conference tonight. In the meeting with Haig in the P’s office at midday, the P told Haig to call Dobrynin and clear up the points raised by Rogers, so that he wasn’t given the impression that we were trying to play a game with the Soviets. The P himself cleared it up pretty well in the press conference tonight, in fact, extremely well. There was no further problem on this touchy subject.” (*Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Regarding the April 29 press conference, see footnote 2, Document 148.

Kissinger: It's hard for them to believe that it's—

Nixon: That Rogers didn't do it at our instruction.

Kissinger: Exactly. You know, that's awfully hard to convince people of—

Nixon: Well, he—just, just dropped it. It was at a press thing, apparently.

Kissinger: Yeah

Nixon: Coming back to this, the Russian thing, the other play we have to do is on Vietnam. See, that's the game now. Let's forget the Russian thing and the rest at the present time. The game is where it is. All that matters here is Vietnam now.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT, portions of which are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 200.]

Nixon: So, that's the Vietnam—in the meantime, Henry, we've got to keep our goddamn troops in the Senate. Do you notice, for example, if you read the weekend news summary, that all these people are, you know, yelling around about what they're going to do, and this, or that. Or [Senator Frank] Church says to share responsibility with the House—with the Congress, you know. Responsibility? You know what they're petrified at?

Kissinger: That you'll succeed.

Nixon: We'll end the goddamn war, and then blame it—and say, "We ended it; they started it."

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: And that's exactly what we're going to do.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I think—I think we can beat them on that issue. I think—but, provided we keep one step ahead. Now, unfortunately, I was hoping we'd have a SALT thing. Let's assume we don't have it. Let's assume we don't have a summit thing. That means we just—I think at the very least we've got to figure that what we've got, we're going to have a June 8th announcement, and then we've got to come back with another announcement of a new negotiating offer and our final negotiating offer. Right?

Kissinger: Right—

Nixon: And we make it publicly.

Kissinger: Right.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 200.]

Kissinger: I just think that once—what we absolutely have to have to the Chinese is a reliable contact, and a game plan, which they and we follow. And if we can get—once we get that visit set up—

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: —we may still get—the secret meeting has the other advantage. Of course, you're assuming we won't get the SALT. I'm not so sure on that yet—

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

Kissinger: We've got to do it—

Nixon: Well, anyway, we'll see. [Laughs]

155. Editorial Note

On May 11, 1971, at 9:10 a.m., President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger spoke with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin about the apparent disconnect between decisions made in their private channel and conversations between Gerard Smith and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov, the respective heads of the United States and Soviet Delegations to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, in Vienna. According to a transcript of their conversation, Kissinger and Dobrynin had the following exchange:

"K: I just had a talk with Gerry Smith and apparently our channel is not working properly. Semenov is going along accepting my proposition to you which Gerry Smith doesn't know about. Semenov has not said what it is but it's the main lines of my proposition to you. The President will be beside himself because we haven't got a reply yet to our proposal.

"D: Semenov didn't have instructions and I have a telegram that says it.

"K: Semenov on a boat trip went into great detail and Smith is so surprised that he has propositions we didn't make to him. Proposed ABM agreement, a freeze on offensive missiles—Smith never heard of it. He hinted that you would accept a ceiling on longer ones within this. Smith thinks he will conclude this simultaneously. He didn't object to the proposal but it isn't easy that when he makes a proposal to the Council of Ministers and gets no answer.

"D: He has no authority.

"K: We are in the position now that as far as Smith is concerned a Soviet proposition exists and the President doesn't have a response to his proposal.

"D: They haven't discussed it in the govt. I know what I am telling you. The Minister directed him and he is not authorized. Gromyko is not deceiving me.

“K: The President can only conclude one of two things. Either there’s confusion in Moscow which we don’t believe or a deliberate attempt to mobilize his people against him or by-pass him.

“D: It’s not so. On this matter, Semonov has no authority. What he makes a hint—I don’t know.

“K: In order to keep our channel intact and avoid on either side a refusal [omission in the transcript]. Now we are in a position that as far as I am concerned it has to be treated formally. Smith is telling everyone what Semonov said. That there should be an ABM agreement and a less formal phrase—we have discussed it and it’s all right. A ceiling which would include large missiles and radar limitations.

“D: I don’t know what’s going on. Does he really make a proposal or just a talk and he picks it up piece by piece.

“K: He talked with Smith alone.

“D: Was it a proposal or picked up by Smith?

“K: Smith thinks it’s a proposal and since it’s never been discussed by me and Smith never knew or authorized to discuss it—if Smith had proposed it—well, you know. But it’s so close to what you and I have discussed—what is the Soviet position and secondly, you may do this deliberately but the President will take this as a personal affront.

“D: It’s not necessary.

“K: What would Brezhnev think if he proposed to us through a channel and we went to a subordinate official and made a reply?

“D: Only two days ago we got a copy of a telegram where he was denounced in strongest way. I have known Gromyko for 20 years. I am just telling you. It’s for my information but it was not for yours. I have the telegram. Direct information from my talk with Haig. It’s not to mislead me. Why would they? It’s for my information and it’s for the record.

“K: We have the serious problem now—

“D: [omission in the transcript] reply.

“K: We have to construct a reply from Smith to Semonov and I can’t say it’s not the Soviet position because no one knows I have talked with you.

“D: I know the story and you must say what you will to the President. Semonov when I was in Moscow he was told not to talk.

“K: I don’t understand it. You can reject the proposal but why when we are trying to do so many things—Smith talked about the summit but he might have gotten that himself.

“D: Only two days ago I [omission in the transcript] that emphasized the same point. If you do not believe it—

“K: There’s no sense in your lying. I just want to be sure you want to work with me.

“D: This case they discuss through you and me. No reason for misleading me.

“K: I now have a message. The problem you have to remember and Moscow must understand is that Smith wants to go to Vienna and give an answer to Semonov.

“D: Semonov probably wants to correct it and made it worse.

“K: He went further. Spelled it out in detail. In a telegram two junior members went into detail with Garthoff. I will show you.

“D: I believe you. He didn’t reply to what you proposed.

“K: He replied without saying what it was.

“D: We didn’t discuss the text.

“K: No, not a text. He made a proposal identical to what you and I discussed with details.

“D: Formally or in discussion?

“K: In private discussions with Smith. He described it as elaboration of what he said at dinner. Two junior members spelled out what Garthoff said—freezing and Safeguard sites and discussed what Safeguard site might be acceptable.

“D: They have that on instructions. Probably we don’t understand what they are talking about. Their delegation there has own instructions—they know nothing about our discussions.

“K: They don’t mention our discussions. They made a proposal. If we defend ABM 4 is not acceptable but 2 would be acceptable. Deliberate that Soviet position only refused 4 and 3. How about 2? They said it was deliberate that they mentioned 4 and 3.

“D: You have to understand if you based on 4 or 2 they have [omission in the transcript].

“K: You can argue with me but the fact is our government believes you have made a formal proposition to which we have to reply and the President believes he made a proposition to you and you are replying in a bureaucratic channel and he will think you are trying to box him in. It’s not going to be considered a friendly gesture.

“D: What can I say when I tell you it was not an intention? What else can I tell you? Just a delegation fishing. 4 or 2 sites when I know for sure—otherwise why would we wait so long?

“K: Unless you want to ignore the President.

“D: We are not children. We know who is boss.

“K: It’s incomprehensible to me.

“D: We know who is boss in the WH.

“K: I will grant that this was done in good faith on your side. The fact is we now have a problem because we have to give Smith a formal instruction. I don’t know really. We can play it your way. Make a

proposal to Semonov that we have made to you. No sense any more in discussion. We have to make a reply. I can't say that this—to ignore Semonov.

"D: I know he has no authority.

"K: Why don't you do the following? It's a Soviet problem.

"D: No problem.

"K: What should we do?

"D: Was it an official proposal or a guess of Smith? Semonov can discuss many things for 5 hours and you can construe what you want and he will say he said nothing. Was it formal?

"K: No. Semonov made the proposal that Haig showed you.

"D: It said that Mr. Semonov hinted. This point—Semonov will say they didn't understand me.

"K: It if stopped there, no problem. On Friday—I will [omission in the transcript] you. Take the proposal that Semonov made because it's very important.

"D: Who said?

"K: I will get you the memos. On Sunday on the boat Semonov went into great detail. Smith talking with—all right first. I will read the first paragraph. May 6—'At dinner for the Soviet delegation May 4 Semonov from a written brief and [on] new instructions introduced coupling of offensive [restraint of ICBMs with ABM only agreement.]'

D: "I received a telegram on that. What happened next?

K: "This is May 6. 'At Soviet Reception Timberlöv and K[ishilov] took initiative in taking Garthoff aside on new Soviet proposal and they emphasized [high importance of reaching initial SALT agreement this calendar year, and need for U.S. to consider seriously and respond affirmatively] to the general approach [indicated by 'very significant' Semonov statement to Smith on May 4].' On the evening of the 6th.

"D: What these two boys really—Semonov wouldn't show them the telegram.

"K: On Sunday Semonov spoke with Smith for 5 hours and gave him the details of what he considers the new Soviet proposal.

"D: He went more and more?

"K: He did that on a boat and not a plenary session and there's not a record but when a Deputy Minister speaks for 5 hours he must have something to say.

"D: It's not necessary. The thing is Semonov could speak for 5 hours is well known in my govt. He can talk on anything he likes. He wouldn't know anything about the military thing but he can philosophize many things. They will be very strongly scolded and he is my friend. Was it a proposal or did Smith think so?

“K: It’s now a difficulty because Smith thinks he has and we must now respond. If I do nothing else now you will get a formal answer to Semonov from Smith.

“D: A telegram coming in now. Will you hold a minute?

“K: Yes.

“D: So I will sum up this way. Smith gets a definite proposal and Semonov continued to elaborate. But he didn’t say we are ready to make this proposal.

“K: He thinks that if we now say all right we accept an agreement on ABM and freeze, he thinks there will be an agreement. Smith feels we can get an agreement along the lines of what you and I talked about. Simultaneous freeze. ABM vs. Moscow. That’s what he thinks.

“D: No authority because it contradicts his instructions. If I mention this to Gromyko, he will say Smith invented it.

“K: Smith believes it’s an ABM agreement with offensive freeze concluded simultaneously with limitations on radar and limitations of testing of surface to air missiles (which we haven’t discussed).

“D: He has instructions not to discuss specifics.

“K: I just finished talking with Smith. This is not something he asked Smith to raise with him and not our major issue.

“D: I have the telegram. This is a copy from Moscow on what Semonov reports. Acting in accordance with instructions and said nothing more. [omission in the transcript] minister and discuss with Smith what we didn’t talk through Smith and Semonov (?). Semonov emphatically denies he talked with Smith about it.

“K: I don’t know what to do now.

“D: I could tell you from this telegram that answer to what you proposed is still not approved. This telegram is the second from Gromyko. He emphatically denies it here.

“K: What’s going to happen—if we don’t straighten this out we will be forced to give a formal answer in Vienna and it will be total confusion.

“D: Smith is confused and trying to present a case he didn’t know.

“K: A case he didn’t advocate before. He had other ideas before.

“D: Safeguard against Moscow.

“K: Then he wouldn’t get if Semonov—

“D: Everything you mentioned was his interpretation.

“K: Semonov made those points on the boat.

“D: He has his instructions. I don’t know whether—I don’t know. Semonov has to follow instructions or he will lose his job. When he denies it I am sure Semonov will not on a second time report the same story. What he could do if they discussed in detail, he will see how

Smith will react and then report back to Moscow. What's important and you should ask Smith was there an official proposal?

"K: No text. I will get his memo.

"D: It would be helpful to me.

"K: I will have it by the end of the day.

"D: A brief summary.

"K: I have to tell you that the—your formal position I understand but the fact is that Smith believes sincerely and since he doesn't know I ever discussed it and he has had different ones—

"D: I can now finish this telegram. Semonov said he discussed only what was discussed before. He emphasized that he was on previous position which I gave to you before and that freezing would be settled after ABM. You check it. Semonov said simultaneously or before." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 368, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File). The bracketed insertions the memoranda Kissinger quoted in this transcript were taken from the original telegrams, USDEL SALT 697 from Helsinki, May 6, and USDEL SALT 698, May 7. (Both in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT, Jan. 9–May 20, 1971) The full text of this transcript is published in *Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969–1972*, Document 151.

On May 12 and 13 Kissinger met with Dobrynin to work on the text of President Nixon and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's joint letter about reaching a SALT agreement. Kissinger wrote highlights from those meetings in a May 18 memorandum to Nixon:

"May 12—Dobrynin gave me the text of the letter which dropped the National Command Authority stipulation. I suggested the substitution of 'elaborated' or 'worked on' for 'discussed' (with regard to the freeze) in order to strengthen the simultaneity requirement. Dobrynin agreed that the text of the letter was clear in this respect, and so was the public announcement. He said that if I insisted that he go back again it would cause another two weeks delay. Dobrynin stated that Moscow preferred a single document instead of the exchange of two separate letters which would raise the question of who had taken the initiative.

"May 13—I told Dobrynin that you found the joint letter and announcement acceptable but that we still preferred to substitute 'elaborated' or 'worked on' for 'discussed.' Dobrynin said the real issue here was whether Gromyko felt he was able to decide this or had to go up to the Politburo. Dobrynin then suggested I give him an oral note along the lines of his explanation which left no doubt that in the view of the Soviet Government there was no question about the simultaneity of coming to a conclusion." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Ma-

terials, NSC Files, Box 491, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 2])

On May 13 at 4:30 p.m. Kissinger and Dobrynin spoke on the telephone to finalize the text of the joint public statement that Nixon and Kosygin would make on May 20. According to a transcript of their conversation, they had the following exchange:

"K: The one thing we didn't settle was the public statement. We agreed to concentrate—

"D: I will look. Just a minute. What's the question?

"K: Where to put the word this year—after concentrate or—

"D: I prefer this year as we have it. If you could do it it would be nice.

"K: To concentrate this year.

"D: Then on working out.

"K: It would be more effective if we said to concentrate working out this year.

"D: I prefer the first one.

"K: OK. Will you point out to your colleagues that I have tried to cooperate?

"D: They know. It's no need because it's the only negotiations that all members of my govt. have been working each day. I have worked for 9 years and it's the first time that the whole govt. has worked on each sentence.

"K: If you get a big promotion it will be because of my showing you attention to your govt.

"D: It's sometimes better not to have attention. I do not complain. It's a little dangerous.

"K: I have been called to the President. I will send you both statements as we will use them.

"D: I will look at them.

"K: Don't make any more changes.

"D: It's only my—

"K: My principal will get mad. I will hand you the memo I read you. But not now. When we exchange the letters.

"D: No special problems. You read it to me and I will write it down." (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 78, Country Files, Europe, USSR, SALT)

156. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, May 15, 1971, 10:10–11:50 a.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

U. Alexis Johnson

Ronald I. Spiers

Seymour Weiss

Raymond Garthoff

DOD

Dr. Gardiner Tucker

Paul Nitze

CIA

Richard Helms

Carl Duckett

JCS

Lt. Gen. Royal B. Allison

ACDA

Gerard C. Smith

Philip J. Farley

Spurgeon Keeny

OST

Dr. Edward David

OMB

James Schlesinger

Attorney General

John N. Mitchell

NSC Staff

William Hyland

Col. Jack Merritt

Barry Carter

Dr. K. Wayne Smith

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

(1) Amb. Parsons would be instructed to try to persuade the Soviets not to make a formal proposal for an accession clause to an accidental launch agreement and, in any event, to take no formal position on it.

(2) The State Department will prepare a paper on all aspects of an accession formula.

(3) The Working Group will consider the State and Defense drafts for a new high-ground position; will work on various equitable Safeguard options; and will start work on various defensive-offensive packages.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

(4) Mr. Smith will meet with the President on Tuesday, May 18, followed by another Verification Panel meeting later in the week.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

157. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 19, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Gerard Smith
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT

SALT Developments

On May 19, I was at Dr. Kissinger's office for breakfast. He told me that he would like to give me the whole background of SALT developments on his part.

On January 8, he had been in touch with Dobrynin about ways to break the impasse. He said that all of the subsequent record, including the January 7th contact² would be made available to me. It is not clear to me whether Dobrynin or Kissinger took the initiative, but there has been an exchange of papers, there has been worked out an understanding that the United States would negotiate an ABM agreement with the Soviets, and the Soviets would agree to a halt in ICBMs while negotiations for offensive restraints were continued. The President is to make an announcement of this fact on the 21st of May and a similar announcement is to be made in Moscow. The President has written or is going to write a letter to Kosygin spelling out the arrangement.

Apparently Kissinger pushed Dobrynin to a more liberal position than the original Soviet one which was that the ABM deal should be worked out first and then the terms of the ICBM deal. Then Dobrynin moved to agreement in principle on the ICBM, with the details worked out after the ABM deal. Apparently the latest position of Dobrynin is that the two would be worked out in parallel (although this is not clear).

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Box 2, Director's Files, Smith/Farley Files, Chronological File, Farley Correspondence, SALT, November 1969–August 1971. Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office.

² No record of discussions on January 7 or 8 have been found. For their meeting on January 9, see Document 124.

I looked at the proposed announcement and pointed out that drafting was imprecise and the language that the countries had agreed to agree would be criticized. I suggested a fix and Kissinger said he would try to make it. I suggested that the way the announcement read was not the best in terms of keeping our bargaining power since it assumed that an ABM agreement would be reached. Kissinger said he had no flexibility to make any further changes. He said that Laird was being advised at 1:00 PM,³ and that the President was advising Rogers⁴ just then. I pointed out that I was not interested in process but the product, and I thought the product was good. I asked what about NAC consultation? He said a pre-prepared telegram had been gotten together. I asked him if the President deliberately wanted me to be out of town when he made this announcement. Kissinger said no, and that under the circumstances he was sure that the President would be glad to have me participate in briefing the Leadership of Congress tomorrow morning and participate in the backgrounding of the press. (He had planned to have Mr. Farley do that.) Kissinger said that in backgrounding the press he would make no mention of his participation in the process. He would say that we had reached this point by negotiations at a number of levels. Kissinger spoke of the pressures that have been put on the President to go in the opposite direction. He told me what the President's natural inclination had been. He spoke of the possibility that had been considered of building up our missiles and leaving it up to The Congress to decide who was in favor of national security and who was not.

He spoke of the fact that we had considered at times in the past public announcements referring to the SWWA notion of the Spring of 1969.⁵ He spoke of calling up Dobrynin to congratulate him on being made a member of the Central Committee. He spoke about how he had told Dobrynin that an NCA/NCA deal was not what interested us. I asked him if it was clear that Minuteman III would not be involved in a halt, and he said "yes, it was clear." I pointed out that this would limit Soviet offensive programs and not American offensive programs and implied that it would be quite a trick if we could pull it off. He reported his difficulties in understanding the Secretary of Defense's

³ See Document 158.

⁴ In his diary, May 19, Haldeman recorded Rogers's reaction to his meeting with the President: "I then went over to the State Department; had about an hour with Rogers. He was clearly very upset. His basic point was 'why didn't you tell me that you were doing this? There's no need for me to be involved, but I do have to be informed.' He made the point that both K and the P had promised him that they would not have any other further meetings with any Ambassadors, and particularly with Dobrynin, without letting him know." (*Haldeman Diaries, Multimedia Edition*)

⁵ Document 16.

position. Sometimes he was a dove and sometimes he took a very hard line. I congratulated Kissinger on his capability to keep privacy. He questioned me as to what the ACDA attitude would be. I told him I thought our people would be very pleased at the end product.⁶

I talked to Bill Rogers who shared my view of the process/product question. I suggested that he should try to advise the British and Japanese Governments in advance. I told him that NAC reaction as to the procedure would not be good. In talking to Kissinger, I asked him if he had detected any interest on Dobrynin's part on a Zero ABM. He had not. Kissinger said that he had told Dobrynin there was a need for a political decision. Dobrynin said: "What do you mean by that?" The answer was not very clear, but in effect it was "let's commit ourselves to go for a deal even though we don't have present agreement on all the 'legalities'."

Gerard Smith⁷

⁶ Attached but not printed is an addendum to the memorandum of conversation that reads: "After pointing out how loose the drafting was I told Henry that I could take no responsibility for the drafting. He understood, and said he knew who would be blamed if anything went wrong. Recalled my proposal in a message from Vienna that a public announcement be made. Kissinger said he wanted this approach included in the NSDM 102 [Document 138] guidance but it had not worked out that way. The only way they could get the result was this highly secretive process."

⁷ Printed from a copy that bears Smith's typed signature.

158. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 19, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 51.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 501–18. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Laird and Kissinger from 2:10 to 2:56 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

Laird: To comment on that [SALT], Mr. President, I'm all for it. I think it's terrific in every way, but I don't want to give the impression it's going to make it any easier—

Nixon: For appropriations?

Laird: —for our position. We're not going to pick up any of our opponents on this—

Nixon: No.

Laird: I mean, they may make a nice statement—

Nixon: They're just tasting—

Laird: They're not going to change their votes—

Nixon: They'll taste—they'll taste blood.

Laird: Right. Percy isn't going to change his vote, or Mike Mansfield, or Symington.

Nixon: The line I think we've got to take, which I'm sure you'll use, is that if there was ever any demonstration needed that now we need ABM, this is it, because for this deal to go it is contingent upon us having something to give, and that's ABM, in order to get something that we want them to give, which is a limitation on offensive weapons. Now, they will not do that, Mel, unless they—we're able to give it to them. And if we give them ABM without, what the hell is there? You see, it's a two-sided deal—

Laird: Oh, I know—

Nixon: They want to limit ABMs, and we want to limit offensive weapons. Now, the game will not be played unless we've got that to play with. Tomorrow, if the matter comes up with the [Congressional] leaders,² I think you ought to make that point. I think you'd be a good one to make it. What do you think, Henry? Of course, I [unclear], at least we want to—we won't tell the leaders [unclear]—

Kissinger: You should say as little as possible tomorrow.

Nixon: I think you're right—

Laird: Well, I—I would—

Nixon: We don't—we don't want to—we don't want to sound belligerent to the Russians. We want this to be as [unclear] conciliatory as possible.

Laird: But I'll have to hard-line it, Mr. President, as far as my position is concerned. I've got to take a little harder position in order to sell our program up there. It keeps—

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon and Kissinger met between 10:15 and 11:05 a.m. with a bipartisan Congressional leadership group in order to brief them on SALT. (Ibid.) A tape recording of the conversation is *ibid.*, White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 58–5.

Kissinger: That, I think, is good on the Hill after tomorrow.

Nixon: After tomorrow, yeah.

Laird: Uh, so, uh—

Kissinger: Or, if anyone asks the direct question, we cannot put ABM in escrow or any of that.

Laird: No, we know we can't do that, you see—

Nixon: Oh. Well, then the deal is shot.

Laird: Yeah, we just can't do that—

Nixon: Well, they aren't putting any in escrow. That—that's the greater point, but look, we'd be delighted to run it through if they'd put their offensive weapons in escrow. But they're not. And they're not asking us to.

Kissinger: If we put things in escrow—

Nixon: That's the point of it all. They're not asking us to put it in the escrow, and we're not asking them to. We're—but we're agreeing to agree, frankly.

Kissinger: We'll give them an incentive to string out the negotiations some.

[An unknown person, possibly the President's valet, Manolo Sanchez, entered the Oval Office at an unknown time after 2:10 p.m. and left at an unknown time before 2:44 p.m.]

Nixon: [Aside to unknown person] Could you get me some coffee? [Back to Kissinger and Laird] I know you're going to have a tough time. I know, but—

Laird: Frankly, I'm not—I'm not complaining—

Nixon: Well, let me say this—and I know you're not—but let me say this: This agreement, however, will give some pause to people like [Drew] Pearson and others who are running it. [Aside to unknown person] Can I have tea, please, instead of coffee? Thank you. [Back to Kissinger and Laird] On the ground where we have, where we have, in effect, have said, "Now, look here, fellows." Well, like that group yesterday. I said—I said to them, "Don't jump too fast on this sort of thing." As you can tell the—without telling them anything, because I knew yesterday that—well, I wasn't sure because we didn't get the final thing until last night at 5 o'clock. And you never know with these bastards—

Laird: Sure.

Nixon: . . . what you're going to get, you know. Because, they have been known to break a deal, but once they make it, they'll keep it. Right?

Kissinger: I—yeah.

Nixon: No. Once they make it, they'll keep it 'til tomorrow, I mean.

Laird: That's [unclear]—

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: What I meant is, but last—but until—the reason that, the reason that I couldn't say anything, the reason we couldn't inform you, what we were going to do is to have you in yesterday, you know, because we had an appointment yesterday. We didn't hear, and I told Henry, I says, "No, sir, you cannot, we cannot go out on this thing until the Russians come in." Now, they're—now, they are—they are bound, as I understand it.

Kissinger: That's right. I mean the text is the one I showed you and it's all agreed.

Nixon: They damn well had better be bound.

Kissinger: And they'll issue—they'll issue an English version by TASS and—

Nixon: Their English version will be the same as ours?

Kissinger: Oh yeah, everything—

Nixon: Because they wrote this. [unclear] complains about his grammar, let's remember this is the Russian version there. But, what I was going to say is that, that I think we, we can make strongly the argument and all that we do know what we're doing in this administration, and after all, whether it's in reducing our troops under the Vietnamization policy, or whether it's the question of negotiating on SALT. Hell, all columnists—not all, but many of the columnists said SALT was dead. Fulbright said, "I don't want to read anything more about it. Nothing's going to happen." He's announced he's going to have hearings on it to see whether—why we don't make some initiative on SALT. And here we are, something happens. So, I—what I meant is, I think it may help you in arguing with members of the House. Not with the doves, but with guys that are sort of on the fence. They say, "Well, Jesus Christ, maybe we better join 'em." Yeah, well, maybe we've got some other things in the wings, because as a matter of fact, there may be other things in the wings. You know that, and I know it. We're all talking about things all the time in a number of channels. As a matter of fact, I told—I didn't tell them. I—when I saw Mansfield—I didn't know that it was going to come about 2 weeks ago—I said, "You know, Mike, there's more going on here than you think." And now he's going to be surprised tomorrow when he finds out this is going. And I think that the game you can play, and play very shrewdly with your colleagues up there, say, "Now, look here. Did any of you expect some inevitable progress on SALT, based on what you've been reading in the press?" The critics aren't going to know. Well, finally, we have some, and under these circumstances this means you have an administration that is working day and night for progress in these fields. But we can't announce it all. That's another point.

[Omitted here is discussion of Nixon's rationale for dealing with the Soviets in secrecy.]

Nixon: As you know, the position that we've stated here is one we all worked out back in January.

Laird: No, our position shouldn't change. My position—

Nixon: Look, our position's exactly the same. In other words, you were always for ABM and offensive limitation. And that's what, finally, the Soviet Union has agreed to.

Kissinger: Mel, we went—we told them last year in our ABM briefings, as you remember, that this will help an agreement—

Nixon: Well, Mel made that point several times in his testimony, very effectively.

Laird: Well, I don't have any—

Nixon: And now it looks good. My point is that I would not hesitate to remind them. I'd like for you to go back, if you would, and pick out all these places where you did speak out on this [unclear], where you did say—in other words, you link the two all the time. You said, "Look, we've got to have ABM in order to get SALT—"

Laird: Yeah—

Nixon: Right?

Laird: Well, I'd like the record to start—

Nixon: Throw it up to them.

Laird: Hmm?

Nixon: I know you did. You've said it. But I think you should remind Congressmen, and Senators, and doubters that you said that. And say, "Now, boys, look. It happened." Because, that will help us on related issues, see? I think, not with doves, but with the fence-riders. I can talk. I know what they're like. Those guys say, "Well, gee, are we going to do anything or not?"

Laird: Well, we're willing to make the best of it, try to get them shifted over.

Nixon: I know how hard it is—

Laird: We're having a little problem with some of those votes, and we got to be careful we don't give some of these guys too much, either, Mr. President. Now, you know that I'm not—

Nixon: Give what? The Russians?

Laird: No, some of our own boys, too much.

159. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks¹

Washington, May 19, 1971.

Nixon: Tell me this—the PFIAB has been looking at it, too—looking at, looking at the so-called comprehensive agreement just isn't possible, is it? What I mean, it's possible. It's possible in terms of maybe 3, 4, or 5 years, but aren't you going to bite off, bite off parts of it, and then go from there to there? Is that their view? Is that your view? How do you all feel about that?

Smith: In terms of negotiability, there's no doubt about it—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: We have to [unclear]—

Nixon: You got to do it [unclear] selectively, and the hardest thing, having stepped part of the way, is then go over—

Smith: I have to say, though, if we make an ABM agreement, there'll be no reason for any continued Soviet buildup, for us to continue to build up in a comprehensive agreement, which is while we're ahead of them in the MIRV business—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: —they're going to be very loath to make a comprehensive deal.

Kissinger: That's right.

Smith: That, of course, it freezes them in—

Nixon: Well, it freezes basically an inferiority, just as—just as a matter of fact, [unclear] hurt us, too, because in large numbers [unclear]—

Smith: I think that they've been pressing this FBS, Forward Based Systems. Question: "Are we ready to move—join them on FBS?" [unclear]—

Nixon: MIRVs are part of the problem?

Smith: MIRVs are their problem.

Nixon: Hmm.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 501–19. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger and the delegation from 3:09 to 3:45 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

Smith: We're not going ahead with any offensive programs except MIRV—

Nixon: I know. Nothing. Nothing. We haven't since 1967 built a damn thing—

Smith: Well, this is—but to them, this MIRV program looks very big, very significant. We tend, I think, to discount it. And they aren't really going ahead with much in the defensive field, whereas we have major [unclear]—

Nixon: Yeah, that's—in other words, what we—basically, yeah. What we want—they want to control us, defensively, with the MIRVs. Well, then we ought to control them with numbers.

Thompson: Gerry, we do talk a lot about ULMS and B-1, that they have to take this seriously—

Nixon: On which?

Thompson: The B-1s.

Nixon: Oh, yeah.

Thompson: Do they—?

Nixon: What do they say about that? He—I, I know that they, they've raised it.

Smith: They constantly say that Mel Laird is sort of shaking B-1—

Nixon: Yeah. I know.

Smith: —and ULMS, and yet they are really proponents of no interference in modernization. They're not against three force—

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah, I noted that three force—they, they, as a matter of fact of modernization and so forth. Well, now, why is that? Is that—do they think that's—doesn't—they know that modernization, if you agree on that, that involves verification? Is that their reason?

Smith: I think they feel they don't want to get frozen in the technology of 1971. They've got lots of new programs going. General Allison and the Chiefs figure you can't control technology. You can't control quantity.

Nixon: He sounds like a scientist.

Smith: But you can control quality. And I think one of the reasons last year they were so strong about it—basically, they knew we're going—

Nixon: And they, of course, can put a MIRV, in the field [unclear]. Can't they?

Smith: Of course. That's modernization—

Nixon: That's really what it amounts to.

Allison: Those are the facts, but, Mr. President, I think they want to be sure that they aren't kept in a position where they're behind us technologically. In certain areas, we're clearly ahead. In ABM, they're not.

Nixon: Is it not true, though, that—I always say this when I’m asked about it at press conferences, which is derivative of your judgment that they still are treating these negotiations in a very serious way, and are not using them simply for the purpose of—well, they’re certainly not using them for the purpose of propaganda. The question is whether they use them for purposes of delay or anything like that. What’s your judgment on that? Do they want—do you think they’re looking toward an agreement?

Smith: I think they clearly want an ABM agreement.

Nixon: An ABM one?

Smith: They don’t want to delay that at all. And, apparently, they’re willing to pay some price—

Nixon: To get it? Let’s hope—

Smith:—freezing their ICBM program, to get it. In that, they clearly see the psychological advantage with Germany. We just couldn’t keep this—

Nixon: They’re right.

Smith: We tend to think, “Well—”

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: “—it’s a serious business, let’s get away from the polemics.”

Nixon: Yes, I know.

[unclear exchange]

Smith: But they have kept it, I would think, in very moderate proportion to SALT.

Nixon: Oh, I think so.

Thompson: [unclear] in any other negotiations [unclear]—

Nixon: Let me ask you this [unclear]: what reaction of ours is, you know, what—from their standpoint, do you really [unclear]? Do you think there is really, I mean, since the Party Congress?²

Allison: It was their conclusion. I think that a lot of the things were based on [unclear]—

Thompson: I always suspected there were some certain staff work and not [unclear]—

Nixon: It takes a little time.

Thompson: Yes, it does. And he was away in Moscow himself. But, even if he’d known about that, he might have just because [unclear]. On the other hand, I do think they’ve had more troops in Germany than they possibly need. I think they want—that they know they can really use [unclear] sitting on these people. And, they—

² The 24th Soviet Party Congress ended on April 9.

Nixon: I think it was maybe the same in Czechoslovakia.

Thompson: Yeah, well—

Nixon: They wanted—the morning report I saw indicated that—State indicated—that they'd like to get some of this stuff out of Czechoslovakia—have a, have a good reason to.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: Whatever happens in these, in these fields, and all the interrelated fields, it seems to me—and I think Tommy would agree with the Department—but I think to them, just as it should be to us, it's all a part of a—not, not, not that we have figured it out as diabolically, as some do, the whole package. I mean, there is movement in one direction. Some day, something's [unclear exchange] something's gotta happen. [Laughs] That's all there is—

Smith: Paul [Nitze] said, Mr. President—

Nixon: It isn't frustrating?

Smith: It isn't frustrating. Here we're talking with the Soviets about Hen House radar, and problems that—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: —5 years ago wouldn't—

Nixon: Well, that means something—

Smith: —have been conceivable—

Thompson: That's correct.

Smith: —to talk to these people and have a serious exchange. So, I—I don't know about the others, but I have never felt—

Nixon: Do you all feel that way?

Smith: —any sense of frustration—

Nixon: Ah, shoot, Tommy, you—you've been around the track with these guys more than anybody else.

Thompson: But I—I've partially escaped most of this last business because I didn't go to the last session, but still—

Kissinger: Actually, I think these have been on a higher level than any exchanges—

Smith: It's very interesting, Mr. President—

Allison: Well, on some—and substantively, too. I mean, when they're talking about the details of military balance, and the question of—the purpose of strategic military forces, and what are your forces for—

Nixon: Yeah.

Allison: —and, what's that [unclear] that you're talking about starting, and so on—

Nixon: Yes. You know it serves a purpose—

Allison: [unclear] frustrating—

Nixon: —to have us think about this, and them think about it. The very fact that we had to go through this exercise, and think about what we would negotiate. It makes us reevaluate our—all of our policy considerations, which we otherwise would not do. We tend to just sit on what we have, and say, “Oh what the hell, let’s do what we—do it the way we did the last time.” The losers fight with the weapons of the last war, and the winners fight with the weapons of the next war.

Thompson: One of the most striking things has been the fact that they’ve learned a lot about what they’ve got.

Nixon: That’s true. [unclear] This is educational for them. I think—I would think that they would be—they would, they would have much less of a tendency for reevaluation with their cumbersome bureaucracy than we have. You know, we constantly reevaluate, because we’ve got the columnists who write about it—

[unclear exchange]

Unidentified speaker: Of course, there’s the military issue—

[unclear exchange]

Kissinger: I understand that their foreign policy—Foreign Office people, at the beginning, didn’t know many of the details of their deployments and learned some of it from us.

Nixon: Is that right—?

Thompson: Henry, they still don’t know about it—

[unclear exchange]

Unidentified speaker: Of course, they’re much more compartmentalized—

Nixon: Yeah.

Unidentified speaker: —as one should be at a secret organization. They should be compartmentalized, and they really are, so that their army fellows are the only ones who really know the details of their deployment.

Unidentified speaker: I brought some pressure from the, from the Foreign Office people and the technical people to give in the end.

Nixon: The Chinese thing has never registered. You’ve never really discussed it—?

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

160. Editorial Note

On May 20, 1971, President Nixon and Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Kosygin issued a joint statement about their desire to come to an agreement on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Their statement, read on nationwide television and radio by Nixon and aired simultaneously on Moscow radio, stated:

“The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

“The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued.”

The text of the statement and Nixon’s additional remarks are printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, page 648.

Nixon and Kosygin exchanged letters similar in content to their public statement. The letters are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President’s Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 1.

The Congressional reaction to the May 20 announcement was generally positive, although Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J.W. Fulbright (D-AR) initially said he did not completely understand its significance and would reserve judgment. Senator Robert Taft, Jr. (R-OH) noted: “What it means is that the Russians are willing to talk about defensive weapons, the ABM, as well as offensive strategic weapons. This, I think, does indicate that we have a much better chance of making some meaningful progress.” Senate Majority Leader Michael Mansfield (D-MT) stated: “I think that now there is some light at the end of the tunnel, to use a time-worn phrase, in these negotiations which have been going on for so long in both Helsinki and Vienna.” (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, May 28, 1971, page 1155)

President Nixon was concerned about press reaction to his announcement and potential leaks. In a May 21 memorandum to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Smith, the President called for an end to leaks about SALT and warned: “I expect that prompt disciplinary action will be instituted against any person found to be responsible for stimulating the kind of press speculation on our negotiation position that appeared in the press for May 21, 1971.” (National

Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV, May 1–July 1971)

Press comment on the announcement was muted and President's Special Assistant Bob Houdek sent a memorandum to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger on May 21 that reads in part: "Haldeman, Colson and Company are concerned that the President is not getting enough credit for yesterday's SALT announcement, and have asked that you meet with or make phone calls to several newsmen who did not attend your briefings yesterday. The names specifically suggested were William S. White, James J. Kilpatrick and Hugh Sidey." (Ibid.)

From SALT Announcement to Summit Announcement, May 27–October 12, 1971

161. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Assistant to the President (Haldeman)¹

Washington, May 27, 1971.

Kissinger: I'm seeing Dobrynin today to exchange the letters.²
And—

Nixon: Fine.

Kissinger: Then, the fellow in Vienna [Semenov] is making some noises about not discussing things simultaneously. And I'm going to be very tough with Dobrynin and say, "You'd better not horse around or we'll just publish the telephone conversations³ I took, which I have—I have every conversation word for word."

[Omitted here is Nixon briefly speaking with aide Stephen Bull on an unrelated topic.]

Kissinger: Well, there it was agreed that it would be discussed simultaneously.

Nixon: Why? Are discussions going again?

Kissinger: No, but—all I want is that they don't, at the concluding session tomorrow, make a reference. By July, we might settle. Gerry is worried that Semenov will say tomorrow that first we do this, and then we do that. And that wouldn't be good. And I think I can get that settled.

Nixon: Well, for Christ's sakes, that's the whole purpose of the deal.

Kissinger: It's in the letters. There's really—

Nixon: So, we'll put the letters out.

Kissinger: Yes.

Nixon: What did you have in mind? [unclear] Well, the thing to do is to simply—now, we want to have a public [unclear].

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 504-2. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger and Haldeman from 9:33 to 10:01 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² See Document 160.

³ See Document 155.

Kissinger: They won't have a problem—

Nixon: I noticed, incidentally, that they've gotten tougher on—I noticed the Soviet [unclear] when they talked about the Brezhnev Doctrine in Prague,⁴ and we—

Kissinger: The embarrassment in Prague.

Nixon: And—but, well, it's the way we expected them to be, and their comments about the UAR, that we were responsible for—

Kissinger: Yes.

Nixon: —that. What I mean is, we are—we have a situation here where with them and with the Chinese, we are still dealing with governments that are basically hostile to us.

Kissinger: Oh, no question.

Nixon: So hostile to us that we, therefore, have got to do those things that are in our interests. And here it's cold turkey: If the sons-of-bitches don't play, fine.

Kissinger: And, actually, I think the Russians are really, basically, gangsters as types.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: The Chinese are a little more civilized.

Nixon: That's about all. Those Chinese are out to whip me.

Kissinger: Oh, they're both out to get us. The difference is that the Chinese will probably go for a big knockout, while the Russians will try to bleed us to death with the—

Nixon: Yeah, the Russians. But, we're going to play it very—with Dobrynin, say, "Look, that the President has called it to your attention—this Semenov or whatever—He saw this news summary and he said, 'Now, look: we're not a bit, a goddamn bit, interested in this, this kind of a thing.'" If he—if they want to play that kind of game, it's—then all bets are off. And I think you got to get to the summit thing faster. Remind me next week sometime, you—when you get back [unclear]—

Kissinger: I can do it next week.

Nixon: And, I'd put it right to 'em, hard: "What the hell are you going to do?"

Kissinger: That's right. I'll tell him. But, the threat has to be there: If they can't accept it now, we won't go in September no matter what they do.

⁴ On May 26, speaking before the 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Party in Prague, Brezhnev re-endorsed the doctrine named after him. The Brezhnev Doctrine was a term applied in the West to the Soviet justification for its invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In a speech on November 13, 1968, Brezhnev declared that a threat to socialist rule in any state of the East European bloc constituted a threat to all and therefore "must engage the attention of all the socialist states."

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: That's the threat we have to—otherwise, it's bleeding us.

162. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 28, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Soviet Line on SALT

For your information the Soviets in various private talks in the last days in Vienna seem intent on establishing the following points:

—The Soviet delegation leadership (Semyonov, Timerbaev, and Kishilov) all knew of the private negotiations and are “perplexed” that our side seems not to be well informed about the course of these negotiations or what was agreed.

—The ABM agreement will be a separate “treaty.”

—The ABM level can not be zero, but has to be equal; this means two-for-two sites, or at least the “right” of each side to have two sites, if that is the American position; they understand that NCA has been “withdrawn.” Each side might designate the geographical area for its ABM provided there was equality.

—Offensive and defensive controls will be linked in “time” and there will be negotiations concerning both, *but offensive restraints will not be in the agreement.*

—The May 20 agreement² “implicitly” recognized the problem of allowing modernization and replacement; the Soviets will have much more to say on this in Helsinki.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV, May 1–July 1971. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum indicating that he saw it.

² See Document 160.

Comment: There is, of course, some posturing on the Soviet side about being “in” on the private negotiations, but their comments suggest that they have been told to nail down certain details along lines preferred by the Soviets. In particular, their post-May 20 instructions seem to suggest that any ABM agreement is regarded as a separate instrument.

163. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Assistant to the President (Haldeman)¹

Washington, May 29, 1971.

Kissinger: I think they’ve never had as tough an opponent in here, as you’ve turned out to be.

Nixon: Hm-hmm. In a minute here you’ve got to give Thurmond² a call, right? And have, I mean, the Russian line that we’d agreed to quit—to give up ABM before we had an offensive limitation. But, it’s rather awkward language of the communiqué³ to have at all.

Kissinger: It says, “Together with.”

Nixon: “Together with.” Goodness, if—aren’t these people stupid up there, though? We say, “We shall concentrate this year on negotiating—”

Kissinger: But, of course—

Nixon: “—an ABM agreement.” And then, it goes on, in the next sentence—

Kissinger: “Together with, we will agree on.”

Nixon: “Together with this, we will agree with that.” You see? That’s all we have to do: say, “Look, you’re off-base, Senator.”

Kissinger: They are—but, what is happening is, Mr. President, I really think that the Communists are beginning to dominate some of our media. Six weeks ago, they were—

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 507–4. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger and Haldeman from 9:08 to 10:32 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina).

³ See Document 160.

Nixon: Oh, on that, I agree with you—

Kissinger: Because, now—

Nixon: I've been saying it for years.

Kissinger: I saw a *New Republic* article in which they castigated you for the SALT thing, because you maintained the relationship between offensive and defensive limitations. Here the Russians have already agreed to it, and they're still hitting away at it, which is, of course, what the Russians really want. And that's what, if they babble away enough, of course the Russians will pick it up at the next Helsinki thing. That's why we should get this summit date fixed.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: Because then they'll be reluctant to be too—

Nixon: Well, Henry, no summit, however, under any circumstances, unless we do have a—an interim SALT agreement to put it to, to put it on the finish there. We have to do that, Henry. To go there without doing that, that's not even worth our time.

Kissinger: They agree to it now, because we can't be sure. But—

Nixon: Perhaps.

Kissinger: —we've got to gamble, I think. We can always sign the Accidental War agreement. We can announce some progress on SALT. If there is a deadlock in Vienna we can break it at Moscow—

Nixon: Why do you have the summit, then? Fisheries?

Kissinger: Frankly, for—partly for domestic reasons, and partly—I frankly feel, Mr. President, at this point, that to keep the Democrats out of office next year—

Nixon: Is the main thing.

Kissinger: —is a major national necessity.

Nixon: That's right. It'd be terrible if they got in.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: Terrible.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Kissinger: And another argument for the summit is we have a better chance of getting the SALT with the summit that—

Nixon: I agree. I agree. They've got reasons as well as we have, to have something come out of the meeting. So, we can be sure on that. I'll put this—the other side of the coin. That we're not going to have a summit and come out without an ABM agreement.

Kissinger: Out of the question. That we can't do.

Nixon: [unclear] Never, never, never.

Kissinger: That we cannot do.

Nixon: I don't think it's all that difficult. They can get—we can have an ABM agreement, and a limitation on offensive weapons—

Kissinger: It's on offensive weapons, so it shouldn't be so hard—

Nixon: It's all we're asking.

164. Editorial Note

On June 4, 1971, between 4:47 and 5:59 p.m., President Nixon briefly discussed with President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Assistant to the President Haldeman, the relationship of SALT to the Vietnam war and an opening with China:

Kissinger: "By the end of the summer, we will know whether we have broken Vietnam."

Nixon: "Or, or SALT."

Kissinger: "Or SALT."

Nixon: "Or China."

Kissinger: "Or China."

Nixon: "Once we know we're going to do that, we'll know which is which."

Kissinger: "Well, it'd be nice if we could make them all work together."

Nixon: "As well as a summit."

Kissinger: "But China, we've got, and that we can—"

Nixon: "Yeah, if we can get one more, I mean—"

Kissinger: "Yeah."

Nixon: "—then we could get two out of three. That's pretty good."

The discussion moved to unrelated subjects then returned to SALT.

Kissinger: "In terms of achievements—this sounds self-serving—but, who has had a 3-year period like this? If you had said on January 20th that you would get 400,000 troops out of Vietnam in 2 years, open the way to—of a visit to Peking, a visit to Moscow, a SALT agreement, you'd have all of that done at the end of your third year—"

Nixon: "That'd be incredible, wouldn't it?"

Kissinger: "—they would have said, 'That's insanity!'" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 512–27) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

On June 8 Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin for a 3-hour dinner during which they discussed a variety of foreign policy issues, including China, Vietnam, and SALT. In a memorandum prepared on June 8 and forwarded to Nixon on June 15, Kissinger described the discussion about SALT as follows:

“We then turned to SALT. I said that I hoped that the Soviet negotiators would come to Helsinki in a positive spirit—that this had become a test case, and it would be very important for us to proceed properly.

“Dobrynin said that in a way he regretted that SALT had become the test case of our relationship. ‘In a way,’ he said, ‘you’ve even imposed it on us.’ The reason he regretted it was because, whether I believed it or not, he was in favor of closer Soviet-American relations and so, on the whole, was the whole Foreign Office. On the other hand, this was an issue which was essentially out of their control because the military played a very important role. Moreover, he said, in the Soviet system they did not have the cushion that was provided by our staff system. When any issue arose, therefore, it was taken directly to Brezhnev by the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry. The Foreign Ministry was precluded from making any comments on military issues. They could only defend their proposals on the grounds that it would help relations with the United States. The military were precluded from making any political judgments, but on the other hand, their military judgments were pretty definitive. This separation was being strictly maintained. For example, when Dobrynin was in Moscow for the Party Congress, he wanted military briefings. This required special Politburo clearance which was reluctantly granted, partly on the basis of his new membership in the Central Committee.

“Therefore, Dobrynin could not in good conscience predict just how things were going to go in Helsinki. He was strongly advocating, and he knew Gromyko was also, that progress be made. But he also knew that this was not a matter entirely up to them. He thought that the issue of missile defense as against NCA would present some conceptual difficulty since their military frankly didn’t understand why we were so interested in that. He also said that he did not think the idea of Semenov coming over here in the interval would work because Semenov would be too busy preparing for Helsinki.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 2]) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 252.

165. Conversation Between President Nixon and West German Chancellor Brandt¹

Washington, June 15, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: Allow me to brief you here on SALT. We—well, with—the joint announcement² indicated an intention to try to seek, this year, eliminating of ABMs and on some offensive weapons. Now, the two are linked. The two must be simultaneous. The reason why you—why different language was used in the communiqué [unclear] Moscow and Washington, is that the ABM system, of course, is one [unclear] whereas if you're only biting off a part of the offensive—for example, ICBMs—you're leaving out air power, you're—I mean, airplanes—you're leaving out submarines—

Brandt: Hmm.

Nixon: —of course, and the rest. Now, there's a lot of hard negotiating to go on. It will start again in July and August sessions. But, a lot of preliminary negotiation has already taken place. I think the hope, at the present time, the prospects—now, I would say they were prospects at present, despite anything that's said publicly, are that some kind of agreement will be reached—perhaps this year. I'd say that's the prospect. Now, you can never be sure, just as you can't be sure about Berlin—

Brandt: Hmm.

Nixon: —but, in this field, this agreement—now, the reason this is, of course, terribly important. I was saying to the Chancellor earlier, that even though, even though our—which, of course, our Soviet friends are always saying: "There is no linkage. We never talk about linkage," if they will make progress on SALT, that makes it more likely that we make progress on Berlin.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 520–6. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Brandt from 11:02 a.m. to 12:34 p.m. Kissinger and the West German State Secretary for Foreign, Defense, and German Policy, Egon Bahr, joined the discussion at 11:13 a.m. Kissinger left at 12:30. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. For portions of the conversation related to Germany, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 254.

² See Document 160.

³ At 2:30 p.m. on June 15 Nixon, Kissinger, and Dobrynin met in the Oval Office, at the Soviet Ambassador's request, to deliver a message from the Soviet Government for a five-power nuclear conference. According to a memorandum prepared by Kissinger, Dobrynin asked: "What do you think of US/Soviet relations in general?" Nixon replied: "We can make a breakthrough on SALT and Berlin, and then our whole post-war relations will be on a new basis. The whole relationship can, indeed, be on a new basis."

Brandt: Um-hmm.

Nixon: If, on—and, on the other side of the coin, if we're able to make progress on Berlin, it makes it more likely that we make progress on SALT.

Brandt: Um-hmm.

Nixon: So, we—we, therefore, have a common interest, it seems to me, in making progress. The other thing I should say about SALT, though: that you can be very sure that nothing is being done—I mean, in any way, in any way—that is not mutual, that will not be simultaneous. And, it will—it will, of course, that will, in any way, weaken our own position in the alliance. I mean, that's all—

Brandt: Yes.

Nixon: —that's [unclear]. But, we are moving forward, and it's hopeful.

166. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, June 18, 1971, 3–4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

John N. Irwin, II

Ronald Spiers

Seymour Weiss

Raymond Garthoff

Amb. Graham Parsons

Defense

David Packard

Paul Nitze

Archie L. Wood

JCS

LTG Royal B. Allison

Justice

Attorney General John Mitchell

CIA

LTG Robert E. Cushman

Carl Duckett

ACDA

Amb. Gerard Smith

Harold Brown

Philip J. Farley

Spurgeon Keeny

OST

Dr. Edward David

OMB

James Schlesinger

NSC

K. Wayne Smith

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

William Hyland

Jack Merritt

Barry Carter

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1) the Working Group would prepare, prior to the NSC meeting on SALT, a statement on collateral restraints in a defensive agreement, including what restraints are agreed, those that are disagreed and by whom, and draft language for an expression of the restraints;

2) the three choices for a freeze on offensive weapons (ICBMs only, ICBMs and SLBMs, and SLBMs and heavy bombers) will be put to the President in an NSC meeting for decision; the consensus of the Verification Panel is to try for a freeze on both ICBMs and SLBMs;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

3) based on Mr. G. Smith's proposal for a simple formulation of a freeze on offensive weapons, with a cut-off date, the Working Group will examine alternatives as to dates, elements of a freeze, and language.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

167. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 21, 1971, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Dobrynin

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Dobrynin then handed me a piece of paper (attached)² which lifted some discrepancies between our English text and their translation of the SALT letter. He said it was not a major matter because we were not responsible for their translation of the text. I said that I did not think that any issues would have to be settled by recourse to the text and that I hoped they would approach matters in a positive spirit. Dobrynin said they would but that it would be extremely helpful if we did not insist from the beginning that we talk about ABM and offensive weapons jointly. He said this would create a major bureaucratic difficulty for them and weaken the influence of the Foreign Office. He could assure me that if we concentrated on ABM for the first two or three weeks, that then there would be no difficulty linking the offensive discussions. I told him I would take this up with Smith.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Map Room at the White House. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 263.

² Attached but not printed.

³ On June 28 Kissinger and Dobrynin met to discuss several issues. According to a memorandum of conversation prepared by Kissinger, they had the following exchange about SALT: "[Dobrynin] said that Garthoff had had a conversation with Vorontsov and had talked in great generalities about a treaty form and, secondly, had mentioned a very broad agreement on offensive limitations. Dobrynin wanted to tell me that in his view, Moscow was prepared for an ICBM freeze, but the broader the freeze on our side, the more difficult their bureaucratic problem would become." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 1])

168. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Salt (Wood) to the Verification Panel Working Group¹

Washington, June 25, 1971.

SUBJECT

Summary of Agency Views on ABM Collateral Constraints

As requested by Dr. K. Wayne Smith,² this office has prepared the attached summary overview of the several agencies' positions on ABM collateral constraints.³

The summary reflects that there is a general convergence of views on many of the constraints and major differences on only one key issue—radar controls. Additionally, OSD considers it essential that the treaty contain a definitions article; other agencies have not yet formally commented on this aspect. There is also a clear preference for reducing the total number of collateral constraints by dropping some and combining others into single provisions.

Radar Controls: All agencies except State believe control of Hen House radars is essential.

—OSD and ACDA proposed a new provision which would apply to all new phased array early warning and non-ABM radars. [2 lines not declassified] OSD and ACDA differ on whether the U.S. would retain the right to deploy a radar system equivalent to Hen House (per the present NSDM-90⁴ formula)—OSD's version includes the right, ACDA's version denies the right.

—State believes it desirable (rather than essential) to combine all radar controls into a new provision calling for consultation (no veto right) on radars which might be confused with ABM radars. Like the OSD and ACDA approach, this would result in the present Hen House Early Warning provision and the non-ABM radar provision becoming a single constraint. State believes a more practical negotiating approach would be to apply the "rule of reason" in such radar consultations.

—CIA believes it essential that limits be imposed on Hen Houses and that it be required that early warning radars continue to be peripherally located and outward-facing. They also believe it highly desirable that Hen House radars be limited to those now operational or under construction, and require that they be undefended and unhard-

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-78-125, Box 9, ABM Limitations. Top Secret.

² On June 18 Smith, as directed at the Verification Panel meeting (see Document 166) instructed the members of the Working Group to have a paper ready by June 22. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-98-0162, SA-5, Effectiveness in the ABM Role)

³ Attached but not printed is a chart of agency positions on ABM collateral constraints.

⁴ Document 113.

ened. [2½ lines not declassified] They would prefer the 4 August 1970 version of the non-ABM radar consultation provision,⁵ and believe it to be desirable rather than essential.

—JCS prefer the wording of the 4 August 1970 proposal on Hen Houses because the alternative formulations introduce new and complex questions of definitions, difficult technical constraints and “mutual agreement” problems. JCS would drop the requirement for non-ABM radar consultation.

Definitions Article: OSD has recommended an additional provision which would establish a set of definitions of the ABM components to which an agreement would apply. They believe it essential that an ABM treaty include such language to support, enhance and strengthen the meaning and intent of the entire document, including other corollary constraints. The point is made that should the U.S. be unsuccessful in negotiating some “essential” constraints on such items as Hen Houses and SAM conversion, a rigorous, well-formulated definitions article will serve as our fundamental basis for challenge.

—Other agencies have not furnished formal comments on the requirement for such a definitions provision. The Soviet draft treaty did not include such a provision and it could be argued that such an approach introduces additional complicating factors or that it is intrinsically impossible to phrase such an article.

Reduce and Simplify: Most agencies would drop the “Advance Notification of New SAM” and “Pre-Announcement of ABM Flight Test” constraints; JCS would also drop the two radar consultation provisions. State, OSD and ACDA would combine radar constraints into a single new provision—however, as noted above, there are major differences on how such a provision would be worded. ACDA and State also recommend combining the “SAM Upgrade Ban” and “SAM Testing in an ABM Mode” constraints into a single new provision. JCS, in general, prefer less complex and simplified versions of the various constraints.

Archie L. Wood

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 104.

169. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

JCSM–308–71

Washington, June 30, 1971.

SUBJECT

US Position for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Helsinki SALT V)

1. The views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been established and forwarded to you on a broad range of matters relating to strategic arms limitations in general and to the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the USSR in particular. However, in consideration of the joint US/USSR 20 May 1971 announcement—which serves to focus SALT in a framework which conceivably could result in relatively early agreement—and the work underway to develop a US position for the resumption of negotiations on 8 July 1971 (Helsinki SALT V), the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it desirable that they set forth specifically their views on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) limitations, certain offensive limitations, and the type of agreement needed to carry out the 20 May announcement. It should be emphasized that these positions have been developed in the context of the joint US/USSR 20 May announcement; they do not reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the full range of issues associated with SALT.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand clearly that the joint US/USSR 20 May announcement means that the United States and the USSR will seek to negotiate an agreement limiting the deployment of ABMs together with certain measures to limit strategic offensive weapons; this is understood to mean that the two agreements—regardless of form—should take effect simultaneously and that no separate ABM agreement will be made unless the Soviets agree to the offensive limitations.

3. With respect to an agreement limiting defensive systems (strategic ABM systems), the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that as a minimum the agreement should:

a. Permit the United States and USSR each to have up to four ABM sites, with no more than 400 launchers/interceptors divided among the four sites.

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological. Top Secret; Sensitive. Moorer sent a draft of this memorandum covering the same points to the JCS on June 29 for approval. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Moorer, Box 52, 388.3, SALT.

b. Permit the USSR to have not more than one site west of the Ural Mountains, with a maximum of 100 launchers/interceptors deployed at that site; and that site would be NCA Moscow. The United States would be permitted not more than one site east of the Mississippi River, with a maximum of 100 launchers/interceptors deployed at that site; and that site would be NCA Washington, D.C.

c. ABM sites east of the Ural Mountains for the USSR and west of the Mississippi River for the United States must be geographically positioned for the defense of deployed fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

d. All controlled ABM components (missiles, launchers, and tracking and guidance radars) would be required to be located within 100 kilometers of each specified site.

e. Retain the option, regardless of the number of ABM sites permitted, for the United States at a later date to inactivate a Safeguard site and to construct an NCA Washington site.

f. Soviet Hen House radars should be limited to those operational and under construction, and the United States would retain the right to construct an equivalent system.

4. In arriving at their position on ABM limitations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken into account the clearly expressed USSR preference for NCA levels of defense on each side and, in particular, for an NCA defense of Moscow. At the same time, they have taken into account the US ballistic missile defense deployment to date and the US strategic purpose of defending a part of its strategic retaliatory forces. The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is equitable for the United States and the USSR in all ways:

a. It takes account of developments and deployments on both sides,
 b. It provides equal options on each side without requiring the exercise of these options, and

c. It promotes strategic stability by providing options for defense of strategic retaliatory forces.

On this latter point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe four site ICBM defenses would serve the purposes of strategic arms limitation and would provide an acceptable strategic posture when taken together with certain offensive limitations. Were the Soviets to exercise their option to defend a part of their strategic missile silos east of the Ural Mountains, this should not be viewed—considering the offensive forces on each side—as tending to upset the strategic balance.

5. In addition, the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, recommends that both the United States and the USSR would be allowed to deploy terminal defense ABMs limited to the dedicated point defense of land-based retaliatory missiles and clearly not capable of providing urban protection.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the specification of limitations in the interim agreement on measures to limit offensive forces—the “together-with” agreement which is to accompany an ABM

agreement—should be as simple as possible, consistent with clear understanding; should take account of the negotiating history to date; and should assure that the security interests of the United States are fully protected or enhanced. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that as a minimum the “together-with” provisions on offensive limitations to accompany an ABM agreement specify that:

a. The United States and the USSR agree not to exceed the aggregate total of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) operational as of 8 July 1971 or the earliest feasible date thereafter that agreement can be reached, but not later than 31 December 1971.

b. The United States and the USSR agree to equal totals of modern large ballistic missiles (MLBMs) at a level not to exceed the number of Soviet MLBMs operational as of 8 July 1971 or the earliest feasible date thereafter that agreement can be reached, but not later than 31 December 1971. An example of specific wording for the recommended offensive force interim limitation is contained in the Appendix hereto.²

7. The Chief of Staff, US Army, and the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, believe that it is militarily undesirable to allow the Soviets to continue their dynamic, ongoing land- and sea-based launcher construction program within an aggregate, permitting the replacement of aging, perhaps obsolescent, ICBM and SLBM launchers. Therefore, they recommend that construction of all strategic offensive missile launchers be halted as of a specified date and for the duration of the interim agreement. This position is based on the proposition that the initial agreement will be an interim one not extending beyond 2 years. If no comprehensive agreement is reached in that period, it would be necessary to alter the interim agreement to provide for freedom to mix and for US development of MLBMs. Therefore, the Chief of Staff, US Army, and the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, believe the Appendix should read: “The United States and the USSR agree to halt the construction of all strategic offensive missile launchers as of (a specified date).”

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the agreement on ABMs and the accompanying interim agreement on certain measures for the limitation of offensive strategic weapons must be in the form of appropriate formal written documents. In order to insure that the Soviets negotiate constructively toward a more comprehensive agreement on offensive forces, the agreement on ABMs must contain a time limitation that will result in automatic cancellation of the ABM limitations,

² Attached but not printed is a draft text: “The US and USSR agree not to exceed the aggregate total of ICBMs and SLBMs operational as of 8 July 1971 or the earliest feasible date thereafter that agreement can be reached, but no later than 31 December 1971. The US and USSR also agree to equal total of MLBMs at a level not to exceed the number of Soviet MLBMs operational as of 8 July 1971, or the earliest feasible date thereafter that agreement can be reached, but no later than 31 December 1971.”

if a more comprehensive agreement on limitation of strategic offensive forces were not concluded within 2 years. Similarly, the “together-with” agreement on offensive forces would carry an automatic 2-year escape option. In other words, both the ABM agreement and the interim agreement on strategic offensive forces would lapse automatically if no comprehensive agreement on offensive limitations has been negotiated within 2 years.

9. As a general point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to emphasize that all systems to be included in these agreements be carefully defined in order to prevent misunderstandings or misinterpretations.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that the agreements should be paralleled during the course of their existence with an active program of hedges designed to avoid a deterioration of US security.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T.H. Moorer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

170. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, June 30, 1971, 3:15–4:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPATION

The President

State

Secretary William P. Rogers

Deputy Under Secretary John N. Irwin

Ronald Spiers, Director of Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs

Defense

Secretary Melvin E. Laird

Deputy Secretary David Packard

Paul Nitze, Consultant to the Secretary

Justice

Attorney General John N. Mitchell

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1971–6/20/74. Top Secret; SALT; Nodis; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Roosevelt Room at the White House.

JCS
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer,
Chairman
Major General Royal B. Allison,
Assistant to the Chairman
for Strategic Arms Negotiation

CIA
Lt. General Robert E. Cushman,
Deputy Director
Carl Duckett

ACDA
Ambassador Gerard Smith, Director
Deputy Director Philip Farley
Spurgeon Keeny, Assistant Director
for Science and Technology

OEP
General George A. Lincoln,
Director

NSC Staff
Henry A. Kissinger
K. Wayne Smith
Helmut Sonnenfeldt

President: I would like to start the meeting with the briefing by CIA. The meeting may take some time because I am sure everyone has a strong opinion on these issues. I would like to go from the CIA briefing to have Dr. Kissinger cover the issues and alternatives. I will then call on Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer, and Ambassador Smith on each issue for their position. As soon as possible after the meeting we will get out an NSDM on what our position should be at Helsinki.

General Cushman: [Copies of the CIA briefing attached.]² General Cushman closed his briefing by noting that our [*less than 1 line not declassified*] will give us much greater intelligence gathering capabilities with higher resolution than we have been able to get from other systems.

Secretary Laird: Mr. President, I would just like to point out that this satellite worked on the first try. We have had problems with some of our other systems and most of them have not worked on the first try.

President: As I recall, we talked at one time about cutting this system out of the budget but look at the pictures that we are getting with it. Let me raise another point which came up recently in my meeting with the Science Advisory Board. Land has proposed a system that he believes will be even better than this one. Henry, can you explain what the system will do?

² Brackets are in the original. The CIA briefing is attached; printed below.

Kissinger: Mr. President, anyone who relies on me for a technical evaluation of such systems is in great trouble. My understanding is that it will [less than 1 line not declassified].

President: Land says it can be done and we all know what a genius he is and what he has accomplished. He says it can be done if a commitment is made now.³ I understand that the system would give [less than 1 line not declassified]. The resolution is also supposed to be better than anything we have now. Land spoke with such conviction that I would like to hear your views about whether or not we should go forward, especially because of the connection with a SALT agreement.

Secretary Packard: The system is a good idea. It is based on new technology—solid state sensors. It has better characteristics than a camera, that is, it can take better pictures with less light. There are some problems but there is no question about feasibility. It will cost, with the [less than 1 line not declassified] that is necessary, about [less than 1 line not declassified] for development.

President: How long will it take to develop the system?

Secretary Packard: 1976.

President: That would mean [less than 1 line not declassified] spread over five years.

Secretary Packard: Yes. The key issue is, do we want to have this capability sooner? There is another system called the [less than 1 line not declassified] that will be available sooner. We could have it in 1974. This system would [less than 1 line not declassified]. If we want the Land system, the chances are it will not be available until at least 1976 at the earliest. The issue is, do we want to have something in the interim? The interim system that I am talking about will cost only one-third as much with operating costs of about [less than 1 line not declassified] year.

President: In light of the negotiations in SALT and the need for verification, we probably need both. Suppose we got a SALT agreement by, say, January 1972, we might not want to wait until 1976.

Secretary Laird: We have both now in the FY 72 budget.

Secretary Packard: Our plan is to have the interim system and when the bugs are all worked out to then go to the Land system.

Secretary Laird: There is a pressing problem. Senator Ellender wants to cut \$500 million out of the intelligence budget. If this cut is sustained by the Congress, one of the systems might have to go.

Secretary Packard: With such a cut we might have to cut out the proposed interim system and wait on the Land system which is better. We should realize we can't have it till 1976.

³ Land urged the President to approve a new reconnaissance satellite at Nixon's June 4 meeting with PFIAB; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 233.

Kissinger: As I understand it, the primary usage of such systems would not be for SALT but for tactical situations and MBFR where you want to monitor any changes, for example in mobilization, very quickly. Had we had such a system during the Suez crisis (1970), we would not have faced the problems posed by a two-week lag in our information.

Secretary Laird: I should point out that neither system works at night. Both are better than what we have now.

Kissinger: My point is that changes in the strategic area happen slowly but changes in the tactical area much more quickly.

President: We should have another talk about this later. Admiral Moorer should sit in. Dr. Kissinger, could you now summarize the issues and alternatives?

Kissinger: Mr. President, the Verification Panel has reviewed the three major issues that you face.⁴ These issues are: the level of ABMs that we want, the nature of an offensive freeze, and the length and form of an agreement. In considering an ABM option we could theoretically choose between a zero, a Washington/Moscow NCA defense, or a Safeguard/Moscow position. However, the NCA defense would likely be zero for the U.S. since there is little hope of getting approval by the Congress. This is why you decided earlier on some form of Safeguard for Moscow. Second, the Soviets may not be interested in the zero level, though we could test this again before the Helsinki negotiations start. Thus, it appears that some form of Safeguard for the U.S. and the Moscow defense for the Soviets is the most realistic option available. The key questions are what level of Safeguard do we want and do we want to maximize Safeguard for us or minimize the Moscow system for them. In looking at what the Safeguard defense can do, the Verification Panel has analyzed the value of Safeguard in relation to four objectives:

(1) Minuteman defense, (2) Population and bomber defense, (3) Value as an expansion base, and (4) In terms of keeping pressure on the Soviets.

The evaluation of the Minuteman defense capability disclosed that the number of surviving Minutemen contributed by even four Safeguard sites and 400 interceptors is quite low. In view of our worries about SAM upgrade we would find this inadequate return for allowing the Soviets an equivalent defense. Moreover, the number of survivors is largely independent of the number of sites at low interceptor levels which are likely to be negotiated if we want to limit Soviet defenses. There is also the problem of saturation. In fact, somewhat iron-

⁴ Reference is to the Verification Panel review of ABMs, the nature of offensive weapons, and the length and form of an agreement. See Document 166.

ically, with 100 interceptors the number of survivors decreases as you increase ABM sites.

For defense of population the more sites the greater is the coverage (however light) and, for bombers, the more sites the greater the number of survivors. For planned Safeguard sites we get maximum coverage at three sites since the site at Warren, Wyoming, covers an area already covered by the other sites. The coverage would be very thin—one site covers 40 million people, 2 sites 70 million and three sites 80 million. Given six minutes reaction time, Safeguard can save 10–20 bombers over no defense, at eight minutes reaction time the savings is 20–40 bombers. The maximum difference between two sites and four sites is 30 additional bombers saved.

As for the value of various Safeguard levels as an expansion base, if we wanted to expand to an area defense there is a fixed lead time of about 4–1/2 years to complete the next four sites whatever number we start with; thereafter, we can complete an additional two sites about every three months. This means the difference between two to four sites is three to six months.

However, it also means that during the 4–1/2 year lead-time period, we would only have whatever sites were already built as improved by the number of missiles which could be added to existing radars.

As General Cushman pointed out the Soviet/Moscow defense is composed of 64 interceptors, four dish-type radars, two phased array acquisition radars, and two new radars under construction. Presumably, these new radars are to enable them to add missiles up to the level of 100 which was in our August 4 proposal.⁵ It seems likely these radars will be modern, phased arrays. It also seems likely that the Soviets would not be willing to stop construction and dismantle these new radar sites.

President: What is the situation with regard to upgrading?

General Cushman: We think they are planning to upgrade with the R&D development work at Sary Shagan, but we don't know whether these new systems will be deployed at Moscow or at another city.

Kissinger: One problem Gerry faces is what the Soviets say if we ask them for more than one site. But in considering comparable levels of ABM, we should remember that there is a great difference between one Moscow site and two Safeguard sites. The Moscow site covers 25 percent of the Soviet population and 35 percent of its industry and about 500 missile sites. The two Safeguard sites defending 350 Minuteman missiles would cover only about 5 percent of our population and 5 percent of our industry, that is, using the basic Spartan. Larger

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 104.

figures can be gotten from the modified Spartan. Thus, we have a respectable rationale for asymmetry in number of sites in terms of the true capabilities of the system. I should add that “covered” means covered in theory only. As long as they are limited to 100 missiles we can saturate their defenses. I am simply defining equivalency, that is, sites or areas protected. Even with one site we can add more radars and more interceptors.

The span of possible positions is:

An agreement allowing both sides 4 sites and 400 interceptors but worded to constrain 3 of the Soviet sites to East of the Urals. This position argues that radars cannot be effectively controlled and that giving the Soviets sites East of the Urals doesn’t threaten our penetration capability in a significant way.

An agreement which gives the U.S. one site and gives the Soviets Moscow with 100 interceptors, their existing 4 dish-type radars, the Dog House and Chekhov arrays and whatever other phased-array radars could be co-located at those sites. This formulation would stop work on the new radar sites around Moscow.

An agreement allowing the U.S. two sites, 4 radar complexes and 100 interceptors and giving the Soviets the Moscow defense and allowing them to complete the new radars. A variant on this as an opening negotiating position would be to try 200 interceptors while not permitting completion of the new Soviet radars. This could be put on basis of either/or, that is, NCA defense or missile defense. There are several ways to present this proposal with equal values and interceptors or equality at each site. It is not very equivalent if one looks at population coverage.

Whatever the ultimate decision on the number of sites, general value of protection, negotiation, etc., I am simply presenting here the alternatives. There is nothing wrong with a three-site alternative, except that Gerry believes it is not negotiable. The combinations of possibilities are almost infinite.

The Verification Panel has also looked at the collateral constraints on ABMs we should include. Without going into those constraints in detail, it was generally agreed that a number of these constraints contained in the U.S. August 4 proposal already had Soviet agreement and others were probably negotiable. It is generally agreed that we should propose, at least initially, most of the constraints from the August 4 proposal. These constraints are: testing and deployment of mobile ABMs prohibited, equipping an ABM, launchers with a reload capability prohibited, a specific provision banning the upgrading of SAM systems, prohibiting testing SAMs in an ABM mode, allowing ABM R&D but test firings only from 15 launchers at agreed test ranges. There is one major issue in the collateral constraints dealing with radars. The questions relating to the issue are, should we propose to limit the So-

viet Hen House radars (or long range acquisition radars) to those existing or under construction? Some argue that this is not negotiable; others argue that they provide a very strong base for expansion of the Soviet ABM system. The other question is, should we insist on the right of the U.S. to build an equivalent network?

First, what systems should be included in a freeze?

On offensive systems, we have three alternatives: (1) ICBMs only, (2) ICBMs and SLBMs, and (3) All three systems—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.

We considered and rejected an option involving only ICBMs and bombers since neither side has a dynamic bomber program, bombers do not have a first-strike capability and limiting bombers while allowing SLBMs to run free lacks logical rationale.

However, a freeze of ICBMs alone would formally validate a Soviet edge of about 460 to 530 ICBMs. This could cause some political and diplomatic difficulties.

Consequently, there seems to be a consensus that we seek, at least initially, to include more than ICBMs.

The second option—freeze on SLBMs as well as ICBMs—would mean that we could reduce the possibility that the Soviets will soon have more SLBMs than we, or we at least would control the size of their advantage. One possible agreement would be a freeze on ICBMs with a clause that the agreement would be terminated if either side deployed more than a designated number of SLBMs.

The third option—a freeze on heavy bombers as well as ICBMs and SLBMs—would be the most comprehensive approach. The difficulty is the more comprehensive our approach the more comprehensive their approach will be, probably including raising the issues of FBS and the negotiating history. Since the U.S. has a numerical edge in bombers, the overall Soviet advantage would be fairly small, about 200–250 delivery vehicles. However, some believe that we should not delay or hamper our negotiating by trying to include bombers. Because of the time it takes them to reach targets, bombers are not as important as ICBMs or SLBMs in a first-strike scenario. Moreover, neither side now has any active bomber construction program.

In any option, a primary objective is to limit the SS-9.

President: Gerry, my understanding is that our greatest interest is to limit ICBMs. Do you agree?

Smith: Yes, if you put a sublimit on MLBMs.

President: What is of greatest concern to the Soviets in offensive systems?

Smith: We have nothing going for us in this area. They may ask for some limitation on MIRVs. The more comprehensive the freeze

we attempt to get the more likely they are to introduce issues such as forward-based systems.

President: They want to limit our defensive system; we want to limit their offensive systems. Would it be in our interest to limit bombers?

Secretary Laird: No.

President: Could we limit bombers at a certain number?

Secretary Irwin: Yes, if we froze at current operational levels we would be ahead.

Smith: If we include bombers and ICBMs only, we would have a difficult time explaining to the Congress why we omitted the dynamic Soviet submarine program.

Admiral Moorer: The important point is the aggregate total, not the sublimits.

President: Henry, would you continue? I know Secretary Rogers has to go to New York to give a speech⁶ and I want to hear his views before he leaves, particularly on the kind of an agreement we should have.

Kissinger: We have looked at various ways to define a freeze as it relates to ICBMs. If we were to freeze at the level operation, e.g., in July, this would mean that the Soviets would not be able to complete either the 12 SS-9s now under active construction or the 68 new-type silos.

If we were to freeze at the level operational as of January, 1972, this might permit completion of the 12 SS-9s under active construction, while probably not permitting completion of the new-type silos.

If we were to freeze at the level operational and under construction as of July, this would, of course, permit completion of both the SS-9s, and the new-type silos.

Let me go now, Mr. President, to the question you raised about the form and duration of an agreement. As for the duration of an agreement there are two major points: (1) Whatever the form and length we clearly want the offensive and defensive position to be coterminous; and (2) all are agreed that there should be a clause relating the ABM agreement to progress in negotiating a more comprehensive agreement. The issue is whether the agreement should have a finite lifetime with a mandatory lapse provision or whether the termination provision should be more flexible.

There are three major alternatives: (1) An indefinite agreement with a clause regarding abrogation if supreme national interest were

⁶ On June 30 Rogers delivered an address, "The United States and Japan: Common Interests and Common Problems," before the Japan Society, Inc., in New York. See Department of State *Bulletin*, July 19, 1971, pp. 69–73.

at stake; (2) an agreement with a clause containing the right to abrogate but no obligation to do so; and (3) an agreement with a mandatory lapse provision.

Secretary Rogers: The options were well outlined and commented on. I have no strong convictions about the alternatives. I would simply make the general points that we are committed to reach an agreement this year. I think we should give maximum flexibility to our negotiators while reserving the final decisions for you. My own preference is for two Safeguard sites in exchange for Moscow but our starting negotiating position might be higher. We want to insure that we have a deal that will look good in public. With respect to offensive systems, I think we should try to freeze both ICBMs and SLBMs but we may have to fall back. If the forward-base systems issue is raised, we should fall off of SLBMs. The key question is how do we handle the simultaneity problem? For our testimony and hearings in Congress we can't have just the prospect of an agreement; we must have a real agreement. For those of us who must go before the Congress we need to have something to defend.

Kissinger: In fact, if we have an ABM agreement first, the Soviets can blackmail us on the offensive portion. The offensive agreement must go in parallel.

Secretary Rogers: We will face a tough problem with the Congress. Both our friends and our enemies would be against us. I think the form of the agreement should be a treaty.

President: Does it have to be?

Secretary Rogers: Yes. It will raise serious political problems if we don't have a treaty. Henry's middle position of a treaty with the right to abrogate but no obligation to do so is the right one. We should not have an obligation to end the treaty after a fixed time since we may want to keep it going. I would favor a two or three-year time limit. Before I leave I would like to hear some additional discussion on the issue of simultaneity.

Smith: If we stick to ICBMs and SLBMs we may be able to get an agreement. After testifying recently before Senator Jackson and others, I think a treaty is the only possible solution.

Rogers: Can we get a written agreement on offensive systems?

Smith: Yes.

President: What kind of an agreement would it be?

Secretary Rogers: I am talking about an executive agreement. We also need to get a joint Congressional resolution.

President: Yes. We first need to get something good, then we need to get Congress to participate and approve. This would give Congress a sense of participation but it would be less formal than advice and consent.

Secretary Rogers: An executive agreement requires only a majority vote in both Houses; a treaty would require a two-thirds vote in the Senate.

Smith: We should try to get a joint or concurrent Congressional resolution in advance. There is one further legal problem, Mr. President. My charter says that no agreement can be made with a foreign power to limit armaments. This was pointed out to me by Senator Jackson. I believe he is wrong about this restriction and that the constitutional prerogatives of the President in foreign affairs will enable us to overcome this legal problem.

President: This is a luxury we can worry about when we get down the road. Henry, go ahead with your briefing. [At this point, Secretary Rogers left the meeting.]⁷

Kissinger: The Soviets now have operational 22 of the Y-class submarines. This big, fast SSBN is roughly comparable to our submarines. An additional 15 Y-class boats are presently under construction, three of which have been launched but are still being fitted out.

The Soviets also have the other G and H-class submarines.

With respect to SLBMs, we could allow the Soviets those which have been launched as of, e.g., July. This would permit them to complete construction on only those three Y-class submarines which have already been launched giving them [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Second, we could allow the Soviets to complete all SLBMs under construction as of July. This would allow them [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

Third, we could simply agree to a number of Y-class SLBMs equal to our SLBMs. However, because they also have G and H-class SLBMs, this would give the Soviets an edge of about [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

There seems to be no consensus yet on how we should freeze SLBMs. The basic issue is aggregate limits not sublimits.

Finally, there is the issue of how we define what activities are allowable under “modernization and replacement”. The terms are ambiguous. We can go through these issues but I don’t think you will be faced with them in the first month.

The key issues facing you, Mr. President, are: What trade-off between Safeguard and Moscow defense is in our interest? What offensive systems should we try to limit at this stage? What should be the nature of the termination clause?

President: Let’s have Defense’s view.

⁷ Brackets are in the original.

Secretary Laird: Let me make a few general points first. I believe strict instructions should be given on the limits of offensive arrangements that we will agree to. Safeguard is our only bargaining chip and we should use this in the context of the offensive arrangements. Regarding ABMs, I can go along with two sites as the final position but we believe that to start out each country should be given the choice of NCA or a missile defense (assuming zero is out). The Soviets could have three sites. Our negotiating position should start with three sites. I think a case can be made that, if a country chooses to have a missile defense rather than an NCA defense, it can have more missiles. In no case should we agree to less than 200 interceptors.

Kissinger: Spread over three sites?

Secretary Laird: Yes. When we started the negotiations the Soviets had 250 MLBMs. We should be able to trade off three interceptors for each MLBM above 250. This can be justified for ICBM defense. With respect to radar, we think each site should have two radars. I would not be concerned if the Soviets have four modern radar complexes. We need four such complexes. I also think that definitions on ABM must be concise and clear. As far as DOD is concerned, we should start with all three offensive systems with a July 1 cutoff date. We would be willing to fall back to ICBMs and SLBMs using the July date. The latter kind of freeze would give the Soviets a total of roughly 2000 and us a total of 1710. I think we can justify this difference to the Congress if bombers are excluded. I think freedom to mix should be permitted. If the Soviets want more SLBMs after the July 1 date, they would have to phase down ICBMs. This is the only chance we have to get effective limits on MLBMs. Once we make ABM agreement we will never have the opportunity again. With regard to the form and duration of an agreement, I agree with what Secretary Rogers has said with one exception: I think the agreement should have an automatic termination date based on progress in the offensive negotiations. The fact is we are never going to be able to terminate an ABM agreement. Our system doesn't work that way no matter what a treaty says. Without an automatic termination date, we would give up any bargaining leverage we have over offensive systems. Tom, why don't you go ahead.

Admiral Moorer: First, let me comment on the basic principles the JCS have followed in arriving at our position. These are: First, we want to maintain an adequate deterrent. Second, the Soviets have ongoing both offensive and defensive systems. We have only defensive systems. Third, we believe the U.S. would receive a first strike. Fourth, we have tried to work out our position in terms of equivalency. Fifth, any interim agreement will likely become permanent. Thus, it would not be prudent to go too far with the notion of being able to correct deficiencies later. With respect to ABMs we would like to have an option per-

mitting us and the Soviets to build four sites. Three of our sites would be west of the Mississippi and three of their sites would be east of the Urals. All of these sites would be in the missile fields. Their fourth site could be Moscow and ours Washington if we wanted. All components of the sites should be in specified geographic areas. We also think we should retain the option to dismantle Safeguard and to build NCA. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force believes we should have an option for hard-site defense at some later point if this should become necessary. We feel this four-site proposal is equitable and would contribute to strategic stability. With respect to offensive systems, we should establish agreed aggregate totals for all three but in any event for ICBMs and SLBMs with a sublimit on MLBMs and an option for the U.S. to build MLBMs. The date for the freeze should be as early as possible. We would prefer July 1 and with December 31 at the latest. The reason for an early date is that the more we continue to talk the worse the problem becomes. We also think that within these aggregates SLBMs should be traded off against ICBMs.

Secretary Laird: Mr. President, it is to our advantage to have them make such a tradeoff.

Admiral Moorer: Yes. They operate submarines in waters where we operate surface vessels and we have sound detection systems which can detect Soviet submarines. They to the best of our knowledge do not have any systems capable of detecting our submarines. The provisions outlined above would provide an incentive for the Soviets to move to a permanent agreement. We must have an automatic termination date. Such a date will give us maximum leverage to force agreement on offensive systems. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force support a freeze where you are. We would leave the form of the agreement to the experts. But we believe there should be some kind of official document. We don't want to get into the situation we had with respect to the bombing halt in 1968 where no one could document what the terms of the agreement had been.

Secretary Laird: We should have a limit on MLBMs but also we should have the option to build them ourselves even though we may never do so. The same thing applies to Hen House. Having these options doesn't mean we will exercise them, but we should at least have the options.

Admiral Moorer: Having these options is essential to insuring equality and protection of our position in the future.

President: Whatever we do we should consider the desirability of having the House express its opinion on this issue. The country has no faith in the Senate and with good reason; the House has the confidence of the country. I would like to have the House express its view. Another reason for having the House participate is that very frequently

in the past the House has had to vote against a great many measures that have been passed by the doves in the Senate. I want to give them a chance to vote *for* something—for something that is in the interest of this country and peace. I note this only as an aside.

Secretary Laird: The recent ABM vote in the House was very important.

Smith: Let me restate the procedural problems we face here. As I understand it, we are committed to work out this year a separate ABM agreement plus whatever can be done regarding a freeze on offensive systems. The conditions such as those Admiral Moorer is talking about do not fit into a freeze but rather into negotiations on offensive systems. A freeze only stops the Soviets. It pinches them. If we try to negotiate the right to build 200 MLBMs in a freeze, this just won't work.

Secretary Laird: Gerry, what about the defensive side, Hen House, etc?

Smith: We have no program for building early warning radar systems. We are going to rely on satellites. Even if we had such a program, we would not build an equivalent system. We would build one using modern technology and that would not be equivalent; apparent symmetry would delay the negotiations. If we were going to have this kind of an arrangement, we should at least have a fallback position to some kind of mutual veto.

Secretary Laird: I would not want to rely entirely on satellites. They would be the first things to be shot down. We should have option to build radars. But go ahead with your position.

Smith: If we built radars like Hen Houses we would be wasting money.

Secretary Irwin: It is important to have an interim agreement, that is, interim but one that would let us move up to equivalency at some later date. We shouldn't be frozen by freeze in the future.

Attorney General: I think the reconciliation of the two positions lies in whatever cutoff date is agreed to.

Smith: Right. We are talking about a freeze not about the provisions of an offensive agreement. A freeze would last at most for only three years. It would take us eight years to build an MLBM. We must put pressure on the Soviets to convert the freeze into a treaty as quickly as possible.

President: Henry, would you speak to this?

Kissinger: Yes. I agree with Gerry. The more formal we make the freeze the less likely we are to get progress on a treaty. The freeze must be interim, of short duration, and designed to put maximum pressure on the Soviets to reach agreement. The more we ask for the closer we get to a deadlock and we would lose time.

The President: The two must go simultaneously. [To Gerry Smith]⁸ In the event that you see foot dragging in the offensive negotiations, you are to torpedo the other. We are committed to an agreement but it must be simultaneous. That position must be made clear to the Soviets early. We must be very clear we can't have one without the other. The danger is that they will want to move quickly on an ABM agreement and drag out the discussions on an offensive agreement. The counter is for you to drag on ABM.

Kissinger: The Soviets probably want a token two- or three-week period of discussions on ABM to satisfy the terms of the statement. But then they should be prepared to move simultaneously on both.

President: They know what "at the same time" means as well as we do. In the end it has to be "at the same time."

Smith: On ABM our goal should be to keep the Soviet ABM level to a minimum. To propose that they have a 400 percent increase in ABM, as Admiral Moorer does, so we can have four sites is not disarmament, it's rearmament. We would be in a terrible position publicly. Three sites East of the Urals with big radar complexes would look like the beginning of a nation-wide system.

President: In defense of the military view, however, there is the point of who is likely to strike first. The public relations problem is serious but my understanding is that we don't give much of a damn about their ABM capability.

Smith: Mr. President, we have worried for years about the Tallinn system. I would hate to see us give them more sites just so we could have a few sites that are militarily insignificant. After my discussions with Senator Jackson, I believe he would prefer a total ban to a truncated Safeguard system.

Secretary Laird: We could offer zero for public relations purposes.

Smith: If we started with zero we would have leverage to get better radar controls.

President: What reasons do you give for Soviet opposition to a total ban?

Smith: They don't want to tear the system down. They want defense against China and they don't want to lose the investment they have already made.

⁸ Brackets are in the original.

Nitze: I think there is another reason the Soviets want the Moscow System. The Soviet High Command, which meets in Moscow, is the main thing to be protected. They don't want to have these people who are the heart of their system vulnerable. It is an emotional commitment. The Soviets will continue to have a light defense of Moscow while continuing to vigorously pursue R&D for thick defense which they would also like to have.

President: There is a real emotional attachment?

Nitze: They would perhaps even like a thick system against the U.S.

Smith: But they proposed only 100 ABMs.

Nitze: But they want more.

Smith: That's why we should stop them.

Smith: On the offensive side, we should go for all three systems. The cessation of construction in ICBMs only is probably what they have in mind. Their reaction to our proposal to go for all three will be severe. I would settle for freeze on ICBMs with a sublimit on MLBMs. On the question of leverage, I think an agreement of short duration would not be in our interest. Automatic termination might not be in our interest. A supreme national interest clause would be sufficient for us to abrogate if we were forced to but I think we should also have a clause linking progress in the offensive area to the ABM agreement. Secretary Laird may be right that we need such an explicit reference.

President: We will do a lot of hard thinking about these issues and get instructions out to you as soon as possible. I wanted to hear this discussion first. (Smith: We need time for a NAC presentation.) I want to be very tough in the bargaining. You should bargain as vigorously for positions you are willing to give up later as you do for positions you are not willing to give up. Our public opinion expects something. You should drag on what they want until we get what we want. There is a real danger that we get an ABM deal and only a fuzzy one on the offense. You should raise any objection you can on ABM till we get what we want. Simultaneity is a must. The danger is that they can renege on the whole deal without the pressure of public opinion.

Secretary Laird: I want to raise one additional point about the accidental launch section. I think this section needs clarification. It gives the impression that the U.S. and Soviets take responsibility for all accidental launches. We should clearly define what is meant in this section and the President should be aware of the responsibilities he is taking on. We should change the title of the section. The Russians want it because of the Chinese.

Smith: There is a proposed accession clause which will remove much of the sting from this possibility but we will check into it further.

Attachment

Briefing by Acting Director of Central Intelligence Cushman⁹

Washington, June 28, 1971.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET STRATEGIC
FORCES RELATED TO SALT

I. Mr. President, I will begin with a review of recent Soviet developments in the ABM field. I will then update the situation concerning ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles and make some mention of the Soviet bomber force. Then finally a few words about our new satellite reconnaissance capability, which is now operational.

A. The Soviets are making new efforts to improve the capabilities of the ABM system deployed at Moscow.

1. They have resumed construction at two ABM launch complexes to the south of the city that were started—and then left unfinished—several years ago. The new construction may be intended to strengthen Moscow's ABM defenses against ballistic missiles launched from China and the Polaris threat from the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

2. In addition, the Soviets have been building two large radars at Chekhov, near Moscow, to expand the long range target acquisition and tracking radar capability against the ballistic missile threat to the city.

a. One of these radars is in the late stages of construction. When it is operational in 1973, it will provide coverage of Polaris missiles coming from launch areas in the North Atlantic.

b. We have recently identified a second radar at the same location in the early stages of construction. It will provide coverage of the ballistic missile threat from China when it is finished, probably in 1975.

B. At the same time, the Soviets are continuing with an extensive ABM developmental effort at the Sary Shagan missile test center.

1. They recently completed a new large missile site radar which had been under construction for nearly four years. It appears to be a follow-on to the Moscow system missile site radar and is designed to increase the number of targets which can be tracked simultaneously. Testing will probably begin soon.

⁹ Top Secret; Sensitive.

2. In another area of Sary Shagan, the Soviets are continuing construction and developmental activity on new defensive system components. This work is at a new ABM facility built during the last three years.

a. They are using this complex to test an ABM interceptor having a slightly higher acceleration than the Galosh missile now deployed at Moscow. This new missile is being fired from launchers similar to those at the operational sites around Moscow.

b. They have built other, smaller launchers at this new facility which are not the same as those used with the Galosh missile. Recently, what may be a prototype for a *silo* launcher was identified under construction at this facility.

1. No missile has yet been identified with either of these types of launchers.

c. Another noteworthy development at this new facility is the assembly, in the space of five months or so, of a radar possibly having an ABM role. This radar appears best suited for relatively short range operation and would probably be deployed in areas already covered by long range radars.

d. The components being tested at this facility may be part of a wholly new ABM system. Alternatively, the Soviets may be planning to incorporate them into the existing Moscow system. We'll be watching closely to see which way it goes.

II. I would like to conclude this ABM review by mentioning the status of the Moscow system and of Hen House radar deployment.

A. The Soviets have an operational ballistic missile defense of four ABM launch complexes and 64 antimissile missile launchers around Moscow. So far, no ABM defenses have been deployed at other cities.

B. Construction on Hen House ballistic missile early warning radars is continuing. When these radars begin operating next year, they will increase the coverage of missiles launched from the north, the Mediterranean, and China.

1. In all, there are 14 Dual Hen Houses—completed or under construction—deployed for ballistic missile early warning and space surveillance.

Soviet Ballistic Missile Forces

III. The current picture of Soviet ICBM deployment remains a mixed one. On the one hand, they are constructing ICBM silos of a new type at some operational missile complexes. On the other hand, the Soviets have clearly slowed down those ICBM programs which have been under way for several years.

IV. We discovered earlier this year that the Soviets had begun construction of what has turned out to be two new types of ICBM silos. Thus far, 17 of the new silos have been detected at five SS-9 complexes and 43 at two complexes in the western USSR where the SS-11 ICBM

is deployed along with IRBMs. No new silos were found in the [1 line not declassified]. In addition, there are several others under construction at the Tyuratam test center.

A. Work on the silos began after September last year, although test borings were evident at some sites at Tyuratam as early as April 1970.

B. The sites are still in an early stage of construction and none is expected to be complete before mid-1972.

V. From satellite photography, we can see that two types of new silos are being built. Construction techniques for both types are similar, but there are major differences in the site configuration and in the diameter of the silos. We are still uncertain of the full extent of this new deployment but our new photographic satellite—which I'll touch on in a moment—promises to help resolve this question.

A. One type is being built at the two complexes where the SS-11 ICBM is deployed along with MRBMs and IRBMs. The inner liners of these silos are [less than 1 line not declassified] in diameter and they appear to be 80 feet deep.

B. Another type is under construction at the SS-9 complexes. These have silo diameters of [less than 1 line not declassified] and an apparent depth of at least 100 feet.

C. This picture is one of these new [less than 1 line not declassified] type silos being built at Tyuratam for test and training purposes. The circular objects are segments of the silo liners which are placed within this coring to form the wall of the silo. Steel reinforcing bars are welded to the outside of the liners and after the segments are placed in the hole, concrete is poured between the segments and the coring.

VI. The work of the Soviets has not advanced sufficiently to enable us to determine what missile systems will be deployed in the new silos.

A. On the basis of current evidence, we can suggest two possible explanations for the new silos.

1. It seems clear that they are intended to provide increased survivability through greater silo hardness, possibly for the existing SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs. The concrete is [less than 1 line not declassified] thicker than in older silos, with steel reinforcements on the sides.

2. It is also possible that one or both of the two new types of silos may be for new missile systems which have not yet been tested.

VII. Looking now at the slowdown, it appears that the deployment programs for the SS-9 and the SS-13 ICBM stopped during the latter part of 1970—at least for the time being—although work continues on 12 SS-9 and 20 SS-13 sites presently unfinished. Deployment of the SS-11 is also believed to have been suspended, although the evidence for this is less clear.

A. Although construction of additional SS-9 silos of the standard type appears to have ended, we believe that the Soviets have begun replacing some of the single warhead SS-9s with the version which carries three re-entry vehicles. The evidence for this judgment is in this photograph of the warhead handling facility at one SS-9 complex. It reveals warhead containers smaller than those associated with the standard SS-9. There are more of these small canisters than there are silos at the complex.

1. The warheads carried by this variant of the SS-9 cannot be independently targeted, however.

B. Altogether the Soviets now have 1,375 operational ICBM launchers, and by this time next year, when the standard silos still under construction are completed, they will have 1,407.

1. This total will include 288 silos for the SS-9, 850 for the SS-11, and 60 for the small solid propellant SS-13. The remaining 209 launchers consist of older SS-7 and SS-8 systems which are deployed about 2/3 in a soft configuration and 1/3 hard.

2. In addition, there will be the new type silos, but we are not yet able to make a confident projection of their numbers or when they will become operational.

Soviet Y-Class Submarines

VIII. The Soviets continue to launch Y-class ballistic missile submarines at the rate of eight a year. This would give them a force comparable in number to the 41 U.S. Polaris submarine by early 1974.

A. Thus far 25 units have been launched, and 22 of these are operational.

B. Regular patrols in the North Atlantic started three years ago and three units are normally on patrol there.

C. In addition, the Soviets began Y-class patrols in the Pacific last October.

1. The third patrol off the U.S. west coast is now going on, and it appears that the Soviets intend to keep at least one Y-class submarine in this area at all times.

Manned Bombers

IX. Although the ballistic missile is the principal Soviet means for strategic attack, the bomber forces of Long Range Aviation continue to have significant capabilities for long-range attack and aerial reconnaissance.

A. The Soviets have some 200 heavy bombers and tankers with a primary mission of intercontinental operations, leaving about 700 medium bombers for use against Europe or Asia.

X. Flight testing of the new Soviet swing-wing bomber, now known as the Backfire, is proceeding smoothly, with the aircraft now engaged in weapons testing. It could enter service between 1974 and 1976; however at present our estimates of the Backfire's performance are still tentative, and we are continuing to study the evidence in order to arrive at the plane's probable primary mission.

New Reconnaissance System

XI. In concluding, Mr. President, I want to mention that we have just inaugurated a new photographic satellite system which will substantially improve our intelligence collection capabilities.

A. [1 paragraph (4½ lines) not declassified]

B. [1½ lines not declassified] but we have already received two packages of film. Although the mission is being flown at a higher than optimum altitude, the photography we have obtained fully meets our expectations.

C. These photographs of the Severodvinsk shipyard—where the Y-class submarine is produced—show how the new system has improved upon the older search system. The photo at the left, taken with the new system, gives much greater detail. Both pictures are enlarged 20 times.

D. [1½ lines not declassified] so there is a good chance that we will have a more definitive count of the new ICBM silos under construction soon after the Helsinki talks begin on July 8.

171. National Security Decision Memorandum 117¹

Washington, July 2, 1971.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Instructions for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki (SALT V)

Having considered the discussion and recommendations of the National Security Council,² I have decided on the United States position for presentation at Helsinki (SALT V),³ as detailed in the attached statement.

The Delegation should prepare a draft agreement incorporating the provisions of the United States position in appropriate language. This agreement should be returned to the White House for review and approval prior to presentation at Helsinki. It is intended that the Delegation table a single document, containing all elements of the U.S. position, as early as possible in the Helsinki round. The final form (e.g., treaty) of the agreement will be determined at a later date.

Pending approval and tabling of this draft agreement, the Delegation may outline to the USSR its principal provisions at the beginning of negotiations.

The negotiations on offensive systems and defensive systems must be conducted in parallel. However, at the discretion of the Chairman of the Delegation, there may be an initial period of two to three weeks when the negotiations concentrate on defensive systems. Thereafter, offensive systems must be considered equally and in parallel with defensive systems. Agreements on offensive and defensive systems must be concluded simultaneously.

The Delegation should continue to negotiate an agreed text on Measures to Prevent Accidental War and indicate to the Soviet Dele-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation.

² See Document 170.

³ The fifth round of negotiations was held in Helsinki from July 8 through September 23.

gation that we would prefer that this agreement be concluded simultaneously with agreements on the main areas of limitation (e.g., ABM and offensive measures). Similarly, the Delegation should complete all preliminary work on the Washington–Moscow direct communications link with a view towards concluding this agreement simultaneously with the main agreement.

We can consider separate agreements on Accidents and the communications link; the decision to do so, however, will be taken in light of the general trend of negotiations in Helsinki.

Previous directives concerning the privacy of the talks and public comment on them are reaffirmed.

Richard Nixon

Attachment

DETAILED STATEMENT OF U.S. POSITION

(all provisions apply equally to each side, except as otherwise specifically provided)

Part I

Strategic Offensive Systems

A. Limitations

1. ICBM launchers and sea-based ballistic missile (SBBM) launchers would be limited to those operational and under active construction as of [the date of the first formal presentation of the U.S. position.]⁴ (“Active” construction is defined so as not to include the 17 SS–9s on which construction has been started and then abandoned.)

The freeze would include all ICBM launchers and SBBM launchers as defined in paragraphs I.A 4 and 5. Missile launchers for research, development, testing, training, and space missions are covered by a separate limit (under paragraph I.B 1.)

Each side would declare the number of missile launchers operational and under active construction as of the above date.

[It should be made clear to the Soviets that if SLBMs are not included, we would consider it to be granting unilateral advantage to allow completion of the new-type silos now under construction, since a

⁴ All brackets are in the original.

sizeable numerical advantage is already granted in operational ICBM launchers.]

2. There would be no increase in the number of launchers fitted with modern, large ballistic missiles (MLBMs), (i.e., larger than 70 m³ of any type which first became operational in 1974 or later), beyond the number completed by December 31, 1971. (This is intended to include the 12 SS-9 launchers now under active construction for a total of 288, since external construction is expected to be completed by about this date. It is not meant to include the new-type silos at the operational SS-9 fields.)

3. Modification of ICBM launchers is permitted, provided that there is no increase in the depth or interior diameter of ICBM launchers, except for those which have been fitted with MLBMs.

[Discussion of the questions of silo relocation, replacement of old SLBM launchers with new ones, and freedom-to-mix from ICBMs to SLBMs should be avoided as being inconsistent with the concept of a freeze. Should the Soviets press the point, the matter should be referred to Washington.]

4. ICBMs are defined as land-based ballistic missiles which have a capability of ranges in excess of 5,000 kilometers. ICBM launchers, even if deployed for use against targets within MR/IRBM range, would be counted as ICBMs. Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment missile systems (FOBS) would also be counted as ICBMs.

5. "Sea-based ballistic missiles" are defined as ballistic missiles with launchers on submarines or surface ships, regardless of the nature of the propulsion plant of the vessel, including those of vessels undergoing overhaul or conversion. [If pressed for a definition in terms of range, we would suggest 100 km initially. In any event, tactical systems such as SUBROC would be excluded while the SS-N-4 and 5 would be counted.]

B. Research and Development, Testing, Evaluation, Training and Space Launchers

Missile launchers for research, development, testing, evaluation and training with respect to all strategic offensive missile systems, and for space missions, would be allowed, but the total number of such launchers on each side could not exceed 160. The 160 limit would include all launchers at research and development test ranges and facilities, launchers on "test-bed" submarines and surface ships, and training launchers at operational sites.

C. Further Negotiations

1. There should be a provision that, with a view to amending the agreement, both sides undertake to continue active negotiations on further limiting strategic offensive armaments.

Part II
Strategic Defensive Systems

A. The agreement should make clear that any system for rendering ineffective strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory are prohibited unless permitted by this agreement. The definitions of permitted systems along the following lines should be included in the agreement:

a. *Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs)*—i.e., missiles constructed for an ABM role, deployed in conjunction with other ABM components, or of a type indistinguishable from missiles tested in an ABM role;

b. *ABM launchers*—i.e., launchers for such ABM missiles;

c. *ABM radars*—i.e., radars constructed for an ABM role, deployed with other ABM components, or of a type indistinguishable from radars tested in an ABM role;

d. *Other large phased-array radars*—i.e., those of greater than 10^6 watts-meter² power aperture product.

B. *Limitations*

1. Deployment of ABM systems would be limited to:

a. 100 fixed launchers, 100 deployed ABM interceptors, 4 modern ABM radar complexes and those mechanical-scan, dish-type radars currently operational. All these elements would be deployed within 100 km of one *agreed* location. Or, alternatively,

b. 300 fixed launchers, 300 deployed ABM interceptors, and 5 modern ABM radar complexes. All these elements would be deployed within 60 km of each of three *agreed* locations at operational ICBM fields.

The phrase “deployed ABM interceptor” refers to any ABM interceptor located on or in the vicinity of an ABM launcher capable of being fired in a short period of time.

A “*modern ABM radar complex*” is defined as a circular area of 3 km diameter within which are deployed components of either ABM radars which first became operational after July 1, 1971, or any phased-array ABM radars.

[It should be made clear that the U.S. will agree to only the *existing Moscow defense* with permitted added components for the USSR and three Safeguard sites defending Minuteman for the U.S.]

[The head of the U.S. Delegation is authorized to fall back, at his discretion, from three agreed sites to two agreed sites. These two sites would have an aggregate of four modern ABM radar complexes and would have 100 fixed launchers and 100 deployed ABM interceptors at *each* site. All these elements would be deployed within 70 km of each of these two agreed locations. Fall-back from two sites and 200 interceptors is not authorized unless approved by the President.]

2. The Soviet Union could retain its present 64 ABM launchers deployed in the vicinity of Moscow, and could add up to 36 additional launchers within 100 kilometers of the center of Moscow, to serve a total of no more than 100 interceptors.

3. Radars would be limited as follows:

a. The Soviet Union could retain the Dog House radar at Naro Fominsk, the radar under construction at Chekhov, the four active Try Add radar complexes around Moscow, and the two additional radar complexes under construction around Moscow.

b. Soviet Hen House-type radars suitable for tracking of ballistic missiles would be limited to those currently operational or under construction. [We would inform the Soviets that we regard these radars as tolerable partly in view of their present vulnerability, and that we would consider increased SAM defense of such radars as inconsistent with an agreement.] The U.S. would have the right to build an agreed number of additional early-warning radars to provide capability equivalent to that provided by the Soviet Hen Houses. While such radars would not be designated as "PARs," it would be understood that PAR components and technology could be used in them.

c. Limitations would be placed on radars suitable for an ABM role. It would be prohibited for either side to construct additional radar complexes containing: Dog House, Hen House, Try Add, MSR, or PAR types, or other radars specifically designed for ABM use, except as provided in these instructions. There would be agreement to consult in the future on the construction of any new phased-array radar with a power-aperture product larger than 10^6 wm^2 or any smaller radar which might be construed as being ABM-associated. The goal would be to meet legitimate needs of the two countries in ways which did not create suspicion or concern over possible circumvention of the ABM radar limitations.

4. Upgrading of SAMs (or other types of missiles, whatever their original design mission) to convert them into ABMs, or to give them a dual anti-aircraft and anti-missile capability, or the development of new SAM systems or other missile systems (apart from permitted ABM systems) with such capabilities, would be prohibited. The flight-testing of missiles other than ABMs in an ABM mode (e.g., testing such missiles against a re-entry vehicle in association with ABM radars, or to test air defense missiles *in flight regimes* inconsistent with air defense threats) would be prohibited. There would be no limitations on SAM systems in their air defense role as such.

C. Corollary Limitations

1. ABM research and development would be permitted. Each side would have no more than 15 experimental fixed ABM launchers and all ABM systems and system components utilized for research and development and testing would be located within current or agreed additional test ranges.

2. Development, testing, production or deployment of mobile or transportable land-based, sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems to include ABM missiles, launchers and radars would be prohibited.

3. Equipping a deployed ABM launcher to handle more than a single ABM interceptor at one time, or to give it a capability for rapid reload through automatic, semi-automatic, or other similar reload mechanism would be prohibited. The development, testing, and deployment of such reload and multiple interceptor equipment would also be prohibited. There would be a prohibition on facilities for rapid reload interceptors, including storage facilities, at ABM sites.

Part III Verification

Verification of the agreement would be accomplished by a combination of reliance upon national means and the provision of corollary limitations and cooperative measures designed to make the overall restrictions compatible with national verification capabilities.

There would be an understanding not to interfere with national means of verification, defined broadly as technical information collection systems necessary for verifying compliance with the agreement operating outside the national territory of the other state, or to undertake deliberate concealment measures which could impede the effectiveness of national means in verifying compliance with the agreement. The prohibition on deliberate concealment measures would not require changes in present U.S. or Soviet practices. The use of covered facilities for fitting out and berthing submarines and surface ships would be prohibited. This prohibition would not bar normal overhaul, conversion, or other work on submarines or surface ships under cover, in accordance with current practices.

Part IV General Provisions

A. *Joint Commission*

Provision would be made for consultations on issues arising out of the provisions of the agreement. A standing Joint Commission would be established to provide a forum to:

1. Consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous.

2. Provide on a voluntary basis such information as either side considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed. Selective direct observation could be offered as a way of clarifying an ambiguous situation.

3. Consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification.

4. Consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this agreement.

5. Consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this agreement, including proposals for additions and amendments.

6. Consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

B. The agreement should include a provision wherein neither side would seek to circumvent the provisions and effectiveness of the agreement through a third country.

C. The agreement should be for an indefinite period with provisions for:

1. Withdrawal in the event either party decided its supreme national interests were threatened by continued adherence.

2. The right to withdraw after an initial period of [x] years and upon one year's notification, if agreement has not been reached on amendments or supplements that provide for additional limitations on strategic systems.

[The President reserves the right to define this period after the outlines of the limitations on strategic offensive systems become clear.]

D. The agreement should be made subject to formal review at fixed periods. [The length of this period will depend upon the nature of the final agreement.] This would create an opportunity for joint consideration of any changed circumstances, for modification of the agreement if deemed advisable, and for reaffirmation.

172. Note From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon¹

Moscow, undated.

The President has already been informed of the Soviet leadership's position on Soviet-American summit meeting including our considerations as to the preparation of such a meeting and creating the conditions which would facilitate its positive outcome. The President, no doubt, remembers the statement of the Soviet side of importance which the Soviet leadership attaches in this connection to the lessening of tension and to normalization of the situation in Europe on the basis of recognition of the territorial and political realities formed there, which in our conviction responds to the interests of all states, including the United States.

Since President Nixon has agreed with the considerations which were put forward by the Soviet leaders in connection with the prospected summit meeting,² this relieves us of the necessity to once again state them in detail.

In Moscow has been noted that there have been lately positive movements in discussions of some questions; on the part of the U.S. representatives there is greater understanding of the situation and more realistic approach towards finding mutually acceptable solutions,—this seems to be the result of the attention which the President has begun to pay personally to these matters.

At the same time there is yet no full certainty whether agreement could be reached as soon as desired. Having this in mind and also taking into consideration that there is not much time left till September, it would obviously be more realistic to agree on some mutually acceptable time which would be closer to the end of this year—for ex-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President's Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 1. No classification marking. Dobrynin sent Kissinger the note on July 5 with the handwritten message: "I am sending herewith a communication from Moscow which I am instructed to forward to you and through you to President Nixon in connection with the conversations we had on the subject." Kissinger, who left Washington on July 1 for an announced 2-week tour of Asia, secretly arrived on July 9 at his real destination, Beijing. In his absence, Vorontsov gave the note to Haig, who transmitted it to Kissinger's aircraft on July 5, and forwarded it to President Nixon on July 6 under cover of a memorandum with the recommendations "that we make no comment to the Soviets at this time" and "that Dr. Kissinger proceed with the other option seeking an early Summit in Peking." Nixon initialed his approval. (Ibid.)

² As our exchanges in the end of January this year showed. [Footnote is in the original. See Documents 127 and 130.]

ample the end of November or in December. We agree that both sides will in fact proceed from the premises that by that time all what is necessary will be done in order to put into practice that important understanding between the President and the Soviet leaders which President Nixon confirmed to the Soviet Ambassador through Dr. Kissinger on June 30.³ The final time of the meeting and a date of an appropriate publication about this prospective meeting could be pinpointed additionally.

Of course in any case it is important that in anticipation of the meeting both sides would pursue in the relations between themselves and in international affairs such a course which to the maximum degree would ensure the fruitfulness of the meeting. In other words, it is necessary that both sides will allow in their activities nothing that would make the situation unfavourable for the preparation and holding of the meeting and would weaken the chances of getting positive results at such a meeting.

³ According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, he met with Dobrynin at 8:45 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, Record of Schedule, 1968–1976) No other U.S. record of a June 30 conversation related to SALT or the summit has been found. However, two memorandums prepared by Dobrynin are published in *Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969–1972*, Documents 172 and 173.

173. Backchannel Message From Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Jack Merritt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 8, 1971.

SUBJECT

Ambassador Smith's Request for Clarification of NSDM 117²

REF

SALT 771³

1. Smith's interpretations in Reftel seem to us to involve substantial departure from the intent of NSDM 117 as written and to introduce complicated new issues. Following are our views based on studies and discussions leading up to NSDM 117. In view of urgency reflected in SALT 771, we believe Smith will need prompt guidance either directly from you or from here after your approval.

2. (Reference paras 2 and 3 reftel.) While Smith's interpretation of the words "agreed location,"⁴ as such, is valid, his interpretations and proposed deletions of instructions to the Delegation would allow the Soviets a real choice between a Moscow defense or three sites East of the Urals.

a. Both in the interagency papers and in all our memoranda to you it was made clear that we would not want to permit a real choice and that it would be made clear to the Soviets that this essentially cosmetic formulation was advanced with the understanding that we would select Safeguard and they would select Moscow. Verification Panel discussion of this was brief but thrust also supports this view.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT. Top Secret; Nodis. Kissinger was en route to Beijing. The text printed here is the copy approved for transmission and does not have a message number.

² Document 171.

³ In telegram USDEL SALT 771, July 7, Smith asked for clarification of several NSDM 117 ABM provisions. Smith sent the same message via backchannel to Kissinger with the additional request "that you can see your way clear to advising your people that you concur." (Both in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT)

⁴ Smith's interpretation in telegram USDEL SALT 771 allowed for the NCA Moscow or ICBM fields east of the Urals for the Soviet Union and NCA Washington or ICBM fields west of the Mississippi for the United States. Smith concluded that "the words do not mean that precise locations on one side would need to be submitted to the other side for approval prior to deployment."

b. While it may be unlikely that the Soviets would exercise the option, it has been generally agreed that we would not want to allow the Soviets any new sites, even East of the Urals, because of the potential both for subsequent cheating and the impetus given to new ABM systems. Smith himself argued that it would amount to “rearmament.”

c. In view of this history, as we understand it, the response to Smith would in our view have to be that the “alternative” ABM deployments mentioned in NSDM 117 are not in fact intended to be real ones and that whether the outcome is three to one or two to one, it is only acceptable if on our side the ABM locations are at ICBM fields and on the Soviet side the ABM location is Moscow. Unless you wish to communicate directly with Helsinki, please indicate whether you wish this position conveyed to Smith or, if not, how he should be instructed.

3. (Reference para 1 reftel.) Smith’s interpretation⁵ raises the issue of post-Helsinki right of both sides to change (e.g. from Safeguard to NCA). (Nitze has been pressing at the staff level to make a negotiating record which permits the right of the US to this choice.) The actual wording of the NSDM (and the intent with respect to language to be given the Soviets) was to neither raise nor foreclose the issue. As a practical matter it seems farfetched that either side, having accepted ABM agreement would soon raise question of shifting deployment to different location. However, since it conceivably may at some point become our desire to shift from Minuteman fields back to NCA, agreement should not be worded so as to foreclose such an option. Particularly if you agree that there should be no preagreement choice, we recommend that Smith be told not to bring up the issue of post-agreement choice. If Soviets do bring it up, the matter would clearly require examination and Smith should refer it to Washington. If you wish us to forward instruction to Smith, please provide guidance.⁶

4. (Reference para 3 reftel.) As for the assertion that there are ambiguities in the NSDM with respect to modernization, we agree. It was not intended to limit modernization nor to limit the numbers and types of radars in a “modern ABM radar complex.” *We recommend that you authorize this interpretation.*⁷

⁵ Smith’s interpretation meant giving the United States and the USSR post-agreement freedom to choose different ABM systems than described in NSDM 117 and the right to change ABM deployment.

⁶ “Yes” is written in the margin. Further instructions for the SALT Delegation were provided in NSDM 120 (Document 180).

⁷ “Yes” is written in the margin.

174. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Offense Provision of NSDM-117

NSDM-117 would permit the Soviets to build up their strategic ballistic missile forces to about 2275 missiles. This figure could be higher if there is more new construction than we know about. This force would contain 288 Modern Large Ballistic Missiles. The U.S. would be limited to 1710 ballistic missiles, none of which are in the Modern Large category. This arrangement gives the Soviets an obvious and sizeable missile and payload advantage. Given the Soviet technical capability to put MRVs and MIRVs on their ballistic missiles, we face the prospect in the 1975–77 period of seeing the U.S. advantage in total warheads on target eroded. That is the last frontier of U.S. advantage in the strategic nuclear field. It could mean the end of U.S. sufficiency and parity. In addition to the inherent undesirability of this overall trend, acceding to such a USSR advantage now could be interpreted by the Soviets as compensation for forward based systems (FBS). So viewed it is a very large and unwarranted compensation.

NSDM-117 also provides for a withdrawal arrangement which would permit us to withdraw if we are unable to work out a more satisfactory follow-on agreement. I feel that this latter provision is apt to make the initial agreement practically permanent. In view of that I recommend that you reconsider the offensive proposal in NSDM-117.

One way to reduce the imbalance outlined above would be to add a provision in NSDM-117 that would require the Soviets to destroy or dismantle ICBM launchers on a one for one basis as new launchers (ICBM or SLBM) are completed. This would narrow the numerical gap between our two forces by perhaps 240 missiles. This approach does

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, National Archives, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV, May 1–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Haig initialed the memorandum and wrote “Hold for HAK.” Kissinger also initialed the memorandum. In a July 18 memorandum to Haig, Merritt summarized Laird’s views. Merritt explained that Laird supported Nitze on the importance of having precise definitions in the ABM agreement and that new large radars be subjected to mutual agreement. Laird did not support Nitze on “the issue of new or exotic ABM systems. He agrees that deployment of advanced ABMs should be prohibited as long as it is very clear that prospective work on such devices is not limited.” Merritt concluded that “this corresponds with the intent of NSDM 117 which permits R&D on ABMs. We agree with Laird and would insure the appropriate wording in the agreement.” (Ibid.)

have implications for ICBM relocation and freedom to mix constraints. It also fails to remove completely the numerical gap between the two missile forces. If these implications are unsatisfactory, an earlier effective date for the freeze on ICBMs and SLBMs might be considered.

Mel Laird

**175. Telegram From the Delegation to the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks to the Department of State¹**

Helsinki, July 12, 1971, 1032Z.

794. Subject: Draft Agreement on Limiting Strategic Defensive Weapons.

Following is draft language of provisions for an agreement on limiting strategic defensive weapons called for in NSDM-117.² Note paras 2, 4, and 6 contain bracketed alternative language explained further in separate telegram.

Draft

Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms of the U.S.
and U.S.S.R.

Preamble

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the parties,

Proceeding from the fact that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Convinced that limitations on strategic arms would result in a reduction in the competition in strategic arms and a decrease in the risk of war,

Recognizing the direct relationship between strategic defensive and offensive arms and the necessity to limit both,

Having agreed upon certain measures constraining ongoing strategic offensive arms programs, pending conclusion of a definitive agree-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV, May 1–July 1971. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; SALT. A stamped notation on the telegram reads: "Sent to San Clemente." Nixon and Haig were in San Clement July 6–18.

² Document 171.

ment limiting strategic offensive systems which will be the subject of subsequent negotiations between the parties,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms competition and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tensions and the strengthening of trust between states,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The parties undertake to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt such other measures relating to strategic defensive arms limitations as provided in this agreement.

Article 2

1. An ABM system is a system for rendering ineffective strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory.

2. As used in this agreement, components of ABM systems are:

- (a) ABM launchers—i.e., ABM interceptor missile launchers;
- (b) ABM interceptor missiles; and,
- (c) ABM radars—i.e., radars for acquiring and tracking ballistic missiles and their components, and for tracking and guiding interceptor missiles.

[Mr. Nitze would substitute the following language for paras. 1 and 2 of Article 2 and renumber para. 3 as para. 2:

“The obligations provided for in articles 3, 4, and 5 of this agreement shall cover:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles—i.e., interceptor missiles constructed for an ABM role, deployed in conjunction with other ABM components, or of a type indistinguishable from missiles tested in an ABM role;

(b) ABM launchers—i.e., launchers for such ABM missiles;

(c) ABM radars—i.e., radars constructed for an ABM role, deployed with other ABM components, or of a type indistinguishable from radars tested in an ABM role;

(d) Other large phased-array radars—i.e., those having a product of power (in watts) and aperture (in square meters) greater than one million.”³

³ All brackets are in the original.

3. The ABM systems limited by this agreement shall include:

- (a) Operational systems;
- (b) Systems under construction;
- (c) Systems undergoing overhaul, repair, or conversion; and
- (d) Systems undergoing development and testing.

Article 3

1. Each party undertakes not to deploy components of ABM systems except as specified in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Article 3.

2. Each party may deploy ABM launchers, ABM interceptor missiles and ABM radars in its own territory and only at one of the following:

(a) One site within a circular area having a radius of one hundred (100) kilometers, centered on its national capital, or

(b) Three (3) sites for defense of ICBM fields, each within a circular area having a radius of sixty (60) kilometers and each centered on a point in ICBM fields west of the Mississippi River for the U.S. and east of the Ural Mountains for the USSR.

3. Within the area referred to in subparagraph (a) of paragraph (2) of Article 3, a party may deploy no more than: one hundred (100) fixed ABM launchers, one hundred (100) ABM interceptor missiles located on or in the vicinity of ABM launchers, four (4) modern ABM radar complexes, and mechanical-scan, dish-type ABM radars operational as of July 1, 1971.

4. Within the area referred to in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 of Article 3, a party may deploy no more than: three hundred (300) fixed ABM launchers, three hundred (300) ABM interceptor missiles located on or in the vicinity of ABM launchers, and five (5) modern ABM radar complexes.

5. A modern ABM radar complex is a circular area of no more than three (3) kilometers in diameter within which are deployed components of any ABM radar which first became operational after July 1, 1971, or any phased-array ABM radar.

Article 4

1. Except as provided in paragraph 2 of Article 4, the parties agree to consult through the standing commission provided for in Article 10, prior to construction of non-ABM phased-array radars, having a product of power (in watts) and aperture (in square meters) greater than one million, which are in addition to those operational or under construction on July 1, 1971.

2. The Soviet Union shall have the right to retain the large phased-array radars operational or under construction as of July 1, 1971. The United States shall have the right to construct an agreed num-

ber of additional early-warning radars to provide a capability equivalent to those Soviet large phased-array radars which provide early-warning which were operational or under construction on July 1, 1971.

[Mr. Nitze would substitute the following paragraph for all of Article 4:

“The parties undertake not to deploy ‘other large phased-array radars’ as defined in Article 2, subparagraph (d), of paragraph 1, except as mutually agreed.”]

Article 5

The limitations provided for in Article 3 shall not apply to components of ABM systems used for development and testing located within current test ranges or within agreed additional test ranges. Each party may have no more than fifteen (15) fixed ABM launchers, at these ranges.

Article 6

1. Each party undertakes not to develop, produce, test, or deploy sea-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems, or components for such systems.

[Alternative 1

2. Neither party shall deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components.

Alternative 2

2. Neither party shall deploy ABM systems which do not require ABM interceptor missiles and which are capable of countering, destroying, or rendering ineffective strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory.

Alternative 3

No subparagraph.]

3. Each party undertakes not to develop, produce, test, or deploy ABM launchers capable of launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to develop, produce, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems with rapid reload capability for ABM launchers.

Article 7

1. The parties undertake not to modify any types of missile systems or their components other than ABM, whatever their origi-

nal design mission, so as to convert them for ABM use or give them a dual anti-aircraft and ABM role, and not to develop or deploy new missile systems or their components other than ABM for such a role.

2. The parties undertake not to test missiles other than ABM interceptor missiles in an ABM mode.

Article 8

With a view to converting this agreement into a definitive arms limitation agreement on strategic offensive as well as strategic defensive arms, the parties undertake to continue active negotiations for definitive limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article 9

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this agreement, each party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal, operating outside the national territory of the other party, together with the corollary limitations and cooperative measures provided for in this agreement designed to supplement national verification capabilities.

2. Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 9.

3. Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national means. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article 10

To promote the objectives and assist in the implementation of the provisions of this agreement, the parties will establish promptly a standing commission within the framework of which they will:

(a) Consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous.

(b) Provide on a voluntary basis such information as either party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed, including the offering of selective direct observation in order to clarify ambiguous situations.

(c) Consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification.

(d) Consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this agreement.

(e) Consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this agreement, including proposals for amendments.

(f) Consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

Article 11

Each party agrees not to prejudice the viability of or circumvent the effectiveness of this agreement through transfers to third countries of strategic arms limited under this agreement.

Article 12

Either party may propose amendments to this agreement. Amendments shall enter into force after adoption in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this agreement.

Article 13

This agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 14

1. Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other party six (6) months prior to withdrawal from the agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. After [x] years have elapsed from the entry into force of the agreement, and if the parties have not reached agreement on definitive limitations on strategic offensive arms as a result of negotiations referred to in Article 8, either party shall have the right to withdraw provided it shall have given notice of its intention to withdraw six (6) months in advance. Such notice may not be given until [x] years have elapsed after entry into force of this agreement.

Article 15

1. Adoption of this agreement shall be in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each party. The agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments which shall take place simultaneously in Washington and Moscow.

2. This agreement shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 16

Pending the entry into force of this agreement, or receipt by either party of written notice from the other of its inability to approve it in accordance with its constitutional processes, each party agrees to comply with the undertakings in this agreement as if it had entered into force.

Done in the city of — in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, the two texts having equal authenticity, this — day of —, 19—.

Smith

176. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

JCSM-330-71

Washington, July 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

Definition of Antiballistic Missile Systems To Be Limited

1. Reference is made to National Security Study [*Decision*] Memorandum 117, dated 2 July 1971, subject: "Instructions for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki (SALT V)."²

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff view with concern the language in the reference relating to strategic defensive systems which states that "the agreement should make clear that any system for rendering ineffective strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory are prohibited unless permitted by this agreement." This wording would foreclose options to deploy future antiballistic missile (ABM) systems and very well can lead to an interpretation that research and development of advanced defensive systems is limited or prohibited.

3. The wisdom of placing constraints on future systems that cannot now be defined or clearly envisioned or which may be unverifiable is questionable [*3 lines not declassified*]. Further, identification of a futuristic type ABM system is also questionable at this time. Moreover, it is highly doubtful that US funding would be made available for research and development in light of an existing agreement which would, at a minimum, preclude deployment of future ABM systems. This could lead to a future situation of clear strategic advantage for the Soviets wherein the USSR develops and deploys an effective counter to the US missile threat while the United States can provide no comparable counter to the Soviet missile threat.

4. Two other considerations become evident against the backdrop of previous rounds of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—the language prohibiting futuristic defensive systems would add new dimensions to the talks which could further complicate the existing complex offense/defense relationship, and the full implications of the language in question were not exposed to the normal careful scrutiny of the SALT interagency mechanism.

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret.

² Document 171.

5. In conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that, as a matter of urgency, this subject receive interagency examination and that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff jointly develop an appropriate position for use in this interagency examination.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T.H. Moorer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

177. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, July 13, 1971, 1812Z.

108. Dear Henry:

In July 13th post plenary,² pursuant to White House instructions,³ I said to Semenov that I understood some Soviet officials felt the US had not been serious in proposing an ABM ban, but had put it forward for propaganda. I was authorized to say that the ban is a serious proposal. I was instructed to sound out Semenov as to whether the Soviet Government was interested in pursuing it. I had not formally tabled a ban because I was familiar with the official Soviet position.

Semenov asked whether his understanding was correct that the US would be prepared to set forth its views on this alternative in detail if the Soviet side showed interest in the matter. He also asked whether his understanding was correct that elaboration of US views could take place in a less formal manner than in plenary.

I said that, on the substance, I would limit myself at the present time to what I had already said. As far as procedure was concerned, if the two sides were to pursue this question, I would be willing to do

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Passed to San Clemente where Kissinger was staying on his return from Beijing. He returned to Washington on July 18 with President Nixon.

² In telegram USDEL SALT 809, July 14, Smith reported his post-plenary conversation with Semenov. (Ibid., Box 881, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV, May 1–July 1971)

³ See Documents 171 and 173.

so either in private conversation with Semenov or in a meeting more restricted than a plenary. For the moment, however, my instructions were merely to sound out Semenov and to learn whether the Soviet side would be interested.

Semenov said “frankly” he had brought instructions for this eventuality, to the following effect—he was to listen carefully to US considerations with respect to this question to determine their substance and real significance. He did not have to ask for additional reactions from Moscow before responding to my question. It was for this reason that he had asked what procedure I had in mind for setting forth the US views which I evidently planned to express.

Semenov said that the two sides were now coming close to the substance of the question of limiting ABMs. It would be wise to consider what the two sides had to say without prejudice. The Soviet side would be interested to hear US views in this connection. Semenov would report my approach to his capital and he could tell me now that he would wish to hear US views in as much detail as possible. I said I would also report this conversation to Washington and would later be in a better position to determine how to proceed.

I have not yet reported this in normal channels, but propose to do so by July 15th unless you advise to the contrary.

I propose to prepare a talking paper outlining the case for a ban, which I will forward before using.

Many thanks for your help in getting our position squared away for today’s session, which went well.

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

178. Editorial Note

On July 15, 1971, President Nixon announced that he had accepted an invitation to visit the People’s Republic of China. His televised announcement, which was simultaneously issued in Beijing, stated that “Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971. Knowing of President Nixon’s expressed desire to visit the People’s Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May

1972. President Nixon has accepted the invitation with pleasure.” (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pages 819–820)

Kissinger sought to assuage Soviet concerns about implications for a U.S.-Soviet summit or a strategic arms limitation agreement by passing a note to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin through Richard Kennedy at 9:15 p.m. on July 15 that assured “the announcement is not directed against any countries as the President pointed out in his accompanying statement. Any reversal of recent positive trends would, of course, have serious results for both countries.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [Part 2])

On July 19 at 1 p.m. Kissinger met with Dobrynin to hear his reaction to Nixon’s July 15 announcement. According to a memorandum of conversation prepared by Winston Lord and Peter Rodman of the National Security Council staff, the only reference to SALT during Kissinger and Dobrynin’s conversation was a mutual expression that the talks were “going according to program, so it was a pity if there were any misunderstanding.” (*Ibid.*) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 288.

179. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, July 16, 1971, 1410Z.

119. Dear Henry:

Congratulations on your constructive use of your spell “under the weather.”²

Recalling your interest in possible conclusion of hot line and accident measures prior to limitations agreement, I suggest consideration of some such move soon to “balance” move re China. Such move might help to avoid possible stiffening of Kremlin attitude re SALT issues.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971 SALT. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Passed to San Clemente.

² Kissinger used the excuse of illness as a cover for his secret visit to Beijing.

Both accidents and hot line agreements are probably reachable in several weeks. Accident measures completion would require some, but not major, adjustment our position. Hot line should be fairly easy. In case of positive decision, I believe communicating it to Soviets at early date would help lubricate Soviet review of other SALT matters.

Semenov may raise July 15 announcement with me in our next private conversation. Would appreciate receiving any guidance you deemed appropriate for me for private conversations with Semenov, either to volunteer or in response.³

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

³ In backchannel message WH10760, July 20, Kissinger informed Smith that “at the President’s direction in a talk with Dobrynin I told him following your suggestion that we would be prepared to consider a separate accidental war agreement if Moscow was interested. He said he would check and let me know. I will keep you informed.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971 SALT)

180. National Security Decision Memorandum 120¹

Washington, July 20, 1971.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Further Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks at Helsinki
(SALT V)

The President has reviewed issues arising from the preparation of the draft agreements directed by NSDM 117² and has decided as follows:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 101–150. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation.

² Document 171.

Defensive Limitations Agreement

1. Definitions of ABM system components to reinforce corollary constraints should be included in the defensive agreement. Wording similar to that in NSDM 117 (and in the alternative provided in the draft agreement)³ should be used.

2. The President has considered the question of stringent controls on new large phased-array radars and has decided that the Delegation should seek an arrangement where new large phased-array radars will be built only as mutually agreed by the U.S. and USSR. (This decision represents a change in NSDM 117.) The agreement must, however, make explicit reference to limits on Hen House radars and the right to U.S. equivalency as directed by NSDM 117.

3. The agreement should be written in a manner which does not prohibit deployment of possible future ABM systems other than systems employing ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars. (This is a tentative decision, pending further study of the issue by the Verification Panel. If raised by the Soviets, the Delegation should take no position on this issue without further guidance from Washington. This decision constitutes a change in NSDM 117.)

4. The language proposed by the Delegation in Article 11 of the Draft Agreement on Limiting Strategic Defensive Weapons should be amended to apply solely to ABM systems limited under the agreement. The question of a similar provision relating to offensive systems should be referred to Washington.

5. The period between the time a country invokes supreme national interests and then withdraws from the agreement is to be six months. (This is a change from the Detailed Statement.)

6. The notification period discussed in IV.C. 2 of the Detailed Statement is to be six months. (This constitutes a change from the one year in the Detailed Statement.)

7. The formal review provision discussed in IV.D. of the Detailed Statement is affirmed.

Offensive Limitations Agreement

1. The freeze dates and provisions in I.A. 1 and 2 of the Detailed Statement are affirmed. The provision in I.A. 2 is intended to prohibit the completion of the new-type silos at the operational SS-9 fields. The phrase “externally completed” is to be used in relation to the December 31, 1971, freeze on MLBMs.

³ Document 175.

The Delegation can make it clear to the Soviet Delegation that the term is intended to allow completion of the 12 SS–9 launchers now under active construction.

2. The definition of ICBM launchers should include an appropriate statement that ICBM launchers, even if deployed for use against targets within MR/ICBM range, would be counted. The ICBM launcher definition needs no specific language regarding use in FOBS role.

3. Paragraph I.B. in the Detailed Statement regarding missile launchers for R&D and similar purpose is affirmed.

4. The Delegation should seek a declaration by each side or an explicit understanding on the numbers of missile launchers involved in the freeze. The Chairman of the Delegation should seek the declaration or understanding as early as he believes it possible in the negotiations.

5. The verification provision of the draft interim agreement on offensive weapons should include, in appropriate explicit language, the substance of Part III of the Detailed Statement regarding covered facilities for naval vessels.

The SALT Backstopping Committee of the Under Secretaries Committee should review the draft agreements in light of the above decisions.

Henry A. Kissinger

**181. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)¹**

Washington, July 20, 1971.

SUBJECT

NSDM 117 and the Delegation's Draft Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements

I am absolutely persuaded that any strategic arms limitation agreement we enter must be specific, precise, and as free of loopholes as possible. We must assume pragmatically that ambiguous and weak

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV, May 1–July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger initialed the memorandum indicating that he saw it.

provisions will be exploited by the Soviets. We should assume, on the other hand, that we would have to comply more literally with the spirit of any agreement we enter. An imprecise or weak U.S. proposal would likely indicate to the Soviets a general weakness in our position. I believe it imperative, therefore, that the draft agreement we table in the near future be as precise as possible and contain provisions which will make the letter of the agreement correspond to its spirit.

To implement the principles of precision and specificity, we should demand definitions of ABM components that (1) are precise, (2) set forth characteristics of the elements defined which are observable by our national means, and (3) complement other desirable provisions that may be difficult to negotiate. Paul Nitze's definition of ABM components² meets these criteria to a greater extent than any other definition so far tabled. I was gratified that you used his definitions in NSDM 117 to exemplify the type of definition we need. I have been informed that some members of the Delegation prefer less precise definitions. I recommend that Paul's definitions be used, subject to any changes we can all agree make these definitions more responsive to the criteria outlined above.

We need to address, also, whether deployment of large powerful phased array radars, not clearly ABM associated but with the potential to support large ABM deployments, ("other large phased array radars," by Paul's definitions) should be subject to mutual agreement or only to "consultation". Such radars are needed only to detect and track many small objects like RVs at very great distances. This makes them appropriate mainly in ABM systems, early warning systems, and as intelligence collectors. An arrangement which would require us to *agree* to Soviet deployments of such radars would close a loophole which would exist if only "consultation" were required. Through such a loophole the Soviets could, by widespread deployment of such radars, seriously undermine our confidence in an ABM agreement. This would be a potentially tragic outcome for the United States after paying such a high price in foregone defenses to obtain an ABM limitation. I recommend that, at least as an opening position, our draft agreements contain a provision requiring mutual agreement before such radars can be deployed outside areas in which ABM radars would be permitted by the agreement.

A last point which I wish to mention is the sweeping requirement of NSDM 117 that all ABM components should be prohibited except those specifically permitted. This approach conceptually would limit devices such as "ABM kill" lasers and particle generators which at this time are only future possibilities as ABM components. However, such a provision would also limit some possibilities we might later find at-

² See Document 175.

tractive and useful. For example, we might be able to build a light area defense against unsophisticated attacks by using an infrared satellite to provide early tracking information to long range interceptors. But this possibility would be prohibited if infrared satellites could not be used as ABM system components. I believe it is wise to ban deployment of devices which could replace ABM interceptors; I do not believe such a ban should be so sweeping, however, that it covers such things as optical sensors. I recommend that alternative two for paragraph two of Article 6 of the draft ABM agreement, as presented in SALT 794,³ be adopted.

Mel Laird

³ Document 175.

182. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to the Chairman of the Verification Panel (Kissinger)¹

CM-1066-71

Washington, July 20, 1971.

SUBJECT

Draft Strategic Defensive and Strategic Offensive Agreements

1. Reference is made to:

a. SALT Delegation messages to the Secretary of State, SALT V 0794/121032Z July 1971, JCS IN 26300, and SALT V 0797/121542Z July 1971,² JCS IN 26413, subject: "Draft Agreement on Limiting Strategic Defensive Weapons," which presented the Delegation's interpretation of National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 117 and supporting rationale to the President on a draft strategic defensive agreement.

b. SALT Delegation message to the Secretary of State, SALT V 0796/121437Z July 1971,³ JCS IN 26412, subject: "Draft Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons," which presented the Delegation's interpretation of NSDM 117 to the President on a draft strategic offensive agreement.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV, 1 May–July 1971. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the members of the Verification Panel: Packard, Irwin, Helms, Farley, and Mitchell.

² Telegram USDEL SALT 794 is Document 175. Telegram USDEL SALT 797, July 12, is not printed. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV, 1 May–June 1971)

³ Not printed. (Ibid.)

2. The messages in reference 1.a contain certain Delegation dissenting views on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to express their view. On SALT 0794, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly support the SALT Delegation majority positions on Articles 2 and 4 and support the accompanying rationale as outlined in SALT 0797.

3. Article 6 is of great concern and lists alternatives in connection with futuristic systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend Alternative 3 of paragraph 2, Article 6. Including either of the other alternatives could lead to a unilateral US interpretation that research and development of advanced defensive systems is limited or prohibited, while in all likelihood the Soviets would proceed with research and development on such systems. Such development is highly unlikely to be identified by the United States.

4. With regard to reference 1.b, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the words “have not initially reached operational status” in paragraph 1. The rest of the draft is acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff support the draft agreements with the foregoing modifications.

T.H. Moorer

183. Telegram From the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to the Department of State¹

Helsinki, July 26, 1971, 1015Z.

842. Subject: U.S. proposed agreements.

1. Texts of U.S. proposed offensive and defensive agreements given herewith. Delegation has prepared them pursuant to guidance; they incorporate the changes indicated in USDEL SALT 838 and 839² and no new points.

2. Delegation plans to table these texts at plenary scheduled at 1100 hours Tuesday, July 27, and would appreciate timely authorization to do so. (Text of plenary remarks introducing texts sent septel).

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV, 1 May–July 1971. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis; SALT.

² Telegrams USDEL SALT 838 and 839, both July 25, contained texts of and modifications to draft agreements on defensive and offensive limitations, respectively. (Both *ibid.*)

Delegation notes Soviets expect such tabling to occur tomorrow, and it would be psychologically disadvantageous to be unable to do so.

3. Texts follow below:

“Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With
Respect to Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

In connection with the Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms of the U.S. and USSR of this date (hereinafter called the Agreement),³ and in recognition of the relationship between offensive and defensive arms and the need to limit both, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree on the measures set forth in this interim agreement.

1. Each party shall not, after July 31, 1971, start construction of new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, and shall limit ICBM launchers to those operational and under active construction as of that date. There shall be no increase in the depth or interior diameter of ICBM launchers.

2. Each party shall limit launchers for modern large ballistic missiles (MLBMs) to those externally completed by December 31, 1971.

3. Each party shall not, after July 31, 1971, start construction of new submarines for submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, or construct additional SLBM launchers on submarines operational as of that date. Each party shall limit SLBM launchers to those launchers on those SLBM submarines operational and under active construction as of that date.

4. For purposes of this interim agreement, the following definitions apply:

(a) ICBM launchers—launchers for land-based ballistic missiles which are capable of ranges in excess of 5,000 kilometers, including those deployed for possible use at lesser ranges.

(b) MLBM launchers—launchers for ballistic missiles which have a volume exceeding 70 cubic meters and are of a type which first became operational in 1964 or later.

(c) SLBM launchers—launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines (including launchers on submarines undergoing overhaul or conversion).

5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this interim agreement, each party shall limit strategic offensive missile launchers for research, development, testing, evaluation, and training, and launchers for space missions, to no more than one-hundred and sixty (160). This

³ The text of this agreement follows.

limit shall include all launchers at research and development test ranges and facilities, launchers on test-bed submarines and surface ships, and training launchers at operational sites.

6. Each party shall not use covered facilities for fitting out or berthing submarines. The provisions of Article 10 of the Agreement shall apply to this interim agreement.

7. The standing commission to be established pursuant to Article 11 of the Agreement shall also perform relevant functions of the types prescribed in that article in connection with the obligations of this interim agreement.

8. The parties shall continue active negotiations for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The parties agree that the obligations in this interim agreement are without prejudice to the scope and terms of the more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms to be negotiated.

9. Either party shall have the right to withdraw from this interim agreement under the conditions and in the manner specified in Article 13 of the Agreement.

10. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which each party shall have informed the other party by written notice of its acceptance.

Done in duplicate in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic, at _____, this _____ day of _____, 19____.

For the United States
of America

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

_____”

“Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms of the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Preamble

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the parties,

Proceeding from the fact that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Convinced that limitations on strategic arms would result in a reduction in the competition in strategic arms and a decrease in the risk of war,

Recognizing the direct relationship between strategic defensive and offensive arms and the necessity to limit both,

Agreeing upon certain measures constraining strategic offensive arms programs, pending conclusion of a more complete agreement limiting strategic offensive arms which will be the subject of subsequent negotiations between the parties,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms competition and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tensions and the strengthening of trust between states,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Parties undertake to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt such other measures relating to strategic arms limitations as provided in this Agreement.

Article 2

1. For purposes of this Agreement, the following definitions apply:

(a) An ABM system is a system for rendering ineffective strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory.

(b) ABM interceptor missiles are interceptor missiles constructed or deployed for an ABM role or of a type indistinguishable from missiles tested in an ABM mode.

(c) ABM launchers are launchers constructed or deployed for ABM interceptor missiles.

(d) ABM radars are radars constructed or deployed for an ABM role or of a type indistinguishable from radars tested in an ABM mode.

(e) Other large phased-array radars are those phased-array radars, outside of modern ABM radar complexes, having a product of power (in watts) and aperture (in square meters) greater than one million.

(f) A modern ABM radar complex is a circular area of no more than three (3) kilometers in diameter within which are deployed any ABM radar or components thereof, which first became operational after July 1, 1971, or any phased-array ABM radar or components thereof.

2. The ABM systems or their components limited by this agreement shall include those:

(a) operational;

(b) under construction;

(c) undergoing overhaul, repair, or conversion; and,

(d) undergoing development and testing.

Article 3

1. Each party undertaking not to deploy ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars except in its own territory and only at one of the following:

(a) One circular area having a radius of one hundred (100) kilometers, centered on the party's national capital, or

(b) Three (3) circular areas each having a radius of sixty (60) kilometers and each centered on a point in ICBM fields west of the Mississippi River for the U.S. and east of the Ural Mountains for the USSR.

2. Within the area referred to in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article, a party may deploy no more than one hundred (100) fixed ABM launchers and one hundred (100) ABM interceptor missiles located on or in the vicinity of ABM launchers; may deploy ABM radars at no more than four (4) modern ABM radar complexes; and may retain those mechanical-scan, dish-type ABM radars which were operational as of July 1, 1971.

3. Within the total of the areas referred to in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article, a party may deploy no more than three hundred (300) fixed ABM launchers and three hundred (300) ABM interceptor missiles located on or in the vicinity of ABM launchers, and may deploy ABM radars at no more than five (5) modern ABM radar complexes.

Article 4

1. Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, or as mutually agreed, the parties undertake not to deploy other large phased-array radars, as defined in subparagraph (e) of paragraph 1 of Article 2, in addition to those operational or under construction on July 1, 1971.

2. The Soviet Union shall have the right to retain the other large phased-array radars operational or under construction as of July 1, 1971. The United States shall have the right to deploy in addition to those operational or under construction as of July 1, 1971, an agreed number of early warning other large phased-array radars to provide a capability equivalent to those Soviet other large phased-array radars which provide early warning and which were operational or under construction on July 1, 1971.

Article 5

The limitations provided for in Article 3 shall not apply to ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars used for development and testing located within current test ranges or agreed additional test ranges. Each party agrees to have no more than fifteen (15) fixed ABM launchers at these ranges.

Article 6

1. Each party undertakes not to develop, produce, test, or deploy sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems, or components for such systems.

2. Each party undertakes not to develop, produce, test, or deploy ABM launchers capable of launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to develop, produce, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems with rapid reload capability for ABM launchers.

Article 7

1. The parties undertake not to modify any types of missile systems or their components other than ABM systems or their components, whatever their original design mission, so as to convert them for ABM use or give them a dual anti-aircraft and ABM role, and not to develop or deploy new missile systems or their components other than ABM systems or their components for such a role.

2. The parties undertake not to test missiles other than ABM interceptor missiles in an ABM mode.

Article 8

Each party undertakes not to prejudice the viability or circumvent the effectiveness of this agreement through transfers to third countries of ABM systems or their components limited under this Agreement.

Article 9

In addition to agreeing upon a separate interim agreement on certain measures to limit strategic offensive arms, the parties undertake to continue active negotiations for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article 10

1. For the purpose of providing assurances of compliance with the provisions of this Agreement, each party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal, operating outside the national territory of the other party, together with the corollary limitations and cooperative measures provided for in this Agreement designed to supplement national verification capabilities.

2. Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each party undertakes not to use concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article 11

To promote the objectives and assist in the implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, the parties shall establish promptly a standing commission within the framework of which they will:

(a) Consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) Provide on a voluntary basis such information as either party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed, including the offering of selective direct observation in order to clarify ambiguous situations;

(c) Consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) Consider possible changes in the strategic situation between the parties which have a bearing on the provisions of this Agreement;

(e) Consider as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Agreement, including proposals for amendments; and

(f) Consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

Article 12

1. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

2. — years after entry into force of this agreement, and at — year intervals thereafter, the parties shall together conduct a review of this Agreement.

Article 13

1. Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other party, which withdrawal shall be effective six (6) months after the date such notice is given. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. After — years have elapsed from the entry into force of the Agreement, and if the parties have not reached agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms as a result of negotiations referred to in Article 9, either party shall have the right to withdraw provided it shall have given notice of its intention to withdraw six (6) months in advance. Such notice may not be given until — years have elapsed after entry into force of this agreement.

Article 14

1. This agreement shall enter into force on the date on which each party shall have informed the other party by written notice of its acceptance.

2. This agreement shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic, at _____, this _____ day of _____, 19____.

For the United States
of America

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

_____”

Smith

184. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 28, 1971.

SUBJECT

Guidance on ABM Ban Proposal

The surfacing in the front channel of Semenov's receptiveness to a zero-ABM proposal requires decisions from you as to what direction we should now take. Gerry Smith has sent a cable (Tab A)² which sets forth the Semenov/Smith discussions and *urges that we promptly table a proposal for an ABM ban.*

The Delegation (except Allison) supports this proposal and is preparing a draft ban proposal along the lines of August 4.³ Allison is taking this opportunity to reassert the long-standing JCS objection to zero ABM.⁴

There are two ways we can proceed on this:

1. We could ask the Working Group⁵ to do a detailed study of zero ABM levels in the context of the current negotiations. This is largely unnecessary, inasmuch as we did a thorough analysis of zero levels at the outset in developing the SALT building blocks and with minor modifications the outlines of the August 4 proposal are adequate. However, referring the issues to the Working Group could serve to buy time and reopen a forum for debating whether we would accept zero ABM at all.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV, 1 May–July 1971. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT. Sent for urgent action. Sent through Haig and Kennedy.

² Attached but not printed is telegram USDEL SALT 854 from Helsinki, July 27.

³ See footnote 2, Document 104.

⁴ On July 28 Kissinger and Laird discussed the zero ABM issue at a breakfast meeting attended by Pursley, Haig, and Admiral Murphy. According to an unsigned memorandum for the record prepared on August 11, they had the following exchange: "Secretary Laird then expressed concern about the U.S. position in the SALT preparations on zero ABM. Dr. Kissinger commented that he was not very sure how this issue would come out, but he expected that we should not complicate the negotiations by the new proposal. Secretary Laird stated that Senator Jackson was having great difficulty with the number of sites we were proposing in the budget since it was apparent that we might take another position in our SALT negotiations." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK MemCons, MemCon—Sec. Laird, HAK, Gen. Pursley, Gen. Haig, and Adm. Murphy, July 28, 1971)

⁵ Reference is to the Verification Panel Working Group.

2. If it is the President's decision that zero ABM remains a part of the U.S. position, we could simply await the Delegation ban proposal, work it over at the Working Group/Backstopping level and refer it for approval perhaps without a Verification Panel meeting. There are some minor issues that need studying in the Verification Panel Working Group, but these are things which we understand fairly well in a broad way, e.g., destruction and dismantling procedures.

We need your guidance as to how to proceed. Please indicate your decisions below.

—Refer the entire issue to the Verification Panel Working Group and for consideration by the Verification Panel.

—Await the Delegation's proposal and consider it at the Working Group level. A decision will be made subsequently as to whether the Verification Panel is required.

—Other. See me.⁶

⁶ Kissinger did not initial any of the options but wrote in the margin: "If we can put it before Aug. 6 meeting, otherwise let Delegation put forward proposal."

185. Editorial Note

On July 28, 1971, Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jacob Beam met for almost 2 hours with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for a general review of bilateral relations. According to Beam's reporting telegram 5367 from Moscow, July 28, the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) were briefly discussed: "Gromyko noted talks were in progress in Helsinki but it was still difficult to forecast results. Soviet desire to find common language with us on central points, if not all points, is not lessening." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 716, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XV)

On August 3, in a memorandum to President Nixon, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed him of Beam's conversation with Gromyko. Kissinger emphasized that "*Gromyko made a special point of saying he had just talked with Brezhnev, who had asked him to appraise the course of US policy toward the USSR. Gromyko claimed that he had answered by saying that much was presently unclear in US policy, but that fairly soon certain questions (Berlin? SALT?) would be answered and this would clarify our overall policy. Gromyko made a point of saying that his conversation with Brezhnev should be brought to your attention.*" Kissinger noted that Beam

“sees this as a possible opportunity, if not an invitation, to a high level dialogue, should you be interested.” (Ibid.)

Taking the Soviet cue, Nixon wrote General Secretary Brezhnev on August 5 about the state of affairs between the two superpowers in a letter that Kissinger handed to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Nixon made the following reference to SALT:

“The agreement announced on May 20 represented a commitment at the highest levels of the political leadership of both our countries to achieve a successful outcome in the negotiations for limitation of strategic armaments. My representatives in Helsinki are under instructions to complete an early equitable agreement on ABMs as well as a parallel agreement on certain measures with regard to the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. We will then have a basis for a more complete limitation of offensive weapons. The final result will strengthen security, permit valuable resources and talents to be used for constructive purposes and, together with progress in the resolution of other differences, contribute to a stable and peaceful world.” (Ibid., Box 497, President’s Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 1)

According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met with Dobrynin on August 10 from 5:34 to 5:52 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) Although no other record of the conversation has been found, at that time Dobrynin handed him a note for President Nixon, which explained that “the Soviet leadership on its part also reaffirms the earlier principal agreement (understanding) with President Nixon concerning his visit to Moscow for discussion of questions of mutual interest with the aim of finding their mutually acceptable solutions.” No direct references were made to SALT. (Ibid.)

On September 7 Brezhnev replied to Nixon’s August 5 letter. Although most of Brezhnev’s letter focused on Indochina and the Middle East, he commented on SALT as follows:

“I share your appraisal of the business-like nature of the strategic arms limitation talks under way between our Governments. Important in itself here is the very fact that both you and ourselves have come to the conclusion that agreement in that field is possible if both sides display caution in those matters which concern the interests of their security, and do not strive to achieve unilateral advantages. There exists now a common understanding on what the talks must concentrate first of all, and that may become the proper foundation for attaining practical decisions. We continue to believe it desirable to agree on a limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, but only on the basis of the principle of complete equivalence. The first concrete results achieved at

those negotiations—completion of the agreement on measure of reducing the danger of outbreak of nuclear war between the USSR and the U.S.—represent, without doubt, a positive factor in Soviet-American relations.” (Ibid., Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 7 [Part 1])

On September 17 Kissinger forwarded the letter to Nixon under a covering memorandum that noted, “Brezhnev fails to mention the offensive side of the May 20 understanding to which you had referred in your letter.” In the margin, Nixon wrote, “K—brace Dobrynin on this.” (Ibid., Box 497, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 1)

Nixon’s August 5 letter, the Soviet note, and Brezhnev’s September 7 letter are printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Documents 309, 314, and 324, respectively.

186. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Zumwalt) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

JCSM–360–71

Washington, July 31, 1971.

SUBJECT

Proposed Strategic Defensive and Offensive Agreements

1. (TS) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM–308–71, dated 30 June 1971,² subject: “US Position for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Helsinki SALT V),” which contained the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on antiballistic missile (ABM) limitations, certain offensive limitations, and the type of agreement needed to carry out the US and USSR joint announcement of 20 May 1971.

b. JCSM–330–71, dated 13 July 1971,³ subject: “Definition of Antiballistic Missile Systems To Be Limited,” which presented the view

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive. According to a notation on the memorandum, Laird saw it on August 2. Another handwritten note reads, “Mr. Laird—Johnny Vogt asked that these views be made known to White House.”

² Document 169.

³ Document 176.

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that prohibiting futuristic ABM systems as is done in NSDM 117 could lead to a future situation of strategic advantage⁴ for the Soviets and strongly recommended that the subject receive interagency examination.

c. CM-1066-71, dated 20 July 1971,⁵ subject: "Draft Strategic Defensive and Offensive Agreements," which reflected the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for two draft agreements submitted by the SALT Delegation, with two reservations: that futuristic ABM systems not be banned and that intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers be limited to those which have not initially reached "operational status" vice those which are not "externally complete" as of 30 September 1971.

2. Since November 1969 when SALT began, the strategic balance has been shifting against the United States.⁶ In the interim, both sides have been modernizing but only the Soviets have made increases in their strategic offensive launchers. Under the current US SALT proposal, the imbalance in launchers which has resulted from this Soviet effort would be maintained, perhaps indefinitely. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel compelled to express their concern over the disadvantageous position of numerical inferiority that would result if the US proposals tabled in Helsinki on 27 July 1971, and resulting from NSDMs 117 and 120, were accepted.

3. The Appendix⁷ hereto reflects the levels of Soviet and US strategic offensive missiles that would eventuate should the Soviets accept the proposal. The US draft agreement⁸ permits Soviet strategic offensive missile launcher deployment of about 300 more launchers than the draft agreement supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reference 1c. The interim offensive proposal is in reality a freeze for the United States but permits the Soviets to complete most of their current construction. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the total Soviet numerical advantage would then be between 600–700 strategic offensive missile launchers. Not only will there be a serious imbalance in numbers of strategic offensive missiles, but the throw-weight disparity is increased. The Soviets are to be allowed 288 SS-9 type missiles with all the potential for MIRV and hard target kill capability which these missiles could eventually represent.

⁴ The words, "strategic advantage" were underlined and the words "meaning?" and "definition?" were handwritten in the margin in an unknown hand.

⁵ Document 182.

⁶ The sentence was highlighted and "in what way?" was written in the margin.

⁷ Attached but not printed.

⁸ See Document 183.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are further concerned by the rapidity with which the US negotiating position has steadily eroded relative to the Soviets to the point that it now appears the United States will be negotiating an agreement in which the United States will be frozen in a position of serious strategic inferiority. They note that:

a. In April 1970, NSDM 51⁹ authorized an equal aggregate total of 1,710 ICBM and SLBM launchers on both sides; heavy bombers were to be limited to those operational, thus providing the United States with an overall delivery vehicle superiority over the USSR.

b. NSDMs 69, 73, and 74 in July 1970¹⁰ contained provisions for aggregates of 1,900 central strategic systems for each side with sub-limits of 1,710 for ICBM and SLBM launchers, and 250 launchers for the modern large ballistic missile (MLBM).

c. NSDMs 117 and 120, published only one year later, in July 1971, would allow significantly greater Soviet levels in numbers of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and in the overall aggregate. Although the principle of the offensive agreement has changed to an interim agreement, it still, at least temporarily, takes away previous US rights of freedom to mix between land and sea missiles and to deploy MLBMs up to a number equal to those of the Soviets. There is always the possibility that an interim agreement will set precedents for a final agreement or extend longer than desired. In comparison, the proposal supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 July 1971 in reference 1c would not have permitted the Soviets to surpass the United States either in SLBM launchers or in the aggregate of all central strategic systems if the relative numbers of heavy bombers remained unchanged.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that an interim agreement, once entered into, will be difficult to terminate.¹¹ They reaffirm their belief that it should not exceed 2 years in length. Should such an interim agreement be concluded for a period of time longer than 2 years, it would have a detrimental effect upon ongoing and possible future US strategic weapons programs. Of particular interest are the following:

a. Undersea Long-Range Missile System Deployment—would be prohibited. (No new construction of submarines for SLBMs after 31 July 1971.)

⁹ Document 68.

¹⁰ Documents 94, 97, and 100.

¹¹ Because of this concern, the Chief of Naval Operations strongly recommends that any interim offensive agreement entered into contain an automatic freedom-to-mix provision to take effect at the expiration of two years. [Footnote is in the original.]

b. Advanced ICBM Deployment—would be prohibited. (No new construction of ICBM launchers after 31 July 1971.)

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are also concerned by recent indications from the Soviet delegation that they may seek to exclude SLBMs from the interim agreement. Such a proposal, if accepted, would result in a freeze on ICBMs with the Soviets in a position of permanent numerical superiority while they are left free to continue their large-scale SLBM program, thus rapidly eroding our current advantage. For this reason, if this contingency develops, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly urge that the Delegation be instructed to hold firm on the inclusion of SLBMs in the agreement. If the negotiations are certain to break off on this issue, the negotiating position of the United States should be reformulated. Protection of US security interests would best be served by a reformulation which, inter alia, established a limit on the aggregate total of strategic missile systems, equality in MLBMs, and freedom to mix. Such a reformulation could also protect US security interests in the event that political circumstances force an extension of the interim agreement beyond its intended duration.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff view with concern the Soviet insistence that we negotiate an ABM agreement on the basis of NCA/NCA only. If the United States were to concur in such a proposal, the Soviets would have a significant relative defensive advantage in that their NCA system provides coverage of some 580 ICBMs in addition to urban and industrial values. The United States would receive no ICBM coverage from its NCA defense. Additionally, the Soviets would have protection for their strategic force command and control centers and the United States would not. For this reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly urge that the Delegation stand firm on the present negotiating position on ABMs or insist on one which provides an equal degree of protection to the vital assets on both sides. The JCS position as set forth in reference 1a is one solution for equality.

8. Another concern on defensive strategic systems centers on futuristic ABM systems. As you are aware from references 1b and 1c, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommended that futuristic ABM systems not be banned. If deployment of futuristic systems were to be banned but research and development permitted, as advocated by some governmental agencies, such an approach would make it extremely difficult to get funds for such research and development (R&D) and could lead to unilateral US neglect of the field. In all likelihood, the Soviets would proceed with R&D on such systems. It seems imprudent to foreclose options on future systems that cannot now be defined or envisioned or which may be unverifiable, particularly in view of the numerical superiority of Soviet offensive missiles involved in the proposed interim strategic offensive agreement. Under any circumstances, R&D programs must be kept viable to avoid technological surprise.

9. In view of the threat to national security posed by long-term acceptance of the strategic imbalance noted above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States proceed with great caution in any further efforts to accommodate the Soviet position. They reaffirm their position that the duration of an interim agreement should not exceed 2 years and recommend that any agreement for a longer duration be negotiated with specific provisions which would allow restoration of the strategic balance.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ER Zumwalt
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

187. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 2, 1971.

SUBJECT

Banning Deployment of Antibalistic Missiles

Minister Semenov informed Ambassador Smith on July 27² that his instructions are to work with the U.S. delegation to see if an ABM ban is a realistic proposition.

I believe that, on balance, the U.S. would benefit from an ABM deployment ban, providing the three following conditions are met:

1. An ABM ban must not be used to reopen the possibility of a MIRV ban. Deployed MIRVs are our best counter to a surprise ABM deployment. I am convinced that a strategic arms limitation agreement banning MIRVs, whether or not ABM is banned, is not in the U.S. interest.

2. The agreement banning ABM must be made contingent on reaching fair offensive limitations. If possible, the limitations should lead to reductions in offensive force levels rather than simple freezes.

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 184.

3. The provisions of the agreement banning deployment of ABM systems must be as precise, complete, and as rigorous as we know how to make them to maximize the probability that the ABM ban will be effective.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has informed me the Chiefs continue to oppose a ban on ABM deployment.³

You might consider two actions to further prospects for an ABM deployment ban. First, you might discuss this matter with Congressional leaders to forestall political pressures for an ABM ban that does not meet the conditions outlined above. In particular, an accompanying MIRV ban should be emphatically discouraged. Second, if we are to pursue this possibility seriously, it might again be appropriate to go through your channel to Mr. Brezhnev with the message:

- We share your interest in exploring an ABM ban.
- It would be a very significant step forward to agree to dismantle our respective ABM systems. It could establish an important precedent which might lead to reductions of offensive forces as well.
- It is a very serious as well as important step, and we would only wish to explore it in detail if we could agree on some guiding principles.

—The first principle is that the ABM deployment ban should be precise, complete, and rigorous so that each side may be assured that the other's capability to destroy incoming missiles is entirely dismantled.

—The second principle is that the actual dismantling must be contingent on reaching a fair offensive arms limitation agreement.

Melvin R. Laird

³ In JCSM-361-71, July 31, Zumwalt set forth to Laird the objections of the JCS to a ban on deployment of ABMs: "Any consideration of zero-ABM must involve a careful weighing of the interrelationships of defensive and offensive Soviet/US forces. As indicated in reference 1c [Document 186] the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned about the imbalance in strategic offensive capability which would result from Soviet acceptance of the current US position on offensive systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it would be contrary to US security interests to agree to a zero-ABM proposal." (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological File)

188. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 5, 1971.

SUBJECT

Next Steps on SALT Agreement for Preventing Accidental War

Negotiations in Helsinki are virtually completed on the agreement on measures to prevent accidental war. The substance of the agreement is based largely on our views, offered when the Soviets broached the general idea last year. The Soviets originally had suggested a treaty, but when talks resumed at Helsinki, they backed away and agreed with us that an executive agreement would be acceptable.

The prospective agreement includes these main points:

—Each side will inform the other concerning “unexplained,” unauthorized or accidental incidents involving detonation of a nuclear weapon.

—Each side will inform the other concerning missile launches outside of its national territory, and concerning detection of unidentified objects or interference with communication facilities.

—Other clauses include provisions for consultations and adopting further measures, as well as an omnibus clause that would allow for exchange of information in situations that might involve accidental war.

Thus *we are about at the point of considering whether we wish this particular agreement to be initialed now by Ambassador Smith and publicized.*

—The Soviets would prefer a separate agreement rather than waiting for the main agreements in SALT, and want to initial the agreement.

—Our current instruction to our Delegation is that it would be preferable to complete this agreement at the same time that the main agreements are concluded.

Once the final text is agreed, it can be referred to Washington, and if acceptable, Ambassador Smith would be authorized to initial the agreement. We would then want to confer with our NATO Allies, and to inform the appropriate Congressional committees, and then we could consider the timing and procedures for signature.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XVI, August 1971. Secret. Sent for information. Initialed by Haig and Kissinger, and a notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

The main purpose of moving toward a separate agreement rather than waiting for all the SALT issues to be resolved is that it provides a means of signaling the Soviets our continuing interest in SALT. Moreover, since Brezhnev personally identified himself with this type of agreement at the Party Congress, our willingness to move toward concluding an executive agreement may be tactically helpful in our main areas of interest.

I have asked that the SALT Backstopping Committee provide new instructions to Ambassador Smith² so that he can inform the Soviets of our willingness to conclude a separate agreement on Accidental War, and to inform them he is authorized to initial it in Helsinki. Final signature would await Congressional and Allied consultations, but the Delegation could solicit Soviet views on timing and publicity.³

² Telegram 142933 to USDEL SALT, August 5, transmitted the text of those instructions to the Backstopping Committee, also called the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, for the delegation's information. (Ibid.)

³ Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote the following comment: "OK. But let's get maximum publicity for it. Ask Scali—privately what he suggests in this respect."

189. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, August 7, 1971, 1143Z.

171. Dear Henry:

I would appreciate your passing the following to the President.²

Dear Mr. President:

Before you have a decision on the "esoteric" problem, i.e.: whether an agreement should cover all ABM systems or only those using radars and missiles, I hope you will consider my personal views.

This is a more important issue than levels and radar restrictions. It poses the basic question: do we seek an ABM constraint to provide

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

² The message bears no indication that Nixon saw it, but several statements he made during an August 10 conversation suggest that he was familiar with Smith's position. See Document 190.

greater stability by assuring maintenance of retaliatory capability, halting a buildup of defensive systems that could threaten that capability and lessening pressures for unnecessary buildup of offensive systems—or just a temporary truce in ABMs—until such time as more effective futuristic ABMs are developed and deployed?

The latter approach runs counter to US strategic policy and public statements on the destabilizing effects of nationwide ABM defenses. It could well lead to a race for futuristic systems and merely put off the danger we are trying to preclude in SALT.

The latter approach would also undercut our rationale for effective restraints on radars. One proposal under consideration in Washington would permit lasers to be used to perform the function of radars but not the function of missiles. That would permit the Soviets to deploy a nationwide sensor infrastructure while we insist on tight controls on radars.

We are stressing the importance of blocking Soviet use of anti-aircraft missiles as ABMs. But a failure to limit future ABM systems will permit their nationwide deployment even though labeled as ABMs. That would make our SAM upgrade control effort seem foolish and illogical.

If future ABM systems are not to be limited, the burden should be allowed to rest on the USSR.

I believe the public and Congressional expectation is that we seek to limit all ABM systems, not just existing type of hardware. Congressional briefings during two years of SALT have not suggested otherwise.

Respectfully,

Gerard Smith

190. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Others¹

Washington, August 10, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Zumwalt: On chart number 5,² I show you how I believe we can provide the kind of power that can help you. I'd like to talk about it. There's nuclear standoff, as Admiral Moorer has discussed, and we hope it will continue into the future, preferably through a successful SALT, but if not, then through increased expenditures in strategic weaponry. But the standoff means that nuclear power is not a useful instrument; it's just a necessary umbrella. And assuming the balance holds, the power which resolves issues will be appropriate conventional capability. My—

Nixon: Before we go on at this point, let me interject one thought here. Mel, I noticed something in which Smith, where he's gone off about the zero ABM thing.³ Now, I understand, the Chiefs are all opposed.

Laird: Mr. President, the Chiefs—

Nixon: Zero ABM, as I—a zero ABM deal, period. Is that right, Henry? Is that what we're looking at?

Kissinger: Well, what Smith wants to do is to slide in zero ABM for—

Nixon: For what?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 68–7. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon attended this meeting from 10:05 to 11:54 a.m. with the following participants: Agnew, Laird, Packard, Moorer, Ryan, Westmoreland, Chapman, Zumwalt, Kissinger, and Haig. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. A memorandum for the President's file of this meeting is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 62, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, and is sprinted in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 191.

² Chart 5 and other charts mentioned have not been found.

³ See Document 189. On August 9 the Verification Panel met from 3:08 to 4:40 p.m. According to minutes of the meeting, Kissinger called on the participants to discuss two major issues: "1) the question of esoteric ABM systems and those in an exotic environment; and the zero-ABM proposal." The summary of conclusions of the meeting included: "that a memorandum would be prepared for the President putting to him the question of whether or not to put forward a zero-ABM proposal at this time as a substitute for Safeguard/NCA or to keep zero ABM for discussion in the next round of a comprehensive agreement." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72)

Kissinger: For the ABM portion of the May 20th agreement.⁴

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: And without changing any of the offensive understandings that were reached. And that is what the Chiefs are opposed [unclear]—

Laird: We are opposed. And the Chiefs and Defense are opposed, Mr. President. If you go to zero, then you've got to change the offensive—

Nixon: Yeah.

Laird: —mix that we've already offered.

Nixon: Spend a second on that. I mean, when I say a second I mean whatever time you need. I didn't mean to interrupt. I just—we started talking about it assuming we have a SALT agreement. Let's see what you're talking about. Why—what is the argument? Why is zero ABM worse than [unclear] the National Command Center, and two—two Minuteman, and what have you? What's your view on this?

Laird: Mr. President—

Nixon: I think I know, but I just wanted to be sure I've heard you.

Laird: From a military standpoint, it is difficult to defend the two-site proposal.

Nixon: Right.

Laird: The two-site proposal can be defended on the basis that it can be expanded for a 12-site program.

Nixon: Right.

Laird: We have tabled a proposition in SALT, which gives the Soviet certainly an advantage as far as the long term is concerned on the offensive weapons systems. If we were to give up the capability, which we have, to go into a defensive system on down the road, by going to zero at this time, without opening up the offensive proposition that we have put on the table in the SALT talks, I believe it would be—endanger our security planning. And so the position of the Chiefs and the position that I've taken is that: no, do not table the zero at this time, unless you're willing also at the same time to make a reduction as far as the offensive limitations are concerned—

Kissinger: Then, if you do that, you are—the May 20th thing is down the drain.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: And we are right back to where we started from last January with the comprehensive negotiations—

⁴ See Document 160.

Laird: It depends. Henry, it depends on what date you attach to the May 20th operation.

Kissinger: Well—

Zumwalt: And whether or not in the offensive side you put into it an automatic date by which you have freedom to make it if they happen to come to a problem.

Nixon: Right. But—

Kissinger: But then, what this will lead us to, if it's a possible way of going, is towards the comprehensive agreement in which all the offensive and defensive weapons are included. What we had attempted to do on May 20th was to make an ABM limitation and a temporary offensive limitation which could act as a bridge to a more comprehensive one. So, what Mel is proposing could be incorporated in the second stage of the negotiation. That is to say, we could then keep the zero ABM for the second stage of the negotiation and couple it with offensive reductions. I agree with the Chiefs and with Mel. I think, however, that if we want a rapid agreement, we've got to stick with the May 20th framework.

Nixon: Do you agree we should stay with the May 20th—?

Laird: Yes. But, I had some problems in that—

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: That's all right. Take your time.

Laird: I had some problems, Mr. President, with the date that's been used in the—this and 17, and this and 20, because it does give the Soviet Union, if this becomes the only agreement we have—and we have to look at it from the standpoint that we might not get anything else—it gives them an opportunity of having a superior force in '74 and '75. And I don't want to be around to see the Soviet Union ever be in a position of superiority. I can accept parity, but I think that this particular proposition, if we don't follow through on something else, gives them the opportunity for superiority. I think that's the position of the Chiefs, too.

Moorer: That's right. And that's what'll happen if the interim agreement turns out to be the final agreement. I don't know, sir—

Kissinger: But there is a provision, which is that if there is no permanent agreement, the whole thing becomes subject to abrogation after a year—

Laird: But, Henry, my problem is this: that I think it's going to be most difficult for the United States to set aside the agreement. I think it's easier for the Soviet Union to set aside an agreement because of the manner of our whole system of government is so much—it's much more difficult for us to set aside the agreement than it is for the Soviet Union.

Nixon: Well, the difficulty with zero ABM—it's just a simple point. Zero ABM, plus a freeze, basically—and that's what it is on their offensive thing—means that we freeze, in terms of ourselves, into an inferior position, both ways.

Zumwalt: That's correct—

Nixon: That's correct. Right? That's why—

Zumwalt: In both segments.

Nixon: That's right. So, that is why we can under no circumstance let Smith continue, Henry, on that line.

Kissinger: I agree.

Nixon: Make that clear to him—

Kissinger: I'll get a message to him—

Nixon: He must. See that he does. That was never the understanding. We are not gonna freeze ourselves. We can always be: "Well, that's all right. We won't have any ABM." But you look at those charts, we're already inferior, except in numbers, of course, of weapons, and it's because of MIRVing—which we may have, basically, 4 or 5 years, if somebody doesn't knock that out. So, we don't want to freeze right now. Right? Is that right?

Laird: Mr. President—

[unclear exchange]

Kissinger: We don't want to have zero ABM.

Nixon: [unclear] Exactly. If you have zero ABM, in the context of the May 20th deal, we are freezing ourselves into a second position, an inferior position. Right?

Laird: That's right.

Moorer: And I might add, sir, we are increasing the numbers where we have a lead in technology.

Nixon: Exactly. Go ahead, Admiral.

Zumwalt: Yes, sir. So, my shorthand term for this appropriate conventional power is "relevant power." On chart 6, I show you examples of where I believe, power was held and used successfully, or was relevant. In the left-hand column, and this is—those were successful. Sea power includes the Marines, of course, with their three-division air wing teams. We could add appreciably to the list on the left. The list on the right is shorter because decisionmakers normally calculate the expected outcome, and hence they find other paths or back down, and these three catch you here. And any President's options will, of course, depend on whether he possesses the relevant power. Now, on chart number 7, I show you how I think relevant power is shifting. In line 1, for example, the term "threat nuclear attack," and the "X" under the column entitled "strategic nuclear forces," shows these forces were ex-

clusively relevant in the '50s and '60s. As discussed, the nuclear balance now makes this threat unlikely, although in ending World War II, and President Truman's threat to Stalin to get him out of Iran, they were relevant. Lines 2 to 4 show Europe. The shift in the threats on the NATO center in the '50s and '60s—line 2. To NATO northern and southern flanks—lines 3 and 4. The greater stability in the center is due to the perceived linking of nuclear weapons to conventional forces, to unrest in the Warsaw Pact, to Russia's concern about the Chinese Communist border forces. The instability on the NATO flanks is due to Soviet flanking movements, increased strength of the Soviet fleet. I've just come back from a seven-country trip through Central and Northern Europe. I found not only the chiefs of navy, but the chiefs of defense staff, of all of those countries had that perception, and in many cases, the Ministers of Defense. In essence, they see Finland becoming a Latvia, Sweden becoming a Finland, and Norway, within 5 years, becoming a Sweden.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Zumwalt: Now, what is the military situation? In chart 10, I'll compare the U.S. and the Soviet forces, and discuss how we've allocated them. With regard to chart 11, Admiral Moorer has discussed those, and I'll just point out that in the slide on the right, with the graph on the right, a significant fraction of that MIRV increase is due to the Polaris/Poseidon. On that, those forces, in essence, represent the pre-strike lineup. Now, on chart number 12, I show you the total—

Nixon: Right there, can I just ask one, one question? Are those Titans working well?

Ryan: Yes, sir. The first three have deployed—

Nixon: Yeah?

Ryan: They're highly reliable. The test results looked like it's a real beauty.

Nixon: In fact, the only—the only positive thing on all these charts that Admiral Moorer showed us—which I was surprised, frankly—is the warhead deal. But that's MIRV isn't it? Well, incidentally, the jackasses have been trying to get us to stop MIRV, and that's worse than stopping ABM. Right, Mel?

Laird: It is.

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: Interestingly enough, Henry, why in the—why is it that the Soviet isn't interested in stopping MIRV?

Unidentified speaker: Because they're going to [unclear]—

Unidentified speaker: Well, because of throw-weight—

Unidentified speaker: They've got that huge SS-9.

[Laughter]

Unidentified speaker: It's because of the throw-weight of the SS-9. They could put a hell of a lot of MIRVs up on top of—

Kissinger: Because they're behind us.

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: And also, it looks like, like they want to develop the capability, too. They figured that we've—

Unidentified speaker: They already have the development program.

Moorer: No doubt about it, sir, they're going to—

Nixon: They may be MIRVed already, you think?

Moorer: No, sir.

Nixon: We don't—we don't know for sure?

Laird: Well, we think they probably have multiple re-entry vehicles—

Nixon: Yeah.

Laird: —on a few SS-9's. But I don't like to get into the debate of whether they're independently targeted or not. But they will have that capability, Mr. President, within the 1972-73 time period.

Nixon: Let me ask Dave [Packard] a question. Dave, looking at this from a, you know, the scientists, and all the rest. I mean, you know, we've been around the track on ABM, and MIRV, and so forth. But, you really—it would seem it's rather interesting that there's always these issues that stir the people up. It's hard to realize it. About a year ago, 18 months ago, it was MIRV; everybody squealing about MIRV, you know, "We got to stop MIRV." What do you think of—MIRV is, wouldn't you say, is almost indispensable in view of—in view of the fact that they have so much of that throw-weight? The advantage that we have, whatever advantage that we have, has got to be maintained by the MIRVing of the system.

Packard: Oh, I think it does, Mr. President, unless—

Nixon: And, as I understand, it works. Ok? Well, let's—

Packard: Mr. President, let me suggest some agreement to reduce the total number of delivery vehicles, so that they are roughly equal.

Nixon: Yeah.

Packard: The MIRV is the one significant advantage we have. Let me just say a word for—

Ryan: Minuteman—

Packard: —General Ryan's—

[unclear exchange]

Packard: —Minuteman III. I just looked at that program. That's the MIRV program—

Nixon: Right.

Packard: —that the Air Force had. That force has better readiness than the previous Minuteman, and the improved accuracy gives each one of the Minuteman III warheads, of which there are 3, each one of these warheads has as much probability to kill a hard target as one of the large Minuteman I warheads.

Nixon: Hmm.

Packard: So, we have provided a significant improved capability with that program, and that's the one advantage we have against that numbers imbalance, and I look at this MIRV program as being one of the only balances we have. It was put in originally as a hedge against ABM, but I think it has to be looked at in terms of the balance against their increased capability, and also as giving us more flexibility in terms of targets we can cover with the Chinese—the China situation buildup. So, I would consider that to be a very important program, and we should not give it up under any conditions.

Agnew: Mr. President, may I ask a question?

Nixon: Ask it. Sure.

Agnew: The—I raised this question before. I'm not sure I understood the answer. If you've got an offensive limitation on delivery vehicles, based on the megatonnage, throw-weight capability that they have, wouldn't, in time, through their technological improvement and their ability to MIRV, wouldn't they, then, far outstrip us without violating the agreements?

Zumwalt: It depends on how many MIRVs they can put into the SS-9. We, for example, put 10 into the Polaris—

Nixon: You put 10 into the Polaris—?

Zumwalt: Yes, sir. We can put 14; we're only putting 10—

Nixon: Phew—

Zumwalt: So that there's 10 to 15 [unclear]. The intelligence estimate says three for the SS-9. I believe they ought to be able to get 20 in, if they get our technology.

Agnew: Looking ahead to the technological development of, Leonard [Chapman], how proficient we've become, we still have that question of throw-weight, though, and, eventually, as silos become harder, so that throw-weight is going to mean something different than it does. Shouldn't we be thinking more about limiting throw-weights than delivery vehicles, for instance?

Chapman: No, this is why—

Nixon: They won't play.

Chapman: This is one of the reasons why—

Laird: But this is one of the reasons that, that we're concerned about this. But, I also think that it should be borne out and kept in

mind, that, with our research and development program, which is so important, I think we can still keep ahead of them. There is a lot more we can even do with the Minuteman at the site as far as getting it even more accurate—

Unidentified speaker: At a small price—

Laird: —and we can do it at a very small price, because we have the technological capability that far outstrips the Soviet Union. This is important to maintain this leadership.

Nixon: Let me say this, and I think this is the—this is important [unclear] of course, the big budget things won't come up. The one place that, again, those of you with proficiency in this area—that I think we've really got to, got to prepare the forces is in improving our technological capability. Now, within the May 20th deal, that is allowed, right, Henry?

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: Both sides. Now, this is one place where we ought to do better. We have to, I mean, in terms of a higher standard, in terms of computers and all that sort of thing. That's one of the reasons the Soviets are concerned. We are better in this, are we not?

Packard: Yes, that's correct, Mr. President.

Nixon: And I feel that's the place where research and development, R&D—not only in R&D, but of application, and so forth, where technological breakthroughs may be the answer.

Unidentified speaker: For increased accuracy—

[unclear exchange]

Unidentified speaker: Increased accuracy is the—

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: Exactly. One of the things—we talk about these huge weapons, and—but one that is—I mean, after all, the bang of one-tenth—of one-tenth of a Polaris is a hell of a bang. Right?

Zumwalt: That's right.

Nixon: If it's accurate—

Packard: It's as accurate as it can be made—

Zumwalt: It is—it's easily within—

Nixon: It's like—it's like hitting with a shotgun or a rifle—

Packard: That's right.

Nixon: A shotgun may scar a guy up pretty good, but the rifle pierces his heart.

Packard: But you run into the people—

Nixon: Yeah?

Packard: —who claim: "Look, you're improving the accuracy. It gives you a first-strike capability." And, if that's developed—

[unclear exchange]

Packard: —we've got—had got a hell of a lot of flak on that.

Nixon: I know. I know. But you see, the point that I've been—I think we have to, we have to make—there's a real fight to be sure that on the—on that area, we do not, at this time, just talking about any kind of a SALT agreement, and so forth, that we go gung-ho on the accuracy side, because that is unlimited. Right, Henry?

Kissinger: That's right. And when we were discussing the strategic planning vis-à-vis China, one problem we had is that you can't use the Minuteman against China—because it will have to over-fly the Soviet Union. So, if we want to use—and against China, we do have a substantial preemptive capability for the next 10, 15 years. So, with that, we have to use planes or Polarises. But Poseidons have—therefore, accuracy is absolutely essential.

Nixon: How long do we have a preemptive capability with China, you think?

Kissinger: We've said about 15—10, 15 years.

Nixon: [clears throat]

Moorer: [unclear] 25 missiles.

Kissinger: Yeah. Yeah. And that's something that we should—

Nixon: And that preemptive capability depends upon Polarises and planes—

Packard: Aircraft, too. See, you can't get it to China without over-flying Russia—

Nixon: Yeah.

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: [unclear] This is where your aircraft becomes even more relevant.

Zumwalt: Flexibility in the air.

Nixon: But, more relevant, really, than they are with the Soviet. [unclear]—

Kissinger: And also, I don't believe—well, most people don't believe—that the Poseidons are going to be very effective, no matter how accurate, against very hard Soviet silos. But they ought to be able to knock out anything the Chinese have—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —for the foreseeable future.

Zumwalt: Well, if we get stellar-inertial guidance, we can get down under a thousand feet and become highly accurate. So, your, your guidance there will—

Nixon: Well, go ahead, Admiral. We interrupted you.

Zumwalt: The last thing I want to say about strategic, Mr. President, is chart 12. This chart shows that using the surface forces [unclear] February of '71. Over on the right, the costs—22 percent of the strategic budget of the years '73 through '77, will provide, in the three ballistic missile forces, the capability to deliver 43 percent of the equivalent megatonnage and 73 percent of the independently-targeted weapons, as a result of the very high capability of the Poseidon. Now, on chart 13, I show you just 4 of 10 charts that I showed last year, which depict a continuing change in conventional balance. In the upper left, the 237 percent shows you that they continue over a 5-year period to outbuild us at the rate of about two-and-a-half in most categories of ships. In the upper right, their missile platforms have increased four-fold in 10 years. In the lower left, they over—they've overtaken us in numbers of merchant ships, and will in deadweight tonnage shortly. And over in the lower right, there, theirs are new and ours are old.

Nixon: This is all U.S., and not—not with the British, and all the rest added in. Right?

Zumwalt: That is correct, sir—

Nixon: Only U.S. versus U.S.S.R.

Zumwalt: However, I will be showing you outcomes of—

Nixon: Right.

Zumwalt: —that on the next page. The most worrisome thing of all is their continued submarine force. This shows you their attack boats, without the missile boats, a threefold superiority. They have more nuclear boats than we do, and in 1973, they will have more nuclear boats than the total number of diesel and attack boats that we have. More honest still, the lower graph shows you that their noise levels are rapidly catching up with ours.

Nixon: We're doing better though?

Zumwalt: Yes, sir. We reckoned we could kill 5 to 1 in the '60s. It's down to something like 2 to 1 now. If they're building 12 per year, we're building 5 per year, so they're overtaking us.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Zumwalt: The temptation for the Soviets to hold out for a better and better deal on SALT, and the pressures on you to settle for a lesser and lesser deal on SALT, and MBFR, and in the Mideast, are getting great. There is decreasing inclination on the part of Moscow and Peking, with this '73 budget, to work with us to resolve the conflict in Southeast Asia, or to follow up on any initiatives you take after your trip to Communist China.

191. Letter From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, August 11, 1971.

Dear Henry:

I write you the following in order to try to keep on the same beam as Washington. I know that operating thousands of miles from one's capital, even with the best of electronic communication facilities, leads to a tendency toward misunderstanding of what one's authorities want.

I gather that there is some feeling in Washington that the SALT Delegation is behind schedule and this is owing to our "fighting" the NSDM.² I believe this is not a fair estimate of the situation.

The two main issues of zero and futuristic systems did not arise from any delegation effort to change the NSDM. The first post-Vienna zero sounding of the USSR was made before the NSDM was issued. My approach to Semenov was at White House authorization.

On futuristics, my proposed text language tracked directly the NSDM. The JCS raised the issue in Washington and urged a change in NSDM policy.³

In some other cases the delegation has sought authoritative interpretation of the NSDM language where the intent of the language was not clear. I believe that greater clarity and a better US position resulted without loss of time.

We have pressed the Soviets without success for more frequent meetings.

When we have guidance on zero and futuristics, the issues should quickly come to a head here. Till then, I see no alternative to pressing on with explanation of the articles of the US ABM text.

I trust you will present these points to the President since, if he thinks I am being dilatory or obstinate, my usefulness to him would be over.

Sincerely,

Gerry

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

² Documents 171 and 180.

³ See Document 186.

192. National Security Decision Memorandum 127¹

Washington, August 12, 1971.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Further Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki (SALT V)

The President has reviewed the issues raised by the Delegation and discussed by the Verification Panel² and has made the following decisions:

1. The U.S. proposal in the 27 July draft agreement³ as well as the fallback position authorized in NSDM 117 remain the preferred U.S. position on ABM limitations. The U.S. Delegation should not introduce a proposal for zero-level ABM deployments nor should the Delegation pursue the issue further in this phase of the negotiations. A ban on all ABM deployments remains an ultimate U.S. objective and will be a subject for negotiations after we have reached an agreement on defensive limitations and an interim agreement on offensive limitations. The Soviet delegation should be informed privately of this position.

2. The Chairman of the Delegation is directed to provide the following interpretations of the freedom of choice between the ABM alternatives in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the 27 July draft agreement: First, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must indicate clearly their choice of an ABM deployment before the negotiations on ABM systems are completed or an agreement is initialled. When it is an appropriate time for selection, the Soviet Delegation should be informed that the U.S. choice would be a deployment at ICBM fields. Second, there should be an

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 201–250. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation. In an August 12 letter to Smith, President Nixon summarized his instructions and concluded, “thus, I am very reluctant to introduce a complete ban as our preferred solution and thereby move the negotiations back into the realm of comprehensive agreements. Nor do I want to create any pretext for the USSR to reopen the question of a completely separate ABM agreement.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 985, Haig Chronological File, Haig Chron, Aug 7–12, 1971)

² See footnote 3, Document 190.

³ See Document 183.

understanding that neither country would have the right to change its deployment except by mutual agreement.

3. The agreement should contain a provision whereby neither side shall deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components. (This provision, along with that in the next paragraph, should not prohibit the development and testing of future ABM components in a fixed, land-based mode.)

4. The agreement should contain a provision whereby neither party shall develop, produce, test, or deploy: (a) sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM launchers, ABM missiles, or ABM radars; (b) ABM components other than ABM interceptor missiles or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components.

5. In presenting this position, the Delegation should not invite a detailed negotiation or discussion of future ABM systems. Our objective is to reach agreement on the broad principle that the agreement should not be interpreted in such a way that either side could circumvent its provisions through future ABM systems or components. We intend to handle any problems that may arise through the Joint Commission and the formal review procedures.

6. For the information of the Delegation, the provisions in paragraph 4 above are not intended to require either country to destroy existing deployed non-radar sensors or similar future ones. Rather, the provisions are intended to prohibit ABM sensors. If the issue is raised by the Soviets, the Delegation should seek guidance from Washington.

7. At some early time at the discretion of the Chairman of the Delegation it should be made clear that the U.S. interprets the spirit of the defensive limitations agreement—i.e., its stringent limits on ABM systems, and particularly the complete ban on launchers with a rapid reload capability—to impose a ban on the development, testing, production, or deployment of ABM interceptor missiles having more than one warhead on each missile.

8. The need for avoiding leaks is particularly compelling during this sensitive stage of the negotiations. The President's directive of October 31, 1969, entitled, "Avoidance of Leaks on SALT,"⁴ is reaffirmed.

Henry A. Kissinger

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 40.

193. Note From the Soviet Leadership¹

Moscow, undated.

Moscow agrees with the President's opinion regarding the importance of finding a practical agreement on ABM—in the same spirit of mutual understanding as was the case with respect to the West Berlin agreement. At the SALT talks, including discussions on limiting ABM systems, we are guided precisely by such approach, i.e. by the desire to find mutually acceptable solutions.

You would recall in this connection that last January when the U.S. side agreed in principle to the conclusion of a separate agreement on ABM, you, Dr. Kissinger, in mentioning various possible variants for the limitation of ABM systems, said at the same time that the United States have “no special preference in favor of one or another variant and would be ready to accept any of them” (talk with Dr. Kissinger of January 23).² Last February speaking in favor of the variant providing for the retention of the ABM systems, the construction of which has already begun, you, Dr. Kissinger, talking about your readiness to accept also other variants, said that “only because of this question the U.S. side will not hinder the possibility of concluding the agreement as a whole” (talk with Dr. Kissinger of February 22).³ While asking us to delete in the exchange of letters of May 20 a concrete reference to the variant of limiting ABM systems to the defense of the capitals, you, Dr. Kissinger, also said that this request was dictated by internal tactical considerations of the President and that at further negotiations the U.S. side would be ready to consider this variant as well.⁴

Trying to find a compromise solution which would be mutually acceptable for both sides the Soviet Government is giving instructions to its delegation at the negotiations in Helsinki to discuss with the U.S. delegation the following variant of limiting ABM systems:

ABM systems in the Soviet Union and the United States would be limited to the defense of their capitals. Beside that, the United States would retain ABM installations on one of the ICBM bases, where their

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President's Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 1. No classification marking. Delivered to Haig for Kissinger on August 30 under a handwritten covering note from Smith that reads: “Henry! I am sending you the texts which we talked about on the phone today. With best wishes, Smith.” (Ibid., Box 492, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [Part 2])

² See Document 127.

³ See Document 134.

⁴ See Document 155. Regarding the May 20 exchange of letters, see Document 160.

construction has begun, while the Soviet Union would have the right to deploy ABM installations for the defense of an equal number of the ICBM silos. The quantitative and geographical limitations on ABM for the capitals will be retained in accordance with the previously submitted proposals. As for the ABM installations for the defense of the ICBM silos—if the U.S. side agrees to such an approach in principle—criteria for the acceptable limitations could be discussed having in mind that the ABM installations for the defense of ICBM silos should not be used for creation of the territorial ABM system, covering the whole country.

I would like to stress that Moscow hopes that this new step of ours, which is directed towards breaking the deadlock at the negotiations in Helsinki on the ABM question, will be duly appreciated by President Nixon and that appropriate instructions will also be given to the U.S. delegation in Helsinki.

194. Note From President Nixon to the Soviet Leadership¹

Washington, undated.

The United States consistently expressed its preference for ABM deployment to protect the Minuteman ICBMs. The original United States proposal on January 9, 1971,² was for three Safeguard sites as contrasted with the NCA defense of the Soviet Union. When the Government of the Soviet Union expressed reservations, the United States Government agreed that this United States position did not need to be included in the letters to be exchanged but stated that this position would be taken in the course of negotiations. On three different occasions the United States refused to accept references to the protection of capitals in the letters to be exchanged. The reference in the Soviet note³ to understandings on this subject pertains only to the United States' understanding as to the text of the letters which were exchanged in connection with the May 20 announcement and not to the subsequent negotiations.

On the question of submarine launched missiles, the United States Government notes that the draft of the letter proposed by the USSR

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President's Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 1. No classification marking. According to a handwritten notation, Haig delivered the note to Dobrynin on September 3.

² See Document 124.

³ Document 193.

refers to “weapons” rather than the word “launchers” which the United States Government had proposed. The letters further state that the weapons to be frozen were among the details to be negotiated. Accordingly the United States Government considers that SLBMs should be discussed in the context of an offensive freeze.

Above all, it is the view of the United States Government that a solution can be found, not so much in legalistic interpretations but in a spirit of goodwill based on the importance of the objective.

195. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Tucker) to Secretary of Defense Laird and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)¹

Washington, September 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

Telephone Conversation with Paul Nitze, 9/11/71

1. “Secondary Issues”. Nitze feels good progress is being made on developing common language, on well defined differences, on the definitions and conditions to go into an ABM agreement. They are proceeding to prepare agreed texts, with certain words or paragraphs bracketed if there is not agreement. Nitze expects the following issues to remain bracketed at the end of SALT V (Helsinki):

A. Our definitions of ABM interceptors and radars to include those of a type *indistinguishable* from missiles and radars tested in an ABM mode. The Soviets object to the words *indistinguishable from* in these definitions. Paul expects the Soviets will agree to a Minute which specifies that interceptors or radars *of a type* tested in an ABM mode include any missiles or radars indistinguishable from these respective types. In this event, we can agree to drop the *indistinguishable from* feature of our definitions.

B. The U.S. paragraph which limits radars of greater than one million watt-meters squared and which provides for peripheral, outward-looking early warning radars. Paul feels the Soviet delegation does not have the authority to agree at Helsinki, but may agree later.

C. The article dealing with ABM levels and Modern ABM Radar Complexes. Paul feels agreement on levels will clearly not be reached in SALT V.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-009, Verification Panel Meeting SALT 9/15/71. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

D. The U.S. paragraph on future types of ABM devices. The Soviets object in principle to limiting unknown or unspecified devices. Paul feels the U.S. should compromise.

E. The U.S. withdrawal clause. The Soviets insist withdrawal should be possible only by invoking “supreme national interest”.

F. On non-transfer to third countries. Paul feels the U.S. should agree to no transfer of any of the components of ABM systems (radars, launchers, interceptors) defined in the limitation agreement.

Thus the principal remaining ABM issues will be: the levels, control of radars, and the withdrawal provisions.

2. Regarding the interim offense agreement, Paul feels that the Soviets will agree to the freeze on ICBMs, although they will quarrel over the cut-off dates and the definitions of “under construction” and “operational”. He feels they will also agree to a freeze on MLBMs, although they have indicated they have some questions regarding our data on numbers.

3. On SLBMs, Paul believes the instructions to the Soviet delegation are firm that they should reject it. On the other hand, they have made no good case against it. Paul expressed a deep concern over the negotiating record which led up to the May 20 announcement. He senses that the Soviets base their case strongly on that record. He said our delegation is fighting hard for inclusion of SLBMs, but he feels “the tree may have been sawed off some time ago”. Paul urged that Mel take Henry up on his offer to let Mel read the record, if he has not yet done so, at least as it refers to SLBMs, so as to understand what flexibility we have. [GLT comment: My impression, through NSC staff, is that the negotiating record is ambiguous and could be used to support either position; that Kissinger said at one point that the U.S. could accept a freeze on ICBM only, but that subsequently he stated our desire to limit SLBMs as well. In any case the precise meaning of the May 20th announcement is now being negotiated at Helsinki, and we should act as though it clearly included SLBMs.]²

4. Nitze’s view is that the delegation does not need new guidance before the end of SALT V, but should continue along their present lines.

5. Regarding the new Soviet ABM proposal. Paul saw two ways to think about the ICBM-defense part. One was for the U.S. to have just what we planned for Grand Forks as a part of 12-site Safeguard, with a Soviet equivalent. The other was a more optimized one-site defense of ICBM, perhaps covering two fields rather than one, with more interceptors and radars than in current Safeguard plans. He said Gerry Smith strongly favored the first approach and opposed the second. Roy Allison comes in between, preferring to defend one Min-

² All brackets are in the original.

uteman field with more interceptors and radars. Paul said the Soviets apparently were considering defense with short-range interceptors only, whereas he thought we would need Spartans as well as Sprints. Paul said he had vague indications the Soviets were *not* thinking their ICBM defense would be limited to East of the Urals, in the relatively sparsely populated region of the USSR, but he planned to push the clarification. [GLT comment: The essential question is whether we can define and negotiate constraints which will give us confidence the Soviet “ICBM defense” ABM will *not* have significant value—defense capability. If we can, and if we can put tight limits on the Moscow-defense and US NCA defense systems, then we have little to lose from Soviet ICBM defense, and should go for an optimized U.S. ICBM defense.]

Paul said the Delegation thinking was that the U.S. response to the new Soviet proposal should be generally negative, but say the U.S. is ready to explore it, and needs clarification. [GLT comment: I agree *if* we also make forcefully clear that defense and offense are coupled, that a new ABM proposal implies also a new offense proposal, and that we cannot take a position on the new ABM proposal until we hear the Soviet views on corresponding offense limits.]

6. Paul reported that he and Gerry Smith will be meeting with Semenov on Monday to seek clarification of the Soviet proposal. He promised feedback before the upcoming Principals’ meeting.

7. Paul said Gerry plans to send back tomorrow a list of options to be assessed in preparation for Vienna. They are:

- a. Freeze where we are *now* both at Grand Forks and Moscow.
- b. Complete Grand Forks (as planned in Safeguard) and Moscow.
- c. The new Soviet proposal.

Paul said Gerry strongly prefers a. because Gerry feels that it gives the best base for going eventually to zero ABM. He said Gerry believes the President is serious about proposing a zero ABM agreement at Vienna. Paul, on the other hand, had understood the President to be thinking of zero ABM after the initial agreement, as part of the follow-on firm agreement on offense. [GLT comment: Our number one goal must be to limit or reduce the Soviet offense, and to stay near offense parity. Zero ABM must be a means to that end, not an end in itself. The trouble with option a. is that it leaves the U.S. with an inoperative system too close to zero, and therefore gives the Soviets no incentive to bargain for zero. We must go for a more capable option.]

8. I reviewed with Paul our assessment of the status, and the following objectives:

- a. Move from the U.S. offense draft to a more equitable one.
- b. Make clear the coupling between offense and defense. Force the Soviets to discuss offense before going further on ABM.

- c. Force Soviets to apply their principles of
 - no unilateral advantage
 - common (“homogeneous”) purposes
 - equal numbers
 - to Ballistic Missiles as well as to ABMs.
- d. Avoid broadening offense limits to FBS or bombers now.

Paul understands and appreciated these, but felt they might be precluded (especially c.) by the May 20th record, which proposed equitability for defense, but a freeze on offense. He agreed the U.S. drafts had apparently gone beyond May 20, but felt it would be very hard to break away from the offense draft now that it has been tabled.

Gardiner Tucker

196. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, September 15, 1971, 3:20–4:33 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

John N. Irwin

Robert Martin

Tom Pickering

Defense

David Packard

Gardiner Tucker

Archie Wood

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Col. Paul Von Ins

CIA

Richard Helms

Carl Duckett

Justice

John Mitchell

ACDA

Philip J. Farley

Spurgeon Keeny

OST

John Baldeschwieler

John Walsh

NSC Staff

William G. Hyland

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Lt. Col. Jack Merritt

R/Adm. Robert Welander

Col. Richard Kennedy

Barry Carter

K. Wayne Smith

Jeanne W. Davis

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—the State Department would draft an instruction to our delegation in Helsinki² to reject the latest Soviet ABM proposal, while taking advantage of the arguments used therein, and to stick with the U.S. two-for-one ABM proposal.³

—Dr. Kissinger will confirm the President's intent in NSDM 127⁴ concerning zero ABMs, with a view to instructing our delegation not to include mention of zero ABMs in the preamble.

—our delegation should continue to insist on inclusion of SLBMs in a defensive agreement.

—the Soviets should be told that there must be serious discussion of offensive limitations when the talks reconvene in Vienna.

—Our delegation should agree to September 24 as a termination date for this round.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

² Telegram 172266 to USDEL SALT, September 18, conveyed the Verification Panel instructions. (Ibid., SALT, Box 882, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. 17, September–December 1971)

³ The Soviet ABM proposal is Document 193, and the U.S. proposal is Document 194.

⁴ Document 192.

197. **Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Helsinki, September 15, 1971, 1750Z.

238. Dear Henry:

We likely will begin communiqué drafting in a day or two. Before starting, I would appreciate advice as to whether the following proposed substantive paragraphs would be approximately what the White House would like to see.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

The parts on accident and hot line would, of course, be contingent on how the “announcement” matter is worked out in Washington.

“In accordance with the May 20, 1971, announcement in which the two governments agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs), the delegations have engaged in detailed consideration of issues relating to this question and of the specific terms of such an agreement. Various areas of agreement on the terms of such a limitation have been achieved during this phase of the negotiations, and a clearer understanding exists concerning the issues that remain to be resolved.

“Also in accordance with the May 20 announcement of the two governments, consideration was given by the delegation to working out an agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic arms.

“During the course of the present phase of the negotiations two governments, as announced in Washington and Moscow on ———,² have reached agreement on the following:

“1. Agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

“2. Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on measures to improve the USA–USSR direct communications link.

“These two agreements will be signed by the two governments in Washington on September 30, 1971. This will make a contribution to world peace. This achievement will also have a positive influence on the continuing negotiations on limiting strategic arms.

“The two sides have agreed that when the negotiations are resumed their aim will be to conclude this year an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems, and an agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic arms, to be concluded at the same time.”

This language, of course, has not been shown to the Soviets.

I would appreciate a reply as soon as possible.³

Warm regards.

² Omission in the original.

³ In telegram 175786 to USDEL SALT, September 23, the Department sent the text of the announcements on reducing the risk of nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union and on improving the Washington–Moscow direct communications link. The Department text was similar to the language proposed by Smith. On September 24 the White House announced the agreements, and on September 30 Rogers and Gromyko signed them in Washington. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. 17) The text of the announcements and Rogers’s remarks at the signing ceremony are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 18, 1971, pp. 399–403.

198. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Attorney General Mitchell¹

Washington, September 18, 1971.

Nixon: I marked, incidentally, Henry, on the letter from Brezhnev.² I think you ought to take Dobrynin, brace him damn hard on the fact that Brezhnev did not respond with regard to the offensive weapons thing at SALT.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I don't want that. We have enough of a problem with our hawks here. They, as I understand it, at SALT, all they've talked about, and I assume that Gerry Smith has not pressed them on it, is about defensive—totally. They haven't—have they blocked offensive or [unclear]—

Kissinger: No. No. That's Laird. Laird is beginning to try to make a record on that. The major problem has been—there've been two problems. They've been pretty tough on the defensive ones. And they've—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —on the offensive ones, have not gone into great detail, but they've discussed it. But, part of the trouble has been our delegation. John sits on this committee—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —and it's the goddamnest thing you've ever seen. They're running this as if it's—if they had gone in there early in July and said, "Here is our understanding of May 20th. This is what we want to discuss," then we would've known within three weeks where we stood.

Nixon: What've they done?

Kissinger: Instead, they—first, they raised zero ABM. Then they raised so many abstruse points that you have to be a theologian to understand them. And finally, last week, John was at the meeting, I just cut them all off.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 576–6. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger and Mitchell from 10:40 a.m. to 2:05 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² See Document 185.

³ See Document 196.

Nixon: Henry, for Christ sakes, I wrote a letter to the son-of-a-bitch, Smith, and said, "This is the line." Why didn't he follow the letter?⁴

Kissinger: Because, he is like—

Nixon: You mean [unclear] everything here?

Kissinger: Well, he's like a shyster lawyer. You put in that letter that we are willing to have zero ABM—

Nixon: Oh, yeah.

Kissinger: —eventually. So, the next thing—

Nixon: He started there, at the beginning. I get it. [unclear]—

Kissinger: So, the next thing, he now wants to put it into the preamble of the present treaty. He's wasting time on it when he doesn't even have an agreement yet. And the Russians have put up a whole series of really cynical proposals, which—

Nixon: Um-hmm. Yeah. Which, of course, they would.

Kissinger: —which they would, and which we should have disposed of in the first week.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT; a portion is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 329.]

Kissinger: Now, the only reason this isn't an unmitigated loss is because, actually, we don't mind staging it so that you can sign it next year.

Nixon: You mean, to let the delegation get it screwed up, and then we will—

Kissinger: Well, let the delegation horse around a bit. Otherwise, it would have been unconscionable what they have done. But, John sits through these meetings. These guys act—

Mitchell: Well, Gerry Smith is trying to make a record for Gerry Smith on the zero ABM, one way or the other.

Nixon: He always does. Well, the minute that we got the ABM through the Congress, the son-of-a-bitch has, ever since, been trying to get it out. Like SALT.

Mitchell: Well, but here if [laughs] this preliminary agreement even mentions zero ABM in the preamble as a direction that you want to go, then you'd lose the ABM in the Congress. Who the hell's going to vote for it—

Kissinger: No—

Mitchell: —when you're going to ultimately get the zero ABM?

⁴ See footnote 1, Document 192.

Kissinger: Actually, Mr. President, I praised—I praised Dobrynin on this offensive link—

Nixon: All right—

Kissinger: —before he went back, and on September 10th, the Russians in Helsinki did make a formal statement that they recognized there was a linkage, that the two had to be discussed simultaneously. So, I think we're going to move along on it.

Nixon: It's just their bark, now, you see.

199. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 20, 1971.

SUBJECT

Secretary Laird's Views on SALT

Secretary Laird has sent you a memorandum (see Tab B)² expressing his view that we are negotiating at SALT in a way which will be interpreted by our allies and the Congress as a sign of U.S. weakness and Soviet strength.

The Secretary points to a Soviet advantage of about 650 ballistic missiles (about 550 ICBMs and some 100 SLBMs) and to the possibility of the Soviets putting MIRVs on this force.

The Secretary goes on to point out that he has been expressing these concerns to me and recommending action to improve the situation. He attaches a chronicle of his actions and memorandums to verify his efforts.

Finally, Secretary Laird recommends that we: (1) express concern over the Soviet build-up; (2) tell the Soviets that we must hear their offensive limit proposals at the start of the Vienna round before we can go further on ABM; and that, (3) we restudy our position to determine how to "reverse the growing Soviet advance in offensive armaments," undoubtedly meaning reductions.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 66, Memoranda to the President, 1969–1974, August–December 1971. Top Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² Attached but not printed is Laird's September 15 memorandum.

While I share some of the Secretary's concern, his arguments implicitly reject both the decisions leading to the May 20 agreement and the possibility that an initial agreement can be truly interim.

I cannot totally reject the Secretary's argument that an initial agreement may be more enduring than we anticipate, but, if true, this raises the following questions:

—Can we get a better price than freezing Soviet ABMs for a Safeguard system which the Congress is unlikely to let us build in any case?

—Can we expect to get approval to build more land-based ICBMs, *whether or not we have a SALT agreement?*

—Since SLBMs are the only system we have that can conceivably be expanded, is it not in our interest to leave these systems open? (Assuredly, one of the reasons the Soviets want to reserve on SLBMs is to retain leverage for the next phase of SALT, but this loses some significance if we assume that an initial agreement will last for an extended period. Thus, there is a basic internal inconsistency to the Secretary's argument.)

You should know that the Delegation has already been told to close Helsinki with very strong statements on the Soviet build-up and on the necessity of getting Soviet views on offensive limits early at Vienna. This was done before receiving the Secretary's memorandum.

As for redesigning our proposal in a way to eliminate the USSR advantage in ICBMs, neither reality nor the basic assumptions underlying the May 20 agreement make this possible. A detailed review of our proposals would only result in our being bogged down in a morass of old issues.

I have prepared a reply to Secretary Laird acknowledging his memorandum. I recommend that you sign the reply at Tab A.³

³ Attached but not printed is a letter to Laird signed by Nixon that reads: "I appreciate the points you made in the memorandum. I understand that, before we recess at Helsinki, Gerry Smith will be making it clear to the Soviet Delegation that we are concerned about their strategic programs and that we must begin to discuss limits on offensive forces."

200. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

CM-1232-71

Washington, September 28, 1971.

SUBJ

SALT Developments

1. I have been concerned by the course of SALT since the announcement of the 20 May 1971 understanding. Of particular concern to me has been the undiminished momentum of all Soviet programs—ICBM, SLBM, and ABM—contrasted with an unyielding Soviet negotiating stance. As you know, on instructions, the U.S. SALT Delegation rejected all four Soviet ABM proposals while the Soviets have not accepted the U.S. “two or one” proposal. The Soviets insist that an ABM Agreement must be reached this year, prior to agreement on certain offensive limitations. Therefore, the Soviets have not discussed offensive limitations in any detail, but have said that SLBMs must be excluded from an interim freeze on strategic offensive weapons.

2. In my opinion, the Soviets feel that the U.S. will accede to an ABM Agreement on Soviet terms and then an interim freeze on ICBMs only. I feel they are holding an SLBM freeze in abeyance as leverage to get U.S. concessions on FBS in later negotiations. The Soviets seem to feel that pressure is on the U.S. to make concessions and, therefore, they need to make none. In the meantime, the ongoing Soviet programs continue to affect adversely the strategic balance from the U.S. point of view.

3. I recommend that we hold fast to our basic objectives in SALT and to require forward movement by the Soviets with respect to offensive restraints prior to signing any defensive agreement.

T.H. Moorer

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Moorer, 388.3, SALT, July–December 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive.

201. Editorial Note

President Nixon was scheduled to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on September 29, 1971, at the White House. Before their meeting, Nixon and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed talking points. In a conversation that began at noon and lasted a little over an hour, Nixon and Kissinger had a brief exchange about the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT):

Kissinger: "Early in the discussion, Mr. President, you should raise SALT—"

Nixon: "Hm-hmm?"

Kissinger: "—and, on SALT, the issue, briefly, is this: We had told them that—in the private discussions—we had told them: three of our ABM sites for their Moscow system, plus an offensive freeze. They now say it's got to be one-for-one on the defensive side, too. But that means their Moscow system covers 40 percent of the population, while one ABM site for us covers only 2 percent of the population, up in North Dakota. You shouldn't go into all this detail, but—"

Nixon: "All right."

Kissinger: "—what you might say, though, is, 'We have to move it forward at the next session.' Our proposal, in effect, is that both sides stay where they are in both categories. We have two ABM sites defensively, but they have more missiles offensively. And, therefore, the freeze is equiv—that if we freeze now, and on both of them, that is fair. They can't ask us to cut down on our ABM sites, but keep an edge in offensive missiles."

Nixon: "So, in effect, we just reiterate we want a freeze?"

Kissinger: "We reiterate that the—that when they speak of equivalence, they can't say there's going to be the same number of things on the defensive side, but they can stay ahead in the offensive side. So, what—you could say the essence of our proposal is that both sides stay where they are in both categories—defensive and offensive."

Nixon: "Hm-hmm. What if he says, 'What about MIRV?'"

Kissinger: "He won't say that."

Nixon: "That changes—"

Kissinger: "I'll guarantee you he won't—"

Nixon: "That changes the number, too. Well, go ahead."

Kissinger: "That's right. I mean that's—that's our hole card."

Nixon: "That's right."

Kissinger: "But we need that [unclear]—"

Nixon: "You know, you stop to think here. Suppose we'd given in to Percy and, frankly, broken the rest and said, 'Why don't we have a

ban on MIRV?’ You know, we—we will have—we would have—if a Kennedy, or a Muskie, or a Humphrey had been sitting in this chair, the United States today would have Gromyko looking right down our throat.”

Kissinger: “This, Mr. President—”

Nixon: “It’s close as it is.”

Kissinger: “This is where these—when these conservatives say, ‘Well, what difference did it make who was here?’ Good God, we would have no ABM, we would have no MIRV.”

Nixon: “That’s right.”

Kissinger: “In net, we would have no B-1, we would have no ULMS.”

Nixon: “Henry, the conservatives, I frankly think they’re—then—let ‘em squall.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 580–13) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

Nixon met with Gromyko in the Oval Office at 3 p.m. Secretary of State Rogers and Kissinger also attended. According to a memorandum for the President’s file prepared by Kissinger on September 29, SALT was discussed at length:

“Naturally, there were other outstanding problems between us. A matter coming to mind immediately was the SALT negotiation, where we had taken a significant step which, however, did not represent the major resolution we were looking for. The President said that we believed that our joint announcement of May 20 had been received everywhere as a hopeful sign that the leadership of our two countries had resolved to reach agreement on a freeze of both offensive and defensive weapons. We recognized that this was a most important matter for both of us since the negotiations dealt with basic questions of our respective security. Without going into detail, the President wanted to say that it was our position on the defensive side that we had presented what we believed to be a fair proposition. Without going into intricacies, as we saw things, on the offensive side the Soviet Union would have an advantage of about 500 land-based missiles. Thus it could be seen that what we were proposing on the defensive side was a reasonable proposal. It would not be reasonable for the United States to agree that we freeze an offensive advantage for the Soviet Union while achieving equality only on the defensive side. This would be severely criticized by our public and in Congress. He did not expect the Foreign Minister to respond at this time, but he wanted to say that this was the very heart of the problem and he hoped that it could be explored. We still felt that progress at SALT was most important. The So-

viet Union had continued to build up offensive armaments and we were not objecting to that, recognizing that we would do the same in a similar situation. On the other hand, if we could not work out an agreement, as Ambassador Dobrynin could confirm, there were many people in this country, many in the President's own party, who would advocate resuming a build-up of offensive armaments on our side. Thus it was in our interests and in the interests of the Soviet Union to seek an agreement that would not give a decisive advantage to either of us. Both of us should consider reaching an agreement that would provide sufficiency for each. These were the general comments he wanted to make in regard to this question.

"Mr. Gromyko wanted to emphasize great importance that the Soviet Union attached to the negotiations on limitation of both offensive and defensive armaments. In this connection, he also wanted to note that the strategic arms limitation talks had provided the impetus for those agreements which were going to be signed tomorrow as a byproduct of SALT. Without SALT these agreements would not have been possible except at a much later date perhaps. On the real subject matter of the negotiations he wanted to emphasize the seriousness of the position and intentions of the Soviet side. Mr. Gromyko wanted to draw the President's attention to the last proposal on ABM's which had been tabled by the Soviet Government. He did not know whether it had been studied in great detail by the U.S. Government and by the President himself, but it seemed to him that it should provide a basis for agreement. The Soviet proposal was not bad as proposals go. It provided for the defense of national capitals and one ICBM location for each side, with the proviso that the United States would choose its ICBM location to be defended and the Soviet Union would defend a commensurate number of ICBM silos in the Soviet Union. As for offensive strategic armaments, not only did the Soviet Union not oppose their limitation; the President had been right when he had said that we should proceed to consider certain steps towards their limitation, and at the next phase of SALT it will be necessary to enter upon concrete discussion of this problem. The Soviet Union wanted both sides to continue negotiations and the Soviet side was no less resolved now and would remain resolved to bring about their success to the extent possible. In this connection, Mr. Gromyko had noted the statement of Mr. Schumann, Foreign Minister of France, at the General Assembly yesterday. As he understood this statement, it meant that France would support the objectives pursued by our two countries in regard to limitation of strategic offensive and defensive armaments. It had sounded to him as if France would join in at least as to the substance of the tasks and objectives pursued at the negotiations.

“Unless the President had something further on bilateral arrangements, Mr. Gromyko said he would like to say a few words regarding problems in Europe.

“On the subject of SALT, the President wanted to add that what Mr. Gromyko had said demonstrated the reason why we must look at the whole package. If we were to separate out defensive armaments only, that would be fine if that were all we were talking about. However, if we found inequality on the offensive side, this would make the whole agreement difficult. The President emphasized that we needed to come up with a solution that could not be viewed as freezing inequality on one side and equality on the other.

“Mr. Gromyko said he could only repeat that the Soviet Union was not making such a distinction. At the next phase of SALT we would be able to discuss both sides more completely in the interests of finding a solution in this field.

“The President said that the interest of both our countries in reaching agreement on strategic armaments was demonstrated by the fact that the United States had frozen the number of its offensive weapons some time ago, yet hardly a day went by that we did not receive reports of an increasing buildup in the Soviet Union. He did not mean to raise objections in this regard since the Soviet actions were based upon evaluations of its own security, but it was necessary to realize that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would let either side get an advantage. Thus the time now was ripe for reaching an appropriate agreement.

“Secretary Rogers explained that one difficulty we had with the latest Soviet proposal was the fact that it provided for an additional build-up of armaments on each side. Since our objective was limitation, such a proposal would not be viewed as limitation in fact.

“Ambassador Dobrynin pointed out that the last Soviet proposal was designed to provide a compromise acceptable to both sides. The Soviet Union was basically in favor of limiting ABM defenses to protection of national capitals, but since the United States had considered it important to defend ICBM’s, the latest proposal had been designed to find a solution acceptable to both sides.

“The President said we could not decide this issue here, but we believe that we have presented a position as forthcoming as we could be and, in view of the high stakes involved, we would continue negotiations.

“Mr. Gromyko said that evidently both sides would have to take stock and analyze the results of the negotiations to date, and also map out their respective positions for the next phase of the negotiations. He repeated that it was his government’s belief that at the next phase of SALT it would be necessary thoroughly to discuss the second aspect

of limitation as well, in order to try and find mutually acceptable common language.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [Part 1]) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–September 1971, Document 337.

202. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 6, 1971.

SUBJECT

Work for SALT VI

To minimize the inevitable last-minute crunch and to avoid letting the Delegation have too free a rein, we need to begin planning now for SALT VI which is to begin November 15 in Vienna.²

I do not think that there is an inordinate amount of work to do, but much of the planning must be started now. The bureaucracy is already starting to get restless over the lack of guidance.

We already have studies completed or well underway on such issues as:

- Silo relocation;
- Definition of Testing of SAMs in an ABM mode;
- Forms of Agreement.

Moreover, in the last few days, I have:

—Directed the Verification Panel Working Group to prepare a paper on the strategic implications of giving the Soviets more “Modern ABM Radar Complexes” (inevitably dubbed “MARC’s”);

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. 17, September–December 1971. Top Secret. Sent for urgent action. Sent through Haig, who initialed the memorandum.

² The Helsinki round of negotiations ended September 23. On October 7 Sonnenfeldt forwarded the SALT Delegation report of September 28 to Kissinger under a covering memorandum that reads in part: “since it contains no recommendations, and adds nothing to what the President already knows, I would not send it forward.” Kissinger initialed his approval. (Ibid.)

—Informally requested a paper identifying issues arising from the joint draft text prepared ad referendum at Helsinki, but *not including issues of offensive or defensive levels.*

Not now being studied are:

- Issues surrounding SLBM replacement (this study was never initiated since we wanted to see whether and how the issues might arise);
- Changes in offensive and defensive levels.

Offensive and Defensive Levels

The most pressing issue you need to consider is *how to handle discussion of possible changes in our proposed offensive and defensive levels.*

There is a distinct likelihood that Defense will mount a major campaign (à la Laird's last letter)³ to reopen the issue of the offensive limits contained in our current proposal.

This campaign was foreshadowed by recent remarks by Paul Nitze to the effect that the question of survivability of strategic forces under a SALT agreement had changed radically since last March. He seemed to feel that we need to look again at our entire proposal in light of the numerical growth of Soviet forces and of the developments (to me as yet undecipherable) disclosed by recent photography.

I agree that we should continue our analysis of strategic forces survivability. Indeed, we are updating the Survivability work in the Strategic Objectives and Forces Study which will be reviewed by the DPRC in late October/early November. This is because the threats projected under a SALT agreement along the lines of our present proposal *are* different since our earlier work was based on the August 4 proposal.

However, the Minuteman survivability issue is largely irrelevant and should not be introduced into SALT if we are considering an agreement along the lines of May 20.

Totally rejecting the limited and interim nature of the May 20 agreement, Laird and Nitze will argue for more comprehensive offensive limits on the grounds:

- That it is unlikely that we will have a follow-on agreement;
- That we are freezing the U.S. in a position of numerical inferiority in ICBMs (c. 1600 to 1054);
- That we are giving up our right to defend Minuteman since we have given up the option of Hard-Site Defense (HSD);
- That the Soviets will build a large margin in SLBMs if they are not included in an agreement.

³ See Document 199.

But we accepted these risks when we accepted the idea of a limited agreement on offensive systems. Moreover, as noted below, the real risks are not as great as Laird and Nitze argue:

—The numerical inferiority argument overlooks our numerical superiority in FBS and bombers and our qualitative advantage—e.g., MIRVs;

—We are unlikely to build any more land-based ICBMs and since the Soviet ICBMs are our greatest worry, freezing ICBMs at any level is in our interests;

—If the Soviets want to develop a capability to destroy all or most Minuteman, they could do that almost as well under the August 4 proposal. Hard-Site Defense was banned there and the Soviets were allowed more than enough ICBMs, with qualitative improvements, to do the job;

—We may not want to freeze SLBMs since that is the only way we could reduce a numerical imbalance if we felt it important to do so. Rather, we might prefer to make a strong declaration of our intentions if the Soviet Y-class program continues at the present pace. (Of course, we must recognize that Phase II will involve bargaining and if SLBMs are excluded from Phase I they will be linked to FBS in Phase II. Further, our Congress may be unwilling to let us build up the SLBM fleet.)

—The important arguments on the ABM agreement are that we won't get Safeguard from the Congress anyway and that the potential effect on our assured destruction capability of Soviet ABMs outweighs any potential value of Minuteman Defense. Moreover, HSD looks to be very, very costly and in an unfavorable exchange ratio in the face of serious Soviet efforts to destroy our ICBMs in their silos.

The real issue on offensive levels is whether we are prepared to accept a limited agreement in the face of Soviet force changes since the preparation of the May 20 agreement. The Soviets now have at least 86 new silos (25 of which are at SS-9 fields) and the implied total of their SLBMs is now about 765 (656 on Y-class boats, equal to our Polaris/Poseidon force) compared to our estimates of about 700 last Spring.

Thus, I think we should consider whether we want to make relatively minor changes in offensive levels, e.g.:

—Do we want to change the ICBM freeze to *stop all construction* on January 1, 1972, if the Soviets refuse to include SLBMs? Do we want to change in any case?

—Do we want to offer completion of all ICBMs under construction as an inducement to get SLBMs covered? (This adds the 25 or so new silos in SS-9 fields to our present position.)

Additionally, we probably want to realign the rationale for our ABM position to reflect a "stop-where-you-are" position. We may even want to change the wording of our proposal to include this approach.

The question is how we should handle discussion of possible changes in our proposed offensive and defensive levels.

One approach would be to avoid doing any more papers on the subject. There is already a wealth of analytical material on this subject and

future decisions turn on negotiating and political judgments. A well-directed discussion at a Verification Panel meeting could cover all the important issues leading to a decision.

If you accept this approach it would be helpful to have an early Verification Panel meeting to forestall pressures building up and to clear the decks for discussion of the other issues which must be addressed in November.

Another approach would be to request a paper on possible negotiating exchanges on offensive and defensive levels. The issue of Modern ABM Radar Complexes (MARC)s could be introduced into this paper to provide additional possibilities for negotiating exchanges.

This approach would make the whole subject a more formal one from the interagency standpoint. It would make clear ACDA's and State's support for further negotiating exchanges. Whether this approach reduces your flexibility turns on whether the JCS would go along with Laird or whether they would admit the need for further exchanges. If they go along with Laird, you will face a deeply divided bureaucracy. If they side with State and ACDA, Laird will be isolated.

If you take this approach of doing a paper, the paper will require at least two weeks to prepare. Hence, the Verification Panel meeting would necessarily be delayed until late October. This would mean a heavy schedule for the first two weeks in November before the Delegation returns to Vienna.

Your decision is to:

1. Schedule a Verification Panel meeting next week.
2. Schedule a Verification Panel meeting for late October.⁴

A. Prepare a paper on negotiating exchanges on offensive and defensive levels.⁵

B. Do not prepare a paper.

Other Issues

As mentioned earlier, I have informally started work on identifying issues arising from the joint draft text prepared ad referendum at Helsinki. This work is to focus on second-order issues—i.e., not on offense and defense levels. These issues include radar limitations, duration of the agreement, definitions, esoteric systems, etc.

⁴ Kissinger initialed his approval.

⁵ Kissinger checked this option.

We will have to discuss these issues at a Verification Panel meeting if we want to make progress at SALT VI without giving the Delegation complete discretion on these issues.

I recommend that we put this paper on a more formal basis.

Approve, you direct the Verification Panel Working Group to do it.⁶
Other.

These issues, plus the other issues which already have studies underway can be discussed at Verification Panel meeting(s) in late October/early November.

Hal Sonnenfeldt concurs.⁷

⁶ Kissinger checked this option.

⁷ Sonnenfeldt initialed next to this line.

203. Editorial Note

On October 9, 1971, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin about a change in the time of the summit announcement scheduled for the agreed date of October 12. According to a memorandum of conversation prepared by Kissinger: "Dobrynin said that this would cause no problem for him and that it was courteous of me to say so." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [Part 1])

On October 12 beginning at 11:27 a.m. President Nixon held a news conference in the White House Briefing Room and read an announcement about his planned meeting with Soviet leaders scheduled for late May 1972. The announcement was aired simultaneously at noon in Washington and 7 p.m. in Moscow. The full text is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, page 1030. In response to a press question concerning the possibility of a strategic arms limitation agreement and whether the President expected to sign it at the summit, Nixon stated that "if the goal can be achieved before May of 1972, we will achieve it, and that, incidentally, is also the view of the Soviet Union." (Ibid., page 1031) The press conference concluded at 11:55 a.m.

From noon to 12:54 p.m. Nixon met with Congressional leaders in the Cabinet Room to discuss the announcement. When comments turned to SALT, Senator John C. Stennis (D–Mississippi) applauded

Nixon on his plans for a summit. According to a memorandum for the President's file prepared by Kissinger, the following exchange took place:

“Senator Stennis said he was very impressed with the President's plans. He assumed that SALT would not be stopped as a result of this announcement. The President said it would not. On the contrary, the announcement may give impetus to it. The President went on to say that with the way the Soviets were moving with their build-up, with SALT where it was and the summit coming up, he had to fight for a credible defense program in order to maintain our bargaining position. He realized that there were some who objected to the size of the defense budget but our purpose was not to have an arms race but to stop it. It was essential to stop the Soviets because they were moving ahead. Secretary Rogers noted that the President had said to the press that we would try to get a SALT agreement before the summit and, failing that, would talk about it at the summit. The President said that the SALT agreement at present under negotiation was only a freeze so there would be a lot more to talk about after an agreement.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 315, Subject Files, Congressional, Jul–Dec 1971, Vol. 3) For the full text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 2.

204. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Washington, October 12, 1971, 2:20 p.m.

S: I read on the ticker that you and the President are going to negotiate SALT in Moscow.

K: Oh Jesus Christ, relax. For Christ's sake! Read what the President said.

S: I am relaxed. I'm disgusted, but relaxed.

K: They asked if SALT was going to be finished. He said he didn't know but if it wasn't it might be discussed. But read what he said. He

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 368, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

said we are pushing ahead and we now expect that the SALT agreement we are working on will be finished. But if it's not, then maybe it will be discussed. If it's finished then the direction of the next steps may be discussed.

S: Henry, do you remember our discussion in December 1970 about whether we were planning for a Summit? Semenov had been saying there would be one and so I asked you about it. You assured me that if there was one I would be advised. So we still took the position that in December of 1970 there was no discussion of a Summit.

K: In December of 1970 as it happens there wasn't.

S: Okay then, before December.

K: There was an earlier one which aborted, and that was it.

S: I look like a fool with Semenov for not knowing about that. I will look like one this time.

K: In what way are you affected this time?

S: What am I to say if I am asked if I knew about this by newsmen? Say no, I knew nothing about it? I went to the edge of the truth in my talk about the May 20 business.² But I don't want to do anything at this point more than register my state of mind.

K: First, with regard to what will be discussed at Moscow, there has been no exchange on that at all, and no change whatever. If you can get it settled before May, so much the better.

S: Do you think the prospects are brighter now than they were yesterday for that?

K: The President said . . . he put great stress on this year or early next year at his press conference. He reminded them of that phrase.

S: I am puzzled as to our tempo here. If we are expecting something I don't know how we'll discuss it in May.

K: Where did you get the idea that we are discussing SALT in May? They asked if SALT would be a subject and the President replied that we have an understanding with the Soviets which was announced. He went further by saying that we would try to reach an agreement this year. If not this year certainly try for early next year. And if something remains to be discussed we'll talk about it in May. I don't see why you think it wouldn't be mentioned.

S: No, but it would have been at least courteous to have the head of the agency directly responsible at least aware that the meeting had been discussed. When you have to read it on the ticker it makes you wonder.

² See Document 160.

K: He didn't volunteer it. Sisco will be calling me next because he said something about the Middle East too.

S: But he is not the head of an agency. I have had this analogy made to me before. I don't get happy when I hear about an Assistant Secretary being upset. If you had an agency in charge of the Middle East I wouldn't blame him for being concerned. But if Marty Hillenbrand didn't know about Berlin, that would be different.

K: The President didn't say it would be on the agenda. He said it could be. I don't think that is so startling. I take your criticism as you being the head of the agency.

S: I go into the Secretary of State staff meeting and hear that there will be an announcement and don't know anything it's about. Then I am asked to talk about SALT. And a few hours later this comes out and I look like a fool. I don't know how you expect people to go playing along like this.

K: I don't see how this affects you.

S: That's the problem; no one sees how it affects anybody else. It makes me look like a fool with Semenov going around saying that I don't know about the discussions for a summit.

K: At that time there had been a discussion which had aborted. There was one on October of 1970 which aborted, by early November 1970.

S: You told me that if anything like that came up I would certainly be advised. That's what gives me concern. But if SALT is not on the agenda . . .

K: I am not saying that. I am saying it will be discussed in the light of existing circumstances in May of '72. Maybe we can sign it there, but we hope the discussions will be finished.

Narrowing the Issues, October 19, 1971– April 18, 1972

205. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, October 19, 1971.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I appreciated receiving your letter of September 7.² I have reflected carefully on it as well as the very full and, I believe, constructive talks we have had with Foreign Minister Gromyko.³ I want to stress again what I already told Mr. Gromyko: my belief that our two countries have a special responsibility for peace and progress. This attitude underlies our policies on specific issues. We are prepared to subordinate tactical advantages to global concerns and we understand from Mr. Gromyko that this is your attitude also.

Now that the meeting in Moscow has been announced, both sides have a concrete goal on which to concentrate. I have asked Dr. Kissinger to begin to work with Ambassador Dobrynin in this special channel on the agenda of the forthcoming conference. Our attitude will be to reach the widest area of understanding before you and I meet so that the Moscow Summit can indeed mark a new departure in U.S.-Soviet relations. With this in mind, let me touch upon some of the issues which are of mutual concern.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

In my conversation with Mr. Gromyko, I outlined in some detail my view of the present status of our negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments. We, and, I am sure, you too, are now preparing for the next round of the formal negotiations in Vienna. If, as in the past, there is opportunity for additional progress through private exchanges here in Washington I am, of course, prepared to undertake them. Much detailed work has been done on an ABM agreement and I think we should now also intensify the parallel work on measures

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. No classification marking. According to a handwritten notation at the top of the first page, the letter was "hand carried" to Dobrynin on October 19. The full text of the letter is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 6.

² See Document 185.

³ See Document 201.

limiting offensive weapons. I believe it is important to view this first major strategic arms agreement for which we are both striving as one whole, even if we are dealing with it in separate parts. Because it will be the first agreement—the foundation upon which further agreements and, indeed, our overall relations in the years ahead will be built—it is important that it command wide support and confidence. Realistically, it is probably not feasible in this first stage to eliminate certain disparities in the numbers, types and dispositions of the strategic forces which our two countries have come to maintain. What we should strive to do, in proceeding on the basis of the principle of equality, is to reach agreements which as a whole prevent the further growth of our respective arsenals and safeguard our relative security positions. We should, in other words, work for a “freeze” in both the major areas under negotiation. I am convinced that if we can make the political decisions required to give concrete definition to such a “freeze,” the agreements themselves can be completed quite rapidly.⁴

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

⁴ On January 17, 1972, Brezhnev responded: “I already wrote to you about the seriousness of our intentions both with respect to the whole of the problem of strategic armaments limitation and to the realization of the agreement of May 20, 1971. Taking due account of your wishes we instructed the Soviet delegation at the Vienna negotiations to conduct a parallel discussion of the questions of an ABM agreement and of certain temporary measures in the field of offensive strategic weapons. You are aware, of course of those proposals which the Soviet delegation put forward in Vienna. And, as we understand, those proposals are now being studied in Washington. On our part, we, too, continue to analyze the U.S. position, taking into account also those considerations that have been transmitted to us through the confidential channel. Given the mutual regard for the interests of both sides we shall be able, one can hope, to achieve progress at the negotiations.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President’s Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 2) The full text is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 39.

206. **Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz), and the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger)¹**

Washington, October 19, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Department of Defense budget.]

Nixon: The idea of a cut, and so forth, as you know, Al, from the briefing we had with Defense, I've raised it on several occasions.

Haig: Well, I think that—

Nixon: And every time I raise it, they just blandly say, "Oh, well, we can't do anything about that." But now, anybody who's got any goddamn brains at all knows that the Soviet Union and [laughs] Communist China—nobody is going to send some aircraft in on a strike on the United States of America, for Christ's sake. They're not going to do it when we can strike back in 15 seconds, or whatever it is—in 30 seconds. It's one of these things, isn't that correct? The whole air—the whole idea of having a lot of interceptors there, ready to take out these bombers—but then, they say, "Oh yeah, but they're building bombers." Sure they're building bombers. What is it about? It's probably about China. It may not be about us. Who knows? They'll make all sorts of arguments, but the flyboys—you know, it's a funny thing—but they've got to realize that with regard to this, they're going very quickly the way the battleship went. And it's sad, but it has—huh?

Haig: Yeah, we've got terrible redundancy out there. [unclear]—

Nixon: We do have. For Christ's sake, we're so goddamn redundant that we find, now, that, as I understand, 80 percent of the trucks killed are made by these old two-engine planes, re-converted cargo planes. Right? And all the super jet boys are up there, you know, getting Air Medals for dropping it out in the jungles. [unclear]

Haig: When you ask the question about the levels thing, my main problem is, sir, facing political constraints and not monetary ones—

Nixon: Yeah?

Haig: —I personally think we're going to have a hell—a hell of a lot of political issues leaving the troops there, given the steps we need to take—

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 292-11. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haig, Shultz, Weinberger, and Ehrlichman between 3:05 and 5:05 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

Nixon: So am I. The strategic interests?

Haig: That's right.

Nixon: Well, assuming we get a SALT agreement, we still are?

Haig: I think so. I think we're going to get something that will be right [unclear]—

Nixon: On the SALT?

Haig: Yes, sir.

Nixon: Well then, Al, what do you think should be done about the budgetary issue?²

Haig: Well, I—that, you see, it's a moot question at this point, because—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: —we could not put those strategic forces in this year while the SALT is on—

Nixon: Yeah, but on the other hand, if we get the right kind of— Well, we don't know what kind of a SALT agreement we're going to get. Is that your point?

Haig: That's right, sir. We're going to have to just look at it very hard.

Nixon: And, on the other hand—on the—well, not to be Pollyannaish about it, I assume that this whole budget assumes that we're going to go forward gung-ho on MIRV?

Haig: Yes, it does.

Nixon: It helps a little bit.

Haig: It helps a little. It's a—it doesn't help if they give up the first-strike. It doesn't help a bit.

Nixon: No. Yeah, because MIRV is retaliatory, right?

Haig: It gives us the numbers of [unclear]—

Nixon: Yeah, but if you get on this, on SALT, assuming you get an agreement, you mean, you don't—you think the agreement is on the edge to allow them—

Haig: I think we're right on the edge—

Nixon: And, and, and allowing them a first-strike capability?

Haig: No. No, I wouldn't say that far, yet, sir. If they cheat a little—

Nixon: They'd have to have quite a bit for a first-strike job. Wouldn't they?

Haig: They'd have—they'd have to go considerably farther—

Nixon: But, also, when you stop and think about the strike, the first-strike thing, when you look at MIRV, well, that's gotta be one hell of a deterrent, it seems to me.

² Reference is to the Department of Defense budget.

Haig: Yes, because of the substantial number of the casualties.

Nixon: And the great number [of warheads] that can get through. What do you think we ought to do? Do you think we ought to get going on some more?

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: No, let's assume we don't get it. So, we don't get a SALT agreement. What would you do right now? [unclear]

Haig: Next year? I'd definitely add to 'em.

Nixon: Yeah, but what? To what? Minutemen? What the hell?

Haig: I think probably with boats.

Nixon: Polaris and Minutemen?

Haig: Yes, sir.

Nixon: Well, they don't give us first-strike capability—those things. Is that what we're looking at? Are they trying to balance [unclear]—

Haig: No, no. That's not what we're trying for. We're just trying to maintain our deterrent there.

Nixon: Well, I see.

Haig: Because we can't go for a first-strike.

Nixon: Never. That's right. But, you mean that that—but, you really think, at the present time, you feel we need more Minutemen and more Polaris, in order to deter the first-strike? Is that it?

Haig: But I don't—

Nixon: But you don't think we should do it now?

Haig: —[unclear] do it now. No.

Nixon: You don't think so?

Haig: No.

Nixon: Those we can?

Haig: It would wreck everything. In the first place, I don't think the Congress would stand for it.

Nixon: Right.

Haig: Second place, it would hurt SALT.

Nixon: It'd raise hell with the Soviet, those little bastards. [unclear]—

Haig: In a way, we have to consider this next year. We've got to stall on a SALT agreement.

Nixon: Oh! Oh, absolutely.

Shultz: I'm not certain that that's just not a goal.

Nixon: We're not going to get a stall, I hope, Al. In my view, they're not gonna have a stall.

Haig: No, I think we're looking at one—

Nixon: We'll make a deal, but it's going to be a close deal. But when we go ahead with MIRV it'll work, I hope.

Haig: Especially if the New Yorkers don't like that.

[Laughter]

Nixon: Hell, they'd negotiate a credit for his visit.

Haig: Yeah.

Weinberger: We're the MIRV warmongers.

Shultz: Mr. President, coming back to the first—

Nixon: All right, this is fine on MIRV. You've gotten what you want to do.

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to SALT.]

207. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense for the Verification Panel Working Group¹

Washington, undated.

Limitations on Modern ABM Radar Complexes

I. Introduction

The U.S. July 27, 1971 proposal to limit ABM systems² contains controls on ABM and ABM potential radars. The purposes of such radar controls are to:

1. [1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified];
2. Restrict deployment of radars with ABM potential elsewhere in the Soviet Union to prevent deployment of a radar infrastructure that could be used for a nationwide ABM defense;
3. Restrict the expansion base potential of the Soviet ABM deployment;
4. Provide increased confidence in the long term viability of an agreement by including well-defined specific limits on *all* ABM components.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–125, Modern ABM Radar Complexes. Top Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded to members of the Verification Panel by Wood under an October 28 covering memorandum. The memorandum explained that the paper, prepared by the OSD staff, was based upon substantive agency comments that had been received by October 23.

² See Document 183.

The U.S. has proposed three ways to control Soviet radars to limit ABM defense capability, while still satisfying U.S. ABM requirements:

—Limit Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars to those which are now operational and under construction. (In effect, a Hen House freeze.)

—Limit the deployment of new ABM radars to a limited number of modern ABM radar complexes within agreed geographical areas.

—Require mutual agreement for the deployment of non-ABM phased-array radars having a power aperture product greater than one-million watts-meters squared, except for those already operational or under construction.

This paper will discuss only the limits on new ABM radars known as “modern ABM radar complexes” (MARC)s within the permitted deployment areas (i.e., 100 km of Moscow). It should be recognized, however, that limitations on MARCs are not independent of the other provisions of the U.S. proposal.

[Omitted here is the discussion section of the paper.]

VII. Agency Positions

The *State Department* representative believes the listed alternatives are poor and has therefore developed another approach. State believes that in the U.S. interest of reaching agreement we should be prepared to permit construction of those modern radars required to support a Moscow system of 100 launchers. We anticipate that the Soviets would insist on at least two additional faces in the Dog House class to provide coverage of other threat corridors. Clearly they plan to complete the engagement radars now being built at two (possibly three) formerly abandoned ABM sites, and they probably plan eventually to replace dish-type engagement radars at existing sites with Modern radars. State would allow the Soviets to construct additional ABM detection and tracking radars of the Dog House class only to close existing gaps in coverage and would endeavor to have them located at the two existing complexes. However, if they were at a third complex, this would not appear to be a serious problem: there would be little overlap in coverage, so it would be necessary to destroy only one of the three complexes to significantly reduce Soviet capability to defend against attack in the corresponding sector. State would also permit the Soviets to have modern ABM engagement radars at the two new complexes under construction and would allow modernization or replacement of the older dish-type engagement radars at the four existing complexes if necessary. They would disallow any additional engagement radars as being excessive for a 100 launcher level. A power-aperture limitation should be agreed upon consistent with the role of these radars.

The *OSD Representative* believes that the U.S. position on MARCs as expressed in our July 27, 1971 Draft text is a necessary limit which should continue to be an essential element of the ingoing U.S. position

at SALT VI. He believes that the U.S. should continue to press for the MARC concept at Vienna, and that it is in the overall U.S. interests to negotiate as low a MARC limit as possible. Possible changes and alternatives to MARC control are not independent of other possible developments. Whether MARC controls can be relaxed or changed depends on the nature and degree of agreement we can achieve with the Soviets on the specifics of other key problems (e.g., what constitutes testing in an ABM mode; OLPAR limits; EW radar limits). If required as a negotiating lever, OSD believes the U.S. should consider increasing the permitted number of MARCs up to about six. This move would permit further Soviet flexibility with their ABM system deployment, retain the principle of radar control, while still recognizing the fact that the radar infrastructure is the fundamental element in controlling the expansion, clandestine or legal, of ABM systems.

The *ACDA Representative* believes that there is merit in the MARC concept and that it is in the U.S. interest to keep the number of MARCs permitted as low as possible. At Vienna, we should continue to try to persuade the Soviets to accept the U.S. position on this question. At the same time, if our proposed provisions on MARCs prove non-negotiable, we should be prepared to consider possible compromises which would maintain the vulnerability of the Moscow system and prevent the creation of a radar base for a thick regional ABM defense.

The *JCS* and *CIA Representatives* reserve their positions on this subject at this time.

**208. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)¹**

Washington, October 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

SALT

In my memorandum of 15 September 1971 to the President,² I expressed my deep concern over the trend in SALT and over the serious international and domestic problems which could face the U.S. if this

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret.

² See footnote 2, Document 199.

trend continues. I mentioned that our goal in SALT must be (a) to halt and then reverse the growing Soviet offensive advantage in throw-weight and numbers of delivery vehicles while (b) limiting or reducing ABM defenses of Soviet cities.

In formulating U.S. strategy and tactics for SALT VI, we should retain these two objectives. We should also strive for an arrangement which will provide inducements to the Soviets to negotiate a more satisfactory follow-on agreement.

We made progress in SALT V toward a defensive agreement that is specific, precise, and relatively free of loopholes. I believe that we must continue to press for these qualities, with priority on precise controls on ABM radars and other ABM capable radars.

I am, however, deeply concerned that the Soviets are succeeding with their tactic of splitting an ABM agreement from any real consideration of strategic offensive limitations. We have, in effect, offered to give up our right to a strategically significant defense of our ICBMs without asking for or obtaining offensive limits that would justify this sacrifice. I believe that we are in danger of losing sight altogether of the relationship between the offensive threat and the survivability of our retaliatory forces. We must re-establish during SALT VI this offense-defense linkage. We should not freeze ourselves into an ABM position that has neither long term strategic utility nor leverage on the Soviets to continue meaningful offense negotiations.

Accordingly, I recommend the following:

1. We should retain the flexibility for increasing the level of defense of a portion of our Minuteman force if a satisfactory follow-on agreement on offenses cannot be obtained within four or five years. The Soviets, with their September 7 proposal,³ have opened the door for just such a proposition. A proposal consistent with the Soviet approach might have the following features.

- a. Each side would be entitled to a defense of its capital with 100 ABM interceptors.

- b. Each side could defend an agreed number of ABM silos subject to appropriate geographic and ABM performance limitations.

- c. The U.S. would complete and retain the ABM capability under construction at Grand Forks. In addition each side would be permitted an unlimited number of short range interceptors and short-range radars colocated with ICBM silos.

- d. There would be an agreement that neither side would initiate the deployment of the defenses not now under construction until a follow-on agreement was concluded, or until a period of two to five years has passed, whichever event occurs first.

³ See Document 185.

Such an approach would give time for conclusion of a follow-on agreement and would preserve the flexibility to move toward an ABM ban or toward a defense of a portion of our ICBMs if that should become necessary. The prospect of ABM defense expansion on both sides could provide an incentive to the Soviets to negotiate a follow-on agreement providing reduction in the counterforce threat to Minuteman.

2. We should continue to press for a limit on SLBMs in an interim offense agreement. However, we should not give up the freedom to initiate new SSBN construction for an indefinite period of time. It would therefore be in our interest to negotiate an interim offensive agreement that would permit, unless subsequently replaced by a more complete agreement, the freedom to replace aging SSBNs and replace vulnerable ICBM launchers with SLBM launchers after four or five years.

3. Finally, I believe it is time to demonstrate that we can and will react to the Soviet strategic offensive buildup. I believe the best action we might take now is to include in the FY 73 budget substantial funds for early deployment of new SSBNs. I will provide, within the next few days, concrete proposals along these lines.

In conclusion, it is my belief that an agreement on ABMs and an interim offensive agreement have a slim chance of being replaced by more satisfactory and complete agreements within the next five years unless we provide the Soviets with inducements for cooperating to this end. We must provide such inducements and hedge against a failure of follow-on negotiations. My recommendations support both of these objectives.⁴

Melvin R. Laird

⁴ In an October 30 memorandum to Kissinger, K. Wayne Smith and Sonnenfeldt summarized Laird's views in preparation for the Verification Panel meeting scheduled for November 1. They commented that "before we allow replacement or freedom-to-mix [of SSBNs], we should consider carefully how long the provisions of the interim agreement will last." They also disagreed with Laird about the effects of a freedom-to-mix provision on the Soviets. They argued that "the Soviets have more obsolescent ICBMs and missile submarines than we do and would benefit from these provisions in the short-term." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-009, Verification Panel Meeting SALT 11/3/71)

209. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, November 3, 1971, 10:14–11:57 a.m.

SUBJECT

SALT Talks

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

John N. Irwin
Ronald Spiers
Raymond Garthoff
Seymour Weiss

Defense

David Packard
Gardiner Tucker
Paul Nitze
Archie L. Wood

JCS

Gen. William C. Westmoreland
Lt. Gen. Royal B. Allison

Justice

John Mitchell

CIA

Richard Helms
Carl Duckett

ACDA

Amb. Gerard Smith
Philip J. Farley
Spurgeon M. Keeny

OST

Dr. Edward David

NSC Staff

K. Wayne Smith
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
R/Adm. Robert Welander
Lt. Col. Jack Merritt
William G. Hyland
Barry Carter
James T. Hackett

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—we are to move ahead with the SALT talks and try to get an acceptable agreement as soon as possible. An agreement should *not* be delayed until the May summit meeting.²

—the Working Group will prepare an interagency paper on the advantages and possible disadvantages of including sea-launched ballistic missiles and submarines in a freeze.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² Kissinger began the meeting by emphasizing this point: “The President clearly understands that some of the more reflective minds in this town realize what he has done to the SALT talks by agreeing to a summit meeting in Moscow. Some people are assuming that if an agreement is reached, it will be delayed so that it can be announced in Moscow in May. The President wants us to ignore these assumptions and go ahead as rapidly as possible. If an agreement is reached in advance of the summit meeting, we will then begin discussions on phase two of the talks.”

—a number of items will be discussed further at the NSC meeting, including:

- the level of Safeguard;
- whether to retain an option for an NCA;
- whether to explore the Soviet proposal further, as suggested by DOD;
- offensive missile levels, including SLBMs.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

210. Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense¹

Washington, undated.

OSD Position Summary

The U.S. should insist that offense limits be discussed in parallel with or ahead of further discussion of ABM limits. We should maintain our “2 or 1” ABM proposal as our formal position at the start of SALT VI, but should positively explore the possibility of agreeing on a new option, based upon the Soviet proposal of September 7th,² and outlined below. If such an agreement can be negotiated, it should be the preferred U.S. position. We should not agree to any alternative giving the U.S. less than 2 sites or denying us a later decision to defend the NCA. We should insist upon the inclusion of SLBMs in the offense freeze, and upon the cutoff dates of our July 27 proposal.³ We should not accept an ABM agreement without an offense freeze.

In order to give us freedom to initiate our own submarine construction program if a satisfactory follow-on offense agreement is not reached soon, we should include freedom to replace aging SSBNs with

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive. On November 6 Packard sent the paper as Tab A to a memorandum to Kissinger. Packard also attached a memorandum from Moorer on the JCS position. In his covering memorandum, Packard wrote that the JCS position was similar to his: “their recommendations on ABM levels and offense limits are more favorable to the U.S. than mine, but less negotiable. The Chiefs’ position on Modern ABM Radar Complexes agrees with my own, but they would accept ‘consultation’ on Other Large Phased Array Radars rather than the ‘mutual agreement’ provision which I believe to be essential.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-032, NSC Meeting SALT 11/12/71)

² See Document 185.

³ See Document 183.

new ones and to replace ICBM launchers with SLBM launchers after two years if the freeze is not superceded by a further offense agreement.

New ABM Proposal

1. *ABM Levels*

a. Each side would be entitled to a defense of its capital, limited to 100 interceptors with geographic and radar limitations along the lines of our July 27th ABM proposal.

b. Each side could defend up to 150 ICBM silos, subject to the following restrictions:

(1) All silos in any defended ICBM field would be counted against the 150 total.

(2) The ICBM fields to be protected would be so located that the defense of their silos would not contribute to an area defense. Mutual predesignation of the fields selected would be agreed. (If Soviet ICBM field defenses are restricted to fields east of the Urals, little collateral coverage of Soviet population will result.)

(3) Only short range interceptors and radars colocated with silos (i.e., within one kilometer) would be permitted. This is evidently a feature of the Soviet September 7 proposal, and we should ask them to be forthcoming on the technical criteria underlying their option. The Soviet proposal in the Joint Draft Text is that "Should the U.S. side agree in principle with such an approach, the criteria of acceptable limitations could be discussed, proceeding from the premise that ABM system components used for defense of ICBM silos could not be used for creating an ABM defense of the territory of the country."⁴ We have already studied this aspect and are prepared to recommend criteria suitable for verification purposes for both "short-range" ABM radars and interceptors used for ICBM defense. We would prefer that the numbers of such interceptors and radars be unspecified, in order to emphasize the linkage to Soviet offensive levels.

(4) As an exception to the "short range" limitations the U.S. would be permitted to complete and retain the Safeguard ABM components at the ICBM field it chooses to defend (i.e., about 100 Spartans and Sprints, 1 PAR and 1 MSR).

c. Both sides would agree that the U.S. would not initiate the deployment of defense of Washington and the Soviets would not initiate the defense of ICBM sites until one of the following events occur:

- (1) Mutual agreement to their deployment is achieved; or
- (2) A follow-on agreement is concluded, including among other things, mutual agreement on ABM levels; or
- (3) Some time limit, between two and five years expires.

⁴ The joint draft text of an ABM agreement was transmitted in telegram USDEL SALT 1055, September 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–3 FIN (HE))

If the Soviets strenuously object to the U.S. right to deploy the short-range ABM defense and Grand Forks prior to their having the right to deploy any ICBM defenses, we could make our rights to additional short range ICBM defenses subject to the three conditions above inasmuch as the leadtime to deploy such a system would be a number of years in any event.

2. *ABM Radar Controls*

a. *Modern ABM Radar Complexes (MARC)s*: The U.S. should not alter its July 27 position on MARCs until the Soviets furnish some convincing rationale for Soviet opposition to this element of our proposal. They have not been persuasive that four MARCs plus their existing four ABM radar complexes are insufficient for an NCA defense with 100 interceptors. In the event that some movement is required in our position on MARCs, we recommend that we first consider redefining MARCs to include only phased-array radars; and as a second measure, agree to increase the permitted number of MARCs from four to six. The use of the MARC concept to assure the vulnerability of the Soviet ABM radar base remains of paramount importance to the long-term viability of the agreement.

b. *Other Large-Phased Array Radars (OLPAR)s*: We continue to believe it essential to obtain mutual agreement prior to the deployment of any phased-array radar, in addition to those operational and under construction, which exceeds a power-aperture product of one-million watts-meters squared. Early Warning phased-arrays in this category are discussed below. The inherent capability of such radars, whether for new air defense systems or other functions, and whether or not tested in an ABM mode, will raise suspicions and undermine confidence in an agreement, unless adequately controlled.

c. *Early Warning Radars*: In order to gain acceptance to the rest of Article VI, specifically the OLPAR provision, we could accept the formulation on this type of radar reflected in the ad referendum Joint Draft Text, provided that the negotiating record clearly sets forth that such radars must remain vulnerable to missile attack, and that increased SAM defenses of these radars would also be inconsistent with the intent of the Agreement.

3. *ABM Testing*

The Delegation should include in a Plenary statement the U.S. interpretation of "testing in an ABM Mode." This would formalize in the negotiating record a specific basis for future challenges. In addition, it is necessary that the negotiating record include statements exempting from provisions of the agreement all range safety and instrumentation radars and past testing of other radars. The specific quantitative and qualitative material recommended as examples of ABM testing are:

- a. Flight testing missiles in conjunction with one or more ABM components, e.g., ABM interceptor missiles, and ABM radars.
 - b. Making radar measurements in conjunction with the testing of ABM interceptors or radars.
 - c. Flight testing an air defense missile to an altitude inconsistent with interception of air defense threats.
 - d. Testing of an interceptor missile and/or radar against any test object whose maximum velocity exceeds 2 km/second or whose altitude exceeds 40 km at any point in its trajectory.
-

211. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, November 12, 1971, 5–6:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on ABM

ATTENDEES

President Nixon
Vice President Agnew
Secretary of State William P. Rogers
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
General George A. Lincoln, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Attorney General John N. Mitchell
Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
Carl Duckett, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency
General John D. Ryan, Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Ronald I. Spiers, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Spurgeon Keeny, Assistant Director for Science and Technology, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Mr. John J. McCloy, Chairman, President's Disarmament Advisory Committee
Ambassador J. Graham Parsons, Member SALT Delegation
Mr. Paul Nitze, Member SALT Delegation

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, National Security Council Minutes Originals 1971 thru 6–20–74. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

Dr. Gardiner Tucker, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis
Colonel Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff
Dr. K. Wayne Smith, NSC Staff
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff

The President: We will have the usual procedures. We'll start with Henry outlining the issues. Then I will issue instructions later. I want to hear today about the ABM and SLBM issues. Henry, will you start?

Dr. Kissinger: I will address these issues: the nature of the ABM limit; the nature of the offensive limit; the link between the offensive and defensive limits; and the form of an agreement. That comes later.

The President: We haven't discussed the degree of formality yet, have we?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Yes, we have discussed it. We talked of an agreement but the Soviets want a treaty on the defensive side but haven't said anything on the offensive side.

Dr. Kissinger: At the opening of the negotiation the position was to defend three sites with ABM, as opposed to the present position, which is that either side can have two sites with 200 interceptors or else, if one of them is NCA, 100 interceptors. This in effect says we stay where we both are.

The rationale for the change from protection of the national capital—which the Soviets have but we haven't—is that it's a bad idea to begin by tearing down what we had and starting something new. The argument that this gives an asymmetry is offset by the offensive asymmetry. Moscow defends 25% of the Soviet population, 35% of their industry, and 500 missiles. Our sites protect only 350 Minutemen and only 5% of our population and industry.

The Soviet proposal is that each side defend its NCA and in addition each side gets one of its missile sites defended. Thus the Soviets could defend two fields while we could do only the capital. If this was accepted, we would probably wind up with three sites for the Soviets and we would wind up with only one missile field.

This is why the Verification Panel recommended against this proposal.² We could just as well argue Moscow against Grand Forks.

The President: We have to face the fact that an arms limitation agreement which requires us to build something new to stay equal won't work. I'm referring to the NCA.

Secretary Laird: Yes, that is true defensively, but not necessarily so offensively.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Soviets don't accept this proposal, the Verification Panel considered these choices.

² See Document 209.

The first is to scale down the US proposal—to accept Grand Forks against Moscow—and just don't defend Minuteman by more than one site. This gives some better urban protection against accidental attack.

In all the discussions before May 20 we always held to three to one. They didn't either accept it or reject it. We then would be going from 12 sites down to one and there would be pressure to go to zero. We would have to start the process by dismantling some of ours, while the Soviets keep theirs. The political and psychological cost of this would be high. If we do it, we should go for more offensive limitations.

The second option is the DOD plan, by which the US keeps one Safeguard and the Soviets keep Moscow—but if there is no offensive agreement in the same period, both go to hard-site defense of a given number of silos with qualitative limits, making point defense of missiles. This rests on an assumption that the Soviets would agree to an arrangement for short-range interceptors. This would protect more US Minutemen and give the Soviets a high incentive to negotiate an offensive limit. On the other hand, this is most complex and has never been put before the Soviets. They also are confused about our stance now, and this proposal would be very difficult for them to understand.

In practice it is 1-to-1 for the short term, which the Soviets would agree. Whether to speed up the negotiations depends on whether they see an opportunity to build for SS-9 protection. It may be more difficult to negotiate qualitative limits on short-range interceptors. Verification would be difficult.

Third is to leave the choice between NCA and missile field defense left open to later. This leaves open the possibility of NCA defense. The problem is we could wind up for the same period with both.

The President: This would require a new system to be built by both sides.

General Ryan: Yes, they have the technical capability we have to do so.

The President: We might be able to get Congress to go along. It is not provocative because it doesn't protect cities.

Dr. Kissinger: This could not be used.

Secretary Rogers: It would look dilatory since we can't have more.

Mr. Nitze: It wouldn't look dilatory if they want to discuss it.

Mr. Smith: Will the Soviets want to talk about certain kinds of short-range interceptors but not so many?

Dr. Kissinger: The announcement of May 20th says that we will have a defensive agreement with some freezes on offensive systems. The argument is that we are freezing ourselves into inferiority. But the conception was a moratorium stopping construction of offensive land-based missiles on both sides—the idea was that this was a unilateral

hold on the Soviets. A lot depends on how long the agreement—the freeze—lasts. If the time period is short, it is an advantage to us. The Soviets would have to stop 25 new silos and new construction.

The big question later is how about submarines? The Soviets refused to discuss it; we insisted on discussing it. The question later will be, if we have an otherwise satisfactory agreement . . .

The President: They are stepping up and they will catch up by '73. What about the ULMS?

Dr. Kissinger: They have none yet. What is the strategic significance of the disparity in numbers of SLBMs given the difference in the basing problem? They might need 70 to cover the same as we do. The issue is, we have to decide what produces the greater pressure of the follow-on negotiation on the offensive side. If we freeze, we could freeze ULMS.

Secretary Laird: It would depend on the mix.

Mr. Smith: The present proposal would not permit us to go ahead with construction of ULMS.

The President: Does DOD want to freeze? Is this wise? We could get Congressional support to build subs but probably not for missiles.

Attorney General Mitchell: It depends how you sell it.

The Vice President: There is better public impact in submarines.

The President: They can make a deal any way they want, but we have to be concerned about public support. We'll take lots of heat on the offensive loss.

Secretary Rogers: Subs are the easiest to get.

The Vice President: Even critics of ABM say build more subs.

Secretary Laird: They are trying for superiority and will get it by '77. If we don't put some limits, we can't sell this agreement.

The President: What is the situation?

Secretary Laird: The earliest we can get going is '77.

Dr. Kissinger: If Mel's argument is right, the argument will be: Do you want a buildup of ICBMs and SLBMs? Because we are fighting for both, thus we are not willing to constrain only ICBMs.

Secretary Laird: The tremendous buildup they can make will force us to build and lose an agreement.

Secretary Rogers: It's between the military position and the political position. The real question is if you can't get a limit on SLBMs, do you take no agreement at all?

General Ryan: The Chiefs feel there should be a total limit with freedom to mix the change.

Mr. Smith: That won't sell. We could double our Polaris but they would have to trade land for sea. I think we can get a freeze on SLBMs but I'm not sure it's wise.

Secretary Laird: There hasn't been enough discussion of the offensive situation.

The President (to Secretary Laird): Has the sub situation been studied carefully?

Secretary Laird: The best estimate now is we can get it by '77.

The President: In the sub area we are good. Why not go ahead?

Secretary Laird: I think the Soviets are going for superiority.

The President: I agree.

Secretary Laird: They have two modernized yards and have cut the construction time. We have a political problem even more than a military problem.

Dr. Kissinger: But if we have an ICBM freeze and no SLBM freeze, we can go ahead and build. Otherwise we freeze ourselves behind or maybe don't get an agreement.

The President: We're not giving away anything on ICBMs when we're not going to build anyway. Why not go ahead on the subs we can build?

General Ryan: They are building only nine a year.

The President: If we take an ICBM freeze alone, then we can build subs and we can do better than they can. The Chiefs are unanimous?

General Ryan: Yes.

Mr. McCloy: The Advisory Committee,³ Mr. President, favors a minimum level on ABMs. We also favor linking subs and ICBMs. It's a difficult political situation if we don't have a limit on subs.

Attorney General Mitchell: On offensive weapons, we are talking about a freeze to give time to talk about a treaty?

Mr. Smith: On balance a freeze is better on both of us, because if we freeze ABMs and ICBMs while they build more boats (and we request a new sub program) we would have a bad public relation problem.

The President: If can't get both, then what?

Mr. Smith: I'd prefer not to answer.

Attorney General Mitchell: But won't we involve FBS?

Secretary Rogers: We have to push though the Soviets may not understand how we feel.

Mr. Smith: We need to give a clear high-level signal.

Secretary Laird: When do we have to give a signal? Can we wait to the budget? They don't think we're going to build any subs.

³ Reference is to the General Advisory Committee for Arms Control and Disarmament, also called the McCloy Committee.

Mr. McCloy: Arbatov discussed this with me. He didn't know whether the Soviets were adamant on subs.

Mr. Smith: This is why we should press hard.

Secretary Laird: I would like to talk a bit about ABM. Paul [Nitze],⁴ would you clarify on the Soviet position?

Mr. Nitze: They would restrict us to protection of 150 silos on the US side. We could keep all the _____⁵ we now have.

Dr. Kissinger: But the important thing is that we could face an upgrade problem.

Mr. Nitze: I think Congress would be more favorable to a proposal that ABM is improving the defense of Minuteman. I hate to see us winding up with two Safeguard sites which don't really defend much. Zero is better than that. The Soviets' September 7 proposal⁶ was: would we discuss the defense of silos—which is easier than defense of a city? We think we have ideas which would do this. And what they are talking about—it's hard to get them to agree. I think we should . . .

Mr. Smith: We have to have a new system.

Mr. Nitze: We have an R&D program now.

Mr. Smith: That is inconsistent with the idea of cutting back.

The Vice President: Is the talk of offensive limits only on numbers? How about on size?

Mr. Smith: We would have a separate ceiling on MLBMs.

I think getting an agreement on this sort of package is very difficult.

General Ryan: The Chiefs believe an MLBM limit is okay if it's within the limit we're talking about now.

Director Helms: They don't have a MIRV now but they will have, I believe in about one year.

The Vice President: Paul's argument is that this protects our retaliatory capability.

General Ryan: The Chiefs believe NCA makes sense and we want defense also of two missile fields. We would go for a new system.

Mr. Nitze: If we could get it.

Dr. Kissinger: You don't need to decide now, Mr. President, except to affirm that we stay with our two-for-one proposal and include SLBMs. These issues will only arise later.

Mr. Smith: If we raise new thoughts now, we are going to confuse them.

⁴ Brackets are in the original.

⁵ Omission is in the original.

⁶ See Document 185.

The President: I want to see what we can do on building subs. I see the arguments against but we still need to look at this. We've been frozen so long in all areas. There is lots of steam and concern that we are going to a position of inferiority. We just may have to go the sub route. Please give me the numbers.

[The meeting concluded.]⁷

⁷ Brackets are in the original.

212. National Security Decision Memorandum 140¹

Washington, November 15, 1971.

TO

The Members of the National Security Council
The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks At Vienna (SALT VI)

The President has made the following decisions for Vienna (SALT VI):²

1. The basic U.S. position is unchanged.
2. The Delegation should initially concentrate its presentation and discussion on offensive limitations and should insist the Soviets do the same. This initial emphasis should focus on establishing that there will be an overall ICBM freeze, with a sub-limit on Modern Large Ballistic Missiles and a precise understanding of what is allowed under modernization and replacement. As for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the Delegation should make a strong effort to negotiate their inclusion in any interim offensive agreement. If it appears that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 101–150. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior members of the U.S. SALT Delegation. Haig initialed the NSDM, indicating that he saw it.

² The sixth round of negotiations began in Vienna on November 15 and continued until February 4, 1972.

this objective can be achieved only by modification of the present U.S. proposal regarding SLBMs, the Delegation should recommend alternatives for Presidential decision.

3. The Delegation should initiate an ad referendum procedure to prepare a Joint Draft Text of an agreement on offensive limitations.

4. Our present ABM proposal regarding the number of sites and launchers/interceptors is unchanged. The Delegation should make clear to the Soviets that there are no alternatives to this proposal. Accordingly, exploration of other alternatives is not authorized at this time. However, with regard to radars and geographic limitations, the Delegation is authorized to continue explorations and to recommend alternatives for Presidential decision.

5. The Chairman of the Delegation is directed to provide the following interpretation of the right to freedom of choice between the two ABM alternatives in Article 3 of the U.S. draft defensive agreement.³ First, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must indicate clearly their initial choice of an ABM deployment before the negotiations on ABM systems are completed or an agreement is initialled. (At the time for selection, the Soviet Delegation should be informed that the initial U.S. choice is a deployment at ICBM fields.) Second, the U.S. proposes that, after a mutually agreed time from the effective date of the defensive agreement, either side would have the right to change its ABM deployment (within the limits of Article 3), subject to destruction procedures which need not be agreed upon prior to conclusion of the agreement but which must be mutually agreed upon prior to the switch.

6. On issues other than those discussed above, the Delegation should continue to seek to narrow the U.S.–U.S.S.R. differences in the Joint Draft Text⁴ on an ad referendum basis. The interagency paper “Some Outstanding Issues at SALT and Possible Negotiating Exchanges,” dated October 27, 1971,⁵ can serve as a guide to resolving the issues it discussed.

7. The need for avoiding leaks remains particularly compelling. The President’s directive of October 31, 1969, entitled “Avoidance of Leaks on SALT,”⁶ is again reaffirmed.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ See Document 183.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 210.

⁵ The interagency paper was prepared for the November 3 Verification Panel meeting and dealt with the defensive elements of an agreement, primarily with ABM option levels, OLPARs, and MARCs. The paper prioritized the offensive elements to be negotiated: MLBMs, followed by ICBMs and SLBMs. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-009, Verification Panel Meeting SALT 11/3/71)

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 40.

213. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 18, 1971, 8:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

SALT

We then discussed SALT. Dobrynin asked me what possibilities I saw. I said it was important that we concluded an agreement. Was it his understanding that it would be finished by the time of the Summit? Dobrynin said it was the firm intention of the Soviet leadership to conclude the agreement in such a manner that it could be signed at the Summit.

Dobrynin asked about my view with respect to defensive weapons; specifically, whether I could imagine a compromise. What was our reasoning for rejecting the Soviet proposal of September 7th?² I replied that the practical consequence of it might be that it would give them three sites as against one for us. They would defend two missile fields plus Moscow while we would have to destroy our defense at one missile field but would get the right to defend Washington, for which we could not get any money. Dobrynin said he believed this but no one in Moscow would believe that the American Government could not get money for the defense of its capital, and therefore this was considered a weak argument in Moscow.

I pointed out that the Moscow system already defended 400 missiles. He said, "Yes, but it is only one point, while the American system has two points and thus provided an air raid basis for area defense." Dobrynin asked whether I thought we would accept a two-for-two trade—one missile field in the Soviet Union, even if it had fewer missiles, for NCA. I said it was premature, but I did not think so. He said "let them talk another few weeks, and we will reconsider it in January."

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 485, President's Trip Files, USSR, Issues Papers Vol. IV, SALT, Confidential Channels. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. The NSC staff prepared this extract from a larger memorandum of conversation of the entire meeting, which covered a range of topics. The full memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, Box 492, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 13.

² See Document 185.

We then turned to offensive limitations. He said that the record of the discussions prior to May 20th was unclear, but he had to say that it concentrated, in his mind, mostly on ICBMs. I said that the situation seemed to me to be as follows: Legally, the exchange of letters³ certainly left us free to include SLBM's, and there had even been some discussion of it in our conversations. At the same time, I had to grant him the fact that we were more concerned at that time with ICBM's, and the thrust of our conversations dealt with them. I was not concerned with the legal argument, but with the substantive one. It would be difficult to explain to the American people why ICBM's should be constrained but a race at sea should continue. I had to tell him frankly that there were many in our government who were not particularly eager to constrain SLBM's because it gave us an opportunity to relaunch a new weapons program at sea. Therefore, if the Soviets rejected our SLBM proposal, our Joint Chiefs of Staff would in my judgment not be a bit unhappy. On the other hand, it seemed to me it would be best if we did limit it. Dobrynin asked why, if we insisted on maintaining superiority at sea, would we be willing to settle for 41 modern submarines for each side? I said I was not sure, but this was not an unreasonable proposition, though I recommended that they surface it through his channel first so that I could make a final check.

Dobrynin said that when he came back from Moscow, he would have an answer, but he hoped we had until March.

Dobrynin then asked how all of this would be affected if China started developing a large nuclear arsenal. Did we think that China could have 50 nuclear submarines while we were constrained to 41? I said that, of course, if we agreed on SALT, we would start an evolution of a common approach to the whole issues of strategic arms that would have to take into account an evolving threat by other nuclear countries. We could not use SALT agreements to give other countries an opportunity to outstrip us.

Dobrynin then suggested very strongly that the chief Soviet reason for an ABM buildup was Communist China. I said, on the other hand, we are told by Smith all the time that you really want a zero ABM. Dobrynin said, "I wish Smith would stop playing games. We are only dealing with him on this basis so that we do not have to bear the onus of rejecting a zero ABM, but please do not propose it to us."

³ See Document 160.

214. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

Memorandum from Ambassador Smith to the President on SALT

Ambassador Smith has written the President (Tab B)² agreeing with the President's press conference statement that ". . . neither major power can get a decisive advantage over the other . . ."³

Smith uses the statement for a brief homily on the theme that the U.S. is not on a course leading to an inferior strategic position; rather, we are substantially increasing our capabilities.

Smith concludes that, if our programs were adequately publicized, our Allies and public would conclude that the President is on the right track in the SALT negotiations.

Smith's facts and interpretation are old ones. They will be very useful when it comes time to present the SALT agreements to Congress and the public.

Attached at Tab A is a draft reply from you to Smith which:

- Says the President appreciated Smith's views;
- Notes that the Administration will have an excellent opportunity to inform our Allies and the American public of the facts when we present the SALT agreements.

There seems to be no need to forward this memorandum to the President or to have him respond to Smith.

*Recommendation*⁴

That you sign the letter to Smith at Tab A.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. 17, September–December 1971. Top Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Haig, who initialed the memorandum and wrote, "Wow."

² The tabs are attached but not printed.

³ The rest of Nixon's October 12 press conference statement, quoted in Smith's letter, reads: "an advantage which would enable it to launch a preemptive strike which might enable it to engage in international blackmail." The full text of Nixon's press conference is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 1030–1032.

⁴ Kissinger wrote: "Let's forward memo to Pres[ident]. I don't want to be in position of blocking agency head. HK."

215. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Vienna, December 8, 1971, 1755Z.

12. Dear Henry:

Perhaps a roundup of the Vienna situation may be useful. I think that we have now largely fulfilled NSDM-140.² Soviets have moved considerably and appear to want to reach agreements.

On offensives they have cleared up a number of uncertainties. They accept our proposed form of agreement, will take commitment that modernization and replacement will not permit new deployments, and will agree not to substitute "heavy" for "light" ICBM's. I think we can get greater precision here. They hint that their proposed cutoff date is negotiable.

There is evidence that they have not started significant ICBM deployment since May 20th.

Their new Article I would declare against nationwide ABM defense.³ This would evidence acceptance theory of mutual deterrence. USSR (plus US) announcing to their people and world that they cannot defend populations against nuclear attack would have substantial political implications.

Soviets say that Moscow has accepted provisions negotiated ad referendum on early warning radars and SAM upgrade.

They show flexibility on other drafting problems in ABM field with willingness to accommodate US on some matters, apparently wanting joint draft text bracketing only Article III on levels and radars, pending final decision at top level. Today Semenov told me that within week they will table new ABM proposal taking into account NCA and ICBM defense without increasing ABM deployments. I guess this will be some form of "deferred options" they hinted at in Helsinki.

With the exception of minor clarification of right to post agreement switch from NCA to ICBM defense and vice versa, US has made no moves.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the message reads: "Hicks for HAK, Haig."

² Document 212.

³ See footnote 4, Document 210.

We can usefully spend next two weeks under general NSDM-140 guidance. It would be very useful to tell them before Christmas we will go for ABM treaty.

But we will soon need fresh guidance to avoid giving impression that our purpose is to “stonewall” and not negotiate.

If there is to be any flexibility in our ABM level position, I think it important to disclose at least some of it during the period January 4th until the end of the current session (Soviet target January 20th). US movement should produce further Soviet move on radars. Key remaining issues (other than perhaps final ABM move) would be SL freeze inclusion and special withdrawal right in ABM treaty to link its life expectancy to negotiation of offensive limitation treaty.

So I trust NSC can address SALT issues before January 4th renewal in Vienna and that I can talk to President during my fortnight in US.⁴

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

⁴ Sonnenfeldt and Odeen forwarded Smith’s message to Kissinger on December 10 with a recommendation that he sign an attached reply telling Smith that he would consider his questions but that he should expect no major changes until they met during the holiday break. Kissinger did not check either recommendation but wrote in the upper right hand corner of the memorandum, “Send out. HK.” A separate handwritten marginal note by Sonnenfeldt reads: “Text cabled to General Haig on December 13, 1971.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT)

216. Memorandum From Philip Odeen and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

Possible Decisions Prior to the Christmas Recess at SALT

The last SALT meeting in Vienna prior to the recess will be on Wednesday, December 22. There are two proposals for modifying our position before the recess. These proposals involve:

- Form of the agreements;
- Modifying our SLBM position.

Form of the Agreements

Our understanding is that the President prefers the ABM limitations to be in a treaty; we are less clear on the form of the offensive limitations, but in any case they should be in a formal and public agreement.

Efforts in the normal inter-agency channels to develop a formal position for the Delegation led to a split. All the agencies, except OSD, are willing to approve instructions which simply state that the ABM agreement should be a treaty and the offensive agreement should be formal and public.

The OSD position has vacillated. Secretary Laird has just written you and cleared matters up. (See Tab B.)² He is willing to accept a treaty for the ABMs, provided that Smith states at the same time that:

- (1) There must be a clause which allows us to withdraw if an acceptable follow-up offensive agreement has not been negotiated after a specified time (e.g., 5 years);
- (2) An ABM agreement is only acceptable if acceptable offense limits will be in force so long as the ABM limits continue.

Regarding the withdrawal provisions (1), this is our present announced position. (We have yet to specify the period, having reserved that decision until we know more about the terms of the agreements.) Restating this position, which the Soviets have objected to, would be

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. 17, September–December 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for urgent action. Sent under a December 16 covering memorandum in which Odeen and Sonnenfeldt informed Kissinger that “Laird has changed the OSD position on form of the agreement, such that you might find it possible to find a compromise position, as discussed in the attached memorandum.”

² Attached but not printed is Laird’s December 14 memorandum to Kissinger.

useful. It is in the U.S. interests to tie the limited offensive agreement to the ABM agreement as much as possible.

As for insuring that we do not eventually have limits only on ABMs (2), this is not an explicit U.S. position, though it is suggested by our withdrawal provision. It might be helpful to state this principle to emphasize our concern that, after a few years, we would only have limits on ABMs.

Reaffirming our present position on withdrawal and stating a principle on duration is different from making them as Laird apparently wants, *sine qua non*s for allowing the ABM agreement to be in the form of a treaty. Our position on form is unlikely to provide much negotiating leverage. Hence, linking our decision on form to provisions regarding duration and withdrawal would serve mainly to slow down the negotiating process and to complicate the issues unnecessarily.

—OSD seems to be trying again to obtain major concessions with only a peppercorn of an offer.

Given OSD's position and the short time left before the recess, you will need to sign out a directive to the SALT Back Stopping Committee if you want to implement a decision on form now. You can meet Laird halfway by instructing Smith to reaffirm our present position on withdrawal and to state a principle that offensive limitations continue as long as defensive limitations. (You assured Smith in a private communication that you would be able to give him some indications by the 20th.)³

Alternatively, you could defer this until later, deciding it during the recess in connection with the related issues of withdrawal, etc.

Attached at Tab A⁴ is a memorandum from you to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (i.e., Back Stopping Committee) which says that the President has decided that:

- The defensive agreement should be a treaty;
 - The offensive agreement should be a formal, public agreement.
- The Delegation should preserve U.S. options as to our subsequent handling of the agreement—e.g., an executive agreement requiring Congressional approval, or a simple executive agreement;
- On related matters such as withdrawal, duration, etc., the Delegation should be guided by existing instructions. However, the Delegation should reaffirm the importance of our provisions regarding withdrawal. Moreover, it should state that, either with the interim of-

³ In backchannel message WH11143 to Smith, December 13, Kissinger gave assurances of more detailed instructions on an ABM treaty from the President by December 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971 SALT)

⁴ Attached but not printed.

fensive agreement or a follow-on agreement, we expect that there will be offensive limitations so long as the ABM limits continue.

Recommendation

If you want to settle the form issue, without further discussion, you should sign the memo to the USC at Tab A.

Approved

Disapproved

- (1) Defer until later; decide in connection with related issues of duration, etc.⁵
- (2) Other.

Delegation Proposal on SLBMs

The Delegation has requested approval (Tab C)⁶ to present a change in our present SLBM proposal. Instead of a freeze on all new submarine construction after July 31, 1971, the Delegation would propose that *the number of SLBM launchers be fixed after a certain date (to be left unspecified); in effect, this permits replacement of old SLBMs with new ones within that numerical limit.*

If the Soviets accept this compromise, it would be a good bargain. We would get SLBMs included. As for the possibility of replacement:

—The Soviets have about 90 SLBMs on older G and H class submarines which they might want to replace.

—The U.S. now has 10 Polaris submarines (160 SLBMs) which we might want to replace with ULMS or new Poseidon submarines.

However, the real purpose of this provision is to attempt to react to Soviet hints that, while a freeze on submarines is out of the question, there is some flexibility on SLBMs.

Making the modified proposal before the Christmas recess will give the Soviets time to consider this proposal and possibly to respond before the next planned recess on January 20th.

However, you might want to hold the line through the Christmas recess. Also, views on the Delegation's proposal should be obtained from the agencies.

—It is not certain whether we want to leave the freeze date unspecified. (Possibly the Delegation left it blank because of internal conflicts among themselves.) If we left the date open, we might end up with a date of July 1972 (the Soviet proposal on ICBMs), which would allow them not only to replace the old SLBMs but also to start con-

⁵ Kissinger checked this option.

⁶ Attached but not printed.

struction on at least eight more Y-class submarines than they are now allowed. Moreover, any uncertainty on our part about the freeze date on SLBMs would suggest a similar uncertainty about our freeze date on ICBMs.

—There might be some sympathy for also allowing freedom-to-fix from land to sea. However, this would seem more advantageous to the Soviets who have over 200 SS-7's and SS-8's which they might retire, while we have only 54 Titans.

We could poll the agencies and get some tentative views by Saturday⁷ noon. However, a more thorough job would require at least a week, meaning it would be finished after the start of the Christmas recess.

If you want to defer any change on SLBMs for now, we need the authority to instruct the Delegation to hold off making the proposal. In the meantime we will begin polling the agencies.

Recommendation

In order to avoid changes before the recess, that you authorize us to direct the Delegation *not* to make a new SLBM proposal before the Christmas recess.

Approved⁸ (We will begin polling the agencies)

Disapproved. Prepare a paper immediately on this issue.

Other.

⁷ December 18.

⁸ Kissinger initialed this option.

217. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Vienna, December 16, 1971, 1443Z.

34. Re WH11186. Dear Henry:

Please tell the President that I regret that my personal estimate to Semenov that the Indian situation might have a negative effect on Soviet/American relations caused him alarm.² I will certainly steer well clear of this subject in the future.

I trust you will recall for the President the instructions to me in WH11135:³ "The situation in South Asia is such that it is most important that the US Delegation maintain a cool and somewhat more reserved attitude towards their Soviet counterparts. . . . President, of course, leaves up to your best judgment the manner in which this perceptible shift in US attitude should be conveyed. But he anticipates your complete cooperation in this endeavor until the situation in South Asia clarifies."³

To avoid conveying the implication that without relationship to the South Asia situation our basic attitude toward SALT was changing, it had seemed to me that a personal allusion to "South Asia" effect on Soviet/American relations in general was the best manner of conveying the desired "perceptible shift in US attitude."

I am especially concerned and puzzled about reasons why passing my personal view to Semenov that Indian situation did not help prospect for improvement US/Soviet relations in general should have "alarmed" the President. Would appreciate anything further on this score which you can give me.

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A hand-written notation at the top of the message reads: "HAK via Hicks, Haig."

² In backchannel message 32 to Kissinger, December 15, Smith reported that in a post-plenary discussion he told Semenov that the Indo-Pakistani crisis "could have a prejudicial effect on the prospect for improvement in Soviet/American relations in which SALT progress had had a part." In backchannel message WH11186 to Smith, December 15, Kissinger replied that "the President was alarmed that you had raised directly the issue of South Asia and linkage with Semenov." (Both *ibid.*)

³ Backchannel message WH11135 to Smith is dated December 13. The sentence omitted at the ellipsis reads: "This demeanor should be adopted immediately and maintained until further notice." (*Ibid.*)

218. Editorial Note

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger analyzed recent Soviet behavior, including indications of Soviet views toward SALT, in a December 22, 1971, memorandum to President Nixon: "There has been no abrupt change in the negotiations, but the tone seems to be degenerating somewhat. The Soviets persist in putting forward their proposals in the most one-sided fashion, in terms they can be virtually certain we will resist. Moreover, they make claims about the status of their forces (i.e., that we both have approximately the same number of ICBMs) that we know to be wildly inaccurate. Most important, one suspects that the Soviets may have made a decision to proceed with the expansion of their ABMs, and want to codify this in SALT under the guise of insisting on equality (this too could be another Soviet bargaining ploy)." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 717, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XVII, Nov–31 Dec 1971) The memorandum is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 33.

On December 23 the Verification Panel met to hear a report by Gerard Smith, Chief of the U.S. Delegation to SALT, on the recessed round of negotiations in Vienna. Smith's report listed seven unresolved issues: "1) inclusion of SLs in the freeze; 2) specifics re freeze definitions, mobiles, soft; 3) ABM levels; 4) the ABM/radar/MARC concept; 5) OLPAR constraints; 6) what constraints should be placed on futures; 7) nature and specifics of the duration/withdrawal provisions of the two agreements and the form of the ABM agreement." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-010, Verification Panel Meeting SALT 12/23/71)

According to the meeting minutes' summary of conclusions, the Panel agreed to the following: "Dr. Kissinger will seek from the President some interim guidance for the Delegation prior to its return to the talks on January 2. This will include, at a minimum, a decision whether the ABM agreement should be a treaty and the modification of our position on SLBMs to permit the replacement of old SLBMs with new models. The Working Group will prepare a paper examining the options available over the longer term. It will consider modifications of our ABM position, whether the inclusion of SLBMs should be a make-or-break proposition with regard to the agreement as a whole, and the duration and withdrawal provisions of both proposed agreements." (Ibid., Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969-3/8/72)

219. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 3, 1972.

Nixon: Incidentally, we've got a little problem on Bill [Rogers], because I had him come on over here—I had him come over here [unclear] the damn meetings on the economic thing [unclear]. I—what I'd like to do is review the meetings with Smith, first; to give Smith his marching orders; and I told Bill not to come 'cause he's not coming 'til 10—'til 10:30, but when he comes in—

Kissinger: Gets his picture taken.

Nixon: Now, I—

Kissinger: That wouldn't make any difference—

Nixon: —wouldn't be too concerned about his trying to get credit for SALT, because, as a matter of fact, as it—we're going to screw SALT up. There isn't going to be any goddamn SALT if—unless these people get a little bit better.

Kissinger: Well, what—to give you the feel for what Smith will want from you—

Nixon: What's that?

Kissinger: He wants your final position on ABM. I'd never give that to him—

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: Besides, I don't think you should give much ground on ABM, because we've already gone a long way towards them.

Nixon: Yeah. But, the thing I would encourage is to get him in and—

Kissinger: It makes no difference if Bill wants to be here.

Nixon: [unclear] No, no, no. I'll—no, no. I would like to, I'd like to get some tough talk with him, first, and say—

Kissinger: Well—

Nixon: "Now, look here: there isn't going to be any final position on ABM." There's nothing left, but he—

Kissinger: It'd just—

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 642–15. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger from 9:25 to 10:04 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

Nixon: —he wants the final position on everything so he can negotiate a settlement. Isn't that it?

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: All right. What other things do you want me to say, Henry? [unclear]—

Kissinger: I wouldn't even say there won't be any final position, Mr. President, because he'll just leak it. I would say you're studying the problem very carefully, as you—

Nixon: [unclear] I'll say we've got a hell of a problem with Defense. How about that?

Kissinger: Well, no. He's already dealing with them, because they've got their own fish to fry. I've got to get Moorer positioned. I would just say you're studying it; it's a tough problem; and you'll let him know—

Nixon: All right. What—what—why don't—

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: Why don't you say what we can give?

Kissinger: Yes. Well, I think you can tell him that he can tell them that it should be a treaty—

Nixon: Fine.

Kissinger: —for ABM, and an executive agreement for offensive—

Nixon: All right, all right, all right. Ok.

Kissinger: That the SLBMs should be in terms of tubes, rather than in terms of boats.

Nixon: Right. Fine.

Kissinger: These are two major—

Nixon: That's fine. But, but on the other things, I [unclear]—

Kissinger: On the other things, you want him to go on the present line for a while longer.

Nixon: Until we let him know.

Kissinger: And then—

Nixon: Henry, the best thing to do is to get him in. Under, under those circumstances, it would be best to get him and let Bill hear that, so that he knows that the treaty entails this move, just to tell him that I made this decision. And just let him ride—and have to ride out the thing. This fellow is—this fellow Smith, how's he thinking, Henry?

Kissinger: Well, he's greasy and oily.

Nixon: [unclear]—

Kissinger: Now, we—well, you know, we are told that Bill is launching, and I'm—this happens to be one that's so complex that he doesn't understand it, so I'm not that eager to get him into too much

of the line of command on it. But, whether he's in on one meeting or not, doesn't make any difference.

Nixon: This meeting is not a big deal.

[Pause]

Kissinger: It's not a major deal.

Nixon: Smith will run right over there afterwards. That's our problem.

Kissinger: Yeah. And I don't want to come—

Nixon: Did he say he's got Laird under control?

Kissinger: Well, Laird is playing such a crooked game—

Nixon: Ha!

Kissinger: —as always. He has a bewildering series of memoranda here.

Nixon: Just don't tell him any more. Don't—I [unclear]—

Kissinger: And, there are such—one of them is that he wants three ABM sites. Another is that he wants to go for an NCA defense, now, a defense of Washington. Another is—

Nixon: I'll tell you what I'm going to do. I'm going to take a very hard-line with Smith, and I know this could get back to State, but, honestly, I've been very concerned about the Soviet buildup. I've been concerned about the fact that they have had—I'm gonna get this son-of-a-bitch straightened out a little, Henry—that they have more tests this year than in any year since the Test Ban Treaty. Under the circumstances, that I have some very grave doubts about what their intentions are, and that I'm just—that we're going to go with these two steps and then take a look. I want to leave 'em in their tracks. How's that sound?

Kissinger: That's right. And I think I can—the Soviets have already asked for a recess on the 20th. Now, Smith thinks he can talk them out of it—

Nixon: Bullshit.

Kissinger: —and I don't think you should show any eagerness for a recess, because I think I can position the Soviets to ask for it, so you're not the villain. Smith's line is—every Verification Panel meeting, Smith says, "I just want to make sure, now, that the President isn't stalling this for the summit." Of course, if [Edward] Kennedy were the President—

Nixon: What the Christ is he talking about?

Kissinger: He should be stalling. I always say, "No, your instructions are to get it as fast as possible." But, of course, if Kennedy were the President, the whole goddamn bureaucracy would be stalling it for the summit.

Nixon: And that's just the SALT thing, Henry.

Kissinger: Of course.

Nixon: Goddamn positioning. Why shouldn't we stall for the summit? So that he can get he credit, is that it?

Kissinger: He isn't running for re-election this year, Mr. President. And he—

Nixon: Well, I, of course, can't give him any indication that I want to stall for the summit. That's not—

Kissinger: That's the problem.

[Omitted here is a discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: Coming back to this thing on SALT, Henry. We'll give him—

Kissinger: I wouldn't give him more than half an hour, Mr. President—

Nixon: Hell, 15 minutes!

Kissinger: Good.

Nixon: That's what you said.

Kissinger: That's all.

Nixon: Yeah. I'll just say, "Gee, I got a tough schedule today." And, so I just—that gets us in and out, and we have—I'll say, "I've been—I've studied all of this, Gerry, and all I want you to do is this: First, I've decided that we'd like a treaty and [unclear]—" I've told him that before!

Kissinger: Well, you've never told him flatly—

Nixon: All right, fine. I've definitely decided we should have a treaty on the ABM, and the executive agreement on the other. Correct?

Kissinger: Right, right.

Nixon: Second, with regard to SLBMs, I think your idea—shall I put to him—

Kissinger: Good.

Nixon: It's your idea; his is different. That the number of weapons, rather than the number of submarines—

Kissinger: The number of missiles.

Nixon: So, in fact—

Kissinger: The number of tubes.

Nixon: Number of tubes. All right, the number of tubes, rather than—

Kissinger: Because if you say "weapons," then they'll start counting the warheads.

Nixon: All right, fine. The number of tubes, rather than [unclear] control the fact that—now, the third thing is that question that you raised in here is—what do you want to say is the third thing?

Kissinger: On the end position, say, "I'm in the process of studying it, and I'll be in touch with you—"

Nixon: “Now, on the end position on—what we’re finally going to [unclear], and I want to be quite candid with you: there is a very grave political problem on this at the present time, and I—well, I have a grave problem with people”—I won’t say “political problem” with regard to the—“what this country is going to take. There’s grave doubts about this thing.” I’m going to tell him this, the little, slippery son-of-a-bitch. How’s that sound to you?

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: I’ve got to study it some more.

Kissinger: Right, right, right.

Nixon: And I’ll let you know.

Kissinger: Right, right.

Nixon: He wants to give the final position away now.

Kissinger: Of course.

Nixon: The son-of-a-bitch.

Kissinger: And then he’s the hero. I mean [chuckles], we broke the goddamn deadlock. We—

Nixon: Shit!

Kissinger: Whatever he’s got, we got for him. He hasn’t advanced it one step.

Nixon: But you don’t think we can fire him?

Kissinger: No. Not now.

Nixon: That’s always the case. We can’t fire anybody. All right. All right.

220. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 3, 1972.

SUBJECT

Discussion with the President, Secretary of State, and Kissinger, January 3, 1972

The President seemed to want to give me his impressions rather than get a report on where we stand. He said he had read the report of last week's Verification Panel meeting² and was acquainted with where things stand.

He stressed the strong tendency developing to distrust Soviet motivations in the military field. He referred to the American Security Council's effort, which clearly had important financing. He referred to a number of Senators who had expressed worry to him about SALT. He had assured them that we had a good negotiator and we would not make an improvident agreement.

I stressed the importance of getting Congressional advisors now, and the President seemed to think that Stennis and Cooper would be useful candidates.

The President said that we would get affirmative guidance on the question of a treaty and on freezing SL launchers rather than boats. Kissinger afterwards said that he had not been able to get the President to focus on the question of equal numbers of interceptors for the 2-to-1 proposal.

Apparently the President has in mind that we take soundings as to what is feasible in the defensive field and report to him on his return from China. He is concerned that as soon as we reach our rock-bottom position it will be publicly known and "the fat will be in the fire". Kissinger afterwards said to me that I should let him know if we really need new guidance and he would get further to work on the problem.

I pointed out to the President the importance of combining with any new acceleration of our SLBM program signaled by Fiscal 73 budget should be accompanied by some private indication to the Soviets by Kissinger or Rogers that this of course would be contingent to some extent on including the SL's in the freeze.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Box 1, Director's Files, Smith/White House Correspondence, January–May 1972. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A tape recording of this conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 642-20. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Smith, Rogers, and Kissinger from 10:23 to 10:56 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

² See Document 218.

I pointed out that the Soviets in good measure had stepped up to the President's challenge which I had delivered on the opening day of this Vienna session about having serious exchanges in the offensive field. Of course, the SLBM question remains in the same position. Kissinger said we would have to step up to that separately.

I asked the President if the Indian episode had affected our thinking about SALT.³ He said I should proceed on course—clearly world events did have some linkage, and he expressed some doubt that one could have confidence in the USSR if they were out to rook us in other areas. Rogers and I stressed the public relations importance of not suggesting publicly that any SALT deal would be based on trust—it would be verifiable.

I pointed out to the President that I had no interest in making an improvident deal. My whole background in Government had been on the side of people like Jackson and Rickover who had been primarily interested in military security.

The President said that Cooper had decided not to run. I said I was sorry to hear that because I had in mind talking to him about it tomorrow in Vienna. The President asked me to tell Cooper that he hoped he would run—or words to that effect.

Gerard Smith⁴

³ See Document 217.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears Smith's typed signature.

221. National Security Decision Memorandum 145¹

Washington, January 3, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

Additional Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Vienna
(SALT VI)

The President has made the following additional decisions for Vienna (SALT VI):

1. The agreement on defensive limitations should be in the form of a treaty. The Chairman of the Delegation should so advise the Soviet Delegation.

2. The agreement on offensive limitations should be in the form of an executive agreement.

3. The Delegation is authorized to present the following substitute to paragraph 3 of the draft offensive agreement:

“Each Party shall limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers to the number operational and under active construction as of”

4. The Delegation should reaffirm the importance of our provisions regarding withdrawal in case the follow-on negotiations fail (i.e., Article 13, paragraph 2 of the draft defensive agreement and Article 9 of the draft offensive agreement).² Moreover, the Delegation should state that, either with the interim offensive agreement or a follow-on agreement, there should be offensive limitations in force as long as the ABM limits continue. As for defining the time period now unspecified in the withdrawal provisions cited above, the President will define this period when the outlines of the limitations on strategic offensive systems become better known.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 101–150. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT.

² Both drafts were transmitted in USDEL SALT 842, July 26, 1971, Document 183.

5. Except for paragraph 1 above, there is no change in the ABM position as stated in paragraph 4 of NSDM 140.³

6. The need for avoiding leaks remains compelling. The President's directive of October 31, 1969, entitled "Avoidance of Leaks on SALT,"⁴ is again reaffirmed.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ Document 212.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 40.

222. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Vienna, January 5, 1972, 1604Z.

Subject: Report on Briefing Senator Cooper, Tuesday, January 4. Cooper seemed well-satisfied with state of affairs, though he sensed continuing impatience in important sections in the Senate with pace of SALT.

He said that opponents of SALT agreement of sort we were projecting would not get more than twenty votes in the Senate.

I queried him regarding question of Congressional advisors for SALT Delegation—stressing that no decision had been made by Executive Branch as yet. He pointed out obvious problems of picking individuals. I am sure he would be pleased to be designated an observer if the Senate leadership so asked him.

His administrative aide, William Miller, whom I have found in the past to be knowledgeable and prudent, made the following post-meeting observations: He and his colleagues were confident that Senator Jackson would not oppose a SALT treaty and that the other Democratic candidates would certainly support it. He confirmed Senator Cooper's statement that even if Jackson did oppose the SALT treaty, they were confident that he would not be able to carry more than twenty Senators with him.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Box 1, Director's Files, Gerard Smith, Smith/White House Correspondence, January–May 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive Eyes Only. The text printed here is the copy Smith approved and does not have a message number.

If SALT agreements were signed at the May Moscow summit and promptly submitted, the Senate could complete action prior to the summer recess and party conventions.

An Executive Agreement for the offensive freeze would be acceptable on the Hill because of the interim nature of the agreement. It should be clear that a long-term follow-on offensive agreement would be a treaty.

It would be “very useful” in submitting the ABM treaty to indicate that consideration was being given to a new effort to work out a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Best regards.

Gerard Smith

223. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Vienna, January 6, 1972, 1414Z.

Subject: SALT Explorations. From talk with President January 4,² I gather that my general mission now (in addition to carrying out the latest NSDM)³ is to prospect for practical solutions for major remaining issues for report to him post China.

At first meeting January 5,⁴ Soviets indicated interest in keeping up pace, apparently in expectation of more new material from us than may be forthcoming. In next two meetings, per the NSDM, we will agree to treaty form for ABM agreement and offer to freeze SLBM launchers rather than submarines.

Without further U.S. initiative, it may as early as January 13 become apparent to Soviets that we are in effect stalled. To avoid such

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383–97–0010, Box 1, Director’s Files, Gerard Smith, Smith/White House Correspondence, January–May 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive Eyes Only. The text printed here is the copy Smith approved and does not have a message number.

² The meeting took place on January 3; see Document 219.

³ Document 221.

⁴ Telegram USDEL SALT 1157 from Vienna, January 5, reported Smith’s conversations with Semenov during their first meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [sic], Vol. 17, January–April 1972)

development, we could say that we need amplifications from Soviets to better understand their positions on ABM levels, radar, mobile ICBM's, etc., before we can recommend to Washington any changes in U.S. position. I expect that Soviets will not be responsive to such approach unless we also give indication of some receptivity to change in U.S. positions maintained since last summer.

In our telecon of January 3,⁵ I promised to send along ideas for carrying out exploration which President directed be made. I do not have in mind any change in NSDM guidance at this time. Here they are:

ABM

1. Explore on non-committal basis Soviet reaction to possible U.S. ABM move (as discussed at December 23 Verification Panel meeting)⁶ to provide for an *equal* number of launchers/interceptors (say 150) for defense of either two ICBM sites or NCA. This would afford test of any Soviet interest in U.S. 2-or-1 proposal.

2. Explore on non-committal basis possible ABM move under which each side would have right to no more than two ABM sites, one for ICBM defense and one for NCA defense with deferral for an agreed period of deployment at second site. Members of Soviet Delegation have solicited U.S. proposal for 2-2 "deferred" deployment arrangement.

Offensive Freeze

Explore on non-committal basis Soviet interest in interim freeze with each side holding to aggregate number of ICBM's and SLBM's operational or under construction on agreed date with one-way freedom to mix from land to sea. (Shchukin January 5 again indicated, as he had before holiday break, that such approach might meet Soviet objection to inclusion of SL's in interim freeze.) Such probe would be worthwhile to help subsequent Presidential decision about freeze inclusion/exclusion of SL's. You will recall that Nitze stated at December 23 Verification Panel that Laird would buy this approach even though Soviet aggregate would substantially exceed U.S. aggregate.

⁵ Kissinger and Smith spoke at 1:15 p.m. According to a transcript of their conversation, Kissinger told Smith, "I am not sure the President is ready to give his position [on ABM levels]." Smith replied, "Other alternative would be a 2-2 arrangement. One or other or we will not get much more out of them. If some disposition to go 2-2 then we could ask them about going for 2—." The conversation ended with Smith asking, "Could I send in a different guidance?" Kissinger replied, "No problem if it's kept between us." Smith said, "I will get you something this week." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

⁶ See Document 218.

I know that studies of some of above problems are underway in NSC machinery, but in view of sterile prospects here by next week's end, I suggest need for early authorization of non-committal explorations.

I believe on basis of delegation discussions that all principal Delegates would concur in general line suggested here, but have not discussed this message with them. If there is no objection, I will solicit Delegation consensus on this matter for transmission to Washington on most restricted basis.

GS

224. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

San Clemente, California, January 7, 1972, 2323Z.

WH20081. Deliver at opening of business. Ref: Vienna 4866.²

1. President's view is (1) non-committal explorations get to be committal very quickly, (2) if you keep this in mind he does not object to (a) exploration of Soviet reaction to equal number of ABM interceptors, (b) exploring an interim freeze on the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs operational and under construction as of an agreed date, and perhaps including one-way freedom to mix.

2. The President is not yet ready to consider the deferred option ABM proposal.

3. In order to avoid confusion could you put this proposal in front channels so that we can instruct you formally.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Box 1, Director's Files, Gerard Smith, Smith/White House Correspondence, January–May 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent through the White House. Handwritten notations on the message include "2-1 Freeze," "Equal # +", "aggregate +", and "deferred -".

² Apparently the telegram number is an error. Presumably the reference is to Document 223.

225. Memorandum From Philip Odeen and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 12, 1972.

SUBJECT

OSD and our ABM Position at SALT

OSD appears to be mounting a major campaign to push their SALT ABM position (i.e., one-for-one now with the possibility of later deploying Hard-Site Defense).

—*Mel Laird will reportedly raise this issue with you at your breakfast together, now planned for Friday.*²

—Gardiner Tucker yesterday asked to meet with Phil Odeen and then pushed the OSD position quite hard. Gen. Pursely also called Phil last week on the same issue.

The OSD Proposal

As you recall, OSD is seeking in the long run an ABM arrangement whereby:

1. For now, the U.S. gets one Safeguard site and the Soviets get Moscow ABM.

2. We enter into an agreement not to build further ABMs unless some time limit (between three and five years) expires without a follow-on agreement.

3. If one of the events occurs or the time period expires, then

—The U.S. could build NCA defense, plus

—The U.S. could also add at its Safeguard site a Hard-Site Defense system with a large number of short-range interceptors and short-range radars. The number would not be specified now, but OSD admits that at least 1000 interceptors would be required to make the system worthwhile.

—The Soviets could add a Hard-Site Defense at one ABM site. (Earlier, OSD had allowed the Soviets to protect equal number of missile silos—which would allow the Soviets ABM defense at two or possibly three ICBM fields to our one. However, OSD now optimistically believes that we could limit the Soviet ICBM defense to one site.)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [sic], Vol. 17, January–April 1972. Top Secret. Sent for urgent information.

² On January 13 Haig sent Kissinger a memorandum about his breakfast meeting with Laird, scheduled for Friday, January 14. No record of the meeting has been found. (Ibid., Box 230, Agency Files, Defense, January 1972, Vol. 15)

An Interim Step

OSD now suggests an interim step of *exploration* to determine whether the Soviets would be interested in their proposal. OSD would authorize the Delegation to see if the Soviets were willing to accept some fundamental principles:

1. Acceptable geographic limits on location of the ICBM defense;
2. Strict qualitative limits on the capabilities of the Hard-Site Defense interceptors and radars;
3. Strict controls on Other Large Phased Array Radars (OLPARS), i.e., those situated elsewhere about the country;
4. Acceptable deferral provisions.

If the Soviets do not accept these principles, then OSD would say we should drop the Hard-Site approach.

OSD is pushing now because they recognize that, if the Delegation is not authorized to undertake explorations like these in the next few weeks or surely before the end of the Vienna session, it would be impossible to negotiate any complicated Hard-Site deal by the time of the Moscow summit.

You are well aware of the arguments pro and con for the detailed OSD proposal. The interim proposal does have the advantage of only being exploratory, rather than making us lay out a detailed position. However, it still represents a complete shift from the present trend of our negotiations, which has been to reduce the number of sites and interceptors. The interim approach would at a minimum sharply undercut our present 2-or-1 position.

Your Next Step

We are not sure whether and, if so, when and how the President plans to resolve the ABM imbroglio with the Soviets. However, even if the OSD proposal was the preferred solution, there are good reasons to tell Secretary Laird that the President could not immediately authorize the Delegation to make the change proposed by OSD. This change would encounter stiff bureaucratic resistance. (The OSD proposal is now strongly opposed by Gerard Smith and apparently by State and CIA. The JCS would probably remain neutral.) Hence, it would help if everyone could feel normal inter-agency processes have been used.

—There is now in the finishing stages a detailed inter-agency paper on ABM options, including OSD's,³ which would involve an in-

³ On January 12 James P. Wade, Jr., of the OSD SALT Support Group sent the third draft of a paper, "Higher Level ABM Options in SALT" to the Verification Panel Working Group. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-79-125, ABM Higher Levels)

crease in the number of interceptors and sites. This paper will be ready early next week; consequently, action before next week would be premature. (The paper has been underway since November. OSD, one of the two co-authors, has vacillated and is responsible for some of the delay.)

—We have just started a brief summary paper which looks at both higher and lower ABM options. This paper should be completed and coordinated with the agencies in two weeks. However, we could do a hurried job in a week if you want us to.

—Smith should be recommending soon in the front channel that we explore equal numbers of interceptors. The OSD proposal might be considered at the same time.

—Even with a delay of a few weeks, there is sufficient time to present any new proposals to the Soviets in this session. The Delegation apparently now expects the Vienna session will probably not be over until mid-February or the end of January at the earliest. Even though they express concern that they might have little new to say after another week it seems clear that by letting them have considerable discretion on minor issues there will be enough grist for the remaining weeks.

Hence, a decision should be deferred for probably two weeks to allow all the papers to be finished.

You might want to promise Laird that there will be a Verification Panel meeting within the next two weeks to consider any modifications in our ABM position.

Alternatively, if you do not want to commit yourself to a meeting, you could tell Laird that the President would be ill-advised to make any decision until the papers have been completed. However, a decision then (to change our position or not) would be appropriate without a meeting since the analysis would have been agreed to and the agency views known.

226. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 18, 1972.

I am deeply concerned over the status of SALT. I believe our present proposal has some definite shortcomings. Safeguard deployments at only Grand Forks and Malmstrom, limited to only 100 to 200 interceptors, are inadequate for the defense of Minuteman, bombers or command centers against potential Soviet threats. This will make it most difficult to defend our position before the Congress and the American people. From the Soviet point of view, our proposal is unacceptable since they adamantly insist on an ABM agreement which gives each side equal rights, based on the May 20th understanding.²

The timing of any SALT agreement also gives me concern. Each month that passes Soviet forces grow and the strategic offensive balance, which an agreement is likely to freeze, shifts more in the Soviet's favor. Moreover it takes time to negotiate the essential details of an acceptable agreement, and rising U.S. expectations and Soviet pressures may push us towards a hastily negotiated agreement with inadequate provisions.

There is always a temptation to link progress in SALT to the transience of foreign affairs. I feel strongly that strategic arms control is of greater long-range importance and that we should resist any temptation to couple SALT with other unrelated issues.

A SALT proposal can be formulated which is more strategically and politically desirable and also more negotiable. Briefly, such a proposal would be:

1. ABM

a. The U.S. would be permitted the Safeguard deployment at Grand Forks. The Soviets would be permitted to complete the Moscow system. Each side would be limited to 100 launchers/interceptors and

¹Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-77-0095, Box 7, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret; Sensitive. On February 8 Kissinger sent Laird's memorandum to Nixon under a covering memorandum in which he concluded that "on the offensive side, his proposal largely corresponds with our present one or makes recommendations on issues which we were already planning to consider during the recess." Kissinger also sent Nixon a draft response, which reads in part: "I appreciate your thoughtful letter of January 18 on our SALT position. I will want to consider your ideas carefully between now and the resumption of the talks. Accordingly, your suggestions will be considered by the Verification Panel in preparation for an NSC meeting on the next phase of SALT." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [sic], Vol. 17, January–April 1972)

²See Document 160.

4 modern ABM radar complexes. There would be strict control of other large radars.

b. After three years, or earlier by mutual agreement:

The U.S. would be permitted to deploy ICBM defenses at Grand Forks and a defense of Washington with 100 launchers/interceptors and 4 modern ABM radar complexes.

The Soviets would be permitted to deploy ICBM defenses at an ICBM site which meets agreed geographic limitations.

For each side the ICBM defense interceptors would not be larger than Sprint and the ICBM defense radars would be less powerful than the Safeguard missile site radar (MSR).

2. *Offense*

Each side would be permitted the number of ICBM silos and SLBM launchers that it had operational and under construction on an agreed date not later than that on which the agreement goes into effect.

No modern large ballistic missile launchers could be completed after the agreed date.

Old SLBM launchers and ICBM silos could be replaced with new SLBM launchers. The number of ICBM launchers on soft pads would be frozen.

ICBM silos could be replaced by mobile ICBM launchers.

3. *Duration and Withdrawal*

The offense agreement remains in force for at least 5 years unless replaced by a follow-on agreement. Either side may withdraw from the defense agreement upon lapse of the offense agreement.

Our analysis shows that against a very considerable growth in counter-force capability, the defenses allowed by this agreement could assure the survival of 220 to 300 Minuteman, which is a sufficient force for a very extensive retaliatory strike. On the other hand, no constrained defense can be adequate against unconstrained technological improvement in the offense, and that is one of the reasons we need a withdrawal clause.

When we present this proposal to the Soviets we should explain our thinking regarding exercise of the ICBM defense option and the withdrawal right as follows:

If the Soviets curb the growing counter-force capability of their offensive missiles (or if we negotiate suitable reductions in the offensive threat in the follow-on agreement), we would not plan to exercise either option.

If the Soviet counter-force capability continues to evolve substantially, we would exercise the ICBM defense option to a level which depends upon the threat.

If the Soviets show a clear intent to develop the capability to destroy Minuteman, we would plan to withdraw from the agreement (or negotiate a modification allowing extensive defense of our retaliatory forces).

This proposal makes strategic sense for the U.S. because:

It allows us to defend Washington, D.C. The National Command Authority is the Achilles Heel of our strategic command and control. This defense allows us time to get the President and his chief advisors airborne and therefore assures us of time to make critical national decisions carefully and deliberately. Defense can also raise the threshold for damage to our capitol above the level posed by threats which might go undetected (e.g., a lone submarine) and above the level of any plausible unauthorized or third country attack. I am now convinced that defense of Washington is politically feasible if it is part of an Arms Control agreement and is accompanied by a reduction in the currently authorized Safeguard program.

It allows us to defend some of our ICBMs in the future if the threat makes such defenses necessary.

It allows us to modernize our offensive forces and to move more of our forces from land to sea if we choose.

It stops the numerical growth of the Soviet strategic ballistic missile forces.

It inhibits further Soviet population defense.

It calls for follow-on negotiations on defensive levels as well as offensive levels, so that it keeps the U.S. system the Soviets most want to limit in balance with the Soviet system the U.S. wants most to limit. It also leaves the door open to follow-on negotiations towards offense reductions and low ABM levels.

The proposal makes political sense because:

It makes strategic sense.

It is fair to the Soviets.

It allows us to keep what we have built (including the Safeguard components so far deployed).

Further ABM deployments are delayed for 3 years to allow time for follow-on negotiations to reduce the need for such deployments:

It saves the U.S. money by dropping 10 Safeguard sites.

It stops the numerical growth in Soviet offensive missiles.

The proposal should be more negotiable because:

It permits both sides the same eventual ABM deployments.

It allows the Soviets to continue production of Y Class submarines and modernization of their missile forces, subject only to numerical ceilings on the total of ICBM silos and SLBM tubes and on modern large missile launchers.

Before abandoning our present proposal, we should explore the Soviet views on four points, to determine whether a move in the direction I have indicated is feasible. First, we should explore whether,

in the context of a more symmetrical ABM proposal, the Soviets would agree to geographic limits to make sure that ICBM fields defended were far from population centers, and would agree to strict limits nationwide on large modern radars. Then we should seek Soviet acceptance of two further points: placing limits on ICBM defense components to limit their capability for population defense, and leaving open the levels of defense at the selected ICBM fields after a given period unless limited by follow-on agreement.

I recommend that the U.S. delegation be directed in the near future to inform the Soviets that the U.S. would be interested in negotiating towards an agreement which would permit an equal defense of national capitals and ICBM fields for each side, providing that the Soviets agree to these four principles.

I also recommend that the delegation be authorized to modify our current offense proposal to a freeze on the total number of ICBM silos and SLBM tubes with freedom to modernize as I have outlined.

Once we have the Soviet reaction to these steps, we can consider putting forward the new proposal outlined above.

I urge that these steps be taken without delay.

Melvin R. Laird

227. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Vienna, January 18, 1972, 1635Z.

Further to SALT timing raised in my 092:²

1. NSDM³ guidance has been carried out. Our recent presentations give correct impression that we are repeating.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Box 1, Director's Files, Gerard Smith, Smith/White House Correspondence, January–May 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive Eyes Only. The text printed here is the copy Smith approved and does not have a message number.

² In backchannel message 92 to Kissinger, January 17, Smith conveyed Semenov's preference for recessing at the end of January. The talks would resume on March 14 at a place to be specified later and continue into May in order to work out details that might be difficult to consider at the highest level. (Ibid.)

³ Reference is to NSDM 145, Document 221.

2. Soviets have moved in a number of respects since 11/15/71 Vienna start. We have hewed to line of NSDM-140,⁴ “the basic US position remains unchanged.”

3. Soviet SALT VI plan appears to have been to try for agreement on language for “secondary” issues, so as to leave only central issues for review in capitals starting early in February with resumption of SALT in March. Major remaining issues would be ABM levels, residual radar issues, SL freeze inclusion, duration/withdrawal provisions.

4. Under these circumstances, I trust you will give the President my strongly held view that we have gone about as far as we can in this round. Any artificial continuation would be counter-productive and, therefore, I urge that we agree to recess about February 4 and resume in the second half of March.

GS

⁴ Document 212.

228. Memorandum From Philip Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

Strategic Analysis of the OSD ABM Proposal

This memorandum analyzes the strategic issues underlying the OSD ABM proposal for SALT. (We have already written you extensively about the negotiating and political issues.)² On a strategic level, *the OSD proposed deployments of Hard-Site Defense would:*

—*Assure the survivability of no more than an additional 100 Minuteman (and possibly less).*

—*Provide some strategic benefits to the Soviet Union, though the extent of these is very sensitive to the number and location of the ICBM fields protected.*

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-010, Verification Panel Meeting SALT Cancelled 1/27/72. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for urgent information.

² See Documents 216 and 225.

The First Stage

The initial ABM deployment allowed would be one Safeguard site for the U.S. at Grand Forks, and Moscow ABM for Soviets.

—We would therefore have to stop the construction now underway at Malmstrom.

One Safeguard site for the U.S. provides no substantial protection of our retaliatory forces and very limited population defense.

Moscow ABM provides the Soviets with protection of the area (including about 25% of the Soviet population and 35% of the industry) against accidental or very limited attacks by missiles.

The Second Stage

The second stage of the OSD proposal would allow, after three years or upon mutual agreement:

—The U.S. could deploy an ABM defense of Washington.

—The U.S. could deploy Hard-Site Defense (HSD) at Grand Forks.

—The Soviets would be allowed to deploy HSD at one ICBM field which meets agreed geographical limitations. (OSD had earlier proposed that the Soviets be allowed to protect equal numbers of silos as the U.S., e.g., 150. This would mean that the Soviets would be allowed to protect as many as 3–4 ICBM fields since the Soviets would have fewer ICBMs in each field. OSD now believes that the Soviets would accept defense of one ICBM field.)

—For each side, Hard-Site Defense would include at least 1,000 short-range interceptors and many short-range ABM radars.

1. The U.S. Deployment

If the U.S. decided this year to plan on deployment of HSD and made prompt funding decisions, *actual deployment would begin by late 1977 and could be completed by about 1979–80.*

—This assumes using the Army HSD system which involves modified Sprints and a new radar. Any major changes in the Army plans would further delay deployment.

—This late deployment date means that the threats to Minuteman which should be considered in evaluating the efficacy of HSD are those which the Soviets could deploy by the 1980s.

There are essentially *three scenarios* the Soviets might follow with respect to their threat to Minuteman:

1. *Scenario 1: The Soviets may develop their counterforce capabilities slowly, so that at least 300 Minuteman could survive into the 1980s.* In this case, we would not need to start deploying Hard-Site Defense for many years, if ever.

2. *Scenario 2: The Soviets might make considerable improvements in their offensive forces so that they could destroy 800–900 Minuteman*

by the late 1970s. (Such improvements would include better accuracy, MIRVing, and increased yield-to-weight ratios.) Note that there would still be about 100 or more survivors even without HSD.

If HSD were then deployed according to the OSD proposal, the system could assure up to 100 additional Minuteman survivors.

—The number of additional survivors is 100 rather than the full 150 Minuteman at Grand Forks because, facing a HSD system with 1000 or so interceptors, the Soviets could overwhelm it by using enough RVs and still destroy most of the missiles at Grand Forks. However, by using up some of their RVs to exhaust our defenses the Soviets would have fewer RVs left to destroy silos at all the ICBM fields (including Grand Forks).

—After deployment of 1000 interceptors at one site, additional ABM interceptors provide no substantial increase in the number of Minuteman survivors. An expansion of the HSD defense to two ICBM fields the number of surviving Minuteman missiles increases by at least 50%. (However, OSD does not recommend that we seek HSD protection of two fields. Presumably this is because the Soviets would argue for something like equivalent protection of 350 ICBM silos. This, given the size of their ICBM fields, would allow them protection of 5 or more ICBM fields, thereby greatly increasing the danger of the Soviets developing a territorial defense.)

—The number of additional survivors would be smaller if the HSD system did not work as planned. (This problem is discussed later.)

3. *Scenario 3: The Soviets could by the 1980s develop and deploy a counterforce threat which could reduce the number of Minuteman down to less than 50 even if we deployed OSD's proposed HSD.* Essentially, the Soviets would deploy enough warheads (through extensive MIRVing) to be able to overwhelm our defenses and still have sufficient warheads and accuracy to destroy the undefended Minuteman.

—These threats do require the Soviets to expend considerable resources on their ICBM force. They are generally beyond what the NIE projects as the more likely trend of Soviet threat development.³

—OSD recognizes that their HSD can be overwhelmed and most Minuteman destroyed. In reply, OSD argues that the U.S. would invoke the supreme national interests clause to withdraw from the SALT agreements and thereupon take more decisive actions, such as more extensive deployment of HSD.

Hence, only in a broad band of "medium" threats (i.e., scenario 2) does HSD provide additional needed Minuteman survivors. Even in that case, there are many technical difficulties facing HSD which might reduce its capabilities and thereby reduce the number of additional survivors below 100.

³ NIE 11–8–71, October 21, 1971, entitled "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack," is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 198.

—The Soviets might develop RVs (e.g., maneuvering RVs) or special endo-atmospheric pen aids which would require more interceptors per RV, thus more quickly exhausting the interceptor inventory.

—The Soviets could also time a barrage attack of hundreds or even thousands of RVs to arrive at the defended ICBM field over a very short period of time (e.g., 10–20 seconds). This would put tremendous demands on the computer software of the tracking radars which must track all the RVs, discriminate them from pen aids, and guide the interceptors to the target. Moreover, the detonation of interceptors might black out the radars, destroy other interceptors which had not yet reached their targets, etc.

On the other hand, unless the technical defects of the HSD were very evident, the Soviet planner might hesitate to rely on any possible weakness and feel he must rely on the simple (and expensive) tactic of exhausting our interceptors with an equivalent number of attacking RVs.

Assuming that an additional 100 Minuteman were saved, there is still some question of the strategic significance of this incremental number of survivors.

—If Minuteman alone were used to retaliate against the Soviets, 100 more Minuteman could account for about 5–8% more Soviet fatalities. (Against zero or NCA ABM, 100 Minuteman account for about 15% fatalities, 200 for about 20% and 300 for about 25%.)

—However, we presumably would also have some surviving bombers and SLBMs. Assuming medium range (i.e., scenario 2) threats against these other forces and say 50 to 200 surviving Minuteman even without HSD, the addition of 100 more Minuteman survivors would increase Soviet fatalities by about 1–5%. (12 surviving SSBNs out of the 31 normally in-transit or on-station can inflict 25–28% fatalities against zero or NCA ABM. Adding some bombers and some Minuteman which survive even without HSD pushes fatalities and targets covered to a level where additional warheads provide diminishing returns.)

—As for U.S. attacks against other than urban/industrial targets, the scenario where HSD is effective (i.e., scenario 2 medium range threats) has about 100 or more Minuteman survivors even without HSD. Moreover, the Poseidon SLBMs would also be effective against most of these other targets.

2. *The Soviet Deployment*

Allowing HSD to the Soviets at one ICBM field provides them with some strategic benefits. The ICBMs at that field would obtain substantial protection. (Note, though, that the largest Soviet ICBM field has about 130 ICBMs and this is west of the Urals. The largest east of the Urals has 77 ICBMs and the largest SS–9 field has 65 missiles.)

—The radars at the ICBM field could be used as a base for a broad regional defense upon abrogation of the agreement.

—Because of verification difficulties, the Soviets could, by cheating which we are unlikely to detect, acquire a substantial exoatmospheric intercept capability at ranges greater than 300 nm.

However, if the ICBM field is east of the Urals, the sparse population there means that the collateral population protection is limited. No more than 12% of the total Soviet population is within 400 nm of any one ICBM field.

—If the Soviets insist on protection of more than one ICBM field, then population protection grows. About 23% of the Soviet *urban* population is within 400 nm radius of five ICBM fields with a total of 150 silos west of the Urals.

—If the Soviets resist any geographical restrictions and also insist on being able to protect 150 silos, then they could defend up to 45% of their urban population.

229. Memorandum From Philip Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 26, 1972.

SUBJECT

New Information on ABM Proposals for SALT

Some new information has come to our attention about ABM proposals for SALT. It should be of use for you at the Verification Panel meeting tomorrow.²

JCS Position

The JCS have recently modified their 3-for-3 ABM proposal to include a vague Hard-Site Defense option. The JCS representatives have been very hesitant to spell out any details, essentially saying only that each side should have the right to deploy, after consultation, an agreed number

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [*sic*], Vol. 17, January–April 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive. Urgent; Sent for information. On January 17 Odeen and Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger a memorandum in which they conveyed Smith's request for guidance to explore "allowing equal number of interceptors within our 2 or 1 ABM proposal" and "allowing freedom-to-mix from ICBMs to SLBMs," as a way to circumvent OSD and JCS objections. Odeen and Sonnenfeldt recommended four possible actions: "1) prepare a memorandum to the President with a draft directive; 2) prepare a draft directive for me; 3) call a Verification Panel meeting as soon as possible; 4) hold in abeyance." Kissinger approved their recommendation to call a Verification Panel meeting as soon as possible and added the handwritten comment, "this is *no* commitment to Smith." (Ibid.)

² The meeting scheduled for January 27 was cancelled.

of additional “limited-range” ABM interceptors and radars in defense of two ICBM fields.

This agrees in theory with the OSD proposal to allow an option for Hard-Site Defense.

However, there are differences between the JCS and OSD. The JCS would like 3-for-3 ABM sites initially (versus 1-for-1 of OSD) and would like the option of HSD defense of two ICBM fields (versus one for OSD). Probably more important than the numerical differences, the JCS would (contrary to OSD):

—Probably not want any initial exploration of “fundamental principles” before the U.S. makes its offer;

—Probably be against strict qualitative controls on ABM radars and ABM interceptors;

—Almost certainly be against each side having a veto power over the other side’s construction of Other Large Phased Array Radars (OLPARs).

Soviet Position

The Soviets said at Tuesday’s³ meeting in Vienna that they were strongly opposed to detailed qualitative controls on ABM components for ICBM defense. They say they would accept at most a general statement that these ABM components were not to have a substantial capability for population defense.

³ January 18.

230. **Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)**¹

Washington, January 28, 1972.

WH20110. Strictly for your own information, I would like to give you the essence of comments Dobrynin has made to me on the offensive weapons problem.² This information has gone to no one else. I would be interested in your reaction.

In the course of a general tour d'horizon, and saying he was thinking out loud, Dobrynin said he saw three "intellectual" possibilities in regard to the SLBM problem: (1) no limitation on submarines, (2) limitation on total number of submarines and (3) limitation on total number of missiles with freedom to mix between land and sea based. As a subdivision of (3) he saw separate ceilings for land and sea-based systems. In a somewhat speculative manner he thought that if the Soviet Union were to agree at all to include SLBMs the alternative I.P. (3) was probably the best. In the course of this conversation, Dobrynin seemed to indicate that from their standpoint a limitation on missiles was preferable to a limitation on boats,³ although I pointed out that our change on this was due to apparent Soviet fears that we would add to the missiles on boats if boats were limited and that we might count other than Y-class Soviet boats.

Dobrynin also wondered why we wanted an SLBM limitation at all as long as we were starting up a new sea-based program. I told him that our position was still in favor of SLBM limitation and I also said that if we deployed a new system an old missile would have to be taken out of the inventory in exchange for a new one to maintain the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive; Eyes Only.

² On January 21 Kissinger met with Dobrynin to discuss SALT and other issues. A memorandum of conversation, prepared by Kissinger, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 39. The section on SALT is almost identical to the summary in this message. On January 31 Kissinger sent Rogers a summary of his conversation with Dobrynin. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 493, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 9, Part 2)

³ In backchannel message WH20113 to Smith, January 29, Kissinger corrected this part of the sentence to read, "in the course of this conversation Dobrynin seemed to indicate that from their standpoint a limitation on boats was preferable to a limitation on missiles." (Ibid., Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT)

ceiling. At the end, Dobrynin reverted to the point that under present circumstances it might be best to keep sea systems unconstrained.⁴

Warm regards.

⁴ In his memorandum of conversation with Dobrynin, Kissinger elaborated further by stating: “Dobrynin asked whether it [i.e., excluding the SLBM program from the agreement] would still remain unacceptable in early May if we still hadn’t broken the deadlock. I said I had no idea but at this moment it was unacceptable.”

231. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Vienna, January 31, 1972, 1714Z.

Re WH–20110 and WH–20113:² Dobrynin’s first “intellectual” possibility (I.P.)—“no limitation on submarines”—perhaps Dobrynin meant here to list the option of no limitation at all affecting SL’s. After our recent change in position, a limitation on submarines is no longer an issue. This change was made in response to Soviet flat opposition to any SALT constraints on submarines per se and to permit them to substitute new SL’s on Y-class boats for old SL’s on G- and H-class boats. His indication that a limit on boats might be preferable to a limit on missiles (WH–20113) is mystifying and inconsistent with what we have learned here. The only plausible interpretation I can think of is that he would welcome a deal where boats were frozen at about the present level—U.S. 41 versus Soviet 70–75 (aggregating the Y, G, and H classes) with both sides free to substitute new boats (containing as many missiles as could be fitted) for old boats. That could produce the wholly unacceptable arithmetic U.S. 41 times 24, and USSR 70–75 times 24 (assuming that as maximum number of missiles per boat).

Dobrynin’s second I.P., “limitation on total number of submarines”. This is answered by the above comment.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383–97–0010, Box 1, Director’s Files, Smith Files, Smith/White House Correspondence, January–May 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive Eyes Only. The message number, “Vienna 144” is handwritten at the top of the first page. The text printed here is the copy Smith approved.

² See Document 230 and footnote 3 thereto.

Dobrynin's third I.P., "limitation on total number of missiles with freedom to mix between land- and sea-based". It is unclear if he was referring to "two-way" freedom to mix. You will recall difficulty I see in having such a mixing provision which contemplates an arrangement going out into the future for a substantial number of years included in a negotiating freeze which, hopefully, is a temporary device. In addition, one should consider the effect of full freedom to mix (both ways) on the problem of making sure that new MLBM's are not added during the freeze. (There is also the problem of avoiding a bad precedent for the subsequent offensive limitation treaty.) If freedom to mix is deemed consistent with an interim freeze, it would be sensible to consider freedom to substitute SL's for IC's as suggested SALT-1164.³

Dobrynin's No. 3 alternate I.P. is or is close to our present offer, depending on whether it would provide substitution of new SL's for old SL's.

I assume the Dobrynin conversation was in recent days. If so, its coincidence with the possible Soviet SL move reported Vienna 128⁴ is worth noting.

Best regards

GS

³ Document 223, but Smith's copy does not bear the telegram number USDEL 1164.

⁴ According to backchannel message 128 to Kissinger, January 28, Semenov had been cryptic about an SLBM freeze and had stated: "You know some problems have a tendency to be self-settling. Here life itself speaks for itself and there is no need for any great hustle and bustle." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT)

232. Editorial Note

On February 15, 1972, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin met at the Soviet Embassy in Washington to discuss a number of issues, including the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). According to the memorandum of conversation, prepared by Kissinger, they had the following exchange on SALT:

"Dobrynin said that the new American SLBM program made an agreement very difficult. It would not be easy in the Soviet Union, he said, to explain why a freeze would not simply be a device for stopping an ongoing Soviet program while giving the United States an op-

portunity to tool up for a new submarine program. The military people had been on the defensive before, but now he could foresee that they would be very much on the offensive, and this was a factor that could not be neglected. He would have a very difficult time convincing Moscow that an SLBM deal was in the cards, partly because he thought that our program was neatly timed to start right after the expiration date of any projected freeze.

“As for ABMs, Dobrynin said he wondered whether we would settle for the Soviet proposal plus giving us two sites, of which one did not have to be Washington. I said I thought we should handle the SLBM and the ABM question together and that our position was not at this time subject to modification.” The memorandum of conversation is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 51.

During their meeting, Kissinger handed Dobrynin a letter from President Nixon addressed to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev that broached a variety of issues which would arise at the summit. Nixon wrote the following concerning SALT:

“With respect to the talks on strategic arms and within the existing confidential channel, we must now concentrate on those points where our position still diverge so that the period after the resumption of talks in Helsinki can be used to put the final touches to the agreement. As in the case of the talks that culminated in the announcement of May 20, 1971, I am hopeful that this channel will lead us to success.” (Ibid.)

233. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 1, 1972, 1 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

The luncheon meeting took place at my initiative because I had told Dobrynin prior to our departure for China that I would brief him as soon as we came back.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

SALT

We then turned to SALT. Dobrynin said that our new submarine program had shaken a lot of people in the Soviet Union, including himself. He did not mind telling me that he had always been in favor of including the submarines, but now it had to look in Moscow as if we were trying to stop the Soviet program while we were tooling up for ours. Was there some compromise possible, or should we put SALT on the back burner? Couldn't we leave the submarines for Brezhnev and the President to settle in Moscow? I said that that would make it impossible, because SALT involved so many technical issues that I saw no way these two could settle the issue there. He wondered if we could work out all other issues before. I said that at this moment it was next to impossible for me to predict what position we would take, but it would be very hard for us to change our position. It was one of the few issues in which my recommendation would not be decisive, since the military felt very strongly that submarines had to be included.

Dobrynin said that we had to come to some general understanding, and he outlined three possibilities. One, that we would make an agreement including submarines. Two, that we would make an agreement excluding submarines. Three, that we would make an agreement which excluded submarines but which put submarines as the top item on the agenda of the next agreement or perhaps even made them the subject of a separate agreement, like the one on ABM, in the new phase.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 493, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 9 [Pt. 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Map Room at the White House. The memorandum of conversation was sent to Nixon under a March 8 covering memorandum that summarized the conversation. A notation on the covering memorandum indicates the President saw it. The memorandum of conversation is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 54.

I told him I would report this to the President and give him a reaction at the next meeting.

Dobrynin then stressed the need for making more rapid progress and affirmed the extreme interest of the Soviet Union in having a constructive summit. I showed him some of the harsh criticism of the President in the Soviet press. He said, well, newspaper commentators in the Soviet Union do not have the same status as a Presidential report.²

We set another meeting for the following Thursday,³ and parted.

² Reference is to President Nixon's third annual report to Congress on foreign affairs, entitled "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace," issued on February 9. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pages 194–346. Soviet reaction to the report was harsh. For information, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 47.

³ March 9. See Document 237.

234. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

JCSM–99–72

Washington, March 6, 1972.

SUBJECT

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

1. (TS) Indications are that the upcoming phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) can be decisive in terms of an agreement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have assessed the US/USSR strategic military relationships and negotiating positions as they have evolved during SALT. Based on this assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following as the US Government position for SALT VII, Helsinki:

a. *Offense*

(1) *Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Inclusion*. The most vital unresolved issue on the offensive side is the issue of SLBM in-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Moorer, 388.3, SALT, January–June 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum was sent as an enclosure to memorandum CM–1606–72, March 6, which informed Kissinger and members of the Verification Panel, Rush, Irwin, Helms, Smith, and Acting Attorney General Kleindienst that it expressed the views of the JCS for use in NSC and Verification Panel deliberations.

clusion in an interim offensive agreement. The Soviet SLBM program is its fastest growing strategic system. Allowing SLBMs to be excluded would be militarily unsound and an unwise negotiating tactic, since the Soviet's building program would be allowed to continue unabated and, at the same time, would undermine the US negotiating position for the follow-on talks by inferring US acceptance of the Soviet linkage of SLBM and US forward-based systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that the United States insist on SLBM inclusion. The United States should make it clear to the Soviets that failure to include SLBM limitations will mean that there will be no agreement on offensive or defense.

(2) *Aggregate Approach*. By JCSM-484-71, dated 1 November 1971, subject: "US Position for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,"² the Joint Chiefs of Staff, considering the fact that the Soviets had not accepted the US 27 July 1971 proposal,³ recommended that the United States seek an equal aggregate limit of SLBM/intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), operational and under construction, with a two-way freedom to mix and with an equal sublimit on modern large ballistic missiles (MLBMs). They now reaffirm the principle of equal aggregates. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe equal aggregates are fair, equitable, negotiable, and militarily sound. Further, acceptance of an unfavorable strategic balance in an interim agreement could set an undesirable precedent for the follow-on comprehensive agreement. There would still remain many issues to be resolved before a comprehensive offensive agreement could be reached. Therefore, in the interim, the United States should seek an agreement that sets equitable parameters while deferring the complicated details for future talks. It is recognized that discussions continue as to freeze dates. From a military standpoint, continued slippage of freeze dates underscores the urgency of changing the US position to the JCS recommended equal aggregate approach.

(3) *Mobile, Soft, Modern, and Heavy ICBMs*. The Soviets are resisting efforts to include soft site and mobile launchers in the interim agreement. Soft sites exist in militarily significant numbers and must be limited. However, neither side has, nor appears capable of deploying, significant numbers of mobile ICBM launchers during the period of an interim short-term agreement. This issue, therefore, can be deferred to the follow-on negotiations. The US SALT Delegation should continue its efforts to achieve satisfactory definitions on the heavy/light and older/modern ICBM question and insure that the number of MLBMs will not be increased after an agreement is signed.

² See footnote 1, Document 210.

³ See Document 183.

b. *Defense.* Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that four-site Safeguard is the minimal acceptable military position, in the context of the current status of SALT, they reaffirm their previous recommendation that both sides be permitted to deploy a ballistic missile defense of their National Command Authorities (NCA) and two sites for defense of ICBMs, west of the Mississippi for the United States and east of the Urals for the Soviets. At all sites, the antiballistic missile (ABM) systems should be deployed within a radius of 100 kilometers and include a total of no more than 300 fixed ABM interceptors/launchers, with no more than 100 at the NCA. In addition, each side would retain the right to deploy, after consultation, an agreed number of limited-range ABM interceptors and associated ABM radars (Site Defense of Minuteman (SDM)) in defense of the two ICBM fields, should deployment of such a concept prove feasible and desirable. Deployment of these additional ABM system components would be restricted to the ICBM fields, and these additional components would be such as to not contribute to wide area defense. In the context of strategic arms limitations and of the ABM alternatives currently under consideration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this proposal most nearly fulfills US defense objectives. It best takes into account the possible development of a Soviet counterforce capability and third-country threats, as well as the offensive/defensive relationship. Furthermore, it provides near equitable coverage of ICBMs, population, and industry, while any two-for-two proposal would give the Soviets an advantage in one or another of those items. It would also enhance negotiability as it provides for equality in number of sites, interceptor/launcher levels, and types of defended areas; takes into account the preferences of both sides regarding NCA and ICBM defense; and allows protection for both sides against unauthorized and accidental attack.

(1) *Modern ABM Radar Complexes (MARC).* The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly support the MARC concept to preclude the building of a radar base for a thick territorial defense. Each side should be permitted an equal number of MARC, the number to be negotiated at as low a level as is possible, with the desired level being four MARC at the NCA site and four at each ICBM site.

(2) *Early Warning Radars.* Soviet large phased-array, early warning (Henhouse) radars should be limited to those operational and under construction, and the United States would retain the right to construct an equivalent system; i.e., equivalent capabilities and numbers. The current joint draft text⁴ should be revised, since it fails to achieve the

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 210.

objective of limiting the further deployment of Henhouse radars which have a potential ABM role.

(3) *Other Large Phased-Array Radars (OLPAR)*. Concerning the OLPAR, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to support consultation before deployment as being the only feasible limitation. An interpretive statement to this effect would appear adequate.

(4) *Qualitative Constraints on Safeguard Components*. It is clear that the Soviets wish to limit the effectiveness of the US Safeguard deployment. The qualitative constraints they have proposed for ICBM defenses would restrict the United States to deploying specified components. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States must retain the technological freedom and flexibility to modernize and replace Safeguard components. The Soviets should again be informed that each side may choose to deploy improved ABM components, within the geographical and numerical limits of the treaty.

c. *Other Issues*. Several important issues of a general nature have arisen during the talks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered these and recommend the following:

(1) *Duration and Withdrawal*. The interim offensive agreement be negotiated for a period which permits full examination of remaining issues but in no case extends beyond 30 months. In no case should an interim agreement be permitted to interfere with weapon systems improvement and modernization. In this connection, any delays in the introduction of modern strategic US offensive systems occasioned by a desire to "wait and see what the outcome of a permanent offensive agreement will be" must be vigorously opposed. Such a position could delay vital modernization which must continue regardless of the nature of any agreement. Any such delay would seriously jeopardize the US strategic security position vis-à-vis that of the Soviets. Understanding should be reached with the Soviets, preferably by explicit language in the ABM treaty, that, if a permanent offensive agreement is not reached in this time period, each side would be permitted to terminate the ABM treaty.

(2) *Interpretive Statements*. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that all interpretive or other explanatory statements not a part of the basic agreement must be legally binding on both parties, accompany the agreements throughout the ratification process, and become part of the public domain along with the agreements.

2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are most concerned by the recent changes in the strategic balance. Before SALT began, the United States held an unquestioned quantitative and qualitative lead in the strategic balance, but, today, that is no longer true. Since SALT began, the Soviets have added some 1,000 strategic missile launchers to their in-

ventory. The charts in Appendices A and B⁵ hereto show how various SALT proposals could affect that growth. There are those who argue that, at the high levels of strategic weapons possessed by the United States and the USSR, simple numerical advantages are not significant. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not accept that view. Superiority, equality, and inferiority have not only a military but also a political and psychological impact on US security interests. The United States should never sign an agreement which places it in a position that other nations, including the other party to the agreement, could perceive as a position of US strategic inferiority.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff urge your endorsement of these positions and request that they be forwarded to the President as the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for SALT VII.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T.H. Moorer

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

⁵ Attached but not printed are an appendix on the “Status of US and Soviet Strategic Forces” and a chart of comparative levels between the August 1970 proposal and the period of negotiations covering July 1971–February 1972.

235. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Assistant to the President (Haldeman)¹

Washington, March 9, 1972.

Nixon: But, be honest: Are you—Did you tell him [Laird] that we’re going to have to get the Joint Chiefs lined up on this?²

Kissinger: Yeah.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 681–2. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger and Haldeman from 9:28 a.m. to 12:50 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² This portion of the conversation was preceded by Kissinger’s general description of his meeting with Laird. No references to SALT were made, and no written record of that meeting has been found.

Nixon: Does he agree, or not? Well, he's got to agree.

Kissinger: On the SALT thing?

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I told him. You probably—I didn't—you can disavow me, but I said if Moorer can't line up the Chiefs, then maybe we shouldn't reappoint him, because his term is up at the end of [unclear]. And I think it's too early—

Nixon: [unclear] the only problem is—I don't care whether the Chiefs believe it—they cannot go out and leak to the likes of Buckley and Tower, and the rest, that we have sold out to the Russians.

Kissinger: Look, and they're so insane. They say if we exclude the submarines, the Soviets are going to have 70 submarines, all—in total, before we can build a new one. That's true. But, if we don't have an agreement, that same condition exists. So, in order—so, in—and, in addition, they will then be building land-based missiles, too, which at least we'd be stopping.

Nixon: The point is that we, at least are—without an agreement, they're going to build submarines.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: With an agreement, they're going to build submarines.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: But with an agreement—

Kissinger: We're giving up nothing.

Nixon: —which would mean we're not going to give them land-based submarines [*missiles*]. So what do they want [unclear]?

Kissinger: Mr. President, that's right. So, we are not giving them—

Nixon: Well, we're going to try. We're going to try to get submarines in, yes.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: But, if we can't, we're better off with an agreement on land-based rather than no agreement at all.

Kissinger: That's exactly my view. Exactly my view—

Nixon: But remember, we're gonna have a hell of a time selling it to everybody.

Kissinger: Well, what we'll have to do—

Nixon: How about waiting? This is one bloody gig we'd get Rogers lined up on pretty quickly—

Kissinger: Oh, no question. But, we ought to get a crash program then, which accelerates some of the submarines. Build some new ones for the interim period.

Nixon: Our own?

Kissinger: That's right. If they won't include submarines, there's a new—before the ULMS comes into being, there is—we could build something called "6–40 submarines." That's—

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: —a submarine with the present hull, but with new missiles.

Nixon: Can we order those, now?

Kissinger: We could go to those now. We wouldn't get any before '75, but at any rate, we could do it—

Nixon: All right. How about—how about putting it out right now, in between?

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: Is that all right with you?

Kissinger: Well, I think we should do it after. I think if we put out another program, the Russians may use it as an excuse.

Nixon: Not to make a deal?

Kissinger: Not to make a deal. But, if we can't get a deal, we should, then, go to the Congress and say, "Since we tried for a deal, they wouldn't give it to us. We've got to go—"

Nixon: Let's start building up the idea on the submarines, now, if submarines are not included, and that, therefore, that we're going to Trident. But, that—what I'm getting at is: Let's don't have a situation where we get them to communicate out and then say, "Ah ha."

Kissinger: Oh, no.

Nixon: We'll get screwed. See what I mean?

Kissinger: No—

Nixon: You know, Henry, in China, we knew we would be screwed, but in Russia, they think—they might have something to say.

Kissinger: Well, what we'd be able to do is—I don't think you should be the one who finally makes that deal. I think we should get Gerry Smith to recommend it and put it through the Verification Panel. I mean that part of the deal.

Nixon: Yeah.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: Here's what I want to keep for myself, and that is, basically, here in this house: SALT—

Kissinger: Yes.

Nixon: —the Middle East, and the decision with regard to the European Security Conference.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: But, if we'd left SALT with Rogers, first of all, he would have—there would have been a flat-out battle with the Joint Chiefs.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: [unclear] we'd have just given away our goddamn balls.

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: Right?

Kissinger: I don't think he can explain the issues to you today on SALT.

Nixon: SALT. Christ. [Laughs] I must say, on that, you've got to hand it to old Laird. He knows the issues on SALT.

Kissinger: He knows them.

Nixon: You're goddamn right.

Kissinger: He plays this politically, but he knows it.

Nixon: But, but, but he knows—

Kissinger: Oh, no—

Nixon: He also knows what the hell it's about. Bill doesn't know. [unclear] I don't know 'em too well, but at least I know what the Christ—now, but Bill will, Bill will not indulge himself in the luxury—what he considers to be a waste of time—on the philosophical [unclear]. In other words, whenever I raise the question, "What do the Russians really want out of SALT?" [Rogers replies:] "Well, that's [unclear]. It's not important." He says, "The important thing is what can we get?" Unless you know what the other guy wants, you just—you don't know how to screw 'em.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Nixon: That's basically—remember how every time I've raised that subject with him, Bill won't listen?

Kissinger: He will not listen.

Nixon: You remember?

Kissinger: No, he doesn't bother to study it, either.

Nixon: And this is the most important thing that we've got to do. What do the Russians want? We've got to look at the world from the way they look at it.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: Henry, you remember the first time we went around on this? What was it, Henry, one of the early SALT meetings? And I raised the subject just like—because I thought he was such a liar on the subject [unclear]. I says, "Well, look, before we get into all this business about counting how many, and throw-weights, and so forth," I said, "Well, look, what do the Russians—what are their motivations? What do they want?" And Bill—Bill constantly comes back, "Oh" he says, "we can't guess about that sort of thing. There's no use to speculate about that sort of thing. The thing to do is to really negotiate," and this and that. [unclear]—

Kissinger: But he never knows what to negotiate.

Nixon: Well, my point is: unless you've got the framework, and know what the other guy wants and what you want, and know deep down what you're going to do, you're going to make a deal, but the deal may be a bad one.

236. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Washington, March 9, 1972, 4:45 p.m.

S: Two things. If any serious disposition to go to high level concept² I would like a chance to argue case against it. Rather than NSC that would last an hour.

K: Thing I suggested yesterday³ was I don't believe there was a serious intention to go to high level concept in American proposal but as I understand meeting yesterday, there was a possibility for going two for two.

S: If you want to go two for two it can be on basis of low levels. Small number of interceptors.

K: In 4 marks [MARC] not as missile field but if 15 or 20 it will be [make] sense but 100 for 50 missiles, you wonder. Even one radar for each missile you wonder.

S: 15 interceptors per radar.

K: If you have a level of 150 with 50 in a missile field then logical for [omission in the original] radars.

S: And that's a mark [MARC] concept. So if you go to [omission in the original] you are in hard defense contract.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² Reference is to ABM alternatives that would allow a high-level hard-site defense of ICBMs, permitting the deployment at one ABM site of interceptors and radars in unlimited numbers.

³ The Verification Panel met on March 8 from 11:11 a.m. to 12:37 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Minutes of the meeting are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969-3/8/72.

K: I think I can persuade the President—dropping my role as traffic cop—I believe with your idea on Hearthsideside [*Hard Site*]. I didn't focus until yesterday on Hearthsideside [*Hard Site*] and going 2 for 2.

S: That's not important. Use terminal [*terms?*] precisely and get high level and qualitative limitations. We won't go into high level if it involves [omission in the original] limitations.

K: If we adopt Hearthsideside [*Hard Site*] I will get you an appt. with the President. I reported yesterday to the President and on SLBM he is prepared to let you slip on completion date but not a freedom to mix idea.

S: He is right.

K: Can you keep your delegation under control? This is not a decision. Just a reaction. I think he will approve changing the date but not freedom to mix or changing soft pads.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

237. Editorial Note

On March 9, 1972, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin met to discuss ongoing bilateral negotiations. According to the memorandum of conversation, which was prepared by Kissinger, SALT was mentioned briefly during the course of their discussion:

"With respect to SALT, Dobrynin raised again the issue of submarines. He said it was going to be an increasingly tough issue, particularly if we were asking for equivalence. I replied that he must have misunderstood me, because there were a number of modifications: first, as Smith had already hinted to Semenov, we were probably prepared to shift the cut-off date, which would add a number of submarines to the total; secondly, we had already proposed that they could convert some of their G- and H-class submarines, which would add six more. I then said that, thinking out loud, there was even a possibility of converting a few of their oldest missiles into submarines. He asked me to give him some idea of what total number would be permitted on this basis. I said that the total number I did not know, but I would let him know as soon as possible." The memorandum of conversation is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 56.

On March 17 at 1 p.m. Kissinger and Dobrynin met again. According to Kissinger's memorandum of conversation, President

Nixon joined the first part of the meeting to discuss arrangements for the summit. Dobrynin made it clear that he understood that major issues such as South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and SALT would be discussed with Kissinger, while arrangements for other issues to be covered at the summit would be handled by the bureaucracy. After Nixon left, Kissinger and Dobrynin turned to the major issues. Concerning SALT, Kissinger wrote: "Dobrynin asked how serious we were about SLBMs. I repeated once more that we were extremely serious, and that indeed I doubted that an agreement was possible that did not include SLBMs. Dobrynin said he would transmit this to Moscow. He asked me for our ABM position. I hinted at movement in the direction of two-for-two, but put it in form of thinking out loud with no definite prospect of a final decision." (Ibid., Document 62)

On March 18 at 10:40 a.m. Dobrynin and Kissinger spoke on the telephone and had the following exchange about SALT:

"D: On SALT? On the first part I cannot get an answer.

"K: The first part is the submarines. I want Semenov to know our delegation knows nothing of what I talked to you about. It is conceivable that we will slip that freeze date early in the discussions; that we accept your proposal early in the discussion, but until Smith says something to Semenov, Semenov shouldn't say anything to Smith. On the ABM proposals you can mention it as a thinking out loud proposal. It is not absolutely final but something you could put as the voice of a friend who is often right.

"D: Yes, what about the second part? I just put it as a thinking out loud?

"K: Well, is the second one under submarines? I just want some reaction from them.

"D: Some reaction as an idea rather than a Soviet proposal.

"K: So far we have heard nothing from Moscow.

"D: I mentioned to them that you were thinking out loud.

"K: Well, I have given it to you now and if they react in a constructive way we can move it very quickly.

"D: And in that connection they can make some counterproposals.

"K: We can do them like we did some other things. Also we want to leave something open to be settled at the summit. You and I can agree but we should leave something to be settled in Helsinki.

"D: Yes.

"K: We have instructed State and they, in the normal way, will call you. I am sure you will be called on Monday. We gave them the instruction last evening. Anatol, the two dates we gave State were the 4th of April or the 7th of April.

"D: 4th or 7th.

"K: Yes, our preference is the 4th. They are going to check it with the British and then they will get to you.

"D: Right, Henry, so have a nice rest. I will try not to bother you very much." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

238. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, March 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

Withdrawal Clause in SALT ABM Treaty

Some weeks ago, you asked me to send along a paper outlining how the Soviet-American disagreement on the "withdrawal" clause in an ABM treaty might be solved.

Both sides agree that the ABM treaty should contain the usual "supreme interests" withdrawal clause permitting each party to withdraw "if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." The parties also have agreed that before exercise of this right, six months' notice must be given, together with a statement of the "extraordinary events."

You will recall that we have been pressing for a supplementary withdrawal right conditioned on the non-success of the subsequent negotiations for a treaty limiting offensive weapons. This effort is rooted in our position that satisfactory offensive limitations must be in effect while our ABM programs are limited, and our reluctance to become committed to an ABM limitation alone. The Soviets say this supplementary right is unnecessary and would prejudice the independent nature of the ABM treaty.

Since no international tribunal is in existence or in prospect to handle breaches of contract of the SALT sort, it seems clear that we are fac-

¹Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files, FRC 383-97-0010, Box 1, Director's Files, Gerard Smith's Files, Smith/Rogers Correspondence, April-December 1972. Secret. Drafted by Smith on March 9. A handwritten notation on the first page of the memorandum indicates that Smith hand-delivered it to Rogers.

ing a political matter, not a legal matter. I think a good case can be made that U.S. interests can be well protected with a “supreme interests” withdrawal clause and without a “special” withdrawal clause.

What I envisage is that the President advise the Soviet leadership that we are willing to go ahead with a “supreme interests” withdrawal clause on the understanding that, if a treaty limiting offensive strategic weapons was not negotiated within a reasonable period of time, a situation could exist where U.S. supreme interests were prejudiced and, in such event, we would consider ourselves justified in exercising the supreme interests withdrawal right. I think that the Soviets would at most “take note” of this assertion. During the Congressional review of any SALT agreements, this Presidential assertion and the Soviet reaction thereto could be made a part of the record.

If this procedure seems sufficient for the ABM treaty, the same approach could be used if necessary in connection with the withdrawal problem in the interim freeze agreement.

I have attached a fuller argument of the case that the “supreme interests” clause sufficiently protects United States’ interests.²

I believe that in asking for this paper, you had in mind making an independent approach to the President on this point in connection with the “home stretch” phase of our SALT negotiation.

Gerard Smith³

² The paper, “The Withdrawal Provision in SALT,” is not attached.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

239. Issues Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

NSC MEETING ON SALT
March 17, 1972

The U.S. SALT Delegation returns to Helsinki to resume the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks on March 28. The Verification Panel has met three times to discuss remaining issues which bar the way to our agreement.² While a number of issues were analyzed carefully and discussed by the Verification Panel the major issues are:

—What should be our basic ABM position? Should we stop both sides where they are? Or, allow each side a limited ICBM defense (with the U.S. having either 2 sites at ICBM fields or one site at an ICBM field and one at Washington, D.C.)? Or, allow each side a dedicated “Hard-Site Defense” of ICBM fields?

—How strictly must we control the building of large Soviet radars?

—On SLBMs, what modifications, if any, should we make now in our present position—for example, slipping the freeze date, allowing freedom-to-mix?

—How essential is it to get SLBMs included in the interim freeze?

—What should be the minimum duration of the offensive freeze?

I. ABM LEVELS

Our Proposal. The U.S. has proposed since the end of August that each side could have *either two ABM sites with 200 interceptors* protecting ICBM fields *or one site with 100 interceptors* protecting the capital. Since the Soviets have much of their Moscow site completed and we have two Safeguard sites under construction the clear intent of our proposal was that both sides freeze existing sites, completing what is now under construction.

Our Delegation has concluded that our two-or-one proposal is “not negotiable.”

Soviet Proposal. The Soviets proposed two sites for them (Moscow plus ICBM defense) and one Safeguard site for us. But, this is more

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-032, NSC Meeting SALT 3/17/72. Top Secret. A notation on the paper indicates the President saw it. All brackets are in the original.

² The Verification Panel met on March 8, 10, and 15. Minutes are *ibid.*, Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969-3/8/72, and *ibid.*, Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 3-15-72-1974.

likely a negotiating ploy and they have hinted that a two-for-two arrangement is acceptable.

Alternative Approaches. There are six alternative approaches to ABM levels:

1. *Stick with two-or-one ABM sites but with equal interceptors.*
2. *One-for-one* (i.e., Safeguard for Moscow ABM, possibly with a deferred right to replace Safeguard with NCA defense).
3. *Asymmetrical two-for-two* (i.e., U.S. gets two Safeguard sites).
4. *Symmetrical two-for-two* (i.e., each side gets NCA defense plus one ICBM defense site).
5. *Two-for-two with Hard-Site Defense* (i.e., NCA and one ICBM field).
6. *Three-for-three with Hard-Site Defense* (i.e., two ICBM defense sites plus NCA defense for each side).

These alternatives can be narrowed to three conceptual approaches:

- Both sides stopping where they are.*
- Allowing each side a limited ICBM defense.*
- Allowing each side Hard-Site Defense.*

A. Both Sides Stopping Where They Are

Limiting the Soviets to a Moscow defense has the advantage of reducing concerns about the Soviets developing a radar base which could support SAM-upgrade or rapid deployment of interceptors. *It would also make it easier at some later point to negotiate zero ABMs, if that is possible, since as a first step we are stopping both sides at a low level.*

As for the ABM allowed the U.S., *we might get two Safeguard sites but with the same number of interceptors (e.g., 100 or 150) as the Soviets have.* [This is an unlikely outcome. The Delegation apparently thinks that this two-for-one is either non-negotiable or would require us to pay too high a price on other issues.] *The second possibility would be one site for us as well.* This would be a Safeguard site for now, but the deal could include an option to switch later to defense of Washington. The disadvantages are: (1) we would have to stop on-going construction at our second Safeguard site; and (2) Soviet protection of Moscow would be more important than defending our ICBM field with 100 interceptors.

If we cannot accept the ABM deployments which are likely if we limit the Soviets to Moscow, then there is the basic decision whether we should allow each side a limited ICBM defense or a Hard-Site defense.

B. Allowing Each Side a Limited ICBM Defense

—*A limited ICBM defense* is characterized by constraints on the number of interceptors and ABM radars. Our Safeguard ABM system is an example.

Possible outcomes here could be either: (1) *symmetrical two-for-two arrangement* where each side gets one ICBM defense site and defense of the capital; or, (2) *an asymmetrical two-for-two arrangement* where the U.S. would forego defense of Washington for a second Safeguard site.

1. *Symmetrical Arrangement.* Under this approach we would be allowed a limited defense of Washington. There are some strategic and diplomatic arguments for such an ABM defense. The Soviets have informally indicated that the symmetrical two-for-two arrangement is negotiable.

The disadvantages are: (1) *We would have to stop construction at Malmstrom*, although, the non-recoverable expenditures would be only about \$100 million; and (2) We would not have an advantage in ICBM defense which could be viewed as a counter to Soviet advantage in numbers of offensive systems.

2. *An Asymmetrical Agreement.* An asymmetrical agreement offsets these disadvantages, to a degree.

On the other hand, the second Safeguard site would provide only limited added protection of our Minuteman and bombers and foregoes defense of Washington.

If we allowed a limited ICBM defense we would need careful controls, particularly on radars. The most critical constraint is *geographical limits* on the location of the ICBM defense site, to keep the ABMs away from heavily populated areas. The Soviets have informally accepted such limits. By also holding the defense to a *low number* of radar targets we could overwhelm the ABM defense by knocking out all the radars.

Our current position seeks to limit the *number* of radar targets by limiting the number of Modern ABM Radar Complexes (MARC)s. [MARC)s are small 3 kilometer circles within which any number of radars are deployed. Even our smallest strategic warhead (the Poseidon RV) can destroy all radars within each circle, giving each circle the value of only one radar.]

We now propose that a total of 4 MARCs be allowed for 2 ICBM fields, and there is general agreement that 6 and possibly 8 MARCs would be acceptable. Although the Soviets have accepted the MARC concept for protection of the national capital, they have rejected it and sought qualitative controls on ICBM defense radars. *If we agreed to only qualitative controls*, then the Soviets *could* legitimately deploy many radars and then, by violation or abrogation of the treaty, quickly deploy additional interceptors, which would effectively give them Hard-Site Defense. *If we think this likely then we probably want to negotiate for the Hard-Site option for ourselves.*

C. *Allowing Each Side a Hard-Site Defense (HSD)*

Hard-Site Defense involves large numbers of interceptors (e.g. 1000) and radars. The proposals considered are: (1) *OSD Proposal*. This

alternative is ultimately a two-for-two arrangement. Initially, it's only Moscow ABM for one-site Safeguard. After three years or upon mutual agreement, the U.S. could deploy a defense of Washington and Hard-Site Defense at Grand Forks. The Soviets would be allowed to deploy Hard-Site Defense at one ICBM field; (2) *JCS Proposal*. This alternative calls for defense of two ICBM fields plus NCA.

Both alternatives essentially boil down to the issue: *Is assuring the survivability of the additional Minuteman missiles against some Soviet threats worth the risks of also allowing the Soviets Hard-Site Defense and the possible negotiating and political problems?*

(1) *Strategic Issues*. One site HSD insures a maximum of 100 additional Minuteman survivors over no defense; 2 sites save 150–200. In terms of Minuteman alone this amounts to 5–10% Soviet fatalities; assuming surviving bombers and submarines, about 1–5%. Moreover the Soviets could totally overwhelm the defense using currently available technology. *Meanwhile, we would have disturbing worries about adequacy of verification and the potential of many interceptors and radars.*

(2) *Political and Diplomatic Issues*. Hard-Site Defense would give the appearance of increasing stability and it might also be easier to defend politically than Safeguard ABM which has limited effectiveness. However, the OSD proposal is a one-to-one arrangement in the short-term if we got a deferred provision. Moreover, we would have to stop construction at Malmstrom (for the OSD proposal); we would be vulnerable to charges that we were increasing not limiting ABMs; we would have to obtain Congressional approval for ABM defense of Washington and for HSD.

(3) *Negotiability*. *There are some difficult problems here:* We would be keeping the number of interceptors unlimited or at a level of 1000 or more, a shift from the negotiating trend; and, there would have to be very strict qualitative limits on the capabilities of the HSD interceptors and radars.

Agency Positions: *State and ACDA* prefer to limit the Soviets to Moscow and accept 1-for-1. Their second preference is a limited ICBM defense and NCA for each side. *OSD and JCS* support their respective positions of 2-for-2 and 3-for-3 with HSD. Failing to get HSD, *OSD* would prefer 1-for-1. *CIA* has taken no position but notes that verification problems increase with the size of deployments.

II. OTHER RADAR CONSTRAINTS

We have officially proposed strict limits on Other Large Phased-Array Radars (OLPARs). These are any large radars, ostensibly for other purposes, which could be used in an ABM role. Mutual agreement would be required before either side can construct future OLPARs. [OLPARs are defined as non-ABM phased array radars with

a power-aperture production of 10^6 watt-meters squared.] As a variant, we informally proposed at Vienna an understanding whereby *no* new OLPARs could be deployed, except for space tracking or for verification purposes. In these cases, there would be consultation. The Soviets have continued to oppose controls on OLPARs, arguing that such controls might limit their future air defenses, a major Soviet concern.

Agency Positions: There was general agreement in the Verification Panel that we should stick with our present position and its variant for the start of the Helsinki session. However, if the Soviets still balk, *all but* OSD feel that we should be willing to accept some provision or understanding that only requires “advance consultation” since we are protected by Soviet agreement not to give such radars an ABM capability. OSD feels that it is essential that we get *strict* controls over OLPARs.

III. INCLUSION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS

We now propose that launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) be frozen at the number of those operational or under construction as of July 31, 1971. This allows replacement of old SLBMs and submarines with new ones. The Soviet total would be about 660–700 SLBMs; the U.S. total would be 656 SLBMs. (Gerry Smith, as instructed, has privately told Semenov that we might be willing to accept a later freeze date.)

The Soviets continue to reject in principle the inclusion of SLBMs in the interim freeze, although Ambassador Smith noted some slight flexibility.

In the meantime, the Soviets continue to produce Y-class submarines at a rate of 8 per year (or 128 SLBMs) and will have more Y-class submarines operational than the U.S. has Polaris/Poseidon submarines by early 1974.

All agreed in the Verification Panel that we should continue to try, at least for a few weeks, to get SLBMs included. The question facing us is whether it is advisable to modify our present position. Possible modifications are: (1) slip the freeze date to July 1972 or the date of the signing of the agreement, allowing the Soviets an additional 128 SLBMs; (2) allow freedom to mix from ICBMs to SLBMs permitting the Soviets to retire 209 old ICBMs to continue their Y-class program; (3) make ULMS an explicit bargaining chip in SALT by promising to slow our accelerated ULMS construction program.

Agency Positions: State and ACDA would agree to slip the date but are hesitant to allow freedom to mix; ACDA would make ULMS a more explicit bargaining chip. OSD would agree to both changing the date and freedom to mix, but, would change the terms of the freeze to be even tougher than present, and would allow only freedom to mix from

silo launchers, not soft ICBMs. JCS opposes both a change in date and freedom to mix.

How Important Are SLBMs?

Dropping SLBMs. The justification for eventually dropping SLBMs is: (1) if both SLBMs and ICBMs are included in a freeze we are implicitly accepting a major Soviet advantage in the aggregate total of offensive missiles; (2) we might have to give on the freeze date and freedom to mix thereby allowing as many as 60 Y-class boats if the Soviets are willing to phase out older subs and soft pad ICBMs; (3) we might have to give much on other issues, and SLBMs could be a roadblock to an agreement.

Reasons to Include SLBMs. There are clear gains if SLBMs are in the freeze: (1) even if we agree to freedom to mix and to a later freeze date, a further build-up of Y class boats will require the Soviets to phase out other systems; (2) we will eventually bring the Y class program to a halt, even if it does continue for another two years or so. If there is no freeze, there is no indication that the Soviets plan to stop building Y class subs soon.

While the strategic advantages to the Soviets of continuing to build Y class subs are not great, the political, diplomatic, and psychological advantages could be significant. Our final SALT agreement could be characterized as: (1) giving the Soviets equality on ABMs; (2) only limiting ICBMs; and, (3) failing to stop the one area where the Soviets have real momentum, Y class submarine construction. Moreover, we will be in a weaker position in the follow-on SAL talks if we don't have a limit on Soviet SLBMs.

IV. DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

We currently propose indefinite duration for both agreements plus a special withdrawal right in the agreements if there is no follow-on offensive agreement.

To meet Soviet objections to special withdrawal from the ABM treaty, there is general agency agreement that we could drop this provision but make a strong unilateral statement that we might withdraw under the supreme national interest clause in the ABM treaty if offensive limitations lapse.

Only the duration of the offensive freeze is controversial. In contrast to our current position (unlimited duration with special withdrawal), the Soviets propose a finite duration of two years. The basic issue is: Unless replaced by a follow-on agreement, do we wish to keep the offensive freeze in effect as long as possible or should we agree to a relatively short period such as proposed by the Soviets.

If only ICBMs are included in the interim freeze, it would seem that we should want the agreement to last as long as possible since we are

building no ICBMs and do not plan to do so while the Soviets have an active program.

If we get SLBMs included as well as ICBMs, we could still proceed with building ULMS at the accelerated pace, but, within 3–4 years, we would have to retire some Polaris boats or ICBMs.

The shorter the period the sooner we would have to negotiate additional offensive limitations (or renegotiate the freeze), or face the issue of letting the ABM treaty stand alone or withdrawing from it.

Agency Positions: ACDA, OSD and State prefer our current position (indefinite duration). [State and ACDA could accept some finite duration (e.g., 5–3 years) if necessary. OSD would accept an even shorter finite duration to get SLBMs included.] The JCS do not want the agreement longer than 2–1/2 if only ICBMs are included—they would accept a longer period if SLBMs were frozen also.

240. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 17, 1972, 10:15–11:55 a.m.

NSC MEETING ON SALT

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Vice President Agnew
Secretary of State William P. Rogers
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
General George A. Lincoln, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
Secretary of Treasury John B. Connally
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Ronald I. Spiers, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
Amb. David Kennedy, U.S. Representative to NATO
Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Spurgeon Keeny, Assistant Director for Science and Technology, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1971 thru 6–20–74. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

Bruce Clarke, Director, Office of Strategic Research, Central Intelligence Agency
Lt. General Royal B. Allison, Member SALT Delegation
Mr. Paul Nitze, Member SALT Delegation
Gardiner Tucker, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)
Colonel Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff
Philip Odeen, NSC Staff
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff

Nixon: The meeting today is on Arms Control. Let's start with a briefing from Director Helms.

[Helms briefs from paper at Tab A]²

Nixon [to Laird]: What does this briefing mean?

Laird: The Soviets are embarked on a course to be the superior military force in the world and the superior strategic force. This goal is more for political than for military purposes. I am not sure the Soviets have stopped producing. They have continued to produce. Their capability for producing ballistic missile submarines we can't match until '75.

Moorer: They have conducted several launches at their test site. We have to wait to see the tests to see whether they are just modernizing or whether they are moving with a new missile.

Laird: As to the submarines, the two options Helms gives are correct. The last two sets of photos give evidence either of modernization of the propulsion system or new missiles (the SSN-6). They also could be putting in SSN-8s, which have a longer range. They have been testing the SSN-8 successfully with inertial guidance. This has a high accuracy capability, with remarkable accuracy and technicality. We have the technology but we have not used it. We have no system deployed at present like this. We can't rule out its extension on the submarine. It could mean an ULMS-type submarine in the fleet at an early date. I am convinced they are going for a superior force.

Nixon: The decisions must be in this context. We should have no illusions. We believe in arms control but we have to realize they have been going for superiority. They may be using the talks for this.

Laird: I believe this.

Kissinger: The Verification Panel met three times on the many issues involved.³ There are three major issues we should discuss today: ABM levels; the inclusion of SLBMs; and duration of the agreement. Perhaps we should have a word also on large phased array radars. We need a decision later in April.

² Attached but not printed is a paper entitled "Developments in Soviet Strategic Forces Related to SALT." All brackets are in the original.

³ See footnote 2, Document 239.

On ABM: The present proposal in practical effect is a freeze. They have indicated 2-for-2 might be acceptable—this means six possible proposals, in three categories: (1) Stop each side where it is; (2) Allow each side a limited ABM defense; and (3) Permit each side hard-site defense of ICBM sites (radar and missiles).

On the first: If each side stops where it is, this reduces the concern that the Soviets are developing a radar net capable of upgrading. It's easier to move them to zero. We stop Malmstrom; they have to stop nothing. The advantage of this is that it's the one with greatest simplicity. The problems are that the present ABM deployment gives a number of advantages. The Moscow system is better suited than Malmstrom for these. The Safeguard has only a small number of radars. The defense could be defeated. Thus to defend an ICBM field we would need more interceptors.

I am more worried about an accidental attack on a missile field than anything else. It could come from insanity.

The primary advantage of Malmstrom is its operational experience. Moscow has the same advantage for Soviet defense.

Variations are possible—for example, either the Soviets get two missile sites for ours or else we change Malmstrom to Washington if we want. The judgment would depend on whether Congress would accept Washington—otherwise we are back to 2 for 1. Malmstrom is already authorized.

Laird: We have Sentinel authority for Washington. We would have to go back to the Congress.

Kissinger: Another problem with one for one is that we have proposed a technical arrangement for radars which makes it easy to defeat the Moscow defense. If this is also to be used for missile sites, it would mean no defense. The Soviets want a different radar arrangement for missile site defense. We could shift another site this way. The Soviets could propose a radar setup that would merge with hard site defense so it's resistant to qualitative control—that slides into a massive hard site defense. We would have to go for strict qualitative limitations on radars and missiles.

Third, there are proposals based on the theory that the present proposals are too inadequate for real defense or area defense. Thus there would be an unlimited number of interceptors and radars but only those useful for defense of missiles.

The strategic issue is how many more ICBM missiles are protected. The domestic issue is: What is advertised as strategic arms limitation gives more radars and ABMs than before.

Nixon: I have to make the political decision. The main problem is whether we get an agreement which limits us and lets the Soviets get

superiority. Make no mistake: we want an agreement that lets us do as much as possible. The political argument will be that we didn't tie their hands enough.

Kissinger: The arguments against are, first, whether it's negotiable, and whether the Soviets understand what we mean.

Nixon: They understand. The question is whether we understand what they want.

Let me hear more arguments on hard site. I know the argument that we might be getting more.

Laird: The 12-site Safeguard program is viable and meets the three criteria. We have argued for it before Congress; we have four sites presently approved. We are going forward with the site survey of Washington. It makes sense if we have 12 sites; it can't be justified with 2 or 4 sites.

We have a program for a point-defense system. We asked for it last year, and Congress gave us the money last year for this. It gives a small point-defense but not an area defense of 12 sites. It will be easier to get Congress to approve this than a 12-site system or a 4-site system related to a 12-site Safeguard. Any other system at 2 or 4 gives nothing strategically.

Nixon: 12 for Safeguard makes sense but 2 or 4 does not?

Laird: Yes.

Nixon: Tom?

Moorer: The JCS believe we should have NCA. Any agreement on ABM should include NCA. We do not intend to shoot first; thus we must have this protection for reaction time.

Laird: The other side knows you have credibility.

Nixon: What about on a plane?

Laird: It's the cheapest way to give credibility to the deterrent.

Nixon: What Congress will do gives credibility.

Laird: Congress would support it if it's part of SALT. There is strong support in the defense and appropriation committees if it's part of SALT. If not, NCA would only be the last of the 12 sites.

Nixon: Moscow defends more than NCA, so it's not an even trade.

Laird: Yes, they get a double pay-off.

Smith: A Washington–Moscow tradeoff would give more population defense for Washington than for Moscow. In the range of interceptors—100—it's not a real advantage. You can't really cover both Moscow and a missile site.

Nixon: What does population have to do with who strikes first? If they strike first, does population have relevance?

Smith: Yes, because population protection gives an advantage.

Nixon: We aren't going to strike first. They are protecting more than population at Moscow.

Smith: They are protecting against China.

Laird: We have the contract signed. The Congress OK'd it and we have major support for hard site defense. The Safeguard problem is the 12 sites we had to have.

Nixon: Is hard site defense negotiable?

Smith: We have not mentioned it at all to either the Soviets or the Allies. If we go up with a SALT treaty with a program for a new ABM system, we'll never get it.

Nitze: In the Soviet statements, they are thinking of 2-for-2, with one on each side as a hard site defense of a missile field. They see possible ground here for compromise. These are the only grounds for negotiations. Gerry and I disagree on this.

Smith: We have talked 200 interceptors; now the Soviets have reduced from 300 to 150 for two sites. Now we go back to a proposal for 1000+ and unlimited radars—this is a whole new world. It would take 2 or 3 years to get to a discussion.

Nitze: They think an unlimited number of radars limited in geography and qualitatively constrained are not dangerous. The reason they talked a lower number of interceptors is because we were. We may have a problem on a large number of interceptors, but the OSD proposal suggested that only we move this way. We could then go forward after 3 years.

Nixon: What about submarines?

Kissinger: If we go for limited ICBMs, we could have constraints on radars and gear further limitations to an offensive agreement.

Smith: We could propose unlimited radar at _____.⁴ The question is, do we want to let the Soviets go to higher levels of interceptors? We might drive them this way.

Laird: We wouldn't say this. We would keep the question open and see how the offensive limits go.

Smith: I was under instruction to negotiate two sites with the Russians.

Kissinger: The present proposal, Mr. President, is to limit the Soviets to 35–37 Y-Class, and 560–590 tubes. Old ones could be replaced by new ones. That would bring them to 40–43 Y-Class—the same number as we. But they have 8 additional under construction. They have showed no interest in including SLBMs and they are pushing ahead

⁴ Omission is in the original.

on their program. A cut-off of July 1, 1971, would force them to stop some that are now going on. They doing eight per year; we are now doing none. We have ULMS but it is far away.

Laird: We wouldn't get 10 of ULMS until 1982; then we'd get three per year.

Kissinger: So we have these options: We could stick with the present proposals. We could make a more attractive agreement if it's not included. We could slip the freeze date to July 1972, which would give them equivalence. They could also convert the G&H class subs. They need more subs to keep an equivalent number on station than we do—but the advantage is not great. We could allow freedom to mix ICBM's and SLBMs. We could permit them to convert soft-pad SS-9's and SS-8's to SLBMs. This would give them 8 more subs. We could force them to convert more modern missiles into SLBMs. They would have to sacrifice the more modern missile but it would not degrade their strategic capability.

Thus either of the above gets them to about 60 subs.

My judgment is without these additions to our proposal, we can't get an agreement. If SLBM's are not constrained, they build 8 a year and we can't catch up.

Nixon: Why can't we catch up?

Moorer: We could construct 3 or 4 additional subs of the present class or we could convert conventional subs, but it's expensive and inefficient and interferes with other programs.

Nixon: What about a crash program? Could we do better than '78?

Moorer: With priority, interfering with ULMS, we could move up to 10, but I would not recommend it. We would prefer to accelerate ULMS.

Rogers: Aren't we ahead because we are MIRVing Poseidon? Can we be ahead on this basis by the Fall of '78?

Laird: They couldn't deploy multiple warheads before two years. I'm not concerned about 51 Soviet submarines versus 41 of ours. The problem is we have to get the new program coming along so our people and our allies can see what we are doing.

Rogers: We all agree on that.

Laird: We have to move ahead with the advanced technology we have.

Kissinger: If there is no follow-on agreement, we could wind up with 70 Soviet and 41 U.S. If there is a follow-on negotiation, and they lay down 16 more and then propose a freeze, we are then in trouble if we are moving at a leisurely pace. We need a program which puts the pressure on.

Nixon: Gerry, is this out of the ballpark?

Smith: No, not necessarily.

Rogers: They had the impression we are going to give in on SLBMs. I think we should press hard. It's hard to justify an agreement without it. Help from you at the highest level might help. There is a pause on ICBMs but not on SLBMs even though we have.

Smith: Mel's point is important. It may be only a pause on ICBMs. Thus an agreement is important.

Rogers: We have to show we're not going to give.

Agnew: If we make an agreement without limiting the technological race we have to be careful. A good agreement could become a bad one.

Moorer: On defensive systems, we spoke of constraining but they have not. We need to fight for equivalency or we will have trouble publicly for rationalizing it.

Kissinger: You may have to come to a decision as to whether we want an agreement or whether to limit what we can—ICBMs—or let it go.

Nixon: In terms of ICBMs, we will have trouble getting any program. In SLBMs we have a program; it is credible for us and for bargaining. We can't negotiate it. In the ICBM field, it's imperative to get a deal. We can't build and they know it. On submarines, it's in our interest to get a deal but if we can't, we can get a program.

Laird: No question. It has a better chance of Congressional support.

Kissinger: We have a real time problem. We can build for three years until we have to scrap. If the Soviets scrap the 8 they are doing, they can do only modernization—larger hulls. Both sides are laying keels and actually there would be no interruption of the construction program. This affects the question of duration.

President: Duration?

Kissinger: There are strong arguments for a short duration. The same clause links the offensive freeze with abrogation of the defensive freeze. An ABM treaty will give them a chance to catch up. Thus it's not clear we would be better off at the end. There is also a question of our offensive position—it depends on how we're tooled up. If we don't interrupt the construction program. So they are strong arguments for a short term. If subs are included, the duration should be on the longer side.

Rogers: If subs are in, it can be longer. If not, it should be shorter. We must make a major effort to convince the Soviets we want SLBMs included. If we leave subs out, the whole proposition is more doubtful. They are moving ahead on submarines.

Moorer: We want finally an aggregate total. If we can't get an SLBM freeze, then the discussion period should be short. We should emphasize equivalency.

Kissinger: We must not explicitly link them. The Soviets want a short freeze—that argues for no SLBMs.

Laird: Our stronger position is now.

Rogers: The Soviets think we are under pressure to sign before Moscow. We want to disabuse them of that. The treaty language is good. Our negotiators should be congratulated. It's a splendid team.

Nixon: Do the translations agree?

Smith: Yes, we have an authenticated translation.

Nixon: The team expresses different points of view. We need that. It's good.

Laird: We must make a decision that gets us in the best possible position for the follow-on discussions. If we give in now on SLBMs, we will have also pressure on FBS in NATO in the next round. We need to see how this will stand up in the future. American industry has to move on the technology.

[Secretary Laird shows some pictures, including pictures of the *Spirit of '76*.]

Nixon: This was a helpful discussion. We all want the best possible deal. I appreciate DOD's expression of views of hard site defense. We don't want them to think we have one. It's desirable, given all the possibilities of cheating and whether it's a balanced agreement. They are moving substantially but we are inhibited. The American people might be "scared" to move ahead. We have the same advantages, but if we look ahead, we see that the Soviets want to be ahead. They have lots more movement than we; they are not concerned with their image of peace in the world or for their own people. The arguments there for an agreement now are strong. Our position with respect to the Soviets has steadily eroded since 1961–62. It's not going to change much. We have the only ABM—which won by 1 vote—as the only new weapons systems in 10 years. Our programming position may be better now than later. It may be the last time we are able to look at them from a position of relative strength.

We don't have to have an agreement because we are going to Moscow. We do it in the context of the national interest—they are moving in the arms race and we are not. We are beginning on both sides to halt the escalation, in a race that neither side can be allowed to win. We can't let them go to massive superiority—but it's more difficult for us to match them.

[The meeting ended.]

241. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 21, 1972, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the President with the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, March 21, 1972, 3:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room

PRESENT

The President
John J. McCloy
Harold Brown
William C. Foster
Kermit Gordon
James R. Killian
Lauris Norstad
Jack Ruina
William Scranton
John A. Wheeler
George Jaeger, GAC Staff
General Haig
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff

In response to the President's invitation, Mr. McCloy opened the discussion by summarizing the attached document (Tab A).² He prefaced his remarks by saying the Committee was particularly appreciative of the opportunity to meet with the President at a time just before the SALT negotiations reconvened. In going through the attached paper, Mr. McCloy stressed that it was important in the strategic arms field to curb rather than to redirect energies. He said he was fearful that the arms race would be extended to the sea. Mr. McCloy further emphasized that a low level of ABMs was in our interest and that his Committee had already gone on record in favoring a total ban. If that was not feasible it favored the lowest possible level, that is, one site for each side. The Committee could support a higher level only reluctantly since it would result in no strategic advantage, especially if the Soviets were permitted to expand their defense from the NCA (Moscow)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 199, Agency Files, ACDA (Jan 1972–[Aug 1974]), Vol. IV. Secret. Prepared by Sonnenfeldt. On March 20 Kissinger sent Nixon talking points for the meeting, explaining that "The Committee has been holding meetings to consider the SALT issues, and is especially concerned that they have a chance to explain their position to you in person, since they believe that final decisions are now being made. Perhaps equally important, Mr. McCloy feels the Committee needs a psychological lift, since they have lost four members, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is balking at the new nominations (Messrs. McCone, Ellsworth, Packard, and General Wheeler)." (Ibid.)

² Attached but not printed is a March 21 memorandum from McCloy to Nixon.

to their ICBM fields. Mr. McCloy felt that an agreement on low levels of ABMs would meet wide-scale international approval.

Mr. McCloy then reviewed the reasons cited in the attached memorandum which, in the Committee's view, argued against a hard-site ABM defense. The President commented that he had heard the arguments in favor a week earlier. In response to the President's question, Mr. McCloy said that he had heard the Defense Department's views, including Mr. Nitze's and that he recognized that these were very serious. Nevertheless, the Committee had come to a negative conclusion.

In regard to offensive weapons, Mr. McCloy underlined the points in his memorandum relating to the desirability of including SLBMs in an agreement. He said that he personally felt perhaps even more strongly on this than some other members of the Committee. He recognized that we might face a crunch if the Soviets remained adamantly opposed; in that event, the Soviets should be put on notice that we would have to take steps of our own to build up if the Soviet momentum continued.

In conclusion, Mr. McCloy said that the Committee was in general agreement as regards ABM levels, hard-site and SLBMs, with some differences of emphasis regarding the last.

The President complimented Mr. McCloy for his presentation and for the hard work put in by the Committee. He said that he had already been exposed to the material presented by Mr. McCloy and he noted that on some of the issues, feelings in the Administration were very vigorous. Governor Scranton interjected that the Committee felt perhaps more strongly about the hard-site issue than any of the others. Mr. Foster associated himself with this comment. The President said he would discuss the subject again with Gerard Smith, having already heard the Defense Department at great length.

Harold Brown then gave his reasoning against hard-site. First, it would be a political mistake since we would be proposing higher levels of ABMs than ever before and the Soviets would be gaining an opportunity to make hay on this score. Second, it would present a serious diplomatic problem because it would be extremely difficult to negotiate. From his own experience as a member of the negotiating team, he knew that the Soviets had never been willing to discuss qualitative limits and he, therefore, felt that a US hard-site proposal would get negotiations tangled up perhaps for years if they could continue at all. Third, while, under the hard-site concept, we might design a defense for the Soviets which would not worry us, the Soviets could hardly be relied upon to design such a defense. It would have the same components as those required for the area defense even if first deployed in ICBM fields. Mr. Ruina agreed with Mr. Brown, commenting that the whole idea was very worrisome. Governor Scranton said it would

reopen the action-reaction cycle. Dr. Wheeler said that he had always in the past testified in favor of ABM but this idea makes him into an opponent. General Norstad endorsed Mr. McCloy's presentation and the other comments about hard-site. He stressed the difficulty of verification and concluded that a US proposal for hard-site could damage the cause of progress.

The President turned the discussion to SLBMs and raised the question of the price that we might have to pay to get them included. Would it be worth it? The President asked whether it was Mr. McCloy's position that there should be no agreement without SLBMs. Mr. McCloy said he came closer to this position than his colleagues. But Mr. Brown asked whether it would be easier to slow down the Soviets without an agreement. The President commented that we had the same question. Mr. Gordon said that we would be under a disadvantage if we gave up the freeze on ICBMs. The President observed that it was to Soviet advantage to stop ABMs and to ours to stop offensive weapons, including land-based ones—even though there had been a pause in their construction. It would be a difficult position to say that there could be no agreement without SLBMs. But we cannot acknowledge this difficulty in the negotiations. Mr. Gordon and Governor Scranton pointed out that some of the concessions proposed to get SLBMs in went very far and might hurt us in subsequent negotiations. The President concluded this part of the discussion by noting that both the Defense Department and the Arms Control Agency quite evidently support inclusion of SLBMs.

The President then summarized the situation we face. In two months he would be on his way to Moscow. There may be a deal then or possibly before—one could not be sure. After the Peking trip there had been many questions about who won or lost. The agreements reached in Peking actually were largely non-substantive and both sides won; each wanted agreement.³ But with the Soviets an agreement will be very substantive and many things were going on with the Soviets, perhaps because of China. Because agreements will be substantive, there will be real questions about who won or lost. Noting that he had listened with great care to the Defense Department and given it perhaps more time at the NSC than the others, the President said the problem will be with the defense minded people in the Congress and in the country. The arms control people will support anything, but the defense minded people will ask: would we get taken? Are we inhibited while the Soviets can move ahead of us? Therefore, we will need sup-

³ President Nixon visited China February 21–28. Text of the joint communiqué issued at Shanghai on February 27 is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 376–379. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972.

port for the agreement that we may reach, support, if the members of the Committee agree, for the point that the agreement is not detrimental to the security of the United States. In addition, the President went on, our Allies will wonder whether we had now become inferior. He had just been talking to the Turkish Prime Minister. The Turks felt surrounded and saw us a long way off. If there were a debate in the United States in which many said that we were inferior, we would have serious international problems. The President continued that the issue was not war; it involves how two major powers conduct foreign policy. It is true that the Soviets were still aggressive and that the Chinese continue to support revolution, but as regards SALT we must seize the present moment which is perhaps the last moment. (The President interjected that he was perhaps more confident about including SLBMs than some others.)

In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, it had been “no contest,” because we had a ten to one superiority. But it is not that way now. The possibility of our going into a massive arms build-up is no longer what it was. It might be possible to frighten the US people into doing something but time is running out. The question is: can we seize this moment with both sides recognizing that neither will allow the other to get ahead? With the Soviets this a credible point; but with us it is getting less credible. In this room we know—and Soviet intelligence knows—that we have weaknesses.

Why, the President went on to ask, would the Soviets make a deal then? The reasons were perhaps temporary. The arms race is burdensome, the Soviet economy has been flat, their neighbor to the East could be a big problem in 20 years, so that may be a good opportunity to deal with the US. The Soviets may also hope to break up NATO, for example, by coupling SALT with a European Security Conference. And the Soviets may hope that an agreement might help them keep Eastern Europe under control. Soviet reasons were obviously different from ours. Publicly, we say with them: let us curb the arms race and prevent nuclear war. But this is not the real Soviet reason so—we had better make as hard-headed a deal as we can. There may be no other opportunity.

The President continued that the present SALT negotiations dealt only with the tip of the iceberg. There would be an ABM treaty and an understanding of offensive weapons, but after that would come reductions. And this was the second area where the President would like to look for help from the Committee.

In conclusion the President reiterated that we needed the Committee’s help with the hawks. And secondly, we need suggestions where we go after Moscow over the next four or five years if the United States and the Soviet Union are to make further progress in the strategic arms area.

Mr. McCloy said he found the President's statement very interesting, but in regard to supporting an agreement there were some complications. The Committee members were supposed to be advisors but not to speak publicly. Mr. Brown said that the President could make available the advice he had been given. The President said he would like the Committee's appraisal of the agreement and then to use it. There will undoubtedly be a great exercise in nit-picking—who won, who got suckered, etc.

Picking up the President's point on reductions, Mr. Ruina said that this could only be accomplished with low levels of ABMs. The President then commented that the Soviets must be worried about the Chinese. Mr. Brown agreed and said this explained Soviet insistence on an NCA defense. Referring to the President's view that the Soviets need not worry about US reactions, Mr. Brown thought that the Soviets might not see it that way. They may see our defense lobby is very powerful. This may be useful for us to play on. The President agreed that we would like the Soviets to think that we were vigorous and our ABM decisions had helped in this regard. The President added that in connection with the SLBM issue our ability to get support for sea weapons was much greater than for ABMs or ICBMs. The Soviets would, of course, have to take that into account. Mr. Brown said while he would not favor a race, if we had one the Soviets had reason to be concerned. The President agreed that we were ahead in technology. Mr. Ruina added that if SLBMs were not included, we would be able to do what we are best at. The President said that that was an argument for the Soviets to make an agreement. Mr. McCloy said one should not discount Soviet willingness to make an agreement. They see it as a way of demonstrating parity. So the President should not give up too easily on the SLBM issue. The President expressed agreement about Soviet willingness to make an agreement but their reasons were different. He added that he would not give up easily on SLBMs.

Mr. Foster asked why we did not use our warheads as an asset. Their accuracy and number represent an incredible force and a great asset. The President added that it was also true that the warheads were not all that small.

The President then said that we must always assume that the other man's motives will differ from ours and each side is out to do the other in. But the reasons do come together and if we can make an agreement it will be a great boon to civilization. When the agreement that was announced last May 20th was reached,⁴ a follow-on agreement became almost inevitable. But we do have to make the best agreement possi-

⁴ See Document 160.

ble and if the two leaders decide to do that, it can be done. Governor Scranton said there was a great opportunity and after the first agreement there would presumably be another one to follow. But the more we can get this time the better because the next one may be harder. The President said “maybe.” If what we hear is only a quarter true, Brezhnev, who was definitely the leader on strategic matters, is vitally interested in agreement. If so, things might move. The NPT had been the basis; then there had been other agreements and soon we would sign the BW agreement.⁵ Berlin had proved to be the breakthrough for the summit, so each agreement builds on the other.

In closing the meeting the President again asked Mr. McCloy to give thought to the issues for a follow-on agreement. Mr. Ruina asked about a complete test ban. The President said that all ideas should be submitted and he would look at them.

The meeting ended after about 45 minutes. In leaving the President again complimented the Committee for its hard work, noting that it was short four members who had not been confirmed by the Senate.

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⁵ The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. It entered into force March 5, 1970. (21 UST 483) The convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10. It entered into force March 26, 1975. (26 UST 583)

242. **Conversation Among President Nixon, the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith), and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)**¹

Washington, March 21, 1972.

Nixon: Let me begin by saying that—speaking of hard work, you're all working awfully hard, and I know that we're now coming down to the real tough decisions. When I say "decisions," I mean, I have to put some down. And the thing that I think I need you—that we've all got to realize that—and I told them this,² and I'm going to tell you the same thing—is that if we get an agreement, the great danger that that agreement will pose to us, it's not going to be on the side of those who want arms control, because they're for any agreement. They'd prefer one that goes further, and so forth. But there will be a potentially very significant danger from those who say, "Who got took?" Needless to say, as you recall, after our China trip, they took a communiqué,³ which had very little to do with substance, but the whole—but many said, "Who won? Who lost?" Well, in a way because that was a good deal for both sides. But, in this instance, this is a highly substantive matter, as you know. And everybody is going to be watching the darn thing. Who won? Who lost? Is the United States in an inferior position to the Soviet Union? Did we get, you know, suckered here by these people and the rest?

What we have to do, therefore, is to be in a position, Gerry, where we've heard everybody. That's why I gave the Defense Department plenty of time to present their case, you know, at one of the last meetings,⁴ and where I told them I have to consider it. You've not only got to hear 'em, but we've got to be in a position that, if we make an agreement with these fellows, that we will not be open, particularly in this political year, to a resounding attack. And it's—and in a political year, never underestimate from which side it will come. You may find some of the most, what you thought were all-out peace-at-any-price crowd,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 691–5. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Smith and Haig from 5:10 to 5:47 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. On March 18 between 11:05 and 11:52 a.m. Kissinger and Nixon discussed talking points for this meeting with Smith. A recording of this conversation is *ibid.*, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 688–4.

² Nixon is presumably referring to the GAC; see Document 241.

³ See footnote 3, Document 241.

⁴ See Document 240.

if they think they could take us on for making an agreement in which we got taken by the Russians, they would do it. Now, an example of that, if you think I'm overestimating, it is the very amusing thing that some of those who, at first blush, when they didn't understand it, criticized, and wooed, and had wept buckets of crocodile tears about Taiwan, are people that would have sunk Taiwan without a trace 25 years ago—20 years ago. What they saw was the political [unclear]. See my point?

Smith: Sure.

Nixon: So what we have to do is to build a record. First, build a record that we considered the thing. And second, there ought to be an agreement, which is some—in other words, it's—which we can thoroughly defend from a national security standpoint. The attack, in other words, is going to be from the Right. It will not be from the Left. And if it is from the Left, to hell with it. We'll just have to fend it off, because it's better than anybody else was going to be able to do. But the attack from the Right could be—by the "Right," I'm referring to not the nut Right. I think that they'll attack anyway. *Human Events*, *National Review*, and the rest will knock the hell out of us, saying, "Why do you even meet with the Russians? Why do you have a toast with them?" And all that. We understand that. But, what we want to remember is the responsible Right. What I mean by that, you know, after all, the fellows like Laird, and Moorer, and Henry Jackson, and others. I mean, the responsible Right will start raising hell—Stennis. We've got to be—if they do, we've got to be in the position to say, "Well, now, we considered all these views, and we rejected them for these reasons." Or, "We accepted these positions," and then be able to defend them. So, if you, when you go back, in talking to the delegation, as you get down to the, you know, the hard, hard ground, that last five yards to the goal line, which we hope that's where it is, this is just scoring a damn touchdown, but it's one that's going to—maybe, we'll be able to hold and still win the game in the public opinion field.

There's also another very substantial danger that's tied to that, in my view. If there is a great hue and cry, an outcry in this country, a lot of it politically-inspired, coming as it does just three weeks before the Democratic Convention, if we don't get the agreement until Moscow, for example, or two—or a month before if you get it in May. I mean, on that sort of thing [unclear] the Democratic thing in July, there's this great hue and outcry on this issue, joined in by some Republicans, as well. I don't mean, I don't mean all the Democrats; it'll split them down the middle. But some of them will, will see it as a political opportunity if they—not only—not because they're really against it but because they'll want to say that we are stupid. But, this could create grave doubts in the world among our friends, because they'll say, "My God,

if the Americans are divided on this, maybe the Americans did make a deal which was not in the American interest; which was in the Soviet interest." So, what I'm saying here is that let's try to get an agreement, of course, above everything else, that we can live with, that is sound. But we also have to remember that about half of this battle—maybe a little more than half—it's got to appear that way. It's got to appear that way. You know, and I know, it's got to appear that way, because if it doesn't appear that way, it could, it could raise a lot of hell, and particularly in this kind of year. It's unfortunate that it's coming in this year. It'd be better if it came last year or next year. But it does come this year. We can't choose. Coming as it does, just before the conventions, it will be a lively, lively subject. And, based on what I've heard, I think, I think we're going to get this agreement, if we get it, if we get a package we can defend. But, it's those considerations that I think we have to have in mind at this point, and rather than simply considerations of—I mean, which would be more obvious: well, does Smith feel that, you know, you don't need to be concerned about the critics? Because, it isn't a case where, normally—which would be normal. I wish it was where everybody could be—breathe a sigh of relief and say, "Thank God. It's a good thing. It's a good step. It's a step toward peace. It's a step toward limitation of armaments." That would be the normal reaction, overwhelmingly, in this country. But, we can't count on it now. It's got to be solid, strong, and tough, so that we can debate it, stand up for it, kick hell out of the critics who are criticizing it for the wrong reason. You see what I mean? So that's a—that's a little of the thinking that I felt. Would you agree, Al?

Haig: Absolutely—

Nixon: You, you're talking to all these conservatives who come in, and they're violent. Hell, you've been—you've been talking to 'em—

Haig: Yes, sir.

Nixon: —Tower and that bunch, huh?

Haig: [unclear]—

Smith: Mr. President, can I just on that—

Nixon: Yeah.

[unclear exchange]

Smith: —report.

Nixon: Sure.

Smith: I have talked to Congressional committees, I think, 35 times—

Nixon: I know.

Smith: —since we have been back.

Nixon: Uh-huh.

Smith: And I don't detect except in Tower, and perhaps Byrd and Scoop—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: —any—

Nixon: How about Stennis?

Smith: Stennis said—and this is all on the basis—I mean, we're trying to get IC—SLs included—he said, "Look, I'm for you."

Nixon: He wants SLs in?

Smith: But he wasn't biding his time—

Nixon: You see, he called me today and took a very hard position. But I—I—frankly, I think, took him off of it a little, because I said, "Now, look, you're really coming down to the point of saying that we shouldn't have agreement if we can't get SLBMs in?" He said, "Well, that's where my position is, but on the rest of the committee—" I said, "Well, suppose the price is too high?" Now, understand: I think—I think we've got to try. And, you know, Defense wants it in. Defense agrees. Defense wants it in. State wants it in. Everybody else, but I don't know. [unclear]—

Smith: But, State will back off from that position, I'm sure. I want it in at the present time, but I want to be perfectly clear now with you, Mr. President, that I think—

Nixon: You don't think we can get it, do you?

Smith: I think it—I think it would be a good deal without it, a first-class deal. I think what you need—

Nixon: Well that's—Al, isn't that your feeling? That it would be a good deal, Al? As a military man?

Haig: Yes, sir. That's my general—

Nixon: [unclear] I understand is that the Defense Department can't figure out on SLBMs. Let me—look, let me be quite candid with you on it. I got appraised of that at this meeting and also at the other meeting. Looking at it from the standpoint of what the United States really can do in terms of more defense in the event that the other side goes for more, we have a much better chance to go for submarines than land-based stuff. There's no way you could get any more land-based stuff! No way. Right?

Haig: That's right.

Nixon: Hell, we've been down in there with ABM, the defensive weapon system, it was close. But, of course, this country for years—well, ever since the turn of the century, has gone for navy, right? And that's one view. On the other hand, if we get SLs in, you could make a—it's certainly going to look a lot like that. Let's have in mind the fact that—I don't know. Unless it's a good deal on SLs, I'm not for it.

[unclear] But what is your—but, I've interrupted. What do you think? Your feelings are somewhat similar?

Smith: Well, I think [unclear] we ought to try, and there's some chance that we can get the SLs included. Now, in this clause—

Nixon: You think there is a chance?

Smith: Yes. Bill Rogers asked me about it, to mention to you. He's going to send you a memo suggesting you write Kosygin stressing the importance of this. Now, I feel—

Nixon: If I wrote anybody, I wouldn't write Kosygin; I'd write Brezhnev. But the second point is: I don't think at this point that I should write—well, it's just my reaction, I don't know if you agree, but I don't think I should be writing—using that chip with that fellow at this point. Do you agree? Do you want it done?

Smith: Well, I think that there is a real chance that the Soviets are interpreting May 20th⁵ as—

Nixon: Excluding them—

Smith: —not requiring them to go into SLBMs.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Smith: And, as long as they have that interpretation—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: —our chances—

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

Smith: They are—

Nixon: Impossible.

Smith: Now, whether this is the right time for you to weigh in, or later, I don't know.

Nixon: I don't like to weigh in, Gerry, on something that we're going to get turned down on.

Smith: I agree.

Nixon: I think that when I weigh in, we've got to have a pretty good idea that, that we're going to get the deal, you know what I mean?

Smith: Yeah.

Nixon: And, and then, we'll go in with everything. You can say, "Now, this is the President." These guys are tough, as you know. And, of course, the other way will be tough, too, but—well, anyway, I've got the message, and I'll consider it.

Smith: My—

Nixon: [unclear]—

⁵ See Document 160.

Smith: My read, Mr. President—

Nixon: The intuition is not to do it.

Smith: We're—we're trying to stop—

Nixon: Why don't you tell them?

Smith: Well, I've told them many a time. [Laughing] Again, I think—

Nixon: Well, you can tell them you and I have talked, and you're working on it. Well, we'll put it in the—and we're going to have it in the instructions, isn't that right, Al?

Haig: Yes, sir. We'll have the instructions—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: But when we started Vienna last November, Mr. President, I communicated a personal message from you—

Nixon: Right.

Smith: —to Semenov on this buildup. And I think the least we should do is something like that—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: —or else, they'll think that we're [unclear]—

Nixon: 'Cause there's something else you could do: Is there any way you could, as a fallback position, say that that would be the next phase, or something to that effect? That's another way to get at it, you see?

Smith: Oh, they'll agree to that in a minute—

Nixon: They've already agreed to that?

Smith: They'll—they say we immediately should sit down after this and negotiate [unclear] like the summit.

Nixon: Also, I suppose other things that are—well—

Smith: But you have all sorts of arguments that I haven't heard surface. I didn't want to get in a donnybrook—

Nixon: I know.

Smith: —in the NSC.

Nixon: No use for 'em, did you? No, I [unclear] but I hear them all, so that nobody can say I didn't listen, you see? Hmm.

Smith: For instance, one of the things we don't often hear is that the French and the British are going to have nine votes, which is over 20 percent of ours, and the Soviets flatly say to me those votes are not going to be on our side; they're going to be on your side. And this is a little bit of an insurance policy we've got to have. We're trying to stop three Soviet programs to just one of ours.

Nixon: Three?

Smith: IC, SL, and ABM. Now, if you only stop two of the Soviets' to one of ours, it still seems to me a pretty good deal because our,

our programs are not going to be stopped at all—the intensity. And they're big. They're much bigger than we like to make out. Poseidon and the Minuteman are tremendous.

Nixon: Poseidon and—

Smith: And the Minuteman III, which is a MIRV—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: —that can be a land-based missile.

Nixon: Yeah, yeah. I know.

Smith: So that it—

Nixon: And that won't be stopped?

Smith: That won't be stopped. Now, there's a tactical point that I hesitate to raise now—

Nixon: That's all right. Raise it if you want.

Smith: [unclear] You mentioned Scoop Jackson. Scoop is the oldest friend I have, and—

Nixon: Great guy.

Smith: And I think [unclear]—

Nixon: If the Democratic Party had any damn brains they'd nominate him, but they won't.

Smith: I have worked with him for 25 years, I think. Last year, on the 29th of May—March, he made a proposal for an interim freeze, and it did not include SLBMs.⁶ See the *Congressional Record*. He wanted also to stop the American Minuteman III program, and the Soviets were just going to stop their ICBMs. Now, in addition to that, he proposed—

Nixon: Um-hmm?

Smith: —this hard-site defense thing, but he—

Nixon: He's on the hard-site defense?

Smith: But the inclusion or exclusion of SLs, logically, has nothing to do with the type of defense you can [unclear] that for, so that if Scoop starts to—acting up—

Nixon: Hell, I know [unclear]—

Smith: —it might be a little slower.

Nixon: Well, on the other hand, let me say I don't like to take him on for other reasons, because he's such a damn decent, responsible guy, you know what I mean? It isn't that. I don't think that he's the one to be concerned about. The ones that are going to surprise you, di-di-di-di [etc.]. To me, the Taiwan thing was a hell of an eye-opener. Good God, when I, when I read about some of these clowns that I know, that

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 150.

I mean, attacked Eisenhower for Quemoy/Matsu; who were always kicking Foster Dulles in the ass because of that, the China lobby, and the rest. And here, they're all crying tears over Taiwan. And I thought, "What the hell gives here?" And I realized it's all politics. [Laughs] They knew there was no problem, you know? So, that's what I think we've got to watch. In other words, just be sure the record is one—we've got to be sure the record is a darn good one, and we can go out and sell this deal and sell it strongly as one that is in the interests of the United States, and this is going to be in our interest; it isn't going to make us second-best. You know, let's put it in the vernacular. That's what I'm trying to get at.

Smith: Well, I'm completely persuaded by this. If I were a Soviet planner, and I've told this to a lot of people, I would be concerned about the way the balance is going. Because—

Nixon: You would?

Smith: When you came into office, we had 1,710 independently targetable warheads. Now we've got double that. In 2½ years, we're going to double our present figures.

Nixon: Because of MIRV?

Smith: And that, I think, is the important thing: the number of warheads you can deliver. Not the fact that they have some more submarines [unclear]—

Nixon: That's in power-weight?

Smith: That's the thing. Now, each one of these is three times the size of the Hiroshima explosion.

Nixon: [unclear]

Smith: And the Minuteman MIRVs are, I don't know, ten times the size of Hiroshima. Now, if we want more to do the job, if you make a deal without the boats, we'll just build boats. I don't think you need more, but you—your hands aren't tied at all.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Smith: So that I have no problem of conscience here about certifying that we're much better off if we can make a deal—

Nixon: Now, on the hard-site thing: We—I know their position, and, of course, it's the position of arms control people. I must say that you have to be impressed by the vigor and the, you know, the campaign. That, that Defense guys really argue it strong, their whole thing, you know. What—But you, basically, take the same position that the arms control group does. Is that really—?

Smith: I think it would be a tragedy—

Nixon: But they, they took us—they—we spent—I would say—I don't know—I think they had 30 minutes on that.

Haig: Yes, sir. They did.

Nixon: You think—don't you think they covered about as much as he, or—ok, let me just ask you: do you endorse their position?

Smith: Yes. A hundred percent—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Smith: I think it's—

Nixon: You think it's a new arms race, and all that?

Smith: And I think you'd lose a great deal of support from the fellows in Congress who you've been briefing. This has been an entirely new thought, to build up instead of reduce. Our allies haven't got a whiff of this. It's an entirely new ballgame, at the last minute, you're proposing. But, basically, I'm against it because it won't work.

Nixon: You don't think it will work?

Smith: They're talking about, look, maybe 1,000 interceptors, 2,000 interceptors. I don't think the Senate is going to give a sort of blank check to the Executive Branch. I said, "How many interceptors are you fellows talking about?" Obviously, we don't know. Indefinite. I even question if we can get consent to—

Nixon: Let me say this: that it's very important, whatever we decide on it, though, to keep the—to keep a line out there. Let's not have a big debate about it. See my point?

Smith: Well, I think that—

Nixon: You see, if we [unclear] if the—if—there is a strong lobby for it, see? So, I want to keep them guessing while, while I consider it. See my point?

Smith: One tactic that you could do—

Nixon Yeah?

Smith: —is the one we've worked out with this future system involving lasers. We've got the Soviets to agree that if they get developed, we'll both look at it, and before we decide the clause of a main treaty. Now, this hard-site is still a dream if it's developed. And if either side wants it—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Smith: —we can amend the treaty.

Nixon: Well, this doesn't stop the R&D, does it?

Smith: No.

Nixon: Which Laird says he's got the money for. Right, Al?

Smith: And it wouldn't stop deploying these components in one of the sites, or two of the sites, whatever you decide. You could take these short-range radars and Sprint missiles and operate them.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Smith: What I don't think you should do is set up something that will leave the whole ABM framework uncertain until three or four years in the future and give us a right to then deploy an unlimited number of interceptors and radars.

Nixon: Do you—you share the view that the hard-site thing would—might lead them to be able to develop a good defense?

Smith: It will certainly give them a bigger base than they have now to do just that.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Smith: And the CIA people tell us it would increase your verification problems. And it's the sort of thing the Soviet military might very well grab at.

Nixon: Hmm.

Smith: But my guess is the Soviet political people would say, "This is just entirely—"

Nixon: Do you think they have some differences?

Smith: I'm sure of it.

Nixon: You're rather sure? They say they do, but I wonder how much credence you give to that. Is that what—?

Smith: I'm—After 2½ years, I'm sure of it.

Nixon: Do you see it, then?

Smith: There are the fellows—

Nixon: Hmm?

Smith: —who want to put the money into civilian resources, and there are the fellows who say—

Nixon: Um-hmm. They want to—

Smith: "—whatever the Americans say, we've got to be ready for an attack by them. We've got to pay whatever it costs."

Nixon: Do you think they, then, underestimate our political problem here?

Smith: Well, which one?

Nixon: [unclear]—

Smith: We have a number of them. Which—?

Nixon: Well, the political problem of, basically, the new isolation, the new—the, you know, put the money into the ghettos, and all that sort of thing. [unclear]—

Smith: I think their military fellows do. I think they believe their own pap: that the military-industrial sector—

Nixon: That which—they—in other words, we're just the greedy capitalist, imperialist, warmonger in power right now? The military fellows believe that?

Smith: I'm sure they do.

Nixon: You see, we might have a—I'm just thinking if I were writing the Democratic platform. It's going to be a bitch to write because Scoop ain't going to [laughs]. He'll have to ignore his wife on this issue. But they're likely to call for a \$30 billion cut on a \$34 billion budget. That would certainly tend to risk, to weaken our bargaining power. So, it seems to me, if we're going to make a deal, we got to make it before then. Right?

Smith: That was a very perceptive comment that you made at the NSC.⁷ It's going to be rough for them.

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: Military budgets.

Nixon: Yeah. Well, the—you think they want a deal?

Smith: Yes, sir.

Nixon: You're convinced of that?

Smith: Semenov talks in terms of buttoning up this next session by the first of May so that he can have three weeks to clean up and get his leadership sufficiently acquainted with it. He mentioned he'd like to have nothing left over. Now, this sounds to me like a man who wants a deal and expects that we're going to work out something. It also points out how short a time we've got. We've got six weeks, so if we're going in with some positions that we know we're going to have to recede from, I hope that—

Nixon: Hmm?

Smith: —Al and his friends will be able to give us some quick—

Nixon: Decisions?

Smith: —decisions from you about—

Nixon: Yeah, I understand.

Smith: I don't know, because we don't have it when—like we used to have when we talked about three months—

Nixon: I know.

Smith: —four months ago. And that—

Nixon: In other words, you feel that they are—that they feel they have to have a deal, and—which balances the problem that some feel on our side: that we have to have one. I mean, it's a—it would be a very bad position for us, wouldn't it, if we went in there saying, "Oh, God, we've got to have a deal," and they didn't feel that way. You don't think they look at it that way now, do you? Or—how do you see that one? Is that—?

⁷ See Document 240.

Smith: I think they probably calculate [unclear].

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: The Americans need a deal more than they do—

Nixon: Right.

Smith: —because of great expectations—

Nixon: Great expectations of the summit, and there's going to be an election. Right. Now, on their side, though, how do we calculate them?

Smith: Well, they've had it now for 2½ years. I'm sure they've got pressures at home to make a deal. I think they're concerned [unclear] things like this hard-site talk. That if the SALT collapses—

Nixon: Yeah?

Smith: —then a new impetus might—

Nixon: Let them worry about that. Let it hang out there. You know, that's why I say, "Don't reject it too quickly."

Smith: Well, I thought, for instance, I would throw out a few fish. Like: we don't have to finish in May—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: —maybe we could go back to Vienna after the summit and see if we can cut some more problems. Let them think a little bit.

Nixon: You go to Vienna now or Helsinki—?

Smith: I go to Helsinki this time. But I would just start talking a little bit about the Vienna phase after this; it will make them think a little bit.

Nixon: What did Thompson think before he died?⁸ Did he think they want a deal?

Smith: Yes, and I believe—

Nixon: Too bad he couldn't live to see it if we get one.

Smith: And I believe that Tommy would strongly endorse what we're saying here: if you can't get the SLs, you've still got the—

Nixon: So, you'd still take the deal, without the SLs? That's your feeling?

Smith: The great problem is to get the ABMs under some control. Because, otherwise, we can, and they can, spend billions of dollars, and it's like a tic-tac-toe game.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Smith: Every guy to make an "X" knows how to play. The other fellow puts an "O" down and—

⁸ Llewellyn Thompson died February 6.

Nixon: From our standpoint, of course, the great prize is to get those land-based ones under control, too. I mean their offensives. Hmm?

Smith: Well, I would have thought if—when we started this three years ago, if we'd said to you, "Look, we can get 100 to 150 interceptors," something like that—"ABMs, that we have to think about penetrating, stop their ICBM program, [coughs] like 300 of these big ones," it would have looked like a pretty good deal to us. [Pause] And I don't see any trouble at all on the right—on the left-wing side.

Nixon: No, no, no. I—

Smith: Unless they say you didn't go far enough.

Nixon: Oh, I agree. We have to—

Smith: And that is [unclear]—

Nixon: I'm not worried about that. I'm not worried about that. We can manage that. Say, "Well, what the hell? We've come a long way. Where were you?" You know? But non-proliferation has nothing to do with limitation; neither did the test ban.

Smith: But this will help non-proliferation, if we can show the other countries we're putting limits on ourselves.

Nixon: Sure. Sure.

Smith: It'll help.

Nixon: Sure. But what I meant is, when you're talking about a test ban and non-proliferation, it has nothing to do with power balance between the Soviet Union and United States. It makes it a little more difficult.

Smith: On this one, you got a different ballpark.

Nixon: That's right. So this gets to the heart of the problem, too. That's why the non-proliferation is hard to negotiate, and so is the test ban. But this should be—this is about the magnitude of a hundred times the size, because it goes to the heart of each nation's security. Right?

Smith: I'm sure of that.

Nixon: That's what they think; it's what we've got to think, too.

Smith: May I raise another tactical question, Mr. President?

Nixon: [unclear]

Smith: I think it would be bad, even if we could get—to reach an agreement before you were ready to sign it. Because if one may have been, been reached in—I mean, at our level—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: —early in May. If there's a leak, it would be shot at—

Nixon: Sure.

Smith: —from all sides. So, if we're—

Nixon: They'd pound it to pieces. They potentially kick your hard-site deal.

Smith: My sense—

Nixon: If it didn't have that in, you'd have all hell breaking loose, and the pressures would come on: demands from Congress that you come down. [unclear] You know what I mean?

Smith: So, I would suggest that, as a tactic, one think about deliberately not reaching an agreement. Even, if necessary, holding out—

Nixon: I don't think it's probably going to be necessary [unclear]—

Smith: Well, I think that's probably too—

Nixon: I see your point, though. I think you're absolutely right.

Smith: Then, you can face them with a *fait accompli*.

Nixon: Because if we come to the—well, then, also, there should be some problems that we may have to solve, and there may—and I think there probably will be. So, if we can come to there, and then whack it, and then sell it with the highest it'll be—I'll put it this way, Gerry: It's going to be much easier for us to sell it at the highest level then it would be for you to sell it.

Smith: Sure.

Nixon: Isn't that really what it gets down to?

Smith: And it will be much easier to sell a *fait accompli*—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: —when you come back with a—

Nixon: That's right.

Smith: —with a good deal than to have people pecking away at it in advance of the summit.

Nixon: In fact, you may have to play a few games there. There's, I mean, ok, well, there's a problem here and a problem there. I don't know. I don't know what's going to happen here, and—but we're going to do our very best—

Smith: On—

Nixon: —and we'll have to discuss the thing again in Moscow.

Smith: On a thing like duration—

Nixon: You [unclear]—you come in—

Smith: —[unclear] could do that.

Nixon: What's that?

Smith: On this question of how long do you think it should last, that might be a good one to do—

Nixon: Right.

Smith: —just to hold it open.

Nixon: And that's something that you could—I don't know. We don't have a basis for hope now, but my general feeling is that I don't know how this would work, but if we don't reach an agreement, which I don't think will happen for reasons that you've mentioned, probably shouldn't 'til we're ready to, to wrap it up. I hadn't thought about this, and I don't want you to say anything about it to anybody—anybody—just, just pass the word to Al or, I don't know, whoever you want in Defense to hear it—if we don't, I'm not inclined to think that we ought to have the whole, the whole delegation come to Moscow and conduct it. The—I think you should, but what's your feeling on that? I [unclear] Al, have we done any thinking about that sort of—? Or, maybe—if it—well, understand: they've all worked on it, and I suppose that, maybe on that side—God. To have a whole—you see my [unclear] of the problem? Maybe you have to. Well, think about it. Think about that. Or, do you have a response—I meant, a feeling about it now that you'd like to express? Maybe they have to—

Smith: Well, I—I have a feeling that these fellows are all professionals, and they would understand it if—

Nixon: Yeah?

Smith: —they were told it would overload the circuit. On the other hand, if it could possibly be damaging—

Nixon: If there's something left to be done. Well, I see your point. What's your feeling, Al? You have anything—?

Haig: I think it might be troublesome. I think we ought to just give it a good, hard look now.

Nixon: They might—it might be troublesome if—

Smith: I think the sweeter if you keep Nitze, for instance—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: —it'll be easier on Congressional testimonies—

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Right. That's very, very persuasive. You have to have the whole group. I think you're right. If we come down there—well, that's no problem, you know. And also, there will be work to be done, and we'll want their advice. Stay up 'til—I hope the damn Russians don't stay up as late as the Chinese. The thing about them, they sleep all morning and work all night.

Smith: Well, they're changing their habits a little.

Nixon: I mean the Chinese do.

Smith: Yeah. Oh, I know—

Nixon: I don't know about the Russians.

Smith: The Russians are working more reasonable—working more—

Nixon: [unclear] They used to work a lot at night.

Smith: —and they're drinking less.

Nixon: They what?

Smith: Because, they're drinking less, and they're working—

Nixon: Are they cutting the drinking?

Smith: —a more normal day, yeah.

Nixon: Yeah. They used to—they used to just drink like—hell, when I was there—

Smith: I think they found that was pretty counterproductive. There were—we'll see people under the table all—

Nixon: But now, they're more moderate?

Smith: That's our experience. They don't force you to drink bottoms up.

Nixon: Well, they're not going to force me to drink bottoms up. [Laughing] I can't stand that stuff. I had enough of that Maotai wine—just a little sip of each. Well, let me say this: we'll get out instructions that will be, you know, give a good bargaining position for you. We'll also be in a position to be in very close touch as things go along. We—it will not be possible all the time, let's face it. You know what I mean? I've got to—I must say that on that SLBMs, that's a very coy defense by—you can go into the fine points, but don't make a deal unless you get it. I don't think we can put that in [unclear]. Huh? Because damn it, we didn't say that at the beginning. We didn't say that last May. That—they're right about that, aren't they? That wasn't in the May understanding was it?

Smith: [unclear]

Nixon: The May understanding involved ABMs and land-based offensive missiles, as I recall.

Smith: That, that should—

Haig: That was the normal understanding—

Nixon: It doesn't say that specific thing, but that's what we understood. Huh?

Haig: They would interpret it that way, I think.

Smith: And when Semenov talked to me in Vienna, just about that same time, he was just talking about ICBMs. And I asked him, "How about the SLBMs?" Even then, he said, "Oh, no. I didn't say anything. I was just asking questions." But, I think they're entitled to interpret May 20th as not requiring—and those new boats. And I think you're well aware of, Mr. President, the great gripe they have on the submarine thing is that we can have forward bases and they can't. They can't use Cuba and we can use Spain—

[unclear exchange]

Smith: And that's a tremendous advantage.

Nixon: Hmm.

Smith: And I—this is, to a good extent, behind their drive, and now they have more boats to make up for that. Now, it's a transient advantage, because we might get thrown out of Spain and—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Smith: —thrown out of Scotland. Nothing is planned in perpetuity.

Nixon: That's right.

Smith: At present, we've a great asset—

Nixon: Yeah.

Smith: —which makes the numbers business look a lot more manageable.

Nixon: I see.

Smith: And on the question of where Tom Moorer comes out, for instance, I was surprised to hear him in the Verification Panel, and in the NSC, say, "Well, if the boats are not going to be included, then we want to have a short-term interim agreement." Now, I never thought I'd hear the Chairman of the Chiefs even speculating about a deal that does not include the boats. So, he's thinking about—

Nixon: Hmm?

Smith: —if you can't get the boats, then let's have a short-term freeze agreement. I took that to mean that he's—

Nixon: I see.

Smith: —he's crossed that Rubicon.

Nixon: Well, anyway, I appreciate the chance to talk to you.

243. National Security Decision Memorandum 158¹

Washington, March 23, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki (SALT VII)

After considering the discussions and recommendations of the National Security Council, I have decided on the United States position for presentation at Helsinki (SALT VII).

Offensive Limitations

1. The Delegation should initially concentrate its efforts on reaching an agreement on offensive limitations. The Delegation must make it clear that our final decision on ABMs will be heavily influenced by the scope of the Interim Agreement.

2. Accordingly, the Delegation will continue to press for the inclusion of limits on SLBM launchers in the Interim Agreement. The Delegation should propose, at the outset, that the SLBM freeze date start on the date of signature of the Interim Agreement (rather than July 31, 1971).

3. At a time he deems appropriate, the Chairman of the Delegation should propose that the ICBM launcher construction freeze also start on the date of the signature of the Interim Agreement. In this connection, the proposal that MLBM launchers be limited to those externally completed by December 31, 1971, should be withdrawn.

4. It is important that the two countries agree, either in the Interim Agreement or in an interpretive statement, that launchers for older, heavy ICBMs (Titans, SS-7s, SS-8s) cannot be converted to accept Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBMs). Regarding other limits on the conversion of launchers to accept MLBMs, the Delegation should propose (a) moving the depth-and-diameter constraint to an agreed interpretive statement, and (b) redefining heavy strategic ballistic missiles as those of a size greater than the SS-11. Subsequently, the Chairman

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 151–200. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT.

of the Delegation may, if he deems it necessary, drop the proposal for agreement on the depth-and-diameter constraint through an agreed interpretive statement and introduce a unilateral statement that the U.S. would consider changes in silo depth or diameter as indicators of possible non-compliance with the MLBM limitation.

5. The Delegation should continue efforts to get limitations on land-mobile ICBM launchers and soft-pad ICBM launchers included in the Interim Agreement. In either or both cases, the Chairman of the Delegation may, at his discretion, propose agreed interpretive statements on such limitations in place of specific provisions in the Interim Agreement.

6. See Annex A for instructions regarding the general definition of ICBMs and limits on test and training launchers.

7. The Delegation should strongly reaffirm our position regarding duration and withdrawal. (See paragraph 4, NSDM 145.)² The period now unspecified in the special withdrawal provision proposed by the U.S. should be *five* years. After further negotiation, the Delegation may recommend alternative positions for Presidential decision; while the terms for continuing the agreement might vary (e.g., fixed duration with automatic renewal or extension by mutual agreement), the minimum duration of the interim agreement, unless replaced by a more complete follow-on agreement, must be five years.

Defensive Limitations

8. Our formal position on the number of ABM sites and ABM launchers/interceptors remains unchanged.

9. The Chairman of the Delegation is directed to explore privately with the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation the proposal that, if the Soviets agree to include SLBM launchers in the Interim Agreement, the U.S. will consider changes in our ABM position. He should suggest that the U.S. would be prepared to negotiate an agreement which would take account of the Soviet interest in ICBM defense. If the Soviets show interest in this proposition and press for a more precise statement, the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation is authorized to reply that the U.S. would accept a two-for-two ABM arrangement with 200 ABM launchers/interceptors. (No more than 100 ABM launchers/interceptors are allowed at any one site.) Each country would have the right to either (a) NCA defense plus defense of one ICBM field, or (b) defense of two ICBM fields. The location of the ICBM fields would be subject to the geographical limitations in our present proposal. Moreover, there would be a right to change the location subject to

² Document 221.

agreed procedures. (These procedures need not be agreed upon prior to any change in location of a deployment area.)

10. If the Soviets indicate they will accept the inclusion of SLBM launchers in the Interim Agreement, then the Chairman of the Delegation is authorized to make a formal proposal of the two-for-two ABM sites.

11. If, however, the Soviets continue to reject the inclusion of SLBM launchers in the Interim Agreement after the first three weeks in Helsinki, then the Delegation should make recommendations for Presidential decision regarding the inclusion of SLBMs and ABM levels.

12. For ABM defense of the national capital, the Chairman of the Delegation is authorized to accept, at his discretion, the 150 kilometer radius proposed by the Soviets. On the other hand, the Delegation should initially hold to our present proposed limit of *four* Modern ABM Radar Complexes. If he deems it necessary, the Chairman of the Delegation may propose *six* MARCs.

13. For ABM defense of ICBM fields, the Delegation should press to get Soviet acceptance of the principle of Modern ABM Radar Complexes (MARCs). The Delegation should initially hold to the limit of *four* MARCs for two ICBM fields. The Delegation should indicate that there is flexibility in our position on the number of MARCs. If he deems it necessary, the Chairman of the Delegation should propose, at his discretion, up to *six* MARCs for *each* ICBM field. (In the case of paragraph 11 where one country chooses NCA defense and *one* ICBM defense site, the number of allowed MARCs for each ICBM field would be one-half the number of the two ICBM fields.)

14. Should the formal proposal in paragraph 10 be made and should the Soviets continue to resist the principle of MARCs for ICBM defense, the Chairman of the Delegation should explore how agreement might alternatively be reached with the Soviets on a combination of qualitative and quantitative ABM radar limits. Specifically, with an exception for the four Safeguard radars at our two ICBM defense sites, ABM radars for ICBM defense should not be larger than 10^6 watt-meters squared. In conjunction with this, the number of ABM radars for ICBM defense sites should be limited so that each party would be assured that neither side would undertake extensive deployments of these radars (i.e., beyond the number which would provide adequate support to the agreed level of ABM launchers/interceptors).

15. The Delegation should continue for now to press for strict limits on Other Large Phased Array Radars (i.e., our “mutual agreement” proposal or the proposal offered to the Soviets on January 26, 1972).

16. The Delegation should reaffirm the importance of our provision regarding withdrawal in case the follow-on negotiations fail (i.e., our proposed addition to Article XV of the Joint Draft Text). The pe-

riod now unspecified in the provisions should be *five* years. I am prepared to omit this provision. However, before authorizing the Delegation to do so, I ask that the Delegation forward for my approval as soon as possible a scenario whereby the U.S. could affirm that failure to replace the Interim Agreement with more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms could jeopardize our supreme interests and, if so, would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

17. The Chairman of the Delegation should, at a time which he deems appropriate, make a statement along the lines that: If the USSR were to undertake a concerted program which substantially increased the threat to the survivability of our strategic retaliatory forces, the U.S. would consider this to jeopardize our supreme interests. Consequently, this could be a basis for withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

Other Issues

18. At Annex A is guidance on the other issues relating to the Joint Draft Texts and associated interpretive statements.

19. The Chairman of the Delegation is authorized to inform the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation that, subject to satisfactory resolution of the issues covered by paragraph 18 above and of the issues reflected in the bracketed portions of the Joint Draft Texts, the unbracketed portions of the Joint Draft Texts would be acceptable to the U.S.

20. We must be particularly careful to avoid leaks during the next few weeks since the negotiations have entered an especially sensitive stage. To this end, all substantive statements on SALT are to be cleared through the White House.

Richard Nixon

Annex A

1. On the general definition of ICBMs, the Delegation should continue efforts to get our present proposal accepted or can propose an alternative definition similar to: "ICBMs are any land-based strategic ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the distance between the eastern-most part of the U.S. and the nearest part of the USSR, including those deployed for possible use at lesser ranges."

2. Either formulation which the Delegation has proposed for test and training launchers would be acceptable. In this connection, the Delegation should inform the Soviets that the U.S. would view as inconsistent with the Interim Agreement a significant increase in the proposition of test and training launchers for MLBMs.

3. With regard to each of the issues examined in the Interagency Paper "Issues Arising from Agreed Language in the Joint Draft Texts

and from Associated Interpretive Statements," dated March 6, 1972, the following guidance applies.

a. ABM Treaty, Article I, 2 (Territorial Defense). This should be retained in its present form.

b. ABM Treaty, Article IV (Test Ranges). The Delegation should make clear that the 15 launchers is an aggregate limit—e.g., by changing the language in the second sentence of Article IV. Moreover, the Delegation should seek an understanding on what are the current test ranges.

c. ABM Treaty, Article V, 1 (Mobile ABM components). The Delegation should make it clear to the Soviets that this provision applies to all ABM components (viz., launchers, interceptors, radars, and other devices capable of substituting for them) which are not fixed land-based. The Delegation should seek to revise Article V, 1, along the following lines: "Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." If the Soviets raise the issue, the Delegation should state that the revised provision does not apply to such devices as satellites providing early warning by detection of missile launch.

d. ABM Treaty, Article VI (a, b) (Test in an ABM mode). At an appropriate time, the Delegation should provide the Soviet Delegation with qualitative examples, such as those listed in the interagency paper, "Testing in an ABM Mode," to clarify our interpretation of that phrase.

e. ABM Treaty, Article VI (b) (Deployment of ballistic missile early-warning radars). Final acceptance of this provision should be deferred until the issue of OLPARs is resolved.

f. ABM Treaty, Interpretive Statement on Multiple Warhead ABMs. The Delegation should seek Soviet agreement to the U.S. interpretation presented on January 28, 1972.

g. ABM Treaty, Interpretive Statement on Defense of Early-Warning Radars. The Delegation need make no further statement on the subject.

h. ABM Treaty, Interpretive Statement on Technology of Early-Warning Radars. The Delegation need make no further statement.

i. ABM Treaty, Interpretive Statement on Selective Direct Observation (SDO). The Delegation should not make the earlier proposed statement on SDO.

j. ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, Interpretive Statement on Verification. The Delegation should not make the proposed statement on operation of national means of verification.

k. Interim Agreement, Interpretive Statement on Test and Training Launchers. See paragraph 2 above.

l. Documentation of Interpretations of SALT Agreements. The Delegation should propose that agreed interpretations or understandings

relating to the Agreements should be documented in an agreed summary record, available for public use, to be initialled by the Chairmen of the Delegations or their designees.

244. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Tucker) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Washington, March 27, 1972.

SUBJECT

SALT VII Instructions—NSDM-158

NSDM-158² could be setting the stage for a summit resolution of outstanding issues by coupling two major difficult issues—SLBM launcher limits and ABM levels—while simplifying agreement on several less important issues. Specifically, the President has decided to

1. Press for SLBM inclusion:

- by tying a change in present U.S. ABM position (from “2 or 1” to “2 for 2”) to Soviet acceptance of SLBM inclusion;
- by allowing the SLBM freeze date to slip to the date of signature;
- but stating that if Soviets continue to reject SLBM inclusion after three weeks in Helsinki the Delegation should “make recommendations for Presidential decision regarding the inclusion of SLBMs and ABM levels.”

2. Reject meaningful ICBM defense:

- by limiting interceptors to 100 per site;
- by pressing for the MARC concept of radar controls at ICBM fields;
- by providing even in the fallback on radar controls at ICBM fields that the radars shall not exceed the numbers needed to support the agreed level of interceptors;
- but directing Gerry Smith to state that if the USSR undertakes a program which would substantially increase the threat to our retaliatory forces, the US would consider this to jeopardize our supreme in-

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-77-0095, Box 7, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret; Nodis. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Laird saw it on March 29. An attached handwritten note from Tucker to Laird reads: “Paul Nitze called on the secure phone from Paris to report that it looked like the Soviets were willing to discuss the inclusion of SLBMs in the offensive agreement if the US was willing to modify its ABM position. Therefore, Paul feels we will be negotiating ABM much earlier than he had originally forecast.”

² Document 243.

terests and to provide the basis for withdrawal under the supreme interest provision.

3. Press (initially) for an unlimited duration offense agreement and the special right of withdrawal from ABM agreement:

—but stating that a 5-year duration is the minimum acceptable for the offense agreement;

—and stating that the President is prepared to omit the special withdrawal provision, substituting for this provision a unilateral statement to the effect that failure to reach more complete offensive limitations could jeopardize our supreme interests and constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

4. Stress control on ABM capable components:

—by pressing for strict OLPAR limits (“for now”);

—by directing the Delegation to clarify “testing in an ABM mode” by providing the Soviets with qualitative examples.

5. Eliminate several possible sources of disagreement:

—by directing that no further statements be made on early warning radar defense, the legality of existing national means of verification, selective direct observation and technology for use in early warning radars;

—by removing the special limit and date on MLBM completion.

I am pleased by the President’s stress on the coupling of offense and defense—tactically, in the coupling of SLBM limits and ABM levels, strategically, by the statement to the effect that a concerted Soviet program to increase substantially the threat to our retaliatory forces could be a basis for withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

I am pleased by the President’s stress on limiting SLBMs. The NSDM, while not as tough as our position, is much harder than could have been expected from earlier White House statements. If the Soviets continue to reject SLBM limits in the first three weeks in Helsinki we should be on guard to insist on their inclusion in any new instructions, and should insist that SLBM launcher limits not be dropped prior to the summit meeting.

The toughness of the initial positions on duration and withdrawal and on OLPARs and ABM mode testing is welcome, even though there is indication of a willingness to fall back.

I am keenly disappointed by the decision to reject Site Defense of Minuteman. I am sorry to see Malmstrom allowed as an alternative to Washington because this will complicate justifying to Congress an NCA defense in lieu of the Malmstrom Safeguard site already under construction. As a result we might wind up with an expensive and unjustifiable two-site Safeguard deployment, still have a vulnerable Minuteman and lack an NCA defense. Instead of a strategically significant defense of

ICBM fields within the agreement, the NSDM relies on a unilateral U.S. declaration that we may withdraw from the defense agreement “if the Soviets were to undertake a concerted program which substantially increased the threat to the survivability of our strategic retaliatory forces.” Thus it increases the probability that we might have to withdraw from the defense agreement in the next few years, and means that adequate offensive controls will be harder to obtain in the follow-on negotiations.

Paul Nitze feels that the numerous fallback positions in the NSDM and the requests for the Delegation to send recommendations back to Washington after three weeks indicate a willingness to complicate the negotiations to the point of jeopardizing ad referendum agreement at Helsinki. Perhaps the White House wishes to reduce disagreements to two or three major issues which could be resolved at the summit.

In spite of my disappointment, I don’t think we should make any reclama on the decision on ABM levels at this time. The issue was fairly presented at the NSC, and the NSDM clearly reflects a lot of care in preparation. We must watch the talks in the next three weeks, responding as the situation develops while we begin careful consideration of the next phase. If there should be agreement at the Moscow meeting, it would be appropriate for the President to discuss the initiation of follow-on negotiations in Moscow. So far little attention has been given to this subject.

Gardiner Tucker

245. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon¹

Moscow, March 27, 1972.

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to express some further considerations in continuation of our correspondence, having in mind your letter of last Febru-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 498, President’s Trip Files, Exchanges of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 3. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the first page of letter indicates that Dobrynin handed it to Kissinger at 12:45 p.m. on March 28. The full text of the letter is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 72.

ary 15² and the conversation with our Ambassador in Washington on March 17.³

I and my colleagues likewise closely follow the course of preparation for the May meeting in Moscow as well as all the events attendant to that preparation.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

I and my colleagues attach special significance as you do, Mr. President, to the forthcoming discussion in Moscow on the questions of strategic arms limitation. We would like to hope that the discussion on those questions will be constructive and yield concrete positive results. Of course, this will require maximum joint efforts to be applied in the remaining period so as to find a mutually acceptable solution based on the principle of equal security for both sides.

I think it is quite realistic. Let us take a question on which a proximity of positions has already emerged—that of cessation, beginning from July 1, 1972, of new construction of silo launchers for land-based ICBMs. This would mean that for a specified period the sides would not increase the number of such launchers which each of them would have as of the date of the beginning of the “freeze”. The time-period to be established could be lengthier, namely—three years, while in the meantime, as agreed, further active negotiations would be pursued on strategic arms limitation. An agreement on such a “freeze” should not, of course, involve the possibility for modernization and replacement of appropriate weapons on which there already exists agreement between the two sides.

Conclusion of such an agreement on “freeze”, along with a treaty on limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems—and here our positions have drawn nearer as well—would be such an important step in the relations between our countries, that its significance can hardly be overestimated. That fact would undoubtedly make a profound favorable impact both in our countries and in the whole world.

As for the considerations transmitted by you with regard to fixing, on a temporary basis, appropriate levels concerning submarines with ballistic missiles, we are carefully studying those considerations with due account of all related factors, whose complexity, it seems, you also recognize, and we shall inform you of our opinion.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

² See Document 232.

³ See Document 237.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize again the importance of a situation in which our talks are prepared and will be held in Moscow. On that, of course, in many respects will depend the results of the negotiations themselves. Making conditions most suitable for our meeting should in an equal degree be a concern of both sides. Therefore, I would like to tell you frankly, Mr. President, that continued bombings of the DRV—which, as I wrote to you in my previous letter, push the developments in Vietnam in a direction opposite to peaceful settlement—can only complicate the situation. We hope that you will weigh all aspects of this question.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

246. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, March 30, 1972, 1645Z.

271. Dear Henry:

I am not reporting in normal channels following episode because significance is unclear and reporting might lead to unwarranted expectations.

At today's mini-plenary, General Trusov reading a paper said an ABM treaty accompanied by an interim freeze limited to ICBMs would be "sufficient". Both sides recognized ICBMs were an important offensive weapon system. In post plenary private session, I queried Semenov as to significance of this change of terminology from their past statements that inclusion of SLBMs in a freeze would be inappropriate for this stage of the negotiations. He, at first, referred me to the Russian text which he promised to send on. But after his interpreter had left, he said to me in Russian "You have very good antennae."

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive.

From this, I assume the Soviets may be foreshadowing willingness to change their SL position—but the change might well be a proposal that if we insist on SL inclusion, they must have a compensating inclusion perhaps involving Poseidon.

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

247. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 31, 1972.

Kissinger: And Dobrynin said to me yesterday—he said he went to see Rogers,² and they talked for 30 seconds about SALT, and State put out a long blip of how Rogers had put it in to him on SALT—

Nixon: Put it in to him? You mean—

Kissinger: You know, with Rogers—Rogers had said to him, “We want SLBMs in SALT, one way or the other.” So, Dobrynin asked him, “Well, what do you mean?” Rogers said, “Well, I don’t know any details. I’m just telling you.” And—

Nixon: That’s the trouble—

Kissinger: That—

Nixon: Dobrynin does know the details.

Kissinger: And Dobrynin does know the details, because I had told him our position. But, at any rate, they’re playing it in such a way that it’s all going to surface—

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 699–1. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger from 10:17 to 11:14 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² Dobrynin met Rogers at the Department of State on March 22 for a review of outstanding bilateral issues. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 67. Kissinger met with Dobrynin on March 30 to discuss the summit. During this conversation Dobrynin gave an account of his meeting with Rogers. According to Kissinger’s memorandum of conversation, there was one other brief exchange about SALT: “Dobrynin said he thought that the SLBM question was now being actively considered in the Soviet Union, though they still thought that even a limit on ICBMs would be major progress. I said that the Soviet leaders would notify us in Washington before making any proposals in Helsinki.” For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see *ibid.*, Document 76.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —at the summit.

Nixon: It's just as well to let it appear that State is—and Defense—are hitting on SLBMs, and that the summit—that an arms control thing is hard. It is hard. And then, what we will do is to make an agreement on the other things, and then, simply say, "And now, we have instructed our negotiators to go to work on SLBMs." That's the way to handle that—

Kissinger: Mr. President, the less we—

Nixon: I am inclined to think that the SLBMs shouldn't be included, but I think [unclear]—

Kissinger: Well, no, we'll get them—no, we'll get them included now.

Nixon: Do we want them included?

Kissinger: Frankly, I don't think we do, but I—but we—I don't see how we can go against the [Joint] Chiefs of Staff.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I think we're going to get it, but I—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Kissinger: I think it's in our interest not to let the Democrats think a hell of a lot is going to come out of Moscow—

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: Because then they'll—

Nixon: Or make it seem as tough at the negotiating round.

Kissinger: Because then, they think—right now, no one has raised any expectations about Moscow, and the more low-key we can hold it, the better off we are.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: Because we're going to have a lot of agreements.

Nixon: Yeah. Particularly keeping it scattered around the government.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

248. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, March 31, 1972, 1440Z.

275. Dear Henry:

On March 30th Kishilov told Garthoff that the transcript of President Nixon's March 24th press conference² had raised questions in their minds as to the US position and the President's remarks left obscure whether the President wished the SLBM question to be left for a decision at the summit. When Garthoff said that that was an incorrect interpretation, Kishilov said that he could understand Garthoff's explanation, but "there were others who might continue to interpret the President's own views on the relationships of SALT to the summit in a somewhat different way."

I think this Soviet interpretation is not farfetched, but I do not believe it is one which the President would like to leave in the Soviet mind.

I have assured Semenov that our purpose at Helsinki is to do our best to finalize agreements here. But it would be helpful if I could tell him that I have checked with the President and that the Soviet interpretation of his remarks on 24 March is not correct. It would also be helpful if the President found an occasion to say to the press that although one cannot foresee the outcome of the Helsinki phase, he does not rule out the possibility that SALT agreements may be reached in Helsinki before the upcoming summit.

Warm regards.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive; Eyes Only.

² During his news conference, Nixon commented on SALT and the summit: "The Moscow trip [...] will be primarily devoted to a number of substantive issues of very great importance. One of them may be SALT, if SALT is not completed before Moscow. It does not appear now likely that they can complete SALT before Moscow, because I find that while we are agreed in principle on the limitation of offensive and defensive weapons, that we are still very far apart on some fundamental issues—well, for example, whether or not SLBM's should be included." For the full text of Nixon's news conference, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 488–498.

³ On March 31 Sonnenfeldt drafted a response that reads: "There can be absolutely no question that 'Soviet interpretation' is wrong. We wish SLBM question settled as part of effort to finalize agreement at Helsinki. Please ensure that there is no misunderstanding on this score." A handwritten note by Haig on Sonnenfeldt's transmittal memorandum to Kissinger reads: "Hal, HAK said don't answer." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT)

249. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Helsinki, March 31, 1972, 1700Z.

WH21129. Reference: Helsinki 0272.² Unfolding of our 2-for-2 ABM position as you propose sometime next week is the right course. However, I would want to check this with the President before giving final approval. Perhaps you could continue to probe Semyonov's interest in SLBMs until next Wednesday or Thursday and check with me before giving him a detailed proposal. If Semyonov presents SLBM position of interest to us before then, you should notify me immediately and I will obtain a prompt decision on how to proceed. In any case, it is our intention to have you move ahead on ABM/SLBM package no later than next weekend.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

² In backchannel message 272 to Kissinger, March 30, Smith suggested "telling Semyonov privately that if the Soviets will include the SLs, the US would move to meet the Soviet interest in IC defense by tabling a 2-2 ABM position and give the specifics set out in the NSDM." (Ibid.) For NSDM 158, see Document 243.

250. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Secretary of Defense Laird, and the Secretary of the Navy (Chafee)¹

Washington, April 4, 1972.

Nixon: We may get, as you know, as a result of the thing, we may get this SLBM and ABM negotiated. But if we don't, we have got to really go on that, and even if we do—I was going to say on SLBM, generally, as I understand it, if we get anything in SALT, it will not mean that ULMS and all the rest go out the window, will it?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 701-14. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger, Laird, and Chafee from 12:25 to 1:15 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

Kissinger: No, but we'll have a tougher time, because—

Nixon: Yes. Well, I am—I think—

Kissinger: —that's what the Navy hadn't thought through, because—

Nixon: This is an area we've got to be ahead in. I—now, I don't want to, I don't want to give away that submarine thing.

Kissinger: I mean, I think, now, we're going to get SLBMs, but—but how to phase in the keel-laying with the replacement is going to be a tough problem, because—

Nixon: Um-hmm?

Kissinger: But, it's a technical issue, because they can lay keels for quite awhile longer—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —and not have to take anything out of inventory—

Nixon: Let me—let me suggest—well [unclear] huh? Can we?

Chafee: Shoot, we could do that, yes, without taking them out of—

Nixon: We can talk about that later.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: Incidentally, before we talk about the Vietnam thing, Henry, what position could Mel take on this damn SLBMs that will strengthen our hand in the negotiations? We can't—

Kissinger: Well, I think we ought to—

Nixon: We've got to be in a position where we don't get screwed on the SLBM deal. That's a priority.

Kissinger: I think we're in good shape, now, if—to stick with our present position until there's a twitch in—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —Helsinki. I have the sense that there will be.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: And then, I have to work out with Mel some system by which we can continue to lay keels for ULMS.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: I mean, we must have an agreement that preserves the ULMS. Don't you agree?

Laird: Yes, Mr. President, replacement of at least for the first half—

Kissinger: As a replacement, yeah.

Laird: —of the Polaris thing.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Well, you see the thing we have to be able to do, Mel. When you talk about the SLBM limitation, it's very appealing on the one

side—and I know the Chiefs favor it, and State favors it, and the rest very strongly; more than I do, although I'm—we're for it; we do have to be for it—but, looking at it from the standpoint of what we can present to the country, people are going to nitpick that agreement in every damn respect. And, on SLBMs, if they see that the Russians now are, because of [unclear] you know, in the one area where we're ahead, that they could close the gap, we're in a real, real problem. In other words, in terms of—we've got to be sure that the, that the submarine agreement is not one that will subject ourselves to the charge that we got took. See?

Laird: Well, that's one of the problems that we have. It's a political problem there, because of this, the facilities that they've developed, and the facilities we haven't developed in this area. Now, the new pictures that just came in this past week show that they are putting that new, big missile on their submarines. And they have one up against the dock there. I don't know whether they—the big missile's on it. And this is—has a 3,000—over 3,000 mile range. And we've watched those tests. And now, we have a first submarine with those missiles, and it's afloat with those missiles aboard. And—

Kissinger: How many? Sixteen?

Laird: Twelve.

Kissinger: Twelve.

Laird: What they did, Henry, was they took—

Kissinger: They extended the midsection. I know, they extended it by 25 feet—

Laird: —they extended—they extended the midsection and put in more living compartments there. We thought that they were going to put in missiles there; they did not. The picture shows, now, they have 12 holes and a new living compartment there, and this is—it's a big submarine, though. And they're much bigger holes there, because these are bigger missiles, and they go all the way down through the much deeper draught. But that's—

Nixon: Well, anyway [unclear]—

Laird: But you have to give them credit, though, Mr. President, for their [clears throat]—the kind of facilities they've developed.

Nixon: We're making them—we'll just say we're making the effort, because we—you know, to try to get the thing in, and we'll have to see what happens. But let's be very sure—

Kissinger: Well, we have to see what specific proposals are—

Laird: Some of these private enterprises, some of these that we've developed here, I'm a little, a little—I'm all for private enterprise, but they haven't kept up with [unclear].

Nixon: [unclear]

Laird: Probably, they—the tax cuts had a lot to do with it, but it’s not the whole story, as far as submarines.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

251. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, April 4, 1972.

283. Dear Henry:

At today’s mini-plenary, the “sufficient” formula for an interim freeze limited to ICBM’s was repeated. The term SLBM was not referred to. Semenov proposed a meeting of Delegation heads for Thursday,² which I accepted. In post-plenary he asked for more information about my reference on the first day to possible evolution of US ABM position. I repeated what I had earlier said about SL linkage with possible evolution of US ABM position and then added that if Semenov was interested in this proposition, I could go into more detail quite soon.

Semenov said that each side had to be interested in matters of interest to the other side. He was interested in getting as much information as possible on the views and considerations of the other side. He would be a poor negotiator if he failed to pay attention to everything I had to say on one subject or another. “Of course, to hear did not mean to agree; but it did mean to know.”

He said he was awaiting instructions from Moscow on certain aspects of ABM limitation. He believed that by Thursday he could dis-

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ACDA Files, FRC 330 383–97–0010, Box 1, Director’s Files, Smith Files, Smith–White House Correspondence, SALT, March–May 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive Eyes Only. The text printed here is the copy Smith approved and has the message number, “#0283”, handwritten on it. At the top of the first page, Smith wrote, “Pres. confirms Sov wrong interp[retation] press conf[erence].” A stamped notation on another cop indicates the message was received at the White House at 1743Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT) Sonnenfeldt and Odeen sent Smith’s message to Kissinger under an April 4 covering memorandum that included a proposed response that reads: “You should proceed with putting SL/ABM package to Semyonov on April 6 in accordance with NSDM 158.” Kissinger initialed his approval of the response. (Ibid.)

² April 6.

cuss these matters. He asked if I would be ready by then. I told him I would try, but could not promise.

With this record, I believe NSDM³ requirement is fully met. Is there any objection to my putting SL/ABM package to Semenov April 6th?

Warm regards.

GS

³ The reference is to NSDM 158, Document 243.

252. Editorial Note

On April 5, 1972, the Soviet Embassy informally presented a new proposal on ABMs to the National Security Council staff. The text of the Soviet note reads:

“The United States, besides ABM defense of one base of ICBMs, would have the right to deploy ABM facilities for defense of Washington, D.C.; and the Soviet Union, besides ABM defense of capital and of ICBM silo launchers amounting to 50% of the number of launchers at the abovementioned US base, would have the right to additionally deploy ABM facilities for the defense of yet 50% of the same number of ICBM launchers in the United States. This right would not be used by the sides during an agreed period (for example, 3–5 years). The total number of ABM launchers, with due account of those which could be additionally deployed for the abovementioned purposes, should not exceed 225. The rest of the conditions for limitations should be similar to those which go with the version now under consideration.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 493, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 10)

At 11:10 a.m. on April 5 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin spoke on the telephone about the Soviet proposal:

“D: It’s a new version as you asked me to keep you informed. Giving you two days before, just for your information.

“K: What we want is frankly some opportunity to talk before, so we can keep some control over it, but you are going to present it anyway in a day or two. We had given you about two weeks advance warning in exchange of our position.

“D: It’s not very big.

“K: No, it’s very courteous and I would like to see it.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Records, Chronological File)

At 11:42 a.m. Kissinger informed Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Smith of his conversation with Dobrynin:

“K: Gerry, I have just had a call from Dobrynin saying that they will make a proposal tomorrow or the day after in Helsinki on ABM and I think you ought to wait with making ours until you have seen theirs.

“S: Well, this is certainly a bad one.

“K: I don’t want to tell you how to run your business. I sent you a cable last night authorizing you to go ahead and in the absence of this call from Dobrynin, which is personal, they informed us that within the next 48 hours they will make one to you.

“S: The [omission in the original] I have is that if they make a proposal like one-to-one it will make it harder later to make a proposal for two-to-two and it will make us look like we are [omission in the original] it, but if it’s got to be done we can hold out.

“K: What do you think?

“S: My personal feeling is we expected they would make their proposal tomorrow but instead of that all hands agreed we would have this exchange take place simultaneously.

“K: If they propose one-to-one and we come two-for-two, does it make any difference?

“S: Except if they propose one-to-one it would be different. Then it wouldn’t happen simultaneously.

“K: Why don’t you let them go first and depending on their proposal make yours. Who speaks first?

“S: This is going to be an informal session in our office and my feeling is he will speak first [omission in the original] but he may say you indicated you had some specifics and I would like to hear yours.

“K: Look, on tactics I have to let you run it the way you want. If you think—if I find anything out about the proposal where can I reach you?” (Ibid.)

Also on April 5 Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff sent Kissinger talking points for his April 6 scheduled meeting with Dobrynin. Sonnenfeldt analyzed the Soviet ABM proposal as follows:

“Their new ABM proposal (Tab A), as you are aware, is their old two for one with a deferred three for two. The number 225 for interceptors is simply a straight line projection from their previous 150 for two for one, i.e., presumably 75 at each of their sites and 100+ at each

of ours. This is, of course, the first time the Soviets have offered 'deferral' (guess who taught them the idea). This proposal is, if anything, worse than the December 15 one, although having broached deferral it may be intended to carry some implication of one for one with eventual two for two. The three to *five* year period is also of some interest in view of Brezhnev's shift to a three year offensive freeze. This has not yet surfaced in Helsinki.

"You should tell Dobrynin that your *first reaction* is negative—no advance, in principle, over their previous position.

"You should go on to stress the clear relationship in our view between what happens on ABMs and what happens on SLBMs. The present Soviet position means clear inequality in our disfavor in both defensive and offensive weapons. This may be a situation that cannot be avoided without an agreement but we certainly cannot accept it *as the result* of agreement.

"It is in this context that Smith today is offering two for two on ABMs (instead of our present two for one) if the Soviets move on SLBMs. (Note: Smith has not made any new specific SLBM proposal, other than a straight freeze. But *you* have given Dobrynin a modified freedom-to-mix, G and H to Yankee, proposition. There has been no Soviet response to either.)

"I believe you should not today debate further the merits of either ABM proposal but *stress the need for basic decisions if we are to get anywhere near agreement by the summit*. We have made a basic decision—permitting the Soviets an ICBM defense which they do not now have. You hope the Politburo is addressing more fundamental matters than the tactical—and discouraging—revisions in the latest Soviet ABM proposal.

"(Note: We will do a more considered analysis with Odeen when the Soviets have tabled their proposal in Helsinki.)"

For the full text of Sonnenfeldt's memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 83.

On April 6, 8:16–9:27 a.m., Kissinger and Dobrynin met to discuss a variety of issues, including Vietnam, the Middle East, and SALT. According to a memorandum of conversation prepared by Kissinger, they had the following exchange concerning SALT:

"We then turned to other matters. Dobrynin raised the issue of SALT. He said the matter had been carefully studied in Moscow and the conclusion had been reached that it would be very difficult to include submarines in the proposal. On the other hand, there was the conviction that if submarines were not included we would be able to come to a solution fairly rapidly. I told Dobrynin that the question of SLBMs was a very difficult one for us, and that I was not very opti-

mistic that we could move on it. It was a point on which our military felt extremely strongly.

“Dobrynin asked whether some progress could not be made by settling on land-based missiles plus the ABM agreement and agreeing to make SLBMs the first item on the agenda of the follow-on discussions. I told him that we would consider that and I would give him an answer at one of our next meetings. At the same time I said that our problem was extremely difficult. We were being asked to accept inferiority in land-based missiles as part of the freeze, and equality if not worse in the ABM agreement. That was an inequitable arrangement. Therefore if SLBMs were to be excluded one would have to find compensation elsewhere by having some slight ABM advantage on the side of the United States.

“We agreed to consider that at a subsequent meeting.”

The full text of the memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, Document 84.

253. Memorandum From Philip Odeen and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 7, 1972.

SUBJECT

SALT and New SLBM Intelligence

There have been some recent events which should affect any consideration of whether or not to give up trying to get SLBMs included in the interim freeze.

—Because of some mistaken estimates by the intelligence community, our present SLBM proposal is not as attractive as we imagined and may figure in Soviet resistance to SLBM inclusion.

—The Soviets have shown some flexibility at Helsinki on SLBMs. As Gerry Smith has pointed out, rather than flatly ruling out the inclusion of SLBMs, the Soviets now say it is “sufficient” to have an ICBM-only freeze. Whether this is just a milder form of reject-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [*sic*], Vol. 17, January–April 1972. Top Secret. Sent for urgent information. Sonnenfeldt did not initial the memorandum.

ing SLBMs or whether it signals a Soviet change in position is still unclear.

Given the above, before we face the issue of dropping SLBMs, we should consider offering the Soviets freedom-to-mix from ICBMs to SLBMs.

The Mistaken Intelligence Estimates

Until the past few weeks, the intelligence community had unanimously informed us that the Soviets had accelerated Y-class submarine construction and that they had started construction of the 42nd Y-class submarine (which would have given them an advantage in modern subs and SLBMs).

These estimates were conveyed to the Soviets through press leaks and comments by Gerry Smith to Semenov.

The intelligence estimates were wrong—significantly inflated.

The intelligence analysis had correctly spotted some anomalies in the order of new Y-class launchings from the construction yards. They interpreted this to mean an acceleration in construction.

In fact, as the latest photography makes clear, the Soviets were in the midst of a *production slowdown* as they were making extensive modifications in the new Y-class submarine. These *modifications included*:

1. [1 paragraph (5½ lines) not declassified]
2. *Lengthening of the submarine by 25 feet* (to a total length of about 150 feet). The purposes for this lengthening are still unclear. It is in the propulsion area of the boat which suggests some measures are being taken to quiet the engine noises. Additionally, it might be to provide more ballast to offset the larger missiles being added.

There is still some uncertainty about the number of Y-class subs operational or under construction. CIA believes the number is at least 2 boats and *probably 3 boats below* what we were estimating last Fall.

Moreover, there is still considerable uncertainty about the number of SLBMs now under construction since the 12 boats now in the construction halls could have 12 launchers or 16 launchers. CIA has looked at the previous photography of components which have entered construction halls and believe at best 2 of the boats will have 16 small launchers and probably at least 6 will have 12 large launchers; the load on the remaining 4 boats is uncertain.

One result of all this is that we have confused the Soviets with our specific, but inflated figures.

Our SALT Position

Most important our proposals to include SLBMs in the interim freeze have not been as attractive to the Soviets as we believed.

Our current SLBM proposal sets as a freeze date the date of signature of the interim agreement and allows replacement of old SLBMs and boats with new ones. While we had some inkling last month of over-inflation in our estimates, we still were not aware of the extent. Consequently, assuming signature would occur the end of May, we estimated that the proposal would allow the Soviets to complete 43–45 Y-class subs and 690–720 Y-class SLBMs operational or under construction. Additionally, the Soviets could replace their 100 launchers in G and H-class boats with an equal number of new launchers in Y-class subs.

In fact, excluding G and H-class replacement, the Soviets probably are now allowed to complete only 41 Y-class subs and about 604 Y-class SLBMs. This is parity in new subs, but slightly less than parity in SLBMs. By allowing replacement we give the Soviets a slight numerical edge in subs and SLBMs. However, this assumes that the Soviets would want to replace the 100 SLBMs on their recently modified G and H-class subs.

[1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified]

Consequently, there seems to be increased reason for suggesting some form of freedom-to-mix from ICBMs to SLBMs.

—We might limit it, at least initially, to replacing soft-pad ICBMs (the Soviets have 134) for SLBMs.

—Alternatively, we might limit it initially to replace silo-launched ICBMs. (The Soviets have 75 SS–7s and SS–8s in silos.) This makes freedom-to-mix less attractive to the Soviets since they get no credit for replacing soft pads.

Freedom-to-mix does have its problems. It essentially allows unequal aggregates for each side. The JCS oppose it on this basis.

However, as we have argued before, getting SLBMs included in the interim freeze is worth the cost of allowing freedom-to-mix.

Attached is a revised chart² which gives the latest estimates of the number of Y-class subs and SLBMs allowed under our present proposal and by allowing freedom-to-mix.

² Attached but not printed.

254. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, April 8, 1972, 1537Z.

294. Perhaps some personal views after two weeks in Helsinki would be useful.

The Soviet SL "neutral/negative" attitude continues to be puzzling. I question the view held by several experts here that Soviets will agree to formal SL freeze. At best, I guess, we may get a foreshadowing of their willingness to consider summit declarations re SL restraint/constraint. I have, and will forward to you if you wish, some personal ideas re possible form of such declarations.

The factor which will tend to block ABM settlement seems to me to be our calling for an option to "defend" ICBM's in two fields while Soviets would "defend" ICBM's in one field (containing even fewer ICBM's than in one U.S. field).

Soviets can calculate as well as we that Malmstrom per se does nothing for U.S. strategically. They likely estimate that we have in mind laying the groundwork for a widespread system (perhaps HSD). Our pressure for a special withdrawal clause may tend to confirm such calculation.

The signal I get from the latest Soviet ABM proposal is that this U.S. ICBM field defense option is very hard if not impossible for them to take.

If U.S. could see its way clear to opting for Grand Forks plus Washington, I believe jam would be broken. With about 75 interceptors (approximate number presently advanced in construction at Grand Forks) or enlargement of ICBM defense area to allow "coverage" of number of Soviet silos comparable to number covered at Grand Forks, overall "equalization" would result.

I would recall that estimates re NCA's acceptability in Congress have recently changed. Radar problems seem soluble.

You might consider authorizing a Smith tentative probe in this general direction, the results of which could help any White House decision.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Haig and Sonnenfeldt.

255. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

April 10, 1972, 8:25 a.m.

S: We're meeting this evening at 7:00² and I just wanted to touch base with you before talking to him. Is there any development in Washington I should know about?

K: No, you must assume you will know about every development I noticed in one of the last meetings with him [omission in the original] was probing the Soviets as if you had to find out from them what was going on.

S: No, he didn't have that in mind. I didn't get that impression.

K: Be that as it may, there is no development here. There has been no development since I talked to you and I have yesterday approved your going ahead with tabling our proposal, but it should be put in the context of SLBM.

S: It certainly will be.

K: Not as a proposal in its own right.

S: It will be done that way.

K: And I want to assure you again you will be kept fully informed. You can assume if they tell you something they are fishing.

S: Your message of Saturday³ . . .

K: On what?

S: General impression of where we stand and raised the possibility of [omission in the original] whether Washington [omission in the original] or [omission in the original]. Would that be agreeable?

K: Washington what?

S: [omission in the original]

K: I see. Let me check that with the President.

S: You may want to give me authority to make a tentative proposal.

K: If you can do it on the basis that you don't know if it will be approved.

S: I can do it that way or I can make it even stronger, say I doubt it will be approved, but am making a personal inquiry.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The conversation took place on a secure telephone line. Kissinger was in Washington; Smith was in Helsinki.

² Reference is to a Smith–Semenov meeting.

³ April 8. No record of a conversation or message has been found.

K: Why don't you do that?

S: The Soviets got the impression from the press conference⁴ just after we got here . . .

K: On SLBM?

S: Yes.

K: That is not correct.

S: May I say I personally checked with the President and that is not correct?

K: You may definitely tell him that.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 248 and footnote 1, Document 251.

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks¹

Washington, April 10, 1972, 2347Z.

61537. Subject: Further instructions on our ABM position. The President has directed that:

1. The Soviet ABM proposal of April 6² is unacceptable in its present form.

2. The delegation is authorized to table as a formal proposal the U.S. ABM position described in paragraph 9 of NSDM-158.³ The presentation should explicitly note that this ABM proposal is made in the context of including SLBM launchers in the interim offensive freeze. Moreover, our August 20 proposal of 2-or-1 ABM sites is not withdrawn.

3. The delegation should proceed, as already authorized in paragraphs 12 and 13 of NSDM-158, to negotiate limits on ABM radars. The delegation is not authorized at this time to employ the approach in paragraph 14.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [sic], Vol. 17, January–April 1972. Top Secret; Immediate. Drafted by A.M. Christopher (ACDA) and cleared by Farley and Miller (S/S).

² See Document 252.

³ Document 243.

257. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, April 11, 1972, 1600Z.

301. Dear Henry:

Full report on Smith/Semenov April 10 dinner meeting will be made in normal channels.² Here are my impressions on session.

1. He is concerned re shortness of time available.

2. ABM Article III (levels and character of sites) is only real ABM issue left. I recalled OLPAR and withdrawal matters. He thinks they are "solvable."

3. USSR "as great land power" making very significant offer to freeze land-based ICBMs.

4. Combination of significant ABM and freeze agreements would open way for broader agreements and improved relations.

5. SL inclusion condition is "artificial." SL place in arsenal a "very special" and "complicated" one.

6. As authorized by April 10 telcon,³ I advised him White House did not have in mind holding back a part of agreement for negotiation at summit. Semenov confirmed that USSR had same position.

7. I did not make personal probe you okayed telcon April 10 re Semenov reaction to US second site limited to NCA rather than present option between NCA and second IC site because today (April 11) we will formally table US 2–2 position. Probing re a change in it before it was tabled seemed, on second thought, unwise. I will so probe soon and report results.

8. I detected no "give" on their SL position.

9. On my leaving Semenov said "It's always darkest before the dawn."

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive. Copies were sent to Haig and Sonnenfeldt.

² Smith sent a full report in telegram USDEL SALT 1253, April 11. (Ibid., Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [*sic*], Vol. 17, January–April 1972)

³ See Document 255.

258. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 18, 1972.

SUBJECT

Secretary Laird on SALT

Secretary Laird has written you (Tab B)² with his latest views on SALT—including a proposed modification of the Delegation's instructions.

Secretary Laird's main point is that we should modify our ABM position. Our present ABM proposal is that, if the Soviets accept including SLBMs in the freeze, each side would get two ABM sites. Each country could choose between two ICBM defense sites, or one ICBM defense site and defense of the national capital. The U.S. would presumably keep the two Safeguard sites, and the Soviets would choose Moscow and one ABM site.

Secretary Laird would eliminate the choice between the two deployment options and allow each side one ICBM defense site and NCA defense.

He argues first that defense of Washington is more important than the Malmstrom Safeguard site.

—ABM defense of Washington does have its strategic advantages. It protects the country's leadership against accidental or limited attacks. Against an all-out attack, it might provide a few added minutes of decision time, though this probably has limited value with current communications.

—On the other hand, we would have to stop construction on Malmstrom. (The expenditures at Malmstrom which could not be recovered would be about \$100 million. This is because the construction will only be 10–20% complete by May 21 and because the movable equipment—e.g., radar components and interceptors—can be shipped to Washington and used for NCA defense.)

Secretary Laird also argues that his new ABM proposal would improve the chances of getting the Soviets to agree to include SLBMs in the interim freeze and to limit future deployment of large non-ABM radars.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [*sic*], Vol. 17, January–April 1972. Top Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Odeen and Sonnenfeldt sent the memorandum to Kissinger through Haig on April 12 under a covering memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is Laird's memorandum, April 11, and an enclosure that included his suggestions for new instructions for the SALT Delegation.

—This is not certain since the Soviets are digging in against including SLBMs.

As for the political problem of getting approval of NCA defense from Congress (at the same time that work is stopped at Malmstrom), Secretary Laird believes that we could obtain the Congressional support in the context of a SALT agreement limiting Soviet ABMs and including SLBM launchers.

For now, our present ABM proposal seems preferable to that proposed by Secretary Laird. We would be allowed to complete Malmstrom, but always have the option to switch to NCA defense later if conditions warrant.

If adopting Laird's proposal meant the difference between getting SLBMs included or not in the interim freeze, it would be worthy of serious consideration since our primary purpose is to constrain the Soviet offensive forces. However, we are not yet to the point of having to face such a choice. We have no strong signals from the Soviets that dropping the right to build a second ICBM defense site is a critical issue.

—At Helsinki in January, the head of the Soviet Delegation indicated that a proposal along the lines of Secretary Laird's would be most negotiable. However, the Soviets have not made this point in Vienna and the difference between the two ABM proposals from the Soviet viewpoint might well be marginal.

In any case, Ambassador Smith intends to sound out the Soviets along the lines of the Laird proposal, but only on a very "personal" basis to gauge their level of interest. After this, you will be in a better position to decide whether there is any chance of agreement on this basis.

Attached at Tab A³ is a short note from you to Secretary Laird which:

—Thanks him for his letter.

—Says that you want to consider his ABM proposal for a while, before making any decision.

Recommendation

That you sign the note to Secretary Laird at Tab A. (Ray Price concurs)

³ Attached but not printed is a draft response, upon which Nixon initialed his approval.

Kissinger's Secret Trip to Moscow and Aftermath, April 19–May 17, 1972

259. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 19, 1972.

SUBJECT

Issues for My Moscow Trip

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

SALT

The major substantive subject being negotiated prior to the summit is SALT. It is at the moment stalled on two major issues and several minor, largely technical ones.

The major issues are (1) whether to include SLBMs in the offensive agreement and (2) where each side can deploy its ABMs. We have related these two by taking the position that an offensive agreement excluding SLBMs would confer such numerical advantages to the Soviet Union that it would be impossible for us to accept equality in the defensive agreement. The Soviets argue that the defensive agreement is permanent and therefore should be equal, while the offensive one is merely interim and any imbalances can be worked out in the follow-on talks for a permanent offensive agreement.

We have not yet exhausted all possible fallbacks on the *SLBM* question. These would involve schemes whereby the Soviets could continue construction of SLBMs in exchange for dismantling older SLBMs and ICBMs. Present evidence, however, suggests that the Soviets are unwilling to include an SLBM even if, as under the above schemes, they could in fact continue their present rate of construction for several years. Thus, we must confront a decision as to whether to accept a SALT agreement without SLBMs and perhaps with only an understanding that submarines will be the first subject of follow-on negotiations. If there is to be a SALT agreement in the next several weeks, we would probably have to take this step.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK's Secret Moscow Trip Apr 1972, TOHAK/HAKTO File [1 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for action. For the full text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 125.

As regards ABMs we can probably expect only a slight advantage, even if we concede on SLBMs. I would not propose in Moscow to accept equality even if the Soviets remain adamant in insisting on it. A number of variants involving certain advantages for us have been examined within our Government. But one special issue needs to be faced: are we prepared to give up our second ABM site at the Malmstrom ICBM field in exchange for an ABM site in Washington? Secretary Laird and Gerry Smith have both recommended this, and there is some evidence that the Soviets might accept a deal whereby each side would have one ABM site in an ICBM field (Grand Forks for us) and one around the national capital. Such a scheme would still permit us to defend a larger number of ICBMs since our ICBM fields contain more launchers than do Soviet fields. If the Soviets continued to make an issue of this "inequality" we would have to consider the matter between my trip and the time of the summit.

A further SALT issue relates to the *duration* of the offensive agreement. We have argued for an indefinite duration, the Soviets for three years. (If the agreement lapsed after a fixed period we would end up with an ABM-only agreement, which we oppose.) But we can probably accept some fixed duration, e.g. four years, on the understanding that if by that time there was no permanent offensive agreement, we might abrogate the ABM treaty.²

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

² Nixon initialed his approval of Kissinger's approach to his secret Moscow meetings and wrote: "OK—as modified by RN's oral instructions." For the oral modifications, see Document 260.

260. **Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, April 19, 1972.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Kissinger: On SALT, Mr. President—

Nixon: Well, let's—yeah, let's go through some of those.

Kissinger: —you don't have to make a decision on these various options, except, are you prepared—

Nixon: I wanted to go over these things. I didn't mean that [unclear]—

Kissinger: Are you prepared—

Nixon: —just the general stuff.

Kissinger: —to give up on the SL—on the submarines?

Nixon: Am I? Of course. I'm prepared to give up on it. I think we can sell it, can't we? [unclear]—

Kissinger: Well, it's—well, I think I'm going to tell that son-of-a— I'm going to tell Moorer, "The President has just saved your bloody honor—"

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: "'—and you are going to do it.'"

Nixon: That's right. That's right. But on that, let's give it up, provided we have a hard-line in that we immediately send our negotiators back to work on the SLBMs, you know, something like that.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: But on that, I don't know—get what you can, but I must say that, you know—let me put it like this, Henry: get everything you can, recognizing that we cannot have an arms control agreement that looks as if we got took. They're going to analyze that son-of-a-bitch right down to the [unclear], so do the best you can. That's all I can say. And the same is true about whether we have a Washington, and then the Malmstrom and all the rest. You know, do the best you can.

Kissinger: All right.

Nixon: You're a hard worker. Do the best you can.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 713-1. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger from 3:27 to 5:01 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. A fuller transcription of the conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Document 126.

Kissinger: All right.

Nixon: Fair enough?

Kissinger: All right.

Nixon: I've looked at all these things, but, normally, if I were to start to say, "Well, take this, don't take that," and so forth—this is a matter that will have to be determined [unclear]—

Kissinger: Frankly, Mr. President, whether we get a 150 more interceptors or not is just of no consequence.

Nixon: Yeah. Listen, I don't think it makes a hell of a lot of difference. On, on the SLBMs, actually, I think, I think it's to our advantage if they don't settle, to continue to build some. Maybe not? Maybe we—you know, we've got a hell of a budget problem. We've got to cut it down. We've got to cut \$5 billion off next year's defense budget. So, I told 'em we couldn't do it unless we've got some settlement with the Russians on that—

Kissinger: I have to talk to you about that.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: Now, on SALT, I know what you're talking about, but—of course, Gerry Smith would give it all away, though, wouldn't he? What's he say about SLBMs? Does he want to give it away?

Kissinger: Well—well, what Gerry would settle for—

Nixon: [chuckles] Right.

Kissinger: —for one site—

Nixon: Zero ABMs. Right?

Kissinger: —for one site each—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Kissinger: —plus giving up SLBMs. But we cannot.

Nixon: No.

Kissinger: Now, the only trouble is if we save two sites, and one of them should be Washington, that puts them into the—if we say, "Each side can complete what it's building," that's a reasonable proposition.

Nixon: All right. Let's do that.

Kissinger: But, if we say, "We will scrap Malmstrom and go to Washington—"

Nixon: I don't want to do that. I don't want Washington. I don't like the deal with Washington. I don't like that goddamn command airplane, or any of this shit. I don't believe in all that crap. I really don't.

Kissinger: But we may be—

Nixon: Do the best you can not to add Washington. I think the idea of building a new system around Washington is stupid. Now, that's my view. It's very stupid. I do feel strongly about that.

Kissinger: Well, let me—

Nixon: I'd even rather build one-and-one than to build in Washington.

Kissinger: No, no. No, one-and-one is morally wrong for us—

Nixon: All right.

Kissinger: —because we would just be getting a [unclear].

Nixon: All right, good. Now, my point is, I just don't see the—what's in it for us to do Washington. I just don't see what's in it for us to do Washington. I think we should complete what we've done—both of us. And then, maybe we'll—

Kissinger: All right.

Nixon: —and then, maybe we'll give on SLBMs.

Kissinger: Well, Laird has recommended Washington.² Gerry Smith has recommended Washington. Now—

Nixon: Well—

Kissinger: If—

Nixon: —why?

Kissinger: I think anything we get—so that we can say, "We got a better deal on ABM."

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: We have to get an advantage on ABM—a little bit. Not that it makes a hell of a lot of difference. [Pause] But—

Nixon: I know that they wanted it, except if it doesn't look all right to the folks.

Kissinger: Well, that we can probably do it if we say.

Nixon: I'd—I don't know. I—it's hard for me to figure it out from, from the stuff I read here.³ Don't you think we could get it? [Nixon turning pages]

Kissinger: Well, it is a terribly complicated thing. Basically, we'd be better off with a two—with a simple formula that each side can complete what they've got. However, that runs into some problems with Laird. Therefore, if they'd let us have Washington and Grand Forks—what screwed us on Malmstrom was the strike. If that strike hadn't happened, there'd be no issue; it'd be two-thirds finished now.

Nixon: Yeah. I know.

Kissinger: If we can have Washington, Grand Forks, and they finesse it somewhat, so that we can say we got one—somewhat more

² See Documents 254 and 258.

³ See Document 259.

than they did on the ABM, it would help us domestically. It would also help us in our position vis-à-vis them.

Nixon: All right.

Kissinger: But, you see, the problem is to make that plausible, we'd have to crash on submarines, and say that we're doing more submarine building.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

261. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, April 21, 1972, 1845Z.

328. Dear Henry:

Semenov returned today at three. We met at six with Garthoff and Kishilov. Semenov reported that he had met several times at the highest level to consider SALT questions.

He then read the following: "The question of SLBM launchers in connection with a possible agreement on certain measures with respect to strategic offensive weapons was presently under serious study in Moscow."² I noted the positive nature of this statement for SALT prospects.

He said his instructions were to try to finalize both agreements here for summit signing.

Semenov then probed about the authoritativeness of the Kishilov/Garthoff conversation of April 16th, USDEL SALT 1265.³ I stressed the informal and unofficial aspect of this exchange and asked Semenov if this approach was of interest to his side. He said categorically that it was. I told him that I, personally, thought it had a good deal of sense, but I still had to persuade my authorities and it would help if I had

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive; Eyes Only.

² Smith was unaware of Kissinger's secret trip to Moscow, where talks began with Brezhnev and Gromyko on April 21.

³ In USDEL SALT 1265 from Helsinki, April 17, Smith reported to the Department on the April 16 conversation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki) [sic], Vol. 17, January–April 1972)

the specifics of his post-Moscow visit position. I hinted that I might return to Washington soon, and that it would be helpful promptly to have his new position.

Pleading need to study his voluminous Moscow record, we suggested deferral of substantive discussion between us until tomorrow at 4:39 p.m.

My three main impressions from this meeting are:

1) The USSR wants to complete the two agreements at Helsinki for summit signature.

2) The USSR will [agree?] on a general ABM approach involving one NCA and one ICBM defense site for each side, with ICBM deployment area expanded to 150 kilometers, and 75 or 100 launcher level per site.

3) Something is possible in SLBM freeze area.⁴

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

⁴ In message Sitto 21 to Kissinger in Moscow, April 21, Haig commented on Smith's backchannel message: "Secretary Rogers called President and passed to him substance of message from Smith which is attached. The President immediately concluded that your hosts may be hoping to trade flexibility in SALT for U.S. concessions on South Vietnam. The President is very concerned that we hold first and foremost to tough position on South Vietnam—that we not giving up bombing of North for illusory promises of negotiations with Hanoi or any other promise that is not firmly guaranteed." The full text of Haig's message is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 136.

262. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, April 22, 1972, 11 a.m.–4:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General-Secretary of Central Committee of CPSU
Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
A. Alexandrov-Agentov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Mr. Samoteykin, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
Mr. John Negroponce, NSC Staff
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SALT

Brezhnev: Now I would like to make some comments on ABM limitation and the freeze on ICBM's. This is an important measure, and we have been discussing it for two years now.

I want to show how the Soviet side solves problems in a constructive spirit. We have taken into account all the communications made to us by President Nixon. We have had quite a few over the past few months, and we have tried to take them all into account, particularly those in the most recent period.

[The General-Secretary then read the Soviet note on ABM's:]²

"It is recognized as expedient to limit ABM systems in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to covering the capitals and to one area each for the location of land-based ICBM silo launchers.

"The location of ABM facilities for the covering of the capitals would be limited to an area in the form of a circle with a radius of 150 km whose center would be within the limits of the capital."

This is a reflection of your proposal to us.³

Kissinger: One member of our delegation is an adviser to your delegation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 485, President's Trip Files, USSR—Issues Papers, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Guest House on Vorobyevskii Road. The NSC staff extracted this discussion of SALT from a memorandum of conversation of the entire meeting, which covered a range of topics. The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 139.

² See Document 252. All brackets are in the original.

³ Document 194.

Brezhnev: [resumes reading ABM note:] “The location of ABM facilities for covering land-based ICBM silo launchers would be limited to an area in the form of a circle with a radius of 150 km whose center for the United States would be in the area of location of ICBM launchers where the deployment of ABM facilities is most advanced.”

This also reflects your proposal.

“The quantity of ABMs and their launchers for each side should not exceed 100 units for covering the capitals and 100 units for covering land-based ICBM silo launchers.”

That, too, reflects your proposal.

So now you have something to take back, a proposal from your confidential channel.

Kissinger: The only one which does not reflect our official thinking, but that of a member of our delegation, is the 150 km radius.

Mr. General-Secretary, let me say this is a constructive approach. I will reserve comment until I hear what you say about submarines.

Brezhnev: Nothing.

Kissinger: Nothing.

Brezhnev: Be patient. What can I say about them? They travel under water, we can't see them, they're silent—

Gromyko: [in English] Puzzle, puzzle!

Kissinger: You do have something on submarines?

Gromyko: You can't read it before Sukhodrev!

[Sukhodrev then reads the text of the note on submarines:]

“We have thoroughly considered the state of affairs at the strategic arms limitation talks taking into account the considerations expressed by the US side through the confidential channel, relating to the freeze on ballistic-missile carrying submarines.

“In this connection we believe it appropriate to state the following:

“1. The question of the freeze on the number of modern ballistic-missile carrying submarines and the total number of launchers thereon is of very significant importance.

“Ballistic-missile carrying submarines occupy a special place in the composition of strategic offensive weapons and their consideration should not overlook differences in the geographies of the sides, the ballistic-missile carrying submarines at the disposal of the US NATO allies and the US forward submarine bases.

“As is known, that offers important strategic advantages to the American side, and under these conditions the number of submarines and ballistic missiles thereon at the disposal of the sides cannot be the same.

“2. In order to bring about relaxation of international tensions, normalization of relations between our two countries and cessation of

the strategic arms race we agree to consider the question of including ballistic-missile carrying submarines in the suggested freeze agreement provided, naturally, that there should be established for the sides appropriate limits for such systems taking into account the considerations set forth above.

“The Soviet Union would agree that the US and their NATO allies should have, for the period of the freeze agreement, up to 50 modern submarines with the total number of ballistic missile launchers thereon of up to 800, including 41 submarines with 656 ballistic missile launchers thereon at the disposal of the United States. Over that period the Soviet Union could have 62 modern submarines with the total number of ballistic missile launchers thereon of no more than 950.

“It is understood that over that period the sides will reduce the number of land-based ICBMs through dismantling older launchers. The sides would also be entitled to modernize and replace older submarines by new submarines but without increasing in the process the above-mentioned number of modern submarines and ballistic missile launchers thereon.

“However, since the above proposal would only be a partial compensation for the strategic disbalance in the location of missile carrying nuclear submarines of the sides, the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the whole of this problem—and primarily the issue of dismantling US missile submarine bases outside the territory of the United States, should be appropriately resolved in the course of subsequent negotiations.

“If over the period of the Interim agreement the US NATO allies increase the number of ballistic-missile carrying submarines to the excess of those operational or under construction, the Soviet Union reserves the right to the corresponding increase in such submarines.

“3. Taking into account the proposals of the US side the Soviet Union could agree to include in the suggested freeze agreement the obligation not to start, in addition to ICBM silo launchers, new construction of fixed soft land-based ICBM launchers as well.

“4. Moscow believes it possible to have the period of the Interim freeze agreement—5 years.

“5. Given understanding in principle on such an approach we would be prepared to give necessary instructions to the Soviet delegation in Helsinki to discuss practical matters related to the final elaboration of the corresponding articles of the Interim agreement on certain measures with respect to strategic offensive armaments having in mind that this Agreement together with the Treaty on the limitation of ABM systems would be signed during the forthcoming meeting in Moscow.”

Brezhnev: I think that is a very constructive proposal and it is in keeping with the spirit of all those communications you made through Ambassador Dobrynin. I would think President Nixon should think it very constructive. Apart from the constructive nature of our proposals, that paper is another sign of the spirit with which we approach the Summit meeting.

Kissinger: If the General-Secretary says as little on Vietnam as he said on submarines, we will make enormous progress today.

Brezhnev: I'd have been pleased to say less on Vietnam, but Dr. Kissinger took so much time.

Kissinger: That was meant as a compliment. You had said you'd say nothing on submarines.

It's a very constructive approach. I recognize that it incorporates many of the points we made in the confidential channel. It is a serious effort to address many of our concerns.

May I ask a practical question, simply for my understanding?

When you say, "Over the period the sides will reduce the number of land-based ICBMs," does this mean you accept the obligation I mentioned to Dobrynin to dismantle older land-based missiles once we grant you the right to build more submarines?

Brezhnev: That is what is implied. We have accepted that principle. We won't build new ones to replace the ones removed. We will build submarines according to the terms allowed, and we are prepared to inform you of the exact month and date we will dismantle the ICBM facilities.

Kissinger: We will have a problem in explaining to our Congress why you have a greater number of missiles in both categories. If we have an understanding that you will dismantle some of the older missiles, we will instruct our delegation to work out the precise numbers. Semenov can work this out with our delegation. We needn't do it here, at this level.

Gromyko: We will instruct accordingly.

Brezhnev: It is very easy. Of course we will be dismantling.

Kissinger: I only want to fix this so we can make this instruction to our delegation and make this part of the negotiation.

Brezhnev: We will give similar instructions.

Kissinger: No problem. But I have one other point. It is difficult for us to discuss limitations on British and French submarines. It would be easier if you make a unilateral declaration. We agree to 41, then if the British and French build more than 9 and if the total number reaches more than 50, then you can respond accordingly. This will be easier, because we have no right to tell the British and French what to do. You will make unilateral deal. We have no right to negotiate the total number.

Brezhnev: Of course. We shall certainly give thought to a unilateral declaration. But the figures are agreed.

Kissinger: The figures are agreed. There is no problem about figures. I will show you what a bad diplomat I am. Gromyko wouldn't do this, but I think the submarine matter is acceptable in principle.

Brezhnev: This shows what a strong diplomat you are. I agree our Foreign Ministry would never do that, but that's an example of how bad it is.

Gromyko: It's your advantage. I would never have said this outright. I would have waited at least three minutes.

Brezhnev: I don't want to raise the question at this time, but I do want to mention the serious matter of the U.S. military bases ringing the Soviet Union. This relates to your air force and intermediate range missiles.

Sonnenfeldt: We have no IRBM's.

Kissinger: We are going to ground Sonnenfeldt.

Brezhnev: We mean forward-based missiles. It doesn't make any difference what kind of rocket you die from.

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt is right. We have no forward-based missiles that can reach the USSR, but I understand the General-Secretary's point.

Brezhnev: Of course it's useless to deploy intermediate range missiles in the U.S., so you deploy them abroad.

Kissinger: We have airplanes that can reach the USSR. As it happens, we have no missiles in Europe that can reach the USSR, but we have airplanes that can. But we understand the General-Secretary's point and we take it seriously.

Brezhnev: As we see it, this could be the start of an important future process. It could be the start of the strengthening of confidence; this should be followed by further measure of goodwill to strengthen normal relations between our two countries.

Kissinger: Agreed.

Brezhnev: . . . measures that would be in no way prejudicial to obligations each of us has to other countries, and would be at the same time encouraging to the Allies of us both. Therein lies the greatness and noble purpose of our two countries.

Kissinger: This attitude can be a principal result of the Summit.

Brezhnev: These are indeed problems of great importance. First, the statement of principles yesterday,⁴ then this,—all this carries great

⁴ Brezhnev gave Kissinger this statement at their first meeting on April 21; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 134. For the text as signed by Nixon and Brezhnev, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 633–634.

significance. It will last the commentators and analysts about 2 years, until the next Summit. I could write a good commentary. I could write a good article for the U.S. press. How much do you pay for a good article?

Kissinger: My only hope is that the next meeting is sooner than 2 years, and I hope the General Secretary can visit us next year.

Brezhnev: I don't think I have an invitation or visa yet.

Kissinger: You will have an invitation when President Nixon comes here. We hope to have that in the final communiqué.

Brezhnev: Thank you. In the coming 4 years, the United States and Soviet Union should take even more important steps to increase the spirit of good will.

Kissinger: As for ABMs, Mr. General Secretary, we have proposed using 2 ICBM fields, rather than Washington and 1 ICBM field, but I consider your proposal constructive.

Brezhnev: Then you said 2 and 2.

Kissinger: I will have to discuss this in Washington, but we will do so in very positive attitude.

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger—I would not want this on the record—this has the advantage for you, which your military are aware of, that yours covers more ICBM's than our does.

Kissinger: I understand, but not necessarily if they are 150 km radius. It depends on where you put your fields.

Brezhnev: This won't be the case. The area will be clearly defined. It is a secret now, but not for long. Your military will photograph it anyway.

Kissinger: If you can give me informally some idea of the number of ICBMs you will put in this field, it would help persuade some of my people. You don't have to tell me the field, just an idea of the number, to tell the President.

Brezhnev: I will tell you that later.

Kissinger: It's just for the President.

Brezhnev: But I can say beforehand that we will have fewer than you have.

Kissinger: May I make a suggestion?

Brezhnev: It is not to be made public. Because it is really to your advantage and it would be bad if it came out.

Kissinger: I must be honest with you. Anything in the White House we can keep totally secret. Once it leaves the White House, as your Ambassador can tell you, I can't completely control it.

Brezhnev: That's why I say I should have invited Rogers in the first place!

Kissinger: You would have gotten more publicity. Therefore what you tell me here will not become public. Once agreement is completed, I can't guarantee that numbers won't become public, but what the General Secretary says here will not.

Brezhnev: In nature of speculation, but not officially.

Kissinger: But once we have a treaty, our people will have to testify before Congressional committees. We will try to control it, but the testimony will only happen several months after an agreement.

Brezhnev: That's a procedural matter. If we agree on this principle, procedural matters won't be a problem.

Kissinger: The submarine matter is certainly acceptable. The ABM matter I will have to discuss in Washington but it is certainly in the direction. . . .

Brezhnev: I feel it incorporates your latest suggestion and incorporates the principle of equality, and I don't foresee changes.

Kissinger: I don't see any problems. Let me suggest the following procedure. I will take this up with the President as soon as I return Monday or Tuesday.⁵ We'll then call back our negotiator from Helsinki and simultaneously get together with our military people. All of this will take about a week. We'll then instruct our negotiator. If you can send your Ambassador back. . . . If in the meantime Semenov can be kept under restraint so he doesn't reveal this, it would speed this matter.

Brezhnev: We have given him instructions. But if you think this is easier, we can send him a telegram to keep it back for a time.

Kissinger: Let me think about it.

Brezhnev: We have enough time to cable him to hold up.

Kissinger: When will he propose it? Monday?

Gromyko: At his discretion. He met with Smith yesterday and said nothing.

Kissinger: He hinted at it.

Brezhnev: On submarines, Semenov knows nothing.

Kissinger: Let him propose it. Let me on second thought talk to the President. I'll tell Vorontsov.

Gromyko: We'll hold Semenov up.

Brezhnev: We have a closed phone link, so we will phone him immediately.

[Aide goes out to do so.]

⁵ April 24 and 25.

Kissinger: How should we do it in Helsinki? Should they conclude the whole thing in Helsinki, or should we leave something for the Summit? We can settle certain things privately but not in Helsinki.

Brezhnev: The signing should be on a high level. The final decision and signing should be at the Summit level.

Kissinger: The signing and final decisions should be at the highest level, yes.

Gromyko: Since this matter relates to a text, it may be best for our delegations to finalize as much as is possible. Because it is a text, the lawyers should look at it. If all is done here, there is a risk of not having enough time. But the final decision and signing should be here.

Kissinger: I agree with the Foreign Minister that perhaps we should pick some issues, perhaps one or two—I don't want to take the time of the General Secretary on this—on which the delegations should write the text, but then, the President and the General Secretary can settle them here.

Gromyko: Deliberately you mean?

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: But to have reached confidential agreement beforehand?

Kissinger: Confidentially.

Brezhnev: So there will be a special signing ceremony in the Kremlin.

Kissinger: We will have a SALT agreement, there is no question.

Brezhnev: I think so too.

Kissinger: I will let your Ambassador know by the end of the coming week when we can proceed in Helsinki, but it will be very soon.

Brezhnev: Good, because there is not so much time left.

Kissinger: Let them talk about radars this week. They have a lot to talk about.

Brezhnev: Yes. That's my view. I don't think they're in any hurry. They don't have much to talk about, but let them talk. Let them talk about the nature of the universe. The Delegations should be locked in a room for the final 3 days without food and told they must get an agreement or not get food for another 3 days.

Kissinger: We've reached the point where despite all the efforts of our delegations we will still reach an agreement.

Brezhnev: No matter how hard they try! That's our success.

Kissinger: Our delegation is so complex we don't understand them anymore.

Brezhnev: You want an example of how to make something very complex? I can pose one or two questions that neither you nor the President can solve for months. So we can consider this closed.

263. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, April 22, 1972, 1847Z.

329. Dear Henry:

At today's Smith/Semenov meeting, he opened by repeating that SL issue was under serious consideration in Moscow.

He said never in his life had he seen such preparations as were being made for President's visit.

He presented OLPAR written formulation, which Nitze approves. Subject to our dropping prior consultation provision, Sovs would agree to smallest ABM radar as ceiling for OLPARs.

He also presented formula banning multiple ABM warheads, which is acceptable in substance.

Based on our telecon of April 10,² I then probed on personal basis Soviet interest in ABM approach permitting one ICBM site plus national capital at 150 kilometers. Under this approach, we could agree to 6 MARCs for NCA. If there was defended only one ICBM site on each side, the MARC concept would be especially useful for ICBM defense. I indicated that we could double our present proposed number of MARCs. (You will recall that NSDM³ authorizes me to triple; we will in all likelihood need to go that far or slightly higher.)

Semenov indicated strong interest in his side's part is such an approach. I stressed that it was in the context of SLBM inclusion.

We have learned that Semenov's instructions are to respond to US initiative, but not to make a new Soviet proposal.

In light of these developments, it would be very helpful from our angle to have early Washington response to delegation recommendations in USDEL SALT VII 1261.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Haig and Howe.

² See Document 255.

³ Reference is to NSDM 158, Document 243.

⁴ In telegram USDEL SALT 1261 from Helsinki, April 14, the delegation submitted its recommendations on SLBMs, ABM limitations, and provisions for the duration of and withdrawal from the proposed agreement on freezing offensive weapons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–3 FIN (HE))

If this unofficially floated ABM approach is not to be US position, damage limitation argues for early advice to Soviets.

Soviets, per Kishilov, are thinking of a 15 May Helsinki end, with both agreements wrapped up “to last comma.”

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

264. Editorial Note

On April 23, 1972, President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig sent a private message to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, who was in Moscow for secret talks with the Soviet leadership. Haig expressed President Nixon’s thoughts about Kissinger’s trip:

“President also seems to be concerned about the bureaucracies of announcing your trip especially if the announcement does not emphasize that trip was based on situation in Vietnam. He also questioned your report that you have prevailed upon Gromyko to prevent Semenov from presenting SALT proposal to Smith when facts are that Semenov did tell Smith of new Soviet position. Smith, of course, told Rogers, who informed the President. I told the President that Semenov was very hazy with Smith about possibility of SLBM agreement but that in the discussion with you in Moscow the Soviets indicated firmly that they would accept an SLBM agreement.” (Sitto 39 from Haig to Kissinger; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Secret Moscow Trip, Apr 1972, TOHAK/HAKTO File [2 of 2])

Kissinger replied to Haig on the same day: “All I can say is that if this is President’s attitude, he had no business approving the Moscow trip.” Kissinger continued, “with respect to SALT, the Washington view is nothing short of absurd. Semenov told Smith that he might have a new ABM proposal and hinted at its nature. He also said that Moscow was ‘reviewing’ the SLBM position. We obtained a precise proposal on both. The SLBM proposal moreover is exactly the scheme we advanced in the special channel. In any event Semenov is now under instructions to make no further move until President acts. But if the President likes to run down his own accomplishments that is his business.” (Ibid.)

At 1945Z on April 23 Nixon sent Kissinger a message that he dictated personally. A passage related to SALT reads:

“However, no matter how good a deal we get out of the summit on SALT and on the other issues, we must realize that now the Soviet summit, far more than the Chinese summit, due to the fact that your trip directly dealt with Vietnam, will be judged as a success or failure depending upon whether we get some progress on Vietnam.”

The message continues: “As Al [Haig] may have already messaged you, any SALT announcement by me now presents a serious problem. Rogers called me Saturday [April 22] and told me that Semenov had given Smith exactly the same offer that you set forth in your message of April 22.

“I realize that we can point out that there is a shade of difference since you now have apparently an agreement with the Soviet to include SLBMs whereas we could say that Smith only had an agreement to discuss the inclusion of SLBMs. On the other hand, I fear that we have the problem in making any Presidential announcement that Smith and his colleagues will simply say that I was trying to point to your trip and my upcoming visit as having been responsible for accomplishing a breakthrough in SALT which Smith had already accomplished at lower levels. Perhaps we can find a way to handle this problem but I think in view of the call I received from Rogers we will find it pretty difficult.” (Ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Personal Files, Box 74, President’s Speech File, April 1972, Kissinger Trip to Moscow)

For the full text of all three messages, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 155, 156, and 157.

265. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, April 24, 1972, 1:50–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to USA
G.M. Kornienko, Chief of USA Division, Foreign Ministry

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

Announcement of Kissinger Visit; Vietnam; SALT

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

SALT

There is also a small problem on SALT. Semenov unfortunately said a little too much. This is another problem. The President himself sent me a message personally.² Let me read part of it to you:

“As Al may have already messaged you, any SALT announcement by me now presents a serious problem. Rogers called me Saturday and told me that Semenov had given Smith exactly the same offer that you set forth in your message of April 22.

“I realize that we can point out that there is a shade of difference since you now have apparently an agreement with the Soviet to include SLBM's whereas we could say that Smith only had an agreement to discuss the inclusion of SLBM's. On the other hand, I fear that we have the problem in making any Presidential announcement that Smith and his colleagues will simply say that I was trying to point to your trip and my upcoming visit as having been responsible for accomplishing a breakthrough in SALT which Smith had already accomplished at lower levels. Perhaps we can find a way to handle this problem but I think in view of the call I received from Rogers we will find it pretty difficult.”

And Anatol can tell you it is very very unusual for the President to write me at all.

Gromyko: This is a very improbable thing.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, MemCons. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place at the Guest House on Vorobyevskii Road. All brackets, except those indicating the omission of unrelated material, are in the original. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 160.

² See Document 264.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me propose this, Mr. Foreign Minister. The President can step out to the press when he sends Smith back to Helsinki and say that he had been in touch with Mr. Brezhnev and that a new proposal had been made to Dr. Kissinger here.

Gromyko: Certainly.

Dr. Kissinger: You should tell your number two guy to keep quiet. What is his name? Kishilev. He and Garthoff think they are running the negotiations themselves.

Could someone bring Ambassador Beam over here now?

[Kornienko goes out of the room to call Semenov in Helsinki. He returned a few minutes later, saying that Semenov was at the office and they would try again later.]

[Dr. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko, who had been standing and walking back and forth through most of these discussions, then sat down in adjacent chairs by the table, and the discussion resumed.]

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

266. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, April 24, 1972, 1335Z.

330. Dear Henry:

Last Saturday afternoon Kishilov advised Garthoff that since a treaty with a complete deferral of the second sites would result in the Soviets having no defense of ICBMs in the initial phase, they would not want to propose such deferral.² But Semenov's instructions call for a positive reply if the US proposes deferral—perhaps covering deferral in a side understanding rather than in treaty. They still have in mind three to five years.

An ABM treaty with a second site deferral would have some aspects of a freeze to existing ABM sites and thus would minimize some-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Haig and Howe.

² Smith may be referring to the discussion on Sunday, April 16; see Document 261.

what the psychological difference between the treatment proposed for offensive and defensive limitations.

I stayed entirely away from the deferral question in recent talks with Semenov since I realize that it may be a controversial matter at home.

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

267. Editorial Note

On April 24, 1972, at 8:30 p.m., after returning from Moscow, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger went to Camp David to report on his trip to President Nixon. Assistant to the President Haldeman and President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig also attended the meeting, which lasted 55 minutes. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) Although no record has been found of the meeting, Haldeman wrote an account in his diary of the discussion relating to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT):

"P[resident] backed down on the K[issinger] briefing to Congressmen, agreed that Henry could do one to steer the direction on how the talks were arranged and how they went, so that no substance or content is disclosed. And also he backed down on the SALT thing and agreed that we would make the announcement. He's ordering Smith back right away to set up for that. The meeting went pretty well, although it was pretty tense at the beginning. The P was all primed to really whack Henry, but backed off when he actually got there. Henry obviously very tense. Haig had called me earlier to say that Henry had sent some extremely bad cables because he felt we had not backed him, and he was very distressed that he had been sabotaged and undercut, and he greeted me very frostily, but the P broke that pretty quickly as the meeting started. We all came out in good spirits." (Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries*, pages 446–447)

On April 24 Kissinger also sent the President a memorandum, which bears Nixon's handwritten comment, "K—superb job! RN, 4–29–72." The memorandum, which provided a summary of Kissinger's 13 hours of conversation with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, includes the following account of SALT:

“—Brezhnev also gave us a *SALT proposal* that is considerably more favorable than we expected. Moscow agrees to include SLBMs at a time when it looked almost certain that we would have to drop this aspect in order to get an agreement by the summit. And the Soviet margin in submarines (21) is partly accounted for by their adding UK and French boats to our total and compensated for by their commitment to phase out their older land-based missiles, as well as the basing advantages we have. Their ABM proposal is a variant of our compromise solution and leaves us with more ICBMs protected than they. They bought our position that the offensive freeze last five years instead of three. They agreed to freeze soft ICBMs. *In short, if the summit meeting takes place, you will be able to sign the most important arms control agreement ever concluded.*

“—Whether we would have gotten this SALT agreement without my trip is certainly a debatable question. They might have moved in Helsinki anyway, but the signs before my trip went in the opposite direction. What is not debatable is the fact that this agreement was produced by your intervention and use of the private channel, and that the specific commitments were delivered by the Soviets only in conjunction with my visit. Thus *you deserve personal credit for this breakthrough.*” The full text of the memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 169.

268. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 25, 1972.

SUBJECT

Radar Controls for ICBM Defense

NSDM-158² directed that the Modern ABM Radar Complex (MARC) concept be applied to ICBM defenses, and the Soviets have recently indicated receptivity toward this approach. However, in Para-

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret.

² Document 243.

graph 14, NSDM-158 anticipated U.S. movement to a combination of qualitative and quantitative constraints on such radars. I believe we should move in this direction now.

Although geographical limitations on the deployment of Soviet ICBM defenses contribute to reducing the degree of Soviet population coverage, I believe limitations on the quality of ICBM defense radars are also necessary to ensure against extensive population coverage from ABM deployments in some of the Soviet ICBM fields east of the Ural Mountains. This is especially important in view of the fact that the Soviets, if they accept MARCs in ICBM fields, will probably insist on a larger number of MARCs than was contemplated in NSDM-158. The Soviets would be permitted by our current MARC concept to emplace radars of any size they wish in these MARCs.

Movement on our part to qualitative and quantitative constraints on radars in ICBM fields would entail permitting radars at a larger number of aim points than would MARC controls. Such deployments of qualitatively constrained radars, however, would provide the reduced vulnerability of the radar base needed to support larger numbers of interceptors for ICBM defense than permitted by the Treaty, if such larger numbers should become necessary.

In short, a combination of qualitative and quantitative radar controls on ABM radars in ICBM fields has two main advantages over MARC controls. First the combination of qualitative and quantitative controls would better limit coverage of Soviet population by the ICBM defenses. Second, it would permit a better radar base for expansion of U.S. ICBM defenses.

For these reasons I urge that the Delegation be directed to carry out explorations of a combination of quantitative and qualitative controls on ABM radars for ICBM defense, as anticipated in Paragraph 14 of NSDM-158, and in addition, be authorized to carry out these explorations in the context of permitting up to 25 qualitatively constrained ABM radars in agreed ICBM deployment areas.

Melvin R. Laird

269. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Tucker) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Washington, April 27, 1972.

SUBJECT

SALT

I talked with Paul Nitze on 4/27/72.² The following observations are the result.

[2 paragraphs (19 lines) not declassified]

NSDM–158, para. 17 authorizes Smith to state: If the USSR were to undertake a concerted program which substantially increased the threat to survivability of our strategic retaliatory forces, the U.S. would consider this to jeopardize our supreme interests. Consequently this could be a basis for withdrawal from the ABM treaty. (Smith has not yet made this statement and seems very reluctant to do so.)

[4 paragraphs (19½ lines) not declassified]

I plan to come to you shortly with a discussion of alternative ways to exercise the essence of paragraph 17.

Gardiner L. Tucker

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–77–0095, Box 7, USSR, 388.3. Top Secret. A stamped notation indicates that Laird saw the memorandum on April 28.

² No other record of their conversation has been found.

270. **Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and the White House Press Secretary (Ziegler)¹**

Washington, May 1, 1972.

Rogers: Mr. President, I'd like to say just a word about the conversation we had.² I think that if you could work out a paper that you can give Gerry to give to Semenov, so that if we work out an agreement, we can say that it was based on your paper.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Rogers: I never liked the Brezhnev paper.³ I think it'll [unclear]—

Nixon: Let me see it.

Rogers: In other words—

Nixon: Right—

Rogers: —if we can—if you can state our position and have a Nixon paper.

Nixon: Hmm.

Rogers: And then when we are questioned about it we can say that—

Nixon: This is our position.

Rogers: —this is our position. I just think if we could do that it'd be a big help, because some of those things in there will be—

Nixon: Well, his instructions, I think, will be an equivalent to that because you can have him hand them a paper—

Rogers: Yeah, and say this is—

Nixon: Yeah. I know.

Rogers: And then—and then, he can negotiate from that paper—

Nixon: I bet if we could work on it now—

Rogers: It will help, too.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 716–2. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, the President met with Rogers, Kissinger, Haig, and Ziegler from 4:11 to 5:29 p.m. Prior to that Nixon met with Smith, Moorer, Allison, Helms, Rogers, Laird, Kissinger, Ziegler, and members of the press in the Cabinet Room from 3:07 to 4:08 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) There is also a recording of the earlier meeting. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 99–10) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² Rogers is referring to the meeting just concluded.

³ See Document 262.

Nixon: Yeah.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Rogers: Now, as for the SALT talks, I thought on the SALT talks I would give them sort of a general map,⁴ but say that Gerry will come to give them any specifics after the discussions he's had in—

Kissinger: [unclear]—

Rogers: —Helsinki. Because we don't want to get into this. Henry, I was saying this, when you were out of the room, to the President: I think it would be worthwhile to think about having a paper from President Nixon, which we can work from, so that if we do agree, and I'm perfectly—I agree that if we could get a—SLBMs included, it's better, as long as we don't have to sacrifice things. If we could get his paper to work from, so that we can say, when we've finally concluded, that we didn't operate from Brezhnev's paper; we operated from ours. We can have Gerry do it, or have the President send a back channel message and then have Gerry negotiate it, so we can do it through his paper rather than from Brezhnev's.

Kissinger: Well, I think what we should do is, we have to let the—I've kept them from tabling this, because I thought we should have—they were all set to table that in Helsinki—

Nixon: The Russians were?

Kissinger: I said give [unclear] give us a chance to look at this thing. And there's—I don't think there's any way we can keep them from tabling it. But, we don't have to accept that, that particular framework, although it incorporates what was said at that meeting.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: Many ideas we proposed. The only addition to what we've already proposed is that in addition to the G- and H-class submarines, they are suggesting that they could trade in 209 old missiles for submarine missiles. And there, you can argue that both ways. You can say those missiles reduce the edge they have in land-based missiles in return for submarine missiles. And—

Nixon: What about the proposition of putting [unclear] Smith tables something, too?

Kissinger: Sure, Smith can table it. What we've given him is different. In the NSDM,⁵ that's different from what they've proposed to us.

Rogers: I'd just like to have something we could label, "President Nixon's."

⁴ Rogers left the next day on a trip to several European countries.

⁵ Document 271.

[unclear exchange]

Kissinger: Well, we have said in your exchange that we, we've got the—

Nixon: Well, I'll give him a letter, like we always have done before. How would that be?

Kissinger: Yeah, we could send him a letter—

Rogers: I think that would be good, yeah—

Nixon: How about—how about preparing a letter? When does he leave? Tonight?

Kissinger: Well, we can wire him the letter.

Nixon: I'll prepare a letter, which I've done before.

Rogers: That'd be good—

Nixon: I'll say after our meeting that if these are the considerations that—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: —he should have in mind, then he has that for the record—

Kissinger: That's right—

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: —as to what we want—

Rogers: And then, we can say we've negotiated from your—

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. The best thing that we could get, yeah. It's a curious situ—proposition. We are—we don't have anything to negotiate [unclear]. We have to face the fact that on the defense—in the defense field that we have a very weak hand in terms of what we can get—

Rogers: Well, I think we got—I think—

Nixon: A very weak hand. We have to—we have to remember the Russians are moving forward like crazy on submarines and offensive weapons—

Kissinger: And they've just built a new ship—

Nixon: —and we're not doing a damn thing. And so, we're in a—and, with all the peaceniks, we have one helluva time getting it. So, I think—I don't know, I—it'll accomplish something to get them slowed down, and yet, in terms of selling it to the country, well, I guess all we can talk about are MIRVs.

Rogers: I think we can sell it to the country—

Nixon: The MIRVs thing, I think, is a powerful thing to them. Don't you agree?

Kissinger: Yeah. It is a fact, which isn't our fault, that every missile we are now working with was designed in the Eisenhower administration—

Nixon: That's right. [unclear]—

Kissinger: —that we've wasted 8 years of McNamara's tenure.

Nixon: We haven't done, we have—we are at a disadvantage. That's the problem.

Kissinger: And when you see this damn thing, that new missile they tested—I don't know whether you've seen this—

Nixon: Do you think it's—do you think it's a real one?

Kissinger: Yeah. And—

Nixon: I thought you said they weren't sure if they had them—

Kissinger: Well, they popped something out of a hole, which they are applying a submarine-launch principle to land-based missiles. That is, just get it out of the ground, and then give it an additional thrust—

Nixon: Yeah, well—

Kissinger: That way they can double the payload of the SS-9, and they could give it as many as—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —twelve 5-megaton warheads. And it's really a scary thing.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT. At 4:23 p.m., Ziegler entered. Rogers and Kissinger left at 4:24 p.m. Kissinger re-entered at 4:26 p.m.]

Nixon: I told Ron I was really, probably, too hard on Smith, but once he—

Kissinger: Mr. President—

Nixon: —just pulled out a piece of paper like that. But that's gobbledegook to say that. What difference is it's—

Kissinger: Well—

Nixon: —State's fucking position. What the [unclear]—

Kissinger: Mr. President, the problem is this—

Nixon: I don't know what the hell he's talking about.

Kissinger: Brezhnev—Brezhnev accepted your propositions. Every point in that Brezhnev paper we gave him.

Nixon: Um-hmm. What the Christ is Rogers talking about?

Kissinger: We are cutting it down from 85 to 62, and we're giving up nothing in return. We can't get another goddamn submarine out of them—

Nixon: Why is Rogers so strong, so strong on this?

Kissinger: So that, so that I'll guarantee you one thing: by Friday of this week, if you don't do this—

Nixon: Um-hmm?

Kissinger: —you're going to get stories out of Helsinki—

Nixon: Yeah—

Kissinger: —that they broke the logjam.

[Omitted here are discussion and dictation of the text of a statement for Ziegler while the Press Secretary takes notes. Ziegler left at 4:36 p.m. Haig entered at 4:38 p.m.]

Nixon: I seldom lose my temper and everything, but I just thought, “Oh, shit,” when he handed the little shit-ass piece of paper over to you—⁶

[unclear exchange]

Kissinger: I didn’t need to bother you. I handed Dobrynin this paper, which he had drafted, which said, “While we can’t agree with all these considerations.”⁷ Dobrynin said, “I’ll transmit it.” But, his reaction was the same as yours. He said, “If Brezhnev reads this—”

Nixon: [speaking on the telephone] Would you have Haig in, please?

Kissinger: He said, “If Brezhnev reads this, he’ll think that we’re playing games with him.” So, I said, “All right, why don’t you give this to Brezhnev [unclear] the other one has been accepted by Smith.”

Nixon: Well, the point is, while we cannot agree with that this— with the lawyers, it’s like writing a letter for the record or some damn thing.

Kissinger: Well, in effect, it says—

Nixon: “Shame on you,” doesn’t it?

⁶ Nixon is referring to the reply Smith drafted in response to the SLBM proposal presented by Brezhnev to Kissinger in Moscow (see footnote 3 and *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1972, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 179.) Kissinger handed Smith’s note to Dobrynin when the two men met on May 1 from 12:15 to 12:40 p.m., according to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976) The note reads in part as follows: “While we cannot agree with certain considerations expressed in the paper given Henry Kissinger in Moscow, we can agree in principle to the general approach suggested in that paper. It is the understanding of the U.S. government that under the proposed SLBM freeze, additional SLBM launchers, beyond those existing on the freeze date, could be built in replacement for certain existing strategic launchers. Such a freeze would last five years if an agreement on more comprehensive limitations on strategic offensive arms was not reached in the meantime. We are prepared at Helsinki to negotiate equitable provisions to cover this kind of arrangement with the aim of concluding an offensive interim agreement, together with an ABM Treaty, for signature during the forthcoming meeting in Moscow.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12) Although no U.S. record of the meeting has been found, Dobrynin’s memorandum of conversation is published in *Soviet-American Relations*, Document 319.

⁷ At 12:50 p.m. Haig called Dobrynin to inform him of revisions to the note. According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Haig, he told Dobrynin that Kissinger wished to delete the first phrase, which reads: “While we cannot agree with certain considerations expressed in the paper given Henry Kissinger in Moscow.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 11) See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 179.

Kissinger: Yeah, and—

Nixon: But now, they put you down, basically, if—
[unclear exchange]

Nixon: [unclear] last night. I didn't know what it's all about. Now, I must admit, that Rogers, Rogers, basically, was pissing on the whole Brezhnev thing.

Kissinger: Of course.

Nixon: And maybe the Brezhnev thing is a bad deal. I don't know.

Kissinger: Mr. President—

Nixon: Is it as bad as he says?

Kissinger: Now, Mr. President, can you imagine that Laird, Helms, and Moorer would support it if it were such a bad thing? That Laird and Moorer, who have to testify about this—

Nixon: Supporting it—and the Brezhnev draft?

Kissinger: Yes! That's what they're supporting. They're out of [unclear]—

Nixon: But, Rogers wants it to be the President's proposal, not Brezhnev's proposal.

Kissinger: Mr. President, first of all, it is—no, it is [unclear]—

Nixon: After all, you negotiated the goddamn thing. That's—

Kissinger: It is, essentially, his proposal—

Nixon: I think that's it. You negotiated it anyway, so what the hell?

Kissinger: It's—it's one of the lowest performances I've ever seen, because, first of all, we're accepting a freeze of 1,500 ICBMs against 1,000 ICBMs. No one raised the issue, there, of equality. The submarine thing, where we have no leverage at all, where with, where—where, supposing there is no agreement, how are we going to explain the fact that the Soviets can then build 85 to 90 submarines, while we're not building one? And I thought this was one of the most third-rate performances I've ever seen.

Nixon: What the hell [unclear]? What—what did you think? I was just telling Henry I was, I seldomly get put out, but when Smith brought in that gobbledygook about—

Kissinger: Did you call him and tell him that?

Nixon: What do you think?

Haig: Well, I just thought you had the right term for it.

[Laughter]

Nixon: Well, but what—what'd you think of that meeting? What the hell was his—?

Haig: It's like Alice in Wonderland. He's arguing the precise opposite track that he did in the NSC meeting, earlier.

Kissinger: Two—

Nixon: He had a meeting earlier today?

Haig: No, no.

Kissinger: No. Two months ago,⁸ Mr. President, when—

Nixon: Oh, yeah.

Kissinger: —when I was making a case against excluding—including SLBMs, because I didn't think we could get it, he was making a passionate case that it had to be included. The figures we gave them, these—I didn't make up these figures; I got them from his own bloody bureaucracy.

Nixon: What the Christ is he up to then? What is—what about Rogers's point about the Brezhnev paper being submitted? I haven't read that carefully. Is it—do you—give me the cold judgment: is Rogers right that that'll look bad on the record?

[Omitted here is a brief interruption as Nixon speaks to Butterfield on a topic unrelated to SALT.]

Haig: Oh, I think there are two things here, sir. One is we're after an interim solution to a problem which is going to go on and on, and we're going to have to work a treaty out sooner or later. What we've got to do is somehow get a stop on what the Soviets are doing. We haven't affected ourselves one iota. And, from the legislative support point of view, had we left SLBMs out, we would have been in the position of fighting for full bore—take this goddamned advanced submarine missile—with nothing to go for. Now, our key Congressional people will see that there's a target that we've got to fund for—

Nixon: Hmm.

Haig: And—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: —beyond that.

Nixon: Yeah. Right. Well, in this connection, Henry, just so that the record is clear, will you see that Al prepares, or somebody prepares, a little instruction to this goddamn Smith for me? A letter from me to Smith—a message?

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: So, that it's in the record?

Kissinger: But, Mr. President, I have a file of—it's perfectly clear who made these proposals.

Nixon: You know what I meant, and you know what Rogers said: that—so that it's a Nixon proposal, basically. I don't mean something

⁸ Reference is to the NSC meeting of March 17; see Document 240.

he hands to them. He says, based—the NSDM, I guess, handles the whole thing, doesn't it?

Kissinger: [unclear] the NSDM—

Nixon: Isn't that a Presidential order?

Kissinger: Of course, it's a presidential order.

Nixon: Well, why don't I—why don't I say that, that—

Kissinger: I don't—we can write Gerry Smith a letter. There's no problem about that. [unclear]—

Nixon: All right, just so that it's for the record. Let me ask you—

Kissinger: But, but their strategy is perfectly plain, Mr. President. They want to get it so screwed up that they can then claim, when it's totally screwed up, they will come in with proposals which will make the Brezhnev proposal look soft—I mean, look tough in, in our favor. I mean, these guys, who have retreated on every single issue, who've been giving our fallback positions to the Russians before we ever surfaced them. For them, when the Russians more or less accept our own proposals—the reason, when I cabled you from Moscow—⁹

Nixon: Oh, yeah.

Kissinger: —was because this is, in effect, our proposal.

Nixon: I didn't know we were talking about the same thing when I listened at that meeting. I couldn't believe it.

Kissinger: Well, but, after all, I haven't positioned Laird, Mr. President. I didn't position Helms. I showed this paper to Moorer. I said, "You study it. You tell me whether you can live with it." He made a study of it. He wants—he's in favor of it.

Nixon: What about—what about Rogers's point that it looks bad for us, publicly, to acknowledge and to freeze inferiority on submarines? It can't be worked—will the Russians accept that, their overall number, rather than the 62-41, or whatever it is? [unclear]—

Kissinger: Mr. President—

Nixon: —every right person will immediately seize [unclear]—

Kissinger: Mr. President, the problem—the advantage of having 62-41, we can express it in dates. We can say, "Submarines under construction by this and this date, plus conversion of other submarines." I mean, we'll never have to give the number, so we can avoid that. But the advantage—there, the fact that they give us both boats and launchers is an advantage to us, because if they have two kinds of boats, some

⁹ For Kissinger's discussion with Brezhnev in Moscow, see Document 262. He reported by cable in WTE 10, April 22; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 148.

with 12 missiles that are very long-range, and some with 16, which are like our Polarises—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: —if we give them an upper number like 950, they can convert all their boats into 12-missile boats, which means that their deployment is much easier for them. If we say that the absolute maximum is 62—

Nixon: Um-hmm?

Kissinger: —then, if they converted into long-range missiles, they can't reach 950. So, they have a real choice to make there: either to take the poor missile and get a lot of them, or to take the good missile and take fewer of them. So, expressing it in both boats and launchers is in to our advantage. It's—it's not to theirs.

Nixon: [unclear] is that Moorer and Laird can be strong as horse-radish for this, because they've got to sell all this. Nobody's going to believe this goddamn Smith on this issue.

Kissinger: Well, Smith—with Smith, Mr. President, it's a pure case of vanity. These sons-of-bitches—on ABM, for example—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Kissinger: —I didn't even bother you—

Nixon: —I noticed he made the very strong point there. You know, he wanted an agreement on ABMs alone, and I said: "Well, by God, they're never going to get that." These sons-of-bitches would have done that. That's what he wanted.

Kissinger: [laughing] On ABM—

Haig: And he wanted zero ABM—

Nixon: Zero ABM, and I'll never agree to that.

Kissinger: He's put a real lawyer's trick on you. I haven't even bothered you with it. This 150-kilometer radius, in effect, combines two Soviet missile sites into one, so we're even getting a slight disadvantage on that. That one, he sneaked by you by defining the radius. I didn't hear anyone say that we are losing an additional site. I thought it was a really sickening performance, if I—

Nixon: Did they know better? Did you think it was?

Haig: I thought [unclear]. It was hard for me to believe, because I've been on the other wicket and had been arguing with Henry, earlier, about keeping the SLBMs—

Nixon: Um-hmm? Yeah?

Haig: We both agreed it'd be better off not to have them—

Kissinger: I didn't want them in.

Nixon: Yeah. I didn't want them in either—

Haig: —'til I saw this proposal.

Nixon: I didn't want 'em in for the very reason that I think that we can build them and they can't. But, now, now we've gotten the goddamn things in.

Haig: And not only this, sir, but the boys on the Hill are already giving Laird a terrific time on the ULMS, wanting to cut that money. Now, the incentive is going to be with the knowledgeable ones—the Stennises, the people we can rely on to get—to say, "Look, here's—this is the problem: if we hadn't taken this deal, we would've been down to the tune of 80-some—"

Nixon: [unclear]—

Haig: "—versus—80-some Soviet missiles versus ours." Now, we have to build to the limit to reduce the gap, and we haven't lost a thing, except to have a great incentive for responsible Congressmen to fund them and fight like hell.

Kissinger: I have studied SALT for 15 years, Mr. President.

Nixon: But it's—

Kissinger: Not—not SALT, but arms control. I've been against including submarines to begin with. I've been arguing with Moorer, and with Laird, and with Zumwalt. If you're going to include submarines, this is, by far, the best deal you can get, because for every additional submarine you build, they have to retire an old missile.

[Pause]

Nixon: You can be at the meeting Wednesday,¹⁰ can't you?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Well, I must say that I haven't known what the Christ the goddamn thing was all about.

Kissinger: Well, I've been going through this all week. I thought I had been beaten down. Alex Johnson, who's an honest guy, is totally in favor of this proposal.

Nixon: Is he?

Kissinger: Yes. But Smith, out of vanity—Smith has the nerve—gall to tell you the ABM thing is a breakthrough, which is nothing, and to piss on the SLBM—

Nixon: With ABM it's two for them and one for us. You know what I mean? They—it's to their interest to control ABM. It's to our interest to conclude—to control the offensive missiles. That's what I told that

¹⁰ On May 3 Kissinger met with Moorer, Rush, and Haig from 10:45 to 10:55 a.m. and then alone with Nixon from 11 a.m. to 12:14 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) No other record of these meetings has been found.

goddamn arms control group. Don't you agree? It's not to our interest to control ABM—

Kissinger: Of course.

Nixon: —it's to theirs.

Kissinger: Of course, Rogers doesn't understand this. I don't think he's ever studied this goddamn problem.

Nixon: Well, it's a very complicated problem. But nevertheless, I don't—his point that he was making, was that he doesn't like the Brezhnev [unclear]—

Kissinger: Mr. President. We can easily interpret—

Nixon: I think what I did—I think Bill was just so goddamn—and Gerry, were both put out that you brought it back from Brezhnev. Isn't that what it gets at? Or is it? I don't know.

Kissinger: I think the basic problem is that Smith and Rogers were going to surface this as their great contribution. The SALT agreement was going to be theirs, and now they're put out that it's in your channel rather than in theirs. I think that's the basic problem.

Nixon: You know, shit, it has to be small stuff, small potatoes.

271. National Security Decision Memorandum 164¹

Washington, May 1, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Additional Instruction for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki
(SALT VII)

The President has made the following additional decisions for Helsinki (SALT VII).

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs. 145–264. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT.

Defensive Limitations

1. The Delegation is authorized to present the following new proposal on ABM levels in the context of the Soviets agreeing to include SLBM launchers in the Interim Agreement:

a. Each side may deploy ABM components only within one national capital defense deployment area and one ICBM defense deployment area.

b. A national capital defense deployment area is a circular area of 150 kilometers radius centered on the party's national capital. It may contain no more than 100 ABM interceptors/launchers, no more than _____ Modern ABM Radar Complexes (MARC)s, and those mechanical-scan, dish-type ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the treaty. (For the number of MARCs, see paragraph 2.)

c. An ICBM defense deployment area is a circular area of 150 kilometers radius, containing ICBM silos which are west of the Mississippi River for the U.S. and east of the Ural Mountains for the U.S.S.R. It may contain no more than 100 ABM interceptors/launchers and no more than _____ MARCs. (For the number of MARCs, see paragraph 3.)

d. In addition to (but not instead of) MARC limitations for ICBM defense deployment areas, the ABM radars should be smaller in power-aperture than our Missile Site Radar (MSR). However, there would be a specific exception for our Phased-Array Radar (PAR) and MSR now being deployed at Grand Forks. (The Chairman of the Delegation may, at his discretion, propose this as a separate agreed understanding.)

2. For ABM defense of the national capital, the Chairman of the Delegation may, at his discretion, propose up to *eight* MARCs.

3. For ICBM defense deployment areas, the Delegation should continue to press to get Soviet acceptance of the principle of Modern ABM Radar Complexes (MARC)s. Moreover, the Delegation should seek to keep the number of MARCs to *eight* or less per ICBM defense deployment area. However, the Chairman of the Delegation may propose, at his discretion, up to *ten* MARCs.

4. With regard to our proposed addition to Article XV of the Joint Draft about withdrawal if the follow-up negotiations fail, the Chairman of the Delegation may, at his discretion, proceed with the scenario outlined by the Delegation. (USDEL SALT VII 1227 as amended by SALT 1235.)²

² The texts of telegram US DEL SALT 1227 and US DEL SALT 1235 are *ibid.*, Box 882, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [*sic*] Vol. 17, January–April 1972).

Offensive Limitations

5. The Delegation should seek the inclusion of SLBMs in the Interim Agreement, the effect of which would be the following:

a. The Soviets, during the duration of the freeze, could have operational or under construction up to 62 modern ballistic missile submarines with no more than 950 SLBM launchers.

b. In order to reach the numbers above, each new Soviet SLBM launcher on which construction is started, after the freeze date, must substitute for an existing SLBM launcher or an existing older, heavy ICBM.

c. The U.S. should have the option to replace its 54 older, heavy ICBM launchers (Titans) with up to three ballistic missile submarines and 54 SLBM launchers.

d. There should be agreed provisions governing the manner in which SLBM launchers would be substituted for the missile launchers to be replaced. (The Delegation should propose, for Presidential decision, appropriate replacements provisions. These provisions should include: (i) notification to the other party when the new SLBM launcher construction begins of what missile launchers will be destroyed or dismantled, and (ii) the procedures and timing for the destruction or dismantling of the old missile launchers. The Delegation should draw upon the work in the interagency paper on "Procedures for Replacement of Old Missile Launchers.")³

6. With respect to duration, the Delegation should propose: (i) that the Interim Agreement remain in force for *five* years unless replaced by a treaty limiting strategic offensive arms, and (ii) that it could be extended by mutual agreement.

7. The Delegation should continue to press for including our proposed language in Article V/VI regarding covered facilities for submarines.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ "Not printed."

272. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Washington, May 6, 1972, 2114Z.

WH21246. To be delivered upon opening of business Sunday a.m. Dobrynin made following points today.²

1. In regard to SLBM's the Soviet leadership is puzzled that we are claiming that our proposal is in effect theirs when in their view they were accepting the essence of our position. In this regard, the Soviets confirm that they will dismantle SS-7's and SS-8's and convert them into SLBMs.

2. In regard to initial phrase in our formal communication to the effect that we could not accept all considerations in the Soviet paper given me in Moscow, Soviets understand that this refers particularly to NATO aspects and FBS. The Soviets will therefore not insist on any formal references to UK and French SLBM's or to any commitment that forward bases will be on agenda for next phase of SALT.

I wanted you to have the above since I understand Semyonov is to present Soviet SLBM on Sunday.³

Warm regards.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972, SALT. Secret; Exclusive; Eyes Only.

² At 5:30 p.m. Dobrynin handed Kissinger a letter from the Soviet leadership concerning the situation in Vietnam, which is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 200. Although no other U.S. record of their discussion has been found, Dobrynin's memorandum of conversation is published in *Soviet-American Relations*, Document 324.

³ In telegram USDEL SALT 1318 from Helsinki, May 15, Smith summarized the Soviet SLBM proposal presented by Semenov: "Substance of understanding would limit US to 656 launchers on 41 submarines, and limit Soviet Union to 950 launchers on modern submarines while permitting it to retain 100 SLBM launchers on G and H class submarines or to modify G and H class with new SLBMs above 950 limit." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 883, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [sic], Vol. 18, May–August 1972)

273. National Security Decision Memorandum 166¹

Washington, May 12, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki (SALT VII);
Amplification of NSDM 164

The President has decided that:

1. The Chairman of the Delegation should indicate that the U.S. has no interest in deferring the second ABM site for each country.

2. While paragraph 3 of NSDM-164² is still valid, the Delegation may recommend switching in whole or in part from the MARC concept to a numerical limit on individual ABM radars, if the Delegation believes that this modification would facilitate the negotiations.

3. The Delegation should propose the following procedures for replacement of old ICBM or SLBM launchers with new SLBM launchers:

a. Notification of the number, type and location of launchers to be deactivated shall be given by the time construction begins on the replacement SLBM launcher. (The Chairman of the Delegation, at his discretion, may fall back to proposing that the time of notification be prior to the launch of the replacement submarine and to the dismantling or destruction of old launchers.)

b. Dismantling or destruction of the missile launchers to be replaced by new SLBM launchers shall be initiated by the time of the launch of the replacement SLBM submarine.

c. Notification and dismantling or destruction shall be accomplished under specific procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-233, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs 145–164. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT.

² Document 271.

274. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Washington, May 14, 1972, 1705Z.

WH21293. Dobrynin has just handed following texts² which he says Semyonov will table in Helsinki Monday.³ He said he was doing so as a courtesy to the President and in conformity with the spirit of the confidential channels between Brezhnev and the President in which SALT matters have been under discussion. I said all my comments were preliminary and official reaction would come from you.

1. *Begin text*

Article III

"The sides undertake for the period of this interim agreement to limit, by levels mutually agreed for each of the sides, the total number of ballistic missile launchers on modern submarines."

End text

I made no comment.

2. *Begin text*

Definition of ICBM

"By ICBM land-based launchers, mentioned in Article I of this agreement, are understood launchers of ICBM with the range exceeding the shortest distance between the north-western border of the continental part of the USSR territory."

End text.

I made no comment.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The instruction "Deliver on receipt" is included.

² On May 14 at 10:30 a.m. Kissinger and Dobrynin met. The memorandum of their conversation and the text of the Soviet note are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 224. At 11:40 a.m. Kissinger informed Nixon of the meeting with Dobrynin. According to a transcript of the telephone conversation, Kissinger stated: "It's highly complex, but nothing you want to bother with. It's how many radars should be at an ICBM defense site." Nixon replied, "As you and I both know, it doesn't make a hell of a lot of difference. Just so we can defend it." The transcript is *ibid.*, Document 225.

³ See footnote 3, Document 272.

3. *Begin text*

"It is not expedient to set geographic limits to the location of areas of ABM deployment for covering ICBM silo launchers both in the Soviet Union and in the United States."

End text

I told him that this would be completely unacceptable. He left the impression that our objection would be manageable.

4. *Begin text*

Annex
Draft Exchange Letter

"The Soviet Government has thoroughly considered the question of establishing for the USSR and the USA agreed levels of the number of modern submarines and ballistic missile launchers thereon in connection with the conclusion of an interim agreement on freezing strategic offensive weapons.

"The Soviet Union agrees that the USA should have, for the period of the interim freeze agreement, 41 modern submarines with the total number of ballistic missile launchers thereon of 656. Over the same period the Soviet Union will have total number of ballistic missile launchers on modern submarines not exceeding 950. The said number of launchers in the Soviet Union will be deployed on modern submarines operational and under construction as of the date of signing the interim agreement, as well as on submarines that will be built additionally. Additional launchers on submarines—in excess of the 48 modern submarines operational and under construction—will be put in commission in the Soviet Union in lieu of older-type ICBM launchers built before 1964.

"It is also implied that in modernizing older submarines with ballistic missiles or in replacing them by new submarines the sides will not increase the above said total number of ballistic missile launchers on modern submarines.

"This letter constitutes an integral part of the interim agreement."

End text.

I reminded Dobrynin that to reach their totals the Soviets must dismantle G and H class submarines. Dobrynin said Moscow understood that we had mentioned this as our position.

Please note that Soviets in the above text assert that they have forty-eight repeat forty-eight modern submarines operational and under construction.

5. *Begin text*

Annex
Statement of the Soviet Side

"Taking into account that at present, besides the US, modern submarines with ballistic missiles are also owned by the US NATO allies,

the Soviet Union agrees that for the period of the interim freeze agreement the US and their NATO allies could have up to 50 such submarines with the total number of ballistic missile launchers thereon of up to 800 (including 41 submarines with 656 ballistic missile launchers thereon at the disposal of the United States).

“If however over the period of the above agreement the US NATO allies increase the number of modern submarines to the excess of those operational or under construction as of the date of signing the agreement, the Soviet Union would have the right to the corresponding increase in the number of its own submarines.

“In the opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the question of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for in the interim agreement, only partially compensates for the disbalance in the location of the USSR and the US missile carrying nuclear submarines. Therefore the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the whole of this problem and primarily the issue of dismantling the US missile submarine bases outside territory of the US, should be appropriately resolved in the course of subsequent negotiations.”

I expressed no opinion to Dobrynin on this unilateral Soviet statement except to say that the last sentence can not repeat not be drafted in any way that implies that the “premise” referred to is one that we accept. Dobrynin indicated that this was a manageable point.

6. *Begin text*

“In the area of the ICBM silo launchers deployment each side may have two large (phased-lattice) radars, comparable in potential with similar ABM radars of the other side, and also not more than 18 ABM radars.

“(We are ready at the same time to make a joint statement by the delegations concerning large (phased-lattice) radars which are not ABM radars. Our delegation will submit draft of technical text to that effect.)”

End text.

I made no comment. However, the President has indicated to me that you can be instructed through normal channels to accept the eighteen plus two proposition which you had already been working on earlier this week. However, you should take the firm position that this deal is totally dependent on agreement concerning geographical location east of the Urals.

Warm regards.

275. **Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Helsinki, May 14, 1972, 1929Z.

388. Dear Henry:

Semenov today gave me a paper² making somewhat more precise and from our point of view slightly improved Soviet SL position over Brezhnev paper.³

Semenov cited movement toward the informal considerations I put to him on May 8th, USDEL SALT VII 1299 (attached for reference).⁴

In brief, Soviets would drop their call for a specific authorization for 62 boats and would accept a freeze ceiling of 950 launchers. Replacement of older ICBMs would be required if Soviets built more than 49 boats. Semenov's answer to my question as to the rationale for 48 boats was that US allies had SLBM submarines.

Soviets dropped call for both sides to phase out older ICBMs as called for in Brezhnev paper. But they do not accept US proposed right to convert Titans to additional SLBMs.

Soviets do not accept our position that to reach 950 launchers they would have to scrap older SLBM submarines of G & H class (31 boats with 100 launchers).

Semenov indicated that "political considerations" (allied submarines, Holy Loch and Rota, US geographic advantage) need not be registered in the agreement or side understanding. A side understanding of unspecified form would record the details of the understanding about the SL freeze.

I do not believe this to be the final Soviet position and will propose through normal channels alternative approaches looking toward negotiating an acceptable arrangement.

Respectfully,

Gerard Smith

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive Eyes Only for Kissinger at Camp David. Copies were sent to Haig, Sonnenfeldt, and Howe.

² See footnote 3, Document 272.

³ See Document 262.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

276. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Washington, May 15, 1972, 0252Z.

WH21295. Thank you for your Helsinki 0388² which crossed my WH21293³ and WH21294.⁴

Re SALT 1299 Nodis, I am puzzled why you are trying to get Soviets off limiting numbers of both submarines and SLBMs. It seems to me that limit of 62 and 950, which is also contained in your instructions approved by the President, imposes on Soviets greater constraints than limit confined to launchers only.

By my arithmetic, latest Soviet proposal would permit Soviets perhaps as many as 66 boats if we do not hold them to 62 boat limit, that is, the 48 boats they presently claim plus nearly 18 twelve-tube boats in lieu of 209 old ICBMs. Consequently, unless there are considerations of which I am not so far aware why we should not hold Soviets to 62 boats, I believe you should stick with your present instructions on this point.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

² Document 275.

³ Document 274.

⁴ Not found.

277. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

Discussion of SALT when you are in Moscow

I recommend you communicate the following points to the Soviet leadership:

The initial SALT agreements are of historic importance, but:

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret.

- They do not impose adequate controls on offensive forces.
- The two sides should undertake to rectify this shortcoming in the next phase of SALT by limiting counterforce capabilities and reducing numbers of offensive weapons.
 - Early Soviet restraint, reciprocating that already imposed by the U.S. on U.S. counterforce capabilities, would greatly facilitate both ratification of the initial agreements and the follow-on negotiations.
 - A substantial increase in the Soviet threat to U.S. retaliatory forces could lead to our reopening the provisions of the ABM treaty limiting defense of retaliatory forces. It could, by jeopardizing the supreme interests of the U.S., lead the U.S. to withdraw from the initial agreements.

The Soviets appear now to be about to start flight testing a new large ICBM. This ICBM could have the accuracy and level of MIRVing to threaten seriously our Minuteman. The agreement we have been negotiating would allow its deployment in SS-9 silos, but prohibit our defense of Minuteman.

There is some evidence the Soviets have also begun testing a larger missile to replace the SS-11. At SALT they have rejected the U.S. proposal that "light" missiles must not be larger than the SS-11. Because of their large number, replacements for SS-11s with improved throw weight and accuracy could also seriously threaten Minuteman.

Should the Soviets proceed with testing and deployment of either the SS-9 or the SS-11 replacement, it would undermine the strategic acceptability of the agreements.

If the Soviet political leadership wants stability, it must restrain its military leadership.

I believe this message must be given at the highest level of Soviet leadership if it is to be effective. I believe the fact that this message has been given will be very important to achieving strong Congressional and public support for the initial agreements.

Melvin R. Laird

278. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

SALT Background

We are now close to final agreement on almost all the major SALT issues. Some issues may be kept open for ostensible resolution in Moscow, but as discussed with Brezhnev, they will be settled in the confidential channel before hand, so that the final outcome will be arranged by the time you arrive in Moscow. The basic agreements are along the lines explored with Dobrynin and are essentially the proposals made by Brezhnev to you.

Brezhnev indicated strongly that he desired these agreements to be signed during your stay in the USSR, and we are planning on a signing ceremony on Friday, May 26 in the Kremlin.

This paper includes highlights of the agreements, background on the negotiations and unresolved issues which will be cleared up this week.

I. The Current Agreements

We will conclude an ABM treaty and an Interim Agreement on Limiting Offensive Weapons. The following are the highlights:

A. The ABM Treaty

—Limits each side to one ABM site for defense of Moscow and Washington and one site for each side for the defense of an ICBM field.

—There will be a total of 200 ABM interceptors, 100 at each site.

—Radars will be limited to Modern ABM Radar Complexes (called MARCs) six for each side within a circle of 150 km radius around the national capitals; (MARCs are a circle of 3 km diameter, in which radars can be deployed; in practice they can accommodate about one large radar or a few smaller ones).

—For the ICBM defense fields there will be a total of twenty radars permitted; two of them will be the size of our two large radars deployed at Grand Forks; the other eighteen radars will be much smaller.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 487, President's Trip Files, For the President's Personal Briefcase, May 1972. Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. A notation on the paper indicates the President saw it. According to a May 16 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, the paper was part of a briefing book for the summit prepared for the President. (Ibid., RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 77 D 112, Box 335, Winston Lord—Chron File, May 1972) The full text of the paper is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 234.

—The Soviet ICBM protection site will be East of the Urals. (The Soviets are balking at specifying this location, but Brezhnev told me they would inform us of where it would be.) It is important that their site not be in the populated area of European Russia. Our comparable site will be at Grand Forks.

—Other non-ABM radars that may be built in the future will be restricted, so as not to create a clandestine ABM potential but the precise limits are still under discussion.

—The treaty will be of unlimited duration with withdrawal rights if supreme interests are jeopardized, and on six months notice.

B. The Interim Offensive Agreement

—Limits ICBMs to those under construction or deployed at the time of signing the treaty or July 1. This will mean 1618 ICBMs for the USSR and 1054 for us. The USSR will field 313 large SS-9s, but they will be prohibited from converting other ICBM silos to accommodate the large SS-9 types. Other silos can be modified but not to a significant degree. Modernization is permitted.

—Submarine launched ballistic missiles will be limited along the lines of Brezhnev's proposal to me.² For the Soviets there will be a ceiling of 950 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on "modern submarines." This means about 62 submarines. We will be limited to our current 41 submarines.³

—The further construction of submarines on the Soviet side, however, will be compensated in part by their dismantling of older land-based ICBMs; in this way they reach their ceiling of 950 but their level of ICBMs goes down.

—The Soviets will justify the unequal levels by counting 9 British and French submarines along with our 41, and reserving the right to increase their own level if this total is exceeded on the NATO side.

—We cannot acknowledge in any agreement that the British and French boats are relevant to SALT; nor can we accept the Soviet contention that the SLBM matter is only temporarily resolved because of our forward bases.⁴

—The Interim Agreement will run for five years (compared to the original Soviet proposal of 18 months), and both sides are committed to replacing it with a permanent and more comprehensive agreement.

² See Document 267.

³ Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote a question mark in the margin.

⁴ Nixon highlighted this paragraph.

—Both sides will abide by the obligations of the agreement once it is signed, though formally the implementation will await ratification of the ABM treaty.

[Omitted here is a summary account of SALT negotiations since late 1970.]

III. *Unresolved Issues*

A. *Limits on Other Large Phased-Array Radars (OLPARs).*

The US has consistently sought some controls over OLPARs since enough of these large radars scattered throughout the Soviet Union could be clandestine base for a territorial defense ABM system. The Soviets agreed to general but vague provisions which prohibit giving these radars ABM capabilities or testing them in an ABM mode.

The US further sought some control over future construction of these radars. *The latest US proposal was that, except for verification or space tracking purposes, neither side could build an OLPAR larger than our Safeguard missile site radar (MSR).*

—This is a highly technical problem. The measurement criteria used are the product of the area of the radar's antenna (i.e., the aperture) and the radar's power. The power-aperture of our MSR is just less than 3 million (3×10^6) watt-meters squared.

—The two exceptions—verification or space tracking—are because radars are needed in small numbers for such purposes and because radars for these purposes are the easiest to distinguish from ABM radars.

The Soviets apparently accepted this proposal on April 22.⁵ There was an ambiguity in their language, but there were indications that this would not be a problem.

About a week later, the Soviets discovered that there was a "small problem" of defining power-aperture levels. The Soviets claimed that they thought the MSR had a power-aperture of 50 million (5×10^7) watt-meters squared, or about 15–20 times larger than it is. In fact, at least two Soviets had been told the MSR's correct size in January.

It is unclear whether the Soviets have changed their mind on accepting our proposal, or whether they had all the time intended to look conciliatory initially and then to claim a significant misunderstanding over levels.

⁵ See Document 262. Kissinger discussed the SALT proposals set forth by Brezhnev during his secret trip to Moscow in *White House Years*, pp. 1148–1150.

We cannot accept the Soviet standard since it is so high as to be almost meaningless. Moreover, it implicitly accepts radars of a “smaller” size. If we are unable to achieve an acceptable compromise, we may drop the disputed provision on definitions and rely on the more general exclusion of large radars except for agreed purposes.

B. Location of the ICBM Defense Area.

There is some dispute, however, over where the Soviets can deploy their ICBM defense area. (The US site will obviously be at Grand Forks, where construction is already well along.)

The Soviets have ICBM fields scattered throughout much of their country. *We have strongly insisted the ICBM defense area be somewhere east of the Urals, since this is a relatively unpopulated area, thereby reducing concern over the system providing extensive population defense. This is an altogether reasonable request since all six of the Soviet SS-9 fields are east of the Urals.*

The Soviets have balked at specifying now where their ICBM defense would be. We will withhold final agreement on radars until we are certain of the Soviet location.

C. SLBM Limitation.

The remaining issues with the language of the SLBM provisions are:

1. *Whether each additional SLBM which is constructed must replace on a one-for-one basis old ICBM or SLBMs.* Our current position at Helsinki requires this; it keeps the aggregate total of missile launchers constant. The Brezhnev proposal was vague. Now the Soviets more or less agree, but are fuzzing the question of their starting base, i.e., how many “modern” SLBMs they have at this point. They are saying 48 (which we think means their current 37 plus 9) to compensate for Britain and France.

2. *How the British and French boats will be handled.* The Brezhnev proposal specifically referred to the Allies as one reason for the Soviets getting a numerical edge. Further, the Soviets claimed the right to build one more submarine (beyond 62) for each additional ones the Allies built.

We resist any reference to our NATO Allies in the Interim Agreement. The Allies would be upset if they were unknowingly made a part of the bilateral agreement.

D. Including Mobile ICBMs.

We seek to include all ICBM launchers in the interim freeze, including mobile ICBMs. Since neither side has deployed mobile systems, this

would effectively *ban* their deployment. In contrast, *the Soviets argue that mobile ICBMs should be negotiated in the follow-on talks*. This is important but not crucial in the short term.⁶

If we are unable to include mobiles in the interim freeze (i.e., effectively ban them), we may:

(1) *Agree that there is no decision one way or another on banning mobiles, but obtain a parallel understanding that the Soviets would not deploy mobiles for a few years.*

(2) *Allow replacement of old ICBMs by mobile ICBMs.* This would allow deployment, but halt an increase in the overall number of Soviet ICBMs.

(3) *A unilateral statement by the US that we would expect both sides to consult on the number of mobiles, etc., before either side started deployments.*

E. Definition of "Light" versus "Heavy" ICBMs.

While the Soviets have agreed not to convert "light" ICBMs to "heavy" ICBMs, they have balked at agreeing to a definition of the dividing line between the two. We proposed that the line be: no larger than the Soviet SS-11, or no larger than 70 cubic meters.

—The SS-11 is about 67 cubic meters and the SS-9 is about 220 m³. Some definition is likely in the next few days.

Attachment

SALT

I. The Soviet Perspective

With the signing of initial SALT agreements, the ABM treaty and the interim offensive agreement, the Soviet leaders may feel they have accomplished their minimal *strategic objective*. They have conceded limits on their most dynamic offensive force, ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as the price for forestalling a round of competition in defensive systems. Regardless of how the Safeguard ABM looked to critics in this country, to the Soviets it loomed as the potential for a heavy defense of the US territory. It was a possible fore-runner, together with our MIRVs and improvement of our missile accuracies, of a threat of a US first strike capability. This has been their driving strategic concern in SALT.

SALT also has a definite political character for the Soviets. It marks, in their view, a definitive achievement of equal status with the US. Beyond this symbolism SALT can be exploited, along with other politi-

⁶ Nixon highlighted this paragraph.

cal developments in Europe to advance the Soviet effort to create a more stable relationship with their Western adversaries at a time when China is becoming their most urgent, intractable problem. Indeed, the demonstration of a Superpower relationship exploitable against *China*, was an underlying Soviet motive in the past negotiations, and *is an incentive for keeping the dialogue alive in the future*.

Indeed, the Soviets will now look to the second phase of SALT, and in Moscow will probably want to explore at least timing and some of their principal concerns.

—It is evident from their conduct of the negotiations that they intend *to make our forward bases a key issue*. Brezhnev indicated this. Though they set this aside in the May 20 understanding,⁷ they are free to raise it in the next SALT phase.

—Moreover, since the offensive agreement is for five years, the Soviets claim that it will have to be replaced with a permanent agreement that will deal with the entire strategic equation. In their interpretation, this means dealing with all weapons capable of striking the USSR (our aircraft abroad and our carrier aircraft).

A second issue in the Soviet view is translating the implied strategic stability of the SALT agreements into more political terms. Brezhnev has privately proposed *a nuclear non-aggression treaty*.⁸ Though not directly related to the second phase of SALT, or proposed in that context, it would appear that this will be a priority Soviet aim.

There are two Soviet motives in such an agreement:

—It could undermine NATO strategy and doctrine if the principal Western nuclear power seemed committed to refrain from any use of nuclear weapons.

—As designed by the Soviets, the agreement could be turned against third countries (China) by implying a commitment to joint US-Soviet action to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third powers.

Brezhnev has not gone into detail on either the second phase of SALT or the nuclear non-aggression treaty. But by raising our forward bases in the Moscow discussions and submitting a draft non-aggression pact, it is clear that *he will use the summit to explore new US commitments* that could prove highly disruptive to the Western Alliance and be exploited by the Soviets against China.

⁷ See Document 160.

⁸ See Document 262. In his memoirs Kissinger described how, during his secret trip to Moscow, Brezhnev took him aside and introduced the idea of a U.S.-Soviet “understanding” not to use nuclear weapons against each other, calling this step of “immense significance” and a “peaceful bomb.” (*White House Years*, p. 1152)

Your Position

We have consistently warned the Soviets that we will not deal behind the backs of our Allies on strategic issues, nor bargain with their weapons systems or our own commitments to the Alliance. Moreover, we cannot accept the notion that our forward-based aircraft are “strategic” while the large Soviet arsenal of intermediate-range missiles are beyond the scope of SALT.

Yet it is inevitable that we will have to confront these questions.

Our objectives in the next phase of SALT, however, are quite different.

—The current agreements on offensive weapons limit numbers of submarines and ICBMs, but qualitative improvements such as MIRVing can proceed. Even though the large Soviet SS–9s are limited to 313, in time the Soviets can develop the combination of MIRVs, accuracy and warhead yields that will threaten our Minuteman ICBMs.

—With ABM systems now limited to low levels, we have no clear options to protect our land-based systems, other than transferring missile launchers to sea.

—*Our aim in the next phase of SALT, therefore, is to raise the question of reductions of the most threatening offensive forces* (the Soviet SS–9s). This was part of our original comprehensive proposal and the Soviets, early in SALT, acknowledged that reductions should be an ultimate goal.

In addition, we have the question of a *more permanent resolution of the level of offensive forces in all systems*.

—We have conceded in both ICBM and SLBM unequal numbers in the Soviet favor; since we had no active offensive programs stopping the current Soviet buildup was a key objective.

—Now, with some underlying stability created, we should deal with the disparity in numbers.

—But in arriving at new, preferably equal ceilings our concern will be to retain flexibility to build new submarines, especially if the threat to our land-based missiles grows.

We also have to face the question of *qualitative controls*.

—Both sides agreed to lay aside controls on MIRVs in the initial agreements. The Soviets had no interest in being frozen in a position of inferiority, since their MIRV program lagged far behind ours. However, we also had diametrically opposing approaches to limitations. Our analysis indicated that only by stopping all testing of MIRVs could we have confidence in a ban. The Soviets proposed to stop production, which we could not verify, but to allow testing to proceed.

—MIRVs thus may become a critical issue.

Finally, *there is the question of ABMs*.

—With ABMs limited to two sites, there will be pressures in this country for a total ban.

—The Soviets apparently will not give up their Moscow system in any case, but might want to reduce our deployments to one site in the follow-on talks. Judging from the remarks of their SALT delegation, they do not consider the ABM question entirely settled.

In sum, we have an interest in trying to build on the current agreements to establish some more permanent and viable limitations that reduce the threat of our forces. The Soviets may not share this interest. Indeed, they may see the next phase as an opportunity for exploitation.

Your general position in Moscow should be

—to emphasize the importance of what has been accomplished already in terms of creating a more stable strategic balance and in terms of contributing to a better political relationship;⁹

—to indicate that *the tasks are not complete*, and the second round could be more important because we need to translate current gains into more permanent arrangements;

—*to leave open commitments to any particular substantive approach in the next phase;*

—to indicate that we will be examining the questions of the *overall ceiling on offensive forces, and some reductions;*

—to suggest that for the time being *ABMs are settled* and the next phase should concentrate on offensive limits.

As for the timing, we do not regard it as urgent, since both governments need to ensure the ratification of the treaty and other agreements, and to set up the mechanism for implementation.

—we contemplate the fall as the time for resuming negotiations;

—this permits time to consider new comprehensive plans;

—the confidential channels will be open however if the Soviets wish to pursue SALT in the interim.

Interpretations of the Current Agreements

Both of the current agreements provide the standard clause for withdrawal if supreme interests are jeopardized. Such circumstances of course, cannot be precisely defined in advance, but it is clear that *if the Soviets were now to embark on a concerted program that would jeopardize the survivability of our strategic retaliatory forces, we would have to invoke this clause.*

In Moscow at an appropriate point in the private discussions you may want to clarify our position so that the Soviets will be on notice; moreover, our interpretation may play a role in the Congressional debates on the treaty ratification.¹⁰

⁹ Nixon highlighted this and the next three points.

¹⁰ Nixon highlighted this paragraph.

You might say:

—In reaching these agreements both sides expect to contribute to strategic stability;

—If these expectations are not fulfilled and the threat to the strategic retaliatory forces of the US substantially increases, you would consider this jeopardizing our supreme interests;

—In such a case, we could withdraw from the current agreements under the supreme interests clause;

—You wanted this to be clearly understood, since this interpretation will be given to the Congress as the question arises during Congressional hearings.¹¹

¹¹ Nixon highlighted all of these four points.

279. National Security Decision Memorandum 167¹

Washington, May 17, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Additional Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki (SALT VII)

The President has made the following additional decisions for Helsinki (SALT VII):

1. The Delegation should continue to press as long as possible for the U.S. position on OLPARs. However, if the Soviets continue their insistence on an OLPAR ceiling of about 10 million watt-meters squared or greater, the Delegation should withdraw the U.S. proposal for an agreed interpretive statement limiting OLPARs of potential greater than the MSR. At the same time, the Chairman of the Delegation should

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDMs. 145–264. Top Secret; Nodis; SALT.

make a formal statement that the U.S. would view with serious concern future deployments of OLPARs with a potential greater than the MSR, except for purposes of space-tracking or national technical means.

2. The Delegation should continue to press as long as possible for the inclusion of mobile ICBMs in the Interim Agreement. However, if the Soviets continue to resist this, the Delegation should withdraw the U.S. proposal on mobile ICBMs. At the same time, the Chairman of the Delegation should make a formal statement along the following lines: The U.S. agrees to defer the question of specific limitation of mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent negotiations on more complete offensive limitations, but would consider the deployment of operational mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the interim agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that agreement and as jeopardizing its continued validity.

3. The steps in paragraphs 1 and 2 should be taken near the close of the Helsinki session. The Chairman of the Delegation should, at his discretion, decide on the exact timing.

4. Assuming continued Soviet rejection of the U.S. proposal to include in the Interim Agreement the provision regarding covered facilities for submarines, the Delegation should withdraw the proposal. At the same time, the Chairman of the Delegation should, unless he believes that this would seriously hamper the negotiations, make a formal statement along the lines of our present proposal.

5. The timing of the steps in paragraph 4 are at the discretion of the Chairman of the Delegation.

6. As recommended by the Delegation, paragraph 17 of NSDM 158² is hereby rescinded.

Henry A. Kissinger

² Document 243.

280. Memorandum From Philip Odeen, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and John Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 17, 1972.

SUBJECT

Resuming SALT

An issue which will have to be addressed at the Summit and which directly affects our early post-Summit work is the question of when we resume SALT talks—an issue closely related to the process of ratification.

The Soviets have expressed interest in an early resumption of the SALT negotiations after the Summit.

The U.S. position on when to resume relates to:

(1) What relationship we see between the ratification process and the follow-on talks. (We think it is imperative to get ratification before follow-on talks.)

(2) What relationships we see between ratification/follow-on talks and the campaign:

—We think that quick ratification is important to preserve the impact of the agreement.

—We think that some kind of follow-on talks, probably not overly detailed, should take place prior to the election to keep up momentum.

Discussion

In no case would we recommend opening the follow-up discussions before ratification. Continuing the discussions while debating the initial agreement could invite strong pressures for renegotiation of aspects of the agreement; bring pressure to put forth certain positions in talks, etc.

In any case, we think early ratification is probably in our best interests. It can be argued, of course, that “stretching-out” the process would allow ratification closer to election time and have more impact on the election. But, we believe that a long ratification process will invite critical debate and dim the luster of the agreements. Moreover, the longer the process goes, the more will be the possibility that the Soviets will engage in major flight-testing of their new big missile. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that over a long period of ratification, issues could

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 883, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [sic], Vol. 18, May–August 1972. Top Secret. Sent for urgent action. Haig initialed the memorandum.

arise in which the *Soviets* would try to use an unfinished SALT agreement as a lever.

There are also good arguments for resuming the talks reasonably early.

—First, there seem to be important political advantages in keeping up the apparent momentum of the talks. Of course, this end could be served by holding talks in the fall, but we question whether we want to be involved in major substantive discussions (which would be expected by that time), while under the pressure of the campaign. If we had early talks we could more easily concentrate on procedures for the Standing Consultative Commission and confine the talks to explorations.

—Many (OSD in particular) think it is important to lay out the negotiating ground early. It is argued that Soviet counterforce capabilities should be our primary target in SALT Phase II. Thus, it might be important to convey very clearly the problems which would be raised by such irreversible actions as testing SS-9 MIRVs. It is certainly optimistic to expect Soviet delays in MIRV testing in accommodation to our concerns, but there would be utility in an early expression of *our* view on the proper direction for Phase II.

Regardless of our wishes, the political process leading to ratification may take us into the fall.

The Congress plans to recess around June 30 for about three weeks; they will return in late July and be in session for about three weeks and recess until after Labor Day. It is almost out of the question to get Congressional action completed by June 30, but *it might be possible with an all-out effort to get it through in the short session between conventions.* The intensely “political” climate might help us to get the agreements through rather quickly. *We could give the process a “push” by indicating our desire to get on with SALT Phase II and the necessity for ratification before further talks.*

The foregoing leads us to the following recommendations:

—We should *not* set a definite time with the Soviets for resumption but should indicate interest in early resumption (we might even get something in the communiqué).

—We should take the opportunity of Friday’s leadership meeting to explain that we think early ratification is important to maintaining the momentum of the talks and to seek their support of the schedule.

Your Decision

1. a. Agree, structure preparations for early ratification and resumption of talks.²

² Kissinger initialed his approval of this option.

- b. No, delay ratification until fall
 - c. Other—See me.
2. a. Include early ratification pitch in President’s talker for Friday’s leadership meeting.
- b. Wait until return from Moscow.³

³ Kissinger initialed his approval of this option.

281. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Washington, May 17, 1972, 2010Z.

WH21351. Dobrynin handed me the text of two instructions provided to Soviet Delegation by Moscow today.² They read as follows:

“1. Additional launchers on submarines—in excess of the 48 modern submarines operational and under construction—will be put in commission in the Soviet Union in lieu of older-type ICBM launchers built before 1964 and in lieu of launchers on older-type submarines.

“2. Therefore, the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the whole of this problem and primarily the issue of dismantling the U.S. missile submarine bases outside the U.S. territory will find their appropriate solution in the course of subsequent negotiations.”

I made no comment but you should be aware that we still do not consider the term “premise” as acceptable if it carries any implication that it is a shared premise.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

² Kissinger met Dobrynin at noon on May 17, and the Soviet Ambassador handed him the instructions that Kissinger transmitted to Smith. Kissinger did not mention this in his memorandum of conversation. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 239 and *ibid.*, Document 243, footnote 2.

President now believes you should plan on travel to Moscow so as to arrive there Thursday afternoon, May 25 Moscow time. He wants you to bring Nitze and Allison.³

Warm regards.

³ Kissinger and Dobrynin met on May 18 at Camp David, following a breakfast meeting that included President Nixon. According to a memorandum of conversation prepared by Kissinger of the post-breakfast discussion, the following exchange took place about SALT: "Dobrynin then asked me about a number of questions from the SALT negotiations, specifically, a sub-limit on the conversion of old missiles to new ones and the conversion of Titans to submarines that had been raised by our Delegation in Helsinki. I told him that the former issue was important; the second issue was marginal. Dobrynin said it was a pity I had not raised both issues five days earlier, since they probably could have been resolved in our sense. I told him to make an effort anyway." For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see *ibid.*, Document 243. A memorandum for the President's file on the breakfast meeting is *ibid.*, Document 242.

The Summit and Congressional Approval of the SALT Agreements, May 19–October 4, 1972

282. Memorandum From Philip Odeen and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 19, 1972.

SUBJECT

Congressional Approval of the SALT Agreements

The exact manner in which we should seek Congressional approval of the SALT Agreements is still unresolved. Moreover, the issue should be decided before the President returns from Moscow so that the appropriate documents can be prepared.

Some decisions have, of course, been made. The President has decided that the ABM agreement should be a treaty and that the interim offensive agreement should be an executive agreement. Further, he has expressed interest that the House of Representatives play an important role.

The remaining issues revolve around:

—Whether the Senate and House should have equal status in approving the Interim Agreement.

—Whether the House of Representatives should consider the ABM Treaty.

Interim Agreement

The President could seek approval of the Interim Agreement in either of two ways:

—A joint resolution requiring a majority vote by both the Senate and the House.

—A 2/3 vote of the Senate, with a resolution (by majority vote) from the House.

Majority vote by both. This is the normal procedure for obtaining Congressional approval of executive agreements.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 316, Subject Files, Congressional, Vol. 5. Top Secret. A copy was sent to John Lehman. A handwritten notation on the first page of the memorandum reads: "Hold till after trip." Another handwritten notation on the same page reads: "5/20-HAKTO #6 wired HAK approval & said no action needed now."

—The House would surely feel that it has a large role to play.

—The Senate might object to this treatment as inconsistent with its constitutional powers with respect to treaties. However, both the President and Ambassador Smith have already indicated publicly that they believe the interim nature of the agreement is such that it is something less than a treaty. Moreover, *the provision in the Interim Agreement that the agreement will not enter into force until the ABM Treaty is ratified effectively gives the Senate a separate veto over entry into force of the Interim Agreement.*

Two-thirds Senate vote. Seeking a 2/3 vote from the Senate would effectively treat the agreement as a treaty. A recent example is the U.S.-Japanese agreement on Okinawa reversion; it was phrased as an agreement, but was handled in Congress as a treaty.

To achieve his objective of participation by the House, the President still would seek a majority vote from the House. The President could give this vote some significance by saying that the U.S. would not ratify the agreement without the approval of the House (as well as the Senate).

Without this Presidential statement, the House vote would be without legal effect. It could, however, have important political implications; House resolution which included conditions, interpretations or understandings that were inconsistent with the Senate's action, would be troublesome.

The ABM Treaty

The ABM treaty will, of course, be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent by a 2/3 vote. *The issue is whether the House of Representatives should be asked to consider the Treaty as well.*

Such a request would be unique. It would enhance the House's role. On the other hand, it would be a challenge to the Senate's constitutional role with respect to treaties and would probably lead to considerable friction with Senators who jealously protect that body's prerogatives.

The President's request to the House would presumably expound on the House's interest in this important agreement. Further, as discussed with the Interim Agreement, the President could either: (a) simply ask that the House enact a non-binding resolution expressing a favorable view of the agreements; or (b) indicate that the U.S. would not ratify the treaty without the House's approval. The latter case would obviously create the most problems with the Senate.

Our Recommendation

We would recommend that the Interim Agreement be presented to Congress as an executive agreement requiring the majority vote of both Houses. This is consistent with earlier indications by the Administration, will

maximize the role of the House of Representatives, and (for the reasons discussed earlier) should not unduly disturb the Senate.

We would further recommend that the ABM Treaty be sent to the Senate only and not to the House. Since the House is being given a major role with the Interim Agreement, there is no reason to take the unique step on the ABM treaty of obtaining House approval.

—If the President also desires to get the House involved in the ABM Treaty, then he needs to decide whether he will announce that the U.S. will not ratify the treaty unless the House approves. We would recommend that the House involvement, if felt necessary, be kept to requesting simple resolution which is not binding on the President. That unique step alone should satisfy the House and any further steps would constitute a clear challenge to the Senate's treaty powers—an unnecessary challenge which would create trouble.

Before taking this issue to the President, you might want to solicit the views of Clark MacGregor.

Recommendation

1. *Interim Agreement*: That it be sent to the Congress as an executive agreement requiring a joint resolution to be passed by a simple majority vote by each House.

Approve.²

Disapprove.

(a) 2/3 Senate vote; non-binding resolution by House

(b) 2/3 Senate vote; resolution by House required before ratification.

2. *ABM Treaty*: That it be sent only to the Senate.

Approved.³

Disapproved.

(a) Also non-binding resolution by House.

(b) Also a resolution by House required before ratification.

² Kissinger initialed his approval of this option.

³ Kissinger initialed his approval of this option.

283. **Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Helsinki, May 19, 1972, 1636Z.

408. Dear Henry:

Before you take off, I thought I might pass on my impressions of where we stand.

The SL freeze matter is in some confusion. The Soviet proposal² can be read to mean that the Soviets claim to have operational or under construction 48 modern SLBM submarines. However, Semenov as yet has not defined "modern" or "under construction." Kishilov advises that their delegation here does not know (a) what the situation is regarding Soviet SLBM submarines, (b) what the meaning is of the word "modern", (c) what the meaning is of "under construction." Under these circumstances, my short-term tactic here is to advise the Soviet Delegation that their proposal is incomprehensible to us and therefore we are hard put to try to negotiate some mutually acceptable solution.

The only movement on our proposal that I would suggest to you is that if the Soviets would agree that the United States has the right to convert the 54 Titans into SLBMs, they might be given high level assurance that we do not intend to exercise that right. Otherwise, I think we should stand on our position that they can have up to 950 missiles on 62 boats only if they replace an equivalent number of older SLBM launchers and SS-7 and 8s.

I think it will be hard to find a persuasive rationale for us agreeing to Soviet building some additional boats without replacing exist-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Haig and Sonnenfeldt.

² In telegram USDEL SALT 1345 from Helsinki, May 18, Smith reported that the Soviet Delegation submitted two separate proposals on replacement and dismantling procedures during the day's plenary session. The first proposal reads: "Notification of replacement, dismantling or destruction of SLBM and ICBM launchers of older types shall be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission." The second proposal reads: "Dismantling or destruction of older ICBM and SLBM launchers to be replaced by new SLBM launchers shall be initiated at the same time that the SLBM launchers on modern nuclear-propelled replacement submarines become operational. Dismantling or destruction shall be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission." Smith noted that the principal differences between the two sides was the Soviet proposal that dismantling would begin not with the launch of the replacement submarine, but at the time it became operational. (Ibid., Box 883, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki) [sic], Vol. 18, May–August 1972)

ing SL or IC launchers. In knowledgeable circles, such a “free ride” will be seen as US acquiescence in the Soviet forward based system thesis. It is hard for me to conceive of the Soviets considering this bonus as anything else (perhaps there are considerations bearing on this of which I am unaware).

I assume that if this or any other SALT issue is discussed by the President’s party in Moscow while I am negotiating here, I will be kept fully and currently advised so as to avoid wire crossing.

I think that the other main sticking point in the offensive agreement is the Soviet refusal to give any precision to the term “light” or the term “heavy” ICBM. I think this foreshadows the development of a new Soviet missile somewhat larger than the SS–11. A unilateral statement by US may have some slight deterrent effect on any such new Soviet program, but I wouldn’t put a very high estimate on the value of such deterrence.

I think the ABM treaty will be considered a good one. I expect that we will hear more from Semenov about a deferral of the second site, and I believe you know that I think we should have made our deferral decision positively—but I do not propose to enter the lists on this one any more.

I would welcome any guidance that could be sent on to me as to timing of final moves here. I have your message indicating I should be in Moscow Thursday afternoon.³

On the assumption that we will not have further negotiations in Helsinki this spring, I am tentatively planning to close out this operation Saturday afternoon, May 27th.

Warm regards and bon voyage.⁴

Gerry Smith

³ Document 281.

⁴ Kissinger replied to Smith in backchannel message WH21372, May 19: “You should make continued effort to determine meaning of 48 number. Free ride for Soviets on H’s would indeed be problem. Re Titan conversion, this can be handled as you suggest. Re precision for ‘light’ and ‘heavy,’ I would appreciate your urgent recommendation. For example, could we say that neither side should replace current light missiles with new ones significantly larger than largest light missile that either side currently has. We could reach side understanding that significant means 10 percent larger.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT)

284. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, May 19, 1972, 2113Z.

409. Dear Henry:

Semenov called private meeting this evening. He acknowledged receipt of our formulations re SL inclusion—(a) generalized Article III; (b) accompanying protocol giving specifics.

He had new instructions re answers to my questions of yesterday:

1. Their definition of a modern submarine is a nuclear-powered submarine which became operational after 1965. (This means Yankees only.)

2. Replacement would start beginning with the 49th submarine.

He ducked any explanation of the significance of the number 48 and any explanation of the relationship of 48 to “operational and under construction” at this time. He said that 48 was a number originated by us. I denied having suggested any such number. He hinted at a failure of communication in our system.

He hinted at a willingness to acknowledge U.S. right to convert old IC's to SL's if U.S. would guarantee not to have more than 41 boats during freeze.

He rejected proposed U.S. positions on mobiles, definition of heavy ICBM's and “east of Urals” restraint for Soviet ICBM defense deployments.

I propose to continue to follow NSDM² guidance on SL inclusion which is not consistent with Soviet position of 48 Yankees as threshold for replacement.

Warm regards.

Gerard Smith

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Haig and Sonnenfeldt.

² Reference is to NSDM 167, Document 279.

285. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, May 19, 1972, 2301Z.

410. Dear Henry:

Re your W.H. 21372:²

My message no. 0409,³ which apparently crossed yours, should be responsive to most points made in your message. I will do my best to meet President's wishes.

Soviet Delegation's instructions are negative on mobiles, definition of heavy missiles and geographic area for ABM defense area definition. I had planned to make our "concessions" on mobiles and heavy missile definition starting tomorrow, but after Semenov's performance tonight, I judged it better to start this process Sunday.⁴

Re your suggestion that we might agree that neither side should replace current light missiles with new ones significantly larger than largest light missile that either side currently has (with understanding that significant means 10 percent larger), I would like 12 hours to consult with our experts.

My central concern is Soviet claim that replacement of SL/IC's start only with 49th boat. This "free ride" strikes me as completely unacceptable. I know of no way to justify such a "bonus" to Soviets and would recommend to President that it not be accepted. Some form of summit declarations re SL programs of the two sides during freeze period would be possible fallback position.

Warm regards.

Gerard Smith

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusive; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Sonnenfeldt.

² See footnote 4, Document 283.

³ Document 284.

⁴ May 21.

286. Memorandum From President Nixon to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, May 20, 1972.

I have covered the points I will be making in this memorandum for the most part in conversations with Henry and with you, but I simply want to put them in writing so that you will have guidance for the period that we are gone on our trip to Moscow.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

On another subject we face a critical problem in terms of avoiding a massive right-wing revolt on the SALT agreement. All of us who have worked on this problem know that the deal we are making is in our best interest, but for a very practical reason that the right-wing will never understand—that we simply can't get from the Congress the additional funds needed to continue the arms race with the Soviet in either the defensive or offensive missile category. I want you to develop a team, consisting of yourself, Moorer, Rush and Laird when he returns, to pick off individual Senators and very important opinion makers who are on the right to try to mute their criticism when the announcement comes in from Moscow. Barry Goldwater, John Tower, Peter Dominick, Scoop Jackson, Eddie Hebert are among those who should be contacted. It is particularly important that Moorer and Rush have a talk with Agnew and get him aboard. Also, it would be very helpful to get Teller² to come back and get him aboard so that he can lobby for us. This should be done on a person-to-person basis and should be done in a very hard-headed way. The most important point to make is that the President is not being taken in and that the military totally supports what we are doing and in fact strongly recommended the inclusion of SLBMs on the basis that we included them.

The most convincing argument you can make to this group is that the President is determined that we must go forward at the fastest pace possible with ULMS, MIRV, B-1 and any new weapon systems not covered by the agreement.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1006, Haig Special File, Presidential Memos to Haig. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum was sent to Kissinger as an "Information Copy." The full text of the memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 250.

² Dr. Edward Teller, a major contributor to the development of the hydrogen bomb and atomic weapons, was at this time a professor of physics at the University of California at Berkeley and associate director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

I think our case can be sold to some of the more sensible hawks, but it must be done on an individual basis before they get the announcement from Moscow and make up their minds and dig in against us.

It is no comfort that the liberals will praise the agreement, whatever it is. But let us always remember that the liberals will never support us—the hawks are our hard-core, and we must do everything that we can to keep them from jumping ship after getting their enthusiasm restored as a result of our mining operation in the North.³

³ Reference is to the mining of Haiphong harbor.

287. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, May 20, 1972, 1612Z.

413. Dear Henry:

I was very glad to get your assurance about the solidity of our SLBM position and that the number 48 has no US blessing. Today I advised Semenov of these two points.

In view of your message of last night (WH21372)² in which you referred to the President's hope that we would move promptly, we met this morning with the Soviet Delegation and made the necessary statements about mobiles and covered facilities.

In a private conversation with Semenov and stressing that I was not speaking under instructions, I told him that in order to move the SL situation, I thought I could get approval for a reformulation of our position along following lines. If the protocol did not refer to 48 submarines, and if it is understood that any hull sections entering construction halls after the date of signature of the agreement would only be for submarines carrying SLBM launchers replacing other SLBM or older ICBM launchers, we could agree to the protocol not mentioning 740. We could agree to an explicit statement that SLBM submarines

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Haig.

² See footnote 4, Document 283.

could replace older submarines within the agreed ceiling level. We would also be prepared to provide in an appropriate separate form assurance that during the freeze the US would not have operational more than 41 SLBM submarines.

You will recognize that this does not depart in substance from our NSDM position as amplified by the statement in your message of last night (WH21372) “re Titan conversion, this can be handled as you suggest.” Semenov said he would immediately put this new formulation to Moscow.

I suggest for consideration a top level “counter démarche” to the one referred to in your WH21372 pointing out that the United States is now making all of the running (the Soviet statements were entirely negative in the session this morning on “heavy” ICBMs and on “east of the Urals”). Démarche might also give high level endorsement to informal SL position put today by Smith to Semenov, perhaps that this is position on which the President would be willing to close at Moscow.

We will try your formulation on “heavy versus light” ICBMs with Soviet Delegation today, and I will advise.

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

288. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Salzburg, May 21, 1972, 1630Z.

WTE 16. Subject: SLBM.

1. We cannot accept 48 modern submarines as Soviet base point, if they insist that this includes only Y class or newer. It is imperative for Congressional reasons that there must be some retirement of H and G classes involved in Soviet reaching level of 62. For this reason, Soviet base point should be about 41–43, which corresponds to real situation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Flash; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Haig. Kissinger was with the President who visited Austria May 20–22 before proceeding to Moscow.

2. It is also imperative that total of 950 for Soviets includes modern missiles no matter on what submarine they are deployed.

3. Phrasing in our proposals on procedures for dismantling and replacement must be amended to permit us to lay keels of ULMs without having to destroy Polaris.

4. You should act on these points immediately; these instructions will also follow through normal channels.²

² Telegram 89509 to USDEL SALT, May 21, provided the guidance contained herein. (Ibid., Box 883, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [*sic*], Vol. 18, May–August 1972)

289. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, May 21, 1972, 1727Z.

415. Dear Henry:

We tried yesterday the formulation on heavy missiles which you suggested. The Soviet side said that it was another variation of the same position which the Soviet Delegation had instructions to reject, and that it was therefore not acceptable.

We are continuing to explore further the concept of regarding as heavy all ICBMs “significantly larger” than the largest current light ICBMs, tied with a similar formulation on no significant increase in dimensions of ICBM silos. But it appears very unlikely that we will be able in this short time to move the Soviets from their position that no definition of “heavy” is needed. NSDM² instructions authorize fallback to unilateral statement on silo dimensions (depth and interior diameter), but do not authorize falling back to a unilateral statement on what we regard as constituting “heavy” ICBMs.

I believe the only feasible solution here, if we cannot get an ac-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusive; Eyes Only. Haig initialed the message. Copies were sent to Howe and Odeen.

² Reference is to NSDM 167, Document 279.

ceptable agreed formulation, would be to make a unilateral statement; a suggested one is appended to this message.

I would appreciate appropriate urgent guidance on this point.³

Best regards,

Gerard C. Smith

Suggested unilateral statement:

The US Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been prepared to agree on a mutually acceptable interpretive statement relating to Article II of the interim agreement. Rather than agree upon an inadequate statement, the United States now withdraws its proposal for an agreed interpretive statement relating to Article II. We note the repeated statements by the Soviet side that our concerns will be met by the terms of Article II under which the parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, and to land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time. The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly stated that there is a common understanding as to what constitutes a light ICBM, and as to what constitutes a heavy ICBM. The United States' understanding on this matter has been repeatedly communicated to the Soviet side. Under these circumstances, the US proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to the US understanding.

³ In backchannel message WH21470 to Smith, May 22, Kissinger replied, "You should persist in effort to set agreed formulation on heavy missiles. In any unilateral statement to which we might fall back you must include precise definition of what constitutes 'US understanding.'" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT)

290. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, May 22, 1972, 0950Z.

421. For delivery on arrival at Moscow Airport. Subject: Heavy ICBM's. Ref: WH21470.²

In response to referenced message, I will persist in effort to set agreed formulation on heavy missiles. I have modified possible unilateral statement appended to my 0415³ to read as follows:

"The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been prepared to agree on a mutually acceptable interpretive statement relating to Article II of the interim agreement. Rather than agree upon an inadequate statement, the United States now withdraws its proposal for an agreed interpretive statement relating to Article II. We note the repeated statements by the Soviet side that our concerns will be met by the terms of Article II under which the parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBM's, or for ICBM's of older types deployed prior to 1964, to land-based launchers for heavy ICBM's of types deployed after that time. The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly stated that there is a common understanding as to what constitutes a light ICBM, and as to what constitutes a heavy ICBM. The United States' understanding on this matter had been repeatedly communicated to the Soviet side. The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this U.S. understanding."

Warm regards.

Gerard Smith

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusive; Eyes Only. Haig initialed the message. A copy was sent to Odeen.

² See footnote 3, Document 289.

³ Document 289.

291. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Helsinki, May 22, 1972, 1447Z.

422. Dear Henry:

Replying to your WH21440,² status of unresolved SALT issues is as follows:

(a) SLBM Limits. Soviets were given this morning new US proposal for Article III of interim agreement and associated protocol reflecting guidance in State 89509.³ New version includes all types of SLBM launchers in 950 limit, but could be modified if necessary to fall back to position of limiting only "modern" (SS-NX-6, SS-NX-8, or any newer) SLBM launchers. Texts being sent septel to Washington with copy to you.

(b) Form of SLBM Agreement. Soviets probably will accept concept of generalized Article III and formal signed protocol, although their present position is for exchange of letters.

(c) SLBM Launchers Operational and Under Construction. Delegation pressing for agreed definitions as follows: "The parties understand that SLBM launchers 'under construction' are those SLBM launchers on submarines which are on building ways, in launch basins, being fitted out, or on sea trials, and that 'operational' SLBM launchers include those on submarines undergoing conversion or overhaul." Soviets agree with US definition of "operational," but have not accepted US definition of "under construction" (and have not proposed alternative). Delegation believes Soviets are keeping flexible position on "under construction" point while negotiating SLBM levels.

(d) Replacement SLBM Launchers. Provision outlining guidelines for replacement of SLBM launchers or older ICBM launchers by new SLBM launchers being negotiated. Delegation believes compromise can be reached along following lines:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusive; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Haig, Howe, and Odeen.

² In backchannel message WH21440 to Smith, May 21, Kissinger asked for "an up-to-date assessment of where matters stand in SALT" for his use upon arrival at the summit. (Ibid.)

³ See footnote 2, Document 288.

“Dismantling or destruction of SLBM and older ICBM launchers to be replaced by new SLBM launchers shall be accomplished by the time the replacement submarine becomes operational. Such dismantling or destruction, and prior notification thereof, shall be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.” This could be either a paragraph in the interim agreement, or an agreed interpretive statement.

(e) Heavy ICBM. Delegation pressing for agreed statement defining “heavy” ICBM, but judges Soviets unlikely to agree. Soviets may agree to statement on silo dimensions along following lines: “The parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there shall be no significant increase in the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers.” Delegation has sent also to Washington statement put to you (0421)⁴ with revised unilateral statement on “heavy” ICBMs. Possible outcome might be agreed statement on silo dimensions, and whatever unilateral statement US may want to make on what constitutes “heavy” ICBM.

(f) Location of ICBM Defense Area. Delegation is pressing for agreed statement that ICBM defense area would be: (1) east of Urals or west of Mississippi; or (2) in non-European part of USSR or west of Mississippi; or (3) at least 1500 kilometers from national capital. Delegation no longer favors unilateral statement along lines suggested in USDEL SALT VII 1358, and if necessary would leave outcome of this issue for summit.

(g) OLPARs. Delegation expects to make authorized unilateral statement on OLPARs tomorrow morning if negotiations make clear that agreed interpretive statement not possible, but we are still pressing for agreed statement.

In this fast moving situation, delegation plans to update this status report as appropriate. Delegation assumes it will be conducting negotiation through Wednesday.⁵

Warm regards.

Gerard Smith

⁴ Document 290.

⁵ May 24.

292. Editorial Note

On May 22, 1972, President Nixon arrived in Moscow where he was met at the airport by Soviet President Nicolai Podgorny and Premier Alexei Kosygin. Nixon then met alone with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev between 6:15 and 8:10 p.m. at the Kremlin. President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger was not present and in his memoir lamented that "I was reduced to asking the splendid Soviet interpreter Viktor Sukhodrev to dictate his account to Julie Pineau, my secretary. He obviously did not give his chief the worst of the exchanges—recalling Dean Acheson's famous dictum that no one ever lost a debate in a memorandum of conversation dictated by oneself." (*White House Years*, page 1208)

According to a memorandum of conversation, the exchanges between Brezhnev and Nixon about arms control and the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) were brief:

"General Secretary Brezhnev: I should now like, so to say, in a particularly confidential way, to express one thought. Despite all the positive significance of the agreements achieved on ABM systems and on offensive types of arms, we have to admit that by themselves such agreements do not lessen the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. And such a danger cannot fail to cause concern in the minds of many millions of people both in your country and in ours. In the agreements that have now been elaborated by us jointly and will be signed people will not find an answer to this question which is causing them concern. I am now giving you these observations so to say as food for thought, and not for public discussion.

"The President: Even with those limitations that we are assuming we still have enough arms to kill one another many times over.

"General Secretary Brezhnev: Exactly. That is why when we looked into the meaning of all that we have already done, we came to the conclusion that although all this is very useful we ought to raise before you the question of achieving agreement on the non-use against one another of nuclear arms. We placed this question before you in a preliminary way hoping that you would give us your view on this matter. I should like to hope for a positive attitude on your part. I believe that an obligation of this kind could serve as a good example for others and promote the invigoration of the international situation.

"You may of course say that the situation is complicated by the fact that you and we have our allies. But I believe that all this can be settled for the sake of delivering our peoples from the threat of nuclear war. An agreement of this kind would have an important and indeed an epoch-making significance. Naturally, I am not asking you to reply to my question right now. I merely wanted to emphasize the impor-

tance of an agreement of this kind. Such an agreement would provide an impetus for the further advance along the road on the physical reduction of the volumes of armaments. I trust you will agree Mr. President that only a radical solution of the problem—the destruction of nuclear weapons—can really rid the peoples of the threat of nuclear war. This would be a tremendous achievement. Our position is that this is what we should strive for.

“The President: I think you told Kissinger that this would be a peaceful bomb. As you admit, there does exist a very serious problem concerning consultations with our allies. But after recently receiving a personal message from you at Camp David, I asked Kissinger quietly to work on this problem with some of my White House staff so that a little later we could discuss the matter to see where we could go. For the time being we do not want to put this question into the hands of our bureaucracy who would immediately find lots of difficulties and obstacles in it. In the early stages we would like to study the matter quietly. I would like to take up this matter a little later but not at a plenary meeting.

“General Secretary Brezhnev: Very well. We have almost a full week at our disposal. During the forthcoming negotiations which I trust will proceed normally and in a good way we shall certainly be able to come back to this matter.

“The President: I do not mean that you and I should waste our time on various words and phrases; that is something that Kissinger, Dobrynin and Gromyko can do. We could give them some general ideas to work on. This applies both to this particular matter and to others.

“General Secretary Brezhnev: We shall seek to achieve agreement in principle and then we could entrust the concrete formulations to others.”

After some discussion about other bilateral issues, Nixon and Brezhnev returned to SALT:

“The President: I think the most important agreements are the ones relating to SALT. I feel they should be signed by the two of us. Also important will be the agreements on space, the environment and trade. I would be prepared to sign all of them. But I understand that you may want some of them to be signed by Kosygin or Podgorny.

“General Secretary Brezhnev: I would say that the most important document will be ‘The Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and the USA.’

“The President: Yes, of course. And that’s a document that should also be signed by us both. As for the SALT agreements, as I see it, you have the same responsibility in your country for military matters as I have in mine as Commander-in-Chief.” The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 257.

At the first plenary session on May 23, which took place at St. Catherine's Hall in the Grand Kremlin Palace, the Soviet and U.S. parties discussed a variety of issues. The comments related to SALT read as follows:

"Podgorny referred to the President's remark that in two years of SALT we had learned how difficult it is to negotiate. He believes there is no comparison between SALT and the other matters under discussion. SALT deals with a very special set of problems which are considerably more complicated and of greater importance for the US and the Soviet Union, and for other countries, than the problems involved in working out agreements on cooperation in space or on improving the environment or on trade. For this reason these questions can be resolved more easily. Yet at the same time, they too are issues of importance and he mentions this only to put SALT into proper perspective.

"Brezhnev remarked that while they are less important than the security issues involved in SALT, they are very close to the hearts of our people.

"Podgorny repeated that SALT involved questions of national security and therefore it is more difficult to deal with.

"The President agreed that any matter which involves national survival must come first. That is why SALT must be approached with care."

Before the first plenary session ended, Kosygin remarked "that there had been so much talk about SALT all over the world that if a final settlement is not achieved during this visit, people everywhere will have an unfavorable impression." The full text of the memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, Document 259.

293. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 23, 1972.

SUBJECT

SALT Status

Following has been tentatively agreed at Helsinki:

1. The Soviets will accept *an agreed interpretive statement* on Other Large Phased Array Radars (OLPARs) at our proposed cut off of three million (3×10 to the 6th power);

2. We will accept *an agreed interpretive statement* that destruction or dismantling of old launchers must proceed when sea trials of the new submarine begins and should be done expeditiously;

3. Both sides have shifted to accept *an agreed interpretive statement* that there will be no significant increase in external silo dimensions;²

4. The U.S. reserved the right to make a unilateral statement on the definition of heavy ICBMs (after the Soviets indicated that they would not accept an agreed statement).

This represents considerable movement by the Soviets and resolves many of the remaining issues.

The SLBM issues and the location of the second Soviet ICBM defense site remain unresolved.

SLBMs

Following is current U.S. position already presented to the Soviets in Helsinki. It includes both G and H Classes.

Article III

The parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, except that under agreed procedures the

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 74, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Moscow Summit 1972 [1 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² In telegram USDEL SALT 1367 from Helsinki, May 23, Smith reported agreement on an interpretive statement relating to Article II of the Interim Agreement that reads: "The parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there would be no significant increase in the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers." (Ibid.)

parties may construct additional SLBM launchers on additional modern ballistic missile submarines as replacements for ICBM launchers of older types constructed prior to 1964 or for SLBM launchers.

Protocol to the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

1. The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which that agreement remains in force:

A. Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (B.) of paragraph 1 of this Protocol, the U.S. shall have no more than seven hundred ten SLBM launchers on submarines operational and under construction and no more than forty-four modern ballistic missile submarines operational and under construction, and the USSR shall have no more than nine hundred fifty SLBM launchers on submarines operational and under construction and no more than sixty-two modern ballistic missile submarines operational and under construction.

B. The US and the USSR shall not exceed the above-mentioned limitations, except that in the process of modernization or replacement they may, under agreed procedures, have under construction additional SLBM launchers on additional modern ballistic missile submarines for replacement of equal numbers of ICBM launchers of older types constructed prior to 1964 or equal numbers of SLBM launchers.

2. This protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

Done at _____ on _____, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Comment: This protocol specifies only ceilings and *leaves aside what numbers are operational or under construction*. Numbers operational or under construction would thus have to be handled by agreed definitions.

—Definition of “operational” would have to be framed to include only those that have completed fitting out trials and “under construc-

tion” would have to be defined to include only those submarines actually in sheds. Such a definition would mean about 41–42 Y-Class submarines.

—Since we can make a good estimate of those submarines already launched, *no definition of “operational” is necessary, if we can agree on the numbers “under construction.”* We would need a definition that excluded any boat not already in the sheds. Otherwise the Soviets will expand their base number to count parts of boats not yet in actual assembly halls.

—This route of defining “operational” or “under construction” would force the Soviet hand on how they calculated the 48 they claimed are operational or under construction.

Ceilings

Specified ceilings for the Soviets (62 boats and 950 missiles) would be temporarily exceeded in our proposal, because both sides can have under construction extra boats as eventual replacements for older launchers and dismantling would not start until completion of sea trials. This allows US to start ULMs without dismantling or replacement.

Numbers

Assuming for the Soviets 41 Y-Class boats and about 624 SLBMs as of now, (36 Y-Class and 4 New Class) the dismantling of SS-7 and 8s ICBMs would allow an additional 17 submarines and 209 missiles. At least half of G and H would *then* have to be converted to reach 62 boats.

Soviet Objections To Our Proposal:

—Modern submarines do not by definition include G and H Class, because “modern” means built after 1965.

—Soviets claim they now have operational and under construction 48 modern submarines. (Seven above our present estimate.)

—This would mean an additional 14 boats could be constructed, requiring only dismantling of 168 older ICBMs (assuming each new boat has only 12 submarines [*launchers*]). This would still leave Soviets short of total of 950 launchers (i.e. a level of about 876).

Possible Compromise

1. To count as “modern” only H Class (i.e. only nuclear powered and with ballistic missiles).
2. And to count G-Class if replaced with “modern” launchers.

Our Objectives:

1. To include in agreement some provision or definition so that Soviets cannot have at least H Class fleet in current total.
2. To include provision or understanding that *if* G and H fitted with “modern” missile (SS-N-6 or 8) that this will count in 950 total launchers.

294. Backchannel Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 23, 1972.

Tohak 95. We are finding it increasingly difficult to keep up with what actually is being agreed with the Soviets and what line Haldeman's people are to take with respect to these agreements. It is essential that some member of the party sit down and provide us with a general press line to be taken here and to also give us specific clarifications as to what has been agreed to in each instance.

As you may know, Haldeman has Ehrlichman geared up to exploit each agreement as it is announced. The problem is that no one knows the finite parameters of the agreement when it occurs, or the press line you wish taken with respect to it. We need your assistance on this in order to prevent glitches.

For example, the Vice President is scheduled to give a 3:00 p.m. statement on the space agreement tomorrow and we have heard nothing on what the final agreement consists of. I recognize what terrible pressure you and our people are under. Perhaps Hyland or Sonnenfeldt could take time out to give us this guidance to be sure that we are all singing from an accurate score card.

Warm regards.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 479, President's Trip Files, President's Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip TOHAK (File No. 1), Situation Room, May–June 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Printed from the copy approved for transmission.

295. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 23, 1972, 4–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

SALT

Gen Secy Brezhnev: What do you consider to be the outstanding issues?

Dr. Kissinger: There are four areas: (1) the location of the second Soviet ABM site, (2) the definition of “heavy” ICBM, (3) the SLBM limits, and (4) mobile land-based ICBMs.

Gen Secy Brezhnev: Then Dr. Kissinger is behind events. They have already been settled.

Dr. Kissinger: Only on the external dimensions of the silos, not what is inside.

Gen Secy Brezhnev: [very irritably]² You cannot put large missiles into small holes.

Dr. Kissinger: It is more complicated than that. It is nevertheless possible.

Gen Secy Brezhnev: No. Any change does not involve modification of the size of the silos. Thickening the walls may look like a change of the character of the missile but it isn't. All the changes are within existing procedures. Why do you raise this issue?

Dr. Kissinger: With new launch procedures it is possible to increase the size of the missile inside the existing silos.

Gen Secy Brezhnev: [drawing diagrams] This is impossible. There are no prospects in the foreseeable future that we will engage in activities of this kind. We will not change the diameter of the missile. But we change the weight/yield ratio.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 487, President's Trip Files, The President's Conversations in Salzburg, Moscow, Tehran, and Warsaw, May 1972, Part 1. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Transcribed from Kissinger's notes. The meeting was held in St. Catherine's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace.

² All brackets are in the original.

We are prepared to drop the word “significant” from the phrase “no significant increase” [in the interpretive statement on Article II].³

The President: Our concern is not the provision of silos but modernization leading to a change in the volume of these missiles. Anyway, a change in volume cannot be verified.

Gen Secy Brezhnev: If we are trying to trick one another, why do we need a piece of paper? We are playing clean. Of course, any modification involves improvement. Therefore, why do you raise the issue? The approach of “catching each other out” is quite inadmissible. The best they can do is improve the efficiency of existing missiles.

I will make another proposal. We will accept the 1500-kilometer distance provision [the requirement that the second Soviet ABM site be at least 1500 kilometers from the national capital]. We will have the same number of sites. But ours will cover few ICBMs. We can also move it elsewhere. We had wanted to move it to European Russia. We have the same kind of ICBM centers as you have.

On submarines, because of the territorial differences between the two sides, we have asked for a larger figure. If you promise not to build new submarines, we accept your right to do so [right to convert Titans to SLBMs].

Dr. Kissinger: I propose counting at least the number of H-Class submarines in the Soviet figure. [He recites the figures.]

Gen Secy Brezhnev: [irritated] So you have the information on the number of submarines we have. The U.S. proposal means that you can build submarines to replace your old ones. You want complete freedom to reconstruct your entire fleet, and substitute Poseidons for Polaris. But we cannot accept replacement of your entire fleet.

I would agree to the following version: not to name 48 in the agreement but to agree that the replacement figure *is* 48. It is hard to explain to our military men if we don’t get a 7-number advantage. If you want me to say our military men are very pleased by this method, then we can only say that they are not.

Speaking man to man, since we know the implications of these armaments and since we are both civilized men, we know these weapons

³ In backchannel message Hakto 20 to Helsinki, May 23, 1523Z, Kissinger informed Smith about the President’s conversation about SALT that afternoon, including Brezhnev’s statement that the Soviets were prepared to drop the “significant” between “no” and “increase” in the interpretive statement relating to Article II. Kissinger also reported Brezhnev’s assertion that the Soviets had no intention of increasing the size of their missiles. Kissinger asked Smith to comment by Flash reply regarding the acceptability of Brezhnev’s proposal. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 479, President’s Trip Files, President’s Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip TOHAK File No. 1, Situation Room, May–June 1972)

must never be used. Perhaps we shall not be able to achieve agreement here on the non-use of nuclear weapons; we can reach accord when Dr. Kissinger comes back to Moscow in September. This would overlap all other considerations. How can I contemplate it [the use of nuclear weapons]? We are now conducting negotiations with the present as well as the future President of the United States.

Transcribed from Dr. Kissinger's notes.

296. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 23, 1972, 7:20–9:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Senior NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

SALT; Vietnam (briefly at end)

[The meeting began with some light exchanges between Brezhnev and the President concerning Dr. Kissinger's previous visit to Moscow and the conversations at that time. The President also mentioned that he had shown Ambassador Dobrynin where Brezhnev would stay when he comes to the United States. The President said that Camp David was not as nice as the Kremlin. He went on to say that Franklin Roosevelt, who was crippled, fished in a pond sitting on a carved-out log, and they would put fish in this pond for Mr. Brezhnev. Mr. Brezhnev thanked the President and said that the Ambassador had spoken warmly about the conversation on that subject. Brezhnev said he was grateful for the President's consideration.]²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 487, President's Trip Files, The President's Conversations in Salzburg, Moscow, Tehran, and Warsaw, May 1972, Part 1. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the General Secretary's office in the Kremlin.

² All brackets are in the original.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I was held up because I had to consult with a small group of my colleagues. Mr. Kissinger should sit and be quiet and the President and I will finalize all the outstanding points. On the other hand, on his last visit Dr. Kissinger was very nice and we had nice talks. But that must have been because he spent three days in Moscow and benefited from its good atmosphere. Then after he returned to America he was contaminated.

The President: The trouble was that he gave everything away to the General Secretary and now I will have to take it back again.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: That reminds me of the proverb about the crayfish walking backwards—but we, of course, are only joking.

The President: The general principles that were worked out when Dr. Kissinger was here are very important.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I and my colleagues agree. It is an important and useful document.

The President: Let us clearly understand, because of our bureaucratic problems, that we worked this out while I was here in Moscow.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You heard how I put it this morning. I was just “initiating” something; I took account of our talk yesterday, but I had to say something so it would not come out of thin air. But now we will follow the script.

As regards the ABM question, this now appears to be cleared up. Twelve hundred is OK with us.

The President: Fifteen hundred kilometers.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You mean we should put it in China?

The President: Well, as the General Secretary will find out, I never nitpick.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Fifteen hundred kilometers is all right. The most important point is not the mileage. You wanted us to move eastward and so now we agree. It would be easier for us to accept twelve hundred but fifteen hundred is all right too, and we won't speak of it anymore.

As regards land-based missiles, how do you view the agreement yesterday in Helsinki?

Dr. Kissinger: On what issue?

Sukhodrev: He is referring to the formula I read out [in the earlier meeting].³

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I had just read the cable a half hour before.

³ See Document 295.

The President: I have no doubt about the General Secretary's attitude about the use of implements of destruction. As long as we are around I have no fear. But there are two matters of importance. One, we have to deal not only with present but future leaders. I hope they are practical men and will not engage in acts of madness. But madmen do come to power; the best example is Hitler. We don't expect one in our country or in your country, but it is still best to have an agreement that is as balanced as possible. Second, I realize the General Secretary has to sell his position to his military. We have a similar problem but I can control ours. But the Representatives and Senators in our Armed Services Committees will watch every line of the agreement to see if we were placed at a disadvantage or who gained an advantage. I would like to make the agreement as balanced as possible to avoid that kind of problem. And it has been raised already. In fact, I was on the phone at 4:00 a.m. this morning to Washington to arrange steps to quiet the opposition if we should sign on Friday.

This is not a matter of lack of trust but a problem of dealing with an opposition. What really would solve the problem for us would be the recognition of the right of modernization, no increase in the size of silos, as already discussed, but where we would unilaterally point out that modernization would not be used significantly to increase the payload size.

Dr. Kissinger: The missile size.

The President: We would spell out "significantly" to be 15%. Otherwise a critic could say on the floor of the Senate that through modernization one could double the size of the missile. Whether this would really be so I don't know, but it would still have to be answered.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Mr. President, if you have completed your thought I should like to say this. We would agree that under the agreement both sides would be entitled to modernization without replacing small missiles with bigger ones, that is to say converting them. Also this would be on the understanding that in the process of modernization of every type there should be no significant increase of either silo or missile. Then there would be no need for a unilateral statement. Because if there are going to be questions, they would also be asked in the Soviet Union: "What kind of an agreement is this if unilateral statements have to be made about it?" You should have a freeze: no new missiles; lesser ones cannot be changed into big ones; and modernization permitted only with insignificant increases in the size of the silos. Of course, the word "insignificant" is very vague, and I don't mind seeing it refined. It is relative. For example, what is insignificant in the case of a big missile? Perhaps we should define it in terms of a percentage. In short, we could reach an understanding to avoid doubts by Senators and legislators in either country. So we would have an agree-

ment to avoid doubts. As for what Mr. Kissinger suggested at the outset, I don't understand it and I don't think we should revert to it.

Now the experts in Helsinki are very literate and competent people, and we should have trust in them. I am sure they know more of the finer points than I because they have studied them more than I. We should agree to accept their formula even without "significant." The sides could modify missiles without changing dimensions of silos or missiles so both sides would be in the same position. But if you want to keep "significant," that would be all right too because we are very flexible.

I would like to add that there is also another political aspect to the question of land-based missiles, and that is that we commit ourselves not only to freezing but to reducing strategic arms. We are ready to proceed to bilateral consultations with you and to continue the arduous work so that by an important date in the history of the United States [presumably the Bicentennial Anniversary], or even earlier, we could solve this problem of reducing. So I suggest we stick to the formula worked out in Helsinki. I would not like to see a unilateral statement. It would look like one kind of an agreement in Moscow and another in Washington. What kind of an agreement would it be if it leads to interpretations? The obligation should be reciprocal and the President and I should be responsible for what was signed.

The President: I agree. We prefer a joint agreement. That is, modernization is permitted but the size of the silo and of the missiles could not be significantly increased. With the details to be worked out by professors.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: [Pause] As I see it, this is almost the same wording as in Helsinki but the wording includes missile modernization.

Dr. Kissinger: We would add that the size of the volume of the missile and the silo would not be increased significantly. Other modernization would be permitted.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You would allow "insignificant" modernization.

The President: Modernization would be permitted according to what the scientists develop and design, but there could be no increase in silo or missile size beyond the insignificant. Otherwise, it is not a limitation.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: We can agree on this if we elaborate the meaning of the word. What is it—5%? 10%? What percentage?

The President: We had better work out a figure—10%, 15%. It can't be too big or it won't be a limitation. We must keep it in the realm of 15%. And, of course, this works for both sides.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: In short, I would sum up then. There is the first part of the agreement that states that both sides freeze the number of missiles. Then there is the second part that says they are not al-

lowed to increase significantly the size of silos and missiles. Then “significantly” could be worked out to say it means not more than X%. But on the exact number of this percentage I would like to consult with my colleagues. So the first part is agreed, but “significant” I have to think over until tomorrow. Also, we have the question of whether this is in the agreement or on the way.

The President: The smaller the percentage the better. The people would understand 10% but not 30%. We are prepared to negotiate. The General Secretary should consult and we will do the same.

Gen Sec’y Brezhnev: Another question has arisen in my mind in the course of our discussion today. As I look at the formula we received from Helsinki I notice two words: “modernization” and “replacement.” Modernization is one thing but replacement is another. It appears that both sides are permitted to replace one type of missile for another, and it would have greater volume. It would be better for public opinion if we restrained this, if we said both sides should be permitted to improve existing types of missiles and have insignificant increases in sizes. Our experts say you are replacing Poseidon with God knows what—it was a good thing I am not on our delegation! When we agree to replacement, this entails the possibility that military men will say we should replace one missile with a more powerful one and then the factories would work full blast. But if we say “modernization and perfection” this would not happen. If we say “replacement” we could mean new types and this would just mean the continuation of the arms race. We really should endeavor to take a drastic step.

The President: This only involves land-based missiles. You can’t increase the volume simply by replacing the missile. But this was a Soviet proposal anyway.

Dr. Kissinger: The replacement language has existed since January of 1971. It has long since been agreed.

Gen Sec’y Brezhnev: OK. I will leave it at that.

The President: I think we have covered it. Now let me see if I can understand the submarine question correctly. We have 950 SLBMs and 62 boats for you and 44 boats and 710 SLBMs for us. But, of course, we actually have only 41 boats and 656 missiles. That’s where we start.

Gen Sec’y Brezhnev: If I might just sum up that both sides expect that in the process of modernization and replacement, there will be no significant increase in the size of silos and missiles. The remaining task is to find a reasonable interpretation of “significant.”

The President: We will be reasonable. I agree.

What we were discussing earlier was the H- and G-Class submarines. How many are there?

Dr. Kissinger: I won’t tell the General Secretary or he will get angry again.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: On the figures of the submarines: As I said earlier, we have a certain group of submarines dating back to before 1964 with only three missiles each. They have all sorts of defects in their engines and so on. We have agreed to scrap them and replace them with new ones. They are no good to us.

Then we also have a considerable territorial disadvantage. The President was fair enough to say that we could have seven submarines more than the United States. We wanted more but we agreed to 48. That means we build 48 under the agreement and you 44 so the difference is really only four. I want to inject complete clarity. Forty-eight need not be mentioned in the main agreement but in the additional agreement it would state that we are entitled to 48. And then whatever else we build would be simultaneous with the removal of old ICBMs and old submarines. So, if for reasons of your own, for example Congress, you think you would not want to mention this in the agreement we can put it into the additional agreement.

Now you say you have no intention to build the three submarines. We have no problem about this. But I have here a report from the *Washington Post* quoting your Secretary of Defense Laird that the United States is planning to build 10 big new submarines and that \$10 billion have already been appropriated and that each is to carry 24 missiles and will become operational by the end of the '70s. Now, this is incompatible with our agreement, so how are we to understand it? We accepted the 44/710 and the 62/950. But now we are confronted with a new issue. Because by the end of the period the United States will have 10 new submarines with 24 missiles and much more modern than now. This is not an evening out, but on the contrary, the United States will get an advantage.

Dr. Kissinger: First, we had always told your Ambassador when discussing these programs about the new submarine; he had always known that it was going on. Secondly, it won't be operational until the late '70's. The first, as I understand it, will be in 1979; two in 1980, and then it won't be till 1982 or '83 that we will have 10. If we have a permanent agreement it would apply at that point. If the new ones come in during the freeze, we would retire the same number of tubes—for every two ULMs, three Polaris. The ceiling would apply.

The President: If you get a permanent agreement this becomes moot; this is the main point. The alternative is that both—and this shows why the agreement is so important—will pour billions more into submarines.

Dr. Kissinger: [To the President] You had intended a big speed-up of our submarine program but then cancelled it because of the SALT agreement.

The President: Yes. Because of the Soviet speed-up I had tentatively ordered the Navy to speed up the submarines, but I stopped it. But if

we can get permanent agreement, we wouldn't pour money into the program. Of course, they would only be replacements under the numbers you are giving here, or lower numbers if we later agree on them.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I think that approach makes it more difficult for me to take a decision. I now understand why the President won't build the three submarines since you have initiated a new program. I would have done the same thing. This changes the whole principle. We discussed the principle of evening out. But now you have a new program for new submarines of new size and with new range. You could even shoot rockets from territorial waters or from your home base. This requires earnest thinking on my part. It would be one thing if you built just one pilot boat. Or if it involves withdrawal of two or one-and-a-half boats for every new one. That would make sense and then our figure—950—would make sense. In fact, I am not even sure that we can build this figure in the present Five-Year Plan. It may be beyond our economic capacity. But in the meantime, you will make a leap forward in range and capacity. I don't know what you told our Ambassador; I may have forgotten it. But this creates a serious problem.

I do want to reach understanding and bring this matter to completion, but to be frank and speaking with all the respect I have for you, if this program is carried out, you will have a significant superiority.

The President: You have to look at it in two time frames. First, there is no program during the freeze. We would not put any new submarines into the fleet. The first one would be in 1979 and then two in 1980. Now, secondly, if in this period we have a new agreement on the same number, or a lower number, these submarines would be substituted for older ones and the numbers would not be affected. It would mean retiring old submarines with an equivalent number of missiles. There is no advantage intended and none certainly that affects this agreement.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You mean if we agree to 950?

The President: Yes, we would be frozen. You have the same right.

One argument we hear—and we had many discussions over the months—is that the Soviet Union's missiles are much larger than ours. So you have a significant advantage there. But we are here as reasonable men to work out a balanced program and that requires some give and take on both sides.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: With all the missiles and all the secrecy you think our missiles are bigger and we think yours are, and a lot of propaganda is raised.

The President: I wish you were right, but I am afraid I am. Actually, they are all too big. That's my view.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I am sure you have probably either attended or seen demonstrations and know that the smallest missile is enough

to destroy a city. Even a small bomb can paralyze and destroy everything—water, electricity, gas and the rest. And then, of course, there is the pollution.

The President: That's why agreement is so important.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: What do you think about the idea of converting the submarine agreement into a permanent one, I mean the figures? And you and we would be entitled to modernize.

The President: Not now. I would have to go back to consult and that would take some months. It can be considered later, but not now. People can count: 950—710—the United States is behind. No, not now.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: But your productive capacity is much greater. It makes no difference if the earliest date for you is 1979; the main thing is the pilot boat and then they go through the assembly line like pancakes.

The President: We must recognize that we each have great capabilities and if there is a race both lose. Now, for example, you talk about the size of the U.S. economy. In 1960, when Khrushchev was in the United States, we had an advantage in missiles of 10 to 1. Today, it's even. We respect your power. We are both strong now and neither will leave the other an advantage. That is why we need an agreement or we will bankrupt each other in the arms race.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I value your frankness, but doesn't that testify that by 1979, at the end of the agreement, the U.S. wants superiority? But frankly, we won't let you.

The President: We would be labeled fools if we don't reach agreement by then.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: It's not a question of labels.

The President: I would consider this agreement a great achievement for us and all the world. I want to reach a permanent agreement but my time is limited—less than five years. And then, I am out—swimming in the Pacific. Maybe even before.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Don't go out before that, Mr. President.

The President: I want the General Secretary and myself to meet again, perhaps in the U.S. or here.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I have no objection to more than one meeting. In fact, they should become routine events in the natural course of developments.

The President: This agreement is the *hors d'oeuvre*. Next comes the main course.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: If I might just throw in another idea. Make the agreement last 10, not five, years. In fact, why have we chosen five years?

Dr. Kissinger: You started at 18 months.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: No, first it was three years, then we suggested five.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I think you started with 18 months.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Now we are bolder, more venturesome. But I am saying things that have not even been discussed in my own circle. I am just thinking aloud.

The President: We should do that—thinking aloud. I may do it too in the next few days. It took a long time to get this far. I know the General Secretary had to sell this agreement to his people, as I had to sell it to mine.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: On the basis of what has already been achieved, we are growing bolder. If at first it seemed to involve great risk, now it looks feasible.

The President: I make this commitment to the General Secretary: Once we make this agreement we will move aggressively to the next phase. Dr. Kissinger will tell you I generally do more than I say.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I would like to see three examples.

The President: Well, for example, next spring in Washington might be a good time to take the next step.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: It would make no sense leaving Washington empty-handed. You will carry much baggage from Moscow.

The President: I will give him a golf cart if he likes it.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: But I don't play.

The President: You don't have to. You can use it on the sidewalk. Anyway, let's get a good agreement.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: To sum up: I cannot give you a final answer this morning, but I will endeavor to do it tomorrow morning. You get 41 plus three and 710. But you give us the private assurance not to build three. We get 62 and 950. This is all logical. It's also agreed we get 48 submarines which we build to compensate for our territorial disadvantage. Whatever other submarines we build will be only to replace older missiles.

But we have to report to my colleagues that you have this other program. They all read this story from the *Washington Post* too—this program with one submarine operational by 1979, two by 1980 and all ten by 1983. You have indicated that if any of them become operational before 1979 it would only be as replacement for older submarines with an equivalent number of missiles. And if it is after the end of the freeze, you will make no change in the numbers.

The President: That depends on the agreement. It should also be said that if you put modern missiles on your older submarines, they count in your 950, just as we have a limit of 710.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Even in the event of your new subs becoming operational.

The President: That is a moot question. None will become operational in five years—no chance. Also, as our technology goes forward, so will yours. So it is important to get a permanent agreement.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: I understand the situation and will report to my colleagues. You do confirm 48, on which we agreed?

The President: Forty-eight new ones; actually 62.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Any built above it will require dismantling of old missiles.

The President: The top is 950. Our own number is really 41.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: We accept what you say, though in the final analysis an extra three won't make any difference.

The President: But we won't do it.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: But you will have a good statement to make. The number 48 need not be mentioned in the main agreement, but in the supplemental one.

The President: Fine.

Dr. Kissinger: So—no figures in the main agreement, but figures in the supplement.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Therefore, it is correct to say we have no other issues on strategic arms. Right?

The President: On the mobiles. We had raised this but since we worked out the situation with regard to the size of missiles, let's throw it out. Of course, some of our people think you have them.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: We've got plenty, haven't you seen them rolling around the Kremlin? Mr. President, then I'll consult with my colleagues. I do believe we have reached an understanding, and I will give you an answer in the morning. We could then give instructions to Helsinki or have them come here.

The President: Well, it is better to give them to Helsinki so we can get on with the other things we have here.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: We ought to agree on common instructions.

Dr. Kissinger: How about the first item?

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: What one is that?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, the definition of heavy missiles. Can we send instruction that the size of the silo and the size of the missile cannot be changed?

The President: We will check the notes and take it from the notes.

[Brezhnev gets up to make phone call which goes on for about four minutes.]

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Maybe we should leave it till morning because I can only reach one. For now we should leave it as it was in the message received from Helsinki, the one that deals with silos only. In the morning I can give you a package deal.

Dr. Kissinger: So we won't send instructions.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You and I have agreed in principle, but we can leave the situation as it is as far as Helsinki is concerned.

[Brezhnev reads brief announcement:

"On 23 May a meeting took place in the Kremlin between General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev, and President of the USA, Richard M. Nixon. The talks continued between L.I. Brezhnev and R. Nixon on questions of Soviet-American relations."]

Anyway the 950 and 710 will last until 1978, the end of this agreement. Incidentally, I would like to ask how do you see the end of the limitation agreement?

Dr. Kissinger: Five years after ratification.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: When do you contemplate ratification?

Dr. Kissinger: The plan is to put the offensive agreement to Congress but we expect no problem.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: You have no doubts.

The President: Unless you drive too hard a bargain.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: This is not a point of principle. The important thing is to get ratification.

The President: That is why I met with the leaders of Congress and this morning called them on the phone. We are working on the Congressional business already.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: We have reached an understanding on almost all questions and will give you an answer in the morning. One more point. I just got a TASS report from Paris saying that today the delegation of the PRG of Vietnam sent a message to the U.S. and South Vietnamese to resume the work of the conference—the 150th session on May 25. And there is also a similar message from the DRV.

The President: We will have an opportunity to discuss this later. We have had 149 sessions and no progress. When we have concrete assurance of progress then we can consider this.

Gen Sec'y Brezhnev: Well, I was just thinking along the line that while you are here there might be significance in your making a response—a positive response. But I am just thinking out loud.

[After closing pleasantries, the meeting adjourned.]

297. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Moscow, May 24, 1972, 0610Z.

WH21557/Hakto 21. Talks with Brezhnev continued late into evening.² Exclusively for your personal information and to be confirmed after further meeting today, following seems to be upshot:

1. They will accept 1500 km separation of second ABM site from national capital.

2. Politburo this morning is considering statement to the effect that during process of modernization and replacement (of ICBMs) there can be no significant increase in size of silo or volume of missile with word significant further defined to be no more than 10–15 percent.

I will let you know further about SLBM question. Brezhnev went into lengthy discourse on ULMS and its alleged contradiction with agreement but matter dropped later.

Please do not share this with anybody until you hear further from me.³

Warm regards.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig initialed the message. A copy was sent to Howe.

² See Document 296.

³ In backchannel message 432 from Helsinki to the White House for delivery to Kissinger in Moscow, May 24, Smith replied: "Re paragraph two, if this is to be mutually binding, it will prevent continuance of present program converting Minuteman I to Minuteman III which is scheduled to continue until 1974. You will recall that Minuteman I has volume of 23 cubic meters and Minuteman III 29 cubic meters—an increase of approximately 25 percent. Delegation's proposed solution avoids this impact on US programs and seems much better." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT)

298. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Helsinki, May 24, 1972, 0930Z.

433. Message for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in Moscow. Deliver immediately even if Dr. Kissinger is in meeting.

Dear Henry:

Sonnenfeldt telcon² suggests that root of possible misunderstanding between us lies in Soviet formula use simply of the word "missiles" rather than the words (which we have tried to negotiate and which we were planning to make in a unilateral statement) "the largest light ICBM now operational on either side."

If at Moscow you can get agreement that there will be no significant increase (a) in the size of ICBM silo launchers, or (b) in the volume of ICBMs beyond that of the largest light ICBM currently deployed by either side, and you can get the word "significant" further defined to be no more than 10 to 15 per cent, that would be great improvement.

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig initialed the message. Copies were sent to Howe and Odeen.

² Smith prepared a memorandum for the record of his telephone conversation with Sonnenfeldt, May 24, that reads: "After recognition of the open line being used, Sonnenfeldt said they had Amb. Smith's message from Mosbacher which they couldn't understand, and that they were trying to get the definitions precisely as Amb. Smith was recommending. GS said Delegation did not want to use specific numbers. Sonnenfeldt wanted to know if Delegation wanted lesser number or larger number; Amb. Smith said no number, that the number they were trying to put in would have an impact on American programs, it is much too small and we are better off without a number. Sonnenfeldt said: We want to leave it vague? GS said: We want to leave it the way the Delegation has worked it out." (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-97-0010, Director's Files, Smith/White House Correspondence, SALT, March-May 1972)

299. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile Launcher Limits

The Soviets are continuing to resist our proposal to limit SLBM launchers to a total of 950. They are arguing that our definition of the term “under construction” is inappropriate, and they are asserting that they have 48 “modern” submarines operational and under construction. We estimate that they have between 41 and 43 such submarines operational and under construction. The effect of the Soviet approach is to allow them to reach the 950 level without replacing the 100 SLBM launchers in G and H class submarines. In effect, they are converting an issue on SLBM launcher levels into a technical issue on how we define such terms as “under construction” and “modern” submarines.

I believe the inequalities in the offense agreement that would result from U.S. proposals are as large as we can tolerate. I strongly recommend therefore that the U.S. continue to insist that the total number of SLBM launchers on the Soviet side be limited to 950 and that the number of missile launching submarines be limited to 62. This matter should be pressed at the summit if necessary.

Melvin R. Laird

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret.

300. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

Location of Soviet ICBM Defenses Allowed under the Prospective Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement

The Soviet Delegation to SALT has objected to an agreed interpretive statement specifying that ABM deployments for defense of ICBMs will be located West of the Mississippi and East of the Ural Mountains. The Soviet Delegation has branded such a statement as “unnecessary”.

I strongly recommend that Soviet agreement to the substance of the proposed interpretive statement be made a prerequisite to consummation of a strategic arms limitation agreement limiting ABMs. We should seek agreement on this matter at the summit if necessary. If agreement cannot be reached there, I recommend signature of the agreement be delayed while this problem is worked out with the Soviets.

The U.S. has consistently maintained that ICBM fields to be defended under the SALT agreement must be located West of the Mississippi and East of the Ural Mountains. More recently we have suggested that these be located at least 1500 kilometers from the national capital. Limits like these are necessary to isolate the ABM defenses of these ICBM fields from large population centers. If the Soviets were permitted to deploy their ICBM defenses west of the Urals, they would, in effect, be permitted an ABM radar base for defense of the heartland of the U.S.S.R., including coverage of Moscow from both the NCA defense and the ICBM defense. I believe such an outcome from SALT is unacceptable.

Melvin R. Laird

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret.

301. **Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹**

Helsinki, May 24, 1972, 1650Z.

436. Message for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in Moscow.

Dear Henry:

We are doing our best here to carry out Presidential instructions.

A good ABM treaty and a fair ICBM freeze are now in sight. I believe you are aware that I have some reservation about the SL deal. I am concerned that what will appear in certain quarters to be an inequitable SL deal could sour the whole SALT outcome. In any event, I would advise the President not to accept any SL freeze that did not call for compulsory replacement right from the start of the agreement.

I would advise the President, rather than to settle for anything less than compulsory replacement from the start, to limit the 1972 SALT arrangements to ABM limitation plus ICBM freeze. This would still be a significant arms control accomplishment. Even taking into consideration present expectations, I believe there would be broad public support for a position—"we tried our best to freeze SLs but the best Soviet offer was unacceptable. We will push hard in the second SALT round for overall offensive limitations including SLBMs. Meanwhile, we will press on with strategic programs we seem [*deem?*] necessary and that are not frozen."

I trust you will put these considerations to the President.

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Exclusively Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Howe and Odeen.

302. Backchannel Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 24, 1972.

Tohak 127. Subject: SLBM Provisions. Smith's message (SALT 0436²) raises the question of whether an SL agreement that would not call for compulsory replacements from the start is worth making at this time. He advises that it would be better to proceed with just a freeze on ICBMs and leave the SLBMs until the next phase.

I just received a call from Admiral Moorer saying that the Chiefs had just met to discuss the SLBM issue. He stated that they would not support an offensive agreement including SLBMs unless the Soviets are required to replace older SLBMs in order to reach their ceiling. This, of course, is consistent with the position they have taken in the past.

Laird has written that "the inequalities in the offensive agreement that would result from U.S. proposals are as large as we can tolerate."³ Initial contacts with Congress indicate that it is very helpful if we can say that the SLBM arrangement is a freeze at present levels, allowing more boats and SLBMs only if the Soviets replace old ICBMs and SLBMs.

Our discussions with key Hawks as well as with Herman Kahn and Bill Kinter confirm that justification of that agreement is exceedingly difficult unless we can say that we have limited the total number of missiles at about current levels. The additional Y-class construction can then be explained as shifts in mix within the total, replacing old, large ICBMs and older SLBMs. Any arrangement that lets the Soviet build some numbers of additional submarines without replacement would be very hard to explain.

1. The Initial Soviet Number

As we have written earlier, the Soviets can be limited to 41–43 Y-class boats as the number currently operational or under construction by either: (a) stating this number is an understanding; or (2) insisting

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 479, President's Trip Files, President's Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, TOHAK File No. 1, Situation Room, May–June 1972. Top Secret; Flash. Sent for information to Sonnenfeldt and Hyland. Printed from the copy approved for transmission.

² Document 301.

³ See Document 299.

on the definitions of operational and under construction which the Delegation has proposed.

The present Delegation SLBM proposal relies on the latter course. The Soviets in Helsinki today began to challenge the need for such definitions.

2. Replacing the SLBMs on G and H Class Boats

The present Delegation proposal counts all SLBMs. However, so long as we keep the Soviet base point at 41–43 boats, we can fall back from all SLBMs to count only modern SLBM launchers.

In order to get to 62 boats and the the 950 SLBM limit, the Soviets must replace most of the older boats and launchers. For example, even assuming the worst and unlikely case of 43 boats and 652 launchers, the Soviets would have to phase out or modernize 89 of their 100 G and H launchers to reach the 950 limit. This is because there are only 209 SS–7s and 8s.

However, because of the political problems back home, it would be much simpler to count all SLBMs rather than try to explain the arithmetic.

303. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 25, 1972, 1:15–3:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid V. Smirnov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Soviet Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member
William G. Hyland, NSC Staff Member

Mr. Gromyko: The President and General Secretary Brezhnev discussed a number of SALT questions yesterday. There are still a number of questions to resolve and we have some formulas to hand over.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Kissinger's Conversations in Moscow, May 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Conference Room of the Foreign Minister's office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The first formula is a joint statement on Article III [of the ABM treaty]. [Hands over to Dr. Kissinger and English and Russian text—Tab A.]²

Dr. Kissinger: [After looking at the document] I thought that we had agreed [with Brezhnev] on 1500 kilometers, not 1300.

Mr. Gromyko: Let us give you all of the formulas first before you attack. Next we have a joint statement on the problem of conversion of light and heavy missiles [hands over a document—Tab B]. Next is a text of the joint statement on dismantling in connection with replacement of submarine launchers [hands over document—Tab C]. Next is the text of Article III of the Interim Agreement, and the text of the Protocol to this Article [hands over documents—Tabs D and E].

Dr. Kissinger: Let us take them one by one, although we did not discuss dismantling with Brezhnev.

Mr. Gromyko: You should have your way—let us proceed.

Dr. Kissinger: The best way to proceed is for you to submit documents to our delegation and they can accept them if we agree.

Mr. Gromyko: If we reach agreement here they can finalize it and we will call Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: (Referring to the dismantling proposal) It is best to do it in Helsinki, if this is the proposal of our delegation.

Mr. Gromyko: And we will instruct our delegation accordingly.

Mr. Smirnov: The original Soviet position was dismantling would begin when submarines become operational but we have now changed this to when submarines begin sea-going trials, as you proposed.

Dr. Kissinger: I would want our delegation to take a look at it. You should get Semyonov to submit it to them. On the ABM article I thought we had agreed yesterday on 1500 kilometers, but now you propose 1300 kilometers.

Mr. Smirnov: In the working group in Helsinki—the Soviet-American working group—yesterday we reached agreement on 1300 kilometers.

Dr. Kissinger: You should resubmit it in Helsinki and they will solve the problem. It looks all right for now.

Mr. Gromyko: We accepted what the American delegation proposed in Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: We can regard these two—dismantling and ABM—as settled. But now we come to the proposal concerning silo launchers. I don't understand the Soviet position. It deals with silo dimen-

² All tabs are attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original.

sions only. The discussions yesterday between the President and Brezhnev dealt with missile volumes as well.³

Mr. Smirnov (interrupting): But this is the accepted formula.

Dr. Kissinger: But you dropped out the word “significantly” from the agreement in Helsinki.

Mr. Smirnov: Yes we did that.

Dr. Kissinger: There were two discussions at the highest level—one on the size of the silo launchers, and the other on the volume of the missiles. My impression of that conversation was there was agreement that neither should be increased or at least agreement that the silo launcher size should not be increased. My impression was that Brezhnev had agreed to deal with both subjects.

Mr. Smirnov: Comrade Brezhnev has informed me of the substance of these talks. He said that in these discussions he had said the Soviet side would not depart from what had been proposed (in Helsinki) not to increase the size of silo launchers.

Dr. Kissinger: Our understanding was he would discuss the issue with the Politburo—he mentioned it was too late to discuss it last evening, but this proposal you have given me tonight represents no change. This is not my understanding of what had been agreed.

Mr. Gromyko: Today we discussed it and came to the conclusion that we should accept your proposal on no increase (in silo dimensions).

Dr. Kissinger: This has already been agreed. There was no reason to call a meeting for this purpose. What is the new point here?

Mr. Gromyko: We had to weigh all the considerations and come to a final conclusion.

Dr. Kissinger: So what you are saying is that after full consideration you came to the conclusion that regardless of what had been discussed between General Secretary Brezhnev and President Nixon you decided to return to the original dropping the word “significantly.” Otherwise there is no change on the question of missile volume.

Mr. Smirnov: I would like it plain from the outset we proposed a limit only on the silos. We never proposed anything on limitation of the size of the missiles. It was the U.S. side that made various proposals, for example, 70 cubic meters or 10 to 15 percent. And the latest information from Helsinki is that the substance concerns only silo launchers. This is the information we got on the 22nd of May.⁴ And in view of the previous discussions here and in Helsinki we proceeded from the former position.

³ See Documents 295 and 296.

⁴ See Documents 290 and 291.

Dr. Kissinger: But we want to combine the two issues, the restrictions on silo launchers and the restrictions on missile size.

Mr. Smirnov (interrupting): But this is the latest from Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: Nevertheless our delegation will take its ideas from the President. We have to go by what the President said to Brezhnev and what was discussed at that level. We are not satisfied with what you have given us this evening. Despite the fact that the leaders spent over three hours on this subject you do not seem to be bound by these discussions.

Mr. Gromyko: I would like to say that we will take into account what has been said, but that we attach significance to this issue and want an understanding. It goes without saying that we will gain no unilateral advantage.

Dr. Kissinger: You will gain a unilateral advantage if you put a bigger missile into the silos. If you are not planning to do so you would agree to our proposal for a separate limit on missile volume.

Mr. Smirnov: The question arises whether we have the right to modernize. From what has been agreed in the past, both sides agree that there is the right of modernization. But now you raise a question. What about your replacing the Minuteman I with the Minuteman III? Up to now we have not questioned this. And then there is the other question of not converting light to heavy missiles. The question is how to be certain that light missiles will not be turned into heavy missiles and it seems that we have agreed on May 22 in Helsinki not to increase the size of silos. This is a good enough criteria. But if you go back to the question of what missile can be put in a silo then many items already agreed will drop out. Your right to convert Minuteman I to Minuteman III would be in question. We would have the right to go back on this understanding. So far you have the right to replace Minuteman I with Minuteman III and Polaris with Poseidon. If this is justifiable why are you now raising the question of a limit on the increase of missile volume?

Dr. Kissinger: Our problem is not with modernization but with the limitation on the increase in missile volumes.

Mr. Smirnov (interrupting): I know quite well the sections.

Dr. Kissinger (continuing): We have discussed with Brezhnev . . .

Mr. Smirnov (interrupting): He told you that we had agreed in Helsinki as far as the substance of the issue is concerned. You will be able to know if silo launchers are changed or not. It is good enough to . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Deputy Minister, you are a scientist and you know well it is possible to put a heavier missile in an existing silo. Since you know this is possible the question is whether we are going to establish some control over this process.

Mr. Smirnov: The question you are addressing is what criteria to set for establishing that light missiles not become heavy ones. You have

the Titan and the Minuteman and we have discussed this in Helsinki and we have agreed on how to proceed. If you take up now the question of putting what missile in the silo you are then putting a limit on modernization.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we are making the right to modernization an even more effective provision by defining it precisely.

Mr. Gromyko: I have one question. Do you think we are trying to gain a unilateral advantage? You can do the same as we.

Dr. Kissinger: But there is a big difference. We have no intention of putting a heavy missile into our silos and we suspect that you are going to.

Mr. Gromyko: But the same could be said of many items in the agreements.

Dr. Kissinger: I do not want to waste any more time on this because I have far more important items to raise. I do not yield easily and never gracefully [motioning to Dobrynin] and particularly when I think that there has already been an agreement. You know that the SS-11 is bigger than the Minuteman III so your approach to the issue is more useful to your side. The Minuteman III is already a further modification and this is limited in terms of what can be done in the future. So in this regard, you can gain a unilateral advantage. We are trying to solve the SALT issues. We are not dealing with you frivolously and the President was not wasting the General Secretary's time when he raised this issue.

Mr. Smirnov: We do not think it worthwhile discussing this issue in detail and in specifics, it is one that should be solved by scientists. We have an agreement in principle and there is no limit on modernization. You already used this right when you converted Minuteman I to Minuteman III and now we want the same right for our side to put in the kind of missiles they (meaning the scientists) want. You already have this right. Do you now propose to stop Minuteman III conversion?

Dr. Kissinger: Let me put your proposal to the President, but let me say this first. I am not sure whether to drop the word "significantly" or not and I will check this with the President. If we decide to retain the phrase "not significantly increased" then what Brezhnev said is that we need to define it as meaning about 10%–15% as discussed with Brezhnev.

Mr. Smirnov: You want to call attention to your concern that light ICBMs not become heavy ICBMs. On the other hand, because the word "significantly" has no meaning we suggest dropping it as agreed in Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: You cannot invoke Helsinki when it serves your purposes and disregard Helsinki when it does not. I frankly do not know

whether we intend to make some small changes in our missiles. I will need technical advice on this. If we decide to go back to the previous statement which includes “significantly” in the text then we would want to define it as being between 10% and 15% as was discussed with Brezhnev. We want to have the right to think this over. We will either accept it as written or add the word “significantly” and then define “significantly” to mean between 10% and 15% but we cannot decide this without technical advice.

Mr. Gromyko: Will you give the answer here or through your delegation? They (the delegation) would need to know at 10 o'clock tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: Will you accept either formula?

Mr. Gromyko: As I said we discussed this today and we have only this conclusion (pointing to text).

Dr. Kissinger: Are you then withdrawing the old proposal?

Mr. Gromyko: No, no, no. But we have expressed our position here today.

Dr. Kissinger: You are giving up the prior agreement in Helsinki and the agreement between Brezhnev and the President.

Mr. Smirnov: There is some misunderstanding. I discussed this with Comrade Brezhnev but there was no agreement to change our position.

Dr. Kissinger: Our impression was not the same. Are you now withdrawing from the agreement of the day before?

Mr. Gromyko: Our position is that our proposal of today goes even further. This is now happening so you should not check for ulterior motives. We both have the same position.

Dr. Kissinger: This would be extremely difficult for me to explain this point. I have to explain something that was discussed and agreed between the President and Brezhnev yet is not reflected in your proposal and second why you have dropped the word “significantly.” If we do not accept what you have now proposed then we should go back to the agreement already made. It seems as if we would have been better off had the discussion with Brezhnev never taken place.

Mr. Smirnov: What is your understanding of the discussion?

Dr. Kissinger: My understanding is the following: First, it was agreed that there would be no significant increase in the silo dimensions and second there would be no significant increase in the volume of the largest light missile on either side. Brezhnev said he wanted to wait to discuss these issues and others with the Politburo but it was too late to do so that evening. Therefore, if for whatever reason we decide to drop the issue of missile volume we still must decide how to define what is meant by the word significantly.

Mr. Smirnov: I understand. Let me clarify our position. Brezhnev told me that he responded to questions put by you on both the silo size and the missile volume but as a result of those discussions he did not agree to make any limitations as regards missiles because that would entail certain problems for modernization on our side. Therefore our position is if you consider it necessary to make proposals on limitations on silo launchers we could consider them, but not the missiles themselves and then we could go back to the delegations in Helsinki with our agreement. But they have already decided in Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: It makes no sense to quote subordinates against the President. The President was not satisfied or he would not have raised the issue with General Secretary Brezhnev. We are now at this point that we either accept this formula you have given us which drops the word “significantly” or we add “significantly” and provide a figure to explain what it means. In this case we would make a unilateral statement about silo volume.

Mr. Gromyko: So you will take the initiative?

Dr. Kissinger: Now that we have settled the easy work, we will not be so accommodating. We can go on to the next problem.

Mr. Gromyko: Submarines? Meeting our position?

Dr. Kissinger: I will tell you frankly what our problem is. We have no interest nor would it make any sense, in making a treaty it takes two years to ratify. We have had major consultations in Washington in the Congress and in the Defense Department with our military leaders and with those academic figures who would be likely to testify on these agreements. We have their reactions to our propositions. Let me read to you some cables so you will know what the reaction is. This cable is from my Deputy who has been making calls on my behalf, an unusual procedure.⁵ He has just received a call from Admiral Moorer, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Admiral said the Joint Chiefs could not support an agreement that would not require some replacement of older submarines. Secretary Laird and the academic figures he mentioned take the same position. Now under your present proposal our estimate is that you do not have 48 modern submarines. Under your proposal you would not have to begin destroying older missiles a year from now (goes back to cable). Senator Goldwater has said the treaty could be a disaster and he will fight it. Representative Wayne Hayes said that he would be opposed. Senator Jackson said that he will go into all-out opposition. What we are trying to do is avoid a situation similar to the one that confronted you in Germany with your

⁵ See Document 302.

treaty. As you know, the ABM Treaty requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate so we are facing a difficult and serious problem.

Mr. Gromyko: (Makes a long presentation in English and Russian combined and not fully translated.) What would be Goldwater's position? We showed them our position. The position which really exists which must be taken into account is the overall position. How would that make Goldwater feel? You must evaluate it but it is inadmissible. You allow differences to strike out three years of painstaking efforts. All factors must be calculated. You have your overseas bases. Goldwater cannot close his eyes to them.

Dr. Kissinger: You must understand that the internal position inside the Administration is the important one.

Mr. Gromyko: But we have interests that are unchecked. You must take into account our interests because there is the geographical factor and your bases so there is no equal footing. Nevertheless we are prepared to sign during the President's visit.

Ambassador Dobrynin: The figures involved were not the ones we proposed. We did not mention 48 submarines in our proposal. You remember how this was derived in my conversations with you.

Dr. Kissinger: At any rate there is no question of 950 missiles and 62 modern submarines. This has been accepted. What we are talking about is the base point of 48 submarines.

Mr. Gromyko: Could you sum up your position?

Dr. Kissinger: In terms of deriving 48 we understood at that time that you had about 41–43 Y-Class submarines plus some H-Class submarines. You would raise yours to 48 and then you could add 14 more to reach 62 but you would have to replace ICBMs to do this.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Do you have a proposal to make?

Dr. Kissinger: You should accept our delegation's proposal of a base line of 740 SLBMs. On the other hand you could count the H-Class submarines. So I have two proposals. First to forget the base line of 48 modern submarines and use the 740 missile base line our delegation proposed. My second proposal is to keep the number 48, if you prefer, but to define it as including H-Class submarines, say 6 H-Class since there are some test submarines in this category and to reach the 950 ceiling you will then have to replace the H-Class. In the United States we could see such a position as formal equivalence otherwise it is going to be difficult to convince the Congress that you do not have an advantage.

Mr. Smirnov: We agreed to the proposal that really is the President's proposal. You said to compensate for geographic factors you would concede 6–7 submarines to us.

Dr. Kissinger: I admire the Deputy Minister's ingenuity in taking two separate proposals and combining them into one. The first pro-

posals was that you must convert all H-Class into modern. This would explain the 48. We thought you had 90 or so missiles on G and H-Class which you could convert into Y-Class equivalents and add to the 42 or 43 you may have. In this way we came to a figure of 48.

Ambassador Dobrynin (interrupting): But you remember when I asked you why you were giving us an advantage in 48 you said it was to compensate for geography.

Dr. Kissinger: I do not recall answering in that way. I said if in addition you convert land-based missiles you could reach the level of 62 but you have taken the numbers 48 and 62 together and dropped both the G and H-Class missiles. My present suggestion would be somewhat more favorable to you because it includes only the H-Class missiles.

Mr. Gromyko: We may have some questions but I suggest a 4 or 5 minute break.

(The meeting broke for a brief period and resumed at 3:12.)

Mr. Gromyko: We cannot go on much longer. It is either too early or too late. I have a question to put to you. If you are prepared to accept our remaining proposals without reservations we could consider favorably your proposal for 740 missiles.

Dr. Kissinger: We have already made concessions in dropping the question of limitations in volume of light missiles. I would be prepared to confirm that except for our SLBM proposal. Even though I don't trust the intentions of the Deputy Minister (jocularly). My second point is with respect to the silos. We will need to take technical advice to determine whether it is acceptable. If it is not, I would return to the formula that includes "significantly" and define it as 10%–15% which should be more favorable to your position since such a definition is closer to zero. We could drop the reservation about volume and make a unilateral statement.

Ambassador Dobrynin: When will you give an answer on the silos?

Dr. Kissinger: We are not bargaining. We need technical advice.

Mr. Gromyko: On the first one—dismantling?

Dr. Kissinger: I am practically certain my answer will be positive. We will give you an answer on the 1300 km. We can accept what the delegation agreed to. On the 1300 we accept. On the second issue we may drop our reservation. On the third we need to get an answer. I think we may be able to accept.

Mr. Gromyko: And the fourth one, Article III?

Dr. Kissinger: This is no problem especially since it is our delegation's text, I believe, but it depends on your answer on the numbers. Article III is meaningless without a definition of the procedure.

Mr. Gromyko: And on the next? (Confusion and simultaneous talking. It appeared that Gromyko had in front of him another piece of paper which he was referring to. Dr. Kissinger said that these documents were all he had been given. Gromyko said “No, you have another,” but looking at his papers, Gromyko realized that he had not handed one document over. He then handed it to Dr. Kissinger.)

Mr. Gromyko: I will read it out to you. It says there will be no definition of ballistic missile launches on submarines under construction given in the document. (Tab F)

Mr. Smirnov: This is only connected with the mentioning of 48 submarines and 768 launchers.

(Dr. Kissinger asked when we would meet next. Gromyko suggested 10 o’clock.)

304. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Moscow, May 25, 1972, 0055Z.

WH0059/Hakto 29. President had extensive talks Wednesday night.² This message being sent 3:45 a.m. Thursday for your immediate reply.

1. Soviets submitted text location of ABM site to effect that ICBM defense site that’ll be no less than 1300 kilometers from national capital defense site. U.S. would make statement that its ICBM defense will be at Grand Forks, N.D. This is acceptable if you agree. They will table it in Helsinki.

2. They also provided text on dismantling or destruction of older ICBM’s. They will table it in Helsinki. Answer them there.

3. Soviets also provided following text of interpretive statement re Article II: “The parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the size of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be increased.”

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, SALT 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Eyes Only. An information copy was sent to Haig.

² May 24; see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 265 and 271.

It was agreed that we would choose between this formula and previously agreed formula (para 3 SALT 1363)³ which includes the word “significant.” However, significant would be given additional definition of 10–15 per cent. The choice is up to the delegation.

4. There is no give on missile volume and it was left that we would make unilateral statement.

5. President requires, for 10 a.m. meeting your immediate comment re acceptability of alternatives in para 3. Please clearly indicate preference.

6. Most of time taken by discussion of submarines and our attempt to obtain immediate beginning of replacement. They promised answer Thursday 10 a.m. to figure of 740 SLBMs which you had given them as base. Please provide immediate reaction on how 740 figure achieves immediate replacement.

7. We need reply by no later than 8:30 a.m. Thursday, May 25.

8. Sorry, and warm regards.

³ The reference should be to telegram USDEL SALT 1367; see footnote 4, Document 305.

305. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Helsinki, May 25, 1972, 0510Z.

437. Message for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in Moscow. Deliver by 8:30 a.m. Moscow time.

Dear Henry:

Re WH0059.²

A. Re Para 1: Agree.

B. Para 2: Assuming “dismantling” text is OK I will agree.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Howe and Odeen.

² Document 304.

C. Para 3: New Soviet text clearly preferable to para 3 of SALT 1367³ (not 1363 as cited in reftel).

D. Para 4: We will make unilateral statement as per para 3 SALT 1367.⁴

E. Para 5: See para C above.

F. Para 6: Figure of 740 was derived as follows. Estimated range of Soviet SLBM launchers at present as given us by White House (State 89509 of 5/22)⁵ based on CIA estimate of 41–43 subs with 608–652 Y class launchers operational and under construction, by our definition, plus 100 launchers on G and H class subs makes a total range of 708–752 SL's operational or under construction. 740 is a relatively safe arbitrary figure up toward the high side of this range. 740 was chosen because with a ceiling of 950 launchers and assuming 209 SS7's and SS8's (a no dissent firm national estimate) the ceiling can be reached by full replacement. 950 minus 209 equals 741, rounded to 740.

Our definition of operational and under construction, referred to above, has been discussed with Soviets here. Wording placed before them on May 3, 1972 but not yet accepted by them is as follows:

The parties understand that SLBM launchers "under construction" are those SLBM launchers on submarines which are on building ways, in launch basins, being fitted out, or on sea trials, and that "operational" SLBM launchers include those on submarines undergoing conversion or overhaul.

You will note that our latest proposal May 22 (USDEL SALT VII 1362) does not refer to 740 although this number appeared in earlier US proposal of May 19 (USDEL SALT VII 1350).

You will recall that US May 22 proposal would require immediate replacement regardless of actual SL numbers at date of signature and is clearly best basis SL arrangement involving "immediate replacement." (This means that first submarine for which hull sections are put

³ In telegram USDEL SALT 1367 from Helsinki, May 23, Smith reported that the delegation was continuing to press for an agreed interpretive statement on the location of ABM defenses for ICBMs, and in conjunction with Article III on SLBM limitation was seeking an agreed interpretation of SLBM launchers "operational" and "under construction." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 883, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [*sic*], Vol. 18, May–August 1972)

⁴ The statement in telegram 1367 reads: "The US delegation regrets that the Soviet delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the US delegation believes it necessary to state the following: the United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The US proceeds on the premise that the Soviets will give due account to this consideration."

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 288, and Document 291.

into construction hall after signature of agreement would have to be a replacement submarine and under present ad ref agreed interpretive statement dismantling of replaced launchers must start by time of sea trials of replacement submarine.)

Warm regards

Gerry Smith

306. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush)¹

Washington, May 25, 1972, 1:45 p.m.

H: I have about ten minutes to get another vote back to Moscow. They have come in with a "compromise." They suggest that we return to 740 formulation that Gerry Smith offered yesterday. In effect what it would do would be to include Y and H classes at starting point and put them under the category of modern submarines but to exclude G.

R: What would they end up with.

H: Give the Soviets the option of retiring the G's and raising the 950 ceiling on SLBM's by 70. We are talking about 1020 and allow them to have 62 boats that are nuclear powered, 22 G class submarines that are conventionally powered but that have nuclear missiles. If they decide to retire the G boats it would enable them to up 70 SS7 and 8's. Henry has asked us to go around the horn and see if in light of the proposed compromise whether or not you want to hold to the position you . . .

R: My own feeling is that we have reached the limit of where we stand now.

H: I have not talked to the Chairman and Dick Helms yet.

M [R]: I think where we are now is going to be awfully hard to sell and going this far will be hard to swallow. We will rally around if this is what the President wants, however.

H: This is my feeling, too.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 999, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1972. No classification marking.

307. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer)¹

Washington, May 25, 1972, 1:50 p.m.

H: I am sorry to bother you. I have about ten minutes to get back to Moscow. The Soviets have come in with a "compromise." What they offered to do is to return to the 740 limit that Gerry Smith talked about yesterday and to include the Y and H classes at the starting point and categorize them as modern nuclear powered. It would exclude the G class. Henry asked us to go around and take a check of the position taken this morning to see if we could modify that position. If the Soviets under this compromise don't retire their . . .

M: They could have 85 submarines and 1,000—I don't think we can compromise with them.

H: Or if they decide to get rid of G they could keep 70 SS-8's.

M: I think we are going to have a hard enough time with what we've got.

H: That's the position Mr. Rush took² but I just wanted to touch base with you.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 999, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1972. No classification marking.

² See Document 306.

308. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 25, 1972, 5:20–6:35 p.m. and 11:30 p.m.–12:32 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid V. Smirnov, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Eduard Zaitsev, Interpreter (afternoon)
Mr. Bratchikov, Interpreter (late evening)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Senior Staff Member, NSC
William G. Hyland, NSC Staff Member
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff (notetaker)

SUBJECT

SALT

Dr. Kissinger: On the subjects we discussed yesterday [Tab A],² to get them out of the way, let me give you our answers:

Point #1, the “Text of a Joint Statement on Article III of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems,” is accepted in your formulation.

Point #2, “The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the size of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be increased,” is accepted in your formulation.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I would like to say on this point that we are ready to make a concession in your favor.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we don’t want your concession.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But it is in your favor.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the concession?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: “The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the size of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be substantially increased.”

Dr. Kissinger: What is the concession?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We accept your formulation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Kissinger’s Conversations in Moscow, May 1972. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in St. Catherine’s Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace.

² All brackets are in the original. Tab A, attached but not printed, is a list of issues discussed. See Document 303 for prior discussion of SALT.

Dr. Kissinger: Look, we can't do this every eight hours, after getting agreement in our government. Yesterday, you said "significantly." Today we got agreement with everybody in our government and informed you only this morning. You're not making a concession, you are withdrawing from an agreed position.

Are you prepared to say 10–15%?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In general, we are.

Dr. Kissinger: In other words, we have wasted three hours of conversation with Mr. Brezhnev and two hours with you.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: We would prefer the formula you suggested and which was accepted in Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: If we are going to do this, we can give it all to Helsinki. To summarize: The President was unsatisfied with what was done in Helsinki. He therefore raised it with Mr. Brezhnev.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yesterday we discussed one possibility, and another possibility. Yesterday we decided to convince you of ours. But the Americans were reluctant to accept ours. Our experts said it made little difference, and we put it to Mr. Brezhnev and he agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: But Mr. Brezhnev said the word "significantly" is meaningless and that we should go back to 10–15%.

[Smirnov spoke in Russian and was not translated.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We have only changed three words—"not substantially increased."

Dr. Kissinger: But that's what we . . . Let's see what else we've got, because we may not have an agreement. I am not accepting this, any way, since if we don't settle the submarine point it doesn't make any difference what we do here.

Should I mention the other two points? [Points #3 and #4 at Tab A] The other two points are agreed to, except for minor editorial points, which they can do in Helsinki.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: On submarines, yesterday we agreed that our position on 48 was discussed, and we also spoke about replacements. We are in agreement on that because we had an exchange on that in March. But if you want to determine this level through the total number of launchers, then we agree with this. If you are more satisfied with translating it into the number of launchers, if you multiply 48 boats by 16 launchers, then you have 768. That would be a figure that we would specify, that we would write down. This is not because we insist on 28 starts but because we would have an even number for each of the submarines. What is your opinion?

Your proposal is 740. We subdivide it by the number of launchers.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand the arithmetic. The arithmetic is not hard, the politics is hard. Policy decisions are hard.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yes, we are for taking that political decision.

Dr. Kissinger: What I tried to explain last night is the following. The problem, Mr. Deputy Minister, is as follows: First of all, I totally reject the proposition by which you arrive at 48. The figure 48, to repeat for the record, is the figure 41–43 which we think you have, plus G- and H-class which you will convert to Y to 48, plus the SS–7s and SS–8s converted to submarines, which gives you 62. This is how the 62 originated with us. It makes no difference to us how *you* arrived at 62.

Then when Mr. Brezhnev gave me a paper which listed 62 boats and 950 launchers, I thought we were operating on the basis of the figures I gave to your Ambassador.

Our problem is this. I repeat: We can accept 62 and 950. We can accept it, although it will present us with enormous difficulties in explaining to the American public why the Soviet Union should have more submarines than we.

What has become apparent over the past few weeks, particularly over the last week is, if we let you build over the next few years without any obligation of retiring anything, then the treaty cannot be ratified. Because we don't believe you have 48 Y-class boats.

So, there are a number of practical solutions. The only way the treaty can be defended in the U.S. is this: We start at an equal base, but we allow the Soviet Union to transform old missiles and old submarine-launched missiles, up to a figure of 62.

Therefore there are only two practical solutions to the problem, in my view: Solution one, is that we don't say anything about the number of submarines you now have. If you like to say you have 48, that's your privilege. But we only say that the next submarine you build after this agreement is signed will lead to the retirement of old missiles, either submarine- or land-based.

Actually there are three possible solutions. The second possibility is: That we accept the figure of 48 but include in it all your nuclear-powered submarines which have missiles on them. A third possibility is that we take the figure 740, or maybe even 768, and include in it 100 missiles you have on G- and H-class submarines. In either event, you will end up with 62 subs and 950 missiles. And since the Deputy Minister is so enamored of our delegation in Helsinki, I will show him the latest formula of our delegation in Helsinki which omits all numbers, which takes the first possibility.

I would merely like to add the following. I sent a cable to Washington today because you asked me if we could drop submarines altogether.

Ambassador Dobrynin: It was my private question.

Dr. Kissinger: Private but nonetheless. [Shows cables Hakto 32 and Tohak 147, at Tab B,³ to Dobrynin.] You will know we can't possibly pass the treaty through the Senate with all these people opposing it. The Defense Department has come up with an even tougher request, which I won't even show you.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: What is your conclusion?

Dr. Kissinger: The conclusion I make, Mr. Foreign Minister, is that we should find a solution which includes one of the three possibilities, otherwise we'll have a treaty that won't be ratified.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: We've got to come to some conclusion finally. As far as I could gather from the previous conversations, I could understand that the formula with the number 740 was most convenient for you.

Dr. Kissinger: If it included G- and H-class submarine missiles.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yesterday that wasn't the question.

Dr. Kissinger: It wasn't discussed.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: I want to specify the term. By H-class you mean the old atom submarines?

Dr. Kissinger: With three missiles each.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: And by G-class you mean the old diesel-powered submarines.

Dr. Kissinger: With three missiles each. It's as old as Polaris.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: I don't think it's worthwhile. I take it as a joke.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, Polaris is a better weapon. I agree with you.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yesterday we did discuss the figure 740 but yesterday we did not include these in the figure; we discussed only modern submarines.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Mr. Kissinger, this element is a new one. It has never been introduced in Helsinki or Vienna. They spoke about the modern submarines, never about the old ones. We cannot accept this.

³ Attached but not printed. In backchannel message Hakto 32 to Haig, May 25, Kissinger inquired whether Laird, Rush, Helms, and Moorer would prefer an offensive agreement that did not include submarines. In backchannel message Tohak 147, May 25, Haig replied that all four concurred that an agreement that limited the Soviets to not more than 950 SLBM launchers of any type on any submarine, including G, H, and Y class, was essential. If such provisions were not acceptable to the Soviets, they recommended a delay in reaching any agreement and continuing negotiations until the issue was resolved. Haig further reported that an ABM alone agreement, an agreement limited to ABM and ICBM, or an agreement permitting more than 950 launchers was not acceptable.

Dr. Kissinger: But the protocol I was working from, which was the protocol of May 19, doesn't have the word "nuclear." If you drop the word "nuclear," we're in business. You added the word "nuclear" to our May 19th protocol. We submitted it to your delegation. We didn't mislead you.

I have always said with the 48 we included G- and H-class.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Not with me. With 740 yes, but not with the 48.

Dr. Kissinger: Our problem is: We have no difficulty about where we will conclude: 950 and 62. What we have problems with is with the interim. We absolutely require domestically that we be able to say that new boats are replacements and that we did not give you a unilateral advantage.

I am not bargaining with you. We have a massive problem. Our military people in the Department of Defense—we'll take care of this; we haven't even shown this to them—propose that we replace SS-9s with subs.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Repeat that last idea about SS-9s.

Dr. Kissinger: [laughs] It's not a serious proposal. I showed your Ambassador the telegram I sent to Washington this morning. I said this, so that you know what we're up against. I said, "Given the present state of SLBM discussions and Smith cable, would Laird, Rush, Helms and Moorer prefer that offensive agreement not include submarines? . . . Under what conditions should we proceed?"

[Dobrynin at this point gets up and leaves.]

Dr. Kissinger: We've driven your Ambassador away?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: According to protocol, the Ambassador has to escort the President to the theater. This is our concern for the President.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Your hospitality has been excellent. We are all grateful. We thank you.

[Reads second cable:] "Have discussed your message with Rush, Helms, and Moorer. All agree that an agreement which limits Soviets to not more than 950 SLBM launchers of any type on any submarine (including G-, H- and Y-class) is essential.

"If such provisions are not acceptable to the Soviets, we recommend a delay in reaching any agreement.

"The alternatives of an ABM agreement alone, an agreement limited to ABM and ICBM, or allowing more than 950 SLBM launchers, is not acceptable."

Then the military have an even more exalted position, but I won't bother with them. They want you to trade in modern missiles . . .

We cannot pass this treaty in the Senate with the opposition of all these people.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: If we start considering the opinions of individual persons, even from very high positions, then we are bound to return to the very start of the negotiations. I can tell you the opinion of our military, that your position—both geography and the availability of forward bases—gives you a very big advantage. Therefore, our navy people tell us our figures are extremely small, given your advantages. That question has already been discussed.

We received information March 17 that your President was agreeable to the proposal of 48, without including diesel or other submarines.⁴ Yesterday you said we should calculate missiles or submarines equally. You mentioned 48, that's your proposal.

But I can assure you that we are more criticized by our military than you are by yours. If you start citing the opinions of the military, citing pluses and minuses of the positions we find ourselves in, we'll have to go back to the beginning of the negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: But that is what we are facing now.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I have to say, Mr. Kissinger, that what you say today introduces something new into our conversation. We seem to come to agreement that we are receiving certain partial inequalities, certain advantages with respect to number, but we did have a different understanding of the situation. We understood we were dealing with modern submarines and modern launchers. Now it seems we have toys that produce certain sounds and we are stuck with them.

Dr. Kissinger: If you accept our proposal you'll have 62 submarines—that's 50% more than we have—and 300 more missiles. That is a compensation for geographic inequality.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That is the quantitative side.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right. On the qualitative side, those 62 submarines and 950 missiles can all be modern. All we ask you to do is to destroy old toy submarines you have in order to reach this total of 950. The Deputy Prime Minister knows very well that the missiles on those submarines are antiquated and aren't very useful. We are giving you a margin of 50% in both missiles and boats. And in ICBMs we're giving you a margin of 40%. This will be a very difficult agreement to present to Congress even in the form we are proposing, and impossible in the form you are proposing.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Your argument may be convincing to your military people but it cannot be satisfactory to us. If you are

⁴ Kissinger and Dobrynin met on March 17; see Document 237. Nixon attended the meeting for a brief time.

including there all the forms we are dealing with, then we would have to start speaking about bases and aircraft and all other initial conditions. It is clear today you are trying to include obsolete units even though those obsolete units have been excluded from the parities long ago. We have been following the negotiations a long time, and today's formulation is a surprise to us. You know our possibilities; what you propose today puts us in a difficult situation. If we were asked to put forward a list of what is demanded by our military, that list is longer than what you have.

We should come to a decision without crossing out what we did before and the political decisions taken in the past by our leaders and your leaders.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not asking you to keep obsolete systems. You can replace the old systems with new ones. We want you to replace them, not keep them. That is the point.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Whether it's worthwhile, we will decide ourselves.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we are just trying to explain our proposal. We are not trying to tell you what to do.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: It seems we are deviating from the specific question that was on the agenda yesterday. The essence of the agreement was that you have 41 submarines plus three according to the letter—plus three you would not use; for us, 950 starts and 62 submarines. Yesterday, no problem was raised with this; nor today. It is known that the number of submarines and ICBMs was determined, as well as the number of replacements. Yesterday, only one question was raised: What is the initial point from which to start counting? It was also raised in Helsinki. The figure was 48 modern submarines.

[The clock chime rang at 6:30 p.m.]

Dr. Kissinger: We have to go.

[Gromyko leaves the room]

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yesterday we came to the following results: You told us it was more convenient for you not to fix any number of submarines, that is omit the 48. You considered it more convenient to calculate the number of launchers, and you put forward 740. This is what we should discuss, not the evaluations of your military.

[Gromyko returns.]

Dr. Kissinger: I have a problem. I have to go with the President to the ballet. Could we meet after the ballet?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Good. Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: May I ask for an explanation here? You said [in your Protocol draft, Tab C] "in excess of 740 nuclear submarine-launched

ballistic missiles." Strictly, that would include H-class.⁵ If this were true, it would give us a certain symmetry with the 710 we have, and would permit me to talk to the President.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Did you ask whether the 740 includes all nuclear submarines?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: On all atomic submarines.

Dr. Kissinger: Including H-class?

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me talk to the President. I think we have a possible . . .

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: That was always our position. That is why your new position about the diesel submarines surprises us.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. That is why I think we may have a solution . . . Let me talk to the President.

[The meeting broke up at 6:35 p.m. for the Bolshoi performance of "Swan Lake." The meeting then reconvened at 11:30 p.m. after the ballet.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Where have you been?

Dr. Kissinger: I was looking for the ballerina.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: You needed a helping hand?

Dr. Kissinger: A helping hand is no good if I don't have the time.

I spent the time talking to the President, and also to Washington. I hope General Antonov reports promptly to you the substance of my conversations!

Ambassador Dobrynin: We want to hear from you personally!

Dr. Kissinger: Let me sum up my understanding of what this protocol means.

The number of 740 ballistic-missiles includes the number of missiles on any nuclear submarine no matter when it was built. You said this in your proposal.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Any nuclear submarine.

Dr. Kissinger: Including H-class submarines.

⁵ Tab C is attached but not printed. The statement in the Protocol reads: "Additional submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers (up to the above mentioned levels) for the U.S.A.—in excess of 656 nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and for the U.S.S.R.—in excess of 740 nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacement for equal numbers of launchers for ICBMs of older types constructed before 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers of older submarines."

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: If you classify our appropriate submarines as H.

Dr. Kissinger: We know what we're talking about. This is clear enough.

So, what divides us is 70 missiles on G-class submarines. Is that correct? You don't have to confirm the figure, just the number of missiles on G-class.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: This is right. They have never been included.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the issue that divides us. I included it in my arithmetic with your Ambassador and our delegation had it in its May 19 proposal.⁶

Ambassador Dobrynin: But you didn't mention the G-class.

Dr. Kissinger: [to Dobrynin] I mentioned the G and H together, five submarines—but you didn't pretend to know all the details.

We understand each other. Does the Minister have any possible compromise in mind?

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Yesterday you made this proposal and we decided to assess the situation to make everything clear. We accepted your proposal to include all nuclear submarines.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: There is no room for additional compromise.

Dr. Kissinger: Then this makes it impossible to reach agreement.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We should put everything in its right place. Yesterday we finished by saying we won't mention 48 submarines and we will restrict ourselves to launchers, numbering 740.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: The question was put by your side and we promised to answer today. We moved to meet your position today, and we gave you a positive answer. That is, we accepted 740, including all atomic submarines, including older submarines.

Dr. Kissinger: May I offer a compromise? As follows: We can accept this figure if you will meet one of our concerns, namely putting modern missiles on your G-class submarines. Therefore add a sentence

⁶ In telegram USDEL SALT 1356 from Helsinki, May 20, Smith reported that on May 19 he had told Semenov that the problem was that the United States did not have the word "modern" before "submarines" in its text. 740 was the approximate total of SLBMs on Soviet Y-, H-, and G-class submarines. The United States was saying that if the Soviet Union wanted to build 950 launchers on 62 modern boats, it could do so, provided it converted from H- and G-class submarines and from SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs. When these ICBM launchers were added to 740, the result was 950. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 883, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [sic], Vol. 18, May–August 1972)

to the protocol: If any modern missiles are put on any nuclear submarines, we will count them against the 950.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Only G-class submarines?

Dr. Kissinger: What I propose is this. You of course have the right to convert G-class to Y-class under this agreement. Into modern subs. That's part of the protocol. But secondly, those that you don't convert, if you put modern missiles on them, they will count in the 950 modern missiles you are permitted.

[Smirnov has trouble understanding; Korniyenko repeats Dr. Kissinger's suggestion.]

Dr. Kissinger: This would be added to the protocol. I have it written here. [Hands over text Tab D.]⁷

Foreign Minister Gromyko: You don't mention G-type in this paper, but actually you mean G-type?

Dr. Kissinger: If you put it on another submarine, naturally it counts too—but I don't think you have any other. What we are saying is that neither side should be able to evade the agreement by putting modern missiles on another submarine.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In fact it means G.

Dr. Kissinger: In fact it means G.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Don't you have a Russian text?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't have a Russian expert on my staff!

[Gromyko and Smirnov confer.]

Ambassador Dobrynin: [to HAK] Really, personally, do you think there is a possibility to put modern missiles on G-class?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think it's worthwhile, but it's technically possible. Really, you should know we need this for our concerns. You're making the same mistake as in Germany, you'll end up making the concessions and making them to the wrong people. The Navy won't accept any agreement unless it eliminates the G-class entirely.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: What else do you have?

Dr. Kissinger: That would take care of the submarine issue—with the proviso that we have to let the delegations work out the language more elegantly. But the substance we accept.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Do you have the other consideration?

Dr. Kissinger: On the other point I have raised with the Foreign Minister, it is of some sensitivity, because the President believes he was

⁷ The text at Tab D reads: "Deployment of modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total submarine-launched missiles permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R." The protocol was transmitted to Smith in Helsinki in telegram WH0072/Hakto 37, Document 311.

given some assurances on silo dimensions. I would suggest a compromise as I suggested last night. That you accept the word “significantly” and that you say that this means 10–15%.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Where would that be said?

Dr. Kissinger: We could have an agreed interpretive statement. We can say 15%.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It is extremely complicated.

Dr. Kissinger: For the same reason, on our side.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: In such a big document, being over-specific will not be too appropriate. It is already accepted that we won't turn light missiles into heavy ones and there will be no expansion of silos. And if we have, say 15–1/2%, what do we do about that? Do we have to be that specific? Different variants were proposed. You used those cables: I also can use our cables.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be a good beginning to our mutual cooperation. I hope your cables are written in better Russian than ours are in English.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: This time unfortunately I have fewer cables than you do, but next time I will bring more.

You will recall that up to recently the position of the Soviet delegation in Helsinki, where the principal talks were held, was “not to increase significantly.” The American side proposed several variants, including figures, in terms both of cubic meters and of percentages. I won't enumerate all the variants; they are well known. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that beginning May 20 our positions began to come closer. On May 20, Vorontsov said that General Haig told him that on Sunday Presidential instructions would be sent to Helsinki. As we understand it, on the basis of those instructions, on May 22 in Helsinki there was a meeting of the Working Group (Grinevsky, Kishilev, Garthoff and Parsons) which arrived at a formula. This was only the Working Group's formula . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I know the formula.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: Today, May 25, we received confirmation that the proposal of the four had been considered by the delegations as approved, and presented as a formal proposal of American side. It seems we now have an agreed text.⁸

Dr. Kissinger: Let me explain why Haig talked to Vorontsov. I was traveling; normally I and your Ambassador handle this. General Haig was not familiar with all the details. He wanted only to fill the gap of one day while I was en route here. In our first formal meeting with Mr.

⁸ See Documents 291 and 293.

Brezhnev we raised the issue. We would not have raised it if we were satisfied with what the delegation had done. So it does no good to tell me how many times our delegation approved it. We are not satisfied with it.

And we have not insisted on the volume limitation [only the dimension of silos], even though that too was discussed. We are willing to go back to the word “significantly,” if we can have some specification.

That really is my last proposal.

[There was a break from 12:12–12:26 a.m.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The situation, in general, is very complicated. If there are no additional considerations, I think we can stop for the time being. We could continue tomorrow, but let’s not fix a time.

I think it will depend on the meeting at the highest level. If there is a high-level meeting tomorrow morning, we could meet tomorrow afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger: So I can inform the President, [can you tell me] which provision is the obstacle?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It is becoming discernible that, first, the provision on launchers, and second, the question that was raised in that last formula that was given us.

Ambassador Dobrynin: To think it over.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: On the other issues we discussed yesterday, you have given us a reply and we think it is settled.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. No signing tomorrow then.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: When could there be a signing? It has to be Sunday.⁹

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I think we won’t be able to sign before Sunday, but we won’t have to interrupt the Saturday schedule, because the President is going to Leningrad and Sunday is free.

Dr. Kissinger: Fine. We can do it Sunday.

We will meet tomorrow.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: At a time to be specified tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: You owe us an answer on the two propositions. We have no other considerations. If you accept those, it will be completed as far as we are concerned. We will raise no other issues.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: After the ballet, have nice dreams. Swans, not evil forces.

[The meeting then ended at 12:32 a.m.]

⁹ May 28.

309. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Helsinki, May 25, 1972, 2055Z.

445. Message for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in Moscow. Eyes Only. Please deliver immediately.

Dear Henry:

Re your telecon tonight:²

1. I do not feel sufficiently clued in to Moscow exchanges to give categorical advice regarding your telephone inquiry.

2. I do not understand reason for apparent switch from this morning's reported position that Soviets would accept Article III with its "immediate replacement" formula.

3. In these circumstances, I can only advise President to hold to present U.S. position tonight. I would add parenthetically that difference between U.S. and USSR positions appears to me to be 60 old launchers on 20 diesel boats (plus 2 additional G-class test beds with 10 modern launchers on them).

4. If, subsequently, President finds it necessary to adjust U.S. position, he might consider following line. If:

(a) Soviet position is that 60 old launchers on 20 diesel boats would make the difference between a major strategic arms limitation agreement or no agreement, and if our position therefore is that these diesel boats need not be included in the freeze;

(b) The Soviets will agree to have not more than these 20 diesel SL subs (plus the 2 test beds) during the freeze and not to place modern SLBM launchers on them;

(c) They agree that any modern replacements for these diesel boats must be counted under the 950–62 ceilings;

the U.S. could agree.

5. However, such adjustment should be based on the understanding that any additional modern SLBM submarine started after the date of the signature of the agreement will count as a replacement submarine, and must be accompanied by dismantling of appropriate number of H-class subs and/or SS-7's and SS-8's.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, SALT 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Exclusive Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Howe and Odeen. The message was sent to Kissinger in Moscow in telegram Tohak 162, May 25, 2055Z; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 278.

² Not further identified.

6. It is easier to state these conditions than to spell out a formulation for an agreement that could be explained logically, [garble—but in view of short time in which you wanted answer,] this is best I can suggest.³

Warm regards.

Gerard Smith

³ An attached note reads, “Jon—per Sit[uation] Room, the garble in cable should read: ‘But in view of short time in which you wanted answer’ Para 6.” This was the text sent to Kissinger in Tohak 162. In backchannel message 446 to Haig for Kissinger, May 25, Smith elaborated on the G-class issue: “After mulling over further G-Class omission issue, and given our intelligence estimates and definition of ‘under construction,’ I see no way to meet simultaneously all three following conditions: a) Soviet desired levels 62–950; b) Soviet desire to exclude G-Class; and c) U.S. need for rational explanation of agreed formulation that would not be a clear admission of a ‘free ride’ for Soviets.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, SALT 1972)

310. Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 25, 1972, 2144Z.

WH21631/Tohak 163. Reference your telephone conversation of 4:15 p.m. Washington time.² It may be that our difficulty here is in ascertaining exactly where the situation stands there and what precise difficulties you are confronted with. On each step along the way over the past 48 hours, we have been presented with very cryptic requirements which complicated our ability to ease the load at your end. Certain realities exist here with which you should be cognizant.

As you weigh the option of compromise, it is quite important that you consider the point of departure from which that compromise will be assessed here. For better or worse, ACDA briefed extensively on the Hill to the effect that 62/950 would be ultimate outcome of the SLBM

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, President’s Trip Files, President’s Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, TOHAK File No. 2, Situation Room, May–June 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The message was sent through Rodman and Lord.

² No further record of this conversation has been found.

freeze. Those figures are now imbedded in the Congressional mental computers. These figures have been the major source of the opposition which has surfaced thus far. Therefore, a compromise which worsens these figures will be more difficult to sell. Jackson and Goldwater are already attacking these figures and will have little trouble exploiting a worsened picture.

As I informed you yesterday, the Chairman, on his own, and Secretary Laird, suspecting a compromise was in the wind, put us on notice that we should avoid this step. In the case of the Chairman, he was adamant that he could not obtain JCS support for such a position. Secretary Laird was equally negative but did not make such a threat. This was the point of departure from which the questions you asked this morning were addressed.³ The subsequent compromise which would have included the H-Class submarines in the freeze was merely an extension of that attitude.

The way the Chairman described the compromise is as follows. The compromise would be tantamount to giving the Soviets 84 boats and 1,020 SLBM's, thereby shattering the argument that we have frozen the overall number of missiles to current levels. Any additional Y-Class submarines or any additional SLBM's are merely replacements for old ICBM's and old SLBM's.

My concern is not so much the strategic effect of the compromise as it is the connotation that the President while in Moscow accepted a position less satisfactory than the one which had allegedly been worked out prior to his departure. This single issue will dominate subsequent public debate. Nevertheless, I think I can assure you that bureaucratically Defense, CIA, State, ACDA and all involved would support the compromise. I am less sure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, even though I am certain that with adequate briefing they would at least keep quiet and probably even support.

The real problem to me is not the strategic implications of the compromise but rather the problem of the President's public image and credibility. This is certainly not my business. Since I sense you want my personal appraisal of the situation, it is as follows.

I believe the strategic implication of the compromise is minor and that we can live with it for we will certainly be better off with it than without it. I also believe that there will be a problem of bureaucratic discipline which is nevertheless manageable. I also believe the President will have some real difficulties with the right wing of the Republican Party. But in a pragmatic sense, they have nowhere else to go, and he can weather that storm without fatal consequences.

³ See Document 304.

I believe the Congressional problem is manageable and that in the final analysis, there will be a substantial majority in favor of any SALT agreement. I would be more concerned about the Soviets who have obviously played a role of duplicity with us in recent weeks. If not, I wonder why we pushed so hard to promulgate the figures 62/950. This is something which only you have been involved in and only you can accurately judge.

On balance, were I making the decision, I would accept the compromise, with the realization that other issues involved are far more important and with my personal acceptance of the fact that we have to get over a difficult period which will be rectified by the re-election of a President who, in the final analysis, will gain more from a SALT agreement that is less than satisfactory than he would from a principled rejection at this stage.

I have talked to Moorer and Rush and both are consulting intensively. I know my men and both will come along.⁴ If you feel you have gone as far as the traffic will possibly bear with your hosts, I would take the compromise, especially with the provision on modernization of G-Class submarines. In doing so, I would urge you, however, to get Sonnenfeldt and Hyland to sit down now and prepare the best conceivable rationale which will be made available to us here in conjunction with the transcript of your briefing. This is the major problem. I would also consider having the President film a brief clip commenting on the agreement and taking the high-road which can be used back here to counter the negative clips that will come from the Goldwaters, the Jacksons, etc.

Recognizing the fatigue and strain that you must be experiencing, I cannot over-emphasize the importance of this one final effort.

Finally, you may be sure that everyone here will concentrate all of their energies in supporting whatever course of action the President takes.

Warm regards.

⁴ In telegram Tohak 170 to Moscow, May 26, 0141Z, Haig informed Kissinger that "thanks to yeoman work by Admiral Moorer, the JCS 'in accord' with proposed SALT package with provision that U.S. strategic programs be accelerated." Haig noted that the crucial factor with the JCS had been the modernization proviso which had "never been surfaced here until your telephone call to me." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, President's Trip Files, President's Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, Tohak File No. 2, Situation Room, May–June 1972) In telegram Tohak 183, May 26, Haig transmitted the formal, detailed JCS position on the SALT package. (Ibid.)

311. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Moscow, May 25, 1972, 2205Z.

WH0072/Hakto 37. Ref: your 0445.²

1. Meetings here on SALT occurring sporadically between President's meetings with Soviet leaders. Your latest views very helpful in late evening session.³ Gromyko handed over following proposal:

"Text of the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Defensive Arms:

'The Parties understand that in accordance with Article III of the interim agreement, for the period during which this agreement remains in force:

The U.S.A. may have not more than 710 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and not more than 44 modern submarines with BMs. The Soviet Union may have not more than 950 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and not more than 62 modern submarines with ballistic missiles.

Additional submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers up to the above mentioned levels for the U.S.A.—in excess of 656 nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and for the U.S.S.R.—in excess of 740 nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of launchers for ICBMs of older types constructed before 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers of older submarines.

This protocol shall be regarded as an integral part of the interim agreement.'

The US side will take an obligation in a written form not to construct additionally 3 submarines in excess of 41. The text of the undertaking shall be agreed with the Soviet side."

2. In ensuing discussion, Soviets made clear all H-class included in 740 total.

3. We offered for Soviet consideration following text based on paragraph 4(b) of your cable.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Haig, Howe, and Odeen.

² Document 309.

³ See Document 308.

“Deployment of modern submarine launched ballistic missiles on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total submarine-launched ballistic missiles permitted for the U.S. and the USSR.”

4. On issues discussed in early telegrams believe these can be settled between you and Soviet Delegation, but signing not likely until Sunday.

5. Your views on Soviet SLBM protocol text and our draft proposal would be appreciated.

Warm regards.

312. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Moscow, May 25, 1972, 2315Z.

WH0074/Hakto 39. Ref: your 0446.²

Your previous cable seemed much better.³ Can you explain how 60 missiles of 300–700 mile range, barred from modernization, in diesel submarines that have to surface to fire, representing less than 3 per cent of the total Soviet force, could represent a free ride? What are we giving up that we were going to do? The Soviets in turn get a ceiling on their SLBM’s, a ban on modernization of the G-class, and lose 240 launchers.

If the Soviets refuse to accept the compromise, I want someone to explain how our security is enhanced when we then confront the G’s, the H’s, 240 more launchers, and a larger number of SLBM’s.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

² See footnote 3, Document 309.

³ Document 309.

⁴ Kissinger sent a similar message to Haig in telegram Hakto 38. The last sentence in that telegram reads: “Anyone able to answer these questions can criticize. The rest should for once support their President.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, President’s Trip Files, President’s Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, Hakto File May–June 1972)

313. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Helsinki, May 26, 1972, 0454Z.

447. Message for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in Moscow. Please deliver by 8:30 am Moscow time.

Dear Henry:

At 4:45 a.m. my reaction to your WH21635 and 21636² is as follows. My 446³ recited my doubts re attainability simultaneously of three desiderata: a) Soviet aim for 62–950, b) drop G-class, c) retain understandable rationale for the deal.

A. If President judges that public/Congress relations problem is manageable and rationale is adequate for Soviets to have 62–950 plus G-class,

B. And Soviets will replace from the start (thus getting right to build last 60 or so launchers before reaching 950 without replacing any thing), (A suggestion for rationale is that the non-compensatory phase would be in the latter part of freeze period, which we may never reach due to follow-on agreement, as well as possibility that Sovs might elect to retire G-class boats.)

C. Gromyko formula as amended by your addition seems better than no SL inclusion.

D. I assume that Sovs will agree to accept Article III they tabled yesterday.⁴ This important because it calls for immediate replacement.

E. There should be no reference to 740. Explicit 740 baseline would be inconsistent with Article III requirement for immediate replacement. Also important to avoid gap between intelligence estimate of Y's plus H's at date of signature and Soviet opening freeze number.

F. Suggest best Titan formula would be statement "US in practice does not have plans for nor does it intend to exercise right during 5-year freeze." If Soviets press for more firm commitment re Titans I think we would be better off to not have this "right" at all.

Warm regards

Gerard Smith

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Exclusive Eyes Only.

² Backchannel messages WH21635 and WH21636 were not found.

³ See footnote 3, Document 309.

⁴ See Document 305.

314. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 26, 1972, 11:15 a.m.–12:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid V. Smirnov, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Bratchikov, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Senior Staff Member, NSC
William G. Hyland, NSC Staff Member
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff (notetaker)

SUBJECTS

SALT; Communiqué

SALT

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The Ambassador must have informed you that we have proposed a top-level meeting for 3 o'clock today.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that's accepted.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Now we are to continue with yesterday's talks. Let us try, both of us, to be still more concrete, without all the cables. There are two questions left open from yesterday on which I would like to comment.

First is your formula, "Deployment of modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total submarine-launched ballistic missiles permitted for the U.S. and the USSR." That is accepted. Hooray!

Ambassador Dobrynin: Hooray!

Dr. Kissinger: We are finished then with this section.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Second, on the wording of the joint statement, "The parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement, the size of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be substantially increased," we accept your proposal on 10–15%.

Dr. Kissinger: Good.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: What should be the exact wording? Do you have a text?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Kissinger's Conversations in Moscow, May 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in St. Catherine's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace.

Dr. Kissinger: We use the word “significantly,” not “substantially,” but it’s not important.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It’s the same word in Russian [znachitel’no].²

Dr. Kissinger: We’ll have a sentence for you in a minute.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We are prepared and believe it advisable to proceed to signature of the treaty and agreement today, that is, this evening—as it was scheduled.

Dr. Kissinger: Today? We will have to call Smith.³

Foreign Minister Gromyko: If for any reason you believe it advisable to meet your delegation first, you can call Smith and bring him here. We can do the same with Semenov.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we have to get the delegations to get the final text. We don’t have the facilities here. But that’s not a problem. We had proceeded on the assumption of Sunday, and we will have to . . .

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Sunday is not very convenient for us.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me talk to the President first. We have to have a press briefing on this.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We thought of 7:00, but if it can’t be at 7:00, we can do it at 8:00 or 8:30. We can postpone your dinner.

Dr. Kissinger: I will first talk to the President, then call Smith. How will we get them here? Do you have a plane there?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: There is an American plane there.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, why don’t we do this? First, I will talk to the President. I am sure he will agree. Second, we have to decide whether they should finish the paper work in Helsinki or here. I recommend that they finish the paper work there, not here. I am tired of hearing complaints from experts.

[Dr. Kissinger leaves the room, at 11:30 a.m., and returns at 11:47.]

Dr. Kissinger: The President agrees. He is delaying the dinner for an hour to allow more time. Dinner will be at 8:30, the signing at around 8:00, 7:30 to 8:00.

You will instruct your delegation immediately and we will instruct our delegation immediately.

² All brackets are in the original.

³ See Document 315. According to Kissinger’s memoirs, Sonnenfeldt called Smith on an open line to tell him that instructions were being sent to him. By routing the instructions through the White House Situation Room, they were delayed in being transmitted to Smith by over 2 hours, and Kissinger recalled that “Smith, now thoroughly aroused, rightly refused to work from the Soviet text, though assured by Sonnenfeldt that the instructions were joint. Nevertheless, after repeated phone conversations [. . .] and the final unsnarling of communications, the two delegations set to work and completed a joint document on the American delegation’s plane to Moscow.” (*White House Years*, p. 1242)

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Immediately.

Dr. Kissinger: On the protocol, we are accepting this in substance but we want the two delegations to work out the precise language and editorial language.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But we proceed on the basis that only language is involved.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree on the substance.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I think we are going to instruct our delegations in the same manner. We will cable the texts to our delegations with the understanding that the texts are agreed and only language is to be considered. I think there should be a time limit. What time limit do you propose? Will you call Smith?

Dr. Kissinger: I have called Smith. He is crying bitterly, but he will do what he is told.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: About what is he crying?

Dr. Kissinger: About all the work he has to do and about other things. But we will take care of it.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: What time should it be?

Dr. Kissinger: Tell them to be here at 6:30 with a completed text.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Two texts, in English and Russian.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I would like to draw your attention that there should be a statement on your part on the three submarines [that you will not build].

Dr. Kissinger: I was going to raise this with you. I want to make two points. First, we have no plans to build these submarines. Second, if we make this a part of the agreement, even as a separate statement, it will present us with major . . . it will compound our difficulties of selling this in Congress. I am therefore suggesting that the President write a letter to the General Secretary outside of the agreement and not as part of the negotiations. And this is the proposed text. We would keep a copy of it in the White House. [Hands over draft at Tab A (identical to letter as sent May 28).]⁴

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I will report this to Mr. Brezhnev, since it involves his conversations with the President.

Dr. Kissinger: We will instruct our delegation to forget about this assurance, and we will handle it here.

⁴ Attached but not printed is a letter dated May 28 from Nixon to Brezhnev that reiterated what he verbally conveyed to the General Secretary: "the United States had no plans during the period of the five-year freeze to add to its present fleet of ballistic missile submarines. I am referring specifically to the right of the United States under the agreement to replace its old Titan ICBMs with SLBM submarines."

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I think all will go well.

Dr. Kissinger: And tell your delegation not to press for it.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Let us just review what we have to communicate to our delegations, so there will be no misunderstanding.

We will communicate to them your Protocol and Article III, the Protocol with the addition of the sentence we gave you yesterday on the modern ballistic missiles. We will accept your definition of your phrase on silo launchers, plus the word “significantly,” plus this agreed interpretation of the word “significantly.” [Hands over text at Tab B.]⁵

Is that all right?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: We will prepare the letter, but not at the ceremony.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: At the risk of being pedantic, let me check with you all the texts we are sending to Helsinki [Tab C].⁶ It will save us trouble later.

First is the Joint Statement on Article III of the Treaty on Limitation of ABM Systems,” containing the 1300 kilometers—always subject to editorial changes.

Number two, the statement that was in effect agreed upon by the delegations on the dimensions of silo launchers, plus the joint interpretive statement we have here (“will not be significantly increased”).

Number three, your text on dismantling, which you gave me the other day.

Number four, your Article III plus the Protocol with the addition of the sentence we agreed last night. Could I delete in your Protocol the last paragraph which speaks of our agreement not to build the three submarines? I don’t want the delegations to discuss it.

[The Russian side indicates no objection.]

I have only one other thing I want to raise. As I told you before, we will have a very difficult time selling this in the U.S., and it is therefore absolutely essential that I give a press briefing this evening, either before or after the signing.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Afterwards.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it will be better to do it just before, with an embargo.

⁵ Attached but not printed. For the final text of the Protocol, see Document 318.

⁶ At Tab C is backchannel message WH0077/Hakto 40, Document 315.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We have no objections. Preferably afterwards, though, and Zamyatin or Korniyenko will do it too.⁷

Dr. Kissinger: We should do it before, because otherwise the press will be so impatient they won't wait for the briefing.

[Foreign Minister Gromyko goes out at 12:07.]

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: It is up to Minister Gromyko to decide.

[Foreign Minister Gromyko returns at 12:12.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Can our delegation return here in your plane?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh yes, I should have offered it to you. Certainly.

Ambassador Dobrynin: A concession!

Dr. Kissinger: If the plane is not big enough, we'll leave Smith in Helsinki.

Now, I have to ask your understanding. When I give this briefing, I have to give arguments that make it look like a good agreement for us, arguments that will appeal to our conservatives, hard-headed and unsentimental.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: No comments.

Dr. Kissinger: I just want your leaders to understand.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We approach this with understanding.

Dr. Kissinger: That's all I ask.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: There should be no definitions in the document of modern SLBM launchers.

Dr. Kissinger: Your proposal was withdrawn.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes, that's right.

Deputy Chairman Smirnov: There are so many cables, sometimes I don't keep up.

Dr. Kissinger: It is a good conclusion.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I don't know about Smith, but Semenov sends five-to-ten cables a day. I think they're spending all their time writing instead of thinking.

⁷ On May 29 the White House released the transcripts of two news briefings on the joint communiqué and the statement of basic principles: the first by Kissinger; the second by Ziegler and Leonid M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS. Kissinger's briefing is printed in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 8, p. 951. The final text of the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," also issued on May 29, is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 633–634.

Dr. Kissinger: On the signature, should there be remarks, or no remarks like the other signings? When the President, and I assume Mr. Brezhnev sign it, should there be remarks?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It was not provided.

Dr. Kissinger: All right, no remarks.

I do want to say I think this is a very important milestone in the relations between our two countries, and I am very proud to have had the opportunity to work with you gentlemen on it.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We are satisfied with the manner in which business was conducted on your part, and we tried to reciprocate. They were really difficult and delicate matters we were working on; specialist delegations have spent almost three years, as of this August, on it. It is really a good end, a real milestone. [In English:] We are substantially satisfied, even more than 15%!

Dr. Kissinger: [laughs] A really important milestone in international relations, and in relations between our two countries.

Communiqué

Dr. Kissinger: On the communiqué, we have two new formulations, one on Europe and one on world disarmament; we have tried to meet your concerns.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Can we meet this afternoon on this, before 3 o'clock?

Dr. Kissinger: Let's say 2:15, or 2:00.⁸

Here is your formulation on Europe. [Tab D]⁹

Foreign Minister Gromyko: "Among the states of East and West in Europe"? Better to say "among the European states."

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I am free all day tomorrow to work on the communiqué. I will have Hillenbrand here with me tomorrow.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Good.

[Everyone gets up and shakes hands.]

Dr. Kissinger: When I get run out of Washington, I will want to know whether I can get an advisory position in your Foreign Ministry.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In our government? Of course!

Ambassador Dobrynin: He can be our American specialist!

⁸ Kissinger and Gromyko met at 2:24 p.m. to discuss the communiqué. For text of the memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 283. The Joint Communiqué was issued in Moscow on May 29; for text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 635–642.

⁹ Attached but not printed.

315. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)¹

Moscow, May 26, 1972, 1000Z.

WH0077/Hakto 40. 1. Tentative agreement reached on outstanding issues. President and Brezhnev hope very much to sign agreement no later than 8 p.m. tonight. You should arrive in Moscow by 1830. Semenov is welcome to ride in your plane.

2. Following are agreed in principle subject to editing by you in Helsinki. If any substantive point still deeply concerns you, please contact us at once.²

3. "Text of Joint Statement on Article III of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems: The Parties understand that the center of ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital, and the center of the ABM system deployment area wherein ICBM silo launchers are located shall for each Party be at a distance of no less than 1300 kilometres.

"The American side will also make a unilateral statement to the effect that the center of the ABM system deployment area for ICBM silo launchers in the USA will be located in the ICBM silo launchers deployment area at Grand Forks, North Dakota."

4. Following text agreed on silo-dimension:

"Text of the Joint Statement on the Prohibition of the Conversion of Light ICBMs Into Heavy ICBMs:

"The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the size of land based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased."

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1972 SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig initialed the message. Copies were sent to Howe and Odeen.

² In backchannel message Hakto 42 to Helsinki, Kissinger informed Smith that Nixon and Brezhnev had definitely agreed to sign the SALT agreement that night at 8 p.m. Moscow time and wrote: "Don't be bashful about making suggestions to the other side because our impression is that they will accept anything reasonable within basic framework of agreement." (Ibid.) In his memoirs, Smith recalled, "I wonder what would have happened if, with about seven hours left to do the editing, hold a final meeting of the delegates, and make the flight to Moscow, I had taken up this suggestion and proposed substantive changes. The expression, 'you must be kidding' came to mind when I read this contrived record of how Kissinger valued the delegation's judgment." (*Doubltalk*, pp. 429–430)

5. In addition, following is agreed interpretive statement:

“The Parties agree that the term ‘significantly increase’ means that the increase will not be greater than 10–15 percent of the present size of land-based ICBM silo launchers.”

6. Following is text of statement on dismantling:

“Text of the Joint Statement on Procedures for the Dismantling or Destruction of Launchers for Older ICBM and Launchers of Older Submarines: The dismantling or destruction of launchers for ICBMs of older types constructed before 1964 and launchers for ballistic missiles of older submarines being replaced by new launchers of modern submarines shall start simultaneously with the beginning of sea-going tests of a submarine intended as replacement and shall be completed within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, as well as timely notification thereof, shall be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.”

7. On SLBMs, Soviet draft text of Article III follows, but already sent you earlier.

“Text of Article III of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms:

“The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and modern submarines with ballistic missiles to the number operational and under construction on the date of signature of this agreement, and also to launchers and submarines constructed additionally, provided that their construction will be carried out in a manner prescribed for the sides as replacements for equal numbers of launchers for ICBMs of older types constructed before 1964, or launchers of older submarines.”

8. Protocol to interim agreement will be Soviet text sent you late last night plus US additional sentence.³

Note: Titan replacement question will not be included in protocol and will be handled in other channels. Will explain later.

Text follows:

“The Parties understand that in accordance with Article III of the interim agreement, for the period during which this agreement remains in force:

“The USA may have not more than 710 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and not more than 44 modern submarines with ballistic missile launchers. The Soviet Union may have not more than 950 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and not more than 62 modern submarines with ballistic missiles.

³ See Document 311.

“Additional submarine launched ballistic missile launchers up to the above mentioned levels for the U.S.A.—7 in excess of 656 nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and for the U.S.S.R.—in excess of 740 nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of launchers for ICBMs of older types constructed before 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers of older submarines.

“Deployment of modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total submarine-launched ballistic missiles permitted for the U.S. and the USSR.

“This protocol shall be regarded as an integral part of the interim agreement.”

9. Believe these are all relevant texts available to us. Call on open line if you have problems.

10. This entire package accepted by Gromyko this morning. Semenov will have Russian texts which we have not been checked here.

11. Your help is much appreciated. President is very proud of accomplishment and your contribution.

316. Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union¹

May 26, 1972.

TREATY

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383-98-0054, Treaties, SALT, ABM. No classification marking. Nixon and Brezhnev signed the treaty in a televised ceremony in St. Vladimir Hall in the Grand Kremlin Palace. The text of the treaty (23 UST 3435) is also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, pp. 918-920.

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) under construction;
- (c) undergoing testing;

- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
- (e) mothballed.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not

require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States
of America
Richard Nixon
*President of the United States
of America*

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Leonid I. Brezhnev²
*General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU*

² Printed from a copy that bears Nixon's and Brezhnev's typed signatures.

317. Interim Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union¹

May 26, 1972.

INTERIM AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON CERTAIN
MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383–98–0054, Box 1, Treaties, SALT, ABM. No classification marking. Nixon and Brezhnev signed the agreement in a televised ceremony in St. Vladimir Hall in the Grand Kremlin Palace. The text of the interim agreement (23 UST 3462) is also printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, pp. 920–921.

the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

Article II

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

Article III

The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers and older submarines.

Article IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken.

Article V

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation

shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

Article VII

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

Article VIII

1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

3. Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

Leonid I. Brezhnev

*The General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU*

For the United States
of America

Richard Nixon²

*The President of the United
States of America*

² Printed from a copy that bears Brezhnev's and Nixon's typed signatures.

318. Protocol to the Interim Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union¹

May 26, 1972.

PROTOCOL

TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which that Agreement remains in force:

The US may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the abovementioned levels, in the U.S.—over 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, and in the U.S.S.R.—over 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines.

The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Files: FRC 383–98–0054, Box 1, Treaties, SALT, ABM. No classification marking. Nixon and Brezhnev signed the protocol in a televised ceremony in St. Vladimir Hall in the Grand Kremlin Palace. The text of the protocol (23 UST 3462) is also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, p. 921.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

For the United States
of America

Richard Nixon

*The President of the United
States of America*

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

Leonid I. Brezhnev²

*The General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU*

² Printed from a copy that bears Nixon's and Brezhnev's typed signatures.

319. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) and the Chairman of the General Advisory Committee for Arms Control and Disarmament (McCloy)¹

May 26, 1972, 11:27 a.m.

H: How are you sir, General Haig.

M: Yes General, how are you.

H: Fine. I just got a message from Moscow—from Henry and the President and they both asked me to call you.

M: Yes.

H: To tell you that they had arrived at an agreement with the Soviets on the SALT business, which is essentially an unlimited duration ABM treaty and an interim agreement or freeze on the number of strategic ballistic missiles launchers for a five year period.

M: Five years, huh.

H: Right. And that is essentially a freeze with ah—This has been a very very tough going and we are very very pleased with the way the outcome was finally reached. Because essentially it is the Soviets that have driven along(?) almost every key issue. But this took the last two days of the most intense kind of work there. In essence, what we have is—what we feel we have done is really broken the momentum

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 999, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1972. No classification marking. Haig was in Washington; McCloy was in New York.

of their on-going programs without any limitation on what we have in our developmental cooker. Assuming of course that the Congress and this is the key aspect of our obligation in the thing—that the Congress funds the ULMS fully and the B-1 and some of the bomber development missiles, are things that we have asked for and will continue to ask for. But in light of that we just feel that we have got as good a proposition as we could have hoped to had and I just—being a military guy of course I have been damned concerned about it—but I do think we are in very good shape knowing all that I know.

(Throughout the above Haig comments, McCloy kept saying yes after each point)

M: Let me ask you this—this is somewhat troubling me. When you look between the lines here you find that they have an American superiority in submarines and the ICBMs and of course they have them in the IRs and the MRs. Isn't this going to have—I am not talking about the [omission in the original] over kill and all that—but isn't this going to have significant political repercussions. The fact you know just the [omission in the original] heaviest(?) battalions has some political consequences or imponderable consequences that can't be related to the possible effect on a battle field or in a war. And the argumentation that I have been reading in the papers so far which troubles me a little bit is that well we have so many more warheads than they have and we have this wonderful MIRV business. In my judgement the Soviets are going to get MIRVs without any question—they have the full capacity to do it and with the [omission in the original] rate that they have it isn't going to be very long before it is much superior to ours. Particularly if you give them the new heavy missiles they are going to have—completely even if not equalize(?) in the number of warriors(?). How do you answer that. What is the answer to that.

H: Well, first let me tell you in general there certainly is some truth in the psychological problem because of talking about certain systems and putting numbers of certain systems. In truth of course we are overwhelmingly ahead in the number of warheads but also under restraint in this thing is that our forward based systems which are targetted on the Soviet Union and our aircraft in which we have almost two to one numerically and a very strong qualitative edge. Look, the only way you can really best answer this thing is first, we have no way of rectifying these figures other than what we are doing and what we are doing is the ULMS and the B-1s. Now we went to the [omission in the original] on this and quite frankly three weeks ago we were under the view that maybe we would keep the submarines out and get into a crash building program. They didn't want to do that—their view was that we had to go with the ULMS system rather than try to gerryrig a foresee(?) absolute nuclear submarine.

M: Yes.

H: and missile systems. So they were very interested in getting the submarines included.

M: Yes.

H: So that really turned the day. It was a cease(?) view that turned it departmentally here in the bureaucracy. I think they are right because what they are going to end up with and what we will approach at the end of the five year period with is massive momentum on our side in the submarine area with the ULM which does two things. One is to put pressure on the Soviets to continue and to try to seek a permanent agreement if you are arms control oriented. And secondly, it will put us in the position that is relatively much much better than we would have been without the ban.

M: Yes.

H: You see they have been building at the rate of roughly 9 subs a year.

M: Nine, a year. Yes.

H: That is right. And they would have had one hell of a pile of subs facing us at the end of this five year period which we could not have built to overcome.

M: Yes.

H: So on balance—

M: So you have given them 62 for 41 whatever it is to offset that.

H: That is right.

M: Yes.

H: That is right. On balance, however, we are very comfortable with that because of—

M: Forward(?) bases, etc.

H: Yes, because of our four base [*forward-based*] systems, our aircraft and the MIRV numerical. Now they are building MIRV probably but you know we just haven't—as hard as we are looking—we haven't gotten confirmation yet.

M: There is no question in your mind that they can do that—if we can do it they can do it.

H: [omission in the original] no question.

M: If they can do it they are going to have a throw away [*throw-weight*] which will be—the MIRV will be more significant than perhaps our MIRV.

H: Now that we don't believe. We think our MIRV—we have the expressed surface(?) on what we can do with it.

M: Yes.

H: If we decided to diversify in terms of our submarines then what have you. So we would quantitatively exploit our warhead base that way if we chose to do it. Now this is certainly—

M: Now this is the point I have heard talked about around up here—[omission in the original] appear so far in the *Times* and etc. The argumentation is that well they may have numerical superiority but we have got quantitative [*qualitative?*] superiority and we have got more warheads because we have got MIRV and they haven't got it. And the criticism has been well they are putting too much emphasis on that form of argumentation. Because it is rather similar(?) in the sense that the Soviets we know—if they concentrate they are going to be able to get MIRVs and you oughtn't just assume that this is a permanent superiority that we have.

H: No, well that is correct.

M: Yes.

H: But I think the simple essence of what we have got here and this is a very generalized statement but it is totally true. We have halted the momentum of their program—we have forced the scrapping of 260 of their big—which are essentially first-class type weapons and have not disturbed one iota programs that we have underway.

M: Yes.

H: So what we are doing is greatly improving our relative balance over the next five year period. If we did not have this freeze in the offensive area we would have come out in the end of the five [year] period with a greatly more serious disparity in our relative strengths. In other words we would have been relatively much weaker and that is really—

M: That is on the basis of this 8 or 9 year basis.

H: That is right.

M: Yes.

H: That is right. And on what they have been building in the ground.

M: And in the ground too.

H: That is right.

M: Yes. Well the limitation on the ground—they should be stopped at whatever it is—1600.

H: That is right.

M: ICBMs. But they can substitute the big fellas for the whole—for how many of those—how many substitutions can they have of the new weapons.

H: On submarines of course.

M: I am not talking about submarines—about ICBMs. I was talking about the new 29s [SS-9s].

H: Well the feeling is fetched(?). Now they can modernize with the overall field(?)

M: 1600—can they substitute?

H: Yes.

M: For all that 1600 new stuff.

H: Yes, they can modernize but they can't put in bigger missiles. There is a fix on the size of it and the whole. Now the technology there is no way of surveiling properly.

M: Yes. Now the fix on the size and the hole is that taken into account or not taken into account this new stuff [omission in the original].

H: Well the new stuff will be in. It has started.

M: It has started. So they could substitute that new stuff for everything they have got.

H: That is underway. That is right.

M: Yes.

H: But what hasn't been built they can not do if it goes beyond these figures.

M: These figures, yes. Now what can we do with our thousand or whatever it is—in the way of—

H: Well we will be able to modify our Minuteman.

M: Yes.

H: Because that is within the very minor size changes that we fixed on.

M: Yes.

H: We can go ahead with that if we decide to do it.

M: Well, just let me ask you this specifically. The fix that you put on the size hole in the silo and whatnot—that is big enough for the Soviets to put this new one in then isn't it?

H: No, no.

M: No?

H: No, no.

M: No?

H: No, I don't think it is. They are frozen with what they have got built or on the way. In other words what they have got the construction started on.

M: Yes, yes. I see [omission in the original] the entire 1600.

H: Oh lord no(?) no no.

M: Well [omission in the original] 288 the other day. That was in the newspaper. I don't know if that is an accurate figure or not. Well at any rate we should do as much with ours as they can with theirs in terms of improvements.

H: Well here is what we have forced the Soviets to do. They have to either destroy about 200 of the large SS-7's and 8's missiles.

M: Yes.

H: Which of course are essentially a first strike missile. Or forego buildup the deployment of an equal number of SLBM launchers. So we can within this build more submarines if we want and we can retire tightens(?) [*Titan*] missiles to do this on an equal number of per-side(?) [*Pershing*] launchers. So the larger net increase in warheads will come to us.

M: Yes. OK. I thought I had better—I am very glad to get this—I have got to go back to this meeting—to get this information and I think I will be coming down to Washington to sit down I don't know maybe over the weekend to get a little more recognition (?) of exactly what did transpire after the last recommendations that we made² and then be prepared whenever you think it is desirable to have a meeting with the Committee or—are you asking that we could do something to support the President on this thing or—

H: Well, yes, here is what we think—there already has been some backlash from the right. As you can well imagine.

M: Well, bound to have it. Yes.

H: And there are going to be people obviously asking you because of the role you play.

M: I think there are already some telephone calls coming through.

H: Right, sir. I think what the President hopes you will do pending any detailed briefing—which I am confident(?) you will be comfortable with. Hopefully to be as supportive as you can. And in doing so the one fundamental aspect of this whole proposition is our fear that a euphoria (?) will develop that will risk our [omission in the original] on the Hill the fundamental aspect of this agreement which from our point of view if it isn't realize it could be a [omission in the original]. And that is we continue to get funded our own submarine program and our B-1 bomber program and the other programs on the missiles that are on the bombers—standoff missiles that we get this money because then we would have used this five year period of the freeze to greatly improve our relative position with the Soviets.

M: Yes.

H: Without it—well it would be a disaster and you know what kind of euphoria will accompany this.

M: Yes.

² See Document 241.

H: And we want to talk about this being a great achievement that will accomplish these strengths(?) and the viability of which can only be maintained through strength.

M: Yes.

H: That is the kind of thing we are hoping for.

M: Yes. OK. Now let me ask you this question. Could I up to this point—I have always refused to make any comments in response to inquiries on the ground that we are advisors to the President and our advice of course is confidential. And also—several times when we have been asked to appear—well I pointed out that we are advisors to the President and were exemplary [*exempt*] from calls on the Hill. Do you at this stage feel that it is proper for the Committee or me or any of the members of it to comment.

H: Yes, I do.

M: Yes.

H: I think we have missed the bench mark [omission in the original] which cumulates an awful lot of the work done by the Committee and I think that the President feels that this is the time to go strong so that we don't get a backlash that is going to affect the whole effort in years ahead.

M: OK. I get the point. And if I may take the liberty, I may when I get some more thoughts give you a ring again.

H: Great, sir. And we are ready to give you any detailed briefing that you want.

M: Thank you very much. It was nice of you to call me.

H: Fine.

M: Thank you.

H: Goodbye.

320. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Moscow, May 27, 1972, 1115Z.

Hakto 44. Ref: Tohak 188.² The following are points that should be elaborated for use in response to Jackson statements.

(1) It is absurd to say that agreement freezes us at 4 to 1 disadvantage in payload when no-agreement situation would have permitted dynamic race in which Soviet payload advantage would increase further. We have now stopped SS-9 deployment which could have run free indefinitely. While Soviets can improve on SS-11 with new missile, they are constrained by silo size limitation (a point not yet public but of course part of the agreement) and they are on notice by our unilateral statement that significant increase in volume of follow on to SS-11 missile could jeopardize continuance of agreement. Moreover we had no program that would have done a thing to improve our payloads in next five years. Hence agreement stops nothing on our side that we had planned. Not aware of any program that Jackson had and that had any prospect of Congressional approval that would have changed payload situation.

(2) On numbers of missiles the point is that no agreement situation would have guaranteed massive widening of Soviet advantage. This agreement puts lid on this trend for precisely the period at the end of which, barring a follow-on agreement, we can begin adding to our numbers by Trident. Had Jackson supported accelerated submarine program? Had he worked on JCS to support it? Did he have any program with chance of adoption that would have affected arithmetic in next five years?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, President's Trip Files, President's Trip, USSR, Iran, Austria, Poland, Hakto File, May–June, 72. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

² Telegram Tohak 188 to Moscow, May 26, reported that the groups briefed on SALT were generally supportive, but that the real problem, as expected, lay with Senator Henry Jackson, whose statement was attached. Jackson stated that "far from curbing the arms race, the present agreements are likely to lead to an accelerated technological arms race with great uncertainties, profound instabilities and considerable costs." He argued that the Moscow agreements froze the United States at a 4 to 1 overall missile payload disadvantage. The SALT agreement not only protected that Soviet advantage, but authorized them to increase it. The United States now had more warheads than the Soviets, but under this agreement the Soviets were free to multiply their warheads and authorized to expand greatly their overall missile capability. Jackson also complained that the agreement prohibited the United States from increasing its numbers of submarines, but authorized the Soviets to continue building them until they first equaled and then greatly surpassed the United States. (Ibid., Box 993, Haig Chronological File, May 21–31, 1972 [1 of 2])

(3) On payload of particular Soviet missiles nothing in this agreement authorizes Soviets to do a thing that they could not have done even more dynamically without it. And nothing prevents US from improving payloads if had a program to do so. Trident is fully protected. What possible leverage did we have to negotiate a freeze on or diminution of Soviet payloads?

(4) On warhead numbers, we again should compare agreement with no-agreement. Under no-agreement SS-9 would have been unconstrained and hence so would warhead multiplication. Now at least SS-9 number is fixed. But we can proceed unconstrained with the only new offensive program—ULMS—we had. We do have a problem about Soviet potential for increasing warheads. But there was never a chance to solve this in SALT I without MIRV ban, which was unobtainable. What we have done is to make this problem less severe than it would otherwise have been.

(5) On submarines, we have limited Soviets to numbers some 25 below what they could have built without agreement and are forcing them to pay for any new submarines by reducing their numbers and payloads in land-based missiles plus in some 30 on H-class boats. Moreover, Y-class boats they can build in next 5 years are qualitatively inferior to our latest boats and, even more, to ULMS boats.

(6) On ABMs, only way we could have gotten “effective ABM defense of missile sites” would have been to give Soviets the same, creating horrendous uncertainties re radar base for potential area defense. We have in fact gotten improved radar base for more effective defense at Grand Forks. Moreover, we already have major advantage in high acceleration interceptors and further development in this respect is in no way constrained.

As regards Moscow defense, Soviets can add 36 interceptors. This has no practical effect on our capacity to hold Moscow hostage, nor, indeed, on US capacity to do likewise. To suggest Soviets can “expand” Moscow system in any meaningful way because of this agreement is absurd. With radar constraints, area limitation and interceptor ceiling, we are obviously better off than if Soviets had been free to do as they please.

(7) We should have overall posture of welcoming full and exhaustive Congressional and indeed national debate. We have nothing to hide. The constant repetition that agreement “confers advantage” on Soviets is sheer demagoguery. It confers nothing that the Soviets could not have done. What it does do is to slow dramatically the process of acquiring advantage while enabling us to gear up for a major new program, provided, of course, people like Jackson devote their energy to supporting our defense programs rather than fighting an agreement that brakes the momentum of Soviet programs.

321. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Assistant to the President (Haldeman)¹

Washington, June 2, 1972.

Nixon: Well, how are you feeling, how are you doing this morning, Henry?

Kissinger: Well, it's beginning to catch up with me. I think by this evening I'll—

Haldeman: Well, stay up for another hour and a half, will you?

Kissinger: Oh, no, I'll be all right. [Laughter] You know, you must feel it, too.

Nixon: Yeah, well—

Kissinger: I'm just beginning to—

Nixon: You need to relax after all the things that we've been through pell-mell. You know, the—I know everybody is tired that went over there. Good god, those advance men and others worked their butts off. But, you and I are tired for different reasons.

Kissinger: Well, the nervous tension of being up for—

Nixon: [unclear] one hell of an emotional fight from having to fight with—the Rogers thing the first day,² and then the SALT thing on Wednesday³ night. Goddamn, you know, you just—Bob, it's hard enough to go to one of these things without going through that, but it's really awful.

Kissinger: Well, then, the SALT thing Wednesday night, afterward, was probably the single most emotional meeting that I've attended since I've been in the White House.

Haldeman: The dacha meeting?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: [unclear].

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 727–5. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger and Haig in the Oval Office from 9:45 to 10:03 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed this portion of the conversation specifically for this volume.

² Nixon became angry when Rogers announced on May 19 that he would hold a press conference to set the tone for the upcoming summit. Nixon, who was also planning to brief the press that day, complained to Kissinger: "He doesn't know anything about it. He doesn't know what's going to happen at the summit. He doesn't have the slightest idea." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 726–4) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 245.

³ May 24.

Kissinger: You've got these three tough guys working the President over.

Nixon: It was a rough one. But it was good and interesting, and it was—

Kissinger: Well, I think it was the turning point of the discussion.

Nixon: I think, probably, what I am trying to do today, Henry, is to say: look confident. The substance is all going to be presented. I'm not going to go into that, but I want to give you—I want to put it in a larger framework. I want to tell you about the men, I want to tell you about—and I'm going to bring both China and Russia into it.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: The China thing only in terms of why do the Chinese want a relationship with us? Because they're pragmatic. Why does the Soviet Union want this relationship with us—?

Kissinger: Right. We just have to be sure they don't go out and blab it. That's [unclear]—

Nixon: I'm not going to say that. I'm not going to say, "The Soviet wanted it because they're against China."

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: Or any—or, not for that reason, though, but—but that the Soviet wanted it for other reasons.

Kissinger: Right. Right. Right.

Nixon: What do you want to cover?

Kissinger: Well, it's entirely up to you, Mr. President.

Nixon: Well, how do you feel with all the things this ought to cover? What [unclear]—?

Kissinger: Well, I could cover the sort of thing about the meetings that you can't. I mean, you can't very well cover how the meetings were conducted the way I can.

Haldeman: I think you should, too.

Kissinger: And—

Haldeman: I mean, this one is one—

Nixon: What else should I do? Should I start with Henry? Or should I—?

Kissinger: No, I think you should start.

Haldeman: No, you should let out the context and the big picture that you're talking about. But then, Henry should start with a, "Let me give you a little background on how these meetings were conducted; how your President represented you."

Nixon: Without going [unclear].

Kissinger: And, uh—

Haldeman: But this is billed, and they understand it, and the press has billed it as a monumental, personal thing, which is the very interesting thing that comes out of all this. It's—they're not—

Kissinger: The first time the press has done that since we have been in—

Haldeman: And they're talking more about the importance of the personal—

Nixon: Component? No—

Haldeman: The promise of what you did, the way you worked, and how you did it—

Kissinger: You see—

Haldeman: —than they are about the substance of the, the whole thing.

Kissinger: You see, the way I could do this is to say, "Why the summit?" I mean, why could it work at the—could certain, certain things work at the summit that couldn't work anywhere else?

Nixon: Yeah, good. Now, how would you say that?

Kissinger: And, and that way—

Nixon: Well, tell me—

Kissinger: Well—

Nixon: —what do we say, so that I don't cover that.

Kissinger: Well, I would say it two ways: First of all, the imminence of the summit—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —enabled the President to take a personal hand—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —on a number of issues. And I'll give them that Incidents at Sea example, which is—

Nixon: Yeah, I know.

Kissinger: —a very trivial example of an agreement⁴—

Nixon: Also, if—then again, if you could go on and say how we broke the impasse on—say on such [unclear]—

Kissinger: Then secondly—

Nixon: —things on SALT.

Kissinger: —how you broke the impasse. That's exactly what I was going to say: how you broke the impasse on SALT—

Nixon: And how you think—and then, you might say, for example, in a field where we did not reach our goal—and then I think this

⁴ The Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea (23 UST 1168) was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at the summit; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, pp. 926–927.

may not be bad on Lend-Lease. I'd say, "We—the President narrowed the difference. We got it down, but we wouldn't give on the matter of the interest rate—"

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: "—and we're going to have to negotiate it." I think they'd love to hear that.

Kissinger: So that was point one. Then, point two was that a number of issues were left that, literally, were unresolvable, except at the highest level. And then, thirdly, the whole statement of principles problem, for example.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: You wouldn't even have known how to start except at the highest level.

Nixon: And I have. You couldn't say, "Well, let's let our Ambassadors work it out." Can you imagine Beam sitting down with Gromyko?

Kissinger: Inconceivable. Well, the point which I've made to the press, which all of them, or all of the—Max Frankel, I know, used it, and a number of others—I said, "Look, under the best of circumstances, you have to consider one diplomatic note is 20 minutes of Presidential talk. Now, you add up 43 hours that the President spent with these people, and that means—"

Nixon: Was it 43 hours?

Kissinger: Yeah. I mean all together. That's what Ron figured out.

Nixon: Phew.

Kissinger: But whatever it is, it would be 60 to 100 diplomatic notes, each of which taking 2 to 3 weeks to get a reply to it. This is without the first-personal impact.

Haldeman: It's much easier. You never get the reading from the notes—

Kissinger: That's right.

Haldeman: —that you get from the face-to-face.

Kissinger: So, that's what I said what you have to consider: it's a 4-year proposition. And then, so many other things happen in the interval that you never get it done. I said—on the other hand, I drew a distinction between summit meetings that are not well-prepared, where, then, the principals get together, create a deadlock and make the situation worse, compared to some which had been narrowed to a point where the principals could act with maximum effectiveness.

Nixon: Um-hmm. Um-hmm. Um-hmm.

Kissinger: And that's sort of the theme. And then, I thought I could hit a few of the high points of the agreements. But the Russians are on an all-out propaganda campaign at home saying what a terrific achievement this was. [2 seconds not declassified] between Brezhnev and

[Marshal] Grechko, in which Brezhnev complains to Grechko saying, “Goddamnit these Americans. You remember that afternoon session, the President and Kissinger hit me about exactly the thing they’re worried about.” You know—

Nixon: On these ULMS?

Kissinger: No, with the missile diameter.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

Kissinger: And Grechko makes all the arguments to him that Jackson is making to us, saying, “How do we know the Americans won’t put modern missiles on diesel submarines? And Brezhnev saying, “You idiot. Why would they scream about our putting missiles on diesel submarines if they wanted to do it?” And Grechko said, “Well you know Brezhnev, that we’re going to scrap the diesel submarines,” which is true.

Nixon: Incidentally, what do you want me to get across to him now? What do you want me to say to him, because I—

Kissinger: On SALT?

Nixon: About anything. Well, SALT, I’m just going to say, I’m going to say, “Look, when I left office and d-d-d-d [etc.], we had—there was a 10-to-1 advantage for the United States. When we came in the advantage had been wiped out. We hadn’t done a thing—”

Kissinger: And they take 10—

Nixon: “And if we hadn’t done something, we were—had to go—we either had two choices: to go for a crash program of building, which I think the American people would have had great concern about, or have a limitation.”

Kissinger: I wouldn’t even give them that. I would say, “There was no crash program of building we could have done.”

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: You can say, “We had the Joint Chiefs of Staff in. We said, ‘Can you do a crash program on submarines?’” I had three meetings with them, Mr. President.

Nixon: Oh, I know, ‘cause I asked Moorer in that meeting, too.

Kissinger: And they said, “No, we cannot do a crash program—”

Nixon: Well, do you think—do you want me to zero in on that or [unclear]—

Kissinger: But I can do that task better than you.

Nixon: All right.

Kissinger: If you want to.

Nixon: Oh, yeah, yeah.

Kissinger: It’s up to you.

Nixon: You take up all the things that I—

Kissinger: I mean you can just say, “When we came in, this was the situation. It worsened every year. I’ve started a number of pro-

grams: ABM, ULMS, B-1. Each of which had enormous Congressional opposition. All of you gentlemen know it takes ten years from the time you start a program until it is operational.”

Nixon: You’ve got to remember, we’ve got doves there as well as hawks. [unclear]

Kissinger: And then I’d say we had two choices then. We had only one choice. We—what we have done is broken the momentum of their agreement.

Haldeman: You don’t have any problems with the doves, though. They’re so—

Kissinger: No. You won’t have any problems with the hawks after two weeks. I guarantee you, I’ll work them over.

Haldeman: Except Scoop [Jackson]. He’s gotten himself out on a limb.

Kissinger: Yeah, but Scoop, I think, is being partisan on this.

Nixon: Sure he is.

Kissinger: I mean, the things Scoop is saying—why the hell didn’t he say them two years ago? Or one year ago? They were equally true. They have nothing to do with the agreement.

Nixon: Well, the whole secret deal has gotten, of course—he says, “That’s an old point—”

Kissinger: Well, the secret deal, Mr. President, the way to hit that is this: You can say, “There are a number of interpretive, if they’re agreed, statements,” which I will be glad to explain to them, “all of which will be submitted by agreement with the Soviets to the Senate.” You, just for your information, you have written a letter to Brezhnev⁵—

Nixon: Saying we wouldn’t build three subs—saying all that?

Kissinger: —in which you’re saying, “I want you to know we have no plans—”

Nixon: No plans.

Kissinger: “—to build those three extra submarines to which we are entitled during the period of the freeze.” This is nothing but the literal truth. We have no such plans—

Nixon: I mean, we’re simply informing him of something. That’s all.

Kissinger: That’s not an agreement. You can change your plans anyway. But, the fact of the matter is, you have no such plans. The Navy doesn’t want them, and nothing in the agreement forces you to exercise your option. That’s only an option. That’s not something that you’re supposed to do. But I must say—incidentally, I talked to some

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 314.

people who heard your speech. Apparently, on television, it came over extremely well.⁶

Haldeman: Yes.

Kissinger: I'm not—I thought he was speaking a little too fast, quite honestly, sitting in the, in the chamber. But, on television, people told me it sounded very effective.

⁶ The text of Nixon's June 1 address to a Joint Session of Congress on his return from the summit is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 660–666. The address was broadcast live on radio and television.

322. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, June 7, 1972, 3:04–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT Submissions

OST

Dr. Edward David

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

AEC

James Schlesinger

State

NSC Staff

John N. Irwin

Philip Odeen

Ray Garthoff

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Seymour Weiss

William Hyland

Robert Martin

Col. Jack Merritt

DOD

James T. Hackett

Kenneth Rush

Gardiner Tucker

Paul Nitze

Archie Wood

JCS

Lt. Gen. Royal B. Allison

CIA

Bruce Clarke

Jack Maury

ACDA

Gerard Smith

Philip Farley

Spurgeon Keeny

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 3/15/72 to 6-4-74. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

—The SALT documents to be sent to the Congress should include a list of all initialed statements. Mr. Kissinger will seek the President's decision as to whether other statements should be listed separately or included in the body of Secretary Rogers' letter. The package submitted is not to be called a comprehensive list of SALT documents.

—The members of the Verification Panel will submit their agencies' views on whether a reference to the fact of satellite verification should be included in the SALT documents being submitted to the Congress.

—The Working Group will prepare a statement to be sent to the Soviets, informing them that it is our interpretation that they cannot count "G" class submarines as subject to replacement by modern ballistic missile submarines.

—The Working Group will prepare a draft interpretation stating when the Soviets must begin dismantling their SS-7/8s or "H" class subs, which will be based on the date the next new sub goes under construction.

—NATO must be informed soon about the unilateral Soviet reservation on British/French subs.

Mr. Kissinger: I'd like to discuss a few questions concerning the SALT agreements before we begin testifying on the Hill. We won't submit the treaty to Congress until Monday, June 12, which gives us time to clear up some of the details. Does this raise any problems for anyone?

Mr. Irwin: The date of submission? That presents no problems.

Mr. Schlesinger: Will the congressional committees be informed?

Mr. Kissinger: You mean about the date of submission?

Mr. Schlesinger: Yes, they should be told when to expect it.

Mr. Kissinger: They will be told. The strategy is to go to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Forces Committee. Now, we have certain unresolved problems. One is how to count replacements and another is what we should do regarding "G" class subs. Still another issue, one that Gerry (Smith) raised, is how many interpretive statements we should submit to the Congress. No one objects to the submission of the agreed interpretations, the question is whether to submit the unilateral ones. This has been raised with Gromyko and he agrees that we can submit them. We thought we should do so. What is your point of view, Gerry (Smith)?

Amb. Smith: I see no point in submitting a great mass of material that is only going to lead to a lot of confusion. We've been having discussions with the Russians for a long time and have reached a number of understandings on a variety of technical issues. Now if we start submitting all of these unilateral understandings to the Congress, the question is where do you cut them off? The more we tell them, the

more they will want to know, and I don't think we should get into the technical details too deeply. My suggestion is that we submit both agreed and unilateral interpretations in the body of the statement.

Mr. Irwin: We have three separate sets of documents here. We have the agreements themselves, the agreed interpretations and the unilateral interpretations. There seems to be no question about the submission of the first two. It is the handling of the unilateral interpretations that is at issue.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, take the silo dimension question. The Soviets don't understand it. We spent a long time explaining it to them, and now you don't want to submit it!

Amb. Smith: I would submit the agreed, initialed agreements, but not the unilateral or uninitialed statements.

Mr. Kissinger: So the difference between what we propose to do and what you want to do is actually the degree of inclusiveness.

Amb. Smith: I would include all important agreements in a single long document to be transmitted to the Congress and then draw on any other understandings as required during the testimony on the Hill.

Mr. Kissinger: Would you leave out the unilateral Soviet statement that they should receive compensation in the agreement for the British/French submarines?

Amb. Smith: Yes, and I would also leave out my statement on zero ABMs.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, if that were in, it would include everything.

Amb. Smith: I'm worried about these items. We have many understandings that we reached in the meetings of four on which the agreements were based, but that doesn't make them part of the agreements.

Mr. Tucker: What Gerry (Smith) is saying is that we could collect this material and add it to the papers going to the Hill, but this would imply that the submission is all-inclusive and he doesn't want to imply this.

Mr. Kissinger: We should include things relevant to their or our understandings. The question of zero ABMs is not relevant and should not be included in any case.

Mr. Garthoff: If we give the Hill the whole Soviet statement on British/French subs, it is likely to raise the question of what we are going to do in the follow-on discussions on this subject.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, what are you going to do when the Soviets start leaking their unilateral statement on British/French subs? You can be sure they will leak it to the NATO countries if we don't disclose it. [to Deputy Secretary Rush]² What is your view?

² All brackets are in the original.

Mr. Rush: I don't think these things should be listed separately. It would be better to bury them in the contents of the letter.

Mr. Kissinger: [to Under Secretary Irwin] And your view?

Mr. Irwin: It seems clear to me that we must include some of these understandings, in which case they (the Congress) will ask if they are complete. Then what do we say?

Mr. Kissinger: Is there any objection to listing the agreed statements but not the unsigned statements?

Mr. Irwin: As I understand Gerry (Smith), he would include everything, but in the body of the letter rather than in a separate list.

Mr. Garthoff: There are many common understandings that could or could not be included, depending on how you want to handle it.

Mr. Kissinger: A considerable amount of time, no, an inordinate amount of time, was spent in Moscow on the document prepared there and we cannot suppress it.

Mr. Rush: Why can't we list a series of agreed statements?

Amb. Smith: We can have a separate category for items negotiated at Moscow.

Mr. Kissinger: I don't give a damn about that! It doesn't matter where it was negotiated, that's irrelevant. Why can't we just list it as an agreed statement? The Russians won't protest that.

Mr. Garthoff: We have a total of twelve initialed statements.

Mr. Kissinger: Why not just list all of the common understandings?

Mr. Nitze: Or a current list of agreed and interpretive statements.

Mr. Kissinger: That's O.K. with me. I will check with the President and inform you of his decision. Now as I understand it, you would list all initialed statements and include in the body of the letter all relevant statements, but would not claim this to be a comprehensive list. Is everyone agreed on that approach?

Mr. Schlesinger: How would we handle the Russian reservation?

Mr. Kissinger: We must tell NATO and soon. It is much better to be forthright and honest now than to have it leak out later and be accused of duplicity. We can just present their unilateral statement and follow it with Gerry's (Smith) firm rejection. Don't you agree?

Mr. Schlesinger: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: What are you planning to do about land mobiles?

Amb. Smith: We'll include it in the text.

Mr. Kissinger: Now, on replacement, there are two interpretations: (1) when the Soviets' 741st ballistic missile goes to sea, replacement must begin, or (2) take their word for it until the next boat goes on sea trials, at which time replacement must begin. They claimed in Moscow that they had 768 ballistic missiles in service or under construction, so

the question really is an interpretation of what is construction. How do we interpret when construction begins? I may add that this interpretation, whatever is determined, may also affect the ULMS program. Paul (Nitze), do I understand correctly that in your view replacement should begin immediately?

(Mr. Nitze answered affirmatively, basing his opinion on the inclusion of a “the” and the location of a comma in the Soviet text of the agreement.)

Mr. Kissinger: The record of our discussions in Moscow supports either interpretation. The question is, which is more in our interest?

Amb. Smith: Well, politically, it would be better to say that the Soviets have to start fresh and begin destruction of their old systems immediately. This would certainly help us with the Congress; however, we have an agreement with the Russians and if we start arguing about the location of commas in the agreement I will be asked on the Hill if this is an agreed interpretation. That will be hard to answer, but it will be even worse if the Congress gets the idea that Soviets have agreed to begin replacements immediately. If that impression takes hold and they don't start dismantling right away, there will then be charges that they are breaking the agreement right at the start. I would prefer to stick to an arbitrary interpretation that when the 741st launcher goes to sea they must begin dismantling.

Mr. Tucker: There actually are three different interpretations of this point: (1) when the total number of launchers in service and undergoing sea trials exceeds 740, (2) when the boat with the 740th launcher goes into construction or (3) when the 741st tube goes to sea. Depending on the interpretation, the Russians have to start tearing down when that point is reached.

Mr. Kissinger: It seems to me that the record in Moscow is most consistent with Number 2, since the Soviets claim to have 768 in service or under construction now.

Amb. Smith: But we don't know when construction begins under their definition.

Mr. Tucker: Garthoff has discussed this with the Russians at some length. It was not an interpretation of the number of tubes under construction but rather the number of subs under construction that seemed acceptable to Semenov, who said it would be submitted to the mini-plenary. Of course, there hasn't been time for them to submit it yet.

Amb. Smith: Don't we have a problem with the difference between what we believe they are doing and what they claim they are?

Mr. Tucker: We do have a problem with regard to the subs under construction, but we can keep track of them when they go to sea.

Amb. Smith: The key point is that we must have an interpretation the Soviets will live up to.

Gen. Allison: Their definition of “under construction” is when the hull arrives in the construction hall. I had a long discussion with the Soviet admiral on the delegation, who also understood the interpretation of this point to be the second one listed by Gardiner (Tucker)—the one you (Mr. Kissinger) agree with.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, I agree with it, but if we and the Soviets define when construction begins differently, then we will be in disagreement.

Mr. Garthoff: We had a long discussion on when construction should begin, whether it is when the hulls actually enter the construction hall or at some other stage along the way.

Amb. Smith: Remember, they said that you were trying to interfere with Soviet naval construction practices by trying to pin them down on these definitions?

Mr. Garthoff: That’s right.

Mr. Kissinger: The only two real choices are when the 741st launcher emerges from construction or when the next sub goes into construction.

Mr. Garthoff: For the sake of having something to count from you could call the next sub to go under construction replacement sub No. 1. If we do this and start counting now, dismantling would not begin until 1974.

Amb. Smith: Can we tell the Soviets this is the public position we will take?

Mr. Kissinger: Why not? That’s a good idea.

Mr. Clarke: There was a Soviet launch at the end of May and a number of hull sections are now lined up outside the construction hall ready to be moved onto the line. This one would be the first replacement sub.

Mr. Kissinger: What number is it in our count?

Mr. Clarke: Number 42 or 44 was just launched, so the one going under construction would be either number 43 or 45.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s consistent with our count. They say they have 48 at sea or under construction.

Amb. Smith: Semenov consistently made the statement that they had 48 subs either at sea or under construction.

Mr. Kissinger: If they have 16 launchers per boat, that would be a total of 768, consistent with their statement.

Mr. Clarke: Between 10 and 13 of the boats could be 12 tube boats. Of the eight under construction, either six are 12 tube boats and two 16 tube subs, or all eight have 12 tubes. We have a strong suspicion that three of the four currently fitting out have 12 tubes, and possibly all four.

Mr. Hyland: If Bruce's (Clarke) estimates are correct, it will be only four more boats before they reach 741 launchers, or about six months construction.

Mr. Kissinger: All right, can somebody draft this interpretation?³ I'd like to have it on paper.

Mr. Odeen: We'll draft it right away.

Amb. Smith: How would you present this to the Soviets?

Mr. Kissinger: I would tell them this is our interpretation and we want to use it in our explanation of the treaty on the Hill.

Mr. Irwin: We should get it to the Soviets and get their view by Sunday (June 11), before it is presented to Congress.

Mr. Kissinger: Now regarding the "G" class, older subs, do they have the right to retire "G" class subs and replace them with new ones?

Mr. Schlesinger: It depends on whether you mean old or new "G" class. Only ten of them are new.

Mr. Kissinger: We're talking about new ones. We tried to get them to count "G" class subs in the 740 total figure, but they argued that they were not nuclear and therefore shouldn't be counted. It would be senseless for them to claim that they are not modern and should not be counted and then to argue that they should have a replacement right for them.

Mr. Nitze: They are diesel submarines.

Mr. Kissinger: The reason they are not being counted is not because they are diesel, but rather because they carry short range missiles.

Gen. Allison: That will make the allies unhappy. The short range missiles can reach them but not us. So by our not including them in the agreement, the allies can charge that we don't care about their protection.

Mr. Nitze: What do you mean they can't reach us! These "G" class subs have been on station against the continental U.S. and now they plan to use them against our allies.

Mr. Clarke: They haven't been on station against us for years, at least since 1967.

Mr. Nitze: They had them on station during the Cuban missile crisis. When I was Secretary of the Navy they were on station against us. They were a matter of great concern to us.

Mr. Clarke: Sir, that was a long time ago. They have been carried for at least the last five years as only a peripheral threat.

³ See Document 323.

Amb. Smith: They do not carry modern ballistic missiles.

Mr. Rush: I don't think they should be subject to replacement.

Mr. Kissinger: [to Under Secretary Irwin] What do you think?

Mr. Irwin: I would take Ken's (Rush) view and not count them.

Mr. Kissinger: Then we need to do a statement on this and get it to the Soviets.

Mr. Odeen: We'll get it out.

Mr. Kissinger: In their present configuration, the "G" class subs are out of the deal.

Mr. Nitze: Can they reconfigure them?

Mr. Kissinger: I suppose they could piece together a total of 950 missiles by putting modern missiles on the "G" class subs.

Mr. Clarke: That would be prohibitively expensive.

Mr. Garthoff: If they want to spend that much money they can do it, but it wouldn't make sense.

Mr. Wood: Under the agreement, they would have to take down SS-7s or SS-8s to put modern missiles on "G" class subs.

Mr. Kissinger: You're right, they would. It would be absurd to do that!

Mr. Rush: I would like to discuss satellites before we finish. It's very important that we have a clear understanding of what position we are to take on the Hill regarding verification by satellites. What I would like to do is mention satellites and acknowledge that they provide a means of verification, but not go into any details.

Mr. Kissinger: Does anyone disagree with that position?

Mr. Irwin: I agree with Ken (Rush). The problem is that we have never acknowledged it publicly before.

Amb. Smith: I think it's O.K. It's been a king without clothes for the last ten years. I see no problem in admitting it now, but we should tell the Soviets in advance that we're going to announce it.

Mr. Kissinger: We should not ask the Soviets if we can announce it.

Mr. Rush: What is to prevent the Soviets from building nine or ten new subs within the five year period, but not put them to sea? They would be way ahead of us at the end of the five years.

Mr. Kissinger: We could do the same thing with ULMS.

Mr. Rush: Under the ULMS program we could build one in 1978 and three in 1979. They could have twice as many ready in the same period of time.

Amb. Smith: The answer is that the Soviets can build any number they want and we can do the same thing, so long as they aren't launched. But if they tried something like that, it would be a clear example of bad faith and we could exercise the escape clause.

Gen. Allison: There is no reference to satellites in the release.

Mr. Kissinger: So we will acknowledge the fact but not the details, are we agreed on that?

Gen. Allison: Is that agreeable to Helms? I don't think it is.

Mr. Rush: I believe so. I had lunch with him today, but I didn't discuss that.

Gen. Allison: It was originally in the text and was taken out to avoid making it public. I am here representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I can say that the JCS wanted it out of the text and they don't want it back in. I think the CIA agrees with that view.

Mr. Clarke: We would prefer to keep it out.

Mr. Odeen: We have had changes here today in the positions of OSD and CIA on this.

Mr. Rush: Did I change our position?

Mr. Tucker: Well, I helped you change it, sir.

Mr. Odeen: In view of these changes, we would like to have a brief position paper from everyone on this point. Could we have it ASAP? By tomorrow?

All agreed.

323. Paper Prepared by the Verification Panel Working Group¹

Washington, June 7, 1972.

Approved Interpretation SLBM Limitations and Replacement

(1) *The Soviets may have no more than 740 SLBM launchers on nuclear submarines (H and Y class) unless they replace older ICBM's in accordance with agreed procedures.*

(a) The 740 includes all ballistic missiles regardless of type on nuclear submarines.

(b) It includes approximately 710 SLBMs on Y-class submarines and 30 on H-class submarines.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-011, Verification Panel Meeting SALT Submissions 6/7/72. No classification marking.

(c) The number 740 was arrived at in the negotiating process as a compromise between different views of the number of SLBMs operational or under construction.

(d) *The purpose of "740"* is to establish a clear and unambiguous baseline which avoids uncertainty or debate over the definition of "under construction" or our accepting a definition which may be unverifiable.

(e) According to Article III, the next submarine on which construction begins will be a replacement boat. There is no agreement on the meaning of "under construction," but it is not necessary since destruction of old systems doesn't start until the replacement boat comes out of the construction hall. Therefore, the first SLBM on a Y-class boat off the ways after 710 will be a replacement. The older ICBMs or SLBMs it is replacing will be destroyed as the boat begins sea trials in accordance with agreed procedures.

(2) *The ultimate* total of 62 *modern* submarines is a ceiling on the number of "operational" Y-class submarines. The total of 950 missiles is a ceiling on SLBMs on nuclear submarines plus modern SLBMs (SS-N-6 or 8) on older (i.e., G-class) submarines.

(3) Additional boats and SLBMs above the ceiling can be under construction (by either side) as replacements for existing boats. The only explanation required for the new construction will be what is required by the notification procedures which have yet to be developed. We could not argue that Y-class cannot be replaced with new Y-class or the like—at some point in time we would face a problem with ULMS with this interpretation since we may have as many as ten boats (240 SLBMs) under construction in 1977.

(4) Reaching the number 950 on Y-class submarines will require the Soviets to retire H-class launchers. They will also have to retire SS-7/8 ICBMs. They cannot build Y-class boats to replace launchers on G-class boats. G-class boats and SLBMs are completely outside the agreement unless they are modernized. Any modern SLBMs on G-class will be counted within the 950 ceiling.

(5) The Soviets could retain older SLBMs on G-class boats in addition to their ceiling of 62 modern boats and 950 SLBMs. The Soviets could also retain SLBMs on H-class submarines (i.e., by having less than 950 launchers on the Y-class). But, the total of SLBMs on Y and H-class submarines and modern SLBMs on G-class submarines must be 950 or less.

324. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, June 8, 1972.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

Finally, in the area of bilateral relations, I share what I know to be your desire to proceed at an early date to the next stage of the negotiations to limit strategic arms. I plan very shortly to submit the treaty limiting ABM systems and the interim agreement on offensive strategic arms to our Congress. From my initial discussions with key members of the two houses of the Congress, I am confident that the agreements we concluded will command a substantial majority. There will, of course, be considerable public discussion, and indeed some controversy, about certain of the terms of these agreements. I consider such discussion vital because it is essential that a historic agreement affecting basic security interests should be fully understood by the public. I believe you are aware that certain aspects of the agreement, especially those dealing with offensive weapons, are viewed by some in this country as disadvantageous to the United States. While I am convinced that the “freeze” agreement represents a fair compromise, safeguarding the security of both sides, I know you will understand that members of my Administration who will appear as witnesses before the relevant Congressional committees will be required to give a full explanation of the terms of the agreement and of their implication for our security.

Once the process of debate, explanation and approval has been completed, we will be in a position to move ahead with the follow-on negotiations looking at an early agreement for the permanent limitation and, hopefully, an actual reduction of offensive strategic weapons. However, even before that I believe we should, through our confidential channel, seek to clarify the issues for the next stage. Moreover, it would be helpful if, through the same channel, we can communicate regularly to ensure that the implementation of the initial agreements is carried out to the satisfaction of both sides and in a way that avoids misunderstandings. Obviously, the negotiations for a follow-on agree-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the letter indicates that it was handed to Dobrynin by Kissinger at 10:50 a.m. in the Map Room at the White House.

ment will have the best chance of succeeding in an atmosphere of confidence about the implementation of the first agreement.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

325. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for the Soviet Government¹

Washington, undated.

In connection with the forthcoming hearings in our Congress on the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, it will be necessary to make clarifying statements regarding the implementation of the Agreement and the associated Protocol.²

On the basis of discussions between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev, and discussions between Dr. Kissinger and Deputy Chairman Smirnov and Foreign Minister Gromyko, the following two clarifying statements seem best designed to ensure fulfillment of the intent of the agreement and to avoid any misunderstandings in the process of implementation.

1. G-Class Submarines

As recorded in the discussions in Moscow, the diesel-powered, ballistic missile submarines of the USSR (known in the United States as the “G-Class”) are not covered by the terms of the Interim Agreement unless they are equipped with modern ballistic missile launchers. Thus, it is our interpretation that these submarines do not qualify as “older submarines” for the purposes of replacement as defined in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement.

For purposes of those provisions of the Protocol to the Interim Agreement that refer to the deployment of “modern” ballistic missile

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12. Top Secret. A covering note dated June 8 from Haig to Dobrynin reads: “Enclosed is the material Dr. Kissinger promised you this morning.” A handwritten notation on Haig’s covering note indicates that the material was delivered to the Soviet Embassy at 1:30 p.m.

² Documents 317 and 318.

launchers on any submarine, regardless of type, a “modern” submarine launched ballistic missile is of a type currently deployed by the USSR on its modern nuclear-powered ballistic submarine known in the United States as the “Y-Class.”

2. *SLBM Replacement*

We plan to give the following interpretation to Article III of the Interim Agreement, the Protocol thereto, and the agreed interpretation statement on replacement and dismantling: A “replacement” submarine for the USSR is that nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine that carries the first SLBM launcher in excess of the 740 SLBMs operational or under construction. When that submarine begins its sea trial and for all subsequent ones, the dismantling of an equal number of older ICBMs or older SLBMs must have begun and will be completed in the shortest possible period of time.

The same interpretation would, of course, apply to the United States, except that in this case the number 656 should be substituted for the number 740.

Explanation:

In connection with the forthcoming Congressional debate on the approval of the Interim Agreement, it will be helpful for us to be in a position to specify the time when the replacement process begins. To arrive at such a time, but at the same time to avoid disclosing intelligence data and stimulating public debate on this sensitive subject, one of two approaches suggest themselves:

(a) We could, on the basis of the discussions in Moscow relating to the number of SLBMs operational and under construction in the USSR at this time, mutually agree that the next submarine to enter the construction halls will be that nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine that carries the first SLBM in excess of 740 SLBMs operational and under construction in the USSR.

(b) Alternatively, we would be ready to accept a statement from the Soviet side indicating when this first replacement submarine begins the construction process in the construction halls. We would assume on the basis of our Moscow discussions that this submarine will enter the construction halls in the course of the next few months.

An early indication of which of the two interpretations to adopt would help the ratification process.

This information would of course be kept confidential but it would enable us to assure the Congress that we have the requisite information concerning the commencement of the actual replacement process. It is of course understood that the actual destruction of older launchers need not begin until the sea trials of the replacement submarine.

326. Conversation Among President Nixon, Members of the Republican Congressional Leadership, and Others¹

Washington, June 13, 1972.

Nixon: Looking at the offensive weapons—that’s the critical one, though. The—here, it’s really a moot question, as I said. [unclear] argue about, “Well, why does the United States need to freeze weapons for five years, such as nuclear weapons, including new submarines, for five years and this and that and the other thing? And at certain levels, the Soviet Union’s building some, and we are not. Why don’t we build some?” The answer is: there’s no weapon system in the United States today—none, absolutely none—that was not begun in the Eisenhower administration. And there is no way they are gonna build the submarines—this is what the Joint Chiefs of Staff think—except possibly in a crash program—or should, possibly, in a crash program build any modern nuclear submarines or missile-carrying submarines over the next five-year period.

What we’re really talking about here is that these categories of weapons, to wit, submarines and land-based missiles, in which the United States, as a result of not our decision, but of what we found when we came into office, has no programs; none over the next five years. Now, of course, the other side of that coin is that, in order to keep balance in this equation we have to remember the offensive freeze limits only certain types of weapons. The United States must continue, which means the B-1 program. It must continue with the ULMS program and new submarines. We must continue, of course, with this MIRV program, because the Soviet Union will be continuing with all their modernization and other programs until—unless—until in the next phase of the negotiations when we reach agreement in our interests—which we consider it in our interests, and which they consider in their interests—on eliminating those categories of weapons. And I’m

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 102–8. No classification marking. According to the Nixon Tapes Log, the recording began after 8:01 a.m. at an unknown time while the conversation was already in progress. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. Other participants included Shultz, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Charles Walker, Senator Margaret Chase Smith, Senator Gordon Allott, Senator Norris Cotton, Congressman Leslie Arends, Congressman John Anderson, Congressman John Rhodes, Congressman Bob Wilson, Congressman H. Allen Smith, Congressman Samuel Devine, Congressman Richard Poff, Congressman Barber Conable, Senator Robert Dole, Haig, MacGregor, Flanigan, Cole, Timmons, Dent, Klein, Buchanan, Weinberger, Cook, Korologos, and Ziegler. On June 13 Nixon sent a message to the Senate and a letter to the House of Representatives that transmitted the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms. The text of those messages is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 674–676.

simply saying that in terms of the categories of weapons we need an offensive freeze. We can have all—we can have all the talk we want about, well, “Does this mean more money and the like?” From a very practical standpoint we’ve got to look at what the United States, not what we could do, but what we—but, in a theoretical world, what we actually did do; and the answer is nothing. So, we’re talking about, actually, to stop freezing the Soviet Union in certain categories, where they had programs, we’ll be moving forward at certain levels, and as far as both cases are concerned, we’re going to freeze them at certain levels, also, but we do not have programs moving.

And I—to all those who are not on Armed Services [Committee], I emphasize again [unclear] purpose of doing anything to our guys. I emphasized submarines last week, here. I particularly hit that because getting the submarines in was hard going. But it’s in the interests of everybody to have a certain bargaining chip in. But, we sat around this table with the Joint Chiefs in the last meeting before going to Moscow and I said, “Well, in order for us to have a bargaining position,” I said that, “what do you want to do?” I asked Moorer, “What can we do in terms of if we ordered it, in the event they don’t agree to submarines, for a crash program of building more nuclear submarines, more than the 41 we’ve got?” And he said that, “Well, we can do it—maybe.” He said, “But it would be a very bad decision.” He said, “We shouldn’t just make copies of what is, basically, now an inferior submarine. We should go ahead, build the ULMS, which is a—it will not be on line until 1979.” So, that if you’re looking at that, we’re not leaving the submarines. We’re not talking about freezing us at a level that we would be moving on in the next five years. We’re talking simply, a very—about a very practical situation. And we leave the other one open. The Soviet are quite aware of this, but that doesn’t mean they don’t have things that they may not build then, too, if it’s in their interests. But, I simply say that in the categories that we can move on, if you believe in a very hard-headed deal, which is in our interest, and, of course, it has to be in their interest, because otherwise there’s no deal. So, we leave it there. The arguments will go on and on on the Mideast, and, I understand that, you know, in the House which you’re gonna supplement [unclear]—

Ford: We got into it in great depth, Mr. President. We didn’t find any way, even by writing a line that we would like to write, that it could go to—

Unidentified speaker: Armed Services.

Ford: Armed Services.

Nixon: I think they’re going to send it to two committees in the Senate—

Unidentified speaker: That’s right, sir—

Nixon: The offensive—the offensive limitation.

Unidentified speaker: We're trying that. Fulbright and Stennis have an active correspondence going on on it.

Unidentified speaker: That's how it'll end up I suppose. The—Fulbright has had a meeting about it in committee and he says that he'd like to get on with the treaty right away [unclear].

Nixon: Well, there it is. It's a—I think—I don't think there's any—when they ask questions—as technical questions come up, may I suggest that the next agreement be subjected to various people here, but the—I mean, because this cuts across the Defense Department and the State Department, and the arms control group, and all of them, of course, have certain competence in this area, particularly in the Defense Department, areas you want to ask about, I mean, technical—the size of missile holes or submarines and so forth, why go over and ask the Defense Department. But there they're—we have, as far as the whole picture's concerned, we have the greatest overall confidence, actually, in the National Security Council organization and General Haig, who was just here, just a few moments ago. Of course, we have three or four people on the staff answering any questions on that at any time. We don't—I would suggest that maybe you can ask them technical questions that cut across everything. Then, of course, in certain other fields, you'll find within the government, of course, there's a—you get sort of a schizophrenic attitude. Over at the Defense Department, naturally, that's why I'm working this thing out, despite—to fight something within our own administration. And they have some in theirs, really.

The Soviet, interestingly enough, they're not altogether that monolithic anymore. I don't mean that they have a dove-hawk the way the—a group in their party. But, there are those who are more interested in the development of the Soviet Union economically, and there are those who are more interested in the military side. In other words, there's conflict—there's competition for their budget in the Soviet hierarchy. But, on the other hand, in our case, of course, we've got—the general attitude of the arms control agency is to control arms, period. The general attitude of the Defense Department, of course, is—as it should be—don't weaken our defenses. So, as you go around, you'll find certain shades of difference of opinion, although all agree, by the time we find this—finally sign, that this, this is specifically in our interest.

But—and you're going to find the same thing in the Senate and the House. You're going to find some of your doves will say, "Oh gee, this is great, but it doesn't go far enough." And the—then you'll find others who will say that—which I well understand—which will say, "I don't want to make any deal with the Soviets. We don't trust them. We don't." Or, "Why is it that the Soviet has more than we've got?" And so forth and so on. Or, "Why can't we do—have this with-

out the other program?" Let me say, we've looked at all those arguments, and have reached the conclusions that we have, which I think are in the best interests of the country, but for very practical considerations.

I come back, finally, too, to that practical consideration that, as we approach this, ironically, as we approach the Democratic Convention, apparently, we don't hear them talking about increasing the arms budget. We talk about—they're talking about a cut of \$30 billion, something massive. Can you imagine, incidentally, what a position that would have put us in if that convention had been held, and their plank had been adopted, before I went to Moscow? They have no bargaining position at all. That's the reason why I say, "Do you want any—?"

And they, but—somebody asked Smith the other day, well, they—in the morning A. Ellender asked the question, "Well, then, on this ABM thing, do we have to build that second ABM system around Moscow?" The answer is, "We'd be out of our heads—" I meant [around] Washington. The answer is, "We'd be out of our heads if we didn't." I mean, because, we wouldn't have had a deal unless we had something to give. In other words, let's say they wanted to stop something we were doing. What was it? ABM. And, on our part, we have to realize, too, that this deal is only limited—it's very important—but it's only limited. It's only a beginning. In order to make another deal in the future, the United States—I don't mean needs to be belligerent; I don't mean needs to have a situation where we're looking down their throat—but, we've got to be in a position of, at least, where they respect you, and where they want to make a deal. And, if they think we're behind anyway, why do they want to make a deal? So, that's why, why those—in the end they're not going to find it. You're going to find a lot of people that will rush up there and who, who'd vote for the arms control thing, criticizing it only on the grounds it doesn't go far enough, and then will vote against appropriations for adding the defenses 'til we get the next deal. All right, that's fine. Let's get their votes now, for what we need, so it's the strongest possible vote we can get.

But I'm simply saying that responsible Senators and Congressmen, who are really interested in arms control, should remember that unless our people like Margaret, and Les, and others have voted, have led—have taken the lead for keeping our own defenses at a high level, we would never have had a deal with the Soviet now. And, we're not going to get it in the future, unless we maintain those defenses at credible levels, those defense expenditures. So, there's where it stands at the present time.

Unidentified speaker: You get [unclear] around pretty quickly because it's likely to move without our procurement bill. It's weakened

if they do. The Chairman said yesterday he'd like to get [unclear] next week [unclear]. I don't know whether it's possible or not. I still think, though, we might get a trial run on some of this stuff directly or indirectly next week.

Nixon: Um-hmm?

Unidentified speaker: Just attitude—pick up attitude [unclear].

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Unidentified speaker: None of this coming out of the Committee [unclear] procurement bill [unclear].

Nixon: Well, the hearings, as I said, will bring out a lot of technical things. This is, I can assure you, this is a—I don't, I don't urge any of those who are not experts to get into it, because when I had 'em, it felt like going to school—

Unidentified speaker: Well, that's it [unclear].

Nixon: I recalled them. Yes, sir. I recall that, I mean, Brezhnev, of course, was well briefed, and I was well briefed, too. The size of, you know, the size of a missile hole, and whether or not you can put a more—a bigger missile into a smaller hole as the reason for [unclear] and the rest. He sits there and draws them out. [unclear] You see, it's the kind of bargaining there was.

Unidentified speaker: Um-hmm.

Nixon: It's no pushover on either side, I can assure you.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: Just remember, you can't have a foreign policy that will stand here but not there. You know, it's the old finger in the dike analogy, but, still, it's a—the U.S. foreign policy must be a credible one. It doesn't mean you go to war all over the world. It doesn't mean you take on additional commitments. It doesn't mean that you do fighting where others should do it. And it doesn't mean that you don't restrict—reduce your defense spending in areas where they're overblown. That's what I'm saying, and I'm simply saying that a foreign policy has to be a whole. You have to have a—we have to have a strong national defense, you've got to keep your commitments around the world, or otherwise, if it is not a whole fabric. If you rend it in one place, it's going to unravel totally. Now, I can make the same argument, incidentally, with regard to Israel. I can make the same argument with regard to Europe. Why is it that the European statesmen—in private, some of them, because they have their, their peacenik groups, of course, doing their own thing, and plenty of them—privately all of them—stand very firmly with the United States on—I mean, around—and, I'm speaking, now, of the British as particular from the rest, especially in these critical areas, to say, "Well, we know that you have to maintain your defenses. We know that you have to also end the war in Vietnam with

honor." Because, they know that even Europe, which is the blue chip, cannot be and will not be defended separately from the rest. They know that when you're dealing with something, when you're dealing with the threat that the Soviet still presents—I don't mean they present it maliciously. I'm only saying that the Soviet's failure, or shall we say [unclear] strength in any area, at this time, or its willingness to negotiate in any area, is directly related to America's strength and America's will to commit its strength. The moment that America's strength, or its will to commit that strength, comes into question, your potential adversary has no incentives to negotiate. That's what this is all about. And that's why, that's why I think we have a very good case for presenting it to the Congress and the country, now. We're always going the extra mile. At least, we've agreed what arms limitation brings. Many believe we really shouldn't have even gone that far. But, anyway, we've agreed. That demonstrates that we're not just building arms for the sake of building up the industrial-military complex. It does indicate that we want to limit them, and that we eventually want to reduce them. But we want to do it in an orderly way that will not damage the security of the United States. That's really what this is all about. That's what Vietnam is about. That's what these other things are about. The intentions of this administration are very clear that way. And I think that—

I think that on this whole ground that where some of our opponents try to say that—grab the peace issue on the ground that they will cut defenses, and they will reduce our commitments around the world, and so forth. On the contrary, that's not the road to peace. That's the road to a very dangerous, a much more dangerous world. If the only force in the world which can discourage aggression, the United States of America, withdraws or reduces its ability to discourage that aggression, once the ability to discourage aggression is reduced any place in the world, the chance for aggression and for wars increases. That's why a strong United States in all of these areas is essential if people want peace. It's the only way to look at it.

327. **Conversation Among President Nixon, Senator John Stennis, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Assistant to the President (Haldeman), and the President's Deputy Assistant for Legislative Affairs (Korologos)**¹

Washington, June 13, 1972.

Nixon: We have to realize, Bob, that we cannot continue for four more years the Henry situation. You cannot have a situation where he, basically, is a de facto Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, particularly with his personality thing. You know what I mean? We could do it now, and that's a vital thing. We couldn't have China, we couldn't have Russia, we couldn't have SALT, without this.²

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: Well, it's very important to do what you've been talking about. The goal is to get that darn Defense Department to, you know, tighten its procedures and the rest. The main thing is that when you're talking about the new weapon system—

Stennis: Yeah.

Nixon: —it has ULMS—

Stennis: Yeah.

Nixon: —B-1, and the rest. That's essential, because if we don't have something to give, there isn't anything they can give us. That's just the way it looks. So, I think you should know that all those tortured hours you spend in fighting for an adequate defense budget, fighting for an adequate foreign assistance program, fighting for ABM, of course, that if you hadn't done it, we wouldn't be here—or we wouldn't be, I mean, in this position. So, that's what's coming.

Stennis: But if you—

Nixon: And, and our peace fellows—our peaceniks, you know, are—

Stennis: Yeah.

Nixon: —are saying that—I mean, I think it's just really ironic that the people that say that they're for peace, because they voted against

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 732-6. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Stennis, Kissinger, Haldeman, and Korologos from 9:52 to 11:09 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² According to the Daily Diary, Haldeman left at 10:26 a.m. when Kissinger entered. Stennis and Korologos entered at 10:28 a.m.

ABM and vote—and want to vote to cut the Defense budget \$10, 15, 20, 30 billion, that proves they're for peace. That's what leads to war. Don't you agree?

Stennis: Oh [unclear]—

Nixon: We'd have never got an agreement without this. But—but, you really carried a terrible load there, and here.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Stennis: But, now, I want to ask you a question: I've got the problem here—

Nixon: Yeah?

Stennis: —too, of getting together this military procurement bill, that is—

Nixon: Yes, sir—

Stennis: —one-tenth axing missiles and planes. That's something we've come down on—

Nixon: Right. Right—

Stennis: You're familiar with that. Now, I want to know if you—as I understand—

Nixon: Um-hmm?

Stennis: —you've put this B-1; you feel like that's a must.

Nixon: Yeah.

Stennis: That's doctrine.

Nixon: Right—

Stennis: What about this command post, here?

Nixon: It's a bargaining chip.

Stennis: Yeah?

Nixon: Yeah.

Stennis: What about this command post, here? You know, the—

Kissinger: The ABM?

Nixon: The ABM?

Stennis: —the ABM [unclear]—

Nixon: A must.

Kissinger: A must.

Nixon: A must. I know that a lot of people have said, "He's not going to build it." Like Ellender, you know, raised that point the other day, but—

Stennis: Yeah, but that would be a good bargaining chip, here. I'm not against it. [unclear]—

Nixon: I understand.

Stennis: —but, if something like that would be a good bargaining chip, legislative-wise here—

Nixon: Um-hmm. Um-hmm.

Stennis: But, if you say you've got to have it, why that's all right. That's just, [unclear]—

Nixon: Well, I think you've got this specific—this problem, John, if we get it. If—let me say, the Russians are going to build everything that they're allowed to build.

Stennis: Um-hmm.

Nixon: And if we decide that, even with—after we make an agreement for two sites or two bases, that we're going to build only one, and they build two, you see what it does to your balance?

Stennis: Yeah.

Nixon: It's all very, very sensitive here. So, I think we've got to have it. Right, Henry?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: It would be misread in Moscow, very much, if the Senate said, "Oh no, we're not going to even build one."

Stennis: Um-hmm.

Nixon: And we're only going to build the one that we've got, and we're not going to—and dismantle one, and keep one, and not build the one around the other.

Korologos: That's going to be a tough fight.

Stennis: Yes, it will—

Kissinger: But is it this week?

Korologos: No, it's on procurement—

Stennis: No, no. That's the procurement bill, military procurement bill. The tanks and missiles, all of that's in here. Now, number 3—but, by the way—

Nixon: B-1s, ULMS—all are necessary. All are necessary—

Stennis: All right. I just want to say, now, that ULMS—you want that, the alternate, the advanced procurement—

Nixon: Yeah.

Stennis: —the—it's a crash program, as I look over it.

Nixon: Yes.

Stennis: You don't want any slow-downs at all.

Nixon: No.

Stennis: You want it to go all the way.

Nixon: No, no. We've got to do that in order to have a bargaining position, John, for the next round of SALT. See, the next round will be—because they're going to be building. They're going to be—they're—they've got—

Stennis: Um-hmm.

Nixon: They've obviously got good engineers and scientists, and all the rest—

Stennis: Oh, yes.

Nixon: —and this is about the one thing—place where we can stay ahead.

Kissinger: There is one other thing, Mr. Chairman. It's highly probable that they're going to be putting new missiles into their old holes. Not—not bigger in size, but greater in power, as you know. You've had that briefing, haven't you?

Stennis: Yes. Yes, I have.

Kissinger: There's a pop-out device they've now got.

Stennis: Well, here's what you're going to have out there, now, as I see it: We're going to have one group argue that, that you don't have to do these positive things we've just been talking about.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Stennis: We have this agreement, now. It's going to be approved—the treaty. And, we don't have to go all out. They want to play it down. Now, Senator Jackson—with all deference to him, and his train of thought—he'll be telling people, "Well, we've given it away. We're taking a second position," and so forth.

Nixon: Hmm.

Stennis: Now, he's going to get people awfully confused.

Nixon: Um-hmm. Um-hmm.

Stennis: You see, they're a little, they're a little skittish on this thing, now. And, I told him—I was actually standing in there, pounding for this very thing that you—

Nixon: Um-hmm?

Stennis: —that you mentioned, as I see it, that you've got to have this strength, there. That is to assure the people of America, [unclear] about the Soviets, yet.

Nixon: Yeah.

Stennis: I think if they can stir things up, working from the different end to make the people upset.

Nixon: Um-hmm

Stennis: Our people.

Nixon: Um-hmm!

Stennis: So, this is an answer to that. I was—I've been in favor of SALT before you came back with this agreement to slow down on this ULMS.

Nixon: Oh, yeah.

Stennis: —on a crash basis. In fact, Packard recommended that last October, and they've gotten—

Nixon: Um-hmm, um-hmm.

Stennis: —they've gotten his statement on it, you see—

Nixon: Oh, I see.

Stennis: [unclear]—

Nixon: Yeah.

Stennis: But you came back, and we met at the White House, and—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Stennis: —pieced this thing right off with this positive step.

Nixon: Yeah.

Stennis: Now [unclear]. I mean, I was willing to—

Nixon: Well, you're right, but, basically, if you want to slow it down, or anything, let's negotiate a slowdown.

Stennis: Yeah, yeah—

Nixon: Let's—don't give it away. That's my point.

Stennis: So, now, you've got to have something that assures the American people.

Nixon: Yeah.

Stennis: And I think one thing—and besides them, this old gear we have, and that's the reason last week I made a show at the fleet, just saying one thing, I mean, look at what we already have. You know, emphasizing that.

Nixon: Yeah.

Stennis: But, there is going to be an odd situation until this debate—I'm talking about on the bill—

Nixon: An enigma [unclear]—

Stennis: [unclear]—

Nixon: Yeah, yeah. That'll come in the next—

Stennis: Yes, yes.

Nixon: —three weeks, three weeks.

Korologos: Before the, before the—

Stennis: Yeah [unclear]—

Nixon: Before the [Republican National] Convention.

Stennis: We just got to go on and get that marked up, Mr. President. And that is another point.

Nixon: Um-hmm?

Stennis: We have a rule in our committee that these weapons and all, we don't put them in without a budget recommendation.

Nixon: Um-hmm. Um-hmm—

Stennis: I want to be able to stand there on the floor and say that the President of the United States says he needs this weapon. I think that'll make the difference.

Nixon: You can say that?

Stennis: Well, I think if you would just tell [unclear]—

Nixon: Do you want a letter?

Stennis: —things that are not covered by the budget proposal.

Nixon: All right.

Stennis: Laird is asking for a \$100 million extra in R&D—extra. Now, I aim to just put that off. I think it'd be highly logical to put that off.

Kissinger: 'Til next year?

Stennis: Yes. Now, he's asking for adjustments on ABM and wanting to keep more—and in fact, he should be—but, in there, he'll try to cut this ULMS down to a—not cut it out, but cut it down to an R&D position, you see? Now, I've just said—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Stennis: I favor going all the way. But, anyway, I'm talking about the situation we're up against. So, if we could get this budget matter settled, get a recommendation in, then we can move that bill better. And, if you could leave out the \$100 million extra for R&D—I talked to Laird about this yesterday. He gave [unclear]—

Kissinger: Let me talk to Laird.

Stennis: Basically, you know. That would help.

Nixon: It would, would it?

Stennis: That would help, yes. And, and if we don't get the budget recommendations, it's going to be hard on the floor.

Nixon: Right.

Stennis: He won't even split it.

Nixon: Yeah. The argument—the way I—the way John has looked at it, and I will generalize, because you know the specifics and I don't, but if you could simply say this: That the President has demonstrated that this country—by his Moscow trip—that this country is for limitation of arms. The President has talked to you, personally, and has told you that, that the only way we got the limitation with arms was to have a clear position, where we had something to negotiate it with. There is no question that the Soviet Union is going to continue its own arms programs. They may—they—there's—the only thing that is limited is what is on that piece of paper. Nothing else is limited. Under these circumstances, you are convinced that the President wants to go forward, and that the Soviet leaders may want to go forward, with the second round of arms limitation agreement. But, until we get agreement, we must not discontinue any of our programs. We've got to go forward with our programs. Let's settle them by agreement—agreement; settle them by mutuality, rather than unilaterally. That's really

what it comes down to. And, if I didn't believe in it—believe me, I'd rather not ask for the money, because we're all under tight budgets, you know.

Stennis: Well, I've told you what's on my mind. I'm going to support the B-1 and the ULMS, now, for the full amount, if we can spare some of this R&D, 'cause, you, see, we've picked up [unclear] having the hearings on all this R&D, and that helps us a lot on the floor. So, we'd have to go back and start hearings again. If that could come later?

Kissinger: Let me talk to Laird about that. That's one that I think is easier to handle—

Stennis: But, I don't mean that the idea is I came to you, asking you to—

Nixon: Don't worry. No, no, no—

Stennis: —do that, you know—

Nixon: All right.

Stennis: —'cause I just talked to him yesterday.

Nixon: No, we'll protect you.

Stennis: Well, I have a [unclear]—

Nixon: No, no, no. What, I mean, we're not going to—

Stennis: [unclear]—

Nixon: —we'll talk to him on our own. Just say that we've had some questions raised on this, and we want to know what the box score is.

Kissinger: Well, but if he could—if there is anything at all we could knock off, just to show that we're willing to. Because, our problem, really—when we were—when the President was negotiating with the Soviets, it's miraculous what we got this time, when we had next to no chips. They're building submarines; they're building missiles.

Stennis: Yeah, yeah.

Kissinger: We don't have a program in either. And, we need the ULMS to have any—

Stennis: Yeah.

Kissinger: —something to bargain with in the second round. Without Safeguard, we would have been dead.

Stennis: Dead?

Kissinger: We would have had no negotiation at all.

Stennis: We wouldn't have gotten very far [unclear]—

Nixon: They—we had to be doing something that they wanted to stop—

Stennis: Yeah.

Nixon: —in order for us to get them to stop something.

Stennis: Yeah.

Nixon: Now, that's why we need ULMS and B-1. Then, we got to stop—they want to stop. And then, we'll want to stop something they're going to build. They're building these big missiles, and all these other things.

Stennis: Well, now, you think that this will pave the way, not perfectly, but this will open the door to a second summit?

Nixon: Well, let me say this—

Stennis: How do you—?

Nixon: You have—you have this: You can say that I—that I am firmly committed to the goal of a second negotiation, with the Soviet with regard to arms limitation, and that—and that it, and that—but that it is indispensable—not only to pave the way—it is indispensable—if such negotiation is to take place, and to be concluded in a way that will not be detrimental to the security of the United States, it's indispensable that the United States go forward with some of its own programs, because the Soviet Union is going forward with its programs.

Stennis: Yes.

Nixon: The Soviet Union is going forward with all advanced programs that are not covered by these limitations. The only thing that is frozen, totally, are defensive weapons. But, in the offensive deal, the only thing that are frozen are those that are mentioned. In other fields, the Soviet—Soviets—they can build more bombers if they want, and they can build advanced submarines if they want, after five years. This is only for five years anyway, John.

Stennis: Right.

Nixon: So, under the circumstances, what we need here—first, there should be a second round of negotiations. There will be—probably. But, if—well, the United States must not go into those negotiations with the Soviet doing many things that we want to stop, and the United States doing nothing that they want to stop.

Kissinger: Yes.

Nixon: That's the deal.

Kissinger: The fact that—if the Senate ratifies these treaties this summer, we expect to have a second round start by October.

Stennis: [unclear]—

Nixon: You can say that.

Stennis: Yeah. Right. Yeah.

Nixon: You're—

Kissinger: But, these will be long negotiations.

Stennis: That's right.

Kissinger: We would have—we are planning—

Stennis: That'd be very—

Nixon: In fact, you can even—you can say that the—one of the reasons we want speedy ratification is so that we can clear the way for the second round of negotiation. But, listen: don't let them put it in escrow. You remember that deal on ABM? They wanted to put it in escrow?

Stennis: Yes. That, I know.

Nixon: That'd kill us.

Stennis: 'Cause, I think, it would tie your hands, too.

Nixon: That's right.

Stennis: Well, I've already told you how I feel about it. It's a matter, now, of—well, in my view, it's a matter of time to get the thing together and get it moving, and I've said we would have some hearings on both the agreement and the—

Korologos: The treaty.

Stennis: . . . treaty, and I think, maybe, that—well, it won't satisfy Senator Jackson, but I think he'll [unclear] have a feeling—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Stennis: —that he'll—hell, you know: He'll ask—

Nixon: Right.

Stennis: —all the questions he wants.

Nixon: Well, he's a very good man.

Stennis: Yes, he is.

Nixon: Very dedicated. He just has a strong hang-up on this, and I understand that. In fact, I'd rather have a hang-up this way, than the other way.

Stennis: Oh, yeah.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Stennis: You've helped me here. Now, I'm not going to go back up there and go to—saying a lot of the things we've said here. But, before we get that bill reported and take it up, I do want to go over it, bringing up some points. I think—you know, the other side is going to go to attack me in—

Nixon: Um-hmm?

Stennis: —B-1 and ULMS and all, and I think I ought to be bringing up some of your points.

Korologos: Let's—we shouldn't give away all of R&D on this one, though. Should we? If we end up with no R&D for the next 5 years—

Stennis: No, no—

Kissinger: But that isn't the point [unclear]—

Stennis: I'm talking about that, that \$100—\$100 million in addition—

Korologos: That they're asked for?

Stennis: —that he [Laird] requested the other day.

Kissinger: Well, did you already give what? \$3 billion for—

Stennis: Oh, no, we haven't earmarked that. I guess research and development with \$8 billion is already approved in effect [unclear]—

Kissinger: No, I mean about \$100 million on top of that—

Stennis: Yeah, that's—yeah, that's on top of it. That's [unclear]—

328. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 14, 1972.

Rogers: On the testimony on the SALT agreement,² the—I assume that on the question of reservations we want to do everything we can to prevent any reservations from being attached?

Nixon: [unclear].

Rogers: There has been some discussion at lower levels that maybe we ought to be lenient toward the reservations—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Rogers: —but my attitude is we ought to oppose them like hell. I think it would—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Rogers: —be very dangerous to have reservations.

Nixon: Well, if you do, I think you'd have a hell of a time having to go back and renegotiate with them. [unclear]

Kissinger: I don't know about reser—but, I would say, in principle, every—any reservation would require a renegotiation. And, some of them might be non-negotiable; all of it would be damaging.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 733–3. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Rogers and Kissinger from 10:04 to 11:07 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for the volume.

² Rogers was scheduled to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 19. The text of his remarks is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 10, 1972, pp. 50–55.

Nixon: That's right.

Rogers: So, I think we should just be against the reservations. Ok, well, I'm glad I asked. Now, on the timing of it, because of Mel Laird's testimony—

Nixon: What's—what day is he going?

Rogers: Well, he's going after me. But, I mean, he—I've talked about the testimony where he will link the defense expenditures to—

Nixon: Yeah.

Rogers: —ratification.

Nixon: Yeah.

Rogers: I talked to Fulbright yesterday, and he said that's one of the things he's going to ask about.

Nixon: Um-hmm

Rogers: So, it really gets down to how we do it. Mel linked it very directly.³ He said he couldn't support ratification unless he got what he wanted on B-1 and on Trident. And, I guess he also referred to the—

Nixon: Hmm.

Rogers: —to the Washington ABM site.

Nixon: I think he—well, I think that the way I would, the way I would feel about it, just offhand, is this: I saw what Mel was trying to do, and I know the way the question would come to you. I think the—I think our position should be that we favor the B-1; we favor that, and we favor—we think we would be out of our minds not to do the two sites, because of the equilibrium, and the rest. But, I don't think that it makes sense to—and Henry, they'll probably ask you that question. So, what is your view, too? I don't think if you link it, I don't—if you link it like Mel has, you might run into—you might just start a hell of a fight among the Fulbright-types, which we don't need.

Rogers: Or, you'll have a Jackson saying, "Well, hell, let's not ratify until we see what's going to happen to the defense budget."

Nixon: Oh, we can't do that. We need ratification as fast as we can get it—

Rogers: [unclear]

Kissinger: Well, now, Jackson was in this morning.

Nixon: Was he?

³ On June 6 Laird commented to reporters that he could not support the SALT agreements if Congress rejected funds for a new missile-firing submarine and other U.S. offensive weapons. (Jim Adams, "Laird Opposes SALT Without New Weapons," *Washington Post*, June 7, 1972, p. A10)

Kissinger: And, I think, well, that he is weakening. And, he makes a good point that over the next term, when you get re-elected—which he says he hopes if McGovern gets the nomination—

Nixon: He really does?

Kissinger: That's what he said. He said McGovern would be an unalloyed disaster for the country.

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: He said you—

Nixon: He is. You see what the son-of-a-bitch said this morning?

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Nixon: Well, let's get to agree on an announcement, what Bill should say. Now, Bill would—what are you going to say?

[unclear exchange]

Kissinger: What I would propose to say, subject to—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —the discussion here, is not to establish a direct linkage, but to say, "We think the treaties are justified in their own right. We believe that the other things are equally justified. That we—that the administration strongly supports both. But—"

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: "Each should stand on their own feet."

Rogers: Yeah. I think that's the way to do it.

Nixon: But, I would say this, that I think it's very important, Bill, for you to come down. I mean Mel, by the linkage thing, I mean, he was basically too belligerent, too threatening. But, on the other hand, the—he was talking to his constituency. The thing is that if you could—I think that the [unclear] that this is a—the point I made to the Republican leaders yesterday:⁴ I said, "Look, this is a deal where we both negotiated very hard." I said, "Neither—and, and neither side got everything it wanted." I said, "That's—and that's why it's a deal which both sides, therefore, can and should accept." That, I said, "On the other hand, we have to realize that it's only the beginning of a long process. It's a total limitation on defensive missiles. It's only a partial on offensive missiles. And, it—we must now set the stage for the next development." And, I told, incidentally, Stennis yesterday⁵ that we would have the next round begin in October, if this thing began. But, I said, "In order to set the stage for the next development, we should pass

⁴ See Document 326.

⁵ See Document 327.

this in—but after—.” Oh, then, I said to the Republicans, “We welcome, we welcome from you a thorough, thorough questioning, a thorough examination of this, because we believe that after—that such examination would clearly demonstrate that these agreements are in the interest of the United States.”

Rogers: Um-hmm.

Nixon: I think we have to—I think we have to avoid—I mean, and this will hurt us to an extent here, but it’s the right thing, and it’s the—if it’s not the right thing it’s responsible. We really can’t say this is a better deal for us than it is for them.

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: It isn’t. And, it isn’t. And, they on their part, have got to avoid that, too. The deal is not a better deal for us than it is for them. Frankly, what—if you really get down to it—is—and this is where Jackson understands it, and I suppose you made this point to him as I made to the Leader, Strom [Thurmond]. I said, “Look, what you really get down to it here is that we in the field of offensive weapons didn’t have any cards to play with.” I said, “We have—because we’re not going to build any, either. The Joint Chiefs are flatly against a crash program for new submarines, so we have no cards to play with. We’ve got to build ULMS with the \$59 billion. We have no land-based missile program. We have no new weapons systems, except those that were started in the Eisenhower administration.” I said, “Under these circumstances, therefore, we are not limiting ourselves in any way that we would not have been limited by what the Congress refused to do.” I said, “Now, you fellows know ABM only passed by one vote.” You can’t talk this way in testimony, but you can to our—the other fellows, the realists. I said, “You also know that as far as the defense budget is concerned, it’s totally unrealistic to say that we’re going to have a \$20 billion increase in the defense budget in order to catch the Soviet.”

Rogers: [unclear]—

Nixon: So, the offensive limitation one, I think—which is the tougher one—

Rogers: Yeah.

Nixon: Everybody wants to hold the defense down. They say, “Well, isn’t that great?” But, the offensive one, really—well, looking at the defensive one, you know there wouldn’t be a prayer to get through another ABM if we didn’t have this agreement. So, we’re not really giving anything away over there. That’s the practical thing. The Russians may be just a little worried that there is. On the offensive side, you and I know there isn’t a prayer to get a crash program increasing the defense budget—

Rogers: That’s right.

Nixon: —that the pull is all in the other direction. So, we're not giving away anything there. So, looking to the future, yes, we should be for ULMS, we should be for the B-1, we should be for all these other things—

Rogers: What about NCA—?

Nixon: —but I wouldn't link it.

Rogers: What about NCA? That's, that's a—oh, that's a tough one—

Nixon: You mean, whether we're going to build it?

Kissinger: As I look back on it, that was one major mistake we made in this bloody negotiation.

Nixon: Well, that's [unclear].

Kissinger: And, we did it because the Joint Chiefs and Laird—and Laird gave us a written letter saying that in the context of SALT he, as a Congressional expert, would guarantee that it would go through.

Nixon: Yeah.

Rogers: I don't think it could get through.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: Well, I'm not too worried, to be perfectly candid—

Kissinger: Well, but if we weren't going to get it, there was no sense for our going for it.

Rogers: Yeah, because that gave them a—an extra—

Kissinger: It gave them the—

Rogers: [unclear]—

Kissinger: Then, we would have been better off. We've could've kept Malmstrom⁶ if we had stuck with it. They would have kicked and screamed, but at the last minute, they would have yielded. They were dying to get the agreement. But, you were in no position to overrule the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all your other advisers. State didn't take a position, as it shouldn't have. I mean, it's not a State problem.

Nixon: No, but I didn't—as you know, I never did feel we ought to build that, then. Do you remember the meeting?

Rogers: Yeah.

Nixon: Do you remember I didn't? I said, "Why—who in the hell wants to build it—?"

Kissinger: But you had, well, Allison on the delegation. You had Moorer—

⁶Malmstrom AFB, one of the proposed Safeguard sites.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: You had a unanimous recommendation—

Nixon: Nitze?

Kissinger: You had Nitze. All of them pressing plans—

Rogers: It never made any sense to me, because I didn't think we could get it through. Well, in any event, we can [unclear] that.

Nixon: While we're thinking about it, let's just understand, period, the thing about it is to say, "Well, of course, we should build them."

[Omitted here is a telephone discussion unrelated to SALT]

Nixon: Now, Bill, so that you'll know, I told the Congressional leaders. They said, "Now, do you want this?" I said, "We certainly do." "Because," I said, "it'd be the wrong signal to the Russians, after we've negotiated it, that we didn't build it." And so, I think we should just take the position: we need it, we should have it, and it provides—and it's essential to the strategic balance. And Laird should say that, god-damnit—

Kissinger: Laird will say it.

Rogers: We don't have a budget this year, do we?

Nixon: No, we had the other.

Kissinger: Not yet.

Rogers: I'll have to check—

Kissinger: You know, I think we have it in. Yeah—

Rogers: Or, beginning—maybe it was—

Kissinger: Beginning—

Rogers: —getting seed-money to somebody.

Kissinger: Under their site—

Rogers: Site selection?

Kissinger: We have in the budget, we have advanced—whatever the word is—preparation, but not actual construction.

Rogers: Um-hmm.

Nixon: Well, it was in the original plan.

Kissinger: Yeah, but then it was dropped out and confined to advanced preparation. And now it's back in. Speaking in this room, it was a mistake. We should have just told the military to go to hell.

Rogers: Yeah.

Kissinger: And that we weren't going to do it.

Nixon: Yeah.

Rogers: I suppose, though, that even—well, even though it's a waste of money, it might have some psychological advantage for the country.

Nixon: Let me tell you something: it's—it's not all [unclear]. I mean, let's look at it from the standpoint of the Russians. Why do they protect Moscow [unclear]? Because, there's a hell of a lot of important population there. And this—

Kissinger: And with China.

Nixon: Yes, that's right, Henry; against China. But, there is a very important—let's face it—population complex around here.

Rogers: Yeah.

Nixon: Right, Henry? It isn't just Washington.

Kissinger: Hell, we'd cover [unclear] you'll cover as far north as Philadelphia, which would have—it is—against third-country attacks, there's a certain utility in it, and it forces a larger attack on us.

Rogers: It also gives us an opportunity to develop our technology [unclear]—

Kissinger: In our population—

Rogers: In other words, if you don't have something going, you're not going to have any interest in the, the program.

Nixon: But, also, it's a—the technology for the defense of civilian areas [unclear]—

Rogers: Of course, you know, that's what I mean.

Nixon: —which they've been developing.

Rogers: Sure.

Nixon: The technological developments will go forward here.

Rogers: I think that's the best argument for it. It really is that—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Rogers: —they're going to go ahead with theirs, and if we're out of the business, entirely, we'll fall behind. Goddamn, I thought it was amazing how the expenses go up. Already the estimates were way above what they were when we made them, initially.

Nixon: On, on this thing?

Rogers: [unclear] Yeah—

Nixon: Oh, God. Well, on this, the—I think just, just be—

Rogers: I think I've got it.

Nixon: Does Mel testify after you do?

Rogers: Yeah.

Kissinger: I think he testifies Wednesday;⁷ Bill testifies Monday, isn't it?

[unclear exchange]

⁷ June 21.

Nixon: Well, I think, I've covered it, I've covered it with the—with Republicans, and I'll cover it in my remarks. [unclear] I'm not going to talk long, just—

Rogers: You know, Mr. President, thinking about the renewed negotiations in October, I think, probably, Gerry's going to resign pretty soon, so we have to give some thought to who—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Rogers: —who we'd put in that spot. Maybe you have someone in mind. But it's going to be a long—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Rogers: —tedious job.

Nixon: Get somebody who's gonna give five years of his life to it.

Rogers: That's right. What do you—what did you say the other night at the dinner? You know, what were you called at the—at the Duke Law School? What did your professors call you there? Hell, "Iron Butt?"

Nixon: An "iron butt."

Rogers: [Laughs]

Nixon: That's all one needs to learn the law.

329. Note From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon¹

Moscow, undated.

1. The Soviet side proceeds on the basis that the aggregate levels of SLBM launchers, established for the sides by the Protocol to the Interim Agreement,² cover SLBM launchers of any type, including those on the diesel-powered submarines (known in the US as "G-Class" submarines). In this connection ballistic missile launchers on older submarines may be used for the purposes of replacement as defined in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the note indicates that Vorontsov handed it to Kissinger at 8:15 p.m. on June 14. According to a transcript of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin at 7:52 p.m., Kissinger asked Dobrynin to send Vorontsov over. Dobrynin replied, "Ok. If you have a question or anything please tell him then and then if you have some comment to make, then I will make a report or—but I am really prepared to come anytime to you after if you need or tomorrow morning." (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 14, Chronological File)

² Document 318.

2. The Soviet side also proceeds on the basis that a first “replacement” submarine for the USSR is that first modern ballistic missile submarine that carries SLBM launchers in excess of the 740 SLBMs on nuclear-powered submarines referred to in the Protocol. When such submarine begins its sea trial and for all subsequent ones, the dismantling of an equal number of older ICBMs or older SLBMs must have begun and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time.

As regards the question of specifying the commencement time of the replacement process, the Soviet side proceeds on the basis that national means of control make it possible to determine the commencement of sea trial of a new ballistic missile submarine, and, according to the agreed statement of the USSR and the USA delegations in Helsinki, notification thereof will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the standing consultative commission. In view of the above, additional specification in regard to this question is not required at this time.

The Soviet side proceeds on the basis that a “modern” ballistic missile on a submarine is a missile of the type which is deployed on nuclear-powered submarines commissioned in the Soviet Union since 1965.

330. Note From President Nixon to the Soviet Leadership¹

Washington, June 15, 1972.

With respect to paragraph one of the Soviet oral note,² the U.S. side accepts the Soviet understanding, provided that each time the phrase “ballistic missile launchers” is used in that paragraph it is understood that this refers to “modern” ballistic missile launchers as defined by the explanatory paragraph of the Soviet note. The record is clear that the only ballistic missile launchers on diesel powered sub-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12. Top Secret. According to a handwritten notation, Haig sent the note to Dobrynin by courier at 2 p.m. At 8:40 a.m. that morning Kissinger and Dobrynin spoke about the note, which Kissinger promised to deliver that afternoon: “D: I didn’t quite get what you said last time. K: I mean I’m assuming that what the record sustains is that the only missiles that are counted on the G-Class submarines are modern missiles and if they’re not modern they cannot be used either for replacement nor are they counted in the total.” Dobrynin replied that he understood. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 14, Chronological File)

² Document 329.

marines that count within the aggregate levels of SLBM launchers established by the Protocol are “modern” ones. Any other interpretation would permit a situation where missiles that are not counted within the 740 SLBM total could be counted within the 950 aggregate, and thus could be used as replacements. This is clearly not the meaning of the Protocol or of the record.

With respect to paragraph two, we accept the premise that national means of verification are adequate to determine when the nuclear submarine carrying the first ballistic missile launcher in excess of 740 SLBM’s begins sea trials. Notification of the commencement of the replacement process will, of course, take place in accordance with the agreed statement of the U.S. and Soviet delegations in Helsinki. If we are asked in the course of Congressional proceedings to indicate the time when this will occur we will state that (1) we expect the first replacement boat to enter the construction halls no later than six months from now, and (2) we expect that boat to commence sea trials in approximately two years.

331. Memorandum From the President’s Special Counsel (Colson) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, June 20, 1972.

SUBJECT

SALT/ABM Treaty

I have the sinking feeling that the SALT/ABM treaty debate is degenerating into an issue which, simply stated, is as follows: Do we have to spend more or less on defense as a result of the SALT agreements? It seems to me that we are backing ourselves into an untenable position. Laird’s testimony today is devastating on this point.² He has virtually made Fulbright’s case. Fulbright will argue, as he already has,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 883, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [sic], Vol. 18, May–August 1972. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “Info. copy sent upstairs.”

² In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 20, Laird stated that he would recommend against approval of the recent U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms agreements unless Congress went along with big increases in Pentagon funding for new missile-submarine and bomber projects allowed under the agreements. (Michael Getler, “Laird Again Links SALT, Arms Boost,” *Washington Post*, June 21, 1972, p. A1)

that the SALT agreement merely means that we will be forced to spend more money for defense than we would have had we not entered into the SALT agreement. By the same token, if we indicate vast savings, then we begin to alarm the Stennises, Jacksons, Heberts, etc.

The only way out of this box in addition to downplaying the line that Laird took today is to emphasize that the first SALT agreement is only the beginning. It is SALT II that is the key. That is where we really have prospects for future savings through arms reductions. But you can't get to SALT II without entering into SALT I.

The debate unfortunately seems to suggest that the SALT agreement thus far executed is an end in and of itself. It isn't; it is only a means to an end, the beginning by which we can make real progress toward arms reduction and cost savings.

If we don't get our people off onto this tack, I think in another few days we could be in really deep trouble. My suggestion is that perhaps you ought to get a few people together and let's talk about our strategy on this from here on out and our line. I am very reluctant, as you can understand, to talk to any of our spokesmen about this without having your approval, but I am also very concerned that this issue can degenerate fast.

332. Note From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

1. The Soviet side proceeds on the basis that a formulation in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement concerning the limiting levels of ballistic missile launchers on submarines (950 for the USSR and 710 for the US) no doubt provides for an inclusion in the above-mentioned number of 950 for the USSR of ballistic missile launchers on *all* submarines including older diesel-powered submarines (known in the United States as the "G-Class"). This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the above formulation of the Protocol does not contain any limiting or clarifying definitions of submarines in contrast to a formulation concerning intermediate levels (740 and 656 respectively for the USSR and the US), in which there is a special reference that in this case ballistic missile launchers of *nuclear-powered* submarines are meant.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12. Top Secret. Dobrynin handed this note to Kissinger during a June 26 meeting, according to a memorandum of conversation prepared by Kissinger. (Ibid.) The note is a response to Nixon's note, Document 330.

Besides, the interpretation suggested now by the American side of the number 950 as not covering launchers of older diesel-powered submarines would not correspond to the provision of the Protocol on which the American side itself had insisted earlier and which states that the commissioning in the USSR of additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-mentioned ultimate level (950) *over* 740 ballistic missile launchers on *nuclear-powered* submarines may be carried out as replacements for equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964, or of ballistic missile launchers on *older submarines*.

2. If, however, the American side for some reason prefers now not to count ballistic missile launchers on diesel-powered submarines (if there are no modern ballistic missiles deployed on such submarines) among the number of 950 of launchers permitted for the Soviet Union, and henceforth not to take them into account in matters connected with the implementation of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereof, including the question of the “replacement”, then the Soviet side is ready to meet the wishes of the American side with the understanding that the whole subject of “interpretations” of these documents will be thereby exhausted.

In this case, in order to avoid any misunderstandings in the future the American side should give us an appropriate written text of the interpretation of this question. Such a text, which will be agreed upon beforehand with the Soviet side, should be initialed by an appropriate official. In accepting this text the Soviet Ambassador would be authorized to state that the Soviet side is in agreement with the interpretation therein.

The Soviet side could agree that the aggregate levels of ballistic missile launchers on submarines, established for the sides (950 for the USSR and 710 for the US), cover launchers on all nuclear-powered submarines and launchers of modern missiles which may be deployed on diesel-powered submarines. At the same time it is understood that launchers of older ballistic missiles on diesel-powered submarines are not included in the above-mentioned aggregate levels and therefore can not be used for the purposes of replacement.

3. The Soviet side confirms the mutual understanding reached in regard to a first “replacement” submarine as well as in regard to fixing the time of commencement of the “replacement” process through national means of control.

As to the formulations received from General Haig of possible answers which the White House intends to give to prospective questions by Congressmen concerning the precise time of the commencement of this process,² the Soviet side does not deem it necessary to comment on them in any way and cannot, of course, be bound by those formulations.

² See Document 325.

333. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 27, 1972.

SUBJECT

Interpretive Statement on SLBMs

Attached is text (Tab A)² covering all outstanding points on SLBMs. It follows closely the Soviet language as proposed in the latest note to you (Tab B, para. 2),³ and incorporates other language already agreed. As indicated by Dobrynin's note, the text is cast as a US understanding with which the Soviets agree.

The net effect is that the Soviets will have to dismantle *all* 209 SS-7s and 8s to reach their 950, but the G-Class are entirely outside the agreement, unless modernized with a SS-N-6 or 8 missile. The alternative of accepting the Soviet interpretation is to allow them to keep about 70 SS-7s and 8s and dismantle 22 G-Class submarines and the 70 SLBMs thereon.

I assume you want to go with the *former*, which has been emphasized to the Congress and is our current interpretation.

Assuming that it is agreed to by the Soviets, you should presumably transmit it to G. Smith for his initialing and presentation to Dobrynin, who would initial for the USSR. This leaves the problem of whether it should be then conveyed to the Congress. If not, it becomes a "secret" agreement. But if we do send it, the questions will arise of why it was negotiated afterwards, etc. Since this interpretation has been followed in testimony, it could be explained as merely housekeeping.

Recommendation

That you send the attached text to Dobrynin⁴ (Tab A).

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. "Very Urgent" is handwritten at the top of the memorandum.

² The text is identical to the final version exchanged on July 20, Document 335.

³ Document 332.

⁴ According to a covering note to the statement, Haig sent it to Dobrynin on June 29. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12)

334. Note From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon¹

Moscow, undated.

The Soviet side could agree to the proposed text of the Interpretive Statement on the Protocol to the Interim Agreement with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. However we deem it necessary to include into it some drafting clarifications.

1. In order not to create an impression of some changes in the provisions of the Protocol we suggest to formulate the opening sentence of the Interpretive Statement as follows:

“In clarification of interpretation of the provisions of the Protocol to the Interim Agreement With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons” . . . (the rest unchanged).

2. We suggest to clarify that paragraph 1 states that aggregate levels of ballistic missile launchers on submarines established for the USSR and the United States include ballistic missile launchers on all nuclear-powered submarines and launchers for modern missiles which may be deployed on diesel-powered submarines, since there are no other submarines in both countries. Having this in mind, to formulate paragraph 1 as follows:

“The aggregate levels of ballistic missile launchers on submarines, established by the Protocol for the United States and the USSR (950 for the USSR and 710 for the US) include ballistic missile launchers on all nuclear-powered submarines and launchers for modern ballistic missiles which may be deployed on diesel-powered submarines”.

3. To bring the terminology in paragraph 4 in conformity with the terms suggested earlier by the Soviet side. Instead of the words “older ICBMs or older SLBMs” used in the American draft to say “launchers of ICBM of older types or launchers of ballistic missiles on older submarines”.

Such a terminology would correspond to the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12. Top Secret. A handwritten covering note from Dobrynin, July 17, reads: “Henry, I send a paper as I told you.” According to a handwritten notation, the note was delivered by Sokolov to Richard Kennedy at 4 p.m. on July 17.

335. Statement Agreed by the United States and the Soviet Union¹

Washington, undated.

Interpretive Statement

In clarification of interpretation of the provisions of the Protocol to the Interim Agreement With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on May 26, 1972, the United States understands that:

(1) the aggregate levels of ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs), established by the Protocol for the United States and the USSR (950 for the USSR and 710 for the US) include ballistic missile launchers on all nuclear-powered submarines and launchers for modern ballistic missiles which may be deployed on diesel-powered submarines;

(2) launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel-powered submarines are not included in the above-mentioned levels and therefore cannot be used for the purposes of replacements as defined in the Protocol;

(3) a “modern” ballistic missile on a submarine is a missile of the type which is deployed on nuclear-powered submarines commissioned in the USSR since 1965;

(4) for purposes of replacement as defined in the Protocol the first replacement submarine for the USSR is that modern ballistic missile submarine that carries SLBM launchers in excess of the 740 SLBMs on nuclear-powered submarines referred to in the Protocol; when such a submarine begins its sea trial and for all subsequent ones, the dismantling of an equal number of launchers of ICBMs of older types or launchers of ballistic missiles on older submarines as defined above, must have begun and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time.

The Soviet side has indicated its agreement with this interpretation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12. Top Secret. According to a July 20 memorandum of conversation prepared by Kissinger, he told Dobrynin that the Nixon administration agreed to the statement and that it should be signed as soon as possible. Dobrynin stated that he preferred that Kissinger, rather than Smith, sign it so that it would not appear in the newspapers. (Ibid.)

336. Paper Agreed by the United States and the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 24, 1972.

CLARIFICATION OF INTERPRETATION OF THE PROTOCOL
TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES
WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Having agreed on certain limitations of strategic offensive arms
and to the Protocol integral [to] the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed to the following clarifications of interpretation:

The aggregate levels of ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs), established by the Protocol for the United States and the USSR (950 for the USSR and 710 for the US) include ballistic missile launchers on all nuclear-powered submarines and launchers for modern ballistic missiles which may be deployed on diesel-powered submarines.

Launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel-powered submarines are not included in the above-mentioned levels and therefore cannot be used for the purpose of replacements as defined in the Protocol.

A “modern” ballistic missile on a submarine is a missile of the type which is deployed on nuclear-powered submarines commissioned in the USSR since 1965.

For purposes of replacement as defined in the Protocol the first replacement submarine for the USSR is that modern ballistic missile submarine that carries SLBM launchers in excess of the 740 SLBMs on nuclear-powered submarines referred to in the Protocol; when such a submarine begins its sea trial and for all subsequent ones, the dismantling of an equal number of launchers of ICBMs of older types or launchers of ballistic missiles on older submarines as defined above, must have begun and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 498, President’s Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 4. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the paper reads: “Gen. Haig has signed orig of this as of 7/28/72.”

Done at Washington this 24th day of July, 1972.

For the United States
of America:
Henry A. Kissinger
*Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs*

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:
A. Dobrynin
Ambassador to the United States

337. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 4, 1972.

PARTICIPANTS

Russian Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting took place in an extremely cordial atmosphere.

SALT

Dobrynin began the meeting by a rather strong attack on the Jackson Resolution.² He said it would be very difficult to understand in Moscow why such a measure should be pushed by the Administration. I said it was not pushed by the Administration, but indeed that we had declared our neutrality. Dobrynin said it would never make any sense in Moscow that Senator Scott would put his name on a resolution not supported by the White House. He thought it was very unfortunate and that we would pay a price totally out of proportion to any possible gain. He said that we should remember that Brezhnev and the President signed it jointly; how would we feel if the Soviets attached reservations on their part even if they repeated things that had already been agreed upon? I told Dobrynin I would have to see what could be done at this late stage. Dobrynin said that he had no official

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The luncheon meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

² The Jackson amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 241 on the Interim Strategic Offensive Arms Agreement, August 7, qualified Congressional support so that if a more comprehensive treaty were not achieved within the 5 years of the interim agreement, the United States was not bound to the levels established by the agreements. The amendment was revised on September 13. See *Documents on Disarmament*, 1972, pp. 547, 652–653.

authority but he wanted to tell me that it really would make a great deal of difference if some progress could be made.

Nuclear Understanding

We then turned to my trip to the Soviet Union.³ Dobrynin said they expected some definite progress on the nuclear understanding,⁴ and they were prepared to sign it early in October when he thought it would do us a great deal of good. I said we would do our best, but that their present draft was not quite acceptable. He said it would help if I could give him a counterdraft. I said I would do my best. Dobrynin pointed out that he would return to the Soviet Union on August 14th for about two weeks, so that it would really be quite important to have such a draft available by then.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

³ Kissinger visited Moscow September 10–14. Discussions covered numerous bilateral topics and those related to SALT concerned a resumption of negotiations under a second round, SALT II. A transcript of a news conference held at the White House on September 16 is in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 9, 1972, pp. 389–400.

⁴ On July 21 Brezhnev wrote a letter to Nixon in which he called for an agreement on the mutual non-use of nuclear weapons. The letter is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12.

338. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Miller) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 5, 1972.

SUBJECT

Next Steps with Respect to the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement

On August 3, 1972 the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM).² This leaves three remaining steps to be taken regarding that Treaty, namely:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 842, ABM-MIRV, ABM System, Vol. VII, August 1971. Limited Official Use.

² The Senate voted 88–2 in favor of the ABM Treaty.

1. Signature by the President of his ratification of the treaty. While this can be done without regard to Soviet action on the treaty, the customary practice is to await an indication of the other side's readiness to proceed. (So far as the Soviet Government is concerned, we believe that ratification could be arranged at any time the government chooses.)

2. Exchange of the U.S. ratification for the U.S.S.R. ratification.

3. Proclamation of the treaty by the President.

The steps to be taken with respect to the ABM Treaty should in part follow and in general parallel the steps remaining to be taken with respect to the Interim Agreement. Once the Senate and the House approve S.J. Res. 241, authorizing the President to approve the Interim Agreement, the next steps are:

1. Signature by the President of S.J. Res. 241.

2. Signature by the President of the U.S. written notice of acceptance of the interim Agreement (called for by Article VIII.)

3. Exchange of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. written notices of acceptance of the Interim Agreement. (Under Article VIII of that Agreement the exchange of the notices is to take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the ABM Treaty.)

The ABM Treaty does not specify where instruments of ratification are to be exchanged nor does the Interim Agreement specify where the written notices of acceptances are to be exchanged. It is customary when a treaty is signed in the capital of one country to exchange ratification in the capital of the other country. Therefore the ratifications and written notices of acceptance should be exchanged in Washington as the treaty and agreement were signed in Moscow.

It would be appropriate to hold a public ceremony for any or all of the above mentioned steps.

R.T. Curran³

³ Curran signed above Miller's typed name.

339. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 5, 1972.

SUBJECT

The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) for the Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements

My views on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) are being circulated today to the Verification Panel Working Group, but I feel several of the points covered in that transmittal are important enough to express directly in a note to you:

—The SCC Delegation and the SALT Delegation are assigned by the SAL Agreements and by precedent, respectively, some of the same functions. The US should not decide now how to resolve this overlap. Instead, we should remain flexible, assigning issues for negotiation as they arise, to the SCC Delegation or to the SALT Delegation as our negotiating strategy and tactics might dictate. In effect, we would view the negotiations in the SCC and in SALT as parts of a whole.

—Issues related to SCC instructions should be considered by the Verification Panel; this would help assure coordination between SCC negotiations and SALT.

—The SCC should function independently of follow-on SALT so that the SCC can continue even if SALT should break down. This implies that the US Delegation to the SCC should be organizationally separate from the US SALT Delegation. The two delegations could, of course, have some common members.

—I believe a Presidential appointee from the State Department should head a small US SCC Delegation, with DOD providing the Deputy.

The SCC is, of course, a joint US/USSR Commission; thus, its precise organization and modus operandi must be worked out with the Soviets. I believe, though, that the ideas outlined above, affecting decisions largely under our unilateral control, should form the basis on which we approach establishment of the SCC.

Mel Laird

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 26, SALT, Chronological File. Confidential.

340. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 5, 1972, 8 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

The meeting began with an exchange of pleasantries in which we talked to each other about each other's vacations. Dobrynin said he never had a chance to see Brezhnev who was traveling around the country, but that they had had an extensive phone conversation.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

SALT

He then asked about SALT. What did we think? Could the Provisional Agreement be made permanent? I said, in principle, yes, but the numbers would have to be modified. He asked whether we had done any thinking. I said yes, but it was in a very preliminary stage. He said it would be very helpful for the meeting with Brezhnev if they could have an outline to consider. For example, would we be willing to make the present agreement permanent? I said no, the numbers would have to be modified. Dobrynin asked whether we had given any thinking to qualitative restrictions. Would it be possible, for example, to have a provisional qualitative agreement as a forerunner to a permanent one just as the interim quantitative agreement was a forerunner to a permanent one? I said that was an interesting question which we should discuss.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The dinner meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

341. Backchannel Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 25, 1972, 1655Z.

WH29473/Tohak 3. Dobrynin just called from New York and stated that he had a technical and procedural question with respect to the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons. He stated that the Soviet Government would like to have our views on how to administratively set up the exchange between the two governments which confirms the mutual acceptability of the Interim Agreement. Such questions as who should sign the document, who the document should be addressed to and precisely the modalities that we would prefer and whether the exchange of whatever the vehicle might be, should occur concurrently with the formal exchange of the treaties.

I told him that we would get the best thinking of our experts and pass it to him as soon as possible but that I was sure we preferred a parallel arrangement so that both the Treaty and the Interim Agreement were handled at the same level simultaneously. I will talk to Sonnenfeldt and propose a game plan which I will then forward to you for approval. Dobrynin also merely reaffirmed that he knew we were moving to get the Treaty and the Interim Agreement through the Congress and that he is proceeding under the assumption that it will be ready next week.²

Warm regards.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Exclusive; Eyes Only. Sent through Winston Lord.

² In a September 25 memorandum to the President, Timmons informed him that "the House today suspended the Rules and passed by 306–4 the Senate version of the SALT interim agreement, clearing the measure for your signature. The enrolling process will take a day so the agreement should be at the White House Tuesday [October 3] afternoon." (Ibid., Box 883, SALT, SALT talks (Helenski) [sic], ending September–October 1972)

342. Editorial Note

As part of the SALT ratification ceremony on October 3, 1972, President Nixon and Soviet President Podgorny exchanged letters notifying each government that the Interim Agreement had been accepted. Copies of those letters are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 765, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, USSR Chairman Podgorny Corres. Podgorny's letter to Nixon is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, page 949.

Although the 5-year Interim Agreement did not require United States Senate ratification, it did need a resolution of support, which both Houses of Congress provided on September 30. At the ceremony for the entry into force of the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, which Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko attended, President Nixon remarked:

“On this occasion, we recognize that these agreements mean the first step in limiting the burden of nuclear arms as far as our two nations are concerned. Also, these agreements mean a first step in reducing the danger of war in the world and increasing the chances of peace.

“I have used the term ‘first step’ quite deliberately, because while these agreements have enormous significance in the ban on defensive nuclear weapons beyond the points that are covered in the agreement and in the treaty, an enormous significance in terms of the limitation of certain offensive categories—there remains a significant number of categories in the nuclear field that are not covered. And that is why I share the views that have been expressed by Foreign Minister Gromyko that we must now move from this first step to the vitally important next step in which we consider the whole range of offensive nuclear weapons and try to find agreement between our two nations in that field.”

The full text of Nixon's remarks and a translation of Gromyko's remarks are *ibid.*, pages 947–949. The same day the White House released the texts of the instrument of ratification of the Treaty, the proclamation of the Treaty, and the protocol of exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty and notices of acceptance of the Interim Agreement.

343. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 4, 1972.

PARTICIPANTS

Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Senators Fulbright, Javits, Symington, Scott, Mansfield, Aiken, Sparkman, Spong, Percy, Muskie, and Cooper)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Tom Korologos, White House Staff
David Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff

Senator Fulbright: Mr. Kissinger has once again consented to come down to brief us, which we very much appreciate. The floor is yours. You know the subjects we are interested in. When is the war going to be over? After that you can answer questions on whatever you want.

Mr. Korologos: Let me say first that we should observe the same ground rules as we have done before. This is off-the-record. This has been satisfactory before.

Senator Fulbright: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Very satisfactory. Actually I prefer to answer your questions.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

Senator Symington: You realize you put us all on the spot, hedging on the SALT deal. First you sign the agreement, then Laird says he won't go along unless all of these big things he wants are funded, then Scoop says the deal is no damn good. But I remember that you in Moscow cited our bombers and our FBA, our forward based aircraft. But Jackson then said it stinks and the Administration then supports Jackson.

Now I think the SALT agreement is out the window unless the Russians are totally stupid. One F-4 in Frankfurt can carry 690 kilotons. And yet Jackson says our planes in Europe aren't worth anything and the Administration supports his amendment.² But if these planes are worthless, we should take them out of there. But if we do want to keep them there, then the Russians will never deal with us if we try to exclude them from an agreement.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK MemCons, MemCon—Kissinger, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 4, 1972. Confidential. The conversation took place in a meeting room in a Senate office building.

² See footnote 2, Document 337.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to get into a debate which is now happily concluded. Everything I said in Moscow and in my briefing to the Congressional leaders I stand by. I believe the deal we made was a provident one. Certainly they can build some more submarines than we have. But without the agreement they would build them anyway. The most the critics can say is that the Russians only agreed to stop where they would have stopped anyway; now since we know we would not be building any more, then it is clear there could be no damage in the agreement.

In the next phase of SALT we have the problem of how to define equality. The future has to be that any attempt by either side to achieve strategic superiority can only lead to disaster. No country will stand still for a decisive thrust at superiority by the other side. The question any leader would have to face is, can he launch an attack that is really going to be decisive? Remember that no one has ever launched as many as ten missiles simultaneously. How could a leader stake the survival of his whole society on a plan which launches a thousand missiles, that has to be coordinated with submarines, etc.? Therefore the question I have put before the interdepartmental group working on this is, what do we mean by equality? At least we can have a unified view within the government. Now obviously for the Soviet Union anything that can reach the Soviet Union has strategic implications. I feel that it is just as wrong to try to be cute in negotiations and gain advantages that way as to try a unilateral buildup for superiority.

In so far as putting you in difficulty, I regret it, because I thought everyone treated the SALT agreements with statesmanship and a positive spirit. In the next phase we hope to broaden the scope of the negotiations, so it will be clear that the numbers in the first agreement were unequal only because we were there limiting weapons where the Soviets happened to be ahead. I believe the SALT agreement as negotiated was in the best interest of the United States.

Senator Symington: The one signed in Moscow or the one changed in Washington?

Dr. Kissinger: The one in Moscow. The amendment is an advisory opinion only. Ron Ziegler made a statement the other day that the SALT agreement was the agreement signed between the President and the General Secretary in Moscow. The Jackson amendment was advisory—although we take any expression of Congressional concern very seriously. I'll send you a copy.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

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