

**FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES**

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**1917–1972**

**Volume VII**

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**PUBLIC DIPLOMACY,  
1964–1968**



**DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE**

**Washington**



# Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972

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## Volume VII

# Public Diplomacy, 1964–1968

*Editor* Charles V. Hawley  
*General Editor* Adam M. Howard

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Washington  
2018

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN  
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# About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series, which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

## *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government

agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Record Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files covering this period are available at Archives II. Almost all of the Department's decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, a small number of documents are extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Johnson Library is processing and declassifying those documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Johnson Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Di-

vision. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in this volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words repeated in telegrams to avoid garbling or provide emphasis are silently corrected. Words and phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarized pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provided references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

#### *Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation*

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records,

advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

### *Declassification Review*

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2016 and was completed in 2017, resulted in the decision to withhold one document in full, excise a paragraph or more in no documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in one document.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the public diplomacy of the Johnson administration.

**Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.**

*Acting Historian*

Bureau of Public Affairs

December 2018

# Preface

## *Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, Public Diplomacy, 1917–1972*

In 2007, historians at the Office of the Historian proposed a retrospective *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* volume designed to augment the series' coverage of U.S. public diplomacy. While the series began to document the subject in a sustained and concerted way starting with the second administration of President Richard M. Nixon, previous *FRUS* coverage of U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been far less consistent. These retrospective volumes will fill that gap, stretching from the First World War to the early 1970s. Resource constraints and the statutory requirement to publish *Foreign Relations* volumes 30 years after the events that they cover mean that compilations in this volume have been researched and compiled piecemeal over a longer period of time than the typical *FRUS* volume. Fortunately, progress is being made. During the fall of 2014, the Office released the first volume covering the U.S. Government's public diplomacy efforts from 1917 to 1919. With the publication of this volume, the retrospective includes coverage of public diplomacy efforts from 1961 until 1972. Subsequent volumes documenting 1920 to 1960 will be published as they are completed.

This volume, covering the years 1964 to 1968 focuses on President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration's efforts to shape and execute public diplomacy and information policy during the middle period of the Cold War. It details the various ways the United States Information Agency (USIA) presented U.S. foreign policy objectives to global audiences during a time of great social change within the United States, particularly during the Civil Rights Movement. The compilation also describes how the Johnson administration, through both USIA and the Department of State, utilized the various tools of public diplomacy in the face of numerous crises, including the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and transition to the Johnson administration, the Dominican Republic intervention, the ongoing nuclear test-ban treaty negotiations, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and, most significant, the Vietnam War, which was a dominant focus through Johnson's Presidency. Additional documentation chronicles the Johnson administration's attempts to reassure the world of U.S. stability following Kennedy's death, to promote a domestic policy during a period of great cultural change, which would greatly impact foreign policy, and to advance the Department of State's educational exchange activities, partic-



Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; and Scientific Matters.

**Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.**  
*General Editor*

*Acknowledgments*

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of John Laster and Peter Halligas of the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.; Elizabeth Gray, David Langbart, Tab Lewis, Don McIlwain, Richard Peuser, and Daniel Rooney of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland; and Claudia Anderson, Jennifer Cuddeback, Jenna DeGraffenried, Regina Greenwell, Lara Hall, and John Wilson of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. Charles V. Hawley and Kristin Ahlberg researched this volume. Charles Hawley selected and edited the documentation for the volume, under the supervision of Adam M. Howard, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Adam Howard and Kristin Ahlberg reviewed the compilation. Stephanie Eckroth performed the copy and technical editing, under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, chief of the Editing and Publishing Division, and Carl Ashley, chief of the Declassification Division, coordinated the declassification review. Joseph Wicentowski provided technical assistance in creating the multimedia component of this volume.

**Charles V. Hawley, Ph.D.**  
*Historian*

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# Sources

The National Archives and Records Administration is the key repository for the majority of the important documents related to the Johnson administrations public diplomacy efforts. The single most important source of documentation is Record Group 306, the records of the United States Information Agency (USIA)/United States Information Service. These collections are a fertile source of information about USIA, the agency in Johnson's administration specifically tasked with public diplomacy and outreach. The USIA Historical Collection includes Subject Files (containing records relating to USIA function, mission, organization, and programs compiled by former USIA archivist Martin Manning), Office of the Director Files (containing biographical material on USIA senior personnel and major speeches), and Reports and Studies Files. The Office of the Director Files is also an excellent source of high-level documentation; particularly useful files include the Director's Subject Files. The files of the Office of Policy (after 1966 the name changed to Office of Policy and Research), as well as the Research and Reference Service (which was absorbed into the Office of Policy and Research in mid-1966), contain a variety of USIA printed products, including the Foreign Opinion Notes, Briefing Papers, Special Reports, and Research Memoranda. Please note that following the completion of the research for this volume, several entry numbers for Record Group 306 have changed, including the following: UD-WW 101, UD-WW 108, and UD-WW 257, which are currently P-331; and UD-WW 151, which is currently UD-WW 379.

The Presidential papers of Lyndon Johnson are another important source of high-level decision making documentation on public diplomacy. A number of collections from the National Security Affairs (NSA) files are relevant to research in this area, particularly the USIA Agency and Vietnam Country files. The Leonard Marks files, in the Office of the President Files, as well as the S. Douglas Cater and Harry McPherson files in the Office Files of the White House Aides contain the most relevant public diplomacy documentation. Beyond the National Security Affairs files, the White House Central Files are also an excellent source of documentation on public diplomacy. Additionally, the Subject Files yield substantial material on USIA on a wide range of topics.

Records of the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) also are important to consult on the Johnson administration's public diplomacy policy-making. Although the bulk

of CU files was transferred to the special collections of the University of Arkansas Libraries in 1983, significant CU records remain in RG 59 at the National Archives. Of the files that remain at the National Archives, the Subject Files in the Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Records of the Multilateral Activities of the Secretariat to the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs and to the Advisory Committee on the Arts are especially rich. Among the records housed at the University of Arkansas, the files of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection (Manuscript Collection 468), Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs (Group VII) are of particular interest for this volume. Group VII contains 5 series. Series 4, which contains the Correspondence records of the Chronological Files, yielded revealing documentation on the United States Government's international book and library programs.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

### Unpublished Sources

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##### **Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State**

###### *Central Files.*

In February 1963 the Department of State switched from a decimal file system to a subject-numeric system for its Central Files

CUL 8-1, culture; policy, plans, guidelines

POL 1, US-Viet S, general policy, U.S.-South Vietnam

POL 27 VIET S, military operations in Vietnam

###### *Lot Files.*

PA Files: Lot 67D131 (Entry A1-5226)

Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Subject Files, 05/17/1961-10/15/1965

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**Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas**

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National Security File

Agency File

Country File

Country File—Vietnam

Subject File

Office of the President File

Marks, Leonard

### Office Files of the White House Aides

S. Douglas Cater

Harry McPherson

### Special Files

Handwriting File

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meeting

### President's Daily Diary

### Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings

### United States Information Agency Records

### White House Central Files

Confidential File

Country Files

Subject Files

## University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas

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# Abbreviations and Terms

**AAU**, Amateur Athletic Union  
**ABA**, American Booksellers Association  
**ABC**, American Broadcasting Company  
**ACEC/S or ACE/S**, Secretariat of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange and the Advisory Committee on the Arts, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State  
**ACLU**, American Civil Liberties Union  
**AEC**, Atomic Energy Commission  
**AF**, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State  
**AFL-CIO**, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations  
**AFN**, Armed Forces Network  
**AFP**, Agence France Presse (French Press Agency); also Alliance for Progress  
**AFRTS**, Armed Forces Radio and Television Services  
**AID**, Agency for International Development  
**ALA**, American Library Association  
**Amb.**, ambassador  
**ANZUS**, Australia, New Zealand, United States  
**AOI or USIA/AOI**, Office of the Assistant Director, Administration, United States Information Agency after 1967  
**AP**, Associated Press  
**ARA**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**ARVN**, Army of the Republic of Vietnam  
**ASAP**, as soon as possible  
**ASEAN**, Association of South East Asian Nations

**BA**, Bachelor of Arts  
**BBC**, British Broadcasting Corporation  
**Benelux**, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg  
**BNC**, Bi-national Center (USIS)  
**BOB**, Bureau of the Budget  
**BOQ**, Bachelor Officers' Quarters  
**BPAO**, Branch Public Affairs Officer

**CA**, circular airgram (USIA)  
**CAO**, cultural affairs officer  
**CAR**, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
**CAS**, controlled American source  
**CBS**, Columbia Broadcasting System  
**cc**, carbon copy  
**CENTO**, Central Treaty Organization  
**CF**, confidential file  
**Ch**, chair  
**Chieu Hoi**, Government of South Vietnam's Viet Cong repatriation program  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CINCEUR**, Commander in Chief, European Command  
**CINCLANT**, Commander in Chief, Atlantic  
**CINCPAC or USCINCPAC**, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command

**CINCSO**, Commander in Chief, Southern Command  
**CINCSTRIKE**, Commander in Chief, Strike Command  
**CINCUSAREUR**, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe  
**COB**, close of business  
**COM**, chief of mission  
**ComMedia**, communications and media  
**COMSAT**, communication satellite  
**COMUSMACV**, Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
**Cong.**, Congress  
**CORDS**, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support  
**CORE**, Congress of Racial Equality  
**COSATI**, (White House) Committee on Scientific and Technological Information  
**CP**, cultural presentation  
**CPAO**, Chief Public Affairs Officer  
**CPP**, Country Plan Program  
**CPPM**, Country Plan Program Memorandum  
**CPR**, Chinese People's Republic (People's Republic of China)  
**CRP**, Chinese Reporting Program (USIS)  
**CTR**, Carl T. Rowan  
**CU**, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State  
**CU/EUR**, Office of European Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State  
**CU/MPP**, Office of Multilateral Policy and Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State (after mid-1966)  
**CU/MSD**, Multilateral and Special Activities, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State (prior to mid-1966)  
**CU/OPP**, Office of Policy and Plans, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State  
**CU/PRS**, Policy Review and Research Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State (after 1964 the name changed to Policy Review and Coordination Staff)  
**cy**, copy

**D**, Democrat  
**DCM**, deputy chief of mission  
**Dept.**, Department  
**Distrib.**, distribution  
**DM**, Deutsche Mark  
**DOD**, Department of Defense  
**DOD/ISA**, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs  
**DOD/SACSA**, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Department of Defense  
**DPAO**, Deputy Public Affairs Officer  
**DRV**, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)  
**DW or DMW**, Donald M. Wilson

**EA**, Office of East Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State (until 1967); also Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State (after 1966)  
**EB**, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State  
**EC**, European Community  
**ECON**, economic section of an embassy  
**EDC**, European Defense Community  
**EDT**, Eastern Daylight Time

**EE**, Eastern European Affairs or Eastern Europe  
**EEC**, European Economic Community  
**Emb.**, Embassy  
**Embtel**, Embassy telegram  
**E.O.**, Executive Order  
**ERM**, Edward R. Murrow  
**EST**, Eastern Standard Time  
**ETV**, educational television  
**EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/CE**, Office of Central European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/EE**, Office of Eastern European Affairs or Eastern Europe, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/SES**, Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/SOV**, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EWA**, Education and World Affairs  
**EXDIS**, exclusive distribution

**FBI**, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
**FBIS**, Foreign Broadcast Information Service  
**FCC**, Federal Communications Commission  
**FE**, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State  
**Fed.**, federal  
**ForMin**, foreign minister  
**FRG**, Federal Republic of Germany  
**FSIO**, Foreign Service Information Officer  
**FSO**, Foreign Service Officer  
**FSR**, Foreign Service Reserve (USIA)  
**FY**, fiscal year  
**FYI**, for your information

**G**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
**G-77**, Group of 77 (group of developing countries established at the conclusion of UNCTAD in 1964)  
**G/Y**, Special Assistant for Youth, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
**GA**, United Nations General Assembly  
**GAO**, General Accounting Office  
**GATT**, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
**GDP**, gross domestic product  
**GDR**, German Democratic Republic  
**gen.**, general  
**GI**, government issue or general issue  
**GMT**, Greenwich Mean Time  
**GOE**, general operating expense  
**GOM**, Government of Mexico  
**GNP**, gross national product  
**GS**, General Schedule  
**GSP**, generalized system of preferences  
**GVN**, Government of Vietnam

**H**, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State

**HAR**, Hewson A. Ryan

**HEW or DHEW**, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

**HHH**, Hubert Horatio Humphrey

**HICOM Ryukyus**, High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands

**HIRC**, House International Relations Committee

**Hop Tac**, Government of South Vietnam program for the pacification of Saigon and surrounding provinces

**I or USIA/I**, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency

**I/O or USIA/I/O**, Operations Center, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency

**I/R or USIA/I/R**, Office of the Assistant Director, Public Information, United States Information Agency

**I/S or USIA I/S**, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency

**IAA or USIA/IAA**, Office of the Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency

**IAE or USIA/IAE**, Office of the Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency

**IAF or USIA/IAF**, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency (after 1966 the name changed to Office of the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific)

**IAL or USIA/IAL**, Office of the Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency

**IAN or USIA/IAN**, Office of the Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency

**IAS or USIA/IAS**, Office of the Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency

**IBS or USIA/IBS**, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency (after 1967 the name changed to Office of the Assistant Director, Broadcasting)

**ICBM**, intercontinental ballistic missile

**ICRC**, International Committee of the Red Cross

**ICS or USIA/ICS**, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency (after 1967 the name changed to Office of the Assistant Director, Information Centers,

**IFC**, International Finance Corporation

**IGC or USIA/IGC**, Office of the General Counsel, United States Information Agency

**IIE**, Institute of International Education

**IMF**, International Monetary Fund

**IMS or USIA/IMS**, Motion Picture Service, United States Information Agency (until 1966)

**IMV or USIA/IMV**, Office of the Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television, United States Information Agency (after 1966)

**Infoguide**, policy statement on U.S. attitudes toward a given situation, usually classified and transmitted by telegram or pouch

**INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**INS**, United States Immigration and Naturalization Service

**IO**, international organization; also information officer, United States Information Agency; also, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**IOA**, Office of the Assistant Director, Administration, United States Information Agency (until 1967; thereafter AOI or USIA/AOI)

**IOA/B**, Agency Budget Officer, Office of the Assistant Director, Administration, United States Information Agency

**IOC or USIA/IOC**, Office of Private Cooperation, United States Information Agency (abolished in 1967 and integrated into IOP and ICS)

**IOC**, International Olympic Committee

**IOP or USIA/IOP**, Office of Policy, United States Information Agency (after 1966 the name changed to Office of Policy and Research)

**IOP/G or USIA/IOP/G**, Policy Guidance Staff, Office of Policy, United States Information Agency (after mid-1967 the name changed to Policy Guidance and Media Reaction Staff)

**IPS or USIA/IPS**, Press and Publication Services, United States Information Agency (after 1967 the name changed to Office of the Director, Press and Publications Service)

**IPT or USIA/IPT**, Office of Personnel and Training, United States Information Agency (after 1967 the name changed to Office of the Assistant Director, Personnel and Training)

**IRG**, Interdepartmental Regional Group

**IRS or USIA/IRS**, Research and Reference Service, United States Information Agency (until mid-1966)

**ITV or USIA/ITV**, Television Service, United States Information Agency (until 1966)

**IV**, International Visitors (cultural exchanges)

**JSC**, Joint Chiefs of Staff

**JUSPAO**, Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (South Vietnam)

**KGB**, *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (State Security Committee)

**Komsomol**, youth division, Communist Party of the Soviet Union

**kw**, kilowatt

**L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

**LA**, Latin America

**LBJ**, Lyndon Baines Johnson

**LDB**, Lucius D. Battle

**LDC**, less developed country

**LHM**, Leonard H. Marks

**M**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

**M/MO**, Management Operations, Department of State

**MA**, Master of Arts

**MAAG**, Military Assistance Advisory Group

**MACV**, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

**mags.**, magazines

**MAP**, Military Assistance Program

**McGB**, McGeorge Bundy

**MECEA**, Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays Act)

**MinEd.**, Ministry of Education

**MIT**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**mm**, millimeter

**MOA**, memorandum of agreement

**MOI**, Ministry of Information (Vietnam)

**Mopix**, motion pictures

**MOU**, memorandum of understanding

**mtg.**, meeting

**NAACP**, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

**NAC**, North Atlantic Council

**NASA**, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
**NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**NBC**, National Broadcasting Company  
**NEA**, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State; also National Endowment for the Arts  
**NEH**, National Endowment for the Humanities  
**NGO**, non-governmental organization  
**NIH**, National Institutes of Health  
**NLF**, National Liberation Front  
**NODIS**, no distribution  
**NP**, nuclear non-proliferation  
**NPT**, nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  
**NSA**, National Security Administration; National Student Association  
**NSAM**, National Security Action Memorandum  
**NSC**, National Security Council  
**NSF**, National Science Foundation

**O**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration  
**O/A**, oversize attachment  
**OAS**, Organization of American States  
**OBE**, overtaken by events  
**OCO**, Office of Civil Operations  
**OECD**, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
**OMB**, Office of Management and Budget  
**OPEC**, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries  
**ORTF**, Office de Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française

**P**, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State; also Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; also, President  
**P/PG**, Policy Plans and Guidance Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State; also Office of Policy Guidance  
**P/VN**, Vietnam Desk, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State  
**PAAs**, Public Affairs Advisers, Department of State  
**Pak**, Pakistan  
**PAM**, Program Action Memorandum  
**PAO**, public affairs officer  
**para**, paragraph  
**PASB**, Pan American Sanitary Bureau  
**PAVN**, People's Army of (North) Vietnam  
**PBS**, Public Broadcasting Service  
**PEN**, non-governmental organization based in the United Kingdom that advocates for human rights, particularly the freedom of expression  
**PKI**, Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)  
**P.L.**, public law; also Pathet Lao  
**PLO**, Palestine Liberation Organization  
**PM**, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State  
**POL**, petroleum, oil, lubricants; political section of an Embassy  
**POLAD**, Political Adviser  
**PPBS**, Planning-Programming-Budgeting System  
**PPP**, post project proposal; also program priority paper  
**PRC**, People's Republic of China  
**Pres.**, President  
**PsyOps**, psychological operations

**PsyWar**, psychological war/warfare  
**PVO**, private voluntary organization

**Q & A**, question-and-answer  
**QTE**, quote

**R**, Republican  
**R & D**, research and development  
**RD**, Revolutionary Development  
**Ref**, reference  
**Reftel**, reference telegram  
**Res**, resolution  
**Rev.**, reverend  
**RFE/RL**, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty  
**RG**, Record Group  
**RIAS**, *Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor* (United States Radio in the American Sector in Berlin)  
**RLG**, Royal Lao Government  
**RLN**, Radio Liberty Network  
**ROK or ROKG**, Republic of Korea/Republic of Korea Government  
**rpt.**, repeat  
**rptd.**, repeated  
**RSC**, Regional Service Center (USIA)  
**RTD**, R.T. Davies

**S**, Office of the Secretary of State; also, Senate  
**S-5**, Civil Affairs or Civil Affairs Officer(s)  
**S/AH**, Ambassador-At-Large W. Averell Harriman  
**S/AL**, Ambassador-At-Large Henry Cabot Lodge  
**S/P**, Policy Planning Council, Department of State  
**S/PRS**, Office of Press Relations, Office of the Secretary of State  
**S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State  
**SAT**, satellite  
**SCA**, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State  
**SE**, Southeast  
**SEATO**, South East Asia Treaty Organization  
**Sec**, Secretary  
**SECAF**, Secretary of the Air Force  
**SECNAV**, Secretary of the Navy  
**SECSTATE**, Secretary of State  
**Sen**, Senator  
**SFRC**, Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
**SIG**, Senior Interdepartmental Group  
**SOP (S.O.P.)**, standard operating procedure  
**SOV**, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**SovBloc**, Soviet Bloc  
**Spaso/Spaso House**, residence of United States Ambassadors in Moscow since 1933.  
**STADIS**, distribution within the Department of State only  
**Stat.**, statute

**TASS**, Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union)  
**Telex**, switched network of teleprinters  
**TV**, television



**U**, Office of the Under Secretary of State

**UAE**, United Arab Emirates

**UAR**, United Arab Republic

**UK**, United Kingdom

**UN**, United Nations

**UNDP**, United Nations Development Programme

**UNESCO**, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

**UNGA**, United National General Assembly

**UNICEF**, United Nations Children's Emergency Fund

**UPI**, United Press International

**US**, United States

**USA**, United States of America; also United States Army

**USACI**, United States Advisory Commission on Information

**USAF**, United States Air Force

**U.S.C.**, United States Code

**USEC**, United States Mission to the European Community

**USG**, United States Government

**USIA**, United States Information Agency

**USINFO**, series indicator for messages from USIS

**USIS**, United States Information Service

**USITO**, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Information Agency to its overseas missions

**USN**, United States Navy

**USOE**, United States Office of Education

**USOM**, United States Operations Mission

**USRO**, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

**USSR**, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**USUN**, U.S. Mission to the United Nations

**VC**, Viet Cong

**VIP**, very important person

**VIS**, Vietnamese Information Service

**VOA**, Voice of America

**WH**, White House

**Wireless File**, daily news service supplied to the field by USIA

**WWE**, Worldwide English

**YMCA**, Young Men's Christian Association

**Z**, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)

# Persons

**Acheson, Dean**, Secretary of State from 1949 until 1953

**Ackerman, William C.**, Deputy Director, Public Information and Reports Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State until August 29, 1965; thereafter Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary

**Adams, Ruth**, Branch Chief, *America Illustrated*, Publications Division, Press and Publication Service, United States Information Agency until 1966

**Adamson, Keith E.**, Deputy Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency from October 10, 1963, until December 19, 1966; Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Saigon until May 1968; thereafter Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Vientiane

**Adenauer, Konrad**, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany; Christian Democratic Union Chairman until March 1966

**Adoula, Cyrille**, Prime Minister of the Congo from August 2, 1961, until June 30, 1964

**Akers, Robert W.**, Deputy Director, United States Information Agency from August 19, 1965

**Allen, George Venable**, Director, United States Information Agency, from November 1957 until 1960; Director of the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State from March 1, 1966

**Anderson, Burnett**, Assistant Deputy Director, Policy and Plans, Office of Policy, United States Information Agency until January 18, 1965; Deputy Director until June 1967; thereafter Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Madrid

**Andreas, Dwayne O.**, Chairman, Executive Committee, National City Bank of Minneapolis; member, President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs

**Andrew, George William, Jr.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Alabama)

**Arzac, Daniel N.**, Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy in Bogota from December 22, 1963, until April 12, 1964; First Secretary until November 21, 1965; thereafter Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

**Askey, Dennis**, Publications Editor, Press and Publications Service, United States Information Agency until April 25, 1965; thereafter Supervisor, International Information Program

**Ayub Khan**, Field Marshal Mohammad, President of Pakistan and Minister of Defense

**Babbidge, Homer D., Jr.**, President of the University of Connecticut from 1962 until 1972; Chairman, United States Advisory Commission on International Education and Cultural Affairs until July 1967

**Ball, George W.**, Under Secretary of State until September 30, 1966; Representative to the United Nations from May 14, 1968, until September 25, 1968

**Bardos, Arthur A.**, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Conakry from August 1963 until May 1965; Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Saigon until February 1967; United States Information Agency member of the Foreign Service Board of Examiners until May 1968; Cultural Affairs Advisor, Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency from June 1968

**Barker, John S.**, Administrative Officer, United States Information Agency until May 9, 1965; Administrative Manager, Montreal Exhibition, until September 26, 1965; Budget Officer until November 14, 1966; thereafter Employee Development Officer

- Barnsley, Richard S.**, Program Coordinator, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency until December 19, 1965; thereafter Publications Officer and Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Beirut
- Bartlett, Lynn M.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education from 1965 until 1968
- Bator, Francis M.**, member of the National Security Staff from April 1964; Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 1965 until September 1967
- Batson, Douglas N.**, Consultant to the Policy Planning Council, Department of State from February 24, 1964, until October 31, 1964; Director, Multilateral Planning Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs from November 22, 1964, until February 28, 1965; Director, Multilateral and Special Activities until October 10, 1966; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs
- Battle, Lucius D.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs until August 20, 1964; Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, from September 22, 1964, until March 5, 1967; Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs from April 5, 1967
- Belk, Samuel**, member, National Security Council Staff until 1965; Coordinator for International Cooperation, Department of State, until March 1967; thereafter Director, Reports and Information Staff, Office of the War on Hunger, Agency for International Development
- Bell, David E.**, Administrator, Agency for International Development until July 1966; member, President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs
- Bell, Gordon H.**, Assistant Director, Office of Private Cooperation (abolished in 1967), United States Information Agency, from September 1966 until July 1967; thereafter Special Assistant, Information Center Services
- Bell, James Dunbar**, Ambassador to Malaysia from March 23, 1964
- Bennett, W. Tapley Jr.**, Ambassador to the Dominican Republic from March 23, 1964, until April 13, 1966; Ambassador to Portugal from July 20, 1966
- Betancourt, Rómulo**, President of Venezuela until March 11, 1964
- Betz, Margaret J.**, Chief, Correspondence Unit, Public Information and Reports Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchange, Department of State, until July 1964; Educational and Cultural Exchange Officer, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Programs, until November 1965; thereafter Staff Assistant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs
- Black, Eugene R.**, former President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs; Special Advisor to the President on Southeast Asian Economic and Social Development after 1965
- Bliss, Ray C.**, Chairman of the Republican National Committee from 1965 until 1969
- Blough, Roger M.**, Chairman and Chief Executive of the United States Steel Corporation until 1969
- Bow, Frank T.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Ohio)
- Bowles, Chester B.**, Ambassador to India
- Brady, Leslie S.**, Assistant Director, Soviet Bloc, United States Information Agency until July 1964; Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Paris
- Brandt, Herbert Frahm (Willy)**, Governing Mayor of Berlin until 1966; Foreign Minister from 1966
- Brezhnev, Leonid I.**, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Brooke, Edgar D.**, Assistant Deputy Director, Media Content, United States Information Agency, until February 1965; Inspector General, until January 1968; Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Brussels

- Brown, Kermit K.**, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency, until January 17, 1965; Assistant Director for Latin America until early 1968
- Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este**, United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom from March 17, 1961, until March 20, 1969
- Brumberg, Abraham**, Supervisor and Technical Publications Editor, United States Information Agency from February 1961
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew**, member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from 1966 until 1967
- Bui Diem**, Vietnamese Chief of Staff in the Quat government until June 1965; Special Assistant for Planning and Foreign Aid in the Thieu-Ky government from June 1965
- Bunce, W. Kenneth**, Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency, until August 15, 1965; Counselor of Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Seoul
- Bundy, McGeorge**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until February 28, 1966
- Bundy, William P.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until March 15, 1964; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from March 16, 1964 (title change to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs on November 1, 1966)
- Bunker, Ellsworth**, Consultant, United States Department of State until January 1964; Representative to the Organization of American States from January 29, 1964 until November 7, 1966; Ambassador at Large from 1966 until 1967; Ambassador to South Vietnam after April 5, 1967
- Byrd, Robert C.**, Senator (D-West Virginia)
- Byroade, Henry A.**, Ambassador to Burma from September 10, 1963, until June 11, 1968
- Califano, Joseph A., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army until July 1, 1963; General Counsel of the Army until 1964; Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense from April 1, 1964, until July 26, 1965; thereafter Special Assistant to the President
- Campbell, Gerald J.**, Reverend, President of Georgetown University from 1964 until 1968
- Cannon, Thomas Langley**, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Press and Publications Service, United States Information Agency, from February 1961
- Canter, Jacob**, Director, Office of Inter-American Programs, Department of State, until July 1966; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs until June 1968; thereafter United States member, Executive Committee, Inter-American Cultural Council, Organization of American States
- Cao Van Vien**, General, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Commander of III Corps, Chief of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff from September 1965
- Carmichael, Leonard**, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution from 1953 until 1964
- Carter, Alan**, Director, Television Services, United States Information Agency from July 1963 until December 1965; thereafter, Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia
- Castro Ruz, Fidel**, Prime Minister of Cuba
- Cater, S. Douglass**, Special Assistant to the President, May 1964 until October 1968
- Catherman, Terrence F.**, Russian Branch Chief, European Division, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency, from July 1964
- Chamberlin, Charles Dean**, Foreign Information Specialist, United States Information Agency, from May 1964
- Chancellor, John W.**, Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, (Voice of America), from August 1965 until June 1967
- Chandler, Dorothy B.**, Vice President, Corporate Relations, the Times Mirror Company; member, United States Advisory Commission on Information from 1965 until 1967

- Chernoff, Howard L.**, Executive Assistant to the Director, United States Information Agency, from August 1965 until October 1968; thereafter Osaka Commissioner General, United States Exhibition, Japan World Exposition
- Christian, George E., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the President from December 1966 until February 1967; thereafter White House Press Secretary
- Churchill, Winston S.**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1940 to 1945 and 1951 to 1955
- Clark, William Ramsey**, Deputy Attorney General from January 1965 until March 1967; Attorney General until January 1969
- Claxton, Philander Priestly**, member, Multilateral Forces Negotiating Team until January 1967; Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary until April 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary for Population Matters
- Clay, Lucius D.**, Chairman of the Board of Free Europe, Inc.
- Clifford, Clark M.**, attorney and unofficial adviser to President Johnson; Secretary of Defense from March 1, 1968
- Colligan, Francis, J.**, Director, Policy Review-Research Staff and Executive Director, Council on International Education and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, from June 1963
- Cox, W. Russell**, Executive Officer United States Information Agency until June 1964; Personnel Officer, United States Information Agency, from December 1965
- Crespi, Leo P.**, Assistant Director for Research, Research and Reference Service (changed to the Research and Analysis Division in the Office of Policy and Research in 1967), United States Information Agency, until July 1967; thereafter Deputy Assistant Director, Research Development
- Crockett, William J.**, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, Department of State, from June 4, 1963, until 1967
- Cronkite, Walter L., Jr.**, American television journalist at CBS News
- Cushing, Richard Golle**, Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Caracas, until January 1967; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, and Acting Assistant Director, United States Information Agency
- Daly, John Charles**, Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service (Voice of America), from June 1967 until June 1968
- Davies, Richard Townsend**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until January 1966; detailed to United States Information Agency as Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe until July 1968; thereafter Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate General in Calcutta
- Davis, Richard Hallock**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until April 1965; Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, until 1965; thereafter Ambassador to Romania
- De Gaulle, Charles**, President of France from 1959 to 1969
- Dentzer, William T.**, Director, Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development until August 1965; Director, Agency for International Development Mission, U.S. Embassy in Lima, until September 1968
- Díaz Ordaz, Gustavo**, President of Mexico from December 1964
- Dillon, Thomas Patrick**, Director, Policy Plans and Guidance Staff, Department of State, from November 1963
- Dobrynin, Anatoli F.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
- Donnelley, Dixon**, detailed to the Department of Treasury until March 21, 1966; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
- Donovan, James A., Jr.**, Staff Director, United States Advisory Commission on International Education and Cultural Affairs, from 1961

- Dorey, Frank D.**, Program Research Officer and Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Beirut, until January 1964; Regional Program Research Officer until December 1964; Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Manila until November 26, 1965; Chief, Program Analysis Staff, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency, until December 11, 1966; Coordinator, Program Analysis Division, Research and Analysis Division in the Office of Policy and Research, until January 1967; Acting Assistant Director, Research and Analysis Division, until July 1967; thereafter detailed to the Brookings Institute
- Doster, Jerry C.**, Chief, Publications Division, Press and Publications Service, United States Information Agency, until March 1964; Chief, Personnel Division, Office of Personnel and Training, until April 1967; thereafter, Executive Officer, U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro
- Douglas-Home, Alexander (Alec) Frederick**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1963 until 1964
- Dulles, Allen Welsh**, Director of Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1961
- Dungan, Ralph A.**, Special Assistant to the President until September 1964; Ambassador to Chile from December 10, 1964, until August 2, 1967
- Echols, James R.**, Foreign Information Specialist, United States Information Agency, until January 1965; Cultural Affairs Adviser until December 1965; thereafter, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Santiago
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States from January 20, 1953, until January 20, 1961
- Eisenhower, Milton S.**, President, Johns Hopkins University, from 1956 until 1967
- Emond, Robert G.**, Deputy Director, Office of Security, United States Information Agency, 1965
- Erhard, Ludwig**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until December 1966; Christian Democratic Union Party Chairman from 1966 until 1967
- Esterline, John Hanly**, Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Manila, until September 1965; thereafter detailed to the Department of State as Director, Office of Far East Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
- Ewing, Gordon A.**, Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency, until February 1964; Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Rome, until July 1967; thereafter Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Bonn
- Fanelli, A. Alexander**, detailed to the Department of State as an Educational-Cultural Exchange Officer, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, until August 30, 1964; Supervisor, Educational-Cultural Exchange Office, until March 1, 1965; West Coast Programs Chief, Office of Inter-American Programs, until January 26, 1966; thereafter Cultural Affairs Adviser, Office of Policy, United States Information Agency
- Fanget, Louis A.**, Supervisor, International Information Program Specialists, United States Information Agency, from November 9, 1965
- Fascell, Dante B.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Florida); Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movement, Committee on Foreign Affairs
- Faubus, Orval**, Governor (D-Arkansas) until January 10, 1967
- Fong, Hiram L.**, Senator (R-Hawaii)
- Frankel, Charles**, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs from September 15, 1965, until December 31, 1967; Chairman, Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs
- Fredman, Herbert I.**, Assistant Director, Research and Analysis Service, Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency, from September 25, 1966, until July 1967; thereafter Assistant Director, Information Center Services
- Freeman, Orville, L.**, Secretary of Agriculture
- Fulbright, J. William**, Senator (D-Arkansas)

- Gandhi, Indira**, Indian Minister of Information and Broadcasting from June 9, 1964, until January 24, 1966; thereafter Prime Minister; Minister of External Affairs from August 22, 1967
- Gardner, John W.**, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare from August 18, 1965, until March 1, 1968; Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on International and Cultural Affairs
- Gates, Thomas**, President, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
- Gaud, William S.**, Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development, until February 27, 1964; Deputy Administrator until August 1, 1966; thereafter Administrator
- German, Robert K.**, Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, until October 25, 1964; thereafter Special Assistant to the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Glatzer, Morton**, Deputy Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency, until September 18, 1966; thereafter Deputy Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Bonn
- Glazer, Joseph**, Information Officer and Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, until September 8, 1965; thereafter Labor and Minorities Advisor (changed to Labor & Equal Opportunity Advisor in 1966), Office of Policy (changed to Office of Policy and Research in 1966), United States Information Agency
- Goldberg, Arthur J.**, Representative to the United Nations from July 26, 1965, until June 24, 1968
- Goldwater, Barry**, Senator (R-Arizona); Republican Presidential candidate in 1964
- Goodwind, Richard N.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until 1963; Special Assistant to the President from 1963 until 1966
- Green, Marshall**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, until June 4, 1965; thereafter Ambassador to Indonesia
- Greenewalt, Crawford H.**, Chairman of the Board of DuPont from 1962 until 1967
- Greenfield, James L.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until August 17, 1964; Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until March 12, 1966
- Griffith, William E.**, Professor of Government, Tufts University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Groff-Smith, Geoffrey**, Branch Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Consulate General in Trieste, until July 4, 1965; Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer and Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Rome, until January 1, 1968; thereafter Assistant Cultural Affairs Advisor, Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency
- Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union
- Guggenheim, Charles E.**, American film director and producer who made several films for USIA
- Guthrie, John C.**, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until May 26, 1965; Minister Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, until November 1967; thereafter Personnel Officer
- Hadsel, Fred L.**, Planning Advisor, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until March 29, 1964; thereafter Director
- Haider, Michael L.**, Chairman of the Standard Oil Company from 1965
- Hall, Theo Elmer**, Foreign Service Inspector, Director General of the Foreign Service, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, Department of State, until December 20, 1964; Executive Director, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, until April 1968; thereafter detailed to the Agency for International Development
- Halsema, James J.**, Counselor of Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Cairo, until September 19, 1966; thereafter Chief, Training Division, Office of the Assistant Director, Personnel and Training, United States Information Agency

- Hansen, Allen C.**, Foreign Information Specialist, United States Information Agency, until January 29, 1967; thereafter Information Officer, U.S. Embassy in Montevideo
- Hanson, Joseph O.**, Advisor for National Security, Planning and Program Advisory Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency
- Harkins, General Paul D.**, Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, until 1964
- Harriman, W. Averell**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 1965; thereafter Ambassador at Large
- Harrar, J. George**, member, President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs
- Harris, Reed**, Executive Assistant to the Director, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency, until January 21, 1964; Director, Information Center Service, until July 1967; thereafter Assistant Director, Policy and Plans, Office of Policy and Research
- Hayden, Carl Trumbull**, U.S. Senate (D-Arizona); President pro tempore of the Senate
- Hayes, John S.**, former president of Washington Post-Newsweek television and radio stations; Ambassador to Switzerland from November 18, 1966
- Hays, Otis E., Jr.**, member, Viet-Nam Working Group, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East (changed to Office of the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, in late 1966), United States Information Agency, until late 1966; thereafter Deputy Assistant Director, Viet-Nam
- Hays, Wayne**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Ohio)
- Helms, Richard M.**, Director of Central Intelligence from June 1966
- Henry, David Howe II**, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until August 2, 1964; Director until July 3, 1966; thereafter Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Reykjavik
- Hewlett, William R.**, president of Hewlett-Packard; member, President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs
- Hines, Earl**, American jazz musician and bandleader
- Hitchcock, David I.**, Branch Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Consulate General in Fukuoka, until July 12, 1965; Foreign Information Officer, Japan, Korea and Okinawa Affairs, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East (changed to Office of the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, in late 1966), United States Information Agency, until April 23, 1967; thereafter Policy Officer
- Ho Chi Minh**, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
- Holbrooke, Richard C.**, field officer, staff assistant to the Ambassador, U.S. Embassy in Saigon, until 1966; White House Staff from 1966 until 1968; staff member of the U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks from 1968
- Hoover, J. Edgar**, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Howland, Harold E.**, Deputy Director, Office of Far East Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, until August 30, 1964; Director until August 29, 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs until August 14, 1966; Senior Seminar, Foreign Service Institute, until July 1967; thereafter Principal Officer, U.S. Embassy in Amsterdam
- Hoyt, Palmer**, editor and publisher of the *Denver Post*; member, United States Advisory Commission on Information
- Hull, Cordell**, Secretary of State from March 1933 until November 1944
- Humphrey, Hubert H., Jr.**, Senator (D-Minnesota) and Senate Majority Whip until 1964; Vice President of the United States from January 1965
- Ikeda, Hayato**, Prime Minister of Japan from July 1960 to November 1964
- Inouye, Daniel K.**, Senator (D-Hawaii)



- Jacobs, John K.**, Information Specialist, Press and Publications Service, United States Information Agency, until April 7, 1964; *Arabic Magazine* Staff Executive Editor, until December 1965; thereafter, *American Illustrated* Branch Chief
- Jaffie, Robert B.**, Public Affairs Officer and Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Kathmandu, until May 24, 1965; thereafter English Teaching Division Chief, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency
- Javits, Jacob K.**, Senator (R-New York)
- Jenkins, Kempton B.**, International Relations Officer, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until May 23, 1965; thereafter Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Caracas
- Jessup, Peter**, member, National Security Council Staff and Executive Secretary of the 303 Committee
- Johnson, Lyndon Baines**, President of the United States from November 22, 1963, until January 20, 1969
- Johnson, U. Alexis**, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs until July 1, 1964; Deputy U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam until September 1965; Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs until October 9, 1966; Ambassador to Japan from November 8, 1966
- Jonathan, Chief Leabua**, Prime Minister of Lesotho from July 7, 1965
- Jones, Walter Warren**, Management Analyst, Media Services, Management Division, Office of the Assistant Director, Administration, United States Information Agency, until November 1967; thereafter Deputy Director
- Jorden, William J.**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until April 11, 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until May 1966; senior member of the National Security Council Staff until May 1968; thereafter member of the Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam
- Kaplan, Harold**, Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Geneva, until January 1965; Deputy Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Saigon, until September 1965; detailed to the Department of State as Counselor for Press Affairs until July 1966; detailed to Department of State as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until August 1967; thereafter Public Affairs Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Brussels
- Katzenbach, Nicholas deB.**, Deputy Attorney General until January 28, 1965; Attorney General until October 2, 1966; thereafter Under Secretary of State
- Kennan, George F.**, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
- Kennedy, Edward M. (Ted)**, Senator (D-Massachusetts)
- Kennedy, John F.**, President of the United States from January 20, 1961, until November 22, 1963
- Kennedy, Robert F.**, Attorney General until 1964; Senator (D-New York) from January 1964 until June 1968
- Keogh, William Howard**, Foreign Information Specialist, United States Information Agency, until January 1965; Special Assistant to the Director until August 1965; Special Assistant to the Deputy Director until February 1967; thereafter Deputy Public Affairs Officer, Consulate General in Hong Kong
- Khrushchev, Nikita S.**, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers (Premier) to October 15, 1964
- Kiesinger, Kurt Georg**, Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1966
- King, Martin Luther, Jr.**, American civil rights leader, Baptist minister, and social activist; co-founder and first President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
- Kintner, Robert E.**, Secretary of the Cabinet from April 1966 until June 1967
- Kitchen, Jeffrey C.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs until May 1967

- Klein, David**, member, National Security Council Staff, until August 1965
- Kliforth, Alexander A.**, Program Manager, Voice of America, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency, until August 1966; thereafter Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Rome
- Koda, Edward**, owner and operator with brother William of a large American rice farming interest in California, who is of Japanese descent
- Koda, William**, owner and operator with his brother Edward of a large American rice farming interest in California, who is of Japanese descent
- Kohler, Foy D.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union until November 14, 1966; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from November 29, 1966, until December 31, 1967
- Kolarek, Joseph C.**, Chief, European Division, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency, until March 1966; thereafter Press Officer, U.S. Embassy in Bonn
- Komer, Robert**, member, National Security Council Staff, until September 1965; Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 1965 to March 1966; Special Assistant to the President from March 1966 to May 1967; thereafter Deputy to the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam with the personal rank of Ambassador
- Kornienko, Georgi M.**, Minister Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington to 1964; Chief of the American Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, from 1966
- Kosygin, Alexei N.**, First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers until October 1964; thereafter Chairman
- Larmon, Sigurd S.**, member, United States Advisory Commission on Information
- Larsen, Roy Edward**, Chairman of the Executive Committee of *Time* and Time, Inc., in the 1960s
- Leddy, John M.**, U.S. Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, until June 15, 1965; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Lewis, Mark B.**, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Accra until July 1964; thereafter Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency
- Lincoln, Robert A.**, Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency, until March 1964; Assistant Director, Europe, from March 1964 until December 1965; thereafter Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Ankara
- Lindley, Ernest K.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary and member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
- Linowitz, Sol M.**, Consultant to the Department of State and U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Economic and Social Committee, and the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress from October 13, 1966
- Lipscomb, Glenard P.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-California)
- Littell, Wallace W.**, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, until November 1964; Press-Cultural Officer until August 1965; thereafter Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency
- Locke, Eugene M.**, Ambassador to Pakistan from June 9, 1966, until April 16, 1967; Deputy Ambassador to South Vietnam after May 1967
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.**, Ambassador to South Vietnam until June 28, 1964, and from July 31, 1965, until April 25, 1967; Ambassador at Large from May 3, 1967, until May 7, 1968; Ambassador to Germany from May 27, 1968, until January 14, 1969
- Loomis, Henry**, Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service (Voice of America), United States Information Agency, until March 1965
- Lopez Arellano, Colonel Oswaldo**, later General, leader of the military junta in Honduras until June 6, 1965; thereafter President of Honduras

- Louchheim, Katie S.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Community Advisory Services, until October 1966; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs
- Macy, John W.**, Chairman, Civil Service Commission
- Magnuson, Warren G.**, Senator (D-Washington); Chairman, Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
- Maguire, Charles M.**, Staff Assistant for Cabinet Affairs, White House, from 1965 until 1968
- Mahon, George H.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Texas)
- Mann, Thomas C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, from January 3, 1964, until March 17, 1965; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from March 18, 1965, until May 31, 1966
- Manning, Robert Joseph**, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs until July 31, 1964
- Mansfield, Michael**, Senator (D-Montana); Majority Leader and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Marks, Leonard H.**, Director of the United States Information Agency, from September 1, 1965, until December 6, 1968
- Marshall, George C.**, Secretary of State from January 21, 1947, until January 20, 1949; Secretary of Defense from September 21, 1950, until September 12, 1951
- Martin, Mary**, American theater and film actor
- Mason, Professor Edward S.**, founder of the Development Advisory Service (Harvard University); member, President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs
- Mason, Francis S., Jr.**, Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer and Attaché, U.S. Embassy in London, until March 1, 1965; East West Exhibits Officer, United States Information Agency, until August 1966
- Matsunaga, Spark M.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Hawaii)
- Mays, Willie Howard**, American baseball player
- McCone, John A.**, Director of Central Intelligence until April 28, 1965
- McCrocklin, James**, President, Southwest Texas State College
- McGhee, George C.**, Ambassador to Germany until May 21, 1968; thereafter, Ambassador at Large
- McKisson, Robert M.**, Deputy Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- McNamara, Robert S.**, Secretary of Defense until February 29, 1968
- McNichol, Paul John**, Assistant Director, Office of Security, United States Information Agency
- McPherson, Harry C., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs from August 1964 until August 1965; Special Assistant to the President until February 1966; thereafter Special Counsel to the President
- Meyers, Tedson J.**, Assistant to the Director of the United States Peace Corps
- Miller, Paul A.**, Assistant Secretary of Education from 1966 until 1967
- Miller, William Doran**, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency until March 1964; Assistant Director until December 1965; thereafter Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi
- Mink, Patsy T.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Hawaii) from January 3, 1965
- Modic, Paul A.**, Information Officer, U.S. Embassy in Beirut, until May 1964; Supervisor, International Radio Information Specialists, United States Information Agency, until May 1966; thereafter Chief, Policy Application Staff, Broadcasting Service
- Mondale, Walter F. (Fritz)**, Senator (D-Minnesota)

- Montgomery, Orville J.**, Attorney-Advisor, United States Information Agency until February 1966; thereafter Deputy General Counsel
- Moore, Daniel E.**, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency, until April 1965; Acting Assistant Director, until October 1965; Assistant Director until August 1966; thereafter Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Seoul
- Moore, Paul, Jr.**, Reverend, Bishop (Episcopal) of Washington, D.C.
- Mora-Otero, Jose Antonio**, Uruguayan, Secretary General of the Organization of American States
- Morales-Carrion, Arturo**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until 1963; Special Assistant to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States from 1964
- Morgan, Thomas E.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Pennsylvania)
- Morton, Thurston B.**, Senator (R-Kentucky) until December 18, 1968
- Moseman, Albert H.**, Agricultural Administrator, Department of Agriculture, until 1964; Consultant, Agency for International Development, until August 1, 1965; thereafter Assistant Administrator, Office of Technical Cooperation and Research
- Mosley, Lionel S.**, Director, Office of Personnel-Training, United States Information Agency, from September 1964
- Mowinckle, John W.**, Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Paris, until May 24, 1964; Public Affairs Officer and Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Leopoldville, until February 1966; Counselor for Public Affairs until January 1, 1967; thereafter Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro
- Moyers, Bill D.**, Special Assistant to the President until January 31, 1967; White House Press Secretary from July 8, 1965, until January 31, 1967
- Mumford, Lawrence Quincy**, Librarian, Library of Congress
- Mundt, Karl E.**, Senator (R-South Dakota)
- Murrow, Edward R.**, Director of the United States Information Agency, 1961 until January 1964
- Muskie, Edmund S.**, Senator (D-Maine)
- Mussolini, Benito**, Italian Prime Minister from 1922 until 1943
- Nalle, David**, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Amman, until August 1965; Program Coordinator, Office of the Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, until September 1967; thereafter Deputy Assistant Director
- Nasser, Gamal Abdel**, President of UAR/Egypt from June 23, 1956
- Nelson, Lyle M.**, Director of University Relations and lecturer with the Department of Communications, Stanford University
- Nguyen Cao Ky, Air Vice Marshal**, VNAF, Vietnamese Prime Minister and Chairman, National Executive Committee until October 1967; thereafter Vice President of Vietnam
- Nguyen Van Thieu**, Lieutenant General, ARVN; Vietnamese Chief of State and Chairman, National Leadership Committee, until October 1967; thereafter President of Vietnam
- Nitze, Paul H.**, Secretary of the Navy until June 1967; Deputy Secretary of Defense from July 1967
- Nixon, Richard M.**, former Vice President of the United States; Republican candidate for President in 1968; thereafter President-elect
- Nkrumah, Kwane**, President of Ghana until February 1966
- Novik, Morris S.**, member, United States Advisory Commission on Information
- Oleksiw, Daniel Philip**, detailed to the National War College until February 1965; Assistant Deputy Director, Media Content, United States Information Agency, until August 1966; thereafter Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific

**Orlich Bolmarcich, Francisco J6se**, President of Costa Rica until May 8, 1966

**Osborn, David L.**, Consul General, U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, until August 1964; detailed to the National War College until July 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs until January 1967; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Tokyo

**Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza**, Shah of Iran

**Pareiman, Samuel T.**, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Bonn until December 1965; Deputy Director, Office of International Conferences, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until November 1967; thereafter Acting Director

**Patterson, Floyd**, U.S. boxer

**Pauker, John**, Chief, Policy Guidance Staff (changed to Policy Guidance and Media Reaction Staff in 1966), Office of Policy (changed to the Office of Policy and Research in 1966), United States Information Agency, from October 1962

**Paul IV (Giovanni Battista Montini)**, Pope

**Payeff, William K.**, Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency, until February 1964; Deputy Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong, until February 1968

**Peers, General William R.**, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Special Operations; Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities for the Joint Chiefs of Staff until January 1967

**Perkins, James A.**, President of Cornell University; Chairman of the President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs

**Peterson, Ruth L.**, Secretary, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency

**Phan Huy Quat**, Vietnamese Premier from February 16 to June 11, 1965

**Plesent, Stanley**, General Counsel of the United States Information Agency until 1966

**Porter, Paul**, attorney and founding partner, Arnold & Porter, Washington D.C.

**Quat**, see **Phan Huy Quat**

**Raborn, William F., Jr.**, Vice Admiral, USN (retired); Director of Central Intelligence from April 28, 1965 until June 30, 1966

**Randolph, A. Philip**, U.S. civil rights leader; founder, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters

**Re, Edward D.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs from February 1968 until January 1969

**Read, Benjamin M.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department

**Reedy, George E.**, White House Press Secretary from 1964 until 1965

**Reinhardt, John E.**, Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Tehran, until August 1966; thereafter Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency

**Reischauer, Edwin O.**, U.S. Ambassador to Japan until August 19, 1966

**Reston, James B.**, journalist and columnist for the *New York Times*

**Richardson, John, Jr.**, President of Radio Free Europe

**Ripley, Sidney Dillon**, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution from 1964

**Rivers, L. Mendel**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-South Carolina)

**Roberts, Edward V.**, Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency, until May 1965; Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Rabat, until April 1968; thereafter Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Tokyo

**Roberts, Juanita**, personal secretary to President Johnson

**Robison, Olin C.**, Special Assistant for Youth, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State, from January 2, 1966, until mid-1968

- Rockefeller, David**, banker and philanthropist; member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs
- Rockefeller, John D., IV**, member, West Virginia House of Delegates from 1966 until 1968
- Ronalds, Francis S., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Director, Programs, Office of the Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency, from August 1966
- Rooney, John J.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York)
- Roosevelt, Franklin Delano**, President of the United States from 1933 until 1945
- Rosenthal, Jacob**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State from October 1966 until mid-1967
- Rostow, Eugene Victor Debs**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from October 14, 1966, until January 20, 1969
- Rostow, Walt W.**, Counselor for the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council until March 31, 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the President
- Rowan, Carl T.**, Director of the United States Information Agency from February 1964 until July 1965
- Rusk, David Dean (Dean)**, Secretary of State
- Russell, Richard Brevard, Jr.**, Senator (D-Georgia)
- Ryan, Hewson A.**, Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency, until February 1965; Associate Director, Policy and Plans, Office of Policy, until August 1966; thereafter Deputy Director, Policy and Research, Office of Policy and Research
- Rylance, George A.**, Deputy Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, until June 1965; Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Latin American, United States Information Agency, until January 1968; thereafter Assistant Director
- Sabri, Ali**, Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic until September 1965
- Salant, Richard S.**, president of CBS News Division
- Salinger, Pierre E. G.**, White House Press Secretary until 1964
- Salisbury, Harrison E.**, American journalist
- Sandvos, Annis**, Foreign Affairs Officer, Multilateral Policy Planning Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
- Sato, Eisaku**, Prime Minister of Japan from November 1964
- Sayles, V. George**, Chief, Policy and Columns Staff, Press and Publications Service, United States Information Agency
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr.**, historian and former Special Assistant to President Kennedy
- Schmidt, Richard M.**, General Counsel of the United States Information Agency from 1965
- Schuetz, Klaus**, First State Secretary (Political and Administrative Affairs) in the West German Foreign Office until October 1966; Governing Mayor of Berlin from 1966
- Schultze, Charles L.**, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, until 1965; thereafter Director until January 1968
- Sharek, Carl Robert**, Foreign Information Specialist, Polish and Hungarian Affairs, Office of the Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency, until April 1967; thereafter Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Belgrade
- Shea, Donald Taylor**, Branch Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Consulate General in Bombay, until August 1964; detailed to the National War College until June 1965; thereafter Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency
- Shelepin, Alexandr N.**, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers to 1965; member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the Central Communist Party from November 1964

- Shriver, Robert Sargent, Jr.**, Director of the Peace Corps until 1966; Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity until 1968; Ambassador to France from May 25, 1968
- Simpson, Daniel H.**, Foreign Affairs Reserve Officer, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, until April 1967; thereafter detailed to the United States Information Agency
- Slack, John M.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-West Virginia)
- Slocum, John J.**, Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Cairo, until May 1965; Program Manager, Montreal Exhibition, United States Information Agency, until August 1966; thereafter Staff Assistant, Office of Policy and Research, until 1967; thereafter Cultural Affairs Advisor, Policy Guidance and Media Reaction Staff
- Smiley, Joseph R.**, Chairman, United States Advisory Commission on International Education and Cultural Affairs from July 1967
- Smith, Bromley K.**, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
- Smith, Howard K.** co-anchor, *ABC Evening News*, until 1975; thereafter political analyst and commentator, ABC News
- Smith, Morton S.**, Press Officer, U.S. Embassy in Rangoon until February 1964; Foreign Affairs Officer, Thailand, Cambodia & Burma Affairs, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East Policy Office, United States Information Agency until February 1967; thereafter Deputy Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Seoul
- Solomon, Anthony M.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until June 1965; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs
- Sorensen, Thomas C.**, Deputy Director, Policy and Plans, Office of Policy, United States Information Agency until 1965
- Sorkin, Marvin**, Information Officer-Press Officer, U.S. Embassy in Vienna until August 1965; thereafter Deputy Chief, Policy Guidance Staff, Policy Guidance and Media Reaction Staff, Office of Policy (changed to Office of Policy and Research in 1966), United States Information Agency
- Stanton, Frank**, President of the Columbia Broadcasting System; chairman, United States Advisory Commission on Information
- Steigman, Andrew L.**, Economics Officer, U.S. Consulate General in Benghazi, until October 1964; Foreign Affairs Officer, Department of State, until April 1966; Staff Assistant to the Secretary of State until January 1968; thereafter International Relations Officer
- Steinbeck, John E.**, American author and Nobel Prize recipient
- Stephens, Oren M.**, Assistant Director, Research and Reference Services, United States Information Agency, until July 1966; thereafter Senior Research Officer, European Research Center
- Stevens, George, C., Jr.**, Director, Motion Picture Service (changed to Motion Picture and Television Service in 1966), United States Information Agency, until June 1967
- Stevenson, Adlai E.**, U.S. Representative to the United Nations until July 14, 1965
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.**, Consul General, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, until September 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until September 12, 1968; thereafter Ambassador to Poland
- Streibert, Theodore C.**, Director of the United States Information Agency from 1953 until 1956
- Sukarno**, President of Indonesia until March 12, 1967
- Suzuki, Chiyoko (Pat)**, American singer and recording artist in the 1950s and 1960s
- Talbot, Phillips**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs until September 1, 1965; thereafter Ambassador to Greece
- Taylor, General Maxwell D.**, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until June 30, 1964; Ambassador to South Vietnam until July 30, 1965

- Temple, Lawrence, E.**, Special Counsel to the President from September 1967 until January 1969
- Thant, U.**, Secretary General of the United Nations
- Thompson, Llewellyn E.**, Ambassador at Large until December 26, 1966; thereafter Ambassador to the Soviet Union
- Thompson, Tyler**, Director General of the Foreign Service until February 15, 1964; thereafter Ambassador to Finland
- Tito, Josip Broz**, President of Yugoslavia
- Trilling, Lionel**, author and professor of English at Columbia University
- Trueheart, William C.**, Consul General, U.S. Embassy in Saigon, until May 1964; Director, Office of South East Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until August 1966; Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, from June 1967
- Truman, Harry S.**, President of the United States from April 12, 1945, until January 20, 1953
- Tull, James N.**, Foreign Affairs Officer, United States Information Agency, until November 1964; Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Manila until February 1967; thereafter Evaluations Officer, U.S. Embassy in Saigon
- Vail, Thomas Van Husen**, member, United States Advisory Commission on Information from 1967
- Valenti, Jack**, Special Assistant to the President until May 15, 1966
- Vance, Cyrus R.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense until June 1967; member, U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks from June 1967
- Vaughn, Jack H.**, Director for Latin America, Peace Corps, until April 8, 1964; Ambassador to Panama until February 27, 1965; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until February 28, 1966; thereafter Director of the Peace Corps
- Vien**, see **Cao Van Vien**
- Vogel, Arthur C.**, Chief, Photographic Division, United States Information Agency, until December 1965; thereafter Chief, Bibliographic Division, Information Service Center
- Wade, Floyd A., Jr.**, International Private Cooperation Specialist, United States Information Agency, until July 1964; Foreign Affairs Officer, Japan, Korea and Okinawa Affairs, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East, until August 1965; Senior Field Representative, U.S. Embassy in Saigon until 1967
- Walker, Lannon**, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Embassy in Rabat until September 1964; Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate General in Constantine until October 1966; thereafter Foreign Affairs Officer, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
- Wallace, George**, Governor (D-Alabama)
- Watson, Arthur K.**, member, President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs
- Watson, Marvin**, Special Assistant to the President from January 1965 until April 1968
- Wattenberg, Benjamin J.**, White House Staff of the President
- Weld, William E., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency until December 1965; thereafter Assistant Director, Europe
- Wells, Herman B.**, former Chancellor of Indiana University; Chairman of the Board, Education & World Affairs
- Westmoreland, General William C.**, Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from 1964 until 1968; thereafter Army Chief of Staff
- Wheeler, General Earle G.**, United States Army, Chief of Staff, until July 2, 1964; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



**Wheeler, John R.**, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Administration, United States Information Agency, until September 1966; thereafter Executive Officer, Motion Picture and Television Service

**White, Barbara M.**, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Santiago, until May 1966; Special Assistant to the Director of the United States Information Agency until August 1966; thereafter Associate Director, Policy and Research, Office of Policy and Research

**White, Theodore**, American journalist and author, *The Making of the President* series

**Wiener, Ernest G.**, Counselor for Cultural Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, until July 1966; thereafter Deputy Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Brasilia

**Wilken, David**, Director, Inter-Department Relations and Government Accounting Office Liaison Staff, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, Department of State, until January 1967; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Kingston

**Wilkins, Roy**, U.S. civil rights leader and activist; head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People from 1955 until 1977

**Williams, G. Mennen**, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until March 23, 1966; Ambassador to the Philippines from June 17, 1968

**Wills, Maurice (Maury)**, American baseball player

**Wilson, Donald M.**, Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency until June 1965

**Wilson, James Harold**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1964

**Wright, Thomas Lloyd**, Director, Press and Publications Service, United States Information Service, until 1967; Executive Assistant to the Director until 1968

**Xuan Thuy**, Chief of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks

**Yamasaki, Minoru**, American architect

**Young, Milton Ruben**, Senator (R-North Dakota)

**Zellerbach, William J.**, member, President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs

**Zhivkov, Todor**, Prime Minister of Bulgaria from November 1962

**Zorthian, Barry**, Deputy Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, until February 1964; Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Saigon, until January 1965; Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs until September 1965; Minister-Counselor for Information at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and head of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office until February 1968; thereafter Special Assistant to the Ambassador

# Public Diplomacy

November 1963–  
December 1968

## 1. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 25, 1963

### SUBJECT

USIA Coverage of President Kennedy's Death and Your Assumption of the Presidency

USIA is using all media to describe your accession to the Presidency and to document the orderly transfer of power following President Kennedy's death.

Since 2:00 p.m. Friday,<sup>2</sup> the Voice of America has been broadcasting a special program around the clock to all parts of the world. This coverage will continue through your address to a joint session of the Congress on Wednesday.<sup>3</sup>

Our Wireless File,<sup>4</sup> a teletype service to 108 posts in 101 countries, has carried full accounts, including biographies of you and the late President. News photos, including a 17-picture biography of you, were rushed out by air.

We are transmitting the text of a brief pamphlet on you to all posts for immediate translation and distribution.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, Subject Files, 1953–1971, Entry UD WW 151, Box 113, White House—1963. No classification marking. Drafted by Burnett Anderson (IOP). Printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 158.

<sup>2</sup> November 22.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Johnson's November 27 address before a joint session of the Congress. For text of the address, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1963–1964*, Book I, pp. 8–10.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to USIA's press service, which disseminated time sensitive information, such as transcripts of speeches, press conferences, Congressional testimony, as well as texts of published articles and interviews.

Extensive newsreel coverage, for both theater and TV use, is being air-shipped daily.

A 15-minute TV biography of you is almost completed, and will be air-shipped to countries having TV by Tuesday.<sup>5</sup>

A full half-hour TV documentary of your rise to the Presidency will be completed and shipped within 10 days.

Two motion picture documentaries in color, one featuring the life work of President Kennedy and the other on your life and assumption of the Presidency, are to be completed within 30 days.

A six panel photographic exhibit on your career is in preparation for shipment to all posts by air on Friday.<sup>6</sup>

Donald M. Wilson<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> November 26.

<sup>6</sup> November 29.

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 2. Notes of Meeting of United States Information Agency Director's Staff<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 26, 1963

### *DIRECTOR'S STAFF MEETING*

Mr. Wilson, Acting Director

MR. WILSON

Something has gone out of all of us, but we must be heartened by the rewarding years that we have had under President Kennedy. The Agency has had an excellent Director and excellent support from the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Executive Secretariat, Entry P-123, Box 2, Director's Staff Meeting Notes, 1963. Limited Official Use. No drafting information appears on the notes.

White House. The President's undelivered Dallas speech<sup>2</sup> contained a favorable reference to USIA. Now we have a great deal to do and must concentrate on doing the task ahead just as well as we possibly can.

All of those who have been involved in the special efforts of the last few days deserve high praise.

The new Administration has been sent a summary of the Agency's weekend activities<sup>3</sup> and has sent thanks. We can count on the continuation of the working relationship we have had with the White House.

A major problem for us is the need for authoritative evidence that the crime was committed by Oswald<sup>4</sup> and that it was a solo act. The President is well aware of the effect of this problem on world opinion.

MR. SORENSEN

While there is only one John F. Kennedy, we can take pride in the fact that Lyndon Johnson was the best prepared Vice President since Theodore Roosevelt.<sup>5</sup> He was intimately involved in all matters with which the White House was involved, and has the temperament and integrity as well as the experience for his new office. We must now concentrate on telling the story of President Johnson and the continuity of our Government.

MR. PLESENT (IGC)

Last Tuesday,<sup>6</sup> Mr. Wilson testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Foreign Agents Registration Act.<sup>7</sup> Now that Senator Fulbright has been won, there is a slight chance that our recommendations will be adopted.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to remarks prepared for President John F. Kennedy to deliver at the Trade Mart in Dallas, Texas, on November 22. According to these undelivered remarks, Kennedy noted: "That is why our Information Agency has doubled the shortwave broadcasting power of the Voice of America and increased the number of broadcasting hours by 30 percent, increased Spanish language broadcasting to Cuba and Latin America from 1 to 9 hours a day, increased seven-fold to more than 3.5 million copies the number of American books being translated and published for Latin American readers, and taken a host of other steps to carry our message of truth and freedom to all the far corners of the earth." (*Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963*, pp. 890-894)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a November 19 memorandum from USIA to the President. A copy is in the National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, General Subject Files, 1953-1971, Entry UD-WW 151, Box 113, White House Reports-1963.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Lee Harvey Oswald, the man accused of assassinating Kennedy.

<sup>5</sup> Roosevelt, William McKinley's Vice President, assumed the Presidency following the latter's assassination in September 1901.

<sup>6</sup> November 19.

<sup>7</sup> Presumably a reference to Wilson's November 19 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in hearings on S. 2136 to strengthen the Foreign Agents Registration Act. (109 *Cong. Rec.* D558 (1963) Daily Digest—November 1963)

MR. BRADY (IAS)

On his recent visit to Eastern Europe, found the difference in the six capitals accentuated by the difference in their economic situations. In each country their growing nationalism is increasingly apparent. We need to analyze the current trends in the Bloc countries for purposes of our own programming.

John Steinbeck's<sup>8</sup> visit to USSR has been even more effective than had been anticipated. His devotion, insight, and humor have made him a most effective visitor.

MR. CARTER (ITV)

During the weekend the regular ITV newsreel clip service for some of the Latin American posts was expanded and is now going to 35 posts. Today posts will be sent items on the funeral and the reception.

We are negotiating for a UPI-produced film biography on Lyndon Johnson which will be sent to television countries by ITV and to the other countries by IMS.

The President's address to Congress<sup>9</sup> on Wednesday will be covered and English prints should be shipped by 5:00 PM on Wednesday.

The celebrated television writer, Rod Serling,<sup>10</sup> has volunteered his services to prepare a thirty-minute program on President Johnson which we hope to have ready in ten days.

ITV is looking into the possibility of obtaining rights from BBC to the excellent "That Was the Week That Was"<sup>11</sup> memorial program shown here on NBC.

MR. MOORE (IAF)

Mr. Bunce plans to meet Arthur Lee, PAO Cambodia in Hong Kong for a discussion of the possible program implications of the cancellation of U.S. aid.

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<sup>8</sup> American author who visited the Soviet Union in October and November 1963 on a USIA exchange program. ("Steinbeck Meets the Soviet Press," *New York Times*, October 22, 1963, p. 34)

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 3, Document 1.

<sup>10</sup> Popular American screenwriter, television producer, and narrator in the 1950s and 1960s.

<sup>11</sup> Reference is to the popular British television comedy and satire program produced by the BBC that aired between 1962 and 1963. According to the *New York Times*, the episode of the program that aired in the United States on NBC the evening of November 25, contained a 19-minute tribute to Kennedy: "The 19-minute show seen here last night contained no politics and no satire. It was made up of seven young persons prominent in British arts, giving short tributes to President Kennedy." ("A British Program Honoring Kennedy Shown Over N.B.C.," November 25, 1963, p. 10)

MR. EWING (ICS)

We are looking into the reported updating of Mooney's "The Lyndon Johnson Story"<sup>12</sup> which was on our recommended list when it was published in 1957. Checks will be made with other publishers on their plans for a Johnson biography.

Tokyo reports a huge demand for the Ladder editions<sup>13</sup> in Japan, well beyond our budget resources. An arrangement will be made with a Japanese publisher for him to publish additional copies, and we will pay the American publishers.

We are obtaining for distribution copies of the NY TIMES special supplement on AFL-CIO, Nov. 17<sup>14</sup> at ten cents per copy.

Mr. Sivard pointed out the problem of getting really good pictorial material on Johnson for use in the Paper Show being prepared by the Exhibits Division. Mr. Wilson did not feel the exhibit should be delayed and that private media should be immediately explored.

MR. KLEIFORTH (IBS)

VOA abandoned its regular programs at 2:10 PM Friday, Nov. 22, and will continue its special programs until after the President's speech to Congress. Emphasis has been placed on the orderly transition of government, with increasing focus on President Johnson.

VOA programs were rebroadcast in many countries where their own programs were abandoned to relay from VOA.

All output has been checked and it has definitely been established that, with the exception of one reference on Special English<sup>15</sup> to Dallas as "the scene of right-wing movements," there was no reference to "Dallas, the center of right-wing movements" as alleged in Krock's column in the NY TIMES.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Reference is to *The Lyndon Johnson Story*, written by Booth Mooney and published in 1956.

<sup>13</sup> "Ladder books" were editions of American literary classics in English language with glossaries provided to explain words in the text perceived to be difficult.

<sup>14</sup> Entitled "The Hands That Build America." (*New York Times*, Section 11, pp. 1-44)

<sup>15</sup> Reference is to VOA programming in which programs were presented in English, but at a slower pace and using a limited number of English words. See Holli Chmela, "Giving News of America in English, with a Twist," *New York Times*, July 31, 2006, p. A15.

<sup>16</sup> *New York Times* columnist Arthur Krock asserted that VOA had made allegations that Dallas, Texas, was the "center of right-wing movements." ("In the Nation: The Modern Miracle and the Ancient Curse," *New York Times*, November 26, 1963, p. 36)

MR. CANNON (*IPS*)

A special Wireless File has been carried ever since Friday.<sup>17</sup> IPS has also serviced nearly 100 pictures.

A pamphlet on President Johnson is to be sent by Wireless to be printed by the RSC's and some of the posts.

The White House is to be checked on the color photograph of the President to be used.

125 pictures of the attending dignitaries were obtained at the reception.<sup>18</sup> The President is to sign the mat pictures for presentation to the dignitaries.

MR. BROWN (*IAL*)

The meeting in the White House today at 4:00 PM<sup>19</sup> with the Latin America dignitaries, which will reaffirm the Alliance for Progress,<sup>20</sup> will receive full coverage.

MR. HALL (*IAA*)

PAO Baldanza who was here on consultation from Leopoldville<sup>21</sup> extended his stay to take back IPS photographs for use in Africa publications.

MR. STEVENS (*IMS*)

A film "World Peace"<sup>22</sup> based on the American University speech of President Kennedy,<sup>23</sup> made 2 months ago, is already in the field. It is believed the film should be especially useful now and its use will be recommended to PAOs.

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<sup>17</sup> November 22.

<sup>18</sup> Presumably a reference to a November 25 reception at the Department of State. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>19</sup> The meeting took place in the East Room of the White House. Johnson stressed the theme of policy continuity: "So I reaffirm the pledge which President Kennedy made last week to improve and strengthen the role of the United States in the Alliance for Progress." (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1963–1964*, Book I, pp. 6–7)

<sup>20</sup> The Alliance for Progress was a United States Government policy to seek economic development in and ties with Central and South America originating with the Kennedy administration and first publically articulated by Kennedy on the U.S. Presidential campaign trail in November 1960. For further information about the origins and development of the Alliance for Progress, see *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. XII, American Republics, Documents 1–72.

<sup>21</sup> Reference is to the previous name of the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

<sup>22</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>23</sup> Reference is to Kennedy's June 10, 1963, commencement address, which he delivered at American University. For text, see *Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963*, pp. 459–464.

MR. STEPHENS (IRS)

A message will be sent to 25 posts requesting an assessment of reaction to the new President.<sup>24</sup>

It has been decided that plans for the world-wide survey would not be altered because of the recent events.

Mr. Ewing regretfully announced the death of Alfred Sansone of ICS.

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<sup>24</sup> Not found.

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### 3. Editorial Note

In a November 26, 1963, memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) Donald M. Wilson asserted that world media attention was shifting focus from President John F. Kennedy's assassination to "prospects for the future under your Administration." Wilson noted that editorial commentary reflected a "generally positive image" of Johnson. However, he added that there were "anxieties about [Johnson's] probable course of action." Wilson stressed that many observers around the world approved of Johnson's "long service in domestic and foreign affairs," the "important functions" he executed at President Kennedy's request, and his civil rights advocacy. (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Federal Government Organizations, Box FG-314, FG 296, U.S. Information Agency 11/22/63-1/31/64)

In a subsequent December 3 Weekly Report memorandum to Johnson, Wilson described the key themes that the USIA emphasized about Johnson and his activities as the new President, which included: "the person, record and policies" of Johnson; the "uninterrupted continuation of the U.S. Government;" and Johnson's "commitment to the stated foreign and domestic policies of the United States." Wilson wrote that USIA had placed special importance on publicizing Johnson's November 27 address before a Joint Session of Congress, in which the President stressed his commitment to Kennedy's policies and to continuity. (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Agency Reports, U.S. Information Agency, Box 135 [1 of 2], United States Information Agency)

A December 24 research report entitled "Worldwide Reaction to the First Month of the Johnson Administration," prepared in the



Research and Reference Service, USIA, provided a detailed assessment of global public and media opinion, divided by geographical region. The summary highlights section of the report stated that “Worldwide confidence in the United States was demonstrated impressively during the first month of the Johnson Administration, with growing confidence in the new President.” Noting the upheaval created by Kennedy’s assassination and questions surrounding U.S. global leadership, the report continued: “While recognizing that the President faces many foreign and domestic tests, there is growing confidence overseas that he will work for peace and civil rights.” While comparisons between Kennedy and Johnson were inevitable, the comparisons “did not seek to put the new President at a disadvantage,” and that “President Johnson is seen as a skilled, experienced political leader more pragmatic than President Kennedy.” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research, Research Reports, 1960–1999, Entry P-142, Box 18, R-223-63)

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#### 4. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 27, 1963

##### *Weekly Report*

1. USIA is using every facility at its command, including the resources of other government agencies, to bring your speech to Congress today quickly and completely by word and picture to every corner of the globe.<sup>2</sup>

An expanded Voice of America network, 55 transmitters aggregating 5.5 million watts, will carry the entire speech live in a special hour-and-a-half program.

The speech will be broadcast simultaneously with delivery in Spanish and Portuguese on six short wave frequencies to Latin America, and also on medium wave to Cuba.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, General Subject Files, 1953–1971, Entry UD-WW 151, Box 113, White House Reports—1963. Secret. Drafted by Anderson. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. According to attached distribution sheet copies were sent to the White House on November 26.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 1.

Translations of the speech in 36 additional languages will be broadcast throughout the day and night.

Special direct feeds for relay over domestic broadcasting networks were set up for Germany, Japan, Greece, and some African and South-east Asian countries.

There is, of course, heavy and continuing coverage in news and commentaries in all languages.

#### *Television*

Film prints of the entire speech will be rushed immediately to 110 posts in 103 countries, for both motion picture showing and TV use.

Countries where Spanish or Portuguese are spoken will receive translated film versions of the full speech. Other posts will make their own language versions.

TV stations in 74 countries, embracing a total of 2,200 transmitters, normally use TV materials from USIA.

The speech will also be made available to nine other networks, mostly in the Soviet Bloc, which do not normally use our material but may accept this speech.

#### *Motion Pictures*

Extensive 35 mm. film excerpts of the speech will go at once to USIA posts in 40 countries where we have arrangements for insertions in local newsreels. The speech will be covered in an unattributed but USIA-controlled newsreel shown in 28 African and Asian countries, and our attributed newsreel produced for 33 African countries.

We are also shooting color coverage of the speech for inclusion in the special film documentary on your rise to the Presidency which is now in preparation.

#### *Press*

Before you finished speaking, 110 USIA posts in 103 countries had the full text through our radioteletype network, for immediate translation and delivery to local press and government officials.

At the same time, the speech was filed in Spanish translation to 22 Latin American countries, and in French to Viet Nam and 30 African countries where French is the key language.

Still photographs of your appearance at the Capitol will be air pouched late this afternoon.

News stories and commentaries on the speech will be teletyped to all points throughout the afternoon.

*Satellite Relay*

The Relay Satellite was in phase for Europe shortly after you spoke and was to replay your appearance from 1:12 to 1:30 p.m. today for Western European TV (Eurovision).<sup>3</sup> There has been no indication whether the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Intervision)<sup>4</sup> will also pick up the relay.

*Other Government Outlets*

I have requested the Defense Department to carry your speech in full at prime time on all stations of the Armed Forces Radio and Television service, and the CIA to assure maximum play on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.<sup>5</sup>

This is done under National Security Action Memorandum No. 63,<sup>6</sup> which authorizes the Director of USIA to pre-empt time in the national interest on all international broadcasting facilities operated or controlled by the U.S. Government.

2. Reactions to the death of President Kennedy and your accession to the Presidency were surveyed by the French Gallup Poll affiliate on November 25 in the Paris area,<sup>7</sup> with these results:

—Asked to name the word which best expressed their reaction, 34 per cent said indignation, 34 per cent stupefaction, 16 per cent horror, 8 per cent compassion, and 5 per cent concern.

—More than half of the people interviewed—57 per cent—were able to name you correctly as the new President.

—De Gaulle's<sup>8</sup> attendance at the funeral was considered proper by 90 per cent, and only 25 per cent were surprised that he chose to go.

—58 per cent of the sample thought Jack Ruby<sup>9</sup> killed Oswald to prevent further police interrogation, 18 per cent believed it an act of revenge, 8 per cent named other motives, and 17 per cent did not know.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Eurovision Network, which was established in 1954 as part of the European Broadcasting Union, for the purpose of exchanging television programs and news information.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Intervision Network, which was the equivalent of the Eurovision Network for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

<sup>5</sup> Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), founded in 1950 and 1953 respectively, originally broadcast uncensored news and anti-communist information. RFE broadcast to Eastern European countries; RL broadcast to the Soviet Union.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 5.

<sup>7</sup> Not found.

<sup>8</sup> Charles de Gaulle, President of France from 1959 to 1969.

<sup>9</sup> Jack Leon Ruby, a Dallas nightclub owner, shot and killed Oswald on November 24.

—35 per cent believed President Kennedy's death increases the chance of world conflict, 43 per cent that the risks remain the same, and 21 per cent did not know.

—33 per cent thought President Kennedy's assassination was due to some racist organization, 19 per cent the act of a madman, 10 per cent that a pro-communist organization was involved, 8 per cent a pro-Castro<sup>10</sup> group, and 30 per cent did not know.

Donald M. Wilson<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz, Prime Minister of Cuba from 1959 until 1976, then President from 1976 until 2008.

<sup>11</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## **5. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Morrow) to United States Information Agency Heads of Elements and Public Affairs Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 20, 1963

It is essential that we help maintain a high level of foreign confidence in the continuity of American Government and policy under President Johnson and in our nation as the leader of the Free World. The President already has done much to assure the world. He has reaffirmed in several ways and in the most specific manner possible his commitment to the continuation of President Kennedy's foreign policy—a policy which he helped shape and carry out.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 11, Policy and Plans (IOP)—General 1963. Limited Official Use. Also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 159. In the same file is a December 20 memorandum from Sorensen to all USIA media and area assistant directors, under which he sent talking points supporting the Agency priorities listed in Morrow's memorandum. The talking points are listed under the following priority categories: "The Pursuit of Peace;" "Strength and Reliability;" "Free Choice;" "The Rule of Law;" and "United Nations." (National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69; Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 11, Policy and Plans (IOP)—General 1963) See the attachment.

For some time I have been considering the priorities for Agency output, first issued July 24, 1961.<sup>2</sup> They have not changed substantially, which reflects in still one more way the continuity of U.S. policy. There have been enough shifts in emphasis, however, to warrant a restatement of these priorities.

There has been and is some confusion as to what these priorities represent and what proportion of our output should be devoted to them. The Agency's function, stated by the President in a directive of January 25, 1963,<sup>3</sup> is to "help achieve United States foreign policy objectives." There are, of course, differences among these objectives: some are world-wide in scope, others limited in geographic applicability; some are capable of achievement in a limited time, others will be with us for the foreseeable future. These goals are spelled out specifically in our Country Plans, which continue to be the basis of our operations in the field and support activities in Washington.

The diversity of our objectives around the world requires a wide variety of approaches, techniques, and activities. It also requires that we define our priorities, and co-ordinate our activities in support of them.

The attached priority subjects are those which I consider most urgent at the present time and which should be given full and persuasive treatment in all Media before other subjects are tackled.

The relative efforts in behalf of any of the five priorities will, as in the past, vary with the unfolding of events, the nature of the medium, and the situation in individual countries.

The responsibility for co-ordinating Media output on the priority and other subjects will continue to rest with the Assistant Deputy Director (Media Content).

**Edward R. Murrow**

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to NSAM 63; see *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 128.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a January 25 memorandum from President Kennedy to Murrow in which Kennedy stated the USIA's mission and outlined guidelines for carrying it out. See *ibid.*; Document 144.

## Attachment

### Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>4</sup>

Washington, undated

While providing a broad range of materials required to support a diversity of objectives in Country Plans, until further notice Agency media will focus attention on, and give priority to:

#### THE PURSUIT OF PEACE

The United States has no more urgent task than the pursuit of peace. In the words of President Johnson, "We will be unceasing in the search for peace; resourceful in our pursuit of areas of agreement even with those with whom we differ." We believe this search for an attainable and honorable peace should be based on a gradual evolution in human institutions and on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements (such as the limited nuclear test ban) leading to general and complete disarmament. The United States will continue to encourage the settlement of international issues by peaceful means rather than force.

#### STRENGTH AND RELIABILITY

The United States, matured and tested under the responsibilities of free world leadership, will maintain its strength in all fields to protect its own freedom and to aid in the defense of other free nations against threats to their independence and institutions. The United States can and will keep its commitments to its allies and to other countries.

#### FREE CHOICE

The United States believes in a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future, free to build and change their own systems so long as they do not threaten the freedom of others. We believe in the dignity of the individual, and will continue to help other nations in their efforts to modernize their societies, to resist coercion, and to construct and maintain free institutions.

#### RULE OF LAW

The fundamental commitment of the United States is to freedom of the individual, of the community, and of the nation under law. This

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<sup>4</sup> No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper.

commitment is the hallmark which distinguishes societies of free men from societies where rule is based on privilege and force. Historically, the rule of law was a commitment of the people of the United States to themselves; today it is the cornerstone of both our domestic and international policies. We will continue to work toward perfecting the rule of law at home and encourage its extension to and among all nations.

#### UNITED NATIONS

The United States will continue its full support of the United Nations, seeking in concert with other countries to strengthen the UN's peacekeeping machinery. It will also continue to support UN functions which assist all free nations, large and small, to maintain their independence and to move toward political, economic, and social justice.

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#### 6. Editorial Note

In a January 17, 1964, letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson, United States Information Agency (USIA) Director Edward R. Murrow discussed responses to the USIA film, "The March," which documented the August 28, 1963, March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom led by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. According to Murrow, Senator William Fulbright (Democrat-Arkansas) and others "questioned the effectiveness abroad" of the film. Murrow explained to the President that he had commissioned the film to counter the "distortion" around the world concerning the role violence played in the Civil Rights movement. The film, he stressed, emphasized "that 200,000 Americans, both Negro and white, came to their nation's capitol and demonstrated peacefully to further the civil rights movement. The quality of that march, which has been described by so many as 'spiritual', comes across most forcefully in the film," and was, in his opinion, "probably the finest argument for peaceful petition for redress of grievance that has ever been put on film." Noting that the film had been distributed to posts, "under the usual operating procedures," Murrow added that if Public Affairs Officers "do not believe it will have a positive effect in their countries, they simply will not show the film." (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 296, Box FG-314, FG 296 U.S. Information Agency 11/22/63-1/31/64)

USIA Director-designate Carl T. Rowan addressed the film within the context of an interview with American Broadcasting Company (ABC) news correspondent Howard K. Smith, scheduled for broadcast

on the ABC news current affairs program, "Issues and Answers," on February 2. Smith, referencing the film, stated that despite the film's accuracy, "many Congressmen felt it would give a false impression to primitive peoples in Africa, and they criticized USIA for producing it." In response to Smith's question as to how Rowan would handle the situation, Rowan responded: "I am not going to adopt any policies, and I don't believe the United States government can adopt any policies based on the assumption that the people of Africa are so primitive that they can't understand some fundamentals of life that we in the United States or that the peoples of Europe understand. Now, as I understand this film and as I have looked at it, the purpose of it is to show that this is a country with problems, yes, but a country where the right of peaceful protest, the right of petition, is as much alive as it ever was in the mind of Thomas Jefferson." Rowan continued by stating: "I know Africans who know a lot more about Thomas Jefferson and our Constitution and our Bill of Rights than my children do, or than most American children do. And if they don't understand it, then that is USIA's job to use this film in such a way as to ensure that this point does come across. And I happen to think it is a point worth making." (Transcript of Carl T. Rowan's Appearance on "Issues and Answers"; National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1069, Box 26, Carl T. Rowan, 1957–1998)

In Joint Circular Message 1431, February 5, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Acting Director of the United States Information Agency Donald Wilson noted the "growing consensus" in Washington that the "film 'The March' could be extremely effective for certain audiences in those countries where there is considerable knowledge of the context of the civil rights struggle in the United States and the role played by the Federal Government and bipartisan support for programs on civil rights." For other countries, the "problem of context might be met by showing the film in conjunction with others illustrating Government's support for civil rights, including President Kennedy's June 11, 1963 speech and President Johnson's strong commitment to civil rights, as demonstrated in films 'Let Us Continue' and 'The President.'" Rusk and Wilson requested that before public showings, the country team make an evaluation "of the value of the film" and determine how the team planned to use the film and send the evaluations to Washington by cable. (National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Sub Files, 1963–69, Box 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 20, The March)

Three days later on February 8, Wilson sent a memorandum to Rusk with copies sent to Attorney General Robert Kennedy and the President's Special Assistant Bill Moyers noting that "The March" was screened for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the morning of



February 7. Wilson stated he had explained the film's background and noted that Joint Circular 1431 had placed a "'hold' on public showings and requires a Country Team evaluation." Wilson wrote that Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (Republican-Iowa) had asserted that the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information (USACI) had "unanimously recommended" that the film not be shown and the USIA had "elected to override that advice." Addressing Hickenlooper's concern, he commented that the USACI recommended that care be used in the selection of countries for showing "The March," adding that "I said that our approach in the cable of February 5 met that Advisory Commission concern directly."

Continuing, Wilson wrote that Hickenlooper, Senator Frank J. Lausche (Democrat-Ohio), and "to a lesser extent" Senator George Aiken (Republican-Vermont) "commented adversely" on the film before the showing and that Hickenlooper, referred to "our country's propensity for 'self-flagellation' before the world." Fulbright's views were "favorable toward usage of the film before audiences able to comprehend the background and context of the civil rights movement in this country." Fulbright was concerned whether USIA and USIS could properly explain that "when the Negro in this country says 'I want freedom' he means something much different than when an African from a former Colonial area says it." (National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963–69, Box 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 17, Motion Pictures—General, 1964)

A May 28 memorandum from Dennis Askey to Rowan summarized some of the responses requested by Joint Circular 1431. Askey wrote: "Evaluation of 'The March' by Ambassadors and country teams from 95 posts shows a consensus that the film has proved widely effective in countering both natural and Communist-influenced misunderstanding overseas of the nature and intent of our continuing civil rights demonstrations." He also noted that in countries "where problems of context do exist" USIA had shown "The March" in conjunction with other USIA films underscoring U.S. support for civil rights, commenting that the addition of an introductory statement made by Rowan had "further relieved" problems of context. Askey concluded by explaining that 23 posts had not yet used the film, adding that 3 had judged it "generally" counter-productive", 13 cited lack of public interest, and others preferred to withhold screening until passage of the Civil Rights Act. (Ibid.)

On July 7, Rowan testified before a Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, regarding Fiscal Year 1965 appropriations. In reference to questions concerning "The March," he first explained the global reaction to the film and the history behind sending Joint Circular 1431 in order to elicit responses from the country teams. Rowan stated: "I have here, for example, a newspaper from India about

the showing of this film in Calcutta. Calcutta just happens to be our most troublesome major city in India. It has the greatest percentage of Communists. The university students or student groups are generally controlled by Communists. The Embassy in Delhi has made it clear that USIS's biggest job in India is in the Calcutta area. This article says that: 'This film has made a big impact on the young intelligentsia of this city. A most moving human document, the film has been shown to college students all over Calcutta and in June and July will be shown in educational institutions in the district. It was a very pleasant revelation to college authorities that for once the thunder had been stolen from the Communist sympathizers in the colleges.' So these are our friends in India who are crediting this film with making it possible for them to steal the thunder from the Communist sympathizers and get the youth to talk about something much more constructive in the United States." Rowan further stressed that "whereas a lot of [Communist sympathizers] wanted to make all Indians believe that every white American was at every Negro American's throat, this film showed in a very dramatic fashion, but not a hammer-on-the-head way, the fact that there was considerable cooperation between American Negroes and whites in this country; that whereas the Communists were trying to spread the propaganda that every Negro in the United States was wallowing in misery and poverty, these students could see that here were Negro Americans who were well dressed, well educated, articulate, and, what was extremely important, that they had a freedom which does not exist in the majority of the countries of the world, and that is the freedom under the first amendment of our Constitution, the right to peacefully assemble and seek redress of grievances, which is what this film illustrated very dramatically." (*Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 88th Congress, Second Session on H.R. 11134* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), pages 1672-1677)

**7. Memorandum From Patricia Newcomb, Motion Picture Industry Coordinator, Motion Picture Service, United States Information Agency to the President's Press Secretary (Salinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 20, 1964

Gene Kelly<sup>2</sup> will be in Washington on Monday, January 27 for a debriefing at the State Department following a month-long tour of French West Africa and Ghana under the cultural exchange program. According to reports received here Mr. Kelly's tour has been a tremendous success and he was extremely well received by press, youth groups, officials, etc.

Kelly ran fifty minutes of film which he put together on many of his famous dance numbers and followed this show with a lecture on the history of American dance, motion pictures in the U.S. and a lot of other things plus answered questions directed to him by the various groups to whom he spoke.

He went to Senegal, Upper Volta,<sup>3</sup> the Ivory Coast (because he speaks fluent French) and Ghana because of its current significance.

I realize the President will be going to Miami the night of the 27th<sup>4</sup> but would it be at all possible for him to have a brief meeting with Mr. Kelly sometime prior to his departure?

I think it is of particular importance because Kelly did take a month out of his busy schedule to make this tour because we felt he could make an important contribution to U.S.-Afro relations. The results prove us to be right. He will be in Washington all day the 27th so anytime convenient to the President would naturally be fine.

In as much as we are trying to encourage our articulate artists to go abroad, particularly to the underdeveloped countries to talk to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Foreign Affairs, EX FO 6-3, Box FO-60, FO 6-3 Publicity, International 11/22/63-4/7/64. No classification marking. In the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum an unknown hand wrote "Did not see President."

<sup>2</sup> Popular American film actor, dancer, and entertainer.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the previous name for the West African country of Burkina Faso.

<sup>4</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Johnson did not travel to Miami on January 27. (Johnson Library)

students, drama groups, etc. I hope very much you will be able to arrange this appointment.

Patricia Newcomb<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Newcomb signed "Pat" above this typed signature.

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## 8. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 21, 1964

In response to a request from Ted Sorensen, the facts about Voice of America broadcasting at the time of President Kennedy's assassination were contained in my December 3 weekly memorandum to you.<sup>2</sup>

However, for the record I will repeat them here.

VOA broke into its normal programming as soon as the first reports were received. One line, which read "Dallas, of recent months, has been the scene of extreme right-wing movements," was included in a single newscast in English and Arabic which went on the air at approximately 2 p.m. EST.<sup>3</sup> Within eleven minutes it had been seen by a senior news editor and was immediately deleted because of the implications it left.

Neither this line nor any similar line was used again in English or any of the 37 foreign-language broadcasts of the VOA.

Any suggestion that this isolated line could have given rise to the Soviet propaganda campaign alleging right-wing involvement seems highly improbable to us. In all its output, Radio Moscow<sup>4</sup> has not cited

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 296-1, Box FG-317, FG 296-1 Voice of America. No classification marking. In the upper left-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum an unknown hand wrote "For Pres. desk."

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> The issue of VOA airing text referring to Dallas as "the scene of extreme right-wing movements" was also discussed at the November 26 USIA Director's staff meeting; see Document 2.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the chief international radio station of the Soviet Union, which started broadcasting in the 1920s.

the VOA, but has quoted extensively from the AP, UPI, *New York Times*, and other sources.

We have furnished the facts to the members of Congress who have inquired, including copies of the script in question and examples of our round-the-clock reporting over the five-day period. Upon seeing the scripts, we have had no kickbacks from any of the members of Congress.

I attach a copy of the script in question.<sup>5</sup>

In my report to you of December 3 I stated the item was included only in a single English-language newscast. Information from VOA disclosed that it was contained in a single Arabic broadcast also at approximately 2 p.m.

**Donald M. Wilson**

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed is the one-page "Transcript of VOA Special English Newscast Beginning at 2:00 PM Fri 11/22."

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**9. Letter From President Johnson to the Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on Information (Stanton)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 23, 1964

Dear Frank:

Let me have your views on the following thought:

*A Joint TV Appearance for Peace*

A proposal for a series of joint television programs—on film or tape to be carried on the same day in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Each government would make available an hour and divide it equally with the other.

The first hour would feature 30-minute appearances for understanding and peace by the President and Chairman Khrushchev. The

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Country Files GEN CO 302 (South Africa, Republic of), Box 72, CO 303 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 11/22/63–5/3/64. No classification marking. Drafted by Valenti.

additional time would be used by each government to describe their economic system, their culture, their history, etc.

Put your best minds to work on this, Frank, and as quickly as you can, let me have your reaction and your opinion.

Sincerely,

Lyndon<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and an indication that Johnson signed an "l" above it.

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# **10. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 19, 1964

## **SUBJECT**

World Opinion on Your Administration

Foreign views of the United States appear to be recovering quickly from the uncertainty generated by the sudden change in United States leadership in November.<sup>2</sup>

The leadership and foreign policies of the late President had wide appeal abroad. Along with expressions of sympathy and loss, foreign comment voiced concern about whether you would and could maintain the Kennedy momentum.

Two main factors appear to have allayed concern:

1. *Your vigorous takeover and your pledges to pursue admired Kennedy goals.*
2. *The generally high esteem in which the United States has been held through the years.*

Foreign opinion was impressed by the orderliness of the transition, and saw in it a demonstration of essential U.S. stability. Your demon-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Foreign Affairs, EX FO, Box FO-1, FO Foreign Affairs 2/1/64-3/8/64. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the November 22, 1963, assassination of President Kennedy.

stration of determination to pursue the broad lines of existing U.S. policy gave further reassurance that U.S. leadership would be neither interrupted nor weakened.

Although no definitive assessment of your Administration has gained general currency, foreign reactions are clearly favorable on two major issues of concern.

1. *The continued thrust of U.S. foreign policy toward the preservation of peace and easing of tensions with the USSR.*

This they find confirmed in:

—The concrete disarmament proposals you made at Geneva,<sup>3</sup> and in your reply to Mr. Khrushchev's message;<sup>4</sup>

—The restraint seen in your handling of such episodes as the downing of a U.S. plane in Germany,<sup>5</sup> and the low key of your response to Castro provocations<sup>6</sup> and events in Panama.<sup>7</sup>

2. *Your concern with human rights and human values at home.*

Despite initial concern that you might pursue a more cautious course, foreign opinion has viewed your position on civil rights as a

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Johnson's January 21 message, which opened the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Only 17 nations participated in this session of the conference, which originally began in 1962, because France opted to boycott. (Sydney Gruson, "President Urges 'Verified Freeze' on Atom Missiles," *New York Times*, January 22, 1964, p. 1) Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and U.S. delegation leader William C. Foster read the President's message. For text, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1963–1964*, Book I, pp. 171–172.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Johnson's January 18 letter responding to Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev's joint New Year's message to Johnson and other heads of state dated December 31, 1963. Johnson reiterated objectives both the United States and Soviet Union had "previously identified," including the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, the ending of the production of fissionable material for weapons, and the reduction of the risk of war by "accident or design." For text of Johnson's letter, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1963–1964*, Book I, pp. 154–155. For text of the Khrushchev-Brezhnev message, see Theodore Shabad, "Soviet Sends U.S. 1964 Peace Wish," *New York Times*, December 31, 1963, pp. 1–2, and Department of State *Bulletin*, February 3, 1964, pp. 158–163.

<sup>5</sup> On January 28, a Soviet MIG fighter jet shot down a U.S. T-39 military aircraft, which had entered German airspace, killing all three Americans aboard. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Document 9.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to Cuban Government action on February 6 to cut off the water supply to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo in response to U.S. Coast Guard seizure of four Cuban fishing vessels located off the coast of Florida. The U.S. Government responded by developing a water facility on the naval base. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, Documents 228–238.

<sup>7</sup> On January 9 rioting erupted in Panama when a group of Panamanian students attempted to raise their country's flag at a high school in the U.S.-controlled Panama Canal Zone. The resulting violence prompted the deployment of U.S. troops stationed in the country and left approximately 20 Panamanians dead. However, tensions between the United States and Panama eased when the United States agreed to negotiations on a new treaty over control of the Panama Canal. ("U.S. and Panama Act To Settle Differences in Direct Talk Today," *Washington Post*, January 12, 1964, p. A1) For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico.

forthright determination to carry forward the late President's program. Your call for a war on poverty, your role in support of increased educational programs, have been praised, with some comment seeing in these programs a degree of personal involvement greater than your predecessor's.

Opinion of you as a political personality appears as yet to be neither very clearly nor very firmly held. You were seen, on entering office, as an experienced political leader with a high degree of political acumen, decisive and pragmatic. Comment was cautious in assessing your probable course, but a more realistic, less imaginative, more compromising, less audacious leadership was often predicted. This feeling appears to continue, though somewhat diminished. Foreign observers are still taking your measure as a new leader whom they see as largely untested in the field of foreign affairs. No single stereotype of you has clearly emerged except possibly the tendency in foreign comment and cartoons, both hostile and favorable, to depict you as a Texan in cowboy hat.

Two aspects of some foreign comment tend to have adverse or qualifying effect on opinion.

—Informed opinion is highly aware that this is an election year in which U.S. leadership traditionally is strongly responsive to domestic political currents. There is some concern that domestic political pressures may unduly affect the conduct of foreign affairs, and that domestic programs and actions may be shaped by political expediency.

—Some comment is skeptical about whether your goal of frugality is consistent with the effective carrying out of your programs. Foreign comment sometimes seems uncertain as to whether the U.S. is entering a period of retrenchment or plans to expand Government efforts in the fields of human and social welfare.

Some specific actions or policies draw regional criticism. The Arab world currently views you as pro-Israeli and thus anti-Arab. Inevitably, reaction to other aspects of your Administration and your actions tend to be colored by this adverse view.

On the issue of trade with Cuba, most European opinion is unfavorable to the U.S. position, but objections are not currently in terms hostile to you, personally. In France, Gaullist<sup>8</sup> opinion, strongly partisan, sometimes seeks to defend their leader's role by attacking your leadership.

The widely-held belief that violence and lawlessness are prominent features of American life has been deepened by the events of November, despite praise for your condemnation of violence and your appeals for unity and tolerance.

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<sup>8</sup> Reference is to supporters of French President de Gaulle.



This current assessment is also affected by the past.

Friendly long-range judgments on the United States have shown themselves to be highly durable in surveys over the last decade, despite disapproval of some specific policies and some fluctuations in estimates of the United States in comparison to the Soviet Union. Although no worldwide surveys have been made since the start of your Administration, the evidence available indicates that there has been no substantial change in general esteem for the United States.

Since November there have been several private surveys<sup>9</sup> in Western Europe regarding opinion of the U.S. in general and opinion of you in particular. These suggest that you and your Administration are well received.

More comprehensive measurements will be available when our current world survey is completed.

**Carl T. Rowan**<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>10</sup> Rowan signed “Carl” above this typed signature.

## 11. News Release Prepared in the Office of Public Information, United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>

No. 4

Washington, March 11, 1964, 1:30 PM

Remarks by Carl T. Rowan, Director, U.S. Information Agency  
at the International Radio and Television Society

Mr. Chairman, I love introductions—of me—but unfortunately they all remind me of the time that Orson Welles<sup>2</sup> spoke before a disappointingly small audience. In characteristic modesty, he began by detailing his qualifications as orator and bearer of wisdom.

"I am a playwright as well as a producer of plays," he said, "and Broadway has thrilled to my acting. I am a screen star *and* a noted producer of movies. I am an author, a painter, and a renowned magician. I am a virtuoso of the violin and a wizard of the piano. . ."

At this point Welles paused, took another look at his audience, and exclaimed: "Isn't it a shame that there are so many of me and so few of you."

Mr. Chairman, your introduction made it sound as though there are several of me here today, but fortunately the audience is such that I remain considerably outnumbered.

And happily, I note that my audience is composed of international broadcasters. This is my first full-fledged speech as Director of the United States Information Agency, and it is fitting that it should be before men and women whose major focus is on the outside world. Our objectives may not be synonymous, but our areas of mutual interest are many—not the least being our desire to learn better ways to transport our messages to distant peoples and places.

Perhaps there is irony in the fact that I, the smudge of inked newsprint barely off my hands, should suddenly be in the broadcasting business. But in it I am, and in a big way. USIA's Voice of America is broadcasting 112 hours daily in 36 languages—or almost 800 hours a week to almost every point on the globe. In addition, each week some 14,000 hours of our taped radio programs are broadcasted on other stations of the world.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Agency History Program, Subject Files, 1926–1975, Entry A1–1072, Box 13, Speeches, Carl T. Rowan, 1964. No classification marking. Rowan delivered these remarks at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York on March 11.

<sup>2</sup> Famous American stage, radio, and film director and actor.

And in the fast growing field of television, we are producing 200 hours of programming annually for telecasting on stations in 80 countries.

In true Orson Wellesian style, I could go on to tell you how, with movies in 52 languages, we reach some 750 million people a year. Or how we influence vast millions through our 85 magazines, 20 newspapers and the 10,000 words that go out daily on our wireless file to 111 posts abroad.

Or, for those of you who believe that a picture is worth 1,000 words, I could mention the 735,000 prints and 220,000 copy negatives that we sent out last year.

But I know, and I am sure you know, that it means little to say that USIA distributes 20 million pamphlets or 10 million books a year, or that it has a comic strip that is the most widely read feature in the world. Each of us knows that none of these statistics means anything until we know also what it is that USIA is saying through these media.

That is what I want to talk about today. I have received many letters of sympathy from people who think that I have moved into an especially difficult job. It *is* a challenging job, but it is far from impossible; indeed it is difficult only to the extent that we Americans are unsure of what we wish to say to the world. My conversations with my colleagues, with members of the press and of the Congress, with friends from many fields, indicate that there is a glaring lack of consensus as to what USIA is to do—and how.

Part of the confusion arises from the fact that our own society is complex. This great diversity of viewpoint that we not only tolerate but encourage is strongly reflected when someone mentions our informational program. No small number of people have said to me recently that we can win the world quickly if only we expose it to their ideas.

On the other hand, we find that we lack consensus also because of the complex nature of this world to which we speak. We find ourselves attempting to convince, to win the support of, not just young nations inhabited by peoples of different racial or historical background, not just our adversaries whose differences of political outlook pose a threat to our security, but also those long-time friends whose history and culture are part of our very being.

Perhaps it is only natural that where complexity is piled on complexity, men become impatient to simplify everything. So it is that we find so many Americans today who seek to reduce every conflict to the simple cops-and-robbers theme of every week's television drama.

Whether the scenario be Cambodia, or Cyprus, Zanzibar<sup>3</sup> or Brazil, this simplified theory of foreign policy is that there is always an easily

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<sup>3</sup> The semi-autonomous islands off the coast of Tanzania in East Africa.

distinguishable good guy and an equally obvious villain, each of whom is to be respectively embraced or disowned by all but the obviously disloyal. Unfortunately—or perhaps fortunately—our world is not as simple as that. We in USIA see day after day that ours is a world of subtle and tricky nuances. And I fear that our Number One problem may not be that we face adversaries skilled in their trade and unscrupulous in their tactics, but rather the fact that so many of our countrymen, following the “simplified approach to foreign policy,” prefer to ignore the subtleties and the delicate shadings that are a part of this business of winning friends and influencing people. They would urge upon us a conglomeration of “hard sell” nostrums that have little real relationship to the problems we face.

This burden is exemplified in its most exasperating form in the comments of those who think that USIA has the sole and simple mission of saying to the world again and again what is good and right and great about this country.

There are people who believe, rightly, that USIA should not dwell solely on our unemployment problems, or instances of corruption or incidents of racial conflict, or the carryings-on of our gangster element. They know, as do you and I, that it is so obvious as to preclude discussion that USIA’s function is to give foreigners a closer understanding and a greater appreciation of these United States. This means that USIA is obligated to emphasize some of the positive things that rarely make the commercial media that operate on the old journalistic credo that “good news is no news.”

The trouble is that, cloaked in this basic and honorable purpose, USIA quickly falls victim to the simplifiers who think USIA should go all the way and force the world to look at America through rose-colored glasses.

In recent days I have been badgered by people who ask why our libraries abroad contain magazines like *Time*, *Newsweek*, the *Saturday Evening Post*. One particularly vocal critic pointed out that almost every issue of these magazines contains one or more articles that are critical of the U.S. Government, or are full of information about this country “that can’t do us any good abroad.”

“Our enemies are saying enough critical things about us,” said one individual. “Why does USIA have to say *anything* about our faults?”

I have pressed hard to explain that the easiest way to destroy USIA, to render it totally ineffective, would be to have it feed the world nothing but superlatives about America and the American way of life. And I have been hard pressed to make the “simplifiers” understand that USIA can and has worked some minor miracles in the propaganda field, but it can never do the undoable or hide the unhideable.

What the advocates of the rose-colored-glasses approach seem not to understand is the fact that while USIA has a Voice of America, it is only a part, indeed a small part, of the real “voice of America.” In our era of miraculously rapid communications, the words of a Congressman engaged in bitter floor debate, a speech by an official of the Chamber of Commerce<sup>4</sup> in Chicago, or the public speech of one of our military leaders moves to the farthest corners of the globe as quickly as do the best-planned words of any Voice of America announcer.

The million GI’s and dependents who are overseas, the 30,000 American missionaries abroad, the four million American tourists who scatter about the globe each year, the half million Americans who go abroad for business reasons, or to represent foundations and participate in educational and cultural exchanges, all are our “voices of America.” And not to be ignored are the 50,000 foreign students who come to this country each year to study, and the thousands of foreign tourists and the scores of foreign journalists who develop their own version of the image of America. They, too, speak to that outside world, and generally with the natural credibility for which our official organs can only strive. So you see that in this context, USIA becomes but a small part of the cacophony that is the real voice of America abroad.

But it is for just this reason that USIA’s role is vital. We cannot afford to have the voices of freedom add up to a babble of confusion for foreigners. It is USIA’s role, then, to ensure that out of this dialogue of freedom is extracted a message that is intelligible and credible.

For as long as I can foresee, our country will be involved in an all-out ideological struggle. In this contest of impressions and misimpressions, of distortions both deliberate and accidental, USIA must be the restorer of focus, the provider of the perspective without which our policies and our purpose can never be understood.

You international broadcasters constitute an invaluable ally to the extent that you help to maintain the perspective, to keep the dialogue of freedom restrained to a point where it does not mislead a suspicious, often ill-informed world.

Yesterday I took a close look at one day’s output of the New China News Agency,<sup>5</sup> the propaganda voice of the Chinese Communists. It was a constant harangue about alleged United States colonialism in Panama; about so-called confusion in Washington as our “politicians both in and out of power are bickering” about the situation in South

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the local and national networks of businesses in the United States that have the chief goal of promoting American business both domestically and internationally.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the Government of People’s Republic of China state-controlled news agency.

Viet-Nam; about poverty in the United States being so horrible that "President Johnson had to declare official war on it"; about rampant "racial injustice" in America, and on and on.

The significant thing was that almost every item carried by the New China News Agency was based on a statement by some American official or an editorial in some American newspaper. In other words, the merchants of tyranny are trying to turn our freedom of expression into a mighty weapon against us. Their obvious goal is to hang us with our own words.

We cannot silence American politicians or the American press, nor have we any desire to do so. But it must be obvious that USIA cannot fulfill its mission unless it talks about the things that free Americans and the free American press are discussing. We know that our adversaries are talking about these things, and one of our most urgent tasks is to ensure that their distortions are not accepted because we are in timid default.

We must and we shall pursue our mission with vigor. Perhaps we shall make mistakes, but I want all my colleagues to know that if we err, let it be on the side of boldness. Let it be because we are moving with confidence to tell the world what our country is and what it strives to be.

Yes, you too are asking what, in my view, this country is and what it strives to be. I gave my view recently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I dare to repeat it today.<sup>6</sup>

I often find myself apologizing for using material from one of my books, even though I know from the royalty reports that I am not repeating anything that anybody has read. I am equally sure that few, if any, of you here will have read fully my remarks to the Senate Committee, so I repeat:

"America is capitalism with a conscience—a country in which laborers own homes, automobiles, new refrigerators, but, more important, where ordinary men have an extraordinary voice in the affairs of their government.

"America is a rocket pin-pointed on the moon and Polaris submarines cruising as sentinels of the deep—military might never surpassed in history, but might harnessed by a sense of responsibility for man's destiny and by a national desire for peace within freedom.

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<sup>6</sup> Rowan gave this testimony at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 25. A copy of the transcript is in the National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Agency History Program Subject Files, 1926–1975, Entry A1–1072, Box 13, Speeches, Carl T. Rowan, 1964.

“And this nation is social ferment—a society caught up in concern for its aged and its ill, full of compassion for its improverished. . . a people struggling as no society *ever* struggled to achieve a unity that transcends the incidental boundaries of religion, race, national origin.

“America is leadership—a nation whose destiny it has become to man the far-flung ramparts of freedom, marching with the fearful and the weak, the hungry and the harassed, toward the goal of a peaceful world community of free and independent states.”

Ladies and gentlemen, brevity forbids my saying all that this nation is. But I think that I have said enough to justify my fundamental belief that all we need wish the world to know about us is the truth. Through face-to-face contacts, through television, films and radio, and through the printed word, we shall spread the truth, and I am confident that the truth will keep us free.

As though it were necessary, I call your attention to the fact that this is an election year—meaning that the danger is all the greater that our dialogue of free speech will appear to strangers to be a babble of confusion and conflict. We are going to do our best to keep the record straight, to keep the world remembering that this periodic political ritual, while vastly important to us, generates a lot of heat and a lot of oratory that have nothing to do with the fundamental strength, unity and commitment of this nation.

Indeed, one of the things I should like most to have the world understand is that it is out of the free airing of complaints, the free expression of conflicting viewpoints that a free society makes progress, or goes about erasing social ills.

We shall try to get this message across, even as we flinch from time to time at the evidence that no people ever indulged more in self-criticism than do we Americans.

I am not so sure that USIA can convince the world that we are a lot better than we Americans tell each other we are—although that surely is the truth. This may be a forlorn hope, but I can hope that Americans might remember that there is a world of difference between the constructive self-criticism that produces progress and the irresponsible self-flagellation that confuses others as to both our intentions and our ability to see them through. I solicit your help in helping Americans to remember this distinction.

In any event, ladies and gentlemen, it is going to be an interesting and a trying year for “us broadcasters.” May we be lucky enough always to know the truth and wise enough to deliver it where it most needs to be heard.

**12. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans of the United States Information Agency (Sorensen) to All Heads of Elements and United States Information Service Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1964

The Mission of the U.S. Information Agency, as defined by the President, "is to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives."<sup>2</sup>

In carrying out this Mission, the President instructed the Agency, among other things, to "emphasize . . . those aspects of American life and culture which facilitate sympathetic understanding of United States policies."

In order to utilize our limited resources for our most urgent needs, and to harmonize media output in meeting these needs, priorities for media output were established by the Agency in July, 1961,<sup>3</sup> and revised in December, 1963.<sup>4</sup> Priorities are also required for that portion of our output on American life and culture to assure that we "emphasize . . . those aspects . . . which facilitate sympathetic understanding of United States policies." The American scene is so varied that only conscious and careful selection for coverage within a framework of priorities can prevent us from diffusing and dissipating our means.

In many countries there are both damaging gaps in knowledge about the United States and widely held shibboleths which adversely affect the achievement of our objectives. Among these stubborn canards are that we are capitalists in the evil 19th century Marxist sense, that we are materialistic and without culture, that we are racist, and that we are in a stage of economic stagnation. The latter supports the corollary effort of the Communists to represent themselves as the "wave of the future."

This memorandum establishes priorities for output on the aspects of American life and culture which will facilitate achievement of U.S. foreign policies. These priorities have been approved by the Director and the Deputy Director.

The attached priority subjects are, of course, not exclusive, but must be given as full and persuasive treatment in all Media as resources

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Agency History Program Subject Files: 1967-1975, Entry A1-1072, Box 5, Mission Statements 1964-1967. Unclassified.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 5.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 5.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 5.



permit before other subjects are tackled. Submissions to the Quarterly Media—Area Meetings should reflect these priorities.

The relative efforts in behalf of any of the priorities will, as in the past, vary with the unfolding of events, the nature of the medium, and the situation in individual countries.

The responsibility for coordinating Media output on these priority and other subjects will continue to rest with the Assistant Deputy Director (Media Content).

**Thomas C. Sorensen**

### **Attachment**

#### **Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>5</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### *I. RACIAL AND ETHNIC PROGRESS*

The United States has the most diverse population in the world. In the melting pot process, minorities have often suffered in the U.S., as they have historically and still do in many countries. But the U.S. democratic social, political, and economic system has provided a means for them to join and be absorbed into the main stream of American life, in all its richness and variety. The last large such minority—Negro Americans—are now actively in this process of full integration. Progress will not always be easy, but, with the support of the Federal Government and a majority of the citizenry, will continue until the process is complete.

#### *II. ECONOMIC STRENGTH*

The U.S. has developed the most powerful and productive economy the world has ever seen, based on a dynamic balance among business, labor, and government. Incentives provide opportunity; government protects against abuses and excess fluctuation of the business cycle. The U.S. economy continues to grow rapidly, and there is no evidence that the Soviets will overtake it soon or in the foreseeable future. The strength and productivity of the U.S. economy permits the U.S. to provide its people with material standards and welfare measures which the communists have only promised; to keep itself and the free

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<sup>5</sup> Unclassified. No drafting information appears on the paper.

world armed at a level adequate to protect against all forms of attack, and to provide substantial aid to less developed countries.

### *III. ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY*

Social benefits, strong labor unions, a progressive tax system, broad capital ownership by the populace, and Government regulatory agencies contribute to widespread ownership and enjoyment of U.S. productive wealth. The American system of "capitalism with a conscience"<sup>6</sup> is far closer in philosophy and practice to the non-coercive Social Democracy of Western Europe than it is to the earlier capitalistic concept. Despite this progress, the U.S. seeks still greater economic opportunity and equality for all its citizens.

### *IV. SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL STRENGTH*

The United States is one of the leaders of the international scientific community, with a depth and breadth of pure and applied scientific research unmatched in any other country. After a late start, the U.S. has taken the lead in space technology and exploration. The quality of the U.S. educational system also ranks with that of the most advanced nations. The American system is unique in the large percentage of its citizens who receive a higher education. Higher learning is available without regard to economic or social classes. Claims that the rigid Soviet educational system is likely soon to overtake the American system in either quality or quantity are not borne out by the facts or by authoritative projections for the next decades.

### *V. CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, DIVERSITY, DISTRIBUTION*

Drawing upon its native inheritance and the wealth of intellectual, artistic, philosophic, and religious traditions brought by immigrants, the U.S. has created its own variegated, dynamic, serious culture. Its hallmark is freedom: there are no more barriers to expression in art than there are in speech; there is no cultural party line imposed from the top. While respecting tradition and continuing to study and appreciate the classical inheritance, current American intellectual life, art, music, literature and other cultural manifestations are characterized by vitality and a will to experiment. Culture in the United States is not reserved for a privileged few nor confined to the capital cities; it spans the breadth of the people and the land. The United States believes in the freedom to create, not only in the United States but for the people everywhere, and the free flow of culture among nations.

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<sup>6</sup> Rowan also used this term during his February 25 confirmation hearing; see footnote 6, Document 11.

**13. Memorandum From the Director of United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 21, 1964

## SUBJECT

Information-Psychological Warfare Program in South Viet-Nam

During the recent trip to Saigon with Secretary Rusk,<sup>2</sup> I came to the conclusion that *the weakest part of the war operation, both on our part and that of the Government of South Viet-Nam, is in the field of information and psychological warfare*. According to a report by the Military Advisory Commission<sup>3</sup> as well as information gathered by USIS, this is true on both a nationwide basis and a province-by-province basis.

It is my judgment that *the Viet-Nameese people will never give sufficient support to the war effort until certain glaring gaps are closed in the information-psychological campaign*.

In view of the importance of public opinion in Viet-Nam, in this country and in the world at large, I believe that *top priority should be given to a large scale United States program to improve the GVN ability to win the support of the people and to tell its story abroad*.

Two steps are urgently required:

1. We must place informational-psychological advisors into every major area, just as we have placed military and economic development advisors throughout the GVN organization.

2. We must begin a crash program to train promising South Viet-Nameese personnel in radio, motion picture, publishing and other techniques crucial to any programs of psychological warfare. This is essential because it is unanimously agreed that the GVN is sorely lacking in personnel with the motivation and training to do the job required.

*I found Prime Minister Khanh and Minister of Information Pham Thai extremely forthcoming in talks about a new information program, and both expressed eagerness to have United States assistance—a sharp improvement over the attitude of the Diem government. This Agency already has submitted to the GVN a detailed proposal of steps needed*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 16, Field—Far East (IAF) January–April. Secret. Drafted by Rowan. Copies were sent to Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and William Bundy. Notations in an unknown hand indicate that copies were sent to Wilson, to McNamara on April 22, to Sullivan and Ball on April 23, and to Lodge in Saigon on April 24. Also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, Document 122.

<sup>2</sup> Rowan accompanied Rusk to Vietnam, April 17–19. For information about the trip, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, Documents 108–145.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

to improve its psychological warfare performance. The GVN has promised to respond with a detailed proposal of areas in which it wishes our immediate assistance.

While in Saigon, I also held sessions with the representatives of CIA, MACV, USOM, the Embassy political section and my USIS staff. We agreed on steps now underway, or soon to be gotten underway, which require no action from Washington. (For example, a small group of key Americans and a few top Viet-Nameese officials Monday held the first meeting of a joint psychological operations committee which had been set up some time earlier but had never gotten together.)<sup>4</sup>

*If the proposed program is to succeed*, it will require a modest outlay of U.S. funds and some increase in personnel from USIA and perhaps other U.S. agencies. I recommend also that we explore the possibility of third country contributions to the information program. U.S. expenditures in the information-psychological field are now quite small, relatively speaking. In fact, I was informed that the program is a failure in several provinces because of the lack of small bits of money to pay for such things as the running of a projector, or paper on which to print leaflets.

I emphasize strongly my belief that *the information effort will fail, no matter what resources we pour into it, unless it has the clear direction of a single individual* capable of formulating the program required and of guiding it to success. For many reasons, I believe that the control should be civilian and that Barry Zorthian, the Country Public Affairs Officer and one of the most capable men in this entire agency, should be given this responsibility.

I further recommend that a top USIA officer be included as an official part of any subsequent missions from Washington to study the development of the Viet-Nameese operation. Likewise, if Mr. Zorthian is to have a chance at success, *USIA must be represented on all committees in Washington which are mapping plans to carry us to victory in Viet-Nam.*

In a few days I shall submit for consideration by you, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense a detailed plan to meet the objectives spelled out above.<sup>5</sup>

Carl T. Rowan<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> No record of the Monday, April 20, meeting has been found.

<sup>5</sup> Presumably a reference to an April 28 memorandum from Rowan to Sullivan. (National Archives, RG 306 USIA Psychological Operations Files: FRC 68 A 4933, INFO-PSYCH Operations, 1964)

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**14. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 27, 1964

In your memorandum of April 6,<sup>2</sup> you asked for some rough measures of the size of CU programs in Europe compared with other regions of the world.

I share your concern for the need to give emphasis to the underdeveloped and emerging areas. Ever since I came into this job I have periodically exhorted my people to plan with a critical eye toward regional priorities. Looking back at the program over the past several years I think one would have to conclude that it has in fact been responsive to shifts in regional importance. There is a very clear trend of diminishing emphasis on Western Europe and of increasing size of programs for Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America, as you will see from the attached data. For example, *ten years ago some 62 percent of our total exchange of persons funds were devoted to Europe—today only 21 percent.*

What one *could* have differing opinions about, of course, is whether this trend is progressing fast enough, and I look forward to discussing this with you and Don Wilson.<sup>3</sup> I must caution you, however, that the full story is not in the figures alone. If it were just a question of juggling the budget around to a better “profile”, the answer would be relatively simple. But in truth, there are several other factors involved in the case for maintaining Western Europe at about the present level. Among these—and not necessarily in the order of their importance—are:

1. The presence of very large numbers of foreign students in Western Europe, many of them from key African and other underdeveloped countries;

2. The fact that we have a foreign currency requirement to meet in the program and these currencies are largely available in Europe—practically none are available in Africa and few in Latin America;

3. Domestic political considerations which cannot be ignored—Senator Fulbright and other key Congressional figures are reluctant to see Western Europe cut, though they want larger programs for the other areas;

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 16, Government Agencies—State. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Wilson, which is the copy printed here. Wilson initialed the memorandum indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Wilson underlined “you and Don Wilson.”

4. The existence of Fulbright agreements with most Western European countries which embody commitments to certain levels of programs;

5. The fairly good chance of working out cost-sharing arrangements with Western European countries;

6. The intellectual ferment existing in Western Europe at the present time;

7. The recommendation in the report to Congress last year by the Advisory Commission on Educational and Cultural Affairs<sup>4</sup>—a group careful not to toss its opinions around lightly—*against* reducing the European program.

You can see that this is not an easy problem and that it is necessary to go beyond the surface statistics in any serious discussion of it. I hope the attached materials will be helpful to you and to Don Wilson to whom I am sending a copy. They include:

Tab A. Distribution of funds and grants for Exchange of Persons activities by geographic regions, for fiscal years 1962 through 1965 proposed program.<sup>5</sup>

Tab B. A statement with respect to the Exchange of Persons program in Europe.<sup>6</sup>

Tab C. A statement with respect to the Exchange of Persons program in Latin America.<sup>7</sup>

Tab D. A comparison under our Cultural Presentations program of the numbers, types and estimated cost of the various groups being sent to Europe and Latin America in fiscal years 1961 through 1965 proposed.<sup>8</sup>

**Lucius D. Battle<sup>9</sup>**

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<sup>4</sup> The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act (P.L. 87-256), established the U.S. Advisory Commission, which advised the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and was responsible for improving and strengthening U.S. international relations through educational and cultural exchange. In 1977, the Commission merged with the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information to form the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.

<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated report, entitled "Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Activities," which was presumably prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated report, entitled "Exchange of Persons Program in Western Europe," which was presumably prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

<sup>7</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated report, entitled "Exchange of Persons Program in Latin America," which was presumably prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

<sup>8</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated report, entitled "Cultural Presentations Program, Western Europe—Latin America, Fiscal Years 1961–1966, By Type of Attraction," which was presumably prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

<sup>9</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**15. Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to All United States Information Service Posts<sup>1</sup>**

CA-3537

Washington, May 15, 1964

**SUBJECT**

The China Reporting Program

**SUMMARY:** Communist China is intensifying its diplomatic, cultural, economic and propaganda offense in virtually every corner of the globe. This poses new problems for the United States and requires a continuing search for effective means to meet this challenge. USIS Hong Kong's *China Reporting Program*, which produces information materials to help counter Communist China's propaganda efforts, can play an important role in assisting USIA posts and other mission elements meet this problem. The Director requests that all USIA posts understand and take full advantage of this program.

**INTRODUCTION**

The Sino-Soviet dispute has resulted in Communist China's assuming an increasingly independent foreign policy line from the Soviet Union. This development requires our treating Communist China as a subject of special concern separate from the Soviet Union. As Peiping<sup>2</sup> attempts to pass itself off as a model of economic development and the political "wave of the future" in underdeveloped areas and steps up its diplomatic and commercial offensive in Europe and elsewhere, there is an increasing need for material to expose Communist China as a threat to the peace, progress, and freedom of the non-communist world. The *China Reporting Program*, conducted by USIS Hong Kong, attempts to supply posts world-wide with such materials.

In a recent memorandum to each Area Director, the Director requested that they insure individual field posts understand and are taking full advantage of the *China Reporting Program*.<sup>3</sup> This circular furnishes a brief description of the program, the materials that are

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 16, Far East (IAF) May/Dec. 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Payeff and Bunce on May 7; cleared by Sorensen, Ryan, Roberts, Lincoln, Miller, Brady, Green, Guthrie, and McKisson; approved by Rowan. In the upper right-hand corner of the first page, Rowan signed his initials "CTR." According to a time stamp in the lower right-hand corner, the message was cleared for transmission on May 15. Sent for information to Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Moscow, and Warsaw (from Rusk). Sent via air pouch.

<sup>2</sup> Beijing.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

available, and recommends ways that posts may use the program to their advantage.

#### WHAT IS THE CHINA REPORTING PROGRAM?

The *China Reporting Program* (CRP) is USIA's principal vehicle for furnishing our posts and missions world-wide with corrective, current, factual information materials about Communist China as a means of countering Peiping's propaganda efforts. The materials consist of books, pamphlets, news stories, articles, photographs, and taped radio features. All CRP materials are available from USIS Hong Kong in English, and some of them are also available in other languages. *NO CRP PRODUCTS ARE ATTRIBUTED TO USIA OR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.*<sup>4</sup>

#### PRINCIPAL CRP MATERIALS

1. *Current Scene*—A bi-weekly newsletter,<sup>5</sup> in English, containing scholarly articles analyzing major political, economic, and other developments in Communist China. These articles are written by recognized authorities on Communist Chinese affairs or by the USIS Hong Kong staff from well documented sources.<sup>6</sup> The tone is factual and objective. At present *Current Scene* has a circulation of approximately 2,500, going to key foreign opinion leaders, government officials, newspaper editors and writers, libraries, universities and individual scholars. It is frequently cited as a reference by outstanding publications in the field of Chinese affairs such as *The China Quarterly*, and has been picked up in whole or in part on occasions by the BBC, Radio Australia, *Times of India*, *The Economist*, Agence France Presse, and countless other media outlets. A Japanese edition, published at Japanese initiative and at no cost to USIA, reaches 5,000 key Government and academic readers in that country. *Current Scene* is designed for an elite audience and for the most part is mailed directly to individual recipients from Hong Kong. Collectively, it also makes an excellent reference for staff use. Plans are under consideration for making *Current Scene* available in French and Spanish.

2. *China Reporting Service* (CRS)—News, features, photographs about Communist China on a more popular level and designed primarily for press and magazine placement.<sup>7</sup> CRS is produced bi-weekly in

<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand underlined the phrase "A bi-weekly newsletter."

<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand underlined the phrase "are written by recognized authorities on Communist Chinese affairs."

<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand underlined the words "News," "features," "photographs," "Communist China," and the phrase "designed primarily for press and magazine placement."



English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese, and goes regularly now to 93 countries.<sup>8</sup> Direct mail recipients include 274 newspapers and correspondents, 30 magazines, 21 radio and television stations, 78 libraries, organizations and individuals as well as 120 USIS posts, many of which also make distribution to mass media outlets.

3. *Books and Pamphlets*—Original books, pamphlets, photobooks, mostly authored by scholars and authorities from several countries on Chinese Communist affairs.<sup>9</sup> Since the inception of the CRP book program in 1955, USIS Hong Kong has produced some 72 titles, many going into multiple editions. A catalogue sent recently to all posts describes books and pamphlets still available from Hong Kong.

There has been a total of 63 translations of CRP books on Communist China in 25 different languages undertaken by various posts in editions ranging from 2,500 to 15,000. Translations of CRP books are undertaken at the initiative of individual posts, which usually try to interest local publishers in producing the books for commercial distribution. The Agency has language rights for almost all CRP books.<sup>10</sup> In 1963, more than 642,000 copies of CRP books were produced: USIS Hong Kong—250,000 copies in English (including 7 new titles); 47,000 reprints in English published in other countries; translations by other posts—over 345,000 copies. Recent CRP books include: *Children of China*, by Margaret Wylie (Introduction by Pearl Buck); *The Peasant and the Communes*, by Henry J. Lethbridge (selected as one of the Agency's "Books That Count"); and *Workers of China*, by K.E. Priestley.

4. *Report on China*<sup>11</sup> —Bi-weekly five-minute taped radio features, based on *China Reporting Service* news releases, and designed for local radio placement. Through facilitative assistance from USIS Mexico City and USIS Beirut, these tapes are available to posts in Spanish, French, English, and Arabic. English and foreign language texts accompany all tapes. Arrangements for direct mailing of the tapes can be made with USIS Hong Kong, which will furnish any post interested with details of this service.

#### HOW DOES THE CRP OPERATE?

Sample copies of *China Reporting Program* materials are sent regularly to each USIS post unless the post instructs USIS Hong Kong to

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<sup>8</sup> An unknown hand underlined the phrase "CRS is produced bi-weekly."

<sup>9</sup> An unknown hand underlined the words "books," "pamphlets," "photobooks," "authorized," and the phrase "scholars and authorities from several countries on Chinese Communist affairs."

<sup>10</sup> An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "Agency."

<sup>11</sup> An unknown hand circled the phrase "Report on China" and underlined the phrase "Bi-weekly five-minute taped radio features."

the contrary. Each post, in turn, is expected to determine the usefulness of the materials and order the quantities which can be used effectively. In some cases posts distribute the materials directly to target audiences. In other cases where political conditions preclude the possibility or desirability of direct distribution, posts can elect to furnish USIS Hong Kong with the names and addresses of individuals or institutions, and the materials are mailed directly to the addressees without involving the post. NOTE: NO MATERIALS ARE MAILED TO ANY INDIVIDUAL OR INSTITUTION IN A COUNTRY WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE POST CONCERNED.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All posts should be familiar with the operation of the *China Reporting Program* and its products. The Agency is fully aware that special circumstances in certain countries may limit the degree to which CRP materials can be effectively distributed. However, the materials can furnish useful background and talking points for officers where placement in local media is not possible. Further, the Agency recommends that where applicable, posts should bring CRP materials to the attention of other elements of missions such as labor, commercial, and agricultural attaches, who may wish to receive some of the items and who may have additional suggestions for their use.

2. Careful study should be made of the possibilities for unattributed direct mailing of CRP materials from Hong Kong to individuals or institutions likely to have an interest in Communist Chinese affairs, in instances where USIS distribution is not practical or desirable. Posts may furnish USIS Hong Kong with the names and addresses of recipients, for materials selected by the post, and these will be mailed directly from Hong Kong without attribution to USIA or the USG.<sup>12</sup>

3. The Agency recommends that posts assign one individual responsibility for liaison with USIS Hong Kong on *China Reporting Program* matters.

4. Since CRP materials are produced for general world-wide use<sup>13</sup> rather than for a specific area of country, this poses problems in terms of tailoring products for special needs of individual posts. However, to the extent of its resources, USIS Hong Kong will make every attempt to provide special materials when requested.

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<sup>12</sup> An unknown hand underlined the phrases "Posts may furnish USIS Hong Kong with the names and addresses of recipients," "selected by the post," and "without attribution to USIA or the USG."

<sup>13</sup> An unknown hand underlined the phrase "CRP materials are produced for general world-wide use."

In this connection, USIS Hong Kong actively seeks and would welcome suggestions from all posts on ways to improve existing CRP materials; ideas for books, articles, pamphlets; other suggestions for making the program more effective. Such suggestions should be sent jointly to USIS Hong Kong and USIA/IAF Washington.

5. The Agency recommends that all posts consider potential contributors to the *China Reporting Program*. USIS Hong Kong would appreciate hearing about recognized writers, journalists, scholars dealing with contemporary Chinese Communist affairs who might be interested in writing a CRP book or articles for *Current Scene*. USIS Hong Kong is prepared to pay reasonable prices for such contributions.

Rowan<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Rowan signed “Carl T. Rowan” above this typed signature.

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## 16. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 26, 1964

During and since my visit to South Viet-Nam, USIA has given the highest priority to altering its program so as to meet the urgent needs of Southeast Asia.<sup>2</sup> In this connection, I have:

1. Increased the USIA staff in Viet-Nam by adding ten new positions.
2. Assigned three officers to Viet-Nam on temporary duty to assist in radio program production and other information activities.
3. Authorized the direct transfer of personnel from any post in the world to fill needs in South Viet-Nam.
4. Facilitated an agreement with the Defense Department to train an additional 42 Army officers who will serve as psychological warfare

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 16, Field—Far East (IAF) May–December. Secret. There is no indication on the memorandum that the President saw it. This memorandum is also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, Document 177.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 13 and footnote 2 thereto.

and civil affairs advisors at the province level. This will permit a vitally-needed expansion of the psychological warfare program in the countryside.

5. Recommended to AID (and secured its agreement) that a \$278,000 "petty cash" fund be set up to insure that the information program in the provinces is not hampered because of lack of funds to cover such items as paper, ink or spare parts.

6. Increased Voice of America broadcasting into North Viet-Nam and made arrangements for a broad expansion of VOA broadcasts in Vietnamese in early July.

7. Secured the agreement of the Government of Viet-Nam to the installation of a portable 50 kilowatt transmitter to be located near Hue for broadcasting into North Viet-Nam (this is a joint USIA-Defense project, with Defense providing most of the money).

8. Arranged to fly, with the help of the Defense Department, three 50 kilowatt short-wave transmitters from Liberia to the Philippines so as to increase our Southeast Asia coverage by fifty per cent.

9. Agreed to provide a USIA officer as an engineering advisor to Radio Viet-Nam.

10. Asked the Australian Government to provide a program advisor for Radio Viet-Nam.

11. Placed on duty a USIA officer to advise the Government of Viet-Nam on motion picture production and have agreed to provide a production specialist for the GVN printing plant.

12. Agreed to provide a USIA officer who will serve as personal press relations advisor to Premier Khanh (this officer, who previously gave award-winning service in Viet-Nam, has been pulled out of France and is now enroute to Saigon.)

13. Submitted a comprehensive country-wide information program for approval of the Government of Viet-Nam (this has been approved in principle and the GVN is now being pressed to implement the program with speed.)

14. Set up in Washington a special research unit to produce materials on Viet-Nam for use by VOA and other facilities.

Following are more details on the actions listed above:

#### VOA PROGRAMMING TO VIET-NAM

On May 3 we introduced a new half-hour of prime evening time broadcasting to Viet-Nam. This raised to three hours per day our program designed to influence listeners in the North. By mid-July, VOA will broadcast a solid evening block of five and one-half hours, from 7:00 pm until 12:30 am Saigon time, plus one-half hour each morning.

To sustain this expanded schedule VOA is recruiting 12 new Vietnamese employees for work in Washington, has stationed an American officer in Saigon to develop new program materials on the scene, and is increasing use of Vietnamese students and other Vietnamese nationals in the United States. These additional resources will provide us with a great deal more material on North Viet-Nam than we have been able to get in the past.

USIA and the Army are cooperating in the crash construction of a 50 kilowatt medium-wave transmitter in Hue. Components are being flown from Liberia and the United States. The transmitter should be relaying VOA by July 18 and should give competitive coverage of North Viet-Nam unless the Communists resort to jamming.

In addition, the three 50 kilowatt short-wave transmitters to be flown from Liberia to the Philippines next month are expected to be operational by July 18. The Philippines is an ideal distance from Viet-Nam for short-wave coverage. These three transmitters will provide a good signal for a full program day.

I discussed with you our need for a megawatt medium-wave transmitter in the area in order for us to compete with Peking and Hanoi. I want to emphasize, however, that this facility is not of immediate importance because 18 to 24 months would be required for its construction. We have rushed, therefore, to install the kind of facilities that can have some immediate influence on the situation.

#### COORDINATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS WITHIN THE U.S. MISSION IN SAIGON

General lack of coordination has been, in my view, our gravest problem in terms of the information-psychological program. You are aware, I believe, that in accepting Barry Zorthian as the Public Affairs Officer last January, Ambassador Lodge specified in a telegram to Ed Murrow that Zorthian “will not have responsibility for press relations (newspaper, magazines, television, radio) as I do this work myself.”<sup>3</sup> In addition the military had its own information program. The general result was that no one could be sure who was responsible for what, which is why I asked in my earlier memorandum to you that Zorthian be given over-all responsibility in this area.<sup>4</sup>

There has been considerable progress in recent weeks. Zorthian has been made Chairman of a mission-wide Psychological Operations

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1285 from Saigon, January 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 13.

Committee and a Joint Field Service Center has been created to merge the resources of all U.S. agencies for the psychological effort.

I emphasize, however, that Zorthian and the USIA staff are still not in a position where they have any clear responsibility for dealing with the American press. I do not say this to suggest that giving them such responsibility would end the spate of critical articles written by American newsmen. Many, such as those by Jim Lucas in the Washington DAILY NEWS, are the products of reporters who go out into the field, gain the confidence of our soldiers and then pick up bits of information which they turn into stories that are not at all helpful to our over-all mission. These are reporters who will be influenced little, if at all, by government press officers. I do believe, however, that Zorthian and other USIA officers ought to be free to make whatever effort they can to inform and give guidance to American newsmen.

One aspect of the reports by American newsmen that has bothered me was their tendency to emphasize American mistakes and acts that could be called "brutal" and to give little coverage to Viet Cong atrocities. USIA has recommended that a special Army photographic team be sent to South Viet-Nam to cover combat actions and to make available to American and other newsmen the kind of photographs that put across the stories we want told. The military have agreed to do whatever is necessary.

#### COOPERATION WITH VIET-NAM GOVERNMENT

Our ability to move on the Country-wide Information Plan depends largely on the extent to which we can budge the GVN to go along.

The GVN has set up a counterpart to the U.S. Mission's Psychological Operations Committee, and a joint committee representing the two governments began meeting immediately after my departure from Saigon.

This represents a significant step in view of the fact that no national information plan existed under previous GVN regimes and we could get no cooperation in producing one. My officers report that the current government is moving much more slowly than we like, but we are prodding them in Saigon, and I have indicated to Zorthian my willingness to write the Minister of Information from this end to urge greater speed on his part.

#### SUMMARY

USIA has given its highest priority to South Viet-Nam. In terms of its own program and that of the Government of South Viet-Nam, we are moving as rapidly in Viet-Nam as is possible and sparing no

facility or personnel in our efforts to see that the rest of the world knows what is at stake in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia.

Carl T. Rowan<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 17. Editorial Note

In a June 1, 1964, memorandum to United States Information Agency Director Carl T. Rowan, Deputy Director Donald M. Wilson reported on his recent trip to the Soviet Union. Wilson observed:

“The Soviet Union is still a land of paradox and nowhere does it show up more clearly than in the information and cultural fields. Although I was able to engage in some remarkably frank and free exchanges with writers, artists, and even professional propagandists, the repressive hand of the bureaucracy (in my case, in the form of the Ministry of Culture) was never far away. On the same day, for example, I engaged in a free-swinging discussion of the Sino-Soviet rift with the leaders of *Novosti*, the ‘press service’ which serves as an overseas propaganda organ of the USSR, and then was prevented by the Ministry of Culture from spending an innocuous evening with the editors of a music magazine watching the Red Army Chorus perform.

“This paradox of today is still a vast improvement over the Stalinist orthodoxy of eight years ago. Since that time the U.S. Government has slowly expanded its information and cultural activities in the Soviet Union. The process has been, and still is, one of trial and error. The proper approach has been, and still is, one of pushing firmly but not belligerently on a number of doors marked ‘exchanges’, ‘cultural presentations’, ‘radio broadcasting’, ‘magazine distribution’, and the like. If the door doesn’t open, return in a while and push again. If it does open, keep your foot in it and establish a program, no matter how meager.

“Several years ago, our problem in the information and cultural field was the basic one of identifying the opinion leaders of the Soviet Union. Today, they have been identified and we are in contact with a number of them. The problem now has become one of maintaining and expanding those contacts.

"If the present political climate prevails, the U.S. Government programs should be able to continue expanding at a gradual and unspectacular rate. Over optimism and an excess of eagerness should be avoided." (National Archives, RG 306, Director's Files: 1962–1965, Entry UD WW 191, Box 9, Director's Office 1964.) Wilson's memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XIV, Soviet Union, Document 34.

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## 18. News Release Prepared in the Office of Public Information, United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>

No. 14

Washington, June 9, 1964, 1 p.m.

Address by Carl Rowan, Director, U.S. Information Agency at the  
American Booksellers Association Convention

Mr. Wimpfheimer, Mr. Duffy—and ladies and gentlemen:

Where were all of you when I was writing books? There's nothing on any royalty report of mine that even suggests that there are this many people going under the label of bookseller.

If I sound a little miffed, it's only because I've been reading all these stories about how some "mystery man" went to Bennett Cerf<sup>2</sup> and tried to buy up the whole printing of "The Invisible Government."<sup>3</sup> There wasn't a sign in any of those stories that, in turning down the mystery man, Bennett offered him the alternative of buying up what's left of the first printing of any of my books! What a patriotic gesture that would have been toward an ex-author whose next book will be "The Invisible Bankbook."

But I hope all this business about "mystery men" and books that are full of security leaks doesn't give any of you the notion that government people are against the book business. We're just hard-working patriots who believe in the Constitution and the Bible. Our favorite Bible pas-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Agency History Program Subject Files, 1926–1975, Entry A1–1072, Box 13, Speeches, Carl T. Rowan, 1964. No classification marking. Rowan addressed the American Booksellers Association convention at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington on June 9.

<sup>2</sup> Founder and President of Random House publishing company.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the 1964 book, *The Invisible Government*, written by journalists David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, which examines the U.S. Government intelligence apparatus.



sage is the one in Ecclesiastes that reads: “Of making many books there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh.”

My 11- and 12-year-old boys give a resounding “AMEN” to the last part of that verse.

And I may add with some seriousness that there is more evidence than my royalty statements or your profit sheets that books have never been as welcome as would be wished by those of us who regard knowledge as a primary virtue.

“I hate books,” muttered the highly-literary Rousseau,<sup>4</sup> “for they only teach people to talk about what they do not understand.”

G. C. Lichtenberg,<sup>5</sup> the 18th century German critic, put the matter candidly enough: “Books, nowadays,” he said, “are printed by people who do not understand them, sold by people who do not understand them, read and reviewed by people who do not understand them, and even written by people who do not understand them.”

This same cheerful gentleman, Lichtenberg, reviewing a book of his own day, could only bring himself to comment: “This book has had the effect which good books usually have: it has made the fools more foolish, the intelligent more intelligent, and left the majority as they were.”

Benjamin Disraeli,<sup>6</sup> the brilliant British politician, who, when he was not popping in and out of the Prime Ministership of England, whiled away his time turning out a whole shelf-full of successful novels, might have been expected to have something kind to say about books; but listen to him: “Books are fatal: they are the curse of the human race. Nine-tenths of existing books are nonsense, and the clever books are the refutation of that nonsense. The greatest misfortune that ever befell man was the invention of printing.”

But surely one of the darkest moments in any author’s life occurred to poor Edward Gibbon,<sup>7</sup> when he presented a copy of the third volume of his celebrated *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* to the Duke of Gloucester, brother of George III.<sup>8</sup> History has recorded the Royal Duke’s comments of that moment—and surely they should stand engraved on the writing desk of any hard-working author naive enough to put his trust in the permanence of literary fame: “What!” shouted

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the 18th century French philosopher, political theorist, and writer. The quote is from Rousseau’s *Emile: Or a Treatise on Education* (1762).

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, the German scientist and writer.

<sup>6</sup> Prime Minister of Great Britain, 1868 and 1874–1880. The quotation is from Disraeli’s book, *Lothair* (1870).

<sup>7</sup> Eighteenth century English historian.

<sup>8</sup> Reference is to Prince William Henry.

the Duke, as Gibbon proudly handed him his labor of love, "Another of those damned, fat, square, thick books! Always scribble, scribble, scribble, eh, Mr. Gibbon?"

Well, a remark that scathing from so imposing a royal critic ought—one supposes—to have been the preface to the *Decline and Fall of Edward Gibbon*. But books have a way of burying their own undertakers; and today you can still buy a copy of that book, or even see a multi-million dollar movie version of it—but who remembers the long-fallen and apparently unlamented Duke of Gloucester?

Say what you will about books: curse them, damn them, burn them, blast them—they remain one of the great, indispensable building blocks of civilization . . . and a bookless world would surely be an exact and terrifying synonym for an inhuman world. For it is out of books that man recovers, saves, uses some of the fragments of learning that are washed up in the deluge of time.

Certainly in our business in USIA the book bulks large.

In our mandate to further the foreign policy objectives of the United States, USIA uses every known tool and technique of communication. We use ancient Asian morality plays—and avant-garde American art. We edit neo-literate wall-newspapers—and learned academic journals. We employ traveling village troubadours—and orbiting relay satellites.

We use in any given case the best communication medium available to get the right message to the right audience at the right time.

But though we are, and must remain, flexible in our choice of means, one of the hardest and time-tested means is the simple book.

There are, for example, our libraries, reading rooms, and bi-national centers: more than 400 points of book-lending, in more than 80 countries, stretching from Stockholm to Stanleyville, from Tokyo to Tegucigalpa.

Every year more than 30 million different people visit our libraries across the world, borrowing nearly eight million volumes, and consulting twice that number on the premises.

Opening a new USIS library is often such a local event that crowd-control becomes a problem. In Marrakech the response was so overwhelming that library membership cards, limited to one-day-a-week admittance, finally had to be issued.

After a month's operation of our new library in Nyasaland, only 20 percent of the collection was left on the shelves: 80 percent of the books had been borrowed immediately.

In Calcutta, the USIS library with 20,000 volumes does as much business as India's National Library with more than a million volumes.

To get American books into the hands of important readers in the hinterland, we operate USIS traveling libraries and bookmobiles in certain countries.

In Israel, the USIS bookmobile was hotly pursued by a police car until our worried driver finally pulled over to the side of the road, and steeled himself for a ticket. “Look here!” said the two earnest men in uniform as they hurried up to the car, “We’d like some books, too. So don’t keep passing up our police outpost!”

A village leader in Pakistan, told politely that he had exceeded the number of books a single patron could borrow at one time from the USIS bookmobile, promptly rounded up his nine children and checked out an additional volume in the name of each child.

In Rangoon, a school teacher came 18 miles for a book on a topic her class was studying. Seeing related titles on the shelves, she sighed: “Ah, if only I could stay here several days and read these other books . . .” Told by our librarian that she could borrow the volumes, her incredulous stare of blank disbelief was broken only by the books being placed physically in her hands.

When Turkey began drafting its new constitution, our USIS library in Ankara was asked for basic works on American democratic institutions. As a result, passages in the Turkish Constitution in force today are based on that reference material.<sup>9</sup>

Last year, during consultations of African leaders in Kampala, the Attorneys General of Uganda and Kenya, together with a prominent attorney representing Tanganyika,<sup>10</sup> visited the USIS library and borrowed books on U.S. constitutional law, in connection with proposals for a draft constitution.

Not only are there constant requests around the world for us to expand our library activities, but whenever budget stringencies require us to close a library or a reading room, there are massive petitions from the local community to keep it open. Just this week I got angry protests from Finland where a rumor was out that the USIS library would be closed.

Indeed, the whole problem with books in many parts of the newly-developing world is not that books are not highly esteemed—but precisely the opposite. In some places, books are esteemed much too much!

In Asia, for example, our posts sometimes donate small, select collections of American books to important colleges. These books are received with such overwhelming gratitude that the affair is usually an elaborate one, with the college rector arranging a formal ceremony of acceptance before the entire assembled student body, complete with garlands of flowers, a high tea, and profuse speeches all around.

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<sup>9</sup> On May 27, 1961, the Government of Turkey adopted a new constitution. (“Turkey Approves Revised Charter,” *New York Times*, May 28, 1961, p. 8)

<sup>10</sup> Reference is to the former name for Tanzania.

But nothing is more frustrating for the USIS officer, checking in for a visit to the college a few months later, than to discover that the books are almost hermetically sealed in locked glass bookcases in the rector's office . . . in absolute mint condition, untouched by human hand, and even worse, unread by human eye. There the books are—proudly on display—clearly regarded with immense esteem; but treasured like a set of crown jewels, rather than used like a set of classroom tools.

When our USIS officer politely remonstrates with the rector that the books don't seem to be getting much use, the rector is likely to reply in surprise, "Oh, but we keep them locked in here only because we are afraid the students might steal them. You know how it is: books—especially *American* books—are so very valuable in our country!"

It is true. And it is a problem. There are still many parts of the world where an American book has such great value that its usefulness is severely compromised.

That is one reason the Model Book Store Exhibit, that your association helped us put together, has been so useful to us overseas. It has been a tremendous hit wherever it has traveled—and by showing in so graphic and attractive a way how books are promoted and sold in America, it helps open new channels of trade which will increase the sale of American books abroad.

All of us in USIA are gratified, too, at the immense success of the ABA International White House Libraries Project. This effort is an outstanding example of the way in which American private enterprise can effectively further our national interests abroad.

And, of course, the open-shelf system in our USIS libraries overseas is another compelling and contagious example of book accessibility.

But there is still another reason we are proud of our USIS libraries . . . and that is because they are blown up so often!

Since 1947 we have had 58 attacks of open violence on our libraries in a total of 29 countries.

As overseas agencies go, USIA has a pretty modest budget—just how modest becomes evident when one considers that if we had AID's budget for a single year, it would carry us along for more than 20 years; and if we had the Defense Department's budget for a single year, it would run USIA for almost four centuries.

But without question, USIA spends more for broken window panes overseas than AID and Defense put together!

While we in USIA are serious about economizing, we are rather proud of those broken windows. Because when an emotional mob decides that it is disappointed with the United States—and wants to

tell it so—it usually picks out the USIS library as the one conspicuous, well-known and well-liked symbol of the United States on the main street of the city.

Our libraries are blown up—not because they aren’t appreciated (indeed, the repairs are almost always paid for by an apologetic host government; and sometimes even by spontaneous and unsolicited donations from the readers themselves), but because in the heat of mob passion, the USIS library seems the most obvious and frequented symbol of Uncle Sam—and is the U.S. building which most youth know by location.

Uncle Sam,<sup>11</sup> I like to think, could do much worse than be symbolized by a free, open, democratic public library!

What is even more interesting, our libraries are blown up by elements of the extreme political right as well as by elements of the extreme political left.

In fact, the bombings have happened so often now that it has been suggested to our Training Division that perhaps a seminar or two on Demolitions Discovery, De-Fusing, and Disposal might well be sandwiched in with the lectures on the Dewey Decimal System we give our lady librarians.

But all things considered, there is almost a certain symbolic cheerfulness in these acts of violence in our libraries. Rarely is anyone hurt—and the motivation for the riots can be quite revealing. In Salisbury, Rhodesia,<sup>12</sup> for example, a young African tossed a brick through our library window. The police promptly arrested him, but when they asked him why he had done it, he replied with proud gusto: “Because ‘the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots . . .!’”

The quotation, of course, is from Thomas Jefferson.<sup>13</sup> And where had this proud young African read it? In that same USIS library, naturally.

I don’t think this argues that we ought to take Thomas Jefferson off our USIS shelves.

I think it does argue that we can afford a few broken windows—if in the end the USIS libraries can help keep the American message of liberty, freedom and equality alive?

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<sup>11</sup> The name and cultural icon, Uncle Sam, is used as a symbol to represent and substitute for the United States.

<sup>12</sup> Reference is to the former name for the Southern African country of Zimbabwe.

<sup>13</sup> Third President of the United States from 1801 until 1809. The quotation is taken from a letter Jefferson wrote in 1787.

Of course, this great nation of ours being such a kaleidoscope of contrasts and convictions, we have a job keeping the book collections in our libraries fully representative. And sometimes American tourists who drop into our USIS libraries overseas complain that we have too many of this kind of book—and not enough of that kind of book; or that we cover this point of view, but not that point of view; or that this author is represented, but not that author—and so on.

And some U.S. tourists feel that certain of the American novels on our shelves present too negative a view of American society.

Well, we work hard at keeping our book collections balanced and representative, but whenever a returning tourist or Congressman complains to me that some of the American novelists on our library shelves present too critical a picture of the United States, I like to recall a little story Robert Penn Warren<sup>14</sup> tells about a conversation he had once with an Italian Fascist who had deserted Mussolini in World War II, and had come over to fight on our side.

Why had he done this? Warren asked him.

"Because of your American novelists," the man replied. "The Fascists used to let us read American fiction because it gave—they thought—a picture of a decadent America. They thought it was good propaganda for Fascism to let us read Dreiser, Faulkner, Sinclair Lewis.<sup>15</sup> But you know, it suddenly occurred to me that if democracy could allow that kind of criticism of itself, it must be very strong and good. So I took to the mountains."<sup>16</sup>

I now take to the mountains of work on my desk. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, very much.

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<sup>14</sup> American poet, novelist, and literary critic.

<sup>15</sup> References are to American writers Theodore Dreiser, William Faulkner, and Sinclair Lewis.

<sup>16</sup> The quotation is from Warren's essay "A Lesson Read in American Books." (Charlotte H. Beck, *Robert Penn Warren: Critic* (Knoxville, Tennessee: The University of Tennessee Press, 2006), pp. 96–97)

**19. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 15, 1964

## SUBJECT

Saigon Press Comment on U.S. Policy

While the Vietnamese press continues to reflect concern with the progress of the war and with what it characterizes as a “defensive” U.S. policy toward Viet-Nam, there is some indication of a developing reassurance as to the firmness of the U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia.

Prior to the most recent forceful actions of the United States in Southeast Asia, strong criticism of U.S. policies by the Saigon-Cholon<sup>2</sup> press remained unrelieved. Persistently dwelling on themes which began to be evident early in 1964, the Vietnamese press generally expressed concern over the “ambiguity” of U.S. policy statements, consistently castigated the U.S. for “making all the decisions in Viet-Nam” and/or expressed fear that the United States will abandon South Viet-Nam.

Neither the Honolulu Conference<sup>3</sup> nor the McNamara visits<sup>4</sup> produced a significant change in press attitudes. In fact, by May 1964 press opinion seemed to have reached a low point of pessimism. Typically, *Dan Quyen* declared on May 13 that “when the McNamara delegation came here in March, the situation in South Viet-Nam was not as critical as it is today.” Indirectly reflected in this attitude was the belief that the United States must adopt a stronger policy, but that—in view of the election year—it was unlikely to do so.

In the past few days, however, Vietnamese press attitudes have shown signs of change, apparently in response to the overflights in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Foreign Affairs, Box FO-1, EX FO, FO 6/1/64-7/10/64. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to the Chinese-influenced section of Saigon.

<sup>3</sup> On November 20, 1963, Rusk, McNamara, and other U.S. diplomatic and military officials, including U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, held a conference in Honolulu, Hawaii, to discuss the future course of U.S. policy in Vietnam. For a summary of the meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963, Document 321.

<sup>4</sup> McNamara made three trips to South Vietnam prior to the date of Rowan’s memorandum to evaluate the situation on the ground and make recommendations. He traveled in September 1963 and March 1964 with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, and in December 1963 made a solo trip. For summaries of these trips, see *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. IV, Vietnam August–December 1963, Documents 167 and 374, and *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. I, Vietnam 1964, Document 84.

Laos<sup>5</sup> and the generally stronger U.S. show of strength in Southeast Asia. With most Saigon newspapers viewing renewed Communist aggression in the neighboring kingdom as part of the overall red design to conquer all of Southeast Asia, Saigon dailies have spoken out editorially in full support of U.S. actions in the new crisis. The influential Chinese-language *Thang Cong Jih Pao*, which on May 7 had bitterly complained that the United States did not want to take "decisive action" against the Communists because it wanted "a peaceful, pre-election breathing spell, had by June 9 lined up with U.S. action and proclaimed "the world-wide communist front is indivisible."

Other leading papers have shown similar confidence, and while it is obviously too early to predict that the short-term comment so far available from Saigon marks a trend, it is significant that caustic criticism of the U.S. no longer goes unchallenged in Viet-Nam. Thus, while the *Saigon Post* recently expressed dismay at the "gullible and naive" attitude of the U.S. in "once more resorting merely to raising the quota of economic and military aid," *A Chau Jih Pao* voiced a strong note of reassurance on June 10.

"It is still premature to tell what change Southeast Asia will undergo," declares *A Chau*, "but one thing is certain: the United States would never abandon Southeast Asia, nor will she make any withdrawal from this part of the world."

Carl T. Rowan<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> In May 1964, the United States started flying reconnaissance flights over Laos. (Hedrick Smith, "Air Aid Requested," *New York Times*, May 22, 1964, p. 1)

<sup>6</sup> Rowan signed "Carl" above this typed signature.



**20. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 19, 1964

As you are aware, the situation in the Congo continues to deteriorate. There is an ever-increasing likelihood that we may be faced with the need to mount an informational-psychological offensive of the magnitude we now are undertaking in Viet-Nam.

As in Viet-Nam, the basic problem continues to be security. However, also as in Viet-Nam, a military solution will not be possible unless an energetic political, psychological, and informational campaign is promptly undertaken designed to obtain the active support of the local tribal leaders and their followers to the central government.

I am readying USIA for the need to make an all-out informational-psychological effort in the Congo, and for a more effective program in the rest of Africa. The following actions have already been taken:

1) Radio Congo is the principal means of communication between the government of Prime Minister Adoula and the people of the country. Upon learning that Radio Congo's studio equipment was in critical need of repair (only three of eight studios capable of operation), I immediately authorized transfer of funds and resources from less critical programs to be used to repair facilities on an emergency basis. I also assigned a USIA radio engineer to the Congo to take charge of this operation.

2) I have transferred one of my senior and most able officers (John W. Mowinckel) from Paris to Leopoldville,<sup>2</sup> where he will be in charge of our field operations. He will be on duty in early July.

3) I have appointed a new Area Director for Africa, Mark Lewis, who most recently was Public Affairs Officer in Ghana. Lewis is a top-notch officer with considerable African experience who is highly regarded by all of our Ambassadors with whom he has served. He has drive and imagination, both vitally needed in the direction of a program for Africa. I have instructed Lewis to go to the Congo to review the situation and to report to me personally on steps we need to take.

**Carl T. Rowan<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Federal Government Organizations, Box FG-33, FG 296 U.S. Information Agency (1964–1966). Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the former name for Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

<sup>3</sup> Rowan signed "Carl" above this typed signature.

**21. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency (Brady) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 19, 1964

The President's speech<sup>2</sup> on building bridges with Eastern Europe indicates, I believe, that we should come up with our own concrete suggestions for implementation. These and some general thoughts on this subject are outlined in the attached paper.

**Leslie S. Brady<sup>3</sup>**

**Attachment**

**Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, undated

While the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies will undoubtedly concern themselves with the political, economic and commercial implications of United States policy toward the countries of Eastern Europe as enunciated by President Johnson in his recent Lexington, Virginia speech,<sup>5</sup> it is USIA's particular responsibility and opportunity to consider the psychological implications and to build informational and cultural bridges.

The psychological approach is particularly important in creating the atmosphere necessary for establishing more substantial and concrete relations in fields of greatest interest to us. Conversely, the unrest—intellectual, economic, political and ideological—existing within the countries of Eastern Europe today provides us with opportunities to bring these people ideas and information from the United States.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 16, Field—Soviet Bloc (IAS) 1964. Confidential. Copies were sent to Wilson, Sorensen, EUR/EE, EUR/SES, CU, and S/AL.

<sup>2</sup> On May 23, Johnson delivered a speech at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia, in which he asserted: "We will continue to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors, and of humanitarian aid." For text, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1963–1964*, Book I, pp. 708–710.

<sup>3</sup> Brady initialed "LSB" above this typed signature.

<sup>4</sup> Confidential. No drafting information appears on the paper.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, above.

We must first seek to *reach* the opinion leaders in Eastern Europe with the information we want them to have and to interpret it for them. Our major goals should be to encourage liberalization within the countries of Eastern Europe, to further evolution away from political repression toward societies in which the leadership responds to the will of the people. Information and ideas will also help reestablish the traditional ties with the West which the people of Eastern Europe have been virtually denied during recent years.

In considering programs in which we now engage, activities which we envisage for the near future and plans which we have on a long-range basis, we make first the following general observations:

1. Some of our information and cultural activities—such as, for instance, the Voice of America—need no agreement by the respective governments and operate without it. Others do need their permission, but we believe that our goals can best be achieved without resorting to the negotiation of formal written agreements. We can probably do best by operating on an *ad hoc* basis as we presently do in Poland, by being flexible in our approach and by taking advantage of opportunities as they arise.

2. The United States stands to gain both by the exposure of American intellectuals and opinion leaders to the people of Eastern Europe and by the exposure of Eastern European men and women of influence to this country.

3. The Eastern European governments should be made to realize that the conduct of cultural and informational activities is consistent with normal friendly relations between countries and that these activities are our part of a *quid-pro-quo* for something they want. There should be at least tacit understanding on the part of these governments that our diplomatic missions will have free access to officials and private citizens in the pursuit of legitimate cultural activities and that the citizens of the respective countries will have access to the cultural activities of the U.S. missions (library, film showings, English classes) without running the risk of harassment by local authorities. The missions of the Eastern European countries in Washington already enjoy analogous access here.

4. Our targets are those individuals in Eastern Europe who now and in the future will guide public opinion and attitudes. These include party and government officials, managers and “technocrats”, youth leaders, publicists and the intellectual elite. In communicating with the intellectual elite—the writers, creative artists and academicians—we must, however, strike a careful balance: On one hand, we want to encourage the “dissident” elements, those avant-gardists who are out of favor but who are bringing new life into intellectualism in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, we do not want to give them the kiss of

death by singling them out for attention. But neither do we want to ignore the moderates among the intellectuals—as opposed to the reactionaries—these moderates being responsible for some of the liberalization which already has been achieved.

Following is a summary of our present activities and future recommendations:

1. Radio. VOA already broadcasts in all the Eastern European languages and no increase is contemplated. However, we are making constant efforts to make our programs more effective in terms of our present foreign policy objectives. VOA remains the single most important source of news from the United States and information about it. Now that jamming has ceased in all countries but Bulgaria, VOA's potential has greatly increased.

2. Publications.

a. We should push for agreement for the sale of a prestige American publication such as *Amerika*<sup>6</sup> (already being distributed in Poland—32,000 copies, and in the USSR—62,000 copies monthly). This type of publication would serve in place of commercially-published American periodicals, unless and until these are freely distributed in Eastern Europe. The United States would agree to the sale in this country of reciprocal publications.

b. We will push for publication of a Cultural Bulletin in Hungary and Czechoslovakia (as we now distribute in the other countries) and of a Science Bulletin (already being distributed in the USSR)—both in local languages. These bulletins give up-to-date news of events and accomplishments in the cultural and technical-scientific fields.

c. We should press to obtain wider circulation of Embassy daily information bulletins to editors, journalists and government officials and of press releases to these same individuals and to others who might be assumed to have special interest in a given press release.

d. We should continue judicious distribution of presentation materials—such as publications, films and elements for display—at the request of local citizens and organizations.

e. We should press officially and privately at all appropriate levels for sales of our commercial publications—books, periodicals, newspapers—in the countries of Eastern Europe thereby to achieve a freer flow of information.

3. Exhibits.

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to a Russian-language USIA publication distributed in the Soviet Union.

a. We should continue to participate in international trade fairs in Eastern Europe and expand to include other trade fairs since they are an excellent platform from which to show the U.S. flag.

b. We should try to expand our current program of major solo exhibits such as those in plastics, transportation, communications, graphics, and medicine which will have been shown already successfully in some Eastern European countries (Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria).

4. Reading Rooms. In spite of categoric opposition to date by the Eastern European governments to the establishment of reciprocal reading rooms (or information centers), we should continue to press for them. We should stress that such reading rooms are part of normal diplomatic establishments in countries maintaining friendly relations with one another.

5. English Teaching Assistance. Since there is great interest in Eastern Europe in learning English, we believe that we can promote American ideas through this means. We are doing some of this now through the publication of the "English Teaching Forum",<sup>7</sup> through loans of language laboratories, and through participation in English teaching seminars.

6. Television and Radio. We should continue to try to place on Eastern European TV networks especially produced and targeted American TV and radio programs, including cultural features and possibly English teaching materials. We should also encourage American commercial and educational radio and TV networks to offer appropriate programs to these countries.

We should likewise encourage exchanges between the Eastern European International Broadcasting and Television Organization and the European Broadcasting Union.

7. Exchanges of People. One of the most effective means of strengthening ties between the people of Eastern Europe and the United States is an increased and free flow of individuals and groups of individuals—tourists, relatives, businessmen, teachers and students, or specialists in various fields visiting their counterparts. We should push particularly exchanges in the intellectual and cultural fields among writers, artists, journalists, educators, and youth leaders.

8. Exchanges with Western Europe. Since, as the President stated, we must work ". . . to demonstrate that identity of interest and the prospects of progress for Eastern Europe lie in a wider relationship with the West", we should seize every opportunity to encourage the Western European countries to build similar bridges using methods delineated above and others which may be available to them.

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to a quarterly magazine publication first published by USIA in 1963.

## 22. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 29, 1964

### SUBJECT

#### *Foreign Reaction to Senate Passage of Civil Rights Bill<sup>2</sup>*

USIA has just completed a study dealing with foreign reaction to the Senate passage of the civil rights bill.<sup>3</sup>

Non-Communist editors universally and extensively acclaimed the event as marking an historic advance. Acclaim is accompanied by warnings that passage of the legislation will not immediately or easily bring equality for the Negro and expectations of continued bitter strife and resistance are widespread.

Along with cautions against expectation of immediate results are some hopes that strife will henceforth be moderated. The long debate heightened attention to the racial question and increased the dramatic impact of the Senate's action. Tribute is paid to your skill, courage, and authority in bringing about the bill's passage.

Commentators viewed the passage as the most important step forward in the American Negro's struggle for equality since the Emancipation Proclamation;<sup>4</sup> as a "victory" that will "shape the future of the United States"; as a "turning point" in American history; as enhancing the international influence of the United States, especially among the non-white and newly-independent nations; and as reinforcing the moral authority of the United States and its dedication to freedom and social justice.

Soviet treatment has sought to downplay the importance of the Senate's action, stressing the "immense distance" between the legislation and its realization, predicting the continuance of racial clashes and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Foreign Affairs, EX FO Box FO-1, FO 6/1/64-7/10/64. No classification marking. The President initialed the memorandum in the top right-hand corner.

<sup>2</sup> The Senate passed the Civil Rights Act (P.L. 88-367; 78 Stat 241) on June 19; the President signed it into law on July 2. For text of the President's remarks on signing the Act, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1963-1964*, Book II, pp. 842-844.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is report R-89-64, entitled "Foreign Reaction to Senate Passage of the Civil Rights Bill," June 25, prepared in USIA's Research and Reference Service.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the proclamation made by President Abraham Lincoln on January 1, 1863, in which he declared "that all persons held as slaves" within the rebellious states "are, and henceforth shall be free."

high-lighting current racial difficulties. No comment from Peking or other Communist areas in the Far East is available.

A summary of regional comment follows:

#### *Western Europe*

Senate passage of the civil rights bill received prominent news coverage in Western Europe and, especially in Britain, Scandinavia and Austria, extensive editorial comment as well. Material currently available indicates that, with a few prominent exceptions, French and West German reaction has not been so extensive. Most see the Senate action as a turning point in U.S. history and give credit to you and President Kennedy. At the same time, the majority is either skeptical or pessimistic over prospects for peaceful and early acceptance of the measure.

#### *Africa*

The African press has responded to Senate passage of the civil rights bill with prominent coverage and enthusiastic comment. Papers in seven African countries described the bill as a major step forward in the Negroes' drive for equality but recognized that the bill's passage did not mean the end of racial discrimination in America. While editors censured Messrs. Goldwater, Faubus, and Wallace for impeding racial progress, they praised the American people, the U.S. Senate, and you and President Kennedy for your combined efforts in achieving victory. The U.S. was seen as implementing its democratic principles.

#### *Near East and South Asia*

Commentators in widely separate centers in both the Near East and South Asia generally regard the passage of the Senate civil rights bill as an historic turning point in the battle for equal opportunity in the United States. Some papers see the measure as a memorial to the late President Kennedy, while others credit your Administration. Most temper their praise, however, by warning that enforcement problems are apt to dilute the full effect of the legislation.

#### *Far East*

The Far East press enthusiastically applauded the Senate passage of the civil rights bill. Editorially, the action was welcomed as certain to improve the U.S. image abroad and as a badly needed answer to Communist charges of officially-sanctioned racial persecution in the United States. While only a few editorialists in the area expressed fear that the bill might lead to increased civil rights strife, a number noted that the legislation in itself was not enough and needed popular support and cooperation. The bill was generally described as a monument to the late President Kennedy and a political triumph for you.

*Latin America*

The Latin American press has given wire service news treatment to the Senate's passage of the civil rights bill. In addition there was substantial editorial comment for a few days. The tone of the comment was almost universally favorable and laudatory. The principal theme has been the resultant enhancing of the international prestige of the U.S. and the influence the law-to-be will have on the rest of the world.

*Soviet Union*

Senate passage of the civil rights bill drew a considerable volume of Soviet commentary attempting to minimize the importance of the legislation, although *Pravda* and several other newspapers have ignored the event. Moscow Radio immediately broadcast a brief, factual account of the vote to both foreign and domestic audiences. The follow-up TASS dispatch from Washington outlined the many hurdles the bill had overcome before passage and concluded that while "racists" had suffered a defeat in Congress, they would continue to struggle in their home states against implementation of the law. Occasionally conceding that passage of the civil rights bill marks "a certain success" for the struggle of American Negroes for equal rights, the Soviet press and radio have continued to spotlight incidents such as those in St. Augustine.

A copy of the USIA report is attached.<sup>5</sup>

Carl T. Rowan<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Rowan signed "Carl" above this typed signature.



### 23. Editorial Note

On July 1, 1964, Director of the United States Information Agency Carl Rowan, in his official statement before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, stated: "I do not think I am being overly dramatic today, Mr. Chairman, when I say that the Nation's need for this Agency to do an adequate, even inspired, job has never been greater." He continued:

"The fires of conflict burn in southeast Asia; the winds of disillusionment blow on every continent; our adversaries are spreading the seeds of discontent, of hostility toward the institutions of freedom that we seek to preserve in Latin America and wherever frustrated men will listen."

I know that you of this committee understand that we have no choice but to use every feasible means of communication—radio, television, motion pictures, books, newspapers, pamphlets, and the force of the knowledge and personalities of our people overseas—to insure that no man chooses tyranny because we have defaulted in telling freedom's story.

"Mindful that USIA's fundamental reason for existence is to tell that story, to advance the foreign policy interests of the United States, I have undertaken a zealous campaign to insure that every foot of film, every minute of broadcasting, every stick of type that is set in our name, goes to portray this country's strength, its dedication to human freedom, its social progress, its economic vitality, its belief in the rule of law—and most of all the yearning for world peace that guides its every effort."

Rowan continued: "There have been two foreign policy developments recently that point up dramatically the magnitude of the current challenge to USIA. The first is the easing of tensions between the United States and a portion of the Communist bloc; the second is the Sino-Soviet split.

"In backing away from the Cuban confrontation to a posture of 'peaceful coexistence,' Khrushchev stated emphatically that there can be 'no ideological coexistence,' so the Soviet propaganda apparatus is busier today perhaps than in the worst days of East-West tension."

"The fact is," Rowan further stated, "the Sino-Soviet split imposes upon USIA a demand for greater activity and greater zeal, for in their efforts to outdo each other, the Soviet Union and Red China each has intensified its propaganda campaign, particularly in the underdeveloped areas where they boast that they will 'bury us'—each in its preferred way.

"Not only have we added and altered broadcasts and sharpened other elements of our program to meet this challenge, but we are taking

on new responsibilities and devising new techniques to meet crisis situations abroad.

"For example, we have increased our broadcasting in Vietnamese from our VOA facilities in the Philippines, and in a few weeks we will add three 50-kilowatt shortwave transmitters to our Philippines complex so as to strengthen by 40 percent this country's shortwave voice in southeast Asia. In mid-June the VOA will be relayed strongly into all of Vietnam over a new medium-wave transmitter that is being constructed in South Vietnam in cooperation with the Department of Defense."

Rowan concluded: "In short, Mr. Chairman, we are determined that our friends not be confused, or the doubtful misled, because we, either through lethargy or a misguided notion of economy, have failed to state this country's case." (*Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1965, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, Second Session on H.R. 11134, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964, Part 1, pages 1487-1489*)

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#### **24. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 11, 1964

##### **SUBJECT**

*Rural Opinion in Viet-Nam*

USIS conducted a study in April and May, 1964, to determine psychological attitudes in the rural Vietnamese province of Binh Hoa.<sup>2</sup> Despite the fact that Binh Hoa is not typical of all rural Vietnamese provinces, findings proved surprisingly consistent with less detailed but significant data taken previously from other areas, and are probably indicative of rural thinking throughout much of the country.

The following summary of findings from the study may interest you.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Countries, CO 312 Vietnam, Box CO-79, CO 312 Viet Nam, 6/15/64-9/30/64. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is the undated study entitled "Rural Opinion in Binh Hoa Province."

1. *Villagers prefer the central government over the Viet Cong.* Viet Cong influence was significant in only two of the fifteen villages surveyed. Only in the face of threats did villagers tend to support the VC. Left alone, they looked to the central government for any real help.

2. *There is confidence in the Khanh<sup>3</sup> government, but it can only be maintained by fulfilling villagers' desires.* Khanh has achieved a considerable measure of respect by meeting certain village demands such as relaxation of taxes and elimination of forced indoctrination sessions. Even among Catholics who felt that Diem<sup>4</sup> gave them preferential treatment, the old regime is no longer mourned.

3. *The most common aspiration is for government credit and material aid.* Financial and technical help is everywhere sought and needed for construction of public works such as hospitals, schools, and irrigation projects and for private assistance in agricultural developments.

4. *Success of the strategic hamlet program is dependent upon several factors.*

- a. Adequate and well-behaved security forces.
- b. Prompt payment of resettlement costs.
- c. Free elections.
- d. Honest, energetic, and socially-responsible government officials and district chiefs.

5. *The presence of U.S. advisors is not resented.* Generally, people "do not care whether U.S. officers act as advisors or commanders as long as they help in winning the war." Despite some unfavorable comparisons with the French who "got closer to the people," U.S. advisors are judged as "better disciplined."

6. *Villagers' uncertainties about their prospects can be reduced by still further improvement of the Vietnamese Information Service.* Common complaints were that publications do not reach the people, movie showings are too infrequent, and Vietnamese information officers do not exert themselves enough. Thus, uncertainties about the government can result from lack of information about so uncomplicated a subject as "People wonder what happened to the savings they have poured into the Agricultural Credit Service fund for the last years."

The overwhelming need is for reassurances of physical security.

For your more detailed information, a fuller report is attached.

Carl T. Rowan<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam military commander, Major General Nguyen Khanh, who led the January 30, 1964, coup. Khanh served as Prime Minister of South Vietnam from February 4 to October 30.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam until November 1, 1963, when he was deposed in a military coup.

<sup>5</sup> Rowan signed "Carl" above this typed signature.

**25. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to United States Information Agency Heads of Elements and Country Public Affairs Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 17, 1964

SUBJECT

Assignment of Priority Project: Viet-Nam

The President has placed the highest priority on programs supporting U.S. determination "to use its strength to help those who are defending themselves against terror and aggression"<sup>2</sup> instigated and supported by Hanoi and Peking in Viet-Nam and other nations of Southeast Asia. I have accordingly assured the President that USIA will spare no resource or effort in support of that objective.

We have almost doubled the size of our program in Viet-Nam and we have developed a coordinated, mission-wide psychological effort in support of the GVN.

In Washington, Mr. Robert Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, has been charged with creating more positive public support in the United States for our policy.

A third and vital area of concern is the necessity to impress upon other nations that communist aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia is indeed a menace to Free World security and that deterrence of that aggression is a responsibility which all nations should share. To meet this need, the Agency must make a maximum effort through all media and in all possible countries to achieve the following objectives:

- (1) to explain the nature and significance of the struggle,
- (2) to expose the evil of communist aims and actions,
- (3) to stress the collective responsibility which other nations must share to stop them,
- (4) to publicize third nation participation and support, and
- (5) to keep before world opinion U.S. determination to persist in its support of those Southeast Asian nations which have requested our assistance until the communist aggression is checked.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Files: 1962-1965, Entry UD WW 191, Director's Office 1964. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> The quotation is from a statement that Johnson read at his June 23 news conference. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 6, 1964, pp. 46-47.

We should all keep in mind that the communists view their aggression in Southeast Asia as a test case for “wars of national liberation” and that a communist victory there would sharply increase the likelihood of future such adventures elsewhere. We should strive to create in the minds of our audience a sense of individual identification with the struggle against communism in Southeast Asia.

*AGENCY REQUIREMENTS:*

*MEDIA:*

(1) Under the direction of the Assistant Deputy Director for Media Content, the media will launch an expanded and sustained flow of products in support of this priority project. A listing of these products will be forthcoming from IOP along with guidance and Talking Papers as appropriate.

(2) In the meantime, the media should give priority treatment to Viet-Nam, and the objectives outlined, in their output. They should insure that all units of their operation are made aware of the priority I place on this project.

*POSTS:*

(1) Should first assess their capabilities and potential to forward the aims described above;

(2) Work with or through whatever local GVN representation may be present and with other friendly missions;

(3) Cross report editorial comment supporting our objectives; and

(4) Forward promptly any ideas on ways in which this project could be bettered, suggestions for media output, etc.

It will be the duty of Area Assistant Directors to insure that posts fulfill these responsibilities.

**Carl T. Rowan<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> Rowan signed “Carl T. Rowan” above this typed signature.

## 26. Editorial Note

In an August 5, 1964, memorandum, United States Information Agency Director Carl T. Rowan, summarized for President Lyndon B. Johnson the international media's initial reactions to United States military action in retaliation to reports that North Vietnamese patrol boats had fired upon two U.S. naval vessels, the USS *Maddox* and USS *Turner Joy*, on August 2 and 4. According to Rowan, "Far East comment sees the situation in Viet-Nam as grave and there are indications of concern and some anxiety but nothing approaching panic." However, Western European media viewed "the American moves in Southeast Asia as retaliation against deliberate North Vietnamese attacks." (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Countries, EX CO 312, Box CO-79, CO 312 Viet Nam 6/15/64-9/30/64)

In a memorandum the following day, Rowan informed Johnson that "the mood of world comment currently is sober, watchful, and concerned, and hopes are strongly expressed that the conflict will not broaden. U.S. action is generally viewed as justified, and praised for 'firmness and restraint.'" (Ibid.) In an August 7 memorandum further assessing the on-going international media attention, Rowan noted: "Strongly favorable initial acceptance of U.S. actions in the Gulf of Tonkin has now been tempered by more concern and increasing doubts about those actions." He further informed Johnson, "General approval, tempered by sober thoughts on escalation, is still coming in from Far Eastern countries, particularly the Philippines and Taiwan." Although European media continued to view U.S. actions as necessary, "more attention is being given to U.S. domestic implications" and that Johnson had "'succumbed to a Goldwater policy'" was appearing in mostly leftist European media. (Ibid.)

On August 10, Johnson signed into law the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (P.L. 88-408; 78 Stat. 384), which authorized him to take any necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to repel any military attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent future aggression. For additional information about the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the subsequent resolution, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, volume I, Vietnam, 1964, Documents 255-308.

**27. Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to All United States Information Service Posts<sup>1</sup>**

CA-865

Washington, September 24, 1964

**SUBJECT**

A Look at USIS Centers—Some Guidelines

*SUMMARY:* It's time for a complete review by PAO's of center operations—purpose, scope, content and service—to see how they can be more purposeful in carrying out specific objectives. Adjustments in program emphasis may be in order to revitalize center operations, including music, lectures and exhibits. The Agency offers some guidelines for this new hard look.

Operations of a USIS Information or Cultural Center, America House, library, reading room, binational center, book-extension collection or other book deposits have been described in detail in the Agency's MOA and the PAO Handbook, plus various circular messages and other communications to the field in the last decade. This message, therefore, is not intended to repeat basic operating procedures but rather to provide a refresher for all American officers and national employees on the utilization of books, periodicals and other "center" resources so that they will be more purposeful in carrying out Agency and country plan objectives.

From personal observations and study by senior Agency officers who have visited and inspected our posts, and discussions in Washington with PAO's, CAO's, librarians and other officers being debriefed, we have concluded that our libraries abroad have not kept up sufficiently with the improved and changing educational and communications situations in their countries or in their areas. This requires a new hard look by the posts, particularly by each PAO, at centers and their program-content potential in terms of country plan objectives. Adjustments in collections, in ordering for targeting purposes, in selection methods by posts and in book promotion may be in order to revitalize library activities. These would go beyond the weeding-out process which is natural for any library; these adjustments would call for weighing the value of each title in relation to the post's specific needs for

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1 1066, Box 219, Centers, Reports, and Studies, Guidelines and Mission, 1964. Unclassified. Drafted by Glatzer on September 11; cleared by Sorensen, Echols, Harris, Lewis, Lincoln, Bunce, Ryan, Miller, Tuch, and in substance by Jenkins (State SOV); classification cleared by Emond; approved by Glatzer. Repeated for information to Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw (from Rusk). Sent via pouch. There is no time of transmission on the message.

carrying out country objectives and for putting emphasis where it needs to be. Books of lesser importance which seem to have assumed a permanency in the collection may have to be discarded and replaced by titles of greater importance.

It's time for a conscientious review of the library investment. To assist each PAO to make this review, the Agency offers these guidelines:

### *1. Purpose and Scope*

A USIS library is established to provide basic information and to supply source material about the United States. Books are purveyors of ideas, and books and libraries have a definite place to further our objectives.

In appearance and operations, a USIS library is similar to a public library. However, unlike a public library, the purpose of the USIS library is not the general diffusion of knowledge. It is not a substitute for any local public library, however willing the local government may be to have us assume that responsibility. Our libraries are neither a recreational reading oasis nor a scholarly research center. The USIS library exists for a special purpose: to promote U.S. objectives.

Obviously, different areas and different countries represent different problems and thus call for different documentation. Some libraries may need to be more sophisticated culturally than others, depending on the reading habits and capacities of the audience; others may need to concentrate on more basic materials, depending on the degree of open communications and commercial channels between our country and the host country.

What goes into each library and how well the books are promoted is the responsibility of the PAO. We have reason to believe that in the press of other matters, the PAO may have delegated this responsibility to other officers (in many cases, junior officers) or to a local librarian and thus may not have been in a position to direct the library program in such a way that its materials and services reach selected audience groups with the right titles at the right time. The PAO should control the special-purpose character of his books and should not rely on persons with lesser policy judgment on how to utilize the collection. In the latter case, this can and has resulted in off-balance collections in the light of the Agency's five major points of emphasis and its five major Americana themes, as well as specific country plan needs.

It is the Agency's feeling that each PAO, CAO, America House and binational center director and other American officers should give more personal attention to the library and its contents as the center of information and cultural operations on which a country program can revolve. The PAO is the key officer in policy application; the librarian is the follow-up action officer.



## 2. Content

Each library collection should provide a wide selection of responsible works on American life and culture, emphasizing those aspects which facilitate sympathetic understanding of United States policies.

Books are primarily selected on the basis of content. Every book on the shelves of a USIS library should have a pertinent program reason for being there—this should be our yardstick. Periodically, program-content inventory should be taken and each book considered for retention on its merits for meeting specific program needs. No book should be guaranteed a permanent place on the shelf.

Book selection for each library is decentralized to field posts. The PAO and CAO should take an active part in selecting titles for center collections; a recommended approach is for each post to establish a “Book Committee” chaired by the PAO or CAO, which must approve each book for which orders will be placed through ICS or locally-procured.

To assist posts in the selection process, ICS makes available lists of recommended books, subject bibliographies and special book lists. The ICS Current Recommended Book Lists will hereafter carry “built-in guidance” on new books by identifying titles by events or themes of most recent concern and thus worthy of special handling. These lists will single out audiences we especially want to reach with the book. In addition, ICS issues regularly each month—or more frequently, if required—a Special Book List on a leading thematic subject, which lists from 10 to 30 recommended books to receive priority book promotion in and outside our libraries. Frequently, the USIS and Embassy staff can call attention to these titles in their contact work.

Posts, of course, can draw on other bibliographic sources in selecting additional titles they require to support Agency themes.

While there is no desire by the Agency to reduce support for libraries and centers, posts will have to find the means to make adjustments in their collections without additional financing. We strongly recommend that posts eliminate some titles, cut down on multiple copies and not re-order less important items to provide the funds. The post will then be able to increase the number of more important books, without increasing the over-all costs for book purchases.

To reshape our libraries along contemporary lines and to fill the gaps, we suggest:

(a) *Substantially reduce popular fiction collections.* At some posts, these vary from 10 to 45 per cent of the total collections. We consider this out of proportion. At posts where American popular titles are accessible through commercial bookstores, public libraries or schools and universities, fiction should be pared down to a minimum of titles, representa-

tive of the best in the contemporary American novel. Even at posts where the book gap is large, we should be highly selective. Each year, posts should limit selection to a maximum of 30 or 40 representative titles of new fiction recommended by ICS.

(b) While cutting down on popular fiction, we should build up a good collection of the *American classics of literature*. This should be basic in every USIS library. ICS will issue a catalogue of basic American classics which should be checked against your collection.

(c) *Support of American Studies courses* in secondary schools and universities has become an increasingly important library function. The American Studies collection should give special attention to history, political science and economics, in addition to the traditional emphasis on American classics of literature. Too many posts are overloaded with expensive books on the fine arts, theater, literary criticism, etc., and the humanities; these definitely have a place in the library but when ordering new titles or re-ordering old titles, thought should be given to the development of a good, but *token* collection of such items, sufficient to meet most needs. Without sacrificing balance, the post may find it could use the money more gainfully for titles more directly in line with policy objectives. (See ICS Special List 5/63 of June 1963.<sup>2</sup>)

(d) American progress in *science and technology* remains one of our major themes and this should be adequately reflected in all collections. Books on these subjects are very popular in many countries, especially among university students, and should be given special attention by the PAO and his senior staff. If there is a Science Attache at the post, seek his advice on documentation.

While a well-rounded science collection would seem to be mandatory at each post, PAO's should weigh carefully the extent to which the library should carry any highly specialized collection such as medical books, which are expensive and which reach a very small audience. Among factors in deciding on such a collection should be (a) the cost in relation to more thematic titles, (b) the availability of the books on the commercial market and/or in the university. Book orders of specialized items could be justified only on the basis of the audience being of such importance to our objectives as to warrant special attention in the country plan.

(e) Books specifically written for *children* under 14 years of age should not be included in a collection unless they are particularly useful in promoting U.S. objectives and, in such cases, they should be justified in the country plan. We believe that certain titles of American history, biography, literature, and even popular fiction written for the less-

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

advanced reader (juvenile series, for example) could be purposefully used in the library for young people or as easy-reading for adults with limited knowledge of English. We feel that we should try to reach secondary-school students from 14 years old upwards, with selective titles. They should be in the formative years of political awareness. It is difficult to envisage tiny-tots or grade-school children as priority target audiences; the money for children's books can be used more gainfully to fill book gaps for young adult and adult audiences.

(f) Libraries at posts with *English-teaching programs*, particularly BNC libraries, should have a wide and representative selection of graded readings for English-language students, as well as source materials, such as books on linguistics and methodology for teachers. This special collection should be labeled as such and it is to be expected that there would be duplication of titles in the regular collection. An English-teaching book item should be a means of introducing American history and social, economic and political thought insofar as possible. Attention is called to titles published under the Agency's Ladder Book program.<sup>3</sup> Appropriate titles also will be found in the "Selected English-Teaching Materials Catalogue No. 5."<sup>4</sup>

Agency-produced tapes and recordings, with their accompanying scripts, should be included in the English-teaching collections.

(g) The *extension collections*, *book lockers* and other depositories should be given the same attention as our own libraries in the book-selection process. A study has disclosed that some posts are using these techniques as a means for making American books available without sufficient regard for basic purposes and objectives. Most current collections are top-heavy with fiction; there should be more attention to basic books on American history, biography and some political matters. We should promote titles in which we have a particular interest. PAO's should direct the composition of these loan collections and posts should make frequent suggestions of specific titles to indigenous librarians operating the extensions. This selection responsibility should not be delegated to local employees.

Evaluations of the usefulness of the extensions and book lockers must be made on a regular basis to determine that the current program potential *and the impact* of these collections on the community where a depository is located justify continuation. The post may decide not to withdraw an inactive collection for various reasons, but further support should be cut off if the investment is not productive from a

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 13, Document 2.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

program-content viewpoint. We should not permit the use of deposits as decorative American shelf acquisitions.

(h) We believe that our libraries have a relatively low proportion of *books in the local language*. This should be remedied. With the marked increase in output of the Agency's book-translation programs in recent years, PAO's should build up the local language portion of the collections. Posts should not only use Agency-sponsored translations but also other available local-language titles which support our objectives. The post's book committee should apply the same criteria to local procurement of books as to titles in English.

(i) A book's success as a policy-application item depends on how it has been handled—this we call *book promotion*. Some posts seem to devote less attention to this important activity than they should. The book's content and author must be introduced to potential readers, in particular the special audiences we are trying to reach. Individuals on the post's leader lists who would be particularly interested in a new book or with whom a USIS or Embassy staff member has had a discussion, could be sent a new title under cover of a letter explaining that it was not a presentation item but a new library book which they might like to read and return.

Every library has or should have display space. New significant titles, plus those on each of the *ICS Special Book Lists* on themes, should be prominently—but not blatantly—displayed. Photographs from the books, of the authors and of current events associated with the theme should be combined with book covers. The introductory page of each of these special book lists summarizes the purpose of the books and the theme and should provide several pegs on which to develop the post's ingenuity.

Too often, monthly bulletins or pamphlets distributed by posts to announce new book acquisitions are deadly. In the attempt to maintain a certain "cultural dignity" the bulletins are dull and unimaginative and hardly conducive to evoking interest in books with special program value. We need attractive pamphlets, with eye-catching make-up and either illustrated with book jackets or other inexpensive graphic work. The Agency suggests posts take a look at *Publishers' Weekly*<sup>5</sup> or the *Wilson Library Bulletin*<sup>6</sup> to get an idea of how it's done.

We also should offer colorful book shelves, identified with clear markings.

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<sup>5</sup> A weekly American news magazine, founded in 1872, that is concerned with the international book publishing business and intended for publishers, booksellers, libraries, authors, and the media.

<sup>6</sup> An American magazine for librarians which was published between 1914 and 1995.

(j) *Periodicals* should represent the richness and diversity of American periodical literature, with priority to those titles selected for relevance to the objectives of the country program and the Agency's points of emphasis. The ICS list of Periodicals Recommended for Program Use should be used as a selection guide. In the annual review required for ordering periodicals, the post's book committee should check the list of periodicals to make certain that the fields of political, international and economic affairs, as well as other serious publications, are given their proper weight. The availability of the popular-type American magazine on the commercial market should also serve as a guiding factor. Multiple copies of most magazines should be discouraged.

### 3. *Services*

The USIS library, or center, should combine the best American library practices with active information services to provide special audiences with materials and documentation designed to expose them to those points of emphasis made in the country plan, as well as the priorities on American life and culture. While all center services and programs are freely available to the public, we give special consideration to individuals, organizations and institutions listed in your country plan as primary target audiences. To this end, services should be supplied as follows:

(a) *Reference service*: It may be desirable for some posts in countries well supplied with public and university libraries and well-stocked bookstores to give more attention to this part of operations, rather than to the conventional lending-library service. The reference service should aim to provide factual and interpretive information to government officials, educators, students, news media, professionals, leaders and others. To be able to supply this documentation, the library resources should be organized to provide a "reference-and-research" section, specially tailored to meet such needs. This may require diverting resources from the popular fiction-lending section, from the social sciences and from the fine arts section, etc., although a representative collection of all these should be maintained for lending purposes.

Some posts where university students are a key audience group and where there are American Studies courses in the schools, should have a special "American Studies Section" in the library which would be a complete study center for history, political science and economics, as well as literature, and which would offer special long-term lending privileges.

The telephone and mail requests for information have bedeviled posts with an overabundance of "quiz-type" questions. Obviously, the origins of these cannot be controlled. However, librarians should be instructed to spend less time on these questions. In one major post, an

extraordinarily large percentage of the reference-service man-hours has been consumed by quiz questions; at another post, USIS has arranged with the public library system to take over this activity and refer only those questions to USIS beyond the ken of the public library. Posts should find a way to tactfully deal with this vexing problem.

When replying to written inquiries, we should take the liberty of enclosing book-promotion materials which will broaden reader interests to include subjects relevant to USIS purposes.

(b) *Music*: ICS no longer automatically sends out scores of American music, except to 25 posts which have shown need for the product. From personal inspection and from talks with returning American officers, we gather that some scores are dormant in USIS centers. We recommend that the scores either be incorporated into the library reference service and limited for lending purpose to conductors, music teachers and students, or else loaned on a long-term basis to conservatories or schools which have shown evidence of interest in contemporary American music.

Posts should consider similar action on musical recordings, which are to be used for group educational purposes rather than for straight entertainment for individuals or groups. Tapes which are part of lecture packets should be made available to institutional borrowers. Posts should be guided by the number of commercial outlets making U.S. recordings available; although in most countries the price for American recordings is extremely high, those institutions or persons professionally interested in our music will generally buy the record.

(c) *Lectures*: It is S.O.P. to tie in books with lectures at our centers. However, posts should also tie in lecture material with the library reference services as additional documentation. The ICS lecture packets are prepared with policy-application in mind; the lectures are written by top people in the academic or writing fields. Recently, the Director of the Agency asked the Agency's Area Director to call attention of their PAO's to these lectures and to point out that he feels they have multiple-use potential. The lectures also can serve as background material for Embassy speech-makers and for leader contacts.

(d) *Exhibits*: Generally, there is good space in centers for display of exhibits and every center should program exhibits and/or book promotion displays on a regular, continuing basis.

Centers should not limit themselves to consideration of fine arts displays. Exhibits distributed to posts for retention (printed unmounted exhibits commonly called "paper shows"), and the circulating panel shows which usually are hung on a Nelson Structure, should receive priority consideration for display in centers.

These "paper shows" and circulating exhibits are concerned with subjects within the framework of the Agency's and the post's major

themes, and are pertinent to the viewers' interest in important and current aspects of America. Displayed in full or in part (depending on available space in the center), the shows often gain effectiveness when placed adjacent to allied library materials for special emphasis.

To insure that exhibits received by the post are not lost in the warehouse, or otherwise "shelved," we feel that American officers charged with supervision of the centers should review each exhibit received. There should be a proper evaluation not only of the aesthetic quality but also of the program value, a consideration that a national employee often is unable to make.

The Agency's exhibit program (other than the East-West Exchange) is small and consists principally of paper shows, in addition to supplying display components to posts for local production. The Agency is canvassing posts for a determination of the value of paper shows. Let us also weigh their effectiveness as a center activity.

*ACTION:*

The Agency expects that each PAO will review center operations, make adjustments in program activities, and establish certain review mechanisms so that policy application and program content will be studied continuously for maximum use of books and other materials in accomplishing program objectives.

PAO's should discuss adjustments in operations with staff, including local employees directly concerned with activities covered by this circular. This message has been administratively controlled for purposes of transmission and the PAO is authorized to disclose contents to local employees, at his discretion.

All parts of this paper should be applied to binational centers, to the greatest degree possible.

**Rowan**



## 28. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 25, 1964

### SUBJECT

*Warren Commission Report*

At your instruction I have today reviewed, within the limits of time, the Warren Report.<sup>2</sup>

My conclusions are as follows:

1. Overseas the report should do something to dilute the conspiracy theory of President Kennedy's assassination. The vested interests in that theory, combined with overseas experience with political conspiracy, make it, I suspect, impossible to eliminate that view.

2. The handling of all aspects of the relations between the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Mexico with Oswald is correct. The report does, however, blow the fact that Oswald<sup>3</sup> saw a named KGB agent at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City; and there is the flat statement on page 423 that: . . . "his commitment to Marxism and communism appears to be another important factor in his motivation." Depending on Senator Goldwater's decision, this statement may get some considerable attention at home; and it may be debated abroad.

3. The criticisms of the FBI and the Secret Service, and the more muted criticism of the Department of State, may get some attention abroad, although the major impact will be domestic.

4. It may well be that the major task for ourselves and the USIA will be to prevent the discussion and debate in the U.S. from projecting an image of excessive domestic disarray.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963-69, Bx 6-29 63-69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 17, Government Agencies—White House, Warren Commission, Kennedy, 1964. Confidential. Sent through S/S. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Copies were sent to Lindley and Greenfield. Dizard's and Wilson's initials and Burnett Anderson's name appear in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> On November 29, 1963, President Johnson established a commission, chaired by then-Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Earl Warren, to investigate Kennedy's November 22 assassination. The group was subsequently referred to as the Warren Commission and the report was the culmination of that investigation. (John D. Morris, "Johnson Names a 7-Man Panel to Investigate Assassination; Chief Justice Warren Heads It," *New York Times*, November 30, 1963, p. 1) See also *Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964).

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 2.



5. With respect to the domestic scene, a good deal hinges, as I suggest, on Senator Goldwater's decision about using this report in the campaign. Specifically, he could seize on these items at least:

a. The passage on Oswald's motivation quoted above from page 423.

b. The role of the State Department. It would be easy to bypass the legal basis for the State Department actions in financing Oswald's return and subsequently giving him a passport, thus exploiting a coarsened version of the story to reflect insensitivity to communism in the State Department. Although the dual failure of the "lookout file" procedure is a bit scandalous, it does not really bear on the tragedy. But critics will use it.

c. The extraordinary communication of Oswald with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City could, evidently, be made the subject of doubt. It took a quite fine-grained analysis by the Commission to sort that one out.

d. The criticism of the FBI and the Secret Service is the most serious of the judgments rendered. Although Senator Goldwater may not be inclined, in principle, to attack the FBI, it is possible that he or the Republican Vice Presidential candidate<sup>4</sup> may try to assign responsibility, directly or indirectly, to the then Attorney General.

6. The criticisms made of the local authorities in Dallas, notably in their handling of Oswald's transfer and permitting Ruby's<sup>5</sup> access, and the criticisms of the press will be noted abroad; but the shock was largely absorbed in the widespread showing of the films of the critical four-days and the thoughtful observations of the Warren Commission on these matters, may be, on balance, a positive factor.

7. On the whole, the Warren Commission report, as Ernest Lindley noted, is up to the best Royal Commission standards. For those with open minds, it cannot help be a strengthening, rather than a weakening, factor both at home and on the world scene; although it will reopen in an authoritative way debates which have only thus far been contained because the Warren Commission Report was on its way.

8. My most important recommendation is that the White House issue a detailed, consolidated statement of changes in government practice in the relevant fields since the assassination, including responses

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<sup>4</sup> Goldwater selected Representative William E. Miller (R-New York), Chairman of the Republican National Committee, as his Vice Presidential running mate for the 1964 Presidential campaign on July 15. ("G.O.P. Chairman Picked for No. 2 Spot on Ticket," *New York Times*, July 16, 1964, p. 1)

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 9, Document 4.

to the Warren Commission recommendations. It is essential that this material not dribble out piecemeal, department by department.

9. I had a conversation in this vein with the USIA (Burnett Anderson). I said they should keep closely in touch with Jim Greenfield and, on my behalf, Ernest Lindley in following up. As the debate unfolds, issues will arise—almost certainly some issues we have not now anticipated. It will be important to maintain the closest possible liaison between the Department and USIA, as well as between the Department, Treasury, Justice, and the White House. We must be a united government in this matter.

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**29. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Greenfield)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 28, 1964

In line with our discussion about the difficulties of USIA keeping well enough informed about military exercises and other developments to do its job adequately, I wish to cite two recent cases to illustrate the contention that the State Department also is delinquent in this respect.

1. More than two weeks ago the White House asked the State Department for a position, *coordinated with other agencies*, on the proposal that the Lockheed Aircraft Company<sup>2</sup> be permitted to sell the South African Government about \$100,000,000 worth of planes for anti-submarine warfare training. I first learned of this potential sale because of a casual remark dropped after one of Secretary Rusk's staff meetings. I later found that Mr. Kitchen, through Ambassador Thompson and Under Secretary Ball, had submitted to the Secretary a proposed response to the President. The submission included letters from Treasury, Commerce and Defense, and discussed the views of various areas of State, but no effort had been made either to inform USIA or to find out its views on the matter.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Subject Files, 05/17/1961–10/15/1965, Lot 67D131, Entry A1–5226, Box 1, U.S. Information Agency. Confidential. Greenfield's response to Rowan's memorandum is printed as Document 31.

<sup>2</sup> An American aerospace company founded in 1912.

I think you will agree that the sale of aircraft to South Africa for possible military use is a matter of the very deepest psychological and propaganda importance, particularly in Africa, and that the views of this agency, charged with responsibility in the propaganda area, ought to be cranked into the decision making process.

2. On Saturday, September 26, Rollie White<sup>3</sup> of State telephoned Burnett Anderson, my Assistant Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, and secured his clearance on a telegram<sup>4</sup> relating to the possible explosion of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists. Anderson was led to believe that this was a more or less routine telegram related to other telegrams on the subject. Information made available to us today, however, indicates that the telegram was far from routine, and would not have been cleared by USIA had all of the background information been made available to us, as it should have been.

I hope that you will impress upon your colleagues that a little better coordination can be achieved quite easily, and that we shall all have fewer headaches as a result. For example, a recent memorandum<sup>5</sup> from me to the President relating to the proposed visit of a nuclear task force to certain African countries created some havoc at State and a request from Ambassador Thompson to me that wherever possible USIA resolve differences of viewpoint directly with State. The trouble here was that State had not kept USIA informed, and thus coordination was impossible.

We are aware that the psychological-propaganda factor is only one of many factors that go into determining policy, but we want to insert that factor in as orderly and helpful a way as possible.

**Carl**

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<sup>3</sup> Foreign Service Officer for the Department of State.

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

### 30. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 1, 1964

In line with our recent conversation in which you asked about items which might be announced from or in relation to the White House, I have just completed several major developments at USIA which can be made public with considerable benefit.

Two of them are of considerable importance, and I believe that it would be advantageous if I could have a few minutes in which to discuss these developments with you.

Following are the points I have in mind:

I. Most important is an agreement just concluded by Secretary Rusk and myself under which this Agency's Career Reserve Officers will become members of the Foreign Service. This is the most important development in USIA since it became an independent agency, and it will go far toward raising the calibre of USIA's personnel and improving the overall efficiency of the Agency. I am forwarding to you here-with a joint memorandum to you from Secretary Rusk and myself along with the pertinent documents, including a Press Statement which the Secretary and I propose that you make.<sup>2</sup> I believe it important that I discuss this development with you prior to any announcement<sup>3</sup> (and I am hoping that the announcement will come soon in view of the danger of press leaks).

II. A magnificent one and one-half hour motion picture on President Kennedy's years in the White House (Frank Stanton mentioned it to you) will be ready for showing in a few days.<sup>4</sup> It is one of the most

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Federal Government Organizations, FG 266-1-1, Box FG 33, FG 296 U.S. Information Agency (1964-1966). Confidential. Handwritten notations indicate that Johnson saw this memorandum and underlined portions of the text.

<sup>2</sup> Not found. The conversion of USIA's Career Reserve Officers into Department of State Foreign Service Officers did not occur during Rowan's tenure as USIA Director. Congressional legislation authorizing the conversion was not passed until 1968. On August 20 of that year, President Johnson signed into law P.L. 90-494 (82 Stat. 810), also known as the Pell-Hays Act. Upon signing, Johnson stressed: "Approval of the act today culminates the determined efforts of three administrations, numerous Members of Congress, advisory committee, and private citizens who have understood that the United States needs a professional career service for this new arm of its diplomacy." For text of Johnson's statement, see *Public Papers: Johnson, Book II, 1968-1969*, pp. 904-905.

<sup>3</sup> Johnson underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "I believe" and ending with "any announcement."

<sup>4</sup> The USIA-produced film, *John F. Kennedy: Years of Lightning, Day of Drums*, was released in 1964. The film was eventually screened for American audiences in 1966 following the passage of a special act by Congress. See Document 64.

effective and important propaganda vehicles ever produced by our country, and if properly launched can have considerable domestic as well as international impact. I believe it ought to be launched during this month, and think you will want to chat briefly about where and how we launch it.<sup>5</sup>

III. Because of a belief that certain USIA publications were not of an influence commensurate with their costs, I recently ordered a thorough study of our publications' policies by a select committee.<sup>6</sup> Yesterday, based on findings of this committee, I ordered the discontinuance of 46 publications which now cost the Government an estimated \$700,000 a year. I have approved the committee's recommendation that we replace these 46 publications with four new publications which will more effectively and economically tell this country's story abroad.

The net result will be a 40 percent reduction in the number of USIA publications and a saving of at least \$350,000 which we can apply to a critically needed expansion of our program in such areas as the Congo and Eastern Africa.

IV. As a further step in sharpening administrative procedures in the Agency, new policies were put into effect this week curtailing sharply the use of overtime. This will produce an estimated saving of between \$100,000 and \$150,000. The savings here as in Item III are annual.

I am aware of the terrible burdens on you during this period, but hope you can find a few minutes in which we may discuss these items.

**Carl T. Rowan<sup>7</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> Johnson underlined this sentence.

<sup>6</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>7</sup> Rowan signed "Carl" above this typed signature.

**31. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Greenfield) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 22, 1964

Dear Carl:

With reference to your memorandum of September 28,<sup>2</sup> I want you to know that I fully agree on the need for better coordination between the Department and the Information Agency. I also share your belief that this should not be too difficult to achieve.

We already have a good basis in existing machinery in the form of close and continuous consultations between your IOP officers and our officers of regional bureaus, as well as in the daily morning visits to Public Affairs by Jay Gildner.<sup>3</sup> What we still need to do, it seems to me, is to improve the working of this machinery in every way we can. On our part this will involve a greater positive awareness of your need to be informed of problems involving foreign opinion and of our need for your special knowledge and expertise in this field.

I am taking several steps within the Department to improve my Bureau's ability to keep you currently informed about projected military exercises and similar developments of the kind described in your memorandum of September 28.

Perhaps a weekly meeting between you, or Don Wilson, and me would prove useful in providing a regular basis on which to keep each other better informed on highly sensitive matters. Before such a meeting I would undertake to inform myself on developments which should be brought to your attention.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963-69, Bx 6-29 63-69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 18, Policy and Plans—General, 1964. Confidential. Dizard sent Wilson a copy of the letter under an undated typed note in which he indicated he had "checked out Greenfield's proposals with Burnett Anderson" commenting that "Burnett buys all the ideas in the letter—particularly the one of having IOP make a late-afternoon policy check with the P." Dizard asked Wilson if he should "draft a short Rowan-to-Greenfield letter, accepting his proposals" and if Wilson wanted to "set up a fixed time each week for the proposed meeting between Greenfield and [Rowan]." In a handwritten notation initialed by Wilson on Dizard's original note Wilson requested that the latter draft the reply and confirmed that he had already agreed with Greenfield to meet every Wednesday at 10 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 29.

<sup>3</sup> USIA Foreign Service Career Reserve Officer.

<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph. A notation to the right of that line reads: "Do you wish to [illegible]." Rowan drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and wrote "OK" to the left of the line. Above Rowan's notation, another notation in an unknown hand reads "10 every wed."

Additionally, you might wish to assign an officer in IOP to make a daily check with my Bureau late in the afternoon as to any developments which may have taken place after Mr. Gildner leaves here at noon. You might wish to have a similar check made around 11:30 or noon on Saturday.<sup>5</sup> Usually, if I am not in then, one of my Deputies will be available. If not, the Duty Officer in my office or in the News Office will be available at that time. Such additional liaison, on a regular basis, should help toward solving this problem.

The overall problem for both of us is, of course, how to bring your knowledge and ours to bear on a policy decision as close to inception time as possible. I have now discussed this matter thoroughly with Ambassador Thompson and Howard Meyers of our Political-Military staff and there is total agreement that they too would make a conscious, concerted, and continuing effort to alert USIA as promptly as possible on all matters of mutual concern. These alerts will, we are assured, take place as near to the inception of any event as is possible.

I will be glad to put into operation as soon as possible any or all of the above suggestions that you consider practicable, and would welcome any suggestions you may care to make which would improve our liaison.<sup>6</sup>

Sincerely,

James L. Greenfield<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Rowan drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, wrote "OK" to the left of the line, and initialed the notation. A notation in the margin to the right of the paragraph in an unknown hand reads "Good idea."

<sup>6</sup> In a November 24 letter to Greenfield, Wilson, responding on Rowan's behalf, indicated that "Carl was delighted with your suggestions, outlined in your October 22 letter, for strengthening coordination between the Department and USIA on policy matters." He continued: "We are agreed that the two suggestions made in your letter should be put into effect right away." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Subject Files, 05/17/1961–10/15/1965, Lot 67D131, Entry A1–5226, Box 1, U.S. Information Agency)

<sup>7</sup> Greenfield signed "Jim" above this typed signature.

**32. Memorandum From James N. Tull of the Office of the Assistant Director for Far East, United States Information Agency to the Assistant Director, Far East (Bunce)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 30, 1964

SUBJECT

Field Program Review—VIETNAM

I arrived in Vietnam on August 22 and remained until September 12, 1964. Since it was necessary for CPAO Barry Zorthian to travel to the U.S. during my visit, I returned to Vietnam on September 26, following my trip to Laos, and remained for four days in order to discuss my observations and recommendations with him. I talked with every member of the American staff except BNC Grantee John Garrett, who was in Nhatrang. I visited My Tho, Go Cong and Can Tho in the Mekong Delta area, and also travelled to Dalat, Danang, Tam Ky and Hue. I consulted with representatives of the Embassy, CAS, MACV, USOM and the British Embassy, as well as numerous Vietnamese in the Government and in private life. Throughout most of the time I spent in Vietnam, my work was interrupted or impeded by governmental instability which sometimes reached the stage of utter chaos.

I. *General*: The almost complete lack of top echelon leadership in the Government of Vietnam (GVN) has made progressively more difficult the conduct of an effective USIS program. The preponderance of USIS activity in Vietnam is designed to provide a surrogate information service for the GVN or to stiffen GVN information operations. To accomplish this we must work *through* the existing GVN information apparatus, an apparatus that has become virtually paralyzed in most provinces because of lack of direction and support from Saigon.

Vietnamese peasants are, in the main, going to be persuaded by *other Vietnamese*. This is the job of the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS). And VIS is not doing its job, except in a few noticeably atypical instances. Indeed, in the areas where VIS employees are needed most, they are least likely to leave the relative security of province or district capitals to work among the peasants.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 16, Field—Far East (IAF) May/December (1964). Secret. Bunce sent a copy of the memorandum to Rowan, Wilson, and Sorensen under a November 10 covering memorandum in which he described Tull's memorandum as of "considerable interest." He noted further that the "major problems" that USIS faced in Vietnam persisted. (Ibid.)



In USIS, and indeed in all other U.S. operations in Vietnam, there are skilled and dedicated Americans literally working themselves to the point of utter exhaustion while most of their Vietnamese counterparts merely go through the motions.

*The number one problem in Vietnam is motivation.* And at this juncture I am constrained to say that I see little likelihood of instilling in the Vietnamese the motivation which will be required to win the war—under the present rules. I refer here to the civil servants and the population at large; in the armed forces, training and leadership (in combat it is often *de facto* American leadership) can compensate to some degree for a lack of personal motivation. But the Vietnamese *civil* population, family-oriented, selfish and opportunistic even in the best of times, has virtually nothing to lead it or inspire it now.

Nevertheless, we must continue to try. The present American approach should be continued and augmented, i.e., install Americans down to the lowest practical level in all branches of the government to stiffen the inadequately motivated Vietnamese civil as well as military officials. Then, if *that* doesn't work, dust off the contingency plans.

We have proved that we can improve the efficiency of centralized Ministry of Information (MOI) operations, such as radio broadcasting, printing and motion picture production, by providing American advisors. With our greatly augmented field operations staff we have been able to make some impact upon VIS provincial operations, but have wrought significant improvement only in those unusual cases where a provincial governor and/or provincial VIS chief are disposed to use initiative in the absence of orders from above. But we cannot expect real progress until we have a more stable GVN, good MOI leadership, and better qualified and motivated personnel in VIS.

II. *Personnel and Post Morale:* We have fielded the “first team” in Vietnam. This is obvious to any qualified observer. It is recognized by all our key colleagues in other agencies.

Although we are still woefully weak in Vietnamese language-qualified officers (there are 17 positions listed as “language essential—Vietnamese”, but only three officers qualified in the language), almost all our officers are qualified in French and use it to advantage in their work.

The post has lost much of the air of intimate camaraderie which previously characterized it, a virtually inevitable consequence of an almost complete personnel turnover as well as the tremendous increase in the size of the staff. Morale is nevertheless good despite overwork, hardship and danger.

Barry Zorthian is aware that he has a potential problem of lowered morale and reduced efficiency in his staff stemming from stress and overwork unrelieved by adequate rest and relaxation. As so often hap-

pens in such situations, the employees who need rest the most get the least. However, Barry should perhaps be more aware that he is unique, that all members of his staff are not Barry Zorthians, capable of functioning at top speed and peak efficiency day and night with little rest and no *divertissement*.

*Recommendation:* The Agency should accelerate its training of officers in the Vietnamese language. We are likely to have a long-range commitment in Vietnam. Furthermore, numerous vacancies will be upcoming next year. A knowledge of French may be sufficient for most of those stationed in Saigon, but only a brief look at the work of Talbott Huey and Frank Scotton quickly convinces one that a knowledge of Vietnamese makes a world of difference in the field.<sup>2</sup>

III. *Country Plan:* The most recent Country Plan was submitted in February 1963.<sup>3</sup> Based on the program being conducted under the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, much of it is completely outdated. The post is working on a draft of a new plan, which should be finished soon. I read a portion of the draft while in Saigon. It reveals that, though the situation has changed much, the basic problems remain the same. The old plan is not as obsolete as it seems. Psychological objectives in the new plan will probably be little different from those now in use.

IV. *Organizational and Operational Evaluation:* The post was still on a shakedown cruise when I arrived; the CPAO had been at the post six months, his DPAO, CAO, IO and at least a dozen others only a few weeks. All key elements of the operation had been recently reorganized.

To the observer it appeared that there was too much emphasis on coordinating, planning, organizing and reporting, and not enough concentration on the quality of the media products and the proper dissemination of those products to the Vietnamese end-users. The newness of staff and the internal reorganization are partly responsible, as is the state of continuing chaos in the GVN. To these must be added the requirements placed on USIS by an Ambassador who has long been accustomed to calling upon a huge staff for frequent briefings and mountains of studies, charts and reports.

The *Joint Field Services Center* is developing well as an inter-agency operation. The Field Representatives are an outstanding group and they are well supervised. The Deputy Director of the Center (a USOM officer) seems well utilized; the military personnel seem underemployed and inadequately supervised.

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<sup>2</sup> Talbott Huey served in Vietnam as a USIA Officer; Frank Scotton served as a Foreign Service Officer.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

Zorthian has divorced the *branch posts* from field operations and has placed them under the supervision of the CAO. He insists that this is the only way to prevent cultural activities in the branches from being ignored in favor of field operations. I would not attempt to second-guess him on this internal matter. However, I would point out that the new arrangement causes some jurisdictional confusion both in Saigon and in the field. Moreover, it ties up personnel (BPAO's and their staffs) and resources in programs of a long-range nature. Granted, there is undeniable value in programs aimed at intellectuals, urban leaders and students, but I believe the war is going to be won or lost out in the hamlets, where the VC are. I suppose it comes down to a matter of relative emphasis, and on this point Barry and I differ.

Peter Madison has been designated *Special Assistant* to the CPAO. He actually is being utilized as a special projects officer rather than a special assistant. He handles such matters as the third country information program and the development of an overseas information capability in the GVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs, i.e., matters which fall outside the realm of any specific section of the post. Madison, a talented and versatile officer, does not seem to be adequately utilized.

USIS relationships with other U.S. agencies are the best I have ever seen anywhere. CPAO Zorthian has been given unprecedented power and responsibility in psychological operations in general and press relations in particular. He uses it in such a way that he gets excellent cooperation and never causes resentment. MACV acknowledges his primacy as Chairman of the Psychological Operations Committee and as the press counsellor and spokesman of the entire U.S. Mission. USOM has voluntarily placed its Communications Media Division under his supervision. Thus, although most of the advisory and consultant personnel which the Agency has provided to work with the GVN report to the Chief of Commedia, USOM, they remain under Zorthian's control. CAS and MACV operate the "Voice of Freedom" radio, but requested a USIS officer (Clifton Naughton) to serve as program director. Approximately a dozen military personnel work full time in the USIS offices, in the Joint Field Services Center and in press relations. The teams of military combat cameramen are under USIS supervision. Col. William Smith, Chief of Psywar, MACV, told me he considers all Sector S-5's an integral part of the Joint Field Services apparatus. Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson and other key members of the Embassy staff offer extravagant praise of Zorthian and his staff. Seems unbelievable, but it's all true!

USIS relations with the GVN continue to be excellent. That they are not very productive at this time is, of course, not the fault of USIS.

Among the worst problems plaguing USIS are *over-centralization of printing facilities*, *over-production* by those over-centralized facilities,

and the consequent *clogging of distribution channels* with printed materials that are inappropriate and too old to be useful when they reach the reader. An American responsible for distribution in the field would destroy publications which reached him too late to be useful and would report to his headquarters that he had done so and why. A Vietnamese wouldn't dare. Thus the tardy publications are even further delayed because the GVN employee has not yet delivered the last batch he received, but is under orders to distribute everything he gets.

USOM and MACV are responsible for the over-centralized printing; through AID and MAP funding, large printing plants have been built in Saigon for MOI and ARVN Psywar. The Vietnamese naturally feel that these plants should be used, as indeed they are, to churn out a staggering quantity of leaflets, pamphlets, magazines, army newspapers, etc., most of which are mediocre at best.

Both the MOI and ARVN printing plants are seldom capable of producing leaflets with sufficient speed to meet tactical needs. Therefore, tactical leaflets are usually printed in USIS's own printing plant. But distribution channels are so burdened with MOI and ARVN materials that leaflets which should be disseminated within hours, or at most days, after printing are found undistributed in outlying provinces weeks later. For example, I found thousands of leaflets concerning the August 4-5 Tonkin Gulf affair undistributed in Can Tho on September 2 and in Quang Tin Province on September 9.

I consider *distribution the most serious operational problem* in Vietnam—distribution of films as well as publications. In approaching the publications distribution problem, USIS and MACV should try to persuade the MOI and ARVN printing plants in Saigon to produce fewer and better products, concentrating as much as possible on non-transient publications. It should be pointed out to ARVN, for example, that a *weekly* troop newspaper is of limited utility if dissemination of that weekly in the provinces is six weeks late. Over-centralization of printing in Saigon not only clogs channels with materials unsuited to local needs, but also uses up funds and supplies which could otherwise be used with more effect regionally and locally.

The only truly effective way to bring the printing nightmare under control is by implementation of Kenneth Sayre's<sup>4</sup> recommendation that a special GVN printing board or printing czar be established to pass on all printing requests from all GVN agencies, with authority to approve or disapprove requests and establish priorities. The chances of getting the Vietnamese to agree to this are virtually nil. Thus, the observer is forced to the ineluctable conclusion that we would all be

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<sup>4</sup> Chief of the USIA Printing Division.

a lot better off in Vietnam if it were possible to stop all ARVN and MOI propaganda printing in Saigon and put an additional mimeograph machine in every district. Instead, while I was in Saigon, MACV brought in a mobile printing plant from Okinawa to increase the ARVN Psywar printing capacity!

Statistically USIS *distribution of films* compares favorably with early 1963. But the statistics reflect repeated showings in the same secure hamlets. This problem can be really solved only by enlargement of areas under effective government control, though some improvement could be effected by persuading certain VIS personnel that their interpretation of what constitutes security is perhaps too restrictive.

Zorthian and his staff are profoundly concerned about the distribution problem. I am confident that they will attack this through the Psychological Operations Committee and the Joint Field Services Center, as well as their GVN counterparts. But it won't be easy.

V. *Program Evaluation*: Media operations are in competent hands, with the exception of the *Press Section*. This will be corrected in a few days with the arrival of Robert Sturdevant.<sup>5</sup> Zorthian wisely plans to use this veteran newsman for general supervision of news coverage for IPS and IBS, in addition to normal Press Officer contacts with the Vietnamese press. However, Zorthian should assure that Sturdevant does not become preoccupied with coverage to the detriment of his work with the local press. The press may have many deficiencies, but it's the only press there is. Circulation of Vietnamese-language dailies is now estimated at 600,000 and the papers are getting out into the provinces more than ever before.

*Radio Officer* James Ascher<sup>6</sup> has overall responsibility for production for VOA and USIS advisory efforts with Radio Vietnam and the "Voice of Freedom", in addition to production for local placement. This is quite a burden for a junior officer, but Ascher is handling it competently. He has reduced the number of programs produced for local placement and is experimenting with production of pilot series of shows using VTVN producers. He plans to tape these in the USIS studios, get the shows established on the air, and then transplant them to VTVN using the same producers. This initiative on his part can upgrade significantly the professional quality of VTVN's work.

*Motion picture production* under Edward Hunter and William Bayer<sup>7</sup> is imaginative, thoroughly professional, and admirably suited to a Vietnamese audience.

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<sup>5</sup> USIA Foreign Service Reserve Officer in Vietnam.

<sup>6</sup> USIA Branch Public Affairs Officer in Vietnam.

<sup>7</sup> Hunter was a USIA Motion Pictures Officer; Bayer was a USIA Foreign Service Staff Officer in Vietnam.

The *Publications Section* produces two major monthlies, *Rural Spirit* and *Free World*, as well as posters, pamphlets, and various specialized items such as school notebooks. The periodicals are excellent and getting even better. The post is inserting some harder-hitting material in *Rural Spirit* on an experimental basis. If it works, i.e., if the anti-communist material does not seriously affect receptivity in insecure areas, this rural how-to-do-it magazine can begin to carry some real propaganda freight.

The USIS Publications Section *prints* vast quantities of leaflets and pamphlets which come to it from the *Joint Field Services Center*.<sup>8</sup> Some of these originate in the Center; others are channeled through the Center from ARVN, MACV or the MOI. The Center is at least one place where printing requests can be more effectively reviewed prior to printing. It appears that the screening is cursory. It is recognized that there are occasions when the Center is reluctant to deny an ARVN officer's request for printing of a leaflet for fear of curbing his all-too-rare initiative. Yet it seems that even quantities are seldom questioned. Furthermore, I could find no evidence that the Center *pre-tests* any of its own leaflets. I was disturbed to discover that USIS would undertake the printing of a leaflet in hundreds of thousands of copies without pre-testing it. After all, even if a leaflet is destined for airdrop in an inaccessible area, one can at least pre-test it in some village near Saigon that is typically Vietnamese. This has not been done. The result is that *post-testing* has shown that some of our leaflets are unclear, too sophisticated, and assume too much knowledge on the part of the rural reader.

Aside from the lack of pre-testing of leaflets, the Center's *research* work is thorough and highly valued by all agencies in Saigon and by the Agency. Particularly useful has been the work of the Center's *Survey Teams*. The teams have given us more of an insight into rural attitudes than any other device that has been used. They should be continued and expanded.

With reference to my earlier pessimistic comments about motivation, I would like to point to one example of conspicuous success in motivating Vietnamese. Field Representative Frank Scotton has conducted four training courses for Self Defense Corps platoons in Quang

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<sup>8</sup> In a February 24, 1965, memorandum to Johnson, Rowan provided a description of the Joint Field Services Center: "Under the U.S. Psychological Operations Committee is a Joint Field Services Center, housed at USIS and composed of personnel of USIS, USOM and MACV. In the Field Service Center are thirteen USIS Americans, two USOM employees, five MACV military personnel and seventy Vietnamese employees of USIS (twenty-three of these Vietnamese employees are stationed in provincial offices of the Vietnamese Information Service)." See *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. II, Vietnam, January-June 1965, Document 160.

Ngai Province designed to indoctrinate as well as to train the troops in propaganda work. Scotton has inspired these troops. They have done exemplary missionary work in the hamlets and, more important, they have demonstrated the highest kind of valor in combat. The question is: How can such a program be expanded? I urged Barry Zorthian to require Scotton to produce some sort of syllabus or training manual that can be used elsewhere. Though much of the Quang Ngai success is attributable to the forcefulness of the Scotton personality and his fluency in Vietnamese, I believe a similar job can be done on a larger scale by others. Certainly anything that will motivate should be tried.

The post's *third country information program* is developing well. Heavy reportage to IPS and IBS on "more flags" support to Vietnam is being supplemented by a greatly augmented flow of photos, motion picture film and radio tapes direct to USIS posts in participating countries. USIS efforts to develop an overseas information capability in Vietnam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs are virtually stymied at present by the chaotic political situation. And we have just been dealt a further blow by the GVN decision to transfer the Ministry's capable Director of Press and Information to Washington as Counsellor of Embassy.

The assignment of USIS officers as *advisors and consultants* to the GVN in radio, printing, equipment maintenance, and press relations has already paid rich dividends. All these officers are skilled professionals and work well with their Vietnamese counterparts. Numerous improvements have already been effected despite the frustrations of working with the Vietnamese bureaucracy.

*Cultural programs* are beset with all the usual problems found in underdeveloped nations, and are compounded by war and political turmoil. Particularly affected are the *Exchange* and *Smith-Mundt* programs.<sup>9</sup> Selection and approval for travel to the U.S. by qualified Vietnamese student and leader grantees are hampered by military conscription and the serious shortage of trained manpower. Recruitment of American professors and teachers for service in Vietnam has been understandably difficult; few academicians relish the idea of serving in a "war zone". Moreover, those who have been sent to Vietnam have found their work impeded by student demonstrations, closing of schools, etc. Despite all these frustrations, the post has managed to conduct a surprisingly good, though modest, exchange program.

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<sup>9</sup> Reference is to international exchange programs established under the Fulbright-Hays Act and the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (P.L. 80–402), commonly known as the Smith-Mundt Act (1948), including the Fulbright Program and International Educational Exchange Program. For information about the Fulbright-Hays Act, see footnote 4, Document 14. The Smith-Mundt Act, named after Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-New Jersey) and Representative Karl Mundt (R-South Dakota), established guidelines by which the United States conducted public diplomacy overseas.



Smith-Mundt professors and teachers have done uniformly excellent work under conditions of stress and hardship.

Though the post has plans for a more organized and structured approach to contacts with returned grantees, AID participants, and military personnel who have trained in the U.S., little has been accomplished to date. Now that the cultural staff has finally been brought up to strength again, this activity should be given a higher priority than it has heretofore enjoyed.

*Bi-National Center* operations are expanding at an almost astonishing rate. English teaching activity is growing in Hue, Dalat, Danang, Nhatrang and Can Tho. A branch of the Saigon Vietnamese-American Association has just been opened in Saigon's Chinese "twin city" of Cholon. For the foreseeable future, only the Saigon and Cholon operations can be expected to conduct more than token programs of general activities in addition to English teaching; the other operations do not have adequate staffs for it. The Saigon BNC stages frequent lectures, exhibits, musical programs and social events—an excellent activities program, which unfortunately has not been emulated by the post's *Information Center* in Saigon. Barry Zorthian is personally very interested in developing an activities program in the Information Center, which is now nothing more than a library. In meetings which I attended he decried the unimaginative presentation of public and untargeted film showings and called for plans for an expanded program for specific target audiences. We can expect improvement, and soon.

Under the conditions prevailing in Vietnam for the past year, effective *programs for youth* have been well nigh impossible. The post's contacts with youth and student leaders have nevertheless improved during this period, enabling USIS officers to exert occasional moderating influence. Improved contacts have also produced the by-product of useful political reporting for the Mission. BPAO's have greatly augmented contacts with secondary schools in their areas. I found universal awareness of the importance of youth activities. In fact, the post was already planning a specialized youth publication before RSC proposed its new *Quest* magazine, a proposal heartily welcomed in Saigon.

No problems or complaints were encountered regarding *Agency support*. On the contrary, I heard many expressions of appreciation for the Agency's unqualified support in personnel, funds, equipment and supplies. Especially appreciated was the outstanding performance of IOC in obtaining donations from private American business firms of commodities which USIS and other field personnel can distribute to establish confidence and rapport on visits to hamlets.

*Recommendations:* 1. Printed materials should be pre-tested before printing whenever possible.

2. The program of indoctrination and propaganda training of selected paramilitary units instituted by Field Representative Frank



Scotton in Quang Ngai Province should be expanded. A standardized training manual should be produced for this purpose.

VI. *Press Relations*: The unique nature of press relations problems in Vietnam requires that this subject be treated separately. The size of the foreign press corps (at one time during my visit there were more than a hundred American and other foreign journalists in the country) and the GVN's inability effectively to handle the press place an enormous burden upon the U.S. Mission. As stated earlier no problems exist within the Mission; cooperation is excellent among all American agencies and Barry Zorthian's primacy in press relations is acknowledged. However, the magnitude of press relations and the serious and sensitive implications for U.S. foreign policy in each day's developments demand that Zorthian spend an inordinate amount of time keeping abreast of events, discussing and helping to formulate the public positions which the U.S. will adopt regarding those events, and meeting with the press. At present, Zorthian is not making sufficient use of his Press Attache and Assistant Press Attache. It is simply impossible for him to do so. He has no time to supervise or direct them. Both are needed; the Press Attache to handle individual press briefings, arrange press conferences and in-country trips, etc.; and the Assistant to concentrate on special visitors and third country journalists.

Several times I asked Zorthian if he thought he could continue to serve as both chief press counsellor and CPAO without detriment to one or both functions. On each occasion he replied that it was too early to tell, that the number of correspondents in Vietnam might begin to taper off, and that the preoccupation with U.S. domestic opinion might decrease following our elections on November 3.<sup>10</sup> Yet he conceded that it might become necessary for him to revive his earlier request for a second DPAO to handle the press. As you know, he has now done so, with Ambassador Taylor's support.

I feel that Barry must have the additional help. It may seem unusual to establish the unprecedented position of a second DPAO. But I would invite your attention to the fact that the President has found it necessary to appoint a Deputy Ambassador, also unprecedented. The problem is unique; the solution must be also.

A second DPAO could relieve Zorthian of a tremendous load. Even a human dynamo such as Barry cannot indefinitely carry the duties and responsibilities which burden him now.

*Recommendation*: The Agency should designate as soon as possible a senior officer experienced in press relations as DPAO for Press Relations in Saigon.

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<sup>10</sup> The date of the 1964 Presidential election.

**33. Telegram From the United States Information Agency to the Embassy in the Congo<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 25, 1964, 1:52 p.m.

USITO 185. PAO from Lewis.

Absolutely essential still photos and all other output reflect humanitarian objective of rescue mission<sup>2</sup> for non-Europeans as well as Belgians and Americans. For this purpose, in addition to Congolese evacuees, you should concentrate on Indian, Pakistan, Sudanese, Haitians and other non-Europeans. Participation Congolese Red Cross, especially doctors and nurses, should provide useful material.

Visibility military aspects rescue mission must be held to minimum. Airship soonest six best photos according this and previous guidance to IPS for world-wide distribution.

**Wilson**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 19, Congo Reaction—Telegrams. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Lewis; cleared by Wilson.

<sup>2</sup> For details of the rescue, which took place between November 22 and 24, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968, Documents 330–365.

**34. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 21, 1964

**SUBJECT***USIA Policy and Operations in Congo Airdrop*

In view of the widespread African hostility to the Stanleyville rescue mission, I thought you might be interested in USIA's efforts to generate understanding and sympathy for the operation.

USIA policy from the start was to rely heavily on rebel brutality as a means of influencing world opinion in support of the humanitarian aspects of the rescue mission. Before the paratroop drop, the USIA mission in Leopoldville had instructions on the press, motion picture, still picture, and radio coverage required to document this brutality. At the time of the drop, the Agency instructed its posts throughout the world to establish the essential facts and to "play up evidence of rebel atrocities, callous disregard for lives of Congolese and other noncombatants, defiance of worldwide condemnation."

*Radio:* From November 24 to December 11, the Voice of America broadcast 360 newscasts in 36 languages describing the rescue operation and rebel brutality. Additionally, there were more than a dozen commentaries on all major language services. USIA correspondents flew to the Congo for first-hand reports and interviews.

*Press:* USIA teletype servicing to all areas was heavy. The Africa File carried 98 stories on the Congo crisis, of which 27 dealt directly with rebel outrages. The other files carried a total of 60 atrocity stories.

*Pictures:* The Agency was able to obtain 23 good photographs of the rescue operation<sup>2</sup> and the results of rebel brutality. Five thousand prints of these pictures were distributed to posts in all countries.

*Publications:* USIA Leopoldville helped the Congolese produce a 40-page booklet, attributed to the Congolese Ministry of Information, describing the atrocities and carrying pictures of many of the victims and some of the escapees. Twelve thousand copies of the booklet are being distributed in the Congo and, if our plans succeed, it will be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 16, Field—Africa (IAA), 1964. Secret. Drafted by Edmond and Anderson. There is no indication that the President saw this memorandum. Under a December 21 covering memorandum, Rowan sent to Harriman a version of the memorandum, dated December 18, signed by Anderson, and sent to Richard Kover of the Central Intelligence Agency.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 33.

distributed in other countries through non-American means. (A copy of the pamphlet is attached.)<sup>3</sup>

Other media output: The Agency produced a 15-minute television program based on the rescue mission and highlighting rebel atrocities. A rescue sequence with pictures of rebel brutality was included in the most recent issue of an unattributed newsreel distributed in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

Carl T. Rowan<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Not attached and not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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### 35. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 31, 1964

Because we are approaching the point of decision with regard to USIS libraries in Indonesia, the UAR and elsewhere, I believe that I ought to set forth my views<sup>2</sup> as to what U.S. policies and actions ought to be.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Federal Government Organizations, Box FG-33, FG 296 U.S. Information Agency (1964-1966). Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Copies were sent to William Bundy, Talbot, Mann, and G. Mennen Williams. Rowan's memorandum is attached to a December 31 memorandum from Rowan to President Johnson, in which Rowan expressed that he had "been very disturbed by the recent attacks on USIS libraries overseas, and by anti-American demonstrations in general."

<sup>2</sup> The text of Rowan's memorandum was also shared with USIS PAOs worldwide in a January 9, 1965, USIA Official-Informal (O/I). According to the O/I, Rowan's text was shared "Because of the recent incidents involving a number of USIS libraries, and because there is a point of view being expressed, at least in the United States, that we should not replace these libraries but rather should leave the burned-out hulks standing as a monument to the irresponsibility of the mobs who burned them." The O/I recommended: "If there is controversy in your area about this subject, you might find the views expressed above useful as talking points." (National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj. Files, 1963-69, Bx 6-29 63-69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 26, Field—Near East—1965)

I believe that there are two fundamental questions the answers to which should form the basis for our future actions:

(1) Do these libraries serve the U.S. national interest to such a degree as to justify extraordinary efforts on our part to maintain them in countries where efforts are being made to pressure them out?

(2) At what point does national pride require us to withdraw voluntarily rather than accept further abuses and affronts?

In my view, the answer to the first question is an unequivocal “yes.” Chalmers Roberts wrote in the *Washington Post* recently: “In travels around the world I have been more impressed, as a generality, by the USIS library operations than by any other American endeavor. Almost without exception they have offered an eagerly sought source of perception about the United States. . . .

“Whatever their cost to the American taxpayer, they are worth it and more. There should be more, not less, of them. And every one sacked or burned should be rebuilt and restocked in a hurry, as is USIS policy.”<sup>3</sup>

Roberts’ comments are generous—but praise which we think can be substantiated.

We avoid saying this publicly, but many of the attacks on USIS libraries arise clearly from Communist and left-wing beliefs that the libraries are a force running counter to their objectives. Nowhere is this stated more blatantly than in a recent editorial in the *Ghanaian Times* (reported in Accra’s 474—tab A).<sup>4</sup> In Indonesia there can be no doubt as to the political motivation of the PKI and the youth groups, though they are less direct in saying that they dislike the political impact our libraries have on those who frequent them.

I feel that in countries like Ghana, the UAR, and Indonesia, we must spare no effort to influence students and other youth groups. We must gamble on the long haul—even as we gambled in Stalin’s time that by persistently telling our story bit-by-bit we would eventually cause some stirrings in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Thus, I feel strongly that we must not become so piqued or angered by a Sukarno, Nasser or Nkrumah that we voluntarily withdraw our informational and propaganda programs, leaving the Communists to win the youth groups by default.

I am for being hard-nosed; for making it clear that we regard these attacks on U.S. mission property as unfriendly acts, and for taking

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<sup>3</sup> Chalmers M. Roberts, “Ideals Written in Burned Books,” *Washington Post*, December 12, 1964, p. A12.

<sup>4</sup> A copy of Tab A is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1964–1966, POL GHANA-US.

stiff diplomatic retaliatory acts—but for withdrawing the libraries only when forced out, or when the situation becomes intolerable.

This raises anew the second question: When must we regard the situation as intolerable? It is not an easy point to specify in theory; but I do not believe that we have reached it. Both the UAR and Indonesian governments have expressed regrets, of a sort, as well as the intention to compensate for damages.<sup>5</sup> The UAR has now offered a building, free of charge, in which library activities can be conducted until a new center is built. I think that we ought to accept the offer and, through the VOA and other means, try to make sure that the UAR people know that the offer of a building has followed an apology—and that we expect further compensation.

I feel that we should not reject out-of-hand even an apology that does not seem as enthusiastic as we believe we deserve. While evidences of governmental complicity were obvious in the recent burnings, I emphasize that in some instances governments may be less to blame than we think. The fact is that demonstrations at our libraries have become a fad—there have been as many in Latin America (9) this year as in Africa (1), the Middle East (2), and Asia (6) combined. When the demonstrators claim to be protesting “imperialism” or “racism,” I am sure that African and Asian leaders find it as difficult, politically, to oppose them publicly as it would be for a Negro congressman publicly to oppose a civil rights demonstration. This does not make the attacks on our libraries any more palatable, but it is a factor we ought to weigh in considering the acceptance of proffered apologies.

In summary, I believe that our long-term national interest requires us to stand firm and to pressure these governments mightily as we seek to maintain the vital channels through which we contact and influence the future leaders of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In Indonesia it will surely involve some waste of money and personnel while the “battle of nerves” goes on, but if we can hold on it will be money well spent in the larger view of our objectives in Indonesia and Southeast Asia.

Carl T. Rowan<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> For information about the attacks on USIS libraries in Indonesia and the United Arabic Republic, see, respectively, *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXVI, Indonesia, Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, Documents 59–91, and *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967, Document 117.

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**36. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (McPherson) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 5, 1965

Two weeks ago I mentioned to the President that the Russians and Chinese had been quite successful in moving into African news media.<sup>2</sup> They had in some countries provided free wire service by Tass and Czech news agencies. The situation as described to me by a USIA man is an increasingly serious one, having reached the point where even news about the U.S. is relayed to many African readers via Communist wire services.<sup>3</sup>

The President was extremely disturbed by this and said that I should inform you of whatever I could learn about the matter. I asked Don Wilson for a summary of the situation.<sup>4</sup> This he has provided and I enclose it herewith.<sup>5</sup>

One thing not mentioned here is that the American wire services have apparently shown some resistance to the idea of a U.S. subsidy

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1965–66, Lot 69D260, Entry UD UP 175, Box 19, 1965 United States Information Agency. Confidential. Sent through S/S. An unknown hand wrote “S saw” on the first page of the memorandum. Rusk initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. A typewritten note in the file from “LL” to McPherson reads: “Mr. Hadsel of AF wishes to see you along with Mr. Welborn of Research & Intelligence—re the attached. Says there are several points on this subject they think you should know about fairly quickly. Needs to see you on Wed. inasmuch as [“Wellborn” is crossed out and an unknown hand wrote “he”] is out of town after that. Set for 4:15 for 15 min.” At the top of the note is typed: “Appt Wed. Jan. 13 at 4:15.” At the bottom of the note an unknown hand wrote: “12:15 apt.” (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand underlined the words “situation” and “increasingly serious.”

<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand underlined “President was extremely disturbed” and “I asked Don Wilson for a summary of the situation.” Attached but not printed is a December 18, 1964, memorandum from Wilson to McPherson, in which Wilson detailed the “Communist penetration of African media.” According to Wilson: “As you requested, here is a rundown on the current Communist campaign to influence and control news media in Africa. I have divided it into three parts: (1) a summary of present Communist activities in this field, (2) a summary of U.S. government programs for strengthening American influence in African media and (3) USIA recommendations for further actions to strengthen our influence.”

<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

for their operations in Africa,<sup>6</sup> being concerned about the possible control of news by government.

Harry C. McPherson, Jr.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

<sup>7</sup> McPherson wrote "Harry McPherson" above this typed signature.

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### 37. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 16, 1965

I have completed a thorough investigation of the informational and psychological warfare programs in South Viet Nam.<sup>2</sup> This included conversations with top American and Vietnamese officials, and with the ten USIA officers and several of the Army officers who are working in the provinces. I concluded that:

1. The program designed to commit the Vietnamese people to greater support of their government and of the war against communist aggression is vastly better than ten months ago. USIS has proved its ability to help the Vietnamese Government meet the insurgency problem through joint development of many techniques (rumor teams, cultural teams, tactical leaflets, loud speaker appeals, film showings, political seminars, etc.) that have met with success in several local areas.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 190, Vietnam Rowan Report. Secret. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963-69, Bx 6-29 63-69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 26, Field—Far East (Viet Nam), 1965.

<sup>2</sup> Rowan, together with Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, accompanied Army Chief of Staff Johnson on a mission to South Vietnam, arriving in Saigon on March 3 and departing on March 12. For information about the mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, vol. II, Vietnam, January-June 1965, Documents 178 and 179. In a February 24 memorandum to President Johnson, Rowan noted their earlier February 19 conversation in which they discussed the feasibility of sending Stanton, rather than Rowan, to South Vietnam. Rowan, within the context of the memorandum, commented that USIA would "welcome a look at the situation by Stanton: "We believe that the program we have developed in the last year is quite impressive—still, we welcome any fresh ideas as to how we might better do the job." (Ibid., Document 160)



2. Nevertheless, this program is still far below what is required to do the job, and is considerably inferior to what USIA and this country are capable of providing.

3. The long period of government instability and the failure to provide basic physical security to the people in the hamlets and villages are overriding handicaps, but these factors must not be accepted as excuses for our failure to mount a psychological *effort* commensurate with the challenge we face.

#### MAJOR U.S. SHORTCOMINGS

There are two fundamental problems on the American side. First, while various mechanisms have been created for inter-agency “coordination,” *what is lacking is unified control and direction* of psychological operations. As you will see later, I have taken steps to erase this, and believe that I have won government-wide acceptance of the several recommendations that will give USIA both the responsibility and authority with which to do the job. Fundamental to all else is a declaration that USIA has primacy in this field. With the proper mandate, we will do the job.

*Second, our psychological program is still penny ante* in comparison with our expenditures in other fields. The yearly cost of USIA’s operation in Viet Nam barely exceeds the cost of one day’s operations in the military and economic fields—this despite the fact that I have virtually doubled our program in the last ten months. So, whereas the money invested in the effort to win over the Vietnamese people was appallingly small a year ago, it can be described even today as glaringly inadequate.

I recommend that we alter this situation both by having USIA “borrow” resources from wealthier agencies and departments, and by having the Agency seek a supplemental appropriation for South Viet Nam. I request your authorization for USIA to seek through the Bureau of the Budget additional funds and American positions as needed for fiscal 1966. We will need at least 60 additional Vietnamese positions, but I will take these out of other country allotments.

#### PROBLEM OF COORDINATION WITH SOUTH VIET NAM

Even when appropriate steps are taken to increase and improve these programs on the American side, we shall still face the crucial problem of provoking proper action on the part of the Vietnamese Government. If the Vietnamese people are to be won over (and I am convinced we have no chance whatsoever of winning this war unless more and more are won over), we must press the GVN to move skillfully and resolutely to meet the problems of apathy, indecision, talent shortage and so forth that have caused the psychological program to remain inadequate.

While in Saigon I spent an hour and a half with Prime Minister Quat, with the Minister of Psychological Warfare, General Vien, and with Quat's principal aide, Bui Diem. I presented to them a 12-point program (TAB A) that would ensure more effective US-GVN action in the psychological field.

I am encouraged by the intellectual fervor that Dr. Quat brings to a discussion of how to improve this program, as well as by the Cabinet-level actions in this direction taken even before I left Saigon. The question remains, however, as to how secure Quat's position is and to what extent his government's talk will be translated into action.

Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson warned me that there is a limit to what we can expect the Vietnamese to accomplish. They say that we can smother the GVN by loading too much on it. I believe, however, that the situation is so urgent that we must demand vastly more of the GVN, in terms of this program, than we have in the past. We must push it to its utmost.

I emphasize, however, that the program will not succeed on either the American or GVN side unless and until there is greater recognition throughout both governments of the importance of the psychological aspect of this struggle. On the American side, these programs to affect what the Vietnamese people *think* must be given the same status, the same concern, the same adequacy of working resources, as our military and economic operations. I hope that my discussions here and in Viet Nam, and your approval of the actions that I shall recommend, will achieve this.

#### *PROPOSED ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS*

1. I propose to reorganize drastically USIA's mission in Saigon so as to permit a substantial expansion, and more senior-level direction, of the program to inform and influence Vietnamese in the countryside, lift their morale, erase apathy and move them to a commitment to preserve their freedom. This would involve the prompt addition to our staff of 36 Americans, bringing the total to 114, and of 60 Vietnamese, bringing the staff total to 325. (TAB C)<sup>3</sup>

I plan also to reorganize our procedures in Washington for backing up the staff in Viet Nam. Instead of a desk officer, I shall create a small working group that will devote itself exclusively to seeing that the Saigon operation has the proper direction, personnel, program materials, etc.

2. I recommend that, just as we did in the Honolulu meeting some months ago regarding the handling of the press, State, Defense, CIA

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed at Tab C is an undated organization chart.

and USIA state jointly that Minister for Public Affairs Barry Zorthian has overall responsibility and authority for the coordination and direction of the entire psychological warfare program in South Viet Nam.<sup>4</sup>

3. Pursuant to the above recommendation, the following steps should be taken to bring vital support operations under Zorthian's control:

A. The MACV officers doing psychological warfare work in the provinces (the S-5s) should operate under direct instructions from USIA's Field Services Center.<sup>5</sup> A MACV Colonel would be made deputy director of the Field Services Center. These officers already work closely with USIA field representatives and are dependent for most of their activities on the USIA contingency piaster<sup>6</sup> fund which I shall discuss later. I have discussed a more co-ordinated arrangement with General Johnson, General Peers and others. We have agreed on a plan which does not go as far as I wish, but which may be workable. General Peers agrees with me that if it turns out to be inadequate, we must move promptly to place the psywar officers under direct control of the Center.

USIA would not assume operational jurisdiction over the psywar officers serving with combat units. These officers will, however, receive general direction from the Mission PysOps Committee, chaired by Zorthian, and guidance from the Field Services Center.

B. USOM's ComMedia operation, which provides some \$600,000 a year to the GVN's Ministry of Psychological Warfare, should be brought under the direction and control of USIA. Only through control of this program, which provides such things as cameras, mimeograph machines, paper, radios and other information materials, will USIA have the necessary leverage to force the Ministry to undertake the programs necessary to cause the people to respect and support their government.

AID's Assistant Director for the Far East, Rutherford Poats, agrees with me on this point. He and my Assistant Director, Ken Bunce, left Baguio<sup>7</sup> together for Saigon where they are to work out the details for the transfer of ComMedia's staff and funds to USIA.

3. USIA's expenditures and its personnel commitments to Viet Nam must be sharply increased. We now have 10 men doing an admirable job in the provinces, some of them operating under conditions of considerable danger. I propose to place 15 more officers out in the field,

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<sup>4</sup> The meeting took place on June 2, 1964, in Honolulu, Hawaii. Those attending included Rusk, McNamara, Rowan, and Lodge. In a June 3 memorandum to Johnson, Bundy noted that "the one major new agreement growing out of Honolulu is that we need to centralize authority for public information on Vietnam, both in Saigon and in Washington. Moreover, there is agreement on the names of the men to do this job: [Barry] Zorthian of USIA in Saigon, and Bob Manning back here." (See *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, Documents 189, 192, and 193)

<sup>5</sup> For a description of the Field Service Center, see footnote 8, Document 32.

<sup>6</sup> Currency of the Republic of Vietnam.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to a city in the Philippines.

meaning that a single officer will then have only an average of two provinces to cover.

Some of our additional personnel needs can be met by absorption of the staffs from present USOM and MACV psychological programs, and hopefully by borrowing other personnel from the military and AID.

It is vital that the people we send into the field be young, vigorous and skilled in the techniques of political motivation. Some ability to speak Vietnamese is also required. I have already begun an effort to locate the right kind of personnel within government. I believe, however, that we must also carry the search outside government, and will want to have a look at some former Peace Corps volunteers who may be just the kind of individuals we want.

4. Perhaps the most urgent financial requirement is a guarantee that USIA will have, on a continuing basis, the contingency piaster fund that is indispensable to the psychological operations in the provinces. As you are aware, several months ago AID made \$200,000 (the piaster equivalent) available in order that we might halt a situation where psychological operations were at a stand-still in many provinces because the Vietnamese Information Service had no ready cash for ink, paper or the repairs of mimeograph machines, projectors and the sort. The military psywar experts, who get no direct funds from the military, told me that without this USIA contingency fund they would have virtually no psywar program. The importance of this fund is illustrated by what was achieved in Tan Ba Village by the expenditure of \$279 combined with some vigorous and shrewd work by our people (see report at TAB B).<sup>8</sup>

Both USIA and MACV field representatives said they have been "nursing" the \$200,000 and declining to initiate programs involving continuing costs, because of doubts that a new allocation would be forthcoming. I have assured them that new funds will be forthcoming, and I now recommend that arrangements be made through USOM or elsewhere to allocate to these field workers a minimum of \$75,000 per quarter.

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<sup>8</sup> Attached but not printed is USIA Field Message No. 31 from USIS Saigon, January 28. According to this message, "A little over three months ago Tan Ba village (population approximately 2,000) was one of the 17 out of 21 villages in Phuoc Thanh province which belonged to the VC. Few if any Vietnamese in Tan Ba or in the province believed in the ability of the government or local authorities to provide security or assistance to this poor farming community." The message further states: "Today all of Tan Ba's population, together with the majority of people in the contiguous VC communities, are aware of the successful government pacification program which is underway." It concludes: "The Trust Fund allotted to the USIS Field Representatives played an important role in this project."

5. I recommend that the military make available 20 fixed-wing aircraft (U-10s) or helicopters with loud speakers, these to be available for psywar use four days and nights a week. These aircraft should be divorced from regular flights or combat units, otherwise military operational priorities will too frequently deprive the psychological operations of their use. These loud speaker flights were described to me as one of the most important and best-used media in this war. Many province chiefs say that the sustained use of such aircraft, with messages locally prepared for specific villages or Viet Cong units, are the most effective form of psychological warfare. In the Fourth Corps, I found evidence that a rise in the number of Viet Cong defectors was clearly and directly related to the occurrence of these loud speaker missions.

The number one complaint of the military psywar experts as well as the USIA field representatives is that aircraft are available for such flights far too rarely. These loud speaker planes have been most effective in using letters from relatives, or the taped voices of wives and parents appealing to young men to leave the VC and return to their homes. It is recalled that during the Korean war the communists sought vigorously to overrun command posts so as to get troop lists and thus be able to make propaganda appeals to individual Korean soldiers.

6. Steps must be taken to give USIA the necessary leverage to induce the province chiefs to include in their economic and military activities the psychological punch that will lift the morale and win the support of the people. At present, these province chiefs listen to advice of the military sector advisors and USOM representatives because each must “sign off” before the pigs are delivered to a village, or the funds are approved for any other project desired by the province chief. Our field representatives working to enhance the people’s view of, and respect for, the government are ignored because they have no voice in the decision as to whether the province chief gets what he wants. I have proposed that the USIA representative in the province be added as a “sign off” official, or that through some other means he be given the leverage he needs. I have taken this up with top AID officials in Washington, and it is to be discussed in the Mission Council<sup>9</sup> in Saigon this week.

7. I recommend that steps be taken to increase radio broadcasting both in South Viet Nam and to North Viet Nam. 20 of some 25 small transmitters taken into Viet Nam by USOM’s ComMedia are presently not being used because of the lack of trained GVN personnel to operate

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<sup>9</sup> For information regarding the formation of the U.S. Mission Council, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, Document 229.

them. We must make a concerted effort to get these stations on the air. A comprehensive radio survey has just been completed by a joint US/GVN committee, and I am urging that it be adopted and quickly put into effect. It is my understanding that this committee has not recommended a powerful new transmitter for broadcasting in South Viet Nam. However, both Prime Minister Quat and General Vien spoke to me of their eagerness to have such a transmitter. If this can be the sweetener needed to pull the government into the kind of imaginative, vigorous program needed, I recommend that we provide it.

8. Ambassador Taylor urges also that we go ahead with the establishment of television in South Viet Nam. There are some substantial drawbacks to doing this, the major one being the fact that inadequate personnel exists to operate the radio stations, and the shortage would be even more acute were television introduced. Nevertheless, because of the great psychological impact of television, and because its introduction would be a dramatic way of saying that the United States intends to stay, I believe that we ought to move speedily to introduce television.

I feel strongly that our go-ahead on television should be contingent upon the GVN adopting and following through promptly on the radio report.

9. There must be an immediate joint US/GVN program to train more Vietnamese in the techniques of radio and television, and in the general art of information and propaganda. I have told Dr. Quat that the entire facilities of USIA are available for such training, and that I am willing to send personnel to Saigon to train people there. The need is so great, however, that we need third-country help. This seems to me an area where third-countries can easily make a significant contribution, and I urge that through both State Department and USIA channels we solicit such assistance.

10. Receipt of this and other third-country help is to a degree dependent on the skill with which the GVN tells its story to the world. Both Prime Minister Quat and I hammered on the need for an overseas information program on the part of the GVN. I expect it will boil down to the question of whether the U.S. can give the GVN some financial support for this program. I recommend that we do so, if necessary. USIA will help to some extent by using its wireless file and other channels for the distribution of some GVN propaganda materials.

11. I recommend that steps be taken to remove the "Chieu Hoi"<sup>10</sup> program from its apparent "stepchild" status. This program to lure

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<sup>10</sup> The English translation of this Vietnamese term is roughly "open arms" or "call to return." For an explanation of this program, see *Foreign Relations, 1961-1963*, vol. III, Vietnam, January-August 1963, Documents 60 and 92.

VC defectors and turn them into loyal citizens is largely ineffective because neither we nor the Vietnamese are devoting adequate personnel or resources to it. Vietnamese sources indicate 17,519 communists have “rallied to the national cause.” Interviews with Viet Cong who have recently defected indicate that poverty, disillusionment and increased GVN and US air strikes are tempting VC soldiers and cadres to defect in larger numbers than before. In spite of an increased number of returnees, Chieu Hoi rehabilitation centers are presently without even the most elementary psychological indoctrination programs. Viet Cong returnees generally languish two or three months in “detention” with few daily activities beyond interrogation and occasional lectures on the “good national cause.”

A recent visit by a USIA officer to the Chieu Hoi center in Bien Hoa province revealed the following facts: 1) Over 750 returnees had been processed through the camp in 1964, among whom were VC commissars, political propaganda cadre, and a large number of soldiers. 2) No Vietnamese or American official had visited the center in recent months. 3) Through discussions with the returnees it became evident that their propaganda indoctrination by the VC still remained unanswered and unchallenged.

The result is that some Viet Cong defectors have become disillusioned anew, returned to the VC fold, and are now warning their colleagues not to fall for the promises of the government’s Chieu Hoi program.

Ambassador Taylor expressed the view that this program probably belongs under the USIS umbrella. I think it does—but is so woefully inadequate at present that I shudder at the thought of taking responsibility for it. USIA will do so, however, if we can get some assurance of reasonable funds, personnel and facilities with which to run it. This would include the building of centers and the kind of program I saw the British using on the Mau Maus in 1956.<sup>11</sup>

This program is *very* important, and if it is to succeed there must be major American involvement for the simple reason that many GVN officials involved seem more interested in killing VC than in rehabilitating them. One of our problems in the villages, I fear, is that some of the extra zealous activities designed to kill VC have wound up infuriating and disillusioning so many non-communist people that US/GVN actions have created more VC members and sympathizers than they have killed.

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<sup>11</sup> Reference is to an African nationalist movement originating in the 1950s among Kenya’s Kikuyu ethnic group.



12. I recommend that USIA and the Pentagon, jointly or separately, launch immediately a vigorous program to produce a corps of experts in psychological warfare. Lt. Colonel Morgan, the Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs Advisor to the 9th Division, characterized the present situation accurately when he told me: "Our biggest problem in Viet Nam is that we are trying to do a psywar job with a bunch of amateurs, both American and Vietnamese."

I think it is beyond dispute that this country's greatest reservoir of trained psywar manpower is in USIA, but I am quick to concede that USIA has only a fraction of what we need or are likely to need in the future.

The fact is that in earlier years USIA never planned, staffed, organized or budgeted for psywar operations; until recently it was not assumed that USIA would be called upon to step in and serve as a surrogate information service for a fledgling nation that has neither the professional skill nor the inclination to explain its programs, actions and policies to its own people.

Not only do we need a larger pool of talent for Viet Nam, but it is also vital to the protection of our national interest in the Congo, Venezuela, and almost certainly in the near future in many other places, possibly including the Philippines. Most military S-5 advisors and some USIA officers have been school trained in methods used during World War II involving the relatively sophisticated use of mass media aimed at literate populations with clearly established ethnic and national unity. Our target in Southeast Asia is different in virtually every respect, and we must develop training and techniques to meet the circumstances that prevail.

This has been discussed with General Johnson and some civilian officials in the Pentagon, one of whom has said that a major reorganization is planned in counter-insurgency training at Fort Bragg and that this reorganization may open the way for implementation of this proposal. I shall pursue this idea.

13. We need to exploit to greater advantage VC prisoners, defectors, captured terrorists. I have been assured of the necessary cooperation of MACV intelligence officers, and MACV and USIA are moving jointly to secure the necessary GVN cooperation. Also, as a result of this mission, I have made arrangements for much closer high-level liaison between USIA and Pentagon officials involved in psychological warfare.

14. There would be considerable psychological advantage if we proceeded immediately with our plans to build a new embassy in Saigon. Not only is the present ugly and inefficient structure no credit to the United States, but the beginning of a new embassy would be an



additional strong indicator of our intention to stay there and to keep our commitment to the Vietnamese people.

15. USIS will increase its work in urban areas among youth, labor and religious leaders and the intellectual community. This is essential because there can be no government stability unless these groups are included, or their views and opinions considered, to their satisfaction. I shall have a separate memorandum for you on what I think is the vital need for our top people to establish a warmer, closer relationship with leading Vietnamese, both military and civilian.

16. I have talked so far in terms of the need for greater authority, better coordination and more personnel. Effective execution of this program will also require a substantial increase in hardware—more paper and ink for provincial newspapers and leaflets, several trilam-brettas to give psywar cadre mobility, perhaps 1,000 new projectors and a suitable collection of films for each province, batteries and generators for radio equipment and projectors, mimeographing machines, and so forth. We shall provide all we can from USIA resources, but will certainly have to call on other agencies and departments for assistance.

I emphasize, in conclusion, that we take these steps fully aware that many vital factors will still remain beyond our control. But given a reasonable degree of governmental stability in Saigon and physical security in the countryside, I am convinced that this program will have significant impact. Our first hope is that it will prompt GVN officials to act out of certain knowledge that they hold the final key to producing a sense of unity and loyalty among the Vietnamese people.<sup>12</sup>

**Carl T. Rowan**

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<sup>12</sup> Bundy sent Johnson a copy of Rowan's March 16 memorandum under a March 17 memorandum that summarized Rowan's memorandum and offered commentary. Bundy's memorandum is in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. II, Vietnam, January–June 1965, Document 203. In National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 330, issued on April 9, the President gave "general approval" to Rowan's March 16 recommendations. The NSAM also directed Rowan to "continue to advise the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence and others as appropriate on psychological and foreign public opinion aspects of the Vietnamese situation." For the text of NSAM 330, see *ibid.*, Document 246.

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**Tab A****Aide-Mémoire<sup>13</sup>**

Saigon, March 8, 1965

*Discussion Points of Mutual Interest With  
the Prime Minister by Mr. Rowan*

Following for the consideration of the Prime Minister are major subjects in the psychological domain which the United States Government suggests are of mutual interest and of critical importance. Insofar as the Prime Minister would desire their implementation, the U.S. Government stands prepared to provide such assistance as the Government of Vietnam deems appropriate:

1. *Credo*—A major public statement by the Prime Minister of the principles to which his new Government is dedicated. This statement could be given the widest distribution throughout Vietnam and throughout the world.

2. *Central Role of the Ministry of Psychological Warfare*—To establish clearly that the PsyWar Ministry is the central voice of the Government of Vietnam, with coordinating authority over public statements in Vietnam of other ministries. The PsyWar Ministry would coordinate with ARVN and would provide full production support to the Foreign Ministry as the voice overseas of the Government of Vietnam.

3. *Participation by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet in Psychological Programs*—To assure the ready cooperation of ministers in personal participation in GVN activities particularly important for psychological objectives. The Quat Government should emerge publicly as a Government at work among its people, with ministers personally visiting and talking with public servants in the field and with the people they serve.

4. *Qualified Personnel*—To emphasize the training of well qualified personnel in the psychological domain, at the national, provincial and international levels.

5. *U.S. Consultants*—To increase as needed the number of American technical consultants to the PsyWar Ministry and to VIS in the provinces.

6. *GVN Image in Provinces*—To establish the presence of the GVN in the provinces, through action on behalf of the people by GVN person-

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<sup>13</sup> No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the aide-mémoire.

nel, civil and military, with a broad public information program to tell how the Government is serving its people.

7a. *Fiscal Responsiveness to Provincial Needs*—To make clear to fiscal authorities that it is imperative that funds be provided quickly and fully to provincial authorities charged with psychological responsibilities. It is suggested that the Prime Minister request a report from appropriate fiscal authorities on any present obstacles to such fast and full fiscal support.

7b. *Provincial Flexibility*—To assure sufficient authority to provincial officials with psychological responsibilities, so that they can promptly take advantage of new local opportunities by making decisions and immediately initiating action.

8. *Hop Tac Psychological Program*—To establish an integrated, effective psychological program for the priority Hop Tac area of the critical Pacification program.

9. *Urban Youth*—To demonstrate the Government's awareness of the needs of youth, particularly university students, in carrying out their education to become future leaders of Vietnam. A Government statement of present and planned action to improve the educational opportunities and the welfare of students might assist in achieving their recognition that through education this Government will help provide them with the dignity of useful lives and the security of economic well being.

10. *Economic Progress*—That the PsyWar Ministry conduct an appraisal of present and impending economic progress in Vietnam, as the foundation of a public informational program to explain the Government's action in terms the people can understand: what is being done to provide more Education, Health, Food, Housing, etc.

11. *GVN Overseas Information*—That the voice of Vietnam overseas be notably strengthened, by implementation of the August 18 recommendations to then Foreign Minister Quat of his request for an improved Vietnamese International Information Program.<sup>14</sup> The first step might be a discussion with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Psychological Warfare, to assure that the production capacity of the PsyWar Ministry is fully aligned behind the Foreign Ministry's needs in conducting the diplomatic offensive of Vietnam overseas. The second step might be for a meeting of operational personnel from the two Ministries and USIS to coordinate implementation of the program.

12. *Coordinated Program Direction*—That the coordination of the GVN informational activities with the U.S. Mission be conducted

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<sup>14</sup> Not further identified.

through the present Joint Psychological Operations Committee for policy and through the Joint Working Committee for operations.

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**38. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 18, 1965

I wish to comment separately on a couple of my observations in South Viet Nam<sup>2</sup> that seem to me to go to the heart of our future contributions to that country's efforts to maintain its freedom. I believe it within my purview to comment on these things, because they are psychological factors in the most vital sense of the word.

The first observation is that top U.S. officers in Viet Nam must make a conscious and concerted effort to develop relationships of warmth, trust and easy collaboration with opposite numbers on the Vietnamese side. At lower levels, out in the provinces, Americans and Vietnamese have established a marked degree of camaraderie; they eat, work, fight, get ambushed together. But at the higher, decision-making levels there is for the most part only stiff formality. There is too much conference table negotiation between American and Vietnamese and not enough coming together in informal mutual trust to work on a mutual problem.

I want to make it clear that my first finger is pointed at my own operation in Viet Nam. Zorthian mentioned to me that several USIA officers "have never asked a Vietnamese in for dinner." I have made it clear that under these circumstances we will never get GVN officials and the Vietnamese people to take the steps needed to beat off Communist aggression, and that I expect more of USIA officers than this.

I observed that on the military side not only is there a scarcity of warm relationships at policy-making levels, but there is considerable

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 190, Vietnam Rowan Report. Confidential. Rowan sent a copy of the memorandum to Bundy under a March 18 covering memorandum, stating, "I believe a bit of deft prodding by the President would help a lot in these areas." (Ibid.) According to Johnson's handwritten notes on a March 29 memorandum he received from Bundy, Johnson saw a copy of Rowan's March 18 memorandum and requested that Bundy "raise these functions at lunch Tuesday not as coming from Rowan but say you have reports etc." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 37.

fear expressed among Americans<sup>3</sup> that we are making mistakes that are certain to worsen the situation.

I refer, for example, to the fact that we have set up separate officers and non-commissioned officers' clubs for Americans—clubs that are quite plush compared with those frequented by the Vietnamese. In Da Nang, General Thi has declared certain bars off limits to Vietnamese soldiers so as to prevent fights between Americans and Vietnamese.

From the standpoint of our refuting the persistent VC clamor that "the Americans are imperialists," these developments are not good. I talked to Vietnamese who expressed fear that we are building divisive factors that the enemy can exploit in a devastating way. It becomes a point to consider seriously as we expand the American military presence.

Further, I think it is a serious psychological mistake for top Americans (military or civilian) to go to Saigon and proceed directly to a briefing session attended and presided over by American military men only. I feel, and I know some key GVN officials feel, that we blunder by creating the impression that Americans come out to sit down with Americans and plan the next steps in the war. It would be a fine stroke of public relations if we asked top GVN military people to join in the first briefing session—indeed to give their assessment of how the war is going in various areas. We Americans could then hold whatever private sessions we deem necessary—without creating the impression that we meet, make the decisions and then drag the GVN along.

Several top Americans in Saigon conceded that a desirable high level of rapport with top Vietnamese is lacking. Alex Johnson attributes this to the fact that, in his view, the Vietnamese are not as warm, friendly, outgoing as he found the Thais to be. This may be, but there are just enough cases in Saigon where genuinely warm relationships have been formed to make me believe that much more is possible. I believe it is incumbent upon us Americans, as the rich, powerful advisers, to make the first vigorous efforts to warm up the situation.

I recommend we start by *pressing* the Vietnamese military to use regularly the American officer and non-com clubs; by encouraging American officers to visit the Vietnamese clubs (many top GVN officers were trained in the United States); by having the Vietnamese military in frequent planning discussions and *ensuring that the public knows* of the joint participation, and finally by having Americans orient their entertainment programs toward building more Vietnamese friendships.

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<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand underlined "fear expressed among Americans."

Finally, I urge that we take much more seriously GVN sensitivities about our announcing actions<sup>4</sup> here that catch GVN leaders in Saigon off guard.

When we announced abruptly the dispatch of 3,500 Marines to Da Nang we caused Prime Minister Quat to lose face among the GVN military. A Vietnamese who is close to the Prime Minister said to me: "We were in a mess, scrambling to inform our top people, to call a cabinet meeting, when the announcement already was on the radio. It made Dr. Quat look like a fool. This sort of thing gives his enemies an excuse to plot against him. It also gave the Viet Cong evidence with which to try to prove that we are lackeys."

My conclusion, of course, is that it is of great political and psychological importance that we coordinate closely with Saigon, and that we not announce here what would be much better announced either by the GVN—or jointly.

I have made no other distribution of this memorandum so as to leave you free to judge whether these points have merit. If so, a suggestion originating with you will produce more effort in the areas mentioned. If on the other hand you see little more that can be done in this area, this airing of my views will not have caused any inter-agency irritations.

Should you desire, of course, I am quite prepared to discuss these issues frankly with other key officials in Washington.

**Carl T. Rowan**

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<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand underlined "announcing actions," drew a line from it to the margin above, and wrote two question marks.

**39. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 8, 1965

The USIA film “Nine From Little Rock”<sup>2</sup> was awarded the “Oscar” of the Motion Picture Arts and Sciences for the best documentary short produced in 1964.

It tells the story of the nine students who were the first Negroes to enter the previously all white Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957. Newsfilm of the actual event depicts the day they entered Little Rock Central High School. The film goes on to show where these nine young people are today tracing their progress to education at the college level, and the progress of Little Rock itself.

“Nine From Little Rock” has been distributed to 97 countries around the world by USIA. For this it has been translated into 17 foreign languages. USIA films are distributed in commercial motion picture theatres and loaned through our libraries to labor unions, schools, civic groups, etc. They are also shown on mobile vans which take the films to the people.

In Africa where it is vitally important that we do our best to keep the United States civil rights struggle in perspective, USIS Nairobi reported that “Nine From Little Rock” was the “best film the Agency has yet made on civil rights . . . it supports the high priority country objective of showing progress in the U.S. to our racial difficulties.”

*USIS Addis Ababa:* “The Post feels that the film ‘Nine From Little Rock’ demonstrates very successfully the real but often undramatic (and hence unreported) progress which is being made in the United States toward full equality for all. From bayonets in 1957 to the peaceful school scenes shown in 1964 is certainly a giant step forward.”

*USIS Kampala, Uganda:* “Another reason for this film’s importance is that incidents like Little Rock stay wedged in men’s minds long after the incident has become irrelevant. This film closes the book on Little

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Federal Government Organizations, Box FG-314, FG 296 U.S. Information Service 1/1/65–6/1/65. No classification marking. Johnson received this memorandum together with an April 6 memorandum from Valenti. In it, Valenti noted that *Nine from Little Rock* had won an Oscar on April 5, the first time a USIA film had done so. Valenti proposed that Rowan, Stevens, and Guggenheim “come by the White House” on April 8 to be photographed with Johnson during a brief ceremony in recognition of the film. Johnson approved the recommendation. Handwritten notations on the covering memorandum read “talked to Rowan on 4/7” and “1:15 Apr. 8.” (Ibid.) Johnson met with Stevens and Guggenheim, in addition to Ball, McNamara, and Rowan, in the White House Oval Office on April 8 from 3:50 until 3:55 p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary)

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix A.1.

Rock and frees the mind to consider the changed aspects of the struggle.”

“Nine From Little Rock” was written and directed by Charles Guggenheim. He is presently at work on two other USIA productions: (1) An excellent color documentary which shows the human suffering of the South Vietnamese at the hands of the Viet-Cong and the determination which these people have to maintain their freedom; (2) “The President’s Country”, a color film on Texas which will express the special nature of democracy which makes it possible for a man of the people to become President of the most powerful country in the world.

This is the first Academy Award for USIA although “The Five Cities of June”<sup>3</sup> was one of the five nominees a year ago. Mr. Guggenheim is one of the number of young American filmmakers who have done distinguished work for USIA in the past few years.

George Stevens, Jr. has been Director of USIA’s Motion Picture Service since 1962.

**Carl T. Rowan**

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a documentary film produced by USIA in 1963. See *Foreign Relations, 1917–1972*, vol. VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963, Appendix A.3.

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#### **40. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 12, 1965

SUBJECT

Reaction to the President’s Speech on Vietnam

The Johns Hopkins speech and its peace and economic development proposals have drawn continuing world-wide press response

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Reference: Office of the Assistant Director For Research Analysis: Research Programs Files, 1961–1966, Entry P–89, Box 3, Deputy Director’s Office, 1965–1966. No classification marking.



which is being sustained by initial unofficial Communist reaction and the military episodes of the weekend.<sup>2</sup>

Most free world commentators agree on the constructive intent and potential of the speech, seeing in it a manifest of U.S. purpose in bringing an honorable peace to Southeast Asia. New U.S. air strikes have, however, underscored the President's determination to support the struggle in South Vietnam while pressing for negotiations.<sup>3</sup> *Tokyo Shimbun* expresses "regret" that the U.S. must continue bombing North Vietnamese targets. "Although President Johnson on April 7 made several proposals to bring peace to Southeast Asia," the paper laments, "the Communist side has not given them a thought."

A feeling that the speech will endure in its broad applications, regardless of immediate Communist reaction to its proposals, is visible in much comment. Thus, in Australia, yesterday's *Melbourne Age* terms it "a cautious opening for peace," and the *Sydney Morning Herald* judges that "the speech by itself didn't constitute a diplomatic initiative, but it did delineate the very broad area in which initiatives by any of the nations with interests in the Vietnam war would be acceptable."

Durability of the economic development idea is widely forecast. To some writers it has prospective relevance to much of the world in its politico-economic implications. Thus today's Vienna *Kurier* declares that "the Soviet Union should be very interested in President Johnson's plan," which could "be a model for the settlement of many similar problems in the developing countries. Perhaps it would even constitute a new kind of guarantee of world peace in general."

Following are some regional features of comment.

In the Far East, non-Communist papers have almost unanimously hailed the message, calling it well-balanced, timely, and a progressive step. The onus falls on the Communist side, papers agree, to make a next move. Editors debate whether the policy it expounds is really new, or merely a clarification of standing U.S. attitudes. They also argue about the wisdom of talking and fighting at the same time, and whether the Viet Cong must be included in discussions.

On the Hainan episode,<sup>4</sup> Tokyo's *Yomiuri* is highly critical, feeling that the peace hopes held forth by the speech have been "wrecked."

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<sup>2</sup> On April 7, Johnson delivered a speech at Johns Hopkins University entitled "Peace Without Conquest." For text, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1965*, Book I, pp. 394–399.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to U.S. airstrikes made against targets in North Vietnam in early April. (Jack Langguth, "U.S. Strikes Again in North Vietnam," *New York Times*, April 6, 1965, p. 1)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the April 9 clash between U.S. and Chinese military jets over Hainan Island in the South China Sea.

Manila papers sharply criticize the Communists for their negative reactions.

In Western Europe, praise is general. Papers speak of the President's "frank and generous offer" of talks without conditions, and his "Marshall Plan<sup>5</sup> for Southeast Asia."

Many observers felt that the President had radically changed Washington's basic stand by the "unprecedented gesture" of offering to negotiate directly with governments which are not recognized by the U.S. As the *Daily Express* put it, "President Johnson has met his first major challenge on foreign policy with a firm decision in favor of peace."

The massive aid program suggested for Southeast Asia was granted almost universal support, though a few carping voices were heard. "A great concept," said Radio Stuttgart's commentator; "a major contribution" to the economic development of the area offered without "political domination," said the *Daily Telegraph*. Many remarked on the general approval the plan was certain to receive in the "third world" of Asian and African countries and praised the President for answering the 17-nonaligned nations so quickly.<sup>6</sup>

The President was said to have offered "the Hanoi government—and China, too—a face-saving approach to the conference table." West Berlin's *Der Tagesspiegel* remarked that the aid program suggested would give North Vietnam "an opportunity to free itself from the unwelcome Chinese embrace."

Reaction to the alleged rejection by Hanoi is not yet available.

In the Near East and South Asia, the Cairo press has been highly critical, but since yesterday there is a marked shift of editorial expression toward hope that the peace-talk proposals may be fruitful. Editors warn this country not to overestimate the depth of the Sino-Soviet rift. The Lebanese press gives grudging approval at best, questioning the President's motives but welcoming his initiative.

Indian press reaction has been overwhelmingly favorable, voicing a sense of relief and hope. The peace proposals are seen as leaving "a

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<sup>5</sup> In March 1948, the U.S. Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act that approved funding a comprehensive program, first articulated by Secretary of State George Marshall in a June 5, 1947, speech and called the "Marshall Plan," for the rebuilding of Western Europe in the wake of World War II. For text of the address, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. III, The British Commonwealth; Europe, pp. 237–239.

<sup>6</sup> On April 1, Rusk received an appeal to President Johnson from 17 nonaligned countries for immediate negotiations and a political solution to end the war in Vietnam "without any preconditions." Johnson's April 7 speech was interpreted by these nations as the U.S. response to their appeal. For additional information about the original appeal and the Johnson administration response, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. II, Vietnam, January–June 1965, footnote 2, Document 228, and Document 245.

broad scope for optimism.” The proposals are seen to prove that the U.S. wants peace and not war. Writers call upon the “non-aligned” nations for speedy implementation of the proposals advanced by the seventeen nations.

Reported Israeli comment is all favorable. Turkish and Greek reaction is mixed. The Pakistani press has generally held to news coverage.

Latin American reaction has been markedly favorable. Papers have featured the President’s invitation to the Soviet Union to share a development effort. Typically, Bogota’s *Tiempo* asserts that the speech “reflects a clear and affirmative desire for peace, putting a solid floor under whatever future discussions may be launched.”

African papers have given substantial news coverage to the speech, and only quite limited comment. Criticism centers on the idea that the President’s suggestions were largely a response to unfavorable world opinion.

After apparent initial hesitation Moscow output attacked the speech as a “propaganda exercise” which reflected no change in U.S. policy in Vietnam. *Pravda* on April 10 took the lead in attempting to refute the “official” U.S. assertion that the President sought “unconditional discussions” on Vietnam. *Pravda* commentator charged that the speech contained no word about any U.S. intention to halt the “aggression” and asked whether U.S. leaders really think that negotiations are possible “under bombings.” Similarly, the President’s proposals for economic development of Southeast Asia are dismissed as “pure propaganda” to divert the attention of world public opinion from their “just wrath” over American aggression in Vietnam.

Other East European capitals generally followed a similar line with only Belgrade still “encouraged” by evidence of a more “realistic and sober” U.S. policy.

Peiping and Hanoi continue to voice strongly negative attitudes toward the President’s proposals.<sup>7</sup> Hanoi’s *Nhan Dan* yesterday castigated the offer of “unconditional” talks as “submission” to the U.S., and reiterated Ho Chi Minh’s earlier demand that the U.S. leave the south. The DRV rejects the President’s aid offer as an effort to buy the peoples of Southeast Asia. Both Peiping and Hanoi continue to press demands for U.S. withdrawal.

Donald M. Wilson<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> An April 15 Intelligence Memorandum from Denny to Rusk summarized North Vietnam’s response to Johnson’s April 7 proposal and the North Vietnamese “basis” for negotiations. (*Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. II, Vietnam January–June 1965, Document 255)

<sup>8</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**41. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 1, 1965

Since one of our obvious goals is to win the support of the Dominican people for a progressive and democratic government, and of the rest of Latin America for our present actions in the Dominican Republic,<sup>2</sup> I think I should point out a few of our major obstacles:

1. While I support completely our sending in more troops, we must be aware that it will be well nigh impossible to justify the presence of 16,000 American troops simply on the grounds that we are protecting Americans and other foreigners.

2. We shall have to devote considerable effort to providing evidence that our actions are to protect the short-range and long-range well-being of the people of the Dominican Republic and *the rest* of Latin America.

3. In order to do this meaningfully, especially when troops are entering during a period of so-called ceasefire, I believe we must exploit as shrewdly as possible, without overdoing it, the Communist and Castroite<sup>3</sup> leadership of the rebels. This is indicated in the fact that almost all the editorials supporting us in Latin America base their support on the fear that the Dominican Republic might become another Cuba, and thus a menace to the entire hemisphere.

4. What I am emphasizing, then, is the need for a two-track information operation—the first being humanitarian, which we can push openly as a government, and the second being the threat to the security of non-Communist nations of Latin America, which would best be pushed by Latin Americans, but which we must encourage in every feasible way.

5. If we are to succeed in making other Latin American nations believe that our actions are vital to their safety and freedom, it is of utmost importance that we get some members of the OAS, and perhaps non-OAS neighbors of the Dominican Republic like Jamaica, to speak out about the Communist involvement in the Dominican Republic, and to offer troops or other support to our efforts to end the bloodshed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Box 74, United States Information Agency Vol. 4, 4/14/65 [2 of 2]. Secret. In the top left-hand corner of the memorandum, Roberts wrote: "President: 'Okay, tell him to get going.' JR."

<sup>2</sup> U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic during this period are detailed at length in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, Documents 1–222.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to Fidel Castro.

6. Proper consideration of the foregoing points will help to mute the cries of “United States aggression” and “gunboat diplomacy” and perhaps preclude attacks on USIS libraries, embassies and other American installations, with attendant Communist exploitation through Latin America and the world.

Carl T. Rowan

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**42. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 1, 1965

In response to your suggestion this morning,<sup>2</sup> I have dispatched the following officers to the Dominican Republic.<sup>3</sup>

*Donald M. Wilson*, Deputy Director, who will remain there long enough to establish a first-rate information and psychological program within the Dominican Republic and to see that the press briefings and other programs are so organized as to win us the maximum possible support in Latin America and other countries.

*Serban Vallimarescu*, a USIA public affairs expert, who formerly was Tom Mann’s press advisor and now serves in that capacity with Jack Vaughn.

*Darrell Carter*, another USIA officer with long experience in Latin America, and *Ray Millette* and *Ray Aylor* of Voice of America, who will

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America—Dominican Republic, Box 49, Dominican Republic USIA Psychological Situation Reports, 5/65. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> A meeting was held on May 1 at 8:40 a.m. in the White House Cabinet Room, which the President joined at 9:40 a.m., to discuss the Dominican Republic situation. Rowan, Rusk, McNamara, Raborn, Bunker, Ball, Wheeler, Mann, Valenti, Moyers, Goodwin, Smith, McGeorge Bundy, Harriman, and Marvin Watson also attended the meeting. (*Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, Document 49, footnote 9) Valenti recorded details of the meeting in handwritten notes, which are in the Johnson Library, Special Files, Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes, Meeting in Cabinet Room, May 1, 1965, 8:40 a.m.

<sup>3</sup> USIA sent these officers to the Dominican Republic in the aftermath of the outbreak of civil war and the deployment of U.S. military forces to the country in late April. (Willard Edwards, “Marines Enter Domingo,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 29, 1965, p. N1) For further information about the situation in the Dominican Republic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, Documents 1, 18, 35, and 68.

provide the technical and other know-how in beaming broadcasts to the people of the Dominican Republic.

A team of this size is needed to bolster USIA's normal staff of two Americans.

This team will depart Washington at 4 pm today.

A psychological warfare unit of the Army will follow so as to provide needed support.

I have asked Don Wilson to make recommendations to me, for discussion among the principals, as to actions and statements that we might take to win greater support among the Dominicans and Latin Americans in general.

**Carl T. Rowan**

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#### **43. Editorial Note**

Beginning with a May 1, 1965, memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) Carl Rowan began sending regular reports on press reaction in Latin America, the United States, and other countries around the world to the situation in the Dominican Republic and the actions of the United States, especially the deployment of troops. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America—Dominican Republic, Box 49, Dominican Republic USIA Psychological Situation Reports, 5/65) On May 2, Rowan also started providing the White House with daily memoranda detailing the measures that USIA was taking "to explain and win support for United States actions and policies in the Dominican Republic." (Ibid.) These measures included not only the placement of a USIA team (see Document 42) in Santo Domingo, but also steady VOA commentary supporting United States policy, the production of leaflets and posters for distribution through the country, and, most important according to Rowan's memoranda, the establishment of local radio stations to counter the messaging from rebel-controlled Radio Santo Domingo. This reporting continued throughout May.

In a May 4 report, for example, Rowan noted USIA success, but also challenges: "We have just received solid evidence of the effectiveness of our psychological operation in Santo Domingo, but part of that evidence constitutes a thorny political problem. I have just received word from Hewson Ryan that the leader of the rebels complained to the OAS [Organization of American States] Commission about our

leaflet drops and loud-speaker broadcasts and demanded that they be stopped." He continued: "The 5,000-watt medium wave transmitter was delivered" and "this will increase our audience in the Santo Domingo area by more than 50 per cent." This station, Rowan added, "will carry VOA programs and other psychological materials prepared in Santo Domingo, of course." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America—Dominican Republic, Box 49, Dominican Republic USIA Psychological Situation Reports, 5/65) As for the rebels, Rowan in a second update on May 4, stressed: "The rebels continue without an effective radio in the Santo Domingo area. Their "Radio Constitution" continues to broadcast on a series of frequencies, but manages to break through the jamming pattern only infrequently." (Ibid.)

Later in the month, in a May 18 situation report, Rowan reported: "The battle of the airwaves continues as hot as the battle of bullets in Santo Domingo, but once again the stations controlled by the USIA team are dominant throughout the country.

"The rebels' output has been reduced to a weak signal, apparently from makeshift facilities, which can be heard only sporadically—and then only in a small area of the Capital." According to Rowan: "Our mission reports abundant evidence that the stations we control are being listened to closely by Dominicans of all political leanings. Our leaflet, pamphlet and other psychological programs continue at a high level." (Ibid.)

In his May 29 psychological situation report, Rowan asserted: "USIA is moving ahead smoothly and positively in its plan to put under OAS aegis the information operation presently carried on by USIA/PsyWar Battalion. Dr. Arturo Morales Carrion has arrived in Santo Domingo and is working with Dr. Mora in studying the entire problem of the OAS information operation. This will include assumption of the publication of the 75,000 circulation newspaper VOICE OF THE SECURITY ZONE and re-issuing it under the aegis of the OAS. This should happen in the next few days. USIA/PsyWar Battalion will continue to lend technical and professional aid to the OAS on its assumption of the operation." (Ibid.)

A collection of Rowan's memoranda on USIA and the Dominican Republic is *ibid.*



#### 44. Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

##### *U.S. Information Policy in Vietnam*

American government policy on information matters in Vietnam is based on maximum candor and fullest disclosure of the facts consistent with national security interests.

This policy represents a realistic assessment of the role that information activities must play if Vietnamese and American efforts to check communist aggression are to succeed. These efforts must be understood by the Vietnamese people, who are bearing the main burdens of the war. Secondly, they must be understood by the American people who are providing the bulk of outside assistance. Finally, these efforts need the support of the allies of Vietnam and the United States. The chances for success in Vietnam will be seriously compromised if any of these groups feel that they are "not getting the facts," that the true situation is being concealed or that they are being misled. Therefore, the policy of maximum candor and full disclosure makes sense not only as a traditional element of U.S. government information policies but also as a requirement for the prosecution of a hard, dirty war.

This is what is being done. There is no censorship of news copy. There is no "managed news," no attempt to blink at unsavory facts. The only restriction on newsmen is a request for their voluntary cooperation in matters directly affecting the security of U.S. and Vietnamese forces in the country. Aside from this, newsmen are given a full briefing by a top-level Embassy spokesman on all aspects of U.S. activities in Vietnam once a day, and more often as required. In addition to these briefings, the Embassy makes a continuing effort to get newsmen to the scene of activities outside the Saigon area: the major restriction here is the problem of physical security in areas where Viet Cong guerrillas are active.

These arrangements have been worked out over a period of several years, largely as a result of requests by American and other journalists covering the war. Their chief complaint was the lack of overall coordina-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963-69, Bx 6-29 63-69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 24, Advisory Commission—Information—1965. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper. Rowan sent a copy of the paper to Stanton under a May 5 covering memorandum. In it Rowan indicated that following the April 26 U.S. Advisory Commission on Information meeting, he had asked his staff to "prepare a summary of U.S. information policies in Vietnam" for the commission members. Copies were also sent to Olom, Moore, Larmon, Hoyt, Novik and Chandler. (Ibid.)



tion of official U.S. news output, with the result that, on occasion, spokesmen for individual elements of the American Mission were telling only parts of the story, sometimes in incorrect and contradictory fashion.

To meet newsmen's desires for a more orderly arrangement, the American Embassy instituted new procedures in June 1964.<sup>2</sup> The key element in these arrangements was reaffirming and strengthening the Ambassador's traditional role as the authorized official spokesman for the United States. This role is particularly complex in Vietnam where the Ambassador is in charge of a complex mission comprising both military and civilian elements responsible to a half-dozen Washington agencies. In order that these elements might speak with one voice—i.e., the Ambassador's—the then-Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, designated the director of USIS, Barry Zorthian, as his spokesman for the entire mission. Mr. Zorthian, who is a Minister-Counselor of the Embassy, not only coordinates information output within the American Mission but also with his counterparts in the South Vietnamese government. This latter factor is an important one in setting U.S. information policy in Vietnam. Our actions must be guided by the fact that we are in Vietnam in an advisory, not a command capacity. Secondly, our ideas on information policies do not always coincide with those of South Vietnamese officials.

With the commencement of air strikes and the further build-up of American forces in South Vietnam early in 1965, these procedures were further refined. The idea of instituting censorship procedures to meet the new security factors involved was reviewed and rejected. The emphasis, as in the past, was placed on voluntary cooperation by the newsmen in respecting the security requirements of individual U.S. installations in South Vietnam. Thus the policy of maximum candor and full disclosure was once again reaffirmed.

The consensus of newsmen, both American and foreign, in South Vietnam is that they are getting an accurate running account of U.S. government operations under this arrangement. They may have individual complaints about alleged gaps in Embassy news output, but by and large they agree that the framework for this output, with its reliance on a single authoritative spokesman, is a good one. There is particular praise for the manner in which Barry Zorthian has handled his duties. The *New York Times* (April 30, 1965) praised "the major improvements

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<sup>2</sup> The new procedures are detailed in a June 4 memorandum from Rowan to Johnson and a June 6 telegram from the Department of State to Saigon; both are printed, respectively, as Documents 197 and 203 in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. I, Vietnam, 1964.

brought by a new civilian information chief in Saigon."<sup>3</sup> The difficulties Zorthian and his associates have in providing newsmen with a complete picture of American activities in South Vietnam have been noted succinctly by Frank McCulloch in the May 7, 1965 issue of *Time*: "I think pointing a finger of blame at any of the exasperated parties in the press-USIS-military conflict is a serious mistake. No one is really at fault. It is just Vietnam." Despite the Embassy's attempts to meet these difficult conditions, some criticism continues. In most cases, this criticism is uninformed or is based on the critic's willingness to ignore the facts. It is useful to review, briefly, the main criticisms.

1. *Censorship*. The critics claim it exists. It doesn't. No copy coming in or going out of the country is censored by anyone, American or Vietnamese. Newsmen have been briefed on the need for their voluntary cooperation in matters involving security matters; they have been given the ground rules. These rules have been broken by some American and other newsmen, i.e., the disclosure of the use of highly-classified U.S. military equipment. In such instances, the Embassy has little recourse but to remind the offenders of the consequences of their actions for the war effort. Under existing rules, no disciplinary action is taken, nor is any plan for such action being considered at this time.

2. *USIS Role*. Another criticism is that USIS should not have the "authorized spokesman" responsibility since its major job is to "put the best face" on American government actions for overseas audiences. Therefore, the argument goes, the American people are being propagandized by their own overseas information agency. This ignores two basic facts. The first is that, for over two decades, USIS public affairs officers at our embassies all over the world have been the official spokesmen to both American and local newsmen. Mr. Zorthian's position is, in this regard, no different from that of his USIS counterparts in 105 other countries. The second fact is that USIS is not in the business of handing out two versions of the truth, one for American newsmen and the other for local journalists. Any attempts to set up such a double system would be, in one word, disastrous.

3. *Escorts*. A frequent criticism is that the mission requires that American newsmen be accompanied by "escorts" when they visit military installations in Vietnam. In general, such escorts have not been assigned to newsmen; when they have, their role has been to facilitate newsmen's access to military facilities.

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<sup>3</sup> The complete quote in the April 30 editorial is: "Misleading information—foisted upon the nation in past years—continues on a reduced scale, despite major improvements brought by a vigorous, new civilian information chief in Saigon." ("Information for What?" *New York Times*, April 30, 1965, p. 34)

4. *Transportation.* The charge here is that USIS and the Embassy do not provide transportation for newsmen to visit areas outside Saigon. The fact is that such facilities are provided whenever feasible. USIS played a major role in assuring access by newsmen to the Da Nang base. In other areas, the Embassy arranges transport for newsmen whenever possible. The major restriction is the fact that the Vietnam war is a war of small scattered actions taking place over an immense territory. There are, however, no restrictions on the movement of newsmen throughout the country.

In summary, there are information problems in Vietnam and there doubtless always will be as long as the war goes on. However, considerable progress has been made. Suspensions and antagonisms which once characterized relations between the American Embassy and newsmen have been largely dissipated. Unrealistic and unnecessary restrictions have been lifted. Most importantly, the American government now speaks with one voice in South Vietnam in a way that provides a full, credible account of our efforts to assist that troubled country.

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**45. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to the President's Special Assistant (Moyers)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 10, 1965

SUBJECT

Reaction to the President's European Address

Editorial reaction to the President's European address<sup>2</sup> is generally favorable in West Germany, Italy, and Great Britain and mixed in France. British reaction is most often concerned with the President's warning on "narrow nationalism" which the press interprets as directed against De Gaulle.

Some editors focus positively on the President's call for Atlantic unity but with emphasis on national angles. German papers underscore

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Files: 1962–1965, Entry UD WW 191, Box 12, IAE Director's Office, 1965. No classification marking. Drafted in IRS; edited by Wilson. Copies were sent to Bundy and Klein. All brackets are in the original.

<sup>2</sup> On May 7, the President delivered remarks from the White House Theater on the 20th Anniversary of V-E Day. For text, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1965*, Book I, pp. 506–509.

passages referring to the German problem. In France the Gaullist<sup>3</sup> papers are naturally most critical, although even such an elite paper as *Le Monde*, generally not uncritical of De Gaulle, is as censorious of the U.S. as of the French government. *Le Monde* declares that the address may "foreshadow a relaunching of the United States' European policy." The paper also says that the address was a document "reflecting very faithfully the ways and thinking of American leaders, the style of their reasoning and the logic of their convictions." An editorial in the same paper is more outspoken in its criticism of the U.S. when it charged that "the stubbornness of the U.S. in wishing to obtain support it demands is as ridiculous as that of French stubbornness which refuses it."

Two of the leading pro-American French papers took a far more positive attitude in their coverage of the address. Both moderate-conservative *Le Figaro* and rightist *L'Aurore* stress that the President had spoken out against "narrow nationalism." *Figaro* coverage is factual although its Washington correspondent found much of the speech "inspired" by the declarations of De Gaulle.

*L'Aurore*, on the other hand, urges Atlantic cooperation and U.S. friendship when it writes: "Under the protection of this [U.S.] power, we were able to live and to recover. . . . Many Frenchmen are stupefied to see French-American friendship threatened. Many Frenchmen remember, and read with joy the words of President Johnson on narrow nationalism which threatens to demolish the Atlantic Alliance and to turn us back to the anguish of twenty years ago."

Mass-circulation *France-Soir*, largest of the French dailies and moderately Gaullist, remarks that "for the moment President Johnson is not attacking De Gaulle directly, but in his present state of mind he will certainly do so if criticism continues from Paris with the same virulence."

West German comments are overwhelmingly favorable and centered on the President's remarks on German affairs. Among the leading papers center-left *Süddeutsche Zeitung* states that the "address assumes an importance of its own among the appeals and speeches devoted to the 8th of May. . . . Johnson draws lessons from the follies of the past and the most fundamental of these is a strict rebuff to the idea of isolationism. Instead, stress is laid on partnership, primarily partnership with Europe . . . Johnson coined a new term in speaking about "Atlantic Civilization." The moderate-conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* headlines: "Johnson—Reunification as a Pressing Problem." Independent *Stuttgart Zeitung* emphasizes: "Johnson Endorses

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a supporter of France's President de Gaulle.

Reunification” and the center-oriented *General Anzeiger*, Bonn, headlines: “Johnson—Free Elections For All Germans.” The opposition *Frankfurter Rundschau*, similar to the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* quoted above, notices above all in the President’s address a “rebuff to European nationalism.”

West Berlin papers focus on the remark that “the shame of the East Zone must end.” The independent *Spandauer Volksblatt*, in addition, notes the President’s call for improved relations and trade with Eastern Europe.

In Italy, the appeal for Atlantic unity is particularly stressed. Typical of comment in the editorial in liberal *La Stampa* (one of Italy’s leading papers) which says: “In substance, Johnson has reverted to the essential outlines of the grand design of President Kennedy, to wit an Atlantic community linked by a common history and civilization, with even closer relations. . . .” Calling the speech of fundamental importance, the paper continues: “The U.S. does not believe in nationalism but works toward closer and deeper interdependence in the Atlantic Community.”

Moderate-right *Il Tempo*’s editorial is equally laudatory when it praises the President for employing language “of truth, with the lofty force of a leader who sees in the world responsibilities entrusted to him, the stimulus to work not for peace at all costs, but for peace with freedom. The aim of the speech so full of wise and realistic warnings is the relaunching of the Atlantic Alliance; many people in Europe hope that his appeal will be listened to, especially in Paris.”

British comments most often single out, as the salient point of the speech, the implied admonition of Gaullist nationalism. The liberal *Guardian* headlines: “LBJ Condemns Gaullist Doctrine” and the conservative *Daily Telegraph* carries a headline: “Johnson Asks Europe to Ignore De Gaulle.” The conservative *Daily Mail* declares this was the first major speech on European affairs by the President since his inauguration. The paper adds that “never before has he spoken with such force to condemn France’s policies.” The independent *Scotsman* remarks that while the President “did not say anything new . . . what he had to say was both timely and reassuring.” The paper says that evidently “Europe was not forgotten” in spite of U.S. preoccupation with Vietnam and the Caribbean.”

Sharp criticism of the publicity angle of the address was contained in the highly respected *Daily Telegraph* which carried a column from its Washington correspondent titled “Misgivings Over Early Bird Speech”: “President Johnson has set a cat among the diplomatic pigeons by this Early Bird televised speech. . . . No European government was notified in advance. Technicians were only given a few hours’ notice. Before Early Bird . . . an American President could speak ‘live’ on a European

network only by being in that continent. Protocol would demand that he give his host government reasonable notice and let it see the text of the speech in advance. . .”

Donald M. Wilson<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**46. Airgram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the  
Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

A-1555

Moscow, May 28, 1965

SUBJECT

Evaluation Report on *Architecture-USA* Exhibit

The following observations are based on the first public showing of the *Architecture-USA* Exhibit in Leningrad on 25 May. Direct reactions to the Exhibit itself will be summarized in a later report<sup>2</sup> which will deal with a week's sample of viewers. It should be understood that the following political discussions made up only a small part of the total number of discussions of various types at the Exhibit.

*Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic*

The question of Viet-Nam was raised numerous times by Soviet viewers in company with small crowds around the guides. Most frequently the question was posed in terms of what the American people think of US policy in Viet-Nam. The guides' answers to the effect that we don't want war any more than the Soviet people do and that infiltration of South Viet-Nam had been started from the North generally were accepted as the best answers that the guides could give and the question usually was not actively pursued further.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CUL 8-1. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Remick; cleared by Stoessel; approved by Wiener. Sent to the Department for USIA/ICS/EW.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

Students were more knowledgeable about Viet-Nam in contrast to one man who simply asserted that the Pentagon was responsible. There were several instances of agitators (or, at least hecklers) attempting to embarrass a guide on Viet-Nam, but without success. One Party-liner even extended himself to assert that the US had erected the Berlin Wall, but he was laughed at by the Soviets around him. Most significant, in no instance did the crowds witnessing or taking part in discussion on Viet-Nam seem overly concerned or apprehensive about the situation.

American policy in the Dominican Republic was questioned less frequently than was US policy in Viet-Nam.

#### *Khrushchev*

Several times guides were asked what Americans thought of Khrushchev. One guide answered that Americans were surprised at his being replaced and had not they also been surprised, which drew sheepish admission that they had been. There were some tentative offers that Khrushchev had retired because of age. Another guide answered that many Americans felt sorry for Khrushchev, and the Soviets found that amusing. Although they acknowledged that Soviet-American relations were better when he was in office, and that this probably was why Americans liked Khrushchev, the Soviets felt that Khrushchev was not the type of man for the job. Some labeled him a blunderer responsible for the present problems in Agriculture. In off-duty private conversations with well-educated Russians similar opinions were offered—that he was a peasant, uncouth, and not the type of man the Soviet Union should have for its leader.

One guide was asked how Americans like the new Soviet leaders.<sup>3</sup> Answering that Americans don't know anything about them and expressing the hope that the new leaders would visit the US drew comment that they should visit America.

#### *Stalin*

A question of whether the American people see Soviet films was followed by one as to whether Americans saw films made in Stalin's time. The Soviets in this discussion observed that a lot of things have changed since Stalin's time—the USSR is now "closer to the truth."

#### *Kennedy*

The late President Kennedy still holds tremendous respect in the eyes of many Soviet citizens. Many asked for Kennedy half-dollars and many said they loved him and compared him with Roosevelt.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the officials who assumed leadership positions in the Soviet Government after Khrushchev was deposed in 1964, including Brezhnev and Kosygin.

*Amerika and VOA*

Many Soviet citizens at the Exhibit and elsewhere offer only the uninformative comment that *Amerika*<sup>4</sup> is “very hard to get.” One young lady about to take her graduate exams in English conversation noted that a friend runs a newstand and sets aside her few copies for her friends and acquaintances.

At the Exhibit several people spotted the piled packages containing *Amerika* (with the President and Vice-President on the cover) before the magazines were given out and unpacked. A crowd swarmed on the packages and ripped some of them open, so that Soviet militia men had to be called to dispel them and “guard” the packages.

In Leningrad<sup>5</sup> several days before the Exhibit opened a number of guides were asked if they were with the Exhibit. One guide was questioned three times in one day by Soviet citizens, two of whom had heard about the exhibit on VOA broadcasts and one by way of *Amerika* magazine.

For the Ambassador:  
**Ernest G. Wiener**<sup>6</sup>  
*Counselor for Cultural Affairs*

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 6, Document 21.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the former name for St. Petersburg, the capital of Imperial Russia (1732–1918).

<sup>6</sup> Wiener signed “E.G. Wiener” above this typed signature.



**47. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency (Davies) to the Director (Rowan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 15, 1965

SUBJECT

Terry Catherman's Comments on Cleveland Orchestra and VOA Reception

I am enclosing a copy of the excellent notes made by Dean Chamberlin of my office at Terry Catherman's debriefing of June 10 on his recent six-week travels in the USSR as escort officer with the Cleveland Orchestra. I urge you to read this document. Based upon my own experience during one week in Moscow and Leningrad, I want to subscribe in the strongest terms possible to everything Terry said. In this document, we have the results of six weeks' observation of the Soviet scene by a thoroughly experienced and perceptive reporter, as summarized by one of the best note-takers I have ever known.

At the risk of briefing an already significantly reduced version of Terry's remarks, I want to underline the four points he made which I regard as the most important.<sup>2</sup>

1. There has been a considerable acceleration of the process of relaxation (Terry's fifth paragraph). This is particularly noticeable when one has not spent any considerable length of time in the USSR for the past two years, as is the case with me, and it is interesting that it struck Terry the same way, since he left his assignment there only a year ago.

2. "People couldn't care less" about Viet-nam and the Dominican Republic (Terry's sixth paragraph). We must take advantage of this widespread popular attitude by finding every occasion to stress the prospects for, and advantage of, increased Soviet (and Eastern Europe) contact with the US and the outside world generally.

3. The necessity of increasing the signal strength with which VOA Russian gets into the Soviet Union (the second and third paragraphs on page 2). As Terry points out, English is no substitute for Russian in the USSR. It is simply ridiculous that Worldwide English is booming

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 26, Field—Soviet Bloc 1965. Confidential. Copies were sent to Wilson, Anderson, Ryan, Adamson, Brumberg, Adams, Wiener, Davis, Henry, and Jones. An unknown hand wrote "CTR" in the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. It appears that Rowan saw the memorandum and wrote a "C" over his initials.

<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand underlined the word "four."

into this country, while our Russian transmissions are not adequately audible in many places. We are not getting full value for the time, money, and intelligent effort being invested in our most important means of communication with the peoples of the USSR.

4. In VOA Russian's programming we should devote more time to "more advanced forms of music" (Terry's antipenultimate paragraph), and less to jazz, leaving it to WWE to carry the burden of jazz programming.

R.T. Davies<sup>3</sup>

## Enclosure

### Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>4</sup>

Washington, undated

#### *Terry Catherman's Comments on Cleveland Orchestra and VOA Reception*

The orchestra was received most enthusiastically. . . "the Russians were spellbound." The tour went to Moscow, Kiev, Tbilisi, Erevan, Sochi and Leningrad—(the same "tired old cities"). Sochi was superfluous as it is a vacation city and has no concert-going audience. Erevan is also a doubtful location. Some 600 more people were admitted than there were seats and there were fist fights over seats. It was "a roaring mess." They came to see Americans rather than to listen to the orchestra. The one hundred Armenian-Americans trying to get back to the U.S. captured the sympathy of the orchestra but of course nothing can be done about them. We should be more insistent on insisting on an itinerary of our own choice.

By Soviet standards, this was the best organized tour we have ever sent to the USSR. Hotel accommodations were good, food all right. Only gripe was that the mail wasn't on time. For Terry it was a rather boring trip, as it was so routine without any irritating incidents and no problems. But he was left a lot of time to listen to VOA.

The last concert was in Tbilisi on May Day, the first time a foreign group has performed in the USSR on that day. This extra performance was requested by the Soviets who came to Terry with the request and couldn't understand why he, as the Director, had to ask the Union

<sup>3</sup> Davies signed "Dick" above this typed signature.

<sup>4</sup> No classification marking. Drafted by Chamberlin on June 15. Copies were sent to Davies and Chapman.

musicians<sup>5</sup> to take a vote as to whether they would perform. Only incident was when a trombonist got drunk and at 3:00 a.m. went into the main square at Tbilisi with a tape recorder to tape the sound of a military convoy. He was arrested but quickly released.

He thinks the orchestra was too timid in its selection of American works. They were given good critiques all over the Soviet Union—three or four in each city, in contrast to usual one or two reviews for the whole country. He hadn't realized how much Soviet music is opening up. They are composing in 12-tone music,<sup>6</sup> jazz is entirely respectable and accepted—and almost as good as ours. They are very receptive to impulses from the West and the orchestra should have brought some more advanced compositions along with the classical repertoire. We should send more advanced musical works with orchestras and also *on the air*.

The relaxation of the last two years is continuing; the Soviets are taking life a lot easier. The orchestra just disappeared into homes, dormitories, cafes each night—on invitation. Perhaps this is not so much security relaxation as the fact that the Russians now have better homes in which to entertain. The big housing effort is catching up with demand. All of Terry's friends now have their own apartments.

There were no questions on Vietnam or Dominican Republic ("People couldn't care less"). Nor on U.S. race relations. Nor about the spacerace ("all propaganda"). They seem glad that Khrushchev ("that bumptious guy with the wild ideas") has gone. They said Khrushchev had established "micro-cities" (suburbs) and has let the middle of the cities rot. Now the trend is reversing and they are building up the cities. No one hesitates to mention Stalin—not true last year. They like to talk about "the profit motive"—are all for it. They distrust the Chinese and hate living near them. They know that U.S. standard of living is better. We needn't tell them *that*.

"Remember that in the USSR everything is primitive—not sophisticated. They use 2 syllable words; 5 word sentences; are more concerned with getting another drink than discussing anything serious."

Acquaintances of Terry told him that in their opinion the credibility of VOA had improved greatly in past year. Good we have taken cold war out of our programs.

The BBC is still ahead in signal strength and program content. Their "Sketch Book from America" using their own correspondents

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the fact that the musicians in the Cleveland Orchestra were also members of a union.

<sup>6</sup> A musical technique credited to the Austrian composer Arnold Schoenberg and popular in the mid-twentieth century.

and Americans does a lot for us. From 5:45 to 6:15 every day they have a news roundup and press review which is excellent. Peking comes in strong but nobody listens—same with Paris. Deutschewelle<sup>7</sup> has an excellent signal and good audience.

Terry mentioned two reports on VOA which are still useful: one by *Scott Lyon* who accompanied *Pro Musica* said Worldwide English came in louder and clearer and on more frequencies than the Russian Service of VOA which was subject to more interference from local radio stations and faded badly. A report by *Dexter Anderson*, covered a trip across the USSR. He said non-Russian programs came in strong; Russian program signal strength dropped off sharply as one moved away from Moscow. Both programs are strong in Moscow.

Terry came to the same conclusion after listening every day to the Voice. Worldwide English came in with a good signal and a good program—especially the off-line commentators. The Russian Service signal was weaker and the program more “monolithic.” But English is *not* a substitute for Russian in broadcasting to the USSR; too few people understand English.

He questions the need for broadcasting *two* VOA jazz programs at the same time. Conover<sup>8</sup> comes in strong on WWE—turn the dial to VOA Russian and it is weak. Conover is extremely popular—“every young Russian who can get near a radio listens to him every night.” The Russian Service “hasn’t a chance of competing with him.” A friend of Terry’s told him: “I don’t understand a word of English, but I understand Willis.”

The Soviets are developing their own jazz idiom. Even in the hotels they play it well. It is no longer forbidden fruit. Perhaps Russian VOA should play less jazz and direct its attention to “more advanced forms of music.”

Russian TV isn’t much good. Radio is still the #1 medium. But Soviet music is getting better—the rest is “still ham-handed.”

VOA policy of telling the truth straight without invective is getting us more and more listeners. And use of the American accent is paying off handsomely.

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<sup>7</sup> German news service.

<sup>8</sup> Reference is to Willis Conover, an American broadcaster and jazz music programmer for VOA.

**48. Guidance Prepared in the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Vietnam<sup>1</sup>**

Issue Number 3

Saigon, June 22, 1965

**U.S. MILITARY BUILD UP AND PROBLEMS OF THE  
AMERICAN PRESENCE IN VIETNAM**

**The Problem:**

To evaluate the psychological implications of the growing U.S. military presence in Vietnam and to determine ways and means of extracting the greatest psychological advantage from this presence while minimizing its adverse impact.

**IT IS PROPOSED THAT:**

1. All output to all audiences on the subject of the American presence be geared to President Johnson's emphasis on the decisive role of U.S. military strength and determination in support of the valiant effort of the Vietnamese people to resist communist aggression and secure peace and independence.

2. A consistent, persistent and pervasive effort be sustained to assure association of the American presence with an inevitably successful military effort that will end Vietnam's decades of war.

3. The reason for the American military presence be forthrightly attributed to communist aggression and that the duration of that presence be equated with the time required to make the enemy aggressor cease fighting.

4. The U.S. military build-up be presented as a positive measure designed to achieve the level of combined Free World strength which is needed to force the aggressors to accept negotiations for the kind of peace the Vietnamese people want.

5. Plans to minimize and localize tensions and frictions between U.S. troops and Vietnamese people presently be determined on the basis of local need.

6. All output be guided by the basic fact that the American purpose in Vietnam is to support the Vietnamese people's struggle for freedom and independence but not to serve as a substitute for the Vietnamese's own military effort.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, General Records Relating to the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) 1966–1975 Acc. #87–0089, Entry A1–31, Box 1, JUSPAO Guidance, Issue #3 U.S. Military Build Up and Problems of the American Presence in Vietnam—June 22, 1965. Unclassified.

### ASSUMPTIONS:

1. The American presence is a "foreign" presence that unavoidably generates resentments which are likely to grow as the presence grows. This is particularly true in any country that has been previously exposed to foreign domination.

2. The people of Vietnam and the world at large understand that the Republic of Vietnam cannot, without assistance, hope to overcome hostile action supported by the resources of the entire communist world.

3. The American presence is most vulnerable to attack on political grounds:

a. The reality of the growing American involvement and presence in Vietnam will seed charges of "U.S. imperialist" infringement of Vietnamese "sovereignty" and political domination of GVN "lackeys."

b. Vietnamese tend to associate the American presence with in-group GVN politicians and to blame the United States for shortcomings of incumbent GVN administration, their political personalities and their policies.

4. Divisive incidents will mount as the U.S. military build-up increases direct contact between American troops and Vietnamese people.

### DISCUSSION:

The initial Vietnamese reaction to the U.S. military build-up is generally favorable and related psychological problems remain as yet at an acceptable level. This is because our Vietnamese friends tentatively view the American presence as their latest and best hope for successfully ending the war within a reasonable period of time.

Our task is to sustain Vietnamese confidence in the fact that the American military presence is linked solely to their war effort, is needed, will be effective and, most importantly, temporary. The key element of our psychological output on the American presence should be a single-minded stress on "decisive American strength and unflagging determination in support of the valiant Vietnamese people's struggle to resist communist aggression and secure peace and independence."

To the extent that we are successful in applying this clear cut psychological line, the unavoidable negative element of the American presence will be counterbalanced and avoidable problems will be averted or minimized.

By focusing on the military nature of the American presence, we reduce attention to sensitive political issues.

By stressing our "support" for the Vietnamese people's struggle against the communist threat, we underscore the decisive but supple-

mentary role of Americans in what is essentially a Vietnamese struggle: this eliminates from our output any implication that the Americans are going to fight the war alone.

By stressing U.S. support for the “people,” we minimize unfavorable association with GVN political elements and unpopular policies. We must, of course, maintain proper courtesy and respect and avoid any reflection on Vietnamese “sovereignty” in our output. Our watchword should be: “Alliance of two sovereign peoples.”

In implementing President Johnson’s policy emphasizing U.S. strength and determination, three cautions should be observed. Firstly, we walk a psychological tightrope as regards the timing of inevitable victory over communist aggression. The burgeoning American military presence must be viewed as temporary and effective enough to conclude the war within a reasonable period. But as the initial overly-optimistic Vietnamese reactions to our bombing of the North demonstrated, we must at the same time reduce unrealistic expectations of “quick” victory. We must generate confidence that the victory of the American and Vietnamese peoples is inevitable but not immediately at hand. Our output must avoid the pitfall of attempting to time the victory.

A second caution is to play down defensive legalistic assertions that we are here “because” we have been “invited.” For this would unnecessarily focus attention on a sensitive political question and imply that U.S. strength and determination can be nullified by any Saigon coup which happens to produce an “invitation out.” If we must point out that we have been “invited,” let’s not stress that we are here “only because” and “only as long” as the “invitation” holds good.

International support of the Vietnamese struggle against the communist aggression should be emphasized but not transparently overdone. There must be no suggestion of a U.S. effort to conceal the dominantly visible American presence under the cloak of “internationalization.”

Straightforward emphasis on U.S. strength and determination conforms with the visible realities of the American presence and precludes resort to defensive, apologetic, argumentative, devious and, therefore, ineffective treatment of the subject.

Divisive incidents and other adverse effects on the U.S. military build-up will mount as direct contact between U.S. troops and the Vietnamese people increase. Psychological activities should support U.S./Vietnamese efforts to minimize and localize the impact of direct contact. The scope, content and form of these activities should be determined on the basis of local need. They should reflect the nature of U.S. troop discipline and be marked by a courteous and sincere concern for the people of affected communities. Those incidents and sufferings

which in war can never be wholly avoided should be blamed on the enemy who brought this war about. It is, of course, understood that the cultivation of constructive community relations can do much to mitigate tensions.

#### CONCLUSIONS:

The U.S. military build-up and the strength and determination it implies constitutes the best psychological asset at our disposal for treating the issue of the American military presence in Vietnam. There can be no question but that it has negative implications as well. We must not, however, permit ourselves to be sidetracked by trying to cope with all conceivable negative effects and thereby focusing attention on them because that would mean sacrificing consistency and clear-cut focus to qualifications and equivocations bound to dilute and diffuse the basic message.

#### ACTION:

1. All U.S. personnel in headquarters and in the field whose work involves psychological activities are to be instructed to implement the proposals contained herein.

2. JUSPAO's Program Services and Field Services and MACV's PolWar Advisory Directorate and J-1 will be requested to develop appropriate program activities concerning the American military presence in Vietnam, to review current output, to determine audience accessibility, to explore media capabilities and potential, to consider ideas, approaches and format for the presentation of the message. (Everything from lectures by troop education officers and armed propaganda teams; through pamphlets, photo-features, movies, radio news and commentary; to cultural center student discussion groups and community relations projects should be utilized.)

3. JUSPAO will monitor and evaluate all output concerning the American military presence in Vietnam.

4. Action plans will be developed jointly with GVN staffs having responsibilities in the areas with which this proposal is concerned.



**49. Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to All Principal United States Information Service Posts<sup>1</sup>**

CA-3728

Washington, June 29, 1965

SUBJECT

Materials on Viet-Nam in Support of Director's Memorandum of July 17, 1964<sup>2</sup> assigning Priority Status to Viet-Nam

SUMMARY

Requests within 2 weeks post's specific needs for subject material

Many posts have indicated a need for additional materials and support on Viet-Nam and on U.S. policy as it relates to that country. The Agency is planning a number of additional products and projects designed to meet this need, but in order to provide the best possible materials on Viet-Nam we need reports from addressee posts on the problems encountered in attempting to explain the situation in Viet-Nam and suggestions and ideas which could be incorporated into materials produced.

Specifically, we need details regarding (a) what you have done on Viet-Nam and the response this has evoked in your country, (b) the issues and subjects which are drawing the heaviest criticism, (c) the gaps in information among critics of the Vietnamese situation which could be filled by providing background materials and (d) the types of products or support which you think would best meet your requirements.

A good example of the type of information needed here, and of the problems confronting one post, was revealed by Mr. Walt Rostow of the State Department during his visit to Japan in April.<sup>3</sup> After numerous contacts with various elements of Japanese society, Mr. Rostow suggested the following six points on which USIS/Tokyo should focus its efforts in explaining the Vietnamese situation:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Files: 1962–1965, Entry UD WW 191, Box 9, Director's Office 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Burns on June 21; cleared by Tull, Smith, Murphy, McClure, Nevins, and DuBois; approved by Moore. Sent via air pouch.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 25.

<sup>3</sup> Rostow visited Japan for 10 days, beginning on April 22, to meet with Japanese officials and give a series of public talks on the war in Vietnam. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXIX, Part 2, Japan, Document 46, footnote 2; and "Japanese Universities Cancel Rostow Talks," *New York Times*, April 17, 1965, p. 7.

1) Arresting fears that the war in Viet-Nam was escalating toward a broader conflict.

2) Explaining the seriousness of military infiltration.

3) Countering the widely held belief that the Viet Cong is a genuine nationalist movement.

4) Emphasizing that American policies in Asia are not based solely on the use of military power for strategic reasons, but are considerate of Asian aspirations for economic development, national independence, etc.

5) Explaining the existing nationalism in South Viet-Nam, which has been concealed by repeated coups in the past 18 months, but which, nonetheless, is a strong force.

6) Explaining the 1962 Geneva treaty provisions and calling attention to the repeated violations committed against these during the past three years.<sup>4</sup>

For obvious reasons some of the above points are not applicable to the situation at your post; but these illustrate, in part, the types of information we need from you.

Request your reply within two weeks of receipt of this message.<sup>5</sup>

**Rowan**

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<sup>4</sup> The Geneva Agreements of July 23, 1962, brought to a close the hostilities between left- and right-wing factions in Laos, and called for the country to become neutral and for the formation of a tripartite government that represented the conflicting factions. The agreement, however, did not hold and conditions continued to deteriorate over the course of 1963. For additional information about the agreement and crisis in Laos in general, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, Laos Crisis, Documents 354–411.

<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand drew a box around this sentence.

**50. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency (Adamson) to the Director (Rowan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 1, 1965

SUBJECT

Comparison of East-West High Frequency Broadcasting Efforts

A radio frequency shortage, which has grown progressively more serious during the past few years, has now reached the point where the Agency's broadcasting effort is hampered. The seriousness is such that I would like to recommend that the U.S. Government as a whole examine the assignment of responsibility for International Broadcasting to be certain that the limited frequencies are made available to the broadcasting interests deemed to have the most pressing need for them.

International Broadcasting is a highly competitive field. As you are aware, in the last eight years the world's effort in this field has more than doubled. At the same time, the number of frequencies available for high frequency broadcasting has remained constant. Simply stated, the problem is one of supply and demand. Despite major technical efforts, it is no longer possible to find the large numbers of frequencies required to support the various independent high frequency broadcasting efforts which, in one way or another, come under the cloak of the United States.

While in Washington on June 21, Mrs. Norman Chandler of the Advisory Commission asked me specifically why both the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe were necessary. I explained to her the basic difference—that the Voice of America speaks for the United States and the government while Radio Free Europe offers a platform for political opposition in exile for Eastern European countries. While I may have been able to justify to Mrs. Chandler the continued existence of both VOA and RFE on the basis of their different missions, I could not answer the questions she asked regarding the relative importance of each. She indicated that the foundation she represents cannot vote to make a contribution to RFE until this question is answered.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 24, Broadcasting Service—General, 1965. Confidential. An unknown hand wrote “CTR” and “For Mr. Marks” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Both were crossed through presumably indicating that Rowan and Marks saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information.

To the best of my knowledge, no attempt has ever been made to answer this question from the point of view of overall U.S. interests. Though I have mentioned VOA and Radio Free Europe, I feel we ought to seek the same answer for Radio Liberty, which broadcasts to the Soviet Union, but that we specifically exclude Armed Forces Radio which broadcasts only to our armed forces stationed overseas even though they do have an "eavesdropping audience".

While RFE and Radio Liberty may appear to be compatible with VOA, because of their different missions, I am alarmed at the competition they are giving the VOA for radio frequencies. The competition is now so keen that in some cases VOA, RFE and Radio Liberty are interfering with each other and with the broadcasts of friendly countries. The interference being caused to the broadcasts of friendly foreign countries is of special concern to us since it blemishes, to a degree, the harmonious relationships that exist between the VOA and the broadcasting organizations of many of these countries. In addition, Radio Liberty and some of the broadcasts of RFE continue to be jammed by target countries. This often makes it impossible for the VOA to use adjacent frequencies without also being inadvertently jammed.

In a recent technical meeting, held to coordinate the seasonal broadcasting schedules of the various U.S. broadcasting organizations, it was noted that RFE and Radio Liberty in their broadcasts to Iron Curtain<sup>3</sup> countries are using daily more than three times the frequency hours of either VOA or BBC. If for no other reason than the competition that now exists for frequencies, I feel we should push for an examination of the role of each, the relative effectiveness of each, and the share of the limited frequencies each should have to carry out its task.

Normally, we compare U.S. and Free World broadcasting efforts to Communist efforts in terms of radio program hours per week, but inasmuch as available frequencies are a major limiting factor, I am attaching for your examination a comparison of frequency hours used daily.<sup>4</sup> In summary, the USSR, Communist China and the UAR use 1,727 frequency hours daily for international broadcasting, whereas United States broadcasters and the BBC use a total of 2,308. (U.S. broadcasters include the VOA, RFE, RLN, AFRTS and the private U.S. international broadcasting organizations WRUL, KGEI and WINB.)

It is significant that VOA broadcasting to the entire world in thirty-eight languages uses 815 frequency hours daily, while Radio Free

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<sup>3</sup> This term was used to describe the Soviet Union and Communist countries of Eastern Europe.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated, 1-page table entitled "Overall U.S. High Frequency Broadcasting Effort."

Europe broadcasting only to Eastern Europe uses 461 and Radio Liberty broadcasting only to the Soviet Union uses 235.

National policy concerning International Broadcasting has not been reviewed, so far as I can determine, for a great number of years. I suggest that the time has come to review the relative importance of the efforts of VOA, RFE and Radio Liberty and to determine the relative priority for their use of the limited number of frequencies.

Keith E. Adamson<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Adamson signed his initials “K.E.A.” above this typed signature.

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## 51. Editorial Note

On July 8, 1965, United States Information Agency (USIA) Director Carl T. Rowan submitted his letter of resignation to President Lyndon Johnson. In the letter, Rowan wrote that he was resigning his position “after considerable soul-searching.” Referencing Johnson’s confidence and trust in him, Rowan continued: “Thus, you can appreciate the difficulty with which I have come to my decision. After more than 4 years of public service, however, personal and family reasons dictate that I return to private life.” After serving in the U.S. Government for over 4 years, first as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from February 1961 until March 1963, U.S. Ambassador to Finland from March 1963 until February 1964, and USIA Director, Rowan planned to return to a career in journalism. He hoped “that through this medium I can still make a contribution to your and our country’s efforts to protect and extend freedom at home and abroad.” (National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 24, Office of the Director—General 1965)

Johnson accepted Rowan’s resignation in a July 10 letter, writing:

“I accept your resignation as Director of the United States Information Agency with sincere regret. You have brought to the job professional confidence and unusual devotion to public service. Your experience and your own personal qualities have set precedents which will challenge your successors for years to come.

“For four years you have given loyal service to the government and people of this nation. I understand the sacrifices which have been

involved in that service and appreciate the reasons which led to your decision to return to private life. As you leave, I want to join with your many friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success." (Ibid.)

A July 10 press release from the Office of the White House Press Secretary made public Rowan's resignation letter and Johnson's response. (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1069, Box 26, Carl T. Rowan, 1957–1998)

The day after Rowan submitted his official letter of resignation, Johnson called attorney Leonard Marks to offer him the position of USIA Director. According to a transcript of their conversation, Johnson told Marks: "I rather think that you're admirably equipped for [the job as U.S. Information Agency Director] and what you don't have you can learn rather quickly. And Don Wilson's job could be a good newspaper man with a lot of management experience. And you could get you an outstanding Voice [of America] man." Johnson noted that Frank Stanton "thinks that you could do a good job of it and you could work very closely with [the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information]. He thinks they would like it." Johnson continued: "I don't think there's any question about this. I think it'll be a little heavy for you to get Rusk's stature, as young as you are, and McNamara's stature, as young as you are, but I think that you can do it." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Leonard Marks, Tape WH6507.02, Conversation 8322. No classification marking. Transcribed in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.)

Shortly after tapping Marks for USIA Director, Johnson approved Chairman of the Civil Service Commission John W. Macy's recommendations of Robert Akers as USIA's Deputy Director and John Chancellor as Voice of America (VOA) Director. In a July 23 memorandum to President Johnson, Macy wrote: "I have talked with Leonard Marks and he is definitely interested in Akers for Deputy and Chancellor for the Voice of America." Johnson underscored his concurrence in a handwritten notation: "At once—get FBI immediately on Akers full field as well as Chancellor." (Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Box 7, Marks, Leonard [3 of 3])

**52. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 2, 1965

Attached is a report on progress to date on the recommendations contained in my report to you of March 16, 1965 concerning informational and psychological warfare programs in South Viet-Nam.<sup>2</sup> The numbered paragraphs correspond to the 16 points in my report, a copy of which is attached for reference.

*1. Expand USIA staff in Saigon and reorganize operation.*

The USIA staff in Saigon has been reorganized and incorporated into the newly-created Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO).<sup>3</sup> JUSPAO's staff build-up is on schedule, and when completed in September will consist of 137 U.S. employees, 15 of whom are being provided by the military.<sup>4</sup> A Viet-Nam Working Group has been created within the Far East Area of USIA in Washington.

*2. Issue joint agency statement assigning responsibility for over-all Mission psychological operations to Minister for Public Affairs Barry Zorthian.*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 190, Vietnam Rowan Report. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: "File—Atts to Bundy memo to President Aug 3, 1965." An additional copy of the memorandum is in the National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 26, Field—Far East (Viet Nam) July–December, 1965. In the same file as the memorandum is an August 2 note from "BK" to Rowan that indicates that the progress report was done at Rowan's suggestion and was based on a May 19 memorandum from Moore to Rowan, and a July 2 memorandum from Ryan to Rowan, both reporting on progress to date on the March recommendations. Handwritten notations on the August 2 note indicate that copies were sent to Rusk and Bundy. Copies of the May 19 and July 2 memoranda are *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 37. In the same file as Rowan's August 2 memorandum is an undated and untitled paper classified as "Secret," attached to a July 2 covering memorandum from Ryan and the Viet-Nam Working Group to Rowan. According to Ryan, the attached paper "is a report on the progress to date on the recommendations contained in your report to the President on March 16, 1965." In a May 19 memorandum from Moore to Rowan in the same file, Moore stated: "Following is a report on the progress to date on the recommendations contained in your report to the President of March 16, 1965."

<sup>3</sup> According to USIA's 25th Report to Congress, JUSPAO was established by Johnson in May 1965. (National Archives, RG 306, Reports to Congress; 8/1953–1979, Entry P–180, Box 1, USIA 25th Report to Congress 7–12/1965) Also see "USIS Controls News Flow of Viet War," *Chicago Tribune*, April 21, 1965, p. A2.

<sup>4</sup> For further information on JUSPAO's mission and organization, see the July 13 "JUSPAO Vietnam: General Briefing Book." (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1 1066, Box 228, Field Post, JUSPAO 1965)

NSAM 330 of April 9 reaffirmed Barry Zorthian's over-all authority for coordination and direction of psychological and informational programs in Viet-Nam.<sup>5</sup>

3. *Plan vital support operations under JUSPAO Director Zorthian's control.*

a. The MAC/V Pol War Directorate in Viet-Nam has been placed under the substantive direction of JUSPAO, and MAC/V Psyops officers at the province level receive substantive direction from the JUSPAO Field Services Center.

b. USOM's communications Media Division was formally transferred to JUSPAO jurisdiction on July 1.

c. USIA has prepared a supplemental budget for operations in Southeast Asia, including sufficient funds to meet the needs of our expanded program in Viet-Nam for the remainder of FY '66. This request, approved by the Bureau of the Budget, is now ready to be submitted to Congress.

4. *Continue the contingency piaster fund required for JUSPAO to conduct psychological operations in the provinces.*

An agreement with USOM now permits JUSPAO to draw as needed \$200,000 unexpended from FY '65 and \$300,000 proposed for FY '66.

5. *Obtain from military the aircraft needed for conducting airborne psychological operations.*

Agreement has been reached under which the military is providing JUSPAO aircraft time rather than specific aircraft. It now appears that after the present deployment of aircraft and loudspeakers is completed in September, the time available to JUSPAO for operations will exceed the original request.

6. *Give JUSPAO Field Representatives "sign off" authority on provincial expenditure of U.S. funds in economic programs.*

JUSPAO and the appropriate Washington agencies have come to the conclusion that granting such authority could slow down the execution of some programs and thus offset advantages which might accrue from it. Therefore no action to obtain "sign off" authority has been taken.

7. *Support increased GVN broadcasting capability.*

Negotiations for building a powerful transmitter in Viet-Nam are postponed temporarily pending GVN improvement of existing broad-

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 12, Document 37.



cast facilities. To assist Radio Viet-Nam with these improvements, JUSPAO has provided an advisory team composed of three American officers and four Vietnamese assistants.

8. *Establish TV capability in Viet-Nam.*

The GVN announcement of major reforms in Radio Viet-Nam considered essential before television can be established is hoped for shortly. When these reforms are implemented, formal negotiations for U.S. aid to TV can begin.

9. *Provide training for GVN personnel in communications media.*

To strengthen GVN radio capability, JUSPAO has planned a four-month training program for Vietnamese radio personnel. A VOA team to survey Radio Viet-Nam's training needs is organized, but departure from Washington is being delayed at JUSPAO request, pending reforms of Radio Viet-Nam recommended in January.

JUSPAO training of GVN district survey teams has been expanded and motivational training of Popular Forces platoons in II and III Corps areas continues.

10. *Support and encourage GVN development of an overseas information program.*

To organize an effective GVN overseas information program, a three-man working group was formed in Saigon with representatives from the GVN Foreign and PsyWar Ministries and JUSPAO.

This group is already producing substantial results as demonstrated by the Free World Aid Day celebration in Saigon during June, the forthcoming world-wide tour of Vietnamese heroes and the initiation of GVN news cables, through USIA channels, to GVN Embassies in 23 foreign countries.

AID and USIA are now preparing a program for training GVN personnel in information dissemination techniques.

11. *Revitalize Chieu Hoi Program.*

To revitalize this program, a special team was sent to Saigon in mid-May and has been consulting with U.S. and GVN officials and studying operations. The team briefed the Secretary of Defense and his party in Saigon on July 17<sup>6</sup> and will be submitting its final report and recommendations to the Mission Council on August 16.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> McNamara, accompanied by Lodge and Wheeler, visited Vietnam from July 16 through July 21.

<sup>7</sup> Not found.

This program has been showing signs of increased effectiveness in recent months. The highest number of military and political cadre returnees since the program's inception (910) was recorded in May.

12. *Undertake a program to produce corps of psywar experts.*

On April 19, USIA initiated a long-range training program designed to produce officers thoroughly trained in psychological warfare. An experienced USIA officer just returned from a tour of duty in Viet-Nam is coordinating a series of four ten-week courses for officers assigned to Viet-Nam and is working closely with DOD to integrate and coordinate military and USIA psychological training on a long-range basis. The 10-week course includes Vietnamese language training and area studies as well as special instruction at Ft. Bragg. The first class completed training in June and is now in Viet-Nam. The second class completes its training in mid-August, and the third and fourth classes are scheduled for August and October.

13. *Exploit Viet Cong prisoners, defectors and terrorists.*

In the provinces, JUSPAO Field Services has a program for letter writing by VC defectors to former units and friends. Distribution is arranged through various channels including air-drop leaflets. Live and taped appeals by defectors to VC units are broadcast by radio and airborne loudspeakers. A platoon of VC defectors now making propaganda tours in the provinces received motivational training from JUSPAO.

External exploitation of prisoners of war, defectors and terrorists is conducted through arranging for foreign correspondents, providing JUSPAO press and photo coverage for overseas distribution and supplying taped materials to VOA.

14. *Build new embassy in Saigon.*

Funds have been authorized for the construction of a new building.

15. *Increase work among youth, labor, religious leaders and intellectual community.*

Informational activities in urban areas, already extensive, have been expanded with the recent arrival of a Youth Officer and a special officer to work with Buddhists.

USOM and JUSPAO are conducting a special summer youth program involving 5,000 students in rural social action programs in 27 of the 44 provinces.

A series of radio programs for youth is being developed; a new quarterly magazine on current American thought is being distributed to intellectuals; and the book translation program has been increased from 13 titles in FY '65 to 30 in FY '66.

16. *Provide necessary material support to expand program in Viet-Nam.*

To render effective support to the expanded program, the Agency has diverted equipment from other areas to meet immediate needs and has prepared a supplemental budget sufficient to meet the total requested increases of the post.

The absorption of USOM's communications media operation will give JUSPAO \$500,000 for replacement and maintenance of equipment and supplies.

Carl T. Rowan

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53. **Notes of a United States Information Agency Director's Staff Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 9, 1965

Director's Staff Meeting  
Mr. Anderson, Chairman

*Mr. Marks* was introduced by Mr. Anderson and expressed his pleasure at the opportunity to talk to the group. He summarized his background and interest in communications, which he termed the life-line of civilization, and emphasized his firm belief in the work of the Agency. Overseas experience has given him a familiarity with and respect for USIS activities, as well as an insight into the conditions and responsibilities of life in the foreign service. In the latter regard, he has urged on the Hill support for the lateral entry legislation which has his full endorsement.

Mr. Marks said that he had been reviewing the memos he requested from element heads on problems and was impressed by the candor of the presentations, a frankness that he wants to continue without inhibition in the future during the decision making dialogue.<sup>2</sup> The present organizational structure will remain intact and no staffing changes are planned.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director: Executive Secretariat; Staff Meeting Notes, 1953–1965, Entry P-123, Box 3, Director's Staff Meeting, 1965. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the notes.

<sup>2</sup> Copies of these briefing memoranda are in the Johnson Library, Papers of Leonard H. Marks, Box 27, Briefing Papers on Major Problems of All Elements of Agency.

Mr. Marks also commented on the selection of Robert Akers as Deputy Director, and of Howard Chernoff as his Executive Assistant. He characterized them, both of whom he has worked with and known for many years, as professionals of outstanding ability and experience. They will enter on duty, with Mr. Marks, on September 1.

*Mr. Posner* (IOA)—The Senate Appropriations committee is to mark up our appropriation on Monday.<sup>3</sup> If the figure agrees with the House markup we will know where we stand. The Program Review Committee on Tuesday will take a first look at funding for the fiscal year. A review already made by IOA/B of our expenditures finds that we are living beyond our means and will have to undertake a modest cutback.

The Agency is getting 10,000 square feet in Tempo R which will help to alleviate the IBS space problem.

*Mr. Shea* (IAE)—The President's press conference on Viet-Nam appears from the reaction in Europe to have bucked up our friends and toned down our critics.<sup>4</sup>

Adverse weekend reaction to the stories of U.S. Marines burning a Vietnamese village did not materialize in the depth anticipated.<sup>5</sup>

*Mr. Carter* (ITV)—Nuestro Barrio is now showing in 14 Latin American countries.<sup>6</sup> With only one exception, telecasts are in prime time.

Gideon's Trumpet is completed and information on screenings for the areas and media will be out this week.<sup>7</sup>

There is enough footage on Adlai Stevenson, originally shot for a 30-minute Report From America on the UN, to do an hour documentary on him as well.

*Mr. Montgomery* (IGC)—Stanley Plesent has been asked to report from Bangkok on the Teak negotiations and is expected back within 10 days.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> August 16.

<sup>4</sup> For text of Johnson's July 28 press conference, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1965*, Book II, pp. 794-803.

<sup>5</sup> See "Burning of Village Described," *New York Times*, August 4, 1965, p. 2; and Jack Langguth, "Marines Defend Burning of Village," *New York Times*, August 6, 1965, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to a Spanish-language television program produced by the United States Information Agency in 1965. See Robert E. Dallos, "U.S. Selling U.S. with Soap Opera," *New York Times*, March 29, 1967, p. 91.

<sup>7</sup> Television documentary produced by the U.S. Information Agency in 1965.

<sup>8</sup> Reference is to the Project TEAK negotiations that took place in Bangkok to improve broadcasting capabilities in Thailand. See *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs, Documents 63 and 344.

There is still some interest in the House Armed Services Committee in the possibility of TV for Viet-Nam. We have reported our views and offered to have our technical people discuss the matter on the Hill.

*Mr. McNichol* (IOS)—New security restrictions in the State Department building were responsible for the difficulty experienced by members of the Advisory Committee on International Book Programs in entering the building, as reported by Mr. Harris of ICS. ID cards are now needed for admission at any entrance. The 23rd street entrance is now open only during the 8–9 and 5–6 rush hours. All others are open during business hours.

*Mr. Stevens* (IMS)—At the Moscow Film Festival the films in competition were of relatively low caliber and lacked the interest of the out-of-competition offerings shown to the general public.<sup>9</sup> An estimated 600,000 saw such American films as *Lilies of the Field* and *Mary Poppins*.<sup>10</sup> In the short film competition, more small countries were represented this year, and the films of the Communist countries showed a noticeable shift from the anti-fascist theme of the past to anti-imperialism. The jury of 18, most of them eastern Europeans, showed an impressive open-mindedness. The loosening influence on a closed society of an event where 54 countries are represented is significant.

*Mr. Stephens* (IRS)—The picture for the Near East part of the World Survey is dark. Pakistan is out. We have cancelled the Egyptian portion after the contractor left the country. Ceylon may not allow a survey and prospects for Iran are questionable.

State is developing clearance procedures for overseas research projects under government auspices under terms of the recent Presidential directive.<sup>11</sup> All our research will be involved. The preliminary plan is for a research council to review all projects.

*Mr. Adamson* (IBS)—Indications are that the price is rising in the Teak negotiations.

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<sup>9</sup> The Moscow film festival ran from July 5 to July 7.

<sup>10</sup> “*Lilies of the Field*” was released in 1963 and “*Mary Poppins*” was released in 1964.

<sup>11</sup> Reference is to the President’s August 2 letter to Rusk in which he noted: “Many agencies of the Government are sponsoring social science research which focuses on foreign areas and people and thus relates to the foreign policy of the United States. Some of it involves residence and travel in foreign countries and communication with foreign nationals. As we have recently learned, it can raise problems affecting the conduct of our foreign policy.” As a result, Johnson required that all such research undergo Secretary of State review: “Therefore I am asking you to establish effective procedures which will enable you to assure the procedures which will enable you to assure the propriety of Government-sponsored social science research in the area of foreign policy.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 23, 1965, p. 323)

A three-part series on freedom of information has been completed for use to under-developed areas, and we are doing commentaries leading to the anniversary of the Alliance for Progress.

On the technical side we have reached a new operating agreement with BBC on charges for facility use, a 15-day reception survey in the USSR has been approved by Embassy Moscow, and the frequency meeting in Toronto has been concluded with the next one scheduled for London.

*Mr. Barnsley* (IAF)—Introduced Barry Zorthian, PAO Saigon, who is here for consultation.

We will close our libraries in Burma when the Ambassador<sup>12</sup> returns there. Books will be turned over to other libraries and some presented to the government if it appears they will be properly handled. There will be resultant reductions in both American and Burmese staff.

It is too early to assess the effects on our operation of Singapore's separation from Malaysia.

*Mr. Miller* (IAN)—Observed in India that newsmen were well informed on Viet-Nam and many were sympathetic to the U.S. Our willingness to talk peace, contrasted to the intransigence of the Communists, counts heavily in our favor. Most of those spoken to did not believe our policy was working and feared escalation into a major war with the Chinese. Current common misconceptions are that the Viet Cong control 90% of the country, most Vietnamese do not want the U.S. there, and that there is major opposition by Americans to United States policy.

There was discussion of visits by Indian and other journalists to Viet-Nam in which Mr. Zorthian noted the willingness of the Mission to program such visits. They are considered effective and should be encouraged although funds are not unlimited and the numbers involved work against the red carpet treatment.

*Mr. Weld* (IAA)—Favorable attitudes are appearing in Mali and will be worth watching. Peiping's interest in the country is reflected in reports of four films being dubbed in the Bambara language by Malian film technicians currently in China on visitor grants.

*Mr. Brown* (IAL)—An Act of Reconciliation which would establish a provisional government is to be presented to the contending Dominican factions by the OAS and represents a major effort toward solution of the crisis.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Reference is to U.S. Ambassador to Burma Henry Byroade.

<sup>13</sup> The Act of Reconciliation was an agreement to establish a provisional government in the Dominican Republic and was signed by the conflicting parties on August 31. See Paul Hofmann, "Dominican Rebels Sign O.A.S. Accord on Interim Regime," *New York Times*, September 1, 1965, p. 1; and *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, Document 128.

*Mr. Littell* (IAS)—Photo exhibits on Viet-Nam are showing in Warsaw, Sofia and Prague. Themes are U.S. aggression and atrocities, the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese, and world-wide reaction to U.S. aggression.

Warsaw has reported that last fiscal year the more than 4,000 film loans were seen by audiences totaling more than 400,000, a good record for eastern Europe.

*Mr. Brooke* (I/IG)—Inspections will begin this month with Oslo scheduled for August 18 and Guayaquil for August 23.

*Mr. Cannon* (IPS)—We answered a White House request last week with a quantity of the pamphlet, “Mr. President” for distribution to foreign visitors.

*Mr. Doster* (IPT)—Senior officer assignments:

Taylor Peck—Cultural Affairs Officer, Madrid

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#### 54. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Keogh) to the Director-Designate (Marks)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 12, 1965

##### SUBJECT

*Field Representatives in Vietnam*

A field representative gets involved with practically every aspect of formal communications, and a large number of decidedly informal types. A collective summary from four Field Representative reports (attached)<sup>2</sup> provides some typical activities:

1. He prepares posters, leaflets, pamphlets, movies, and tapes in connection with the Chieu Hoi program in the districts, designed to persuade the Viet Cong to abandon their warfare and return to peaceable ways under government control.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 26, Field—Far East (Vietnam), July–December 1965. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Not found attached.

2. He assists the government teams in coping with returnees at the Chieu Hoi centers, in re-educating and rehabilitating them, providing ideas and materials.

3. He provides leaflets for local PsyWar air-drops, and often is the man who pushes the bundles out of the plane. He prepares messages for air-borne loudspeaker missions.

4. He provides rice sacks printed with appropriate messages for repackaging food stores captured from the Viet Cong which will be distributed to the local citizenry.

5. He develops local newspapers and wall newspapers in Vietnamese and tribal languages, frequently preparing editorial copy and working with the printer to get them out.

6. He provides photos for local and Saigon newspapers.

7. He represents the Embassy at memorial services for U.S. and Vietnamese dead, both civilians and military. He gets involved in local problems for the care and schooling of orphaned children of killed Vietnamese soldiers, organizing fund collections for schools, food programs and the like.

8. He develops drama troupes who entertain in remote districts with politically themed plays and dances.

9. He helps train the Vietnamese military in civil action work around their bases.

10. He administers funds for local JUSPAO work.

11. He services and maintains bulletin boards in remote as well as central sites, and supplies the Vietnam Information Service in providing authentic news and comment which will contradict Viet Cong propaganda and rumors, providing tapes for sound truck use, organizing local distribution of low-cost radio sets for families in outlying districts, assisting in local radio programming.

12. He advises the VIS in publicity programs for summer work projects by students in the hamlets.

13. He assists local authorities in election procedures and publicity.

14. Assists the Vietnamese military in troop morale projects, providing camp libraries, publishing wall newspapers, providing projector boxes, films, etc., even using JUSPAO funds to purchase bed mats and mosquito nets for recruits who are ordinarily badly neglected.

15. Stimulates the military in such useful practices as collecting information documents on the battlefield and reproducing those letters, orders and what-not in newspapers and other media for the edification of the local populace.

16. He lectures to students and youth.

17. He stimulates the formation of village libraries and helps to stock them, to replenish and rebuild when the VC destroy them.



18. He ranges widely within his zone, travelling by air, river and road, often hitching rides on such unorthodox vehicles as ammunition plans and military helicopters. He must keep in touch not only with Vietnamese government officials, military and opinion leaders, but with hamlet leaders and heads of family groups, travelling roads which are laced with Viet Cong roadblocks, mines and tax collectors. In addition, he keeps in touch with U.S. military advisers and USOM representatives, coordinating his activities with theirs when useful and possible.

Bill Keogh<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**55. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Director of the United States Information Agency (Shea) to All United States Information Agency Public Affairs Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 27, 1965

Dear PAO:

In Bob's<sup>2</sup> absence in Europe I would like to let you know the latest thinking here on FY66 programming. The most important development is a decision from the highest authority to stress the quality of U.S. leadership at a time when the whole free world is evaluating our performance and presumably shaping its own course of action accordingly.

Secretary Rusk the other day said the time has come to tell the world more about the Great Society and the aims and accomplishments of the President's program.<sup>3</sup> It is vital that the philosophy and achievement of the Administration be understood. Mr. Marks agrees that this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306 DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 28, Policy and Plans—General—1965. Limited Official Use.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to USIA Assistant Director, Europe, Robert A. Lincoln.

<sup>3</sup> Rusk's statement has not been further identified. The "Great Society" refers to President Johnson's initiative of social programs articulated in his May 22, 1964, speech at the University of Michigan. For text of that speech, see *Public Papers: Johnson*, 1963–1964, Book I, pp. 704–707.

is a vital task, and the Agency will undertake a much-increased effort in this direction.

Everyone here, including the Director, recognized we have been giving considerable attention to the Great Society, key U.S. legislation, and the Administration's domestic and foreign programs in general. It is also appreciated that there is no money available for new programming. But the effort in this field must now be increased, reprogramming to do it when necessary.

The Agency operational priorities and media emphases will be revised to include the Great Society, and the media have been asked for a report on how they might increase their output on this subject. We will keep you informed of plans here as they develop.

Sincerely,

Donald T. Shea

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## 56. Editorial Note

The Senate confirmed the nomination of United States Information Agency (USIA) Director-Designate Leonard Marks on July 27, 1965, but he did not assume his duties until September 1, 1965. On August 31, Associate Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark administered the oath of office to Marks at a ceremony held in the Rose Garden at the White House. In his remarks made during the ceremony, President Lyndon B. Johnson thanked outgoing Director Carl Rowan for his service and welcomed Marks. In doing so, Johnson stressed: "Truth wears no uniform and bears no flag. But it is the most loyal ally that freedom knows. It is the mission, therefore, of the USIA to be always loyal and always faithful and always vigilant to the course of the truth.

"The USIA now has an opportunity, I think, without parallel in its entire history. The truth about America today, I believe, if you tell it, is stirring and exciting. This is a country that is succeeding. This is a country that is moving forward. This is a country that is confident of its course, a country more devoted than it has ever been to the cause of mankind everywhere.

"But truth about America is essentially the truth about freedom—and the story of freedom is the story we want to tell the world." (*Public Papers: Johnson*, 1965, Book II, pages 955–956)

The following day, John Chancellor, a prominent journalist with NBC News, joined Marks at the United States Information Agency

when he assumed the Directorship of the Voice of America. Over a month earlier, during a July 28, news conference, President Johnson stated that Chancellor “is a man whose voice and whose face and whose mind is known to this country and to most of the entire world.” According to Johnson, “Now, what America is, and was, and hopes to stand for as an important national asset, telling the truth to this world, telling an exciting story, is the Voice of America,” and with Chancellor, he was “satisfied that the Voice of America will be in imaginative, competent, reliable, and always truthful hands.” (Ibid., page 798)

In brief remarks Chancellor made on his first day as the Voice of America Director, he stated: “The news operation of the Voice of America, as I knew it as a listener abroad, and as I have come to know it in recent weeks, is a professional news operation of high quality. It functions well, and its standards of excellence are acknowledged abroad. That is as it should be. We do not serve the needs of an American audience; our competition is found in the products of other countries. Some of these are virtuous, some are not. There is, therefore, a particular responsibility placed upon the news department of the Voice: our product must be deadly accurate, and it must be as fast as yesterday’s rumor or today’s slander. Speed is essential to any healthy and vigorous news operation; but to us, recognizing as we do the political realities of our time, speed is vital, for we are deeply involved in these political realities, representing, as we do, the official voice of the Government we serve. If a commercial broadcaster makes a mistake, he can run a correction. If we stumble, America stumbles. It is fundamental to our performance that we acknowledge this responsibility. It places upon us a special burden of truth and accuracy. Our task is to make the policies of the Government of the United States clearly and explicitly understood around the world, with no chance for any misunderstandings. (Remarks made by John Chancellor on Assuming Directorship of the Voice of America, September 1, 1965; National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Files: 1962–1965, Entry UD WW 191, Box 13, IAE 1965, Broadcasting (IBS))

**57. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 1, 1965

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you are aware, the President and the National Security Council have given the Director of the U.S. Information Agency the overall responsibility for psychological operations in Viet-Nam.<sup>2</sup> In order to carry out this task as effectively as possible, I believe it is desirable to define areas of responsibility among the field agencies in Viet-Nam.

The division of labor between our respective field organizations has already been worked out in Viet-Nam by appropriate officials and has received the endorsement of the responsible representatives of our agencies in Washington. The purpose of this letter is to confirm these arrangements.

Responsibility for supervision of psychological operations in Viet-Nam has been delegated to the Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs, who functions under the overall authority of the Ambassador. By agreement of all agencies concerned, he supervises the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), which has incorporated all elements of USIS, the communications media personnel of the United States Operations Mission (AID) and a number of military officers.

JUSPAO is responsible for the coordination and direction of psychological operations by all American agencies in Viet-Nam, including both direct operations and the advisory function. It exercises this responsibility either through its own facilities or through technical supervision, direction, and support of the psychological operations element of the Political Warfare Directorate, Military Assistance Command in Viet-Nam (MACV).

JUSPAO's activities in Saigon include media support of U.S. and GVN psychological operations, advisory assistance to GVN media, policy planning and guidance and technical service support for both American and GVN agencies, and overall substantive direction of the conduct of the American contribution to psychological operations.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963-69, Bx 6-29 63-69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 26, Field—Far East (Viet Nam) July-December 1965. No classification marking. Drafted by Hays on August 27; cleared by Tull (IAF/VN) and in draft in DOD/ISA and DOD/SACSA. Moore sent the final draft to Marks under an August 26 covering memorandum indicating that the letter had the concurrence of the Interagency Psychological Operations Working Group. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 12, Document 37.

At the corps level, JUSPAO carries out its work through its field representative and through the military S–5 advisor on the corps senior advisor’s staff. A statement of the responsibilities of the JUSPAO field representatives has been approved by the U.S. Mission Council in Viet-Nam and is attached.<sup>3</sup> These representatives serve as the senior American psychological advisors to the corps commanders and province chiefs. They provide policy, planning, and guidance for U.S. psychological operations and advisory and technical assistance for GVN psychological operations. Working together with MACV and USOM advisors, they are members of an informal American team which coordinates the entire U.S. operational effort in the field.

A most significant operational level, where our personnel engaged in the overall psychological effort have their closest contact with the problems and the greatest opportunity to take action leading to their direct solution, is at the province (sector) headquarters. I do not believe that we should attempt to define rigid concepts for this echelon beyond the general statement of responsibility already issued by the U.S. Mission Council, for the needs differ from province to province and as the situation changes. I propose that we continue to allow these arrangements to be worked out on the ground between USIS and MACV under the general authority and responsibility granted to USIA and its principal representative in Viet-Nam, recognizing that the numbers of skilled personnel available for this task—whether they are from military or civilian manpower resources—are likely to fall short of requirements for some time to come. Assignments to these duties will depend on need, priorities, and availability.

If you concur, I would suggest that we agree to inform appropriate officials in our respective agencies that this letter constitutes a confirming memorandum of understanding between us.

Sincerely yours,

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> Not found attached, but presumably a reference to Document 54. Regarding the U.S. Mission Council, see footnote 9, Document 37.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**58. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1965

**PARTICIPANTS**

Douglass Cater, White House  
Charles Frankel

Mr. Cater called Dr. Frankel, said he had been trying to get the President to give a speech on the subject of Dr. Frankel's memorandum re Task Force in Education and to kick this off with what could be a broad outline of the program as touched on by Dr. Frankel.<sup>2</sup> He asked Dr. Frankel to take on the job of drafting such an outline, which Dr. Frankel agreed to do.

Mr. Cater mentioned that the President was speaking to the Smithsonian Institution gathering on September 18, at the large international Bicentennial Celebration.<sup>3</sup> He thought that would be a good occasion for such a speech, in the presence of so many scholars from all over the world. Dr. Frankel also mentioned a Princeton speech as a good possibility.

Mr. Cater said he thought the Smithsonian seemed even more appropriate an occasion since he could tell all these foreign scholars that the President has given education the highest priority at home; it doesn't stop at the water's edge; that he wants to set up a special White House Task Force to bring all of us together, etc. Mr. Cater thought this could be an important speech and could set the guide lines that will permit Dr. Frankel to operate in a way useful to him in the future. Dr. Frankel asked how much he would want in the speech as to the announcement of a new doctrine; Cater mentioned it was hard for a President to announce a new Johnson doctrine, it should be written so that the press will say he announced a clear new initiative. Cater asked if he could have about 3000 words over the weekend which they could discuss on Monday at lunch.<sup>4</sup> Said he had a call in to Smithsonian to get that institution involved in this too; suggested that Dr. Frankel

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1966-1967, Lot 70D190, Entry UD UP 176, Box 14, International Education Program: President's Task Force General. No classification marking. Drafted by "LL," who is not further identified. A copy was sent to Ackerman.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Johnson's September 16 "Remarks at the Smithsonian Bicentennial Celebration." See Document 60.

<sup>4</sup> September 13. No record of this meeting was found.

might weave in some quotes as to why international education is an important thing.

Dr. Frankel mentioned two books that could be quoted from: Alfred North Whitehead, “The Aims of Education,”<sup>5</sup> and Julian Benda, “The Treason of the Clerks.”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the American educator, scholar, and writer. *The Aims of Education* was published in 1929.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the French philosopher and writer, whose first name is also spelled “Julien.” *The Treason of the Clerks* was published in 1927.

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## 59. Statement Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 11, 1965

### *USIA AND CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE*

#### *The Laws*

USIA has two mandates from the Congress: Public Law 87–256 of September 21, 1961 (the Fulbright-Hays Act) and Public Law 402 of January 27, 1948 (the Smith-Mundt Act).

Under the Fulbright-Hays Act (and Executive Order 10034<sup>2</sup> implementing it), USIA does two things: (1) it conducts the overseas cultural and educational programs of the Department of State (CU): exchange of students, leaders and specialists, Fulbright scholars and teachers; (2) it conducts its own cultural and educational programs: libraries, book programs, binational centers, English teaching, American studies, music programs, trade fairs and East-West exhibitions. (Most of these

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 24, Advisory Groups—U.S. Educational and Cultural Programs, 1965. No classification marking. Drafted by Anderson, who sent it to Marks under a September 13 covering memorandum indicating that Marks had requested the statement in advance of his September 13 lunch with Frankel. (Ibid.) Anderson also sent a copy of a statement, with the same title, prepared by Echols, under the September 13 covering memorandum. In a September 23 memorandum to Marks, Lewis indicated that he wanted to add “two supporting points” to Anderson’s September 13 memorandum. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> The actual Executive Order is 11034. For the full text of the Executive Order, see 27 *Federal Register* 6071, June 28, 1962.

cultural programs were authorized under the Smith-Mundt Act; the Fulbright-Hays legislation superseded it.)

The largest part of USIA's job is described in the Smith-Mundt Act as "disseminating information about the United States." This includes cultural and educational information as well as direct foreign policy information. Thus all USIA media are engaged in "cultural-information" programs.

When USIA was created in 1953, the dissemination of information, including cultural media, was separated from the educational exchange program in Washington. One result, however, was that the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU), which kept the exchange of persons, became known as a "cultural program" involving *persons* while USIA, which continued to operate all of the cultural programs which involved *things* (books, English lessons, musical recordings, etc.) and the information programs about cultural and educational institutions in the U.S., became known as an "information" program.

Overseas, no such confusion regarding division of labor exists. The Public Affairs Officer is responsible for all of these programs.

### *The Philosophies*

There are two schools of thought. One would describe cultural and educational exchange programs as "culture for culture's sake"<sup>3</sup> which would, at best, result in "mutual understanding." The other would describe USIA as a "propaganda" program which, by manipulating the facts about the U.S. and its foreign affairs, tries to gain acceptance for U.S. policies.

Though these two extreme views constantly plague USIA and CU, there is a middle ground which is achieved by meshing the two stated philosophies of the Fulbright-Hays and Smith-Mundt legislation.

CU officers, and to a lesser extent USIA officers who deal with cultural and educational exchange, are guided by the wording of the preamble to the Fulbright-Hays Act:

"... to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange; to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement;

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<sup>3</sup> Charles Frankel says "Educational and cultural relations are important in the end, because they are educational and cultural relations." [Footnote is in the original.]



and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and other countries of the world.”

USIA officers are guided by the Smith-Mundt Act which calls for: “an information service to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people, and policies promulgated by the Congress, the President, the Secretary of State and other responsible officials of Government having to do with matters affecting foreign affairs . . .” and more recently a Presidential statement which says: “The mission of the United States Information Agency is to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in other nations. . . by overt use of various techniques of communication.”<sup>4</sup>

As applied to operations, the first of these two philosophies results in CU programs that relate far less to immediate political objectives than to a long-range goal of achieving “mutual understanding.” For example, selecting U.S. students for political sophistication as well as academic excellence, though felt to be of importance by one politically sensitive arm of CU, is questioned by the CU Advisory Committee and the Board of Foreign Scholarships. Generally however, CU does apply some political criteria, especially to its American Specialist and its Foreign Leader programs.

USIA is not satisfied that this is done to a sufficient degree. The Agency applies political criteria rigorously to its cultural and educational programs. For example, English teaching is used to reach foreign leaders or to deliver a cultural and informational message to students. Our mandate is to present “those aspects of American life and culture which facilitate sympathetic understanding of American policies.”

USIA often applies these political criteria to the CU programs which it administers overseas and in its advisory capacity to CU in Washington. CU feels that this is an intrusion into its own affairs and a violation of the Fulbright-Hays philosophy.

### *The Problems*

Many important groups, including Education and World Affairs, the Brookings Institution, the Board of Foreign Scholarships, the State Department Advisory Commission on Educational and Cultural

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<sup>4</sup> The statement is from a January 25, 1963, memorandum from President Kennedy to Murrow in which the President articulates the USIA mission. See *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 144; and *Foreign Relations*, 1917–1972, vol. VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963, Document 109.

Affairs, and individuals including Walter Johnson,<sup>5</sup> HEW Secretary John Gardner, Senator Fulbright, and Mr. Frankel, the present Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, have joined CU in their disapproval of the Agency's handling of its own and CU's cultural and educational programs.

Among the elements of the problem, as they see it, are these:

—Cultural officers in the field are under constant pressure to apply political criteria to the exchange program, which the Fulbright-Hays Act defines as essentially non-political.

—The Agency places first priority on direct policy statements and their interpretations via the fast media. Thus USIA's own cultural media are not as well-financed as its fast media, and receive less top level attention.

—USIA assigns its weaker officers to cultural affairs assignments.

—USIA cultural media are eliminated first when budget cuts come: libraries, English teaching, binational centers, American studies, music, lectures, etc. are the first, not the last, to go.

—Top personnel in USIA have been chosen predominantly with information rather than cultural backgrounds. Only one-third of the PAO's have had experience as Cultural Officers. No present Area or Media Director has served as a CAO. Only one of the top six officers above them has ever served as a CAO.

In sum, these people feel that USIA is not a hospitable base from which to conduct cultural programs.

Most of these people agree with one or the other of Mr. Frankel's proposed solutions: (1) A semi-autonomous foundation which would conduct all U.S. government cultural and educational programs, or (2) the upgrading of CU in the State Department accompanied by the absorption of USIA cultural programs and the CAO's. Then, they feel, cultural and educational exchange could achieve excellence free from the taint of propaganda and from the press of immediate foreign policy and political considerations.

I believe:

—PAO's and CAO's conduct the CU exchange programs in keeping with guidelines set by the Ambassador and in accordance with CU instructions, bearing in mind political objectives.

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<sup>5</sup> Professor of History at the University of Chicago; member of the CU Advisory Commission and the BFS; author of recent report on American studies overseas; as highly regarded as Frankel or Gardner in international educational circles. [Footnote is in the original.]

—Cultural content, though important, is relatively less so than the dissemination of information which will achieve U.S. political objectives.

—Personnel assignments to ICS and CU are being upgraded. A number of top USIA officers are now assigned to CU. USIA regrets the loss of the Deputy Assistant Secretary position.

—USIA has been required to cut back in Europe across the board, and cultural programs have suffered.

In sum, I think that U.S. government cultural programs should *not* be separate from U.S. government informational-political programs. They are mutually supporting and should continue to be so.

### *The Future*

As we discussed in the corridor on Friday,<sup>6</sup> Frankel's political orientation under Harry McPherson does not seem to have been total.

On the exchange program specifically, we are under several pressures. The Emphasis on Youth Program could accommodate the entire budget, so could the Labor Leader Program, so could the Journalist Program, vis-à-vis Viet-Nam.

I think you will find that Mr. Frankel will continue with his culture for culture's sake approach, his expressed desire (soon to be published in his book called *The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs*)<sup>7</sup> to divorce culture from politics and all government agencies, and possibly the idea of making cultural affairs much more important in the Department of State than what attaches to an Assistant Secretary equated with area Assistant Secretaries.

If we had unlimited funds, we could presumably accommodate all these competing interests. As it is, I think we have to look at the national interest and program accordingly.

You spoke of getting something in writing from Mr. Frankel. I am not sure that it would be either possible or desirable at this point. What we need, I think, is a commitment from him that from within the limited budget of CU we take care of specific priorities which are essentially political in nature: youth, labor, government, journalism.

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<sup>6</sup> September 10.

<sup>7</sup> *The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1966).

While he may agree to this over lunch, I think we are going to have a running battle because his philosophy is fundamentally different from ours.

**Burnett Anderson**<sup>8</sup>  
*Deputy Director*  
*(Policy and Plans)*

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<sup>8</sup> Anderson initialed "BA" above this typed signature.

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## 60. Remarks by President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 16, 1965

*Mr. Chief Justice,<sup>2</sup> Secretary Ripley, Dr. Carmichael, Bishop Moore, Reverend Campbell, ladies and gentlemen, distinguished scholars from 80 nations:*

Amid this pomp and pageantry we have gathered to celebrate a man about whom we know very little but to whom we owe very much. James Smithson was a scientist who achieved no great distinction. He was an Englishman who never visited the United States. He never even expressed a desire to do so.

But this man became our Nation's first great benefactor. He gave his entire fortune to establish this Institution which would serve "for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men."

He had a vision which lifted him ahead of his time—or at least of some politicians of his time. One illustrious United States Senator argued that it was beneath the dignity of the country to accept such gifts from foreigners. Congress debated 8 long years before deciding to receive Smithson's bequest.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: *Public Papers: Johnson, 1965*, Book II, pp. 1003–1006. The President delivered his remarks at the Smithsonian Institution at ceremonies marking the beginning of the bicentennial of Smithson's birth.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Earl Warren.

<sup>3</sup> The Smithsonian Institution was established by Congress in 1846.

### James Smithson's Legacy

Yet James Smithson's life and legacy brought meaning to three ideas more powerful than anyone at that time ever dreamed.

The first idea was that learning respects no geographic boundaries. The Institution bearing his name became the first agency in the United States to promote scientific and scholarly exchange with all the nations of the world.

The second idea was that partnership between Government and private enterprise can serve the greater good of both. The Smithsonian Institution started a new kind of venture in this country, chartered by act of Congress, maintained by both public funds and private contributions. It inspired a relationship which has grown and flowered in a thousand different ways.

Finally, the Institution financed by Smithson breathed life in the idea that the growth and the spread of learning must be the first work of a nation that seeks to be free.

These ideas have not always gained easy acceptance among those employed in my line of work. The Government official must cope with the daily disorder that he finds in the world around him.

But today, the official, the scholar, and the scientist cannot settle for limited objectives. We must pursue knowledge no matter what the consequences. We must value the tried less than the true.

To split the atom, to launch the rocket, to explore the innermost mysteries and the outermost reaches of the universe—these are your God-given chores. And even when you risk bringing fresh disorder to the politics of men and nations, these explorations still must go on.

### Ideas, Not Armaments

The men who founded our country were passionate believers in the revolutionary power of ideas.

They knew that once a nation commits itself to the increase and diffusion of knowledge, the real revolution begins. It can never be stopped.

In my own life, I have had cause again and again to bless the chance events which started me as a teacher. In our country and in our time we have recognized, with new passion, that learning is basic to our hopes for America. It is the taproot which gives sustaining life to all of our purposes. And whatever we seek to do to wage the war on poverty or to set new goals for health and happiness, to curb crime or try to bring beauty to our cities and our countryside—all of these, and more, depend on education.

But the legacy we inherit from James Smithson cannot be limited to these shores. He called for the increase and diffusion of knowledge

among men, not just Americans, not just Anglo-Saxons, and not just the citizens of the Western World—but all men everywhere.

The world we face on his bicentennial anniversary makes that mandate much more urgent than it ever was. For we know today that certain truths are self-evident in every nation on this earth; that ideas, not armaments, will shape our lasting prospects for peace; that the conduct of our foreign policy will advance no faster than the curriculum of our classrooms; that the knowledge of our citizens is the one treasure which grows only when it is shared.

It would profit us little to limit the world's exchange to those who can afford it. We must extend the treasure to those lands where learning is still a luxury for the few.

Today, more than 700 million adults—4 out of 10 of the world's population—dwell in darkness where they cannot read or write. Almost half the nations of this globe suffer from illiteracy among half or more of their people. And unless the world can find a way to extend the light, the force of that darkness may ultimately engulf us all.

### A New Beginning

For our part, this Government and this Nation are prepared to join in finding the way. During recent years we have made many hopeful beginnings. But we can and we must do more. That is why I have directed a special task force within my administration to recommend a broad and long-range plan of worldwide educational endeavor.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk has accepted my request to chair this task force. Secretary John Gardner of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has agreed to serve on it. Both these men have proved, in their past careers, how great is their devotion to international education.

I intend to call on leaders in both public and private enterprise to join with us in mapping this effort.

We must move ahead on every front and at every level of learning. We can support Secretary Ripley's dream of creating a center here at the Smithsonian where great scholars from every nation will come and collaborate. At a more junior level, we can promote the growth of the school-to-school program started under Peace Corps auspices so that our children may learn about—and care about—each other.

### An International Effort

We mean to show that this Nation's dream of a Great Society does not stop at the water's edge: and that it is not just an American dream. All are welcome to share in it. All are invited to contribute to it.

Together we must embark on a new and a noble adventure:

First, to assist the education efforts of the developing nations and the developing regions.

Second, to help our schools and universities increase their knowledge of the world and the people who inhabit it.

Third, to advance the exchange of students and teachers who travel and work outside their native lands.

Fourth, to increase the free flow of books and ideas and art, of works of science and imagination.

And, fifth, to assemble meetings of men and women from every discipline and every culture to ponder the common problems of mankind.

In all these endeavors, I pledge that the United States will play its full role.

By January, I intend to present such a program to the Congress.

Despite the noise of daily events, history is made by men and the ideas of men. We—and only we—can generate growing light in our universe, or we can allow the darkness to gather.

De Tocqueville challenged us more than a century ago: “Men cannot remain strangers to each other, or be ignorant of what is taking place in any corner of the globe.”<sup>4</sup> We must banish the strangeness and the ignorance.

In all we do toward one another, we must try—and try again—to live the words of the prophet: “I shall light a candle of understanding in thine heart which shall not be put out.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the 19th century French political thinker and author. The quotation is from his book *Democracy in America*.

<sup>5</sup> The quotation is from the *Apocrypha* of the Bible.

**61. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the Staff of the United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 28, 1965

As of today, I am combining the Agency's Motion Picture Service and Television Service into one audio-visual media service.

I am convinced that the Agency will provide a greater service to its objectives, with significant economies and efficiencies, through a merger of its audio-visual resources.

This new combined service will be under the direction of Mr. George Stevens, former director of the Motion Picture Service. Mr. Alan Carter, former head of the Television Service and a career foreign service officer of the Agency, is needed in a new position which will be announced in the near future.

There are certain precepts of management and organization that must accompany this merger, and I stress them here for the guidance of all concerned:

First, the merger of these two activities must take advantage of the similarities in objectives and facilities that the two services possess. I expect from this combined organization a significant reduction in costs and positions.

Second, the merger of these two activities must recognize the differences and the unique capabilities of the two media to meet the Agency's objectives. I expect nothing in this combined organization to hamper the effectiveness of either outlet.

Third, the merger of the two activities must respond to the basic requirements of the Agency world-wide, the Area in general, and the individual post in particular. I expect from this combined organization a responsive service in every meaning of the word.

I am establishing an *ad hoc* Committee to recommend to me and to Mr. Stevens within thirty days the details of how most effectively to set up the new organization.

To this Committee, I designate the following:

Mr. Howard L. Chernoff, Executive Assistant (Chairman)  
Mr. Burnett Anderson, Deputy Director (Policy and Plans)  
Mr. Ben Posner, Assistant Director (Administration)  
Mr. William Miller, Assistant Director (Near East and South Asia)  
Mr. George Stevens, Jr., Director, Motion Picture Service

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1069, Box 11, Leonard H. Marks, Directives, 1964–1966. No classification marking.



Mr. Alan Carter, Director, Television Service  
Mr. Lionel Mosley, Director of Personnel

To prepare the procedures and alternatives for consideration by the Committee, I am establishing a Special Task Force. It will be the duty of this group under the guidance of the Committee to work out all the details of the consolidation—including the definition of functions and sub-functions, the detailing of organizational relationships, the developing of position patterns and staffing, and the presentation of budget procedures and financing. Members of this task force will be:

Mr. John S. Barker, Planning Officer, IOA/B (Chairman)  
Mr. Richard Ballard, Chief, Media Branch, IOA/B  
Mr. Walter Jones, Media Services Analyst, IOA/M  
Mr. Robert Pitcher, Media Personnel Officer, IPT  
Mr. John Wheeler, Executive Officer, IMS  
Mr. Russell Cox, Executive Officer, ITV

Pending final recommendations of the Committee, which I expect within thirty days, the Motion Picture Service and the Television Service will continue to operate as at present. I appreciate that this step will involve some disruptions during the transition period. I will make every effort to assure a smooth transition in operations and staffing, with full consideration of the people involved. I know that all concerned will cooperate fully to maintain and improve the quality and effectiveness of this vital aspect of our work.<sup>2</sup>

**Leonard H. Marks**

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<sup>2</sup> On September 29, the United States Information Agency issued a press release announcing the merger of its motion picture and television services. According to the release, Marks “was convinced the merger would create significant economies, increase efficiency and improve output.” (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files: 1953–2000, Entry A1–1066, Box 153, Motion Pictures 1965)

**62. Memorandum From the Deputy Director, Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Anderson) to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 30, 1965

SUBJECT

Leading Cultural Figures as Cultural Officers

For many years the Agency has hired top cultural figures for selected cultural attaché and Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO) positions. Currently we have such people in London (Cleanth Brooks),<sup>2</sup> Paris (Prof. Lawrence Wylie),<sup>3</sup> Delhi (Robert R.R. Brooks),<sup>4</sup> and Tokyo (Charles B. Fahs).<sup>5</sup> Several career CAOs are also well-known authors or cultural figures: John Brown in Mexico and John T. Reid in Buenos Aires.

Last year we agreed to increase our efforts to obtain such people (see attached letter to Mr. McPherson).<sup>6</sup>

While we are eager to take as many top cultural and educational figures as we have places for, there are several problems:

1. Most such people are not willing or able to take a two-year assignment.
2. Our salaries, even at the FSR-1 and 2 levels, are not equal to theirs.
3. Except for a few language and area specialists, most such people do not have a working command of a foreign language.
4. It is an expensive process for us—(a) they command a high salary, and (b) we must really create a new position for them, since someone else is necessary to administer the complex of cultural programs.

Bob Lincoln reports, "When you bring in for two years a professor or scholar as CAO, you've got to back him up with a rugged staff that can handle all of the normal bureaucratic stuff from CU and elsewhere.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963-69, Bx 6-29 63-69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 28, Policy and Plans—General—1965. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Cleanth Brooks, American literary critic and professor at Yale University.

<sup>3</sup> Laurence Wylie, American anthropologist and professor at Harvard University.

<sup>4</sup> Robert R.R. Brooks, American economist, and dean and professor at Williams College.

<sup>5</sup> Charles B. Fahs, American political scientist, Director of the Rockefeller Foundation, and Director of International Studies, Miami University.

<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed is a January 13 letter from Wilson to McPherson.

You cannot expect your scholar to do it—you don't want him to. Thus, you really have to add a new position to your ceiling at that post."

Our feeling is that the results which the Secretary desires can be effected best through the American Specialist program, sending such people for a year as a "scholar-in-residence" and attaching them to a university or a binational or cultural center.

The following people are the kind of top cultural figures who might be able to do the job either as a cultural attaché or as a "scholar-in-residence"; they must be checked for suitability and personality as well as security before the Agency endorses them.

*John H. Updike*, short story writer and novelist

*John Cheever*, short story writer

*William Snodgrass*, Pulitzer prize poet; Professor of English, University of Buffalo

*Langston Hughes*, poet, essayist and short story writer

*Saul Bellow*, novelist

*Lionel Trilling*, literary critic; Professor of English at Columbia University

*Bell Wiley*, Professor of History, Emory University, Atlanta

*Philip Roth*, author, writer-in-residence, Princeton 1962–63

*Ralph Ellison*, author of "The Invisible Man"; writer-in-residence, Rutgers

*Wallace Stegner*, Professor of English and Director of Writer's Workshop, Stanford

*Wilbur Schramm*, Director, Institute of Communications Research, Stanford

*Lewis Leary*, Professor of English, Columbia U.

*Paul (Hamilton) Engle*, Director of Writer's Workshop, University of Iowa

Area Assistant Directors have suggested the following posts and names:

*IAF: Tokyo and Manila*

*George E. Taylor*, Professor of Far Eastern Affairs, U. of Washington, Specializes on the Philippines

*IAN: Athens, Cairo, Delhi, Tel Aviv*

*John Badeau*, ex-Ambassador to UAR, Professor of Religion and Philosophy, American University

*Morroe Berger*, Professor of Near Eastern Affairs (UAR), Princeton

*Manfred Halperin*, Professor of Near Eastern Affairs, Princeton

*George Lenczowski*, Professor of Near Eastern Affairs (Iran), U. of California (Berkeley)

*IAL: Rio de Janeiro* (Further suggestions to come)

*Dr. Charles Wagley*, Brazilian expert, Professor of Latin American Affairs, Columbia University

*Dr. Fred P. Ellison*, Professor of Latin American Studies, U. of Texas, Brazilian expert

*IAE: London, Rome, Paris, Bonn, Madrid*

*Robert Penn Warren, author*

*Robert Newmann, Professor of International Relations (Atlantic Affairs), UCLA*

*Eugene Rostow, Dean of Yale Law School (retiring)*

*Daniel Boorstin, Professor of History, U. of Chicago*

*IAA: Lagos, Tunis, Yaounde, Dakar*

*David E. Apter, African Affairs, University of California (Berkeley)*

*Vernon McKay, formerly with State; Professor of African Studies, Johns Hopkins*

*Robert Rotberg, Professor of History, Harvard*

I also attach a draft letter designed for educational organizations and foundations in the effort to have them help recruit.<sup>7</sup>

**Burnett Anderson<sup>8</sup>**

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<sup>7</sup> Attached but not printed is a September 30 draft letter from Marks.

<sup>8</sup> Anderson signed "Burnett" above this typed signature.

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### **63. Message From the United States Information Agency to All United States Information Service Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Infoguide No. 66-2

Washington, October 6, 1965

*INFOGUIDE: The Great Society<sup>2</sup>*

#### *SITUATION*

USIA-State CA-868<sup>3</sup> of October 5, 1965 discusses the Great Society as a program reflecting the Administration's and the President's commitment to the most ambitious domestic goals ever established by this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963-69, Bx 6-29 63-69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 27, Government Agencies—White House 1965. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Oleksiw and Pauker on October 4; cleared by Dillon; approved by Anderson. Pauker initialed for himself and Oleksiw; Ryan initialed for Anderson. Sent via pouch.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 55.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

nation. It urges posts to make the Great Society meaningful to foreign audience groups because an understanding of the Great Society is fundamental to an understanding of the U.S. of today and of the future.

Significant legislation passed during this Session of Congress will enable many of the Great Society's goals to become realities. Following is a list of the most important legislation bearing upon those goals:

*88th Congress (adjourned Oct. 3, 1964):*

- Poverty Program: Omnibus Bill
- Food Stamp Program
- National Defense Educational Act, Impacted Areas
- Civil Rights Act
- Library Services Act
- Indigent Legal Aid
- National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress
- National Council on the Arts
- National Wilderness Preservation System
- Urban Mass Transportation Act
- Land and Water Conservation Fund
- Park Lands Legislation (Ozark National Riverways, Fire Island National Seashore, Canyonlands National Park)
- Highway Trust Fund
- Water Resources Research

*89th Congress (As of October 3, 1965)*

- Medicare
- Appalachia Assistance
- Regional Development
- Aid to Elementary & Secondary Education
- Omnibus Housing Act
- Voting Rights Act
- Public Works and Economic Development Act
- Creation of Department of Housing and Urban Affairs
- State Technical Services Act
- Assateague Island Seashore National Park Bill
- Creation of Arts and Humanities Foundation
- Immigration Act

#### *TREATMENT*

(1) We want to use the aspirations and the accomplishments of the Great Society as a means to show important audiences that (a) the United States, President Johnson, and his Administration are committed to a great and attainable program to improve the quality of American life, and (b) this program has meaning to foreign peoples.

(2) We want to demonstrate that, even while deeply committed to the defense of free nations and free institutions in many parts of the world, the U.S. is equally committed to the preservation and the devel-

opment of the basic American institutions which provide this nation with the strength and vigor required to meet its foreign commitments.

(3) We want the Great Society to illustrate what “government of the people, by the people, and for the people”<sup>4</sup> means—how progress toward national goals engages the effort of many individuals acting through a wide variety of voluntary, nongovernmental and civic groups, and how the system of free choice encourages and responds to the concern and initiative of its citizens.

(4) Recognizing that every people has its own ideals of excellence, we want to suggest American readiness to learn from the experience of other peoples in progressing toward peaceful goals, and to share the evolving American experience of the Great Society where it is applicable.

(5) We want to convince people that a nation so committed to the Great Society could not strive less energetically for peace or refrain more steadfastly from aggression or aspirations for territorial gain or political domination.

(6) We want to demonstrate that a nation which can afford the Great Society must be a strong and reliable friend and ally and, if necessary, a determined adversary.

#### *Cautions*

(1) Never suggest that the United States promises to bring the fruits of the Great Society to all people, everywhere, lest the Great Society be interpreted as some sort of vast foreign aid project.

(2) Use extreme care in projecting “the American standard of living” as requiring improvement, for that standard already is considered beyond the hopes and expectations of numerous peoples especially in the developing areas.

[Omitted here are background information and a list of supporting USIA materials.]

#### **Marks**

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<sup>4</sup> The quotation is from President Lincoln’s November 19, 1863, “Gettysburg Address.”

**64. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the President's Special Assistant (Califano)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 14, 1965

SUBJECT

Proposed legislation to permit dissemination of USIA films domestically

The basic authority of USIA (Public Law 402 of 1948) requires the Agency "to disseminate *abroad* information about the United States, its people and policies." While there is no specific statutory provision prohibiting the Agency from making its material available to American audiences, Congressional intent is clear in that respect and leaves no room for doubt.

Various educational groups, Congressmen, and other special interests are continually pressuring the Agency for release of materials usually for only limited distribution. Oftentimes these requests may legitimately be granted, eg., where the target audience is a special foreign group within the United States. In any event, refusal of such requests frequently has adverse repercussions almost as serious as those which might result from unauthorized release.

In short, this whole matter of domestic distribution is a very real problem and one which requires constant vigilance in order to keep us out of trouble. The only apparent solution is clarifying legislation.

On September 23, 1965, Congress adopted a joint resolution (S. J. Res. 106) to allow the showing in the United States of the USIA film "John F. Kennedy—Years of Lightning, Day of Drums"<sup>2</sup> by transferring six master copies of this film to the trustees of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts upon the payment of \$122,000 which would reimburse USIA for expenses in producing the film. The Kennedy Center was given exclusive rights to distribute this film through commercial and educational media for viewing within the United States. This report referred to the previous Congressional statements that USIA-produced films should not "be made available for public showing in this country except pursuant to a specific legislative authorization."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 24, Congressional Relations—General Counsel 1965. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Produced by USIA and released in 1964. See footnote 4, Document 30.

*A. Arguments in support of proposed recommended legislation:*

Briefly, experience has demonstrated that some of the films made by USIA have great educational value for U.S. audiences and do not fall into the category of "domestic propaganda." If these films were made available to domestic groups, the following advantages would result:

1. It would increase the knowledge of the U.S. public about foreign policy. This is important for several reasons. Because of the nature of our society, the people of the U.S. have more direct influence on foreign policy than the people of any other country in the world. Further, we have four million tourists going abroad annually and it would be useful if they were better informed on foreign affairs.

2. Use of selected USIA films in the schools would serve as a valuable educational tool in the field of foreign affairs, which is still not adequately covered, generally speaking, in current curricula.

3. Showing of USIA films would give the U.S. taxpayer some knowledge of what we are doing with his dollar. This may lead to greater interest in USIA as a whole, and with it increased general knowledge and understanding of what we do. If our case is good, it may thus also lead to greater public support for USIA.

4. The distribution of USIA films throughout the U.S. would result in a greater return from the investment made, without any substantial additional expenses. This distribution will require merely additional prints, cost of which would be nominal compared to the initial cost of producing the film.

*B. Arguments against recommended legislation:*

1. A substantial element in the U.S. press has in the past opposed the showing of USIA films at home. For example, Russ Wiggins<sup>3</sup> of the *Washington Post* has consistently opposed this distribution on emotional rather than philosophic arguments. However, it is possible that prior consultation may reduce or eliminate this opposition.

2. USIA would expose itself to another hundred million critics. Perhaps more importantly, our producers—and particularly our contractors—may have their judgment influenced by the knowledge that they are producing for a domestic audience instead of an exclusive foreign audience.

3. USIA films publicly shown could and probably would become the subject of partisan political arguments. Particularly those looking

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<sup>3</sup> Editor and executive vice president of the *Washington Post* until 1968, when he became U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.



for issues will find support or opposition for one party or another (or a particular foreign position) in our films, or at least be able to allege it.

4. A program to show films domestically would create a complexity of problems, distribution, financing, pricing for and selection of commercial distributors and TV stations and networks, etc., which would require many man hours of work and repeated sensitive policy decisions.

5. Critics of the Administration could use any move to show our films domestically as one more basis for the charge of “news management.” As you know, there is already a widespread suspicion that this Administration is bending USIA to partisan purposes in its overseas output.

#### *CONCLUSIONS:*

After considerable reflection, I would recommend the following:

1. It would not be desirable to have all films or other media products of the USIA distributed domestically.

2. Some films contain information and additional material which could be shown to the American public. Specifically, products such as the Kennedy film, documentaries on the visit of foreign dignitaries and feature films such as “Night of the Dragon”<sup>4</sup> on the issue of Vietnam could provide material of substance and value, without provoking controversy.

In the past, Congress has recognized that certain films should be shown to the American public and has authorized specific legislation for this purpose. However, it is obviously cumbersome to require a joint resolution of the House and Senate each time that a film is produced of this nature.

Therefore, I would recommend the creation of a joint committee of the House and Senate which would review USIA films and determine which should be made available for domestic distribution, and through what channels the films would be distributed and exhibited. This committee should be bi-partisan with an equal number of Republicans and Democrats. To remove any question of political partisanship, I would suggest the resolution provide that no film should be released unless two-thirds of the committee approve.

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>4</sup> Produced by USIA and released in 1966.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**65. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel) to Lionel Trilling<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

Dear Lionel:

I am very happy indeed that you will be able to attend our meeting in Washington on November 2.<sup>2</sup>

I hope you will come to my office a little before noon on that day. We will have lunch here in the State Department and then come back to my office for conversation. The meeting will end at 4 p.m.

My office is Room 6218. I would recommend that you enter the building at the C Street entrance.

The central purpose of our conversation will be to explore ways and means of finding or developing cultural representatives who can represent us with distinction in our embassies abroad. I hope the conversation will provide us with the beginning of a list of the names of people who, over the course of the next two or three years, may be available for such positions. We are, of course, interested in finding distinguished people in private life—in the universities, in literature, the arts or the foundations—and not only in combing the list of people currently in Government service. I hope that our conversation will also help to clarify the nature and conditions of the job of cultural representative and indicate the ways in which it can be made attractive to men of high accomplishment.

At present, we are concentrating on finding men for our larger and most important posts—for example, London, Paris, Rome, Bonn, New Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, etc. In certain of these posts, we now have satisfactory people, but, of course, we cannot count on being able to replace them adequately unless we make careful plans well in advance.

You are probably well enough acquainted with our embassies abroad to know something about the way in which the job of the Cultural Attaché is at present defined, but we shall provide you with detailed information at the time we meet. In thinking about this subject, however, I hope you will not restrict yourself to thinking in terms of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1965–1966, Lot 69D260, Entry UD UP 175, Box 19, 1965 T–U–V. No classification marking. Drafted by Frankel on October 20.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.

what now exists, but will draw up your own description of the position as you think it should be.

I am enclosing a list of the people who are expected to attend the meeting.<sup>3</sup>

Miss Mary Tsouvalas, in my office, will be in touch with you shortly about travel arrangements. We shall, of course, cover your travel expenses. If you want any further information, do not hesitate to call her (DU 3-2933) or call me directly (DU 3-5235).

I am particularly pleased that you have agreed to come since it suggests that you share my sense of concern about this problem. But I am also pleased because it will give me the chance to see you again. I will feel a little as though I am playing hooky.

Sincerely,

**Charles Frankel<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed. According to the list, those expected to participate included: Gordon Craig, Professor of History at Stanford University; H. Field Haviland, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute; August Heckscher, Director of the Twentieth Century Fund; Leonard Marks; Joseph Mazzeo, Professor of Comparative Literature at Columbia University; George E. Taylor, Director of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington; Lionel Trilling; Robert E. Ward, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan; Harold E. Howland; and David L. Osborn.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**66. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Fascell)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 1, 1965

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter of October 13, addressed to Mr. John Chancellor, Director of the Voice of America.<sup>2</sup> You asked for a report on the activities of the Voice of America with respect to the Dominican Republic during the crisis which resulted in sending U.S. Marines to that country.<sup>3</sup> This information is detailed below.

From the very beginning in April, 1965, the Voice of America, particularly the Latin American and Worldwide English Divisions, gave heavy coverage in depth to developments in the Dominican Republic, including events leading up to the attack by the insurgents, and explanations of subsequent action taken by the United States. This coverage included President Johnson's message on the sending of the Marines to the Dominican Republic, carried live and repeated in full or excerpted numerous times; reports from OAS headquarters on the deliberations of the Council climaxed by the report on the vote for the inter-American peace force; Ambassador Bunker's statement thanking the Council for its vote; special interview with Secretary-General Jose Mora; special reports from the U.N., State Department and White House; and the Thomas Mann interview originally aired on the "Today" show.<sup>4</sup> The collective aspect of the Dominican situation was stressed and President Johnson's and Ambassador Stevenson's allegations on Red involvement were backed up with eye-witness accounts by evacuees who were interviewed by VOA correspondents in Miami and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

President Johnson's subsequent message on the sending of more troops and his report to the Nation on the Dominican situation were carried live, as were highlights of his remarks to the AFL-CIO. Amba-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963-69, Bx 6-29 63-69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 24, Broadcasting Service—General 1965. No classification marking. The letter was taken in draft from Chancellor, transmitted in an October 21 memorandum to Plesent, and edited and typed by M. Cox (IGC) on October 22. Cleared by and copied to Hanson and Ryan.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 41. United States actions in the Dominican Republic during this period are detailed at length in *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, Documents 1-222.

<sup>4</sup> American morning television news program.

sador Stevenson’s statements at the U.N. were broadcast in full. Statements by Anthony Solomon, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, from Santo Domingo and an interview with Ricardo Colombo, head of the OAS Peace Mission, constituted further coverage. Other officials included in the broadcasts were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance; Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Jack Vaughn; and ex-President Betancourt. The humanitarian aspects of the embarkation, as well as the support voiced by Brazil, Costa Rica and other Latin American countries, were given good play.

In addition to the many correspondents’ reports, and commentaries and editorial roundups by our Central Program Services Division, the Spanish Branch aired a special 15-minute program on the Dominican Republic which included interviews with OAS Secretary-General Jose Mora, Elis Antonio Perez (a Dominican journalist), and Cesar Ortiz (a U.N. observer). Along with daily OAS and U.N. spots were statements by Colonel Oswaldo Lopez A., Chief of the Honduran Government; and by Francisco J. Orlich, President of Costa Rica. Several interviews were recorded in Santo Domingo, including one with the Guatemalan Ambassador in the Dominican Republic.

Effectiveness of the Spanish Branch broadcasts is evidenced by the fact that more than ninety stations in ten Latin American countries rebroadcast portions of the Spanish programs or relayed the news directly, via medium wave, to their listeners.

During the period May 1, 1965, through May 25, 1965, the following material was included in the Spanish Branch broadcasts on the situation in the Dominican Republic:

<u>Correspondents Reports</u> .....	80
<u>Commentaries, Analyses and General Features</u> .....	85
<u>Statements by Officials</u> .....	35
<u>OAS and UN Reports</u> .....	40
<u>Editorial Roundups</u> .....	30
<u>Interviews with Evacuees</u> .....	45
<u>Total</u> .....	315

All of the 315 programs were directly concerned with events leading up to and throughout the crisis.

Due to the explosive situation, the Spanish Branch modified its 9-hour schedule on Saturday, May 1, and began broadcasting 24 hours a day to Latin America. The Brazilian Branch remained on its usual schedule, but included a great amount of material on the Dominican Republic in its broadcasts.

From May 1 until May 12, all of the Spanish programs were devoted exclusively to the Dominican question. On May 12, the Branch resumed its usual 9-hour daily schedule, with emphasis, however, on Dominican

developments. In addition, it continued its broadcasts beamed directly to the Dominican Republic during the hours of 12:30 AM to 7:00 AM, 10:00 AM through 6:30 PM. Programs during the 14½ hours to the Republic included a 15-minute newscast on the hour, a 5-minute newscast on the half-hour, with music between. Newscasts during the regular 9-hour schedule consisted of 10 minutes on the hour.

On May 25, the Branch eliminated the 12:30 AM to 7:00 AM broadcasts to the Dominican Republic, but continued with its regular normal 9-hour broadcasts to Latin America and the 10:00 AM through 6:30 PM direct broadcasts to the Dominican Republic. The news patterns remained the same. The Branch continued to broadcast 17½ hours per day until June 8 when it returned to its normal schedule.

The Voice of America has not modified its broadcast schedule to Latin America since June 8, 1965. It has continued to report developments in the Dominican Republic, including the establishment of the Provisional Government, in its regularly scheduled broadcasts.

I trust the foregoing supplies the facts needed by your Subcommittee. If we can be of further service, please let us know.

Sincerely,

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**67. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to Representative Glenard Lipscomb<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 3, 1965

Dear Mr. Lipscomb:

This will reply further to your letter of September 29, 1965, relative to the distribution of printed propaganda by the Soviet Union, and our assessment of the problem posed by these activities.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 26, Field—Soviet Bloc 1965. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

The Soviet Union has always put a high value on the propaganda value of the printed word, and its current efforts are voluminous and many-sided. It sends abroad a steady flow of books, pamphlets, periodicals, in the languages of those in whom it has an interest and can reach. This output is carefully directed to reach the target groups that it considers politically important, possibly vulnerable, or potentially influential, ranging from influential leaders to children just learning to read. The messages vary from explicit ideological indoctrination and argument to the subtler message carried by harmless children's tales and editions of Russian classics: "We share with you a community of innocent human interests."

The Soviet Union does not make public the total number of their books actually exported. But production figures for last year show the USSR published over 1,500 titles in about 45 million copies in languages not spoken inside its boundaries. A considerable number of these, undoubtedly, were for educational and training use within the USSR. Hence, the statistics serve better as a guide to the pattern, direction, and general dimensions of Soviet foreign book publishing than as exact export figures.

The largest group of books—678 titles and some 35 million copies—is in the general category of educational works, especially technical and scientific textbooks. The Soviet program of producing scientific textbooks for developing countries seems to be the most important of their publishing efforts. A brochure recently published in India lists about fifty textbooks from the USSR dealing with science and technology. All but one of them are published in English. We also have had reports that about 70 Soviet textbooks in English are being sold in some parts of Latin America.

Announced Soviet book production in other broad categories is much smaller. Books about and by the "founding fathers" of Marxism-Leninism published last year numbered 126 titles, in something over a million copies. Books about international affairs and foreign policy numbered 67 titles, in about three-quarters of a million copies. *Belles-lettres*<sup>3</sup> accounted for 122 titles and almost a million copies. Children's books numbered over 1.2 million copies of 82 titles.

Because Soviet figures do not indicate exports and may not be complete, these figures are not a certain or complete index of the scope of emphasis of their book publishing for foreign consumption. Soviet sources say that books produced by the USSR in foreign languages in other countries exceed foreign-language output in the Soviet Union.

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<sup>3</sup> Works of literature that are considered works of art, entertainment and culture, including novels, poetry, and short stories.

Figures are not available for recent years. However, occasional figures revealed in the past suggest that Soviet-sponsored books printed in other countries are at least double the volume of titles and copies produced within the USSR.

Periodicals published for circulation abroad form the other major Soviet use of the weapon of print, and this effort has been expanding steadily. Last year, 15 propaganda magazines were published in the Soviet Union, in languages not spoken there. Some of these appeared in as many as 17 different language editions, with circulation totaling about 12 million. These magazines are competently printed, and some are attractive in format. Language and content are carefully gauged for selected audiences. "Prestige pictorials" are designed to impress a general audience with the achievements of the USSR under Communist rule. For example, *Soviet Union* appears monthly in Finnish, English, French, German, Hindi, Japanese, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish, and Urdu, as well as Chinese, Hungarian, Korean, Mongolian, Rumanian, and Russian. Prestige magazines have the largest circulation and broadest appeal, but the specialized periodicals, carefully aimed at particular groups and interests, bear the most explicit messages. *Soviet Woman* appears monthly in ten languages and *Sport in the USSR* appears in six. *Soviet Film* appears monthly in Russian, Arabic, French, German, and English. Recently, a Spanish edition was added.

The languages and the targets vary with the shifting political interests of the USSR. English, as an international language, has shown a steady increase. Circulation of periodicals in Indian languages increased six-fold in the last five years, and Spanish has shown a marked upturn.

Soviet production does not tell anything like the whole story. It is supplemented—and in fact surpassed—by three additional sources of printed materials. One is the massive production of other Communist countries, each with a sizeable output of its own—roughly 200 periodicals in all. Second is the output of international front groups, such as the World Federation of Teachers quarterly publication, *Teachers of the World*, in English, French, German, and Spanish, or *Scientific World*, a review published in six languages by the World Federation of Scientific Workers, London. And, third, at least three dozen periodicals—varying greatly in regularity and distribution—are published outside the USSR by Communist-front organizations, a large number of them in Prague.

The export of Soviet periodicals is increased by the many magazines, newspapers, and bulletins published in other countries by Soviet and other Communist diplomatic missions and agencies. The Soviet news agency, Novosti, which operates around the world, claims that it publishes 26 magazines, 5 newspapers, and 64 press bulletins. These magazines include *Soviet Life* (formerly *USSR*), published in this coun-



try, and *Soviet Land*, published in India and Ceylon—in 15 languages and 300,000 copies per issue.

Two Agency reports, *Soviet Book Publishing for Export, 1964*, and *Periodicals Exported by the Communist Countries in 1964* are enclosed, since they provide fuller discussion and detail.<sup>4</sup>

The distribution system for Communist books and periodicals is as extensive and elaborate as the production system. The Soviet book export organization has contracts for the distribution of books and periodicals with more than 800 firms in 68 countries. Books are shipped to retail outlets on what amounts to a consignment basis, although the facade of a normal export transaction is maintained. The distributor receives the books postpaid at a 30 to 60 percent discount from the retail prices in his catalogue. Terms of payment are extremely liberal and can be made in local currency to local Soviet officials. Distributors who do not meet their payments are apparently treated very gently. Funds accumulated locally are used by the Soviets to finance local printing of additional literature.

This system tends to frustrate government controls and to expand contacts with local publishers and distributors. It conserves foreign exchange. It can circumvent laws prohibiting the importation of propaganda—a bloc country can sponsor the importation only of innocuous books, while propaganda materials are printed within the target country, thus avoiding local restrictions.

Supplementing this mechanism, local Communist parties have a substantial role in distributing and advertising propaganda literature. In some countries, only about ten percent of Communist literature is sold in stores. The balance is distributed by Communist diplomatic, trade, and cultural missions, street vendors, door-to-door salesmen, hawkers, and local party organizations. These methods are employed especially in under-developed areas, where there is a shortage of books and a large supply of labor is available.

You asked how serious a problem is posed to the United States by the Soviet Union's exports of the printed word. Certainly, so massive a flow of propaganda is a matter of serious concern. Though much of this material may seem to us heavy-handed, difficult to credit, obviously self-serving, and wearily monotonous, it would be unwise to underestimate its effectiveness.

Apart from sheer volume, a number of considerations make this a serious problem. Much of this material sets forth, with single-minded intensity and sometimes with skill and cunning, a doctrine implacably hostile to the free society. It is persistent, flexible, and unscrupulous.

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<sup>4</sup> Not attached and not found.

Much of it reaches an audience without the experience or resources to make objective judgments on the "evidence" and arguments Communism presents.

Perhaps most important of all, among the developing and modernizing societies, there is a vast hunger for the printed word (for books, for magazines, for anything) that will feed the hunger for knowledge, for know-how, for the texts from which these peoples hope to learn how to fulfill their new hopes and aspirations. The peoples seeking to modernize their societies look for short-cuts.

We cannot seek to make the official segment of our output match the Soviet Union's in extent, to make all—or even much—of the print we send abroad carry a controlled and calculated message. We cannot discipline, censor, direct, and focus. As a free society, we must allow our national life, insofar as it is reflected in the words that go overseas, to make its own impact. Although its diversity means the inclusion of some materials damaging to us, its obvious freedom from control, its enormous variety and liveliness, will on balance speak more eloquently and effectively for the cause of freedom than all the disciplined words that make their concerted assault in the Communist cause.

USIA's publications are part of that reflection of our national life. They aim to tell our story to audiences that would not automatically be reached, or not be reached in time. They aim to explain or clarify what has been muddled or distorted by accident, misunderstanding, or hostility. We seek to fill gaps, within the limits of our means, and to supply the urgently needed information that is not available through the normal exporting of American publications. To do this, is a demanding and difficult responsibility, and one that grows as the world hunger for information grows. Hunger for information tends to increase as it is fed—fed not only by the printed word, but by all the channels of communication opened by the wonders of modern technology and the world's increasing interdependence.

In regard to your question about the sale of printing equipment to the Soviet Union, I do not think that the Soviet Union's printed propaganda effort is currently impeded significantly by lack of advanced or sophisticated equipment. It is probable that for most of the audiences they reach, the technical level of their production is adequate—and may even seem impressive. They themselves have provided printing equipment and training to some countries. It is probable that distribution of material, rather than access to more refined, economical, or efficient processes and equipment, is the problem most concerning them. You are aware, of course, that the Soviets have arrangements with indigenous publishers in many countries.

The United States Government, for reasons of national security, prohibits the export of strategic goods and technology to the Soviet

Union and other Communist countries of Eastern Europe. I have been informed that no American-made printing equipment which was clearly destined to be used in the international propaganda efforts of the Soviet Union has been licensed for export to the Soviet Union. In fact, in 1961 the Department of Commerce denied an export license application to sell printing equipment to the USSR which would have been used to print foreign language publications. Since that time there have been no export license applications submitted for the sale of printing equipment of that type. However, we understand that export license applications have been approved by the Department of Commerce for the sale of equipment to be used in the printing of Russian-language publications which circulate primarily within the Soviet Union.

If I can be of further service, please let me know.

Sincerely,

**Leonard H. Marks**

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**68. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Akers) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 20, 1965

Given a world situation in which the greater part of humanity is increasingly dissatisfied with its economic circumstances, and is determined in various revolutionary ways to change this condition, economic development is a critical determinant in U.S. foreign policy, and of the USIA programming in support of that policy.

Directly or indirectly, support of AID consumes much more than one-half of total USIA resources in the underdeveloped world. In some countries, the effort to derive maximum psychological effect from the AID program, in effect IS the USIS program, consuming 95% of USIS resources in Nigeria, for example. In most USIA media geographical divisions, the AID subject is the single largest concern dealt with directly: 40% of the VOA Far East program, for instance.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 27, Government Agencies—White House 1965. No classification marking. Drafted by Keogh and Akers. A copy was sent to Gaud.

Massive and continuous promotion of U.S. economic assistance programs has been provided by USIA and its field posts, from the Marshall Plan to the Alliance for Progress<sup>2</sup> and the distribution of Food for Peace.<sup>3</sup>

In clusters of countries, a public conviction of economic progress being made is the factor that assures the nature of the governments and the political order of nations. There, USIA has taken major steps, such as appointing senior officers whose only activity is the effective spread of information on the U.S. aid effort. Four such men are assigned in the Near East and South Asia, six in South-East Asia, seven in Latin America. A large number of information officers work most of their time at it.

Support of AID is by and large a localized operation, performed in the field at the initiative of men on the scene in response to specific projects and problems. Nevertheless, the centralized effort is still very large. The latter comprises the films, TV programs, pamphlets, features, packets, books, various analyses and daily news stories distributed from USIA Washington, either on a regional basis or on a world-wide basis.

All major developments related to AID are reported in the news, world-wide if of sufficient significance, or regionally. This work most heavily bears on the VOA and its counterpart in print, IPS, the press service. Supplementing their news is a continuous production of secondary materials, scripts and program series in the case of VOA, features and analyses by IPS.

Recent VOA productions have included a six-part series on "Food for Peace," and programs in the continuing series on "Modernization Around the World." Unexceptional, but illustrative of VOA's specially targeted productions, are signing ceremonies for new AID agreements and swearing-in ceremonies for country AID chiefs, regularly recorded for broadcast to countries concerned; dedication and presentation ceremonies in the field are taped for broadcast from Washington; interviews with hundreds of AID grantees visiting the U.S. are recorded for incor-

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<sup>2</sup> The Alliance for Progress was a United States program to seek economic development in and ties with Central and South American countries, which originated with the Kennedy administration and was first publically articulated by Kennedy on the Presidential campaign trail in November 1960. For further information about the origins and development of the Alliance for Progress, see *Foreign Relations, 1961-1963*, vol. XII, American Republics, Document 1.

<sup>3</sup> Food for Peace, also known as PL-480, was an act passed in 1954 that permitted the President to order the shipment of commodities to U.S. allies on concessional or grant terms and authorized the U.S. Government to donate commodities to religious and voluntary organizations for humanitarian purposes.

poration in targeted programs, and also shipped to the field for local placement.

VOA's World-Wide English programming is heavily involved. Recent examples from its schedule include interviews with or statements by Secretary Rusk, Undersecretary Ball, AID Administrator Bell, Undersecretary Mann, Senators Dodd and McGovern, and Food for Peace Director Reuter.

The Press Service's Wireless File output is comparable to daily VOA programming in news and background pieces. Illustrative of Wireless File background items in recent months: "U.S. Food for Peace—Unique Assistance Program" (Nov. 16); "Johnson Signs Food for Peace Extension" (Oct. 8); "Johnson Urges More Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid" (Aug. 25); "AID Official Looks to Rehabilitation of Vietnam", an interview with Charles A. Mann (Aug. 16); "Massive Free World Aid Helps Vietnamese at all Levels," A 1400-word feature written in Saigon for world-wide distribution (Mar. 3).

The Press Service provides Airmailed Features, to single countries or to all posts:

"World Bank Facilitates Assistance for Developing Nations," by George Woods, President, World Bank.

"Foreign Aid: Building a Better Life," by David E. Bell.

"U.S. Foreign Aid in 1965: Strength, Hope, Self-Aid," yearender.

"U.S. Economic Aid to Vietnam Totals \$1,500,000 Per Day," yearender.

On the same basis, the Press Service provides picture stories: In the spring of 1962 IPS sent a photographer on a 50-day tour of five Latin American countries to photograph the sites of 20 Alliance projects; the same man revisited the projects in 1964 for progress pictures. Twenty-four picture stories resulted, plus the materials for press placement pamphlets, posters and books.

The Latin American wireless file produces about five stories a day on the Alliance for Progress. IPS produces a regular newspaper column, "Hace la Alianza," widely used. Its Regional Service Center in Mexico has printed 52 leaflets and pamphlets on the Alliance since its inauguration, or a total print run of 2,600,000, and a miscellany of bookmarks, rulers, pennants with slogans, 50,000 bus cards, placards for store windows. Fifty million IPS cartoon books, directly concerned with economic growth, or indirectly with its correlative, insurgency, have been circulated.

USIA's Motion Picture (IMS) and Television (ITV) services are heavily involved in AID. There are centralized and particularized activities in both, as in the VOA and IPS programs.

Most TV film output on AID is made in the field. In every country where there is a USIS cameraman, and where there is an AID program,

there is a sizable interaction providing full and intimate coverage for local newsreels and TV.

ITV has produced one major color documentary on U.S. foreign aid: "Tomorrow by Their Hands," for world-wide distribution. Much more work is directed regionally, in established program series, newsreels produced in Washington, or in separate items.

Regional or more localized series distributed to posts for placement include "Panorama Panamericano" for Latin America, "Thai Washington Newsletter," Iranian Washington Report."

"Panorama", 15 minutes weekly in Spanish and Portuguese, distributed to 19 countries, is keyed almost entirely to the Alliance, and its concerns, modernization, industrial development, public health. It plays on 115 television stations in Latin America, to an estimated weekly audience of 14,000,000. Following are typical stories from this year's Panorama filmed on the scene:

Cooperative housing in Costa Rica; new dam in Nicaragua; water purification in San Salvador; textile and handicrafts in Ecuador; hydro-electric power in Guatemala; electric co-op in Ecuador; remodeling airport at La Paz; school construction in rural Colombia; slum clearance in Rio de Janeiro; the Furnas Dam in Brazil; construction of steel mills in numerous places.

ITV also produces a 26-part series of half-hour family-drama programs entirely in support of the Alliance. It currently plays on 16 TV stations in 13 countries, and in many cities is commercially sponsored.

Approximately 35% of the Motion Picture services African production is devoted to publicizing AID programs; 65% in the Near East and South Asia; 40% in the Far East. In Latin America, films supporting the Alliance and AID, directly and indirectly, in all aspects of their meaning, constitute more than 90% of IMS production.

Spot status reports from IMS include the following:

India: Six films in production, from 10 to 30 minutes long, "Kanpur Institute of Technology", "Agriculture in India", "Four Men of Kot-tayan" (self-help), "River Valley Projects", "Forest Research Institute", "Dehradun", "Port Development".

Thailand: Molam Series (monthly explanations of development projects).

Latin America: Horizons "newsmagazine", two 10-minute issues a month with 200 prints each for use theatrically, on TV and for other showings; 50% on subjects directly in support of Alliance and AID.

USIA's Information Center Service is largely concerned with long-range effects: developing books, producing exhibits, English Teaching programs and the like. Its activities on behalf of the AID program include:

Publishing some 50 million books of which 42 million were textbooks; publication of U.S. encyclopedias in foreign languages and bilingual dictionaries; operating the Informational Media Guarantee Program facilitating the distribution of U.S. publications, and educational films. ICS exhibits program directly supports the AID program.

Robert W. Akers<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**69. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Director of the United States Information Agency (White) to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 7, 1966

SUBJECT

PAO Replies on Programs

I have marked with clips the parts in the PAO replies for your attention, either because of special interest or because they are typical of the tenor of the replies.<sup>2</sup>

I also suggest you may want to read fully at least one reply from each area, since this will give you the flavor of the thinking of the PAO's. Good replies for this purpose are from Colombia, UAR, Tanzania, U.K., Hungary, and Laos.

Note the summaries done by two of the Area Directors, for Latin America and Africa.

There are, of course, great differences in the problems and programs between areas and even within a given area. Yet certain common themes stand out.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Files Bx 33–36, 1966: Acc. #69–A–3445 [E], Entry UD WW 193, Box 33, I—The Director's Office (January through March, 1966). Confidential. Drafted by White. A copy was sent to Chernoff. An attached January 25 covering note from White to Moore indicates that White sent the memorandum to Moore for his information.

<sup>2</sup> The clips were not found attached.



## I. POLITICO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

1. *Need for confidence in the U.S.*—a strong common thread throughout, with variations by area, e.g., questioning of American reliability and quality of leadership (in Western Europe); a heritage of resentment accentuated by fears that the U.S. may be returning to old patterns of unilateral intervention (in Latin America); suspicion of the U.S. and skepticism as to the value of collaborating with the West (in Africa). The need for deeper understanding as the necessary basis for confidence and cooperation is almost universally reported.

2. *The communist challenge*—not only direct threats of communist subversion, but also the ideological appeal of Marxism (on Soviet, Chinese, Castroite or other model) as the wave of the future. While particularly strong in some of the developing areas, this appeal is likewise cited among influential intellectual circles in more sophisticated and stable countries.

3. *Disagreement with the U.S. on specific issues of foreign policy*—especially Vietnam at the present time.

4. *Internal weaknesses and instability*—lack of effective governments responsive to the people; problems of economic and social development, of moving traditional societies into the modern era. Psychological problems are manifold, such as frustrations caused by the “revolution of rising expectations”; lack of national unity and identification; the “search for dignity”. These are mentioned most often in the developing areas, but by no means exclusively: e.g., Rome cites lack of strength of democratic institutions as the basic problem for the U.S. in Italy.

5. *Basic factors limiting USIS leverage*—in some countries, obsession with one particular problem which sets the climate of opinion and highly limits USIS freedom of action (e.g., Arab nations’ over Israel, Pakistan’s over Kashmir); emotional attitudes (e.g., hatred of “imperialists” in ex-colonial countries) which color all thinking and limit receptivity to fact and reason; the problem of how to build meaningful bridges to the developing nations with problems and outlook so different from ours (mentioned particularly in Africa). Some PAO’s point out that the process of education is gradual and changing fundamental attitudes takes time.

## II. OBJECTIVES

1. *Maintain a dialogue, open channels of communications*—a fundamental objective in most countries and the principal one in some, where USIS potential is highly limited for the present. In Eastern Europe the aim is sometimes expressed as “ventilating closed societies”. In certain situations, we can do little more than open doors, bring in Western ideas, and begin to talk. In others, the dialogue and introduction of ideas serves as the basis for more directed actions.



2. *Build confidence in the United States*—create better understanding of the U.S. as a means of gaining the confidence necessary for collaboration, a prime objective in most cases. This is the basic justification for the projection of the U.S. as a central part of country programs. (In many cases, U.S. experience and ideas are also used as examples on which nations may draw for solving their own internal problems.)

3. *Explain and gain support for U.S. policies*, with chief emphasis at present on Vietnam.

4. *Counter the communist threat*—in varying degrees and forms in most programs.

5. *Influence internal development*, political, economic, social. A leading example is Vietnam, where the prime objective is to create support for the GVN on the part of the Vietnamese people. “Nation-building” figures in several programs, with emphasis on strengthening national unity and popular support for the government. Some concentrate on inculcating principles of democracy. Other programs seek to influence attitudes on economic issues, such as the need for socially-controlled private enterprise. In Eastern Europe, nudging the regimes toward liberatization is a prime aim; in Latin America, motivation to carry out the goals of the Alliance for Progress.<sup>3</sup>

### III. MOST EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES AND ACTIVITIES

Personal contact is usually first choice. Other preferred techniques vary according to the local situation, but cultural exchanges are most frequently near the top of the list.

### IV. CHIEF TARGET AUDIENCES

With few exceptions, posts say their programs are primarily directed at opinion leaders—in the communications media, government, politics, military, labor, education, cultural and intellectual worlds.

### V. PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES

Most posts list a number of peripheral activities eliminated and maintain they are now down to essentials.

### VI. HOW TO USE MORE BUDGET AND PERSONNEL

A surprising number of PAO's do not ask for more of either, although many plead for both, particularly posts that have been cut to a minimum operation.

Some ask for higher quality media and CU support rather than more money in GOE.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 68.

When PAO's request more American personnel, the reasons usually are (1) to expand personal contact and (2) to work more outside the capital city. In small posts, PAO's frequently want an administrative assistant or American secretary to free themselves from office routine for contacts and program activities.

The requests for money cover a great variety of activities. In Latin America, binational centers would get priority on additional funds. Many posts point to the need for more adequate space for offices and information centers.

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**70. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency (Davies) to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 10, 1966

SUBJECT

Increasing Evidence of Soviet and Eastern European Concern at the Impact of Western Propaganda

The Soviet and Eastern European press and other public media are currently revealing clear evidence of concern on the part of the Communist leadership at the impact of Western propaganda on their peoples. American propaganda, especially, is singled out for analysis and attack and youth is indicated as the age group which has succumbed most to it.

The concern is revealed in a coordinated program of ideological indoctrination which features an expose of what is termed "the Western ideological offensive." This "offensive" is alleged to be coordinated

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963-1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 1966. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Littell and Sharek. Copies were sent to Akers, IOP, IAE, IBS, ICS, IRS, IMV, IPS, S/AL, EUR, EUR/SES, EUR/EE, EUR/SOV, INR, and Budapest, Bucharest, Vienna, Vienna for SPO, Warsaw, Sofia, Prague, and Moscow.

through a “special office in NATO.” The American effort is largely attributed to CIA and to its “close associate”, USIA, which is said to play the major overt role. The ideological indoctrination effort itself is marshalled under the slogan, “The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence does not permit coexistence in the sphere of ideology.” Many of the articles, which are very similar in content and direction, give statistical information on USIA’s budget and personnel. Their attacks extend to all of the USIA media.

Some examples are:

1. In a speech of December 29, 1965, which was featured in the Union of Communist Youth organ, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Soviet Komsomol leader Sergei Pavlov attacked *U.S. exhibits and cultural-exchange visits* as two activities “promoting ideological confusion and disaffection” among Soviet youth.

2. *Nova Mysl*, a Czechoslovak Communist Party publication, also laments the effectiveness of the *appeal of Western propaganda to the youth*. In attacking Western radio broadcasts, the article states: “The enemy . . . knows that young people like music, especially hot music. Therefore, he sets about influencing young people with the help of music, attracting them to foreign broadcasts and leading them away from public and political life.”

3. A Hungarian daily from the county of Nograd also attacks VOA and RFE *use of music to appeal to the youth* and to entice them into listening to the brief propaganda pitches which are interspersed throughout the musical programs. It says that USIA has, “. . . in 106 countries, 239 independent offices, 182 libraries, 79 reading rooms, and 154 information centers, which help in the psychological warfare. Great efforts are made by the USIA to influence public opinion in the socialist countries.”

4. The new Hungarian youth magazine, *Ifusagi Magazin*, in its December, 1965, issue credits *President Johnson himself* with advancing this method of reaching youth. He is quoted as having said, in a session with RFE, “We must get close to the politically immature, backward strata. To those who like music, the text of the news items will also appeal. We must exert an emotional, intellectual, and physical influence on them. The pieces of music on the program should be catchy and flattering to the ear. Young people like to hear such music . . . . At least twenty out of a hundred will listen in to the political programs too.”

5. An issue of the Czechoslovak Party biweekly, *Zivot Strany*, in November, 1965, states: “The crux of the new [American]<sup>2</sup> tactical

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<sup>2</sup> Brackets are in the original.

concept lies in the ideological sphere. *Its chief goal and purpose is the creation of favorable conditions for the penetration of anti-Communist propaganda into the socialist countries.* This is the source of the efforts of imperialist propaganda to make maximum use of all existing channels to infiltrate into the socialist countries through the press, radio, tourist traffic, cultural relations, film festivals, international congresses, expositions, fairs, etc., and to increase the number of these channels through *international agreements on cultural relations*, having as their aim, among other things, more widespread sales of Western press and literature, permission to set up information centers in our countries, etc."

6. The current issue of the Czechoslovak Party ideological monthly, *Nova Mysl*, attacks *Western efforts to conduct surveys*, noting that ". . . in the past year, they have been trying to analyze the various social strata of the Czechoslovak population, with the aim of beaming their broadcasts to those layers which they deem the most receptive. The United States Information Agency has even complained bitterly that in Czechoslovakia it has no opportunity to carry out surveys of listeners." The article goes on to say that "*Contests among listeners* are of special significance. . . . The objectives of these inquiries are multiple: to ascertain the geographical distribution of listeners, to promote interest in the broadcasts by utilizing answers supplied by respondents, to make use of the winners, and to enhance confidence.

"An inseparable part of the arsenal is an endeavor to be cordial, jovial, and sensitive to simple, everyday human interests. An effort is exerted to surround the broadcasts with a legal atmosphere *by inviting before the microphone Czechoslovak citizens* on visits in the capitalist countries."

7. Writing in the Polish military organ, *Zolnierz Wolnosci* of January 5, 1966, General Gregorz Korczynski states: "Particularly intensive and systematic is imperialism's activity aimed at the so-called *softening of the population of the socialist countries* in order to disarm at least some of the people morally and politically. . . . This activity, conducted in the framework of so-called psychological warfare, constitutes one of the basic methods applied by the imperialist camp in the ideological and political struggle against the forces of socialism."

*Comment:* These articles give one a feel for the current thinking of the Communist leadership of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They constitute not only evidence of effectiveness, but also provide a clue to what we are up against in trying to move ahead on renegotiation

of cultural-exchange agreements with the Soviet Union and Rumania, as well as in trying to carry on and expand our program elsewhere in the area.

We in IAS have long felt that the war in Viet-nam, so often cited by Soviet and Eastern European authorities as the reason why cultural-exchange events could not be agreed to, was more a pretext than the real motivation. The recent increase in published evidence of Communist concern at the effectiveness of Western information and exchange activities appears to bear out this belief.

IAS—R. T. Davies<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Davies signed “Dick” above this typed signature.

**71. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 14, 1966

I would like to outline briefly the problems which we face in Viet Nam in disseminating information on U.S. participation in the existing conflict. The following represents a summary of the principal issues which I have noted from my review of world press and study of reports received from our various field posts:

1. There is an uncertainty about the convictions of the Vietnamese people in prosecuting the present war.

2. There is an uncertainty about the character of the present leadership of South Viet Nam—whether or not it is a genuine government or a military clique—whether it is a principal in the war or an adjunct of U.S. forces.

3. There are doubts about the support which Hanoi has given to the Viet Cong, about whether the PAVN is on the scene in South Viet Nam and about which side was responsible for the escalation of the war.

4. There is confusion over the U.S. attitude toward the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962, about the role we played in the Geneva Conferences and about our acceptance of these Agreements as a basis for negotiations.<sup>2</sup>

5. Doubts have been expressed on whether we want the United Nations to play a major role in negotiations for settlement of the Vietnamese war, or whether we merely want it to support us in our efforts to arrive at the conference table.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 4, Government Agencies—White House—General 1966. Secret. There is no indication that the President saw this memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Geneva Conference, which took place between April 26 and July 20, 1954. The following countries participated: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, Laos, the Soviet Union, and the representatives of what would become South Vietnam and North Vietnam. The Geneva Agreement of July 21, 1954, commonly known as the Geneva Accords, was negotiated during the Geneva Conference and brought about the cessation of hostilities between the Viet Minh and France. Some of the key provisions of the Accord included the establishment of a boundary line along the 17th parallel, which divided Vietnam in two as north and south entities; a call for Communist Viet Minh forces, and their civilian sympathizers, to be above the 17th parallel and French and anti-Communist Vietnamese to be below it; and a mandate for national elections in Vietnam, under international supervision, in 1956. For additional information regarding United States policy and the Geneva Conference and 1954 Accords, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, Part 2, Documents 802–1079. The Geneva Agreement of 1962 brought to a close the hostilities between left- and right-wing factions in Laos and called for the country to become neutral and for the formation of a tripartite government that represented the conflicting factions.

6. There is uncertainty about our long term attitude toward South-east Asia and whether we are seeking peace, the establishment of independent countries, area social and economic developments, or a base for anti-communist activities on this continent.

*None of these doubts, uncertainties or ambiguities are justified.* However, they represent practical problems with which the USIA must deal in telling the Vietnamese story to foreign audiences.

To meet these problems, I plan the following:

*A. In the event of a continuation of the peace campaign and the bombing pause:*

1. We will arrange for interviews of world leaders who are conspicuous in the search for peace and whose views will be significant in influencing world opinion. These interviews will be carried over the VOA, presented on film, over television, in newsreels, and texts distributed to the press.

2. We will prepare a written record showing the history of U.S. initiatives through private and diplomatic channels to reach a peaceful settlement. Pamphlets will be prepared with a chronology of events, photographs and significant exhibits from speeches by you, Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Goldberg and other diplomatic representatives.

3. We will increase substantially through all media our coverage of the U.S. efforts to develop South Viet Nam socially and politically. I intend to stimulate an increase in the visits of foreign correspondents to Viet Nam, to distribute additional written and film material and to have documentaries and interviews carried on the VOA. In this connection, I have conferred with Secretary of Agriculture Freeman about press coverage on his proposed trip to Viet Nam to study agricultural developments by the Vietnamese carried out with U.S. assistance in the field of crop and livestock production, agricultural extension, irrigation and drainage, fisheries, plant protection and related topics.<sup>3</sup> This should lend itself to dramatic developments in films and in picture stories for the press.

I propose to send a first-rate motion picture producer to Saigon for an unspecified time to make films for distribution abroad on AID activities, medical care, rehabilitation, education and other social economic programs.

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<sup>3</sup> Freeman visited South Vietnam February 11–February 16. (“Signs of Progress on Vietnam Farms Hailed by Freeman,” *New York Times*, February 15, 1966, p. 3; “Freeman Calls Agriculture Key to Victory in Vietnam,” *New York Times*, February 16, 1966, p. L2) For additional information, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, Documents 15, 28, and 74.

In all of the above efforts, we will stress the Vietnamese Government's efforts and focus attention on the independence of that government and its efforts to provide a better way of life for the Vietnamese people. As a corollary, it is important that the Government of South Viet Nam participate in the peace efforts as well as the general diplomacy surrounding the war. I recognize that all interested agencies support this view and I have instructed our staff to constantly keep this point in mind.

4. I intend to increase our film production on the non-military aspects of our assistance to South Viet Nam. We need the counterpart of "The Night of the Dragon"<sup>4</sup> stressing the work that is being done in assisting the villages in rebuilding their economic and social structure.

B. *In the event that there is a diplomatic response from Hanoi leading to active peace discussions*, we would begin to stress with appropriate caution and an awareness of the need not to raise false hopes such activities as:

1. Publicizing our commitment to the economic development to Viet Nam (North as well as South) through the Asian Development Bank and other agencies.

2. The U.S. objectives for the ultimate non-alignment of Viet Nam and the right of the people of that country to determine their future.

C. *In the event of a resumption of bombing in North Viet Nam*, with or without military escalation in the South, I propose the following:

1. Publicizing your statements and those of Secretary Rusk and others that the search for peace will continue.

2. An emphasis upon all previous initiatives towards peace, private as well as public.

3. Preparation of documentary evidence of PAVN infiltration into South Viet Nam, showing the number of regiments and military equipment. South Vietnamese spokesmen can be used to document these facts by disclosing evidence offered by captured soldiers, pictures of equipment that has been confiscated, and similar material.

4. Stressing the criteria for bombing North Viet Nam targets—the military nature of these targets and the efforts to avoid injury to civilians.

5. We would also publicize the activities of the Viet Cong, the damage and death that it has caused and the terrorist activities directed to the civilian population.

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<sup>4</sup> "Night of the Dragon" is a film produced by USIA and released in 1966 that addresses U.S. involvement in Vietnam. An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.



These programs will be most effective if we have time to plan them and to carry them out with the complete cooperation of all other interested agencies. I have received this cooperation in the past.

At this time I would also like to suggest that you consider taking the following steps in the event that bombing is resumed in North Viet Nam.

1. Either you or Secretary Rusk should issue a public statement repeating the many offers to meet at the conference table at any time with any person to discuss a resolution of the conflict. A channel of communication for this purpose should be named publicly to avoid any argument that the offer is “window dressing.”

2. You might also wish to consider the desirability of having Ambassador Goldberg present at the United Nations a proposal that the Geneva Conference powers, or a group of them, be asked to meet again to review the Geneva Agreements. When that proposal is presented, the U.S. can pledge to adherence to the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962.

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**72. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 14, 1966

Dear Charles:

I recently received from Palmer Hoyt, Publisher of the *Denver Post*, an inspiring letter with suggestions on exchange of persons in Asia.<sup>2</sup> He points out that our objectives in South Vietnam are being misunderstood in the Far East and urges that we take certain specific steps to show people in the Far East that we in the United States are united as a nation, that we are not waging a racist war, and that our intentions in Asia are honorable.<sup>3</sup>

Here are some of the specific suggestions which he has made:

Demonstrate once again to Asians that the United States is made up of people of many races and backgrounds. Senators Dan Inouye and Hiram Fong, Congressman Spark Matsunaga and Congresswoman Patsy Mink, all of Hawaii, might be sent together or separately on just such a<sup>4</sup> mission as described above . . . (national unity). They might also be joined by some of our outstanding Negro congressmen. Their visits should be concerned less with meeting government officials than with calls on universities, business and industrial leaders, labor leaders, sessions with opposition political leaders, newspaper editors, municipal and provincial legislators, religious leaders, etc. Being seen and heard would be sufficient; they wouldn't necessarily have to say a word about Vietnam to serve the purpose.

Capitalize on the national interests of the various Asian peoples in the fields of sports, music and arts as a means of reaching the common people with the non-political but nonetheless very important message that Americans are nice people. The Japanese, for example, are rabid baseball fans; a series of baseball clinics conducted around

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1965–66, Lot 69D260, Entry UD UP 175, 1966—EDX 32—Cultural Presentations. No classification marking. The letter is incorrectly dated January 14, 1965. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 24, ADVISORY GROUPS—General, 1965.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a December 20, 1965, letter from Hoyt to Marks. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand underlined the following phrases in this sentence: "show people in the Far East that we," "are united as a nation," "waging a racist war," and "Asia are honorable."

<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand drew a bracket to the left of this paragraph from the words "of people" to the words "just such a."

Japan by athletes like Willie Mays, Maury Wills and other Negro athletes whose names are household words in that country would expose them to the view<sup>5</sup> and admiration of millions. Korea is a great country for track and field; Taiwan has hundreds of outdoor basketball courts; Thais are rabid boxing enthusiasts and someone like Floyd Patterson would be greeted like a hero. The possibilities are endless.<sup>6</sup>

A similar program of good will and favorable exposure of Americans could be carried out with musicians and artists. Not long ago the University of Denver jazz band toured the Far East and made friends wherever they went. Projects such as this ought to be expanded. Imagine the reception that a sparkling Nisei<sup>7</sup> personality such as Pat Suzuki, the singer, would gain if she could be sent out to show Indonesians or Malaysians in a subtle, soft-sell manner that Americans are nice people and come in a variety of sizes and colors.

Re-export, if only temporarily, some of the skills and talents contributed to the American melting pot by the offspring of Asian immigrants. I have in mind such men as Minoru Yamasaki of Detroit, one of America's outstanding architects, who might be persuaded to travel through Asia talking to builders and developers about the architecture of a reawakening Asia. I am also thinking of Baron Goto, vice-chancellor of the East-West Center in Honolulu, already well-known throughout Asia, who is extremely versed in Asian agricultural problems. Of District Judge John Aiso of Los Angeles who can reach the legal profession. Of the Koda brothers who grow more rice in Central California than many Asian provinces. While all these men are Japanese-Americans, I am sure there are persons of comparable stature among the Chinese-Americans, Korean-Americans and Filipino-Americans, all capable of helping to bury the myth that the United States is an Anglo-Saxon nation waging a racist war in Asia, and expressing our interest in the welfare and progress of the people of Asia.

I would indeed appreciate your reaction to these views.

Sincerely,

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>8</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand drew a bracket to the left of this paragraph from the words "people with the non-political" to the words "expose them to the view."

<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand drew a bracket to the left of this paragraph from the word "Taiwan" to the end of the paragraph.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the Japanese word that means "second generation." In this context, the word is used to describe the American born children of first generation Japanese immigrants.

<sup>8</sup> Marks signed "Leonard" above this typed signature.

**73. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency (Moore) to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 25, 1966

SUBJECT

Summaries of Programs and Problems Submitted by PAOs

REFERENCE

Your memo of January 19, 1966<sup>2</sup>

1. *Major politico-psychological problems*—Our major problems stem from Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese overt and covert pressures against the independent nations of the Far East. Not only must we provide material exposing the dangers of these activities but we must also convince our audiences of our determination and ability to fulfill our military and economic commitments in the face of this growing menace.

2. *USIS Program Objectives*—In all cases, Country Plans are based upon the latest available statements of US policy. Each USIS country program, therefore, reflects the demands of the particular country situation. In all cases, however, the image of American strength, reliability and friendship is basic to our objectives.

3. *Media Techniques*—Effectiveness and usefulness of media techniques depend upon the audience and message. In all countries, personal contact is necessary in order to establish a receptivity to or

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Files Bx 33–36, 1966: Acc. #69–A–3445 [E], Entry UD WW 193, Box 33, The Director's Office (January through March, 1966). Confidential. Drafted by Smith. Printed from a uninitialed copy.

<sup>2</sup> Marks reviewed several PAOs' summaries of their activities and programs, which were referred to in the January 7 memorandum he received from White (see Document 69), and subsequently shared his thoughts with USIA's Area and Media Directors in this January 19 memorandum. He offered three conclusions for the Directors to consider:

"(1) Almost everywhere we say that our chief audience is leaders, yet our programs are not sufficiently directed toward them, nor are our techniques for identifying and keeping in touch with them as good as they should be.

"(2) Personal contact is accepted as our most effective medium, yet the nature of our programs is such that we do too little of it. Adding American personnel may be the answer in some cases but not in most; solutions must be found in the workload of the posts.

"(3) While most PAOs maintain that they have cut out peripheral activities, there is much evidence to the contrary, including inspection reports. PAOs need more help in identifying these activities and in managing their workloads."

Marks concluded the memorandum by requesting that the Directors of each area "summarize for me replies that have been received from its posts." (Ibid.)

awareness of a particular media product and is needed to gauge the value of all our programs.

4. *Target Audiences*—In almost every country of the area, our programs are directed at elite groups: government officials, university and high school teachers, media representatives, top-level business executives. Rural, mass audiences are also our target in Viet-Nam, Laos and Thailand where there are active counter-insurgency programs. In these countries we concentrate on training the information services of the host government and assisting its programs for establishing greater national unity. In most programs, however, budget stringencies make it impossible to carry out meaningful, mass efforts.

5. *Peripheral Activities Eliminated*—Cutbacks have been made by some posts in the variety of publications and radio programs distributed. In countries such as Burma, Indonesia and Cambodia, cuts were made at the request of the host governments. At all posts, steadily rising fixed costs make it difficult to maintain the effectiveness of current programs without budget increases.

6. *Larger Budget, Manpower*—In almost every case, PAOs could use larger staffs to capitalize on personal contact. Related to this is their view that new libraries and information centers can help the Post reach important segments of the population which at present receive minimal attention. They point out that fixed costs are usually eighty percent of their budgets and that added program money could increase the effectiveness of present staffs.

**74. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency (Carter) to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 26, 1966

Here are some general impressions I have formed after three months in this assignment, including a month-long field trip.

A.1. Many of our posts get locked into mechanisms and the general apparatus of the Agency; too many of our PAO's lack a sufficient sense of detachment to enable them to cut out marginal activities or those which have outlived their usefulness; and, worse, we don't often enough reshape a total program effort to new political and/or psychological situations.

2. The entire Agency—in Washington and in the field—would benefit by a reduction in total output. "The more the better" just ain't true in this business; "more" is apt to further diffuse what should be a highly concentrated effort directed toward very specific audiences.

3. PAOs generally pay too little attention to material produced at the regional centers. It's easy to incorporate this material into a program; just as easy to let it keep coming in without regular review of its value to a given program.

4. We've all got to be a lot tougher in our attitude toward taking on additional program activities. Otherwise we wind up with diffuse, activity oriented rather than tight, policy oriented programs.

These four concerns could best be attacked by more old-fashioned bossism by Area Directors and the front office. I think we engage in too many lengthy exchanges with the field over given program questions and ought, instead, to make a decision to cut, reduce, sharpen or improve and then make that decision stick.

B. There are three problems on which I feel the necessity for clarification here in Washington. I'm uncomfortable with the fact that our PAOs have varying views on these items, which are basic:

1. The purpose of English Teaching by USIA, regarded by some as an end in itself and by others (myself included) as a means to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Files Bx 33-36, 1966: Acc. #69-A-3445 [E], Entry UD WW 193, Box 33, The Director's Office (January through March, 1966). No classification marking. In response to this memorandum, Marks sent a February 2 memorandum to all area directors and all media directors drawing their attention to this memorandum and asking them: "Will you please give some thought to this and send your suggestions to me during the month of February?" Copies of Marks' memorandum and replies from Smith; Weld, Jr.; and Littell, dated March 2, February 23, and February 28, respectively, are *ibid*.

drawing appropriate target audiences into our program orbit. The one modification to this, I believe, is English Teaching in the bi-national centers.<sup>2</sup> In this case English Teaching is a primary source of revenue. Even here, however, every effort should be made to attract target groups and then fill out the classes as necessary.

2. A lot of our programs keep requesting “how-to-do-it” materials and it is my judgement that this crosses into AID’s province. This isn’t a question of bureaucratic line-drawing; it’s a question of the function and purpose of an information agency. Here again I’d like to see a clear statement prepared for the field.

3. In my area, over the past few years, some bi-national centers have been closed and we’ve markedly reduced our support of others. Although there’s no one clear rule, it is my general impression that the less our support of any center, the weaker our control and the more likely that the center will not play its appropriate role. So, generally, what’s the Agency’s position vis-à-vis support—more or less?

C. Here’s a long-range concern: to the extent that our field operations are split into several buildings, to that extent is effectiveness diminished. When and as possible, we should work toward physically unified programs.

D. Finally, the most difficult problem and one which I think deserves a discussion with all Area and Media Directors. I am convinced that we are not communicating effectively with the intellectual community in much of our area. This is due in part to the semantic “gap” (basically, the different meaning applied to the terms socialism and capitalism, and the various sub-terms that flow from these); in part to official statements that leave unclear our position concerning private versus public sector enterprises (we *sound*, too often, like we’re only for private sector development); partly because we seem to be critical about revolutionary strains in our own society (we’re so defensive about kids in the SDS, SNCC, etc.); partly because our elite audience occasionally wants us to be against governments elected by a majority but which are status quo governments (an impossible position for us to take). Whatever the reasons, we’re not in effective communication

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to independent, foreign institutions that served to promote mutual understanding between the United States and the host nation and generally worked closely with USIS offices, particularly in the area of English language teaching.

and I'd like to see a discussion with appropriate people to see if others feel the problem and also to make some suggestions of my own.<sup>3</sup>

Alan Carter<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand drew a line in the right-hand margin next to the final sentence of this paragraph and wrote the following sentence at the bottom of the page, beneath Carter's signature: "Our memo to Akers re scholarly + [several illegible words] on VN—other subjects—again too media oriented—" This memorandum to Akers was not found or further identified.

<sup>4</sup> Carter signed "A Carter" above this typed signature.

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**75. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency (Davies) to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 1, 1966

SUBJECT

*Pravda* Confirms Our Success

A searching analysis of Russian manpower waste by *Pravda*, the Soviet party newspaper, reported by Theodore Shabad in the *New York Times* of January 24, provides justification for one of the basic tenets of our policy in Eastern Europe.<sup>2</sup>

We have long maintained that our efforts directed toward the "satellite" countries of Eastern Europe are not only important for their impact upon the peoples of these countries but equally so for their pass-on impact upon the Soviet Union. A belated discovery that the Soviet citizen wastes 70 percent of his leisure time because of badly organized service industries has caused *Pravda* to advise Soviet planners to emulate the experience of the other countries of Communist

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 1966. Limited Official Use. Copies were sent to Akers, Anderson, Chancellor, Kolarek, Wright, and Jacobs.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is Theodore Shabad, "Pravda Asks Freer Free Time, Says Chores Fill 70% of Leisure," *New York Times*, January 24, 1966, p. 9.



Eastern Europe. *Pravda* points, for example, to the efficiency of the supermarkets like the Polish “Super Sam” which first came into being after we had displayed such a store at our exhibit in Poznan in 1958.<sup>3</sup>

*Pravda* may in fact be rushing us a bit. One of the major objectives of our Trade Fair exhibits in Eastern Europe this year is to encourage the spread of small, privately owned service shops. While we have been moving in this direction for several years, added impetus was provided earlier this year by Polish authorities who expressly asked that we show some of the machinery used in our service and repair shops. As with the supermarket, we are hopeful that a seed planted in the “satellite” countries will nurture fruit in the Soviet Union also.

There are other examples of this pass-on impact, the most obvious being the widespread popularity of American popular and dance music which spreads like wildfire from the Western borders of the Communist bloc to the East. *Pravda*’s recognition of this comes late, but is interesting, nevertheless.

IAS—R. T. Davies<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the city in Poland where major trade fairs were held in 1957 and 1958; the United States had exhibitions at both. (“U.S. Fairs Abroad Lift Iron Curtain,” *New York Times*, January 7, 1958, p. 54; A.M. Rosenthal, “Poznan Fair: Jazz, Sputnik, Blue Jeans,” *New York Times*, June 9, 1958, p. 1)

<sup>4</sup> Davies signed “Dick” above this typed signature.

**76. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 8, 1966

Dear Leonard:

Had I not been away from my desk, I would have answered your letter of January 14 before this.<sup>2</sup> I am delighted to have this expression, not only of your own concern, but that of Mr. Palmer Hoyt,<sup>3</sup> in our exchange of persons program in Asia. I found his suggestions, which you forwarded with your letter, both interesting and valuable.

In recruiting American participants for the Far East exchange program, as well as for other areas of the world, it has been our practice constantly to seek to reflect the multiracial character of our society. In fact, if we proceed on the principle of asking the outstanding people in their fields, the multiracial character of our society is almost automatically reflected, since we happen to have a society in which people with ability rise to the top, no matter what their origins. Thus, in recent years we have sent the following persons abroad:

Dr. Sammy Lee, Korean ancestry, Olympic High-Diving Champion (1948, 1952)

Mal Whitfield, Negro, Olympic 800-Meter Champion in Track (1948, 1952)

The San Francisco Chinese-American Basketball Team

The Harlem Globetrotters,<sup>4</sup> Negro

AAU Basketball Teams, racially-mixed

AAU Softball Team, racially-mixed

The Alvin Ailey Dance Company, composed of Negroes, Caucasians, and an Asian

Jade Snow Wong, Chinese ancestry, author of *The Fifth Chinese Daughter*

Dr. James M. Nabrit, Negro, President of Howard University

Dong Kingman, Chinese ancestry, renowned water-color artist.

The foregoing does not include a substantial number of Americans of Asian origin and Negroes whom we have "re-exported" under aca-

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1965-1966, Lot 69D260, Entry UD UP 175, 1966—EDX 32—Cultural Presentations. No classification marking. Drafted by Esterline on February 5; redrafted by Frankel on February 7.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 72.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Hoyt's December 20, 1965, letter to Marks; see footnote 2, Document 72.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the popular African-American exhibition basketball team, which was founded in 1926.

demic programs to the Far East as teachers, professors, and research scholars.

As an indication of our continued concern to give a multi-racial content to our cultural features, we have under active consideration for presentation such integrated groups as the Cornell University Glee Club, the Charlie Byrd Trio, the Northwestern Saxophone Quartette, and the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra. Among outstanding Negroes who recently have responded affirmatively to our solicitations are: John Wheeler, President, Mechanics and Farmers Bank, Durham, North Carolina; Harry H.C. Gibson, Vice-President and General Counsel for the Supreme Life Insurance Company, Chicago, and Dr. Frank M. Snowden, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, Howard University.

For reasons of policy, members of Congress are not funded through the exchange program because of the partisan issue, but we encourage their trips. We are not, however, under such limitation in the selection of officials at the state and local levels.

On the other hand, popular personalities such as Miss Pat Suzuki have ample opportunity through commercial channels for appearances in Asia. And World Series Baseball Champions, as Mr. Hoyt may know, have been visiting Japan for years under such auspices.

Among other persons mentioned by Mr. Hoyt, Minoru Yamasaki was approached about the possibility of participating in the exchange program, but without success, and the Koda brothers are associated with a technical and developmental field and are thus beyond the normal purview of our operations.

As funds and other priorities permit, we shall certainly consider the names on the list suggested by Mr. Hoyt to see if they are qualified for Department sponsorship.

I hope this information will be helpful and that you will continue to let me have your views on this and other subjects.

Sincerely yours,

**Charles Frankel<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**77. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (Zorthian) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Saigon, February 10, 1966

SUBJECT

The accelerated Media Coverage Effort

*Background*

The purpose of the coverage effort is to increase the flow abroad of information media materials on specific themes through three major channels: (1) from JUSPAO to targeted USIS posts, (2) from JUSPAO to USIA for processing and output to USIS posts, and (3) from the GVN PsyWar and foreign ministries to Vietnamese diplomatic missions abroad, with JUSPAO and USIA support and guidance.

The list of specific themes involved is flexible and can be adapted or increased as conditions change. At the start of the accelerated effort, they are (1) evidence of infiltration of regular NVN military units and bloc weapons from the North, (2) evidence that the VC's political structure is tied to Hanoi and has no basis of popular support in the South, (3) evidence of humane GVN treatment of VC and NVN prisoners, (4) the pacification (rural construction) program, (5) evidence of political stability and democratization progress, (6) economic and social progress, and (7) Free World (including U.S.) assistance, especially in non-military and civic action fields.

The urgency of the need for the accelerated effort was so great that in the three weeks since it started, the required reorganization of staff and material resources has been carried on simultaneously with actual coverage operations.

The basic reorganization of resources involved (1) the formation of a mobile coverage team capable of moving out on short notice to gather materials for all media without disrupting on-going programs; (2) the adjustment of media processing facilities in Saigon to give priority handling to the materials gathered; and (3) the allocation of material resources to support both the team and the media processing services.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963-1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Far East (Viet Nam) 1966, January, February, March. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Briggs.

*Accelerated Media Coverage Effort*

1. *Coverage Team.* The field coverage team consists of an American Field Manager, Press Reporter, Combat Photographer and Economics Reporter, and Vietnamese Radio Reporter and Mopix Photographer. Its composition may vary according to the assignment, and can be reinforced from the media sections as needed.

The media materials gathered by the team are adapted by the IPS Correspondent (columns and backgrounders), VOA Correspondent (English-language feeds to IBS), IBS Program Officer (other language reports by feed and tape to IBS and other posts), Publications Officer (features to RSC's, regional and other posts' publications), and USAID Liaison Office (photos and features to AID/W, USIA and other posts, and local release).

2. *Media Processing Adjustments.* Measures are being taken to adjust media processing facilities in Saigon to handle the increased flow of materials abroad. These include: a contract with the National Motion Picture Center for priority processing of film;<sup>2</sup> an increase in the number and output of other-language stringers for radio production; a shift of all but news photo processing from the Press Section to Tech Services; and internal Information Division cross-play of materials produced for one medium to other media for adaptation.

3. *Material Resources.* For the most part, the resources needed for this accelerated effort are being acquired. Arrangements for military air transportation to the field are functioning. A vehicle for fast coverages within the Saigon-Gia Dinh area is not yet available. Office space for a team headquarters has been allocated, and field media equipment has been furnished by the media sections. For the most part, personnel requirements have been met. The reassignment of the Press Officer without an immediate replacement has created a serious temporary shortage in the Press side of the operation, but the arrival of the special IPS coverage team will help alleviate this problem.

4. *The Vietnamese International Information Program.* Output through the third channel—from the PsyWar and Foreign ministries to GVN diplomatic missions abroad—is virtually at a stand-still. The "Vista" cables continue to be filed daily. A number of pamphlets created earlier are in process of production at RSC-Manila and of distribution. An information training course for Foreign Ministry officers who will carry on information activities abroad is continuing successfully. This is only a small fraction of what could be accomplished.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Government of South Vietnam's center for motion picture production.

The designation of an American officer to work exclusively on the development of this program with both the PsyWar directorate and the Foreign Ministry should help move the program into wider fields and more extensive production. The program will continue to meet frustrations, however, unless the PsyWar Director and Foreign Minister can be convinced to give the program a higher priority and larger and better staffs than is now the case.

*Highlights for Discussion with PsyWar Minister Chinh*

1. How can the PsyWar Ministry create a stronger International Information Program? The need is for more and better production of media materials designed for output through GVN diplomatic missions abroad. At present, the Ministry gives this program too low priority, and has assigned inadequate staff.

2. Looking ahead, can the Ministry give assurance of a balanced film production at the National Motion Picture Center? At present, the Center's resources are largely consumed in production for television. It should not neglect the continuing need for films and film processing for distribution at home and abroad.

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**78. News Release Prepared in the Office of Public Information,  
United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

No. 2

New York, February 11, 1966

Address by Leonard H. Marks, Director, U.S. Information Agency  
International Radio and Television Society Newsmaker Luncheon

**THE OTHER WAR IN VIET-NAM**

The story today in Viet-Nam is one of war. Radio and television, the headlines and front pages of our newspapers tell us daily of American forces—in support of our gallant Vietnamese allies—fighting countless deadly engagements in delta swamps, in dense jungles, over rugged mountainous terrain. The horizon of every American's concern has

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1069, Box 13, Leonard H. Marks, Speeches, 1966–1967. No classification marking. The address was delivered by Howard L. Chernoff, Executive Assistant to the Director, in Marks' absence.

been extended to remote places with unfamiliar names—the Iadrang river valley, Binhdin province, Chulai, Danang.

But there is another war being fought at the same time, and in the same country, that the American people know little about. It is the struggle for the minds and hearts of the Vietnamese people, and it is just as crucial in its final import as is the military effort. For this other war is a confrontation of concepts—those of freedom versus those of coercion.

In that struggle the whole matter of communications—communication among the people, and between the people and their government—is of vital importance. Let me tell you something about it.

Slow, low-flying airplanes drop millions of leaflets asking:

“Why do the Viet Cong kill innocent, unarmed people?

“Why are the Viet Cong rice taxes so very high?

“Why do the Viet Cong force the people to labor at gun point?”

Hovering helicopters relay recorded appeals to Viet Cong guerrillas from their wives and sweethearts to lay down arms and come home.

Traveling drama troupes—an ancient Vietnamese custom—bring entertainment to the hamlets as well as a kind of “commercial”, for they also speak out the story of attack and subversion from the North and of valiant resistance in the South.

Newly established provincial newspapers, national radio—and now television, posters and photo exhibits—set forth the Saigon Government’s efforts to build and to protect a free, prosperous and peaceful nation.

Offers to welcome back Viet Cong to the Government side *chieu hoi*—“with open arms”—have been even floated down rivers on banana tree rafts to enemy-held territory.

The North Vietnamese are informed by air leaflet drops of the facts of their regime’s aggression, of the reasons for our limited bombings. The leaflets make clear that it is the communist party of North Vietnam which is our enemy, not the people. Gift packages of clothing and toys are dropped addressed to the children of the North from the young people of the South.

South Vietnamese Government information teams are spread out over the countryside talking to the people face-to-face. They tell of the real goal of the Viet Cong—conquest, directed and supported by outside communist forces. They tell of the opportunities of freedom, of independence, and of rising levels of life possible with the end of communist aggression.

These are a few examples of the psychological and informational operations in the field of human communication being carried out with

vigor and ingenuity by the South Vietnamese—advised and assisted by American representatives operating in all 43 provinces of that tragic and war-scarred country.

Recognition of the critical importance of the psychological front and the necessity of a coordinated American approach was signaled in May, 1965, when President Johnson delegated the overall responsibility of coordinating and directing U.S. psychological and informational activities in Viet-Nam to the director of the United States Information Agency.<sup>2</sup> A new U.S. field organization—the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO)—was established to carry out this responsibility within Viet-Nam.

JUSPAO combined USIA's operations in Viet-Nam with the communications media activities of our AID program there, which provides communications equipment and technical advice to the Government of Viet-Nam. The U.S. military assigned carefully selected military officers to JUSPAO, and the Department of State contributed its own qualified personnel. JUSPAO also began providing policy direction to the psychological warfare operations of our military, to assure common policies and closer operational coordination between U.S. civilian and military psychological actions.

I know that all of you here today are interested particularly in the fields of television and radio. In the past few days television has come to Viet-Nam. It is yet another means of establishing sound, reliable and continuing communications between the Government and the people and its immediacy and visual impact make it a potentially powerful and effective medium in a country of wide regional and local differences to inform, to educate, to unify. At the same time this television capacity will be used to inform and to entertain our own forces stationed there.

We have also helped the Vietnamese to develop their own radio capability in many directions. We advise and assist the Vietnamese Broadcasting Corporation and the Vietnamese Defense Ministry's *Voice of Freedom*. We are training Vietnamese in program production, station and network management and administration, and central and regional programming.

The Voice of America—USIA's global radio network—broadcasts to South and North Viet-Nam six and one-half hours daily in Vietnamese. In the VOA transmitting and relay complex is a 50,000 watt, medium-wave relay transmitter situated at Hue in South Viet-Nam,

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<sup>2</sup> Delegation of that responsibility actually occurred on April 9, 1965, with the issuance of NSAM 330. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. II, Vietnam, January–June 1965, Document 246.



just south of the 17th parallel, with directional antennae capable of providing strong signals to both North and South Viet-Nam. Incidentally, this installation must be an audio thorn in the side of the communists since they have shelled it several times over the past year and a half and our personnel there have found it prudent to carry out their duties wearing side arms.

JUSPAO is perhaps the most unusual development in U.S. overseas information activities since the establishment in 1953 of the U.S. Information Agency as an independent arm of the Executive Branch of our Government.

What is its plan of action?

JUSPAO acts to help the Government of Viet-Nam:

- (1) to increase the participation of the Vietnamese people and their Government in the war against communist subversion and aggression;
- (2) to increase the Vietnamese people's participation in developing Viet-Nam's social and economic progress, and its unity as a nation within the free world community;
- (3) to develop further understanding of the United States and of our policies and programs among the Vietnamese; and
- (4) to increase other nations' understanding and support of Viet-Nam's cause.

To carry out this wide range of activities, JUSPAO's muscle has been carefully but substantially strengthened over the past months. Its manpower now includes some 160 Americans and nearly 400 Vietnamese fellow workers.

JUSPAO installations now comprise a headquarters in Saigon, a printing center, American cultural centers in four major cities, and field representatives operating in every province. JUSPAO also oversees U.S. support for seven Vietnamese-American centers throughout the nation.

The nerve ends of this entire operation are those valiant and valuable men—our field representatives.<sup>3</sup> Some 40 of them aided by over 100 Vietnamese colleagues are now serving throughout the country from the mountainous North to the Southern delta.

For the most part civilians, these representatives work at the rice roots<sup>4</sup> level under difficult wartime conditions. With a basic mission to move among the people, they must often do so in the sinister shadow of the Viet Cong presence. The danger is real. For instance, I can tell you that only a few days ago—on February 4—one of our own Vietnamese staff members, and four employees of the Vietnamese

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<sup>3</sup> For additional information about JUSPAO Field Representatives, see Document 54.

<sup>4</sup> Reference and comparison is to "grass roots," an American idiom used to describe the basic level or foundation.

Information Service, were ambushed and murdered by the enemy. Frequently far from home base, our representatives' success in cooperative operations with their Vietnamese Information Service colleagues singularly depends upon their own reservoirs of judgment, ingenuity—and courage.

Naturally such an intrepid corps develops its own legends. I have heard many. For instance, often our men in the field have to improvise. Because of higher priorities, air leaflet drops have been known to be cancelled. Some of our representatives at times have taken to hand delivering up to 10,000 leaflets from light L-19 observation planes simply by leaning out the side windows and letting fly. As a result a new occupational disease, known as "the L-19 arm" has developed—a bruise on the upper pitching arm—caused by repeatedly striking the window frame as the leaflets are flung into the wind.

The immediacy of our challenge is reflected in the report of one officer battling to keep hamlet bulletin boards from being shot up constantly by the Viet Cong. In one town he advised the construction of a reinforced concrete bulletin board and up went the latest posters. True to precedent, the Viet Cong tried to destroy it, but the board held and the patrol fled. There was beautiful irony in the theme of the bullet proof exhibit that the Viet Cong were unable to ruin: *how the Viet Cong fails to prevent the facts from reaching the people*.

Yes, our officers' days and nights out there can be quite different from life at more sedate and sartorially splendid posts. They tell of one particularly well-dressed man who after three days under mortar attack and nights in a slit trench remarked of his near lethal experience: "You sure can lose the crease in your pants out there".

After all this, it's a fair question to ask: how are we doing, and what have we accomplished?

To lead off, may I first point out that the JUSPAO coordinated effort is only little more than six months old.

And then I want to make clear that psychological and informational programs do not operate in a vacuum. They must—over the long haul—reflect the realities of situations. True national images—like personal ones—cannot be created by trick lights or soft focus.

But we *can* advise and assist in showing how modern methods can be established, how channels of communication can be opened up so that a vital flow of ideas, information, the facts may reach all the people.

Through such methods and channels the Vietnamese can learn, for instance, of strengthened American commitments, of the rise of their own national morale, of the increased terrorism of the Viet Cong, of Vietnamese-American military successes.

On this score a senior correspondent for a distinguished London journal wrote from Saigon only a couple of weeks ago that the impression of a mood of defeatism has “gone” in the South and has been replaced by an “all pervading certainty that the war cannot be lost”.

He goes on: “The notion spread by the communists the world over that the Viet Cong movement is a spontaneous, indigenous and gallant agrarian revolt against a repressive Saigon regime is self-evident nonsense. The Viet Cong’s exceptionally revolting system of rule by sudden terror, murder, and mutilations, which understandably evokes counter-terror, is a system under which 1,100 village and hamlet chiefs and other local officials were assassinated in one year—a living advertisement for Mao’s dictum that power grows out of the barrel of a gun . . . If the Viet Cong movement had any genuinely convinced support among the South Vietnamese populace, it is scarcely conceivable that the National Liberation Front should have totally failed to attract a single Vietnamese of any standing or caliber in the South, even during last year’s nadir of hope.”

One way to gauge your psychological effectiveness is how sharply the opposition reacts. Let’s look at the record. The North Vietnamese army paper, *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, has said: “They—the South Vietnamese and the Americans—have resorted to the use of radio stations, leaflets, anonymous letters with counter-revolutionary contents slandering us with despicable and disgusting arguments, and false rumors fabricating thrilling and attractive stories in the hope of creating skepticism, the fear of war and of the United States among our people.”

Another case: “They take advantage of the poor political standards, the inquisitiveness and talkativeness of a number of persons in order to use them as loudspeakers to disseminate their psychological warfare venom in an unconscious way.”

And on September 11 Hanoi Radio’s *domestic service*—not designed for foreign consumption—reported that: “. . . the enemy has intensified its activities against our installations and dropped leaflets spreading false rumors with the aim of sowing confusion among our cadres and people. The revolutionary vigilance and the fighting spirit of our cadres and people are *not* as high as desired.”

Another way to measure results—set within the context of psychological potentials—is to chart the course of defections by the Viet Cong and their supporters.

Here it is significant to note that the rate of defections has trended sharply upward over the past twelve months. For instance, the January 1965 figure was 406. But by December it had climbed to 1,482. During 1964 the number had averaged out to something between 150 and 200 monthly. By the latter half of 1965 this average was over the 1,000 mark.

I cite some instances of specific action and reaction. On October 24, copies of eight different leaflets were airdropped into Viet Cong threatened areas in 15 southern provinces. Calls to defect were carried directly to the enemy by loudspeakers, airborne and located on the ground. Over the next three weeks a careful check was made of Viet Cong defectors. Of 86 coming from the areas covered, 62 carried with them copies of the leaflets dropped on October 24.

In another area a similar effort produced the joint defection of a 22-man Viet Cong guerrilla platoon and an eight-man Viet Cong cell, the largest single Viet Cong unit defection in the war to date.

During last month—January—the Vietnamese Government's Psychological Warfare Ministry carried out an intensive propaganda campaign to coincide with Tet—the seven-day Vietnamese observance of the lunar new year—which is a celebration with profound nationalist, cultural and religious implications. JUSPAO provided considerable logistical support and other assistance to the campaign.

Its principal objective was to enhance the confidence of the Vietnamese people in their Government and to erode the faith of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces in their own leadership and cause. Stress was laid on the Government's *chieu hoi*—open arms—program.

Just a few days ago I learned that during January there were 1672 *chieu hoi* returnees—this sets a record. Now these results, obviously, can be only partly attributable to the Tet campaign, and they are only very early straws in the wind—and nothing more. But they do give reason for sensible hope.

Where do all these psychological and information programs lead?

In a profound and long-term sense we Americans—through the JUSPAO experience—are gaining invaluable insight into how best to blunt and turn the thrust of what the communists call “wars of liberation”—to wit: the tragic visitation upon innocent people desiring only peace and freedom of subversion, infiltration, guerrilla operations, terror tactics. There can be no doubt that the somber prospect of possible future “liberating wars” makes it essential that we develop—in the free world—highly effective techniques to stop the communists at their new ploy for conquest.

In South Viet-Nam itself these psychological and informational programs can result in the firm forging of continuing and effective lines of communication to allow discussion and decision among the people and between them and their Government. It can also save and widen the opportunities for Viet-Nam to participate and to gain from the constant international exchange of ideas, inventions and innovations between the free nations of the world.

The South Vietnamese want this freedom and they have the inalienable right to enjoy it.

Let me give you just one example of how badly they want it, and I quote from a recent *Editor and Publisher* article datelined Bloomington, Indiana:

“Prophetic words were spoken a year ago at Indiana University by a South Vietnamese editor. He was murdered recently in front of his home in Saigon by the Viet Cong.

“The slain editor was Vu Nhat Huy, editor-in-chief of Viet-Nam’s second largest newspaper, *Chinh Luan* (Right Reason). A year ago he was in a group of 19 newsmen who spent four months in the Foreign Journalists project, sponsored by the State Department, which is based at Indiana University.

“Professor Floyd G. Arpan, director of the program for the past 15 years, recalled that at a seminar on the campus, Mr. Huy asserted:

“‘All of us must fight for principles, and in South Viet-Nam we are engaged in a life and death struggle for those principles. Some of us will die for those principles.’ . . .

“According to press dispatches, he was one of many Vietnamese newsmen who received letters from the communists threatening them with death if they did not moderate their editorial policies to suit the Viet Cong.

“Chinh Luan published the letter he received along with an editorial of defiance of the communists. According to press dispatches, a gunman killed Mr. Huy when he arrived home for lunch with his wife and six children.”

There is then this one bedrock humanitarian issue of ultimate principle and purpose—the fate of every Vietnamese man, woman and child. The Vietnamese people want peace, independence, social and economic progress. We know that it is the free world that can help them best to achieve these ends. They must be allowed to have this opportunity.

It has been the free and peaceful interplay of minds, and talents, and skills that has produced the most harmonious systems of government and the greatest economic abundance the world has ever known. Mao Tse-tung can assert that power grows out of the barrel of a gun, but it was Victor Hugo who discerned that: “No army can withstand the strength of an idea whose time has come”.

This then is the season for testing. The time is now and the place is Viet-Nam. The issues, psychological—in the broadest meaning of that word—as well as military need to be known the world over. For I submit that, in the final reckoning, how the psychological struggle goes will turn out to be as decisive as what happens on the field of battle.

The USIA is now telling the story of that struggle—and all that it implies—to men everywhere.

This task, of course, is only one part of our Agency's role in the foreign affairs establishment. For we have a daily challenge and a vital responsibility to present to *the world*, in full and fair perspective, the truth about America in order to gain foreign understanding of our ideals and aims, and—where possible—support for our policies and actions.

To carry out this mission we have a huge broadcasting network, movie and television producing studios, a magazine chain, a worldwide radio-teletype service, a cultural, library and exhibit program. And, certainly the most important asset: a dedicated foreign service corps serving in over 100 countries around the globe.

Our constant goal is to ensure that no man anywhere chooses tyranny because he has never had the opportunity to know of the philosophy and prospects of freedom.

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**79. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the Assistant Directors for the Areas<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 23, 1966

SUBJECT

CU Programs

I have been concerned for some time that we may not be getting as much from the CU programs as we might if they were given more attention and better planned. I am thinking particularly of the American leader grants and the performing artists, which are a major resource in furthering our national objectives.

My concern goes both to the quality of the selections and to the choice of what kind of grantees and performers.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 4, Government Agencies—State, Department of, 1966. No classification marking.

I believe the Assistant Directors for the areas should be as concerned with and, in effect, know as much about these programs in their respective areas as they do about the ones we finance.

This will require two things:

(1) Substantially greater initiative on the part of PAO's and CAO's to request well in advance those leaders and performers that will directly support U.S. objectives in their countries.

(2) Much closer cooperation between you and the regional branches of CU in the earliest stages of planning and programming.

You should be in a position to support and defend the selection of an American leader grantee or a performing artist for your area as well you are your own programs.

I realize there will be differences of opinion and that the position of USIA will by no means always prevail. However, when you are in very fundamental disagreement on a major program, or where you think the resources of the Government may be wasted, or where you think a particular grant or tour will be actually harmful, these can be brought to me for direct discussion with Dr. Frankel.

You should also make certain you are aware of and concur in every monetary or other grant to a foreign academic or cultural institution, or to a U.S. institution for activities abroad. We had a recent incident where a grant of \$214,000 was made to an American University for cultural activities in Paris, of which no one in this Agency—in Washington at least—was aware.<sup>2</sup> This was at a time when we were undertaking a controversial change in our own cultural activities there.

I am attaching a copy of a letter I've sent to Dr. Frankel which I hope will facilitate more intimate cooperation between you and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

**Leonard H. Marks**

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<sup>2</sup> According to the *New York Times*, "The signing of an agreement in Paris last Friday under which the University of Paris and the State University of New York will jointly operate the Institute of American Studies in Paris with the continued aid of the United States Government." (Farnsworth Fowle, "State University Plans a Role in Foreign Study and Exchanges," January 25, 1966, p. 36)

## Attachment

### **Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel)<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, March 2, 1966

Dear Charles:

As you know I have for some time shared your concern about certain aspects of the exchange program, particularly the selection of American leader grantees and performing artists.

I recognize that our policy and desk officers have worked closely with your regional people for some time and that there has been cooperation in planning your program.

It occurred to me that this program for which you and I both have a responsibility might be materially enhanced if my Assistant Directors worked more closely with their regional counterparts in your office. I know that you would welcome such further assistance and accordingly, I am instructing my Assistant Directors to keep me fully informed of your program so that I can defend and support it when any inquiry is made.

This letter is prompted primarily by our current preparation for hearings before the Appropriations Committee and the realization that in some instances we have not known about your plans until they were announced. Specifically, the recent action making available \$214,000 to the University of the State of New York for activities in Paris came at a time when we were retrenching our library activities there to carry out congressional mandates. Obviously, your assistance to the University of the State of New York at this time could have been—and may still be—a source of embarrassment to both of us.

The instructions which I have issued hopefully will preclude any similar incident in the future.

Sincerely,

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> No classification marking.

<sup>4</sup> Marks signed "LHM" above this typed signature.



**80. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 24, 1966

Dear Leonard:

I am glad to know that you are back, and trust that the many missions you have been performing leave you still as full of bounce as ever.

I have waited to respond to your letter of December 20<sup>2</sup> about the flow of communications from CU to the field until your return. Meanwhile, however, I have talked to Bob Akers about your letter, as well as about communications that people on my staff have been receiving from Howard Chernoff.

The general problem of excessive communications to our posts had concerned me long before I took this post. Immediately on entering it, I asked that procedures be introduced to cut down this flow wherever possible. Our progress is attested by the fact that our Executive Director, Theo Hall, recently received a nomination for an honor award from the Department because CU has had a better record since September in controlling communications than any other Bureau of the Department.

You will see, then, that we are entirely on the same road. With regard to the specific matters you put before me, I must say that the record is mixed. While we hear complaints, some of them justifiable, we also hear only too often from the typical Embassy PAO that he “appreciates the guidance and support received from the Department and has no suggestions for improvement” (to quote a recent report<sup>3</sup> from PAO Cyprus). But I am not satisfied, and will never be satisfied, until I can be sure that we have done everything possible to cut down communications that are unnecessary. I am sure that you in USIA are making the same effort.

In this connection, we have found that some of the bulky items sent out from this office consist of reference material. No one expects the posts to read this material in its entirety. It is essential, however, that they have this material at hand if they are to be able to answer

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 4, Government Agencies—State—Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 1966. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

questions that come up in connection with their administration of exchange programs.

However, we have found instances where such material was broadcast much too far and wide, and we are trying to cut down on it. We also are working steadily at eliminating wordiness.

I suspect that in many cases procedural and informational material could be communicated to the posts more effectively by improving our use of the Foreign Affairs Manual. We are looking into this possibility urgently. Meanwhile, it is good to know of your progress in USIA about communications and I am sure you will be glad to know of ours. We shall work together on this.

Sincerely,

Charles Frankel<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Frankel signed "Charles" above this typed signature.

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**81. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 14, 1966

Our offices in Europe report the need for continuing efforts in informing responsible audiences of developments in Vietnam and the extent of U.S. participation.

To carry out this responsibility, I have arranged with the Department of State to send teachers, writers, and others capable of interpreting our policy.

At the same time, we have sent American experts from other U.S. Government agencies using PL-480 funds for travel.<sup>2</sup> For example, a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Federal Government Organizations, EX FG 296, Box FG-315, FG 296 4/25/67-6/15/67. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, which President Eisenhower signed into law on July 10, 1954. (Public Law (P.L.) 480 (68 Stat. 454)) The law established the Food For Peace program. Under its provisions, the United States could make concessional sales of surpluses grains to friendly nations, earmark commodities for domestic and foreign disaster relief, and barter surpluses for strategic materials.

senior AID official who formerly was in charge of Vietnamese affairs in Washington has just completed a very successful tour, and the deputy chief of the USIS mission in Vietnam will be used for this purpose on his way to Washington for home leave.

Based upon these experiences, I would like to suggest:

(1) That State, AID, Agriculture, HEW, and USIA each assign one man to a traveling task force to meet with important policy-determining groups in Europe for the next several months.

(2) That individual members of the task force be assigned at the earliest possible date to Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, France, and Austria for speaking engagements as soon as suitable arrangements can be completed.

If you approve, I will undertake to coordinate this assignment.<sup>3</sup>

**Leonard H. Marks**

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<sup>3</sup> The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendations but below the recommendations Johnson wrote: "Send to Rusk direct for his decision. L." A notation in an unknown hand below Marks' signature reads: "Msg Relayed to Mr. Marks Mar 15 12:30 p."

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**82. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 15, 1966

Mr. President:

The Secretary of State plans to speak to you about the Russian exchange negotiations. He feels very strongly that we should let Leddy initial tomorrow.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of the White House Aides, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 6, CU (Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs) 1966. No classification marking. An unknown hand wrote "March 15, 8:09 P.M." in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Leddy and Dobrynin signed the new exchange agreement on March 19. For the full text of the United States-Soviet Cultural Exchange Agreement, for the Years 1966 and 1967, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966*, pp. 461–476.

Unfortunately, the “Hello, Dolly”<sup>3</sup> company which was all set to go to Moscow last year has broken up. (Mary Martin<sup>4</sup> is in the current London production, with a predominantly British company.)

Subject to our going ahead with the agreement the Russians have signed contracts to receive the Iowa State Symphony,<sup>5</sup> the Earl Hines Jazz Band, the New England Conservatory Chorus and the Boston Symphony Chamber Players. In addition, we are negotiating for the American Ballet Company and the Los Angeles Symphony. Dean Rusk’s memorandum of yesterday reporting on this, and my cover note are at Tab A. (I have been standing by to see you but I understand from Marvin<sup>6</sup> you have had a rough day.)

Rusk’s earlier memo reporting on negotiating position is at Tab B.<sup>7</sup>

Francis M. Bator<sup>8</sup>

## Tab A

### Covering Note From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson<sup>9</sup>

Washington, March 14, 1966, 7:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Leddy has what appears to be a reasonable “exchange agreement” deal with the Russians.

As the attached memorandum from Dean Rusk reports, the Russians have specifically agreed to new, much tougher language which puts them on notice that they cannot get away with another “Hello Dolly” without retaliation on our part. (They have tried to make amends for “Hello Dolly” by agreeing to receive the Iowa State Symphony.)

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<sup>3</sup> Popular American musical play originally produced in 1964. In 1965, the Soviet Union cancelled an American production of *Hello Dolly* that was to be staged in Moscow as part of a United States exchange program agreement with the Soviet Union. For additional information regarding the cancellation, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Documents 125, 136, and 137.

<sup>4</sup> Popular American stage and film actor.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the Iowa State University symphony.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to Marvin Watson.

<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand, presumably that of Bator, inserted the word “our” between “on negotiating” and crossed out the entire sentence. No Tab B was found attached.

<sup>8</sup> Bator initialed “FMB” above this typed signature.

<sup>9</sup> No classification marking.

All of your advisors are agreed that renewal of this tougher agreement is a net gain for us.

May I tell John Leddy that he can go ahead and initial? State would like to do so on Wednesday, March 16, so that the Russians can go home.

Francis M. Bator<sup>10</sup>

Go ahead \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_<sup>11</sup>

No \_\_\_\_\_<sup>12</sup>

### Attachment

#### Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson<sup>13</sup>

Washington, March 14, 1966

#### SUBJECT

New Exchanges Agreement with Soviet Union

We have now completed negotiations and are prepared to sign on March 16 a new two-year exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union.

The new agreement provides for a balanced program of exchanges generally comparable in scope and size to the previous program. The agreement also preserves the provisions which keep the program under United States Government direction.

In addition, we successfully introduced new language regarding the appearance of performing arts groups in order to prevent any repetition of the "Hello, Dolly!" situation. Henceforth, if the Soviets fail to receive an agreed American group, we now have a clearly understood basis for refusing their groups. The Soviets are also signing today a contract to receive the Iowa State Symphony Band to make up for their failure to receive "Hello, Dolly!". Thus, when we sign the over-

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<sup>10</sup> Bator initialed "FB" above this typed signature.

<sup>11</sup> The President placed a checkmark on the line that reads "Speak to me." Next to it, he wrote: "Why not send Hello Dolly back as #1 visit—L."

<sup>12</sup> An unknown hand added this handwritten "No" line.

<sup>13</sup> Confidential. Also printed as Document 154 in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union.

all agreement on Wednesday, the way will be clear for the Bolshoi Ballet<sup>14</sup> to come to the United States on April 19.

After prolonged resistance, the Soviets finally accepted an exchange of two exhibits. The previous agreement had provided for an exchange of three exhibits, but in practice the Soviets refused to approve more than two, since American exhibits are politically troublesome for them.

We made clear to the Soviets our concern over obtaining adequate arrangements for distribution of *Amerika*<sup>15</sup> magazine in the U.S.S.R. They in turn indicated that our distribution would be improved if circulation of their magazine *Soviet Life*<sup>16</sup> increases in the United States.

The Soviet decision to negotiate the agreement, after months of stalling, and Soviet willingness to receive American attractions beginning next month (after refusing to do so since last September on the grounds of Viet-Nam) indicate a Soviet desire not only to keep the exchanges program alive, but also to avoid further deterioration in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.

The Soviets have indicated that they wish a minimum of publicity on the agreement. Obviously they are sensitive to Peiping's charges of Soviet-American collaboration. For our part, we see no reason to play up the agreement.<sup>17</sup>

**Dean Rusk**

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<sup>14</sup> Famous Russian ballet company founded in 1776.

<sup>15</sup> Reference is to a Russian-language USIA publication distributed in the Soviet Union.

<sup>16</sup> Reference is to an English-language Soviet Government publication distributed in the United States.

<sup>17</sup> An unknown hand drew two pairs of parallel lines in both the left- and right-hand margins of this paragraph.

**83. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 18, 1966

**SUBJECT**

American Prestige

Since you may be questioned about America's prestige as a result of current press analyses you may wish to review our findings on the subject. Enclosed is a general summary of our latest World Survey of 22 countries and major cities around the world.<sup>2</sup> The "Highlights" section, together with the accompanying charts, gives the gist of the story. The main highlights are underlined in red.

Briefly, the general esteem for the United States is still very high, whereas the esteem for the Soviet Union is still on the negative side of the scale. Any esteem for Communist China is hard to find.

General reaction to U.S. foreign policies is still far more favorable than unfavorable, as is the case with the "peace" image of America. Judgments of the overall national strength put the U.S. clearly out in front.

Trends are somewhat downward, however, in judgments of our foreign policies and our efforts to prevent another war. These trends result mainly from our Vietnam and Dominican involvements.

Although we do not have such quantitative measurements of your image as President, press and other analyses indicate that you share the high esteem of the nation and you share blame for some of the nation's problems. Your determined and confident assumption of control after the assassination, your resoluteness and effectiveness on the civil rights front, your proclaiming the Great Society<sup>3</sup> and gaining legislative support for it, and your "peace offensives" have been widely and highly admired. It is only when you are forced to take an action that can be interpreted as a danger to the peace of the world or the sovereignty of another state that your image suffers. Perhaps the truest

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Reference, Office of the Asst. Dir. For Research and Analysis, Research Programs Files, 1961–1966, Entry P-89, Box 4, White House (2 of 2) 1963–1965. Confidential. There is no indication on the memorandum that Johnson saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> The Great Society was Johnson's initiative of social programs articulated in his May 22, 1964, commencement speech at the University of Michigan. For text, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1963–1964*, Book I, pp. 704–707.

index of your stature is the degree to which the bright image of President Kennedy has now faded.

Leonard H. Marks<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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#### 84. Policy Program Directive Prepared in the Office of Policy, United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>

No. 4-4-66

Washington, April 15, 1966

##### *U.S. FOOD AID AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE*

##### *Policy*

Food supplies and population growth are two sides of a major world problem. It is a problem with political as well as economic and humanitarian overtones. It affects the stability and economic advancement of all peoples, especially those in the developing lands.

These lands, with their traditional agriculture, are losing their ability to feed themselves as populations grow and demands increase. Many which were food exporters have now become food importers.

Present food-exporting nations such as the United States have helped fill the food gap in recent years. They cannot feed the world indefinitely. U.S. commodity stockpiles are declining. U.S. productive capacity and reserves are adequate to help feed the hungry nations for a while. But the U.S., even if it put all idle acres into production, would not be able to meet the food needs of the world for more than 10 or 15 years.

The U.S. can increase its food aid even though its stockpiles are reduced. But this food aid must become part of a vast effort to modern-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963-1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 6, Policy & Plans—General 1966. Limited Official Use. Anderson sent a copy of the Policy Program Directive to all USIA Assistant Directors and USIS posts under an April 15 memorandum indicating that the guidance was the fourth in a series of policy program directives. (Ibid.)



ize agriculture in less-developed countries. The major U.S. export must be technical know-how.

It is clear that most of the additional food needs of the hungry nations must be met through the expansion of their own food production. Unless these nations move to expand their own production now, the food gap will be even greater in the future.

As President Johnson said in the new Food for Freedom program he proposed to Congress on February 10, 1966, "The key to victory is self-help."<sup>2</sup>

*Food Supply:* In many developing countries, increasing food demands resulting from rapid population growth—and in some instances from rising incomes as well—are outstripping food production plus feasible imports. This means that less-developed countries must step up their own food production, improve their agricultural policies, and put more emphasis on agriculture.

The U.S. is prepared to help in these efforts, and is putting more emphasis on agriculture in its foreign aid. Wherever appropriate, the U.S. is prepared to relate its food aid to self-help measures which less-developed countries take to improve their own agricultural production or to accelerate their own economic development in general.

The relationship between food aid and self-help is underscored in the President's proposed Food for Freedom program, through which the U.S. would lead the world in a "war against hunger." This program envisages use of the vast productive capacity and know-how of American agriculture to help meet world needs. It thus would get away from the frequently troublesome concept of surplus disposal under Public Law 480.<sup>3</sup> Farm products would not have to be in surplus to be available under the Food for Freedom program. It would gradually phase out over a five-year period the present policy of selling commodities for local currencies, and would make food aid available on much the same terms as other economic development assistance: credit sale for dollars, repayable over a long term and at a low interest rate.

The U.S. also is prepared to increase its participation in realistic regional and multilateral efforts to help meet food needs, and would like to see other developed countries—both food exporters and importers—assume an appropriate share of the food aid burden. Such assist-

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<sup>2</sup> In a February 10 special message to Congress, Johnson indicated that he planned to revamp the Food for Peace program renaming it "Food for Freedom," and emphasize self-help initiatives as a condition for PL-480 agreements. For text of the message, and Johnson's statement on it, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1966*, Book I, pp. 163–169.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 81.

ance may take the form of contributions in kind (food, fertilizer, pesticides, shipping services, technical assistance) or in cash.

Food aid alone is the road to disaster. Food aid must be a tool of technical aid—a means by which less-developed countries can boost their own production.

*Nutrition:* Food aid must also relate to the food needs of the hungry nations. New medical evidence indicates that serious malnutrition, especially protein and vitamin deficiencies, can permanently retard young children—physically and mentally. As adults, they may not be able to do a full day's work. Improved nutrition thus not only serves the humanitarian purpose of relieving hunger and misery, but also contributes to progress.

The U.S. is enriching its Food for Peace shipments where it can to help overcome these deficiencies, and is working with recipient countries and with private industry to develop special foods to help meet nutritional needs. U.S. efforts by themselves cannot solve the problem, however. Local agricultural, health, industrial and commodity development programs all can contribute to improved nutrition. Local production of fortified and formulated foods can be increased, with technical and financial help—public and private—from the U.S.

*Population:* Concerned with the problems which rapidly rising populations pose in developing lands, the U.S. has expressed a willingness to help, both to improve statistical understanding of the problem and to establish and expand voluntary programs of family planning. Where appropriate, the U.S. is prepared to give top priority to sound technical cooperation proposals.

The U.S. recognizes that agricultural and nutritional improvement will have limited effect in the long run if rapid population growth continues to outrun available food. Hence, to be effective these programs must be coupled with intelligent efforts at population control and family planning.

#### *Treatment*

We want all audiences to understand and accept the following propositions:

(1) Every country has an important stake in the search for solutions to problems of food shortage and malnutrition amid an unprecedented increase in world population. These problems represent not only moral and humanitarian issues for all governments, but also potential threats to the political stability and aspirations of food-short nations.

(2) It is important that every country in a position to contribute toward solutions of these problems do so as best it can, through unilateral and multilateral means. It is clear, however, that the combined food exports and reserves of the food-abundant nations could not begin

to fill the growing gap between food supply and food demand. Food aid can help to solve, but cannot accomplish alone, the task of meeting the food needs of food-deficient developing countries. Recipients in turn should relate food aid, no less than other forms of economic assistance, to effective self-help measures.

(3) The future stability of each less-developed country requires it to give highest priority to agricultural development and population growth within the overall effort to achieve satisfactory standards of living. These priorities do not impede, but actually enhance other forms of development—e.g., industrial. Application of scientific knowledge to correct a national imbalance between agricultural development and population growth can advance a developing nation toward the goals of overall development.

(4) World food problems concern quality as well as quantity. Their solutions require not only determined self-help in food-short countries to increase per acre yields, but also more emphasis on such key factors as improved nutrition and education in nutritional practices, avoiding waste and spoilage, improving food distribution, and effective incentives for farmers.

In the above framework, emphasize the following points:

—The U.S. is concerned with the world's food problem, and will continue to do what it can to forestall and alleviate hunger and improve nutrition in food-deficient lands.

—The U.S. has a notable record of food and technical assistance. Its Food for Peace and technical agricultural assistance program has served both humanitarian and economic ends. (Where possible, translate these accomplishments into human terms to show their impact on people.) This includes, for example, special feeding programs for children; special emergency and disaster donations; sale of foods for local currencies, research on improved crops and livestock, soil and water conservation, farm credit, and improved marketing. Note that in its sales of surplus commodities under the Food for Peace program, the U.S. has been careful not to disrupt normal international markets and has consulted with other exporting nations whose sales might be affected by concessional sales programs. This practice will be continued.

—The President's proposed Food for Freedom program,<sup>4</sup> which must be approved by Congress before it becomes effective (a point

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<sup>4</sup> Although Congress rejected the proposed name change of the Act to "Food for Freedom," Johnson signed the Food for Peace Act of 1966 into law (PL 89-808, 80 Stat. 1526) on November 12. (See Robert B. Semple, Jr., "President Signs Food Peace Plan But Scores Curbs," *New York Times*, November 13, 1966, p. 1; and Chesly Manly, "U.S. Overseas Aid Cost Soars to 10 Billions," *Chicago Tribune*, November 13, 1966, p. 1)

worth noting while it is applicable), would further enhance U.S. assistance efforts by removing the limitations of surplus commodity disposal and putting food aid on a continuing long-term basis geared to supply-demand considerations. By relating food aid to overall development planning and local self-help efforts, it also would provide a realistic and workable incentive to needed agricultural improvements in developing lands.

—In private as well as public capacities, the American people are ready to share their well-being with peoples of other nations. In addition to government transactions, private nonprofit organizations in the U.S. cooperate in the Food for Peace program, and otherwise help meet food needs abroad. Private American companies play an important role in helping to meet local requirements for more and better food by providing (1) needed equipment and supplies, (2) capital investments (often jointly with local sources), and (3) technical know-how to help build up local production of fertilizers and pesticides; to develop more efficient storage and distribution methods and facilities; and to fill other related needs. This role of private industry can be enlarged where feasible with appropriate encouragement from abroad.

—Where developing countries take the initiative in giving increased attention to population problems, the U.S. is ready to assist. U.S. support of national and international efforts toward a solution of such problems is based on two premises: (1) free choice for the individual, and (2) increased availability of knowledge to the individual for making this choice.

—Self-help efforts by developing countries to increase agricultural production and marketing embrace a wide range of activities from both public and private sources. They include the use of more and better seeds, equipment, fertilizers, pesticides and other supplies; flood control and irrigation; better cultural practices; better storage and distribution to avoid waste and spoilage; incentives to farmers—land tenure and farm credit policies, etc.—which will elicit from them a maximum production effort. In all of these the U.S., with its notably productive agriculture, has the kind of broad experience and know-how which can be applied effectively to the problems of other nations.

Throughout, make clear that the task of increasing agricultural production and meeting food needs will not be easy. It requires the wholehearted attention and effort of developing countries. It is far from hopeless if undertaken in a determined and intelligent manner. A number of less developed lands have made notable strides in this direction, to the benefit of the entire developmental process. Progress of this kind can be usefully cited to audiences elsewhere. To the extent, moreover, that increased production helps reduce dependence on imports (this may include fertilizers, for instance, as well as food), or

enhances the capability to expand agricultural exports, it also helps build up foreign exchange needed to advance the total economic development of a nation.

*SOME PERTINENT BACKGROUND READING*

President Johnson's Message to Congress on the Foreign Aid Program, February 1, 1966.

President Johnson's Message to Congress on Food for Freedom, February 10, 1966.

Passages on foreign aid in the budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1967.

Economic Report of the President, together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, January, 1966.

Food for Peace Program Charts.

Background Memorandum, "The Foreign Assistance Act of 1966," Agency for International Development, Program for Fiscal Year 1967.

"Food for Freedom," February 10, 1966, by Departments of State and Agriculture and Agency for International Development.

"Changes In Agriculture in Twenty-Six Developing Nations 1948–1963," Department of Agriculture, November 23, 1965.

*International Development Review*, December 1965: "Unsolved Problems of International Development," by Walt W. Rostow.

AIDTO Circular A 342, April 13, 1965, "Fiscal Year 1967 Program Submission."

AIDTO Circular A 18, July 20, 1965, "Combatting Malnutrition in the Preschool Child."

Secretary of Agriculture Freeman's address at Biennial Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, Italy, November 23, 1965: "Hope for Hungry Nations."

Secretary of Agriculture Freeman's statement before the House Committee on Agriculture, February 23, 1966.

CEDTO 870, March 17, 1966, "World Food Problem."

*Food for Peace*, Monthly Newsletter published by Food for Peace Office.

*Foreign Agriculture*, Weekly Magazine published by Foreign Agriculture Service, Department of Agriculture.

85. **Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Director, Viet-Nam Affairs, Office of the Assistant Director for the Far East, United States Information Agency (Marlowe) to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 15, 1966

SUBJECT

After the Crisis,<sup>2</sup> What?

This memorandum is being written on the optimistic basis that the current crisis will somehow be resolved, that a *modus operandi* satisfactory to the Buddhist Institute, the current GVN and other major forces will be reached, and that a constitution will be written which will lead to the installation of an elected, more or less representative civilian government. Assuming that this is the way the next act will unfold, what should we have learned from the last crisis which will help deal with or even (ever hopeful) prevent the next.

Certainly we did not need this crisis to teach us how fragile the government of South Viet-Nam—any government of South Viet-Nam—is. That we already knew or should have known. Similarly we knew how badly the political and social structure of Viet-Nam is fractionized; and how lacking each faction is in positive political ideas or programs. We knew, too, how the society is lacking in competent leaders dedicated not to the furtherance of a particular group or interest but to the building of the nation.

But there are things we either didn't know or to which we didn't pay sufficient heed. Admittedly our knowledge about them, even

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Files Bx 33-36, 1966: Acc. #69-A-3445 [E], Entry UD WW 193, Box 33, The Director's Office (April through June, 1966). Secret. Sent through Moore. An unknown hand wrote: "IAF—Mr. Oleksiw" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the 1966 Buddhist Crisis, also referred to as the Buddhist Uprising, during which Buddhists in South Vietnam, initially in Da Nang and Hue, led protests against the military junta-based government of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky. The Buddhists and their supporters, who were displeased in part because of Ky's firing of General Nguyen Chanh Thi in March, called for an end to the Ky government. They also demanded a return to civilian rule in South Vietnam and that a new constitution be drafted immediately, not at a later date as Ky had proposed. (Charles Mohr, "Buddhists Criticize Ky Regime: Protests on Ouster of Thi Grow," *New York Times*, March 13, 1966, p. 1; "Buddhists Boycott Saigon Crisis Talks," *Washington Post*, April 7, 1966, p. A1; Thomas A. Reedy, "Dissidents Boycott Premier's Call for Political Meeting," *Washington Post*, April 12, 1966, p. A1; and Neil Sheehan, "Buddhists' Drive Against Ky Junta Appears Tougher," *New York Times*, April 15, 1966, p. 1) For additional information about the Buddhist Crisis, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, Documents 91-164.

where it exists, is still not very profound and is based on indirect evidence such as (1) the assumption that a group like the Hue “Struggle Forces” picks on a particular theme because it has reason to believe that the theme strikes a responsive chord among the audience it is aiming at, or (2) the rather surprising degree of unanimity among disparate political groups on a particular subject. What are some of these things?

1. *Anti-Americanism*. I think it came as a surprise to most Americans that there is an unfortunately large amount of anti-Americanism under the surface in Viet-Nam. As I mentioned in my memo of April 5, this should not surprise anyone.<sup>3</sup> Nor does it seem to represent a lack of willingness to prosecute the war or a desire that we withdraw our support in the current struggle and “go home.” It seems to be primarily related (1) to the irritations which occur anytime a large body of men, particularly military personnel, are stationed in another country, and (2) to the continued scepticism among many Vietnamese regarding our real and eventual intentions, a scepticism which comes natural to the Vietnamese in view of their history and the efforts which have been made by others to colonize or control them.

2. *Regard for Military Government*. Certainly the apathy toward their government which many observers have noted about the Vietnamese has a basis in truth. But I think there is rather less apathy than many thought there was. It seems obvious now that there is a surprising amount of unanimity in dislike of being governed by the military among most leading Vietnamese civilian figures and religious leaders, among high school and university students and probably among a majority of, at least, the educated urban population. If there is anything on which all the different factions seemed to agree, it is that the present government should be replaced by a civilian government.

3. *Desire for Legitimacy in Government*. Related to 2 above, is the equally surprising unanimity that Viet-Nam should have some sort of constitution and an elected government which would be more representative of the people than, certainly, any recent government has been. Even Generals Thieu and Ky have felt impelled (through conviction or otherwise) to underwrite this goal.

4. *Our Commitment*. We have established our commitment to Viet-Nam on a “no matter what” basis. The unconditional nature of this commitment has several disadvantages. First, it reduces our leverage in trying to bring our influence to bear. The Vietnamese can afford the luxury of internecine strife because they are sure (we have told them) we will be there to fight the VC. Any hints that we might decide to

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.



reduce our forces or even give up the fight as hopeless are properly ignored since we have told them time and again (in other words, of course) that our support is eternal and will continue no matter what foolishness the Vietnamese indulge in. And second, the unconditional nature of our commitment would make it very embarrassing to us to disengage should the situation deteriorate to the point where there was no other sensible course left open to us.

Each of these items is, or should be, something which deeply concerns USIA (and JUSPAO). They are all "psychological" matters, "public opinion" matters, matters involving how and about what people think. The basic problems in Viet-Nam are socio-psychological in nature and therefore should concern us professionally very much. Obviously they do, or we would not have invested as large a proportion of the Agency's resources in Viet-Nam as we have. Consequently, I feel no hesitation in making the following comments even though JUSPAO's (and USIA's) operations are not necessarily involved in most of them. The psychological effect of the American presence in Viet-Nam will, needless to say, be effective primarily through what Americans, both here and there, do rather than through what JUSPAO says or prints.

A. The signs of the American presence must be reduced to the irreducible minimum. Lip service has been paid to this statement ever since the American build-up. And while much effort has been expended in trying to carry it out, to too large an extent it has remained lip service. There follow a few concrete suggestions not listed in any order of importance.

1. Speed up the construction of barracks in military compounds outside the towns and cities (even if at the expense of other military construction) and release all possible in-town housing and office space. On the civilian side, housing arrangements should be made in such a way as to reduce to the minimum its impact on the Vietnamese. I know that much is being done along these lines. I suspect that, if we accept the inconveniences and drawbacks, more could be done.

2. Work with the Vietnamese authorities to relocate bars and other amusement and recreation spots from the centers of the towns to military compound areas. There will be objections and oppositions to this not only from the American servicemen but also from the Vietnamese who are profiting from the current situation. Perhaps one way of handling this is to rule that all in-town bars will be declared off limits after a given date, set perhaps three months away so that the bar owners would have time to relocate.

3. Eliminate such annoyances as the loud music which envelops much of downtown Saigon from the Officer's Bar on the top of the



Rex BOQ<sup>4</sup> and the eternal racket which emanates from the generators in front of military housing and office installations and the dozens of other similar small nuisances and annoyances (such as the handling of garbage in Da Nang). Perhaps a combined Vietnamese-US group should be set up to identify these irritations and make arrangements for their elimination.

4. Crack down on the speed and driving practices of drivers, American or Vietnamese, of American civilian and military vehicles.

5. Insofar as possible, redirect military traffic so that it will not interfere with civilian life.

B. To some extent the signs of the American presence can be made more palatable through effective community relations programs. The Vietnamese-US Friendship Councils which exist in some places should be established wherever there are American troops. (In theory these probably have been so established.) On the Vietnamese side, the membership should be broadened so that these Councils represent more of Vietnamese life than just the government and the "Establishment." Student leaders, religious leaders, political leaders should also be involved. And the Councils should be given some authority if they are to serve a real purpose and if the right kind of Vietnamese are to take an active part. Certainly the demands of these Councils might become annoying to American military commanders. The alternative, however, is likely to be more than annoying to American national objectives. We also have to do a better job in educating American civilians and soldiers alike on Vietnamese history, culture and customs and in seeing to it that Vietnamese customs are respected. Here again, much has been done but not enough. Too much has been lip service.

C. The warning against having too many Americans in Viet-Nam has been raised many times. This fact does not lessen its importance. Nor does it mean that every effort has been made to limit the number as much as possible. For one thing, some Americans are there because we want things done on *our* timetable (as fast as possible) rather than on the more leisurely timetable of the Vietnamese. If we were willing to compromise with Vietnamese views regarding the desirability and practicality of doing various things speedily, and plan for their accomplishment within a longer time frame, it is possible that we could do with fewer Americans. The opposite side of this coin is that the personnel we have in Viet-Nam should be as well trained as possible, as knowledgeable about Viet-Nam as we can make them and extremely

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Rex Hotel in downtown Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City). In addition to housing a U.S. military BOQ, the Rex Hotel was also the location for the daily U.S. military briefings, colloquially referred to as the "Five O'Clock Follies," which were organized by JUSPAO.

sensitive to Vietnamese sensibilities. Although it is not true in every case, in many instances such knowledge and sensitivity is a direct reflection of an officer's experience in Viet-Nam. To the extent this is true, the current brief tours (a year or eighteen months for civilian agencies and a year for the military non-combat staff) rob the United States of much needed experience, knowledge and talent. There is no use in going over the problems of family separation again. Needless to say, in simple justice, everything possible should be done to ease the officer's life; in addition, one can hope that he will agree to a second tour. Also, we ought to consider asking for legislative authority to enable the government to make it worthwhile for an officer to extend for an additional year, or return for an additional tour. One way would be to get authority for civilian agencies to pay each officer a 50% hardship differential on a second tour with the differential remaining at 25% for the first tour; perhaps a second tour bonus could be paid the military similar to the current reenlistment bonus. If the family separation problem is met by allowing wives in on a limited basis, perhaps officers serving a second tour could be the first ones to have their wives join them. We should—in other words—do everything we can, including requesting additional legislative authority, to create a situation under which the best officers will have adequate enticement to return for a second tour, especially those in whom the Agency has invested eleven months of Vietnamese language training.

D. The U.S. officials in Viet-Nam should be more outspoken in their support of constitutional government for the country and in favoring a representative government of a type acceptable to the Vietnamese. Our understandable support for Diem and for each of the governments which followed his overthrow has, it is quite obvious, given many Vietnamese the idea that we really prefer a "strong man" for Viet-Nam rather than an elective, constitutional government (and indeed many Americans do feel this way). While we certainly have to work with the government in power (assuming that this is possible), we ought to make it clear that we regard it as only an "interim" government and that while we have no intention of imposing our views of government on the Vietnamese, we will consider as "permanent" only one which is based on a large measure of representative-ness and which is the result of the self-determination of the Vietnamese people—the principle which is at the heart of our entire Vietnamese policy.

E. As I said at the beginning, this paper is based on the assumption that an elected, civilian government will be established in South Viet-Nam. I hope we are considering in advance what the U.S. position is going to be toward those things which an elected legislative and executive body is likely to bring up which we would rather it didn't. I think it is in the nature of things for an elected Vietnamese government to

desire to show its sovereignty and its independence of the United States. Indeed, it is probably in our interest that it do so. The easiest way to do this, and the most visible, is to insist on things being done their way rather than ours, and to insist that we agree to conditions we don't like. We ought to try to decide in advance which of these we are willing to give on, reluctantly of course, and which we are not and will insist on as a condition of our continued aid. While it is impossible to foretell what the specific issues are going to be, the following are likely:

1. A Status of Forces Agreement.
2. Limitations on the manner in which the war is fought—restrictions or prohibitions on the use of napalm, for instance, or on Harassment and Interdiction Fire.
3. The establishment of brothels and amusement centers for American troops within compound areas, with towns and cities themselves declared off-limits to most personnel.

F. Americans have, on many occasions, discussed the need for Vietnam to develop two or three strong parties, if an elective system is to work, to replace the more than forty that are now registered (which number is likely to be increased with the institution of meaningful elections). I am aware of no decisions ever having been made, nor have I ever heard any really good ideas as to how we can help in this effort. Indeed, I don't have any bright suggestions to make, either. But the timetable for accomplishing this has shortened radically with the development of the present situation, and I hope that competent people are thinking about it.

G. To repeat another statement which has almost become a truism, we have to do better and better in respecting the forms of Vietnamese sovereignty and be ever more careful regarding statements made in Washington and similar matters. You know the problem as well as I do, and I raise it again only because it is of very great importance.

H. We should rethink our relationships with Buddhist organizations. While we have maintained liaison with them, it has been to some extent in an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust (possibly well deserved). But the fact is that the major Buddhist organizations, especially the Institute<sup>5</sup> and its subordinate groupings, are among those best able in the country to obtain action and sacrifice from their members and to plan and execute imaginative, even if destructive, projects such as that of the "Struggle Forces" in Hue.

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the Buddhist Institute.

I. In my memorandum of April 5, I also commented on the quality of reporting from Viet-Nam. It surely is obvious to everyone that we know less about what the Vietnamese are thinking (or planning) than we wish we did, or should. A corollary of this is the eternal optimism associated with Americans in Viet-Nam. Somehow we always seem to convince ourselves that things will turn out for the best—for us. Because we thought that stability in the Saigon Government under General Ky was essential for the prosecution of the war, we refused to give credence to the few indicators there were which showed that the government was unstable and that opposition to it was wide-spread; fearing that elections at this time would open the possibility of VC infiltration into the structure of government, we did not consider that the Vietnamese might demand an elective system anyhow. And so on. To too great an extent, understandable as it is, we continue to look at Viet-Nam through American eyes, instead of trying to understand it as a Vietnamese would, difficult as that may be. There are no easy answers here, but a change in the overall spirit in which we approach Viet-Nam and our operations there would help.

J. Also in my April 5 memo, I made the point that we are not devoting enough of our resources to establishing, maintaining contact with, helping educate and persuade the urban audiences, especially the student leaders, the teachers and professors, the religious, social and political leaders as well as the mass media operators. I simply repeat that this element of our operations, especially JUSPAO's, needs more emphasis.

K. As I said in 4 above, psychologically the unconditional nature of our commitment has been a handicap. The Vietnamese would, I submit, be much less likely to indulge in serious quarrels among themselves at this point in history if they weren't so sure of our shield, and would be more amenable to our suggestions on things we thought vitally important if there were the possibility that we might pull out. Consequently, I suggest that little by little we start putting conditions into our support. In my view these should be so phrased that we guarantee our support:

1. As long as that support and assistance is desired;
2. As long as the Vietnamese maintain and support a government which is acceptable to the bulk of the population, and
3. As long as that government actively prosecutes the war and equally actively undertakes the measures necessary to bring about the social revolution we have all agreed is essential.

Not only will this change in attitude be helpful in our dealings with the Vietnamese, it will make our path world-wide (and particularly in the Asian area) much easier if we find that we have no choice but to disengage and withdraw.

L. Lastly, I would suggest that we should be well prepared with contingency plans in case the pessimists turn out to be correct and an elected civilian Vietnamese government be weak, faction-ridden and completely unable to cope with the situation. Unfortunately, the chances are at least 50–50 that this will turn out to be the ugly reality.

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**86. Memorandum From the Associate Director, Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Ryan) to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 19, 1966

SUBJECT

*U.S. Strength Image*

It has seemed to us in IOP that Secretary McNamara has been sounding more and more defensive lately on the issue of preparedness for Vietnam. Joe Hanson has submitted a thoughtful paper on the effect of this on our global strength image, and what might be done to improve it. It seems to me that Mr. McNamara might appreciate a little down-to-earth advice, and that the reasonableness of the arguments in this paper might carry some weight and do some good. You might consider communicating these ideas either orally if a convenient opportunity arises, or in an informal letter which we could draft for you.

Hewson A. Ryan<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 6, Policy & Plans—General 1966. Confidential Attachment.

<sup>2</sup> Ryan signed “H.A. Ryan” above this typed signature.

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## Attachment

### Paper Prepared by Joseph Hanson, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency<sup>3</sup>

Washington, undated

#### *DEFENDING THE U.S. STRENGTH IMAGE*

The basic U.S. strength image, which USIA has taken some pains to maintain over the years, is in danger of erosion. The fundamental problem—the strain on American manpower and supplies from the Vietnam effort—is inherent in our national decisions. But the way we speak of this problem can and should be improved.

The current hazard to the national strength image comes from two sources—an ostrich policy on transfers of men and equipment from Europe to Vietnam; and the continuing domestic commotion over shortages and delays in the Vietnam effort. It is submitted that these hazards could be met by abandoning the present information policy of defensive secretiveness and adopting a positive and forthcoming policy.

The secretiveness on Europe-to-Vietnam transfers, a problem area we are just getting into, is especially harmful. When the news leaks out—as it has just done on the withdrawal of 15,000 men from Germany<sup>4</sup> and the removal of three air squadrons from Italy and Turkey—the United States image is hurt in two ways: (1) our general credibility and our pledged word to NATO is compromised, as the withdrawals follow two years of official U.S. reassurances that no major combat units would be removed from Europe; (2) our strength image suffers because the impression is created that desperate need is forcing us to abandon a firm prior commitment to preserve U.S. forces in Europe.

How to correct this? First, we need to place announcements of our various actions in the positive perspective of our world primacy in military strength, about which too little has been said in the past year. Second, the announcements of withdrawals from Europe, or answers to charges of shortages, should be frank and forthcoming. Once we have re-established the image of our overwhelming total strength, the details will fall into proper perspective and we will not need to be so defensive.

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<sup>3</sup> Confidential. Drafted by Hanson on April 19.

<sup>4</sup> Information regarding the U.S. troop withdrawal from Germany was reported in the *New York Times* on April 8. (Benjamin Welles, "15,000 U.S. Troops to Leave Europe," April 8, 1966, p. 1)

A list of points which could usefully be made, both in high-level official statements and in USIA output, might read something like this:

- (1) The U.S. military strength is far and away the world's greatest.
- (2) The U.S. is deliberately refraining from using its tremendous nuclear power, in Vietnam or anywhere else. U.S. nuclear forces are kept under constant control to prevent war by accident.
- (3) The U.S. is using in Vietnam only its non-nuclear forces, deployed at greater distances and with greater mobility than ever before achieved by any nation.
- (4) The U.S. and the South Vietnamese are fighting a carefully limited war, thinking out each move to avoid escalation and frequently spelling out its aims to encourage a settlement.
- (5) Despite these self-imposed limitations, the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces are winning in Vietnam. (NOTE: This fact should be pointed up much more than we have been doing, preferably in scholarly, military-analyst terms.)
- (6) The U.S. will need to draw on its very large NATO forces in Europe from time to time to meet special needs in Vietnam. This will be temporary, will leave the great majority of U.S. forces in Europe untouched, and will probably include \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ (as many specifics as possible).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Omissions and underscoring are in the original.

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## 87. Address by the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks)<sup>1</sup>

Fort Worth, Texas, April 23, 1966, 1 p.m.

### *The Truth—America's Best Propaganda*

On Monday night<sup>2</sup> at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York the Bolshoi Ballet opened its current tour of the United States. There was standing room only and a thunderous ovation greeted the performers at the conclusion of each number. The newspaper reviews were ecstatic.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1069, Box 13, Leonard H. Marks, Speeches, 1966–1967. Marks addressed the membership meeting of the 48th Annual Convention of the West Texas Chamber of Commerce at the Green Oaks Inn in Fort Worth, Texas.

<sup>2</sup> April 18.

When Texas' Van Cliburn<sup>3</sup> plays in Moscow, Leningrad or other Russian cities, tickets are at a premium and the audience shouts a roar of approval and stamps its feet in enthusiastic praise.

Last night I listened to Radio Moscow. The commentary referred to American butchers, the greed of American imperialists, the \$2 billion dollar income of General Motors,<sup>4</sup> made at the expense of the working class, the oppression of the average man, and the fact that the DuPont Company<sup>5</sup> believes in war so that it may sell munitions.

Why, today with all the modern improvements in communications, do we find such anomalies? Great acclaim is given by the people for the culture, the art, the literature of respective countries and yet official condemnation and cascades of hatred are poured out over the air waves.

We in the United States earnestly desire that the people of the Soviet Union know something about our way of life, our aspirations, the views of our people and our international policies. Only a few weeks ago we signed a cultural exchange agreement with the Soviet Union<sup>6</sup> which will allow for the further exchange of professional people, periodicals, and exhibits. We look forward to the full development of these programs of exchange which bulk so large in building what President Johnson has described as "bridges of understanding" between our country and the USSR and the other nations in Eastern Europe.<sup>7</sup>

Our exhibits in the Soviet Union have been immensely popular. These major efforts—which have covered such subjects as transportation, medicine, communications, and architecture—have been seen by millions of Soviet citizens in a wide geographic range of cities and areas. One on graphic arts, for example, was seen by more than one and one half million people in Alma Ata, Moscow, Yerevan, and Leningrad—smashing all records for attendance at an American exhibit in the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup> In Moscow alone, more than 700,000 visitors saw it. Queues hundreds of yards long formed in the 20-degree cold. Even

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to American classical pianist Harvey Levan "Van" Cliburn.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the American automobile manufacturer.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the American chemical company.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. and Soviet officials signed the cultural exchange agreement on March 19. This agreement was the fifth in a series of 2-year exchanges agreements signed between the United States and the Soviet Union. The first was signed in 1958. For more information, see "Soviet Cultural Exchange Pact Signed After White House Delay," *New York Times*, March 20, 1966, p. 56. For text of the joint communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 4, 1966, pp. 543–544.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 2, Document 21.

<sup>8</sup> The exhibit is detailed in a June 1, 1964, memorandum from Wilson to Rowan, printed as Document 34 in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union.



though the exhibit was located more than a half a mile from the nearest public transportation stop, 60,000 viewers toured the show in the first two days alone.

From the Soviet Union, *Graphic Arts—USA* moved to Rumania. In Ploesti, 156,841 visitors enthusiastically elbowed their way through the exhibit—an attendance several thousand people *more* than the total population of the city.

At the exhibits, our young, Russian-speaking American guides are invariably as popular as the items on display—and sometimes perhaps more so. They answer an insistent flood of questions about every conceivable aspect of life in America.

Here are some of the questions asked most frequently at one of our exhibits in Leningrad.

“How much do you make a month? How much does a new car cost? How much does a kilogram of butter cost? Of sugar? Of bread? Of meat? How come you have so many unemployed people in America? How do the unemployed live? Where do they get the money to live on? How do you pay for medical service? Higher education? Do you jam Radio Moscow? How much does an apartment cost to rent each month? How long must you wait to buy a car? A phone? A house? Do you have all the produce you need in the stores? Are there a lot of gangsters in the USA? What will you do when your workers revolt? Can a worker in America really save enough money to start his own business?”

Another highly effective means of communication with the USSR and Poland is our full color magazine *America Illustrated*, which covers the entire range of American life.<sup>9</sup>

An independent observer, the Moscow correspondent of the Swedish daily, *Svenska Dagbladet*, wrote a couple of months ago:

“It happened on Gorky Street in Moscow, which could rightly be described as the main shopping street of the capital. On the sidewalk, there formed a line of people about a hundred yards long, which is quite long even for Russian lines. The people crowded and scuffled. I joined the line to find out what sensational items could possibly be on sale. Maybe nylon stockings, foreign woolen sweaters, bananas, Polish beer or newly pickled cucumbers? . . . At long last, I elbowed myself to the objective—an ordinary news stand, where they were selling the American magazine ‘America.’ The buyers literally snatched the magazines out of the hands of the clerk, started leafing through the publication and discussing it among themselves.”

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<sup>9</sup> See footnote 6, Document 21.

We have also direct, instantaneous contact with the people of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe every day of the week through our overseas radio giant—the Voice of America. The Voice broadcasts a blend of programming designed to inform a wide range of listeners. This blend includes an objective and balanced presentation of the news, commentaries on American foreign and domestic policy positions, music and features.

These broadcasts are getting through loud and clear with increasing effectiveness, especially to young people and the intellectual and economic elite. A *New York Times* dispatch reported recently it is the impression of foreign travelers in the Soviet Union that “the Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and other stations are almost as frequent fare for Soviet listeners as the official controlled Soviet radio”.<sup>10</sup>

Hundreds of thousands of letters arrive annually from people who listen to our Voice. One letter from Eastern Europe said that the writer was a factory worker and a faithful listener. He said he dreamed of leaving his country some day. He wound up: “In the meantime, please play for me ‘The Yellow Rose of Texas.’”<sup>11</sup>

Our operations in Eastern Europe are only one part of our international information effort which extends into more than 100 countries around the globe.

What do we do? We tell the truth about America—in balance and in perspective.

When I was sworn in as USIA’s director eight months ago the President said: “Truth wears no uniform and bears no flag. But it is the most loyal ally that freedom knows. It is the mission, therefore, of the USIA to be always loyal and always faithful and always vigilant to the course of the truth.”<sup>12</sup>

And I replied that as a lawyer “I had had many clients and appeared in many forums. Today I put that behind me. I have only one client—the United States of America. No man can ask for a better client, no cause can be more just.”<sup>13</sup>

In this job I am indeed fortunate to have as my deputy and close adviser, a man with a distinguished name in Texas journalism—Bob

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<sup>10</sup> Reference is to Peter Grose, “Leaders in Soviet Fear West’s Radio is Ensnaring Youth,” *New York Times*, March 25, 1966, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> Reference is to an American folk song popularized in the 1950s by the Mitch Miller singers.

<sup>12</sup> See Document 56.

<sup>13</sup> For text of Marks’ remarks, see *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, September 6, 1965, pp. 182–183; and Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Box 7, Marks, Leonard [3 of 3].

Akers, long-time editor and executive officer of the *Beaumont Enterprise and Journal*.

Let me tell you something about our mission. By Presidential directive, the mission of the United States Information Agency is to advance U.S. objectives by (1) informing audiences overseas of American foreign and domestic policies and views, (2) influencing attitudes in foreign countries, and (3) advising your Government on foreign public opinion relating to American policies.<sup>14</sup>

To do this my Agency maintains posts in 105 countries; we use almost every known means of communication from ancient Asian morality plays to modern orbiting relay satellites. But I say, that the most effective means of communication is face-to-face contact. We have American personnel—whom I often call the unsung heroes of our Service—from the high reaches of the Andes to the jungle swamps of the Mekong River delta.

The Voice of America is one of our principal instruments to get the word through—not only to the Soviet Union and to Eastern Europe—but around the world and around the clock. We broadcast, live and direct from Washington, 838 hours of short wave programs a week, and place another 15,000 hours on tapes and disks weekly on some 3,000 local radio stations at points scattered around the globe.

We use 100 transmitters, here and overseas, with a total power of about 15 million watts or, to put it in familiar perspective, the equivalent of 300 maximum-power domestic radio stations. The VOA's transmitting complex at Greenville, North Carolina, is the largest and most powerful long range broadcasting station in the world, packing a 4,800,000-watt punch.

And then there is television. TV is expanding across the globe at a startling rate. Our USIA television programs are screened now in more than 86 countries—and reach an estimated audience of almost 393 million. In Latin America, for example, 211 TV stations in 25 countries carry USIA programs.

Or take motion pictures. We now produce about 600 documentaries and shorts each year for audiences that number in the hundreds of millions. People see them in their own commercial theaters, in our USIS auditoriums, in universities, and associations and organizations of every type that bring important audiences together. Our USIS mobile units take films into the provinces and villages. Our newsreel, *Africa*

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<sup>14</sup> Reference is to a January 25, 1963, memorandum from Kennedy to Murrow in which Kennedy stated USIA's mission and outlined guidelines for the Agency to follow. See *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Document 144; and *Foreign Relations*, 1917–1972, vol. VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963, Document 109.

*Today*, is seen by some 20 million Africans monthly in 1,540 theaters across that crucial continent.

Our movies win many prizes—both domestic and international. *Nine From Little Rock*, a documentary portraying the useful and responsible roles in American life assumed by the nine Negro students originally integrated into Central High School at Little Rock, last year won an Oscar in the Academy Awards.<sup>15</sup>

Books are vital in our program. USIA libraries, reading rooms and bi-national centers constitute more than 400 points of book lending, in more than 80 countries stretching from Tokyo to Tegucigalpa. Every year more than 30 million people visit our libraries, borrowing about six and one half million volumes, and consulting twice that number on the premises.

In the past four years we have produced and distributed in Latin America alone more than 50 million cartoon books—books which graphically support democratic processes and the Alliance for Progress<sup>16</sup> and expose Castro's efforts to subvert the Hemisphere.

To give a recent example of our foreign information program, let me point out that our media extensively covered the President's visit last week to Mexico.<sup>17</sup> Incidentally, Mexican press comment on his journey was heavy and enthusiastic. *El Sol de Mexico*, for instance, saw the visit as having "written one of the most important pages in history, not only as it pertains to Mexico and the nation of Lincoln, but also with respect to all of the Americas."

Utilizing a Mexico City radio station as the originating source, the Voice of America broadcast coverage of the ceremonies over a network of more than one hundred stations in Latin America.

An inevitable question in all of this is the one of effectiveness. Well, one way to measure that is the reaction of our adversaries. Let me cite just one instance of that.

In a French language broadcast to Africa on January 28, Radio Moscow said:

"The U.S. Information Centers stop at nothing to attain their aims. They deceive public opinion, spread false rumors and interfere in the internal affairs of African peoples. There are some Africans who close

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<sup>15</sup> See Document 39 and Appendix A.1.

<sup>16</sup> See footnote 2, Document 68.

<sup>17</sup> Johnson visited Mexico April 14 and 15. He met with Díaz Ordaz on April 14 and dedicated a statue of Lincoln in Mexico City on April 15. For the memorandum of conversation detailing their meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 356. For text of Johnson's remarks at the dedication ceremony, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1966*, Book I, pp. 417-421.

their eyes and believe American propaganda, but they are those whose economic interests depend upon the foreign monopolies. One thing is certain, however: it is becoming more and more difficult for U.S. propaganda to poison African consciences, particularly that of the fighting youth who thirst for knowledge.”

And then a report came across my desk a few days ago stating that at the height of the recent coup d'état in one of the African countries, many of the thousands of demonstrators who marched past the U.S. Cultural Center shouted, “Don't touch these windows. They are our friends.” Immediately after burning several buildings nearby, the demonstrators stationed themselves in front of the USIA center as protectors.

I also know that the president of another African country takes daily English language lessons with Peace Corps volunteers and at the same time is deep in works on American Government and democracy supplied to him by the local USIA library.

And it was heartening for me to note only last week that Senator Saltonstall devoted his entire *Report to Massachusetts*<sup>18</sup> to the work of my Agency. I appreciated that because it is of cardinal importance that the people of the United States know of the USIA, what its aims are and what it is able to accomplish.

The Senator concluded his *Report*: “The basic idea behind the operation of the USIA is that understanding is fundamental to any kind of rapport with people of other countries. Through the USIA we are trying to let our friends in other lands know what we stand for, and, from the reports I get through the Appropriations Committee, I believe we are making progress in doing so.”

I have come to believe that as long as ideas influence the minds of men and as long as men and their aspirations are a major component of power, ideas—both good and evil—will continue to upset nations, defy armies and write history.

America's ideas are good ideas and they are ideas of essential truth. Thus USIA's task is a straightforward and honest one—to tell them to the world.

I began my remarks by asking you a question. Why, today do we find the anomaly that although the people of the Soviet Union appreciate and applaud our culture and literature, official media condemn the United States and its actions around the world? It is my sincere belief

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<sup>18</sup> Reference is to Saltonstall's April 14 newsletter sent to his Massachusetts constituents. A copy of “Report to Massachusetts,” which Marks sent to the President under an April 15 covering memorandum, is in the National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 2, Congressional Relations A thru Z 1966.

that if the people of the Soviet Union were permitted to travel freely and visit our country and see for themselves, if they were permitted to read our literature—our daily newspapers, our magazines, our books—if they were permitted to view our films, and exchange views with our people here in the United States or in the Soviet Union, the abyss of misunderstanding would soon disappear. They would find that we are a peaceful nation, that we covet no territory, that we have no desire to dominate foreign cultures, and that all we seek is a better way of life for all mankind. Our efforts have been greeted with some success and the hope that improvements can and will result, makes us strive daily to further this very important mission.

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**88. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 25, 1966

Dear Leonard:

You wrote me on March 2<sup>2</sup> about several aspects of CU-USIA relations, and we have already had a chance to talk fruitfully about some of these questions. In particular, you already have on hand a memorandum giving facts about the grant in support of the Institute of American Studies in Paris, and I trust this information has been useful to you and sets the record straight.

However, I find that there were also some matters that you discussed with me in your letter to which I have not yet given a written reply. In the first paragraph of your letter you referred to the American Specialists and Cultural Presentations Programs as areas of joint responsibility. As you know, under Executive Order 11034 of June 25, 1962,<sup>3</sup> only a limited share of the responsibility for these programs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1965–1966, Lot 69D260, Entry UD UP 175, 1966: Government Agencies: USIA. No classification marking. Drafted by Frankel on April 22; cleared in draft by Roland (CU/EUR).

<sup>2</sup> See the attachment to Document 79.

<sup>3</sup> Executive Order 11034, signed by President Kennedy on June 25, 1962, regarding the administration of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 23, 1962, pp. 138–140. Additional information about the order is in *Foreign Relations*, 1917–1972, vol. VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963.

devolves upon USIA. However, CU has consistently gone beyond the strict requirements of that Order so far as consultation with USIA is concerned. CU and USIA have regularly collaborated in developing the recommendations for the Cultural Presentations Program that are considered by the U.S. Advisory Committee on the Arts and expert panels. I need hardly tell you that I contemplate no changes in these procedures for cooperation that have been developed, even though final responsibility must obviously rest with CU, which has the budgetary obligation and legislative mandate for these programs. In line with these procedures, the joint recommendations of the Agency and CU for the 1968 program in Cultural Presentations have been presented to the Advisory Committee for its consideration.

With regard to the American Specialists Program, the situation, of course, is not quite parallel. This program is part of the general exchange of persons program, and specifically of the cultural exchanges authorized under the Fulbright-Hays Act.<sup>4</sup> Responsibility for this activity is delegated exclusively to the Department of State. The collateral interests of USIA in the program has nevertheless been recognized, and USIA has been represented on the Committee which my predecessor, Lucius Battle, established to review the qualifications of nominees for American Specialists grants. Once again, I certainly see no reason at this time to alter this procedure. We will always welcome your Agency's suggestions concerning specialists although, of course, we may not always be able to comply with them, and must retain final decision about the basic procedures, objectives, and plans with regard to this area of our obligations. As background on this matter, you may want to refer to Arthur Hummel's memorandum of June 26, 1964, to Robert Lincoln,<sup>5</sup> and also to David Osborn's memorandum of August 30, 1965, to Burnett Anderson.<sup>6</sup>

With regard to all these matters, I believe that the essence of the problem—if, indeed, there is a problem—is not bureaucratic definitions but full and frank communication to ensure that we understand each other's responsibilities and provide what mutual help we can. As we have said to each other on many occasions, and I think effectively demonstrated, this begins with the two of us. But it must also include our agencies. I will do all I can to foster the spirit of cooperation. Although working relations between our respective area offices have been close, cordial and productive, we cannot remain content with this record. We can do even better.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 14.

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

Such cooperation, I believe, is perfectly compatible with what must always be the case in Government—namely, that the agency concerned (in this case, CU)—must obviously retain full responsibility for the planning, budgeting and defense of those activities for which it has been given sole obligation.

With all best regards,  
Sincerely,

Charles Frankel<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**89. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel) to the President's Special Assistant (Cater)<sup>1</sup>**

En route to Paris, May 13, 1966

Dear Doug:

I write this en route to Paris to speak to the Executive Board of UNESCO and to Mr. Maheu,<sup>2</sup> principally about the President's new international education program.<sup>3</sup> What I am about to say to you I have tried out, quite briefly and informally, on John Gardner and Harry McPherson. I'm putting it in writing now so that you will have a chance to turn it over in your mind.

In my meetings with Congressman, university officials and teachers, and a good number of people, high and low, in the Executive

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1965–1966, Lot 69D260, Entry UD UP 175, 1966—U.S. Government: White House. Personal and Confidential. Copies were sent to Gardner and McPherson.

<sup>2</sup> Rene Maheu, Director General of UNESCO from 1962 until 1974.

<sup>3</sup> Johnson outlined his international education program in a February 2 address to Congress. The program included: creating a Center for Educational Cooperation within HEW; establishing Corps of Education Officers to serve in the U.S. Foreign Service; encouraging partnerships between U.S. and foreign schools; enlarging AID education assistance programs; assisting the teaching of English abroad; and forming an Exchange Peace Corps to bring "volunteers to America." (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1966*, Book I, pp. 128–137)



branch, I have noted that people generally accept the international education program, but ask, in effect, “What’s new about it?” The degree of the President’s interest and the original qualities of the program have somehow not registered; nor has the program quite emerged as the reflection, in foreign policy, of this President’s special ideals and beliefs.

It is time, I think, to give the program new zip and lift. An action by the President to dramatize his interest, and to focus new attention on the program as the distinctive expression of his foreign policy, is highly desirable. This is also important because it is being said that the President is losing the intellectuals (see the Reston article, enclosed),<sup>4</sup> and because old suspicions have been resurrected recently about the government role in relation to the universities. (CIA, AID, contracts, etc., etc.)

Here are two suggestions:

(1) Immediately following the passage of the International Education Act, the President might invite Ministers of Education of all nations (provided they are UN members) to meet to discuss the launching of cooperative educational programs. His stance would be that we do not take it upon ourselves to educate the world, but would like to join with others, if they are interested. He could say that he recognizes that our school system, like those of other nations, has frequently brought up the young in insular or chauvinistic attitudes, but that it is time to see whether the school systems of the world could work together to reverse this old tendency. The purpose of the conference would be to consider first steps.

I won’t get into the question here of auspices for such a meeting, degree of publicity, level of representation, etc. If there’s anything in the idea at all, we could come to that. We can also look into whether such a Presidential invitation should come before or after the looked-for passage of the International Education Act.<sup>5</sup>

(2) If this idea seems too big, the President, at the right time, might call a meeting of leading university people to air the main issues affecting a healthy relationship between government and the U.S. academic community. He could say that we recognize that there are problems and doubts, that we are concerned to respect and protect the independence and integrity of our educational institutions, and that

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<sup>4</sup> Not found attached. Reference is to an article by James Reston, “Santa Cruz, Calif.: Johnson and the Universities,” *New York Times*, May 6, 1966, p. 46.

<sup>5</sup> Congress passed the International Education Act (PL 89–698; 80 Stat. 1066), on October 29. The President signed the Act into law that same day. For Johnson’s remarks at the signing ceremony, held at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1966*, Book II, pp. 1276–1278.

this requires, at the outset of a broad new program, a candid meeting of minds. This would help in many ways, and not least in getting the international education program launched in the right way.

I do *not* mean another grab-bag White House conference. The meeting I envisage should be highly selective about those invited—not more than 100, perhaps—and reasonably limited in its agenda and preparation.

If either or both of these ideas appeal to you, I would, of course, run them by my colleagues in State.

After Paris, I go to Yugoslavia as an official guest of the Yugoslav Government, to discuss our educational and cultural exchange programs. My office will know where I am if you want to write or talk with me. I'll be back the 27th.

Helen and I missed Libbie and you at our party. But we understood. Hasta la vista!

Yours,

Charles Frankel<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## 90. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 17, 1966

*Weekly Report*

USSR

Increasing Soviet concern over the effectiveness of U.S. information efforts was recently made explicit by *International Affairs*, an authoritative Soviet monthly. Noting the growing importance of USIA during

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 4, Government Agencies—White House—Weekly Report 1966. Confidential. Sent through Kintner, who did not initial the memorandum. There is no indication that Johnson saw the memorandum.

your Administration, the article called for stepped up Soviet propaganda to neutralize our efforts.<sup>2</sup> Anti-Communist propaganda is now based on considerable research, it asserted, it is efficiently organized and has improved continuously. It would be wrong to underestimate it, the monthly said.

The article singled out Communist ideology, the building of a Socialist economy, and Soviet foreign policy as the three major issues in the East-West ideological struggle. It called upon Soviet propagandists to refute Western information efforts. Ideological warfare between the two systems now is entering into a new stage, *International Affairs* said.

#### VIET-NAM

The April Chieu Hoi returnee figure was 1,510. While this number represents a decline from the record high of February and March, it not only is almost three times the number of last April's returnees, but also is higher than any single monthly figure in 1965.

#### CUBA

In anticipation of the dismal failure of the Cuban sugar harvest—a total production of about 4.5 million tons, 1.5 million less than last year—we are supplying all posts and media with background material to exploit these production figures when announced by the Castro government.

#### LATIN AMERICA

*Reaction to Speech by Senator Robert Kennedy.*<sup>3</sup> The Latin American press differed in its comment on Senator Kennedy's speech on Latin America. In Brazil where criticism seems strongest, there was marked resentment against his "paternalistic" tone. Critical reactions seemed to fear U.S. interference in economic affairs, the inadequacies of proposals made by Kennedy and alleged U.S. unwillingness to do anything about low raw material prices and high prices for manufactured goods.

In Colombia, liberal *El Espectador* praised the speech but warned against "treating Latin America as family," an "error" which could lead to another Dominican crisis. Another paper "feared another Cuba" if Kennedy tried to push the Latin America revolution too fast.

Brazil's conservative *O Estado de Sao Paulo* bitterly attacked the Senator and stated that he seemed to be setting himself up as a Latin

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<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Kennedy's speech, delivered over 2 days, May 9 and 10, before the Senate. (Richard Eder, "Kennedy's Latin Views," *New York Times*, May 12, 1966, p. 8)

American expert by virtue of a hurried visit to some of the Latin American countries.

Most papers approved Senator Kennedy's sincere concern for Latin American welfare.

#### ECUADOR

Seventeen former Grantees from Ecuador recently have come into positions of influence as political changes saw the substitution of civilians for military figures in national or municipal institutions.

Among ex-grantees named to important positions recently have been the Minister of Foreign Relations, Minister of Public Education, Attorney General, Secretary General of Administration in the Presidency, Director of the Ecuadorean Housing Bank, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Mayor of Cuenca and a member of the National Juridical Commission for reforming the National Constitution.

#### PAKISTAN

The film produced by USIA on President Ayub Khan's visit<sup>4</sup> to Washington is now being shown in all Pakistan theatres. The post reports that there is "compulsory commercial distribution" in these theatres.

Leonard H. Marks<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Ayub Kahn came to the United States in December 1965 on an official visit. He met with President Johnson at the White House on December 14 and 15. For memoranda of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XXV, South Asia, Documents 263, 265, and 267.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**91. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the President's Special Assistant (Komer)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 3, 1966

SUBJECT

Progress Report on JUSPAO Support to Pacification

Any review of progress made in the extent of JUSPAO support to pacification and other non-military programs in South Viet-Nam must be a high selective exercise, for most JUSPAO programming is non-military in objective and essence. Although providing support to the GVN/US military effort in tactical situations in the field, JUSPAO programs are oriented toward the long-range objective of helping to build a sense of Vietnamese nationhood and to promote the emergence of a national consensus.

An examination of JUSPAO support to pacification since July 1, 1965 should also be prefaced by the fact that JUSPAO as an inter-agency organization only came into being around that time.

*Personnel Input:*

Perhaps one of the most immediate and tangible yardsticks of JUSPAO contribution to pacification has been the process by which JUSPAO officers are trained and deployed for provincial operation in South Viet-Nam. For one of the vital ingredients in the pacification process is communication, particularly communication between the populace in rural areas and their government. And among the American officers committed to this task in the field is the JUSPAO Field Representative—a key individual who functions as psychological adviser as well as operator who utilizes every means of formal and informal communication.<sup>2</sup> With backing of JUSPAO media and program resources, the Field Representative strives to help the Vietnamese Information Service close the communication gap that exists between the GVN and her officials on the one hand and the Vietnamese peasant on the other. On July 1, 1965, ten such officers were operating in South Viet-Nam. By January, 1966, 31 such JUSPAO officers supported by 73 Vietnamese assistants were stationed and functioning in provincial

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Field—Far East (Viet Nam) 1966, April, May, June 1966. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> For further information about JUSPAO Field Representatives, see Document 54.

locations throughout the country. Since January, several more have been added.

*Media Capability:*

The increase in JUSPAO personnel has also meant corresponding increases in the volume and variety of media output. The following major themes have been given continuing emphasis: explaining the U.S. presence; publicizing GVN/US military victories to bolster Vietnamese morale; promoting the Chieu Hoi program; generating and maintaining popular support for the government and at the same time seeking to deny it to the VC by exposing their true nature and intent; and exploiting VC vulnerabilities whether these be found in their rank and file or in their terroristic and other oppressive tactics directed against the people. A quantitative measure of the mix of media output on the above themes would be difficult to develop. For illustrative purposes, a review of increased JUSPAO capabilities, specifically in offset printing in Saigon since July 1965, may provide a graphic picture of progress made by JUSPAO. Following are sample monthly totals of the number of impressions:

1965	July	4.97 million
	September	7.06 million
	December	8.82 million
1966	March	13.16 million

Thus, in the last six months in 1965, JUSPAO offset printing had nearly doubled in capacity. The March 1966 figure furthermore reflected the added priority given to printing support for revolutionary development.<sup>3</sup> In the third week of last month, for example, a weekly record of 5.44 million offset impressions was achieved. This level of production in one week exceeded that of the month of July last year. It should be noted finally that JUSPAO offset printing represents only *one* of several sources of printing support; in fact most JUSPAO printing is done in the USIA printing plant in Manila.

*Chieu Hoi Program:*

This program has a central place in the pacification scheme of things. The variety and volume of JUSPAO input into this program and the dramatic results in terms of the numbers of Chieu Hoi returnees warrant a lengthier discussion.

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<sup>3</sup> For further information about "revolutionary development," see *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 88.

Although the collection of monthly returnee statistics under this program is not as refined and controlled as it might be, these figures do provide a rough quantitative index with which to measure the impact of the psychological operations conducted in support of the program. Furthermore, over a period of months, a trend measurement of this effort emerged and is useful as a chart of progress achieved.

Of all psywar products developed in JUSPAO for tactical use in the field, Chieu Hoi themes have been emphasized above all others. For example, in August, 1965, 10 of the 20 items (posters and leaflets) developed and produced that month were geared to the Chieu Hoi program. Seen in terms of volume, the JUSPAO "psywar" output in October 1965 totaled some 13 million copies, of which 30 per cent were related to the Chieu Hoi program. Operationally, JUSPAO field representatives have also given this program their priority attention, utilizing not only printed materials (leaflets, posters, banners and pamphlets) but also airborne and ground loudspeaker broadcasts from tapes and by returnees themselves, public rallies in which films and speakers would be used, and radio or word-of-mouth communications.

The 1965 Chieu Hoi monthly statistics thus provide a graphic picture of this increased JUSPAO effort. The upward trend in the second half of 1965 reflected not only the U.S. military buildup, upswing of Vietnamese morale and the series of GVN/US military successes but also concerted psychological exploitation of these favorable trends, an operation in which JUSPAO plays a primary role.

1965	
<i>Chieu Hoi Returnees</i>	
January	406
February	467
March	489
April	532
May	1,015
June	1,089
July	688
August	1,571(includes 898 KKK, Cambodian minority group)
September	1,068
October	1,211
November	1,482
December	1,106

During the second half of 1965, monthly returnee figures had consistently exceeded the 1,000 mark which was double that of any previous month since the program was launched in 1963. It might be noted also that although some 11,000 Viet Cong had defected to the govern-

ment side under the fresh impact of this new program in 1963, the total in 1964 was only half that number because of the unfavorable political and military factors. Reversing this trend, the 1965 total again exceeded 11,000 Viet Cong defectors.

Numerous anecdotal accounts of the Chieu Hoi program in action have been reported on other occasions, but perhaps a mention of a couple incidents in this context may serve to illustrate qualitatively the 1965 statistical trend.

In Vinh Long province last September, the JUSPAO Field Representative there developed a "returnee diary" project. This booklet gave pictorial evidence of good treatment of Chieu Hoi returnees by the GVN as well as details of the program such as weapon rewards and per diem payments. Copies were distributed to families known or suspected to have relatives in the Viet Cong. After these "diaries" were distributed in late September 1965, one of the recipients apparently visited her son attached to a VC unit in the neighboring district and using the booklet convinced him to turn himself in. Six days after distribution, he appeared at the Vinh Long Chieu Hoi Center with a safe conduct pass torn from the booklet. In November, two Viet Cong defecting with JUSPAO leaflets reported the VC in the area told them to crawl into holes or caves whenever government psywar aircraft appeared in the vicinity. In Tay Ninh Province, one returnee claimed that he rallied because of the drudgery of the task assigned him by his unit: he had to police his area for leaflets following every airdrop.

Perhaps the most concentrated effort was the multi-media Chieu Hoi campaign conducted countrywide in the two-week period prior to Tet, the Vietnamese New Year, in January 1966. In this GVN campaign with massive U.S. support, more than 130 million leaflets of 25 different types were airdropped in VC areas throughout South Vietnam. Additionally, 391 hours of airborne loudspeaker missions were flown, 150 hours of special radio programs were broadcast, ballads and films were specially written or adapted for the occasion, and articles and photos were carried by provincial newspapers. The results were dramatically demonstrated by the record-breaking numbers of Chieu Hoi returnees during the first quarter of this year:

1966	
<i>Chieu Hoi Returnees</i>	
January	1,672
February	2,084
March	2,336

The April figure of 1,650 halted the upward trend. The political crisis in Hue-Danang<sup>4</sup> and downswing in major military actions were

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Buddhist Crisis; see footnote 2, Document 85.



in part responsible. The April figure is nevertheless higher than that of any single month in 1965. Because of the success of the “Tet Campaign,” a joint GVN/US Chieu Hoi psychological operation plan has been developed and issued, and a continuing effort will be made to maintain the momentum which, we hope, is being only temporarily interrupted by the current political crisis.

*Strengthening the GVN Communication Infrastructure:*

The increased JUSPAO media capabilities discussed above represents only a part of the total JUSPAO support to revolutionary development in South Viet-Nam. In the RD framework, JUSPAO has given fresh emphasis to those programs designed to strengthen the GVN capability and motivation to communicate with the Vietnamese people. To enable the government’s revolutionary objectives as well as progress in specific areas to be communicated to and be understood by the people, the GVN requires a viable media-infrastructure as well as a corps of cadres trained to be effective communicators. JUSPAO has made forward strides in both areas. To illustrate progress made, attention might be focused on radio and television.

The first significant break-through in the JUSPAO effort to convince the GVN of the need to strengthen Radio Viet-Nam (VTVN) was the decree signed by Premier Ky on September 30, 1965, restructuring VTVN as a semi-autonomous broadcasting corporation within the GVN. The decree was but the first step, but it did provide a framework for some badly-needed administrative and fiscal reforms. Changes in organization, personnel policy and pay scales have since gradually been put into effect. The autonomy aspect is solely from the GVN’s administrative regulations, since from the policy viewpoint, VTVN continues to be completely responsive to the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi. An overall reorganization plan reflecting all the changes was finally ready and scheduled for formal signature in late May, 1966.

In the fall of 1965, a technical radio survey preparatory to the completion of a National Radio Network was carried out by a VOA representative. At that time, it was estimated that VTVN broadcasting signals reached some 60 per cent of the population. Results of the survey show that if its recommendations were implemented, VTVN as a network could provide round-the-clock coverage for 95 per cent of the population. Approval of the project awaits GVN action.

JUSPAO has also carried out a series of eight-week training courses for Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) provincial technicians in the field of audio-visual equipment maintenance and repair. The course which got underway in March, 1966, was the fourth in this series. A major and coordinated radio training effort was a three-month program conducted by a VOA team of instructors. A class of 98 people selected

from the VTVN and the Voice of Freedom Station studied radio programming and production as well as management and the operation of a national network. The course ended in May this year.

It is estimated that South Viet-Nam has a total of 500–600,000 radio receivers, each of which has considerable multiple-listenership potential. Radio communication therefore has an integral part to play as the government revolutionary development program is extended to all parts of the country. Studies have shown that radio is the prime news disseminator in South Viet-Nam.

Television is now at its infancy in South Viet-Nam, and it will grow and expand much more slowly than radio. But it, too, will play a vital role in revolutionary development for its programming goal is educational TV which will support the GVN's social and economic construction tasks in rural areas.

The introduction and growth of TV broadcasting in South Viet-Nam were just short of phenomenal. Although exploratory discussion and planning were carried out as early as November, 1964, it was in the fall of 1965 that the project gained momentum. Approved in November, 1965, by February 7, 1966, television was on-air in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area, with the GVN and AFRTS sharing the U.S. Navy airborne transmitting facilities. The one-hour of daily Vietnamese program in the evening is followed by three hours of AFRTS telecast for the U.S. troops. For this initial airborne phase, the DOD provided transmission equipment, training of Vietnamese technicians and 500 TV receivers through MAP channels for the Vietnamese military. The AID is responsible for financing the construction of GVN ground stations, studio equipment and the import of an eventual total of 3,500 community viewing receivers. JUSPAO's role is to assist and advise the GVN in programming and production of TV programs as well as in the management of the TV institution.

Today, over 650 community viewing receivers are operating at key locations in Saigon and surrounding provincial areas in Gia Dinh. TV therefore is supporting RD efforts in the Hop Tac area around Saigon. In May, for example, the second in a weekly series of 15-minute shows on the Chieu Hoi program was telecast by the GVN. Construction of Saigon ground transmission facilities and studio has already begun with a projected completion date of October 15, 1966.

Another ground station will be built in Cantho, for which a site has been selected. When it comes on the air on January 15, 1967, TV programs will provide support to the RD province of An Giang. The GVN's third TV station will be in Qui Nhon (on-air target April 15, 1967), thus targeting another media resource to the priority RD province of Binh Dinh. The fourth will be in the Hue-Danang area.

An examination of progress in the above "sophisticated" media would not be complete without some attention given to the strengthen-

ing by JUSPAO of the more conventional and traditionally Vietnamese channels of communication in rural areas. Because daily newspapers are all published in Saigon and circulate mostly in urban centers, JUSPAO was instrumental in the project of developing newspapers for individual provinces which can be shaped into vehicles for the Province Chiefs to communicate with the people. By the end of August, 1965, the Ministry of Information had decided to provide regular budgetary support to 19 such provincial newspapers, all having been started, financed and nurtured by JUSPAO up to that time. By the end of September, 24 provincial newspapers were published in key provinces. In the effort to improve the quality of these products, JUSPAO then secured the Ministry's agreement to a series of two-week training courses for writers and editors of these provincial papers. Before the year was out, the first course in this series was held. By concentrating on basic and practical techniques of journalism, the program enabled the trainees to put what they learned to work immediately. JUSPAO's effort in shaping this basic communication tool paid handsome dividends when the revolutionary development program was launched. In RD provinces where provincial newspapers were going concerns, they were ready channels for RD information to flow to the peasants. In May, RD feature materials and photos developed by JUSPAO have been made a regular part of all 25 provincial newspapers. "News in Pictures" emphasizing RD, Chieu Hoi and American presence topics is a regular feature in these newspapers.

The popularity of South Vietnamese classical opera in rural areas is well known to JUSPAO. Traveling drama troupes performing in this medium, in modern songs and in skits, are thus an effective channel of communication in rural Viet-Nam. JUSPAO succeeded in December, 1965, in arranging for the transfer and consolidation of all U.S.-sponsored drama teams under a joint JUSPAO-VIS management and direction. Through the centralized production of a monthly packet of songs and skits with policy themes built in, these traveling troupes combine political messages and entertainment in a traditional Vietnamese format.

A spot check shows that in April, 1966, seven of the drama troupes put on 161 shows in hamlets and villages, of which 91 were at night, to a total audience of 64,355 people (80 per cent of whom were peasants, 10 per cent students and 10 per cent military). The thrust of these programs was the Chieu Hoi theme. In May, the second issue of the Drama Troupe Magazine, also developed by JUSPAO, devoted the entire issue to RD. The material included the text of a RD play for use by all troupes countrywide.

*JUSPAO Support to RD:*

It is yet premature to render an overall assessment of the JUSPAO informational input since revolutionary development programs have

been hampered directly or indirectly by unsettled political conditions since mid-April. One can, however, gain some impressions of the nature and scope of JUSPAO support by reviewing the highlights of various JUSPAO RD projects and activities since February.

To provide RD support, it should be noted that JUSPAO machinery did not need "re-tooling" so much as a series of gear-shiftings, namely: re-adjusting program priorities, shifting personnel assignments and allocating resources within the framework of an overall plan designed to exploit and intensify the social, economic, security and national unity aspects of Revolutionary Development. Such a plan has been drawn up in JUSPAO. The key concept in public affairs support of RD is not merely to tell the peasant what the GVN is doing for him, or to awaken a peasant gratitude for government favors granted. The program must aim higher than mere peasant cooperation motivated by opportunistic expectations of personal gain. The crux is motivation, and the GVN must motivate and educate the peasants to become responsible citizens, not merely of their villages but also of their District, their Province and the Nation. Development of responsible citizens is therefore the business of nation-building. To insure continuing and full supervision of public affairs programs in RD areas, about a quarter of the JUSPAO Field Representatives have been specifically deployed to RD provinces.

As early as February and in the aftermath of the Honolulu Conference,<sup>5</sup> scattered psywar programs supporting the RD concept were begun by JUSPAO in South Viet-Nam. In the IV Corps, 6,000 JUSPAO-provided posters were used in public rallies organized to explain the new GVN revolutionary objectives. Vinh Binh Province conducted special seminars for civil servants and teachers. The Dinh Tuong Provincial Radio broadcast shows on the work of RD cadres. JUSPAO began planning a series of posters for nationwide use, designed to reinforce the effects of the work by RD teams, emphasizing personal identification of cadres and peasants and the role of each in achieving social revolution.

In March, considerable field activities in support of RD were noted in all Corps areas. In Binh Dinh, JUSPAO posters and periodicals were used by RD cadres in the newly established hamlet reading rooms and bulletin boards. In Binh Duong Province, photos were made of RD cadres working with hamlet peasants digging wells, and building dispensaries and schools for refugee children. JUSPAO worked with VIS to get these into media products for Binh Duong and adjacent areas.

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the conference organized by the United States, held in Honolulu, Hawaii, February 5-8, where President Johnson met with Ky and Thieu, as well as his top military commander, Ambassador to Vietnam, Cabinet heads, and other officials. See *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, Documents 58-90.

Kien Giang Province, for example, began feeding RD news for broadcast by Radio Saigon. The JUSPAO motion picture section researched and set up a list of 73 films supporting RD concepts and requested additional prints for mopix libraries in RD provinces. JUSPAO exhibits section began designing a display stand for printed exhibits. Among the printed materials distributed in March were 17 RD posters and plastic rice bags containing a psywar message. The III Corps in April utilized 50,000 of these plastic bags to redistribute to the peasants rice which the government captured from the VC.

A special series of 13 radio shows entitled "RD Today," prepared in April, began broadcasting by VTVN in May. The first of five manuals which JUSPAO developed for RD cadre training at Vung Tau rolled off the presses last month. At the Vung Tau Center, the first graduation class of RD cadres was given multi-media coverage. Each of the graduates received from JUSPAO a 100-page "RD Diary," which includes a cartoon history of Viet-Nam, 65 Questions and Answers relating to work in pacification, a set of cadre operating rules and 25 photos of effective RD work in hamlets. (This diary, incidentally, will be updated every three months so that future graduates will be apprised of the latest accomplishments.) The Vung Tau graduation called attention to third-country coverage, in which JUSPAO has played an increasingly significant facilitative role since July 1965. In May 1966, for example, RD interviews were arranged by JUSPAO for Israeli newsmen, Danish News Service, the London Economist, Die Presse Vienna, Venevision (from Caracus) and Turkish journalists. To supplement direct coverage by the large third-country press corps in-country, JUSPAO is sending regularly through USIA channels to 95 USIS posts a monthly packet of photos and features which stress heavily the U.S. non-military programs in South Viet-Nam. The May packet, for example, was devoted entirely to revolutionary development.

The theme of a 1967 Vietnamese calendar project (to be undertaken by MACV Polwar Directorate with JUSPAO advice and assistance) will be on revolutionary development. Barring unforeseen developments, that will also be the 1967 theme for JUSPAO programs in South Viet-Nam.

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>6</sup>**

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<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## 92. Report Prepared in the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

Presidential Directive of February 2, 1966<sup>2</sup>

The following is an account of what the Department has done to carry out the directive of the President in his special Message on *International Health and Education* on February 2.

1. The Interagency Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, chaired by Assistant Secretary Charles Frankel recorded at its meeting on May 10, the following action in the relevant section of the minutes of that meeting. (Attachment 1)<sup>3</sup>

2. Assistant Secretary Frankel has requested that geographic offices in his Bureau urgently survey possibilities for holding regional seminars and colloquies abroad and report to him by the end of June. Meanwhile, he is reserving the sum of \$1 million, part or all of which will be devoted to such seminars, provided the survey reveals significant possibilities. The subject of seminars has also been discussed at conferences of Cultural Affairs Officers. The Far Eastern officers have made the following suggestions which are now being reviewed:

(1) The inclusion of Southeast Asians in the highly successful Kyoto American Studies seminars, held annually, thus providing a new multinational dimension.

(2) A regional center for international seminars to be established in Bangkok to which scholars from the nearby countries of Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Burma might be invited.

(3) If the binational foundation is established in India, seminars could be held there on various subjects and might include scholars from the Far East, as well as Near East and South Asia.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1965–1966, Lot 69D260, Entry UD UP 175, Box 21, 1966—EDU 3—Conferences & Organizations. No classification marking. According to an undated covering memorandum from Read to Rostow, the memorandum was drafted by Sandvos and Betz on June 17; cleared by Frankel and in substance by Simpson (SCA) and Parelman (OIC). An unknown hand wrote “June 18, 1966” on the covering memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> According to the Presidential Directive, which Johnson described in his February 2 special message to Congress (see footnote 3, Document 89): “We are ready to serve as host to international gatherings. I have therefore called on the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to explore ways to remove unnecessary hindrances in granting visas to guests invited from abroad.” (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1966*, Book I, p. 132)

<sup>3</sup> Not attached.

The Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West,<sup>4</sup> a cooperative project of the U.S. Government and the University of Brazil, has sponsored small, multinational conferences in such subjects as world health problems, international development, and communications, and as a regular part of its academic program has brought together senior specialists from Asia and the Pacific, as well as the United States, to explore problems of common concern. These programs of the East-West Center will be continued and their applicability to other areas explored.

The Bureau will continue to cooperate with seminars, conferences, and international meetings held in this country of relevance to our exchange program (such as the International Conference on Social Work). This means timing the visits of international visitors in such a way that they can take advantage of international meetings of special interest to them.

3. The Department has continued to look to UNESCO, and the other U.N. agencies and regional organizations of which the United States is a member, to provide forums for seeking answers to the common problems of mankind. Following conversations held between the Secretary and the Director-General in November, 1965,<sup>5</sup> and pursuant to the Presidential Message of February 2, Assistant Secretary Frankel has carried on the discussion verbally and in an exchange of letters with the Director-General. Technical problems affect the holding of such meetings. The Department and the Director-General have agreed to the meeting of legal specialists within the next two months to solve these problems. Also, discussions have been opened with UNESCO concerning the following two meetings:

International Meetings on the Use and Conservation of Resources of the Biosphere.

Meeting of Experts on the Creation and Development of Cultural Centers.

4. The Secretary and the Attorney General have issued instructions for new procedures with regard to visas for visitors invited to attend international meetings in the United States. As discussed in the attached press release (Attachment 2),<sup>6</sup> these new procedures provide for blanket waivers to participants in international meetings.

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the institution, also referred to as the East-West Center, which was established by P.L. 86-472, Chapter VII, and signed into law by President Eisenhower on May 14, 1960.

<sup>5</sup> No record of these conversations has been found.

<sup>6</sup> Not attached.



These procedures were first employed in processing delegates to the meeting of the International Congress of P.E.N. (organization of poets, playwrights, essayists and novelists) being held at New York University June 12–18. The application of the procedures was a notable success, and brought favorable recognition from officials of the organization at the opening session, as well as in the press. A request for the blanket waiver for participants in the XXVII International Congress of Orientalists, to be held at the University of Michigan in August, 1967, is now being processed.

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**93. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Director of the United States Information Agency (White) to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 20, 1966

SUBJECT

Clarifying the Cultural Mission of USIA

I recommend the following:

(1) A letter from you to PAO's (with a copy to all Assistant Directors) giving your views on the cultural mission of the Agency. A suggested draft is attached.

(2) A new statement of mission for USIA (draft attached).

(3) A revised instruction on the Country Plan (CA-1195 of October 21, 1964)<sup>2</sup> which makes clear that posts may include aspects of the American image as Psychological Objectives. The present wording suggests that this is not so, and many posts have eliminated these from their Country Plans. (For example, half of the posts in Western Europe have no Psychological Objective relating to the U.S. image although a major part of their programs is devoted to it.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 311, CUL CULTURE (GEN). No classification marking. A copy was sent to Chernoff. Attached but not printed is a copy of the January 25, 1963, USIA mission statement. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 144. There is no indication that Marks approved the draft or that any further action was taken.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.



(4) The name of USIA should be changed. The name we use in the United States should indicate that we operate abroad; and the word “cultural” should be included in our name both at home and abroad. Because USIS as a title is already well known overseas, I suggest the minimum change in this.

*Possible names:*

*In the U.S.*

OICA (Overseas Information and Cultural Agency)

or

IICA (International Information and Cultural Agency)

*Abroad*

USICS (U.S. Information and Cultural Service)

or

USCIS (U.S. Cultural and Information Service)

These titles should be checked with the Area Directors to be sure that the initials do not have a bad connotation abroad.

(5) At an appropriate moment, the President might announce both the new name for USIA and his redefinition of our mission. This could be done casually, at a time when he is making several other announcements, without calling special attention to it.

(6) In connection with the new statement of mission, each of the media services should prepare a statement of its role in carrying out this mission. The VOA Charter does this adequately for IBS, but we have no comparable documents for the other three services. These statements need not be made public, but would serve a useful purpose in clarifying thinking within the Agency on what we are supposed to be doing.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

## Enclosure 2

### **Draft Statement Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, June 20, 1966

#### MISSION OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

The mission of the U.S. Information Agency is to strengthen the foreign relations of the United States by (1) building understanding abroad of the United States, its institutions, culture and policies, and (2) helping construct a world of progress and peace in freedom by sharing with other nations information, thought and experience that can contribute to this goal.

To carry out its mission, USIA conducts information and cultural programs overseas through all media of communication.

The U.S.I.A. also advises the President, his overseas representatives, and departments and agencies of the executive branch on the implications of public opinion abroad for the United States in the conduct of its foreign policy.

## Enclosure 3

### **Draft Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to All United States Information Agency Public Affairs Officers<sup>5</sup>**

Washington, June 20, 1966

Dear PAOs:

Questions come to me from time to time about the cultural mission of USIA. I should like to take this opportunity to give you my views.

Our cultural mission is two-fold. In the first place, we are building understanding of the United States as a nation. Peoples abroad do not judge the United States as a world leader, or its policies, in a vacuum: they judge the whole nation—our society and institutions, our culture, our ideals and aims. Even with the myriad communications of the

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<sup>4</sup> No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the draft statement.

<sup>5</sup> No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the letter.

twentieth century,<sup>6</sup> the picture transmitted is often distorted and incomplete. And there are those who seek to amplify distortions and twist the truth. It is our job to present relevant facts where they are not known, to place in perspective those that are. We aim by so doing to strengthen the image of a democratic, dynamic, socially and culturally mature nation in which others can have confidence. Such confidence is an essential underpinning for the conduct of our foreign policy.

In many countries we also have a second responsibility that goes beyond projection of the United States. We use the tools of communication, several of them cultural, to bring to other peoples information, thought and experience that can help shape their national development—economic, political and social. This may mean building an understanding of the democratic process; helping to create a sense of national unity; forging attitudes of self-help that will speed economic development; or “ventilating” a closed society with fresh ideas from the outside world.

Both aspects of our cultural program contribute to the national goal of constructing a world of progress and peace in freedom.

Our cultural mission must be defined country by country according to the local situation and USIA’s potential. Each of you is faced with the necessity of setting priorities. Perhaps your single most important task as PAO is to distinguish between the merely useful and the essential—to select psychological objectives wisely and fashion a country program that is realistic in terms of the resources at your disposal. Selectivity is particularly necessary in cultural operations, which can easily become so diffuse as to be ineffective. Properly conceived and skillfully executed, however, these operations can be among our most valuable tools.

I count upon you and your staffs to make them so.

Sincerely,

LHM<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The word “twentieth” is crossed out and “20th” is written above it in an unknown hand.

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that bears Marks’ typed initials.

**94. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information (Stanton)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 21, 1966

Dear Frank,

The following will serve as a status report on actions taken by the Agency on the recommendations made by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information in its Twenty-first Report to Congress.<sup>2</sup> I have listed below the specific recommendations which you have made and my comment on each. They are as follows:

1. *USIA's purpose and role should cover both present and future objectives.*

2. *USIA should develop long-range plans. A ten-year (1966–76) plan is recommended.*

I concur in your recommendation that we have a responsibility to project U.S. foreign policy from a short and long-range standpoint. We attempt to do so.

Since taking over the office of Director, I have stressed long-range planning and have emphasized its importance in:

- a. Planning for the recruitment of trained personnel.
- b. Instituting language training programs.
- c. Evaluating the technical facilities which we operate to determine whether they will become obsolete.
- d. Considering new facilities in light of technological advances made in the art of communications.

Consistent with these objectives, I have appointed Wilson Dizard as long-range planning officer and have given him specific assignments which are now being developed.

In order that we may keep abreast of technological improvements, we have constantly conferred with the National Aeronautics and Space Council representatives to determine the prospective use of satellites for short-wave broadcasting, for frequency modulation programs and other means of communications. Special studies have been instituted on these subjects directed towards our particular problems.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 1, Advisory Groups—Information 1966. No classification marking. Drafted by Marks. Written in an unknown hand above the date line on the first page of the letter is the name "Frank Stanton" and the note "(sent June 24)."

<sup>2</sup> *Twenty-First Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information*, 89th Congress, Second Session, House Document No. 403 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966).

I am enclosing at this time a summary which I recently prepared covering certain basic assumptions with reference to political and other circumstances which will influence the operation of the Agency in the 1970s.

3. *USIA should use more research in its plans, programs, budget and evaluation.*

In your report you state, "This Commission has long urged that USIA employ wherever possible modern research methods in order to ascertain when and where it has succeeded or failed, and how it can influence attitudes more effectively."

As you know, our Research Section has carried out specific projects using "modern research methods," and I am satisfied that the personnel of this section are highly qualified to continue doing so. I am unable to comment on your statement that, "The use of research has been seriously neglected in USIA to the detriment of the program." This statement obviously refers to a situation which may have existed prior to my appointment.

We are currently using research for planning purposes, to evaluate the usefulness of particular media products, to justify our request for appropriations before the Bureau of the Budget and Congress, and to determine attitudes of foreign populations on significant problems of mutual interest.

I have recently determined that research can be used more effectively if it is integrated with the Office of Policy. Accordingly, on July 1, 1966 the Research unit will be transferred to that section and the Reference Service will be transferred to the Office of Administration. It is my expectation that this reorganization will bring about a more efficient operation.

4. *USIA should improve the quality of its programs, products, and personnel.*

I concur in this recommendation and we are constantly striving to improve the quality of the programs, products and personnel of the Agency.

Effective October 1, 1966, I have named an experienced Foreign Service Officer, James J. Halsema, as Head of the Training Division and he will institute a more vigorous program of indoctrination for our officers assigned overseas. Moreover, arrangements are being made for a larger complement of personnel to be trained at the Foreign Service Institute,<sup>3</sup> not only in language training but in cultural aspects of the foreign countries to which officers will be assigned.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the United States Government's primary training institution for officers and support personnel of the U.S. foreign affairs community, which is administered by the Department of State.

In your recommendation you also suggest that "Each USIA employee should be encouraged to offer his ideas on these and related matters." You will be gratified to learn that the Employee Suggestion Program which I instituted immediately after my appointment has resulted in 541 suggestions as compared to 110 in a comparable period. Not only have I received valuable suggestions for improvement of Agency material and programs, but we have been able to effect savings of \$45,000 as a result of these ideas.

Reviews have been made periodically on the usefulness of our magazines and pamphlets. New products will be instituted when the need arises and others will be abandoned when they no longer serve a useful purpose.

The VOA is altering its basic format and in the Fall we will present a new concept of program service. I am hopeful that we can shortly present to your Commission taped excerpts from typical programs which are being planned. In addition, I have recently received a report on a special investigation made on our Latin American program by Peter Straus, an experienced broadcast station owner-manager.<sup>4</sup> During this investigation he visited Latin American countries, monitored the programs of the domestic system as well as short-wave transmission of the VOA and other services. As a result of this report, I plan on making substantial changes in the Latin American output.

*5. USIA should strengthen, and integrate more effectively its cultural and information programs.*

In order to strengthen our cultural program, I have appointed Dr. Charles Cole as Cultural Advisor. As you may know, Dr. Cole has an eminent background for this responsibility and has served as the U.S. Ambassador to Chile<sup>5</sup> and President of Amherst College.

We have endeavored to strengthen the Binational Center institutes as a means of developing cultural programs more fully in certain areas of the world.

In order to aid in the recruitment of outstanding scholars as Cultural Affairs Officers, I plan on convening a meeting of leading college presidents who will be informed of USIA objectives and programs and whose support will be enlisted.

*6. USIA should re-examine its assumptions and review its programs, country by country, in order to expand useful ones and discard those that are marginal; USIA should also review its list of priority countries for the purpose of determining areas of concentration and saturation and areas where minimum U.S. presence is sufficient.*

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>5</sup> Cole was Ambassador to Chile from 1961 until 1964.

We regularly re-examine the assumptions and the country plan for each of the countries in which we operate. Concurrently, programs of the Agency are regularly monitored and those which have outlived their usefulness or are not serving a valid purpose are discarded. This effort is a constant one and emphasis has been placed upon it at all times.

*7. USIA should search constantly for new techniques in communication from the private sector, especially from advertising, public relations, the public media of communication and from the universities.*

Since my appointment as Director on September 1, 1965, I have met with distinguished representatives from advertising, public relations, radio broadcasting, magazines, newspapers and from the educational community. Specifically, formal meetings have been held with the Public Relations Society of America—National Officers, New York Chapter; Public Relations Roundtable; Advertising Federation of America; Broadcasters Promotion Association; National Association of Broadcasters; selected representatives of multiple-owners of broadcast facilities; and International Council of Industrial Editors. These meetings have resulted in valuable suggestions and have brought about an area of cooperation which promises to stimulate the recruitment of personnel and the development of new ideas.

*8. USIA should continue to help create favorable atmospheres abroad for the understanding of U.S. foreign policies.*

We endeavor to carry out this suggestion at all times.

*9. USIA should review and reconsider the decision to close libraries, bi-national centers and information centers in Europe.*

I have previously explained the circumstances which led to the curtailment or reduction of our library service in London and Paris. At this point I would like to give you a report on the current situation in these capitals.

In Paris we retained the first floor of the three-story building at the Place de l'Odeon which housed the USIS library. A reference collection of 5,000 volumes is in active use. The remaining volumes were transferred to the USIS Youth Center and to the American Library. Reports from the post disclose that the patronage at the Place de l'Odeon has increased because of the presence of an Institute of American Studies on the 2nd and 3rd floors and that students attending this Institute have made good use of the reference facilities. Considerable use is also made of the augmented collection at the USIS Cultural Center.

In London we maintain a small reference library at the American Embassy. The remaining volumes were transferred to the University of London where they are actively used by the large student population

of the University. Reference queries are being handled by mail and phone. By virtue of these arrangements, there has been no diminution in service being rendered to the residents of London desiring library access to U.S. library facilities nor to the residents of the United Kingdom seeking reference service. In addition, books are being sent by mail throughout the United Kingdom.

No further reductions have been made in libraries, Binational and Information Centers in Europe. However, improvements have been made in certain facilities and every effort will be made to up-grade the existing centers.

The status of our libraries in Europe are under continuing review and efforts will be made to improve the facilities. However, at this time I do not believe that it would be desirable to attempt to expand the facilities in Paris and London described above.

10. *USIA should seek a level of appropriations more commensurate with its responsibilities and more in proportion to the efforts of the U.S. military and of the U.S. economic and military assistance programs.*

At the present time, I am preparing the estimates for the budget for Fiscal Year 1968 and will request at that time funds adequate to carry out our responsibilities in light of conditions which are anticipated for that period.

This brief summary is designed to acquaint you with some of the highlights of our program in the areas enumerated. Periodically, I look forward to meeting with you and other members of the Commission to answer your questions and to seek your advice on the most effective way of carrying out the objectives assigned to us by the Congress and the President.

Sincerely,

Leonard H. Marks<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



## Attachment

### Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>7</sup>

Washington, undated

#### *Looking Towards the 1970's*

In projecting its mission for the 1970's, the U.S. Information Agency must begin with two related factors. They are:

1. the continued need for the United States to maintain its international leadership both for its own security and that of the rest of the Free World and
2. the continuing expansion of the role of world public opinion in influencing international issues which affect our national security.

The Agency is guided by two sets of assumptions in projecting its mission for the next five years. The first involves the operational environment which will determine the shape of future Agency activities. The second, determined primarily by the Department of State and other agencies involved in foreign policies, actively relates to the general political environment during this period. A brief summary of the important aspects of the operational environment follows:

#### *THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: 1968–72*

As it prepares for the 1970's, USIA must consider its role in a new world communication environment. The fundamental operational factor in this new situation is accelerated change. The characteristics of USIA elite audiences are shifting in ways that give new force to the role of public opinion abroad.

The Agency's effectiveness as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy will depend on its ability to adapt its operations to these conditions in the coming years. The key characteristics of these changes are:

1. *USIA elite audiences are expanding at a greater rate than the general increase in world population.* The general rate of population increase is about two percent annually. Quantitatively most of this increase is taking place among low-income rural and urban families in underdeveloped countries. By and large, this group is not a USIA target audience. The significant audience for USIA are students, public officials and middle-to-upper class professionals abroad. These groups are expanding in numbers at a faster pace than is the general population.

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<sup>7</sup> Limited Official Use. No drafting information appears on the paper although Marks indicated in his letter to Stanton that he prepared this summary.

This is particularly true in underdeveloped countries where the base on which elite-group expansion has taken place has been a narrow one. Eighty percent of the Agency's operations take place in such countries. In addition, the characteristics of the Agency's overseas target audiences are changing. It is a younger audience. It is better educated and it is more mobile, both socially and geographically. It is an increasingly urbanized audience, with a higher ratio of women than ever before. The Agency will have to take these characteristics into account.

2. *The range of informational and cultural outlets available to these audiences are expanding at a rapid rate.* As elite audiences grow, the range of information outlets also tends to increase. This has been particularly true in less-developed countries during the past decade, and it will be increasingly so in the next few years. In Asia, Africa and Latin America, the number of newspapers and libraries has doubled; the number of radio transmitters has tripled. Television, non-existent in these areas a dozen years ago, now is a factor in sixty countries. Higher education facilities in these countries have doubled in the past decade and will probably double again in the next ten years. Thus USIA's target audiences not only have greater choices of cultural and informational outlets, but also a greater variety of choice within each medium. USIA's effectiveness in reaching these audiences depends in large part upon its ability to service their new range of informational and cultural outlets.

3. *The amount of information USIA must consider for processing has increased.* An important influence on world communications has been the great expansion in the amount of data to be handled—the so-called “information explosion.” This phenomenon has seen the doubling of the amount of total information during the past decade, with the prospects for another doubling in the next ten years. USIA must be selective in its information processing, emphasizing those areas which relate most directly to its mission objectives. USIA must also be responsive to the new range and complexity of information resources which are relevant to the Agency's mission.

4. *The Agency must adapt its operations to changes now taking place in communications technology.* World communications is changing not only in terms of expanded outlets and audiences but also in its technology. The dramatic current example of this is the global communications satellite network, scheduled for full operation in 1968. Less dramatic but equally significant changes are taking place in other areas affecting Agency operations—automated library techniques, computerized information storage and teaching machines. USIA operations should be adapted to take advantage of the efficiencies offered by these techniques.

In summary, USIA is entering a period of accelerated change in world communications which affects this total pattern of its operations

abroad. These changes should be met in part by a realignment of its present resources in ways that improve their effectiveness and, when necessary, by a careful expansion of these resources to permit the Agency to meet its wider responsibilities.

5. *USIA must adapt itself more directly to the psychological-operations requirements of insurgency situations which threaten U.S. interests.* In recent years, the balance of USIA overseas operations has shifted to countries where the major security problem is latent or active insurgency. This shift has placed new demands on the Agency's need to identify more precisely its role in modernization and insurgency operations and to adapt its own operations accordingly. In particular, the Agency should examine its operations in the following fields as they relate to insurgency situations: (1) training officers in psychological operations for insurgency situations, (2) improving the collection and use of intelligence related to insurgencies, (3) improving its technological capabilities for insurgency operations and (4) strengthening indigenous organizations which have, directly or indirectly, a local psychological-operations role, and (5) improving the Agency's capability to support overall U.S. Government policies and operations relating to insurgency situations throughout the world.

95. **Memorandum From the Executive Director of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State (Hall) and the Director, Inter-Departmental Relations and GAO Liaison Staff, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration (Wilken) to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration (Crockett) and the Assistant Secretary for Education and Cultural Affairs (Frankel)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 27, 1966

This memorandum transmits our study of the organization of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU).

Our findings and recommendations derive from the assumptions and guidance given us, as set forth in Appendix 2,<sup>2</sup> applied to the present structure of the Bureau. We believe the recommendations to be feasible and consistent with the assumptions. They will provide a tighter, more responsive CU organization to carry out the Department's upgraded responsibilities in international educational and cultural affairs.

Some of the recommendations can be put into effect forthwith; others depend on the outcome of interdepartmental negotiations that lie ahead. Therefore, we foresee the proposed reorganization taking place by phases over a span of time.

We recommend the approval of this study and its findings.

**Theo E. Hall**<sup>3</sup>

**David Wilken**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Bureau of Information Office of Information and Research, Library Programs Division, Special Collection, Branch Office of the Historical Librarian, Subject Files: 1953-1999, Entry P-195, Box 6, Reorganization (CU). Limited Official Use.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Hall signed "T.E. Hall" above this typed signature.

## Attachment

### Study Prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State<sup>4</sup>

Washington, undated

[Omitted here are the Table of Contents and list of appendices.]

#### I. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) has not had continuity of direction. Its program operations are isolated from the mainstream of the conduct of foreign affairs.<sup>5</sup> The program's explicit legal authority (Public Law 87–256, the Fulbright-Hays Act,<sup>6</sup> and previous legislation), a separate appropriation, and the Department's organizational structure have contributed to this seclusion. The full program potential of legislative authority has not been achieved.

The Bureau's program operations are complicated. There are four statutory boards and four other advisory groups which advise and oversee elements of the program and CU provides them secretariat services. Management of CU's finances is intricate. The organizational structure of the Bureau is cumbersome and fragmented. Thirteen units report to the Assistant Secretary. All but the smallest units are, in turn, subdivided and most offices are layered with deputy and supervisory positions.<sup>7</sup>

The main thrust of this report is the transfer from the Department to the Center for Educational Cooperation, HEW, of domestic operations of the academic exchange programs.<sup>8</sup> Mechanisms are in existence or can be created to assure the Department's leadership and coordinating role in the direction of the foreign relations content of these programs. The result of the reorganization proposed will be an upgraded, tighter CU, more responsive to foreign relations considerations.

This study proposes a mustering of CU functions into three logical groupings: program operations, program support, and coordination; each group of functions to be headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. Within these groupings, functions of subordinate units are clarified,

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<sup>4</sup> Limited Official Use. No drafting information appears on the study.

<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand underlined "isolated from" and drew two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4, Document 14.

<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand drew a bracket in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 3, Document 89.

layers of supervision are eliminated, and the number of positions is reduced. Through transfer of operations and staff from the Bureau and the elimination of superfluous positions, CU can be reduced by 63 positions.

The organization and staffing changes recommended in the following sections are desirable and attainable goals, but the timing of their accomplishment will depend in part on developments outside the authority of the Bureau and the Department, e.g., the creation and proper functioning of the Center for Educational Cooperation and the ability to make necessary administrative and personnel changes.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the study with the exception of the recommendations.]

### *RECOMMENDATIONS*

It is recommended that:

1. The Policy Review and Coordination Staff be given an executive secretariat role for the Bureau to deal with various commissions, boards, and other groups concerned with international education, complementing the role of other secretariats in CU which represent such groups.

2. PRS give increased emphasis to its role of policy development and formulation.

3. PRS be specifically given responsibility for liaison with individual U.S. Government agencies on present and proposed programs in international educational and cultural affairs so that the Assistant Secretary is kept informed and in a position to exert policy leadership.

4. Two additional positions be established, and later consideration be given to authorizing other positions on the basis of PRS experience in performing its expanded role.

5. The GS-5 position concerned with maintenance of the CU Reference Center be transferred to CU/IR, subject to reexamination after the establishment of the Center for Educational Cooperation in HEW.

**96. Airgram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic and Consular Posts<sup>1</sup>**

CA-47

Washington, July 1, 1966, 6:42 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Information Program for NATO Crisis

This is a Joint State-USIA Message.

There is attached a revision of CA-10959 in the light of changes recommended at the PAO meeting, Paris, May 12–14, and comments from missions.

The attached program is now to be put into effect by all addressees. It is to be considered a check list of agreed guide lines for coordinated action. Missions are to use their own judgment and discretion in carrying out the purposes of the program. However, it is intended to be carried forward actively.

Material for rebuttal to Gaullist<sup>2</sup> charges (Part III) and additional factual material in support of themes will be sent later.

Additional guidance as part of this program will be sent from time to time.<sup>3</sup> (Separate messages being sent Stockholm and Helsinki.)<sup>4</sup>

**Ball, Acting<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Policy Guidance Files: 1953–1969, Entry UD WW 266, Box 317, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO to 1966). Secret. Drafted by Claxton on June 11; cleared by Marks and Weld and in S and EUR; approved by Ball. Sent to all NATO capitals, USRO, OECD, USEC, and the Mission in Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to supporters of France's President de Gaulle.

<sup>3</sup> In an August 2 memorandum, the Acting Assistant Director for IOC, Arnold C. Hanson, notified Akers that "IOC has instituted two actions in support of the NATO Information Paper." Hanson continued: "IOC has a foreign policy mailer program under which selected foreign policy background information is sent periodically to the home offices of over 800 participating American corporations with overseas operations." He also noted that IOC was "presently combing through the ICS 'NATO book list' for suitable book titles for possible acquisition and distribution in Europe under the Donated Books Program." (National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 2, Field—Europe July–December 1966)

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>5</sup> Ball signed "George Ball" underneath this typed signature. Ball was Acting Secretary while Rusk attended the SEATO and ANZUS Council meetings in Canberra, June 25–July 2.

## Attachment

### Paper Prepared in the Department of State and the United States Information Agency<sup>6</sup>

Washington, undated

#### INFORMATION PROGRAM IN CONNECTION WITH NATO CRISIS

This is a plan for an operating program of information activities in Europe in the NATO crisis.

A. *Objectives*: The program is directed to objectives in two separate areas.

I. *In France*. To insure that the basic interests of France in NATO are understood by the French public and are kept continually before it.

II. *In the 13 NATO Nations Outside France*.<sup>7</sup> To strengthen the commitment of the 13 to NATO; to reduce their susceptibility to French propaganda designed to undercut support for NATO. Separate Plans for these two areas are attached.<sup>8</sup>

B. *Rebuttal of Gaullist Charges*: In addition to positive themes set out in Plans I and II, we must, where it would be helpful, rebut Gaullist charges against NATO and the U.S. A collection of the principal charges with factual replies is at Tab III.

C. *General Considerations*:

1. Within France we wish to make a strong case for the views of the U.S. and the 14 on NATO and to give the French people opportunity to understand the adverse effects Gaullist NATO policies will have on France. We wish also to rebut the arguments and allegations made by Gaullist leaders against NATO and the U.S. role in NATO.

2. Among the 13, while we may agree on the broad policy goals regarding the France/NATO crisis we will shortly be confronted by major differences in view on tactics. In this connection some of the 13 will wish for a variety of reasons to go to unreasonable lengths to seek accommodations with the French, and to gloss over or ignore the damage and problems caused by the French actions.

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<sup>6</sup> Secret.

<sup>7</sup> In 1966, NATO member countries included: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, Turkey, Greece, and Germany. France withdrew from NATO that year.

<sup>8</sup> Attached but not printed.



3. It will be hard to sustain steady American and general Allied interest in the crisis as it stretches out and particularly as the issues before governments become complicated, e.g. how NAC should be reorganized.

4. Neither the Europeans nor we wish to see the NATO crisis unnecessarily contaminate other matters, e.g. we wish to avoid having the NATO crisis foul up the European Community and the Kennedy Round.<sup>9</sup> But our friends in Europe should understand we will be firm on keeping NATO strong in the full realization that in its absence neither the European Communities nor the Kennedy Round could reach meaningful and enduring goals—for NATO is fundamental to both.

5. We do not wish the NATO crisis to affect France's present role as one of the Allied Occupation Powers in Berlin and present indications are that the French also desire to continue this role.<sup>10</sup> Speculation and comment relating France's actions in NATO to its position in Berlin should therefore be avoided. Moreover, in implementing our Information Program concerning the NATO crisis, the U.S. Mission in Berlin will obviously need to bear in mind the special importance in Berlin itself of maintaining harmonious relationships with the French.

6. We wish to strengthen the incentive of the 13 to remain in NATO and vigorously support it—and the French to return to it—by making their peoples feel that NATO can be further developed to serve their common vital interests and such deeply felt desires as progress toward a European settlement.

7. The programs both in and outside France must be carried out over many months. Missions should, therefore, measure their activity against public acceptance. They should plan ahead to use developments in the NATO situation such as President DeGaulle's Russian trip, the deadline for removal of French troops from NATO, the deadline for removal of French troops from Germany, President DeGaulle's September press conference, opening of parliaments (especially the French); meetings of the European Parliament, the Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, the December

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<sup>9</sup> Reference is to the sixth session of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations held in Geneva, Switzerland, which opened on May 4, 1964, and were concluded with the Geneva Protocol to the GATT signed in Geneva on June 30, 1967. For general information about the Kennedy Rounds, see *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. IX, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 282; and *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. VIII, International Monetary and Trade Policy, Documents 225–377.

<sup>10</sup> Reference is to the nations that divided the occupation of Germany, as well as the city of Berlin, following the conclusion of World War II. The Allied Occupation Powers included the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France.

Ministerial Meeting, the election campaign in France, the deadlines for withdrawal of NATO facilities and U.S. and allied installations.

8. *We are not—and we should avoid any impression that we are—carrying on a campaign against France, the French or DeGaulle in person. Our purpose is to support NATO and to show the errors and dangers of Gaullist policies that will injure NATO and its members.*

[Omitted here is the remainder of the paper.]

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**97. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, July 21, 1966

334. Subject: Cultural Exchanges.

1. Ambassador and DCM had long discussion current situation re cultural exchanges with Dobrynin and Kornienko at Spaso lunch July 19.

2. Ambassador made strong plea that Dobrynin use his influence see Cultural Exchanges Agreement<sup>2</sup> does not go down drain as it is in danger of doing thanks to Soviet actions. He referred to recent Soviet cancellation of plans participate in Los Angeles track meet and to go through with basketball games here.<sup>3</sup> He said decision had to be made literally now on hand tools exhibit scheduled to open August 1 in Kharkov. Visas had to be issued and permission given for forwarding exhibit materials held up at Soviet border. Amb Kohler noted exchanges were just about all that was left that was not frozen into immobility in U.S.-Soviet relations and thought it important they not be allowed to dry up. He noted Exchanges Agreement had been signed only few months ago and that nothing had changed in international field in interim despite contrary Soviet claims. Furthermore, these exchanges should be divorced from politics and continued on their merits. Even from Kremlin's point of view—which he tried to understand—contin-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1966. Confidential. No time of transmission is indicated; received in the Department on July 21 at 6:31 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 82.

<sup>3</sup> The Soviets cancelled these sporting events in protest of the U.S. war in Vietnam. (Peter Grose, "Soviet Athletes Spurn U.S. Meet in War Protest," *New York Times*, July 12, 1966, p. 1)

uation of broad program of popular exchanges seemed consistent with distinction they always professed to see between “ruling circles” and people.

3. Dobrynin was neither very specific nor very encouraging in his reply. He said we would get our reply (presumably on hand tools exhibit) “rather soon” but general tenor of his comments suggested we would not be pleased with reply. At one point, he indicated exchange program would be carried out on a reduced basis. He said that problem was being debated at present time with some for and some against continuation. Dobrynin of course echoed Gromyko’s line that what happened in cultural field was “up to you”. He insisted that such program could not be divorced from political developments. In this connection, both Dobrynin and Kornienko showed considerable sensitivity to Ambassador’s charges Soviet Government directly responsible for decision to cancel US–USSR sports meets. Dobrynin argued at some length (but unconvincingly) that Soviet public opinion was responsible for attitude of Soviet Government in this matter.

4. Dobrynin said that every night VOA (Russian) very conveniently totals up numbers of U.S. aircraft involved in raids over North Vietnam. Soviet listeners, who remember very well Nazi bombings during World War II, cannot but react with revulsion at such news. This is having cumulative effect in slowly but surely drying up reservoir of good will toward U.S. which he did not deny existed there. Amb Kohler commented that even if this were the case, VOA has a policy of telling the truth.

5. Comment: Seems clear to us Dobrynin’s advanced recall on consultation connected with this problem and as Dept will realize from above, he carefully avoided committing self as to where he stood in debate over future of exchanges.

**Kohler**

98. **Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency (Davies) to the Director (Marks)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 22, 1966

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Exchanges Program

You have seen Moscow's 333<sup>2</sup> and 334.<sup>3</sup> In 333, the Embassy informs us that the Soviets have unilaterally altered the agreement on the cities for the Earl Hines Band tour, eliminating Alma Ata,<sup>4</sup> Leningrad,<sup>5</sup> and Moscow, large population centers in which the Hines Band would be particularly visible, and substituting the more remote, secondary resort areas of Krasnodar, Sukhumi, and Batumi.

In 334, the Embassy describes Ambassador Kohler's discussion of the exchanges program with Ambassador Dobrynin. We had earlier asked the Embassy to inform us whether the exhibit shipment had reached Kharkov. The Embassy has not yet replied to that telegram. But, in 334, the Ambassador is reported as telling Dobrynin that the shipment is still at the border. Since shipping time from the border to Kharkov runs between a week and ten days, the exhibit could not reach Kharkov in time to permit its setting-up, which would take four days at a minimum. It is thus clear now that *Hand Tools* cannot possibly open as scheduled on August 1.

Meanwhile, there has still been no action on the telegram to Ambassador Kohler.<sup>6</sup> The effect of this delay is severely to diminish the chances that we will be able to take the initiative in putting the onus for blocking the program on the Soviets.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963-1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Soviet Union and Easter Europe 1966. Confidential. Drafted by Davies. Copies were sent to Akers, Chernoff, and Ryan. Davies sent the memorandum to Marks under a July 22 covering note, in which he wrote: "I wrote this before our telephone conversation at 9:50 this morning. I am sending it along just in case a hassle develops over whether we should go for Alternative 1 or Alternative 2. rtd 7/22." Davies signed "Dick" on the note above his typed initials.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 97.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the former name for Almaty, which served as the capital of Kazakhstan until 1997.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the former name for St. Petersburg, Russia.

<sup>6</sup> Not further identified.

These new developments make it all the more imperative that we take the hard line in dealing with the Soviets on this. That hard line is represented by Alternative No. 1 in the Secretary's memorandum to the President.<sup>7</sup> It is quite clear that the Soviets are repeating the tired old script of last fall, according to which they would eliminate what they don't like, while keeping what they do like, particularly the sending of scientific and technical personnel to the U.S. In order to be able to block this, we must make sure we get agreement to Alternative No. 1. If Alternative No. 2 is adopted, pressures from the U.S. scientific community will ensure that Soviet scientific and technical personnel continue to come in large numbers to this country, without any quid pro quo for us.

I am now totally at a loss to recommend to you what might be done to move this question off dead center, short of suggesting that you call the President.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> In a July 19 memorandum to Johnson, Bator described the July 19 Rusk memorandum and the two alternatives, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Document 168.

<sup>8</sup> The President approved of the suspension of all new exchange programs with the Soviet Union on July 19. A subsequent Soviet agreement signed on July 29 permitted the "Hand Tools" exhibit to proceed in 1967. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, footnote 3, Document 168 and footnote 2, Document 197. See also Anthony C. Collings, "Russians 'See' U.S. at Exhibit," *Chicago Tribune*, April 9, 1967, p. A3)

**99. Circular Telegram From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to All Diplomatic Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 25, 1966, 1655Z

USIA 882. I direct your personal attention to Circ. Deptel 13082 re climate world opinion regarding U.S. Viet-Nam policy<sup>2</sup> and urge your continuing contribution to Country Team and Washington thinking on subject.

While recognizing that problem may appear be less urgent some areas and some countries than others, Viet-Nam continues be our country's primary foreign policy consideration at this time and Agency's primary concern now is world-wide public atmosphere in which Viet-Nam reported, discussed, and understood or misunderstood.

I urge all Agency officers consider best means by which Agency can improve and sustain public understanding issues involved and goals established both by U.S. and our adversaries. In addition to field implementation your best ideas, Agency wishes receive on continuing basis your positive suggestions for means achieve greater acceptance abroad our Viet-Nam policies, whose success truly vital to American security and world stability.

Whereas Agency can produce radio programs, films, pamphlets, etc. exposing American point of view to world interest, simple and repetitious restatement of American policies sometimes less persuasive

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 30, Vietnam and World Opinion. Confidential. Drafted by Oleksiw; cleared by Ryan; approved by Marks. The time of transmission is illegible. Another copy of the telegram is in the National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963-1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3. Field—Far East (Viet Nam) 1966 July, August. Marks sent a copy of the telegram to Kintner under a July 25 memorandum noting that the intent of circular message was to solicit suggestions by PAOs "on how we can improve public understanding of the issues involved in Vietnam." (Johnson Library, Special Files, Handwriting File, Box 16, Handwriting File: Handwriting—President Johnson, July, 1966 (notes, instructions, doodles) [3 of 3]) Under cover of a July 26 memorandum, Kintner sent the telegram to Johnson and copied Moyers and Rostow. Johnson wrote a note on Kintner's memorandum: "Excellent—I want more of this & I want to see responses summarized. L." (Ibid.) Kintner, in a July 28 memorandum to Marks, highlighted the President's comment (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In circular telegram 13082, the Department of State requested "posts' ideas on what actions could be taken to bring about better climate of world opinion on U.S. policy in Viet-Nam, both in regard to host countries and generally." The telegram continued: "Feeling is that this is appropriate time to examine what additional efforts might be undertaken to increase understanding and support for American position. For example, in many instances there is greater tendency to regard U.S. efforts as 'war oriented' rather than peace directed. In this respect, unrealistic approach to Southeast Asian situation fails to recognize necessity for continued U.S. military pressure as essential component in overall U.S. policy directed at achieving peaceful resolution by successfully persuading Hanoi to change her course." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1964-1966, POL 1, US-Viet S)

than coverage resulting from thoughtful activity planned for purpose generating public interest in U.S. search for peace. Toward that end, especially, Circ. Deptel 13082 and this message seek your specific recommendations for public actions, announcements, visits by American officials, or other overtures which might enhance understanding and credibility U.S. efforts. I urge you to be specific.

Withal, our posture re Viet-Nam must be founded on (1) our absolute and continued determination resist aggression by Hanoi, (2) fact that Hanoi simply cannot defeat U.S. and that North Vietnamese failure is inevitable, (3) that peace equally inevitable but being delayed only by Hanoi's unwillingness thus far rpt thus far to come to negotiating table and (4) that U.S. remains ready—indeed, eager—pursue cessation of hostilities and road to lasting peace by unconditional negotiations at any time and any place, as suggested so often by President and other American officials. Your advice to Country Team and your ideas forwarded to Washington should parallel this line of thought.

Request you mark all replies for my attention.<sup>3</sup>

**Marks**

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<sup>3</sup> Under a July 28 covering memorandum, Lewis sent Marks a copy of telegram 72 from Ouagadougou, July 25, in which the Embassy transmitted its recommendations. Lewis, in his memorandum to Marks, wrote that the Embassy concluded that "the effort to improve understanding [about U.S. policy in Vietnam] should be handled on a long-term basis;" that "U.S. actions in *other* fields of direct, *local* interest to Africans raise our standing and having an important bearing on creating a favorable attitude toward our Viet-Nam policy," that "efforts by South Viet-Nam to explain the situation are more effective than official U.S. efforts," and that the "thrust of our information program should be aimed at influential elements in youth, labor and media groups." (National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Far East (Viet Nam) 1966 July, August)

**100. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 8, 1966

On July 25 I sent a circular message<sup>2</sup> to all of our posts requesting information regarding current public opinion on U.S. actions in Viet Nam.

We received an excellent response describing press and other reaction to our Viet Nam position, and suggesting courses of action that might be taken to explain our position.

The enclosed volume tabulates the responses from all posts and summarizes this reaction on the first three pages.

If you desire further detail for any country, a supplemental report will be sent to you.

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>3</sup>**

**Attachment**

**Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, August 1966

**VIETNAM and World Opinion: Analysis and Recommendations**

*ABSTRACT*

What is the state of current world opinion on US actions in Vietnam?

What can the US Government do to strengthen understanding and support for its Vietnam policies abroad?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 212, Vietnam: Vietnam and World Opinion (USIA). Secret. A copy was sent to Jorden. An unknown hand wrote: "Mr. Jorden rec'd copy direct" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 99.

<sup>3</sup> Marks signed "LHM" above this typed signature.

<sup>4</sup> No classification marking.



This report contains analyses and summaries of responses to these questions from US diplomatic missions around the world during the last week of July, 1966.<sup>5</sup>

Understanding and support for the US, both public and private, vary widely according to proximity to the scene of action and domestic political and economic considerations.

Vietnam seems far away and of little direct concern to most people. In many countries, however, public opinion shows increasing concern, reflecting in part the rising level of public controversy and debate in the United States. A strong contributing factor is the generally negative impact of international news media coverage, particularly the US wire services, *Agency France Presse*, *The New York Times*, the *Paris Herald Tribune*, and Walter Lippman,<sup>6</sup> which makes the Communist's propaganda job easier.

Principal negative points include:

1. The image of a huge white nation attempting to suppress an Asian struggle for freedom.
2. The image of the struggle as a civil war in South Vietnam.
3. The Viet Cong as embattled revolutionaries.
4. The military and non-representational character of the South Vietnamese government.

On the plus side, the US peace offensive has had a positive effect.

Opinions generally follow cold war alignments but most foreigners who support the US on other issues show some serious doubts about aspects of Vietnam. Many government officials are sympathetic in private but reluctant to show sympathy in public. In the developing areas there is a general feeling that the large US commitments in Vietnam markedly subtract from possible US aid to their countries. Opposition to US policies comes from influential groups including the "intelligentsia," university students, left-of-center political parties and segments of organized labor, and is by no means limited to those controlled or influenced by the Communists.

Recommendations for US policy actions stress the need for:

1. greater persistence in identifying the US as the seeker of peace;
2. more actions to multilateralize the efforts to resist aggression;
3. more public and diplomatic actions by Asians in support of the effort.

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to USIA 882, July 25; see Document 99.

<sup>6</sup> American journalist, writer, and political commentator.

Principal themes which missions most frequently cite as helpful are:

1. Economic and social progress as a principal US goal.
2. Emphasis on the role of South Vietnam in promoting economic and social progress, as well as in prosecuting the war.
3. Less emphasis on US military presence and actions wherever possible.
4. The US is in Vietnam only to help the Government of South Vietnam repel aggression.
5. By meeting Communist aggression in Vietnam we are weakening the Communist potential to make trouble elsewhere and demonstrating that aggression does not pay.

In the field of information activities, the survey confirms the validity of the general direction of our present programming. The majority of the recommendations are for enlarging or sharpening present operations.

Judged particularly effective are:

1. visits by indigenous newsmen to Vietnam;
2. the use of speakers—American, South Vietnamese and others, especially Asians—who have had direct observation or experience in Vietnam;
3. the views of respected, high-level public figures, presented in articles or books for selective USIS placement and in direct confrontation with critical or skeptical audiences.

The missions particularly request:

1. more material for use by all news media on the non-military aspects of the war, especially films;
2. more action by Asians, officially and non-officially, to tell the Vietnam story, even if this requires US financial support;
3. maximum precise information to justify any action which might be construed as intensifying or escalating the war, i.e., effect of POL bombings, air strikes in the demilitarized zone.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the paper, which contains information concerning specific responses from U.S. diplomatic missions around the world.]

**101. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency (Weld) to the Deputy Director, Policy and Plans (Ryan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 9, 1966

**SUBJECT**

Comment on and Analysis of Response to State and USIA Queries on Viet-Nam from IAE Posts<sup>2</sup>

In back of all post analyses and comment is an unexpressed leitmotif: Europeans tend to think of the conflict as *a U.S. war* that is being carried on irrespective of the interests of all the South Vietnamese and of Asians in general. The posts therefore recommend a more international approach to our effort, in addition to fresh U.S. presentations of our position. Also noted is a conviction that photos and stories originating with U.S. wire services are almost always detrimental to our cause.

**I. GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:**

We have increasing evidence, from our recent PAO meeting<sup>3</sup> onwards, that Europeans can understand the war and our involvement better if they grasp the degree of our interests in the Pacific area in general rather than in South Viet-Nam in particular. With the President's July 12 speech<sup>4</sup> as a base, IAE would suggest that media treatment to our area might be more effective if there were more emphasis on our position in the Pacific as a whole. When Europeans understand why we are there, to prevent repetition of what happened in Asia in the 30's, and to permit socio-economic progress, they might well understand why we cannot leave. Sensitive as Europeans are about potential withdrawals of troops and interests to advance our concerns elsewhere, they are sophisticated enough, when fully informed, to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Far East (Viet Nam) 1966 July–August. Confidential. Drafted by Mason.

<sup>2</sup> See the attachment to Document 100.

<sup>3</sup> No record of the PAO meeting has been found.

<sup>4</sup> In a July 12 speech to the American Alumni Council, which Johnson delivered from the White House and was broadcast nationwide over both television and radio, he stressed: "Asia is now the crucial arena of man's striving for independence and order, and for life itself. This is true because three out of every five people in all this world live in Asia tonight. This is true because hundreds of millions of them exist on less than 25 cents a day. This is true because Communists in Asia tonight still believe in force in order to achieve their Communist goals. So if enduring peace can ever come to Asia, all mankind will benefit. But if peace fails there, nowhere else will our achievements really be secure." For text of the speech, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1966*, Book II, pp. 718–722.

judge our presence in the Pacific to be necessary by classical balance of power principles. They should be reminded that the attack on SVN is but the latest in a long series of post-war communist actions in the Far East (Malaya, the Philippines, Korea, Laos). While SVN is not necessarily the ideal place for us to make a stand, it is nevertheless the place where the stand must be made. Should we withdraw, opportunity to make a stand elsewhere under more favorable conditions would not be possible. Our presence and performance in SVN are making possible constructive developments throughout the Far East and South East Asia; our withdrawal could only advance the interests of Peking and Hanoi throughout the area. Ultimately, that would create a situation even more detrimental to our ability to maintain our European commitments.

The following specific suggestions, many made by the posts themselves, seem worthy of pursuit:

## II. PRESENTATIONS BY AUTHORITATIVE U.S. SOURCES:

1. Increase flow to our overseas posts of knowledgeable U.S. speakers on VN. (Many posts)
2. Encourage famous U.S. professionals to correspond with their European colleagues on issues involved in the conflict. These letters could be published and broadcast. The Steinbeck-Yevtushenko exchange is the model here.<sup>5</sup>
3. Increase feeds to RIAS from its Saigon correspondent; these can be picked up by FRG stations. (Germany)

## III. PRESENTATIONS BY NON-U.S. SOURCES

1. Expand the number of backgrounders given by the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense to individual European correspondents. These should be off-the-record private talks rather than exclusive interviews. The correspondents should be selected among those who write unsympathetically about the conflict.
2. Assign experienced USIA officers to the 'P' staff in each area at State so that contacts can be increased with Washington-based correspondents from overseas. Many attitudes abroad are determined by what correspondents report from Washington; these correspondents

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<sup>5</sup> On July 7, the Soviet poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko published a poem in a Soviet paper entitled "Letter to John Steinbeck," imploring the American novelist to protest the United States' war in Vietnam. Steinbeck, in turn, replied to Yevtushenko in an open letter printed in the U.S. newspaper, *Newsday*, noting that the Soviet poet, "asked me to denounce half a war, our half. I appeal to you to join me in denouncing the whole war." (Raymond H. Anderson, "Soviet Poet Bids Steinbeck Speak," *New York Times*, July 8, 1966, p. 6; "Reply by Steinbeck Chides Yevtushenko," *New York Times*, July 11, 1966, p. 1)

are likely to report more accurately, and sympathetically, if they are seen regularly by informed Americans.

3. Increase the number of European correspondents and TV teams who are sent on special trips to Viet-Nam, including popular magazine writers and editors of student newspapers. This increase might be pegged to the upcoming September elections. It would be ideal if the South Vietnamese could invite them. (Austria, Germany)

4. Explore use of Italian film on the conflict for possible worldwide placement on TV. (Italy)

5. Explore use of Canadian film on non-military aspects of South Viet-Nam today for possible worldwide placement on TV. (Canada)

6. Explore possibility of a film on multi-national aid programs to South Viet-Nam. (Norway)

7. Arrange for more Asian leaders to make public statements in Europe on their understanding of the conflict. The British, for example, will hearken to what the Australians and New Zealanders say. (Germany)

8. Arrange for returning Vietnamese leaders and students to stop off in Europe on the way back home from the U.S. It is not necessary for these people to make talks and become 'spokesmen.' Lunches and informal groups in which they are included would be useful to our posts.

9. Suggest that a prominent British scholar on Far East like P. J. Honey<sup>6</sup> do the 1967 Reith lectures<sup>7</sup> on the BBC on the situation in that area. These could be re-broadcast by IBS and published afterwards.

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<sup>6</sup> British scholar and writer whose work focused primarily on Vietnam.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the series of annual radio lectures commissioned by the BBC that began in 1948.

## 102. Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to the President's Special Assistant (Moyers)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 10, 1966

Responses have been coming in from all over the world to a State/USIA Circular asking for analyses of local attitudes toward the Vietnam conflict and recommendations concerning how Washington can improve its output. I think one or two responses are particularly worth calling to your attention.

Ambassador Bowles' response is the best I have read. After reviewing the local situation concerning Indian attitudes toward Vietnam, Ambassador Bowles quickly reports on the measures he has taken in New Delhi to get our position across. He has done a lot. But his ideas about what we ought to do here in Washington are, perhaps, more pertinent.

He calls for a maximum emphasis on the efforts of the South Vietnamese Army and a playdown of the role of our forces. He strongly urges an even greater effort to publicize the positive efforts being made by the Vietnamese and Americans to improve the life of the people, to bring about social and political progress, etc.

Ambassador Bowles thinks we can improve reporting on the actual fighting by developing ways "less likely to strike adverse emotional chords." The daily concentration on killing is what he had in mind. He emphasizes the harm done by photographs; they are "extremely costly."

He calls for more emphasis on the bloody terroristic actions against villagers and civilians by the Communists and their attacks against economic growth, social reform, and political progress.

His next point is even more interesting. He calls for greater emphasis on the role of the Chinese. He says the war is an uneven contest, as it is now being reported, between the most powerful nations in the world and a tiny nation of farmers in North Vietnam. He would use the presence of the Chinese in North Vietnam, as well as their inflexibility against negotiations.

He would stress our treatment of POW's in contrast with Hanoi's.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963-1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Far East (Vietnam) 1966 July-August. No classification marking. Humphrey initialed the first page of the memorandum. Kintner sent a copy to Marks under an attached August 17 covering note indicating that the memorandum "will be of interest to you if you have not received a copy." (Ibid.)

In backgrounders, he thinks we should be far tougher about the Soviet failure to seek peace. He would create doubts about the Soviet desire for peace. While the Soviets denounce the Chinese as reckless dogmatists, they are in fact Peking's captives: China tells Hanoi what to do, then Hanoi tells the Russians what to do. Skepticism of the Soviet bona fides is needed. "The point should be driven home over and over again that Kosygin and Brezhnev have taken no tangible steps toward a peaceful solution."

We should stress relentlessly our continued efforts for a political solution. Next he wants illustrated feature articles in simple language stressing the massive economic development that can begin immediately after hostilities.

We should reiterate our support for a peace agreement that satisfies the governments of both South and North Vietnam, lessening the notion that this is an American war. He would somehow mute the emphasis on bombing which he feels underscores the notion that the basic contest is between big Uncle Sam and little Ho Chi Minh.

He thinks it is very important to avoid bombing civilian centers. He thinks hundreds of millions of people around the world admire the way the North Vietnamese are standing up to the bombing attacks. He would couple these attacks with their objective: to bring Hanoi to the peace table.

Moving away from Ambassador Bowles' notions, the next best paper is from Ambassador Jim Bell in Malaysia. He points out that the Government of Malaysia continues its broad support for the United States in Vietnam. He reminds us that the Foreign Minister has recently publicly stated that South Vietnam would have fallen to Communist aggression if the United States had failed. Since the bombing the Malaysians have been more careful. Even so, the Foreign Ministry is preparing a White Paper to discuss the general power equation in Asia and why Malaysia must continue to support our effort in Vietnam.

Jim Bell thinks it is vital for Asian audiences to get across the absolute fact that we will remain in Vietnam until our objectives are achieved. Despite the President's speeches some Malaysians still question that we will stick and not weary.

Ambassador Bell is also worried about the war looking white versus yellow. To correct this distortion he would send small groups of carefully selected Vietnamese students to Asian countries to explain the South Vietnamese fight for freedom. In reverse, he would invite Malaysian students to South Vietnam to areas outside Saigon, avoiding all Americans.

He wants more personalized attention to editors, politicians, officials, and professors on the part of our Embassy officials. He thinks

that each American overseas should send personal notes to contacts, including useful articles and speeches of high quality. The audiences he has in mind are in policy-forming or influential positions.

He is worried about the extensive publicity given to body counts, number of tons of bombs dropped, etc., all of which tend to overshadow the "economic and social aspect of the U.S. effort which news media often ignore . . . serious consideration should be given to releasing only bi-weekly or monthly summaries of detailed statistics on casualties, etc."

He would like a USIA film totally devoted to economic and social programs in Vietnam. He would like a series produced on a continuing basis. He says the best effort in Malaysia last year on behalf of South Vietnam was a USIA-produced movie, "Night of [the] Dragon,"<sup>2</sup> shown on commercial circuits and television. He thinks MGM or Paramount ought to produce full-length films of that caliber for commercial showing.

Jim Bell calls for more consultation among the Allies to listen, to ponder, to measure the real feelings of ordinary men and women in Asia, quoting the *Straits Times*.<sup>3</sup> To increase Asian involvement he would recommend personal correspondence by the President or Secretary Rusk to Asian leaders requesting their suggestions. He suggests visits by me or Secretary Rusk to Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, and possibly Laos, not previously or recently visited. He would use these visits to explore views of Asian leaders not previously consulted. He suggests a conference of Asian and U.S. intellectuals, maybe at the East-West Center, to seek Asian views.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 71.

<sup>3</sup> One of the leading newspapers in Singapore, founded in 1845.



**103. Memorandum of Agreement on Direction and Supervision of U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam<sup>1</sup>**

Saigon, August 10, 1966

1. The United States Government has established the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) as the U.S. Mission organization for coordination and direction of all U.S. psychological operations in Vietnam, including psychological operations advice and assistance to the Government of Vietnam. The Minister Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Saigon, has been designated as Director, JUSPAO. He functions under the overall authority of the Ambassador.

2. The responsibility for development of psyops policy and for substantive supervision and coordination of all psychological operations in Vietnam is delegated to the Director, JUSPAO. This responsibility is applicable to all U.S. Mission Agencies in Vietnam. The Director, JUSPAO, through his planning office develops psychological operations directives applicable, with Mission Council concurrence when appropriate, to all U.S. Mission Agencies in Vietnam.

3. JUSPAO serves a three-fold function of providing advice and assistance to the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi (Vietnamese Information Service), conducting psychological operations in support of U.S. objectives and of providing substantive (technical) supervision, direction and support of all Mission elements involved in psychological operations. Within this framework, the primary task of the JUSPAO field organization is support of Revolutionary Development.

4. The responsibility for coordination of regional/provincial psychological operations rests with the JUSPAO regional/provincial representatives who serve as principal psychological operations advisors to the corps commanders and provincial chiefs for civil matters and provide advice on psyops policy and substantive supervision, direction and support to all U.S. efforts in the field of psychological operations.

5. The Mission Psychological Operations Committee chaired by Director, JUSPAO, consists of representatives of the Mission Agencies convened as necessary to review substantive psychological operations questions and coordinate the management of Mission participation in and support of psychological operations programs. All Mission Agen-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Files Bx 33–36, 1966: Acc. #69–A–3445 [E], Entry UD WW 193, Box 23, I—The Director's Office (July through September, 1966). No classification marking. Oleksiw sent Marks the memorandum of agreement under a September 22 covering memorandum, noting: "In effect, the memorandum merely reconfirms the authority of JUSPAO as the principal director and supervisor of psychological operations." (*Ibid.*)

cies are represented on the Mission Psychological Operations Committee, with the ACofs, J-3 representing COMUSMACV.

6. Inter-agency support of approved psychological campaigns will be coordinated through the U.S. Mission Council, the Mission Psychological Operations Committee, or by other duly appointed representatives of the agencies concerned.

7. COMUSMACV conducts psychological operations in support of US/FWMAF/RVNAF military operations and in other areas as agreed to by COMUSMACV and Director, JUSPAO, within the context of JUSPAO guidance and directives. COMUSMACV provides advice and assistance to RVNAF psychological warfare activities, to include corps commanders and sector and sub-sector commanders for military matters.

8. This agreement replaces Joint MACV/JUSPAO message dated 18 May 1965, Subject: Direction and Supervision of U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam.<sup>2</sup>

**General William C. Westmoreland**  
*COMUSMACV*

**Barry Zorthian**  
*Director JUSPAO, Vietnam*

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

**104. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to All United States Information Agency Public Affairs Officers and Cultural Affairs Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 12, 1966

Recently some reports have reached me regarding lack of understanding of the educational exchange programs of the Department of State (CU) on the part of some Public Affairs Officers and Cultural Affairs Officers. I believe these reports may be based on inadequate information or poor communication, but the fact that such misunderstanding may exist is a matter of serious concern to me.

I am therefore writing this letter to make my views clear.

The USIS post abroad is responsible for administering the programs of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the field. I expect the PAO—who has overall responsibility for both USIA and CU functions—and the CAO—to whom operating responsibility for the latter is generally delegated—to discharge these responsibilities with as much understanding, insight, and knowledge as they bring to their conduct of the USIA program.

I expect other USIS officers to have a good general knowledge of the nature and purposes of the exchange programs, and as much specific information as their position requires.

I particularly wish to call to your attention the role of the Board of Foreign Scholarships as specified in the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 (P. L. 87–256), which is the legislative authority for the CU programs.<sup>2</sup> Under this Act the Board has the statutory responsibility for supervising the academic programs authorized by the Act, as well as for the selection of the academic grantees. The policies of the Board are thus binding on all those who administer the academic programs—on CU in Washington and on USIA in the field.

In the 48 countries where a Binational Commission has been established by agreement of the United States and the host government, it

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files, 1955–1971, Acc. #69–H–3445 [A], Entry UD WW 200, Box 174, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU), 1966. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> The Board of Foreign Scholarships, also known as the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, was established by the U.S. Congress to oversee the worldwide Fulbright Program as authorized by the Fulbright-Hays Act. The Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 expanded the Board's authority. The Board was, and continues to be, responsible for setting policy for the Academic Exchange Program under the Act and oversees the program.

is the policy of the Board of Foreign Scholarships that the Commission program be truly binational in character. Needless to say, the responsible officers should be guided by this policy, both in its letter and in its spirit.

While the USIA and CU programs are closely related and mutually supporting, each has its own philosophy, objectives, statutory basis and method of operation. I expect USIA officers to carry out their responsibilities for both programs with due regard for the special characteristics of each.

Although I am sure you have all read the Fulbright-Hays Act, I think it would be well for you to refresh your memories about it. A copy is being sent to each post, marked for the personal attention of the PAO and CAO.

**Leonard H. Marks**

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## **105. Editorial Note**

In his February 2, 1966, special message to Congress proposing an international education and health program, President Lyndon Johnson urged Congress to pass his proposed International Education Act because "Education lies at the heart of every nation's hopes and purposes. It must be at the heart of our international relations." (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1966, Book I, page 128*) On August 17, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Charles Frankel testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in support of the President's proposed International Education Act. Frankel enumerated several reasons why the proposed legislation was important: "It offers a better chance to American citizens to acquire the education they need to cope with the facts of international life. It strengthens the American capacity to develop, to conduct, and to man informed and farsighted policies in international affairs. It takes steps that are essential if our Nation is to join with other nations in a more intensive effort to educate the people of the world in habits of mutual understanding and forbearance. Finally, it is important because it makes a frontal attack on a fundamental issue in the relation between Government and the universities, and attempts to deal with this issue from a long-term rather than a short-term point of view."

Frankel stressed the importance to Americans on having an international affairs perspective in their education, but he noted that beyond

this, the proposed legislation and its emphasis on education as part of U.S. foreign policy was also vital: “In the developing nations, little can be accomplished without the advancement of education. In the more prosperous industrial nations, education is the keystone on which depends these nations’ power to keep up with the accelerating pace of change. In our own country, as we have discovered, we must turn to education again and again as an indispensable element in the solution of pressing social problems. In short, the role of educational systems in 20th-century societies is immense. Working together, rather than against each other, these educational systems have as much power as any human agency to build an international structure of peace in diversity. The legislation that is before you proposes that we in this country prepare ourselves to do our part in such an effort at international education cooperation. And it proposes that we begin here at home by educating ourselves better about the needs and aspirations of others.” Frankel continued: “In sum, from the standpoint of foreign policy, I endorse this proposed legislation because it lays the foundation for an international effort that gives proper attention to the crucial role that education plays in realizing the promise of our time and offsetting its perils.” (*International Education Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 88th Congress, 2nd Session on S. 2874 and H.R. 14643, August 17, 19, and September 19, 1966*, pages 208–212) On October 21, 1966, Congress passed the International Education Act and the President signed it into law on October 29. See Document 111.

## 106. Minutes of a Meeting of the President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs<sup>1</sup>

GAC Meeting No. 6.2

Washington, September 12, 1966

### SUBJECT

USIA

### PRESENT

#### *Members of the Committee*

Dr. James A. Perkins, Chairman

Mr. Dwayne O. Andreas

Mr. Eugene R. Black

Mrs. Everett N. Case

Dr. J. George Harrar

Mr. David E. Bell

Mr. William R. Hewlett

Professor Edward S. Mason

Mr. David Rockefeller

Mr. Arthur K. Watson

Mr. William J. Zellerbach

#### *USIA*

Mr. Leonard H. Marks, Director, USIA

Mr. Hewson A. Ryan, Deputy Director, Office of Policy and Research, USIA

#### *AID*

Mr. William S. Gaud, Administrator

Mr. C. Tyler Wood, Special Assistant to the Administrator

Mr. George P. Scurria, Staff Officer

*Dr. Perkins* welcomed Mr. Marks and asked him to proceed with any statements he had for the Committee. *Mr. Marks* said that he would like first to give some background on USIA, so that the Committee might appreciate USIA's problems in trying to carry out the mission assigned to it.

He said that he had been Director of USIA since September 1, 1965. In the past, he said, USIA had been buffeted at times by Congress due

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 1, Advisory Groups—General 1966. Limited Official Use. The meeting took place at the Department of State. There is no indication as to the time of the meeting. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs (GAC) was established by Presidential Directive under authority granted by Public Law 88–206, dated December 16, 1963, to advise the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development and other departments and agencies on issues of policy and on the implementation of foreign assistance programs. The GAC was convened for the first time on March 26, 1965. For additional information about the Advisory Committee, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. IX, International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities, Document 32.

to a lack of appreciation and a misunderstanding of its function. On the appropriations side, he said he found a particularly difficult situation. In the past there have been peaks, when there was need for expansion and large amounts of money were appropriated and strenuous recruiting activities undertaken; these periods have been followed by valleys in the appropriations, necessitating letting people go. It has been difficult to maintain an organization with the kind of adjustments which such circumstances called for. In September, 1965 the House Appropriations Committee appropriated \$150,241,000 for USIA. This level would maintain the agency's operations at substantially the same level as the previous two years, despite the growth of its activities around the world. However, there is a tendency in the Senate to reduce the USIA program in Western Europe on the theory that Western Europe is an area where everybody knows what is going on in the United States. The Senate Appropriations Committee, accordingly, proposed to cut the portion of the agency's appropriation for Europe from \$8 million to \$4 million. He said that he interceded with those members of the Senate Appropriations Committee he knew and asked them not to make any cuts at least until he, as the new Director, could determine the agency's status, and assured them that if he felt savings could be made, they would be made. In the end, the Senate Appropriations Committee rounded off the appropriations at \$150 million, saying that \$241,000 should be taken from Western Europe.

USIA staffs embassies in 105 countries with information specialists trained in the various communications media of the world. They advise ambassadors and other members of the Country Team on how best to present the information side of United States programs. USIA has a minimum complement of 12,000 people, which had been considerably greater in some previous years. It operates in 218 localities in 106 countries. Roughly, one-third of the 12,000 personnel works in the U.S. Local employees overseas account for about 60% of total employment. The job of USIA is not to make foreign policy nor to establish the principles on which the AID programs are based, but rather to explain and interpret the operations of the United States overseas.

Information programs can be carried out in two different ways: the story can be told by giving the bare facts or an attempt can be made to explain and persuade. USIA does both. When the President or any of his leading officers makes a statement in connection with United States programs, USIA disseminates that statement as the first part of its function. This dissemination takes place in a variety of ways. Every day USIA sends to each of the American Embassies a minimum of 10,000 words and in some cases as much as 15,000 words reporting on what takes place in the United States affecting their operations. Separate reports are sent to Latin America, the Far East, Africa, and

other areas of the world. This is known as the wireless file and is an essential element in keeping Ambassadors informed. Mr. Marks said many Ambassadors had told him that it is the only reliable, authoritative link which they have with Washington other than the official cables which go back and forth. The information officer rewrites the wireless file material in the language of his particular country or in a form which may be more useable, and then takes it to editors, radio stations, and television stations for distribution. This is the basis, we hope, on which that country will find out about what the United States is doing. As countries become more sophisticated, it takes greater ingenuity to have them use this material. In the great majority of cases, however, this is not true. The newspapers in most countries are hardly papers of general circulation and vary greatly in quality.

Probably the most publicized of various USIA media is the Voice of America. The VOA has a responsibility to inform its listeners and to keep their interest. This cannot be done just by having news hour after hour, and expecting to hold an audience in competition with other broadcasters of the world. Therefore, it is necessary to have music, drama, and a diversified program schedule which will keep the listeners tuned in, so that they will hear the news and the commentary as well. The commentary and the news suddenly have become recognized in the United States as authoritative and reliable. In the past, there had been much criticism (some of it from people who had never heard a VOA program), but, Mr. Marks said, he felt the Voice of America has always been a credible medium, ever since it was created in 1948. It tells the bad as well as the good and it hopes to put in perspective what happens in the United States—that we are not a perfect society, but we strive for perfection; that we do have riots in some places today, but at the same time tremendous progress has been made in the civil rights field.

The VOA broadcasts regularly in 38 languages, 845 hours per week. That is not the greatest amount of broadcasting done in the competitive broadcasting field. Russia broadcasts about 1100 hours, Radio Peking about the same, and the United Arab Republic about 800 hours. However, VOA has one device that none of its competitors can match. It makes tape recordings of news, commentary, and programs which will explain U.S. objectives and U.S. activities, and then takes them to the managers of radio stations in foreign countries for broadcasting on their networks. Thus, when a listener in a foreign country tunes in his local radio station, he is liable to hear a VOA program just as he hears his local commentator. USIA places weekly 15,000 hours of radio programs on the local stations of the world. Approximately 11,000 of the 15,000 hours are placed in Latin American countries. In addition, when there is a major event, such as a space shot, hundreds of radio



stations in Latin America will take the VOA program intact from short wave and play it over their domestic systems.

A third medium, which is developing rapidly, is television. It ranges from 85 to 90% circulation in Japan to 800 sets in Ghana, for example, but every nation in the world today either has television or is getting television facilities. It is easier to list the approximately 18 countries which do not have it than it is to list the nearly 100 who do have television facilities.

USIA makes films which it takes to the television stations for showing to local audiences. USIA programs are being shown today in approximately 68 countries on a regular basis. As with the VOA tapes, these films deal in many instances with the AID program. They relate to accomplishments in space, assistance to underdeveloped countries, programs describing American schools, and efforts being made to rehabilitate the economy and people of Vietnam. In short, films are used in the same way as the other media to tell the story. Last year, 2,082 television stations in 94 countries used USIA films, and the same films also are used in theaters. Based on surveys, these USIA films have a regular audience of 350 million people in 120 countries. Statistically, this figure includes news releases which also are made by USIA and provided to local theaters and television.

Mr. Marks said he wished to discuss the propaganda effort of USIA. He said it is necessary to define the word "propaganda" because no matter how sophisticated people are, the word "propaganda" has sinister overtones. There is an attitude, even among some members of the Congress, that USIA is a propaganda medium and that its product somehow or other doesn't ring true. He said that he had done a great deal of research to determine a consistent definition of propaganda and has concluded that each author has his own concept which he tailors for the end result he wants to achieve. He said the day he took office as Director he stated that his philosophy was that USIA would be a propaganda agency, but truth would be its propaganda. USIA tells the truth because in the American society there is nothing to conceal. There is a great deal of which to be proud, and furthermore the U.S. has no colonial aspirations and is not trying to subjugate any people. If the truth can simply be known, it will be adequate propaganda for the U.S.

Another area of USIA activity is the production of pamphlets. USIA puts out millions of pamphlets each year on topics germane to the United States; AID projects provide a great deal of the material used in this way. These pamphlets are available in the USIS field offices overseas, are distributed to schools, and in some cases are used as teaching materials in universities and colleges.

USIA maintains 223 libraries overseas. These have gained notoriety from the numerous incidents which have taken place at them. He

noted, however, that those protests are usually well organized by the communist groups. In eastern European countries, it was noted recently that the cameras arrived 30 minutes before the rioters and that the police stood by until the demonstration had taken place, and then they broke it up. This is not a protest against anything which USIA is doing as much as it is a government to government activity where there is resentment and a feeling that the other government has to make world headlines by protesting.

Textbooks also are a valuable tool. AID prints textbooks and distributes them throughout the world. USIA uses them in some fields, teaching English through binational centers in Latin America and through regular courses in other parts of the world. The concept of the binational center is a very sound one; Mr. Marks said that he was most anxious to increase the number of them. The binational center is a corporation, run by a board of directors consisting of an equal number of Americans and locals. These men form a society for the purpose of teaching English and charge a fee for enrollment. The teaching of English is to the advantage of the U.S. because when a person becomes exposed to the English language he can read USIA publications, he can understand its films, can listen to the VOA and becomes one who will more readily accept U.S. ideas than if he had a remote language and no knowledge of English.

The binational centers in Latin America really have become little universities. For example, in Lima, 11,000 students are studying English at the binational center. In addition, there are seminars and libraries and films. In Mexico City, there are 8,000 students at the binational center. The binational foundation is an institution that is rapidly spreading throughout Latin America. In many cases they are operating at a breakeven point, with the instructor and the materials supplied by USIA. Many of them on the other hand have realized substantial income and own their own buildings. Mr. Marks said that he is trying to persuade the Congress to recognize that the institution of binational centers is one of the most valuable things that the U.S. has in its information and education programs because it is not peculiarly or particularly a U.S. institution. It has great favor because prominent businessmen and industrialists of the host country are on the board and it becomes a local institution which carries out the mutual objectives of the two countries. USIA has asked for \$1 million in its FY 67 appropriation to assist in helping binational centers improve their physical facilities.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> On October 20, 1966, the Congress voted an appropriation of \$169,328,000 for USIA for FY 67. This amount included \$300,000 to assist binational foundations improve their facilities. [Footnote is in the original.]

*Dr. Perkins* said in this connection that it has now become increasingly clear overseas that the chances of having a major modern university turn almost directly on having courses in an international language, of which English is now the preferred one because of American mastery of technology. University people throughout the world are increasingly concerned that their students have English as a second language because only in this way can they attract English-speaking faculty, and only in this way can they really have any chance of modernizing themselves. For example, the Dutch are now thinking of setting up a graduate school in which all courses would be taught in English. The Japanese universities are moving to a point where they are becoming bilingual, not because they particularly like English, but because this is their only way of attracting English-speaking faculty, without whom they feel they don't have a chance of becoming modern universities. To a lesser extent, one could settle for French because he could then go to some of the major French universities, but for the next foreseeable period of time, the only chance that universities around the world, outside of Russia and China, can become really modernized, depends upon how quickly their students learn English as their second language. Thus, a very direct causal connection can be made between the mastery of English as a second language and the chances of ever training indigenous personnel in modern technology.

*Mr. Marks* said that he had been gratified to receive a report recently that the University of Leyden, outside of Amsterdam, is starting a course in American studies, staffed with American professors. The USIS cultural affairs officer in Holland had been very active in creating this interest through the cultural program of the State Department, which brought an outstanding Dutch historian to this country for several months who, upon his return, wrote a textbook which is a major one in its field now. USIA assisted by providing photographs and research materials for the book.

At the risk of over-simplification he would say that USIA has two weapons at its disposal that no other country in the competitive broadcasting field has. The U.S. has a food surplus for the time being, and the English language. The English language is the key because it opens up doors to scientists, social workers, and other people who have a curiosity about what is going on in advanced societies. This has been recognized by Russia which is distributing books throughout Latin America and other parts of the world, books in English. There are very few courses in Russian which are sponsored by the Russian cultural institutions throughout the world. They tried it and it didn't work. For example, a very ambitious program was undertaken in the UAR, but it failed. He said he is anxious, therefore, that the program of English language teaching and textbook distribution be strengthened

because these are invaluable devices for carrying out the rest of the U.S. objectives.

*Dr. Perkins* said that there are tides running against what Mr. Marks had been talking about which should be kept in mind. Rising nationalism is something the United States has found very advantageous in dealing with countries in the perimeters around China and Russia. However, one of its consequences is an interest in promoting local language differences; for example, there is strong pressure in India now for the development of various Indian languages as opposed to English. This tendency appears even in advanced countries; for example, in Belgium, the universities which had been French and Flemish are now abolishing French. Everything has to be in Flemish now, which means that 75% of the faculty will have to leave in a year. In the Philippines, one cannot help but view with alarm the increasing interest in Tagalog as a means of communication as opposed to Spanish or English. Thus, in addition to pointing out the positive advantages of English teaching, one ought to mention also that it is increasingly important because nationalistic tides cut right across everything else the U.S. is trying to do.

*Mr. Marks* said that when Mrs. Ghandi occupied the post of Minister of Information and Broadcasting in India, prior to becoming Prime Minister, she asked him if there were some way USIA could help remedy the decline of English in India. This has been accelerated by the withdrawal by the British of their principal officers. He said that perhaps after the elections in India, in February 1967, there will be an opportunity to help with this.

With respect to the relationship between USIA and AID, Mr. Marks said that it is necessary to distinguish among the areas of the world where AID operates. For example, in Africa and parts of Asia, the literacy rates range as low as 5% to 15% of the population. Higher literacy rates generally prevail in Latin America. With minimum literacy, it is not possible to use the tools of books or pamphlets. One must rely more on films, television, and radio.

In Latin America, USIA has found that it could dramatize the work the United States is doing as a good neighbor under the Alliance for Progress most effectively through films.<sup>3</sup> For example, USIA sponsored a series of 26 half-hour programs which it produced in Mexico in Spanish to tell the story of the Alliance for Progress. The program is called *Nuestro Barrio*, set in a typical working class neighborhood of a large unnamed Latin American city. Its format consists of a series of dramatic episodes involving various people whose lives are in some

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 68.

way affected by the barrio. In the barrio are poor but honest workers, and displaced *campesinos*<sup>4</sup> bewildered by the big city and its ways. The stories depict good and bad persons, young doctors, teachers, students, and trade unionists, and within this framework the characters face and solve a wide range of socio-economic problems, each of which illustrates some goal of the Alliance for Progress. By applying the principles of the Alliance, the people of the barrio learn the value of self-help, the need to educate illiterates, the benefits of free labor unions, etc.<sup>5</sup> The program has acquired a remarkably faithful audience throughout the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America.

This illustrates the point that USIA uses all of the tools available; in cases of highly illiterate populations the drama of film is employed, whereas for college students pamphlets, seminars, and books are used. The cartoon book, the picture story, is a very effective tool, particularly in Latin America where, since 1961, USIA has printed about 15 million comic books which are distributed throughout this area.

In response to a question by *Mr. Rockefeller*, *Mr. Marks* said that since the beginning of the book program in 1950, USIA has published 122 million copies of 13,000 book titles. This runs at the rate of about 5 to 6 million copies a year. *Mr. Rockefeller* asked if this included Vietnam, which, he learned during a recent visit to Saigon, was receiving approximately 14 million copies a year. *Mr. Marks* said that the book publication program in Vietnam is run by AID, not USIA. The two agencies work closely together, but there is no real overlap.

*Dr. Perkins* asked *Mr. Marks* to deal with the role USIA plays with respect to other U.S. Government agencies. *Mr. Marks* said that a number of years ago, in order to avoid duplication of effort, USIA was given the role of information officer for all foreign service activities for all government agencies dealing in overseas work. With the single exception of the military, USIA is the information arm of the entire U.S. Government overseas. If the Department of Agriculture or AID has a particular publication or program which it wishes to publicize abroad, it provides the material to USIA which tells the story. In some countries, where the AID program is substantial, USIA has full-time officers devoted to nothing but AID work. The best illustration of cooperation comes in Vietnam where AID, State Department, Department of Defense and USIA work together in a Joint United States Public Affairs Office. Through a coordinated effort, all of the information work

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<sup>4</sup> *Campesinos* is a Spanish term used to describe a farmer or rural resident from Latin America.

<sup>5</sup> See Monthly Newsletter No. 15 dated September 1, 1966. [Footnote is in the original.]

is being carried on by that office. USIA has 100 Americans assigned to Vietnam.

*Dr. Perkins* asked Mr. Marks to describe how USIA will work with the new educational officers from HEW, and also how it works with the activities of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the State Department and with the educational activities of AID. *Mr. Marks* said that this coordination is somewhat baffling. The International Education Act<sup>6</sup> provides for the establishment of education officers in American Embassies overseas, whose role will be to work with the universities in counselling students and to work with the university administrations in creating curricula. This will be essentially at the university level, although in some countries it may involve the secondary school level as well. The educational officer will be an employee of the Department of State and will work for and report to the Ambassador; he will cooperate with the cultural affairs officer who is a USIA employee. He will work with the information officer, who also is a USIA employee. His role will not be to disseminate information and to deal with the public; he will deal primarily with the university element. He will have the normal liaison with all education activities, but will be on the payroll of the State Department and report to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. *Mr. Ryan* noted that this proposal is still in the planning stage. It provides for recruitment of these officers by HEW and placement as State Department reserve officers. They are supposed to have a coordinating function for all educational activities, including AID, USIA, and the State Department, and they also will have a coordinating relationship with the science attache at the Embassy. It will not be an operating program, but will be an advisory type of activity.

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the State Department arranges for private U.S. citizens to travel abroad as representatives of the U.S., sponsored by the Department of State. When they arrive in a foreign country, they are taken over by USIA which schedules and sets up the program for them in that country. This is an arrangement that has been underway since 1953 on a cooperative basis.

With respect to AID, USIA handles all of the information for publicizing AID projects. It receives the information from AID and publicizes it through the various media. *Dr. Perkins* asked how USIA handles the distribution of textbooks, which he noted seems to go somewhat beyond the dissemination of information. *Mr. Ryan* explained that USIA distributes and publishes textbooks in many countries on behalf of AID. In some countries, where there is a surplus of local currency,

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 3, Document 89.

USIA handles the production and distribution of textbooks largely because it was the only U.S. agency involved in those countries when the original agreements were signed. In other countries, where there is no AID program, but where there is a textbook program, USIA also is the operating agency. In general, however, textbook programs in support of developmental projects are funded through AID and are part of the related AID project. That is why USIA is not involved, except in India and two or three other places, in the textbook program below the university level. In other countries, USIA is in the textbook business for university textbooks in the ideological field in support of changing attitudes toward political development, which is a USIA function.

*Mr. Zellerbach* asked how the activities of AID were publicized within the United States. *Mr. Marks* said that AID itself handles any public information in the United States because the USIA is restricted by legislation to overseas activities.<sup>7</sup> This reflects, he said, part of the concept that USIA is primarily a propaganda agency and that people in the United States do not need to know what it is doing. *Mr. Gaud* said that AID has only a relatively few people who work on public information; there are less than 40 people in its central information staff and about 10 to 15 on separate staffs set up for the Alliance for Progress and Vietnam. He noted that until several years ago, the legislation governing administration of the foreign assistance program included the Dworshak Amendment, which prohibited the expenditure of funds in the United States to publicize the activities of the AID program.<sup>8</sup> This amendment no longer applies, but AID has gone very gingerly in this direction. There are those who feel AID should build up a larger organization for publicizing what it does, he said, but it has not done this as a matter of policy. *Dr. Perkins* noted that this is a reflection of the fact that AID is an agency with no domestic roots; if the Department of Agriculture, for example, wished to go into this area, it could do so without inhibition because it supposedly is part of the domestic interest of the United States. However, if AID were to undertake something similar it would be regarded as propagandizing.

*Mr. Linowitz* said that it was his impression that the USIA responsibility consists not only of explaining and trying to get support for U.S. policy overseas, but also reporting back to the President and senior

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the Smith-Mundt Act. See footnote 9, Document 32.

<sup>8</sup> Reference is to the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (P.L. 165; 65 Stat. 373). For information, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Document 106. The Dworshak amendment, proposed by Senator Henry Dworshak (R-Idaho), was adopted as part of the Mutual Security Act of 1952 (P.L. 400; 66 Stat. 141). (See *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. I, part 1, General: Economic and Political Matters, Document 147)



government officials on the implications of foreign opinion with respect to U.S. policies and programs. He noted that this has become increasingly important with respect to Vietnam, and asked how this portion of USIA's responsibility is carried out. *Mr. Marks* said that he sits as a member of the National Security Council and has the responsibility to report whenever the Council considers projects involving any aspects of foreign opinion. He said he operates according to the principle that the U.S. should do what is best for the United States, not what is best for foreign opinion. Foreign opinion is taken into consideration, but the decision must be what is in the true interest of the United States. Consistent with that responsibility, he said, USIA analyzes the foreign press comment and reports from field officers on communist activities. They take into account the local mores and the sensitivities of populations to particular activities of the United States. This advisory function also is carried on through direct relationships with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Agriculture. The USIA Research Service constantly studies developments taking place in individual countries; when there is something relevant to agriculture, defense, or any other government agency dealing in the given country, it is reported to the agency concerned.

*Mr. Linowitz* referred to the recent uprisings at universities in Argentina<sup>9</sup> and asked if USIA personnel had appraised this situation and notified the State Department and other concerned agencies of how it interpreted these events in terms of what U.S. policies might be. *Mr. Marks* said that this is exactly what takes place constantly. The representatives of the interested agencies meet regularly at the desk officer level on developments in any individual country. Then on the regional level, the Assistant Secretaries of the interested departments will work together on a particular policy. Beyond that, the Secretary of State and they might meet, or the problem might be taken up in the Senior Interdepartmental Group,<sup>10</sup> of which *Mr. Gaud* also is a member.<sup>11</sup> The Senior Interdepartmental Group discusses problems affecting overseas activities and eventually may refer certain matters to the National Security Council. *Mr. Gaud* pointed out that the daily

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<sup>9</sup> In September demonstrations and strikes by students erupted throughout Argentina in protest of the takeover of Argentina's national universities by the administration of Lt. Gen. Juan Carlos Onganía. ("Students Strike In Argentina," *Washington Post*, September 8, 1966, p. A3)

<sup>10</sup> See Monthly Newsletter No. 12 dated June 1, 1966. [Footnote is in the original.]

<sup>11</sup> The Senior Interdepartmental Group was established by NSAM 341. For text of NSAM 341, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56.



contact between the representatives of the two agencies was even more frequent in field operations.

*Dr. Perkins* asked whether or not aid to a country might not be modified or reduced if it is learned that nothing about it is going to be publicized. *Mr. Marks* said this decision is made by the Administrator of AID; he said it is his job to inform the Administrator of the facts and let him take them into consideration in reaching his overall judgment. It would be the decision of the Administrator as to whether economic aid has a greater value in terms of relationships between the U.S. and the given country than the particular parochial problems with which USIA might be concerned.

*Mr. Linowitz* noted that the USIA statute requires that CIA be kept advised of its activities; he asked if USIA knows what CIA is doing? *Mr. Marks* replied that USIA receives reports on intelligence matters from CIA and that both agencies sit on the National Security Council. Estimates made by CIA are made available to him, he said, although USIA does not work with CIA on any operational matters.

*Professor Mason* said that the Committee had been discussing the justification for the AID program, and asked what line USIA takes in dealing with this question. *Mr. Marks* said that there is no general line established—that each particular AID project must be tailor-made. The project must be related to the country's economy and to its development. He said it would not be very useful to talk in Latin America about the overall U.S. aid objectives in Southeast Asia. Thus, USIA does not attempt in a general way to explain an AID philosophy, but it does deal with this question country by country and project by project.

*Mr. Marks* thanked *Mr. Zellerbach* for the report he had written on his trip to Brazil<sup>12</sup> and said that he agreed with his recommendation that the communications program there be increased. He said that he intended to stress before the Congressional Appropriations Committee the importance of Latin America in the overall USIA program. That is one area where USIA must strengthen its resources. The Alliance for Progress is probably one of the single most important programs that AID has, and as far as Brazil is concerned, he said he intends to make a detailed study now that he has *Mr. Zellerbach's* report in hand. He said he plans to increase the overall information program, particularly binational centers and the placement of films for television in Latin America. There is no need at present for increasing the VOA which has been tremendously successful in Latin America.

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<sup>12</sup> See Memorandum to Committee Members No. 71, dated July 1, 1966. [Footnote is in the original.]

*Mr. Black* asked what connection USIA has with Franklin Publications. *Mr. Ryan* explained that USIA had a contract with this firm in the Middle East and also has worked closely with it in getting books for India. In Latin America, Franklin Publications operated without any funding from USIA. Franklin Publications is an independent non-profit corporation which has underwritten the publication of low cost American books in many of the developing areas. The corporation has received money from AID and USIA to provide incentives for local translations and circulation of low priced books on a subsidized basis.

*Mr. Hewlett* noted that as the AID program moves more toward self-help, it involves putting pressure on the recipient government to make certain changes. This results sometimes in resentment against the United States; what is the USIA mechanism for countering this? *Mr. Marks* said there is no magic answer, but it requires a detailed, painstaking effort on the part of individual officers. He cited two examples to make this point. The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) in London received an inquiry from the editor of the *East Anglican Daily Times*. In an editorial, the editor had said, "Red China has frequently advocated the use of force to extend Communist ideology". This statement was challenged by a prominent local Communist, and the editor wrote to the PAO requesting assistance in responding to the letter. The PAO supplied him with material and a few weeks later received a letter from the editor saying, "You can mark off one more disillusioned Communist in Suffolk."

The second example concerned a man who became a regular library user in Africa and participated in seminars organized there. Eventually, USIA received a letter from him saying that before he first entered the USIA library he was a member of the Communist party, but with a curiosity about the other way of life. Over a period of time, after he had read books taken from the USIA library, he had changed his mind. *Mr. Marks* said this was particularly important since this man was a member of his country's parliament. Thus, in answer to *Mr. Hewlett's* question, this problem can be met only on a person to person basis with editors, opinion makers, and those who are vocal in articulating opposing viewpoints.

*Professor Mason* said he would like to place *Mr. Hewlett's* question in a specific context. As a result of pressures from the United States and the World Bank, the Government of India has undertaken some important economic policy changes in the previous 6 or 7 months. This has resulted in tremendous political reaction in many quarters in India. He asked if this problem was subject to systematic consideration by USIA in India. *Mr. Marks* said that it definitely was, that the USIA personnel meet regularly on a Country Team basis with AID and Embassy personnel to plan strategy. This is the idea behind the concept

of the Country Team. This type of problem must be handled on the basis of person to person relationships locally. In many cases, the Ambassador has to be the agent for carrying out Country Team strategy, advised and assisted by the local USIA representatives.

*Dr. Perkins* asked if there were any sign that the recipients of public information programs around the world are tiring of the overload of information and just do not wish to receive any more, as sometimes happens when an information system becomes too intense. *Mr. Marks* said he had seen no sign of this, though in individual instances there might be some. He said he recently felt the U.S. was doing too much on Vietnam in certain areas of the world. In general, however, there is no feeling that the U.S. is doing too much in the information field.

*Dr. Perkins* asked what reader indices USIA receives which it feels it can rely upon. *Mr. Marks* said USIA takes surveys of those who listen to its programs and read its publications, using professional polling organizations around the world. In some areas of the world this is meaningless because the responses cannot be equated with those received in highly developed societies. This type of information is also transmitted through reports from field officers who have day to day relationships with important audiences. Finally, it is obtained by analyzing mail; the VOA receives approximately 400,000 letters a year. When somebody takes the trouble to write a letter, and to post it, which in some countries is a major undertaking, it is an indication that they are gaining some benefit or want some information.

*Mr. Linowitz* asked *Mr. Marks* to suppose that the U.S. information program were starting from scratch today. Assuming that any governmental effort to present truth is subject to scepticism, simply because it has the stamp of government, would it be better to put all of the information programs under private auspices subsidized by government funds? *Mr. Marks* said absolutely not because a government operation must be completely overt. When USIA speaks, it is the Voice of America. It must be a government operation because that is the most impressive way to demonstrate what the government position is. When a news agency reports that the United States believes such and such, it doesn't have the same effect; what is reported may or may not be true. However, when the government itself puts out a publication or says something, that is official and it has to be official.

*Mr. Zellerbach* asked if USIA could compete with the professionals to properly staff its needs. *Mr. Marks* said that it undoubtedly could. During the recent strike of the *New York Herald Tribune*, some of its leading writers came to USIA for jobs, and were delighted to find that their colleagues there were men of equal, if not higher, professional standing. These men do not come simply from Madison Avenue, but come from all over the United States. For example, some of the films

produced by USIA are examples of professionalism at its greatest; he cited the film on President Kennedy, "Years of Lightning, Day of Drums,"<sup>13</sup> in this connection.

In reply to a question by *Mr. Hewlett*, *Mr. Marks* said that USIA personnel are Foreign Service employees. He said some of them have left jobs earning \$75,000 to \$100,000 annually in commercial fields to work for  $\frac{1}{5}$  or  $\frac{1}{4}$  of that. He cited, in this regard, John Chancellor, the head of the Voice of America.

In reply to a question by *Mr. Linowitz*, *Mr. Marks* said that USIA has no relationship with Radio Free Europe. Radio Free Europe is privately supported, and USIA knows what it does. Its efforts are directed to parts of the world in which USIA operates, but in a different way; it tells the people of Eastern Europe what is going on in their countries that they cannot learn from their own news sources. USIA tells them, instead, what is going on in the United States and in the rest of the world as it affects U.S. objectives. Thus, they complement one another, but do not have any direct association.

*Dr. Perkins* said that as a result of a series on the Central Intelligence Agency by the *New York Times* this summer,<sup>14</sup> the question had arisen as to what government or private activities might in fact be receiving financing from the CIA. He asked if this had become a problem. *Mr. Marks* said the question had not come to him directly, but that the criticism of CIA hurts to the extent that there is an undermining of confidence in any governmental agency. However, he said the question of how far the CIA might be a financial source behind a variety of governmental and private activities has not hurt USIA. *Professor Mason* said that when he was in India the previous June, part of the opposition to the proposed Indo-American Binational Foundation stemmed from a fear that the CIA would infiltrate through the Foundation.<sup>15</sup> In fact, it was even suggested at that time that the Peace Corps may be infil-

<sup>13</sup> See footnote 4, Document 30.

<sup>14</sup> Presumably a reference to a five-part series of articles about the CIA that appeared in the *New York Times* between April 25 and 29: Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, and E. W. Kenworthy, "C.I.A.: Maker of Policy, or Tool?" April 25, 1966, p. 1; "How the C.I.A. Put 'Instant Air Force' Into Congo," April 26, 1966, p. 1; "Electronic Prying Grows," April 27, 1966, p. 1; "C.I.A. Operations: A Plot Scuttled," April 28, 1966, p. 1; and "The C.I.A.: Qualities of Director Viewed as Chief Rein on Agency," April 29, 1966, p. 1. During the same time period, the *New York Times* also published several articles discussing the issue of CIA funding to American universities in exchange for the universities providing cover for CIA activities overseas, specifically the case of Michigan State University providing such support to the CIA in Vietnam between 1955 and 1959. (Max Frankel, "University Project Cloaked C.I.A. Role In Saigon, 1955-59," April 14, 1966, p. 1; "University Aides Explain C.I.A. Tie," April 15, 1966, p. 11; Fred M. Hechinger, "Education: Lessons of the M.S.U. Affair," April 24, 1966, p. E9)

<sup>15</sup> See J. Anthony Lukas, "C.I.A. Disclosures May Damage Project for India Foundation," *New York Times*, May 7, 1966, p. 5.

trated by the CIA, which reflects a general suspicion. *Mr. Marks* said this is simply a part of the battle which the Communists wage; indigenous Communist organizations in a country will always seize upon CIA to help defeat a project they do not like. Ambassador Bowles had received the assurances of every important Minister of the Government of India that the Binational Foundation would be welcome, and the Government of India has been satisfied with the activities of the Ford Foundation in India. However, because of the political climate and because of the opposition of the Communists, a decision on the Binational Foundation could not be taken. *Dr. Perkins* said that he did not wish to imply that his information was very accurate by suggesting that the Communist opposition had torpedoed one proposal or another; however, *Mr. Marks* agreed that it helped to stimulate general opposition.

*Dr. Perkins* said he was impressed by *Mr. Marks'* statement that U.S. propaganda, or rather the best propaganda, is to speak the truth. However, the problem of deciding which truth to select for dissemination must be relevant at some point and he asked if some specific cases could be cited to show how the directions to be taken in certain countries had been decided within the U.S. Government. *Mr. Marks* said that the head of the operations of the United States Government in any country is the Ambassador. He is head of the Country Team; everybody works for and receives his general direction from the Ambassador. The Country Team develops a Country Plan on what the United States' objectives are in that country; this plan is not a rigid blueprint, but rather is flexible enough to change as U.S. interests require. The Ambassador, with the assistance of the Country Team, determines what U.S. objectives are in consultation with the Department of State and other agencies as required. However, policy for that country is carried out by the Ambassador on a day to day basis. The Ambassador is responsible for deciding what is important to the United States, which he does after consultation with his economic, political, military and information advisors. In Brazil, for example, there was a recent inquiry as to the ownership by non-Brazilian interests, of media such as *Time*, *Life*, and *Readers' Digest*. Therefore, explaining to the Brazilian people that the participation of American business interests is vital and important and beneficial to them becomes an objective of the Country Plan. Once the objectives are determined, the Ambassador decides how to go about attaining them. This requires determination as to who the audience is and what might be the best vehicle for reaching that audience—AID, USIA, etc.

*Mr. Marks* said that he wishes to do more to create a climate where business can operate, where people of the individual countries realize that foreign investment has made a beneficial contribution to the development of their country, and that much can be achieved through coop-

eration in telling this story. It is not only a government effort, but wherever possible USIA tries to see that it is a private enterprise effort, working in tandem with the government. *Mr. Rockefeller* said that these efforts have been most helpful in Latin America and have worked very well. *Mr. Marks* said there are many things the government cannot do as well as private business, and vice versa, so it is determined who can do a certain thing best and that is how the program evolves.

*Mr. Linowitz* asked whether a problem was created by people trying to decide when they were being told the facts and when they were being influenced. *Mr. Marks* said this is not a major problem since all of life is a matter of marshalling facts to sell a product. Not all of the truth can be told, however, because in the whole complex of facts there is too much. Therefore, it is necessary to select the facts which are germane to the subject. In the process, many facts which are unfavorable will be told, because confidence cannot be gained if the material is not credible. He said that in his own practice of law, he would readily admit to the court any fact which is adverse to his client and then argue against it; that is what USIA does to the world. It tells the peoples of Latin America what the United States is doing, admits that there is a large financial investment by American business there, and then goes on to point out, however, that this is to the advantage of the people. He said that the selection of the facts presented in order to make sure that the impression is the one desired does not depreciate the full impact of being an agency which tells the whole truth.

Another example, also in Brazil, *Mr. Marks* continued, might involve AID assistance for the development of natural resources. USIA would take the facts showing how this would result in greater prosperity and a higher standard of living. This also would be directed toward an objective of the Country Plan, viz., to point out that the assistance being rendered by AID is in the national interest of Brazil. That then would become a major project of the USIA information program in Brazil which would be implemented through all of its media resources. These resources are selected individually, having in mind the audience which it is desired to persuade.

*Mr. Zellerbach* mentioned that in northeast Brazil there is only 20% literacy. How does USIA reach the vast majority of the people who live in the slums? *Mr. Marks* said that first USIA must decide whether it is important to reach these people; that is, the first job is to decide who USIA wishes to reach through its programs. In many countries, particularly in Africa, USIA may wish to reach only 5% of the population because public opinion in those countries means very little. The leaders themselves determine policy and so it is necessary to reach the leaders. He said that, nevertheless, a vast literacy program in northeast Brazil includes thousands of people, which will make them an audience

for USIA tomorrow. *Mr. Zellerbach* asked how USIA reaches the group which will be important five years from now. *Mr. Ryan* said that in northeast Brazil USIA has put out 17 different cartoon books in Portuguese designed for the neo-literates. This is a great problem in all areas where literacy training programs are underway. It is easy to train people to read, but then there is not always reading material available for them. The cartoon book ties in the visual image in rather simple language so that they can keep up their reading skills. This is a general program throughout Latin America for the neo-literates.

At 12:25 the meeting was recessed for luncheon.

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**107. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Kaplan) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 13, 1966

SUBJECT

Climate of World Opinion Regarding U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam

1. The replies to the Department's circular telegram 13082<sup>2</sup> and USIA's circular telegram 882<sup>3</sup> on this subject have provided many useful ideas on actions which might be considered to improve the climate of world opinion regarding U.S. policy in Viet-Nam. The analysis prepared by USIA, entitled "Viet-Nam and World Opinion",<sup>4</sup> together with the addenda thereto, recapitulates the replies to both circular messages;<sup>5</sup> in most cases posts replied to both with a single Country Team telegram.

2. In reviewing these materials, I am particularly struck by the following facts:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Far East (Viet Nam) September–December 1966. Secret. Drafted by Arzac. In the top right corner of the first page of the memorandum, below the date line, written in an unknown hand is the letter "M," which is crossed out with a single slash.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 99.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 99.

<sup>4</sup> See the attachment to Document 100.

<sup>5</sup> The phrase "both circular messages" is underlined in an unknown hand.



(a) the air strikes against North Viet-Nam are most often cited as a major unfavorable element in terms of opinion on U.S. policy in Viet-Nam;<sup>6</sup>

(b) the fear that the conflict will escalate into a major war involving communist China is virtually universal;<sup>7</sup>

(c) nevertheless, opinion in many countries is preoccupied chiefly with local problems and the conflict in Viet-Nam is of relatively remote interest;

(d) the military emphasis of reporting out of Viet-Nam, the use of body counts, discussion of POW treatment, and the widespread use of pictures of suffering and destruction are important factors working against us;<sup>8</sup>

(e) the apparent Americanization of the conflict similarly works against us, and there is a considerable David-and-Goliath sympathy for the North Vietnamese;<sup>9</sup>

(f) statement and actions by American domestic opposition elements are important elements in creating unfavorable opinion;<sup>10</sup>

(g) active opposition elements tend to be comparable to those actively opposed in the U.S., such as students, intellectuals and university teachers;<sup>11</sup>

(h) many undeveloped countries relate their desire for a peaceful settlement to freeing U.S. attention and resources for assistance to them;

(i) opinion tends to be favorable to us and unfavorable to the Communists regarding readiness to negotiate, although inclusion of the Viet Cong as an independent entity in negotiations tends to be favored;<sup>12</sup>

(j) we need to continue working on the problem, but we should not be overly pessimistic since much good will remains toward the U.S.;

(k) we ought not to expect too much in terms of public statements and other additional measures of overt support; and

(l) what we do is much more important than what we say.<sup>13</sup>

3. Suggestions of an informational-psychological nature are being followed up systematically by USIA. Actions of a more political nature suggested by the posts which we may wish to consider are as follows:

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<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point. Next to it is a hand-drawn checkmark.

<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point. Next to it is a hand-drawn arrow pointing to it.

<sup>8</sup> An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.

<sup>9</sup> An unknown hand underlined "there is considerable David-and-Goliath sympathy for the North Vietnamese" and wrote in the left-hand margin diagonally above this point: "*Major project.*"

<sup>10</sup> The entire point is underlined in an unknown hand. An unknown hand also placed two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to this point.

<sup>11</sup> An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point.

<sup>12</sup> An unknown hand underlined "inclusion of the Viet Cong as an independent entity in negotiations tends to be favored."

<sup>13</sup> An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left hand margin next to this point.



(a) There have been too many high level statements. These need to be better timed, more widely spaced, and more specifically aimed at foreign countries to be more effective. They should emphasize the GVN's role, place the problem in the perspective of Asia as a whole as enunciated in the President's speech to the American Alumni Council,<sup>14</sup> give more attention to Asian help, and reiterate both the firmness of our commitment and our readiness to negotiate. They should be less vociferous and more subdued in tone than in the past, and they ought to exploit the communist Chinese sensitivity regarding negotiations.<sup>15</sup>

(b) Statements should be made by the President, as well as by the Secretary and other high level officials, explaining U.S. policy.

(c) The President should reiterate his offer of economic aid to North Viet-Nam.<sup>16</sup>

(d) The President should make a major speech addressed to fellow citizens of the world, calling on their help for peace.<sup>17</sup>

(e) The President should make a worldwide humanitarian appeal for help to the refugees in Viet-Nam (the King of Morocco originally suggested this).<sup>18</sup>

(f) The President should write letters to heads of state and heads of governments about Viet-Nam.<sup>19</sup>

(g) The Vice President should visit the Latin American capitals to explain U.S. policy.

(h) There should be a Presidential or other high level speech on "the other war" in South Viet-Nam.<sup>20</sup>

(i) Steps to "Asianize" the discussion should be taken, such as statements by GVN leaders, stationing GVN and other Asian diplomats in more capitals, arranging tours and visits by Vietnamese and other Asians including cultural presentations, and getting Southeast Asian leaders to issue statements. A conference of Asian and U.S. intellectuals could be organized, perhaps at the East-West Center. There should be more exploitation of Asian statements.<sup>21</sup> A Southeast Asian (preferably Moslem) "trade delegation" should tour Arab capitals.

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<sup>14</sup> See footnote 4, Document 101.

<sup>15</sup> An unknown hand drew two parallel vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and drew a question mark next to the lines.

<sup>16</sup> An unknown hand drew a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this point and drew a question mark in the left-hand margin.

<sup>17</sup> An unknown hand drew a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this point.

<sup>18</sup> An unknown hand underlined "The President should make a worldwide humanitarian appeal for help to the refugees in Viet-Nam," drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point, and drew a question mark in the right-hand margin.

<sup>19</sup> An unknown hand drew a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this and the subsequent point.

<sup>20</sup> An unknown hand drew a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this point and wrote "Election" next to it.

<sup>21</sup> At the beginning of the paragraph an unknown hand underlined "Steps to 'Asianize' the discussion should be taken" and the sentence "There should be more exploitation of Asian statements."

(j) Members of Congress and high level Administration officials should tour foreign capitals regularly to discuss U.S. policy in Viet-Nam. More officers with Viet-Nam experience should do the same.<sup>22</sup>

(k) We should make a standing offer to negotiate, setting out our minimum demands. We ought periodically to repeat our concerted diplomatic campaigns.

(l) There should be periodic high level briefings for Latin American chiefs of mission accredited to Washington.

(m) Governor Harriman should meet with a senior communist Chinese official to discuss all differences between Peiping and Washington.<sup>23</sup>

(n) More attention should be given to influencing opinion indirectly, such as encouraging more paid advertisements for U.S. products, arranging to buy military supplies in Australia, and pursuing constructive relations.

(o) Statements by liberal U.S. educators should be encouraged and exploited.

4. A number of suggestions of an administrative support nature were also made by posts. The most feasible of these are:

(a) issue a factbook on Viet-Nam;

(b) arrange for posts to get advance texts of speeches by U.S. officials; and

(c) issue a weekly situation report so that posts can regularly brief senior host government officials.

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<sup>22</sup> An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point and a question mark in the right-hand margin.

<sup>23</sup> An unknown hand underlined the entire point and wrote "How" in the right-hand margin.

**108. Memorandum From the Assistant Area Directors of the United States Information Agency to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 14, 1966

However the concept is expressed in the MOA or anywhere else, the Area offices are your eyes and ears in the field and are operating extensions of your office. We run the field posts in your name. Running them means everything from working with Personnel on staffing the posts to having meaningful contact with the Department on political affairs and participating more and more in complicated Pentagon matters, from war games to counter insurgency.<sup>2</sup>

We're all doing the job now one way or another, but none of us is satisfied that we're doing the best job that could be done; several of us are concerned that we're not giving you the backstopping you deserve.

The problem: the minimal staffs we have in our Area offices in Washington. We don't have enough people, and some of those we have aren't the right level. We are all aware of this, and as foreign affairs become more involved, the situation becomes more critical. USIA's standards should be high; we want to represent you properly. Too often it's impossible to do so when one Desk Officer, for instance, has to cover too many countries. We need help!

You have had Herb Fredman and others take close looks at many elements of the Agency, but you have still to examine the Areas. Over the past several weeks the Area Directors have colluded to take a look at their own offices to see what their most urgent personnel needs are. Attached is a list of what we honestly think we need. Ben Posner listened to our deliberations, as did Mose.<sup>3</sup>

We are aware of the locked-up budget, the personnel ceilings, etc., and the many reasons anybody could cite not to increase our staffs.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Files Bx 33–36, 1966: Acc. #69–A–3445 [E], Entry UD WW 193, Box 33, I—The Director's Office (October through December 1966). No classification marking. The day of the month is handwritten in an unknown hand. Also written in an unknown hand in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum are the initials "BW" (Barbara White) and "FYI."

<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand crossed out the part of the sentence that reads "in complicated Pentagon matters, from war games to counter insurgency" and substituted "in all sorts of related and unrelated affairs from war games to counter insurgency and from PPBS to personnel selection panels." For additional information on the PPBS, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Documents 45 and 80; and *Public Papers: Johnson, 1965*, Book II, pp. 916–917.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably a reference to Lionel Mosley.

Nevertheless, we think you should be warned that we all feel we can't do you justice unless we get some help.

However, we think the best way to go at this would be to have a study made of the Area offices to determine in fact the number of additional positions required. Perhaps you could ask Herb Fredman to undertake such a study. This should provide you with an objective picture of our problem.<sup>4</sup>

IAA—Mark B. Lewis<sup>5</sup>

IAE—William E. Weld, Jr.

IAF—Daniel P. Oleksiw

IAL—Kermit K. Brown

IAN—Alan Carter

IAS—Richard T. Davies

### Attachment

### Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>6</sup>

Washington, undated

### ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR AREA OFFICES

<u>AREA OFFICE</u>	<u>POSITION TITLE</u>	<u>NO. OF POSITIONS</u>
IAA	Deputy Program Coordinator Youth and Cultural Officer One Desk Officer Two Secretaries	5

<sup>4</sup> Marks responded to the memorandum in a September 15 memorandum for Area Assistant Directors. In it Marks stated: "Your determination to maintain the highest possible standards for USIA is one I share and I appreciate your coordinated approach to me on this particular problem." He continued: "Pursuant to the request in your memorandum, I am taking steps immediately to have the personnel needs of the Area offices surveyed and I will discuss the findings with you at the earliest opportunity." (National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Files Bx 33-36, 1966: Acc. #69-A-3445 [E], Entry UD WW 193, Box 33, I—The Director's Office (October through December 1966))

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

<sup>6</sup> No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper.

IAE	Deputy Program Coordinator	1
IAF	Deputy Program Coordinator One Desk Officer Two Secretaries Staff Assistant	5
IAL	Deputy Program Coordinator One Secretary	2
IAN	Deputy Program Coordinator Staff Assistant	2
IAS	Deputy Program Coordinator	1
TOTAL		16

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**109. Letter From the Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs (Babbidge) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 23, 1966

Dear Mr. President:

At the meeting of the Advisory Commission which ended this morning, the members requested me to express to you their continuing concern and deep distress about the budget level of the Department of State’s educational and cultural exchange programs.

The Commission is of course cognizant of the tremendous demands on the Federal budget made by the war in Vietnam. Nevertheless, there are hidden non-monetary costs in this war which we cannot ignore without jeopardizing the understanding abroad of our national values.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1965–1966, Lot 69D260, Entry UD UP 175, 1966 EDX 8 United States Advisory Commission on International & Cultural Affairs. No classification marking. Babbidge sent a copy of the letter to Rusk under a September 23 covering memorandum, in which he noted it was a “self-explanatory letter” and added that the Commission members hoped that the Department, in preparing its budget for submission to BOB, would “give full consideration to the views expressed to the President.” (Ibid.) Frankel sent the letter and the covering memorandum to Cater under an October 4 memorandum, indicating that Babbidge’s letter should be called to Cater’s attention. (Ibid.)

The purpose of the educational and cultural exchange programs is to keep open and reinforce the channels through which this understanding must flow, and to safeguard the historic friendships which this nation has built up over the years. Members of the Commission who have recently traveled—in all parts of the world—emphasize that it is precisely because of the war in Vietnam that our efforts to create a balanced view of the totality of American civilization and culture should be redoubled. Such understanding, members of the Commission are persuaded, cannot be achieved by programs directed solely towards “selling” specific aspects of foreign policy. It must derive ultimately from a profound appreciation of the American value system and our commitment to the goals which you so eloquently expressed last September in your Smithsonian address.<sup>2</sup> To abandon or even reduce our traditional efforts in this field would cause disappointment, indeed consternation, among the leadership elites around the world.

It is a truism to point out that the mere maintenance of present program levels represents an actual cut in program effectiveness. A fortiori, a decrease in the program level would be a regrettable and costly form of economy which we cannot afford, especially in this period of tension. We fervently hope, therefore, that these views be considered when the budget for FY-68 is prepared for presentation to the Congress, and trust you understand that our sense of urgency stems from our obligations under P.L. 87-256.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely yours,

**Homer D. Babbidge, Jr.**

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 60.

<sup>3</sup> The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961.

**110. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 3, 1966

I have just returned from a conference which I held of our Public Affairs Officer representatives in Eastern European countries (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia). From this conference and meetings which I held in some of these capitals, I would like to report the following:

1. Viet Nam is not a matter of principal interest in the satellite countries. It is a “convenient excuse” for taking certain actions or refusing to do so, rather than a basic reason.

2. The Eastern European countries are primarily interested in expanding trade with the U.S., in most-favored-nation treatment, in increase of tourism, and improvement in the standards of living.

3. Even where *official* relations are cool, our representatives find cordiality in *personal* relations.

4. Except in Yugoslavia the press is biased, highly critical and militantly adverse to official U.S. positions. However, in private conversations there is a good understanding of U.S. objectives and a latent sympathy.

Following the conference, I accompanied Senator Warren Magnuson to Plovdiv, Bulgaria for the “America Day” ceremonies at the Trade Fair. During the day we called on Prime Minister Zhivkov, representatives of the Foreign Office and Trade Ministries. In our meeting with the Prime Minister *at no time was there any reference to Viet Nam*, although the Prime Minister had numerous opportunities to bring up the subject.

Senator Magnuson explained his sponsorship of the East-West Trade Bill and his hope that Congress might consider it in its next session.<sup>2</sup> He cautioned against optimism but registered his strong support for the measure. In the discussion I pointed out that Bulgaria was the only nation in Eastern Europe which still jammed the VOA (the jamming is only of Bulgarian language and not English programs) and that if this practice stopped it would be an indication of Bulgarian desire to cooperate. The Prime Minister responded by saying, “I could stop the jamming in two minutes—but then what would we Bulgarians

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 2, Field—Europe July–December 1966. Confidential. Drafted by Marks. Sent through Kintner.

<sup>2</sup> For further information about the East-West Trade Relations bill, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. IX, International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities, Documents 181 and 192.

have to trade?" He also expressed irritation that the Bulgarian representative in the U.S. was a Minister and not an Ambassador. He felt that this was a discrimination which should be eliminated. I got the feeling that if we upgraded our diplomatic representation, he would order cessation of jamming. I intend to discuss this with Secretary Rusk and urge that this step be taken.

5. In Yugoslavia new economic reforms have been introduced which require all enterprise to "show profit" or go out of business. There are striking similarities with our own free enterprise system and the differences appear to be more in theory than fact. Yugoslavia maintains its independence although it still clings to a theoretical adherence to the communist bloc. The Yugoslavians believe that the Czechs will follow this pattern and that there may be others in due course who will also do so. I met with Ministry of Information officials and found them highly cooperative. Our press relations have improved materially and are likely to remain favorable.

### *Summary*

From my observations I would conclude that although our formal relations in Eastern Europe have not altered perceptively, there is a strong undercurrent which is pulling these nations closer to the West; that although there is no open support for our position in Viet Nam, there is no active personal antagonism. In view of these conditions, continuing close attention should be paid to our relations in Eastern Europe. At some point it might be desirable to send a high level representative on a good-will mission or as an emissary to discuss the possibility of Viet Nam peace negotiations.

Leonard H. Marks<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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## **111. Editorial Note**

On October 21, 1966, Congress passed the International Education Act (Public Law 89-698 (80 Stat. 1966)). President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the bill into law on October 29, during his trip to Bangkok, Thailand. Johnson was in Thailand as part of an Asia regional trip from October 17 to November 2, which also included visits to New



Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and South Korea. (Lewis Gulick, "Johnson Begins History-Making Tour of Far East Today," *Washington Post*, October 17, 1966, page A15; and John W. Finney, "Johnson is Home, 'More Confident' on Goals in Asia," *New York Times*, November 3, 1966, page 1)

In his remarks, which he delivered at Chulalongkorn University before signing the Act, Johnson noted:

"One year ago at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., I proposed that my country, the United States of America, launch a concerted effort in international studies. I learned just a few days ago while I was already here in Asia that our Congress had acted on this proposal and passed a new law, the first step—the International Education Act. That will have to be implemented, as it will be, as we go along. Its purpose is to help Americans learn from other nations and, we hope, to help other nations learn from America. It will also establish a center for educational cooperation in Washington, D.C.

"I am so very proud that the American Congress has passed this act. I think it is fitting and appropriate to sign this program into law here today on this stage of this great university in a land where international cooperation has now become a national byword." (*Public Papers: Johnson*, 1966, Book II, pages 1276–1278) For Johnson's September 1965 remarks at the Smithsonian, see Document 60.

For additional information about Johnson's trip to Asia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Documents 280 and 281; *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, Document 347; *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs, Documents 19, 333–335; and *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, Documents 94 and 96.

## 112. Memorandum Prepared by the Council on International Educational Cooperation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 1, 1966

### SUBJECT

The International Migration of Talent and Skills—Proceedings of a Workshop and Conference

This is to call your attention to certain background information about the attached report and also to emphasize various conclusions of the report itself.<sup>2</sup>

*The International Migration of Talent and Skills* is a report on a conference which was held in Washington, D.C. on June 14–15, 1966. Financed by the U.S.O.E. and sponsored by the interagency Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs,<sup>3</sup> the Conference was one of the major steps that have recently been taken by the Council to help diagnose the so-called “Brain Drain”<sup>4</sup> problem and devise remedies for it.

The member agencies of the Council are not alone in their concern with this problem. Other U.S. Government agencies, and private agencies, international organizations, foreign governments and individual scholars are also involved. The Council therefore decided to sponsor a two-day meeting. The first day was devoted to a workshop to review

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files, 1955–1971, Acc. #69–H–3445 [A], Entry UD WW 200, Box 175, Council on International Education and Cultural Affairs (CIC) 1966. No classification marking. The memorandum was sent on behalf of the Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. Louchheim sent a copy of the memorandum to Council members Moseman, Bartlett, Miller, Vaughn, and Marks under a November 1 covering memorandum. (Ibid.) The memorandum was sent to all American diplomatic and consular Posts in circular airgram 5210, January 16, 1967. (National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files, 1955–1971, Acc. #69–H–3445 [A], Entry UD WW 200, Box 174, Brain Drain, 1966)

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is the October 1966 report entitled: “The International Migration of Talent and Skills: Proceedings of a Workshop and Conference.”

<sup>3</sup> Chairman—Mr. Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State; the Agency for International Development; the Department of Defense; the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Peace Corps; the U.S. Information Agency. Observers: the Bureau of the Budget, the Smithsonian Institution, and the White House Committee on Scientific and Technical Information (COSATI). [Footnote is in the original.]

<sup>4</sup> Senator Mondale introduced S. 3905, the “International Brain Drain Act,” on October 13 “to assist developing countries in meeting one of the great and neglected problems of our time, the brain drain which robs them of the professional and skilled manpower they need to bring hope to their peoples.” For texts of Mondale’s remarks and the bill, see 112 *Congressional Record*, October 13, 1966, pp. 26496–26504. For additional remarks by Mondale on the subject of “brain drain,” see 112 *Congressional Record*, August 31, 1966, pp. 21477–21480.

past and current research on the “brain drain,” at which critical problems and data requirements for future studies could be reviewed. On the second day a conference was held to provide a forum for a fuller exchange of information among people from agencies and groups with programs or responsibilities connected with the field of educational and cultural exchange.

These sessions produced no “miracle drug.” But they demonstrated the complexity of the problem, and they provided useful insights and specific directions for future steps. The principal issues, viewpoints, and findings are summarized in the Introduction to the Report. Some of the major conclusions, however tentative, that can be drawn from the discussions are the following.

1. There is a basic need for more facts to establish the actual dimensions of the problem. Many of the necessary “raw” data are available in our Immigration and Naturalization records. Much also must be sought elsewhere.

2. The kinds of travelers to the United States who are involved in this problem vary widely—in their status under our immigration laws, their specialties, their relationship to developmental projects, their obligation to return home and, of course, in their professional, social and personal motivations.

3. The primacy *locus* of the problem lies in the developing countries. It is in connection with these countries that strong incentives should be provided to induce foreign nationals to return home—for example, attractive job opportunities and facilities—and social and political *milieu*.

4. The governments of developing countries vary greatly in their concern with the problem and in their views and policies regarding it. One step that they might take would be to encourage for study and work abroad only those individuals who are morally or legally committed to return home. Another would be to increase communication with their nationals while abroad so as to keep them abreast of developments at home, thus minimizing their alienation from their own cultures.

5. Means should be found to enable developing countries to exchange information as to what they are doing to attract their nationals homeward.

6. Again with respect to developing countries, greater emphasis should be placed on developing training and research facilities in countries other than their own but in the same region, where students, scholars, scientists, and other professional personnel can do advanced work within an environment similar to their own.

7. In the United States, one of the principal “host” countries, more might be done to provide: special academic programs to equip foreign students more adequately for jobs in their home countries; predeparture orientation to prepare them for reentry into their home environment; and a full awareness by all sponsors of development-related projects of their responsibility to encourage the return of foreign visitors whose work in the U.S. they sponsor.

8. The United States can cooperate with other governments, inter-governmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations and

institutions abroad in such efforts to reduce the "drain" as home-recruitment projects and institution-building. Moreover, insofar as it increases its own pools of skilled manpower to meet its own needs, it will decrease the opportunities for the employment of skilled persons from other countries.

Here in the United States, the Conference has been followed by certain steps which are advancing our realistic consideration of the problem, in both the Government and the private sectors.

The Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service are giving priority to the development of statistical procedures which have the objective of providing the data needed for a meaningful appraisal of the dimensions of the talent migration. Also, the Department of State has alerted its missions abroad to the significance of the problem and the need for encouraging other governments to assume more responsibility for the return of their own. The American Council on Education, which has shared the Government's concern about the "brain drain," has played a leading role in focusing attention on the problem in the university world. The American Council's Commission on International Education has deliberated at length on the "drain" at a number of sessions and is preparing a soon-to-be-published statement which attempts to define in reasonable terms the responsibility of the American academic community toward the problem.<sup>5</sup>

In conclusion, the assistance of the readers of the attached report is solicited. The Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs will appreciate it if readers will supply any information they may have on any aspect of the "brain drain" problem. Bibliographic data from research specialists would be especially welcome (see page 151 of the attached report). Requests and inquiries should be directed to Francis J. Colligan, Executive Secretary, Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, CU/PRS, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

**113. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 7, 1966

SUBJECT

U.S. Government Policy on International Book and Library Activities

*Recommendation:*

That you approve the enclosed statement of policy of the United States Government on International Book and Library Activities and its implementing directive, and authorize their issuance as a National Security Action Memorandum.<sup>2</sup>

*Background:*

In your special message to the Congress on February 2, 1966, you recommended that the flow of books and other educational material between the United States and other countries of the world be increased.<sup>3</sup> A policy to carry out your directive has been agreed upon. Concurrences have been received from the Department of State, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Agency for International Development, the Library of Congress, the Peace Corps, the Smithsonian Institution, the United States Information Agency and the Government Advisory Committee on International Book Programs. Action programs are being planned to carry out this policy if it meets with your approval.

**Dean Rusk**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of the White House Aides, Files of S. Douglass Cater, Box 19, Miscellaneous Correspondence, November, 1966. No classification marking. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Copy for Mr. Douglass Cater, The White House."

<sup>2</sup> There is no indication that President Johnson either approved or disapproved the recommendation.

<sup>3</sup> In this speech, Johnson advocated for legislation designed to implement the 1950 Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials, commonly known as the Florence Agreement, and the 1949 Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials of an Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Character, commonly known as the Beirut Agreement. The United States Congress passed legislation for the implementation of the Beirut Agreement on October 8 and the Florence Agreement on October 14. (*Sixty-Ninth Annual Report of the Register of Copyrights For Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1966* (Washington: Copyright Office, The Library of Congress, 1964), p. 7; and *Implementation of Florence and Beirut Agreements: Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, on H.R. 8664, H.R. 15271, and H.J. Res. 688* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 8 and 238)

## Attachment

### Policy Statement<sup>4</sup>

Washington, undated

#### NATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL BOOK AND LIBRARY ACTIVITIES

In his Message to Congress of February 2, 1966,<sup>5</sup> the President said, "Education lies at the heart of every nation's hopes and purposes. It must be at the heart of our international relations." Books, by definition, are essential to education and to the achievement of literacy. They are also essential to communication and understanding among the peoples of the world. It is through books that people communicate in the most lasting form their beliefs, aspirations, cultural achievements, and scientific and technical knowledge.

In the United States and other developed countries, where there has been the opportunity for a long time to emphasize education and books, there have been created vast resources of printed materials and other forms of recorded knowledge in all fields of human endeavor. In the United States, a great complex of library systems has emerged, serving ordinary citizens as well as students and scholars. In the developing countries, where more than two-thirds of the world's population live, there is an acute need for the books essential to educational growth and general social progress, and for libraries which can enable these nations more easily to acquire and use the technology of the modern world. The United States Government declares that it is prepared, as a major policy, to give full and vigorous support to a coordinated effort of public and private organizations which will make more available to the developing countries those book and library resources of the United States which these countries need and desire.

The total needs of the developing countries with regard to books cannot be adequately filled by assistance from the outside; nor, under present conditions, can they be filled from local resources. From a long-range point of view, the establishment of viable book publishing and distributing facilities in the developing countries and regions is essential. It shall therefore also be the policy of the United States Government to encourage and support the establishment of such facilities.

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<sup>4</sup> No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the statement.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3 above.

The utility of books goes beyond their contribution to material progress. The free and full exchange of ideas, experiences and information, through books, is indispensable to effective communication between people and nations, and has a unique role to play in the enrichment of the human spirit. Recognizing this, the United States Government is further prepared, as a major policy, actively to promote the free flow of books and other forms of recorded knowledge.

The task of filling the world's need for books and of achieving an adequate exchange of books among the nations is immense. No single institution or agency and no single government can hope to accomplish it alone. It is therefore essential that all agencies of Government concerned in any way with international book and library programs assign to these a high priority. It is further essential that they coordinate their book and library efforts with those of other pertinent government agencies and private institutions. If new legislation or special funds are needed to carry out this policy, agencies will make appropriate requests to the Congress. All agencies of Government, under the direction of the Department of State, should actively seek to cooperate with other governments on a bilateral or multilateral basis in the achievement of these objectives.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs has the responsibility for coordinating United States Government efforts in this field.

### **Attachment**

#### **Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>6</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### **DIRECTIVE TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL BOOK AND LIBRARY ACTIVITIES**

- I. To carry out the foregoing policy, agencies are directed to develop specific courses of action, within the framework of their financial resources and statutory responsibilities, to accomplish the following goals:

- A. To ensure that the book and library assistance programs of all federal agencies contribute on a coordinated basis to the broad objec-

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<sup>6</sup> No classification marking. Although there is no indication as to the drafter, it was drafted on October 4.

tives of educational growth and peaceful progress in the developing countries by such activities as:

(1) assisting in the development of textbooks and supplementary reading materials for indigenous school systems;

(2) expanding programs for distributing and supporting the publication of low-priced editions of American books, including textbooks and source materials, in English and in translation;

(3) establishing, under local auspices, English and indigenous language rental libraries and bookstores for high school and college students;

(4) providing graded reading materials for new literates in local languages or English;

(5) providing books to support the basic professions and trades and the learned disciplines, theoretical and practical;

(6) providing funds and technical assistance to establish viable indigenous book publishing and distributing facilities;

(7) contributing to the development of greater professional competence by increasing the number of exchange and training programs for book publishers, librarians, textbook writers and editors, and persons engaged in related activities;

(8) supporting a program of library development, in cooperation with the U.S. publishing industry, U.S. libraries, library organizations and institutions, to include:

(a) assistance in adapting to local conditions and needs the most advanced library technology;

(b) overall "collection development" programs by cooperating institutions in the U.S.;

(c) counseling on library development;

(d) sizeable expansion of the present Smithsonian program to provide core libraries overseas with U.S. journals and serial publications;

(9) initiating a major training program for library personnel, to include:

a) strengthening of existing national and regional library schools, plus refresher and in-service training and selected work-study training in the U.S.;

b) development of additional regional library schools, with provision of scholarship funds;

c) instruction in the application of modern technology to library practices.

B. To encourage and directly support the increased distribution abroad of books studying or reflecting the full spectrum of American life and culture by:

(1) expanding U.S. book "presentation" programs and otherwise facilitating gifts of books abroad;



(2) encouraging cooperative ventures between U.S. and overseas publishers for the publication of American books abroad, in translations or in inexpensive English-language reprints; and

(3) increasing the number of American libraries and bookstores overseas.

C. To further a greatly increased inflow of foreign books and materials including journals, microfilms, and reproductions of art, music, folklore, archival and manuscript collections, to U.S. libraries through the use of PL 480,<sup>7</sup> appropriations under Title II c of the Higher Education Act of 1965<sup>8</sup> and other funds.

D. To stimulate and support a much more extensive exchange program in books and related materials between U.S. and foreign libraries, museums, educational and research institutions.

E. To encourage closer liaison between American and foreign libraries, greater exchange of reference and bibliographical information, and closer collaboration in the development of information storage and retrieval and computer utilization programs.

F. To support all measures designed to lower or eliminate tariff barriers, exchange restrictions and other impediments to the free flow of books and related educational materials.

G. To provide greater support to the efforts of the U.S. book industry toward the attainment of these goals through positive measures such as political risk-insurance, guaranteed convertibility, and whatever other means are required to normalize communication and the channels of trade in international publishing and book distribution.

II. The Department of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies, is directed to ensure:

A. That activities of U.S. Government agencies are coordinated in such a way that Government resources will be used with the greatest efficiency and economy.

B. That the actions of the U.S. Government take into account the activities of private institutions and of the American book industry in the international book and library field.

C. That specific actions are tailored to conditions in specific countries or regions.

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 2, Document 81.

<sup>8</sup> President Johnson signed the Higher Education Act of 1965 (H.R. 9567) into law on November 8, 1965, as Public Law 89–329 (79 Stat. 1219).

- III. In seeking any new legislation or additional funds, agencies, in consultation with the Department of State, should make appropriate proposals to the President through normal legislative clearances and budgetary channels.

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**114. Memorandum From President Johnson to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 26, 1966

During my recent trip to the Far East, I visited the educational television station in Pago Pago, American Samoa,<sup>2</sup> and saw how television is being used to improve the level of learning in elementary and secondary schools.

I believe that educational television can play a vital role in assisting less-developed countries in their educational effort. These stations can be used for adult education and information programs during evening hours. Community leaders can use these channels for discussion of important public issues.

For these reasons, I am appointing a Task Force with the following assignment:

1. Assess the value of educational television broadcasting for primary and secondary schools in less-developed countries.
2. Report on plans being made for educational television outside the United States and how the United States may participate most effectively in this effort.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of the White House Aides, Files of S. Douglass Cater, Box 40, Cater, Douglass: Material on the Task Force on Educational Television in Less-Developed Countries. No classification marking. On November 26, the Office of the White House Press Secretary released the text of a memorandum addressed to Rusk, Gardner, Marks, Gaud, and Vaughn that contained the text of the memorandum printed here. A reference slip attached to this copy, dated December 5 and addressed to Louchheim and other recipients in the Department of State, indicated that Frankel would represent the Department on the task force and that Batson would attend the first meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1965–1966, Lot 69D260, Entry UD UP 175, 1966 EDU 9–6 Educational Media)

<sup>2</sup> Johnson visited Pago Pago, American Samoa, on October 18. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) This visit was part of an extensive regional trip to Asia; see Document 111.

3. Advise whether AID education programs and other foreign assistance can be better concentrated on this effort within their present limits.

Representatives of the Agency for International Development, the Department of State, U.S. Information Agency, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Peace Corps are designated as members of the Task Force. Leonard H. Marks, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, is to act as Chairman of the Task Force and Douglass Cater of my staff as liaison with the various departments or governmental agencies involved.

This Task Force should commence its work immediately and submit a preliminary report within 90 days and a final report on or before July 1, 1967.

**Lyndon B. Johnson**

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## 115. Editorial Note

On November 28, 1966, United States Information Agency (USIA) Director Leonard Marks sent a memorandum to all USIA Assistant Area Directors with a request for answers to the following questions for 1967 planning purposes:

“1. Which countries in your area are likely to be the principal focus of U.S. attention in 1967?

2. Which issues in your area will cause the greatest concern for USIS during the coming year?

3. Based upon the foregoing, do you feel that you have adequate staff to meet these problems?” (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 2, Field—Africa—1966)

In response to Mark’s memorandum, Area Directors weighed in with their key priorities and concerns.

According to a December 29 response from Assistant Director, Europe, William Weld, Jr., “the greatest concern” for IAE in the coming year and “for USIS in Western Europe will be maintaining European confidence in U.S. leadership.” Weld stressed that although IAE had enough American positions, “we do not have enough *qualified* people to fill the positions.” He also noted: “Experience has shown us that not all USIS officers who have been highly successful in other areas of the world find the European climate congenial.” (Ibid.)

Assistant Director, Africa, Mark B. Lewis, highlighted IAA's greatest concerns in a memorandum to Marks on December 28, stating that: "U.S. (and Western) *credibility* on such questions as decolonization, self-determination and race emerging from the problems of Southern Africa and extending—emotionally—throughout the continent. All of this—decolonization, self-determination and race—gets mixed up and confused with communism and anti-communism. How the U.S. stands, votes, acts and *looks* on these issues in the southern sixth of Africa will be a matter of great concern to USIS." Another issue, Lewis wrote, was "continuing public *explanation* and interpretation of the Shift of Emphasis of U.S. Assistance Programs in Africa e.g. bilateral assistance will be completed in *many* countries and there will be a shift toward concentrating aid in a few countries." (Ibid.)

In a December 12 memorandum, Assistant Director, Latin America, Kermit Brown, stated that two of the key issues IAL identified as "looming largest on the horizon for 1967" were:

- "a. Negotiations with Panama over the Canal and military bases.
- "b. The Summit Meeting and follow-up.
- "c. Inter-American Meetings on (1) revision of the OAS Charter and (2) annual review of the Alliance for Progress by the OAS.
- "d. Perennial political instability of Latin American governments."

IAL further emphasized that the main problem regarding personnel issues was "the gradual deterioration of quality of our personnel caused mainly by the Viet Nam drain." (Ibid.)

Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, Daniel Oleksiw, noted in a December 7 memorandum that IAF saw "no major shifts in the East Asia and Pacific area which would change the current focus of U.S. concern." According to Oleksiw, the "war in Viet-Nam is expected to continue through 1967 in no less an intensive manner than at present" and the "major issue of concern will continue to be combating communist insurgency in Viet-Nam, Thailand and Laos and making the dangers of 'wars of national liberation' known to other countries of the area, especially Japan." (Ibid.)

Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, R.T. Davies noted in his December 6 memorandum to Marks: "For obvious reasons, the USSR will continue to be the principal focus of U.S. attention in 1967," but IAS "may also become involved in a good deal of additional activity regarding Poland." "Beyond that," he stated, "our principal concerns will revolve around maintaining our activities in Eastern Europe at their present level and, if possible, expanding them in Poland and by small increments elsewhere." (Ibid.)

Finally, Assistant Director, Middle East, Alan Carter, listed as his "probable" issues of greatest concern: "food aid and population explosion," "polarization of Arab World," "military assistance and arms aid

(particularly in the Middle East),” “Vietnam war,” “disengagement from overly close association with U.S. policies (particularly Turkey and Iran),” “mixed economy versus socialism in terms of development,” and “industrialization versus agricultural development.” (Ibid.)

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**116. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel) to the President’s Special Assistant (Cater)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 30, 1966

SUBJECT

Letter from a USIA Foreign Service Career Reserve Officer

The anonymous letter from the USIA officer<sup>2</sup> which you sent me raises a number of important issues. I have been intending to give you my own thoughts on long-range reorganization matters independently of this. But let me respond to each of his recommendations first.

1. *A transfer of the purely academic elements in the exchange programs from State to the new Center for Educational Cooperation, HEW.*

This is in principle a desirable move, which I have already explored quietly with Secretaries Rusk, Gardner and Niller, and which has received a sympathetic hearing from them. It requires, however, careful coordination by State, since the overseas administration of the exchange program, which is handled mainly by binational commissions, requires careful diplomatic liaison. CU in State should remain in charge of this overseas representational job, since there can be only one Secretary of State. In principle, appropriations could go to the new Center, and that part of the appropriation to be spent by binational commissions abroad could be reallocated to State acting as the overseas agent. Such a procedure is workable, and would be superior to the present arrangement

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1965–1966, Lot 69D260, Entry UD UP 175, 1966—U.S. Government: White House. Personal and Confidential. “No distribution” is written in an unknown hand at the top of the first page of the memorandum. Printed from an uninitialed and unsigned copy.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the anonymous letter that Cater sent to Frankel under a November 28 covering note is in the National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1965–1966, Lot 69D260, Entry UD UP 175, 1966—U.S. Government: White House. For information on USIA Foreign Reserve Officers, see Document 30 and footnote 2 thereto.

educationally, financially and politically. I have already laid the ground-work for such an eventual move by beginning a reorganization in my own Bureau, but must naturally move slowly until such an arrangement is financially approved.

2. *A shift of the overseas administration of the "non-academic" programs for foreign leaders and for cultural presentations to USIA.*

This, to my mind, would be undesirable. The exchange of foreign leaders, even when it has political purposes as it often does and should, should not be overtly a public relations operation. Its context and atmosphere should be long-range, and should be geared to the broad goals of better mutual understanding rather than to the immediate informational objectives. Cultural Affairs Officers are better able to manage such operations than Information Officers, and, in any case, decisions about foreign leaders are normally made by the entire "country team" in an embassy under the leadership of the Ambassador.

With regard to cultural presentations, the present situation is not a good one, but USIA, in view of the various Congressional pressures upon it, and also in view of its own outlook and primary mission is not the agency to handle cultural presentations. The ideal arrangement, to my mind, would be to create a council which brings together State, the National Council on the Arts,<sup>3</sup> the Smithsonian and the Humanities Endowment.<sup>4</sup> Overseas operations are, at present, handled by USIA Cultural Affairs Officers. In the future, the CAO could handle these as part of a coordinated educational and cultural program overseas. Precisely because Information Officers have, as the writer says, "an overtly political function", they should not be in charge overseas of cultural presentations.

The above reorganization would help greatly to insulate cultural presentations from the pressures which now prevent this program from being as important as it should be. It would, in the American style, approximate the advantages gained by the British Council.<sup>5</sup> Once again, I have explored these matters with Messrs. Ripley, Stevens and Keaney, and I now have in my shop a Special Assistant already working on the coordination of the resources in the federal "arts community" so

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<sup>3</sup> The National Arts and Cultural Development Act of 1964 established the National Council on the Arts. It advises the Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts on agency policies and programs.

<sup>4</sup> Congress established the National Endowment for the Humanities in 1965 as an independent agency of the Federal government.

<sup>5</sup> The British Council was founded in 1934 as an executive non-department public body that receives United Kingdom Government grants, but does not operate on behalf of the government. According to its founding charter, its mission is "promoting abroad a wider appreciation of British culture and civilization."

that we can put our best foot forward overseas using all available operations.

3. *Elimination of CAO slots from USIA, conversion of CAOs to HEW employees, and broadening the base of recruitment.*

The writer is absolutely correct in his view that the present situation of the CAO within USIA, and under a PAO, is extremely bad. Based on my own interviews and talks with CAOs, I believe he speaks for the overwhelming majority of CAOs in the field. The CAO should be an independent officer in embassies, and not under the PAO from USIA.

I do not agree, however, that the CAO should be an "HEW employee." If he is to be effective, he must be a full member of the Embassy team, and this means he should be a Department of State officer. However, I do think it desirable that the pattern we have established with regard to Education Officers be followed with CAOs—namely, that recruitment be a joint State-HEW venture, that criteria for selection be jointly established, and that the CAO have an opportunity to work in HEW (particularly in the Center for Educational Cooperation) on appropriate occasions when he is on duty in the United States. It may also be desirable that funds for the CAO be provided from HEW budgets, but this is something that I do not think BOB is likely to accept, and does not seem to me fundamental.

4. *Maintenance of AID technical assistance and vocational programs under USOM chiefs.*

From a purely administrative point of view, this is probably necessary and desirable. However, it is not the case that "AID technical assistance and vocational programs" can be insulated from other educational activities, or that they do not in themselves involve fundamental problems of cultural relations and cultural understanding. The difficulties now encountered by these programs are due in large part to the narrow conception that underlies them and to the comparatively narrow and limited outlook and background of the Americans overseas responsible for them. For this reason, an officer is needed in embassies who can coordinate these programs with other educational and exchange activities within the embassy, who can reach the powerful people at the top of the educational pyramid in the host country, and who can develop guidelines that all the agencies with an educational mission can follow. This is the primary and indispensable function of our proposed Education Officer.

Similarly in Washington an instrument of coordination is needed to develop such broad guidelines for our foreign activities. With backstopping from the new Center for Educational Cooperation, this should be the primary function of CU in State. We have already begun to operate in this manner, but much more needs to be done. The proposed reorganization within CU would carry us farther down the road. So

would the proposed Executive Order<sup>6</sup> which has been prepared, and which has been approved not only by State but by all other agencies (AID, USIA, Peace Corps, HEW, etc.) that are now members of the federal Interagency Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. However, at the moment, BOB seems disinclined to issue this order despite the universal support for it.

5. *Retention of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in State, etc.*

I believe my answers to the above questions indicate my view of the role of CU. It includes what the writer says, but also the very important functions of diplomatic representation overseas, management of the exchange programs, and coordination.

This, I believe, covers most of the items raised in the letter. I would add only that I do not view the projected Education Officer position as replaceable across the board by a CAO, even if the CAO, as is desirable, becomes a full State Department officer reporting through the Ambassador. Assuming that international education is to be a primary thrust in our foreign policy, and assuming that administrative responsibilities for it will be shared among various agencies, someone is needed on the spot to orchestrate the operation. The CAO will have special and important duties of his own, and could not also perform this coordinating function where our educational operations are large and varied. However, if there were a change in the CAO's status, we would probably need Education Officers only in our largest missions—at a guess 30. In the smaller missions the CAO could well perform both functions.

The views I have described above, and particularly those related to the CAO, have been discussed with the Secretary of State, who supports them. There is also considerable support, indeed pressure, from people like Ambassador Bruce, George Allen, and others. This, as you know, is a sensitive bureaucratic matter, but I think the time has come to take some action with regard to it. I shall discuss this with you.

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<sup>6</sup> Not found.



## 117. Minutes of a Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

White House Task Force on Educational Television  
in Less-Developed Countries

*Report of Organizing Meeting*

The first meeting of the Task Force was held in the West Wing second-floor conference room on December 6, 1966 at 11 A.M. Those attending were:

Hon. Leonard H. Marks, Chairman  
Hon. Douglass S. Cater, White House  
Hon. Paul A. Miller, HEW  
Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz  
Mr. Douglas Batson, State  
Dr. A.H. Moseman, AID  
Dr. Bascom Story, AID  
Mr. Tedson Meyers, Peace Corps

In his opening remarks, Chairman Marks noted that the President has requested a preliminary report from the Task Force within ninety days and a final report by July 1, 1967.<sup>2</sup> The report, Mr. Marks said, should be centered around three major points:

1. The effectiveness of television as an educational and nation-building tool in less-developed countries.
2. Present resources and future needs for utilizing ETV effectively in these countries.
3. The specific role the United States should play in providing assistance to meet these needs.

Messrs Moseman, Meyers and Miller reviewed the activities of their respective agencies in educational television. In the ensuing discussion, particular attention was paid to the question of making available to the Task Force whatever research has been done on the effectiveness of ETV in developing countries.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of the White House Aides, Files of Douglass Cater, Box 40, Cater, Douglass: Material on the Task Force on Education Television in Less-Developed Countries. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the minutes. Marks sent the minutes to Cater, Linowitz, Miller, Moseman, Meyers, and Frankel under a December 9 memorandum, indicating that since the meeting he had interviewed Nelson "who was much attracted by the possibility of working with us." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 114.

Ambassador Linowitz expressed his particular interest in educational television as a subject for a possible inter-American cooperative effort which might be proposed by the President at the OAS summit<sup>3</sup> meeting next Spring. It was agreed that this possibility would be explored actively by the Task Force as part of its study.

The Task Force members agreed with the Chairman's proposal that backstopping assistance for the Task Force would be provided by individuals from agencies on the Task Force, but that an executive secretary should be recruited as soon as possible to handle the overall affairs of the group. It was agreed that the executive secretary could be employed as a consultant by AID and that he could call on staff members from each of the agencies represented on the Task Force. Mr. Marks suggested that, until the executive secretary began his duties, any questions about the Task Force from the agencies involved should be referred to Mr. Wilson Dizard of his office. (Code 182, Extension 5330)

The following action assignments were agreed to:

1. Dr. Miller would provide the Task Force with the results of any studies made by HEW in connection with the American Samoa ETV project.
2. Dr. Moseman would supply the Task Force with a listing of overall AID activities in the educational field abroad.
3. Mr. Marks will keep the Task Force members informed on his attempts to recruit a qualified executive secretary for the group.

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<sup>3</sup> The OAS summit was held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 11–15, 1967. (Max Frankel, "Johnson and Other Chiefs Gather Without Fanfare," *New York Times*, April 12, 1967, p. 1; and Russell Freeburg, "Lyndon Lauds Plan to Form Latin Market," *Chicago Tribune*, April 15, 1967, p. 1) For further information about the summit, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Documents 50 and 51.

**118. Memorandum From the Director, Motion Picture and Television Service, United States Information Agency (Stevens) to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 9, 1966

I wish I could put a red star on this memo or clip to it a little tag saying “this is the heart of the matter”, or even if necessary employ State Department jargon and say “this is the gut issue”.

There is a decreasing interest in the best USIA motion pictures and it results from a shift in Agency policy.

The popular word today is “targeted”, meaning that a communication is designed to implement a precise “country objective” and that in the judgment of some country expert it does so. I don’t believe that this is a sound approach for a propaganda agency which serves a hundred and some odd countries. You cannot attract the manpower to USIA which can implement such a highly diverse and specialized communications program. By distributing the responsibility for content and style to lower echelons, as is necessary if each country or desk is to shape its own product, you ultimately rely on lesser quality individuals, not well trained or particularly talented, to make the decisions and shape the style and content of media products.

I will give you one example because it is small and simple. I could give you 50.

The attached report<sup>2</sup> from Bangkok is typical of a growing trend. It is the response to three films distributed by the Agency, two of which were produced by IMV at the request of and in consultation with all area and policy offices.

*Transportation USA* and *Celebration* are dismissed by USIS Bangkok as “not suitable for the village audiences” in Thailand. No prints were ordered. They consider the village audiences important yet they do not intend to show them two principal Agency products.

This is not as you might argue, a matter of taste. It is a matter of policy and Agency direction. The attitude in Bangkok, and at an increasing number of other posts, is that the only materials to be distributed are ones which they view as having “direct program value”, “applying to country objectives”, “carrying the freight”, or whatever slogan is presently in vogue. It is not that the slogans are so bad, rather that the interpretation is rapidly narrowing.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 5, Motion Pictures & Television—General 1966. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Not found attached.

USIS Bangkok can express it another way, and would if asked say that the Agency has no business making "Transportation USA" or "Celebration" (or any other number of our best works). I happen to think they are wrong. However, if they are right, and the Agency must make a policy decision on this, we have no business running a top-flight documentary motion picture and television operation.

I can show you in elaborate detail that the two films in question are serving us throughout the world with great effectiveness, wherever they are given the opportunity.

Someone must say, beyond funding and approving these and like projects, "part of USIA's business is to communicate the American spirit. It is part of our job to let people around the world know that the United States is an extraordinary and wonderful country inhabited by some damn fine people."

Your regional advisors do not see this as important work; or in the current gobbledygook of the trade, they argue that they have a country plan and post objectives which must come first.

I believe that this philosophy has never been more wrong than it is today at a time when the motives and morals of this country, its President and its people are being castigated in every corner of the earth. Our associates would disagree. Yet, whether their targeted propaganda blatantly presented persuades anyone is seldom measured, or more urgently whether it offends anyone is hardly considered.

Coincident with the field message rejecting two powerful films about the American people for Thailand audiences (who, it appears, are going to have to adjust to living alongside Americans in uniform) I received the *Saturday Review*.<sup>3</sup> Here its comments on the film showing in New York, *Eyewitness . . . North Vietnam*:

"The most powerful impression of all is made by the faces of the people, for these faces . . . are the faces of human beings . . . and their beauty is sometimes throat-catching. This is the film's major comment . . . the viewer can decide for himself whether he likes the idea of these people being killed for the reasons of policy."<sup>4</sup>

I know the writer. He is not a declaimer of our policy in Vietnam. Yet he was propagandized, not by political argumentation, rather by scenes dealing with people in human terms. Your advisors reject as unproductive our efforts in that direction. Consider the irony that

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<sup>3</sup> Popular American magazine.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the 1966 documentary film, "Eyewitness . . . North Vietnam," made by a British journalist, James Cameron. The film was shot in North Vietnam as "an undoctored glimpse of such places as Hanoi, Haiphong, and Cam Pha, with all the public manifestations of what is obviously a Marxist society." See Hollis Alpert, "Know the Enemy," *Saturday Review*, December 10, 1966, p. 65.

communist states, long ridiculed for their dreary heavy handed approach to propaganda, have become more sophisticated and clever than USIA by using techniques which I am being urged to abandon.

And how hypocritical are we, basking in *Time Magazine's* praise words—"swinging", "new sound", "vigorous, amusing, avant-garde—the first with the latest"—while the policy shifts. The new Worldwide English was done, in truth, behind the backs of the area people. If they could intercept VOA like they do films, they would not use it. They would say "get rid of Sinatra,<sup>5</sup> Fatha Hines,<sup>6</sup> Willis Conover<sup>7</sup> and Jazz. Give us the freight . . . hit the 'post objectives'."

With the aforementioned communication from Bangkok came another demanding that the successful Thai Report television series be adjusted to contain 100% freight rather than 50% freight. . . . "we seek to minimize the merely amusing or frivolous—as folk songs, dances, sports or tourism". USIS Thailand is saying to us, we'll get it on television and slug the yellow jerks with freight . . . fill their bamboo living rooms with U.S. country objectives.

And you say to me that we must rely on the area people (presumably without regard to their quality of mind) on all such matters.

I respectfully suggest that you cannot say that we must rely completely on the people in the field. Policy, philosophy and direction are determined in Washington and there has been a drift in direction. The Agency is losing sight of the forest for the trees. The people in the field must be *led*, not followed.

If a change cannot take place my advice to you must be that the filmmaking money is going largely to waste because our distribution is badly managed; that the pendulum is ready to swing back to the films of Turner Shelton<sup>8</sup> (over which the foreign service expressed no serious discontent); and that you should accede to the Area Directors' pressures and shift so-called worldwide funds to targeted programming.

Then let the "specialist" mentality harden up the content, without skill or sensitivity, and let USIA continue to veer off course toward a style which shares more in common with Peking than with the American Dream.

IMV—George Stevens, Jr.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> American singer and actor, Frank Sinatra.

<sup>6</sup> American jazz musician Earl "Fatha" Hines.

<sup>7</sup> VOA broadcaster, Willis Clark Conover, who hosted a popular jazz program for the radio network.

<sup>8</sup> The Director of Motion Picture Service at the United States Information Agency from 1954 to 1961.

<sup>9</sup> Stevens signed "George" above this typed signature.

**119. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 15, 1966

SUBJECT

The Program of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs

Since September 1965, CU has been engaged in a fundamental redirection of its activities. In that month, in his Smithsonian Address, the President declared that educational cooperation with other countries would be a central and deliberately emphasized feature of U.S. foreign policy, and expressed an enduring national interest of the United States.<sup>2</sup> This was followed by the President's Message to Congress of February 2, 1966.<sup>3</sup>

To carry this new initiative in foreign policy forward, fundamental changes are required both in CU and in the Government as a whole. More than 25 agencies of the Federal Government now carry on programs involving educational and cultural activities abroad. Most do so simply as a by-product of their normal activities—e.g. the NSF, NASA, AEC, AID, which has the largest budget for international education, is committed in principle to phasing out its assistance efforts, and is project-oriented mainly along technical and economic lines. In short, although the participation of Federal agencies in international education is both extensive and varied, the programs that have been inherited need to be coordinated and redesigned if educational and cultural policies are to be coherent, and are to be front and center in our foreign relations.

In all this, a special responsibility falls on CU. First, as a Bureau of the Department of State it has the responsibility for policy-guidance and leadership to facilitate coordination—a responsibility already fixed on it by Executive Order.<sup>4</sup> Second, although its own programs are smaller than those of many other agencies, they are the most visible

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Education and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1966–1967, Lot 70D190, Entry UD UP 176, East-West Center—House Appropriations Committee Investigation EDR. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned and uninitialed copy.

<sup>2</sup> For Johnson's remarks, see Document 60.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Johnson's Special Message to Congress Proposing International Education and Health Programs. See footnote 3, Document 89.

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

and symbolic, and are the prototypes of the cooperative binational and multinational programs envisaged by the President.

Accordingly, CU has been regrouping its forces during the past year in order to achieve certain central objectives:

1. *The movement of educational and cultural relations to the front and center of U.S. foreign policy.* This has been carried forward by CU's participation in the preparation of the Smithsonian Address, the President's Message of February 2, and other statements, by its leadership of the President's special Task Force on International Education, by its active association with the planning and organization of the new Center for Educational Cooperation in HEW, and by its role in the preparation and passage of the International Education Act, the Florence and Beirut Agreements,<sup>5</sup> the new rules governing visas for visitors invited to scholarly conferences, etc.

2. *The improvement and sharpening of CU's coordinative function.* The existing mechanism for coordinating programs is the "Federal Inter-agency Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs," which is chaired by the Assistant Secretary. During the past year, old subcommittees have been reactivated and new sub-committees formed—e.g. for international book programs and English-language teaching abroad—which have greatly improved coordination. Other informal groups in the sciences and the arts have also been created which are proving effective.

However, this coordinative function is at present performed largely by means of persuasion, and remains limited and patchy. An Executive Order has accordingly been prepared, more or less parallel to the Sig-Irg Orders,<sup>6</sup> sharpening and lifting the authority of the Assistant Secretary. All participating agencies in the Federal Interagency Council have accepted this new Executive Order. It is now stalled in the Bureau of the Budget.

3. *The development within CU of programs that have specific and definable educational objectives in contrast with programs defined simply in terms of numbers of persons exchanged.* Long-range replanning programs are being introduced, under which binational commissions abroad and the Board of Foreign Scholarships<sup>7</sup> in Washington will seek greater selectivity and continuity in exchange programs. In each country certain priority fields of special interest to the host country or to the United

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<sup>5</sup> See, footnote 3, Document 113.

<sup>6</sup> For information about the SIG-IRG, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Documents 56 and 64.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 2, Document 104.

States will be selected for emphasis so that exchange programs can be used systematically to fill educational needs.

4. *The development of new procedures that will bring the U.S. educational community closer to the actual planning and implementation of exchange programs thus increasing its support for these programs and adding to the resources at our command.* In keeping with this objective advisory planning teams composed of selected United States and foreign scholars have been formed to review and recommend long-range exchange programs.

5. *The initial phases of a reorganization of CU have begun, the object of which is gradually to free its principal officers from purely operational and grant-writing responsibilities, so that they can participate more actively in foreign policy planning.*<sup>8</sup> This plan depends for completion on developments within State and other parts of the Executive Branch, for example, HEW.

#### *CU's Relations to the Other Bureaus in the Department*

1. CU's programs break down into three main types:
  - a. Academic programs;
  - b. Exchanges of leaders and specialists;
  - c. Presentations in the performing arts.

The academic programs are governed in a large number of cases by binational commissions established under the Fulbright-Hays law, and though chaired by an Embassy officer, are independent, on the whole, of the day-to-day political operations and plans of the regional bureaus or the country teams. The leaders and specialists program and cultural presentations programs are more responsive to the expressed desires of the regional bureaus and country teams. On the whole, however, CU has in the past functioned as a quasi-independent agency performing *ad hoc* services for the regional bureaus. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. It is proposed that CU officers work as educational advisers within the regional bureaus in order to ensure that the plans of these bureaus will systematically incorporate plans for cooperative educational and cultural relations with other countries.

#### *CU's Relationship to USIS*

In Washington, CU and USIA are independent. CU's function under the Fulbright-Hays law<sup>9</sup> is to promote mutual education and cultural exchange, largely through exchange of persons. USIA's function is to promote sympathetic understanding of the United States,

<sup>8</sup> See Document 95.

<sup>9</sup> See, footnote 4, Document 14.



largely through use of the so-called “fast media,” although USIA also has a number of “long-range” programs—e.g. libraries, translations, etc. For practical purposes, CU deals in “persons”; USIA deals in “things.”

Despite the fact that the functions of the two agencies are distinct, CU’s programs overseas are conducted by Cultural Affairs Officers who are members of USIS, and who work under the immediate direction of a Public Affairs Officer. In short, the Assistant Secretary does not have overseas people directly responsible to him or the Ambassador for carrying out State Department policies. This administrative anomaly dates back to 1953 when what is now USIA was removed from the Department of State while the cultural program, as a result of a Congressional resolution, was separated from USIA and retained in the Department. At that time, however, the overseas administration of the Fulbright-Hays educational and cultural exchange program was left in the hands of USIA.

#### *Significance of the International Education Act*

As part of the effort to involve American colleges and universities more fully and directly in international education, the International Education Act was prepared and has now been passed. Over the years, assuming Congressional appropriations, this Act means that American universities are likely to engage in a large number of exchange programs they design and operate themselves, with the financial support of the Federal Government. Under these circumstances, the State Department programs will serve to fill out and supplement a federally supported effort, and should be closely coordinated with programs under the International Education Act.

In order to move in this direction, a new Center for Educational Cooperation has been created in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In addition to operating its own program of grants, this Center will conduct regular reviews and analyses of the American nation’s total resources and efforts in international education, something much needed for purposes of planning and coordination. The function of CU under these circumstances is to lead and coordinate the overseas side of this effort since foreign operations must remain under the control of the Secretary of State. As these new programs develop, it may be expected that some of CU’s present operational responsibilities will gradually shift to HEW. However, although preparations have already begun for such a step, it should obviously not be taken until we know better the character and quality of the new Center.

#### *The East-West Center*

The East-West Center in Hawaii is established under separate legislation and had the special interest of President Johnson, Congressmen

Rooney and Bow, and Governor Burns of Hawaii. The Center is a federally supported institution, but the grant is made to the State of Hawaii, and, through the State, to the University of Hawaii. Legally the situation is fuzzy. Congress insists that the East-West Center is a federal institution; the Board of Regents at the University of Hawaii tend to regard the East-West Center as a responsibility of the University. It has been proposed that the East-West Center be established clearly as a federal corporation, and that the responsibility for it be shifted from State to HEW. This idea makes sense over the long run, but is clearly premature at the present moment and should be checked out with Congress and the White House.

*CU's Relations to the USSR Eastern European Exchange Program*

The Cultural Exchange Agreement<sup>10</sup> with the Soviet Union is so intermingled with large-scale political considerations affecting our relations with Eastern Europe that responsibility for negotiating these agreements and controlling their political aspects has been placed in the Europe Bureau. However, because there is a substantive educational and cultural aspect of this program, actual responsibility for recruiting people, preparing presentations, etc., has rested with CU, and the supporting budget for this operation is part of the CU appropriation. On the whole, this arrangement has worked satisfactorily, due largely to the fact that Assistant Secretaries Leddy and Frankel have consulted closely and that their staffs have a close and sympathetic relationship. Since the exchanges agreement with the Soviets include much that does not come under CU's operational authority—e.g., agricultural exchanges, industrial exhibits, etc.—the problem of transferring total authority over exchanges to CU is complex. This is a matter that should be reviewed when the new structures created to carry the President's International Education Program forward have become more clearly defined.

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<sup>10</sup> See, footnote 8, Document 98.

**120. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy and Research Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State (Colligan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 16, 1966

SUBJECT

Meeting of Representatives of Foreign Missions in Washington and of U.S. Universities: The “Technological Gap”

I was invited by Mr. Christensen, Dean of the Educational and Cultural Officers in D.C., to attend their meeting with the Board of Directors of the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs (NAFSA) and representatives of about 50 U.S. universities enrolling more than 400 foreign students. A few of the embassy representatives were concerned with consular rather than with educational or cultural affairs.

The meeting was devoted almost entirely to the question of the “technological gap” between the United States and other countries with emphasis on the flow of their students to and from the United States. (A significant addition is noted below.) Thus it served as something of an indicator of current thinking of other governments or, at least, of their embassies in Washington regarding this problem.

On behalf of the foreign embassies represented, Mr. Christensen expressed his thanks to Mr. Humphrey of the American Council on Education and to me, as the representative of CU, for our attendance. (We were the only “outsiders” invited.) He referred with appreciation to the previous discussion of this problem at a cultural officers’ meeting in the Department of State and to the Report of our June Conference,<sup>2</sup> which all embassies in Washington have now received. He also said that, since the meeting and the circulation of the Report, he and his colleagues had given much thought to this problem. He referred also to the interest of the American Council as indicated particularly in the recent number of the Council’s *Bulletin on International Education*,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files, 1955–1971, Acc. #69–H–3445 [A], Entry UD WW 200, Box 174, Brain Drain 1966. No classification marking. Drafted by Colligan on December 15. Copies were sent to Louchheim, Canter, Batson, CU Area and Staff Directors, and members of the Interagency Council.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 112 and footnote 2 thereto.

(November 17, 1966), which was devoted entirely to this subject.<sup>3</sup> He hoped that there would be future meetings on the same theme, and perhaps even definite suggestions to make within the next few months, when, as he assumes, Congress will consider something like the “Mon-dale Bill” of the last Congress.<sup>4</sup> He looks forward to pursuing this question further at the monthly meetings of cultural officers. At some such meeting representatives of the Immigration and Naturalization Service will be invited to participate.

The Report of the June conference, the summary by CU/PRS, dated November 1, 1966,<sup>5</sup> and the ACE’s *Bulletin*, implicitly served as the working papers for the discussion. This was reflected in the meeting and in informal conversations with key people afterwards. While no resolutions or recommendations were made, the general trend of the discussion may be summarized as follows:

1. Much of the discussion was based upon the assumption that, as someone put it, it is “impossible to generalize about foreign students as such—there are too many kinds.” To try to cover all of them in any single form, legislative, political or academic, would do more harm than good since it would lead to more and more inflexibility rather than the other way around. Much of the discussion was based on an acceptance as fundamental, of the distinction between the “unsponsored” foreign students, usually here under “F” visas, and the “sponsored” students, that is, those under “J” visas, and *and also* those sponsored by other countries—their governments, institutions, or organizations.

2. It was well recognized that unsponsored students form by and large the greater number. Most other countries are as reluctant to stop the exit of their citizens as the U.S. is to stop their entry. Such action would put a limitation on their freedom of movement, which not only would be morally unjustifiable, but also, in many cases, would deprive them of the superior opportunities for study which are offered in the United States. This feeling is tempered, however, by a general concern about the need for trained personnel in their own countries. There seemed to be a general consensus that more might well be done by the sending countries to persuade their students to return home after their studies—largely by building up their own institutions, making more and better job opportunities available, and providing facilities,

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<sup>3</sup> A copy of the American Council on Education’s November 17 *Bulletin on International Education* entitled, “International Migration of Intellectual Talent,” is in the National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files, 1955–1971, Acc. #69–H–3445 [A], Entry UD WW 200, Box 174, Brain Drain 1966.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 112.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 112.

salaries and standing, which would give promise of adequate job satisfaction. There was no indication that specific steps should be taken by the U.S. Government through legislation to control the flow of these unsponsored students to the United States.

3. These steps, and others also, apply to “sponsored” students—those under J visas *or* sponsored by their own countries. (The ratio of students under the sponsorship of the other countries to other foreign students was suggested by some of the figures that were mentioned. Thus, of 1200 Iranian students reportedly in the United States, only 200 are sponsored by the Iranian Government. Out of some 8000 Indians, only 100 are under the direct sponsorship of the Indian Embassy.) It was recognized that there was a gap between these two types of “sponsored” visitors, but no suggestions were made that further action by the U.S. Government would solve the problem.

It seemed generally agreed that the purpose of the “two-year rule”<sup>6</sup> for “J” students was a well-meant attempt by the U.S. Government to discourage the permanent residence here of a large percentage of such “sponsored” students, but it was pointed out that the U.S. has no control over where foreign visitors may go after they leave the U.S. under this rule. That many of them go to “third countries” rather than home simply underlines first, the unwillingness of many of them, for one reason or another, to return home immediately, at least, and secondly, the essentially multilateral nature of this problem. The “drain” is not only to the United States. (It was reported that, at a meeting of representatives of five South American countries last August, Mr. Galo Plaza, former President of Ecuador, discussed the “brain drain” with particular reference to a recent study in Chile. It was proposed at that meeting that this item be put on the prospective “summit meeting” next year in Latin America.<sup>7</sup>)

Attention continued to focus on what other countries might do to plug the leaks in the flow of sponsored students. It was pointed out that there were many points in the “lifeline” of the foreign student at which some action can be taken by their own countries. Where students are selected by the other governments or institutions such selection should be made in full awareness of the need for such trained people

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the United States Government’s “2-year home-country physical presence requirement” for recipients of J Visas, which required that these visa recipients return to their home countries for a cumulative period of at least 2 years at the conclusion of their exchange programs in the United States before being allowed to: change status to nonimmigrant H or L worker visas; adjust status to that immigrant visa holder or lawful permanent resident; or receive an immigrant visa or H or L worker visas at U.S. embassies or consulates.

<sup>7</sup> Presumably a reference to the OAS summit that took place in Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 11–15, 1967. See footnote 3, Document 117.

in their own countries. A few countries already have more specific controls. India, it was reported, has some control through (1) foreign exchange regulations, (2) the quality of students selected as determined by their academic records, and (3) the priority of fields of current significance to Indian development. This also meant closer collaboration between other countries and American universities, whose autonomy and independence of the federal government places a correspondingly greater duty on the representatives of other governments to work cooperatively and persuasively with them and with their students to maintain student interest in returning home. The degree of cooperation between the representatives of other countries and American universities varies widely in practice from country to country. Representatives of governments which were already doing much of this attested warmly to the cooperation which they had received from universities, notably from foreign student advisers. Such cooperation might not only be increased, but extended by strengthening connections between "hosts" and "home" *institutions*, where possible.

Another useful step that should be more widely used is that of job placement afterwards. One example of placement efforts here in the U.S. was offered by the Korean representative, who explained that Korea had an office in New York specifically for this purpose. Placement offices might well be established in the home countries also, and continuous contact maintained between these placement offices and foreign students even before their return. Such offices, if they were to be successful, would have to offer students a reasonable choice of opportunities which they would wish to pursue at home. "International institutes" outside the U.S. might also help solve the problem, as the Latin American group, already referred to.

It was also suggested that part of the solution of the problem lies in the field of public relations in the home countries, and that our Conference Report with its summary might be used as a basis for such publicity. (I made no objection to this point. We have already sent copies to each of the embassies in Washington as well as to our own posts abroad. What use they make of the Report is something which each government should decide for itself.)

In regard to possible legislation and government controls there seemed to be a general feeling that what was needed essentially was greater flexibility in the conditions governing study and stay in the U.S., including more time to be spent here, but combined with or compensated for, by making such periods more specific and clear cut and by taking decisive action at the end of that time. The U.S., for example, should allow two years rather than eighteen months for "practical field work" for foreign students thereby enriching the experience that they can bring to bear on their return to their own countries.

Prompt decisiveness in action regarding their return would go far to minimize leakage. Decisiveness in administering regulations might also, somewhat, discourage the “drifting” of “eternal students” from one university to another while in this country.

There was no enthusiasm for precise, tight arrangements between the U.S. Government and the other governments involved in the enforcement of international travel regulations or the selection of students, beyond those which grow out of already existing, broader agreements—for example, those involving the binational commissions and the USOMs in the respective countries.

The representatives of American universities were very active in the discussion. They emphasized particularly, that the basic position of the U.S. should be not to “exploit” the flow of students from other countries insofar as such flow is designed to build up institutions and generally provide trained manpower. At the same time they confirmed the opinion expressed by several embassy representatives that cooperative contact could be a very effective way of keeping in current touch with their students during their stay, bringing to the special attention of university officials the special significance of students whose studies here were designed to fill manpower needs in their own countries. Initiative for such contacts rested with the embassies. They pointed out that U.S. institutions, like governments, were reluctant to discourage entry into their institutions.

In private conversations after the meeting, some of them deplored the use by the U.S. of the term “brain drain” as being, however well meant, a phrase easily exploitable for anti-American propaganda. They preferred the use of such terms as the migration of talent and skills,” or the “technological gap.”

In general the meeting was a useful one. The representatives of NAFSA indicated that they should like to pursue this problem in their regional meetings during the next several months.

The discussion also brought out the following facts. First, that the statistical gap in the diagnosis of this problem is as great in other countries as it is in the U.S.; the fields that were stressed in general conversation were the health professions (physicians and nurses especially) and engineering, with emphasis on electronics. The discussion by and large followed the suggestion made in the CU/PRS summary of November 1, 1966, in that it was primarily a lively exchange of information and views which helped put the problem in sharper perspective while, at the same time, underscoring a wide variety of concerns and problems faced by other countries in carrying these matters out. The embassy representatives that were most active in expressing themselves were those of the UK, Chile, Ecuador, Greece, Iran, India, Israel, and Korea.



I restricted my remarks to indicating that we were still pursuing our diagnosis of the problem and would welcome any suggestions for dealing with it. I brought them up to date on the summary of current action attached to the Conference Report, offering to talk informally with embassy representatives or university officials on this matter individually.

#### *Addendum*

Much of the first hour of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of a problem which the chairman, Mr. Christensen, in effect, ruled out of order, but in which consular representatives in particular, expressed great interest. Chance reference to the proposal of Mr. Henry, of Harvard, on the desirability of a new kind of an "H" visa, led to some discussion of it. Stressing the fact that he was speaking for himself as an individual, not as a representative of Harvard University, much less NAFSA, he indicated that the so-called "H" visa and the "J" visa under which visiting instructors or professors came to the U.S., was unsatisfactory; the former because it was interpreted as requiring proof that the position to be filled by a visiting instructor was a "permanent" one whereas universities would prefer to describe such positions as "temporary." Otherwise, he thought, we were in effect perpetuating the "brain drain" by insisting on the "permanence" of "temporary" teachers. As to the J visa he indicated that the two-year rule frequently broke up a man's work when he might be making an important contribution. He would like to propose the establishment of a new H visa under which prospective instructors could be allowed to occupy a post declared to be "temporary" so that, in effect, if they turned out well, they could continue to stay here unhampered by the two-year rule. While several questions were asked of Mr. Henry regarding his proposal, no one else spoke in support of it. One representative (India), said that it was precisely this sort of thing that he thought would actually increase the "brain drain," especially because of the difficulty of determining the meaning of the word "temporary" in this context. Mr. Henry replied by citing certain examples especially in the field of area studies.



**121. Draft Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research,  
United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 30, 1966

Policy Program Directive No. 8:

*AMERICAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE**Background*

Critical views of American society and culture held by many foreigners are frequently based on one or more of the following notions:

- That the United States is a “cultural wasteland”;
- That the U.S. educational system, despite rich material facilities, is qualitatively inferior to that of several other countries;
- That the “democratic ideals” Americans talk about are mostly window-dressing, and that in reality U.S. society is shot through with gross racial injustices, economic inequities, and social disorganization;
- That America’s “capitalist” economic system results in riches and power for the few and exploitation and oppression for the many;
- That despite some technical accomplishments, the U.S. is not really in the forefront in scientific achievement.

*Such views of American society and culture undermine confidence in the United States. They inevitably come to form part of the frame of reference within which U.S. actions and words are perceived and evaluated and thus they influence judgments about what the U.S. does and says in its relations with other countries. They color the way foreign people see U.S. intentions. For these reasons they have great relevance for the mission of USIA in all countries.*

*Policy and Treatment*

USIA policy should be aimed at demonstrating not the perfection of American society and culture—an impossible and undesirable task—but rather their *strength, diversity and richness, and capacity for change*. It is these elements we want to stress in treating the following areas that are most important for U.S. foreign policy considerations:

- (1) *Education*: Our treatment should underline the fact that the economic, scientific, and cultural accomplishments of the U.S. are solidly based on an educational system of high quality which is free to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files 1955–1971: Acc. #74–0044, Entry UD WW 102, Box 2, INF 1—PPD on American Society and Culture. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper. In the top left-hand corner of the first page of the paper, written in an unknown hand, is the notation: “2nd Draft.”

all through the twelfth grade and accessible to a large proportion of its citizens even at the university level; not rigidly controlled by political or social conventions; and continually experimenting with new forms, techniques, and organizational methods to improve existing systems and to solve new problems created by the expansion of man's knowledge.

In discussing what remains to be done in this area we should point out that the Great Society<sup>2</sup> concept proposes to expand U.S. educational facilities so that every child and adult in the nation has full access to the education he needs. Of special significance to overseas audiences are the proposals in President Johnson's Smithsonian address (9/16/65) that the U.S. engage in programs for the sharing of its educational knowledge with the citizens of other countries in a two-way exchange that will both enrich U.S. culture and assist the modernization process in other countries.<sup>3</sup> Several of these proposals are embodied in the International Education Act of 1966.<sup>4</sup>

(2) *Economic Strength*: While avoiding invidious comparisons and undue emphasis on material wealth, our treatment should show that the U.S. has fashioned the most productive economy the world has ever seen, based on the dynamic inter-action of labor, business, and government. We should describe our mixed economy in such a way that audiences are not automatically alienated by their negative reactions to terms (such as "capitalism") whose meanings have changed considerably over the years. Thus, we should show that our economic prosperity and strength are attributable to the balance worked out between freedom of private initiative on the one hand, and public regulation on the other.

Where appropriate we should detail such ingredients of our system as strong labor unions, social benefits, a progressive tax system, and government regulation of matters affecting the public interest. We should not obscure the fact, however, that our consumer-oriented economy and the discipline of the marketplace have led us to allocate our material and human resources productively. We should point out that when government regulation or control enters in, it does so in response to crisis or need rather than for ideological reasons, and that this introduction of pragmatism (as opposed to ideology) into government planning and assistance is perhaps the greatest contribution of the U.S. to economic theory.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 83.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 60.

<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand bracketed this sentence.

(3) *The Great Society*: While the economic system described above has resulted in extraordinary productivity, minimal unemployment, and a generally high standard of living, some elements of the population are still *relatively* underprivileged in terms of our own standards which set the “poverty level” at an income of something over \$3000 a year for a family of four.<sup>5</sup> The Great Society is the expression of the goals set by President Johnson for improving conditions in disadvantaged sectors. Our treatment should show that among the basic objectives of American society are the elimination of ignorance, disease, poverty, and racial injustice—goals aspired to by most nations and which they can identify as their own.

(4) *Racial Progress*: In a world in which two-thirds of the population is non-white, how the U.S. handles its own minority problems can determine the degree of credibility foreign audiences attach to our profession of ideals. The United States has one of the most diverse populations in the world. In the acculturation process in the United States many minority groups have suffered discrimination, as they have and still do in many other countries. What is most significant in this process in the U.S., however, is not the clash of interests inevitably generated by the stresses and strains of social change, but rather the overriding fact that our social, political, and economic systems provide means by which minorities can be (and are) integrated into the mainstream of American life. And we should stress the corollary fact that in the present struggle for full participation by the Negro in American life, the full moral and legal weight of the federal government is on the side of peaceful social change.

(5) *Scientific and Technical Achievement*: The people of the world’s advanced countries respect scientific and technical achievement because they know the key role science and technology have played in improving man’s condition. Leaders of the developing nations are equally aware that modernization of their countries depends largely on the successful application of scientific and technical knowledge to their particular problems. It is understandable, therefore, that among our foreign audiences respect for such achievement can have special significance in determining attitudes toward, and judgments of, the United States.

Our treatment should show that the U.S. is one of the leaders of the international scientific community, with a depth and breadth of pure and applied scientific research unmatched in any other country. In describing U.S. space achievements and our other advances in the

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<sup>5</sup> According to the 1966 United States Census, \$3306.00 was the “poverty threshold” for a family of four.

area of science we should stress the openness of these efforts and the willingness of our scientific community to share information and to provide specific know how and assistance to other countries throughout the world.

(6) *Cultural Development*: While the scientific and technological achievements noted above command worldwide attention and respect, important portions of our foreign audience place even greater emphasis on cultural and intellectual achievements as the measure of a society's worth. Many, in fact, tend to equate cultural maturity with political maturity.

Our main point should be that the United States, drawing on the wealth of intellectual, artistic, philosophic and religious traditions brought by immigrants, has developed a dynamic culture marked by great *diversity and freedom*. The diversity is reflected in the wide range which characterizes writing and the arts in America today. The freedom is evident in our culture's creative vitality and in the willingness of American artists (and their audiences) to experiment with new forms and new ideas. It has enabled us to make original contributions to many forms of the creative arts. We should further point out that the generally high standard of living in the United States, by providing a large proportion of the population with the necessary means, leisure, and educational background, has strikingly broadened the base of participation in all aspects of cultural activity. At the same time, the development of mass communications techniques has increased the ability of most Americans to share in the enjoyment of the culture of other lands as well as of our own. Our treatment should also make clear that the United States, as a matter of policy, seeks to share the best of its cultural products with the peoples of other nations, and invites reciprocation, through both private and governmental programs of cultural exchange. The U.S. believes strongly in the freedom to create, not only for its citizens but for peoples everywhere, and it vigorously promotes the free flow of culture among nations.

### *Summary*

In explaining these dimensions, our task is to show that American society has the intelligence, character, and moral fiber to solve its own problems and has the capacity for world leadership; that it is coherent, dynamic, and fully committed to progress and change; that it is guided by humanitarian concerns; and that it has an exciting and varied culture. In portraying a society with these characteristics we should not imply that it is without imperfections or problems, nor should we imply that we believe our particular pattern of institutions and values is the "right" one for other people. To the extent that we exercise a leadership role we do so with genuine respect for the values of others and in full

recognition of the contribution others must make to any solution of our common problems.

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**122. Paper Prepared by Ben Wattenberg of the White House Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

*BOOKS-FOR-PEACE or BOOKS-FOR-FREEDOM*

If the United States has surplus agricultural capacity to supply food for freedom—so too does it have a surplus capacity in another crop that helps build not only better bodies but better minds as well: books.

I suggest a four-part program.

1) *Library Schools*. To be built in underdeveloped countries, at the invitation of governments, to be staffed and supplied with U.S. personnel if needed and desired—with the express intent of training native librarians. The theoretical arithmetic is interesting: if a library school turns out 30 librarians a year and each librarian ultimately serves a constituency of 750 persons after graduation, and the United States helps set up 30 library schools throughout the world, then in a decade 7 million people have been exposed to a library, or, figured another way, 35 million people have been exposed to a library for one year. Key to program: schools must be there, not here.

2) *Libraries*. We will help supply dollars to build and stock new libraries in local communities. Possibly an AID—Peace Corps project.

3) *Librarians*. We will provide through Peace Corps, until local library schools can provide enough local talent.

4) *Books*.<sup>2</sup> We will supply to existing public libraries and school libraries throughout the underdeveloped world, *any book in print in the United States*, to a specific dollar amount, upon request from the Government. This would include specifically, the Selected Writings of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 23, EX FO 3–2, 11/27/66–5/23/67. No classification marking. Cater sent the paper to Marks under a January 3 covering memorandum, in which Cater noted: “This proposal came from Ben Wattenberg who has been supplying ideas to the White House. I still think we need to develop a coordinated plan to promote the President’s interest in book programs overseas.”

<sup>2</sup> This program can run completely independently of the others. [Footnote is in the original.]

Karl Marx,<sup>3</sup> because we know that when men read Karl Marx and Thomas Jefferson, we come out of it pretty well.

Also: we will provide—on a much expanded basis from what USIA is now doing—kits of paperback books sent directly to schools and libraries for distribution to students. One hundred million paperback books can be purchased for about 10 million dollars *at publishers' cost*. If four people read a book, you are contacting about *half* of the literate people in the underdeveloped world—at a cost of about 2½ cents per person. If the book happens to be “Life on the Mississippi”,<sup>4</sup> or “Profiles in Courage”,<sup>5</sup> or “Marjorie Morningstar”<sup>6</sup>—it would seem to be a pretty good investment for America.

This is a program that I think would get good support from American publishers. They are flush now from recent Federal Library expenditures, and the economics of publishing also give a bonus to producing “at cost” if the press run can be increased.

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<sup>3</sup> The German 19th century philosopher and economist.

<sup>4</sup> The autobiographical book, published in 1883, written by the 19th century American author Mark Twain.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to a collection of short biographies, published in 1956, written by President Kennedy.

<sup>6</sup> The 1955 novel by American author Herman Wouk.

**123. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Cater)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 4, 1967

The President has approved and asked me to transmit to you the attached National Policy Statement on International Book and Library Activities. In addition, he has approved a directive to government agencies for Implementation of the National Policy Statement, a copy of which is also attached.

The President believes that an intensified effort in book and library activities must be a basic part of America's effort in international education as described in his Message to Congress on February 2, 1966.<sup>2</sup>

**Douglass Cater****Attachment****National Policy Statement Prepared in the White House<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, undated

**NATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT ON  
INTERNATIONAL BOOK AND LIBRARY ACTIVITIES**

In his message to Congress of February 2, 1966, the President said, "Education lies at the heart of every nation's hopes and purposes. It must be at the heart of our international relations." Books, by definition, are essential to education and to the achievement of literacy. They are also essential to communication and understanding among the peoples of the world. It is through books that people communicate in the most lasting form their beliefs, aspirations, cultural achievements, and scientific and technical knowledge.

In the United States and other developed countries, where there has been the opportunity for a long time to emphasize education and books, there have been created vast resources of printed materials and other forms of recorded knowledge in all fields of human endeavor.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 5, Government Agencies—White House—General 1967. No classification marking. Sent to Rusk, Gardner, Gaud, Mumferd, Vaughn, Ripley, and Marks. Another copy is in the Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 16, Book Programs [1 of 2].

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 89.

<sup>3</sup> No classification marking.

In the United States, a great complex of library systems has emerged, serving ordinary citizens as well as students and scholars. In the developing countries, where more than two-thirds of the world's population live, there is an acute need for the books essential to educational growth and general social progress, and for libraries which can enable these nations more easily to acquire and use the technology of the modern world. The United States Government declares that it is prepared, as a major policy, to give full and vigorous support to a coordinated effort of public and private organizations which will make more available to the developing countries these book and library resources of the United States which these countries need and desire.

The total needs of the developing countries with regard to books cannot be adequately filled by assistance from the outside; nor, under present conditions, can they be filled from local resources. From a long-range point of view, the establishment of viable book publishing and distributing facilities in the developing countries and regions is essential. It shall therefore also be the policy of the United States Government to encourage and support the establishment of such facilities.

The utility of books goes beyond their contribution to material progress. The free and full exchange of ideas, experiences and information, through books, is indispensable to effective communication between people and nations, and has a unique role to play in the enrichment of the human spirit. Recognizing this, the United States Government is further prepared, as a major policy, actively to promote the free flow of books and other forms of recorded knowledge.

The task of filling the world's need for books and of achieving an adequate exchange of books among the nations is immense. No single institution or agency and no single government can hope to accomplish it alone. It is therefore essential that all agencies of Government concerned in any way with international book and library programs assign to these a high priority. It is further essential that they coordinate their book and library efforts with those of other pertinent government agencies and private institutions. "Agencies will propose to the President for transmittal to the Congress any requirements for new legislation or special funds to carry out this policy." All agencies of Government, under the direction of the Department of State, should actively seek to cooperate with other governments on a bilateral or multilateral basis in the achievement of these objectives.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs has the responsibility for coordinating United States Government efforts in this field.



## **Attachment**

### **Directive Prepared in the White House<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### **DIRECTIVE TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL BOOK AND LIBRARY ACTIVITIES**

I. To carry out the foregoing policy, agencies are directed to develop specific courses of action, within the framework of their financial resources and statutory responsibilities, to accomplish the following goals:

A. To ensure that the book and library assistance programs of all federal agencies contribute on a coordinated basis to the broad objectives of educational growth and peaceful progress in the developing countries by such activities as:

(1) Assisting in the development of textbooks and supplementary reading materials for indigenous school systems;

(2) expanding programs for distributing and supporting the publication of low-priced editions of American books, including textbooks and source materials, in English and in translation;

(3) establishing, under local auspices, English and indigenous language rental libraries and bookstores for high school and college students;

(4) providing graded reading materials for new literates in local languages or English;

(5) providing books to support the basic professions and trades and the learned disciplines, theoretical and practical;

(6) providing funds and technical assistance to establish viable indigenous book publishing and distributing facilities;

(7) contributing to the development of greater professional competence by increasing the number of exchange and training programs for book publishers, librarians, textbook writers and editors, and persons engaged in related activities;

(8) supporting a program of library development, in cooperation with the U.S. publishing industry, U.S. libraries, library organizations and institutions, to include:

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<sup>4</sup> No classification marking.

(a) assistance in adapting to local conditions and needs the most advanced library technology;

(b) overall "collection development" programs by cooperating institutions in the U.S.;

(c) counseling on library development;

(d) sizeable expansion of the present Smithsonian program to provide core libraries overseas with U.S. journals and serial publications;

(9) initiating a major training program for library personnel, to include:

a) strengthening of existing national and regional library schools, plus refresher and in-service training and selected work-study training in the U.S.:

b) development of additional regional library schools, with provision of scholarship funds;

c) instruction in the application of modern technology to library practices.

B. To encourage and directly support the increased distribution abroad of books studying or reflecting the full spectrum of American life and culture by:

(1) expanding U.S. book "presentation" programs and otherwise facilitating gifts of books abroad;

(2) encouraging cooperative ventures between U.S. and overseas publishers for the publication of American books abroad, in translations or in inexpensive English-language reprints; and

(3) increasing the number of American libraries and bookstores overseas.

C. To further a greatly increased inflow of foreign books and materials including journals, microfilms, and reproductions of art, music, folklore, archival and manuscript collections, to U.S. libraries through the use of PL 480,<sup>5</sup> appropriations under Title II c of the Higher Education Act of 1965<sup>6</sup> and other funds.

D. To stimulate and support a much more extensive exchange program in books and related materials between U.S. and foreign libraries, museums, educational and research institutions.

E. To encourage closer liaison between American and foreign libraries, greater exchange of reference and bibliographical information, and closer collaboration in the development of information storage and retrieval and computer utilization programs.

<sup>5</sup> The United States Government used excess local currencies accruing under P.L.-480 to fund these types of programs.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to Title II, Part C, of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-329), entitled "General Provisions" (Sec. 301. [20 U.S.C. 1041]).

F. To support as appropriate measures designed to lower or eliminate tariff barriers, exchange restrictions and other impediments to the free flow of books and related educational materials.

G. To provide greater support to the efforts of the U.S. book industry toward the attainment of these goals.

II. The Department of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies, is directed to ensure:

A. That activities of U.S. Government agencies are coordinated in such a way that Government resources will be used with the greatest efficiency and economy.

B. That the actions of the U.S. Government take into account the activities of private institutions and of the American book industry in the international book and library field.

C. That specific actions are tailored to conditions in specific countries or regions.

III. In seeking any new legislation or additional funds, agencies, in consultation with the Department of State, should make appropriate proposals to the President through normal legislative clearances and budgetary channels.

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**124. Department of State Press Release<sup>1</sup>**

No. 2

Washington, January 6, 1967

**LETTER FROM SECRETARY RUSK TO STUDENT LEADERS**

Following is the text of a letter from Secretary Rusk to 100 student leaders in response to their letter to President Johnson of December 29.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary's letter, dated January 4, was forwarded to Robert Powell, President of the Student Body, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill:

January 4, 1967

Dear Student Leaders:

I have received and read carefully your thoughtful letter to the President about our policy in Viet-Nam.

Your interest and your concern are shared by most thinking Americans. No one desires more strongly to bring an early and honorable conclusion to the conflict in Viet-Nam than those who are working day and night, both here and in Viet-Nam, to achieve that end.

The questions you have raised are among those that have been asked and discussed repeatedly in the councils of your Government. If some of these matters continue, as you say, to agitate the academic community, it is certainly not because answers have not been provided. It is more, I think, because the answers to great and complex questions can never fully satisfy all the people in a free and questioning society.

Nevertheless, I am glad to have the chance to address myself to the four specific questions about which you stated you and others felt doubt or concern.

First, you asked if America's vital interests are sufficiently threatened in Viet-Nam to necessitate the growing commitment there.

There is no shadow of doubt in my mind that our vital interests are deeply involved in Viet-Nam and in Southeast Asia.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files, 1955-1971, Acc. #69-H-3445 [A], Entry UD WW 200, Box 177, Miscellaneous Record Copy. No classification marking. Fanelli sent a copy of the release to Slocum under a January 18 covering memorandum indicating that "Joe Glazer has suggested possible use of the Rusk letter in USIS publications with a student audience." Fanelli also stated that: "Since the questions asked by the U.S. student leaders are similar to those of many students abroad, I think wide distribution of the Rusk reply would be very helpful." (Ibid.) An unknown hand wrote on Fanelli's memorandum that the press release was sent to all USIS posts and made the subject of a column.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the December 29 letter to Johnson, see "Text of Students' Letter to the President," *New York Times*, December 30, 1966, p. 4.

We are involved because the nation's word has been given that we would be involved. On February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1 the United States Senate passed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That Treaty stated that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area would endanger our own peace and safety and, in that event, "we would act to meet the common danger."<sup>3</sup> There is no question that an expanding armed attack by North Viet-Nam on South Viet-Nam has been under way in recent years; and six nations, with vital interests in the peace and security of the region, have joined South Viet-Nam in defense against that armed attack.

Behind the words and the commitment of the Treaty lies the lesson learned in the tragic half century since the First World War. After that war our country withdrew from effective world responsibility. When aggressors challenged the peace in Manchuria, Ethiopia, and then Central Europe during the 1930's, the world community did not act to prevent their success. The result was a Second World War—which could have been prevented.

That is why the Charter of the United Nations begins with these words: "We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind. . . ." And the Charter goes on to state these objectives: "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained . . . and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security. . . ."

This was also the experience President Truman had in mind when—at a period when the United Nations was incapable of protecting Greece and Turkey from aggression—he said: "We shall not realize our objectives unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes."<sup>4</sup>

These are the memories which have inspired the four postwar American President as they dealt with aggressive pressures and thrusts from Berlin to Korea, from the Caribbean to Viet-Nam.

In short, we are involved in Viet-Nam because we know from painful experience that the minimum condition for order on our planet is that aggression must not be permitted to succeed. For when it does

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<sup>3</sup> For further information regarding the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. XII, Part 1, East Asia and the Pacific, Document 358; and *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. XIII, Part 2, Indochina, Document 1168.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to President Truman's March 12, 1947, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine." For text, see *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 176–180.

succeed, the consequence is not peace, it is the further expansion of aggression.

And those who have borne responsibility in our country since 1945 have not for one moment forgotten that a third world war would be a nuclear war.

The result of this conviction and this policy has been a generation's effort which has not been easy for the United States. We have borne heavy burdens. We have had to face some conflict and a series of dangerous situations.

But the hard and important fact is that in the postwar world external aggression has not been permitted to develop its momentum into general war.

Look back and imagine the kind of world we now would have if we had adopted a different course. What kind of Europe would now exist if there had been no commitment to Greece and Turkey? No Marshall Plan? No NATO? No defense of Berlin? Would Europe and the world be better off or worse? Would the possibilities of detente be on the present horizon?

Then turn the globe and look at Asia. If we had made no commitments and offered no assistance, what kind of Asia would there now be? Would there be a confident and vital South Korea? A prosperous and peaceful Japan? Would there be the new spirit of regional cooperation and forward movement now developing throughout Asia?

If you were to talk to the leaders of Asia as I have, you would know what Asians really think of our commitment in Viet-Nam. You would know that the new vigor in Asia, the new hope and determination, are based in part on the conviction that the United States will continue to support the South Vietnamese in their struggle to build a life of their own within the framework of the Geneva Accords in 1954 and 1962<sup>5</sup>—that we shall see it through to an honorable peace.

Second, you wonder whether our vital interests are best protected by our growing commitment.

We must always weigh what we are doing against the requirements of the situation and what the other side is doing. You are aware, I am sure, that the flow of men and material from North Viet-Nam into the South radically increased towards the end of 1964 and continued at a high level in the next two years. It was to meet that escalation, designed to achieve military victory by the North against the South, that we sent our men in large numbers and began an air campaign against military targets in North Viet-Nam.

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 71.

At the other end of the scale, one must contrast what we are doing with what we could be doing. You know the power that is available to us—in men, resources and weaponry.

We have done both more than some people would wish, and less than others advocate. We have been guided both by the demands imposed upon us by increased aggression and by the need for restraint in the application of force. We have been doing what the President judges to be necessary to protect the nation's vital interests, after hearing the views of the government's military and civilian experts. We shall continue to do what is necessary to meet the threat the Vietnamese and their allies face.

Third, you raise the question whether a war that may devastate much of the countryside can lead to the stable and prosperous Viet-Nam we hope for.

First, it is an error to suggest that the fighting in Viet-Nam has devastated much of the countryside." There has been too much destruction and disruption—as there is in any war. And we deeply regret the loss of life that is involved—in the South and in the North, among both soldiers and civilians.

But devastation has been far less than on the conventional battlefields of World War II and Korea. If peace could come to South Viet-Nam today, I think most people would be amazed at its rapid recovery. For the Vietnamese are intelligent, energetic and ambitious people. And they are determined to see their country prosper. I am confident that they can achieve that end—if they but have the chance to do so, in peace and in their own way.

That day cannot come too soon.

You also suggest that there are "apparent contradictions" in the American position on efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement.

We have said that there will be no difficulty in having the views of the Viet Cong presented at any serious negotiation. The details of how this might be done can be discussed with the other side; there is little point in negotiating such details with those who cannot stop the fighting.

We have made it clear that we cannot accept the Liberation Front<sup>6</sup> as the "sole" or "only legitimate voice" of the Vietnamese people. Yet that is what the Front has said it is. The Buddhists, Catholics, Cao Dai,<sup>7</sup> Hoa Hao,<sup>8</sup> ethnic Cambodians, the almost a million refugees who fled

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<sup>6</sup> The National Liberation Front, also known as the Viet Cong.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to a minority religious sect in Vietnam.

<sup>8</sup> Reference is to a minority religious sect in Vietnam.

from North Viet-Nam to the South in 1954–55, and the Montagnards<sup>9</sup> are not prepared to have the Liberation Front as their spokesman. The capacity of the Government and people of South Viet-Nam to conduct the election of the Constitutional Assembly in September 1966, despite the opposition of the Viet Cong, made clear that the VC are a small minority in the country, determined to convert their ability to organize for terror into domination over the majority. Those now enrolled with the Viet Cong should be turning their minds in a different direction. They should be asking: “How can we end this war and join as free citizens in the making of a modern nation in South Viet-Nam”?

We know that the effort at armed conquest which we oppose in Viet-Nam is organized, led, and supplied by the leaders in Hanoi. We know that the struggle will not end until those leaders decide that they want it to end.

So we stand ready—now and at any time in the future—to sit down with representatives of Hanoi, either in public or in secret, to work out arrangements for a just solution.

You state correctly that we have a commitment to the right of self-determination of the people of South Viet-Nam. There is no ambiguity whatsoever. We shall abide by the decision of the Vietnamese people as they make their wishes known in free and democratic elections. Hanoi and the Liberation Front do not agree.

You also suggest that there is disparity between our statements and our actions in Viet-Nam, and you refer to recent reports of the results of our bombing in North Viet-Nam.

It is our policy to strike targets of a military nature, especially those closely related to North Viet-Nam’s efforts to conquer the South. We have never deliberately attacked any target that could legitimately be called civilian. We have not bombed cities or directed our efforts against the population of North Viet-Nam.

We recognize that there has been loss of life. We recognize that people living or working in close proximity to military targets may have suffered. We recognize, too, that men and machines are not infallible and that some mistakes have occurred.

But there is a vast difference between such unintentional events and a deliberate policy of attacking civilian centers. I would remind you that tens of thousands of civilians have been killed, wounded, or kidnapped in South Viet-Nam, not by accident but as the result of

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<sup>9</sup> Reference is to an ethnic minority in Vietnam, who reside primarily in the Central Highlands of the country.



a deliberate policy of terrorism and intimidation conducted by the Viet Cong.

We regret all the loss of life and property that this conflict entails. We regret that a single person, North or South, civilian or soldier, American or Vietnamese, must die.

And the sooner this conflict can be settled, the happier we and the Vietnamese people will be.

Meantime, we shall continue to do what is necessary—to protect the vital interests of the United States, to stand by our allies in Asia, and to work with all our energy for a peaceful, secure and prosperous Southeast Asia. Only by meeting these commitments can we keep on this small and vulnerable planet the minimum conditions for peace and order.

Only history will be able to judge the wisdom and the full meaning [of] our present course—in all its dimensions.

But I would close by sharing with you a hope and a belief. I believe that we are coming towards the end of an era when men can believe it is profitable and, even, possible to change the *status quo* by applying external force. I believe those in Hanoi who persist in their aggressive adventure—and those who support them—represent ideas and methods from the past, not the future. Elsewhere in the world those committed to such concepts have faded or are fading from the scene.

I believe, therefore, that if we and our allies have the courage, will, and durability to see this struggle through to an honorable peace, based on the reinstallation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, we have a fair chance of entering quieter times in which all of us will be able to turn more of our energies to the great unfinished tasks of human welfare and to developing the arts of conciliation and peaceful change.

The overriding question for all of mankind in this last third of the Twentieth Century is how to organize a durable peace. Much of the experience which has gone into answers to that question has been largely forgotten—perhaps some of it should be. But the question remains—and remains to be answered. I should much enjoy discussing this with you if we can find a way to do so.

I would value a chance to discuss the issues posed in your letter with a representative group of signatories or with as many as could conveniently join me in Washington at a mutually agreeable time.

With best wishes and thanks for your serious concern,  
Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

## 125. Report Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>

R-2-67

Washington, January 18, 1967

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

### COMMUNIST ATTACKS ON U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

(October 1–December 31, 1966)

Over the years, Communist media have kept up a steady stream of attacks on USIA and its various programs. Much of the material is trite and untimely, but serves as a reminder that the ideological struggle is unceasing.

Of all the Communist states, the USSR has shown the greatest sensitivity to USIA programs and activities, not only those directed at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but also in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Soviet attacks on the USIA vary greatly in frequency and in virulence. On occasion, Soviet propagandists have praised the “professionalism” of USIA efforts and urged Communists to emulate its more successful techniques.

### ATTACKS ON VOA

The Voice of America is the most frequent target of Soviet efforts to counter Western propaganda activities. Soviet government efforts to limit the impact of VOA on its Soviet audience is strong, if indirect, evidence of the radio’s effectiveness in this area. A number of times over the past year, Moscow’s own radio carried direct rebuttals of VOA broadcasts and attacked VOA broadcasters and officials. However, most of Moscow’s attacks on the Voice are oblique. Soviet propagandists wish to avoid giving dignity to VOA, or to calling attention to the voice of the enemy. Moreover, Soviet officials apparently have recognized the danger of building up VOA’s potential audience by heightening the feeling among Soviet citizens that it is “forbidden fruit.”

Moscow’s favorite charge against VOA is that it “distorts” the news, and especially the policies and efforts of the Soviet government. In the recent Leningrad trial of two Americans accused of currency speculation and theft, Moscow Radio accused VOA of “distorting the essence of the charge” and of a ten-fold error in quoting the amount

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research: Research Reports: 1960–1999, Entry P-142, Box 32, R-2-67. No classification marking.

of the fine asked by the Prosecutor.<sup>2</sup> Earlier, summing up the results of two and one-half months of disarmament talks in Geneva, Radio Moscow accused VOA not only of “tendentiousness” but of “deliberately concealing the truth” from its listeners, and of trying to becloud the U.S. position:

According to the Voice of America, it seems that the disarmament talks are taking place not on the earth but on some other planet not accessible to the echoes of events in Vietnam. . . . It is not accidental that the Voice of America tries to distort the true state of affairs on these issues, attempting to prove that the Soviet Union is allegedly to blame for the absence of agreement on them. Moreover, the U.S. radio commentators are not in the least embarrassed by the fact that their statements flagrantly contradict the facts.

In a similar vein, VOA and other Western radios were attacked in the literary magazine *Moskva* for allegedly unsympathetic and “wild stories” on the series of Tashkent earthquakes.

#### GENERAL SOVIET ATTACKS ON USIA

Soviet attacks on the Agency generally have centered on the following: 1) USIA is an integral part of the U.S. intelligence community and thus an “arm of CIA;” 2) USIA—and VOA in particular—is the official propaganda instrument of the U.S. Government and thus is not objective; and 3) USIA’s major function worldwide is to slander Communism and sell Capitalism.

A favorite recent tack has been to focus attention on the size of the anti-Communist ideological conspiracy. The authoritative Soviet Party journal *Kommunist* in September described the broad basis of the “propaganda combines” furthering the dissemination of anti-communist ideas as follows:

Leading among them is the information agency of the USA (USIA), which maintains propaganda centers in 105 countries. In foreign countries alone, the Agency publishes 68 journals and 20 newspapers in 25 languages. USIA has at its disposal hundreds of libraries and reading rooms which are also agencies for the dissemination of free propaganda literature. The Agency produces documentary motion pictures, programs for radio and television broadcasts, organizes traveling exhibits, etc. The “Voice of America” radio station is a huge radio and television broadcasting network with transmitters capable of reaching all corners of the world. The “Voice of America” supplies foreign radio stations

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the arrest and conviction of Americans Craddock M. Gilmour, Jr., and Buel R. Wortham by Soviet customs officials in fall 1966 on charges of violating Soviet currency regulations and the theft of a statue. For further information see, “Two Americans Plead Guilty at Leningrad Trial,” *New York Times*, December 20, 1966, p. 18; and *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Document 190.

with materials and broadcasts on the radio 730 hours per week in 37 different languages.

Other commentaries on the Agency cite a staff of "12,000 USIA workers" and a "150 million dollar annual budget" to conjure up an anticommunist colossus.

Soviet commentators routinely replay U.S. domestic criticism of the Agency and its operations, with their own glosses and notes of glee at official discomfiture. Arthur Meyerhoff's *The Strategy of Persuasion* is still being plumbed for evidence that the Agency lacks propaganda skills and that U.S. "propagandists" face an insurmountable task in attempting to combat Communist ideology.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, a *New Republic* discussion<sup>4</sup> of personnel and policy changes at the Voice was used as a take off point for an RT (Radio-Television) magazine article alleging VOA policy was to "hoodwink" the listener, to "slander" Communism and to "whitewash the internal and external policies of American imperialism."

In Soviet domestic propaganda the Agency is only occasionally linked to CIA and to the "American intelligence community" in general, but in the underdeveloped countries and in Soviet propaganda—especially radio broadcasts—designed for use in these areas major emphasis is made on alleged CIA-USIA ties. According to Radio Peace and Progress (which broadcasts over the facilities of Moscow Radio):

Deception and bribery are not the only powerful tools in the arsenal of the U.S. Information Agency. And it is no wonder it works in close contact with the Central Intelligence Agency. The men of the USIA and of the CIA recently concocted material to incriminate leaders of the Buddhist movement. . . . Political provocations, outright interference in the internal affairs of the countries where USIA operates are not simply episodes. This is the style of work of the American propaganda headquarters.

#### NOTEWORTHY RECENT SOVIET ATTACKS ON USIA

##### *December*

21 Moscow Radio "regretted" that VOA coverage of the Wortham-Gilmour trial in Leningrad "distorted" the Prosecutor's charge and erred in reporting the fine asked.

##### *November*

26 *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev) published a long article, "Psychological Diversion," by Polish journalist Jerzy Olbricht which claimed USIA

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Arthur E. Meyerhoff, an advertising executive from Chicago, who was the author of the book *The Strategy of Persuasion*, published in 1965. (Walter Goodman, "Spreading the Word," *New York Times*, February 14, 1965, p. BR34)

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

directs a large scale “psychological war” staff abroad, including allegedly the Free Europe Committee.

18 “Radio Peace and Progress,” a broadcast from Moscow, described how USIA wages propaganda war in Vietnam.

*October*

10 RT (Radio-Television) magazine featured an article, “Speaking to the Russians in a New Voice,” by Aleksandr Estaf’iev attacking the “new team” at USIA and new concepts it allegedly has brought to American propaganda activities overseas.

*September*

24 The lead article in *Kommunist*, “Anti-Communism—An Ideology of Fear and Hatred,” included an attack on USIA as the “leader” of bourgeois centers of anticommunist propaganda.

*September*

12 *Pravda* attacked Abe Brumberg and *Problems of Communism* as Goebbels’ successor.

12 Moscow Radio charged that VOA newscasts on Syria disclosed CIA involvement in the Damascus riots.

7 *Golos Rodiny* (Voice of the Homeland) attacked a variety of Western “propagandists” including the U.S. Information Agency as head of the “white” or official anti-Soviet propaganda conducted by organs of the U.S. Government.

*August*

30 “The Spy Corps,” an attack on the Peace Corps by M. Gaydar in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, alleged Peace Corps-CIA-USIA cooperation in attempting to subvert newly-formed states.

29 Moscow Radio alleged VOA consistently distorted Soviet policies and efforts at the 18-nation disarmament talks in Geneva.

1 Article by E. Popovkin in the literary magazine *Moskva* claimed Western media including VOA presented inaccurate and unsympathetic accounts of the Tashkent earthquakes.

— *Anti-Communism: Who Benefits by It?* by Vladimir Mshvenieradze, a booklet published by Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, surveyed on an elementary level the whole field of ideological struggle, including the role of USIA.

**126. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 19, 1967

SUBJECT

Meeting of January 20 with trustees of Education and World Affairs—BRIEFING MEMORANDUM<sup>2</sup>

I understand that you are to meet on Friday, January 20,<sup>3</sup> with a group of trustees of Education and World Affairs<sup>4</sup> to discuss relations between the Administration and the academic community. After your meeting, in which Secretary McNamara and Walt Rostow will join you, the EWA representatives will have a meeting with the President.

It occurs to me that the following "talking points" may be useful both for your meeting and for that with the President. They affect long-range matters,<sup>5</sup> rather than the immediacies of policy such as Viet Nam, student protests, etc. I mention them because, as a consultant, I drew up the first broad policy and program statement for EWA after its formation, and I believe I know the sorts of special issues that are on the EWA trustees' minds.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Files, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Subject Files, 1966–1967, Lot 70D190, Entry UD UP 176, Box 17, East-West Center—House Appropriations Committee Investigation EDR. Limited Official Use. Sent through S/S. Rusk initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand underlined the subject line.

<sup>3</sup> Secretary Rusk, along with McNamara, Rostow, and Linowitz, met with the trustees of Education and World Affairs at the White House beginning at 10:30 a.m. on January 20. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1967) President Johnson, along with Cater, joined the meeting from 11:53 a.m. to 12:11 p.m. The trustees were Herman B. Wells, Chancellor of Indiana University; T. Keith Glennan, President of Associated Industries, Inc.; John A. Hannah, President of Michigan State University; William W. Marvel, President of Education and World Affairs; Frederick Seitz, President of the National Academy of Science; and Logan Wilson, President of the American Council on Education. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>4</sup> Education and World Affairs was a nonprofit educational foundation established in 1962 through funding from the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation. For additional information, see Theodore M. Vestal, *International Education: Its History and Promise for Today* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers: 1994), p. 24; "AID—The University's Role," *New York Times*, February 13, 1966, p. 175.

<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand underlined from "following" to "matters."

<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand underlined this entire sentence.

*Talking Points*<sup>7</sup>

1. One major source of tension between government and the academic world comes from the contract procedures and *ad hoc* grant arrangements through which government has secured the services of universities and individual academics.<sup>8</sup> The universities have felt that government has depleted their resources or distorted their programs without taking compensatory steps to strengthen the universities.<sup>9</sup>

This administration has been extremely conscious of this problem, and has taken steps to deal with it.<sup>10</sup> Thus:

a. John Gardner's recommendations to David Bell on AID and the Universities<sup>11</sup> have almost all been adopted by AID.

b. The International Education Act provides for long-term back-up support to universities that should allow them to build international activities into their own institutional structure and programs.<sup>12</sup>

c. The new Center for Educational Cooperation in HEW will be advised by an Advisory Committee that should provide for constant and intimate liaison<sup>13</sup> between Government and the educational community.

d. The President has directed that a new corps of Education Officers,<sup>14</sup> representative of the educational community, be created.

2. Academics have complained that they are called upon to do jobs to implement government policy, but they are not part of the planning and consultative process that leads to the development of policy.<sup>15</sup>

Measures like those mentioned above<sup>16</sup> are designed to remedy this state of affairs.

In addition, we in State (CU) have changed procedures with regard to the development of our plans and programs in the field of educa-

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<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand underlined "Talking Points."

<sup>8</sup> An unknown hand underlined this entire sentence.

<sup>9</sup> An unknown hand underlined from "universities" through the end of the paragraph.

<sup>10</sup> An unknown hand underlined this entire sentence.

<sup>11</sup> The recommendations from Gardner to Bell have not been further identified. An unknown hand underlined "a." and "Gardner's recommendations to David Bell on AID and the Universities."

<sup>12</sup> An unknown hand underlined "International Education Act" and "long-term back up support to universities."

<sup>13</sup> An unknown hand underlined "Center for Educational Cooperation in HEW" and "should provide for constant and intimate liaison."

<sup>14</sup> An unknown hand underlined "new corps of Education officers." The President proposed this in his February 2, 1966, address to Congress, see footnote 3, Document 89.

<sup>15</sup> An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

<sup>16</sup> An unknown hand underlined "Measures like those mentioned above."

tional exchange. We have created advisory teams of scholars,<sup>17</sup> whose members are nominated by the major U.S. learned societies. These teams meet with counterpart teams in foreign countries, and are now engaged in recommending coherent 5-year programs for exchanges,<sup>18</sup> based on a review of the educational needs of the U.S. and the country concerned. Each team works in a specific country. We now have about ten of these teams in operation or active formation.<sup>19</sup> More will follow.

3. Another set of difficulties have been caused by worries about CIA influence, classified research, etc.<sup>20</sup> These are very complex issues, but, as the representative of State, I have convened meetings with important representatives of the academic community and had a number of candid and useful exchanges of views.<sup>21</sup> The academic community itself is not of one mind on these matters.<sup>22</sup> I have indicated to them that they themselves would do well to discuss these matters systematically and dispassionately, and see whether, through their organizations, they have any definite advice to give the Administration.

4. Special difficulties have been caused by reductions in the budget for exchange activities.<sup>23</sup> The absence of appropriations to support the new International Education Act has also aroused concern.<sup>24</sup> These events would create problems under any circumstances. They cause special problems now because the President has made statements, and announced the initiation of programs, which have caught the imagination of many leaders of the university world. The let-down is all the greater when there is no follow-up.<sup>25</sup>

Whatever Congress may do, I think the President would be well advised to promise his strong personal support for these programs. This would do much to demonstrate the importance he attaches to

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<sup>17</sup> An unknown hand underlined the first sentence through "scholars" in the following sentence.

<sup>18</sup> An unknown hand underlined "engaged in recommending coherent 5-year programs for exchanges."

<sup>19</sup> An unknown hand underlined "about ten of these teams in operation or active formation."

<sup>20</sup> An unknown hand underlined "worries about CIA influence, classified research, etc."

<sup>21</sup> An unknown hand underlined "as the representative of State, I have convened meetings with important representatives of the academic community and had a number of candid and useful exchanges of views."

<sup>22</sup> An unknown hand underlined "academic community is not of one mind."

<sup>23</sup> An unknown hand underlined "reductions in the budget for exchange activities."

<sup>24</sup> An unknown hand underlined "absence of appropriations to support the new International Exchange Act has also aroused concern."

<sup>25</sup> An unknown hand underlined "special problems now because the President has made statements, and announced the initiation of programs, which has caught the imagination of many leaders of the university world" and the following sentence.



educational and intellectual matters. It would also help a bit to alleviate anxieties about Viet Nam if these programs, which comparatively cost so little, were also strongly supported.

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**127. Policy Program Directive Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

No. 11–2–67

Washington, February 1, 1967

THE “OTHER WAR” IN VIETNAM

*SITUATION*

The United States and the Government of South Vietnam are together making an unprecedented effort to build a nation in the midst of a shooting war. Yet—

—foreign media give most space to the shooting war;

—most reporting from Saigon bolsters the notion that the war in all its aspects is primarily an American show.

Fresh impetus is now being given to the “Other War.”

We should focus attention upon the determination with which Vietnamese, Americans and colleagues from other countries are tackling an enormous and difficult job.

We must give candid recognition to the fact that it may be some time before these exertions begin to show substantial results. Doing so will provide opportunity to take frequent account of a fundamental reason why the task is so large and difficult—the systematic Viet Cong attempt to impose a Communist system and to undercut GVN efforts at democratic economic and social reform.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 7, Policy and Plans—General 1967. Confidential. Ryan sent a copy of the Program Directive to all USIA Assistant Directors and USIS posts under a February 1 memorandum noting that action was to be taken in accordance with a March 24, 1966, memorandum from USIA Director Marks. (Ibid.) Marks sent copies of the Program Directive and Ryan’s memorandum to Komer under a February 23 memorandum in which Marks noted: “I thought you might like to see the enclosed report which we released on ‘The “Other War” in Viet Nam.’ If you haven’t see the material to which we refer (exclusive of the films), I will be glad to send it to you. One of these days, we might even inveigle you into seeing some of our excellent films on your field.” (Ibid.)

Hopeful progress in specific areas can be reported as an indication of what can be achieved in all of South Vietnam as soon as the military situation permits. Key fronts are the Revolutionary Development Program in the countryside; the evolution toward a more representative central government signalized by the drafting of a new Constitution and plans for a national election;<sup>2</sup> the Chieu Hoi or "Open Arms" program; and continuing major programs in public health, education and other fields. These are described at more length in Attachment A.

### OBJECTIVES

(1) To bring about a wider understanding abroad of the "Other War" and of the energy, patience and courage committed to it.

(2) Remind audiences frequently that the task of nation-building in Vietnam has been made much more difficult by a decade of Viet Cong sabotage and terrorism.

(3) Promote greater awareness that more than 30 other nations are providing help for the "Other War."

### ACTION

The following materials on this subject are either in hand or in the pipeline:

#### IMV

"The Hands of a Stranger"—describes a Filipino medical doctor at work in Vietnam. Completed January, 1967.

"A Distant Province"—depicts a typical day's activities of an American AID provincial representative in Vietnam. Completed January, 1967.

"The Other War"—describes a rural Vietnamese revolutionary development team working in the countryside. Completed January, 1967.

"The Eighth District"—Developing the self-help theme, this film shows how a small Vietnamese community helped to improve its own lot. Scheduled for completion February, 1967.

"Philippine Contingent in Vietnam" (working title)—a Philippine military group at work on civic action projects in Vietnam. Scheduled for completion July, 1967.

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<sup>2</sup> The Directorate approved the Constitution on March 27 and promulgated it on April 1. (*Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, Document 120; and R.W. Apple, Jr., "Saigon Promulgates A New Constitution," *New York Times*, April 1, 1967, p. 1) For additional information about the election of the Constituent Assembly in Vietnam, see "Vote in Vietnam: The Second Front Is Political," *New York Times*, September 18, 1966, p. 199; and *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 229.

“Rice” (working title)—stressing the importance of agricultural development in Vietnam. Scheduled for completion July, 1967.

“Three Free Men” (working title)—describing the contributions of countries other than the U.S. in Vietnam by depicting the activities of individuals from three other countries. Scheduled for completion September, 1967.

IPS

USIS Packet, “The Other War in Vietnam” (F-66-140)—Packet was sent to the field May 4, 1966.<sup>3</sup>

White House (“Komer”) report on progress in “the other war” released September 13, 1966 and distributed to all posts.<sup>4</sup> Additional copies will be available from IPS by March, 1967.

IBS

Four-part series on Komer report broadcast in September 1966; English scripts and tapes available on post request.

“The Third Face of War,” eight-part series broadcast during January, 1966; English scripts and tapes available upon post request. Describes reconstruction effort.

ICS

Lecture: “Behind the Crisis” (with 180 color slides) distributed in November, 1966.<sup>5</sup> Describes the economic and social progress achieved with Free World assistance, and underscores U.S. policy of helping the Vietnamese build a modern, self-sufficient and peaceful country.

Book: “War Without Guns” by George K. Tanham.<sup>6</sup> Fifteen hundred hard-back copies sent to the field, multiple rights obtained and posts notified; 20,000 copies of student edition distributed in September, 1966.

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Komer’s report was also published in two parts in the Department of State *Bulletin* under the title “The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report.” See Department of State *Bulletin*, October 10, 1966, pp. 549–567 and *ibid.*, October 17, 1966, pp. 591–601.

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to George K. Tanham, *War Without Guns: American Civilians in Rural Vietnam* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966).

## Attachment A

### Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency<sup>7</sup>

Washington, undated

#### *The Other War: A Checklist*

For the information of Agency elements, here is a checklist of the major programs in the "Other War" effort in Viet Nam:

1. *Revolutionary Development (RD)*.<sup>8</sup> More than a simple expansion of previous rural pacification programs, this program is an effort to weave together a single program to cope with all aspects of the struggle for hamlets and villages. The chosen instrument is the specially-trained 59-man armed team which enters a village to establish local military security, learn the grievances and aspirations of the villagers. In the process team members offer technical advice, funds and materials—and their own labor—to the villagers to carry forward wanted or needed self-help projects.

Although Revolutionary Development has made slow progress in its first year, we can look forward to increased momentum as more and better-trained teams are deployed. A development to watch for is the substantial new task GVN forces are taking on in providing better security for areas undergoing RD and also in participating more actively in RD projects.

2. *Progress toward a representative national government*. The Constituent Assembly elected on September 11, 1966 is drafting a Constitution, with work expected to be completed in the early spring. In the final Manila communique<sup>9</sup> the GVN declared its intention to hold national elections within six months after the new Constitution is promulgated.

3. *Democracy at the riceroots level*. Village and hamlet elections are expected to take place sometime between April and June this year. Similar elections were held in May 1965.

4. *Land reform and modernization of agriculture*. At Manila the GVN declared its intention to give high priority to land reform and other

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<sup>7</sup> Limited Official Use.

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 3, Document 91.

<sup>9</sup> Reference is to the Manila Summit Conference—Joint Communique issued at the close of the Manila Conference on October 25, 1966. (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1966, Book II*, pp. 1259–1265) For additional information on the Manila Conference, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. IV, Vietnam, Documents 280 and 281.

programs concerned with agriculture. Watch for an expansion of farm credit facilities, and effective Vietnamese use of increased aid to farming (e.g., improved seed, more fertilizer and more insecticide) in the latter half of 1967.

5. *Chieu Hoi*. One major program already showing significant success is the “Open Arms” program to attract defections from enemy ranks. Some 11,000 enemy soldiers, political teams, etc. came over in 1965, and 20,242 in 1966, an increase of 82%. The GVN hopes to bring in over 45,000 in 1967, although this figure is for planning purposes and should not be publicized. Also in prospect is a “National Reconciliation Plan” to induce middle and high level officers of the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front (NLF), the political facade of the Viet Cong movement, to defect and be integrated into public service with a guarantee of full civil rights. However, for program planning purposes, there may not be too many exploitable results right away.

6. *Education and Youth*. Despite the war—and frequent enemy attacks on schools and assassination of teachers—the GVN has managed to expand educational facilities in rural areas with the aid of the U.S. and other countries. Plans for 1967 include 3,400 new school-rooms, 4,000 additional teachers, 8 million more textbooks. The GVN has started a new University of the South, the first in the Mekong delta. This may be worth following. In the past two years some students have joined a number of programs in support of the “Other War.”

**128. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to All United States Information Agency Public Affairs Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 1, 1967

Dear PAO:

For several months I have considered the need of establishing a regular channel of communication to Country Public Affairs Officers, and have explored various ways of bringing ideas and viewpoints to your attention. With the new year I have decided to institute a monthly letter to accomplish this purpose. I hope that it proves to be of value to all.

I have just returned from a PAO conference in Mexico City and visits with the staffs in five Latin American countries. As always on my trips to the field, I felt refreshed by personal contact with those who are doing the Agency's work abroad. While time does not permit me to travel as frequently as I should like, I hope that these monthly letters will help to keep us in closer touch.

This month I want to talk with you about a subject that is uppermost in our minds here in Washington, the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS).<sup>2</sup> Those of you in the 39 countries in which the system is now being introduced will be much concerned with it in the coming weeks. Those of you in other countries should also be well informed about PPBS and its significance for the Agency.

The purpose of the new system is to help us—you as Country PAO, your Area Assistant Director and myself in Washington—ensure that we make most effective use of resources to accomplish our aims. This requires clear definition of objectives and systematic analysis of alternative ways to reach these objectives. It means weighing possible approaches against one another to determine which are likely to bring greatest results for the funds expended. It means better use of research to guide program judgments.

You should know that the PPB system is being instituted throughout the Executive Branch of the government at the express direction of the President.

We have in recent months been exploring ways to see how best we could apply PPBS within the Agency. It soon became clear that since Agency programs stem from field needs, the field program must

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 28, PAO Letters. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 108.

be the basis for our analysis. After preliminary work in Washington, the Agency pre-tested the Country Plan Program Memorandum (CPPM) in Turkey and Japan. As a result of lessons learned in these two posts, the revised handbook was prepared.

The system is still in an experimental stage. Based on the experience that we gain from the 39 posts which are participating this spring, further improvements and refinements will be made.

We should realize that PPBS will not provide easy answers to difficult questions. All of us experienced in USIA recognize that results are hard to evaluate and often involve intangibles that cannot be measured precisely. PPBS *can* help focus our thinking on critical questions, reduce some of the areas of uncertainty, and provide us with tools to make more informed decisions. Nothing in PPBS lessens the need for the seasoned, professional judgment that I count on from our Public Affairs Officers.

I am very conscious of the fact that PPBS will place additional demands upon the posts, especially in this first year. It should, however, help us to concentrate upon essentials and thus ultimately to reduce our work-load.

I want you to know that we have been commended by the Bureau of the Budget for the manner in which we have adapted PPBS to our particular needs.

The work we have already done in inaugurating this new management tool helped us to demonstrate to the Bureau of the Budget the value of our activities. I am pleased to report that the Bureau has permitted us to plan for selective increases in vital functions in our budget for the coming year. You can see, therefore, that PPBS is not just an academic exercise.

I look forward with keen interest to the field submissions, and to your suggestions on how PPBS can best serve the Agency.

Sincerely,

**Leonard H. Marks**

**129. Memorandum From the Director of the United States  
Information Agency (Marks) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 2, 1967

SUBJECT

Regaining Initiative on Tet Truce

I recommend that the U.S. attempt to regain the initiative on the Tet truce by announcing or arranging for the GVN to announce that the four day truce will be extended in 12 or 24 hour periods contingent upon DRV and VC continued observance of the truce conditions.<sup>2</sup>

These conditions would be: continued cessation of all military action, including terrorism; suspension of all infiltration and movement toward infiltration; and, suspension of all regrouping of forces.

This action should help us to take the psychological initiative on the Tet truce from the hands of the enemy. We could control the definition of violations (within reasonable limits) and also probably use this period to good advantage in assessing any alleged VC/DRV "signals."

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967-1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 4, Government Agencies—State, Department of, 1967. Secret. Copies were sent to President Johnson (through Kintner), Rostow (with note), and McNamara. All *ibid.* Drafted by Marks. Written at the bottom of the memorandum in an unknown hand is a notation that reads "By hand 2/3."

<sup>2</sup> For additional information about the Tet truce extension, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, Document 34.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



**130. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 2, 1967

In reviewing the foreign press I was struck with a recent change in attitude on the Harrison Salisbury articles from Hanoi.<sup>2</sup>

Since the first shock of the Salisbury articles in the *New York Times* one month ago, free world media reaction may be divided roughly into three stages, each one covering about ten days.

The initial outcry against U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam deplored civilian casualties while denouncing official American statements for not acknowledging them all along. This first burst of media reaction had spent itself by January 6 and was followed by a lull which lasted until mid-month. The third stage in the latter part of January produced a new crop of editorials, with a growing number asking why severe critics of occasional U.S. bombing accidents virtually ignored the Viet Cong's deliberate campaign of terrorism and murder. Some suggested that Hanoi had skillfully exploited the *New York Times* to divert world opinion from the basic realities of the war.

To illustrate the third stage, the following quotations from representative papers are significant:

Hong Kong's *China Mail* said:

The "accidental killing of North Vietnamese civilians in American bombing raids has been widely publicized and criticized," but "strangely, the critics are generally silent when South Vietnamese civilians are brutally put to death by Viet Cong guerrillas whose operations are directed from Hanoi." The paper referred to the recent "massacre of 41 men, women, and children in the Mekong delta."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 3, Field—East Asia and Pacific (Viet Nam), 1967. No classification marking. Drafted by Marks. Sent through Kintner. Copies were sent to Christian and Rostow. A typed notation in the upper left-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "SAME TO: Secretary of State Rusk." Attached to the memorandum but not printed is an undated paper prepared in USIA entitled, "Trend of Reaction to Salisbury Articles Show Recent Shift of Emphasis."

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a series of articles authored by Salisbury: "A Visitor to Hanoi Inspects Damage Laid to U.S. Raids," *New York Times*, December 25, 1966, p. 1; "Hanoi During an Air Alert: Waitresses Take Up Rifles," *New York Times*, December 18, 1966, p. 1; "Villagers Tell of Raids in North," *New York Times*, January 2, 1967, p. 3; and "A Newsman, Home From Hanoi, Says Dispatches Will Help U.S.," *New York Times*, January 19, 1967, p. 3. For further details about Salisbury's articles and their impact on the Johnson administration, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 352.

Amsterdam's Catholic *Volkskrant* warned:

"Emotional involvement with the Vietnamese war can easily lead to placing the charge of cruelty at the wrong doorstep." It said that the latest "ruthless actions" of the Viet Cong against non-combatants were "basic Viet Cong strategy."

In Milan, *Corriere della Sera*, one of Italy's most influential dailies, said:

"The truth is that the Americans could win if they really were barbaric, terroristic, atrocious. The truth is that they are none of these things and they never will be."

I am sending a copy of this memorandum to George Christian with the hope that he can use it for background information.

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**131. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 13, 1967

SUBJECT

Ramparts—NSA—CIA

I spent several hours yesterday and today reviewing the situation and attempting to come up with the best way of handling it. The

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Box 44, Ramparts—NSA—CIA. Secret; Exdis. Katzenbach was acting for Rusk, who was in Buenos Aires attending the Third Special Inter-American Conference.

following recommendations are tentative, since it may be important to know exactly what tomorrow's newspapers say.<sup>2</sup>

I do not believe a backgrounder as such is a possible way of dealing with the situation since (1) I am not absolutely confident that we are in possession of all of the facts and I am concerned that whoever attempted the backgrounder (Foy Kohler or myself) would inadvertently answer incorrectly questions; (2) a backgrounder will open up for questioning related programs of CIA, and it would be extremely difficult to control this aspect.

I am working on the following tentative scenario:

1. A statement the State Department would give at the noon briefing attributable to CIA.<sup>3</sup> This would be a bare bones admission of the fact of NSA subsidy, coupled with the fact that this program was tapering off to complete ending at the request of NSA and as a result of Government review. The statement would note that the program had continued for many years.

2. A statement on background which explained some of the reasons for the initial decision in the most favorable light it could be put. This would be attributable only to official sources.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to possible publication of an article in *Ramparts* magazine that alleged covert attempts by the CIA to influence the National Student Association in order to get information about international student leaders. On February 14, the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* printed full-page *Ramparts* advertisements which announced: "In its March issue, *Ramparts* magazine will document how the CIA has infiltrated and subverted the world of American student leaders, over the past fifteen years." (*Washington Post*, February 14, 1967, p. 9; *New York Times*, February 14, 1967, p. 31) *Ramparts* published the article, entitled "NSA and the CIA," as advertised. (Sol Stern, "NSA and the CIA," *Ramparts*, March 1967, pp. 29–39) Also on February 14, the *New York Times* and the *Chicago Tribune* printed stories on student groups and the CIA. (Neil Sheehan, "A Student Groups Concedes it Took Funds from C.I.A.," *New York Times*, February 14, 1967, p. 1; "U.S Student Group Admits Subsidy by CIA," *Chicago Tribune*, February 14, 1967, p. 9) The *Washington Post* reported on the story the following day, February 15. (Andrew J. Glass and Gerald Grant, "NSA Officers Describe Aid Given by CIA," *Washington Post*, February 15, 1967, p. A1)

<sup>3</sup> In circular telegram 137161 to all diplomatic posts, February 14, the Department reported: "At press briefing Feb. 14 Department spokesman made following on-the-record statement: 'We have confirmed with the Central Intelligence Agency that as stated by National Student Association yesterday, its leadership has been working over the past two years to terminate the financial relationship concerning support of NSA's international activities, which began in the early 1950's. Even prior to that time, the degree of governmental support for those activities had begun tapering off sharply.'" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Box 44, Ramparts—NSA—CIA)

<sup>4</sup> In circular telegram 137161 (see footnote 3 above), the Department reported that "additional information was provided on background basis, for attribution to U.S. officials" and listed eight points.

3. A statement from the State Department, in response to a question, that this sort of program was reviewed inter-departmentally at a high level.<sup>5</sup>

I think that it would not be wise to involve the State Department more directly than this, since I see little to be gained from the point of view of protecting CIA and considerable to be lost from the view of the State Department.

As soon as we have seen the morning papers I will send drafts of the proposed statements indicated above, as well as any changes in the scenario which might be called for.

**Nicholas deB Katzenbach**

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<sup>5</sup> In a February 15 memorandum to Christian, Rosenthal outlined "the general press line" Katzenbach had approved, adding that Katzenbach "is undertaking an immediate and full survey and study of the problems involved in this matter, in an effort both to clarify the present situation and to suggest sensible future course of action. We would then seek to deflect any questions on the ground that it is impossible to answer them sensibly until the study is complete—and that there is no immediate way of knowing the length of time that would take." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Box 44, Ramparts—NSA—CIA)

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### **132. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 15, 1967, 9:44 p.m.

138199. Subject: Dept guidance CIA NSA story and subsequent press developments. Ref: State 137161.<sup>2</sup> Circular.

1. Press follow-up to Rampart disclosures of past CIA assistance to National Students Association assures continuing worldwide interest in story and makes likely inquiries to many posts from press, diplomatic colleagues and friendly host governments.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Box 44, Ramparts—NSA—CIA. Confidential. Drafted by Geraldine Sheehan (G/Y), Robison, and Slocum; cleared by Canter, German, and Walker; approved by Kohler. All brackets are in the original.

<sup>2</sup> See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 131.

2. Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, who has been directed by the President to undertake an immediate and full survey and study of the problems involved in this matter today said:

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

QTE The President believes strongly that the integrity and independence of the education community must be preserved. He has directed a careful review of any government activities that may endanger this integrity and independence.

He has further directed me, in consultation with Secretary Gardner and Director Helms, to formulate a policy which will provide necessary guidance for government agencies in their relationship to the international activities of American educational organizations.

At the same time, the President recognizes the great need of America's private organizations to participate in the world community. Other countries provide heavy subsidy for such activities. He has asked me to explore means for assuring that US organizations play their proper and vital role. UNQTE

END UNCLASSIFIED

3. Department should be informed immediately of grantees in NSA-administered programs who are targets of official or public hostility. Department in turn will provide posts as much background as can be assembled quickly on overt, federal assistance to student programs.

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

4. Press reports today included the following:

Washington Star,<sup>3</sup> leaving source unattributed, reported CIA has also given substantial support to US Youth Council (USYC), World Assembly of Youth (WAY), and International Student Conference (ISC). [US Youth Council is umbrella organization that embraces 36 political, service and student groups; it is American member of WAY. WAY is federation of more than 50 national committees that embrace youth groups in member countries; it has headquarters in Brussels and is counterpart of Moscow-dominated World Federation of Democratic Youth. ISC is federation of Western and non-aligned national student unions, with headquarters at Leyden, the Netherlands, and is counterpart of Moscow-dominated International Union of Students.]

Story says that CIA gave millions over more than a decade to those organizations; that money was channeled through foundations; that principal donor to those organizations and to NSA is Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs in New York; that in WAY and ISC a limited

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<sup>3</sup> A daily afternoon newspaper published in Washington, DC, between 1852 and 1981.

number US citizens have served in executive posts and usually were only ones aware of source of funds.

Story adds that the two international organizations, like NSA, received CIA funds after it became apparent they were engaged in bitter struggle with Communist-financed counterpart organizations for allegiance of youth and student leaders in emerging nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America. While NSA and USYC have sizable programs aimed at increasing political awareness and participation of students and youth in US, as well as extensive international programs, according to story, WAY and ISC involved almost entirely in continuing ideological struggle with Communist-controlled counterparts headquartered in Prague (IUS) and Budapest (WFDY). It was against this background that CIA in early 1950s began providing financial support.

Story charges that young people in all four organizations carried on limited intelligence work, forwarding to CIA confidential reports from overseas representatives and reports on foreign students or youth leaders visiting US. Policies of all groups involved described as generally liberal.

Story says CIA came to rely on NSA as means of developing potential recruits; adds that officers of the four organizations played musical chairs in moving from group to group.

Harry Lunn, former NSA president and current director Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs, quoted as saying his organization was not CIA front. While relying heavily on CIA for money, he said it also receives sizable contributions from a number of wealthy US citizens, and has made donations to wide variety nonprofit groups.

New York Times,<sup>4</sup> quoting NSA officers, said CIA financed NSA seminar on student newspapers in 1965 in East Africa. Student newspaper editors from Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia attended. It said in earlier years, between 1958 and 1962, CIA financed scholarship program for Algerian students through NSA, presumably because USG decided it could not publicly provide scholarships for Algerians, many of whom had been expelled from French universities for anti-French activities, at time when France was attempting quell Algerian rebellion. After Algerian independence, State Department began openly funding the program.

James Reston<sup>5</sup> in Times said that the history of international youth and student organizations and the use made of them by the USSR help explain both the CIA policy with regard to them and the embarrassing

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<sup>4</sup> See Neil Sheehan, "Order by Johnson Reported Ending C.I.A. Student Aid," *New York Times*, February 15, 1967, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> "C.I.A. Aid on Campus," *The New York Times*, February 15, 1967, p. 19.

consequences of that policy. He said the reason for establishing CIA help to the student association is perfectly clear.

Washington Post<sup>6</sup> quoted former CIA official as saying that CIA gave American students the wherewithal to attend international student conferences such as World Youth Festivals in Helsinki in 1962 and in Vienna in 1959.

END UNCLASSIFIED

5. In addition specific guidance contained reftel and future guidance from Dept, posts may wish emphasize following points in off-the-record discussions with friendly foreign officials:

a. USG support for NSA began at height of cold war, when USSR was seeking to dominate international youth movements with Party-picked<sup>7</sup> and financed delegates. Aforementioned article by James Reston developed this, pointing out communist delegations gained control of key positions at first World Students Congress in Prague in 1946 and notes inter alia that first Soviet Vice President of International Union of Students was Aleksandr Shelepin, later chairman Soviet State Security Committee (KGB). Dept also preparing fuller summary for background info of posts.

b. At that time, USG was only source of funds to enable American students to participate on equal basis in international youth activities.

c. Student groups from all countries obviously require and receive extensive financial support. In totalitarian countries, it generally known that delegations are financed by government or ruling party and that delegates have no alternative but to advocate official government line. From some free world countries, youth delegations are customarily sponsored and chosen by dominant political party. Covert support of US student activities in international field had obvious disadvantages, as noted in background quoted reftel, but had advantage permitting students express own opinion without government interference.

d. American delegates to international conferences have in fact traditionally expressed their own views irrespective of official USG policy.

e. Knowledge of CIA support limited to very few NSA officials, hence disclosure this past association carries no implication that all American youth active in student work were witting beneficiaries of USG assistance. (Many such former youth leaders are now active in government; among those now in Foreign Service and AID, Reston article mentions US Ambassador to Chile Dungan, AID Director in

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<sup>6</sup> See Andrew J. Glass and Gerald Grant, "NSA Officers Describe Aid Given by CIA," *Washington Post*, February 15, 1967, p. A1.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Peru William Dentzer, and special assistant to Director of AID Robert Smith.) It also totally unfounded to assume that students active in NSA, with or without knowledge CIA support, maintained continuing association with CIA after student days. (Front page Washington Post article Feb. 15 quotes unnamed NSA officers to effect that CIA recruited agents from top echelons of NSA over period of fourteen years.)

f. Covert CIA funding should not be confused with other student activities with which agencies of USG, including State, have been and are openly associated. Resume of activities which Department's Bureau of Cultural Affairs arranges on contract basis with NSA being provided septel.<sup>8</sup>

Katzenbach

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<sup>8</sup> Not found

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**133. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Director for Research Development, United States Information Agency (Crespi) to the Deputy Director for Policy and Research (Ryan)**

Washington, February 16, 1967

[Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, Policy Coordination Staff, Policy Guidance Staff, Research Program Subject Files, 1966–1967, Entry UD WW 229, Box 59, R-7 Research—General. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]



**134. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Cabinet (Kintner) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 18, 1967, 12:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Re the CIA publicity, which is of course going to increase with ramifications, would it be a good idea to get President Truman, even though I know he is ill, President Eisenhower, and Allen Dulles to defend the necessities, the proprieties of the CIA activity? While I think it is important to separate and strongly support the CIA, Dulles does have a stature, particularly in the East. I think he is a good friend of the Senator from New York,<sup>2</sup> which might also be important in a story that is obviously going to be played up tremendously over the next few weeks.

**Robert E. Kintner<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Box 10, CIA Funding of Private Organizations. Personal. At the bottom of the memorandum Johnson wrote: "yes but suggest to Nick & ask him to talk to Clark C [Clark Clifford] if he thinks ok. L."

<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to Robert Kennedy.

<sup>3</sup> Kintner signed "K" above this typed signature.

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**135. Memorandum From the Special Counsel to the President (McPherson) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 18, 1967, 8 p.m.

Excuse my typing. Zbig Brzezinski of the State Department called this evening with an idea that I think is worth passing on for your consideration.

In all the ruckus about the CIA and the student groups they have sponsored over the past ten or twelve years, no one occupying a high position in government has been heard to say that the students did,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Box 10, CIA Funding of Private Organizations. No classification marking. In the upper left-hand corner of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: "rec'd 2/19/67 6:00 p."

in fact, perform a great service for their country. It is unfortunate that no other funds were available to assist them in taking part in international activities, than covert funds. But quarrels over the method of supporting these groups ought not to diminish our gratitude for what they did for the United States.

They represented our people . . . not the CIA . . . at hundreds of meetings abroad where, without them, there would have been no American voice. They served in international organizations, in committees and projects where the Soviet Union was represented, where Europeans were represented, and where plenty of third-world, uncommitted nations were represented.

If it is true . . . as I believe it is . . . that traditional diplomacy and powerful security forces cannot alone assure success in our international operations, and that the opinions and commitments of youth are critically important to us, then American students travelling abroad to work, study, and take part in international meetings are essential to our larger purposes. They help to build trust and understanding with their contemporaries abroad in a way that diplomats find hard to match. And they speak for democratic ideals and describe the American experience in the councils of international youth groups, where without them those ideals and that experience would have gone un-recognized or would have been denounced.

Many of them represent the best of our youth. If we now sweep the whole thing under the rug with the CIA, and make the work they did seem a part of a generally unsavory business, we will have discredited a public service, and the people who performed it. We will have permitted a bunch of phony muckrakers in the press and in Congress . . . none of whom ever came up with a better idea for supporting this kind of activity . . . to hurt, not only the Administration and the CIA, but some fine Americans as well.

I think someone high in the Administration . . . either George, speaking for you, or Nick,<sup>2</sup> should speak out on this.

**Harry**

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<sup>2</sup> References are to Christian and Katzenbach.

### 136. Editorial Note

In a February 21, 1967, memorandum, Francis Colligan, Executive Secretary of the Council on International Education and Cultural Affairs, sent to the Council's Chairman, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Charles Frankel, a copy of a position paper for Frankel's approval. (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1 1066, Box 48, Educational Exchange Program, International Exchanges, 1967) The paper, entitled *Some Facts and Figures on the Migration of Talent and Skills* and prepared by the Council's staff, presented the Council's findings and recommendations regarding the so-called "Brain Drain" issue. (See Document 120.) The Council's findings included: "the probability that there is a migration of skilled personnel to the United States" despite inadequate U.S. Government statistics; "any drain or gap which exists in developing nations should be stemmed if it in any way runs counter to U.S. developmental objectives;" the concern that "steps to regulate the migration would be effective or would be in the best tradition of an open society;" the "vast majority of aliens in scientific and technological occupations enter the United States as immigrants for permanent residence;" U.S. Government-sponsored J visa exchange visitors programs "do not appear to be contributing significantly to the Drain;" non-sponsored students are more likely to remain in the United States; and "any drain or gap which may exist is caused primarily by the migration of mature scientists, technical people, and other professional personnel" and not exchange students. The Council also made recommendations that no legal prohibitions be placed on entry into the United States, and that certain remedial steps be taken for developing countries facing a potential "brain drain" problem (including the U.S. Government's encouragement of countries to do more domestically to stem the emigration of skilled workers, and to recruit these people "for special job categories in the home countries").

The following month, the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judiciary convened hearings about the issue on March 6 and 10. The hearings were entitled "International Migration of Talent and Skills," which was the same title as a June 14–15, 1966, conference that the Council held to "help diagnose the so-called 'Brain Drain' problem and devise remedies." (See Document 112.) During the March 6 hearing, Assistant Secretary Frankel addressed the relationship between U.S. Government-sponsored exchange programs and "Brain Drain." According to Frankel and the Council: "In short, where the government is involved, the drain is clearly controlled. Our exchange programs are not self-defeating with respect to our efforts to assist the social and economic development

of other countries." Although he cautioned that the government's data to support this "mainly reflects information about the exit from the United States of Exchange Visitors," he continued that he could report "with reasonable accuracy that Exchange Visitors leave our shores." (*International Migration of Talent and Skills: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, March 6 and 19, 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968))

On October 6, the Council released a progress report on the "action taken by the member agencies to carry out the Council's own recommendations" entitled "The Interagency Council and the 'Brain Drain' in Developing Countries." In the report, the Council documented what it was doing "to administer the remedies" prescribed in *Some Facts and Figures on the Migration of Talent and Skills*. The report also noted key actions that were taken including: "closing the information gap;" "assisting foreign governments to stem the drain;" "emphasizing educational development abroad and regional training;" "dealing with the medical portion of the drain;" "improving the selection, counseling and placement of foreign students;" and "expanding and intensifying activities in the area of manpower surveys and educational planning." (National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 4, Government Agencies—State, Department of, 1967)

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### 137. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 22, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

With respect to your inquiry of yesterday,<sup>2</sup> I wish to assure you that Secretary Gardner, Mr. Helms and myself will be able to complete our inquiry into the relations of government agencies and private organizations operating abroad in the very near future. I anticipate that it will be possible to report our conclusions and recommendations early next month.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Box 10, CIA Funding of Private Organizations. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this inquiry was found.

<sup>3</sup> The final report was released on March 29; see the attachment to Document 144.

In the interval, there are certain basic facts with respect to past activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in this area which should be underscored.

When the Central Intelligence Agency lent financial support to the work of certain American private organizations, it did not act on its own initiative but in accordance with national policies established by the National Security Council in 1952 through 1954. Throughout it acted with the approval of senior interdepartmental review committees, including the Secretaries of State and Defense or their representatives. These policies have, therefore, been in effect under four Presidents.

The support provided by the Central Intelligence Agency enabled many far-sighted and courageous Americans to serve their country in times of challenge and danger to the United States and the free world.

Furthermore, the Central Intelligence Agency has been, and continues to be, indispensable to the security of this nation. It is vitally important that the current controversy over its support of certain private organizations not be permitted to obscure the value, or impede the effectiveness, of competent and dedicated career officials serving this country.

Respectfully yours,

**Nicholas deB. Katzenbach**

**138. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 23, 1967

SUBJECT

The Reorganization of International Educational and Cultural Activities

The situation created by public discussion of the CIA's activities in international educational and cultural activities confronts us with both a negative and a positive task.

On the negative side, lines must be drawn indicating what the Government in general, and CIA in particular, will not do. I take it that this will be one consequence of the high-level review ordered by the President.<sup>2</sup>

However, the announcement that new rules have been adopted is unlikely by itself to remove doubts, or to eliminate the cloud of suspicion that will surround *all* U.S. educational and cultural programs, whether public or private, for some time to come. Moreover, a solution that merely says what we will not do will not solve the essential problems that the actions of the CIA were designed to solve—the problem of supporting international exchanges at a proper level, and in a manner allowing us to pursue long-range objectives free from immediate political pressures.

I would urge in the strongest terms, therefore, that the high-level review now being conducted lead to the positive proposal of a new framework for international educational and cultural affairs. Three alternatives seem to me to be available.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of the White House Aides, McPherson, Box 1, Aides Files—McPherson, Box 6, CU 1967. Confidential. Sent through S/S. Copies were sent to McPherson, Cater, and Gardner. According to another copy of the memorandum, Frankel sent a copy to Cater under a February 23 typewritten note. (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, Box 193, 12/2/68, Packet #3 [Cater 2/67—10/67 Materials re US Government and Private Voluntary Organizations, Committee on Voluntary Overseas Activity (COVA) also the Rusk Committee])

<sup>2</sup> On February 15, Johnson appointed Katzenbach, Gardner, and Helms to a committee, referred to as the Katzenbach Committee, to examine the relationship between the CIA and the student groups. (J.Y. Smith and John Maffre, "U.S. to Review Agency-Student Links," *Washington Post*, February 16, 1967, p. A1; and John Herbers, "President Bars Agency Influence Over Education," *New York Times*, February 16, 1967, p. 1)

*Alternative 1:* Turn over responsibilities to State/CU, and request a larger appropriation for FY 1968 to take care of these new tasks. A rough estimate of additional appropriations needed is \$8,976,000. (An illustrative breakdown of this figure is attached at Tab A.)

This alternative has been widely proposed by Congressmen and Senators—e.g., Congressman Wayne Hays and Senator Javits—and has been frequently mentioned in the press. Legal opinion is that the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (the Fulbright-Hays Law)<sup>3</sup> provides full authority to State to provide open support to private organizations engaged in international exchange activities.

In favor of this proposal are the following considerations:

- 1) It is simple.
- 2) Favorable and reasonably quick action could be expected in Congress.
- 3) CU as an organization could absorb this new function quickly and comfortably, since it has been conducting parallel activities for some time.

Against this proposal are the following considerations:

- 1) Even though the State Department's support is overt, the State Department imprimatur, in the present atmosphere, will leave strong suspicion, at home and abroad, that our intellectual, cultural and youth activities are being subjected to political manipulation.
- 2) The overseas management of State's exchange programs by USIA will reinforce this impression.
- 3) The program will always be under some pressure from Congress and other quarters to produce quick and obvious political results, and to avoid "controversial" groups, individuals and themes.
- 4) The budgetary outlook will probably vary from uncertain to bad.

On balance, I regard this Alternative as feasible, and as better than the status quo, but only as a very partial answer to the problem.

*Alternative 2:* Create an American version of the British Council,<sup>4</sup> and turn over to it only the kind of general organizational support activity previously conducted by CIA.

This idea has been in the wind for some time, and has been put forward both within the Administration and by people outside. It essentially proposes a semi-private corporation, supported by government funds, and governed by a Board of Trustees chosen from the private sector.

In favor of this proposal are the following considerations:

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 14.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5, Document 116.

- 1) It will ensure open control by the private sector, and particularly the educational community.
- 2) It will insulate the activities supported against charges of political manipulation.

Against this proposal are the following considerations:

- 1) It is too limited in scope, and will not repair the damage that has been done to the whole spectrum of Government-supported exchange activities.
- 2) It adds one more agency to a field of activity that is already overpopulated, and that is badly in need of simplification and coordination.
- 3) It overlaps functions that could properly be conducted by the new Center for Educational Cooperation (HEW) under the International Education Act of 1966.<sup>5</sup>
- 4) It does not come to grips with the problem of our official overseas representation in cultural affairs by USIA—a problem that has been a chronic source of trouble, and that, in the circumstances now existing, is almost certainly going to get worse.

On balance, I believe that this proposal is a move in the right direction, but that it does not go far enough, and will not satisfy the most important domestic or foreign critics.

*Alternative 3:* Create a semi-autonomous Foundation for International Educational and Cultural Exchange, and turn over to it, in a phased manner, the following activities and programs:

- 1) All State/CU's academic exchange programs.
  - 2) All USIA's libraries, cultural centers, book programs, etc.
  - 3) All AID's long-range, non-technical educational activities, including continuing educational programs in countries where AID does not or will cease to function.
  - 4) All general support to private organizations of the kind previously given by CIA.
  - 5) All activities involving the counselling, assistance, placement and repatriation of foreign students, whether Government sponsored or not.
  - 6) Art exhibits and presentations in the performing arts, including the "reverse flow" to this country.
- (Some of these activities could be sub-contracted to other agencies: e.g., the Library of Congress could handle overseas libraries, and give them its sponsorship.)

I. I suggest the following guidelines with regard to *the basic structure* of such a Foundation.

- 1) It should be governed by a Board of Trustees, composed of 15–25 members chosen from private life. The authorizing legislation should probably provide that a majority of the group be representatives of

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<sup>5</sup> The Center for Educational Cooperation was never established.



key voluntary and educational organizations. (This is similar to the legislation for the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO.)

2) This Board, which might be called a “Grants Commission” to make its functions clear, should have final authority for the expenditure of all funds, as well as general supervisory authority over policy and policy execution.

3) The Foundation should have a Director or Administrator, of Under-Secretary rank, at the Executive Pay Level II or III. He should have a Deputy at Executive Level V. Neither should be in a Cabinet Department.

4) The Foundation should be free to receive private donations in addition to Government appropriations.

5) The Committees of Congress to which it reports should probably be the education committees.

6) It should be represented abroad by Cultural Affairs Officers and/or Educational Officers, who are full members of the State Department, but who carry the additional title, “Representative of the Foundation for International Educational and Cultural Exchange.” (This is similar to French representation in this country, and to British representation in some countries.)

II. The relationship of such a Foundation to other agencies now operating will have to be carefully defined.

For purposes of general coordination, I would recommend that the Director or Administrator of the Foundation be named Chairman of the Federal Inter-Agency Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. This Council, which is now the principal instrument of coordination in the Government, and is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, should be upgraded in its authority and altered in its composition. It should consist of the following member agencies: (The proposed new members are starred.)

State/CU

State/SCI\*

AID

HEW (Center for Educational Cooperation and Office of Education)

Peace Corps

National Science Foundation\*

National Endowment for the Arts\*

National Endowment for the Humanities\*

Atomic Energy Commission\*

National Aeronautics and Space Agency\*

Library of Congress (now has observer status)

Official observer status should go to:

Bureau of the Budget (now has observer status)

USIA (now is a member agency)

Smithsonian Institution (now has observer status)

Office of Science and Technology

This reformed Council would be more relevant to the actual facts than the present set-up. The new agencies listed above for membership

are active in the field of international intellectual exchange in a major way, and their programs have considerable impact on matters like the brain drain and the technological gap. They are also deeply affected in their international activities by the general U.S. posture with regard to exchanges, and by our reputation for honesty in this field.

III. *Questions can be asked about the impact of such a Foundation on existing agencies and programs.*

*Question 1) What would be the impact on State/CU?*

*Answer:* State/CU will still be responsible for the exchanges of non-academic leaders and specialists, which is the most immediately diplomatic-political aspect of its present activities.

It would also be responsible for—and would be freer to devote its energies to—the area of general foreign policy guidance concerning the significance of intellectual and cultural movements and events.

It would have, in addition, more direct control of and responsibility for the corps of educational and cultural officers in our embassies. These officers ought to be freer than they have been in the past to report on events in their country. Under present conditions, they are excessively preoccupied with other duties related to their USIA tasks. Although CU would be a smaller bureau with a smaller budget under these conditions, its significance for *policy* would be greater.

Finally, CU would serve as the transmission belt between the activities of the proposed Foundation and our programs overseas.

*Question 2) What would be the impact on the new Center for Educational Cooperation in HEW?*

*Answer:* This Center would continue to be the principal agency for stimulating and supporting the *domestic* U.S. effort in international studies. By creating a parallel Foundation whose responsibilities are for overseas activities, the fuzziness in the present situation would be removed.

*Question 3) What happens to AID education programs?*

*Answer:* Short-range project-oriented education projects would continue in AID's domain. More long-range activities, including activities that continue after technical assistance ceases, would gradually be transferred to the Foundation.

An essentially similar recommendation was made by John Gardner in his *AID and the Universities*.<sup>6</sup>

In dealing with this problem, it would be a mistake, obviously, for the Foundation to take over AID activities quickly. The transfer should be a planned one over a period of time.

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 11, Document 126.

*Question 4) What happens to Cultural Affairs Officers?*

*Answer:* They would be transferred to State. State now reimburses USIA, from CU appropriations, for approximately 100 man-years (Americans) and over 200 man-years (foreign) for the conduct of cultural affairs programs overseas. This provides a base for the transfer of personnel. If and when other cultural activities—e.g., libraries, cultural centers—are transferred, adjustments in the present USIA budget could be made.

USIA will undoubtedly take the position that its entree and credibility will be adversely affected by such a transfer. This does not come to grips with the fact that our cultural activities are now adversely affected by their tie-up to USIA overseas. Nor does it face the new situation created by recent revelations, which make it imperative that the *bona fides* of our cultural activities be spelled out visibly, dramatically, and in a new form.

Moreover, since State/CU, under this proposal, would also give up much of its authority, and various agencies will change their responsibilities, this change will be only a part of a larger picture, and cannot be construed as aimed at USIA alone.

Another and important advantage of this proposal is that it will remove long-standing barriers to the recruitment of good Cultural Affairs Officers. The best ones we have are dissatisfied with their present situation, which requires them to report through Public Affairs Officers. Outstanding figures like Cleanth Brooks, who served in London, and Laurence Wylie, now in Paris, have said that they could not recommend to any colleague that he repeat their experience.

Dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs has been expressed for a number of years, and recently with increasing impatience, by the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, and by outstanding representatives of American higher education. The White House Conference on International Cooperation specifically recommended both a semi-autonomous Foundation, and the dissociation of cultural affairs from USIA.<sup>7</sup> No step would do more to restore the confidence of the educational community in government-sponsored exchanges than this change in our system of overseas representation.

*Question 5) What happens to the plans for Education Officers?*

*Answer:* These plans would continue to be valid for countries where there is a large private educational traffic with the United States, or

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<sup>7</sup> The White House Conference on International Cooperation was held November 29–December 1, 1965. For further information, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues, Documents 274, 275, 276, and 278.

where a large number of Federal agencies are active in education, and require coordination.

In smaller and medium-sized embassies, it would be appropriate to combine the activities of the Cultural and Educational Officers. In large embassies, according to the Ambassador's desires, one could be subordinate to the other.

In general, the above proposal would probably mean that we would not need more than 30 Education Officers in overseas posts.

*Summary:*

In favor of this third alternative are the following considerations:

- 1) It provides a visible guarantee of the integrity of all U.S. exchange activities.
- 2) It brings together activities that belong together.
- 3) It deals across the board, rather than in an *ad hoc* way, with the fundamental problem of government-private cooperation.
- 4) It is based on similar proposals that have been put forward for many years by the educational-scientific-cultural community, and will remove most of the objections they have raised to existing arrangements.
- 5) It puts exchange activities in a healthier setting—an educational and long-range foreign policy setting rather than a propagandistic and short-range setting. (In this connection, it would be useful, though not absolutely essential, to explore the possibility of five-year appropriations for such a Foundation.)

Against this proposal are some obvious considerations:

- 1) It is ambitious, and envisages major administrative changes. There will be bureaucratic pushing and pulling.
- 2) It will probably lead to general debate, since it will require new legislation.

On balance, even these adverse considerations seem themselves to be favorable consequences. I believe the Administration can turn what is now an embarrassment into a major triumph for its credibility, flexibility and imagination if it puts forward this idea.

**Charles Frankel**

**Tab A**

**Chart Prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State<sup>8</sup>**

Washington, undated

*ESTIMATE OF ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUIRED*

1. American student participation in international Conferences abroad:		
396 universities		
<u>150</u> colleges		
546 institutions × 1 student @ \$1,000 each		= \$546,000 <sup>9</sup>
2. Student conferences in the U.S.		
5 regional annual meetings		
Unit cost \$22,000 - logistics		
20,000 - international travel		
24,000 - domestic transportation for		
100 U.S. students		
\$66,000		
5 conferences		= \$330,000
3. Participation in International meetings by U.S. Scholars (funding through scholarly societies)		
		= \$500,000
4. Network of counseling and orientation centers for foreign students		
		= \$1,600,000
5. Support to private student interchange organizations (including university-to-university interchange)		
		\$6,000,000
	Total	\$8,976,000

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<sup>8</sup> Confidential.

<sup>9</sup> This is merely a rough-and-ready way of figuring costs if the decision were taken to ensure broad representation of U.S. students at international meetings. Obviously, some institutions need not be represented at all; others would have more than one delegate. Obviously, too, these figures merely contemplate attendance by small delegations at the many meetings that take place. [Footnote is in the original.]

**139. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 1, 1967

The following will summarize steps taken to meet press criticism of the Agency activities:

1. During the past month only one story appeared that was critical of Agency operations—the *Washington Post* on February 5<sup>2</sup> in its book section referred to the fact that USIA had subsidized books for overseas distribution under an arrangement which permitted the publisher to circulate these books in the U.S. This story was taken from testimony offered to the House Appropriations Committee in September 1966 relating to activities in 1965.<sup>3</sup>

2. The writer made no effort to determine whether there had been a change in policy since my appointment in September 1965. If he had, he would have discovered that no books of this nature had been commissioned since October 1965, when two volumes which had been under consideration for a period of time were permitted to be released.

3. On February 6 a letter explaining these facts was sent to the *Washington Post*.<sup>4</sup> It was printed on February 9.

4. On February 9 Senator Gale McGee discussed the program on the floor of the Senate and introduced our explanation.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Federal Government Organizations, EX FG 296, Box FG-315, FG 296 3/1/67-4/24/67. No classification marking. Sent through Kintner. An unknown hand, presumably that of one of Johnson's secretaries, wrote the letter "L" and "brought to the ranch 3/2/67" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See "Well Poisoners," *Washington Post*, February 5, 1967, p. E6. An unknown hand wrote "D.C." following "*Washington Post*."

<sup>3</sup> Marks testified before the House Appropriations Committee on September 13 and 14, 1966. For text of Marks' testimony, see *Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1967: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 337-769.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the letter, see Reed Harris, "Letters to the Editor: On the USIA and Books," *Washington Post*, February 9, 1967, p. A20.

<sup>5</sup> For text of the discussion, see *Congressional Record*, February 9, 1967, pp. 3261-3262.

5. On February 17 Clayton Fritchey wrote a column<sup>6</sup> explaining that I had not followed previous Directors' policies but had not intended to criticize their actions.

6. On February 19 the UPI carried a similar story.<sup>7</sup>

In view of these steps, I believe that the Agency's position has been fully clarified.

**Leonard H. Marks**

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<sup>6</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>7</sup> Not further identified.

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**140. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to All United States Information Agency Public Affairs Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 6, 1967

Dear PAO:

All of us in USIA take pride in the growing recognition that our responsibility for direct communication with foreign audiences is essential to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.

This recognition reflects awareness that public opinion exerts increasing influence on governments throughout the world and reaches

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 3, Field—General, 1967. Limited Official Use. A shorter version of the letter, which Marks also signed, was circulated in the April edition of the U.S. Information Agency publication, *USIA Correspondent*, a copy of which is in the National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1069, Box 14, Leonard H. Marks, Letter to PAOs, 1967. A year later, on March 27, 1968, the U.S. Information Agency, sent an unclassified copy of Mark's March 6, 1967, letter in circular airgram 2202, and noted that the letter "has been slightly revised and reissued in unclassified form so that it may be made available to all personnel." (National Archives, RG 306, Executive Secretariat, Secretariat Staff, Subject Files, 1973–1978, Entry P–116, Box 1, 1975 Pike Committee)

beyond national boundaries. To achieve its foreign policy goals, the United States must break down barriers of misunderstanding; it must communicate effectively and persuasively with other people on the many issues on which our security and welfare depend.

Obviously, in an increasingly complex world society, our responsibilities are growing. I thought that it would be useful at this time, for us in Washington and you in the field, to review these responsibilities.

### *The Task of USIA*

In carrying out the mission assigned us by law and Presidential directive, USIA:

- Supports the foreign policy of the United States by direct communication with people of other nations.

- Builds understanding of the United States, its institutions, culture and policies among other people; and shares with them information, thought and experience that can contribute toward achieving mutual goals.

- Advises the U.S. government on public opinion abroad and its implications for the United States.

Specifically this means that the Agency:

- Serves as official voice of the U.S. government through the media and through the USIS role as press spokesman for the Ambassador and Country Team abroad.

- Informs foreign audiences about the United States, U.S. policies and issues of mutual concern.

- Provides, through the Voice of America, an accurate, objective, and comprehensive service of world news.

- Acts as an advocate for the views and policies of the United States, correcting distortions of our position and falsehoods about our country.

- Advises within the Executive Branch on foreign opinion.

- Plays a role in the cultural relations of the United States with other nations, both through its own programs and through its responsibility for administering abroad the educational and cultural programs of the Department of State.<sup>2</sup>

### *USIA Objectives*

To guide overseas operations, we have established objectives for each country program, stemming from the foreign policy objectives of the United States.

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<sup>2</sup> In my memorandum of August 12, 1966, to all USIS posts, I emphasized that I expect our field representatives to carry out educational and cultural functions on behalf of the Department "with as much understanding, insight and knowledge" as they bring to the conduct of USIA programs. [Footnote is in the original. For the August 12 memorandum, see Document 104.]



I find it helpful to consider USIA Objectives in the following three broad categories:

1. *The United States as a nation.* To achieve its goals, the United States requires cooperation and often active partnership with other countries. Their understanding of what we have achieved and are seeking to achieve, inevitably colors their interpretation of U.S. actions and intentions throughout the world. It is imperative that they know the kind of nation we are—the facts about our people, our governmental officials, our industrial, business, political and labor leaders, our educators and cultural figures.

From this need derives USIA's fundamental responsibility to build understanding of the United States, its institutions, culture, and ideals. Such understanding is a necessary basis for the respect, confidence, and support that the U.S. world role today requires. A sympathetic climate of opinion not only helps to achieve immediate objectives; it can also keep alive common bonds that may withstand or lessen serious political tensions.

Because the panorama of America is so broad, we must concentrate on *significant* aspects most relevant for our audiences in their total judgment of the United States. Where those who disagree with us have distorted the truth, we must correct the record and affirmatively present the facts. The values that our audiences themselves prize, as well as the misconceptions they hold about the U.S., should determine the points of emphasis in each country program.

2. *International Issues and U.S. Policies.* The United States needs understanding and support on many international issues. These may range from NATO and the Kennedy Round<sup>3</sup> to a non-proliferation treaty, the Alliance for Progress, and questions before the United Nations.

We in USIA must present the facts about these issues clearly and cogently. When the U.S. needs active support for its position, we seek to persuade not only governmental leaders who have the power of action, but also influential elements of public opinion who must support them.

3. *National Development.* The United States is today helping many developing countries to build the foundations of independent, modern states, responsive to the needs of their people.

When the U.S. has specific objectives of national development within a country, USIA has a role in the total U.S. effort. This may include:

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<sup>3</sup> For information about the Kennedy Round, see footnote 9, Document 96.

- Explaining AID assistance and showing how cooperative programs can spur the nation's growth;<sup>4</sup>
- Helping build understanding of responsible citizenship and the democratic process;
- Focusing attention on critical issues such as the relation of population to agricultural production;
- Sharing relevant thought and experience that the developing countries can apply to their own problems;
- Acting as a catalyst in the circulation of ideas and helping shape new attitudes that must underlie modernization.

Exposing the fallacies and dangers of communism in its many forms has been a task of USIA and its predecessor organizations<sup>5</sup> since the end of World War II. This task is still with us, particularly in the developing countries where the threat often takes the form of communist-supported insurgency. Our information programs can help alert people to the dangers, and support efforts of these nations to maintain their independence.

The Agency must, of course, operate here with considerable caution, and recognize the limits of our capacities and responsibilities. While much of our activity will be carried out in cooperation with local organizations and governments, we should not attempt to substitute for them.

#### *Program Priorities*

Opportunities for USIA programs far outstrip our resources. The skill with which we set priorities in large measure determines our effectiveness.

Priority need not go only to immediate objectives. Just as the goals of the United States are both long and short range, so USIA Objectives may be a combination of both. Some of our most significant work requires time: change in understanding and attitude often comes slowly. The fact that an objective is long range, however, does not

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<sup>4</sup> As the information arm of AID abroad, we build public understanding of AID programs. Our task does not include providing technical information, which is the responsibility of AID. While the demarcation line may not always be clear, and there is often an understandable tendency to "get the job done," we should avoid activities that do not clearly fall within our mission. [Footnote is in the original.]

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, established in late 1945, which was followed by the creation of the Office of International Information and Office of Educational Exchange by the U.S. Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 9) and, in 1952, the International Information Administration, which was abolished with the formation of the United States Information Agency in 1953.

obviate the need for precision in its definition—nor for periodically evaluating progress toward its accomplishment.

With rare exceptions our primary targets must be leaders, present and potential. The commercial mass media often give us the opportunity to reach not only leaders but also wider audiences. We should remember, however, that our greatest effect comes from concentrating on those individuals who wield influence in their own societies.

Our programs must be limited to those activities most likely to contribute toward achievement of objectives. The work-load must be realistic. We should not attempt more than we can competently perform.

Finally, there must be no reverence for activities simply because they have been carried on for many years. As conditions change, so must programs be altered to meet current problems.

#### *New Challenges for USIA*

I am well aware that the Agency's many and varied responsibilities place exceptional demands upon our personnel.

To meet them, we need the highest standards of professional competence.

We must be proficient in the arts of communication and the techniques of the media. We must also be experts in understanding our audiences—their cultural heritage, their aspirations and attitudes. To be a good communicator requires an ability to listen and understand, as well as to speak and inform.

Looking ahead, I see increasing demands upon us. The growing complexity of issues around the world with which the United States is concerned; the burgeoning of communications in an electronic age; the development of new information techniques and media—all pose new challenges.

I particularly hope in the coming months to make significant progress toward:

1. A more effective means of setting priorities for all Agency activities. We must devise through the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System a systematic means of analyzing the relative benefits of different programs, making full use of research tools.

2. Reduction of marginal activities.

3. Higher quality of output.

4. Further definition of the Agency's role in national development.

5. Exploration of new media techniques.

6. Increased professionalism of Agency personnel, both through recruitment of talented new staff and through the training of career officers to help each develop his abilities to the fullest.

With your help I know we can enhance the Agency's capacity to meet new challenges. I invite your comments and questions on these vital problems.

Sincerely,

Leonard H. Marks

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**141. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State  
(Katzenbach) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 17, 1967

SUBJECT

Report of your committee on CIA Relations with Private Voluntary Organizations

*1. Nature of the Report*

I thought that you might wish, prior to our meeting today,<sup>2</sup> to have an idea of the direction in which our study is going. Hence I enclose a very nearly final draft report.<sup>3</sup> There may yet be language changes, but I believe this has the general approval of the committee.

You might focus particularly on the two underlined recommendations on pages 1 and 2 and the proposed Statement of Policy on page

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, Box 193, C.F. Oversize Attachments: 12/2/68, Packet 3 [Cater 2/67–10/67 material re U.S. Government and Private Voluntary Organizations, Committee on Voluntary Overseas Activity (COVA), also the Rusk Committee]. Secret. Copies were sent to Gardner and Helms. A notation in an unknown hand in the bottom right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum indicates that it was received at the White House on March 17 at 6:54 pm. Attached to the memorandum are a March 23 typewritten note indicating that the memorandum and its attachment were sent to Clark "at President's request" and a March 23 routing slip transmitting the memorandum and report. Another copy of the memorandum is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Box 44, Ramparts—NSA—CIA.

<sup>2</sup> No record of a meeting was found.

<sup>3</sup> The final report will include a series of classified appendices which do not affect the substance of the report proper, which is drafted in a way to permit you to make it public. [Footnote is in the original. The undated draft final report is attached but not printed.]

4. The footnote is particularly important.<sup>4</sup> I believe it fair to say that Dick Helms would wish more leeway than the Policy allows and that John Gardner would prefer virtually no leeway at all. The footnote represents a position that we ought to *try* to achieve a flat ban, but without handcuffing the Administration or the United States Government, whatever the future danger. I believe the footnote is acceptable to both Messrs. Gardner and Helms—but they can speak for themselves.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. *Public Reaction*

In my view, this report would be a satisfactory solution to the first public problem of how to sweep up the broken china.

The committee also has sought to provide a platform for the second problem—a constructive alternative. We did not attempt to particularize a recommendation of a new funding mechanism for the reasons stated in the report. (But we also thought it unwise for a committee on which CIA was represented to undertake this task).

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the footnote on page 5 of the draft report (see footnote 3 above) which reads: "If the Statement of Policy is to be effective, it must be rigorously enforced. In the judgment of this committee, no current programs would justify any exception to this policy. At the same time, where the security of the nation may be at stake, it is impossible for this committee to state categorically now that there will never be a contingency in which overriding national security interests may require an exception—nor would it be credible to enunciate a policy which purported to do so. We therefore recommend that, in the event of such contingencies, the interdepartmental review committee be permitted to make exceptions to the Statement of Policy, but only where the overriding national security interests so require; only on a case-by-case basis; only where open sources of support are shown to be unavailable; and only when such exceptions receive the specific approval of the Secretaries of State and Defense. In no event should any future exception be approved which involves any private educational, philanthropic, or cultural organization." An unknown hand crossed out the word "private."

<sup>5</sup> Helms sent McPherson his thoughts regarding the report in a paper, which he dated by hand "16 March '67," entitled "Implications of a Policy Statement Prohibiting Covert Assistance to 'Educational, Philanthropic, or Other Voluntary Organizations.'" In the paper, he stated: "For the most part I agree with the position taken in the proposed report. I completely concur in the conclusion that covert financial support to most of the organizations formerly supported by the CIA should be terminated, and I have no objection to public announcement of this decision. I continue, however, to be deeply concerned about the implications of a public policy statement which categorically provides that after December 31st, 1967, no further covert financial assistance will be given to any 'private educational, philanthropic or other voluntary organization.'" He continued that a public announcement would present the CIA with "an impossible dilemma" and he described an example: "Perhaps the best illustration of this dilemma is RFE. I am convinced that with the best possible cooperation from all concerned, it will take considerable time, if indeed it is ever possible, to arrange alternative sources of funding for RFE, via a Congressionally approved council or foundation or otherwise. As a practical matter, in my opinion, it will not be possible between now and December 1967 to provide RFE with funds through covert channels which are adequate to permit it to continue its activities until alternative sources of funds are established. Therefore, CIA will almost inevitably be forced either to violate the wording of the proposed policy statement by continuing covert support to RFE, or to liquidate RFE entirely." (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Box 68, CFOA 12/2/68 Packet #3)

I would suggest that you now have an opportunity to turn the whole issue to advantage and to win substantial credit with the liberal, academic, intellectual community, by going forward promptly with the recommended followup committee. For this reason, you might wish to release a response to our report at the time it is released. This response could announce the new committee and reflect your determination to achieve and support a sensible solution.

Respectfully,

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

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**142. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 25, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I am joining Messrs. Gardner and Katzenbach in signing the report of the committee on CIA relations with private organizations on the assumption that it has been decided as a matter of policy to accept what I believe are the probable consequences of a public release of this report. I am writing, however, to make sure that my views concerning these consequences have been made clear.

Insofar as the report recommends new measures of support for private organizations, I am of course in total agreement. To the extent, however, that the report constitutes public announcement of a policy which will hereafter prohibit covert support to any of "the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations," I believe that it seriously jeopardizes the existence of certain existing resources of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, Box 192 [2 of 2], C.F. Oversize Attachments: 12/2/68, Packet 2 [Cater 2/67-10/67 material re U.S. Government and Private Voluntary Organizations, Committee on Voluntary Overseas Activity (COVA), also the Rusk Committee]. Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Gardner and Katzenbach. Cater and McPherson sent the letter to Johnson under a March 25 covering memorandum, in which they stated that Helms had suggested a revision to the Katzenbach report, which Helms had already signed, adding that Katzenbach and Gardner opposed the revision. They explained the nature of Helms's main reservation, adding that "the amendments suggested by Helms would cripple the report." Cater and McPherson recommended that the President accept the report as submitted and signed by Katzenbach, Gardner and Helms. Johnson did not approve or disapprove the recommendation, but did initial the top left-hand corner of the memorandum. (Ibid.)

Government, such as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and one or two other organizations, the value and effectiveness of which have been reaffirmed over a period of many years. In my opinion the proposed policy statement will also curtail the options available to the Government and its ability to react swiftly in situations which may develop abroad,<sup>2</sup> comparable to the 1962 political crisis in British Guiana.

I recognize that the footnote<sup>3</sup> in the report is intended to provide some leeway for future contingencies. It will be difficult and probably impossible, however, to continue covert funding for existing organizations such as RFE and Radio Liberty, particularly in view of the searching and critical scrutiny which these organizations are likely to receive as a result of publication of this report. Moreover, I am doubtful that alternative sources of funding can be found which will permit continued operation of these radios under circumstances which will ensure that they are neither official organs like the Voice of America nor vehicles for the uninhibited expression of emigre opinion.

I have suggested alternative language to the committee which, in my opinion, would achieve the objectives desired for the report without tying our hands or involving risks of future embarrassment. Although the other two members of the committee did not agree with my recommendation, it is still my view that the report should be so worded as to feature a policy of support for the foreign activities of genuinely private organizations and the need for a new quasi-official instrumentality through which such support can be channelled. The problem of clarifying the Government's attitude towards CIA relationships with private institutions would be adequately covered by a brief factual statement. I believe that the report should simply confirm the fact that CIA is proceeding to disengage from all domestic educational or private voluntary organizations as rapidly as the national security permits under the direction of a substantially strengthened interagency control mechanism which involves the personal participation of the Secretaries of State and Defense as appropriate.

Such a statement has the advantage of being factually accurate. It provides reasonable assurance to critics of CIA programs that firm action has been taken to liquidate activities which they find objectionable. It contains no admissions or commitments which are not fully compatible with the dignity and prerogatives of the Government.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the political crisis in British Guiana during which the CIA began funding groups opposed to Premier Cheddi Jagan. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, Document 370; and *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XII, American Republics, Documents 241–299.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the footnote on page 5 of the report; see footnote 4, Document 141.

I am attaching proposed rewording of the report along the lines suggested above.

If you decide to release the report substantially in its present form, we will immediately study the problem which the report poses for the continuation of RFE and Radio Liberty. I would like to be able to give a neat solution, but the complex of factors involved will require time to work out. Possible alternative sources of funding, the implications of the status and legal composition of the radios and the problem of arrangements adequate to ensure control of broadcasting policy will all have to be examined.

These are perplexing questions and, particularly if alternative sources of funds must be found, are unlikely to be resolved prior to December 31, 1967, the cut-off date established in the report for termination of CIA support for private organizations. Therefore, I believe that there should be at least some relaxation in the time which the report allows to CIA to accomplish liquidation of these relationships.

Respectfully,

**Richard Helms<sup>4</sup>**

#### **Attachment**

#### **Paper Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence Helms<sup>5</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### *Proposed Changes in the Wording of the Proposed Report on Covert Assistance to Voluntary Organizations*

A. The two basic recommendations of the report (beginning on page 1) should be amended to read as follows:

1. To assure that private American voluntary organizations can play a proper and vital role abroad, it should be the policy of the United States Government to develop and the Congress should promptly establish a mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of such organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.

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<sup>4</sup> Helms signed "Dick" above this typed signature.

<sup>5</sup> No classification marking.



2. Covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of our society's private organizations should be discontinued as rapidly as circumstances affecting the national security permit and responsibility for overseeing and assisting in the implementation of this policy should be entrusted to a strengthened interdepartmental review committee.

B. The words "A NEW POLICY" should be deleted from page 2.

C. Beginning with the last sentence of the 4th paragraph on page 3, the present material through the paragraph ending on page 5 and the footnote should be eliminated and the following language substituted:

These considerations have led us to the conclusion that CIA can and should terminate its support to domestic private associations, institutions and other organizations. It should be noted that, starting well before the recent wave of disclosures and assertions, CIA had initiated and pursued efforts to disengage from much of this activity. Total disengagement should proceed as rapidly as circumstances affecting the national security permit and responsibility for overseeing and assisting in the implementation of this policy should be entrusted to a strengthened interdepartmental review committee with personal participation by the Secretaries of State and Defense as appropriate.

# 143. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Cater) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 27, 1967, 7:45 p.m.

Attached is a letter from Under Secretary Katzenbach which reports today's review meeting with Gardner and Helms and includes a revised page 4<sup>2</sup> which resulted from that meeting. Katzenbach says that Helms "assures me that he can go along with the report without complaint."

The revision on page 4 simply makes it clear that termination of covert support to certain private organizations such as Radio Free Europe may not be entirely completed by December 31, 1967.

If you are satisfied with Katzenbach's letter, we can issue the report on Tuesday afternoon.<sup>3</sup> Ramsey Clark has reviewed the report and finds no problems. Katzenbach suggests that it would be useful for him to conduct a background briefing at Christian's press conference.

The following Members of Congress have agreed to serve on the new committee:

Carl Hayden  
William Fulbright  
George Mahon  
Mendel Rivers  
Frank Bow  
Thomas Morgan  
Milton Young

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, Box 192 [2 of 2], C.F. Oversize Attachments: 12/2/68, Packet 2 [Cater 2/67-10/67 material re U.S. Government and Private Voluntary Organizations, Committee on Voluntary Overseas Activity (COVA), also the Rusk Committee]. No classification marking. Cater sent the memorandum to Johnson under a March 28 note, in which Cater stated that he had "held up sending in this new report from Katzenbach until I could talk to Helms this morning. He tells me that it is 'properly descriptive of my attitude.' He says that the report is the best consensus that the three of them [Helms, Katzenbach, and Gardner] could reach." Cater also indicated that Helms urged that the President consider Milton Katz, Professor of International Law at Harvard University, for the follow-up committee as "the most knowledgeable man he [Helms] knows about the overseas aspects of these activities by non-government organizations." Cater added that Gardner also believed that Katz "would be a strong man on the committee." Although a line on this note written in an unknown hand reads "Put on President's Desk" there is no indication that Johnson saw it. Attached to both the memorandum and the note is a handwritten note from Roberts to Cater, in which she wrote: "any need for this to stay on Pres's desk?"

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is the revised version of page 4 from the March 24 draft of the Katzenbach Report.

<sup>3</sup> March 28.

Katzenbach believes Russell will serve if you call him personally.

Rusk says he is willing to serve as Chairman, but believes that it would be better to have Herman Wells as Chairman. In addition to Rusk, Gardner and Schultze will represent the Executive Branch. You may wish to indicate, not for publication, that McPherson and I can serve as White House liaison for the committee.

For nongovernment membership we suggest the following:

Herman Wells, former Chancellor, University of Indiana  
William Marvel, President, Education and World Affairs  
Dr. Frank Rose, President, University of Alabama  
James A. Linen, President, TIME, Inc.  
James Perkins, President, Cornell University

If you approve the Katzenbach report, the attached draft statement to the press,<sup>4</sup> and the proposed membership for the committee, Christian can make arrangements for a briefing.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Rusk serve as Chairman \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Herman Wells serve as Chairman \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_<sup>5</sup>

### **Attachment**

#### **Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson<sup>6</sup>**

Washington, March 27, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Secretary Gardner, Mr. Helms and myself, have reviewed our report of March 24<sup>7</sup> in the light of Mr. Helms' letter to you of March 25.<sup>8</sup> I am attaching a new page 4 to the report which makes some minor editorial changes in line with recommendations contained in the last

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<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> The President did not check any of these options.

<sup>6</sup> Eyes only. Copies were sent to Gardner and Helms.

<sup>7</sup> A copy of the report dated March 24 is in the Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, Box 193 [2 of 2], C.F. Oversize Attachments: 12/2/68, Packet 4 [Cater 2/67–10/67 material re U.S. Government and Private Voluntary Organizations, Committee on Voluntary Overseas Activity (COVA), also the Rusk Committee]. The final version of the report was released on March 29; see footnote 3, Document 144.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 142.

paragraph of Mr. Helms' letter. With this change, Mr. Helms assures me that he can go along with the report "without complaint".

I think it would be wise if I backgrounded the press at the time the report is released. While I think that the report speaks for itself, a backgrounder would insure a common interpretation and understanding of its provisions.

As you know, I took it to be the function of our small committee to review only one small aspect of CIA operations—the covert support it has been giving for many years to domestic private organizations which operate programs abroad. I have no doubt that these programs performed a useful and necessary function. I believe that many of them could today be overtly financed by the Government. Others can be continued within the policy of the committee by shifting financing abroad.

Secretary Gardner and I strongly believe that it is necessary for the report to state a firm policy with respect to these domestic organizations. Mr. Helms fully understands and appreciates the reasons for such a policy. From the point of view of CIA operations, he would prefer more flexibility and latitude, but appreciates the force of the arguments made in the report. He believes CIA can "live with" this policy, as presently modified, and has therefore signed the report.

Respectfully,

**Nicholas deB. Katzenbach**

**144. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Cater) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 28, 1967, 11:10 p.m.

Here is the proposed statement which was prepared by Katzenbach at your request together with the members of the committee.<sup>2</sup> I have to check with Tom Gates in the morning. You were planning to approach Russell directly.

Also attached is the public part of the Katzenbach report which will be issued to the press.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of the White House Aides, Files of S. Douglass Cater, Box 16, Cater, Douglass: Memos to the President, March, 1967. No classification marking. Johnson initialed the top left-hand corner of the memorandum. A notation in an unknown hand in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that it was received on March 29 at 12:15 p.m. Another copy of the final Katzenbach, Gardner, and Helms report is in the Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Oversize Attachments, 12/2/68, Box 193, Oversized Attachments: 12/2/68, Packet #4 [Cater 2/67–10/67 Materials re U.S. Government and Private Voluntary Organizations Committee on Voluntary Overseas Activities (COVA), also the Rusk Committee].

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed. The final version of the statement was released on March 29: "I have received the report from the committee which I appointed on February 15 to review relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency and private American voluntary organizations. This committee consisted of Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, as Chairman, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John Gardner, and CIA Director Richard Helms. I accept this committee's proposed statement of policy and am directing all agencies of the Government to implement it fully. We will also give serious consideration to the committee's recommendation 'that the Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.' To review concrete ways of accomplishing this objective, I am requesting Secretary Rusk to serve as chairman of a special committee which will include representatives from the executive, the Congress, and the private community." (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1967*, Book I, pp. 403–404) The draft statement that Cater sent to Johnson included the names of proposed members of the Rusk Committee, which were omitted in the final public statement: Rusk, Chairman, Clark, Schultze, Fulbright, Hayden, Russell, Young, Bow, Mahon, Morgan, Rivers, Johns Hopkins University President Eisenhower, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company President Gates, Southwest Texas State College President McCrocklin, Paul Porter, John D. Rockefeller, IV, and former Indiana University Chancellor Wells. (Johnson Library, Office Files of the White House Aides, Files of S. Douglass Cater, Box 16, Cater, Douglass: Memos to the President, March, 1967)

## Attachment

### Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson<sup>3</sup>

Washington, March 24, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

The committee which you appointed on February 15, 1967 has sought, pursuant to your request:

—To review relationships between government agencies, notably the Central Intelligence Agency, and educational and private voluntary organizations which operate abroad; and

—To recommend means to help assure that such organizations can play their proper and vital role abroad.

The committee has held a number of meetings, interviewed dozens of individuals in and out of government, and reviewed thousands of pages of reports. We have surveyed the relevant activities of a number of federal agencies. And we have reviewed in particular and specific detail the relationship between CIA and each relevant organization.

Our report,<sup>4</sup> supplemented with supporting classified documents,<sup>5</sup> follows.

In summary, the committee offers two basic recommendations:

1. *It should be the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations.*
2. *The Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.*

#### 1: A NEW POLICY

The years immediately after World War II saw a surge of communist activity in organizations throughout the world. Students, scientists, veterans, women and professional groups were organized into interna-

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<sup>3</sup> No classification marking. The report was released along with the President's statement to the public on March 29. Both are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 24, 1967, pp. 665–668; and *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1967, pp. 1214–1217.

<sup>4</sup> The report was also referred to as “the Katzenbach Report” or “the Katzenbach-Helms Report.”

<sup>5</sup> The supporting classified documents were not found attached.

tional bodies which spoke in the cadences, advocated the policies, and furthered the interests of the communist bloc. Much of this activity was organized, directed, and financed covertly by communist governments.

American organizations reacted from the first. The young men and women who founded the United States National Student Association, for example, did so precisely to give American youth the capacity to hold their own in the international arena. But the importance of students as a force in international events had yet to become widely understood and NSA found it difficult to attract private support for its international activities. Accordingly, the United States Government, acting through the Central Intelligence Agency, provided support for this overseas work.

We have taken NSA as an example. While no useful purpose would be served by detailing any other CIA programs of assistance to private American voluntary organizations, one fundamental point should be clearly stated: such assistance was given pursuant to National Security Council policies beginning in October, 1951 and with the subsequent concurrence of high-level senior interdepartmental review committees in the last four Administrations. In December, 1960, in a classified report submitted after a year of study, a public-private Presidential Committee on Information Activities Abroad specifically endorsed both overt and covert programs, including those assisted by CIA.<sup>6</sup>

Our study, undertaken at a later time, discloses new developments which suggest that we should now re-examine these policies. The American public, for example, has become increasingly aware of the importance of the complex forms of international competition between free societies and communist states. As this awareness has grown, so have potential sources of support for the overseas work of private organizations.

There is no precise index to these sources, but their increase is suggested by the growth in the number of private foundations from 2,220 in 1955 to 18,000 in 1967. Hence it is increasingly possible for organizations like NSA to seek support for overseas activities from open sources.

Just as sources of support have increased, so has the number of American groups engaged in overseas work. According to the Agency for International Development, there has been a *nine-fold* increase just among voluntary organizations which participate in technical assistance abroad, rising from 24 in 1951 to 220 in 1965. The total of *all* private American voluntary groups now working overseas may well exceed a thousand.

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<sup>6</sup> This committee was also referred to as the Sprague Committee.

The number of such organizations which has been assisted covertly is a small fraction of the total. The vast preponderance have had no relationship with the government or have accepted only open government funds—which greatly exceed funds supplied covertly.

The work of private American organizations, in a host of fields, has been of great benefit to scores of countries. That benefit must not be impaired by foreign doubts about the independence of these organizations. *The committee believes it is essential for the United States to underscore that independence immediately and decisively.*

For these reasons, the committee recommends the following:

*Statement of Policy*<sup>7</sup>

No federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy specifically applies to all foreign activities of such organizations and it reaffirms present policy with respect to their domestic activities.

Where such support has been given, it will be terminated as quickly as possible without destroying valuable private organizations before they can seek new means of support.<sup>8</sup>

We believe that, particularly in the light of recent publicity, establishment of a clear policy of this kind is the only way for the government to carry out two important responsibilities. One is to avoid any implication that governmental assistance, because it is given covertly, is used to affect the policies of private voluntary groups. The second responsibility is to make it plain in all foreign countries that the activities of private American groups abroad are, in fact, private.

The committee has sought carefully to assess the impact of this Statement of Policy on CIA. We have reviewed each relevant program of assistance carried out by the Agency in case-by-case detail. As a result of this scrutiny, the committee is satisfied that application of the Statement of Policy will not unduly handicap the Agency in the exercise of its national security responsibilities. Indeed, it should be noted that, starting well before the appearance of recent publicity, CIA had initiated and pursued efforts to disengage from certain of these activities.

The committee also recommends that the implementation of this policy be supervised by the senior interdepartmental review committee

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<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand, presumably Cater's, wrote and underlined "Statement of Policy" at this point in the text.

<sup>8</sup> On the basis of our case-by-case review, we expect that the process of termination can be largely—perhaps entirely—completed by December 31, 1967. [Footnote is in the original.]



which already passes on proposed CIA activities and which would review and assist in the process of disengagement.<sup>9</sup>

## 2: NEW METHODS OF SUPPORT

While our first recommendation seeks to insure the independence of private voluntary organizations, it does not deal with an underlying problem—how to support the national need for, and the intrinsic worth of, their efforts abroad.

Anyone who has the slightest familiarity with intellectual or youth groups abroad knows that free institutions continue to be under bitter, continuous attack, some of it carefully organized and well-financed, all of it potentially dangerous to this nation.

It is of the greatest importance to our future and to the future of free institutions everywhere that other nations, especially their young people, know and understand American viewpoints. There is no better way to meet this need than through the activity of private American organizations.

The time has surely come for the government to help support such activity in a mature, open manner.

Some progress toward that aim already has been made. In recent years, a number of federal agencies have developed contracts, grants, and other forms of open assistance to private organizations for overseas activities. This assistance, however, does not deal with a major aspect of the problem. A number of organizations cannot, without hampering their effectiveness as independent bodies, accept funds directly from government agencies.

The committee therefore recommends that *the Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.*

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<sup>9</sup> If the Statement of Policy is to be effective, it must be rigorously enforced. In the judgment of this committee, no programs currently would justify any exception to this policy. At the same time, where the security of the nation may be at stake, it is impossible for this committee to state categorically now that there will never be a contingency in which overriding national security interests may require an exception—nor would it be credible to enunciate a policy which purported to do so.

*We therefore recommend that, in the event of such unusual contingencies, the interdepartmental review committee be permitted to make exceptions to the Statement of Policy, but only where overriding national security interests so require; only on a case by case basis; only where open sources of support are shown to be unavailable; and only when such exceptions receive the specific approval of the Secretaries of State and Defense. In no event should any future exception be approved which involves any educational, philanthropic, or cultural organization.* [Footnote is in the original.]

Such a mechanism could take various forms. One promising proposal, advanced by Mr. Eugene Black, calls for a publicly funded but privately administered body patterned on the British Council.<sup>10</sup>

The British Council established in 1934, operates in 80 countries, administering approximately \$30,000,000 annually for reference libraries, exhibitions, scholarships, international conferences, and cultural exchanges. Because 21 of its 30 members are drawn from private life, the Council has maintained a reputation for independence, even though 90 percent of its funds are governmental.

According to the UNESCO Directory of Cultural Relations Services, other nations have developed somewhat similar institutions. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations, for example, is entirely government-financed but operates autonomously. The governing body of the Swedish Institute for Cultural Relations consists of both government and private members. This institute receives 75 percent of its funds from the government and the remainder from private contributions.

The experience of these and other countries helps to demonstrate the desirability of a similar body in the United States, wholly or largely funded by the federal government. Another approach might be the establishment of a governmental foundation, perhaps with links to the existing Federal Inter-Agency Council on International Education and Cultural Affairs.

Such a public-private body would not be new to the United States. Congress established the Smithsonian Institution, for example, more than a century ago as a private corporation, under the guardianship of Congress, but governed by a mixed public-private Board of Regents.

The committee began a preliminary study of what might be the best method of meeting the present need. It is evident, however, that, because of the great range both of existing government and private philanthropic programs, the refinement of alternatives and selection among them is a task of considerable complexity. Accordingly, we do not believe that this exclusively governmental committee is an appropriate forum for the task and we recommend, instead, the appointment of a larger group, including individuals in private life with extensive experience in this field.

The basic principle, in any event, is clear. Such a new institution would involve government funds. It might well involve government officials. But a premium must be placed on the involvement of private citizens and the exercise of private judgments, for to be effective, it would have to have—and be recognized to have—a high degree of independence.

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<sup>10</sup> See footnote 5, Document 116.

**145. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Cater) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 31, 1967, 10:30 a.m.

I met with Secretary Rusk late yesterday afternoon to discuss the plans for the committee which is to serve as followup to the Katzenbach Report.<sup>2</sup> Two points emerged which you may wish to consider:

1. Rusk believes that this committee would be the wrong group to dig deeper into CIA operations. He suggests that a better way to accomplish this would be to get Clark Clifford and the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board<sup>3</sup> to make a systematic review of all CIA clandestine activities. Alternatively, you could designate whoever you wished to serve with the Interdepartmental Review Committee—the 303 Committee<sup>4</sup>—to conduct a special review of all such activities. Either of these arrangements could provide you a far more searching and secure means of finding out what goes on in CIA. When it is completed, you might wish to review it with certain of the Senators and Congressmen who sit on the CIA Subcommittee. But Rusk doubts that this public committee would be well equipped to do the initial review.

2. In discussing ways to carry out the Katzenbach Report suggestion that we “. . . establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support. . . .” Rusk thought serious consideration should be given to placing this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of the White House Aides, Files of S. Douglass Cater, Box 16, Cater, Douglass: Memos to the President, March, 1967. No classification marking. Annotation in an unknown hand in the top left-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “rec'd 3-31-67 1030a.”

<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting was found. Reference is to the Rusk Committee, which was announced in the President's March 29 statement regarding the release of the report prepared by Katzenbach, Helms, and Gardner (see footnotes 2, 3, and 4, Document 144; and Roy Reed, “President Orders C.I.A. to Halt Aid to Private Groups.” *New York Times*, March 30, 1967, p. 1)

<sup>3</sup> For additional information about the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 183.

<sup>4</sup> The 303 Committee, was originally known as Special Group 5412 and established by National Security Council Directive NSC 5412/2. This group was comprised of representatives of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The group was to be advised prior to the establishment of major covert action programs and were to advise and approve these programs. See *Foreign Relations*, 1958–1960, vol. XIX, China, footnote 1, Document 277. NSAM 303 officially changed the name of Special Group 5412 to the 303 Committee, but “in no way alters the composition, function or responsibility of the Special Group 5412.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 204)

responsibility in the new center for international education in HEW.<sup>5</sup> If this proves to be the best course it may be awkward to propose this when Gardner wasn't a member of the Committee. I suggest that you may wish to consider either making him a Committee member or else indicate publicly that he will be consulted as the Committee performs its work.

Make Gardner Committee member? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Designate Gardner to be consulted by Committee? Yes \_\_\_\_\_  
No \_\_\_\_\_

See me: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Presumably a reference to the proposed Center for Educational Cooperation.

<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand, presumably that of the President, checked all three "No" options.

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#### 146. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 5, 1967

##### SUBJECT

Scope of Special Review of Funding of Private Voluntary Organizations Abroad

On March 29, you asked me<sup>2</sup> to serve as Chairman of a *special committee* to consider a recommendation in the Katzenbach-Gardner-Helms report<sup>3</sup> that

The Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of youth, educational, cultural, and labor organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, Box 68, CF Oversized Attachments 12/2/68, Packet # 2. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Johnson likely asked Rusk to serve as Chairman during an "off record" meeting he had with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, and Christian on March 29 in the Cabinet Room of the White House between 5:07 p.m. and 6:16 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>3</sup> See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 144.

This memorandum outlines for your approval the way in which I plan to proceed with this assignment.

*Approach*

1. *I propose to have the committee review the kinds of activities formerly funded by CIA which might accept overt Government funding to determine whether continued support is in the U.S. interest.*

—We will concentrate on the organizations (excluding Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty—see below) which the Katzenbach committee identified as possible recipients of overt Government support. [2 lines not declassified]

—We will also attempt to judge the extent to which the many voluntary American organizations not formerly funded by CIA may seek and qualify for public support, if overt funding is available.

—The committee should *not* review CIA covert activities, beyond those identified by the Katzenbach committee as prospects for overt U.S. funding.<sup>4</sup>

—Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty should not be included at least initially in the study of the special committee, since the radios are primarily propaganda instruments, not cultural and educational. The 303 committee<sup>5</sup> with the support of the Budget Director should proceed immediately with a study of the alternatives for the future of these organizations.

2. *If there is a demonstrated need for public funding, we will examine form or means of public support.* Should we expand existing appropriations (like HEW's Center for International Education) or should we create new organizations, including the quasi-public foundation or council proposed in the Katzenbach report?

3. *In connection with a quasi-public council, we will explore any advantage to transferring to such a body the funding of existing agency educational and cultural activities.*

—“Education and World Affairs,” a non-profit corporation, representing seven major foundations, has suggested transfer to such a body, a large part of the \$400 million of educational and exchange programs carried out by regular Government agencies.

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<sup>4</sup> According to the Committee report, “no useful purpose would be served by detailing any other CIA programs of assistance to private American voluntary organizations.” See Document 144.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 145.

—Realistically, we propose to limit the committee's consideration to a smaller package of activities in the range of \$50–\$60 million annually. These might include Fulbright academic exchanges, support of East-West Center,<sup>6</sup> American colleges and universities abroad such as the one in Beirut,<sup>7</sup> and cultural and athletic presentations.

4. *We will also look into the relation between Federal and private financing.* Our experience demonstrates a reluctance on the part of private contributors to give sustained operating support to entities basically funded by the Federal Government (e.g., the Smithsonian). On the other hand, Government has given grants to institutions which are almost wholly funded privately.

I expect to hold the first meeting of the committee on my return from Punta Del Este.<sup>8</sup> My objective is to complete the work of the special committee in about 60 days. I will keep you regularly informed as the work of the committee proceeds.

Dean Rusk

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4, Document 92.

<sup>7</sup> Presumably a reference to the American University of Beirut.

<sup>8</sup> Rusk was in Punta del Este April 7–14 for the OAS Heads of State and Foreign Ministers meetings. (For additional information see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 292; "Rusk in Uruguay for Talks," *New York Times*, April 8, 1967, p. 10; and John M. Goshko, "Hemisphere Chiefs Vow to Modernize Latin Life," *Washington Post*, April 15, 1967, p. A1)

<sup>9</sup> The President did not check either option.

**147. Report Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

USIA RESPONSIBILITIES IN LIMITED WAR AND  
INSURGENCY SITUATIONS

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

I. *SITUATION*

In several limited war and insurgency situations where the United States is directly involved, USIA is performing tasks that place severe strains on its resources. Some of these tasks appear to lie outside the Agency's appropriate sphere of operations.

In a number of countries USIS has been aiding, or indeed leading, host government efforts to immunize its population against threats of subversion and to strengthen the government's own appeal to its citizens. In Vietnam, the Agency has taken on extensive responsibility for the GVN's information program, as well as for the entire U.S. psychological warfare effort. USIS Bangkok devotes a major portion of its activities to supporting joint Thai-U.S. counterinsurgency programs in rural northeast Thailand. In Laos, USIS is in effect the Ministry of Information for the Royal Lao Government.

These three country operations absorb nearly fifteen percent of the Agency's resources available for overseas programming. In FY 1967 the Agency has budgeted \$87 million for country programs (GOE, salaries, media support, administrative support and special foreign currency). The total for Vietnam, Thailand and Laos is \$12 million. Of the Agency's approximately 1,200 U.S. and 6,000 local employees serving abroad, 184 Americans and 717 locals are serving in these three countries. The programs require a particularly large number of middle grade officers, a large proportion of whom must also receive a minimum of ten months' language training. The result is that 20 to 25 percent of the Agency's grade 4 and 5 officers are either stationed in one of these countries or in the training pipeline for assignment there. It is estimated that by mid-FY '70 the Agency's present supply of eligible middle grade officers will have been selected for service in these countries.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 32, USIA Responsibilities in Limited War & Insurgency Situations. Secret. Ryan sent the report to Marks under an April 26 covering memorandum, in which he summarized the report.

These activities impose a severe burden upon Agency resources in personnel and funds.

The basic document defining the Agency's role in insurgency situations is the "U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy" (OIDP), approved by the President in NSAM 182 of August 24, 1962.<sup>2</sup> This provides that USIA "orient its program toward immunizing the vulnerable sectors of developing societies against Communist propaganda and subversive activities and helping the modernization process to maturity." The OIDP also provides that USIA "assist the host government in its psychological operations aimed at preventing or defeating subversive insurgency."

More general authorization is found in the Presidential statement of mission (January 25, 1963), which (1) assigns USIA an advisory role on all programs of the executive branch affecting foreign opinion; and (2) makes USIA responsible for the conduct of the overt public information programs abroad of all U.S. government agencies except for Commands of the Department of Defense.<sup>3</sup>

In the case of Vietnam, NSAM 330 of April 9, 1965 specifically charged USIA with responsibility for *all* psychological activities.<sup>4</sup>

With respect to statutory authority, the Agency is responsible under Title V of the Smith-Mundt Act for the dissemination of information "about the United States, its people, and its policies."<sup>5</sup> The General Counsel believes that the term "its policies" is broad enough to cover the Agency's counterinsurgency and limited warfare activities.

Thus the Agency appears to have adequate authority, both by law and by Presidential directive, for these operations. In each case there have been valid reasons for USIA to step into a crisis situation and attempt to meet it. The Agency has, however, undertaken responsibili-

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<sup>2</sup> NSAM 182 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Document 105. The OIDP, according to NSAM 182, elucidated a "national counter-insurgency doctrine" and served as "basic policy guidance" for government agencies, diplomatic missions, and military commands. See also *ibid.*, Document 106.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 14, Document 87.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 12, Document 37. Specifically, according to NSAM 330: "The responsibility of the Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs [a senior U.S. Information Agency officer], Saigon, for all psychological and informational programs in South Vietnam under the direction of the U.S. Ambassador is here reaffirmed."

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 9, Document 32. According to section 2 of the Smith-Mundt Act: "The Congress hereby declares that the objectives of this Act are to enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries. Among the means to be used in achieving these objectives are—(1) an information service to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people, and policies promulgated by the Congress, the President, the Secretary of State and other responsible officials of Government having to do with matters affecting foreign affairs."



ties that in the long run could more appropriately and effectively be handled by other U.S. government agencies or by the host government. And the Agency has not planned sufficiently for phasing out of responsibilities which, over an extended period of time, unduly tax its resources.

## II. RECOMMENDATIONS

### 1. *General Principles Applying to Limited War and Insurgency Situations*

a. As psychological adviser to the executive branch of the government (see Agency's statement of mission, Appendix A-2-IV<sup>6</sup>), USIA has the responsibility to *advise* all agencies on the public opinion aspects of their programs.

b. This advisory role includes psychological warfare programs (i.e., information activities directed at hostile forces or at populations under hostile control). Normally the Agency's role should be limited to (1) supplying policy guidance, information about the local psychological environment and advice to the appropriate military authorities, and (2) aid in planning and designing the content of psywar materials.

c. The Department of Defense should be responsible for funding, manning and equipping psychological warfare *operations*. USIA should direct or carry out such operations only in an emergency when specifically instructed to do so by the President. USIS posts should not engage in the actual production or distribution of psywar materials except upon request of the military in a crisis situation, with specific approval of USIA Washington, and until military resources can be brought to bear.

This definition of responsibility is in line with the Presidential statement of mission (Appendix A-Z-IV)<sup>7</sup> which provides that the Agency shall be responsible for overt public information programs abroad of all U.S. government agencies except for Commands of the Department of Defense.

d. USIA assistance to foreign government information programs aimed at defeat of subversive insurgency normally will be limited to an advisory role—in planning, preparation of materials, and training of personnel. Actual production or distribution of materials for a foreign government will not be undertaken except in crisis situations and with specific approval of the Agency.

USIA assistance to a foreign government should include a definite time-table for its termination and posts should report regularly to Washington on progress toward this goal. Where an extended informa-

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<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed is Tab A, Appendix A-2, "Legal basis for USIA operation."

<sup>7</sup> Attached but not printed.

tion effort is required to suppress insurgency, a primary objective of USIA should be to help the local government build up its own facilities to take over the task. In such situations other appropriate government agencies (AID, CIA, Defense) should provide needed equipment, production facilities, personnel, and training to the local government, with USIA restricted to an advisory role.

e. USIA advisory personnel for local government information programs should be assigned only to central information services and, if clearly necessary, to the chief regional capitals. USIA should not provide personnel to supplement local government information activity at the provincial or local level. Nor should it provide personnel when overt participation by foreigners will in the long run defeat the purpose of the program (i.e., identification of the government with its own people). In the latter case, CIA should fulfill U.S. responsibilities.

Exceptions to this principle should be allowed only with specific approval by USIA Washington, and should be limited to emergency situations, again with a time-table for termination of USIS assistance.

f. Upon request, USIA will assign officers experienced in psychological operations to training programs maintained by the Department of Defense, OCO or other U.S. government agencies. The Agency will likewise maintain regular liaison with such training establishments by providing sample materials, current country plans and occasional lecturers in Agency doctrine and operations.

g. Area Assistant Directors should maintain regular liaison with major military regional commands in their areas, preferably through periodic visits. Participation in contingency planning should be considered on an individual country priority basis.

## 2. *Specific Changes in Present USIA Responsibilities and Operations*

### a. *Vietnam*

(1) JUSPAO should turn over to MACV all production and distribution of psywar materials as soon as MACV is prepared to assume responsibility for such activities. (This covers all materials directed at enemy forces and populations under their control, including Chieu Hoi appeals, the newspaper *Mien Nam Tu Do*, and materials for airdrop over North Vietnam.)

(2) The responsibilities of JUSPAO field representatives should be limited to:

support to the GVN's revolutionary development program; support to U.S. military forces in community relations; and conventional USIS activities promoting understanding of the U.S. and its objectives in Vietnam.

JUSPAO should review assignments of field representatives to ensure that they do not exceed these functions.

As outlined in the general principles above, USIS personnel should be limited to major regional capitals. Fifteen officers should be adequate: five senior officers for the four corps and the Capital Military District, six officers for the four National Priority Areas and two other high-priority areas, and four officers for assignment to military commands.

At the specific request of a U.S. military commander at the division level or above, and with the approval of the JUSPAO Director, the field representative may also supply advice on psywar activities supporting specific military operations.

(3) JUSPAO should work out time-tables to reduce and eventually terminate its substantial direction of the Ministry of Information, Radio Vietnam and Television Vietnam, as well as its financial aid to these programs. JUSPAO participation should eventually be limited to an advisory role.

*b. Thailand*

(1) USIS should establish a time-table to turn over responsibility for the Mobile Information Team program to the Thai Government, phasing out personnel and financial support.<sup>8</sup> This timetable should provide for closing most Branch Posts as soon as Thai government officials in the area acquire enough competence to operate the Mobile Information Teams without U.S. assistance.

(2) In cooperation with AID the post should establish a training and equipment program to strengthen the personnel resources and production capability of the Thai information service. This should also provide a time-table for eventual termination.

(3) Production and distribution of the 80,000 information packets should be turned over to the Thai Government as soon as possible, although USIS should continue to advise on program content and techniques. AID should be asked to supply or underwrite those technical materials in the packets dealing with agriculture, water and other aspects of national development.

*c. Laos*

(1) In cooperation with other U.S. government agencies, the post should devise a program for building an effective Lao Information Service. AID should provide equipment and technical training, while

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<sup>8</sup> Mobile Information Teams in Thailand were made up of a Government of Thailand official, a doctor, a U.S. Information Service "observer," and a film projectionist. These teams traveled to remote areas of Thailand, in order to show films and lead discussions on themes that "stress national unity, loyalty to the King and Thai culture." The team doctor provided medical aid and the teams took village requests to the Thai Government for assistance. (Seymour Topping, "Thailand Progresses in Efforts to Thwart Reds," *New York Times*, December 31, 1963, p. 3)

USIS should offer advice on program training, format and content. The post should prepare a timetable for transferring responsibility for the production and distribution of materials from USIS to the RLG.

If necessary, CIA should provide the necessary funds and stimulus to ensure that the RLG assigns adequate personnel to staff the Information Service.

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**148. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 2, 1967

EXPO 67 at Montreal has opened and has received wide press attention.<sup>2</sup>

The U.S. Pavilion produced and operated by USIA has been featured in all leading reviews. With few exceptions, great praise has been given to the United States for the imaginative design of the pavilion and the manner in which the exhibit has been prepared. Typical press comment is shown below:

*New York Times*—April 28, 1967—states editorially “Canada and the U.S. both have hits in EXPO 67, which opens in Montreal today. . . . the United States Pavilion is a standout—a joyous distillation of the best American art, science and culture, no less profound for its easy wit and beauty.”

“Fortunately, the U.S. has finally recognized, in its glittering Buckminster Fuller ‘skybreak bubble,’ that its best cultural exports are its dynamic young talent and its innovative masters.<sup>3</sup> The combination steals the scene.”

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Agency Reports, U.S. Information Agency, Box 135 [2 of 2], United States Information Agency 1967 [3 of 3]. No classification marking. Sent through Kintner, who initialed the memorandum. An unknown hand, presumably that of one of Johnson’s secretaries, wrote the letter “L” in the upper left-hand corner of the memorandum indicating that Johnson had seen it. Another copy is in the Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 32, White House Weekly Reports, Library 1967.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the 1967 International and Universal Exposition, commonly referred to as Expo 67 or the 1967 World’s Fair held in Montreal, Canada. It opened April 27 and closed October 29. The exposition served to showcase the industry, science, agricultural production, technology, and culture of participating nations. (Eugene Griffin, “Canada’s Expo Will Open to Public Today,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 28, 1967, p. 1; and Gerald Waring, “Expo Closes, Future Unsure,” *Washington Post*, October 30, 1967, p. A1)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the American architect, theorist, author, and inventor Buckminster Fuller who designed the “skybreak bubble” for the Montreal Expo. (Kathleen Teltsch, “A 20-Story Bubble by Fuller to Hold U.S. Expo 67 Display,” *New York Times*, March 1, 1967, p. 45)

*New York Times*—April 28, 1967—Ada Louise Huxtable says of the U.S. Pavilion, “It is suave, witty, sensitive, subtle, artful, elegant and profound. It is also beautiful.”<sup>4</sup>

*Montreal Star*—April 20, 1967—praises the U.S. Pavilion . . . “the pavilion exhibits two sterling virtues which are scarcer than hen’s teeth when the government of a powerful nation is involved: elegance and humor.”

*Montreal Star*—April 30, 1967 is filled with praise of U.S. Pavilion—stating “. . . an overwhelming statement about American architectural and engineering genius.” And, after describing the exhibit in detail it continues, “If you don’t grasp the fact that these and many other similar exhibits in the Pavilion (U.S.) of one of the two most powerful nations on earth could have been conceived only by people of wit and imagination with real love for and a knowledge of their country and a supreme confidence in its strength and variety—you missed the point entirely.”

*Montreal Star* comments appear to be typical of Canadian press reaction.

*Christian Science Monitor*<sup>5</sup>—April 7, 1967—says of the U.S. Pavilion, “The most striking of all . . .”

*Associated Press*—April 29, 1967—under Max Harrelson’s byline says, “Even at this early stage the U.S. Pavilion has established itself as the biggest attraction at the Montreal World’s Fair—and the most controversial.

“Some of those viewing the U.S. Pavilion had strong opinions about its contents, but all seemed to agree that the design was spectacular and worthy of the United States.”

As a lone voice, *Newsday* was highly critical and said, “Throughout the building there is size without meaning, numbers without substance, artifacts without ideas. There is little intellect, little humor and little entertainment, and worst of all, there is little humanity . . .”

Attendance at the U.S. Pavilion is running about 50,000 a day, and EXPO officials tell us that it has been the most popular exhibit. Comments from visitors given to guides and to our officials confirm the complimentary remarks in the editorials quoted above.

**Leonard H. Marks**

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<sup>4</sup> See Ada Louise Huxtable, “A Fair with Flair,” *New York Times*, April 28, 1967, p. 18.

<sup>5</sup> See Richard L. Strout, “Borsch to Caviar,” *Christian Science Monitor*, April 7, 1967, p. 20.

**149. Letter From the Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs (Babbidge) to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Storrs, Connecticut, May 4, 1967

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The recent disclosures about the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in international educational and cultural programs came as a surprise and shock to the members of this Commission, as indeed they did to large numbers of the academic community and the general public.

It is our belief that incalculable damage was done by the concealed subsidies of the CIA to American participants in these programs. Questions have now been raised in the minds of foreign scholars, intellectuals, and artists about the objectivity, integrity, and independence of American foundations and the role of any U.S. citizen abroad. Even persons connected with private institutions, to say nothing of those having overt government grants, have been tainted as possible agents of the American intelligence community.

It is ironic that an intelligence agency, working covertly, found it in the national interest to engage in programs which this Commission has always underscored as a vital instrument of foreign policy. In our annual and special reports we have long urged an increase in the size and an improvement in the quality of the U.S. government's international educational and cultural programs. We have stated repeatedly, however that only programs of academic validity and unquestioned

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, Box 192 [2 of 2], C.F. Oversize Attachments: 12/2/68, Packet 2 [Cater 2/67-10/67 material re U.S. Government and Private Voluntary Organizations, Committee on Voluntary Overseas Activity (COVA), also the Rusk Committee]. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Frankel and Donovan. Attached to this letter is an undated typewritten note marked "urgent" that reads: "Mr. Donovan called to say that Mr. Frankel should have this for his meeting with the Secretary tomorrow morning." There is no record of a meeting between Frankel and Rusk. In the upper right-hand corner of the letter a time stamp indicates that the letter was received in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs at 2:27 p.m. on May 5. Babbidge sent a similar and lengthier letter to Vice President Humphrey on the same day. In it, he stated that the Advisory Commission members "are convinced that a basic problem is one of funding and that existing authorities are not wholly effective because of a lack of funds," and "what is needed is much greater visibility of these programs, and we welcome the opportunity provided by the report of the Katzenbach panel to put down some of our thoughts on this subject." Babbidge also noted "that any responsible citizen must recognize a need for an intelligence-gathering operation in modern society and a similar need for an apparatus to explain American foreign policy overseas—both in its day-to-day operation and its long-range effects. Nevertheless, both of these instrumentalities should be meticulously separated from education and cultural exchange programs, public and private." (National Archives, RG 306, Director Subject Files, 1967-1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 1, Advisory Groups—U.S. Education and Cultural Programs, 1967)

integrity can achieve the purpose for which they are intended, namely, the promotion of mutual understanding and the elimination of national stereotypes.

The Commission is pleased to note that many people in and out of government have recognized that, as a result of the revelations of CIA's activities, the time is now ripe for decisive action and a great step forward toward the proper support of present and ongoing programs.

We write to you in your capacity as chairman of the committee set up by the President to consider the implications of the reports of the panel chaired by Under Secretary Katzenbach.<sup>2</sup> The panel's suggestion that consideration be given to establishing a quasi-public organization to become the main vehicle of educational and cultural exchange of this government is surely a stride in the right direction. In addition to the models proposed by the Katzenbach panel we suggest that consideration also be given to the admirable Canada Council,<sup>3</sup> then hope that the executive branch and the Congress will approve bold, comprehensive, and pervasive action.

If this Commission can be of assistance to you and your committee in the crucial tasks before you, please call on us.<sup>4</sup>

Sincerely yours,

Homer D. Babbidge, Jr.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 144.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the institution, also referred to as the Canada Council for the Arts, founded by the Government of Canada in 1957, which provides funding to cultural and arts organizations. Although established by the Canadian Government, the Council operates like a private entity, setting its own policy. It answers to Parliament through the Minister of Canadian Heritage and publishes annual reports for Parliament. For additional information, see Jean Battey, "Culture's Flowering (With Bit of Help)," *Washington Post*, May 23, 1965, p. M6; and Harry Trimbom, "All Canadians Are Art Patrons Via Council of Royal Authority," *Washington Post*, December 5, 1965, p. G2.

<sup>4</sup> In a July 12 letter to Rusk, the new Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Education and Cultural Affairs, Joseph Smiley, reported that during the Advisory Commission meeting a month earlier, he had lunch with Frankel, Babbidge, and others. According to Smiley, "We talked of a possible new public-private entity, which might take over grant programs now conducted directly by certain existing Government agencies. The fundamental purpose of such an arrangement would be to make the clearest possible distinction between cultural and educational efforts as such and information or propaganda functions. It is our thought that such a mechanism would take care of at least some of the so-called 'CIA orphans' and that the educational programs of USIA (for example, libraries as contrasted with reading rooms) as well as the many cultural and educational exchange programs now handled through the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State would also become the responsibility of the new agency." (National Archives, RG 306, Director Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 1, Advisory Groups—U.S. Educational and Cultural Programs, 1967)

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



## 150. Editorial Note

On May 1, 1967, an extra-legal, unofficial tribunal, known as the "International War Crimes Tribunal" and the "Russell Tribunal," initiated by the British philosopher and political activist Bertrand Russell, was convened in Stockholm, Sweden, to conduct an inquiry into possible United States culpability in war crimes in Vietnam. Members of the tribunal included French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, American political activist Stokely Carmichael, and American author James Baldwin. (Dana Adams Schmidt, "Russell Inquiry Will Open Today," *New York Times*, May 2, 1967, page 1)

United States Information Agency Director Leonard Marks, under a May 4 covering memorandum, sent to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Walt Rostow, copies of the May 1 and May 3 report "World Wide Treatment of Current Issues" prepared in USIA's Office of Policy and Research, which included the Russell Tribunal. In his covering memorandum, Marks wrote: "You will note that the European press, including Swedish and French press journals, were highly critical of the sponsors. Typical comments called the tribunal 'a farce,' 'macabre, distasteful and puerile exercise,' 'another anti-American demonstration.'" (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, National Security File, Country File: Vietnam, Box 191, Vietnam: The Bertrand Russell "Trial")

Rostow included the information from the May 3 "World Wide Treatment" publication in telegram WH 70255, May 5, to President Lyndon Johnson at the LBJ Ranch in Stonewall, Texas. In the telegram, Rostow stated: "You may be interested—and a little cheered by the USIA summary of European press reaction to the shenanigans in Stockholm." (Ibid.) Also on May 5, Marks sent the President media reaction analysis of the tribunal and a transcript of remarks by the prominent American journalist and CBS television anchor, Eric Severeid, both of which Johnson received. According to the media reaction analysis, "The world press generally have given only minor news treatment to Bertrand Russell's so-called 'international tribunal on war crimes,' which opened in Stockholm this week." (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, EX FO, Box 3, FO 4/28/67–6/10/67)

On May 8, both the United States Information Agency and the Department of State sent reaction guidance in joint circular telegram 190249, in which both agencies stressed to posts around the world: "The biased and propagandistic nature of this project has been fully documented in the press, so there is no reason for statements to this effect to be attributed to U.S. officials, either for the record or on background. We hope to avoid focusing attention on the tribunal, or raising its stature, by making it the subject of official U.S. notice."



(Johnson Library, White House Central Files, National Security File, Country File: Vietnam, Box 191, Vietnam: The Bertrand Russell “Trial”)

After nine days of testimony and examining the evidence various teams which conducted studies produced, the tribunal concluded that the United States was guilty. (“Little Attention Is Being Paid ‘War Tribunal,’” *Washington Post*, May 7, 1967, page A15; and Dana Adams Schmidt, “‘Tribunal’ Finds U.S. Guilty in War,” *New York Times*, May 11, 1967, page 6)

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#### **151. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 8, 1967

On Friday,<sup>2</sup> Vice President Humphrey scheduled a meeting with me, Nick Katzenbach, and Sargent Shriver to discuss an expansion of the information program in Western Europe and the need for more speakers representing the Administration on “Great Society” programs.

At the meeting I suggested the following:

1. That Cabinet officials and Agency heads cooperate with me in meeting the foreign press in New York at our Foreign Correspondents Center. Over 400 foreign correspondents are registered in New York and we have been able to attract a substantial number when top-name speakers are scheduled. The Vice President agreed to meet with this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 2, Congressional Relations—Vice President, 1967. No classification marking. Sent through Kintner. Marks sent a copy to Humphrey under a May 8 covering memorandum, in which he drew Humphrey’s attention to the fact that he had shared information about their meeting with the President and also that “many of our posts in Europe have held seminars on ‘Great Society’ activities.” (Ibid.)

On May 8 Marks also wrote a memorandum for the file summarizing the May 5 meeting with Humphrey, Katzenbach, and Shriver. In it, Marks noted that Humphrey was “distressed to find so little knowledge of American domestic activities by otherwise well-informed Europeans.” Humphrey suggested several ways to correct this, including expanding the “leader grant program” to attract more young people; encouraging U.S. Government officials “to travel abroad and attend meetings, make speeches and be interviewed on radio and television”; and “describing the work that we are now undertaking in relieving poverty, improving education, controlling water pollution, traffic, crime control, etc.” According to Marks, Humphrey called the meeting in order “to stimulate activities in this field and that he would periodically request reports on the progress being made.” A copy of Marks’ memorandum summarizing the meeting is in the same file as his May 8 memorandum to Johnson.

<sup>2</sup> May 5.

group within the next two weeks, as did Sargent Shriver. I will keep the pressure on other Administration spokesmen to do likewise.

2. Our Public Affairs Officers in Western Europe will be instructed to stimulate radio and television producers in their countries to visit the United States in order to prepare documentaries on subjects such as water pollution, urban renewal, low-cost housing, city planning and traffic control. As an inducement, we will offer the cooperation of the affected governmental agency in providing the necessary information and guidance, as well as top-level spokesmen.

3. When Administration officials travel abroad, if they will give me advance notice of their plans we will schedule them for interviews by press, radio and television and conferences with significant local groups. In the past we have not had advance notice and have been unable to make the most desirable arrangements of this nature.

I am planning a two-day meeting with our Public Affairs Officers from all of Western Europe on June 19–20 at Brussels.<sup>3</sup> These plans and other Agency operating problems will be reviewed at that time.

I thought you might also be interested in the program which I have started to acquaint our representatives with current activities in domestic programs when they return to Washington for home leave or consultation. We now schedule intensive courses on the legislative programs passed by the 89th Congress and significant actions of this Administration relating to the topics I have enumerated above and other social welfare programs.

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> Weld summarized the June 19–20 Brussels PAO conference in a July 31 memorandum to Marks, Ryan, Olom, Canter, and the PAOs from all the principal European posts. (National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 3, Field—Europe (IAE), 1967)

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**152. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to All United States Information Agency Public Affairs Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 15, 1967

Dear PAO:

Among the many responsibilities of USIA, none challenges us more than communicating to foreign audiences the American spirit and ideals, the reality of our people and institutions. Selecting the most significant in the vast panorama of our society requires a high order of knowledge and skill.

I am convinced that understanding of our nation abroad must underlie the successful conduct of U.S. foreign policy today.

The picture is richly varied and rapidly changing. Those of you who return home after several years abroad note the dramatic pace of change in twentieth century America. Just to cite two examples: our educational system from Head Start<sup>2</sup> and pre-school through post-graduate study, is undergoing profound transformations; the whole complex of programs, public and private, that make up the war on poverty form a very different picture today from what they did only two years ago.

In my March 6 letter<sup>3</sup> I divided USIA objectives into three broad categories, one of which was building understanding of the United States as a nation. Let me stress here a few points for your special attention.

1. *Planning.* Each PAO has the responsibility to build into his country plan, as the local situation demands, an appropriate objective on projecting the United States. I consider this essential for two reasons. First, it should ensure proper attention in programming. This is especially important in the case of long-range activities that run the risk of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 28, PAO Letters. No classification marking. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 306, United States Information Agency History Program, Subject Files, 1967–1975, Entry A1–1072, Box 5, Mission Statements, 1964–1967.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the educational program established by the Johnson administration through the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1965. In remarks he made on May 18, 1965, at the White House announcing the program, President Johnson stated: "Today we are able to announce that we will have open, and we believe operating this summer, coast-to-coast, some 2,000 child development centers serving as many as possibly a half million children." He noted: "These children will receive preschool training to prepare them for regular school in September. They will get medical and dental attention that they badly need, and parents will receive counseling on improving the home environment." (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1965*, Book I, pp. 556–557)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 140.

being swept aside by the more immediate, unless they are given due weight in the country plan.

The second reason is selectivity. The panorama of the United States is broad. With limited resources we must concentrate on those aspects that are most significant and relevant. The starting point is the country plan, with careful wording of objectives and themes.

2. *Quality.* As you know, the quality of all USIA work remains one of my chief concerns. Here in Washington we have done much to raise our media products to a higher standard of excellence. I have also given considerable thought to the quality of our USIS centers abroad—their physical appearance and the ways in which they represent the cultural heritage of the United States. I would like to feel that every visitor to a USIS center senses the spirit of our country and glimpses something of the best that America has to offer.

We have taken important steps to improve the quarter's of USIS centers and binational centers; to display in them fine examples of contemporary American graphic arts; and to improve the holdings of our library collections. I also have in mind other steps about which you will be hearing shortly.

3. *Our human resources.* Programs, media products, buildings—all play a part, but none are so important as the human beings who serve USIA abroad. How can we help them to be well-rounded, knowledgeable representatives of America?

I realize that keeping abreast of developments in the United States is no simple task, especially for our field officers who frequently work under keen pressure. Nevertheless I am sure you agree that USIA should set and maintain the highest standards for its personnel.

Part of this responsibility, of course, falls upon the Agency. We have just completed a two-week field officers' seminar on "Problem Areas of Contemporary America." We plan more such seminars in the coming months, and have other projects in mind for training in Washington and at the post. We welcome any suggestions you care to make.

While the Agency can help, however—and will increasingly in the future—there is no substitute for the individual's motivation and determination. The chief responsibility must lie with each officer, whether his sphere of operations is in exchanges, radio, press, or the other media. It is up to him to take advantage of the many materials that are available, from the wireless file to cultural packets, newspapers, magazines and books.

You as Public Affairs Officer have a heavy responsibility to set an example by your own efforts, and through your leadership to encourage others.

I know I can count on you to do so.  
Sincerely,

Leonard H. Marks

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**153. Memorandum From the Director of the United States  
Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 16, 1967

Reports from Western Europe continue to stress the need for an expanded information program directed to the youth of those countries. The program presented by CBS via satellite last night (featuring Governor Reagan and Senator Kennedy) confirmed this view.<sup>2</sup>

I have planned a meeting of our Public Affairs Officers in Brussels on June 19 and 20 at which time great stress will be laid upon this situation and directions will be issued by me to concentrate our efforts on the Great Society legislation and the work that we are carrying out to improve individual welfare.<sup>3</sup>

The presentation of these topics would be far more effective if one of your assistants, fully familiar with domestic legislation, attended the meeting and addressed the group, answering detailed questions that will be raised. For this purpose, I would recommend Doug Cater, Joe Califano or Harry McPherson.<sup>4</sup>

Leonard H. Marks

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Federal Government Organizations, EX FG 296, Box FG-315, FG 296 4/25/67-6/15/67. No classification marking. Sent through Kintner who initialed it.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the CBS television program "Town Meeting of the World." Kennedy and Reagan answered questions about the United States and foreign policy from a group of European and Asian students via satellite from London. (Jack Gould, "TV: Dialogue with London Students," *New York Times*, May 16, 1967, p. 91)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 151.

<sup>4</sup> The President disapproved the recommendation. Next to his initial, he wrote: "You must handle USIA. Our people have their work here—not roaming around the world—P." In a May 18 memorandum, Kintner informed Marks of the President's decision: "In reply to your suggestion that one of the President's Special Assistants accompany you, the President feels his staff is too pre-occupied with their own duties." (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Federal Government Organizations, EX FG 296, Box FG-315, FG 296 4/25/67-6/15/67)

**154. Memorandum From the Deputy Director, Policy and Research, United States Information Agency (Ryan) to the Director (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 10, 1967

SUBJECT

Output to the Arab World

Friday<sup>2</sup> afternoon I met with John Chancellor, John Daly, Dick Cushing, Alan Carter, Mark Lewis. Purpose: to identify and discuss the problems of talking to Arab audiences in the immediate future.

We agreed that:

(1) Dignity is a paramount sensitivity in the Arab world. We must do nothing to impair the Arab sense of dignity.

(2) Regardless of the invective of Arab media, VOA will maintain dignity, not gloat or reflect gloating, will not dwell on "Arab defeat," will not use charged language, rhetorical adjectives, or an indignant tone in refuting Arab charges. Refutation of those charges, however, will continue.

(3) VOA will follow the lead of the official U.S. position on rupture of relations. We regret the break with Arab nations, hope the breach can be healed.

(4) VOA will make every effort to avoid the collective term *Arab* in discussing the contenders against Israel. Some Arabs resent being—unjustly, as they feel—lumped with the combatants.

(5) Speculation on the meaning of Nasser's resignation,<sup>3</sup> and on his future role, is taboo in original output, and will be played down in use of attributed comment. The same applies to speculation on the Soviet role and motives, and on the responsibility for the initial outbreak of hostilities.

We agreed that a prime problem will be Arab preoccupation with the applicability of the U.S. commitment to territorial integrity of the nations in the area. We also agreed that we do not have the answer now.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 4, Field: Near East & South Asia, Middle East Crisis, 1967. No classification marking. Another copy is in National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 311, INFI Near East Middle East Crisis Agency Output 1967. USIA generated this memorandum in response to the conclusion of the Six Day War between Israel and the UAR (Egypt), Syria and Jordan, June 5–10. Israel defeated the forces of the three Arab nations on June 10.

<sup>2</sup> June 9.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the UAR, who resigned his office on June 10 because of the UAR's loss to Israel, but changed his mind later that day and decided to remain in office. (See Eric Pace, "Nasser Decides to Remain, Yielding to 'People's Will,'" *New York Times*, June 11, 1967, p. 1)

IOP will incorporate these points in a more general guidance<sup>4</sup> to the media.

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

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**155. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 15, 1967

A UPI despatch yesterday reported the following:

“Already their big propaganda guns were blasting away at the U.S., Britain and Israel in what London diplomats said would become one of the biggest Soviet propaganda campaigns in years.”

There are other indications that this prediction will be fulfilled.

During the past week, Arab propaganda organs such as Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus have engaged in a vituperative and vicious campaign to discredit the United States. In addition to originating the “big lie” about the U.S. participation with Israel forces,<sup>2</sup> it has indulged in name-calling and tactics reminiscent of Nazi Germany.

As I have previously reported, we have attempted to meet this challenge by expanding all of our information services and concentrating on the Middle East problem.

Since the press of the Arab world will not print our statements, the Voice of America is the only effective tool available to us. We have doubled the hours of broadcasting in Arabic and increased the French language broadcasting to North Africa. We have emphasized and repeated over-and-over our answers to the Arabic charges and to Soviet accusations. Reports from the affected posts indicate a measure of success.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Agency Reports, Box 135 [2 of 2], United States Information Agency, 1967 [3 of 3]. Confidential. Sent through Kintner, who did not initial the memorandum. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum. Another copy is in Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 32, White House Library, Jan–June 1967.

<sup>2</sup> For additional information about the “big lie” and the UAR accusation of U.S. and British support to Israel and involvement in the Six Day War, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 261.

In evaluating this situation, I call your attention to the following:

1. Emotionally, the Arab world wants to believe the truth of the charges and it is very difficult to overcome their historic deep-seated bias.

2. Because the Arab world today is frustrated by the stunning defeat administered to it by a handful of Israeli forces, they accept the "big lie" and have made the United States a scape goat. U.S. officials engaged in foreign policy matters may become frustrated because the "big lie" will not be completely repudiated despite our most vigorous and intensive efforts. In this frustration, they must not assume that the media are inadequate—radio and press are merely tools, they are not substitute for effective deeds, nor will they overcome historic animosities, or emotional bias.

3. U.S. *actions* and *deeds* will speak louder than the words in a shortwave program. Accordingly, it is vital that during the coming months our actions with reference to Middle East problems be presented for the maximum impact on the Arab world. These actions should be announced in such a fashion as to create the greatest attention.

4. The USIA does not make policy—it reports it. However, unless we are fully informed during the time that the policies are being considered, we cannot report to the maximum advantage. We cannot prepare ourselves unless we know the background of the problem and the action well in advance of the public announcement.

5. The actions of the Bundy Committee will be of vital importance in determining how the USIA uses its media resources.<sup>3</sup> Unless we are fully informed on the deliberations and decision of this committee, our effectiveness will be diminished.

I am writing to you in this fashion since I fear that we are facing a most critical period during the next several months and I am anxious to avoid misunderstandings on the role which the USIA can play in attempting to resolve these complex problems. It would be helpful if you would instruct McGeorge Bundy and others involved in handling the Middle East crisis to keep me fully informed at all times.

Leonard H. Marks

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Special Committee established on the order of the President following the outbreak of the Six Day War on June 7. The Special Committee, with Bundy serving as Executive Secretary, provided crisis management during and after the war. For additional information see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 149; and *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Documents 91 and 104.



**156. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 10, 1967

## SUBJECT

Committee on Overseas Voluntary Activities (COVA)

This is a preliminary report on the work of the Committee you appointed to consider the Katzenbach-Helms-Gardner recommendation “that the Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.” Our work to date includes—

- two meetings of the full Committee<sup>2</sup> (see attendance list attached)<sup>3</sup>
- three other meetings of panels of the Committee<sup>4</sup>
- consultations with 90 knowledgeable individuals, representatives of voluntary organizations, and Government officials by members of the Committee and staff.

The full Committee has not yet definitively expressed its views. But on the basis of discussions to date, my assessment of what may emerge as recommendations to you is summarized below.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, Box 192 [1 of 2], Oversized Attachment 12/2/68, Packet #1 [Cater 2/67–10/67 Material re U.S. Government and Private Voluntary Organizations Committee on Voluntary Overseas Activities (COVA), also the Rusk Committee]. Limited Official Use. Cater sent the memorandum to Johnson under a July 11 note in which Cater stated: “Rusk indicates that the Committee is seriously considering a recommendation for a new semi-private Commission to assist voluntary organizations which are doing important work abroad.” Cater explained that Rusk had suggested that Johnson meet with Rusk before a third meeting of the Committee. Cater, at the conclusion of the note, wrote: “See Rusk?” Johnson approved the recommendation and added: “get Walt [Rostow] to put on agenda for regular Tuesday lunch. L.” No record of a discussion of this issue at a regular Tuesday White House lunch was found.

<sup>2</sup> A meeting of the Committee on Public Funding of Overseas Activities of American Voluntary Organizations took place on May 6, but it is unclear if this was the first or second such meeting. The agenda and minutes of the May 6 meeting are in the National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Records of Nicholas Katzenbach, Lot 74D271, Box 3, CIA-Rusk Committee.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated list entitled “Membership of Committee on Overseas Voluntary Activities.”

<sup>4</sup> No record of any of the three meetings was found.

1. We believe that the Committee's concern should not be limited to the so-called CIA orphans.<sup>5</sup> We have examined the work of the three dozen voluntary organizations formerly funded by CIA (annual cost of about \$15 million) and found some excellent work which deserved support. We have also become aware of a much larger number (100–150) of private voluntary organizations doing similar worthy work overseas.

2. The most interesting activities of voluntary organizations involve institution building—helping to build overseas the kind of local communities and private groups necessary to free and economically successful societies. Private organizations have played an important, and perhaps underestimated, role in our own national development. They can be even more important in a number of developing countries. The kinds of private organizations we are thinking about include: rural cooperatives; adult literacy and family planning groups; labor groups; youth and student organizations; credit unions and locally-run savings and loan associations; businessmen's organizations; and women's organizations.

Since U.S. private organizations can work directly with like-minded groups in other countries without having to go through official government channels, they can often run experimental projects which deal with sensitive activities—like fostering political literacy and birth control, changing outmoded economic practices, and developing civic attitudes. A few agencies, primarily AID and State, already contract with some private organizations for specific projects programmed by the agencies. However, it appears that we lose a great deal by not supporting work which the organizations themselves initiate through their own channels.

3. Our examination indicates that the private organizations can make small grants go a long way (most CIA grants were less than \$250,000). Thus, a reasonable annual program might run \$20–30 million.

4. While we cannot be definitive at this point (only Congressman Mahon of the eight congressional members has taken an active part in the Committee's work), we believe that there could be significant political and congressional support for the kind of initiative that reaches people and private groups in other countries through U.S. private organizations, many of which have large and influential memberships.

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to what *Time*, in its May 19 issue, called "the orphans". "In current capital usage, the orphans are the nearly 100 private agencies that had been getting CIA money and were left high and dry by the White House order that all such undercover support must cease—preferably by year's end." ("How to Care for the CIA Orphans," *Time*, May 19, 1967, pp. 42–43)

5. Organizationally, there would be substantial advantage to separating such grant-making from existing agencies and foreign policy considerations and placing it in a bipartisan Commission of distinguished private citizens. This would emphasize the private nature of the activities and permit support of more sensitive and experimental activities. We envision a Commission whose members and chairman would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, with a staff of about 300. It would derive most of its funds by appropriation and some from private donations, although the latter would probably not be large.

6. We are also exploring transfer to such a commission of certain existing academic and cultural exchange programs. Senator Fulbright believes that such a shift would benefit the exchange programs. This alternative would involve transfer of about \$60 million from existing agency budgets (primarily State), in addition to the \$20–30 million of new funds for “institution building.”

I would be happy to discuss the matter with you if you believe it would be helpful, and I will in any event keep you informed of further developments in the Committee. We are proceeding to develop a final report to you and a draft bill to embody our recommendations.

**Dean Rusk**

**157. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 13, 1967

During a six-day stay in Viet-Nam<sup>2</sup> I conferred with:

1. Prime Minister Ky

Chairman Thieu

General Tri (Minister of Information and Chieu Hoi)<sup>3</sup>

The heads of press, radio, television

Representatives of the Vietnamese Information Service

2. Ambassadors Bunker, Locke, Komer and other Mission heads

3. USIA officials in Saigon and the provinces, Bac Lieu and Son Trang, which I visited for one day.

Based upon this experience I would like to report the following:

*1. Press Relations*

We are facing today the most serious problem in dealing with the press stationed in Viet-Nam. Pessimism and criticism about the course of the war is more pronounced today than at any time in the past two years. There is a growing vocal doubt about the Presidential campaign,<sup>4</sup> the military situation, ARVN's capabilities, the pacification program, prospects for social justice in Viet-Nam society and U.S. intentions for the future.

Correspondents are more critical in private conversations than in their written dispatches, although the latter are sufficiently critical.

This situation has been brought about by complex reasons, including the following:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 32, White House Library, July-Dec. 1967. Confidential. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum. Under an August 8 memorandum, Marks sent Rusk portions of the first and second pages of his July 13 memorandum to the President and noted: "I explored thoroughly the press relations problem of the Mission and concluded that the present press corps was likely to cause serious and difficult problems." Marks stressed that "our prophecy has regrettably been fulfilled, particularly by the recent story in the *New York Times* written by R.W. Apple." (National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967-1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 4, Government Agencies—State, Department of, 1967) Marks was likely referring to Apple's August 7 story "Vietnam: The Signs of Stalemate," *New York Times*, August 7, 1967, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Marks made his trip to Vietnam in early July. See *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, Document 240.

<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand wrote "and" over the word "in."

<sup>4</sup> The Presidential election in South Vietnam was scheduled for September 3.

A. The loss through reassignment and summer vacations of the more experienced and mature correspondents who have been replaced by a relatively new and young press corps in Saigon.

They are new to Viet-Nam and to the Far East, new to the complexities of any war and this war in particular, and new to the need for discrimination and evaluation of the many factors involved in this conflict. Many of these correspondents have built-in doubts and reservations which they brought with them from the United States. Many are here on their first “big assignment” and have a tendency to search for the critical story which might lead to a Pulitzer Prize. Such stories are easy to find if reliance is placed upon selfish interests and dissidents who seek publicity.

B. A general sense of war weariness and frustration.

Few correspondents see progress that holds any promise for an end to the war.

C. A growing doubt about the ability of the Vietnamese to do anything for themselves.

There is a despair about the corruption and government inefficiency, a belief that the Presidential campaign will be little more than a mockery of free election procedure and the belief that the Vietnamese lack motivation.

When I met with Prime Minister Ky and commended him on his patriotic attitude in accepting the Vice Presidency to avoid a conflict within the military, he thanked me but became quite indignant at a report filed by R.W. Apple of the *New York Times* which called this move “a stunning defeat” for Ky.<sup>5</sup> He became quite intemperate when he explained that he had done everything possible to keep Mr. Apple informed, had taken him aboard his personal helicopter on trips so that he might have an opportunity for a firsthand review of the war and political situation—and yet Apple persisted in attempting to “bring him down.” He threatened to throw Apple and other correspondents of that nature out of the country. Prime Minister Ky repeated this accusation later that night to a group of correspondents.

*Recommendation:*

The problem outlined is not readily resolved but may be alleviated by explaining to the American radio and television networks, the wire services and the principal newspaper publishers, the importance of having *experienced* and *mature* correspondents available to cover the elections in the next several months. I will undertake this effort if you approve. In doing so, I am mindful that every effort must be made to

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<sup>5</sup> See R. W. Apple, Jr., “Ky Gives Up Race For Presidency, Bowing to Junta,” *New York Times*, July 1, 1967, p. 1.

avoid any interference with the reporting of the news and that any suggestion of this nature must not be construed as a criticism of individual reporters.

## 2. Vietnamese Information Service (VIS)

There are at the present time, 14,000 persons employed by the Vietnamese Government to carry on an information program within Viet-Nam. I am informed that funds for this operation are being provided by AID.

During the past year, I have stressed the importance of having VIS take over many of the functions which USIS is currently providing in the provinces and throughout Viet-Nam. Our efforts have been unsuccessful.

When I met with General Tri, Minister of Information in charge of VIS, I reminded him of the promises made by him and by his predecessor, Minister Chinh, to fulfill this responsibility and complained that no progress had been made. I told him that it was apparent that relatively few of the 14,000 employees were performing a valuable function and earning their salary. When I asked him to give me his opinion of how many were doing their job, he replied "about 50." He frankly confessed that the others were doing little or nothing, that they were incompetent, that he was powerless to change the situation.

Despite his pessimism, on two previous occasions the VIS had responded to the challenge—during the TET campaign and during the elections for the Constituent Assembly.<sup>6</sup> In both cases they received strong orders "from the top" and they carried out their responsibilities.

I raised the subject with Prime Minister Ky and Chairman Thieu and received the polite promises to investigate the matter and do something. *In my opinion, nothing will be done.*

It is apparent that there is an ever-growing need for an expanded information service within Viet-Nam, yet an inability or a reluctance by the Vietnamese to carry it out. The USIS is unable to handle the entire responsibility.

## 3. Vietnamese Overseas Information Program

At the Manila Conference,<sup>7</sup> I secured an agreement from the then-Minister of Information General Chinh, Chairman Thieu, Bui Diem (then acting as Assistant to Prime Minister Ky) and Foreign Minister Do that the Vietnamese Embassies in various parts of the world would undertake an information program. They promised that qualified news

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 127.

<sup>7</sup> Johnson attended the Manila Conference during his trip to Asia in October and November 1966. See Document 111.

officials would be assigned to assist the Ambassadors in the principal capitals. When I reviewed this situation last week in Saigon, I found that nothing had been done.

I raised the subject with Chairman Thieu who recalled our discussions in Manila and reiterated his willingness to assist. He readily agreed that there were “a dozen” competent Vietnamese who could be assigned to fill this function and then asked if we would provide the funds for the salaries and expenses required—about \$500,000. Ambassador Bunker and I explained that the amount was small and certainly within the resources of the Vietnamese Government; however, we urged him to secure the personnel as soon as possible and that if funds had to be provided, we would see what arrangements could be made.

#### 4. *Use of Media*

A. My investigation revealed that we are using our press, radio and television facilities to good advantage. However, I am not satisfied that we have done everything possible to carry out an information program in *North Viet-Nam*. Our intelligence reveals that there are relatively few shortwave receivers in North Viet-Nam and that most people listen only to their local stations and that many are served by a central broadcasting service over which they have no choice of programs.

B. The Voice of Freedom, operated by the Vietnamese with U.S. assistance, is currently broadcasting about 12 hours per day. I have ordered an increase to 24 hours per day. To enable the North Vietnamese to listen to this station which has an excellent signal throughout the area, I propose to have fixed-frequency radio receivers dropped in North Viet-Nam. These sets will cost about \$3.00 a piece and should provide means of reaching a substantial audience.

C. The Voice of America is currently broadcasting to North Viet-Nam from Hue about 12 hours a day. This schedule is being increased to 24 hours a day effective next month.

D. Good progress is being made on the construction of land-based television stations and the entire country will have this service before the end of the year.

I am informed that there are in excess of 100,000 television receivers in the hands of the public. I visited radio and television stores which displayed Japanese, German and other sets. There is a brisk sale of these receivers. However, I found, to my dismay, that no licenses had been granted by the Viet-Nam Government for the assembly or manufacture of television receivers in Viet-Nam. On my last visit to Saigon, this subject was discussed with Prime Minister Ky and others who readily agreed that these licenses should be issued to stimulate

local industry and to siphon off excess purchasing power in the hands of the Vietnamese.

I raised the subject again with General Ky and Chairman Thieu who have again promised to do something.

#### *5. European Reaction to Viet-Nam War*

Despite increasing efforts to inform European audiences, there has been little improvement in European reaction to the U.S. position in Viet-Nam. Accordingly, I intend to continue the program of bringing European journalists to Viet-Nam for firsthand study of the war and non-military aspects.

In addition, I will send our PAOs to Saigon in small groups for a 4-5 day indoctrination course so that they may acquire firsthand experience and a greater knowledge of the issue. Hopefully, this will permit them to tell the story more effectively in their respective countries.

#### *6. Comments on Organization*

At the present time, U.S. operations are conducted by a multitude of committees and working groups. As a result, many of our officers are devoting a great deal of time to meetings and liaison work which could better be spent in carrying out their informational activity. I would hope that there could be a simplification of the structure which now houses MACV, OCO, CORDS and JUSPAO. Ambassador Locke is aware of this situation.

#### *Summary*

There is an acute need for an expanded information service in Viet-Nam between now and the September elections and continuing thereafter during the transitional period to constitutional government. Despite this need, little effort is being directed toward this end by the VIS and there is an apathy towards correcting the situation. Similarly, there is a desperate urgency for the Vietnamese story to be told by the Vietnamese in world capitals—and yet little is being done. I have brought these matters to the attention of the highest authorities and will continue to remind them of their responsibilities in these areas.

**Leonard H. Marks**



**158. Media Reaction Analysis Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 26, 1967

*RIOTS IN U.S. CITIES*

The riots in Newark, Detroit, and half a dozen other cities in the past two weeks have drawn increasingly sensational headlines and heavy coverage in most news centers around the world.<sup>2</sup>

As the riots in Detroit<sup>3</sup> rose to a new level of violence, widely reported by wire services with pictures, newspapers abroad generally raised the pitch of their headlines from “riots” to “rebellion” or, in some extreme cases, to “revolution” and even “civil war.” Some examples of the most recent front-page headlines:

RACIAL WAR EXPLODES IN U.S.A.

(*La Nacion*, government daily, Santiago, Chile, July 25)

12,000 U.S. SOLDIERS FAIL TO CONTROL NEGRO  
REVOLUTION

(*Al-Rai al-Am*, left-leaning, Khartoum, July 25)

Editorial comment, moderate in volume, reported from widely separated parts of the non-Communist world has reflected sympathetic understanding of the complexities. The primary lines of thought emphasized most frequently in the past ten days were:

1. U.S. race relations are very serious and dangerous. Any one-sided condemnation would be wrong because they are also very complex.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, EX FO 6–3, Box 62, FO 6–3 7/21/67–9/30/67. No classification marking. Maguire sent the President a copy of the analysis under a July 27 covering memorandum, in which he wrote: “Leonard Marks summarizes the reaction as generally sympathetic and understanding of the complexities of the problem. Several commentators stress the irony of the situation—because the Johnson Administration has done so much more than any other to improve Negro welfare. Radio Moscow, predictably, has highlighted news reports on the riots—and editorialized extensively on economic weaknesses and class distinction as roots of disorder.” (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Rioting was widespread in cities throughout the United States during the month of July, and continued throughout the year. For further details, see Fred Graham, “Restraint Urged in Race Riot News,” *New York Times*, July 8, 1967, p. 10; Richard Reeves, “Riots in Newark Are the Worst In the Nation Since 34 Died in Watts,” *New York Times*, July 15, 1967, p. 11; and “Major 1967 Riots: 19 Cities Hit by Violence Beginning in April,” *Washington Post*, July 18, 1967, p. A6.

<sup>3</sup> Rioting broke out in Detroit on July 23; see “Detroit is Swept by Rioting and Fires; Romney Calls in Guard; 700 Arrested,” *New York Times*, July 24, 1967, p. 1.

2. The tragic situation is "paradoxical" and "ironic" because the Johnson Administration has done far more than any other to improve the welfare of the Negroes.

3. But much more progress is needed to give the Negroes equality. What has been done is "like sprinkling water on thirsty soil."

4. Therefore, the Negro extremists are, "unfortunately," taking over from the moderates.

5. Extremists such as Stokely Carmichael<sup>4</sup> believe that the force of riots is necessary to stimulate faster progress for the impatient Negroes. This is not surprising and they may be right.

Less conspicuous has been the view expressed in some commentaries that the riots have little or nothing to do with the civil rights movement but are created by lawless, hooligan elements that exist in every city ready to destroy and loot whenever possible.

Mexico City papers told the U.S. riot story in banner headlines, detailed dispatches, pictures, editorials and cartoons.

Conservative *El Sol* said a "civil war that could destroy the U.S. may be in the offing. Newark is a warning that cannot go unheeded." It said "irresponsible" Negro leaders were to blame for the events, naming Stokely Carmichael.

*"Summer Madness Undiagnosed"*

Radical Liberal *Politiken*, Copenhagen, observed that "a diagnosis of the reasons for the summer madness in the big cities of the U.S. would probably be more useful" than exploring the moon. It said that "the world should be careful not to condemn the phenomenon one-sidedly."

In Sweden, liberal *Expressen* of Stockholm found the Newark events "not astonishing" considering "how little is being done to eliminate the causes of dissatisfaction." It contended that "what is astonishing is that the riots have not occurred more often and reached even more destructive scope."

*Indian Press Sees Paradox*

Indian editors deplored the "paradox" of riots in a period of social progress.

The *Free Press Journal* of Bombay said:

"The claim is perhaps not without justification that no previous American Administration in living memory has done as much for the social and economic rehabilitation of the Negro as the Johnson Administration. Yet, paradoxically enough, even as official efforts are

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the American social activist, civil rights advocate, and member of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, to whom the term "Black Power" is attributed.

directed at lessening the legal distance between the Negro and the rest of the European-Americans, racial antagonism also has increased."

The paper said "basic inequality" would continue, "and it will not be surprising, meanwhile, if Negro discontent expresses itself in violent forms, however much this violence may be deplored."

The *Times of India* wrote:

"Ironically, the incidents took place at a time when the Negroes are making significant gains in social integration in many fields. The riots are the work of extremists among the whites and the Negroes . . . . The general attitude of the police towards Negroes is not helpful."

The conservative London *Daily Telegraph* said that, except in housing, "progress in removing discrimination against Negroes has been much faster than ever before on all fronts . . . . Much that could otherwise be done in the way of material improvements has had to be postponed because of the drain of the Vietnam war."

The paper feared that "the growing influence of agitators preaching violence in a campaign for black power" could mean "an excuse for an orgy of looting and anti-white violence." It urged Administration and community efforts to "remove the underlying causes of discontent, thus supporting the moderate Negro leaders."

*"U.S. Leaders Willing to Help"*

Some West German comment stressed U.S. efforts to help Negro progress. The pro-Christian Democratic *Muenchner Merkur* said the Negroes' "liberation from backwardness and social injustice must be furthered from without. America's political leaders are now as before willing to do so."

Pro-Christian Democratic *Frankfurter Neue Presse* asserted:

"Much has been done for the Negroes in the U.S., but compared with what should be done, it is too little. It is regrettable that it takes such outbursts as those in Newark to spark the required deliberation on how to remedy the situation."

A failure for the moderates was seen by the independent *Stuttgarter Zeitung*:

"The present radical trend demonstrates that the protracted efforts of their moderate leaders to achieve equality have failed. Extremists are pressing them into the role of humiliated collaborators with the whites. This is a shame for the U.S. What lies at the root of the trouble is the refusal of the whites to accept the Negroes as fellow-citizens."

Scandinavian papers stressed that the causes of U.S. racial tension must be examined. In Denmark, Copenhagen's conservative *Berlingske Tidende* asserted that "the law must be the same for all . . . but the unsolved and almost insoluble dilemma of conflict" is the problem of

"uniting the spirit and the letter through a change of mind which no law can enforce."

*Solutions Considered Difficult*

Italy's Communist press, and many friendly papers as well, gave liberal space to riot stories and pictures. Right-of-center *Tempo* of Rome was puzzled:

"The precise, immediate causes of these manifestations of violence by the Negroes of America are always difficult to identify.

"Washington's notable and laudable postwar efforts notwithstanding, racial problems and prejudices still weigh heavily on the U.S. to a dramatic degree, in spite of many steps taken on the road to integration."

In Paris, rightist *Aurore* judged that the "striking thing" was that "racial strife is becoming worse precisely at the time when Negroes have more chances than ever to find their place in a fairer and more fraternal American society."

The paper said that the "rebellion" was started by Negro extremists of the "Carmichael type" and was "not intended to accelerate the integration of colored people, but to prevent it." Carmichael, the paper declared, refused cooperation with whites and sought self-determination by the Negroes.

"What he finally serves is not the cause of the Negroes whom he pretends to want to emancipate but the cause of blind and criminal violence."

The liberal *Dagens Nyheter* of Stockholm asserted that in the long run the American Negro could not be content with the simple statement that violence is self-defeating.

"On the contrary, he must realize that in certain situations force is the only thing that pays off. It is through the force of protest actions alone that America's blacks have released the chain reaction which has led to many—even if in practice limited—advances during the 1960's."

*"Hoodlum Anarchy"*

Christian Democratic *Popolo* of Rome ran a Washington correspondent's report that "the right term for the phenomenon is not 'uprising' or 'revolt'—terms which recur in all of the press—but rather 'orgy', to be understood as an outburst of unsatisfied desires having little to do with civil rights."

The *Straits Times* of Kuala Lumpur wrote of "a nightmare orgy of racial violence," for which "the tinder lies underfoot in every large city . . . . The mobs in Detroit did not loot and burn because Vietnam was in their hearts. . . . Grave as this latest wave of racial violence is, it is hoodlum anarchy, not black revolt."

*Communist Media*

Moscow radio quoted *Pravda* as saying the riots were “a result of the destitution and unemployment which the Negroes have suffered over the years.” Referring to a *New York Times* article which spoke of “two countries,” the Soviet newspaper declared that there were “two Americas which are at war with each other—that of the rich and strong and that of the poor and humiliated, of whom the majority are Negroes.”<sup>5</sup>

Peking radio said that “racist authorities, under Johnson’s instructions, brought in more than 4,000 National Guardsmen and state police, armed with rifles, pistols and machineguns” to help Newark police “in the wholesale arrest and slaughter of Afro-Americans.”

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to “Race Relations: The Ghetto Explodes in Another City,” *New York Times*, July 16, 1967, p. 131.

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**159. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to All United States Information Agency Public Affairs Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 27, 1967

Dear PAO:

I want to discuss with you two issues that concern me deeply—the need for change in USIA programs, *when circumstances so require*; and the need to address ourselves to fundamental problems.

Most of us, in varying degrees, resist change. All of us like the familiar and at times face the untried with trepidation. We find it more comfortable to continue in established patterns than to question them. From conversations and previous PAO letters, you know my concern that USIA can become too comfortable in familiar routines that may have outlived their usefulness. Media products and activities tend to become ends in themselves rather than means toward ends.

The second issue, closely related, is the need to analyze the fundamental problems that face the United States country by country—not simply the superficial manifestations of these problems. We then must

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 28, PAO Letters. Limited Official Use.

judge how USIA, using the tools of modern communications, can contribute toward their solution. Since many of these problems are long-range in nature, so our programs must be geared to long-term needs. Progress may require years, not weeks or months; yet we must set our sights clearly and realistically, shaping programs so that each day's efforts contribute toward our goals. And as circumstances change, our programs must change with them.

In all frankness, I do not believe that today all programs measure up to these standards. We often attack the superficial symptoms, not the fundamental illness. We frequently apply band-aids where the requirement is for penicillin. And at times we continue with old remedies that may no longer be effective.

I can think of no profession where such constant re-examination and questioning is more necessary than in USIA.

To shape meaningful goals and realistic programs, I am sure you will agree, we need a sound understanding of the psychology of the peoples with whom we communicate—their hopes and frustrations, their basic motivations, outlook and attitudes. Each post should cull the best from writings and studies that cast light on these questions, adding to them the expert first-hand knowledge of local employees and American staff. The resulting analysis should serve as a basis for the country program in shaping objectives and in guiding the approaches for media products and activities.

I call to your attention the attached analysis of the psychology of Arab peoples, "Arabia Decepta: A People Self-Deluded," in the July 14 issue of *Time*.<sup>2</sup> I know that you as PAO's are capable of producing such expert analyses of your own target audiences. I would like to challenge each PAO who has not written such a document to do so within the next two months.

In the Middle East, we now face the question, "Where do we go from here?" In several countries, we must start afresh. We are forced to re-think the circumstances under which we shall operate, the fundamental problems we face, what our objectives should be and how we can best achieve them.

We need not, however, await an unfortunate debacle such as that in the Middle East in order to take the same searching view of our programs elsewhere. We should take a fresh look, in terms of current circumstances and the foreseeable future, with no necessity to perpetuate operations in their old forms. Where these serve we should continue them; where they do not, we should find new formulas.

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

I am aware that much fine analytical work has gone into the preparation of the CPPM's; we must build on this but move still further. I have accordingly asked the Area Assistant Directors to review CPPM's and Country Plans to see whether they contain, in the opening "Situation" section, an analysis along the lines mentioned above; whether objectives are responsible to the fundamental problems as outlined; and whether programs are imaginatively framed to accomplish objectives. I have also asked each to give me an analytical paper dealing with the psychological situation, objectives and programs on an area basis.

As a result of this review, some of you will be asked by your Area Assistant Directors to re-think certain aspects of your program before preparing your new CPPM or Country Plan later this year. But for all PAOs, re-examination and revision are continuing processes. I hope that each of you will be challenged by these concepts and will give your best thought to putting them into practice.

Leonard H. Marks

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**160. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 28, 1967

It has become apparent that the Russians have started a campaign directed against the USIA, accusing it of attempting to undermine the 50th Anniversary celebration of the founding of the Soviet Union, scheduled for October 1967.

There have been a series of articles in *Pravda*, *Izvestiya* and various youth publications which follow a similar line. The accusations also involve the State Department, CIA, Department of Defense and the President. The following quotation will illustrate the nature of the charge:

"The basic points in the American program of preparation for the USSR anniversary in general can be expressed in three points:

"1. Discreditation of Soviet foreign policy,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 4, Field—Soviet Union & Eastern Europe (IAS) 1967. Confidential. Drafted by Marks.

"2. The undermining of the unity of the Socialist countries thereby creating the political isolation of the USSR,

"3. Discreditation of the political and economic system of the USSR.

"So, this time USIA has switched to our holiday. Among its projects that are being carried out are: conferences, symposia, sessions, question and answer periods, and seminars in anti-Soviet centers at the major universities in America. In particular, we are talking about Columbia, Stanford, Harvard, Princeton, and other universities."

Soviet publications contend that:

"... And the entire movement is supervised by the coordinating committee on the general direction of psychological warfare under the direct command of the President of the USIA."

Linked with this attack are references to the publication of a book by Svetlana Stalin to be published in October by Harper and Row.<sup>2</sup>

With reference to the Stalin book, Arthur Schlesinger recently wrote me suggesting that the publication be deferred until 1968 to avoid a conflict with the 50th Anniversary celebrations.<sup>3</sup>

I anticipate that future Soviet propaganda will attempt to link USIA to the book and accuse us of having it published to discredit the Anniversary. Incidentally, it is a common Soviet practice to accuse someone else of motives and tactics which they constantly employ.

The USIA has had no connection with this publication. We will not interfere with its contents, publication or method of distribution. No reply will be made to the Schlesinger letter.

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the daughter of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and to her book *Twenty Letters to a Friend*, which was published on October 2 by Harper & Row.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. A notation in an unknown hand below the typed signature reads: "Note: Ltr to President sealed in front office & given to I/S for delivery."



**161. News Policy Note Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

No. 21–67

Washington, July 28, 1967

**VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN CITIES**

(NOTE: This NPN consolidates and supplements a series of recent guidances issued to the media in both written and oral form. However, this paper should also be considered only an interim guidance, subject to change as the situation in the cities evolves and as other developments unfold.)

The “long, hot summers” of discontent and violence in American cities were amply predicted; yet when Newark, Detroit and other cities erupted in recent days they left the country shocked and dismayed by their nature and magnitude.<sup>2</sup>

A variety of explanations of the events is being offered. Theories are manifold, and sometimes conflicting. Several Congressional hearings have been scheduled, and from these undoubtedly will emerge a wide range of ideas and proposals.<sup>3</sup>

*Treatment*

Stories of urban violence and the economic, social and political problems associated with racial unrest are likely to remain prominent in the coming weeks. These are major news stories, and USIA media must continue to report them in some detail in order to maintain credibility.

*Guidelines:*

—Focus sharply on President Johnson’s two-pronged response (7/27/67) to the challenge: (1) measures aimed at a quick, final and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 309, Master Copies, 1967. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Sorkin. Sent for action to Modic, Vogel, Findlay, and Sayles. The News Policy Note is an enclosure to Infoguide 68–3, sent via pouch to all Principal USIS posts on July 31. In the infoguide Marks stated that the News Policy Note was being sent “for your information, and to guide you in treating this subject.” (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 158.

<sup>3</sup> Between August 2 and August 30, Senate committees held hearings addressing the riots in considering H.R. 421, the Anti-Riot Bill, which the House of Representatives passed immediately following the riots in late July. (John Herbers, “Police in 3 Cities Say S.N.C.C. Chiefs Incited Rioting,” *New York Times*, August 3, 1967, p. 1; John Herbers, “The Riots: What to Do Is the Issue,” *New York Times*, August 13, 1967, p. 153; Eve Edstrom, “No Easy Answer to Riots, Senators Told,” *Washington Post*, August 22, 1967, p. A4; and “Firemen Tell Senators of Riot Attacks and Ask Protection in Law,” *New York Times*, August 31, 1967, p. 17)

permanent end to the violence and punishment of law-breakers, and (2) "an attack—mounted at every level—upon the conditions that breed despair and violence . . . ignorance, discrimination, slums, disease, and not enough jobs."<sup>4</sup>

—Stress that only a tiny minority of the Negro population has taken part in the violence; that the great majority of Negroes, as well as whites, utterly deplore such tactics.

—Call particular attention to the July 26 joint statement by Negro leaders Martin Luther King, A. Philip Randolph, Roy Wilkins and Whitney M. Young, Jr., condemning the criminal violence and those who incite it. They stated: "We who have fought so long and so hard to achieve justice for all Americans have consistently opposed violence as a means of redress. Riots have proved ineffective, disruptive and highly damaging to the Negro population, to the civil rights cause, and to the entire nation."<sup>5</sup>

—To the extent possible, place the urban violence in socio-economic perspective. Rapid industrialization in the South, especially in agriculture where mechanization displaced human labor in recent years, as well as other factors, resulted in mass migrations to the cities. Cities were not prepared to cope with the massive influxes, and overcrowding, inadequate housing and schooling, and unemployment followed. Most Negroes from rural areas lacked technical skills, and were thus unemployable until trained. All these complex problems are being tackled, but by their nature are solvable only over the long term.

—While the U.S. as a whole has been enjoying unprecedented affluence, there has remained a hard core of disadvantaged persons who, for lack of education or the technical skills required by a modern nation, have not benefited. Results of the War on Poverty and a variety of other Great Society programs, such as massive Federal aid to education, will be felt in time.

—While these long-range programs are gaining momentum—and many will take years to produce large-scale results—a number of intermediate measures are also in progress—by municipalities, volunteer groups, states, and the Federal Government. The Federal Government's Office of Economic Opportunity directs such diverse programs as Job Corps, Head Start, Neighborhood Youth Corps, Upward Bound, and others.

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Johnson's July 27 "Address to the Nation on Civil Disorders." For full text of the address, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1967*, Book II, pp. 721-724.

<sup>5</sup> For full text of the statement, see "Top Negro Leaders Call for an End to Rioting," *Washington Post*, July 27, 1967, p. A1.

—Many of these programs have stirred interest and hope among the underprivileged where previously there had been only passivity and despair. Thus, paradoxically, the improvement in the Negroes' condition in recent years has contributed to the bringing about of violence, in the opinion of some observers. "Nothing is so unstable as a bad situation that is beginning to improve," writes William V. Shannon (*New York Times*, 7/27/67).<sup>6</sup> Sociologists point out that progress in its initial stages tends to generate expectations faster than they can be fulfilled; people who harbor frustrated hopes are more likely to rebel than those with no hope at all.

When violence takes over, obviously the story of quiet, steady progress of the Negro American cannot command comparable attention. But we must continue to plug away at that story, as we have over the years. That it has produced results is evident in the generally sympathetic and knowledgeable way many foreign editors have been handling the story of the Negro American and the current situation. The progress has been dramatic in civil rights legislation, voter registration and other political gains, economic benefits deriving from various Great Society and other programs.

You should screen the Negro press in the U.S. for constructive editorial comment which will make clear that most of America's 20 million Negroes are opposed to extremism and law-breaking, that the vast majority seek ways of working with their white fellow-Americans toward racial and economic equality.

*Cautions:*

Only to the minimum extent consistent with credibility should you report extreme, partisan statements seeking to place blame for the violence on one political group or another. On the other hand, statements which demonstrate widespread recognition of the need to do more for the underprivileged are useful.

Do not espouse any one theory, or any "pat" interpretation, of the cause or causes of the urban unrest. Many of the so-called experts are baffled by seeming inconsistencies and conflicting facts.

Avoid such inflammatory reports as those describing the situation as "a conspiracy," "civil war," "revolution," etc.

In President Johnson's words (7/27/67), "Let us acknowledge the tragedy; but let us not exaggerate it . . . Most Americans, Negro and white, are leading decent, responsible and productive lives. Most Amer-

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<sup>6</sup> For full text of Shannon's commentary, see William V. Shannon, "Negro Violence vs. the American Dream," *New York Times*, July 27, 1967, p. 34.

icans, Negro and white, seek safety in their neighborhoods and harmony with their neighbors . . ."<sup>7</sup>

*Background  
Foreign Press Treatment*

The riots in Newark, Detroit, and half a dozen other cities have drawn increasingly sensational headlines and heavy coverage in most news centers around the world.

As the riots in Detroit rose to a new level of violence, newspapers abroad generally raised the pitch of their headlines from "riots" to "rebellion" or, in some extreme cases, to "revolution" and even "civil war."

Editorial comment reported from widely separated parts of the non-Communist world has reflected great concern but also sympathetic understanding of the complexities. The primary lines of thought emphasized most frequently were:

1. U.S. race relations are very serious and dangerous. Any one-sided condemnation would be wrong because they are also very complex.

2. The tragic situation is "paradoxical" and "ironic" because the Johnson Administration has done far more than any other to improve the welfare of the Negroes.

3. But much more progress is needed to give the Negroes equality. What has been done is "like sprinkling water on thirsty soil."

4. Therefore, the Negro extremists are, "unfortunately," taking over from the moderates.

5. Extremists such as Stokely Carmichael<sup>8</sup> believe that the force of riots is necessary to stimulate faster progress for the impatient Negroes. This is not surprising and they may be right.

Less conspicuous has been the view expressed in some commentaries that the riots have little or nothing to do with the civil rights movement but are created by lawless, hooligan elements that exist in every city ready to destroy and loot whenever possible.

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 4, above.

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 4, Document 158.

**162. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to Senator Fulbright<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 1, 1967

Dear Senator Fulbright:

I am delighted to be able to respond in detail to your letter of July 12 regarding the distribution of our English-language publications in non-English-speaking countries.<sup>2</sup> We maintain a continuing review of requests from all of our USIS posts for printed media materials in all languages.

Basic to the question of distribution of pamphlets in English is the number of people around the world who have an English-speaking capability. At present, they total almost a half-billion persons.

Throughout the world, 285 million people speak English as their first language making it second only to Chinese among the world's living languages. At least 200 million more people use English as an acquired idiom. It is our only international language, with one-sixth of the world's population having a working knowledge of it.

Its importance to USIA cannot be underestimated in terms of its universality in reaching world opinion leaders. Although the Agency's pamphlet program emphasizes production in languages native to recipients worldwide, there is a continuing need at all USIS posts for modest quantities of pamphlets in English. Eighteen of these countries, with a total population of nearly 95 million people, use English as an official or co-official language. These figures include eight countries in Africa, five in East Asia and the Pacific, one in Europe, two in Latin America, one in the Near East, plus Canada. Thus, the importance of English in USIA's efforts in international communication cannot be overemphasized.

The pamphlet you enclosed with your letter—"Viet Cong Use of Terror Against the Vietnamese People"—was produced by JUSPAO in Saigon for distribution in limited copies in English to USIS posts

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 2, Congressional Relations—A thru Z—1967. No classification marking. Drafted by Wade on July 31; cleared by Hays, Oleksiw, and Wright; cleared in draft by Reinhardt, Hitchcock, Schmidt, and Cannon; White cleared in draft for Ryan.

<sup>2</sup> In his letter to Marks, Fulbright commented: "In recent months other publications in English, supporting the administration's position in Vietnam, have come to my attention. These are not marked as to source but I understand that they were published by your agency. I am unable to see the justification for publication and distribution of booklets of this nature in non-English speaking nations." He requested that Marks "provide the [Senate Committee on Foreign Relations] with the reasons for distributing such publications in non-English speaking countries." (Ibid.)

requesting copies. Sample copies were sent by JUSPAO to USIS posts worldwide with a mimeographed order form containing a coupon to be returned to Saigon indicating number of copies requested. To date, 17 posts have responded and orders totaling 10,924 copies have been shipped. Of these orders, 7,300 were from countries where English either is the official or co-official language. The remaining 3,624 pamphlets were sent to non-English-speaking countries. The largest order—3,600—came from Canberra. Kuala Lumpur, where English is a co-official language, was second with an order for 2,000 copies. The remaining 15 orders were for comparatively small quantities.

Both the Agency and JUSPAO usually print a small number of pamphlets in English and send sample copies to all principal USIS posts with an offer to fill reasonable requests for additional copies. Non-English-speaking posts generally respond with requests for small numbers of pamphlets in English for distribution to the following groups: government officials, professors and students, editors and publishers, business leaders, and similar opinion leaders whose sophistication includes a knowledge of English. In addition, Fulbright students and teachers who have studied in America are always eager to receive publications in English, as are members of the foreign diplomatic corps, many of whom are fluent in English. USIS Libraries, Information Centers, Cultural Centers and Binational Centers all maintain English reading rooms frequented by scholars and students where these pamphlets are available for the asking.

Distribution of English-language pamphlets in Viet-Nam seldom exceeds 10,000 copies of any one of them. Approximately 7,000 copies are distributed to our Abraham Lincoln Library in Saigon and to the three other American Cultural Centers in Dalat, Can Tho and Da Nang. In each of these centers, there is a continuing demand for pamphlets in English since monthly attendance averages 18,000 patrons. Additional pamphlets are made available to the six Vietnamese-American Associations in Saigon/Cholon, Can Tho, Nha Trang, Dalat and Da Nang which conduct English-teaching programs with a total enrollment of 14,000 students. The other 3,000 pamphlets are sent to the Mission Press Center for distribution to more than 500 foreign correspondents, to diplomatic missions, to all official visitors, and to Vietnamese who have asked to receive these publications on a continuing basis. In some instances, as in the case of a pamphlet explaining USAID's activities ("The View Beyond the Battle"), these publications are used by USAID and MACV/CORDS for briefing visitors to Viet-Nam and copies are made available to them for permanent reference.

As you requested, a copy of each of the Agency's English-language pamphlets on Viet-Nam produced in Washington and Saigon is

enclosed.<sup>3</sup> Each pamphlet contains an insert showing country-by-country distribution in non-English-speaking countries.

If I can offer additional information on this subject, please call on me.

Sincerely,

Leonard H. Marks<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears his typed signature.

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### 163. Talking Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>

No. 34

Washington, August 7, 1967

#### THE U.S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST

(1) QUESTION: Why has the United States always supported Israel against the Arab states?

ANSWER: It has never been U.S. policy to support Israel against the Arab states. Like the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and a majority of the members of the United Nations, the U.S. favored the establishment of Israel as a state in 1948.<sup>2</sup>

But the U.S. certainly did not support the Israeli use of force against Egypt in 1956.<sup>3</sup> The basic U.S. policy has always been to work for the peace and stability of the area.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 4, Government Agencies—State, Department of, 1967. No classification marking. Marks sent a copy of the Talking Paper to Harriman under cover of an attached August 9 typewritten note informing him that the Talking Paper had been “released for us in all posts on the U.S. position in the Middle East.” The note indicates that copies of the Talking Paper were also sent to Walt Rostow and Eugene Rostow. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> For further information regarding the U.S. position on the establishment of Israel as a state in 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. V, Part 2, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Suez Crisis in 1956, in which Israel, as well as Great Britain and France, attacked the UAR in response to Nasser's move to nationalize the Suez Canal.

(2) QUESTION: What about the Middle East crisis which began in May 1967? Didn't the United States support Israel from the outset?

ANSWER: In this crisis, as before, the U.S. has opposed acts of hostility and acts likely to lead to war—the infiltration of terrorists, the closing of the Strait of Tiran, the menace of mobilization, the encouragement and support of an arms race in the area.<sup>4</sup> The U.S. did everything in its power to find a peaceful solution to the crisis before fighting broke out. It used its influence with all involved in an effort to prevent the outbreak of fighting.

When the fighting started, the U.S. made every effort to obtain a cease-fire, and then to move toward a more durable peace. That course is in the equal interest of the Arab states as well as Israel.

(3) QUESTION: What about the widespread reports that American and British warplanes helped the Israelis in the fighting?

ANSWER: In the first hours of the war, the Israelis destroyed most of the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian Air Forces. Arab leaders, particularly in Cairo, were unwilling or unable to admit this great loss. So the story of U.S. intervention was invented as an excuse.

Jordanian leaders have admitted there was no evidence of foreign intervention, and other Arab leaders are gradually coming around to making the same admission.

It is noteworthy that the USSR, which—through observer vessels—maintains a constant vigil in the Mediterranean, never became a party to those false charges.

(4) QUESTION: What about the USS Liberty,<sup>5</sup> then, and U-2 photographs? Didn't the U.S. use its highly sophisticated scientific and electronic equipment to spy for Israel, and to disrupt Arab military communications?

ANSWER: These stories grew out of the first tales of intervention by U.S. aircraft. They are equally untrue.

As for the USS Liberty, it seems likely that if the Liberty had been helping the Israelis, the latter would have been aware of its presence and would not have attacked it.

There were no U-2s involved. There was no U.S. jamming of communications. To quote Ambassador Goldberg: “. . . no United States soldier, sailor, airman, ship, airplane or military instrument of any

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<sup>4</sup> On May 22, President Nasser announced that Israeli vessels would not be permitted to pass through the Straits of Tiran. (Eric Pace, “Cairo Acts to Bar Israeli Shipping in Gulf of Aqaba,” *New York Times*, May 23, 1967, p. 1)

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the June 8 attack on the USS *Liberty* by Israeli boats and planes. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 219.



kind—including radar jamming—pertaining to the Armed Forces, or to any agency of the United States, intervened in this conflict.”<sup>6</sup>

(5) QUESTION: Even if there was no direct U.S. military intervention, President Johnson did help Israel. He urged President Nasser not to start the fighting. Then the Israelis struck first. Wasn’t this an American-Israeli plot?

ANSWER: The United States, both publicly and privately, urged *all* parties to keep from starting hostilities. As to who actually fired the first shot, we have only the claims of the two sides. Each says the other started it.

The staff of the U.N. Emergency Force, as impartial observers, might have been able to determine who was the aggressor. But the U.N.E.F. had been removed from the border at Egyptian request.

(6) QUESTION: You will admit, though, that the United States gave Israel large amounts of military equipment—especially in the period just before the fighting started—and encouraged Israeli aggression in that way?

ANSWER: In the past few years, seventy-five per cent of all arms flowing into the Middle East have come from the Soviet Union. The United States and Europe have each supplied about one-eighth of the region’s weapons.

Soviet arms, worth over \$2,000 million, have gone entirely to Arab states. U.S. and West European arms went to *both* Israel and the Arab states.

The U.S. has always urged a limitation on arms shipments to the Middle East, and has provided arms only to prevent an imbalance in military capabilities. Over half of U.S. weaponry in the Middle East has gone to Arab states.

There were, incidentally, no significant U.S. shipments to Israel just before the outbreak of hostilities. In fact, the bulk of U.S. arms sold to Israel has been surplus World War II equipment.

(7) QUESTION: What about economic assistance to Israel?

ANSWER: The U.S. has provided economic assistance totalling over \$1 billion to Israel. In recent years the level of assistance has declined as the Israeli economy grew stronger.

During the same period the U.S. provided economic aid to Arab states as well. For example, our economic aid to the U.A.R.—over \$1.1 billion—was greater than to Israel. Other Arab states: Algeria \$202 million, Iraq \$59 million, Jordan \$562 million, Libya \$208 million,

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<sup>6</sup> The quotation is taken from Goldberg’s address to the UN General Assembly on June 20. (“Goldberg: ‘New Foundation for Peace,’” *Washington Post*, June 21, 1967, p. A1)

Morocco \$591 million, Lebanon \$103 million, Saudi Arabia \$47 million, Sudan \$127 million, Syria \$80 million, Tunisia \$516 million, Yemen \$43 million. These figures emphatically refute a notion of partiality in giving aid.

(8) QUESTION: The U.S. may be able to deny its military and economic collaboration with Israel, but there is no disguising U.S. championship of Israel in the U.N. Why has the U.S. led the effort to defeat U.N. resolutions demanding immediate Israel withdrawal from the territory Israel has gained by its aggression?

ANSWER: The U.S. believes that withdrawal of Israeli forces is an essential element in any Middle Eastern settlement. But, as a practical matter, such withdrawal can hardly be expected in the absence of arrangements which would assure a more stable situation in the area than existed before June 5, 1967. Ambassador Goldberg, chief U.S. representative at the U.N., spoke of what the situation would be if such an unconditional withdrawal took place:

"Once again opposing forces would stand in direct confrontation, poised for combat. Once again, no international machinery would be present to hold them apart. Once again, innocent maritime passage would be denied. Once again there would be no bar to belligerent acts and acts of force. Once again there would be no acceptance of Israel by her neighbors as a sovereign state, no action to solve the tragic refugee problem, no effective security against terrorism and violence. Once again, in short, nothing would be done to resolve the deep-laying grievances on both sides that have fed the fires of war in the Middle East for 20 years."<sup>7</sup>

(9) QUESTION: What about the much-proclaimed U.S. policy of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all nations in the Middle East? Or does that guarantee really only apply to Israel?

ANSWER: It applies to all nations in the Middle East. But territorial integrity is best guaranteed by a genuine peace. The U.S. hopes there will be found the basis for a just and durable peace in the Middle East. That can only be a peace which rests on respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all the states in the area, justice for the refugees, a status for Jerusalem which protects the deep religious interests of the whole world, the assurance of maritime rights, and an end of the arms race in the Middle East.

(10) QUESTION: How can you expect the Arab states to recognize Israel?

ANSWER: The fact is that Israel does exist. It would be extremely difficult for the Arab states to assume normal diplomatic relations in

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

the light of all that has happened. But a start must be made, and it can best be made at the root of the problem. That is the claim of some Arab states that a state of war continues with Israel, and that they have the right to the status of belligerents under international law with respect to Israel.

The claim of belligerent rights works both ways. If Egypt claims belligerent rights, it can hardly deny belligerent rights to Israel. Egypt cannot claim the right to mass overwhelming military forces on Israel's borders, issue threats of liquidation, exclude Israel from the Suez Canal, blockade the Gulf of Aqaba—and then deny Israel the right of counter-measures. Surely, the time has come to see if better ways to resolve these differences can be found.

(11) QUESTION: How can you urge the Arab states to recognize Israel when you refuse to recognize the People's Republic of China?

ANSWER: The two cases are not the same. Israel's existence has been recognized by the United Nations from the first. With Communist China, it has been quite another case. The regime has been branded an aggressor by the United Nations for its part in the Korean war. Communist China has shown little inclination to change its bellicose ways since then. And Peking outspokenly defies and denounces the U.N.

(12) QUESTION: Isn't it true that Jewish voters in the United States dictate American policy toward the Middle East?

ANSWER: There is no doubt that many Jewish Americans have an interest in the welfare of Israel. And, like any other interest group, they try to see that U.S. Government policy takes their views into account. For that matter, so do the large oil companies which have investments in Arab states. But American foreign policy represents a national consensus, not just the wishes of a single interest group.

(13) QUESTION: Isn't the United States trying to keep the Middle East in a state of neocolonialism? Isn't it U.S. policy to retard Arabs' progress for the sake of U.S. business interests, especially oil interests?

ANSWER: It doesn't seem reasonable that the United States would spend over \$3 billion in economic aid to the Arab nations if it wanted to keep them in an underdeveloped condition.

As for American business interests, it would be more profitable for them if the Middle East progressed more rapidly. American business invests more money, and earns greater profits, in developed areas. For example, the U.S. business investment in Europe now runs to over \$13.5 billion. The American investment in the Middle East, oil and all, is slightly over \$1 billion.

(14) QUESTION: If that is so, then why does the United States always support feudal and reactionary Arab states against the progressive ones?

ANSWER: First, the United States cannot dictate the system of government for any other state.

Second, some of the so-called progressive Arab states have allowed doctrinaire, and often out-dated, political theory to obstruct development of fruitful relations with the United States. When these artificial barriers have not been raised by the Arab states themselves, the U.S. has always been willing to enter into a mutually beneficial relationship. U.S. economic assistance to the area shows this. So do U.S. commercial relations. Proceeds from the sale of oil can be the basis of economic development—as is the case in Kuwait, for example.

(15) QUESTION: Actually, isn't the U.S. merely using the Arab states as pawns in the "cold war"?

ANSWER: One of the eventualities the United States hoped to avoid was the splitting of the Middle East into two camps, along East-West lines. For one thing, the big powers cannot decide the dispute between Israel and the Arab states. Both President Johnson and Premier Kosygin have stated this clearly.

For another, when the nations of the Middle East look to the big powers for war materials and political backing in their military adventures, they are merely putting off the time when a peaceful settlement must be made.

Finally, the intrusion of big-power considerations into regional disputes can seriously jeopardize world peace.

(16) QUESTION: Nonetheless, the United States is a big power, and does have responsibilities in the Middle East. How does the U.S. propose to carry out those responsibilities?

ANSWER: If you mean that the big powers have a special responsibility to see the peace is preserved, then the United States is carrying out its responsibilities in the Middle East.

The United States has consistently supported the kind of peace settlement to which both sides could find it possible to subscribe. This program has been listed in many ways. Perhaps these ten points cover it as well as any:

- (a) Withdrawal of troops; this action to be firmly linked to
- (b) an end to the state of belligerency,
- (c) acceptance of Israel's right to exist,
- (d) renunciation of the use of force in the region,
- (e) free passage for all nations through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba,
- (f) regional economic development,
- (g) limitations on the regional arms race,
- (h) resettlement of the Arab refugees,
- (i) establishment of an effective U.N. presence until peace treaties are written, and
- (j) some kind of international mediation procedure.

(17) QUESTION: When the U.S. advocates limitations on arms, it really wants to keep the Arab states in a permanent condition of military inferiority to Israel—isn't that right?

ANSWER: The basic position of the United States is that arms and arms races have no place in the settlement of Middle East problems. The U.S. hopes that the major suppliers of arms could cooperate in a program of arms limitation, and public registration of arms shipments, which would permit the allocation of scarce resources now spent on arms to the vital requirements of technological and economic development of the area.

Then there is also the danger that Arab leaders will find they have bargained away a sizable part of their independence in exchange for Soviet arms.

(18) QUESTION: What about the Arab refugees from Palestine?

ANSWER: Secretary of State Rusk proposed that the refugees have a free and private choice of their future. The U.S. is firmly opposed to permanent eviction of the refugees, and to barring their return.

It is probable that not all would want to return to the Palestine area—especially if they were offered an opportunity for resettlement, with the required financial backing, in other Arab states.

It should be remembered that the United States has contributed over a third of a billion dollars to Palestinian refugee relief since 1950. This is about 70 per cent of the total funds made available for this purpose. So it cannot be said that the U.S. is not interested in the welfare of the refugees, or in a permanent solution of their problems.

(19) QUESTION: The U.S. didn't vote for condemnation of the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem by the U.N. General Assembly. Does this mean the U.S. concurs in the Israeli annexation?

ANSWER: The United States has made it clear that the U.S. will not accept Israel's unilateral action as a determinant of the future of Jerusalem.<sup>8</sup>

The Israeli Government has said that its arrangements for the administration of Jerusalem were not an annexation. It seemed to the United States that the proposed U.N.G.A. resolution, which condemned annexation and called for its rescission, was not directed to the situation on the ground.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> See Robert Young, "U.S. Assails Israeli Annexation," *Chicago Tribune*, June 29, 1967, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> For further information on the United States position on the UNGA resolution, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 344.

Ambassador Goldberg summed up the U.S. position this way:

“During my own statement to the General Assembly on July 3, I said . . . the safeguarding of the holy places and freedom of access to them for all should be internationally guaranteed and the status of Jerusalem in relation to them should be decided not unilaterally but in consultation with all concerned. These statements represent the considered and continuing policy of the United States Government.”<sup>10</sup>

(20) QUESTION: How do you feel about what happened in the June–July 1967 emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly, then?

ANSWER: The U.S. didn’t seek the emergency session. The U.S. didn’t think that the U.N. Security Council had exhausted all its possibilities for action in the Middle East crisis. It seemed doubtful the General Assembly could make a helpful contribution. Once the session was called, however, the U.S. sought to encourage resolutions which had a realistic prospect of helping to bring lasting peace.

The General Assembly, in its capacity as a “town meeting” of the world, did crystallize a certain state of world opinion. The General Assembly refused to name a single aggressor. In effect, it expressed opposition to territorial change achieved by force. It demonstrated the strong international interest in the holy places of Jerusalem. The General Assembly couldn’t agree on the way peace should be achieved—but it did indicate that peace was a more desirable goal than the mere return to the armistice situation.

On balance, the emergency session was not the failure some see it to be.

(21) QUESTION: The United States has never been more unpopular in the Middle East. What are you going to do about it?

ANSWER: The U.S. doesn’t consider popularity per se as its most important goal in the Middle East. Naturally the people of the United States resent the false allegations that the U.S. was in collusion with Israel during the hostilities. The U.S. regrets the decision of some Arab countries to break off relations on the basis of these charges. These factors necessarily influence American attitudes toward the states concerned.

The U.S. hopes that the adverse effects will be redressed quickly, so that normal relations may be re-established. Boycotts and other forms of retaliation are only self-defeating.

What is needed is the realization throughout the Middle East that peace and regional economic cooperation are vital to the area now.

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<sup>10</sup> The quotation is taken from Goldberg’s statement made on June 14 prior to the Fifth Emergency Special Session on the Middle East of the UN General Assembly on June 17 and 18. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 31, 1967, pp. 148–151.

(22) QUESTION: Will the U.S. be willing to supply economic aid to the Middle East again?

ANSWER: The U.S. interest in economic development of the region, and of all the states in it, has not been affected by what has happened in the 1967 crisis. The U.S. will not be vindictive in its approach to those who have broken relations, nor will the U.S. engage in any reprisals.

The American hope is that conditions of amity and security may soon enable the U.S. to resume the types of peaceful, constructive assistance it has rendered in the past. The U.S. would join with others in international programs of regional development for the Middle East as soon as political conditions permit such efforts.

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**164. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on Information (Stanton)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 1, 1967

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During the past several months, I have given considerable attention to the recommendations in the Twenty-second Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information.<sup>2</sup> Each of the recommendations made by the Commission has been studied in detail by the sections affected and reviewed by me.

At the outset, I want the Commission to know that I am heartened by your praise of our efforts and gratified at your recognition of the need for an expansion of the existing program service. I want to assure you that we are aware of the importance of our mission and the heavy responsibility which we bear in attempting to relate American domestic and foreign policy to overseas audiences.

Now, I would like to offer the following comments on the specific points made by your Commission:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 1, Advisory Group—Information 1967. No classification marking. Drafted by Marks on August 31. Copies were sent to Novik, Larmon, Hoyt, and Van Husen Vail. An unknown hand wrote “sent 9/1 nra” in the bottom right-hand corner of the memorandum. NRA are the initials of Marks' secretary.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to *The Twenty-Second Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information to the Congress of the United States*, January 26, 1967.



1. You recommend the appointment of a permanent Deputy Director chosen from within the career Civil Service or Foreign Service to provide a continuity of management as high-level personnel change periodically.

In 1964 Congress provided for two Deputy Directors—one appointed by the President and the other a career officer. These are permanent positions and have been filled by the type of individual which you describe.

From the time the legislation was passed in 1964 to date, there have been only two Deputy Directors—one held the position for four and one-half years and the present incumbent for two years.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, the Deputy for Policy and Plans has always been a career officer and incumbents have held the position for substantial periods of time.

It is my opinion that these two positions meet your objectives. Accordingly, I do not share your view that there should be any additional officer assigned for management responsibility.

2. You also refer to the past practice of assigning Foreign Service Officers to geographic areas with which they have limited knowledge. During my term of office, I have attempted to build up a corps who would specialize in particular areas such as you describe—an Arabic corps, a Slavik corps, an African corps, an Asian corps, a European corps, a Latin American corps. Wherever possible we are now assigning officers to those areas in which they have developed a particular expertise and where their language aptitudes can be used profitably. Because of the need for rotation of officers and transfer to the United States at periodic intervals, it is not always possible to assign personnel to areas in which they have developed particular expertise. Nevertheless, I agree with your concept, support your objectives and am attempting to fulfill them.

3. You recommend the production of information materials tailored to fit local needs. This is a concept with which I thoroughly agree. We strive to meet this requirement and have made great progress in this direction.

Currently, we are publishing 66 magazines for specific countries. For example, in India *Span* has a circulation of approximately 100,000 and the *American Reporter* has a circulation of 400,000 solely within that country. We also produce *American Review* directed to the Indian cultural and intellectual community. Similarly in Russia, we publish *America Magazine* directed to the Russian audience, and another edition

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<sup>3</sup> Presumably a reference to Donald Wilson, who was Deputy Director from 1961 to 1965, and to Robert Akers, who was the Deputy Director at the time.



of that publication for the Polish audience. Our activities in other countries are directed along the same lines; the effort to meet local needs will be continued.

4. I share your enthusiasm for our program of English Teaching. Last year, about 300,000 persons studied English through USIS-sponsored programs. In addition, a large audience had the opportunity to study the English language through radio programs broadcast by the Voice of America or over local stations through VOA-supplied tapes. Three series of television programs, "Let's Learn English," "Let's Speak English," and "Adventures in English" have been distributed in 63 countries. It is my objective to emphasize this aspect of our activity in all under-developed areas of the world.

5. Similarly, I share your enthusiasm for recruiting and training Women's Affairs Officers to serve in countries where women's groups are actively participating in society or in emerging societies where this trend is now evident. We have under consideration at this time the addition of a Women's Affairs Officer in several countries.

6. I note you suggest that we consider a publication which would "deal with democracy, modernization and nation building" as a companion publication to *Problems of Communism* which you commend so highly.

It is my view that these subjects are treated constantly in various USIA publications and that a single publication devoted to these subjects would not be as effective as the placement of specific articles in many publications which would reach a much larger audience. A specialized publication would have a very restricted appeal and could only reach a limited audience. You can see that our present system enables us to reach many more people with significant information on these vital topics.

7. You point out the necessity of providing opinion-forming groups with information on the free labor movement in the United States and on the progress of free labor organizations around the world. I support this objective.

We have at present a full-time Labor Information Officer in the Office of Policy, and similar officers in our posts in Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Bogota, Montevideo and Caracas. I have stressed the importance of disseminating labor information and the need for highly-trained officers to carry out the mission. Currently, I am in the process of recruiting an additional Labor Information Officer and will seek others as opportunities arise and our budget permits.

8. I share your enthusiasm for the work being carried on by the Binational Centers, particularly in Latin America as referred to by Ambassador Charles W. Cole in his report to me from which you quote.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

To encourage the development of these institutions, last year I authorized the expenditure of \$332,000 to assist in the improvement of physical facilities in seven countries. This year I have requested an authorization of \$1 million for this purpose.

To assist in the recruitment of qualified persons as directors of these centers, I am converting these positions from contract status to that of regular employees. I believe that this action will attract more able young people and will keep in our service those who have recently been recruited and who have performed so admirably.

9. You comment on our libraries and recommend that the percentage of books in the language of the host country be at least 50% and preferably 75%. It has not been possible in the past to reach this level but we are currently adding to our library shelves more books in the languages of the country. Progress is slow since there are not enough suitable books available in translation. For the most part we are dependent upon the translations we sponsor ourselves.

Moreover, I have recently created a committee of distinguished scholars to recommend 250 or more titles of "Great American Classics" so that all of our libraries and reading rooms may have this basic collection. I am confident that it will prove of great value throughout the world and will lift the level of reading material for those scholars who are seeking a wider knowledge of American history, social and political science, culture, drama and scientific accomplishments.

During the past year we have also completed a program of displaying classic American art in all of our libraries through the use of high quality lithographs. At this date, approximately 100 libraries in 76 countries have participated in the program.

10. I note your comments about the need for a vigorous information program in Western Europe and for an expansion of our European programs for youth which should be centered around libraries.

I have previously reported to your Commission my desire to expand our information effort in Western Europe. In a recent appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee, I placed these views in the *Record* and testified to the need. In our budget request for Fiscal 1969 an expansion of this program will be sought.

11. You advocate the installation of equipment which would become "a corporate memory." A program of this nature has been started and a computer has been installed for our administrative records. We plan on an expansion of this computer service to include substantive material such as you describe.

12. I concur in your suggestion that our training program is basic to the Agency's operations. You note that I have appointed a new Director of Training and have given him full support for a drastic

revision in this effort.<sup>5</sup> Although insufficient time has elapsed to note the full effect of such changes, I am heartened by the progress which has been made.

13. You recommend that the Agency “renew its contacts with the academic community, rekindle its interest and invite its suggestions, reviews and commentaries.” I subscribe to this philosophy and have constantly endeavored to achieve this result.

14. You suggest that the inspection program be broadened to include civilian review of Agency operations. Towards this end, I have appointed prominent private individuals as Public Members of inspection teams. Between now and the end of the year, five additional Public Members will be assigned to inspection teams. We have received numerous benefits from such individual appraisals. The program will be expanded as conditions permit.

15. You suggest a formulation of a ten-year program culminating in the celebration of the American Bicentennial in 1976. I have not yet done so because of more urgent and immediate problems. Hopefully, I can give serious consideration to this suggestion next year.

The above comments on the principal suggestions made in the chapters of your report entitled, “*Recommendations for Action by the USIA.*”

In addition, you propose to Congress that legislation be adopted for a career service for the U.S. Information Agency. I continue to advocate such legislation and am currently awaiting hearings on Administration-sponsored legislation for this purpose.

Finally, you also suggest that Public Law 402 be amended so that the “American taxpayer should no longer be prohibited from seeing and studying the product a government agency produces with public funds for overseas audiences.” I have testified before congressional committees that:

1. I have no objection to making any of our products available for inspection. We have nothing to hide and are indeed proud of our efforts.

2. However, I do not wish to take the initiative in requesting any funds for the dissemination to *United States citizens* of books, pamphlets, films or radio broadcasts prepared under our auspices. If Congress should authorize such, we shall gladly cooperate.

In the concluding portion of your report you recommend to Congress and the President that additional funds be allocated for future Agency operations. I concur and as previously stated will request such in our submission to the Bureau of the Budget for Fiscal 1969.

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<sup>5</sup> Presumably a reference to James J. Halsema, who was appointed Chief of the Training Division of the USIA Office of Personal and Training in September 1966.

These comments are designed to acquaint you with my thinking on the very significant problems which you have outlined and to report on specific projects which are underway to meet the objectives that you have so ably described. Our principal officers and I have greatly benefited from the careful consideration which your Commission gives to our program. We welcome the close relationship which exists and will strive to maintain and justify your confidence in our program.

Sincerely,

Leonard H. Marks<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**165. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the White House Staff Assistant for Cabinet Affairs (Maguire)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 14, 1967

**ACHIEVEMENTS REPORT**

The achievements of the USIA during the past two months cannot be recited in any catalogue of events.

The Agency performed its functions in operating the Voice of America in 38 languages, in producing approximately 80 separate magazines monthly, in preparing and transmitting to embassies in approximately 100 countries a news report of approximately 10 to 15,000 words a day, produced films and television programs, arranged for numerous briefings, press interviews and the many other functions carried on in the ordinary course of events.

Of particular significance would be the extraordinary campaign conducted in Viet-Nam to assist the Government of South Viet-Nam in its election efforts. A report summarizing this campaign has been sent to the President and a copy is attached.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director Subject's Files, 1967-1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 5, Government Agencies—White House—General, 1967. No classification marking. Drafted by Marks.

Another achievement of note would be the culmination of an essay contest on the Alliance for Progress for secondary school students conducted throughout Latin America.<sup>2</sup> This contest was initiated in July 1966 and culminated in the visit to Washington last month of the 38 first prize winners. Their arrival in Washington highlighted the celebration of the 6th Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. The students were greeted by President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey. USIA initiated the contest and secured cooperation of the Department of State and the Pan American Union.<sup>3</sup> A local press and radio campaign was conducted in each of the countries participating and entries were submitted by thousands of students. Every student submitting an essay received a book of his choice from the USIA and prizes of greater value of educational significance were given to the winners.

**Leonard H. Marks<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 20, Document 2.

<sup>3</sup> On August 17, the President spoke at the Pan American Union in Washington at a ceremony marking the sixth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. The first-prize winning secondary students of the essay contest also attended this event and were present for Johnson's remarks. Representing 15 Central and South American countries, the students wrote on the theme of "Social and Economic Development—the Challenge to Youth" and Johnson quoted from one of the winning essays in his remarks: "Latin American youth accepts the challenge of the struggle for progress, conscious of its responsibility before history and nation . . . Our voices, shouted from the Andes . . . will echo from the roof of the world: We can do it!" (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1967*, Book II, pp. 787–788)

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## Attachment

### Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>5</sup>

Washington, September 12, 1967

I have previously furnished you with a brief status report on the steps which USIA took to "Get Out the Vote" in Viet-Nam.<sup>6</sup> At this time, I thought you might like to have a more complete report, as follows:

#### 1. RADIO AND TELEVISION

JUSPAO rendered professional assistance and guidance to the Vietnamese television staff in preparing:

A. 20-second promotional announcements which were broadcast daily during the entire campaign, and

B. two 30-minute feature programs with election themes.

C. Election coverage was included in all standard news programs broadcast over the Vietnamese television system.

D. All candidates were afforded opportunities to appear on television at times well-advertised in advance.

Similar activities were conducted over the Vietnamese radio stations.

For use outside of Viet-Nam, the VOA regularly broadcast news reports and features on the election. Special reports from VOA correspondents in Viet-Nam were regularly broadcast. Tape-recorded programs in 13 languages were sent to posts in 43 countries.

#### 2. NEWSPAPER

Beginning with the initial July issue, JUSPAO's *Mien Nam Tu Do* (Free South), a newspaper distributed to the VC (by air) and by armed propaganda teams and river patrol boats in contested areas, carried articles concerning elections to the "otherside." Publication of Free South is in 2,000,000 copies.

#### 3. LOUDSPEAKER TAPES

A special 30-minute entertainment tape consisting of music and songs, interspersed with five election or voting messages, was produced in 64 copies for stationary or vehicular use. Two additional tapes for airborne loudspeaker use were distributed in 105 copies each to

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<sup>5</sup> No classification marking. Sent through Maguire.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the September 3 South Vietnam Presidential election.

the Air Commando Squadrons. These were to have been given the fullest possible use during the period immediately preceding election day.

#### 4. MOTION PICTURES

Two films were produced:

A. An artwork portrayal of the current voting situation tied together with an incident in Vietnamese history.

B. Animated puppets on “Get Out the Vote” themes.

Prints of these films were furnished to the Government of Viet-Nam for use in theatres, for newsreel release and for public exhibitions in meeting places. It is estimated these films were viewed by 90,000 people per week in the Saigon area alone.

#### 5. PRINTED MEDIA

A. *Leaflets*: Seven leaflets were produced in a total of 11,850,000 copies. Five of the leaflets were of pre-election themes; one concerned the Doan Ket policy (National Reconciliation), and the other was addressed to the VC/NVA connecting the elections to Chieu Hoi (Return to the Government) and Doan Ket.

B. *Posters*: Five posters totalling 750,000 copies were distributed. These consisted of photographic and cartoon instructions on the election and voting process itself. In addition, these posters were produced in 8 x 10½ inch hand-out size (950,000 copies).

C. *Slogan Banners*: JUSPAO produced four banners in 4,500,000 copies telling of the advantages to be gained by and the privileges of voting. Further, we published in limited quantity (15,000 each) two other banners in Cambodian/Vietnamese for distribution in three provinces of IV Corps.

D. *Cartoon Book*: Produced in 50,000 copies for distribution in schools, clubs, and village/hamlet meeting places.

E. *Ruler*: This was a paper item with a metric ruler and vote slogan on one side and a multiplication table on the other as a gift to children (1,000,000).

F. *Adhesive Stickers*: Two were printed totalling 40,000 copies. This was an experiment since this Madison Avenue<sup>7</sup> approach isn’t general in Viet-Nam. These were printed in bright “rescue orange” for affixing to vehicles, boats, and even military mechanized equipment.

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the avenue in New York, the location of several prominent and famous American professional advertising companies. Using the term “Madison Avenue” as an adjective signifies that the method of promotion is considered on par with a professional American-style advertising campaign or effort.

*G. Magazine*: An election-oriented issue of Van Tac Vu (Cultural/Drama) magazine was distributed in the cities. This magazine contained guidance and programming for the drama teams who provide entertainment and government propaganda messages to the people in the hamlets and villages, including areas contested by the Viet Cong.

The above refers primarily to efforts by USIA field officers in assisting Vietnamese authorities. The Government of Viet-Nam carried out a parallel campaign in which extensive use was made of leaflets (18,600,000 copies) posters (540,000 copies), pamphlets (134,000 copies) slogan banners (1,000,000) lapel insignia (3,000,000), cartoon books (500,000 copies).

I am confident that these efforts resulted in the large turnout on election day.

Leonard H. Marks<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**166. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 19, 1967

**BIWEEKLY REPORT**

In my recent visits to overseas posts I regularly inquire about the content of textbooks in secondary schools. My particular concern rises from the manner in which they describe the United States, its government, its political institutions and its culture.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Agency Reports, Box 135 [2 of 2], United States Information Agency, 1967 [3 of 3]. No classification marking. Sent through Maguire, who did not initial the memorandum. Maguire sent the memorandum to Johnson under a September 20 covering note in which he noted that Marks "reports on a new USIA-AID-Peace Corps effort to improve the American image presented in foreign textbooks and classrooms." (Ibid.) Marks sent a copy of the memorandum to Cater also under a September 20 covering note. In it Marks stated: "I thought you would be interested in the attached biweekly report. It covers the same ground that we discussed the other day." An unknown hand wrote on the note "DC has seen." (Ibid.)



From my observations, it appeared that the textbooks of many countries contained misinformation or inadequate information which was being given to children at very impressionable ages. As a result, misconceptions and prejudices were being developed which are difficult to eradicate.

To confirm this view, I recently conducted a survey in all areas of the world and found that preliminary impressions were accurate and that in some countries the teachers had a prejudice against American cultural or political institutions which resulted in a serious bias being disseminated to the student bodies.<sup>2</sup> In only a few countries did we find that the textbooks devoted adequate attention to the United States and its role in world affairs.

As a result of this survey, I have proposed a cooperative program with AID, the Peace Corps and other agencies which play a role in overseas education to enable us to:

1. Assist school authorities in foreign countries in the preparation of textbooks relating to the geography, history, literature and cultural, social and political characteristics of the United States.

2. Provide grants through public or private foundations to local teachers or professors in the textbook field; to study textbook rights and production methods of the U.S.

3. Encourage book translations into local languages on subjects that are germane to these topics.

4. Stress the greater use in USIS libraries of our collection of American reference books on these topics.

5. Hold seminars on American studies for significant groups of secondary school teachers.

In addition to these steps, I propose to stress the greater use of our "Ladder Edition" books which are simplified English versions of American books for foreigners who have a limited vocabulary in English. These books are reduced in vocabulary to 1,000 to 5,000 words, simplified in structure to permit rapid reading and appreciation to hold the attention of people to whom English is a second language.

The "Ladder" series encompasses a wide selection of program themes ranging from communism and international relations to nation-building, the American social and cultural activities and significant literature.

The series is now being sold throughout the world except in English-speaking countries. Currently, approximately 30 new titles are published each year in editions of 20–30,000 copies. The books sell for 15¢ retail but many copies are distributed free of charge. To date, 192 titles have been published and approximately 4 million copies have

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<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

been sold. For your reference, I am attaching "Building a New Country" which was reduced to a vocabulary of 1,000 words of English.<sup>3</sup>

Leonard H. Marks

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<sup>3</sup> Not found attached.

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**167. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 25, 1967, 4:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, A Summary

The future of Radio Free Europe has been under consideration for several years. McGeorge Bundy convened a special study group in 1966 which consisted of Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Dr. William Griffith of MIT, Richard Salant of CBS, and the current Ambassador to Switzerland, John S. Hayes. This paper, among other tasks, reviewed the work of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and found that the value of these assets had not diminished and would continue to have a role in an era beyond the cold war. This opinion was unanimous.

The matter became more critical after the Katzenbach Committee was forced to reach some decisions regarding covert support to various U.S. voluntary educational, philanthropic and cultural endeavours. This committee and Secretary Rusk recommended that the 303 Committee examine this problem because of its unique complexities.<sup>2</sup> Since that time, Messrs. Rostow, Nitze, Kohler, and Helms, as well as Marks and Schultze, have given considerable time to looking at this problem from all angles.

Some nine possible solutions were examined; these included the status quo, conversion from non-profit to profit-making corporations,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Box 44, Radio Free Europe, Vol. 1. Secret; Eyes Only. Also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Document 17.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 146.

reincorporation abroad, relocation abroad, support by a public private mechanism, support from a public private mechanism specifically designed to foster private international broadcasting and other communications, overt funding by USIA (or another agency of the Executive Branch), transfer to VOA/USIA, and termination. All were eliminated in 303 discussions except for the three possibilities:

- a. continued financing by CIA;
- b. financing through a public private mechanism to be established by Congress;
- c. transfer to USIA.

It was these three approaches that were tackled on a priority basis by William Trueheart of State and an interagency group.<sup>3</sup> The conclusion reached in this solid study was that there were really but two realistic choices: either continuation as now constituted or termination. Some basic conclusions from this report are quoted:

“A special Radio Study Group (RSG), with representatives from State (Chairman), White House, Bureau of the Budget, Defense, USIA, and CIA, was directed to conduct this further study and make recommendations.

“The RSG has concluded that *RFE operations should be continued on substantially the present scale*. RFE broadcasts make and can continue to make a significant contribution to U.S. objectives in Eastern Europe in promoting and encouraging internal pressures for reform and political liberalization (de-Stalinization) and for the attenuation of Soviet influence and control. Further, we believe that the broadcasts are not incompatible with a policy of bridge-building; indeed, meaningful improvement in East-West relations is probably dependent in the long run on the kind of internal changes which RFE seeks to foster. The unique element of RFE broadcasts—detailed reporting and comment on internal developments—could not be duplicated by VOA without substantial changes in VOA operating principles and the risk of unacceptable diplomatic consequences. Nor do we believe that VOA could realistically be expected, partly but not wholly for budgetary reasons, to maintain the massive news-gathering and research operations on which effective programming of the RFE sort depends.

“The case for continuing RL is less clear because it is impossible to obtain relatively reliable data, such as we have for RFE, on the size and make-up of the RL audience. We do know that the massive Soviet jamming operation makes listening difficult at best. As against this, the RL target is incomparably more important than that of RFE, audi-

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<sup>3</sup> Neither the identification of this inter-agency group and its composition nor its report was found.

ence access to foreign information other than by radio is very much less, and developments in the Soviet Union could make retention of RL's capability of substantial importance. The Soviet jamming effort (at least 160 jamming centers) itself attests to the effectiveness, at least potentially, of the broadcasts and argues against according the windfall which termination would represent. *On balance, we believe that RL operations should also be continued on substantially the present scale.*

*"Both RFE and RL represent important U.S. assets, in terms of rare talent, specialized organization and base facilities, which it has taken over 15 years and some \$350 million to develop. Once dispersed, they could be recreated only with immense difficulty, if at all. We believe that this in itself is a powerful argument for continuing the operations for the time being.*

*"On the other hand, RFE and RL should not be regarded as permanent enterprises. The situation in the target countries may over time so develop as to make the broadcasts superfluous.*

*"If the radios are to be continued, we see no satisfactory alternative to continued CIA financing. Our judgment and that of those we have consulted—including some who have earlier advocated other solutions—is that normal Congressional appropriation procedures would almost certainly result in a fairly rapid phase-out of the operations, whether the radios were being funded through a public-private mechanism or as a line item in the USIA budget. In the process, appropriations for VOA might suffer as well. Even if this were not so, the extensive and annual public debate, in which it would be necessary *inter alia* to explain and defend the mission of RFE/RL as distinct from VOA, would directly jeopardize the position of the radios in certain host countries and could lead to serious diplomatic complications with the target countries. The public appropriation procedure, in short, would firmly fix the image of the radios as official instruments of the U.S. Government and, in our view, this image would not be significantly blurred by the device of the public-private mechanism, at least in foreign eyes.*

*"It will not be feasible to deny government support of the radios, and we propose that such support (without identifying CIA explicitly as the source) be officially acknowledged. There would be certain advantages, e.g., in handling Communist protests over the broadcasts, if open acknowledgement could be avoided. We believe, however, that to take a 'no comment' stance in response to queries about government support would very likely undermine the credibility of the Katzenbach Report<sup>4</sup> as a whole. On the other hand, official acknowledgement can be accom-*

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<sup>4</sup> See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 144.

panied by an unambiguous assurance that RFE/RL are the only activities covered by the statement of policy in the Katzenbach Report which will continue to be subsidized in substantially the same way after December 31, 1967. There is the subsidiary advantage that future government support being acknowledged, i.e., not covert, *an exception to the Katzenbach policy is not involved*. Mr. Helms, however, is on record as follows:<sup>5</sup> “To contend that, since government support is being openly acknowledged, no exception to the Katzenbach policy is involved, would in my opinion be construed as an evasion of the issue. It would invite questions as to source and specific amounts. The failure to answer would provoke editorial criticism and a continuing attempt to get at the whole truth . . . I believe our best course is to face the situation directly by making an exception under the terms of the Katzenbach report, and by admitting that it has in fact been made.” Needless to say, the solution recommended in the report (if successful) would make life happier for the State Department and Mr. Katzenbach.

“We believe that there is no reason to expect that the press will seek to exploit the acknowledgment in a major way. Government support for these operations is not ‘news’. Moreover, neither operation has come in for serious press criticism in the past, except for charges of deception in connection with the mass-media solicitation of individual contributions by RFE. (We concur in previous recommendations that such solicitation be discontinued but we also agree that fund-raising within the business community should be continued, in part to substantiate the private nature of the organization.)

*“Protests from target countries will be somewhat more difficult to handle, once government support is acknowledged.* However, it is believed that the United States can continue to take the position in diplomatic exchanges that RFE and RL are private operations, pointing out that many private organizations receive government financial support without thereby becoming instruments of the government. Host countries should be able to use the same line in response to target country protests or press criticism. Nevertheless, if government support is acknowledged, there will be added importance in insuring that any needlessly provocative themes are avoided.

*“Acknowledgement of U.S. Government support is not expected to make any substantial difference in RFE and RL credibility with their audiences.* Most listeners have probably assumed such support all along and if anything acceptance of the radios may have been enhanced thereby.

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<sup>5</sup> No further record was found.

*“Continued CIA financing is of course dependent on approval by the Senate and House ‘watch-dog’ committees. They have not been consulted and we have no basis for estimating their likely reaction.*

*“Should continued CIA financing be ruled out, then we believe the operations should be terminated.* The problems associated with normal appropriation procedures, taken with our estimate of the practical life expectancy of the operations, convince us that the game would not be worth the candle.

*“In the event of termination of either radio, every effort should be made to retain technical facilities, frequencies and personnel for the VOA.* As the report of the technical sub group indicates, certain of the technical installations and frequencies would be valuable to VOA in improving its service and in providing a backstop in the event of loss of facilities elsewhere.<sup>6</sup> Important savings might also be made in future construction costs. These benefits would, of course, be contingent on satisfactory arrangements with the host countries for VOA use of the facilities. The price of such arrangements in Portugal would probably be unacceptably high: a change in our African policy, especially modification of our views on self-determination for Portuguese territories.<sup>7</sup> In the case of Spain, prospects would be less bleak, but we could expect the Spanish to demand a substantial monetary *quid pro quo*. At this juncture, this might take the form of increased demands in the 1968 base negotiations.<sup>8</sup> We believe also that the German Government, for the reasons mentioned earlier, would be reluctant to agree to additional USIA facilities on German soil. As regards personnel, any major use of RFE/RL personnel would probably be contingent on a VOA decision to expand its programs to the target areas as well as to change its broadcast policies so as to permit somewhat more freedom in dealing with internal developments. This raises much broader problems affecting the world-wide operations of VOA which are beyond the scope of this study.

*“We have considered whether it would be possible to obtain a quid pro quo for the termination of RFE and RL. While the target countries would undoubtedly regard cessation of the broadcasts as a concession,*

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<sup>6</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>7</sup> For further information on the Johnson administration's Africa policy regarding Portuguese Africa, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXIV, Africa, Documents 413–456.

<sup>8</sup> Reference is to the United States naval base in Rota, Spain, and the air bases in Torrejon, Moron, and Zaragoza.

we see no way of using them as direct bargaining counters in present circumstances. On the other hand, the kind of broad negotiations directed at detente, in which the question of terminating the broadcasts might indirectly play an important role, are not in the offing.

“Finally, we recommend that the question of the future of RFE and RL be reviewed periodically, perhaps annually. Such reviews should take into account, as the present study has done, (a) the continuing need for the radios, (b) the outlook for retention of base facilities, and (c) the feasibility of transferring technical facilities and staff to VOA and/or of obtaining compensating concessions from the Communist countries in the event of termination.”

The Bureau of the Budget dissented from this report on the grounds that the following considerations were not adequately assessed:

- a. The alternative of an enriched VOA should be more adequately developed. . .
- b. The recommendations of the committee should be assessed in the light of (1) implicit disclosure of CIA funding; (2) attendant political repercussions at home and abroad; and (3) probable congressional reactions to funding acknowledged activities in the CIA budget.
- c. The case for continuing Radio Liberty under acknowledged U.S. Government financing is even less convincing than the RFE case and should be decided separately.

The Department answered this dissent, saying that even if the concept of an enriched VOA was not “developed”, it was thoroughly considered and the program review groups for the following areas had reported as follows:

“The *Polish* Program Review Group reported as follows:

‘Within the present charter of VOA it could not duplicate the type of reporting on internal policy affairs broadcast by RFE.’

“The *Czechoslovak* PRG reported:

‘We do not see how the official U.S. Government radio station can ever take over some of the specific objectives of RFE—unless we were at war with the country being broadcast to . . . The U.S. objective, like RFE’s, is awakening and creating political consciousness among the citizens of Czechoslovakia. As it stands now, it does not appear that VOA could effectively absorb RFE.’

“The *Hungarian* PRG reported:

‘Department of State and USIA guidances, as well as the USIA mission document and the VOA charter would have to be specifically amended and changed to permit VOA direct approach to Hungarian internal affairs . . . We do not believe that such an overall policy change is either advisable or desirable.’

“The *Rumanian* PRG reported:



'The key difference—and the principal RFE function which VOA cannot and should not undertake—is RFE's open criticism of the domestic situation in Romania and suggestions for improvement.'

"The *Radio Liberty* PRG reported:

'Theoretically, it would not be impossible for VOA to duplicate most of the objectives and themes of RL, using the same facilities and personnel. . . The U.S. would be giving up a current asset—and one with considerable potential value for years to come—without receiving a *quid pro quo* from the Soviet government.'

"The second way in which the Study Group addressed the possibility of an 'enriched country-oriented VOA' was through inquiries to our missions in target countries. In a relevant comment from Embassy Moscow, Ambassador Thompson concluded that status quo should be maintained for the time being and that 'public disclosure (of U.S. Government support) would be unfortunate but believe risk must be taken.'

"The third approach to the 'enriched VOA' alternative was technical. . . The subgroup report brings out that 'the entire shortwave system of the VOA is being used at maximum capacity for broadcasting to the European area at the present time during reasonable listening hours.' Hence additional broadcasting during such hours would require additional transmitters.

"A fourth consideration is that enrichment of VOA programs would also require VOA to absorb at least some substantial part of the RFE/RL news-gathering, research, and program personnel and facilities. Embassy Bonn believes that 'if the RFE/RL executive and professional staffs became U.S. Government employees, the FRG would certainly view the status of the organizations as having basically changed.'

"More basic than any of the foregoing is the question whether VOA world-wide broadcasting policies, evolved over the years, *should* be changed—quite apart from the practicality of doing so. The Study Group thought this question went well beyond its mandate.

"Apart from the question of the 'enriched, country-oriented VOA', the BOB dissent boils down to a questioning of the majority view on the public reaction to acknowledging U.S. Government support and Congressional reaction to continued CIA funding. The former is a matter of judgment; the latter can only be assessed by consultation with the Congress—which the Study Group assumed would be the first order of business if the basic recommendation is approved."

However, Budget Director Schultze has expressed serious doubts, both orally at the 303 Committee meeting on 20 September 1967 and later on paper, about the proposal to acknowledge government support



and continue CIA financing of both RFE and RL, with or without a public exception to the policy developed by the Katzenbach Committee. He believes the principal disadvantages of this course of action are:

—The CIA funding will be obvious; it is the only source of covert funding for this type of activity.

—Continued CIA funding of an acknowledged activity will create serious problems in Congress:

—Congress has already eliminated all funding for RFE and RL after December 31, 1967, except termination costs.

—Russell and Mahon are strongly opposed to CIA funding of activities that are not wholly covert. (On these grounds, Congress cut out CIA funding of the Vietnam Revolutionary Development Worker program.)

—We should be very careful not to start the practice of having CIA finance activities simply because Congress won't provide funds otherwise.

—Public acknowledgement of continued covert U.S. Government financing will cast doubt on the credibility of the whole Katzenbach policy.

—Though there has been considerable speculation about CIA funding, the acknowledgement of support would be given a big play in the press and will provide ammunition to attack the Administration.

There are two alternatives to the proposed course of action which would avoid the dangers cited above and keep open our options on Radio Free Europe. The options are:

1. *Terminate Radio Liberty and, before December 31, prefund RFE for an 18–21 month period.* Mr. Schultze believes the case for RL is weak and termination would simplify the problem. Pre-funding RFE would require the approval of Russell and Mahon, but they are more likely to agree to this one-shot action than to continued CIA funding. No exception to the Katzenbach policy would be required. We would have time to develop a plan either to provide alternative means of overt support or to fold the valuable RFE activities into USIA in connection with the 1970 budget.

2. *Terminate RL and seek an open appropriation to USIA to support RFE.* The main disadvantages of this lie in the risk of congressional turndown, the inevitable congressional comparisons between VOA and RFE and the effect of open support on the target countries and the countries where the transmitters are located.

The 303 Committee, in discussing these opinions on 20 September 1967, recommended that Secretaries Rusk's and McNamara's views be sought and the matter brought to your attention.

As I see it, this is basically a political decision with some far-ranging repercussions regardless of the way the issue is decided. We have built

up a \$350,000,000 asset; it has been and is a useful instrument; by terminating, we will indeed lose something. By continuing as is, with CIA funding, certain credibility risks exist.

As we see it, the risks of termination are as follows:

a. We would be surrendering without any *quid pro quo* a proven instrument for affecting the rate of change in Soviet and Eastern European societies.

b. We would, in other words, be making a unilateral concession to the other side.

c. There could be a Western European reaction in which they could construe the termination of RFE/RL as an acceptance of Communist domination of Eastern Europe after 17 years of opposition.

d. Within the United States, certain blocs within both Democratic and Republican parties would consider the termination as outright appeasement. Certain ethnic minority groups of Eastern European origin with powerful regional strength in Pittsburgh, Chicago and Detroit, etc., and a political voice through such congressmen as Pucinski and Zablocki could be both vociferous and intemperate.

e. There is more than a possibility that Richard Nixon or another Republican candidate, in casting about for issues, could go flat-out against bridge-building. The liquidation of RFE/RL could provide some gunpowder for such an attack.

f. Last but not least, a decision to liquidate might well be taken quite personally by such individuals as Michael Haider of Standard Oil, Crawford Greenwalt, Frank Stanton, Roy Larsen, and Roger Blough. These men have had long association with this effort and, we have reason to believe, feel strongly about it.

*Continuation* as recommended with continued CIA financing entails the following hazards:

a. If the State Department scenario is followed in which the United States government admits covert funding, it is definitely open to the charge: How can you call this an open subsidy if you won't reveal how much and from where? Both the press and Congress may find this unpalatable.

b. If it is claimed by the government that, yes, this is an exception to the Katzenbach ruling, the press could lean heavily on this and the only truthful answer is that no other solution has been found.

c. Any large-scale press play—something very difficult to forecast—may directly affect the present satisfactory attitudes of the Portuguese, Spanish and Germans, who control as host governments the leasing and transmitting site facilities. An open disclosure by itself could adversely affect the attitudes of these governments.

We have desisted from initial feelers among members of Congress because we felt this issue was sufficiently subtle so that you would prefer to design the strategy and name the strategists yourself.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have been briefed on this problem by Mr. Kohler and Mr. Nitze and are presumed ready to discuss the matter with you.

A decision is needed sooner rather than later because of the size of the enterprises, the interested parties, the money involved, and the deadline of December 31, 1967.

Peter Jessup

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**168. Program Action Memorandum Prepared in the Office of  
Policy and Research, United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

R-29-67

Washington, September 1967

**TRENDS IN WEST EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION  
ON U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES**

Much of our Western European program—indeed, much of U.S. policy toward Europe—is based on the assumption that similarities of civilization, ethnic composition and socio-economic development make the basic interests of Europeans and Americans similar. The results of this survey, following upon and confirming a similar survey in February, show that the psychological foundation for this approach to Western Europeans is growing shaky.<sup>2</sup> We are thus faced with a fundamental problem. Some of the questions we need to answer are:

*1. What is the nature of the problem?*

Are Europeans correct in thinking that their interests are less close to those of the United States than was the case a few years ago? Or are they deluded? To what extent is the change one of mind on the part of individual Europeans? To what extent does it reflect the fact that unlike a few years ago the younger members of our samples are people who did not directly experience as adults the conditions that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 7, IOP—Research, 1967. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

brought about an Atlantic Partnership?<sup>3</sup> In short, to what extent does the problem have psychological roots that USIA can touch?

2. *What are the implications of the problem for USIA programming in Europe?*

What adjustments ought we to make in (a) the content of our program, (b) our programming techniques? Do we have adequate resources to deal with the problem? Could we do more about it if we had more resources? If so, what should be the increase in each country in personnel, GOE, funds for research? Or are we already spending too much to too little effect?

#### *Action Required*

IAE is attempting to grapple with these and related questions in a Regional Analytical Survey<sup>4</sup> that it is preparing on the basis of CPPM's, country plans and other information at hand in the Agency at this time.

Posts are invited (but not required) to respond to this PAM at this time. They are, however, required to take the questions stated into account in drafting the next round of CPPM's and Country Plans. IAE will review submissions in the light of their adequacy as a response to this PAM.

FOR BONN: What do you make of the finding that Germans are not much concerned about possible reductions of U.S. forces in Europe? Reply by Field Message.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the concept articulated by President Kennedy in a July 4, 1962, address in Philadelphia when he said: "Building the Atlantic partnership now will not be easily or cheaply finished. But I will say here and now, on this Day of Independence, that the United States will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence, that we will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded here 175 years ago." (*Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 537-539)

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

**169. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 18, 1967

*VIET-NAM*

To counter the barrage of misinformation presented by the world press on Viet-Nam, we have increased our output on Viet-Nam subjects through television and films as follows:

1. Secretary Rusk was interviewed on television by five European journalists.<sup>2</sup> Before undertaking the program, we received commitments from television organizations in approximately 25 countries that they would carry such a program.

A previous appearance of this nature by Secretary Rusk was very successful and was carried in about 60 countries, and also shown repeatedly at USIS auditoriums and in private Embassy gatherings.<sup>3</sup>

2. A similar television film will be prepared with Walt Rostow on/or about November 1 in which he will review “Where we are in Viet-Nam.”

3. A documentary film using newsclips dating back to the French involvement in Viet-Nam will be prepared explaining, “Why the United States is involved in the present controversy.”

4. Based upon recent conversations with Ambassador George McGhee and other European Ambassadors, I am inaugurating a series of five or ten-minute news clips that can be sent to European capitals for inclusion in regular news programs over their television facilities.

During my recent visit to London, Madrid and Lisbon, I was told repeatedly by journalists in those capitals that public opinion in Europe is based upon fragmentary, erroneous and frequently distorted reports emanating from U.S. news services, magazines and television news-reels. It is difficult, if not impossible, to counter these reports without

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Agency Reports, U.S. Information Agency, Box 135 [2 of 2], United States Information Agency, 1967 [2 of 3]. Confidential. Sent through Maguire, who did not initial the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> On October 16, Rusk was interviewed at the USIA television studio in Washington by five journalists from West Germany, Italy, Australia, France, and the Netherlands. For a transcript of the interview, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 6, 1967, pp. 595–602.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably a reference to the January 31 interview Rusk took part in with four journalists from British media outlets and to which Marks referred in an August 8 memorandum to Rusk. (Department of State *Bulletin*, February 20, 1967, pp. 274–284; National Archives, RG 306, Director Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 7, Policy and Plans—General, 1967)

a world-wide news gathering and film clip service. The efforts recited above will at best be a limited response to this daily barrage.

Despite repeated and continuing efforts with the Information Ministry of the Government of Viet-Nam, there has been little progress in supplying press officers with assistance in the embassies located in principal world capitals. In London, I was informed that the Government of Viet-Nam Embassy receives "virtually no logistical support from its government" and as a result USIS must bear the principal burden of supplying press and pamphlet materials and advising on press relations. A similar report was received from Rome. Good cooperation exists at these embassies but the program would be far more effective if Saigon were able to supply the necessary assistance.<sup>4</sup>

### SOVIET UNION

On September 23 a bitter anti-U.S. attack was shown on Soviet television during prime time. Our post reports that the program featured our involvement in Viet-Nam, the "brutalization of western civilization" and the "threat of foreign tourism in the USSR." The following is an excerpt from that report:

"The program opened with a reference to VOA reports of a barrier between North and South Vietnam. The commentator, with a sneer accentuating his verbalized disgust for the barbaric aggressors, explained that U.S. policy is bankrupt. The North Vietnamese will soon hang their wash on the McNamarra wall, a barrier created as an election gimmick to dupe Americans that the war is not futile. The commentator asks with barbed hostility: "Americans, what do you think of your war in Vietnam? We are listening to you!"

President Johnson's photo flashes on the screen and a masculine documentary film voice says: "President Johnson, Washington, D.C., August 17 . . ." and continues in Russian to the foreboding droning of bombers to quote a statement made by the President that the Vietnamese seek relief from the surrounding terror.

The commentator interrupts: "Thanks, Mister President, for your clear estimate of the forces of resistance of the Vietnamese patriots. Continue, Gentlemen, we are all listening!"

Senator Robert Kennedy, Governor George Romney, Howard Rusk in the New York Times, Senator William Fulbright, Associated Press, Senator Wayne Morse, a New York daily newspaper, Senator Stuart Symington, and President Johnson are quoted by the documentary voice in a composite conceived to condemn the cruel external manifestations of a hopelessly sick society."

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<sup>4</sup> Marks echoed the same observation he shared with Johnson following his July trip to Vietnam: "There is a desperate urgency for the Vietnamese story to be told by the Vietnamese in world capitals—and yet little is being done." See Document 157.

This reference would confirm my previous reports that Soviet citizens are being fed a strong diet of malicious statements frequently including personal attacks on American leaders.

*A STUDY OF FOREIGN TEXT BOOKS*

Several months ago I initiated a worldwide study to determine what children in primary and secondary schools are being taught about the United States, its political, economic and social systems. A preliminary report indicates basic misconceptions and inadequate information is being presented.<sup>5</sup> I am now working with an interagency committee to propose a legislative program which would provide an expanded program in the field of education aimed at correcting this situation, of increasing the exchange of teachers, and providing additional textbooks and reference material about the U.S.

Leonard H. Marks

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 166.

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**170. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 14, 1967

1. You will recall that at lunch on 17 October we discussed the future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.<sup>2</sup> At that time, you expressed a willingness for me to consult those leaders of Congress

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Box 44, Radio Free Europe, Vol. 1. No classification marking. Steigman sent the memorandum to Helms under a November 18 typewritten covering note, in which he stated that Rusk “has asked me to tell you that the attached memorandum is completely satisfactory to him.” (Ibid.) Printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Document 18.

<sup>2</sup> Helms is referring to the regular Tuesday lunch the President convened at the White House with his top cabinet and policy advisors. On October 17, the President held the lunch meeting at 1:40 p.m. with Rusk, McNamara, Helms, Rostow, Christian, and Wheeler; Tom Johnson served as note-taker. (Johnson Library, Special Files, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meeting, Box 1, October 17, 1967—1:40 PM, McNamara, Rusk, Wheeler, Helms, Rostow, Christian; and Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) Parts of Johnson’s meeting notes that pertain specifically to the war in Vietnam are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, Document 355.

having to do with appropriations in an effort to establish whether or not they would be willing to continue appropriating money for these radios on the understanding that this would not constitute a request by you for this money or a charge against your congressional program.

2. As a result, I visited individually with five members of Congress: Representatives Mahon of Texas, Bow of Ohio, Lipscomb of California, and Senators Russell of Georgia and Milton Young of North Dakota. All five of these individuals expressed a willingness to support the radios financially in the round amount of \$30,000,000 per annum for at least the next fiscal year and possibly longer.

3. At my visit with each of those five individuals, I explained in detail the problem we have had in finding alternative means of financing those radios. I made it clear that a public relations problem still exists in terms of how the Administration explains the continuance of the present financial arrangements. On the other hand, if there is no firm assurance of congressional support for the radios, there is no need to waste time on devising the right tactical approach to the press. I carefully underlined that I was there on my own since you wanted it clearly understood that you did not want to make a personal appeal for the money involved nor did you feel that you should be asked to plead for these radios as against other projects which you felt to be more essential. It was my distinct impression that each individual understood the terms of the discussion quite clearly.

4. Congressman Mahon reacted to my presentation by saying that he had felt it had been a mistake to include the radios in the Katzenbach report<sup>3</sup> and that he had always preferred to have them continue to operate as they had in the past.<sup>4</sup> He recognized the public relations problems but stated that it did not concern him unduly even if there were some criticism. (At this point, he made a disparaging reference to the influence of THE NEW YORK TIMES and told me "I never read Reston.") He then remarked that he thought the radios should be continued and that he was prepared to help provide the necessary funds. He pointed out, however, that Mr. Bow would have to agree and asked me to see both Mr. Bow and Mr. Lipscomb, the two Republican members of his CIA Appropriations Subcommittee.<sup>5</sup>

5. Representative Bow told me that he thought the radios were doing a good job and that they should be continued.<sup>6</sup> He promised to

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 144.

<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand highlighted this sentence in yellow.

<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand highlighted from "he was prepared" through the end of this paragraph in yellow.

<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand highlighted this sentence in yellow.



help provide the money. In the course of our conversation, he pointed out that he was on the Appropriations Subcommittee which deals with USIA and that in his opinion it would make no sense to try to meld Radio Free Europe and/or Radio Liberty into the Voice of America organization. He indicated that he clearly understood the difference in the program content of the Voice of America on the one hand and the two “private” radios on the other. He concluded by opining that this was no time in history to reduce our efforts to bring about change behind the Iron Curtain.<sup>7</sup>

6. Representative Lipscomb said that he was in favor of the radios and did not want to see them terminated.<sup>8</sup> He volunteered to do what he could to have the money appropriated and asked a few questions about the amounts involved and how they were allocated. He accepted the fact that some admission of government support might have to be made. He stated that this would present “a tricky problem” in dealing with the press but did not anticipate widespread newspaper criticism.<sup>9</sup>

7. Senator Russell expressed his support of the radios and said that he thought they ought to be continued at least for a time.<sup>10</sup> He repeated what he has said before that he never could understand what all the ruckus had been about. He pointed out that criticism over these subsidies had died out quickly after the initial flurry last winter. He indicated his willingness to help secure the money involved and asked me to go see Senator Young and put the matter to him.<sup>11</sup> He authorized me to tell Senator Young that he favored continuing the radios.

8. When I met with Senator Young, I told him that Senator Russell had asked me to see him, but I did not attempt to influence his decision by telling him in advance what Senator Russell’s position was. He did not even inquire. He simply stated that he thought the radios should continue to operate and that he would do what he could to help as far as appropriations are concerned.<sup>12</sup> He expressed the opinion that the state of the world being what it was, no useful efforts to deal with

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<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand highlighted from “this was no time” through the end of this sentence in yellow.

<sup>8</sup> An unknown hand highlighted this sentence in yellow.

<sup>9</sup> An unknown hand highlighted from “this would present” through the end of this paragraph in yellow.

<sup>10</sup> An unknown hand highlighted this sentence in yellow.

<sup>11</sup> An unknown hand highlighted from “asked me to” through the end of this sentence in yellow.

<sup>12</sup> An unknown hand highlighted from “I told him” through “as far as appropriations are concerned” in yellow.

Communism or Communist ideology should be reduced.<sup>13</sup> He voiced concern that possibly not enough was being done in this area.

9. I have reported the above to Secretary Rusk. We will again raise with you shortly how we should proceed on this problem of handling Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

**Richard Helms<sup>14</sup>**

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<sup>13</sup> An unknown hand highlighted from "no useful efforts" through the end of this sentence in yellow.

<sup>14</sup> Helms signed "Dick" above this typed signature.

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**171. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency (Oleksiw) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 24, 1967

**SUBJECT**

Educational Television for Viet-Nam<sup>2</sup>

You asked me to keep you informed of planning for educational television in Viet-Nam. In addition to the information contained in the three memoranda<sup>3</sup> attached herewith, you should be aware that:

1) Mr. Marks has determined that Premier Sato offered the President only television receivers: no "stations," transmitters, studios, technicians, or advisors were mentioned by Sato.

The transmitters presently in operation or scheduled for operation within Viet-Nam are sufficient to support whatever educational television projects we could reasonably envisage.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 30, Educational TV—Vietnam. Confidential. A copy was sent to Marks.

<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand underlined the subject line.

<sup>3</sup> Memo from Mr. Marks to the President, Nov. 21; Memo from Mr. Rostow to Messrs. Rusk, Gaud and Marks, Nov. 21; Memo from Mr. Marks to Messrs. Rusk, Gaud and Rostow, Nov. 22. [Footnote is in the original. None of the memoranda is attached but see footnote 4 below.]

The present studios probably can suffice, depending on how efficiently we can schedule them and the degree of austerity the GVN is willing to assign to the projects (obviously, an ambitious television producer working toward highest U.S. operational standards could recommend new, separate, complex, and expensive studios: I believe we should try to get along without them).

Some additional technical assistance will be necessary to establish production standards, and we are in contact with such persons already (at least one of them, Loren Stone from the University of Washington, has been working with us on television in Viet-Nam for some time now and is well known and respected by GVN officials now engaged in television projects). Too, we will need some first-class educational specialists who can devise reasonable methods for integrating television instruction into the present and developing educational plant of the country (Mr. Marks is very familiar with what is required and will make some recommendations soon). In any case, both the limited technical assistance and the educational advisors to consult on the proper introduction of television into the school system of Viet-Nam should be funded by AID. I hope that when Mr. Marks meets with the Japanese official who will be responsible for implementing the Sato plan he will be able to induce them to offer additional assistance in the way of technical training in Japan for maintenance personnel and perhaps some technicians or advisors to work in Viet-Nam (Sony is training 25 or so non-Japanese Asians in Tokyo at this time).

2) Although the President has designated Mr. Marks to be the Washington official responsible for fostering educational television development in Viet-Nam,<sup>4</sup> Mr. Marks will act in this instance outside his role as Director of USIA (for obvious reasons: the effort should not be construed as a propaganda mechanism).

The Director has instructed me to call on the Minister of Education with Ambassador Bunker or Locke during my upcoming visit to Viet-Nam to try to induce a genuine interest by the GVN in using television for education.

We should hope for a realistic, modest plan by the GVN to use television as a supplementary tool in certain areas where the quality

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<sup>4</sup> In a November 21 memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, Gaud, and Marks, Rostow noted that during a November 15 meeting in Washington the President and the Japanese Prime Minister agreed that the two countries would work together to improve education in South Vietnam through "the use of television and modern teaching techniques." They further agreed to form a joint committee, which would also include South Vietnam, to work out the details of the program. The President also suggested that Marks was "the appropriate U.S. chief representative" on that joint committee. (Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 30, Educational TV—Vietnam) For Johnson's meeting with Sato, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXIX, Part 2, Japan, Document 106.

of education, now affected by a teacher shortage, can be improved. On the basis of what I know now, it would appear that educational television could be begun most meaningfully in the Saigon and Hue areas.

3) Following is the status of television in Viet-Nam at this time (this information is useful if educational television follows the development of non-educational television, as we foresee that it will):

Ground stations are now in operation in Saigon and Hue, the latter from temporary facilities.

An airborne station operates over Cantho, but it will be replaced by a ground station in early 1968.

Studios are completed or nearing completion in Saigon and Cantho.

Additional permanent ground stations are scheduled for completion in the following cities by the indicated dates: Hue and Qui Nhon in late 1968; Danang and Nha Trang in early 1969.

At least 125,500 receivers are in the country at this time (we supplied 2,500 for group viewing, 48,000 were purchased on the open market, and another 75,000 were purchased by U.S. military personnel).

The GVN has licensed a Vietnamese TV assembly plant which plans to start turning out Japanese sets for civilian commercial distribution (we don't know how high the rate of production will be); another Vietnamese has a franchise to assemble RCA sets, but he does not appear to have made much real headway towards getting into operation.

We supervise a DOD-funded contract with NBC International for the operation, programming and training of GVN television personnel who ultimately will be responsible for this network.

**Daniel P. Oleksiw<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**172. Talking Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research,  
United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

No. 35

Washington, December 13, 1967

**VIET-NAM IN PERSPECTIVE**

(1) QUESTION: Why is the United States fighting in Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: In the most basic terms: The U.S. is in Viet-Nam because (a) the peace and security of Southeast Asia are vital to the U.S. national interest; (b) the U.S. has solemn commitments to aid South Viet-Nam (SVN) against aggression; we will keep our pledge to assist SVN, as we would assist other nations with whom we have similar commitments through agreements and treaties; (c) we believe that nations, large and small, have the right to chart their own destinies without the threat of external force and interference.

Because we have a vital interest in the peace and security of Southeast Asia, we joined other powers in signing the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) of 1954, which the U.S. Senate approved by an 82-to-1 vote.<sup>2</sup>

One of the most important provisions of that treaty states that “each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area . . . would endanger its own peace and safety,” and, in that event, would “act to meet the common danger.” A protocol, signed and approved with the treaty, extended this provision to the non-Communist states of former French Indo-China (Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia).<sup>3</sup>

At the request of the Government of SVN, and in keeping with our SEATO obligations, we went to the aid of South Viet-Nam when that country was subjected to “aggression by means of armed attack” from the north. We are helping the people of South Viet-Nam and their government to defend themselves against aggression directed, politically and militarily, and largely supplied by North Viet-Nam. The

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 309, Master Copies, 1967. No classification marking. All brackets are in the original. The Talking Paper was distributed by pouch to all USIS posts under cover of Infoguide 68–14, December 15. According to the Infoguide, Talking Paper No. 35 updated Talking Paper No. 27, “The Issues in Vietnam,” which was sent March 4, 1966, as Infoguide 66–7, a copy of which is in the National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 313, Master Copies, 1966.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 124.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Protocol, see 6 U.S.T. 81.

so-called “war of national liberation” in Viet-Nam is nothing more than a new form of aggression.

We seek only to help the South Vietnamese people control their own destiny, determine their own future, lead their own lives as they choose and not as imposed by Hanoi. We do not seek to overthrow or destroy the Government of North Viet-Nam. We are determined to prevent its aggression from succeeding.

(2) QUESTION: Is there really any legal basis for U.S. military aid to South Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: U.S. actions are justified under the SEATO Treaty, the Geneva Accords of 1954, and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The right of self-defense against armed attack is recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense . . .”).

North Viet-Nam violated the Geneva accords in instigating, directing and sustaining armed attack against South Viet-Nam.<sup>4</sup> As the victim of armed attack, South Viet-Nam has the right of self-defense, and to have the assistance of others in that defense. South Viet-Nam asked for such assistance. In line with Article IV of the SEATO Treaty, the U.S. and four other SEATO members have undertaken to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with [their] constitutional processes.”

In addition, on August 10, 1964, the U.S. Congress—with only two dissenting votes—authorized U.S. participation in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam.<sup>5</sup>

(3) QUESTION: If the war in Viet-Nam is such a threat to Asia, why have so few SEATO members joined the U.S. in Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: France, Pakistan and the United Kingdom have not contributed militarily to Viet-Nam. All the other SEATO signatories—the U.S., Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand—have troops in South Viet-Nam. Thus, all five Asian-Pacific members of SEATO are fighting side by side with South Vietnamese troops.

South Korea, with some 48,000 front-line troops, is making a major contribution in South Viet-Nam.

Other Asian nations—Japan, the Republic of China, and Malaysia—have supplied medical teams, technicians, advisers, and economic and educational assistance to South Viet-Nam.

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<sup>4</sup> For further information about the Geneva Accords, see footnote 2, Document 71.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution or Joint Resolution 1145, “To Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia.” See Document 26.

In all, more than 30 countries are providing South Viet-Nam with non-military assistance in one form or another. More than two dozen medical and surgical teams from various countries are working in South Viet-Nam, caring for civilian needs as well as military casualties.

Among the non-Asian contributors of assistance are Canada, the German Federal Republic, Iran, Italy, and the Netherlands. These countries have sent doctors, nurses, teachers, agricultural advisers, engineers and other technical personnel to help bring a better life to all the South Vietnamese.

(4) QUESTION: Why is the U.S. reluctant to bring the question of peace in Viet-Nam before the United Nations?

ANSWER: There is no reluctance on the part of the U.S. We have repeatedly sought to move the Viet-Nam conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. On January 31, 1966, the U.S. formally requested the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) to consider the Viet-Nam problem, and to recommend steps toward a peaceful solution.<sup>6</sup> In September of 1967 the U.S. again circulated a draft UNSC resolution aimed at bringing peace to Viet-Nam, based on the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962.<sup>7</sup>

However, Hanoi, Peking and Moscow have repeatedly opposed submission of the Viet-Nam problem to the U.N.<sup>8</sup>

Since the summer of 1964 Hanoi has taken the position that (a) the U.N. is not competent to deal with the Viet-Nam problem, and (b) Hanoi would consider null and void any Security Council resolution on the Viet-Nam question. During the February 1–2, 1966, Security Council discussions of the U.S. draft resolution on steps toward peace, the Soviet Union opposed the inclusion of the resolution in the Council's agenda. France took a similarly negative attitude.<sup>9</sup>

(5) QUESTION: If the United Nations approach is not possible, why doesn't the U.S. agree to a reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference to discuss possible peace negotiations?

ANSWER: The U.S. would welcome the reconvening of such a conference to discuss Viet-Nam and the future of Southeast Asia. The United States has made this clear on numerous occasions.

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<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 59; and Earl W. Foell, "U.S. plea puzzles UN: Vietnam role uncertain," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 2, 1966, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> See Earl W. Foell, "UN sees U.S. Viet hope dim," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 1, 1967, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> See Robert H. Estabrook, "Gromyko Vows Aid to Hanoi," *Washington Post*, September 23, 1967, p. A1.

<sup>9</sup> See Carlyle Morgan, "Paris-Hanoi notes rouse speculation," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 4, 1966, p. 4.

In fact the U.K., a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, has sought to reconvene such a conference—only to be rebuffed in this endeavor by the other co-chairman, the Soviet Union. Like the USSR, Hanoi has opposed the Geneva Conference approach, stating its refusal to take part in such a meeting.

(6) QUESTION: Isn't Hanoi's refusal to participate based largely on U.S. refusal to recognize the right of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) to take part?

ANSWER: President Johnson has said that inclusion of the NLF in peace talks does not pose an "insurmountable problem," and that the Viet Cong (VC) "would have no difficulty in being represented if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants to cease aggression."<sup>10</sup>

On November 2, 1967, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, made it clear that the United States "would not stand in the way" of a Security Council invitation to the NLF. Furthermore, Ambassador Goldberg, in expressing U.S. willingness for the reconvening of the General [*Geneva?*] Conference, stated that the U.S. "would recognize the competence of the conferees (the co-chairmen, the Soviet Union and Britain) to decide the invitees and the scope" of the discussions.<sup>11</sup>

(7) QUESTION: Why does the U.S. refuse to accept the NLF as the representative of a considerable segment of the population of South Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: The NLF itself claims to be the *sole* legitimate representative of all the South Vietnamese, not just a portion of them.

But the South Vietnamese do not accept the NLF as their "sole representative" or "only legitimate voice." South Viet-Nam has many groups with different religious and ethnic origins, including Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Cambodians, and Montagnards. These groups, and certainly the almost one million refugees who fled from North Viet-Nam to the south in 1954–55, do not recognize the NLF as their "sole" spokesman.

(8) QUESTION: What evidence is there that the Saigon government has any better claim than the NLF to be the "sole" representative of the people of South Viet-Nam?

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<sup>10</sup> Johnson made this statement during a July 28, 1965, press conference held in the East Room of the White House at 12:34 p.m. where he said: "We have stated time and time again that we would negotiate with any government, any place, any time. The Viet Cong would have no difficulty in being represented and having their views presented if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants to cease aggression. And I would not think that would be an insurmountable problem at all. I think that could be worked out." (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1965*, Book II, pp. 794–803)

<sup>11</sup> See John W. Finney, "U.S. Says Vietcong Could Take Part in a Peace Parley," *New York Times*, November 3, 1967, p. 1.



ANSWER: In the summer of 1967, 83 per cent of 5.8 million registered South Vietnamese voters elected a government of their own choice.

Of course those South Vietnamese in areas under Viet Cong control were unable either to register or to vote. But of those who were free of Viet Cong control and eligible to register, some 70 per cent did register. And 83 per cent of the registered electorate cast ballots for leaders of their choice.

That choice was a clear rejection of the NLF's claim to represent the South Vietnamese people. Through assassinations, kidnapping, and other forms of intimidation, the Viet Cong tried to disrupt the elections in areas they did not control. Most of the eligible voters were not deterred from making their choice. The turnout at the polls shows that the Viet Cong not only failed in their objective but do not have the popular support they claim.

Under the circumstances, the elections were almost a miracle in politics. In the midst of a cruel, mean guerrilla war, under constant Viet Cong terror and threat, it took courage to vote. Nevertheless the elections took place, and provided an example of free choice in democratic diversity.

There was ample diversity, a wide range of choice, in those elections. There were "peace" candidates, and "hawks" as well. In both the presidential and assembly elections there were many issues, many proposals, many candidates. The new Saigon government and its leaders represent the outcome—the product of the determined exercise of free choice by the South Vietnamese who were free to choose.

(9) QUESTION: Hanoi termed the elections a "farce," and denounced the victors—Generals Thieu and Ky—as "puppets." Isn't there some basis for such charges?

ANSWER: One can understand why Hanoi resorted to such bitter denunciations, for it failed completely in its objective of disrupting the elections.

Surely, if the elections were rigged, General Thieu would have far outdistanced all opposition. As it was, he drew only 35 per cent of the total vote for president. He was one of 11 candidates for the post, and the people naturally scattered their votes. But the fact that the voters gave him 35 per cent of the total—twice the vote for his nearest rival—can be considered a very substantial demonstration of popular support.

Hanoi and the NLF are quick to criticize elections in South Viet-Nam. The fact remains that there have never been free elections either in North Viet-Nam or in areas under Viet Cong military control. Some 500 foreign newsmen and observers who witnessed the elections in South Viet-Nam concluded that these were generally fair and free. This

means that irregularities which occurred were certainly no more serious than those which figure in elections in highly developed democratic countries with long histories of free elections.

(10) QUESTION: Didn't the election of Generals Thieu and Ky merely perpetuate military rule?

ANSWER: The South Vietnamese people have civilian constitutional government now. The Constituent Assembly worked hard and long to evolve a strong constitution. South Viet-Nam's elected bicameral legislature is a guarantee against one-man rule or rule by any one group, including the military.

The members of the Senate and House represent many different elements of Vietnamese society. There is no single "military" bloc. Those military men who were elected could not have won without civilian support. Eleven out of sixty elected senators are military or former military men; 30 of the 137 elected representatives have a military background.

The fact is that neither President Thieu nor Vice-President Ky controls a dominant bloc in either the Senate or House. And in selecting his cabinet, President Thieu gave ministries to only three military men; 24 to civilians. The Prime Minister is a Southern Buddhist civilian, Nguyen Van Loc. Other civilians head the key ministries of foreign affairs, of justice, and of all the ministries controlling the economic and educational life of the country.

The cabinet is representative of the varied religious, regional and ethnic groupings in Viet-Nam. There are twelve southerners, ten northerners, and seven central Vietnamese. There is a rough balance between Buddhist and Catholic representation. Ethnic Montagnards and Chinese also are represented.

(11) QUESTION: Why are you bombing North Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: The primary purpose of the bombing is to make infiltration from north to south more difficult and costly for the North Vietnamese army. The targets are bridges, supply depots, munitions factories, roads leading south, and truck convoys and trains moving in the same direction. Every possible precaution is taken to prevent bombs from falling on nonmilitary targets.

(12) QUESTION: Hanoi claims the U.S. has a deliberate policy of hitting targets that are not even remotely connected with the war effort, and that hospitals have been a prime U.S. target. Isn't that true?

ANSWER: It is entirely possible and most regrettable that some civilian targets may have been inadvertently hit, either by stray bombs or by NVN anti-aircraft ordnance which comes to earth after failing to hit its targets. It is not true that U.S. bombing is aimed at civilian targets. None of the foreign diplomats and news correspondents from

neutral countries in Hanoi has accused the U.S. of *deliberately* bombing civilian targets.

While there have been mistakes, for no airmen are infallible, these errors hardly compare with the deliberate Viet Cong policy of terrorism against civilians in South Viet-Nam. Since 1958, 58,000 civilians have been killed or kidnapped in the course of the Viet Cong's continuing, systematic, premeditated program of assassination and intimidation.

(13) QUESTION: You say the U.S. is bombing North Viet-Nam to halt the flow of men and supplies to the south, but you acknowledge that such infiltration continues. Doesn't this show that the policy of bombing has failed?

ANSWER: The U.S. has never claimed that its aircraft could or would halt infiltration entirely. Defense Secretary McNamara has said repeatedly that the primary objective of U.S. air action over North Viet-Nam is to reduce the flow of continued infiltration of men and supplies from the north to South Viet-Nam, and to increase the cost of such infiltration. The bombing makes it clear to the North Vietnamese leaders that, so long as they continue their aggression against the South, they have to pay a price in the north.

Weighed against its stated objectives, the bombing campaign has been successful. The North Vietnamese have paid, and will continue to pay, a high price for their continued aggression. It has been made abundantly clear to Hanoi's leaders that they cannot expect North Viet-Nam to remain a sanctuary while North Vietnamese forces conduct operations freely outside their own territory.

Complete interdiction of the flow of men and supplies from north to south has never been considered possible by U.S. military leaders. The air assaults, however, have made North Vietnamese infiltration increasingly difficult and costly.

(14) QUESTION: Many countries have urged the U.S. to stop bombing North Viet-Nam. Why do you ignore such pleas?

ANSWER: President Johnson has said the U.S. is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions—provided that, while the discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation. The U.S. and many other countries consider this a reasonable and fair proposition.

If Hanoi is interested in peace, all it would have to say is "Yes," publicly or privately, to the President's offer. Unfortunately, Hanoi has not responded affirmatively to this or any other proposals made by the Vietnamese Government, the U.S., the U.N. Secretary General, Pope Paul, and other governments and groups—all striving for peace in Southeast Asia.

(15) QUESTION: The leaders in Hanoi and some other capitals have said talks could start when you stop bombing. You ignore this signal, and insist that Hanoi accept your conditions. Why are you so adamant about demanding a specific concession from Hanoi to stop bombing?

ANSWER: There has been considerable misunderstanding of what Hanoi has said, or is supposed to have said, on the question of bombing and talks.

Hanoi insists that the U.S. stop bombing, permanently and unconditionally. Hanoi has said this over and over. In responding on February 15, 1967, to a letter from President Johnson proposing the start of discussions toward peace, Ho Chi Minh demanded unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing and all other military activity of the U.S. troops and the other allies of South Viet-Nam.<sup>12</sup>

As Ambassador Goldberg pointed out at the U.N. on September 21, 1967, Hanoi in its public statements "has merely indicated that there 'could' be negotiations if the bombing stopped." Some governments and individuals had expressed their belief or assumption that negotiations "would" begin if bombings were halted. Ambassador Goldberg commented:

"We have given these expressions of belief our most careful attention, but no such third party—including those governments which are among Hanoi's closest friends—has conveyed to us any authoritative message from Hanoi that there would in fact be negotiations if the bombing were stopped. We have sought such a message directly from Hanoi without success."<sup>13</sup>

Secretary of State Rusk has stated:

"We've made it very clear that, as a step toward peace, we are prepared to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam. If anyone anywhere in the world can demonstrate that stopping the bombing is a step toward peace, they will have no difficulty in Washington."<sup>14</sup>

In fact, the U.S. has stopped bombing on five occasions, ranging from two days in one period to 37 days in another, without any positive response from Hanoi.

<sup>12</sup> For an English translation of Ho Chi Minh's letter to the President, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, attachment to Document 82.

<sup>13</sup> See "Text of Goldberg's Address to U.N. Assembly on Peace in Vietnam and Mideast," *New York Times*, September 22, 1967, p. 16.

<sup>14</sup> The quote is taken from Rusk's July 19 news conference. However, the actual quote as reported in the Department of State *Bulletin* is: "We've made it very clear that we are prepared to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace. If anyone anywhere in the world can demonstrate that stopping the bombing is a step toward peace, they will have no difficulty in Washington." (August 7, 1967, pp. 159-167)

What the GVN and its allies need to know is what will happen if the bombing stops. There is no word from Hanoi, however, nor from any power which has Hanoi's confidence.

(16) QUESTION: You claim you would do anything possible to promote peace, yet you won't halt the bombing of North Viet-Nam. How do you reconcile these views?

ANSWER: You can't expect the U.S. to stop the bombing permanently without some reciprocity to relieve the beleaguered South Vietnamese. This is not likely to contribute toward peace.

Mr. Rusk's explanation of the U.S. view on this aspect of the situation:

"For us to say, 'We will stop, you go right ahead with your war; you live there safely and comfortably, without being disturbed, while you send men and arms into South Viet-Nam for the next 50 years'—where would be the incentive for peace?

"Now, we are interested in peace; we are not interested in a sanctuary which will let them carry on these operations against South Viet-Nam and Laos for eternity, while they sit there in a sanctuary taking their own time, paying no price, trying to seize their neighbors by force."<sup>15</sup>

That is why the U.S. needs something more than a vague indication from Hanoi that talks could possibly start if the bombing stopped. Cessation of bombing, without any concrete reciprocal action from the other side, does not appear to be a fruitful way to move toward peace.

(17) QUESTION: It seems to me that you talk a lot about peace and continue to escalate the war. Thus, you make the prospect of peace increasingly difficult. How sincere can your peace gestures really be?

ANSWER: The U.S. proposals for peace negotiations have been openly, fully and clearly spelled out by President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Goldberg, and other top U.S. officials.

On November 11, 1967, President Johnson stated that the U.S. would be ready and willing to meet with the other side on a neutral ship, in neutral waters, to discuss peace negotiations.<sup>16</sup> That proposal was another in a series of pledges he has made to go anywhere at any time to begin discussions with North Vietnamese representatives.

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<sup>15</sup> The quote is taken from Rusk's October 12 news conference. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 30, 1967, pp. 555–564)

<sup>16</sup> Reference is to the 7:11 a.m. remarks the President made on the flight deck of the USS *Enterprise*: "The United States follows the dream of peace, so we include even the seas in our search. For us, the wardroom could easily be a conference room. A neutral ship on a neutral sea would be as good a meetingplace as any." (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1967*, Book II, pp. 1017–1019)

Unconditional discussions have been proposed more than 30 times by the U.S. itself and, collectively and individually, by nations of the West, and nonaligned or neutral countries. Some Communist countries have sought to bring the Viet-Nam issue to the conference table. World leaders, among them Pope Paul VI and U.N. Secretary General U Thant, have exerted their influence to bring about negotiations.

The U.S. welcomed all such initiatives but Hanoi rejected them.

All Hanoi has to do to test U.S. sincerity is to agree to discuss, with the government of South Viet-Nam and its allies, a settlement or even the conditions for a settlement.

(18) QUESTION: You place great emphasis on the U.S. "commitment" in South Viet-Nam. Doesn't this commitment increase the risk of world war?

ANSWER: We believe the possibility of world conflict would increase if the U.S. abandoned its commitments in Asia, Europe or elsewhere. The U.S. has allies around the world. It cannot consider some of its commitments less firm or less important than others.

If on several occasions the Soviet Union had not believed that the U.S. meant what it said about Berlin, or if Chairman Khrushchev had not believed President Kennedy's statement that Soviet missiles had to be removed from Cuba,<sup>17</sup> general war could have resulted. In the same way, it is important that North Viet-Nam, Communist China, and the Soviet Union place equal credence in the determination of the U.S. to fulfill its commitments in Southeast Asia.

Thus, it is clearly in the interest of world peace that the U.S. live up to its commitments.

(19) QUESTION: Isn't it a fact that neither the U.S. nor South Viet-Nam ever signed the Geneva Accords of 1954? Does this account for the failure of the U.S. in 1956 to support free elections in Viet-Nam, although the Accords called for such elections?

ANSWER: The powers represented at the Geneva Conference of 1954 were Cambodia, North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Laos, Communist China, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Agreements reached during the conference were summarized in a Final Declaration which bore no signatures at all.

The Agreements called for provisional partition of Viet-Nam at the 17th parallel. They called for an end to all hostilities in the country, and for the formation of an International Control Commission—comprising representatives of Canada, India, and Poland—to supervise the execu-

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<sup>17</sup> Reference is to President Kennedy's October 22, 1962, televised report on the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba. (*Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 806-809)

tion of the agreements. The Final Declaration of the conference called for free elections in 1956 to bring about unification of Viet-Nam.

At that time South Viet-Nam not only protested the partitioning of the country, but also emphasized the impossibility of holding free elections in the Communist-controlled north. Therefore SVN did not accept the Final Declaration. The United States did not join in the Final Declaration because of reservations about certain features of the Accords—in particular, their failure to include United Nations supervision of the proposed 1956 elections. The United States, however, issued a unilateral declaration<sup>18</sup> stipulating that the U.S. would (a) refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the Geneva Agreements, but (b) view any renewal of aggression in violation of the accords as seriously threatening international peace and security.

By 1956, when the elections were to be held, the situation in North Viet-Nam showed that free elections were in fact not possible in the north. Under such conditions, the RVN did not consider itself obliged to take part in elections which (a) could not be free, (b) would greatly favor more populous North Viet-Nam, and (c) could only result in the takeover of South Viet-Nam by the Hanoi regime.

For its part the U.S. advocates free elections today, as it did in 1954. The U.S. said in 1954:

“In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.”<sup>19</sup>

And that is the U.S. stand today.

(20) QUESTION: Aren't the Viet Cong, in reality, revolutionaries engaged in a war of national liberation?

ANSWER: In Communist terminology, a “war of national liberation” means a war to achieve eventual Communist control. This clearly applies to the Viet-Nam war.

In an article written for *Pravda* on the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Ho Chi Minh said that victory in a “war of national liberation” can be won only when it has developed into a Communist revolution. Ho wrote:

“Only with the leadership of a party that knows how to apply Marxism-Leninism in a creative manner to the practical conditions of

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<sup>18</sup> Reference is to the July 21, 1954, declaration made by Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith on behalf of the United States at the conclusion of the Geneva Conference. For a text, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. XIII, Part 2, Indochina (In two parts), Document 1073.

<sup>19</sup> This statement is part of the declaration cited in footnote 18 above.



the country is it possible to bring the national liberation revolution to victory and the socialist revolution to success.”

A war of national liberation, therefore, is the form of aggression which stimulates and exploits dissidence and violence within a non-Communist state in order to subvert that state. It uses the tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion. It readily serves the purposes of a disciplined minority, particularly in countries where the physical terrain makes clandestine infiltration relatively easy.

The nature of the conflict in South Viet-Nam is very clear. The “liberation” proposed by Hanoi and the so-called “National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam” means a Communist takeover of SVN by force, and an end to the free choice of the South Vietnamese in determining how they will live and govern themselves.

(21) QUESTION: Who, then, are the Viet Cong?

ANSWER: Viet Cong means Vietnamese Communist. It refers to the military forces and political cadres of the National Liberation Front. The NLF is the invention and instrument of the Lao Dong—the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam. The NLF is designed to cloak Hanoi’s continuing efforts to overthrow the government in the south, establish a Communist regime, and unify the country under the government in Hanoi.

(22) QUESTION: What proof have you that Hanoi invented the NLF and now controls it? Many people believe that the NLF is a genuine South Vietnamese indigenous nationalist movement.

ANSWER: In 1959, Hanoi openly called for “national liberation” of the south, using (a) an estimated 5,000 Communist cadre left in South Viet-Nam after the 1954 division, and (b) additional cadre infiltrated from the north. This 1959 decision was best described by North Viet-Nam’s military leader, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who said:

“The north is the revolutionary base for the whole country.”

In establishing the National Liberation Front in 1960, Hanoi sought to create the fiction that the north was not directing the effort in the south. The NLF attracted a following by skillful organization and propaganda, selectively reinforced by the use of terrorism; and by exploiting the theme of social injustice, with promises of a variety of economic and government “reforms.” Much of the following of the NLF has been involuntary. Thousands of former Viet Cong have testified that they were driven to cooperate by fear of reprisals against them or their families. Viet Cong claims of widespread popular support also are tellingly refuted by the absence in the NLF’s leadership of any Vietnamese of national stature.

In 1961, Hanoi sought to convince the world that the NLF was a genuinely indigenous southern, nationalist movement. It did this by



creating the name “People’s Revolutionary Party” (PRP) for the principal element of the NLF, which until then had been the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party of NVN. A captured secret document of the Lao Dong Party, the North Vietnamese Communist Party, disclosed the facts. The document revealed that in November, 1961, the Party’s Central Committee passed a resolution which makes clear that the PRP differed only in name from the Lao Dong Party:

“It must be clearly understood that this is only a name change. Although the overt name is different from what it is in North Viet-Nam, nevertheless, secretly . . . the party segment in South Viet-Nam is a segment of the Lao Dong Party under the leadership of the party Central Committee, headed by Chairman Ho . . . Except for the name, there is no change whatever.”

(23) QUESTION: You insist that Hanoi controls the NLF and directs the war in the south; yet Hanoi does not admit it has troops in South Viet-Nam. How can Hanoi control the war without the use of its own regulars?

ANSWER: From prisoners, documents, films and numerous defectors, we have solid proof of the presence in South Viet-Nam of about 55,000 North Vietnamese army regulars. We know the numbers of their divisions and regiments, and even the dates when they entered the south. We know that other regulars from NVN—in addition to the 55,000—serve in Viet Cong ranks. We have photos and films of North Vietnamese generals, including the late General Nguyen Chi Thanh, directing North Vietnamese troops in the south. We have orders and various memoranda sent to these troops and to the VC from Hanoi.

Since the 1959 decision in Hanoi to launch a major military campaign in the south, more than 100,000 fighting men and tons of military equipment and supplies have been moved into the south from the north.

In June, 1962, the Indian and Canadian members of the International Control Commission—with the Poles dissenting—investigated South Vietnamese charges of North Vietnamese activities in the south.<sup>20</sup> The Indians and Canadians concluded:

“In specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the north to the Zone in the south, with the object of carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the south. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.”

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<sup>20</sup> See “Saigon Hails Report,” *New York Times*, June 26, 1962, p. 8.

Since 1962, more evidence has rapidly accumulated. We can now reconstruct the chain of events that led to the current presence in the south of more than 55,000 North Vietnamese regulars.

Early in 1964, the Communists believed that an NLF victory in the south was imminent. South Viet-Nam was in a state of grave political unrest. The Diem regime had fallen, the Viet Cong had stepped up subversion and terror, and the South Vietnamese army had suffered numerous setbacks. Sensing that victory was possible, Hanoi committed regular troops and vast new resources for a final blow. Documents prove that this decision was made early in 1964—well before the first U.S. combat units arrived in South Viet-Nam in May, 1965.

Prisoners from the 95th Regiment and 325th Division of the regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) have revealed they were being prepared for infiltration in April, 1964. The first regular NVA units began arriving in the south in November, 1964. The first complete tactical unit of the NVA—the 808th Battalion, with cadre drawn largely from the 325th Division—reached the south in November, 1964; it was joined the following month by other elements of the 325th Division, including the 95th Regiment.

The trickle soon became a steady flow. By the end of 1965, there were some 26,000 North Vietnamese Army regulars in the south; in 1966, more than 40,000. In 1965, NVA regulars comprised about one-fourth of the total main-force Communist strength in the south. By the end of 1966, there were 63 NVA battalions and 83 Viet Cong battalions. In all, the NVA regulars then constituted almost 43 per cent of the Communist main force. And this proportion rose to 45 per cent by mid-1967.

(24) QUESTION: Still, the number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces does not approach the total of South Vietnamese, U.S. and other forces in South Viet-Nam. Doesn't this indicate that the Viet Cong have been able to continue their operations because, unlike the Saigon government, they have the support of the masses?

ANSWER: There is little evidence of popular support for the VC. Why should the peasants support the VC, who have killed or kidnapped 58,000 South Vietnamese peasants, village officials and local government workers since 1958? Why support the VC, who are now levying taxes at a rate higher than Saigon's rate, and who are even now forcing South Vietnamese youth to join their forces?

The Viet Cong today control at best some 17 per cent of the population in SVN. The VC method of control remains, basically, the use and threat of terror. It is not surprising that the VC are now losing the support of the rural population. And it is quite natural that, as the VC situation becomes more desperate, Viet Cong defections have increased. In 1964 there were 5,417 Viet Cong defectors; 11,124 in 1965;

20,242 in 1966. During the first 10 months of 1967, twenty-five thousand VC gave up and rallied to the GVN under its “Chieu Hoi”—“Open Arms”—program.

In 1966, the GVN controlled areas inhabited by about 55 per cent of the population. By November, 1967, it controlled about 67 per cent, with the Viet Cong holding only 17 per cent, and the remainder in contested areas.

(25) QUESTION: The U.S. has repeatedly said this war must be won by the South Vietnamese. Yet it has become an American war, with many more Americans dying in the war now than Vietnamese. How can you say it is not a U.S. war?

ANSWER: During the first six months of 1967, the weekly average of South Vietnamese killed in action was 213; of Americans, 188.

From June through September, 1967, the weekly average of South Vietnamese killed in action was 172; of Americans, 162.

In 1966 a total of 8,679 South Vietnamese were killed in action. During the same period, 7,901 Americans were killed in action.

The primary task of the U.S. forces has been to oppose the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in major military engagements, and to search out and destroy the enemy in his camps and bases. The U.S. has air power to concentrate on this aspect of the war.

The South Vietnamese army is concentrating on the defense of villages and hamlets, a task which includes clearing areas of the enemy and holding areas from the enemy. Such engagements are just as deadly, just as bloody as major operations, and perhaps even more difficult than major operations.

Some South Vietnamese units are not so tough as they should be, and the South Vietnamese leaders themselves know this. But other units are showing courage and determination. The South Vietnamese soldier's morale is mounting. Desertions from the South Vietnamese army, once a problem, have greatly decreased. The South Vietnamese soldier has improved markedly since early 1965, when the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese were making military gains. And the South Vietnamese soldier is continuing to show increasing promise as a skillful, effective fighter.

(26) QUESTION: What is being done to improve the life of the average South Vietnamese, especially of the peasants?

ANSWER: In the midst of a brutal war, with its demand for tremendous sacrifices and great drain of manpower, the GVN has been moving ahead—slowly, but with great determination and increasing success—to improve social conditions. The United States and many other nations are giving the GVN considerable support in re-building and developing the country.

In the past two years, 42,000 peasants have been trained in improved farming techniques and animal husbandry. Almost 2,000 new hamlets have been built, providing a haven for some three and one-half million peasants to work the land. The farmers have greatly benefited from the building of 400 kilometers of canals, 100 dikes, 1,200 kilometers of roads. There have been noteworthy improvements in education, with 4,777 classrooms added in 1966 and 1967. Hamlet school teachers are being trained at the rate of 3,500 a year, and a massive textbook program is under way. By mid-1967, more than eight million school books were distributed.

Life in secured hamlets is being revitalized by trained teams of South Vietnamese Revolutionary Development (RD) workers who seek to advance the process of nation-building. More than 600 RD teams of 59 men each joined the program in 1967, as compared with 450 in 1966, and another 800 to 1,000 teams are expected to be added in 1968.

(27) QUESTION: Doesn't the system of land tenure in South Viet-Nam continue to benefit rich landlords, not the poor peasants?

ANSWER: In the first six months of 1967, under a GVN program of redistributing state-held land, some 12,000 farm families had received such land. The GVN has given 93,000 families permanent titles to some 500,000 acres of other land—including squatter lands, former French-owned rice lands, and lands expropriated from landlords. Over 900,000 acres remain to be distributed, and the transfer of titles is continuing.

Actually, the GVN had already begun an enlightened land reform program earlier in the late 1950's. All French-owned rice lands were expropriated; land holdings were limited to 250 acres, and rents to 25 per cent of the principal crop; tenant farmers were given substantial security of tenure. By 1961 a majority of farm families owned at least part of the land they farmed, and rented lands belonged to the small local farmer, not to absentee landlords. Unfortunately, the widespread insecurity of war made it difficult to enforce and re-establish effective administration in various areas.

Since 1965, the GVN has issued several decrees prohibiting the military from assisting in the collection of back rent, and exempting tenants from paying back rents for periods when the land was under Viet Cong control. There are provisions for providing land for tenants who had been given title illegally by the Viet Cong. In the richest rice-growing area of South Viet-Nam—the Mekong Delta—an aerial survey is under way to clarify the present pattern of land ownership. The survey will enable the government to grant permanent titles much more quickly to farmers who otherwise would have to wait years for a formal ground survey. Meanwhile, data on present land holdings are being collected systematically. The new data will help the GVN develop new land policies and to improve existing programs.

The GVN, therefore, fully recognizes that land tenure practices constitute a major rural issue, and is giving high priority to steps to improve the situation.

No one denies there are land problems in South Viet-Nam. But they are problems largely caused by the dislocation of war—lack of adequate rural administration, failure to implement existing legislation, inadequate data on land holdings.

(28) QUESTION: Are the small farmers gaining any benefit from the various programs?

ANSWER: The farmers themselves, with the help of GVN and U.S. experts, have established their own organizations—the Agricultural Cooperatives, the Farmers' Association, and the Tenant Farmers Union.

These organizations are actively supporting fertilizer and corn-hog programs made possible by the creation of the Agricultural Development Bank, a public institution providing low-interest credits to enable the farmers to use fertilizers and other products to increase their productivity. In 1967 the supply of fertilizers was expected to increase by 50 per cent. The U.S. is supplying 300,000 tons of fertilizer, valued at over \$35 million, to this effort. And the GVN is importing over 60,000 tons of feed corn to promote hog production.

As hostilities abate, these programs will spread, and the farmers will benefit more and more.

(29) QUESTION: How can you justify the deliberate destruction of rice fields and other crops by herbicide spraying? Isn't this taking food from the mouths of poor farmers and their families, and gaining nothing but hostility?

ANSWER: The destruction of rice fields and other crops impedes the Viet Cong. Crop destruction has taken place only in areas fully controlled by the Viet Cong for a considerable period of time. There the harvested foodstuffs, used solely by the Viet Cong, sustain the attackers in their military operations and their acts of terrorism against innocent civilians. Farmers in areas where crops are to be destroyed are warned in advance and given assistance if they leave such areas and come under GVN protection as refugees.

(30) QUESTION: In addition to destroying crops, aren't you also using defoliants over the jungle in Viet-Nam?

ANSWER: The heavy vegetation of many of the jungle and swamp areas in South Viet-Nam provides natural shelter for the Viet Cong guerrillas, and makes it easier for them to move without detection. The RVN has used chemicals against the shelter of natural growth, not against people; against the crops which the Viet Cong grow, not against the guerrillas themselves. The defoliant exposes the lurking marauder—it does not harm him, but makes it harder for him to carry out his destructive mission.

Chemical defoliants have been widely used as herbicides, or weed-killers, all over the world for more than 15 years. They are in regular use in such other Asian countries as Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, the Republic of China, Japan, India, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand.

Use of herbicides is also widespread in the USSR. On March 5, 1962, then Premier Khrushchev, in a report to the Soviet Central Committee, urged that "herbicide production be placed on a wide industrial basis."

(31) QUESTION: Why do you use poison gas against the other side? Don't you adhere to the Geneva Conventions which prohibit this kind of warfare?

ANSWER: Neither the RVN nor any of its allies has used poison gas. Tear gas, which has been used on occasions against the Viet Cong, is neither lethal nor toxic.

To force the VC from tunnels and other hiding places, tear gas is sometimes used. Tear gas is a nontoxic agent which police forces use for riot control in almost every country of the world as a means of limiting violence and casualties. It causes tears and sneezing only; it produces no pain, burn or other harm; its effects last only a few minutes and leave no aftereffects. Its use is not contrary to any Geneva convention.

(32) QUESTION: Why are South Vietnamese and American soldiers so brutal or callous toward civilians? I have seen shocking films and photos of their behavior.

ANSWER: The task of South Vietnamese troops and their allies is to protect civilians, not brutalize them; to deter the terrorists, not emulate them. But, most regrettably, innocent civilians are sometimes caught in the crossfire and passions of any war.

Covering the South Vietnamese side of the war, newsmen and cameramen tend to focus on incidents involving civilians. Such incidents, because they are so infrequent, are especially newsworthy. Viet Cong brutality is less easily covered by foreign correspondents. The VC make sure that newsmen are not around to witness the terror killing of a RD worker, or of a district chief and his family. Viet Cong attacks are so numerous that they no longer make dramatic news.

The fact is that the South Vietnamese and their allies have provided some two million refugees from the Viet Cong with food, housing, education, training, and medical care. Of those two million, an estimated 1.2 million have been successfully resettled within South Vietnam even while that country fights for its national life.

**173. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Frankel) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 29, 1967

SUBJECT

Interagency Book Committee's Review of Overseas Posts' Responses to the National Policy Statement on International Book and Library Activities

The Interagency Book Committee has just completed a review of the overseas posts' responses to the national policy statement on international book and library activities approved by the President last January.<sup>2</sup>

One point that recurs in responses from all areas of the world raises a basic policy question which has long been a matter of concern to me. That is the policy which governs the operation of the USIS libraries overseas. I recognize that USIA has a special mission to perform. I suspect, however, that USIA's objectives would be better served in the long-run by a broader and less propagandistically oriented library policy. I believe that it is in our national interest to support libraries overseas which give a very broad view of the United States and of its connections to and roots in Western and world civilization.

I reiterate this belief at this time because, quite independently of what I think myself, it has been stated by a number of our foreign service officers responsible for book and library programs overseas in their responses to the President's policy statement. All of them have had a much greater opportunity than I to observe at first-hand the effects of the present narrow and restrictive policy.

The Embassy in Laos, for example, suggests that USIS libraries should "serve as showcases of the diversity of ideas and of the role of critical commentary in a democratic and free society. It believes that the national policy statement underlines the necessity for eliminating polarized, doctrinaire book-shelf content which robs libraries of their credibility and casts doubt on America's confidence in free inquiry."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: University of Arkansas Libraries, Special Collections Division, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection (CU), MC 468, Group VII, Government Advisory Committee (GAC) on International Book and Library Programs, Series 4: Chronological Files: Correspondence, Box 206, Interagency Book Committee (3 of 3), folder 206–23. No classification marking. Frankel sent a copy of the memorandum to Ball under a December 29 memorandum. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> For text of the national policy statement approved by Johnson, see the first attachment to Document 123.



The post in Niger recommends broadening the book selection policy of USIS libraries. Pointing out that the French, British and Italian libraries offer a much broader selection of literary, scientific and other works, it offers this difference in library content as one reason for the notion that USIS peddles propaganda. It suggests that we should stock USIS libraries with the best in American and world literature, and in Africa, furnish a generous supply of books on Africa.

The post in Gabon suggests that we would "increase our readership if we were able to offer a higher quantity and quality of books of a purely cultural as opposed to a political 'propagandistic' character. This is the policy pursued in the local French Cultural Center where the reader can even find translations of American authors."

The Embassy in Brazil believes that "USIS libraries should be showcases of the American library system", while the Embassy in Belgium states that the most vital service the USIS library provides is "the demonstration it offers daily to Belgians in all walks of life, that a free society needs free access to 'recorded knowledge in all fields of human endeavor'."

One further related point I should like to bring to your attention is the general agreement in the responses of the European posts on the value of having American libraries overseas, the importance of maintaining those now in existence, and the desirability of opening new ones to replace some of those that have been closed.

Attached is a list of pertinent quotations from post responses to the national book and library policy statement.

### **Attachment**

#### **Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS FROM OVERSEAS POSTS ON WHAT THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF USIS LIBRARIES SHOULD BE**

LAOS: [The post] "suggests that USIA should study how USIS libraries can serve as showcases of the diversity of ideas and of the role of critical commentary in a democratic and free society. It believes that the policy statement underlines the necessity for eliminating polar-

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<sup>3</sup> No classification marking. Drafted on December 12. All brackets are in the original.



ized, doctrinaire book-shelf content which robs libraries of their credibility and casts doubt on America's confidence in free inquiry. It believes this can be done without endangering our national position vis-à-vis those totalitarian contenders who practice a monolithic approach to libraries. It suggests that the policy USIA now follows in its choice of periodicals, which expose American thought on issues of the day, can serve as a model for book selection policies."

NIGER: "The post recommends broadening the book selection policy of USIS libraries. These libraries are now stocked with certain kinds of books, generally those which are "approved" and which are not controversial. Comparing USIS libraries with libraries supported by France, Great Britain or Italy, many readers are likely to find there a broader selection of literary, scientific and other works of the country which supports the library as well as noteworthy works of other countries, either in translation or in the original. This difference in library content may be one reason for the notion that USIS peddles propaganda. One may well ask whether in most African countries there is a reason to have such comprehensive libraries, since only a fraction of the population reads and writes. One answer could be that this fraction contains the intellectual elite on whom political leaders, some of whom may also be intellectuals, will rely to do the work in the government, in education, in economic planning, etc. Since these are primary target audiences, we should want them to find books of real interest to them in our libraries. Once people find in a library the things for which they are looking, they eventually may get around to the books which we would like them to read. Therefore, we should stock USIS libraries with the best in American and world literature. In Africa we should furnish our libraries with a generous supply of books on Africa. . . ."

KENYA: "If [USIS libraries] are to be models of today's library service, emphasis will have to be placed on having an American library staff. Reference collections should be stressed, book collections widened and made more balanced, up-to-date techniques employed and appearances modernized. These factors are important for . . . our country continues to be regarded as the most modern in the world, and our libraries should reflect the modern concept of library service."

GABON: "Even if one aim of our international book and library program, namely the promotion of readership in England, can hope to have only very limited success, this should not discourage us from pursuing our main objective, which should be the development in francophone areas of a readership for American authors and an appreciation for American values and techniques. . . . Important [for this] is the provision of adequate French translations of the latest publications in the world of American fiction and non-fiction. We would increase our readership if we were able to offer a higher quantity and quality

of books of a purely cultural as opposed to a political "propagandistic" character. This is the policy pursued in the local French Cultural Center where the reader can even find translations of American authors."

BRAZIL: "USIS libraries should be showcases of the American library system and should provide the best of reference and technical service."

BELGIUM: "The USIS Lincoln Library's most important contribution to [national book and library policy] objectives lies in the fact of its existence, as an example of American library science on foreign soil. For, in functioning as an American library, it has something profound to say about democracy and about the free access to information in a democratic society. . . . The most vital service [it] provides in terms of the [policy] objectives is the demonstration it offers daily to Belgians of all walks of life: that a free society needs free access to 'recorded knowledge in all fields of human endeavor.'"

SWEDEN: "It remains our opinion, often expressed through the years, that books are basic to our country's information program here, and that the American library remains the exemplary and tangible symbol of a free and open society which places value on fact, enlightened opinion and free discussion."

FRANCE: "It is in the area of providing libraries where French students and others could enjoy maximum access to the best books on American civilization . . . that USIA has made a major effort in the past. This effort was substantially curtailed between 1963 and 1966 because of budget cuts, and can only be restored through increased budget allocations. . . . Ideally, there should be an American library in each university center, staffed by American and French personnel. . . . More realistically, depending on funds, one or more such libraries could be established by USIS in the highest priority university cities. . . . Should funds and personnel essential for opening new branch libraries be available, the Post could develop an order of priority . . . and could undertake to establish one or more libraries designed to serve both U.S. and French interests."

SPAIN: "Centers in Bilbao and Sevilla were closed several years ago and the book collections given to area universities. Valencia's center remains a USIS responsibility, but no funds are available for its support. . . . This is plainly short-sighted, for Spain is at a stage when the flow of current reliable information and contemporary scholarship is essential to the growing, discontented generation. The Post is sadly aware that it cannot do everything, but wishes it could at a minimum maintain its purpose and responsibility in Spain's three major cities. . . . This means money and support for the faces of the U.S. represented by the study and information centers. It is very difficult to explain to young Spaniards, or to anyone, that the U.S. does not have enough money for such things."

AUSTRIA: “The objectives of the Directive, the Post’s country plan objectives, and specific needs of top priority target groups would all be served by measures increasing the availability of American books [in America House Libraries]. . . . The Post is making a study to determine staff, funds, and space involved in reconversion of the America House Reference Library [in Vienna] to a lending library.”

ITALY: “Thought might be given to the involvement of American libraries, both public and private, in the sponsorship and management of individual American overseas libraries as a part of their normal programs. American librarians could be rotated abroad under a system integrated with the sponsoring American library or library association. The overseas American libraries would be shaped to the needs of the community—sometimes the emphasis could be on a free, open public library, sometimes on a research library—and the sponsoring library, or group, in the United States selected accordingly. Necessary governmental support could be contractual.

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#### **174. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 31, 1968

The Republican Party leadership plans to issue a report later this week “calling for strengthening the USIA to improve the American image abroad.”<sup>2</sup> The report was tentatively approved at the December meeting of the Republican Coordinating Committee composed of congressional leaders, governors, former Presidential nominees and party officials.

I have just secured the attached draft of this report.<sup>3</sup> It contains familiar phrases which have often been used by General Eisenhower and Senator Karl Mundt. The following are my observations:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Federal Government Organizations, EX FG 266–1–1, Box FG–33, FG 296 U.S. Info. Agency (1967– ). No classification marking. Sent through Maguire, who did not initial the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a December 11, 1967, Task Force draft report on the conduct of foreign relations entitled “The American Image Abroad,” which was prepared by the Republican National Committee, under the direction of Chairman Ray C. Bliss. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Memorandums of the Executive Secretariat, 1964–1976, Lot 72D372, Entry A1–5195, Box 1, S/S Memorandum 1966–1968 1 of 2 Vol. 3)

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached.

1. I am complimented by the absence of criticism of the manner in which the Agency has been run during my term of office. Instead of the usual complaint of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, the Committee demands that a greater emphasis be placed on the information program through larger appropriations and a more prominent role for the USIA in determining foreign policy.

2. The only serious charge in the document relates to the failure of your Administration to recognize the importance of the Government's information program in foreign affairs. It states:

"Throughout his administration, President Eisenhower evidenced keen personal interest in our psychological programs; he ordered the Director of USIA to report directly to him and insured that he would have ready access to the White House;<sup>4</sup> he placed the USIA chief at the table during OCB and NSC meetings so that the Director could share in policy-making instead of serving only as the official purveyor of information;<sup>5</sup> he gave the new Agency a clear statement of its mission<sup>6</sup> and he consistently fought for higher budgets necessary for USIA to achieve orderly growth."

Reference is made to the fact that you were Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1957 when the USIA budget was drastically reduced "because of a failure to comprehend the importance of psychological activities." It concludes that your Administration has not followed the Eisenhower doctrine, has subordinated the role of USIA in foreign affairs, and as a result U.S. prestige abroad has declined.

3. In an effort to substantiate the decline of U.S. prestige, reference is made to the prestige polls<sup>7</sup> on which President Kennedy relied in the 1960 campaign. Since I discontinued taking these polls shortly after my appointment, the Committee deplores their inability to justify their charge by reference to USIA material. However, the Republican National Committee undertook its own private polls last year and refer to these as proof of our declining prestige abroad.

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<sup>4</sup> In his June 1, 1953, memorandum on the Organization of the Executive Branch for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs to the Heads of All Executive Departments and the Director of Mutual Security, Eisenhower stated: "The Director of the United States Information Agency shall report to and receive instructions from me through the National Security Council or as I may otherwise direct." (*Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 351-354)

<sup>5</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, National Security Affairs, Document 353.

<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 2, National Security Affairs, Documents 354 and 355.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to overseas polling and preparation of opinion surveys by USIA at the time of the 1960 U.S. Presidential election to gauge the status of U.S. prestige. See Lewis Gulick, "2 Prestige Polls Released by USIA," *New York Times*, January 28, 1961, p. A4; and *Foreign Relations, 1961-1963*, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 117.

When this subject was raised on the Senate floor on October 11, 1966 by Senator Thruston Morton, he said:

“The present USIA Director, Leonard Marks, has stated that foreign public opinion surveys are ‘of little value.’ I strongly agree.”<sup>8</sup> (Congressional Record, October 11, 1966<sup>9</sup>)

In view of this admission it would seem difficult for the Committee to capitalize on the absence of polls.

4. Minor comments were:

A. “The budget for U.S. informational activities has routinely amounted to less than one per cent of expenditures for other civilian and military overseas purposes, and as the total Federal budget has rapidly expanded, the proportion allocated for psychological activities has sharply decreased.”

I disagree with this comment and can defend your position without difficulty.

B. “As a first step, a career service—vigorously sought by President Eisenhower in 1956, 1957 and 1959, but each time rejected by a politically hostile Congress—should be created in order to attract and hold competent and dedicated people in USIA.”

I sponsored legislation to establish a career service and in November 1967 the Senate passed S. 633 with only two dissenting votes. Yesterday I talked with Congressman Wayne Hays about hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and anticipate hearings will be ordered within the next thirty days.<sup>10</sup>

C. “Transfer of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs from the Department of State to USIA would permit a unified psychological operation, facilitate a proper mix of programs in each foreign country, and reduce administrative duplication. Transfer of the Bureau would also relieve the Secretary of State of a serious administrative burden

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<sup>8</sup> An unknown hand underlined the words: “I strongly agree.”

<sup>9</sup> See 112 *Congressional Record* 26022–26023 (1966).

<sup>10</sup> The House Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations held the hearings on S. 633, “A Bill to Promote the Foreign Policy of the United States by Strengthening and Improving the Foreign Service Personnel System of the United States Information Agency Through the Establishment of a Foreign Service Information Officer Corps,” on April 4, May 20, and June 26. Marks testified before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, regarding the USIA Foreign Service Officer Corps, on April 4. For the record of his testimony, see *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives, 90th Congress, Second Session on S. 633, April 4, May 20, and June 26, 1968*, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 1–44.

and enable the Director of USIA to concentrate on developing effective long-range programs."

The merger suggested would not be feasible *at this time*.

D. "There is also need for greater use of privately-generated material in place of governmental productions, yet in the fall of 1967, the Johnson-Humphrey Administration abolished USIA's Office of Private Cooperation. This was a grievous error, symptomatic of the Democrats' desire to have Big Government do all things."

I did abolish this office in November 1967. However, *all functions formerly performed by the office are now being carried out by other sections with a consequent annual savings of approximately \$161,000.*

Based upon this report, I am confident that the Republican organization has removed USIA from the field of partisan politics during the coming year. If attacks are made as reflected above (except for point no. 1), we are on secure ground.

I would like to discuss the first point with you.

**Leonard H. Marks**

**175. Memorandum From the Assistant Cultural Affairs Adviser, Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency (Groff-Smith) to the Executive Director, Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State (Colligan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 31, 1968

SUBJECT

U.S. Information Agency Activities to Carry Out President Johnson's New Initiatives in the Field Of International Education

**I. TO BUILD NEW BRIDGES OF INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING; STIMULATE CONFERENCES OF LEADERS AND EXPERTS:**

Pursuant to President Johnson's message of February 2, 1966, emphasizing the need for increased efforts in the field of international education,<sup>2</sup> the United States Information Agency increased its efforts to stimulate conferences of leaders and experts throughout the world. Since February 1966, USIS posts around the world have organized some 590 seminars, bringing together leading American experts with top-ranking leaders in foreign countries. These seminars have all been of at least one day's duration and many of them have been as long as two weeks. All have been directed to highly specialized groups. In addition to these seminars, many lectures and conferences have been held all over the world.

The seminar technique has proved to be a highly useful one to convey our message and also an effective technique to bring together leading educators. In the European area some 150 seminars were organized in 1966. This increased to 180 in 1967 and it is contemplated that some 200 seminars will be held in 1968.

In Africa it has been found that individual lectures and informal discussions are still the most useful techniques and have proved to be effective methods of promoting international education and understanding. Fifty-nine seminars were held in 1966 and 1967, and many lectures and meetings of experts were sponsored.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files 1955–1971: Acc. #74–0044, Entry UD WW 102, Box 1, CUL 3 Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. No classification marking. Drafted by Groff-Smith; cleared by White, and in IOP and IOP/PA. Copies were sent to Lewis, Weld, Oleksiw, Rylance, Carter, Bell, Fanget, and Jaffie.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 89.

Examples of some of the effective seminars held in 1966 and 1967 are attached.<sup>3</sup>

## II. *INCREASING THE FLOW OF BOOKS AND OTHER EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS:*

Pursuant to the President's Initiative, the United States Information Agency has taken several steps to increase the flow of books and other educational material abroad. A program to refurbish information centers and to make these centers and libraries more attractive is in process and is serving to increase attendance and use of books and magazines. Exhibits such as "The World of Paperbacks" have been circulated to universities, information centers, book fairs, and binational centers to expand the interest and readership of books. The circulation of these book exhibits has also spurred the commercial market for American publications.

There has been a significant increase in the last two years in the USIA Donated Book Program. In FY 1965 USIA sent 1.37 million books abroad under this program. This increased to 1.88 million copies in FY 1966 and to 1.94 million in FY 1967. At the present moment there are more than 3.5 million titles being processed for shipment overseas.

Recently there has been a significant increase in the number of American titles which have been published abroad by commercial publishers. USIA encourages foreign publishers to print American books as part of their own commercial activities by suggesting titles, assisting in the obtaining of copyright privileges, advising on distribution and facilitating production. The substantial increase in American Studies at foreign universities, a program which has had an impetus from USIA, will create an additional commercial demand for American book titles.

The United States is now a member of both the Beirut and the Florence Agreements which grant duty free entry of audio visual and educational materials respectively.<sup>4</sup> Already there has been an increased flow in these items and it is fully expected that there will be a steady and notable increase in the future.

## III. *TO ASSIST THE PROGRESS OF EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING NATIONS; PROMOTING THE TEACHINGS OF ENGLISH ABROAD:*

Pursuant to the President's Initiative in emphasizing the importance of international education, USIA has stressed English teaching

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled "Sample Seminars and Conferences Sponsored by USIA Which Have Served To Build New Bridges of International Understanding 1966 and 1967."

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 113.



abroad. It is estimated that the number of teachers who have been trained in USIS sponsored English teaching seminars in the past two years is 32% higher than in the two previous years. In 1966 and 1967 USIA taught English to some 648,000 individuals—an approximate 25% increase over the 1965–66 period. Further, USIA has significantly increased its efforts to target English teaching activities toward teachers and key individuals in order to make far more effective use of available resources.

The above information refers to activities carried out directly by USIA. In addition, the overseas USIS posts were involved in implementing several other of the President's Initiatives as part of their responsibilities for administering CU's Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs abroad.

**Geoffrey Groff-Smith<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## 176. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 14, 1968

### BIWEEKLY REPORT

During the past ten days we have witnessed throughout Europe a well-coordinated and planned attack on the U.S. position in Viet-Nam. There have been demonstrations against USIS libraries and events at Cultural Centers in Germany, France, Spain, Austria and in Scandinavia.<sup>2</sup> In reviewing reports from our missions, I came to the following conclusions:

1. The demonstrations and public outrages appear to be the work of professional anti-Americans who have been on the European scene for the past two decades. They will continue to hate America, if not for Viet-Nam, then for some other reason. It also appears that they have clear associations with Communist organizations and accept the "line from Moscow."

2. Europeans are generally puzzled as to what is happening in Viet-Nam and show a great anxiety that the war there may have some detrimental effect in our relationships with Europe. They constantly ask, "How and when is the war going to end?"

3. As part of this background, I want to quote from a recent report from one of our officers:

"European scholars who are sympathetic to the U.S. position in Viet-Nam told me that there is a terrible tyranny being enforced on academics in Europe, especially in Sweden, Italy and Britain. Their

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Agency Reports, Box 135 [2 of 2], United States Information Agency, 1967 [2 of 3]. Confidential. Sent through Maguire, who did not initial the memorandum. Temple sent the memorandum to the President under a typewritten note, dated February 15, 7:30 p.m. in which he stressed that he thought the "USIA report was of such significance that you would want to see it separately from the agency summaries." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> The Tet offensive was launched on January 30 and 31 by North Vietnam and National Liberation Front forces in a coordinated attack against various targets in South Vietnam, including those with a large U.S. military presence in the cities of Saigon and Hue. The offensive would have two more phases in May and August. Although suffering serious casualties, the military forces of the United States and South Vietnam were able to respond to and effectively repel the North Vietnamese and NLF forces and regain control of the parts of South Vietnam they had initially lost. According to a *Christian Science Monitor* article published on January 30: "Most Europeans used to consider themselves good friends of the United States, and the feeling was mutual. But recently primarily because of the Vietnam conflict, the American image in Europe has become severely tarnished." (Barry Edgar, "Opinionmakers Sought: How USIS reaches the Danes," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 30, 1968, p. 4)

complaint seemed to be that the anti-Viet-Nam forces control the universities, which means they control faculty appointments, promotions, decisions on publishing, etc., and thus can and do bring great pressures to bear on what they consider the deviants, those not totally hostile to U.S. and Viet-Nam, including scholars who seek simply to maintain scholarly objectivity.

“One of the knottiest problems to handle are Europeans of good will and open mind who ask about anti-Viet-Nam statements by prominent Americans, Lippmann, Fulbright, Robert Kennedy, etc., U.S. television footage. We are undoubtedly our own worst enemy in Europe.”

4. One can discuss our participation in Viet-Nam on three levels:

A. The factual level—A discussion of the historical background, how we got there and what we are doing there today, militarily and economically.

B. The policy level—What the U.S. is trying to do in Viet-Nam and its broader meanings to Asia and the rest of the world.

C. The opinion level—This involves a discussion of moral judgments in abstract terms such as idealism.

A discussion on the “factual” or “policy level” can be productive with reasonably fair-minded audiences. A discuss on the “opinion level” is rarely productive and quickly becomes a debate in which “heat” rather than “light” is generated.

Our Missions note that the questions most frequently raised are:

1. Why can’t the war be brought to a rapid conclusion in view of the great power and strength of the U.S.?

2. What are the Viet Cong fighting for? What do they want? Why do they continue to fight? What would they settle for?

3. What difference does it make to the U.S. in terms of its national interest? What happens in this small distant country?

4. Why is there so much hostility to the war among so many prominent scholars, community and political figures, particularly in the U.S.?

5. What would the U.S. actually settle for?

6. Is the war in Viet-Nam going to be the principle issue in the 1968 Presidential elections?<sup>3</sup>

Our output has addressed itself to these questions and our Missions have been instructed to anticipate these concerns in all seminars and face-to-face meetings. Reasonable progress is being reported.

*Finally, throughout the reports from our officers in Europe is the plea that “more Vietnamese ought to be telling the Viet-Nam story.” I have repeat-*

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<sup>3</sup> The U.S. Presidential election was November 5.

*edly made this suggestion in Saigon to both Thieu and Ky and their Ministers of Information and Foreign Affairs. Regrettably, very little has been done.*

**Leonard H. Marks**

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**177. Airgram From the Department of State to All American Diplomatic and Consular Posts and United States Information Service Posts<sup>1</sup>**

CA-6002

Washington, February 23, 1968, 1419Z

SUBJECT

The Vice President on Viet-Nam, February 18, 1968

Joint State/USIA Message. On February 18, a major television network carried a panel discussion between the Vice President and a panel of students representing the six principal universities in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.<sup>2</sup> The discussion encompassed both domestic and foreign policy issues. Addressees received the highlights of this discussion in the USIA Wireless File of the same date (World File No. 2).<sup>3</sup>

The discussion of Viet-Nam in this telecast is of particular interest. Verbatim excerpts from this portion of the discussion are enclosed for your information and appropriate use. The questions posed in these excerpts are about corruption in South Viet-Nam, political stability in that country, the role of press reporting, and the bombing of North Viet-Nam.

**Katzenbach**  
*Acting*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File: Vietnam, Box 100, Vietnam 7 E (4)a 2/68-4/68, Public Relations Activities [2 of 2]. Unclassified. Drafted by P/VN. Cleared in OVP, P/PG, P/VN, EA/P, and IAF; approved by Donnelley. The airgram was also sent to the following POLADS: HICOM Ryukyus, CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCSRIKE, CINCSO, CINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR.

<sup>2</sup> Humphrey appeared with the students on the news program "Face to Face," produced by WTTG, a local Washington, D.C., television station. The discussion was taped on February 14 and aired at 8 p.m. on February 18. (Morton Mintz, "Draft Call of Oldest Laid to LBJ," *Washington Post*, February 18, 1968, p. A1; "Rough Going Seen for Saigon," *Washington Post*, February 18, 1968, p. A27)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

## Enclosure

### Excerpts of a Panel Discussion with Vice President Humphrey<sup>4</sup>

Washington, undated

Q. As Senator Ted Kennedy, among others, has brought home from his last trip to Viet-Nam<sup>5</sup> some accusations of rather extended corruption in the South Vietnamese government—and that these conditions are a rather important key to the ability of the South Vietnamese government to mould a national society. I was wondering what the U.S. Government has done in the past weeks or so to react to these accusations, and also if this South Vietnamese government is not going to respond to correct these conditions, if we will continue our commitment to that nation?

*The Vice President:* Well, now, corruption is not exactly a monopoly of Southeast Asia, or of Viet-Nam. I don't want to make any invidious comparisons, but there are a few cities in the United States that could teach the South Vietnamese some lessons in how to operate corrupt government, and I think we might spend a little time cleaning our own stables before we start lecturing, piously lecturing a goodly number of other people.

There isn't any doubt but what there's corruption in the government of Viet-Nam, and by the way, there's a good deal of it in some other governments, a good deal of it. Now, if you want to go around the world, picking out people that you're going to do business with, and with whom you have alliances and allegiance, on the basis of whether or not they meet puritanical standards, you're going to find yourself with very, very few friends. As a matter of fact, there may be a few of them that'll leave us, because we have a little problem here every once in a while. We even have to appoint committees in the Congress on ethics.

So let's not try to pretend that corruption is a monopoly of any particular people or country. Now, the next thing. We wanted—for a

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<sup>4</sup> Unclassified.

<sup>5</sup> Kennedy visited South Vietnam January 1–15. Upon his return, Kennedy noted the following about corruption in South Vietnam: "I would urge a confrontation between our government and South Vietnam on the entire question of corruption, inefficiency, waste of American resources and the future of 'the other war.'" (John H. Fenton, "Edward Kennedy Upbraids Saigon," *New York Times*, January 26, 1968, p. 4; see also, "Edward Kennedy Opens War Study," *New York Times*, January 2, 1968, p. 3; and "Congress: Has Funds, Will Travel," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 13, 1968, p. 20)

period of time there was a great deal of criticism because the government in South Viet-Nam was a military junta. So we insisted, as an ally, and encouraged as an ally, the development of representative government institutions, and with all its limitations, the people of South Viet-Nam did elect a Constituent Assembly, and my fellow American, we never did. Our Constitution was not written by elected officials. That Constituent Assembly did write a Constitution, despite the fact that most of the critics said they never would, and it wrote it in the open light of day without any censorship; ours was not.<sup>6</sup> Ours was written behind closed doors; there wasn't a single cameraman or newspaperman permitted within a hundred yards. Had anybody known what the Founding Fathers were doing in Philadelphia, we never would have had a Constitution; everybody knew that.

Now, those of us that are students of history and government ought to start leveling with the American people. A Constitution was written and it was adopted, and elections were held. Now, it's no small task to have an election in a country that's beleaguered by guerrilla warfare, but they held it.<sup>7</sup> There were very few elections in World War II, in the Allied countries that were under attack; I don't recall any. As a matter of fact, it's rather unusual. Now, a government has been elected. Now it may not be so good, but some people don't think ours is so good. There's a substantial portion of the American public that thinks they ought to change here too. And they accuse us of all kinds of things. Now, that government is their government; it may not be as good as I'd like, but we insisted that they have one that was elected. Now the fact of the matter is that there is a need for progress as we see it in the government in Viet-Nam, and we do press for it. But they are not a satellite. On the one hand, if we took them and bent them to our will, somebody would say "Now, that's the total Americanization, not only of the war, but of the government."

On the other hand, if we don't bend them to our will, we're criticized because we don't exercise our influence. So what do we try to do? We try to reason; I think one of the most impressive men in American public life, in my lifetime, is Ambassador Bunker, and one of the things I'd like to leave with you students is that this man has been respected in university circles, in church circles, in political circles, and professional circles, for at least forty years. He's a tremendous person. Now when did he get to be so bad? I mean, here is the same Ambassador Bunker that was a United Nations representative, an Ambassador to Italy, an Ambassador to India, our special representa-

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<sup>6</sup> The Vietnamese Constitution was promulgated in April 1967. See footnote 2, Document 127.

<sup>7</sup> The Presidential election in South Vietnam took place September 3, 1967.

tive in the Dominican Republic; heralded, considered one of the great, ethical, practical statesmen of our time.<sup>8</sup> Now he goes to Viet-Nam and all at once you can't believe him; all at once he's ineffective. All at once he isn't telling us the truth, according to some people. I don't agree with that at all; I think Ambassador Bunker is doing a magnificent job representing the people of the United States, and if any man wants decency in government, if I know him, and I know him well. I served in the U.N. with Ambassador Bunker; I know of no more moral man in this world than Ambassador Bunker. I know of no more effective man in diplomacy than Ambassador Bunker. I think he's doing everything that can be done to influence people to do what is right. In the meantime, it is an elected government, and that's some accomplishment. By the way, has anybody made a report on the corruption in North Viet-Nam? When did they have an election?

Q. Mr. Vice President, the real question seems to be the—not so much the fact that there is corruption, which I'm willing to agree to, not only in South Viet-Nam but anywhere, but what if, in light of this, the continued problems that the South Vietnamese government continues to face, within its own structure, that it collapses, what will then be our position? Is this not a possibility?

*The Vice President:* Well, my good friend, there are always possibilities, but there's been no evidence that it's going to collapse. As a matter of fact, this is what people have been predicting all along. The predictions about this country have been unbelievable. First of all, some people predicted in the Congress that the elections would be a hoax and a fraud. They weren't. Some people predicted that the junta would never permit a Constitution to come into being, but they did. Some people said that Thieu and Ky and the Assembly would never respond to constitutional government, but they have. And now we are saying it'll most likely collapse, and it hasn't, and it has gone through the most terrible blood bath in recent days that any country could possibly face, and what's been the result? Thus far, the government is holding its own; thus far, not a single unit of the South Vietnamese Army has defected, not one. Thus far, the National Assembly meets and debates. I haven't heard of any reports of a National Assembly debating up in Hanoi. I think we are—ought to be praising these people for their efforts in trying to make constitutional government work.

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<sup>8</sup> Bunker was U.S. mediator in UN brokered Indonesian-Netherlands negotiations from March until August 1962. He served as Ambassador to Italy from March 1952 until April 1953 and Ambassador to India from November 1956 until March 1961. He served as United States Representative to the OAS from January 1964 until November 1966 and, as such, had an active role in the United States involvement in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

It isn't that it's perfect; it's not very perfect here. We've been trying to get a tax bill out of committee in this country for a year and a half. Can't even get it out of subcommittee. I don't think that we've got too much to brag about sometimes, when we're criticizing others. All I'm saying is, don't sell them out before the facts. The truth of the matter is that they've done better than most of their critics ever thought they would do. We hope they'll do better; we encourage them to do better. But I learned a long time ago that if you constantly brand a fellow as a failure, if you are suspicious as to whether or not he can ever do anything, you can rest assured that most people will react just about the way you treat them, and if you treat them like losers, they'll start acting that way. If you treat them as if they're unwanted, they'll act that way, but if you give them some sense of confidence, and at the same time encourage and persuade and cajole and try to instruct, you may get a better system. And I think that's what we're doing. I think we have a right to be somewhat encouraged at what we've seen.

Q. Mr. Vice President, positions regarding U.S. involvement in Viet-Nam are widely disparate, even among the most respected public officials and figures in the United States. Do you interpret this as simply misinformation, or maybe differences of opinion, or is it misinterpretation of facts, or just is it misinformation?

*The Vice President:* I think it's a compound of all of those. This is the first—maybe I can be helpful on this.

First of all, I don't think that people that disagree with us are unpatriotic. I want to make that quite clear. This is a very complex situation. This is an entirely different kind of struggle than this country has ever been engaged in before. This is the first war in the nation's history that has been fought without conditions of censorship. This is the first war in the nation's history that's been fought on television, where the actors are real, where, in the quiet of your living room, of your home, or your dormitory, wherever you may be, this cruel, ugly, dirty fact of life and death and war and pain and suffering come right to you, and it isn't a Hollywood actor. I've had letters from mothers that have seen their boys shot down in battle, and let me tell you that I think that television is the most—well, it's the most dramatic instrument of our time. That tube, for either good or evil, and thank goodness we can use it now at least in dialogue, which I think is the way it ought to be used. At least in part. It can be a great educational instrument.

There are so many different views about—even whether we should be there, whether our national interest is involved, whether a treaty ought to be fulfilled. Whether we should have ever signed a treaty; there are a lot of—well, many people feel that we made mistakes, and we really are over-involved. There are people that honestly feel that



way. I happen to be one of those, sir, that believes that you can't relive the past. I also happen to be one that believes that the greatest protection of peace in this world today is the integrity of the American word or commitment. Now maybe we shouldn't give our word as often as we do, or our commitment; but when we do, it is imperative that we mean what we say, and I can say for President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey, we signed no new treaties in the years that we've been in power. One treaty that we've signed is the space treaty,<sup>9</sup> to prevent the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction. That's the only international treaty of great international significance. Now we're trying to get a non-proliferation treaty on nuclear weapons,<sup>10</sup> to stop the spread of nuclear power in this world, because we think it increases danger.

But going back to your question, sir. I, as a government official, must place a great deal of reliance upon what we call our intelligence sources. I do not place total reliance upon them; I know there are newsmen in Viet-Nam for whom I have great respect, that differ with these intelligence observations, but might I say that it's pretty much like the domestic scene. Some of us get a fixation, or get a fixed point of view on a particular development and do not see the totality of it. For example, if you wanted to talk with me about politics, domestic politics, let's say two or three years ago, I most likely would have concentrated most of my attention upon that area which I knew the better, which is my home state of Minnesota, and I'd get into intricate details about it which would be rather baffling both to the viewer, the listener, and even to the propounder.

But when you take a bigger view of the nation, you don't have time for all of that little detail, and your observations become more generalized, and in a sense, I think, more meaningful. I think this is part of the trouble in Viet-Nam. For example, most of our reporters, and they're good reporters, they follow American troops. They like to live with the American troops; they speak the language, they like the food, they like the fellows. It's their life; they don't go with the ARVN

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<sup>9</sup> On January 27, 1967, the United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom signed a treaty that banned the use of space and the moon for military purposes. In his remarks delivered in the East Room of the White House that same day, President Johnson said: "We can keep the ugly and wasteful weapons of mass destruction from contaminating space. And that is exactly what this treaty does." *Public Papers: Johnson, 1967*, Book I, pp. 91–92. See, also, "3-Power Space Pact is Signed in Moscow," *New York Times*, January 27, 1967, p. 3)

<sup>10</sup> President Johnson signed the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the Soviet Union on July 1 in a ceremony in the East Room of the White House. For text of his remarks made at the signing ceremony, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–1969*, Book II, pp. 763–765. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Document 277.

troops, only once in a while. And generally the time that they observe the ARVN troops is when they—when they lose, when they're in trouble.

Now, within recent weeks, because of the nature of the Tet offensive from the Viet Cong and North Viet-Nam, and because about ninety percent of the troops that are engaged on the Allies side are South Vietnamese troops, not American but South Vietnamese, the reporters have, by necessity, if they were going to cover anything and because much of the fighting was in Saigon, where the reporters remain, they had to cover South Vietnamese operations. Now the fact of the matter is, the South Vietnamese have fought bravely, very bravely, and they have fought well, and these are the same troops that they were calling no good just a few weeks ago. The fact that the war was brought to Saigon, my friend, I think has changed a great deal of reporting on the war, and I noticed over the weekend that even from Paris, the observers in Paris that have been very critical of us now seem to come pretty much to the conclusion that some of us had about the nature of this recent Tet offensive and what its purpose was. They now agree, all the capitals around the world now seem to agree that the Viet Cong were out to take the cities, to establish what they called revolutionary administrations, to force upon Saigon a coalition government, to depose Thieu and Ky, and to really have a *fait accompli*, and tell the Americans "If you want to negotiate, you're going to negotiate with us or get out." It didn't work. They didn't get a popular uprising; they didn't get mass defection of troops. They don't hold a single city today; they hold a part of Hue, and a small part of a suburb in Saigon. They had terrific losses. I speak of the enemy. Obviously there have been some negative aspects; the pacification program has been brought to a stand-still. I still think the enemy has the strength to launch a very serious attack; I don't know what the ultimate outcome of all this is going to be. I think you'll have to wait for events to speak louder than newspaper reports, but you see, it's the complexity of a guerrilla war; it's the complexity, too, of this culture, that we're so unfamiliar with. And I think that this is why that there's so much what you call in different interpretations. I think it is wrong, however, for us to assume that there is a kind of malice on the part of some. I think really what happens is people just see it differently.

Q. When the bombing was first started, we said it was to bring the Vietnamese to the conference table, and then later we said it was to keep the guerrilla warfare down. Exactly what is the stated policy now for the bombing, since obviously the other two haven't worked?

*The Vice President:* Well, I'll just say this. Bombing has been a part of our general military operation. I want to say with equal candor, as

the Prime Minister of Great Britain said when he was here,<sup>11</sup> that this government has proposed to the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, in the San Antonio formula, that we are prepared to stop the bombing, aerial and naval, at once, if it will lead to prompt and productive talks, provided that the assumption is that there will be no escalation or no taking advantage of this type of a negotiating stance. We are prepared, my dear lady, right now, to accept immediate cease-fire. We are really prepared to have what we call immediate stand-down, with every bit of the troops standing as they are, and to enter negotiation. The roadblock to peace is not in Washington. I can tell you that my dear lady; the roadblock to peace is not here. The roadblock to peace, regrettably, is in Hanoi. We are prepared as of this moment, I say as Vice President of the United States, to have immediate negotiations for the cessation of this struggle; immediate cease-fire. Now, if you could get a statement like that out of an equally responsible official of the enemy, you will perform the greatest service that any citizen in this country has ever performed.

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<sup>11</sup> British Prime Minister Harold Wilson visited Washington February 7–9. ("To Honor Britain's Wilson," *Washington Post*, February 7, 1968, p. C1; Joseph C. Harsch, "A Time for Saying 'The Right Things,'" *Christian Science Monitor*, February 12, 1968, p. 1)

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**178. Memorandum From the Director of the United States  
Information Agency (Marks) to All United States  
Information Agency Public Affairs Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 8, 1968

Dear PAO:

In recent weeks two separate groups have studied the operations of our Agency. The Republican Coordinating Committee issued a special report of its Task Force on the Conduct of Foreign Relations,<sup>2</sup> and the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information has just completed one of its periodic reviews of our programs.<sup>3</sup> It is significant that:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 28, PAO Letters. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 174.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to *The Twenty-Third Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information to the Congress of the United States* (February 14, 1967).

... Both groups call for greater attention to USIA's essential function in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations today.

... Both support the creation of a career service.

... Both call for increased emphasis on long-range educational and cultural programs.

... Both reports highlight the importance of careful coordination between the Department of State and USIA in the planning and execution of cultural and educational exchange programs.

I am gratified that these independent reviews of our operations confirm the importance of USIA's function and the need to devote greater attention to it. I welcome, as I know you do, their constructive suggestions for ways in which we can do our job better. We can point with pride to many accomplishments, but must constantly strive for improvement.

From previous letters you know my own views on the importance of our long-range cultural programs. Here are some recent initiatives:

1. The first issue of the new cultural quarterly, *Dialogue*, is now reaching the field. I hope that you will find it a lively, stimulating presentation of the intellectual vigor and creativity of American society today.

2. Now at press is "Creative America" by Howard Taubman, Art and Cultural critic of the *New York Times*. It introduces a series of nine pamphlets on the arts.

3. In the film medium we are seeking to communicate the spirit, variety and quality of American life through a number of color documentaries for commercial distribution. "Airport" and "The Golden Gate" are the first.

4. New initiatives in the book field offer excellent opportunities for strengthening our cultural programs. Post responses to the *USA in Books* reflect your enthusiasm for this prestige 250-volume collection and show some imaginative ideas for promoting it. "Current Thought Readers" will be a new series of adaptations of outstanding American works in fields related to national development. The donated book program, now an integral part of ICS' operations, has been developed into a major resource for filling the needs of libraries and institutions abroad. Make sure that your staffs are familiar with its potential and with the lists issued periodically, "Donated Books Available for Presentation."

You will soon be hearing about ICS' new Educational Support Branch and its plans to strengthen Agency support for your activities with educational institutions abroad. Another new development is the concept of "package programs" for cultural centers, combining the resources of several media to project principal themes about American life. I also call to your attention the Information Center Guidance (CA-

1747 of February 5, 1968) which outlines the role of the Center in achieving USIA's long-range goals.<sup>4</sup>

Obviously, it is essential that we keep abreast of technical changes in the communications field. We must take advantage of new ways to improve our distribution through the printed and electronic media. Accordingly, we have watched carefully the developments in "micro-forms"—miniaturization of the printed word. For example, one process has reduced the entire Holy Bible to a slide measuring 2 inches by 2 inches. A sample is attached.<sup>5</sup> If this process becomes commercially feasible, we may be able vastly to expand our library holdings.

Similarly, in the electronic field, there will shortly be introduced "Electronic Video Recording" which will permit the presentation of a film through a television set. We are developing a sample one-hour film for test purposes and hope to have it available before the end of the year.

You can see that there are exciting new prospects ahead which will challenge our ingenuity and open vast new horizons for our Information Centers and for local institutions.

These are some of the new approaches we are exploring in Washington. They are based as far as possible on our understanding of your needs, through first-hand observation by the Area Assistant Directors and through your reports. But I am eager to hear more of your ideas about how we can strengthen our cultural programs, what we should be saying and how we should be saying it.

Each month we are improving the Agency's world-wide system of communication. Yet no system, no matter how modern, efficient and rapid, is better than the ideas it transmits. We need imaginative thinking from all our staff, and particularly from you in the field who know best what will be most meaningful to our audiences.

I enjoy reading your responses to these letters. Please feel free to write whenever you have a suggestion.

Sincerely,

**Leonard H. Marks**

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> Not found attached.

## 179. Message From the United States Information Agency to All Principal United States Information Service Posts<sup>1</sup>

Infoguide 68-22

Washington, March 11, 1968

### SUBJECT

The Urban Crisis in the United States

### REFERENCE

Summary Infoguide No. 68-20 (USIA circular telegram No. 8448 of March 1, 1968), "Report on Civil Disorders."<sup>2</sup>

### SITUATION

From now until the summer of 1968 is over we can expect constant headlines about the urban crisis, and the problems arising from Negro-white relations, in the United States.

There are at least four focal points of attention which have been, and will continue to be, widely publicized in the United States. The foreign press will probably devote considerable attention to them, especially when they generate events with high dramatic impact. Those focal points are:

(1) *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.*<sup>3</sup>

President Johnson appointed this Commission on July 29, 1967, to find the causes of urban riots in the U.S., and to recommend solutions. The Commission made public its 1,485-page report on March 2, 1968.

The hard-hitting report made national headlines, and is receiving international attention, because of its uncompromising language and its concentration on problems that remain unsolved in the Negro centers of American cities where riots occurred in 1967.<sup>4</sup> The report touches only lightly on the positive aspects, such as the recent record of Negro

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files 1955-1971: Acc. #74-0044, Entry UD WW 102, Box 2, INF 1 "America—1968, The Excitement and the Ordeal of Rapid Change." Limited Official Use. Drafted by Glazer on March 8. Cleared by Wright and Pauker; approved by Ryan. Sent via pouch.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of Infoguide 68-20 is in the National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files; 1949-1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 313, Master Copies—1968.

<sup>3</sup> The Advisory Commission was also referred to as the "Kerner Commission," named after its chairman, Illinois Governor Otto Kerner.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, William Kling, "Why, What, When of Riots: Kerner Commission Tells Findings," *Chicago Tribune*, March 1, 1968, p. 1; "Partial Text of Report by Civil Disorder Commission," *Chicago Tribune*, March 1, 1968, p. 12; "Portents of a Hot Summer," *New York Times*, March 3, 1968, p. E1; and "The Riot Report: Ghetto Discrimination Begins at Birth," *Washington Post*, March 3, 1968, p. A1.

progress, the expansion of antipoverty programs, and recent proposals to the Congress by the President.<sup>5</sup>

The report emphasized the following basic causes for the riots: white racism, which led to Negro belligerence; pervasive anti-Negro discrimination and segregation; massive and growing concentration of impoverished Negroes in the city centers, caused by a combination of high birth rate among urban Negroes, white exodus from cities, and Negro immigration from the rural American south; frustrated hopes of the poor and the jobless in city slums; the feeling of powerlessness among many Negro Americans, manifested in various “black power” movements.

The report contains a long series of recommendations for action, much of which has already been submitted to Congress by the President.

(2) *The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King’s “Poor People’s Campaign,” now scheduled for April 22 in Washington, D.C.*<sup>6</sup>

Dr. King expects to bring thousands of nonviolent demonstrators to the city when Congress reconvenes after its Easter recess. King’s group will be demonstrating for jobs and more antipoverty funds. If “black power”<sup>7</sup> groups manage to gain control of this campaign, and there are violent confrontations at the Capitol or in front of the White House, the foreign press is likely to give prominence to the resulting pictures and stories.

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<sup>5</sup> Presumably a reference to proposals Johnson made in his January 24 Special Message to Congress on Civil Rights and his February 5 Special Message to Congress on Education. (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–1969*, Book I, pp. 55–62 and 165–172)

<sup>6</sup> The “Poor People’s Campaign” was postponed until April 29 due to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination by James Earl Ray in Memphis, Tennessee on April 4. The march on and subsequent protest in Washington began on May 12. (Earl Caldwell, “Abernathy Pledges ‘Militant’ Drive for the Poor,” *New York Times*, April 19, 1968, p. 21; Earl Caldwell “Launch First Phase of Poor People’s Drive,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 30, 1968; Earl Caldwell, “Campaign of Poor Begins in Capital,” *New York Times*, April 30, 1968, p. 1; and Ben A. Franklin, “5,000 Open Poor People’s Campaign in Washington,” *New York Times*, May 13, 1968, p. 1) On May 1, representatives of the “Poor People’s Campaign,” along with its head Dr. Ralph Abernathy, met with Secretary Rusk to raise their grievances, which included United States policy in South Africa and other countries, AID policies, and immigration policies. Rusk responded to Abernathy and the group in a May 23 letter. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues, Documents 330 and 331.

<sup>7</sup> This term was popularized by African American activists Stokely Carmichael, Willie Ricks, and others in 1966. Although the term encompassed a variety of ideologies, it generally referred to the advancement, self-determination, and political empowerment of African Americans. At a June 17, 1966, rally in Greenwood, Mississippi, Carmichael stated “The only way we can change things in Mississippi is with the ballot. That’s black power.” (Gene Roberts, “Marchers Stage Mississippi Rally,” *New York Times*, June 18, 1966, p. 20)



(3) *Negro Boycott of Olympics Scheduled for Mexico City, Oct. 12-27.*<sup>8</sup>

Various "black power" groups have been agitating for months among Negro American athletes, urging a boycott of the Olympics in Mexico. This effort will probably be heightened because of the International Olympic Committee's recent readmission of South Africa to the Olympic Games and the subsequent declaration of many African nations that they intend to withdraw from the games. The campaign will probably intensify as the date of the games draws near. If this coincides with summer rioting, the campaign could have a strong negative effect abroad.

(4) *Summer Riots.*

There is already considerable speculation in the media, both at home and overseas, about the possibility of riots in the U.S. this summer. The elements which led to riots in 1967 are still present—the crowded slums, high unemployment among Negro youths who are in the forefront of the rioters, Negro resentment of whites fanned by a growing number of "black power" groups, white fear of Negro violence.<sup>9</sup>

#### TREATMENT

In line with standing guidance, media will report developments factually, and reflect responsible commentary and opinion on these developments.

Riots, boycotts and demonstrations in the U.S. make headlines. The steady, day-to-day progress in American race relations on many fronts does not. Without denying the serious situation in American cities, we seek to place the crisis in the context of continuing progress toward eliminating its causes. We must heighten foreign awareness of important constructive development demonstrating the sustained efforts of the President, many members of Congress, and diverse elements of American society.

We should:

(1) Remind all audiences that the United States is an open society which is constantly examining its weaknesses and its shortcomings,

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<sup>8</sup> The proposed boycott did not occur because not enough of the African American athletes were willing to join, opting instead to avoid victory stand ceremonies and undertake other forms of protest at the Olympic games. Two African American Olympic athletes, Tommie Smith and John Carlos, were expelled from the remaining days of the Olympics after their protest demonstration at the awards ceremony on October 16. (C. Gerald Fraser, "Negroes Call Off Boycott, Reshape Olympic Protest," *New York Times*, September 1, 1968, p. S1; "Why Boycott Failed Told by Edwards," *Chicago Tribune*, September 1, 1968, p. B1; and "Two Negro Athletes Banished: Olympic Officials React to Protest," *Washington Post*, October 19, 1968, p. A1)

<sup>9</sup> See Document 158.



often with brutal candor. For example, the Commission on Civil Disorders was personally appointed by the President to make recommendations on America's greatest item of unfinished domestic business, the racial-urban crisis. He did not ask for a whitewash, or for praise of progress made so far. He asked for the hard facts about the crisis, and the Commission reported them (see ANNEX for pertinent comment from the Ghanaian *Times* of March 2, 1968).<sup>10</sup>

(2) Point out that the U.S. Government is fully aware of the urban crisis. Cite the President's statement in his January 17, 1968, State of the Union Message:

"In our cities last summer, we saw how wide is the gulf for some Americans between the promise and the reality of our society."<sup>11</sup>

And in the President's comprehensive message of February 22, 1968, to Congress on "The Crisis of the Cities" (see *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 4, No. 8, pp. 325–341)<sup>12</sup> he began by saying:

"Today, America's cities are in crisis. This clear and urgent warning rises from the decay of decades—and is amplified by the harsh realities of the present."

Draw on the latter message for the specific programs he recommended. In addition to programs already in effect (job training, Job Corps, Head Start, VISTA, Community Action, aid to education, and others), the President is pressing hard for new programs (expanded low-cost housing, model cities) which will improve life in the troubled American cities. The report of the Commission on Civil Disorders supports, repeats, and expands many of the President's recommendations to Congress on housing, employment and urban development. That report may help to muster support for his programs to ease the urban and racial crisis.

(3) Acquaint audiences with the magnitude and complexity of the task of absorbing into the mainstream of American urban life the millions of unprepared, undereducated Negro Americans from the rural south who have migrated to the cities in recent years. Make audiences aware of the crushing demand this migration has made on the cities for housing, education and jobs. The Commission's report cites the following figures: About 3.5 million Negroes migrated from the south

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<sup>10</sup> Attached, but not printed is the Annex, which includes excerpts from Humphrey's speech, a summary of the Ghanaian *Times* March 2 commentary, and a listing of the Kerner Commission members.

<sup>11</sup> For the full text of Johnson's State of the Union address, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–1969*, Book I, pp. 25–33.

<sup>12</sup> The text of this message is also printed in *Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–1969*, Book I, pp. 248–263.

to northern cities during the past 25 years; the percentage of Negroes in the central cities rose from 12 per cent in 1950 to 17 per cent in 1960, to 20 per cent in 1966, and it is still rising; since 1960, Negro population has doubled in six major cities.

(4) Point out that Negro protests today are stimulated to a large degree by the revolution of rising expectations which many Negro Americans have experienced; that the successful integration of large numbers of Negroes into the political, economic and cultural life of the nation has intensified the despair and frustration of the millions of untrained, poorly educated Negroes who remain in the urban slums; and that "Great Society" programs—of education, job training and placement, and community action—are designed to give Negroes and others who are below the poverty line increasing opportunity to participate fully in American life.

(5) Place in historical and worldwide context the civil rights revolution and the fight against discrimination in the U.S. Minorities exist throughout the world; securing equality for them is a worldwide problem. The U.S., a veritable nation of minorities, has probably made as much progress as any nation in solving the problems of its minorities. It now faces the most critical minority problem in its history—the need to eliminate deep damage caused by centuries of slavery, segregation, discrimination, and prejudice; and to help the Negro minority achieve the higher living standards of the rest of the nation. (See ANNEX for pertinent excerpts from a March 4, 1968, speech by Vice President Humphrey.)

(6) Without denying that racial prejudices and shibboleths exacerbate the problem of adjusting rural and unskilled migrants to American city life, seek to show that the migrants' difficulties and discontents are comparable to those of new urbanites throughout the world who have migrated to cities faster than jobs have been created there.

(7) Remind audiences that the President and the entire Executive Branch are committed, without reservation, to the elimination of discrimination and segregation from American life; that many recent developments show the will of important, diverse segments of the American majority to eliminate slums and improve substandard conditions. Among such developments:

(a) The massive increase in recent years in Federal programs to attack these basic problems. (The Executive Branch is asking Congress for \$22 billion for housing, anti-poverty, education, and urban renewal programs this year, in comparison with \$9 billion in fiscal 1964.)<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> In his message to Congress on "The Crisis of the Cities," (see footnote 12, above) Johnson stressed: "No one can say how long it will take, or how much of our fortune will eventually be committed. For the problems we are dealing with are stubborn, entrenched and slow to yield. But we are moving on them—now—through more than a hundred programs, long and short range, making financial commitments of more than \$22 billion to the task." (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–1969*, Book I, pp. 249–250)

(b) The announcement on February 25, 1968, of the organization of the National Alliance of Businessmen under the chairmanship of Henry Ford II.<sup>14</sup> This group of influential business executives is leading a drive to find 500,000 jobs for unskilled Negroes.

(c) The stepped-up activities of the Urban Coalition under the leadership of former HEW Secretary, John W. Gardner.<sup>15</sup> The Urban Coalition is a nationwide federation of labor leaders, business executives, university presidents, religious leaders, and big-city mayors. It coordinates the efforts of private organizations to eliminate poverty and discrimination in the central cities, and stimulates public bodies to improve and expand ongoing programs.

(d) The agreement on February 2, 1968, between Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz and the building trades unions to make an all-out effort to bring young Negroes into the apprenticeship programs of these highly paid crafts.<sup>16</sup>

(8) Remind audiences that the legal basis of equal rights for Negro Americans has been firmly established. But the more complex and difficult steps toward full equality, while already in process, entail sustained, long-range national effort:

(a) To wipe out the educational, occupational, cultural, and psychological deficits which disadvantage the Negro American after centuries of discrimination and segregation.

(b) To eliminate the discriminatory practices and prejudices which still operate against him.

**Marks<sup>17</sup>**

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<sup>14</sup> See Roy Reed, "Top Businessmen Join U.S. Effort to Find More Jobs," *New York Times*, February 25, 1968, p. 1.

<sup>15</sup> Gardner stepped down as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare on March 1. See also James Reston, "Gardner Will Head Private Campaign On Urban Poverty," *New York Times*, February 14, 1968, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> The agreement between Wirtz and the AFL-CIO unions was actually reached on February 13. (Neil Gilbride, "Trade Unions Agree to Stop Discrimination," *Washington Post*, February 14, 1968, p. A6)

<sup>17</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

## 180. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

### SUBJECT

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Comment and Cross-Reporting On Events in Poland and Czechoslovakia

1. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Coverage:* Radio Free Europe's coverage of the Warsaw student demonstrations has been factual and restrained with quiet emphasis on the limits of its knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Broadcasts to Poland stress that the students have, in a mature fashion, focused their demands on the immediate student issues involved—the arrest and expulsion of students, violation of the university's extraterritorial status, and disregard of the rights of defendants in university disciplinary proceedings. The broadcasts also point out that the students have been influenced by the events in Czechoslovakia<sup>3</sup> and student discontent elsewhere in the world, compounded by the recent series of repressive cultural measures in their own country and their awareness of Poland's general failure to continue the processes of democratization and modernization that seemed so promising in 1956.

2. *Cross-Reporting:* News of the street demonstrations in Warsaw is being cross-reported to RFE's other audiences—Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian—with special emphasis on comparisons with developments in Czechoslovakia where the Interior Ministry condemned police violence against students during demonstrations in Prague in October.<sup>4</sup> In addition to providing its Soviet audience with full coverage of developments in Poland, Radio Liberty takes Soviet media to task for failure to give any coverage at all to the Polish events.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Box 44, Radio Free Europe, Vol. 1. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the paper. Helms sent the paper to the President under a March 15 typed note, in which he stated: "I thought you might be interested to see this brief description of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty activities during the current unrest in Poland and Czechoslovakia. You will note that both Radios are carefully following the policy guidance set forth by the Department of State."

<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand highlighted this sentence. For further information about the demonstrations, see Jonathan Randal, "50 Students Held in Polish Protest," *New York Times*, February 1, 1968, p. 2; "Police Battle Students Over Play in Poland," *Chicago Tribune*, March 9, 1968, p. N4; "Warsaw Students Riot for 7 Hours," *Washington Post*, March 12, 1968, p. A1; and "Riots Hit 8 Cities in Poland," *Washington Post*, March 14, 1968, p. A1.

<sup>3</sup> See "Czechs Want Democracy to be Returned," *Chicago Tribune*, March 11, 1968, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

3. *Effectiveness*: Ambassador Gronouski has cabled the State Department that RFE's broadcasts to Poland during the present crisis, particularly detailed up-to-date accounts of Polish events and comparative treatment of developments in Czechoslovakia, have been "especially appreciated by the Polish audience."<sup>5</sup> Another Warsaw report states that many Poles are full of praise for RFE coverage of the news, the only source they listen to in order to get the true facts.<sup>6</sup> It notes that RFE broadcasts have left Polish media no choice but to react hastily in their treatment, with resulting fumbling and blunders as they attempt to present some of the facts. Although RFE broadcasts to Czechoslovakia are jammed, there is considerable evidence that they are heard by Czechoslovak listeners.<sup>7</sup> Western broadcasts, including RadLib, are the only source of information about the Polish crisis in the Soviet Union since Soviet media have maintained a complete black-out on news of the Polish demonstrations.

4. *Policy Controls*: Special procedures have been implemented to insure that RFE broadcasts continue to follow the guidelines set forth in the guidance papers and that there be no "shooting from the hip."<sup>8</sup> The Director of the Polish Broadcast Desk has agreed with American management that it is absolutely essential that tone and content of RFE programming, including news programs, be as unemotional as possible and that the voices of his announcers be normal and unexcited.<sup>9</sup> The Director of the Czechoslovak Broadcast Desk was given a lengthy review by the Director of RFE<sup>10</sup> of the lessons learned from the experience of the Hungarian Revolt in 1956. The new President of Free Europe, Inc.,<sup>11</sup> assured his Board of Directors on 11 March that policy controls and script controls were firmly in the hands of American management. Radio Liberty has also instituted emergency policy procedures which entail advance approval of daily policy and programming with their American headquarters.

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<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand highlighted this sentence. The referenced cable was not found.

<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand highlighted the portion of the sentence beginning with "many" through the end of the sentence. The referenced report was not found.

<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand highlighted the portion of the sentence beginning with "there" through the end of the sentence.

<sup>8</sup> An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

<sup>9</sup> An unknown hand highlighted the portion of the sentence beginning with "tone" through the end of the sentence.

<sup>10</sup> Reference is to John Richardson, Jr.

<sup>11</sup> Reference is to Lucius D. Clay, who was elected to the position in February 1968. ("Free Europe, Inc., Elects Lucius D. Clay as Chairman," *New York Times*, February 10, 1968, p. 67)

# 181. Circular Telegram From the United States Information Agency to All Principal United States Information Service Posts<sup>1</sup>

USIA 9809. Infoguide 68-23.

Washington, April 5, 1968

## SUBJECT

Assassination of Martin Luther King

1. President's April 5, 1968 proclamation set tone and substance of treatment.<sup>2</sup> Detailed guidelines to media called for output to note that:

(a) Leaders throughout U.S., including white southerners, expressing grief. Nation, white and Negro, not touched by such grief since death of President Kennedy.

(b) Massive search continues for murderer. President directed Justice Department cooperate fully.

(c) King never deviated from principles of nonviolence, even under great pressure from extremists to give up faith in American system. His nonviolent tactics during Montgomery bus boycott in 1955 helped drive first major wedge in historic pattern of southern segregation practices. His role in 1963 civil rights march on Washington was key factor in passage sweeping civil rights bill, which banned segregation and discrimination in public accommodations. His leadership of Selma (Alabama) demonstrations in 1965 lent impetus to passage of voting rights law which helped to add 1.5 million Negro voters to polling lists in American south.<sup>3</sup>

(d) Specific cause for which King went to Memphis was strike of Negro sanitation workers. Strike had massive support of national union, mostly white, and strong support of white trade unionists in Memphis.

2. IPS will provide texts key public statements. Among these, President's is paramount in expressing national shock and revulsion at crime, and calling for victory over violence and end to divisiveness in U.S. Key quote from Vice President Humphrey: "The blight of discrimination, poverty, and neglect must be erased from America. Indeed, an America full of quality of hope should be and shall be as living memo-

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files; 1949-1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 313, Master Copies, 1968. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Glazer; cleared by Pauker, White, and Carter; approved by White. Sent via telegraph.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Johnson's proclamation, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1968-1969*, Book I, pp. 493-495.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (P.L. 79-584), which Johnson signed into law on August 6, 1965.

rial.” Quote from Roy Wilkins, head of NAACP: “If anger caused by tragic death of Martin Luther King results in violence, it would dishonor his name and the cause King stood for, because his entire life was devoted to nonviolence. . . . Let us channel our anger toward constructive action to get the legislative programs we need to improve the lives of all Negroes.”

3. An infinitesimal proportion of 22 million Negro Americans involved in disorders. Avoid impression of recurrence of mass rioting that erupted in Watts, Detroit, Newark.

4. For earlier guidance on related subjects, see Infoguides 64–12, “War Against Poverty”;<sup>4</sup> 64–23, “Civil Rights Act of 1964”;<sup>5</sup> 65–12, “The Right to Vote”;<sup>6</sup> 67–8, “Progress Toward Equal Rights”;<sup>7</sup> 68–3, “Violence in American Cities”;<sup>8</sup> 68–20, “Report on Civil Disorder”;<sup>9</sup> 68–22, “Urban Crisis in the U.S.”<sup>10</sup> See also CA—961, 10/20/67, “Who Speaks for the Negro American?”<sup>11</sup>

**Marks**

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<sup>4</sup> A copy of Infoguide 64–12 is in the National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files; 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 308, Master Copies—1964.

<sup>5</sup> A copy of Infoguide 64–23 is *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> A copy of Infoguide 65–12 is in the National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files; 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 308, Master Copies—1965.

<sup>7</sup> Not found.

<sup>8</sup> A copy of Infoguide 68–3 is in the National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files; 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 308, Master Copies—1967.

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 2, Document 179.

<sup>10</sup> See Document 179.

<sup>11</sup> A copy of CA—961 is in the National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files; 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 309, Master Copies—1967.

**182. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 10, 1968

*YOUR MARCH 31 SPEECH ON VIET-NAM<sup>2</sup>*

Following your address to the nation on March 31, we printed the attached pamphlet which has had worldwide circulation.<sup>3</sup>

*FOREIGN PRESS REACTION TO RECENT CIVIL DISORDERS*

The looting and burning in American cities following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King drew sensational headlines and lurid press accounts in news centers around the world. Heavy news treatment pictured the U.S. in racial turmoil, with some papers saying the country was on the brink of civil war.

Headlines and pictures played up the deployment of Federal troops in "riot-torn cities."

Voluminous editorial comment expressed shock and sorrow at the murder of Dr. King and apprehension that with the loss of his voice of moderation, more militant forces would come to the fore.

Typical comments were:

"In Moscow, *Izvestia* said: 'The fatal gun of the murderer of Dr. King was aimed by the same America which is bringing death in Viet-Nam with tens of thousands of bullets. This is the America of the oil magnates, automobile kings, and Pentagon brasshats. . . . But the day will come when the progressive citizens of the U.S. will put an end to it. . . . They have our warm sympathy.'

"Havana radio carried a telephone interview with Stokely Carmichael, quoting him as saying: 'we've gone full swing into the revolution. . . . More people are now beginning to plan seriously a major urban guerrilla war. . . . The U.S. must fall in order for humanity to live.'"

It was quite apparent that the events of the past week have seriously shaken the confidence of America's allies and friends throughout the world. We have suffered a blow from which it will take a long time to recover. To overcome the adverse reports, we have stressed:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Agency Reports, Box 135 [2 of 2], United States Information Agency 1967 [2 of 3]. Confidential. Sent through Maguire, who did not initial the memorandum. Maguire did, however, send the memorandum to the President under an April 11 note. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> For text of Johnson's address, in which he indicated he would not seek or accept the nomination of the Democratic Party for another term as President, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1968-1969*, Book I, pp. 469-476.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.



A. The looting and violence in our major cities involved only a small percentage of our 22 million Negroes.

B. That the Negroes and whites cooperated in every community to repair the damage and aid the afflicted.

C. Great progress has been made in civil rights during your Administration—you have appointed Negroes to your Cabinet, the Supreme Court and other important federal positions;<sup>4</sup> Negroes have been selected as public officials in all parts of the nation; substantial gains have been made in integrating Negroes into the business and social community. These themes will be stressed for a substantial period of time.

#### NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR ON NEW CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT

You will recall that two years ago your personal intervention brought about the successful conclusion of the Cultural Exchange Agreement with the Soviet Union. Negotiations for the new agreement have been delayed by the Soviets and we have just received the first draft of their proposal.<sup>5</sup> It contains drastic reductions in the exchanges and exhibits program. Moreover, the circulation of our magazine, “America,” has been reduced with the returns for this month exceeding any for the past year.<sup>6</sup>

Coincidentally, attacks have been made in the Soviet press against “America,” and against me and the USIA.

It may be that these attacks are a prelude to the negotiations; however, I anticipate rough going.

**Leonard H. Marks**

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<sup>4</sup> Among those appointed or nominated by Johnson were Carl T. Rowan, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Robert C. Weaver, and Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall.

<sup>5</sup> Soviet and American officials signed the exchange agreement (19.5 U.S.T. 6073 (1968)), “Cultural Relations: Exchanges in Scientific, Technical, Education, Cultural and Other Fields in 1968–1969,” in Moscow on July 15. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 5, 1968, pp. 154–159. The original exchange agreement was signed in January 1958; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 17, 1958, p. 243.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 6, Document 21.

**183. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to All United States Information Agency Public Affairs Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 12, 1968

Dear PAO:

The kaleidoscopic events of the past two weeks have, I know, placed exceptional demands upon you in the field as they have upon us in Washington.

I want first to reiterate to you what I have told the staff here: that I plan to continue as USIA Director through the President's term of office.<sup>2</sup> I look forward to the coming nine months as a time when we shall move ahead on many important projects already under way and, I hope, initiate some new ones as well.

As the election campaign proceeds, it presents both problems and opportunities for us. The problems are evident: we must in our output give a balanced, impartial presentation of the campaign, the issues and the candidates, scrupulously avoiding any impression of partisanship. We must also help our foreign audiences see the campaign in perspective, last they be misled by the traditional campaign oratory to overestimate the divisions in America or to magnify the problems, both domestic and international, that will be thoroughly aired before the world. I am confident that our seasoned staffs will meet both of these challenges.

We should remember, too, that the campaign offers us unique opportunities. We can take advantage of public interest abroad to depict the processes of the American political system and thereby build confidence in American democracy. We can show that responsible dissent and political conflict in a free society are signs of strength, not weakness; we can stress the grassroots character of U.S. political activity and the manner in which our citizens relate themselves to their government; and we can demonstrate how our nation closes ranks after election day and prepares for the orderly transition of power—the culminating act of the democratic process.

The tragic death of Martin Luther King and the repercussions that followed shocked us all as Americans. They also brought in their wake special problems for the United States abroad. I have followed the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 28, PAO Letters. No classification marking. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 306, United States Information Agency History Program, Subject Files, 1967–1975, Entry A1–1072, Box 5, L. Marks, Reports, 1968.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the President's March 31 speech; see footnote 2, Document 182.

overseas reaction closely and realize the questions and attitudes that your audiences are expressing. I see our task here as an excellent illustration of the role of USIA. We must give a balanced accounting which involves both a debit and an asset side of the ledger. Since what reaches our foreign audience at a time such as this is apt to be heavily weighted on the negative side, we have a special obligation to present the often overlooked factors that put the situation in full perspective.

During the past week, our media fulfilled this obligation admirably. While in no way minimizing the problems that the United States faced in its cities in the days following the death of Dr. King, the media made clear that only a very small proportion of Negro Americans were involved in the disorders; that violence was confined to small pockets of large cities; and that the overwhelming majority of Americans, whatever the color of their skins, demonstrated their respect for law and order.

Finally I want to report to you that last week I testified before committees of the House on both our appropriations and our career legislation.<sup>3</sup>

The House Appropriations Committee was extremely courteous and quite considerate in reviewing our budget requests. I am indeed hopeful that we will receive considerable support for maintenance of our current operation and for selective increases.

I am pleased that the personnel hearings were scheduled early in the legislative year, and I am hopeful that the Committee will be able to report out the bill within the next thirty days. Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that a number of hurdles lie ahead: action by the subcommittee, by the full Foreign Affairs Committee, by the Rules Committee and finally by the House itself. I want you to know, however, that we will do everything we can to help bring the legislation through to final enactment.<sup>4</sup>

Sincerely,

**Leonard H. Marks**

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4 below.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to S. 633, providing for a career service for USIA officers similar to the Department of State's Foreign Service Officer corps. For further information, see footnote 2, Document 30; and footnote 10, Document 174.

## 184. Foreign Media Reaction Report Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 19, 1968

### *PRESIDENT'S DECISION NOT TO SEEK OR ACCEPT RENOMINATION*

President Johnson's announcement in his March 31 nationwide address on the Viet-Nam war that he would not seek or accept the Democratic Party nomination was generally seen by world media as a remarkable act of political and personal selflessness.<sup>2</sup> Most observers accepted the decision as a laudable effort to prevent the war from becoming an election issue which would impair peace prospects.

Editorialists in many countries expressed admiration for Mr. Johnson's "courage" and "statemanship" in withdrawing from the race "in the interest of national unity and peace." At the same time, papers warned against interpreting the action as resignation or surrender.

The President's accomplishments won considerable praise, especially his "unparalleled" success in bringing about advances in the fields of civil rights, health care, and education. Some papers said the Great Society and the New Deal<sup>3</sup> would be linked together in history as periods of great domestic reform.

In several instances papers critical of U.S. actions interpreted the decision not to run as an admission that U.S. Viet-Nam policy had failed to achieve its objectives. However, many critics thought the announcement was a "supreme and noble" effort to bring peace in Viet-Nam and unity on the home front.

Foreign media emphasized that the withdrawal from the Presidential race greatly increased Mr. Johnson's freedom of action in the difficult months ahead. A number of observers speculated that a successful conclusion of the Viet-Nam war might set in motion a draft-Johnson movement.

[Omitted here are excerpts from newspapers reporting on Johnson's decision.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FO 6-3, Box 62, FO 6-3 4/10/68-5/20/68. No classification marking. Marks sent the report to Roberts under an April 19 covering note that reads in part: "I thought that you should have this material for the archives." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 182.

<sup>3</sup> The New Deal was a series of laws and programs initiated by President Franklin Roosevelt and his administration in the mid-to-late 1930s to help the United States recover from the severe economic crisis, commonly referred to as the Great Depression, into which it had fallen following the stock market crash in October 1929.

**185. Memorandum From the Director of the United States  
Information Agency (Marks) to All United States  
Information Agency Public Affairs Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 28, 1968

Dear PAO:

During the first two weeks of negotiations in Paris on the Viet-Nam war it has become quite apparent that world opinion will play a large role in determining the positions of the North Vietnamese negotiators.<sup>2</sup>

We have analyzed press opinion in all areas from March 31 to date and have prepared the enclosed summary.

It is significant to note that there has been increasing sympathy and approval of U.S. efforts to end the war. In your discussions with local media and with officials and prominent leaders of the country, you should make liberal use of this material.

I also suggest that you call the attention of the Ambassador to this summary since it might be useful to him in making speeches and public statements.

Regular reporting on media reaction from principal posts is the source material on which this analysis is based. We rely heavily on this reporting, as well as on your assessments of public opinion in your country.

Sincerely,

**Leonard H. Marks**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Agency History Program Subject Files: 1926–1975, Entry A1–1072, Box 5, L. Marks, Reports, 1968. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Formal peace negotiation talks between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam began on Monday, May 13, at the Hotel Majestic. For additional information on the first plenary meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. VI, Viet-nam, January–August 1968, Document 230.

## Enclosure

### Foreign Media Reaction Summary Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>3</sup>

Washington, May 27, 1968

#### *WIDER APPROVAL OF U.S. PEACE SEEKING SINCE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 31 ADDRESS*

Since March 31 when President Johnson opened a new peace initiative on Viet-Nam while removing himself from the 1968 Presidential race, the attitude of West European media toward the U.S. has lost much of its previous hostility. Increasing sympathy and approval of U.S. efforts to end the war have been expressed by newspapers in pointing out:

1. The President's sacrifice of his political future in his overriding desire to achieve peace in Viet-Nam.
2. U.S. military restraint in curtailing the bombing.
3. Sincere U.S. efforts to open peace talks with North Viet-Nam.
4. Assignment of "skilled" Averell Harriman to head a high-grade U.S. delegation to the peace talks.
5. Reasonable, constructive U.S. negotiating terms, expressed in part by Harriman's five points.<sup>4</sup>
6. Hanoi's intransigence in Paris, accompanied by new offensives and the murder of civilians in South Viet-Nam.

West European press emphasis of these points since March 31 is in clear contrast to previous charges that the U.S. had been talking

<sup>3</sup> No classification marking.

<sup>4</sup> Presumably a reference to what Xuan Thuy, Chief of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, described as "the five points" made by Harriman on May 15 in Paris. ("Harriman's Statement in Paris and Excerpts From Remarks by Thuy," *New York Times*, May 19, 1968, p. 44) The points were enumerated by Harriman as "areas in which it seems reasonable to hope to find agreement" between the United States and North Vietnam. According to Harriman: "First, we both speak of an independent, democratic, peaceful and prosperous South Vietnam. You also speak of a neutral South Vietnam. We have no problem with this if that is South Vietnam's wish. Second, we both speak of peace on the basis of respect of the Geneva accords of 1954—to which we add the 1962 agreements on Laos. Third, we both speak of letting the internal affairs of South Vietnam be settled by the South Vietnamese themselves—which we would clarify by adding 'without outside interference or coercion.' Fourth, we both speak of the reunification of Vietnam by peaceful means. In our view this must not only be peaceful but also through the free choice of the people of South Vietnam and of North Vietnam. Fifth, we both speak of the need for strict respect of the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords." ("Texts of Remarks by U.S. and North Vietnamese Envoys at Second Paris Session," *New York Times*, May 16, 1968, p. 16)

about peace while actually ignoring or belittling Hanoi peace feelers in seeking a military decision and a victor's place at the peace table.

Meanwhile, in other areas of the world, the press has made some of the same points, emphasizing the President's efforts to achieve an honorable peace despite Hanoi's intransigence. However, media in Saigon, Seoul, and Bangkok have reflected deep concern that in pursuing peace, the U.S. might be led to remove its protective shield from its Asian allies.

No change is evident in the basic views of newspapers in supporting or objecting to U.S. involvement in Viet-Nam and the bombing of the north.

Attached are editorial excerpts which make the above points in West Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia, and Latin America.<sup>5</sup>

[Omitted here are excerpts from newspapers reporting on Johnson's decision and the Vietnam war peace process.]

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed.

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## **186. Report to the President of the Committee on Overseas Voluntary Activities<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

[Omitted here are the title page and a list of the members of the Committee on Overseas Voluntary Activities.]

### **I**

On March 29, 1967, Mr. President, you approved the recommendation of Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, Secretary of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential Files, Oversized Attachments, 11/30/68, Box 192 [1 of 2], C.F. Oversize Attachments: 12/2/68, Packet 1 [Cater 2/67–10/67 material re U.S. Government and Private Voluntary Organizations, Committee on Voluntary Overseas Activity (COVA), also the Rusk Committee]. No classification marking. According to newspaper accounts, this report was likely released on or about May 27. The report was to be released by December 31, 1967, but the Rusk Committee was sufficiently divided to prevent an agreement on a final document. (Robert H. Phelps, "Panel on C.I.A. Subsidies Divided Over Alternatives," *New York Times*, December 18, 1967, p. 1)

Health, Education and Welfare John Gardner, and CIA Director Richard Helms

“that no Federal agency of the United States Government should provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation’s educational or private voluntary organizations.”<sup>2</sup>

You further directed termination of such support as quickly as possible and no later than December 31, 1967, without destroying valuable private organizations before they can seek new means of support. The termination process was completed prior to December 31, 1967.

You asked this Committee to consider a recommendation in the Katzenbach report “that the Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of such support.” This Committee was to review concrete ways of accomplishing this objective.

## II

Mr. President, we submit for your consideration three basic conclusions:

1. Considering only the work of the relatively few voluntary organizations formerly supported by CIA, *we conclude that no special organizational or funding arrangement for further support is required.* Support to continue essential work of these organizations must come from private sources and regular Federal programs.

2. *However, we do see a need for a new program of Federal support for worth-while overseas activities of private, non-profit organizations particularly in developing countries.* We recommend administration of the program by an independent commission.

3. To permit adequate consideration of the new program, we believe that *legislation should be proposed to the next session of the Congress.*

Though we strongly support the termination policy, *we were impressed with the worth of the voluntary activities overseas that CIA supported.*

- The organizations were highly respected on the American scene.
- Their leadership was responsible and dedicated.
- The work being supported was not covert and was considered worth-while and effective.

Of the several hundreds of voluntary organizations doing work overseas, *only a few dozen received funds from CIA.* The grants were small—the median annual grant being about \$200,000. In the termina-

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 144.



tion process, which was not the responsibility of this Committee, the financial burdens on the organizations were carefully considered. Some organizations received limited contributions to tide them over the period during which they could seek new sources of funds.

Early in our deliberations the Committee turned its attention to *the important role which all American voluntary organizations are playing overseas*. These organizations have for many years been involved effectively in humanitarian, civic, and technical assistance activities.

The Committee believes there is *an opportunity to expand this role at small cost* compared to the long-range benefits to the United States and peoples of developing countries. We see a need not now being met adequately by existing U.S. Government programs overseas. We see a way of meeting this need which is strongly in the American tradition—the maximum use of the energies and idealism of private citizens.

These conclusions are based upon an extensive review. We started with the conclusions of the Katzenbach Committee. We reviewed the work and funding of over 100 American voluntary organizations with activities overseas. We have consulted extensively with knowledgeable persons in Government and private life. We examined a large number of organizational possibilities—ranging from a Federally-chartered private corporation to inclusion of the proposed program within various existing Federal agencies.

### III

An important but little recognized aspect of national development is *the role of private, non-profit groups* involved in civic, cultural, professional, and humanitarian activities. In developed and developing countries alike, *governments cannot and should not do everything*. Citizens must undertake on their own initiative important economic, social, and political tasks.

In the United States, we take voluntary activities for granted. They are a precious part of the American heritage. We have used them to contribute wholly or partly to a large variety of purposes: fire protection, first aid services, health programs, settlement houses, all levels of education, improvement of professional standards, encouragement of sound agricultural and conservation practices, protection of individual rights, development and maintenance of hosts of cultural activities, and meeting the needs of underprivileged children. Total American philanthropy approaches \$10 billion annually.

Unfortunately, comparable voluntary organizations and associations are often lacking in developing countries. This lack is both a symptom and a cause of underdevelopment.

The Committee believes that voluntary organizations and associations can and should play a special role in developing countries. They

can help to translate individual energies into effective group action. They can grapple more directly with the ancient and entrenched barriers to progress—the apathy and despair of the poor in many lands; social and community disorganization; and the distrust of outsiders and governments beyond the village.

Examples of the *kinds of organizations* which have been important to our national development and which can help similar groups in developing countries are:

*Rural organizations*, like our rural electric and farmers' cooperatives, the Grange, and Farm Bureau Federation;

*Businessmen's organizations*, like our Committee for Economic Development, Chambers of Commerce, Service clubs;

*Adult literacy and family planning groups*, like Planned Parenthood; *Credit unions* and locally-run savings and loan associations;

*Youth and student organizations*, like 4H clubs, YMCA, Boy and Girl Scouts;

*Free labor groups*, like our AFL-CIO and independent unions;

*Women's organizations*, like the League of Women Voters, the Federation of American Women's Clubs;

*Professional associations*, like the National Education Association, Bar Associations, and scientific and learned societies.

As examples of their *grass-roots development activities overseas*, American voluntary organizations have:

—conducted a supervised *credit program for 3,000 small farmers in India* which has led to increased farm productivity, all managed and operated by local people (Cooperative League of the U.S.A.);

—*helped establish book publishing firms*, managed and staffed with local people, in the Near East, Asia, and Africa (Franklin Book Programs, Inc.);

—*organized a settlement house program in Venezuela* with a multi-purposed approach to problems of health, education, and community organization (National Federation of Settlement and Neighborhood Centers);

—*taught youth leaders in Latin America* the basic skills of organizing community programs in construction, agriculture, conservation, and sanitation (Youth for Development).

Private voluntary organizations can play a crucial role in our relations with other nations *which U.S. Government agencies cannot play*:

- The organizations reach directly private individuals and groups in foreign countries which Government programs often cannot.

- They can play helpful roles in sensitive areas, such as family planning, education, land reform, and community organization.

- They develop institutions and groups which will exist when they leave.

- They offer the advantages of flexibility, innovation, enterprise, and commitment of the private sector.

It is worth noting that our national life has been enriched by private voluntary organizations which originated in other countries. Most notable examples are the Red Cross, YMCA's, the cooperative movement, Boy and Girl Scouts, trade unions, and the Salvation Army.

We believe it desirable to develop *a new program of public support for private American efforts* designed to assist like-minded groups in developing countries.

*It need not be an expensive program.* Because voluntary organizations tend to teach others and work through them, they can make relatively small sums go a long way. A modest public investment of \$25 million a year, *aimed at the crucial area of private grass-roots development*, would have a multiplier effect in developing societies.

To administer such a program, *we recommend establishment within the Executive Branch of a commission of 15 distinguished private citizens.* To emphasize the independent and private nature of the program, the commission would be separate from the Department of State and other foreign affairs agencies. However, it could receive necessary policy guidance and information as to plans of other agencies through a *liaison committee*, composed of the Secretary of State, Chairman, and heads of relevant agencies.

The commission supported by director and staff would

—*receive from voluntary organizations*<sup>3</sup> *specific proposals for work overseas;*

—*make grants to support the most meritorious of the proposals in the national interest;*<sup>4</sup>

—*contract with voluntary organizations for government agencies and act as an information clearing house.*

In making this recommendation, our Committee is fully aware of possible pitfalls: (a) with scarce funds relative to demand, the commission could dissipate grants over too many worthy organizations; (b) pressures from voluntary organizations could result in spiraling appropriations; and (c) the new source of public support could dry up private contributions, thus merely shifting private activities to the Federal budget.

We believe ample protection against such possibilities lies in the effectiveness of Executive and congressional review in the annual budget and appropriation process, the ability of the commission and

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<sup>3</sup> As used in this report, *voluntary organizations* are *private non-profit organizations*, defined in Section 170, Title 26 of the United States Code, which are capable of undertaking work overseas. [Footnote is in the original.]

<sup>4</sup> Excluded would be grants for general or disaster relief, research, construction and capital projects, and religious worship, sectarian, or proselytizing activities. [Footnote is in the original.]

staff within appropriations to select innovative and high impact projects, and the establishment in legislation and practice of strict criteria for making grants.

We envision that the *commission should operate under such groundrules as these:*

- Grants would not be given for work which can obtain adequate private financing.

- Voluntary organizations to be eligible for grants could not reduce the scope of activities currently supported by private funds.

- In choosing among competing grant proposals, the commission would consider the contributions of the voluntary organizations and local groups abroad.

- The proposed work would foster an activity or entity in the developing country *which will continue on its own after the grant is completed.*

- The commission would give priority to innovative or experimental projects.

- The commission would not finance major construction or long-term capital projects.

- All grants would be reviewed at least annually.

Support for overseas work of private voluntary groups is too important to be left solely to the commission or the Federal Government. A new initiative must be broadly supported by individuals who contribute money and service to the overseas activities of voluntary organizations; by business organizations; and by private foundations and philanthropic entities. *There is much to be gained from increased support from all such sources.*

Lastly, our Committee believes that voluntary organizations should not have to face unnecessary financial burdens and delay (a) in the long project approval process in Federal agencies, and (b) in meeting reporting and other requirements often more suited to larger contracting operations. We believe that the proposed commission and agencies should evaluate rigorously the work carried out. At the same time, we hope they would attune their procedures to the small grants and projects of voluntary organizations.

## V

Early in the Committee's work, the *British Council* was discussed as a possible organizational approach to the proposed program. The thirty-man Council is a royally-chartered body, with an annual budget of \$28 million, almost all from government appropriations. Its broad purpose is to represent British life and institutions to the world and to increase understanding between Britain and other nations. It combines within its program functions performed in the U.S. by many agencies—academic and cultural exchanges (State); furnishing of libraries, books, lectures, and exhibits (USIA); technical assistance (AID); voluntary ser-

vices overseas (Peace Corps); and promotion of English language teaching (many U.S. agencies). It employs 3,700 people, about 2,100 overseas.

*We concluded that the British Council offered little in the way of a model.* With its mixture of public and private elements and its freedom from accountability, it is an institution unique to the British system of government.

Our recommendation conceives of a body separated from foreign affairs agencies, but with obvious governmental responsibilities. It places primary emphasis on *privately developed relations* through voluntary organizations and in fostering private groups and activities abroad.

We have examined the desirability of including within the proposed commission a number of functions now performed by Federal agencies. We believe that activities like the following, totalling \$10 million, could appropriately be added to the grants to voluntary organizations discussed above:

	Approximate Annual Appropriations (in millions)
1. Grants to special education projects, including the Bologna Center and Salzburg Seminar (now funded in State)	\$1.0
2. Grants to American-sponsored universities overseas, such as the American University of Beirut (now funded in AID)	9.1
3. Centrally administered book development activities (AID)	.5
4. Assistance to American, privately sponsored libraries abroad (State has legal authority, but has not funded)	–
Total	\$10.6

These activities are conducted through grants to American organizations that sponsor a group abroad. Their administration would not overburden a new commission, beginning a new approach.

Some members of the Committee suggested that cultural presentations and exchanges of students, teachers, and researchers might also be added to the program of the new commission. Such an approach, however desirable, would involve the commission at the outset not merely in the making of grants, but also in direct administration of large programs. Moreover, this Committee did not consider a broad

examination of international educational and cultural activities to be within its purview.

## VI

Our Committee is convinced that there is a real need for and a great benefit to be expected from open public support for the best work of private organizations overseas.

It is a program to give modest but effective help to those who ask it. It is targeted not to government functions, but to things people can do for themselves. It is a program to enlist and support the creative energies of American voluntarism in meeting a great challenge of our time—the conquest of ignorance, famine, disease, and social backwardness in two-thirds of the world. It will provide greater opportunities for *an effective and lasting form of bridge-building*—the face-to-face contact between, for example, a man who has spent a lifetime organizing rural electric cooperatives and people who seek the first benefits of electricity and don't know how to go about it.

We believe this proposal is consistent with the support for voluntary activities abroad which has been expressed by many members of the Congress in recent years.

## VII

*In summary, we recommend*

1. legislation next session to authorize a commission of highly qualified citizens to make grants to voluntary organizations to encourage private activities in developing countries.

2. after establishment of the commission, an initial annual level of appropriations of about \$25 million for the new program, augmented by \$10 million of transferred support for existing activities.

3. more effective cooperation with private voluntary organizations by Federal agencies in the carrying out of their programs within present funds and authorities.

Senator Russell would like to make the following additional comment: "Senate duties have kept me from participating in the work of the Committee to the degree necessary for a constructive contribution to this report. Confidence in the other members of the Committee reassures me that the task has been approached objectively and diligently. I do wish to restate my conviction that the support formerly provided by the Central Intelligence Agency to voluntary organizations was not nearly so sinister in its design or effect as some critics would have the public believe."

**187. Telegram From the United States Information Agency to All Principal United States Information Service Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 5, 1968, 9:57 a.m.

12120.

1. The following guidance has been transmitted to USIA media:

2. All strata of American society are shocked and horrified by the Kennedy shooting. From the President and his official family to the lowliest members of the national community, all share the deepest compassion for the Kennedy family. In the words of President Johnson, we all pray for the Senator's recovery.<sup>2</sup>

3. It can be expected that once the initial statements of shock, horror and grief have been made, there may be a flurry of extremist and intemperate statements, statements critical of "a sick society" which can generate such assassinations. These should be used only in direct ratio to the importance of their authors.

4. As in the death of John Kennedy, many in the world again will regard today's tragic shooting in terms of a conspiracy. We cannot and should not be in a position of adding to, or assessing in any way, this kind of theorizing. We should stick strictly with official comments by the police and other law enforcement agencies. For the time being, avoid picking up non-official comments on this subject from whatever source.

5. In view of the events surrounding the killing of President Kennedy's assassin five years ago, we should watch for and use any details on the legal rights being afforded the man under arrest in today's shooting. He has been offered the opportunity to have a lawyer, informed of other rights, etc.

6. On the basis of descriptions of the alleged assailant, some news items speculate that he might be a Latin American, Mexican-American, Eurasian, etc. We should not use any of these reports pending official confirmation of the man's identity.<sup>3</sup>

**Marks**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files; 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 313, Master Copies, 1968. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Sorkin; cleared by Chernoff; approved by Ryan.

<sup>2</sup> Kennedy was shot after midnight on June 5 in Los Angeles and died on June 6. The actual quotation from Johnson's official statement released after the shooting was: "All America prays for his recovery." (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–1969*, Book I, p. 691)

<sup>3</sup> The individual identified as the man who assassinated Kennedy was Sirhan Bishara Sirhan, who was born in Jordan, but moved to the United States with his family and grew up in California. He was eventually tried and convicted of the killing. (Ward Just, "The Accused: A Loner Who Hated Israel" *Washington Post*, June 7, 1968, p. A1)



## 188. Editorial Note

To commemorate the 30th anniversary of the creation of the first Division of Cultural Relations in the Department of State, on July 27, 1968, VOA broadcast an Interview with Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Edward Re. The following excerpts of that interview were published in the September edition of the Department of State *News Letter*:

### "The U.S. Cultural Relations Program in Retrospect

"A Voice of America broadcast in the World-Wide English Service and excerpted in several foreign languages marked the 30th anniversary (on July 27) of the creation of the first Division of Cultural Relations in the Department. The Division was the lineal ancestor of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU).

"The broadcast featured an interview with CU Assistant Secretary Edward D. Re. Excerpts from the interview, with James Parisi of VOA, follow:

*"Q. Thirty years ago, in 1938, the number of people going from one country to another—from one continent to another—to study, or teach, or do research, or take part in seminars and conferences was a small part of what it is today. The order of increase is so great as to represent almost a new factor in the relations among peoples of the world. Very large numbers of people today know about educational and cultural travel and exchange activities, and the advantages they can open up on both ends of an exchange. More and more people are becoming directly involved in these activities as the growing desire for greater educational and cultural opportunities spreads around the world.*

*"Governments of the world have seen the importance of these activities and given them strong encouragement and support. The Government of the United States began organizing to do so 30 years ago . . . Dr. Re, what did happen 30 years ago?*

"A. Well, Mr. Parisi, on July 27, 1938, Secretary of State Cordell Hull announced the creation of the first Division of Cultural Relations in our Department of State. Secretary Hull, you recall, was a vigorous advocate of the Good Neighbor Policy toward our neighbors to the South, and a vigorous proponent of constructive trade and other relations with other parts of the world as well.

*"Q. Are we the first nation, Dr. Re, to establish a government program of educational and cultural relations with other countries?*

"A. No, not at all. A number of other governments had already done so. In our country, private organizations had been engaged in such activities for a long time before—foundations, churches, universities, the Institute of International Education, and others.



"I might just add that travel for study and related purposes is an old and almost universal world phenomenon. There were the wandering scholars of the Middle Ages in Europe, for example—scholars who clustered at many places, such as Bologna, Paris, and at Oxford, among others. Various waves of civilization carried their cultures with them to other areas.

*"Q. Since the United States wasn't in any sense first, was there anything distinctive about the way we approached these activities?"*

"A. I would say that Secretary Hull planned very well, because his basic ideas continue in today's broad range of activities. The Cultural Division he created is a direct ancestor of our present Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, though there have of course been many new programs added along the way. Perhaps the Fulbright Program of academic exchanges, which came a few years later, is the best-known example to most people. Nearly 100,000 people, about two-thirds from other countries, have now been a part of that program since it began a little over 20 years ago. But there have been other programs as well which our Congress has authorized, so that Americans and citizens of other countries and territories could travel to gain the benefits of study, observation, consultation, and friendly association in an academic or other field of special interest.

*"Q. What were the particular principles that Secretary Hull laid down, Dr. Re?"*

"A. Well, he and his principal aide, Dr. Ben Cherrington, laid down two central points, and they have marked these programs throughout these 30 years. First, the prime role of our government should be to encourage the widest possible initiative and participation by non-governmental organizations—colleges and universities, corporations, foundations, labor unions, women's organizations, and other national and community groups. The purpose was to build on the broad base of existing activity in this country. In this way the program could involve the participation of people and institutions representing day-to-day activities throughout the country—thus assuring programs that authentically represented this country.

"A second guiding principle for these programs—established at the outset and continued to this day—is that educational and cultural relations should be reciprocal to the maximum extent possible. We do, therefore, honor the memory of Secretary Hull for the strong foundations he laid for these programs.

*"Q. You mentioned the Good Neighbor Policy toward our neighbors to the South. Was this new educational and cultural activity a part of the Good Neighbor Policy?"*

"A. It was certainly in the spirit of that policy. The first activities the Division of Cultural Relations undertook were with other countries

of the hemisphere that had signed the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, in Buenos Aires two years before.

*"Q. Would you know who some of these first grantees were?"*

*"A. Yes, I have had that looked up. A Peruvian author and educator, Fernando Romero, was the first of many leaders in Latin American life and letters to come to the United States under the program. Pedro Calmon, lawyer and historian, of Brazil, and Domingo Santa Cruz, musician and diplomat of Chile, were others who came early in the program. The first Americans who went to Latin America under these programs included Thornton Wilder, the playwright, and Rene d'Harnoncourt, who retired early this month as Director of the Museum of Modern Art in New York.*

*"Q. Dr. Re, what would you say are the purposes of the activities in which you are now engaged?"*

*"A. The charter for the activities we conduct today is a new and very broad authorizing act, The Fulbright-Hays Act—more formally known as the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. (I emphasize the word 'mutual' because it is just that.)*

*"When President Kennedy signed the Act, he said Congress had recognized 'the importance of a more comprehensive program of educational and cultural activities as a component of our foreign relations.'*

*"The statement of purpose in the Act—an eloquent one, I believe—shows the breadth of the program. Let me cite just a few lines:*

*""To increase mutual understanding . . .*

*""To strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations . . .*

*""To promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement;*

*""And thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.'*

*"Surely you agree that these are eloquent and noble aspirations and purposes.*

*"Q. Dr. Re, what kinds of activities are you now conducting?"*

*"A. Well, I cannot of course describe them all in the few minutes we have. But let me say that on any day we would be engaged in mutual exchanges or related arrangements with countries on all the continents. For example, UNESCO is holding a conference on education in Africa, in Nairobi, Kenya, and we have representatives there; international visitors—many of them distinguished leaders and specialists—are in our country from Latin America, East Asia, the Near East and South Asia, Europe and Africa. American lecturers, consultants, per-*

forming artists and athletes are traveling in many parts of the world. These are just a few general examples of current exchanges—both ways.

*“Q. Could you give us a more specific example?”*

*“A. I might do so in terms of a group project, since it covers many countries and is now in the third of its four-month program in the United States. It is a project for youth leaders and social workers, begun a dozen years ago by citizens of Cleveland, Ohio. This is truly an international program—with 10 from Africa, 29 from Latin America, 75 from Europe, 31 from the Near East and South Asia, and 10 from East Asia and the South Pacific. One reason I believe this program has been so successful is that the talented and dedicated people who come here are so keenly aware of the importance of their work in their societies, and because they are keenly aware, too, that the problems with which they deal are common problems pretty much the world over.”*

*“Q. There doesn’t seem to be much doubt of your belief that programs like these are beneficial to the individuals who participate and to their countries. Would you explain why you believe this?”*

*“A. Let me give two reasons. First, in addition to my own commitment—my fundamental faith in education, for example—there is well-documented proof. A survey made a few years ago in 20 other countries—of nearly 3,000 former grantees—and an additional 1,100 non-grantee leaders in these countries—left no doubt that these programs do increase mutual understanding, do help to dispel misconceptions, do help to establish channels of communication.”*

*“My second reason for faith in these programs is that so many other people—including so many other countries—have faith in them too. We now have agreements with some 48 countries for truly bi-national commissions in those countries to administer the programs there. These commissions, or foundations as they are sometimes called, are composed equally of nationals of the host country and of U.S. citizens resident in that country. In addition, some dozen countries have now pledged financial support through cost-sharing agreements. As Secretary of State Rusk has said, ‘Nothing could better express the mutuality of benefit under international-exchange programs than increasing mutuality of support.’ Over the last year and a half, too, teams of American scholars have visited other countries to discuss with scholars of those countries the directions the program with each country could most usefully take over the next 5–10 years. So far the countries in which such reviews and consultations have taken place are Brazil, Colombia, Finland, Korea, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand and Yugoslavia.”*

*“So the program is really world-wide. And it has—in all its parts—brought more than 125,000 persons into it over the last 30 years.”*

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*"Q. Dr. Re, how would you compare the promise—the potential—of such programs today as against 30 years ago?"*

*"A. The promise and potential have of course been there all the time and the rate of growth has been very rapid. The new fact about today is that these activities are more widely recognized—all over the world—to be valuable. Take education, for example. Last October, 150 education leaders from 52 countries met in this country. It was called the International Conference on the World Crisis in Education. The final report of that conference said that ' . . . education is now a central preoccupation of every nation in the world.'*

*"President Johnson had discussed the same point, too, in a special message to Congress in 1966. 'Education,' said the President, 'lies at the heart of every nation's hopes and purposes.' Then he added: 'It must be at the heart of our international relations.'*

*And so, cooperative educational relations among nations are taking a more central place in mankind's hopes and plans for building a more stable world order. Perhaps this is the best indication we have of the greater promise and potential these activities now have as compared with 30 years ago."* (National Archives, RG 306, Washington, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1 1066, Box 48, Educational Exchange Program, International Exchange, 1968)

**189. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to All United States Information Agency Element Heads<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 22, 1968

As I visited our overseas offices, I found that there was no common symbol identifying the USIS operation. In some cases local artists had prepared designs which they thought were appropriate, and in others no symbol was employed.

In order that we may have a graphic symbol that would universally identify our publications, films and other informational materials, I asked Bob Sivard to submit appropriate designs. After reviewing a number, I have selected the one shown below—the torch in the up-raised hand of the Statue of Liberty. This design will hereafter be the official USIA symbol.



Area Directors are requested to advise all posts in your area to use this symbol in place of the variety of designs now in use. When possible, it should be printed in red, white and blue. If a press notice is made of the adoption of the symbol, reference should be made to the following statement by me:

"I hope that in time this symbol will come to symbolize for men everywhere the message of freedom and hope which USIA carries to the world."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 19, Directors Memos to Area and Media Directors, January–November 1968. No classification marking.

Bob Sivard will shortly be in touch with you to facilitate carrying out this program.

Leonard H. Marks

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**190. News Release Prepared in the United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

No. 26

Washington, November 4, 1968

PRIVATE OBSERVATIONS ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Remarks by

LEONARD H. MARKS, DIRECTOR

on occasion of the

ANNUAL U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

HONOR AWARDS CEREMONY

I came to the United States Information Agency, and became your colleague, three years and three months ago.<sup>2</sup>

In accepting this assignment, I resigned from the practice of law, representing clients whose business was “communicating”, to take on the task of being the communicator for a single client. Sometimes frustrating—but always exciting, often difficult—but ultimately rewarding, the experience has been a unique privilege.

While I did not enter USIA as a novice in the field of communications, I was aware that I had a lot to learn. One thing I have learned is that the learning process never ceases. The need to be alert continuously to changing world affairs and to technical changes in the art of communication is the unyielding demand of our profession—and its greatest appeal.

There is no orientation program for agency directors. My post-graduate education began immediately.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1069, Box 13, Leonard H. Marks, Speeches, 1966–1968. No classification marking. Additional copies are in the Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 21, Speeches by Leonard H. Marks; and the National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Agency History Program Subject Files, 1926–1972, Entry A1–1072, Box 5, L. Marks, Reports, 1968.

<sup>2</sup> Marks started his official duties as USIA Director on September 1, 1965; see Document 56.

When I appeared before the Senate for confirmation, after President Johnson had appointed me Director, I said, in my opening statement:

"I am aware of the vital role which the USIA plays in explaining and interpreting U.S. policies, actions, and culture to the rest of the world. I am aware that there is today a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, and that the battleground extends over a wide area. I am confident of the strength of our democracy and of the virtues of our way of life, and I have long contended that communications can serve as a vital force in bringing peoples of the world closer together, creating mutual understanding and trust and removing the barriers which currently separate us."

Very soon after assuming office, however, I realized that my awareness did not take in

- The full *extent* of USIA's vital role, nor
- The *magnitude and complexity* of the problem involved.

I entered upon my duties within weeks of U.S. military landings in the Dominican Republic and the destructive, tragic riots in the Watts section of Los Angeles.<sup>3</sup> Internationally, we were involved in a most trying military-political situation. At home, we were experiencing explosive difficulties.

Some of the questions I immediately faced were:

- What do such events do to our *image* abroad?, and to our *influence*?
- How do they affect our *capacity for leadership* in the world?
- Must* we expose our predicaments, and explain them, overseas?
- Should USIA mount *crash information programs* with each crisis?
- In times like these, to what extent can this country draw upon the reservoir of trust and confidence, created in part by USIA's long-range programs, among foreign peoples?

These questions themselves reflect the scope of USIA responsibility, arising out of this decade's rapid changes—both political and technological. This Agency's contribution to national security today involves much more than the "cold war" assignments of an earlier and less complex era. It is not likely that we shall again live in a world comprised

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<sup>3</sup> On August 11, 1965, riots broke out in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles, California following the arrest of an African American motorist. The riots continued for approximately a week. An official investigation report suggested that the causes for the riots were deeper and included poverty, inequality, and racial discrimination. (Dave Smith, "Los Angeles Area Tense After Riot," *Washington Post*, August 13, 1965, p. A2; Peter Bart, "New Negro Riots Erupt on Coast," *New York Times*, August 13, 1965, p. 1; and Alfred Friendly, "Official Watts Riot Report Pulls No Punches," *Washington Post*, December 13, 1965, p. A4)

mainly of those “for” and those “against” us; a world in which one could, without argument, designate as “against” us anybody who was not “for” us.

Communist initiatives, of course, must still be met. But in the overall job of psychological support of American foreign policy, USIA must now deal with a rising tide of participation in the modern world by populations whose attitudes can no longer be defined in simple ideological terms.

The “revolution of rising expectations” threatens to give way to a “revolution of rising frustrations.”

To encourage the first without setting off the second calls for extreme sensitivity and skill. Realities—such as a nation’s resources and its development timetable—must determine the *degree* of encouragement. There are new pressures, which leaders must constructively direct, rather than use as tides upon which to be swept to temporary popularity.

The new pressures, and opportunities, of awakening public opinion are a result of a modern two-edged development: the worldwide communications and education “explosion.” My official travels abroad confirmed what I had already observed privately—the transistor radio, television, motion pictures, the jet airplane, and a massive assault on illiteracy are transforming the entire world. For the first time, the remotest villages of the most distant lands are figuratively *and* literally plugging into the modern world. Information, ideas, and opinions are spreading with the speed of light. Now, people discuss subjects which, until recently, they were not even aware existed as problems.

In this new environment, trouble or tension in one part of the world travels like a shock wave to every other part. A seemingly minor incident in a small, far-away place can upset a far wider balance. Isolation is no longer possible for any country—neither physical, political, nor moral.

For the work of our Agency, this new rising tide of public involvement in the contemporary world has enormous significance. The potential of American influence on the course of the world is without modern precedent. In the words of those who drafted it, the Declaration of Independence was brought forth “out of a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” As the power of public opinion has increased, that respect—that *responsibility*—has become all the more awesome. USIA must lend voice to America’s world influence—and must lend an ear to the words of others—to help place our country in meaningful communication with other people.

Within this wider concept of Agency responsibility, I attach great importance to USIA collaboration with other elements of the nation’s



foreign affairs community, as well as private organizations active abroad. USIA is spokesman overseas for the Department of State; AID; the Peace Corps; the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce; the Atomic Energy Commission; NASA; and other departments and agencies. As spokesman, our Agency cooperates in their programs directed against poverty, hunger, disease, over-population, under-development, and illiteracy. Just as a USIA broadcast or pamphlet refuting a communist distortion about our actions or intentions serves our national interest, so is that interest served by stimulating dialogues between Americans and the peoples of other countries on the great issues of common security and mutual well-being.

When I came to USIA as your sixth director,<sup>4</sup> I found an organization well staffed and deployed for what I regard as one of the most varied, subtle, and trying tasks of the U.S. Government. Years of planning and creative effort by previous directors and by the Agency's senior officers had developed effective patterns of staffing, media production, policy guidance, external relations, and self-evaluation. There was a welcome, unmistakable air of *professionalism* about the organization.

I immediately began my search for *more efficient methods* and *more sharply defined goals*. Innovations were introduced. New products and services were added; out-dated ones were pruned away. To existing procedures I have tried to apply new management criteria, to introduce new technologies. Progress has been made in adapting the Program-Planning-Budget-System to USIA's work.<sup>5</sup> Experiments were undertaken, and are now under way, in computerization, miniaturization, and multimedia use of products.

I tried to reduce paper work, abolish ancient report forms, and simplify our communication *with each other*. You have responded to the challenge to modernize by eliminating 546 forms, by cutting down on our cable traffic, and by making reports readable as reports—rather than as doctoral theses.

As you know, I have never shied away from the word *propaganda*. But I have operated on the premise that *truth* is our best propaganda. While that may seem self-evident, it is well to remind ourselves that there are still many countries which would not dare to adopt such a policy. They have imitated our magazine formats, and they have copied the style of our VOA broadcasts. But they have refused to accept the

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<sup>4</sup> The prior USIA Directors from its inception were: Theodore Cuyler Steibert (1953–1956), Arthur Larson (1956–1957), George Venable Allen (1957–1960), Edward R. Murrow (1961–1964), and Carl T. Rowan (1964–1965).

<sup>5</sup> Regarding the PPBS, see footnote 2, Document 108.

thesis that it is important to *tell it as it is*. When they do, we will all move to a new stage of international togetherness.

I have shared with you the joys of success, but also occasional impatience about what seemed too small an accomplishment in this or that place or fleeting disappointment that, on some occasion, we have not been able to make ourselves fully understood. But I take refuge in the philosophy that “it is better to understand a little than to misunderstand a lot.”

Like you, I have sometimes felt discouraged about the hard fact that there are places where we cannot hope to achieve agreement—where even the creation of a *little* understanding must be attempted in the face of great odds. As Woodrow Wilson pointed out, “Comprehension *must* be the soil in which grow all the fruits of friendship.”<sup>6</sup>

Much has been done but more remains. Our kaleidoscopic world refuses to let us rest on past accomplishments and shoves us forward with changes which we sometimes cannot fathom.

Whether it is electronic music, “put-ons” or “happenings”—we must “get with it.” Words and ideas are our tools and we must use today’s advanced vocabulary and not yesterday’s classic speech. And *we are*—that’s why there never has been a dull period nor is there likely to be.

Above all, I have devoted my energies to nurturing the Agency’s most precious resource: our personnel. From my pre-Agency travels abroad, when I had seen USIA officers in action, I knew the pressures placed upon them in the field. And I knew how they met those pressures, facing skeptical or downright hostile audiences, combatting local prejudice in an effort to win understanding and respect for our country.

And I recognize the valued contributions of our foreign national employees, who provide the continuity and essential experience for our overseas operations.

To the seasoned ranks we have brought in new blood, including numbers of bright young people fresh from college. At the same time, we have not turned our backs on the corps of older, experienced officers. Those who entered USIA from the ranks of many professions in the late 1940’s and 1950’s, with zeal and idealism, remain the backbone of the Agency. New programs of mid-career training update skills and knowledge of contemporary Americana—reinvigorating the contribution of senior officers already rich in media, language, area, and managerial competence.

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<sup>6</sup> Marks is quoting from an address President Wilson delivered before the Southern Commercial Congress in Mobile, Alabama, on October 27, 1913. (“No Conquest, Wilson’s Pledge,” *New York Times*, October 28, 1913, p. 1)

I take special pride in the performance of our field officers, the junior officer trainees, and the management interns. From my experience in professional life, I well know that most of these people could choose other careers—with far higher rewards, both financial and in terms of public recognition.

Good, healthy patriotism draws such men and women to the Agency, and the challenge of the job keeps them there. It has been most gratifying to me to identify the magnetism of this challenge on Agency personnel and performance. I was particularly pleased to see it recognized this year in the Congressional enactment of the Pell-Hays Act, establishing a permanent USIA foreign service corps on the same footing as the foreign service of the Department of State.<sup>7</sup> The commissioning of 592 men and women as the first Foreign Service Information Officers was, for me, an outstanding highlight of my three-year tenure.

Last week, a reporter, interviewing me for a roundup feature story on my USIA years, asked me what I would expect to be the most enduring contribution of my administration. I have thought about that question since and would now answer it: “An advancement of the stature and role of our personnel; greater emphasis on their training, with resulting higher standards of professionalism.” It is trite to say that we are no better than the people we employ; but you, the Agency career people, the civil service and the local staffs everywhere, are the vital resource which must always be nurtured. On your efforts rests the success or failure of our mission.

USIA’s work is the kind of activity whose effectiveness cannot be measured fully, nor does it lend itself to public recognition.

Within the family, however, it is another matter, and that is why this ceremony is so vital to me.

These annual honor awards ceremonies have rightly come to occupy a special place in our scheme of things. They represent *professional* recognition of *professional* accomplishment. The outside observer could not be expected to understand the significance or intrinsic value of our honor awards. But within the family, the importance of the occasion and the reception by one’s colleagues make it very special. And so, I salute those of you who are honored today and congratulate the Agency on your achievements. As we honor you, you honor us by your presence.

I have been spoiled, and I hope my successors will be, by the performance standards of USIA. *Excellence* has become the criterion against which we measure *satisfactory* performance. And this, in my mind, further enhances the significance of the annual honor awards.

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 2, Document 30.

I have said that my greatest concern has been with the Agency's most precious asset—the human resource.

It is difficult to express *how* strongly I have felt about that.

But let me underscore it:

I have delayed my departure from USIA, and postponed the assumption of my new duties, because I wanted to preside at today's honor award ceremonies—and to thank you for the great satisfaction you have given me during the three years I have had the honor to be your Director. And now that chapter ends.

Today is my last day as Director of USIA.

And this will be my last official act.

I thank you for the unstinting cooperation you have given me, and I salute you for what you are doing on behalf of our country.

My thoughts will be with you.

I will miss you more than you will miss me. I will look back upon happy years, exciting experiences, new and lasting friendships; and I will always remember colleagues with whom I shared satisfying achievements, laughter, anger, sadness, excitement, and, sometimes, frustration—but never boredom.

And so, may it always be.

**191. Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 6, 1968

**WORLDWIDE PRIORITY THEMES****AMERICA—1968: THE EXCITEMENT AND  
THE ORDEAL OF RAPID CHANGE**

NOTE: See “Worldwide Priority Themes,” July 30, 1968.<sup>2</sup> This paper relates specifically to themes of *Contemporary America—a Society in Transition*.

In the decade and a half after the second world war, most people around the world came to think of America as a “success story” of incredible economic, scientific, technological, and social progress. Recent headlines about political assassinations, urban violence, racial strife, and student revolt in the U.S., thrown against this background, could not help but baffle our foreign audiences and leave many with the feeling that they had, somehow, been cheated into thinking this country was strong, healthy, progressive, an epitome of success. One concept which may, over time, help us deal with the apparent contradiction is that of rapid change.

While we have occasionally spoken of “permanent revolution,” we have perhaps failed to communicate the measure in which change itself is of the essence of our society—and of our time—and to prepare people abroad for the often painful spectacles that accompany such rapid and fundamental transformations in a large social organism. As we explain

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files 1955–1971: Acc. #74–0044, Entry UD WW 102, Box 2, INF: “America—1968, The Excitement and the Ordeal of Rapid Change.” No classification marking. Ryan sent the paper to all USIA Head Elements under a December 9 covering memorandum, in which he noted that this “theme paper” supplemented a July 30 World Wide Priority Themes paper and that the theme papers are “designed primarily to guide worldwide media output.” USIA sent a copy of the paper to all USIS posts in circular airgram CA-4294, December 10. (National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files; 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 264, Box 313, Master Copies, 1968) In August, the IOP’s CAO Arthur Bardos circulated a draft copy of the paper for comment within the USIA. On August 14 he received replies. IAN’s Deputy Assistant Director David Nalle thought the following theme alluded to in the paper could “more strongly” be emphasized: “That we are engaged in a new kind of ball-game with new and more complex rules, and which demands new orders of skill.” IAS Assistant Direct Wallace Littell stressed to Bardos: “You have addressed yourself to one of the most difficult problem areas that the Agency faces in seeking to achieve its mission of explaining the U.S. as a nation.” (National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files 1955–1971: Acc. #74–0044, Entry UD WW 102, Box 2, INF 1 “America—1968. The Excitement and the Ordeal of Rapid Change”)

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

these processes, we can hope to reconcile the clashing images of America and provide a cushion against the shocks produced by episodes of violence and conflict. As we succeed in conveying something of the excitement of change and in drawing our audiences into the whole complex of our awesome problems and breathtaking opportunities, our experiments and failures, as well as successes, we can enhance their sympathetic understanding and hope that they will come to identify with us and to respect us.

The following major themes are suggested:

1. *Our Strains and Stresses Reflect Change, Not Sickness.*

The statistics of spectacular growth (population, GNP, educational system, agricultural and industrial technology, etc.), following patterns of geometric progression, bear witness to the continuing vitality of America. This growth has been accompanied by profound economic, social, and psychological changes. It has, at the same time, brought into focus many long-unresolved problems and has left in its wake completely new problems as well.

This, the rapid realization of the promise of the Twentieth Century and an awareness of the threat of crisis which it contains, is an experience shared by the United States with many other countries. The United States is in the vanguard, within reach of the promise and therefore perhaps most sharply aware of the threat.

Technology is transforming our economy into a new kind of structure often described as "post-industrial." A new pattern of relationships between government, industry, organized labor, and the educational establishment is evolving. The mechanization of agriculture has accelerated the movement of farm laborers—a great many of them representing minority groups—to urban centers, while higher incomes, city congestion, auto expressways have led middle-class Americans to the suburbs. The economic gap between the skilled, eagerly sought after by ever more automated industries, and the unskilled, for whom there is less and less employment, has widened—the poor becoming relatively, and in some cases absolutely, poorer—although the percentage of the poor in the whole society has continued to diminish.

Our pursuit of economic and technological growth and progress has led us at times to neglect some other, equally important, values and purposes. It has also become evident that our social and political mechanisms and habits have adapted much more slowly than they should have in the face of accelerating population growth, urbanization, technological progress, and productivity. Mass communications, especially television, sharpen the feeling of the poor that they are being left behind. They also make the more affluent feel that the "American dream" is being violated by the existence of poverty, even hunger, in the richest society the world has ever known. The steady progress of

black Americans, as a race, toward legal equality everywhere in the country and, as individuals, to higher positions in business and government, adds just enough expectation to their sense of bitterness to give explosive urgency to their demands for immediate and complete social and economic justice. The relatively undeveloped state of our skills in speeding the processes of social development and the loss of the individual's feeling of participation in the ever-growing, more complex, unwieldy, and impersonal social and economic environment combine to produce a sense of isolation and insecurity on the part of the affluent and the poor alike.

All these developments have necessitated a re-examination of a whole list of ethical and practical assumptions. These had served America well in bringing into the movement of economic progress larger and larger segments of a population coming from a multitude of different cultural backgrounds. Now, however, that we are dealing with the hard core of poverty and underprivilege in a highly sophisticated technological society, we are finding that hard work without skill is no longer enough to keep a family afloat; that free public education has not been flexible enough to cope with the "subculture of poverty"; that the best public housing becomes a slum when inhabited by people without jobs, local political leverage, and social skills; that welfare is not necessarily temporary help on the way to a solution of human problems but often a dead end; that the movement for racial integration may have, in spite of apparent successes, failed to stem the trend toward "two Americas"; that honest courts do not always assure equal justice; and that clean elections do not inevitably result in effective representation of all the people.

These changes and reassessments have led many Americans, especially the young, to question vigorously, sometimes noisily, just about all the premises of Western civilization in general and present-day America in particular. Much as young people do all over the world just now, many young Americans challenge "the system," the ideals of their elders, and their elders' failure to live up to those ideals. They are often intemperate in their rhetoric and unduly reluctant to reject the nihilists and demagogues in their own ranks.

All this makes for painful self-examination, self-criticism, search for new definitions of the national purpose, strain and conflict. It is a time similar to other periods in the past when many old problems came to a head and many people came to feel that they had reached a fork in the road of history. The uneasiness is worldwide today, but it is perhaps more intense in America than elsewhere. We are further along the road of industrial development, "ahead" of the rest of the world not only in technological achievements but in the nature of our problems as well. Our role is to pioneer in finding solutions to these



problems, and it must be in the interest of those who in time will face comparable problems that we find our way.

2. *An Atmosphere of Intense Questioning and Dissent Contains Risks, But Opportunities as Well.*

A tendency to self-examination and the willingness to discard outdated premises have characterized American society from its beginnings. What Churchill called our "genius for self-criticism" has in the past finally always proved to be a source of strength rather than of decay. We have perhaps never, certainly not in a hundred years, probed as deeply or attempted to solve problems as complex as at this moment in our history. The occasion is not one for shame, nor for panic that our social fabric is being "rent apart." We can take some pride in our courage to *take* it apart, our candor in confronting what is wrong with it, and our intent—though not always our success—in experimenting with new solutions. In view of America's record in past crises, we can also show some confidence in our ability to put the fabric together again, in a pattern more in harmony with the demands of our time as well as with our firmly held principles.

One of these principles, the right to free speech and the freedom to dissent, is responsible for many misunderstandings of America abroad; but it is also a most important instrument for the society's adaptation to rapid change. Civil disobedience, though of course never immune to legal sanctions, also has roots in the American tradition and has sometimes contributed to changing society. More often, however, the required adjustments were brought about peacefully, in orderly fashion, within the framework of our social and legal institutions. The electoral process, the courts which continuously re-interpret the fundamental laws, the ever more diverse, burgeoning educational system, the foundations, the churches (most of which have been in the vanguard of progress for many years now), civic groups, voluntary organizations, private enterprise and the trade unions—all these are, by and large, prepared to participate, or to lead, in experiments with new solutions for problems which no society has ever previously encountered, or certainly not on a comparable scale. There is, along with concern, impatience, and frustration, a new spirit of adventure in the land, characterized more by sober resolve than by easy optimism, more by growing self-knowledge than by facile self-confidence.

It may be possible to communicate some of this spirit not only by telling about it but also through the products of contemporary American writers, artists and musicians. Many of our audiences abroad have reason to be interested in our unsolved problems—some of which already face them, others of which soon will. If we place the emphasis on the search for solutions as well as on their achievement, then the failures, setbacks, and backlashes which we are bound to encounter over time will also be more comprehensible to our audiences.



3. *The New Generation of Americans, Raised in and for the New World of Accelerating Change, is Well Equipped to Face the New Problems.*

In no group are the concern with human values, the spirit of questioning, and the predisposition to adventure more alive than among that segment of American youth which has largely been setting the tone on many university campuses. A decade ago, college professors were still complaining about the “silent generation,” apathetic, efficient, and materialistic. Today, the complaint is about hippies and extremists—the relatively few who have proved incapable of dealing constructively with their despair, frustration, or anger. These, however, represent no more than the froth on top of the waves of the much larger number of socially committed, independent and irreverent young people at our universities, radical in their analysis of facts and principles, rigorous in their idealism and their rejection of cant. They feel what young people often felt and what Ralph Waldo Emerson expressed this way: “We are to revise the whole of our social structure, the State, the school, religion, marriage, trade, science, and explore their foundations in our own nature; we are to see that the world not only fitted the former men, but fits us, and to clear ourselves of every usage which has not its roots in our own mind.”<sup>3</sup>

The new generation was raised in this period of rapid change and taught to respond to it. Trained for intellectual excellence, the most gifted members of this generation are, nevertheless, distrustful of reason untempered by feeling and moral direction. These are individualists, enemies of all violence, democrats to the point of rejecting all hierarchy, patriots in their pained sensitivity to every imperfection which they perceive in their country, and as indifferent to material gain as their secure childhood could make them. They are more likely to spend their spare time tutoring underprivileged children than going to football games; more inclined to become public servants than to seek prosperous careers in their specialties; to place higher value on their personal independence than on the accepted marks of success.

Americans, more than most others, have always looked to their children to accomplish the tasks left undone by their own generation. In this instance, having raised the young with as few constraints and preconceived ideas as possible, and given unprecedented numbers of them the opportunity for higher education, some are shocked by the radicalism of the “new breed.” As the shock wears off, the dialogue and the cooperation between the two halves of our people—those under 25 and those over—show signs of becoming more constructive.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the 19th century American essayist and poet. The quotation is from Emerson’s “Man the Reformer” speech delivered before the Mechanic’s Apprentices’ Library Association in Boston on January 25, 1841.

Both share the most fundamental ideals: equality, social justice, patriotism, and a desire for peace in the world. Only, these young people, never having experienced the kind of struggle for survival which their parents knew, feel less special pride in America's past achievements, but rather responsibility for solving the problems of the present and the future. Having never had to fear competition for employment, their insistence on equal rights for less fortunate groups is freer of reservations. More concerned about feelings than about efficiency, they can "relate" to people of other social and cultural backgrounds than their own and communicate with them. Knowing more about the world outside their country and less about wars, which their parents deplored but, somehow, always expected, they are both more naive and less rigid in their ideas on how to achieve lasting peace.

Remarkably free of prejudices, rich in energy and idealism, competent in the new arts of the Twentieth Century, with its new and more complex ways, these young people are equipped to contribute to America's progress and to play a constructive role in the world.

### **Attachment**

#### **Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### *SOME BENCHMARKS OF CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES*

Note: These categories, selected almost at random, are merely illustrations of rapid growth in a few areas of national life. While the figures are based on authoritative sources, they may differ in some measure from other, perhaps equally authoritative, statistical data found elsewhere.

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<sup>4</sup> No classification marking.

	1950	1960	1968 (Est.)	Projection (Year 2000 Unless Otherwise Indicated)
<i>POPULATION</i> <sup>5</sup>	150	180	200	340
Urban	96	125	140	280+
Rural (Farm)	23	13.5	11	—
<i>LABOR FORCE</i> <sup>6</sup>				
<i>Total</i> (Including Armed Forces)	63.9	72.1	82.6	92.2 (1975)
Manufacturing, Mining, Construction	18.5	20.4	23.5	24.5 (1975)
Services, Transporta- tion, Commerce	20.7	25.5	32.2	37.4 (1975)
Agriculture	7.2	5.5	3.9	3.7 (1975)
Government (State & Local)	4.1	6.1	9.5	11.4 (1975)
Government (Federal)	1.9	2.3	2.7	2.7 (1975)
Other: Military, Etc.	11.5	12.3	10.8	12.5 (1975)
<i>GNP (1958\$)</i>	\$355 billion	\$487 billion	\$700 billion	\$1,500–4,000 billion
Per Capita GNP (1958\$)	\$2,342	\$2,700	\$3,500	\$15,000
Family Income (1965\$)				
Over \$10,000 p.a.	7%	18%	27.7% (1966)	
\$7–10,000 p.a.	13%	21%	24.5% (1966)	
\$5–7,000 p.a.	20%	22%	18.4% (1966)	
\$3–5,000 p.a.	30%	19%	14.5% (1966)	
Under \$3,000 p.a.	30%	20%	14.8% (1966)	

<sup>5</sup> In Millions. [Footnote is in the original.]<sup>6</sup> In Millions. [Footnote is in the original.]

	1950	1960	1968 (Est.)	Projection (Year 2000 Unless Otherwise Indicated)
<i>EDUCATION</i>				
<i>People Involved:</i> <sup>7</sup>				
Teachers	1.2	1.8	2.6	2.9 (1975)
University Students	2.3	3.6	6.3	9.1 (1975)
Secondary	6.5	9.6	13.7	16.6 (1975)
Elementary	22.2	32.4	37	35.5 (1975)
<i>Negro Students in Universities</i>	124,000	233,000	283,000	
<i>Total Education Expendi- ture as % of GNP</i>	3.4%	5.4%	6.9%	
<i>RESEARCH</i>				
R & D Expenditure, Public and Private <sup>8</sup>	\$2,800	\$13,700	\$25,000	
R & D Expenditure as % of GNP	1%	2.7%	3%	
USG Funds for R & D <sup>9</sup>	\$973	\$7,546	\$16,733	
Basic	No	610	2,331	
Applied	breakdown	1,331	4,059	
Development	available	5,605	10,343	
<i>Number Of:</i>				
Colleges	1,851	2,008	2,374 (1968 rate of increase: 1 a week)	
Museums & Art Galleries	3,700	4,000	5,600 (1968 rate of increase: 1 every 3 days)	
Symphony Orchestras	839	1,226	1,436	
Regional Theaters	3	9	40	
Computers	5	5,400	50,000	110,000 (1975)

<sup>7</sup> In Millions. [Footnote is in the original.]

<sup>8</sup> In Millions. [Footnote is in the original.]

<sup>9</sup> In Millions. [Footnote is in the original.]

## Appendix A


### Appendix A.1 *Nine From Little Rock*<sup>1</sup>



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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 306, Moving Images Relating to U.S. Domestic and International Activities, 1982–1998, *Nine From Little Rock*, 1964. Produced for the United States Information Agency. Written and directed by Charles E. Guggenheim. Narrated by Jefferson Thomas.

Appendix A.2 *The President and the Press*<sup>1</sup>



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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, RG 306, Film Production Materials Related to the Vice Presidency and Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, 1961–1975, *The President and the Press*, 1964, MP#151. Produced by Quest Productions. Narrated by Edward P. Morgan.

**Appendix A.3** *U.S.A. 1967*<sup>1</sup>



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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, RG 306, Film Production Materials Related to the Vice Presidency and Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, 1961–1975, *U.S.A. 1967*, 1967, MP#171. Produced by the United States Information Agency.