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VOLUME III

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CHINA

Microfiche Supplement

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DEPARTMENT  
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STATE

Washington



# Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

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Volume III

## China

### Microfiche Supplement

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# Preface

This microfiche supplement to *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China*, presents documents concerning the ambassadorial talks between representatives of the United States and the People's Republic of China held in Geneva from August 1955 through December 1957. It includes all the reports and comments on the meetings from Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, the U.S. representative at the talks, instructions sent to him by the Department, related messages exchanged between Geneva and the Department, and a series of official-informal letters between Johnson and the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs. The documents are arranged in chronological order.

Most of the documents are in the Department of State central files, chiefly the 611.93 file, which includes almost all the documentation directly related to the talks. The official-informal letters are in the Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415, which consists of files relating to the ambassadorial talks at Geneva and Warsaw for the years 1955–1968. These files were maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs, which had responsibility for drafting and coordinating the clearance of the Department's instructions to Ambassador Johnson.

A small proportion of the documents presented in this supplement and additional documents relating to the ambassadorial talks, including some from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, Volumes II and III*. The diplomatic exchanges which led to the initiation of the talks are documented in Volume II. Conversations with leaders or diplomatic representatives of other governments concerning the talks are documented in Volume III. The documents included both in Volume III and in the supplement consist primarily of the brief, summary reports that Johnson sent to the Department immediately after each meeting in advance of his detailed reports, which are presented in the supplement.

The documents in the supplement were declassified by the Department of State's Classification/Declassification Center, which reviewed them according to the guidelines and procedures by which it customarily reviews documents selected for publication in the printed volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State and other appropriate agencies of the government. In coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, the Center also conducts communications with

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foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for publication in the series. Documents which were declassified with excisions appear in the supplement with the excised portions indicated by ellipses.

The supplement was prepared in the Office of the Historian under the supervision of General Editor John P. Glennon and David W. Mabon. Harriet D. Schwar selected the documents and prepared the introduction. Rosa D. Pace prepared the list of documents and the list of persons.

**William Z. Slany**  
*The Historian*  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

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# Introduction

Ambassadorial talks between representatives of the United States and the People's Republic of China were held in Geneva from August 1955 through December 1957 and in Warsaw from September 1958 through February 1970. The 73 meetings in Geneva constituted more than half the entire series of 136 meetings, which provided a direct channel of communication between the two countries at a time when they did not have diplomatic relations. The participants in the Geneva discussions were U. Alexis Johnson, United States Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, and Wang Bingnan (Wang Ping-nan), Chinese Ambassador to Poland.

## *Background of the Ambassadorial Talks*

Ambassadors Johnson and Wang represented their respective governments in direct talks held during the Geneva Conference of 1954 concerning U.S. nationals imprisoned in China and U.S. restrictions on certain Chinese nationals in the United States. The 1954 discussions were precursors of the later ambassadorial talks, although they were more limited in scope. These conversations, as well as subsequent meetings on the same subjects between U.S. and Chinese consular representatives at Geneva, are documented in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, Volume XIV, and 1955–1957, Volume II.

U.S. concern with the problem of Americans imprisoned in China increased in November 1954, when a Chinese military tribunal sentenced 13 Americans to prison on charges of espionage. They included 11 Air Force personnel shot down in 1952 while flying a mission for the United Nations Command over North Korea. At the request of the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld visited Beijing in January 1955 in a vain effort to obtain the release of the 11 airmen. They were freed on July 31, 1955, on the eve of the opening of the ambassadorial talks.

The Taiwan Strait crisis, which had been simmering since September 1954, intensified in early 1955 when Beijing increased pressure on the Nationalist-held offshore islands. On January 29, 1955, Congress passed a Joint Resolution (the "Formosa Resolution") authorizing the President to use U.S. forces to protect Taiwan, the Pescadores, and related positions against armed attack. In February, the Nationalists evacuated the northernmost of the disputed offshore islands with U.S. assistance. Nevertheless, tension remained high.

The continuing crisis led to diplomatic efforts to open a channel of communication between Washington and Beijing. Chinese Premier



Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) stated at Bandung on April 23, 1955, that the Chinese Government was willing to “enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East and especially in the Taiwan area.” On July 11, the United States sent a message to Premier Zhou through the British Chargé in Beijing proposing that the consular-level talks in Geneva be raised to the ambassadorial level and enlarged in scope. After further exchanges, the following announcement was released on July 25 in Washington and Beijing:

“As a result of communication between the United States and the People’s Republic of China through the diplomatic channels of the United Kingdom, it has been agreed that the talks held in the last year between consular representatives of both sides at Geneva should be conducted on ambassadorial level in order to aid in settling the matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries and to facilitate further discussions and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between both sides. The first meeting of ambassadorial representatives of both sides will take place on August 1, 1955, at Geneva.”

#### *The Geneva Talks*

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles set forth his general instructions for the ambassadorial talks in a letter of July 29, 1955, to Ambassador Johnson. President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the draft instructions at a meeting with the Ambassador and the Secretary that day. Ambassador Johnson described his recollections of the meeting with the President and of a meeting between himself and Secretary Dulles at which they discussed his instructions in *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984, pp. 238–240). According to Johnson, the Secretary indicated that he should try to keep the talks going as long as possible. Although this instruction is not in the letter, other documents in the supplement refer to it.

Between August 1955 and December 1957, Johnson and Wang held 73 formal meetings. They also met twice on an informal, private basis over dinner in August 1955. The supplement includes Johnson’s reports of these meetings. Because Secretary Dulles took a great interest in the talks, especially in the early stages, and requested detailed reports, Johnson sent a brief summary telegram followed by a long, detailed report after each meeting. As the documents in the supplement show, many of the instructions sent to Johnson bear Dulles’ signature or initials, indicating that he had drafted or approved them.

In the initial stage of the talks, Johnson and Wang negotiated an agreed announcement on the repatriation of civilians which was issued on September 10, 1955. During the next few months, they held extensive

discussions of a possible mutual renunciation of force but did not reach agreement. In mid-1956, the two Ambassadors turned to other topics, including the possible relaxation of trade restrictions, exchange of journalists, or other bilateral contacts, again without reaching agreement. Meanwhile, they continued to discuss the problem of implementation of the agreed announcement.

By 1957, the discussions had become repetitive and unproductive. The frequency of the meetings, initially held two or three times a week but soon cut back to a weekly schedule, was reduced to once a month. In late 1957, the Department decided to shift Johnson to the Embassy in Bangkok and to lower the level of the Geneva talks. The Chinese did not accept the U.S. proposal to continue the discussions at a lower level, and after Johnson and Wang held their last meeting in Geneva in December 1957, the talks lapsed until they were renewed in Warsaw in September 1958.

The ambassadorial talks in Warsaw will be documented in forthcoming volumes and supplements to the *Foreign Relations* series.



# List of Meetings

Number	Date	Number	Date
1	August 1, 1955	26	November 17, 1955
2	August 2, 1955	27	November 23, 1955
3	August 4, 1955	28	December 1, 1955
4	August 8, 1955	29	December 8, 1955
5	August 11, 1955	30	December 15, 1955
6	August 13, 1955	31	December 22, 1955
7	August 16, 1955	32	January 12, 1956
8	August 18, 1955	33	January 19, 1956
9	August 20, 1955	34	January 25, 1956
	August 22, 1955 <sup>1</sup>	35	February 4, 1956
10	August 23, 1955	36	February 9, 1956
11	August 25, 1955	37	February 18, 1956
	August 28, 1955 <sup>1</sup>	38	February 24, 1956
12	August 31, 1955	39	March 1, 1956
13	September 6, 1955	40	March 8, 1956
14	September 10, 1955	41	March 22, 1956
15	September 14, 1955	42	March 29, 1956
16	September 20, 1955	43	April 9, 1956
17	September 23, 1955	44	April 19, 1956
18	September 28, 1955	45	April 26, 1956
19	October 5, 1955	46	May 11, 1956
20	October 8, 1955	47	May 17, 1956
21	October 14, 1955	48	May 24, 1956
22	October 20, 1955	49	May 31, 1956
23	October 27, 1955	50	June 8, 1956
24	November 3, 1955	51	June 21, 1956
25	November 10, 1955	52	June 28, 1956

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<sup>1</sup> Ambassadors Johnson and Wang met privately and informally on August 22 and 28, 1955, with only their interpreters present.

## XII List of Meetings

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Number	Date	Number	Date
53	July 10, 1956	64	January 19, 1957
54	July 26, 1956	65	February 14, 1957
55	August 9, 1956	66	March 14, 1957
56	August 21, 1956	67	May 15, 1957
57	September 7, 1956	68	July 11, 1957
58	September 22, 1956	69	August 8, 1957
59	October 4, 1956	70	September 12, 1957
60	October 18, 1956	71	October 10, 1957
61	November 15, 1956	72	November 14, 1957
62	November 30, 1956	73	December 12, 1957
63	December 13, 1956		

# List of Persons

*Editor's Note* – This list is designed to provide ready reference for identification of persons mentioned frequently in the supplement and on the document list. Identification of the persons on the list is limited to positions and circumstances relating to the ambassadorial talks and is confined to the years 1955–1957. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise indicated. Where no dates are given, the individual held the position throughout the period covered by the supplement. Chinese names are spelled according to contemporary usage.

**Adams, Sherman**, Assistant to the President.

**Barnes, Robert G.**, Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, August 1955–March 1956.

**Bunker, Ellsworth**, President of the American National Red Cross through 1956.

**Chou En-lai**, Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China.

**Clough, Ralph N.**, Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, July 1955–June 1957; adviser to the U.S. representative in the ambassadorial talks, August–September 1955; after June 1957, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.

**Colm, Peter W.**, Intelligence Research Analyst, Office of Intelligence Research, Division of Research for Far East, Department of State; adviser to the U.S. representative in the ambassadorial talks, October–December 1955.

**Dulles, John Foster**, Secretary of State.

**Ekvall, Lieutenant Colonel Robert B.**, U.S. Army, interpreter for the U.S. representative in the ambassadorial talks, August 1955–December 1957.

**Erskine, General Graves B.**, USMC (retired), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations.

**Forman, Douglas N.**, Office of Chinese Affairs from June 1955; adviser to the U.S. representative in the ambassadorial talks, August–November 1955.

**Freers, Edward L.**, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, from July 1956.

**George, Senator Walter F.**, Democratic Senator from Georgia and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to January 1957.

**Gowen, Franklin C.**, Consul General in Geneva and U.S. Representative, International Organizations.

**Hagerty, James C.**, Press Secretary to the President.

**Hill, Robert C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, March 1956–May 1957.

**Hoover, Herbert, Jr.**, Under Secretary of State to February 1957.

**Johnson, U. Alexis**, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia to December 1957; U.S. representative in ambassadorial talks with the People's Republic of China, August 1955–December 1957.

**Koo, V.K. Wellington**, Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States to May 1956.

**Lindbeck, John M.H.**, Public Affairs Officer, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

**Martin, Edwin W.**, Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, to July 1955; National War College, August 1955–July 1956; thereafter, First Secretary at the Embassy in London; adviser to the U.S. representative in the ambassadorial talks, August 1955 and June–December 1957; designated U.S. representative in the ambassadorial talks, December 1957.

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- McConaughy, Walter P.**, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, to May 1957.
- Moorman, Brigadier General P.M.**, U.S. Army Attaché at the Embassy in Paris from September 1955.
- Murphy, Robert D.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
- O'Neill, Con**, British Chargé in the People's Republic of China, June 1956–October 1957.
- Osborn, David L.**, Officer in Charge of Political Affairs, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, March 1955–December 1955; adviser to the U.S. representative in the ambassadorial talks and Consul in Geneva, December 1955–March 1957; thereafter, with the Office of Chinese Affairs.
- Phleger, Herman**, Legal Adviser of the Department of State to April 1957.
- Richards, James P.**, Democratic Representative from South Carolina and Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to January 1957.
- Robertson, Walter S.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
- Sebald, William J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to March 1957.
- Wang Ping-nan**, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to March 1955; thereafter, Ambassador to Poland; representative of the People's Republic of China in ambassadorial talks with the United States from August 1955.

# Notice of Declassification

All the documents in this supplement were declassified by the Classification/Declassification Center of the Department of State, which reviewed them according to the guidelines and procedures by which it customarily reviews documents selected for publication in the printed volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series. These procedures include inspection of pertinent materials by all appropriate agencies of the United States Government. Documents which were declassified with excisions appear in the supplement without the excised material.





# List of Documents

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
1	7/29/55	Letter from Dulles to Johnson	xx/xx
2	7/29/55	Telegram 312 to Geneva	
3	7/31/55	Telegram 227 from Geneva	
4	8/1/55	Telegram 231 from Geneva	
5	8/1/55	Telegram 232 from Geneva	
6	8/1/55	Telegram 238 from Geneva	
7	8/1/55	Telegram 239 from Geneva	
8	8/1/55	Telegram 240 from Geneva	
9	8/1/55	Telegram 330 to Geneva	
10	8/2/55	Telegram 242 from Geneva	
11	8/2/55	Telegram 243 from Geneva	
12	8/2/55	Telegram 244 from Geneva	
13	8/2/55	Telegram 246 from Geneva	
14	8/2/55	Telegram 248 from Geneva	
15	8/2/55	Telegram 249 from Geneva	
16	8/2/55	Telegram 250 from Geneva	
17	8/2/55	Telegram 255 from Geneva	
18	8/2/55	Telegram 341 to Geneva	
19	8/3/55	Telegram 257 from Geneva	
20	8/3/55	Telegram 358 to Geneva	
21	8/3/55	Telegram 359 to Geneva	
22	8/3/55	Telegram 360 to Geneva	
23	8/4/55	Telegram 310 from Geneva	
24	8/4/55	Telegram 314 from Geneva	
25	8/4/55	Telegram 315 from Geneva	
26	8/4/55	Telegram 368 to Geneva	
27	8/4/55	Telegram 373 to Geneva	
28	8/5/55	Telegram 317 from Geneva	
29	8/5/55	Telegram 320 from Geneva	
30	8/5/55	Telegram 321 from Geneva	

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No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
31	8/5/55	Telegram 328 from Geneva	
32	8/5/55	Telegram 384 to Geneva	
33	8/5/85	Telegram 389 to Geneva	
34	8/5/55	Telegram 391 to Geneva	
35	8/6/55	Telegram 333 from Geneva	
36	8/6/55	Telegram 334 from Geneva	
37	8/6/55	Telegram 398 to Geneva	
38	8/6/55	Telegram 399 to Geneva	
39	8/6/55	Telegram 400 to Geneva	
40	8/7/55	Telegram 335 from Geneva	
41	8/8/55	Telegram 345 from Geneva	
42	8/8/55	Telegram 346 from Geneva	
43	8/8/55	Telegram 347 from Geneva	
44	8/8/55	Telegram 354 from Geneva	
45	8/8/55	Telegram 356 from Geneva	
46	8/8/55	Telegram 357 from Geneva	
47	8/8/55	Letter from McConaughy to Johnson	
48	8/9/55	Telegram 362 from Geneva	
49	8/9/55	Telegram 364 from Geneva	
50	8/9/55	Telegram 369 from Geneva	
51	8/9/55	Telegram 428 to Geneva	
52	8/9/55	Telegram 429 to Geneva	
53	8/9/55	Despatch 2 from Geneva Enclosure: Johnson remarks, 8/4/55	
54	8/9/55	Memorandum of Conversation, Koo and Robertson	
55	8/10/55	Telegram 389 from Geneva	
56	8/10/55	Telegram 439 to Geneva	
57	8/10/55	Telegram 440 to Geneva	
58	8/10/55	Telegram 441 to Geneva	
59	8/10/55	Letter 2 from McConaughy to Johnson	
60	8/10/55	Letter from Johnson to McConaughy	
61	8/11/55	Telegram 401 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
62	8/11/55	Telegram 402 from Geneva	
63	8/11/55	Telegram 403 from Geneva	
64	8/11/55	Telegram 412 from Geneva	
65	8/11/55	Telegram 417 from Geneva	
66	8/11/55	Telegram 418 from Geneva	
67	8/11/55	Telegram 466 to Geneva	
68	8/11/55	Letter from Johnson to McConaughy	
69	8/12/55	Telegram 425 from Geneva	
70	8/12/55	Telegram 4 from Geneva	
71	8/12/55	Telegram 428 from Geneva	
72	8/12/55	Telegram 429 from Geneva	
73	8/12/55	Telegram 470 to Geneva	
74	8/12/55	Telegram 478 to Geneva	
75	8/12/55	Letter 3 from Johnson to McConaughy	
76	8/12/55	Letter from McConaughy to Johnson	
77	8/12/55	Telegram 448 from Geneva	
	[8/13/55]		
78	8/13/55	Telegram 452 from Geneva	
79	8/13/55	Telegram 457 from Geneva	
80	8/13/55	Telegram 458 from Geneva	
81	8/13/55	Telegram 492 to Geneva	
82	8/14/55	Telegram 495 to Geneva	
83	8/15/55	Telegram 463 from Geneva	
84	8/15/55	Telegram 464 from Geneva	
85	8/15/55	Telegram 112 from USUN	
86	8/15/55	Telegram 496 to Geneva	
87	8/15/55	Telegram 361 to New Delhi	
88	8/15/55	Letter from McConaughy to Johnson	
89	8/16/55	Telegram 485 from Geneva	
90	8/16/55	Telegram 490 from Geneva	
91	8/16/55	Telegram 499 from Geneva	
92	8/16/55	Telegram 500 from Geneva	
93	8/16/55	Telegram 523 to Geneva	

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No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
94	8/16/55	Telegram 526 to Geneva	
95	8/17/55	Telegram 504 from Geneva	
96	8/17/55	Telegram 516 from Geneva	
97	8/17/55	Telegram 541 to Geneva	
98	8/17/55	Telegram 542 to Geneva	
99	8/17/55	Letter from McConaughy to Johnson	
100	8/18/55	Telegram 520 from Geneva	
101	8/18/55	Telegram 537 from Geneva	
102	8/18/55	Telegram 538 from Geneva	
103	8/18/55	Telegram 540 from Geneva	
104	8/18/55	Telegram 543 from Geneva	
105	8/18/55	Telegram 562 to Geneva	
106	8/19/55	Telegram 545 from Geneva	
107	8/19/55	Telegram 547 from Geneva	
108	8/19/55	Telegram 551 from Geneva	
109	8/19/55	Telegram 569 to Geneva	
110	8/19/55	Telegram 582 to Geneva	
111	8/19/55	Letter 4 from Johnson to McConaughy	
112	8/19/55	Letter 6 from McConaughy to Johnson	
113	8/20/55	Telegram 560 from Geneva	
114	8/20/55	Telegram 563 from Geneva	
115	8/20/55	Telegram 564 from Geneva	
116	8/20/55	Telegram 566 from Geneva	
117	8/21/55	Telegram 598 to Geneva	
118	8/21/55	Telegram 599 to Geneva	
119	8/22/55	Telegram 571 from Geneva	
120	8/22/55	Telegram 602 to Geneva	
121	8/22/55	Telegram 603 to Geneva	
122	8/22/55	Letter 8 from McConaughy to Johnson	
123	8/23/55	Telegram 585 from Geneva	
124	8/23/55	Telegram 586 from Geneva	
125	8/23/55	Telegram 589 from Geneva	
126	8/23/55	Telegram 594 from Geneva	

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127	8/23/55	Telegram 616 to Geneva	
128	8/24/55	Telegram 599 from Geneva	
129	8/24/55	Telegram 607 from Geneva	
130	8/24/55	Telegram 622 to Geneva	
131	8/24/55	Telegram 627 to Geneva	
132	8/24/55	Letter 5 from Johnson to McConaughy	
133	8/25/55	Memorandum from Dulles to Phleger	
134	8/25/55	Telegram 616 from Geneva	
135	8/25/55	Telegram 617 from Geneva	
136	8/25/55	Telegram 623 from Geneva	
137	8/25/55	Telegram 624 from Geneva	
138	8/25/55	Telegram 625 from Geneva	
139	8/25/55	Telegram 92 to USUN	
140	8/25/55	Telegram 633 to Geneva	
141	8/26/55	Telegram 628 from Geneva	
142	8/26/55	Telegram 630 from Geneva	
143	8/26/55	Telegram 631 from Geneva	
144	8/26/55	Memorandum of Conversation, Koo and Sebald	
145	8/26/55	Letter 9 from McConaughy to Johnson	
146	8/29/55	Telegram 642 from Geneva	
147	8/29/55	Telegram 654 to Geneva	
148	8/29/55	Letter 10 from McConaughy to Johnson	
149	8/30/55	Telegram 651 from Geneva	
150	8/30/55	Telegram 658 to Geneva	
151	8/31/55	Telegram 657 from Geneva	
152	8/31/55	Telegram 658 from Geneva	
153	8/31/55	Telegram 659 from Geneva	
154	8/31/55	Telegram 661 from Geneva	
155	8/31/55	Letter 6 from Johnson to McConaughy	
156	9/1/55	Letter from Clough to McConaughy Enclosure: Johnson remarks, 8/31/55	
157	9/2/55	Telegram 677 to Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
158	9/2/55	Telegram 678 to Geneva	
159	9/2/55	Letter 11 from McConaughy to Johnson	
160	9/3/55	Telegram 672 from Geneva	
161	9/3/55	Telegram 682 to Geneva	
162	9/4/55	Telegram 673 from Geneva	
163	9/5/55	Telegram 685 to Geneva	
164	9/6/55	Telegram 678 from Geneva	
165	9/6/55	Telegram 682 from Geneva	
166	9/6/55	Telegram 684 from Geneva	
167	9/6/55	Telegram 687 from Geneva	
168	9/7/55	Telegram 693 to Geneva	
169	9/7/55	Letter 7 from Johnson to McConaughy	
170	9/8/55	Telegram 691 from Geneva	
171	9/8/55	Telegram 694 to Geneva	
172	9/8/55	Telegram 695 to Geneva	
173	9/8/55	Telegram 696 to Geneva	
174	9/8/55	Telegram 555 to New Delhi	
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176	9/9/55	Telegram unnumbered to Hagerty in Denver	
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180	9/10/55	Telegram 709 from Geneva	
181	9/12/55	Telegram 715 from Geneva	
182	9/12/55	Circular Telegram 163	
183	9/12/55	Letter 13 from McConaughy to Johnson	
184	9/13/55	Telegram 713 to Geneva	
185	9/13/55	Telegram 717 to Geneva	
186	9/13/55	Telegram 718 to Geneva	
187	9/14/55	Telegram 722 from Geneva	
188	9/14/55	Telegram 724 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
189	9/14/55	Telegram 725 from Geneva	
190	9/14/55	Telegram 726 from Geneva	
191	9/15/55	Telegram 729 from Geneva	
192	9/15/55	Telegram 732 from Geneva	
193	9/15/55	Telegram 728 to Geneva	
194	9/15/55	Letter 8 from Johnson to McConaughy	
195	9/16/55	Telegram 733 from Geneva	
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197	9/17/55	Telegram 739 from Geneva	
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212	9/21/55	Telegram 753 from Geneva	
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214	9/21/55	Telegram 761 to Geneva	
215	9/21/55	Memorandum of Conversation, George and Robertson	
216	9/21/55	Despatch 5 from Geneva Enclosure: Letter from Wang to Johnson, 9/16/55	
217	9/22/55	Telegram 6 from Geneva	
218	9/22/66	Telegram 764 to Geneva	
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No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
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222	9/22/55	Memorandum of Conversation, Richards and Robertson	
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225	9/23/55	Telegram 768 from Geneva	
226	9/23/55	Telegram 770 from Geneva	
227	9/23/55	Telegram 772 from Geneva	
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229	9/23/55	Telegram 776 to Geneva	
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231	9/23/55	Telegram USITO 51 to Geneva	
232	9/23/55	Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles	
233	9/23/55	Letter 15 from McConaughy to Johnson	
234	9/26/55	Telegram 7 from Geneva	
235	9/26/55	Telegram 777 from Geneva	
236	9/26/55	Telegram 4 from USUN to Geneva (Telegram Dulte 1 from USUN)	
237	9/27/55	Telegram 779 from Geneva	
238	9/27/55	Telegram 780 from Geneva	
239	9/27/55	Telegram 784 from Geneva	
240	9/27/55	Telegram Dulte 3 from USUN	
241	9/27/55	Telegram 789 to Geneva	
242	9/27/55	Telegram 790 to Geneva	
243	9/27/55	Telegram 797 to Geneva	
244	9/27/55	Telegram 798 to Geneva	
245	9/28/55	Telegram 790 from Geneva	
246	9/28/55	Telegram 791 from Geneva	
247	9/28/55	Telegram 793 from Geneva	
248	9/28/55	Telegram 794 from Geneva	
249	9/28/55	Telegram 795 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
250	9/28/55	Telegram 796 from Geneva	
251	9/28/55	Telegram 797 from Geneva	
252	9/28/55	Telegram 798 from Geneva	
253	9/29/55	Letter from Clough to McConaughy	
254	9/30/55	Telegram 86 to Prague	
255	9/30/55	Telegram 809 to Geneva	
256	9/30/55	Letter 16 from McConaughy to Johnson	
257	10/1/55	Telegram 819 to Geneva	
258	10/3/55	Telegram 823 to Geneva	
259	10/3/55	Telegram 824 to Geneva	
260	10/3/55	Letter 17 from McConaughy to Johnson	
261	10/4/55	Telegram 804 from Geneva	
262	10/4/55	Despatch 7 from Geneva Enclosure: Comparison of texts	
263	10/5/55	Telegram 811 from Geneva	
264	10/5/55	Telegram 815 from Geneva	
265	10/5/55	Telegram 817 from Geneva	
266	10/5/55	Telegram 818 from Geneva	
267	10/5/55	Telegram 819 from Geneva	
268	10/6/55	Telegram 834 to Geneva	
269	10/6/55	Telegram 838 to Geneva	
270	10/6/55	Letter 11 from Johnson to McConaughy	
271	10/7/55	Telegram 841 to Geneva	
272	10/7/55	Telegram 847 to Geneva	
273	10/7/55	Telegram 852 to Geneva	
274	10/8/55	Telegram 833 from Geneva	
275	10/8/55	Telegram 835 from Geneva	
276	10/8/55	Telegram 836 from Geneva	
277	10/8/55	Telegram 837 from Geneva	
278	10/10/55	Letter 18 from McConaughy to Johnson	
279	10/11/55	Telegram 865 to Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
280	10/12/55	Telegram 870 to Geneva	
281	10/13/55	Telegram 855 from Geneva	
282	10/13/55	Telegram 856 from Geneva	
283	10/13/55	Letter 12 from Johnson to McConaughy	
284	10/14/55	Telegram 864 from Geneva	
285	10/14/55	Telegram 865 from Geneva	
286	10/14/55	Telegram 867 from Geneva	
287	10/14/55	Telegram 869 from Geneva	
288	10/14/55	Telegram 871 from Geneva	
289	10/14/55	Telegram 872 from Geneva	
290	10/14/55	Telegram 886 to Geneva	
291	10/14/55	Letter 19 from McConaughy to Johnson	
292	10/17/55	Telegram 900 to Geneva	
293	10/17/55	Letter 20 from McConaughy to Johnson	
294	10/18/55	Telegram 914 to Geneva	
295	10/18/55	Telegram 915 to Geneva	
296	10/19/55	Telegram 896 from Geneva	
297	10/19/55	Telegram 931 to Geneva	
298	10/19/55	Telegram 934 to Geneva	
299	10/19/55	Letter 13 from Johnson to McConaughy	
300	10/19/55	Letter from Robertson to Erskine	
301	10/20/55	Telegram 910 from Geneva	
302	10/20/55	Telegram 915 from Geneva	
303	10/20/55	Telegram 921 from Geneva	
304	10/20/55	Telegram 922 from Geneva	
305	10/21/55	Telegram 924 from Geneva	
306	10/21/55	Telegram 966 to Geneva	
307	10/21/55	Letter 14 from Johnson to McConaughy	
308	10/21/55	Letter 21 from McConaughy to Johnson	

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No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
309	10/24/55	Telegram 980 to Geneva	
310	10/24/55	Telegram Tedul 8 to Paris	
311	10/25/55	Telegram 957 from Geneva	
312	10/25/55	Telegram 989 to Geneva	
313	10/25/55	Telegram 996 to Geneva	
314	10/26/55	Telegram 962 from Geneva	
315	10/26/55	Telegram Dulte 12 from Geneva	
316	10/26/55	Telegram 1003 to Geneva	
317	10/26/55	Telegram 1013 to Geneva	
318	10/27/55	Telegram 968 from Geneva	
319	10/27/55	Telegram 970 from Geneva	
320	10/27/55	Telegram 977 from Geneva	
321	10/28/55	Telegram 994 from Geneva	
322	10/28/55	Letter 15 from Johnson to McConaughy	
323	10/29/55	Telegram 999 from Geneva	
324	10/29/55	Telegram 1053 to Geneva	
325	10/29/55	Telegram Tedul 28 to Geneva	
326	10/29/55	Letter 22 from McConaughy to Johnson	
327	10/31/55	Telegram Dulte 34 from Geneva	
328	10/31/55	Telegram 1064 to Geneva	
329	10/31/55	Telegram Tedul 42 to Geneva	
330	11/1/55	Telegram 1027 from Geneva	
331	11/1/55	Telegram to Geneva 1079	
332	11/1/55	Letter 16 from Johnson to McConaughy	
333	11/2/55	Telegram 1033 from Geneva	
334	11/2/55	Telegram 1036 from Geneva	
335	11/2/55	Letter 23 from McConaughy to Johnson	
336	11/3/55	Telegram 1044 from Geneva	
337	11/3/55	Telegram 1048 from Geneva	
338	11/3/55	Telegram 1054 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
339	11/3/55	Telegram 1056 from Geneva	
340	11/4/55	Telegram 1061 from Geneva	
341	11/4/55	Letter 17 from Johnson to McConaughy	
342	11/4/55	Letter from Sebald to Johnson	
343	11/4/55	Letter 24 from Clough to Johnson	
344	11/5/55	Telegram 1136 to Geneva	
345	11/5/55	Telegram 1140 to Geneva	
346	11/7/55	Telegram 161 from Prague	
347	11/7/55	Telegram 2561 to London	
348	11/7/55	Telegram 1143 to Geneva	
349	11/8/55	Telegram 1096 from Geneva	
350	11/8/55	Telegram 1097 from Geneva	
351	11/8/55	Telegram 1099 from Geneva	
352	11/8/55	Telegram 1101 from Geneva	
353	11/8/55	Telegram 1162 to Geneva	
354	11/8/55	Telegram 1162 to Geneva	
355	11/8/55	Letter 25 from McConaughy to Johnson Enclosure: Message from O'Neill, 11/4/55	
356	11/9/55	Telegram 1108 from Geneva	
357	11/9/55	Telegram 1110 from Geneva	
358	11/9/55	Telegram 1183 to Geneva	
359	11/9/55	Letter from Clough to Forman	
360	11/10/55	Telegram 1115 from Geneva	
361	11/10/55	Telegram 1116 from Geneva	
362	11/10/55	Telegram 1122 from Geneva	
363	11/10/55	Telegram 1125 from Geneva	
364	11/10/55	Telegram 1126 from Geneva	
365	11/10/55	Telegram 1132 from Geneva	
366	11/10/55	Telegram 1133 from Geneva	
367	11/10/55	Telegram 1135 from Geneva	
368	11/11/55	Telegram 1140 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
369	11/11/55	Telegram 1141 from Geneva	
370	11/11/55	Letter from Johnson to Sebald	
371	11/12/55	Telegram 1219 to Geneva	
372	11/15/55	Telegram 1247 to Geneva	
373	11/16/55	Telegram 1186 from Geneva	
374	11/17/55	Telegram 1192 from Geneva	
375	11/17/55	Telegram 1197 from Geneva	
376	11/17/55	Telegram 1272 to Geneva	
377	11/18/55	Telegram 1203 from Geneva	
378	11/18/55	Letter 26 from McConaughy to Johnson	
379	11/19/55	Telegram 1281 to Geneva	
380	11/21/55	Telegram 1210 from Geneva	
381	11/21/55	Telegram 1289 to Geneva	
382	11/23/55	Telegram 1212 from Geneva	
383	11/23/55	Telegram 1214 from Geneva	
384	11/23/55	Telegram 1215 from Geneva	
385	11/23/55	Telegram 1216 from Geneva	
386	11/23/55	Letter 18 from Johnson to McConaughy	
387	11/29/55	Telegram 1326 to Geneva	
388	11/29/55	Telegram 1329 to Geneva	
389	11/29/55	Telegram 1330 to Geneva	
390	11/30/55	Circular Airgram 4199	
391	11/30/55	Circular Airgram 4200	
392	11/30/55	Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles Attachments: Chinese draft, 10/27/55; U.S. draft, 11/8/55; Johnson's pro- posed draft	
393	12/1/55	Telegram 1235 from Geneva	
394	12/1/55	Telegram 1240 from Geneva	
395	12/2/55	Telegram 1241 from Geneva	
396	12/2/55	Telegram 1243 from Geneva	

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397	12/2/55	Telegram 1244 from Geneva	
398	12/2/55	Telegram 1339 to Geneva	
399	12/6/55	Telegram 1354 to Geneva	
400	12/7/55	Telegram 1260 from Geneva	
401	12/7/55	Telegram 1355 to Geneva	
402	12/8/55	Telegram 1263 from Geneva	
403	12/8/55	Telegram 1269 from Geneva	
404	12/9/55	Telegram 1270 from Geneva	
405	12/9/55	Telegram 1271 from Geneva	
406	12/9/55	Telegram 1272 from Geneva	
407	12/10/55	Telegram 1372 to Geneva	
408	12/12/55	Telegram 1276 from Geneva	
409	12/12/55	Telegram 1376 to Geneva	
410	12/12/55	Telegram 1377 to Geneva	
411	12/12/55	Telegram 1378 to Geneva	
412	12/12/55	Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles	
413	12/13/55	Telegram 1283 from Geneva	
414	12/14/55	Telegram 1393 to Geneva	
415	12/15/55	Telegram 1286 from Geneva	
416	12/15/55	Telegram 1288 from Geneva	
417	12/15/55	Telegram 1289 from Geneva	
418	12/16/55	Telegram 1294 from Geneva	
419	12/16/55	Telegram 1295 from Geneva	
420	12/16/55	Telegram 1296 from Geneva	
421	12/16/55	Letter 19 from Johnson to McConaughy	
422	12/16/55	Letter 27 from McConaughy to Johnson	
423	12/19/55	Telegram 1300 from Geneva	
424	12/19/55	Telegram 218 from Prague	
425	12/20/55	Telegram 1410 to Geneva	
426	12/22/55	Telegram 1308 from Geneva	
427	12/22/55	Telegram 1311 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
428	12/22/55	Letter 20 from Johnson to McConaughy	
429	12/28/55	Telegram 1320 from Geneva	
430	12/30/55	Telegram 194 to Prague	
431	1/5/56	Telegram 1338 from Geneva	
432	1/9/56	Telegram 1465 to Geneva	
433	1/9/56	Telegram 1466 to Geneva	
434	1/9/56	Telegram 1467 to Geneva	
435	1/9/56	Telegram 1468 to Geneva	
436	1/9/56	Letter 28 from Clough to Johnson	
437	1/11/56	Telegram 1351 from Geneva	
438	1/11/56	Telegram 1353 from Geneva	
439	1/11/56	Telegram 1475 to Geneva	
440	1/11/56	Telegram 1476 to Geneva	
441	1/12/56	Telegram 1362 from Geneva	
442	1/12/56	Telegram 1363 from Geneva	
443	1/12/56	Telegram 1364 from Geneva	
444	1/13/56	Telegram 1365 from Geneva	
445	1/13/56	Telegram 1366 from Geneva	
446	1/13/56	Telegram 1369 from Geneva	
447	1/16/56	Telegram 1496 to Geneva	
448	1/16/56	Airgram 173 to Geneva	
449	1/16/56	Letter 29 from McConaughy to Johnson	
450	1/17/56	Telegram 1387 from Geneva	
451	1/17/56	Telegram 1507 to Geneva	
452	1/17/56	Telegram 1512 to Geneva	
453	1/18/56	Telegram 1388 from Geneva	
454	1/19/56	Telegram 1398 from Geneva	
455	1/19/56	Telegram 1402 from Geneva	
456	1/19/56	Telegram 1403 from Geneva	
457	1/10/56 [1/20/56]	Telegram 1405 from Geneva	
458	1/20/56	Telegram 1524 to Geneva	



No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
459	1/20/56	Letter 21 from Johnson to McConaughy	
460	1/21/56	Telegram 1410 from Geneva	
461	1/23/56	Telegram 1530 to Geneva	
462	1/23/56	Telegram 1531 to Geneva	
463	1/23/56	Telegram 1533 to Geneva	
464	1/24/56	Telegram 1416 from Geneva	
465	1/25/56	Telegram 1419 from Geneva	
466	1/25/56	Telegram 1422 from Geneva	
467	1/26/56	Telegram 1425 from Geneva	
468	1/26/56	Telegram 1426 from Geneva	
469	1/27/56	Telegram 1429 from Geneva	
470	1/27/56	Circular Telegram 500	
471	1/30/56	Telegram 1559 to Geneva	
472	2/1/56	Telegram 1440 from Geneva	
473	2/1/56	Telegram 1568 to Geneva	
474	2/2/56	Telegram 1573 to Geneva	
475	2/4/56	Telegram 1453 from Geneva	
476	2/4/56	Telegram 1454 from Geneva	
477	2/4/56	Telegram 1455 from Geneva	
478	2/4/56	Telegram 3173 from Saigon	
479	2/6/56	Telegram 1457 from Geneva	
480	2/7/56	Telegram 1591 to Geneva	
481	2/8/56	Telegram 1467 from Geneva	
482	2/8/56	Telegram 1592 to Geneva	
483	2/9/56	Telegram 1474 from Geneva	
484	2/9/56	Telegram 1476 from Geneva	
485	2/9/56	Telegram 1479 from Geneva	
486	2/9/56	Memorandum from McConaughy to Robertson	
487	2/13/56	Telegram 1619 to Geneva	
488	2/13/56	Letter 30 from McConaughy to Johnson	
489	2/16/56	Letter from Johnson to McConaughy	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
490	2/17/56	Letter 31 from McConaughy to Johnson	
491	2/17/56	Letter from Lindbeck to Osborn	
492	2/18/56	Telegram 1509 from Geneva	
493	2/18/56	Telegram 1512 from Geneva	
494	2/18/56	Telegram 1513 from Geneva	
495	2/19/56	Letter 22 from Johnson to McConaughy	
496	2/21/56	Telegram 1526 from Geneva	
497	2/21/56	Telegram 1663 to Geneva	
498	2/22/56	Letter 23 from Johnson to McConaughy Enclosures: Comments on draft; draft press release	
499	2/24/56	Telegram 1547 from Geneva	
500	2/24/56	Telegram 1554 from Geneva	
501	2/24/56	Letter 32 from McConaughy to Johnson	
502	2/27/56	Telegram 1558 from Geneva	
503	2/28/56	Telegram 1693 to Geneva	
504	2/28/56	Telegram 1694 to Geneva	
505	2/28/56	Letter 24 from Johnson to McConaughy	
506	2/29/56	Telegram 1695 to Geneva	
507	2/29/56	Telegram 1697 to Geneva	
508	3/1/56	Telegram 1569 from Geneva	
509	3/1/56	Telegram 1571 from Geneva	
510	3/1/56	Telegram 1572 from Geneva	
511	3/1/56	Telegram 1574 from Geneva	
512	3/1/56	Telegram 1577 from Geneva	
513	3/2/56	Telegram 1578 from Geneva	
514	3/2/56	Letter 33 from McConaughy to Johnson	
515	3/3/56	Telegram 1585 from Geneva	
516	3/3/56	Telegram 1586 from Geneva	
517	3/4/56	Telegram 1587 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
518	3/4/56	Telegram Tosec 3 to Karachi	
519	3/5/56	Telegram Tosec 7 to Karachi	
520	3/5/56	Telegram Tosec 10 to Karachi	
521	3/5/56	Telegram 1718 to Geneva	
522	3/7/56	Telegram 1603 from Geneva	
523	3/7/56	Telegram 1730 to Geneva	
524	3/8/56	Telegram 1611 from Geneva	
525	3/8/56	Telegram 1614 from Geneva	
526	3/8/56	Telegram 1615 from Geneva	
527	3/9/56	Telegram 1617 from Geneva	
528	3/9/56	Letter 34 from McConaughy to Johnson	
529	3/11/56	Telegram 1621 from Geneva	
530	3/11/56	Telegram Secto 43 from Colombo	
531	3/11/56	Telegram Tosec 54 to Djakarta	
532	3/12/56	Telegram Tosec 60 to Bangkok	
533	3/12/56	Telegram 1750 to Geneva	
534	3/12/56	Telegram 1751 to Geneva	
535	3/13/56	Telegram 1631 from Geneva	
536	3/13/56	Telegram 4 from Geneva	
537	3/13/56	Telegram 1754 to Geneva	
538	3/15/56	Telegram 2293 to New Delhi	
539	3/15/56	Letter 25 from Johnson to McConaughy	
540	3/16/56	Telegram 1474 from The Hague	
541	3/19/56	Telegram 1769 to Geneva	
542	3/19/56	Telegram 1770 to Geneva	
543	3/19/56	Telegram 1771 to Geneva	
544	3/20/56	Telegram 1652 from Geneva	
545	3/20/56	Telegram 1772 to Geneva	
546	3/20/56	Telegram 1776 to Geneva	
547	3/21/56	Telegram 1658 from Geneva	
548	3/22/56	Telegram 1661 from Geneva	
549	3/22/56	Telegram 1663 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
550	3/22/56	Telegram 1668 from Geneva	
551	3/27/56	Telegram 1804 to Geneva	
552	3/28/56	Telegram 1809 to Geneva	
553	3/28/56	Letter 26 from Johnson to McConaughy	
554	3/29/56	Telegram 1706 from Geneva	
555	3/29/56	Telegram 1707 from Geneva	
556	3/29/56	Telegram 1709 from Geneva	
557	3/29/56	Telegram 1713 from Geneva	
558	4/2/56	Letter 36 from McConaughy to Johnson Enclosures: Memorandum from Hoover to Dulles, 3/21/56; memorandum from Adams to Hoover, 3/19/56	
559	4/3/56	Telegram 1836 to Geneva	
560	4/5/56	Telegram 426 from Prague	
561	4/5/56	Telegram 1841 to Geneva	
562	4/6/56	Memorandum of conversation, Robertson and Koo	
563	4/6/56	Letter 37 from McConaughy to Johnson	
564	4/8/56	Telegram 1735 from Geneva	
565	4/8/56	Telegram 1736 from Geneva	
566	4/8/56	Letter 27 from Johnson to McConaughy	
567	4/8/56	Letter 28 from Johnson to McConaughy	
568	4/9/56	Telegram 1737 from Geneva	
569	4/9/56	Telegram 1742 from Geneva	
570	4/10/56	Telegram 1746 from Geneva	
571	4/10/56	Telegram 1856 to Geneva	
572	4/11/56	Telegram 1860 to Geneva	
573	4/12/56	Telegram 324 to Prague	
574	4/12/56	Telegram 327 to Prague	
575	4/13/56	Telegram 1874 to Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
576	4/13/56	Letter 38 from McConaughy to Johnson	
577	4/16/56	Telegram 1892 to Geneva	
578	4/16/56	Memorandum of Conversation, Hill, Robertson, and Members of Congress	
579	4/18/56	Letter 29 from Johnson to McConaughy	
580	4/19/56	Telegram 1797 from Geneva	
581	4/19/56	Telegram 1799 from Geneva	
582	4/19/56	Telegram 1800 from Geneva	
583	4/20/56	Letter 39 from McConaughy to Johnson	
584	4/24/56	Telegram 1912 to Geneva	
585	4/24/56	Telegram 2617 to New Delhi	
586	4/25/56	Letter 30 from Johnson to McConaughy	
587	4/26/56	Telegram 1818 from Geneva	
588	4/26/56	Telegram 1825 from Geneva	
589	4/27/56	Telegram 1823 from Geneva	
590	4/30/56	Letter 40 from McConaughy to Johnson	
591	5/2/56	Telegram 1943 to Geneva	
592	5/3/56	Telegram 1840 from Geneva	
593	5/3/56	Letter 31 from Johnson to McConaughy	
594	5/4/56	Telegram 1841 from Geneva	
595	5/5/56	Telegram 6 from Geneva	
596	5/7/56	Letter 41 from McConaughy to Johnson	
597	5/8/56	Telegram 41 from Geneva	
598	5/9/56	Telegram 1967 to Geneva	
599	5/10/56	Letter 32 from Johnson to McConaughy	
600	5/11/56	Telegram 1866 from Geneva	
601	5/11/56	Telegram 1870 from Geneva	

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602	5/11/56	Telegram 1871 from Geneva	
603	5/11/56	Telegram 1875 from Geneva	
604	5/11/56	Letter 42 from McConaughy to Johnson	
605	5/14/56	Memorandum from Clough to Robertson	
606	5/14/56	Letter from Osborn to Clough Enclosure: Draft agreed announcement	
607	5/15/56	Telegram 1994 to Geneva	
608	5/16/56	Letter 33 from Johnson to McConaughy	
609	5/17/56	Telegram 1895 from Geneva	
610	5/17/56	Telegram 1902 from Geneva	
611	5/17/56	Telegram 1903 from Geneva	
612	5/21/56	Letter 43 from McConaughy to Johnson	
613	5/22/56	Telegram 2023 to Geneva	
614	5/24/56	Telegram 1925 from Geneva	
615	5/25/56 [5/24/56]	Telegram 1928 from Geneva	
616	5/24/56	Telegram 1929 from Geneva	
617	5/24/56	Telegram 1930 from Geneva	
618	5/25/56	Telegram 1937 from Geneva	
619	5/25/56	Letter 34 from Johnson to McConaughy	
620	5/25/56	Letter 44 from Clough to Johnson	
621	5/26/56	Letter from Osborn to Clough	
622	5/28/56	Letter from Osborn to Clough Enclosure: Draft agreed announcement	
623	5/28/56	Letter from Johnson to McConaughy	
624	5/29/56	Telegram 1949 from Geneva	
625	5/29/56	Telegram 2059 to Geneva	
626	5/29/56	Telegram 2066 to Geneva	
627	5/29/56	Telegram 2067 to Geneva	
628	5/30/56	Telegram 2068 to Geneva	

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629	5/31/56	Telegram 1958 from Geneva	
630	5/31/56	Telegram 1964 from Geneva	
631	5/31/56	Telegram 1965 from Geneva	
632	5/31/56	Telegram 730 to Taipei	
633	5/31/56	Letter from Johnson to McConaughy	
634	6/1/56	Letter from Osborn to Clough Enclosure: Comments	
635	6/1/56	Letter 45 from McConaughy to Johnson	
636	6/4/56	Telegram 1985 from Geneva	
637	6/4/56	Letter 46 from McConaughy to Johnson	
638	6/5/56	Telegram 2090 to Geneva	
639	6/6/56	Telegram 551 from Prague	
640	6/6/56	Telegram 2099 to Geneva	
641	6/6/56	Telegram 2100 to Geneva	
642	6/6/56	Telegram 741 to Taipei	
643	6/6/56	Telegram 2102 to Geneva	
644	6/7/56	Telegram 2008 from Geneva	
645	6/7/56	Telegram 2104 to Geneva	
646	6/7/56	Telegram 2105 to Geneva	
647	6/8/56	Telegram 2009 from Geneva	
648	6/8/56	Telegram 2013 from Geneva	
649	6/8/56	Telegram 2022 from Geneva	
650	6/8/56	Telegram 2023 from Geneva	
651	6/8/56	Letter 37 from Johnson to McConaughy	
652	6/11/56	Telegram 557 from Prague	
653	6/11/56	Telegram 561 from Prague	
654	6/12/56	Telegram 50 from Geneva	
655	6/12/56	Telegram 2033 from Geneva	
656	6/12/56	Telegram 2039 from Geneva	
657	6/12/56	Telegram 389 to Prague	
658	6/13/56	Telegram 53 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
659	6/14/56	Letter from Osborn to Clough Enclosure: List, 6/8/56	
660	6/19/56	Telegram 2183 to Geneva	
661	6/20/56	Telegram 2103 from Geneva	
662	6/20/56	Letter 38 from Johnson to McConaughy	
663	6/21/56	Telegram 2100 from Geneva	
664	6/22/56	Letter 47 from McConaughy to Johnson	
665	6/25/56	Letter 48 from McConaughy to Johnson	
666	6/26/56	Telegram 2217 to Geneva	
667	6/27/56	Telegram 2219 to Geneva	
668	6/28/56	Telegram 2129 from Geneva	
669	6/28/56	Telegram 2135 from Geneva	
670	6/28/56	Letter 39 from Johnson to McConaughy	
671	7/6/56	Telegram 11 to Geneva	
672	7/6/56	Letter 49 from McConaughy to Johnson	
673	7/9/56	Telegram 16 to Geneva	
674	7/9/56	Letter 50 from McConaughy to Johnson	
675	7/10/56	Telegram 20 from Geneva	
676	7/10/56	Telegram 22 from Geneva	
677	7/10/56	Telegram 23 from Geneva	
678	7/11/56	Telegram 25 from Geneva	
679	7/11/56	Letter 40 from Johnson to McConaughy	
680	7/18/56	Memorandum from Colm to McConaughy	
681	7/19/56	Telegram 60 to Geneva	
682	7/20/56	Letter 51 from McConaughy to Johnson	
683	7/23/56	Telegram 70 to Geneva	
684	7/23/56	Telegram 72 to Geneva	



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No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
685	7/26/56	Telegram 71 from Geneva	
686	7/26/56	Telegram 75 from Geneva	
687	7/26/56	Letter 41 from Johnson to McConaughy	
688	7/27/56	Telegram 76 from Geneva	
689	7/31/56	Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles Attachments: Memorandum for the President; draft letter to Johnson	
690	8/1/56	Memorandum of Conversation, Bunker and Robertson Attachment: Letter from Robertson to Bunker, 8/2/56	
691	8/3/56	Letter 52 from McConaughy to Johnson	
692	8/6/56	Telegram 124 to Geneva	
693	8/8/56	Telegram 135 to Geneva	
694	8/9/56	Telegram 129 from Geneva	
695	8/9/56	Telegram 134 from Geneva	
696	8/9/56	Telegram 135 from Geneva	
697	8/9/56	Letter 42 from Johnson to McConaughy	
698	8/13/56	Letter 53 from McConaughy to Johnson	
699	8/17/56	Telegram 176 to Geneva	
700	8/20/56	Letter 43 from Johnson to McConaughy	
701	8/21/56	Telegram 167 from Geneva	
702	8/21/56	Telegram 168 from Geneva	
703	8/21/56	Telegram 172 from Geneva	
704	8/21/56	Telegram 173 from Geneva	
705	8/31/56	Letter 54 from Clough to Johnson	
706	9/5/56	Telegram 248 to Geneva	
707	9/7/56	Telegram 230 from Geneva	
708	9/7/56	Telegram 231 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
709	9/7/56	Telegram 232 from Geneva	
710	9/7/56	Letter 44 from Johnson to McConaughy	
711	9/12/56	Letter from Johnson to McConaughy	
712	9/13/56	Letter 55 from McConaughy to Johnson Enclosure: U.S. Navy Statement	
713	9/17/56	Telegram 300 to Geneva	
714	9/17/56	Telegram 301 to Geneva	
715	9/19/56	Telegram 279 from Geneva	
716	9/21/56	Telegram 295 from Geneva	
717	9/21/56	Telegram 320 to Geneva	
718	9/22/56	Telegram 297 from Geneva	
719	9/22/56	Telegram 301 from Geneva	
720	9/22/56	Telegram 302 from Geneva	
721	9/22/56	Telegram 303 from Geneva	
722	9/22/56	Letter 45 from Johnson to McConaughy	
723	10/1/56	Memorandum from McConaughy to Robertson	
724	10/1/56	Letter 56 from McConaughy to Johnson	
725	10/2/56	Telegram 374 to Geneva	
726	10/4/56	Telegram 359 from Geneva	
727	10/4/56	Telegram 362 from Geneva	
728	10/4/56	Telegram 363 from Geneva	
729	10/4/56	Letter 46 from Johnson to McConaughy	
730	10/12/56	Letter 57 from McConaughy to Johnson	
731	10/16/56	Telegram 440 to Geneva	
732	10/17/56	Telegram 443 to Geneva	
733	10/17/56	Letter 47 from Johnson to McConaughy Enclosure: Draft statement	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
734	10/18/56	Telegram 415 from Geneva	
735	10/18/56	Telegram 416 from Geneva	
736	10/18/56	Telegram 417 from Geneva	
737	10/19/56	Telegram 189 from Prague	
738	10/24/56	Telegram 137 to Prague	
739	10/25/56	Letter from Osborn to McConaughy	
740	10/31/56	Letter 48 from Johnson to McConaughy	
741	11/1/56	Telegram 451 from Geneva	
742	11/1/56	Telegram 453 from Geneva	
743	11/1/56	Telegram 456 from Geneva	
744	11/9/56	Letter 58 from McConaughy to Johnson	
745	11/13/56	Telegram 531 to Geneva	
746	11/13/56	Telegram 532 to Geneva	
747	11/15/56	Telegram 508 from Geneva	
748	11/15/56	Telegram 514 from Geneva	
749	11/15/56	Telegram 515 from Geneva	
750	11/15/56	Letter 49 from Johnson to McConaughy	
751	11/23/56	Letter 59 from McConaughy to Johnson	
752	11/26/56	Telegram 581 to Geneva	
753	11/26/56	Letter 60 from McConaughy to Johnson	
754	11/27/56	Telegram 587 to Geneva	
755	11/28/56	Telegram 562 from Geneva	
756	11/30/56	Telegram 570 from Geneva	
757	11/30/56	Telegram 571 from Geneva	
758	11/30/56	Letter 50 from Johnson to McConaughy	
759	12/7/56	Letter 61 from McConaughy to Johnson	
760	12/10/56	Telegram 638 to Geneva	
761	12/10/56	Telegram 640 to Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
762	12/11/56	Telegram 643 to Geneva	
763	12/12/56	Telegram 597 from Geneva	
764	12/12/56	Telegram 647 to Geneva	
765	12/13/56	Telegram 605 from Geneva	
766	12/13/56	Telegram 611 from Geneva	
767	12/13/56	Letter 51 from Johnson to McConaughy	
768	12/19/56	Letter from Clough to Osborn	
769	12/26/56	Letter from Osborn to Clough	
770	1/4/57	Letter 62 from McConaughy to Johnson	
771	1/7/57	Letter from Johnson to McConaughy	
772	1/14/57	Letter 63 from McConaughy to Johnson	
773	1/15/57	Telegram 736 to Geneva	
774	1/17/57	Telegram 705 from Geneva	
775	1/17/56 [1/17/57]	Letter 52 from Johnson to McConaughy	
776	1/19/57	Telegram 710 from Geneva	
777	1/19/57	Telegram 712 from Geneva	
778	1/19/56 [1/19/57]	Telegram unnumbered from Geneva	
779	1/19/57	Letter 53 from Johnson to McConaughy	
780	1/23/57	Telegram 260 to Prague	
781	1/28/57	Letter from Johnson to McConaughy	
782	1/30/57	Letter from Osborn to Clough	
783	1/30/57	Letter 64 from McConaughy to Johnson	
784	2/6/57	Letter from Johnson to McConaughy	
785	2/11/57	Telegram 815 to Geneva	
786	2/11/57	Letter 65 from McConaughy to Johnson	
787	2/14/57	Telegram 784 from Geneva	
788	2/14/57	Telegram 787 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
789	2/14/56	Letter 54 from Johnson to McConaughy	
	[2/14/57]		
790	2/15/57	Telegram 790 from Geneva	
791	3/8/57	Letter 66 from McConaughy to Johnson	
792	3/11/57	Telegram 895 to Geneva	
793	3/11/57	Letter 67 from Clough to Johnson	
794	3/13/57	Telegram 874 from Geneva	
795	3/13/57	Telegram 899 to Geneva	
796	3/14/57	Telegram 881 from Geneva	
797	3/14/57	Telegram unnumbered from Geneva	
798	3/14/57	Letter 55 from Johnson to McConaughy Attachment: Note from McConaughy to Freers, 3/20/57	
799	3/21/57	Letter from Freers to Johnson	
800	4/5/57	Telegram 487 from Prague	
801	4/8/57	Telegram 491 from Prague	
802	4/17/57	Letter 68 from McConaughy to Johnson	
803	4/24/57	Letter from Johnson to McConaughy	
804	5/10/57	Letter 69 from Clough to Johnson	
805	5/11/57	Telegram 1181 to Geneva	
806	5/14/57	Telegram 1193 to Geneva	
807	5/15/57	Telegram 1166 from Geneva	
808	5/15/57	Telegram unnumbered from Geneva	
809	7/5/57	Letter from Clough to Johnson	
810	7/9/57	Telegram 36 to Geneva	
811	7/11/57	Telegram 30 from Geneva	
812	7/11/57	Telegram 31 from Geneva	
813	7/11/57	Telegram unnumbered from Geneva	
814	7/11/57	Letter 57 from Johnson to Clough	
815	7/12/57	Telegram 37 from Geneva	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
816	7/18/57	Letter 71 from Clough to Johnson Enclosure: Draft press release, 7/11/57	
817	7/26/57	Letter from Johnson to Clough	
818	8/2/57	Letter 72 from Clough to Johnson	
819	8/5/57	Telegram 148 to Geneva	
820	8/8/57	Telegram 138 from Geneva	
821	8/8/57	Despatch unnumbered from Geneva	
822	8/8/57	Letter 58 from Johnson to Clough	
823	8/29/57	Letter from Johnson to Clough	
824	9/6/57	Letter 73 from Clough to Johnson	
825	9/10/57	Telegram 244 to Geneva	
826	9/12/57	Telegram 235 from Geneva	
827	9/12/57	Telegram 240 from Geneva	
828	9/12/57	Letter 59 from Johnson to Clough Enclosures: Copy of Reuters ticker; Chinese draft, 9/12/57	
829	9/17/57	Telegram 145 from Prague	
830	9/27/57	Letter 74 from Clough to Johnson	
831	10/4/57	Letter 75 from Clough to Johnson	
832	10/8/57	Telegram 366 to Geneva	
833	10/8/57	Letter from Clough to Johnson	
834	10/10/57	Telegram 347 from Geneva	
835	10/9/57	Despatch unnumbered from Geneva [10/10/57]	
836	10/9/57	Letter 60 from Johnson to Clough [10/10/57]	
837	11/8/57	Letter 76 from Clough to Johnson	
838	11/12/57	Telegram 497 to Geneva	
839	11/14/57	Telegram 448 from Geneva	
840	11/14/57	Despatch unnumbered from Geneva	
841	11/14/57	Letter 61 from Johnson to Clough	
842	11/19/57	Letter from Martin to Clough	
843	11/21/57	Telegram 182 to Prague	
844	11/22/57	Telegram 316 from Prague	

No.	Date	Document	Fiche/ Frame
845	11/26/57	Letter 77 from Clough to Johnson	
846	12/4/57	Telegram 199 to Prague	
847	12/6/57	Telegram 332 from Prague	
848	12/6/57	Letter from Martin to Clough	
849	12/10/57	Telegram 556 to Geneva	
850	12/10/57	Telegram 557 to Geneva	
851	12/11/57	Telegram 506 from Geneva	
852	12/11/57	Telegram 563 to Geneva	
853	12/12/57	Telegram 510 from Geneva	
854	12/12/57	Unnumbered Despatch from Geneva	
855	12/12/57	Letter 62 from Johnson to Clough Enclosure: Receipt from Martin, 12/12/57	
856	12/12/57	Letter from Johnson to Moorman	
857	12/16/57	Letter from Martin to Clough	
858	12/17/57	Letter from Martin to Clough	
859	12/23/57	Letter 1 from Clough to Martin Enclosure: Draft press release	

# China

## 1. Letter from Dulles to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 29, 1955

My dear Ambassador Johnson:

In your forthcoming talks at Geneva, Switzerland, with a representative of the Chinese Peoples Republic (CPR), you will be guided by the following considerations:

(1) The talks are a continuation of the talks held in the last year between representatives of both sides at Geneva.

(2) Through you and the appropriate representative of the CPR, the talks are now being resumed at the ambassadorial level.

(3) The agreed purpose of your talks is "to aid in settling the matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries and to facilitate further discussion and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between both sides".

(4) You should seek agreement that the talks will be conducted in an atmosphere of privacy and that no other than routine public statements will be made regarding them, except as may be approved by both sides or after prior notification by one side to the other. The approval or notification from our side is to be authorized by the Department of State. In the main, you will discourage publicity about, and exaggeration of, the meeting.

(5) You may in your discretion meet socially with the CPR representative.

(6) It is, of course, understood that the conversations upon which you are to engage do not involve diplomatic recognition.

(7) Since the scope of your talks is "practical matters now at issue between both sides", i.e., the U.S. and the CPR, you will not discuss issues which involve the rights of the Republic of China. If you are in doubt as to the practical application of this instruction, you will seek guidance from the Department of State.

(8) The U.S. is willing to talk about "other practical matters" than the repatriation of civilians because we do not want to have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2955. Confidential. A handwritten notation at the bottom states the letter was handed to Johnson by Barnes on July 31. A stamp on the document indicates it is "a true copy of the signed original."



unnecessary differences with anyone if these differences can be honorably resolved.

(9) Direct talks have been preferred to carrying on discussions through intermediaries. The reason is that there is more apt to be misunderstanding when matters are dealt with through intermediaries; therefore, we believe direct dealings should, in the first instance at least, be tried.

(10) The first agreed purpose of the meeting is already the subject of bilateral talks, i.e., “settling the matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries”. You will seek immediate authorization to U.S. civilians to return to the U.S. You may point out that so long as American civilians are held under restraint on the mainland of China, there is bound to be ill feeling in the U.S. We are not, however, willing to promise political concessions to obtain their release. Only voluntary action by the CPR would really serve to remove the widespread resentment now felt in the U.S. because of the mistreatment by the CPR of U.S. citizens.

(11) You are authorized formally to assure the CPR representative that the U.S. does not impose restraints upon Chinese civilians who desire to return to the Mainland. The U.S. is prepared to authorize some mutually agreeable government through its embassy in the U.S. to assist Chinese students who desire to return to the China mainland and to be a medium for the transmission of funds required for this purpose.

(12) One of the “other practical matters now at issue between both sides” is the prisoners of war who were under the UN Command in Korea, and as to whom an initiative has been taken by the United Nations. The U.S. wishes to reinforce that initiative and you should raise this matter concurrently with the matter of the U.S. civilians. The considerations above (paragraph 10) alluded to in reference to U.S. civilians apply with equal or greater force with respect to the U.S. military, who are deemed covered by the Korean Armistice agreement.

(13) You may, if and as you deem appropriate, mention that if U.S. nationals, civilian and POW’s, now held within China, are released that might facilitate the U.S. voluntarily adopting a less restrictive policy as to U.S. citizens going to the China mainland.

(14) As another of the “practical matters” which you should take up at a later stage of the discussions is the matter of assuring instructions which will prevent a repetition of such incidents as the shooting down of the Cathay Pacific airliner with death and injury to U.S. citizens.

(15) You will also, at whatever times you deem appropriate, emphasize the deep concern of the U.S. in getting assurance that the CPR is prepared to renounce force to achieve its ambitions.

If the CPR representative contends that the use of force in the Formosa area is justifiable because this involves a domestic matter, i.e., the unification of China, you may point out that the fact of a divided China is not basically different from the fact of a divided Korea, Germany, and

Vietnam. It could be argued in each of these cases that unification is purely an internal matter. But in reality resort to force would endanger international peace and security. The same applies to China. The U.S. believes that the principle of non-recourse to force is valid not merely for the U.S. and its allies, but for all.

(16) If the CPR questions the acceptance of the foregoing principle by the U.S. and its allies, you may in response point to the purely defensive character of our arrangements with the Republic of China, particularly exemplified in our 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.

(17) If the CPR has practical matters at issue with the U.S. which they would like to bring up, you are authorized to take note of what the CPR representative has to say in this respect and report to me and await appropriate instructions.

(18) You will seek to arrange your talks with the CPR representative so that you will be able to return from time to time to your regular post at Prague, for I deem it important that the people of Czechoslovakia should not feel that the U.S. is disinterested in their fate, the fact being quite the contrary as the President has personally made clear to you. If you should feel that you cannot adequately discharge your responsibilities as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and at the same time discharge your present special mission, you will promptly inform me.

Sincerely yours,

**John Foster Dulles**

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## **2. Telegram 312 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 29, 1955, 7:01 p.m.

312. Essential Ambassador Johnson have full freedom telegraphic communications with Department and interested posts during forthcoming Chinese discussions. Following procedures will apply:

Telegrams will be numbered in regular consulate series without external designator but carrying internal caption for or from Johnson.

Outgoing telegrams will be signed Gowen. This will not imply or require consulate concurrence nor should any such telegrams receive any distribution within consulate.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2955. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Kreer (SS).

3. **Telegram 227 from Geneva**<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, July 31, 1955, 8 p.m.

227. From Johnson.

Extremely heavy press coverage at my arrival this afternoon. I confined myself entirely to same statement made on departure from Washington.

All press services and many principal correspondents here with more arriving hourly. I am making clear all of them directly and through ConGen press offices no news to be expected from me and doing all possible play down, emphasizing these only talks between two ambassadors. Hope Department will continue do all possible help.

Wang gave press conference this morning and issued statement which I presume available Dept through press services. Chinese are exuding sweetness and light a la Soviets and appear making preparations heavy propaganda play. Anticipate I may have difficulty obtaining Wang's agreement closed nature meetings. However I intend press hard on this if necessary adjourning tomorrow's meeting on this issue.

I have talked Pelt on phone and accepted his suggestion that I visit Palais early tomorrow morning time press not usually around to decide meeting room. He to suggest that Wang be there same time. If Wang only sends rep I will send Clough. Pelt assures me unpretentious small secluded meeting room is available. I have privately emphasized to American press correspondents entire lack any significance Palais meeting place other than only suitable place available and was where Wang and I last met. Plan to seek Wang's agreement to 3 P.M. meeting time and no photographers to be admitted but will not blow latter up into any major issue.

In reply correspondent's questions Chinese have said Wang came directly from Warsaw to Geneva.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–3155. Official Use Only.

**4. Telegram 231 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 1, 1955, 1 p.m.

231. From Johnson.

Clough and Ekvall met with Chinese and Pelt this morning 9 A.M. and agreed on office President Council for meeting room which is same used meetings last year. Chinese suggested and we agreed to 4 P.M. meeting time. Press inquiries have been informed time and place of meeting but question photography still undecided at time this message.

I paid courtesy call on Pelt 10 A.M. this morning and he promised full cooperation guard on meeting room, etc. Chinese have asked him about press briefing room and facilities for issuance of communiques. He replied that if any joint communiques issued he would at request both sides extend facilities but would not (repeat not) act on behalf one side. He made clear Chinese only UN role is renting meeting place.

I reiterated my desire cooperate with Hammarskjold on military personnel. He said Hammarskjold would get in touch with me immediately upon his arrival tomorrow afternoon.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-155. Official Use Only.

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**5. Telegram 232 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 1, 1955, 4 p.m.

232. From Johnson.

Krishna Menon called at 2:30 this afternoon "privately to inform me" that Nehru was informing Cooper that the 11 flyers were to be released very shortly. Menon went great pains make it clear that this due his efforts. Also said will be readily able reach agreement with Wang on civilians on basis someone represent Chinese students in US. Said Wang and Chou had both asked him remain in Geneva and was fishing hard for me make similar request which of course I refused do. Finally said would be glad come back if and when I asked him.

Will report long conversation more fully in subsequent telegram.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.05A241/8-155. Confidential; Priority.

**6. Telegram 238 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 1, 1955, 8 p.m.

238. For Assistant Secretary McCardle From Gowen. Your 310.

Garnish has been made available to Johnson. Garnish reported here only today.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–155. Confidential; No Distribution.

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**7. Telegram 239 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 1, 1955, 7 p.m.

239. From Johnson.

Held first meeting with Chinese 4 PM August 1. After agreed five minutes of photography meeting opened and I asked Wang whether he wished speak first. He accepted offer and read prepared statement gist of which follows:

Chinese People's Government announced July 31st that in accordance Chinese legal procedure eleven Air Force personnel had been freed and left Peiping same day. They due Hong Kong August 4. Wang said his government hopes this action will have favorable effects on present talks. He then quoted from agreed statement both governments of July 25 and added he sincerely hoped talks would continue ease tension between US and China. Expressed conviction that with joint effort it should be possible achieve this highly significant goal. Referring to consular talks held during past year, he declared that although results not entirely satisfactory he was sure I would agree that appreciation should be expressed to consular representatives both sides for their efforts. He said that so long as both sides adopt an attitude of conciliation it should not be difficult reach a solution of return of civilians of both sides.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–155. Official Use Only.

He added that talks should not be confined to above question because number of other issues exist between China and US.

Wang then proposed following agenda:

1. Return of civilians of both sides to their respective countries.
2. Other practical matters at issue between two sides.

Regarding second item he proposed each side might put forth matters they desired discuss so that there might be free exchange of views.

After few words of introduction, I expressed gratification at release of flyers and agreed it would facilitate our discussions. I said agenda proposed appeared in accordance with agreement between our two governments and I had no objection to it. Noting fact neither Wang nor I had brought stenographer I proposed that in interest maintaining maximum informality this practice be continued at future meetings. I also proposed that we do our best conduct these talks in atmosphere of privacy. And that we agreed neither of us will make any public statements or otherwise make available to press any information whatever concerning these talks except in agreement with each other or after prior notification to each other.

Wang declared he welcomed spirit in which I spoke and added that so long as both sides sincerely desire solve problems favorable results could be achieved.

He stated it was advisable at first meeting discuss procedural matters and that he was glad note there was no difference of opinion regarding procedure. Since there was no objection regarding agenda he proposed discussion of first item begin August 2 at 10 A.M.

Regarding question publicity, Wang said he agreed in principle that information should only be released after mutual agreement. He proposed that as first meeting was closely followed by world press and statements would receive attention throughout world each side be free release statement made at today's meeting. At second meeting publicity question should be further discussed. He expressed pleasure at fact that there was no disagreement on agenda and suggested that it also be released to press.

Texts of agreed statement as well as my oral statement to press through Consulate PAO by separate telegram.

Gowen

8. Telegram 240 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 1, 1955, 8 p.m.

240. From Johnson.

Details today's meeting by separate telegram. However clear be release military personnel CHICOMS have spectacularly grabbed propaganda ball. World quickly forgets why these men detained and CHICOMS get credit for magnanimous gesture. Menon's visit to me also well timed. As he was leaving office first telephone reports on release were just coming in and in his own inimitable fashion without saying anything definite managed leave impression with correspondents he somehow responsible and that he discussed matter with me. I have refused to admit to correspondents he even mentioned matter to me.

It also now seems probable CHICOMS are going to move fast and early on civilians as they are playing for big game.

While they today accepted "in principle" my proposal for private character meetings it was not possible for me refuse agree tell press they had told me about release fliers or that we agreed on agenda which was simply repetition July 25 public statement by two governments although their purpose of showing great progress was clear.

I am going to have continuous difficulty on private nature meetings but will fight this to best my ability. For example they may quickly agree whatever proposal I make on representation under my present instructions and then wish make immediate announcement. I will in accordance my instructions of course stall until I can consult Dept on any announcement this kind but they are going do all possible make stalling difficult.

On such matters as their informing me release individual Americans believe I must immediately release information here as they will certainly do so one way or another.

While release fliers enables me maintain position can be no discussion "other practical matters" until CHICOMS agree release all civilians I feel we are very shortly going to be at this point. In addition to points specifically mentioned my instructions I intend take up under this heading 461 military personnel missing from Korean War and still unaccounted for through MAC as well as 11 Navy and Coast Guard personnel missing off Swatow.

However I may shortly be reaching point where I will have to introduce "renunciation of force" by CPR and will desire make very careful presentation this subject. We will prepare draft here for Dept's approval but in meanwhile would welcome any suggestions Dept may have.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–155. Secret.

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**9. Telegram 330 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 1, 1955, 8:30 p.m.

330. For 8 a.m. Delivery to Ambassador Johnson.

Re your telephone report following first meeting, we are keenly aware difficulty your position. We will endeavor to reduce correspondents' pressure on you at Secretary's Press Conference tomorrow. We suggest that you immediately hold backgrounder for American press, at which you would put your mission in perspective and indicate nature, scope and limitations of Geneva talks. You are authorized in your discretion to follow the general line of your instructions, without, of course, identifying anything as comprising your instructions. Naturally you will not divulge anything which would prejudice your bargaining position.

You should vigorously press Wang Ping-nan for explicit understanding that nothing on discussions will be released without mutual agreement. For obvious reasons, caution advised in use trans-Atlantic telephone.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-155. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in substance by McCardle and Dulles.

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**10. Telegram 242 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 2, 1955, 3 p.m.

242. From Johnson.

Appreciate Deptel 330. As at today's meeting Wang went whole way in agreeing my yesterday's proposal for private nature meetings I believe it preferable wait see how he observes agreement before holding backgrounder as it would quickly become known to him I had done so. If there are any leaks out of CHICOMS I will immediately hold backgrounder.

He also agreed to my amplification of proposal at today's meeting that prior notice to each of intent to release information on meetings

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-255. Confidential; Priority.



without agreement other should be reasonable in time, that is without setting any definite period probably something in order of not less than one or two days.

At today's meeting I opened with presentation on American civilians in China. He repeated former CHICOM position and made presentation on Chinese in US along familiar lines but mild in tone and ended with proposal for mutual representation interests they nominating India in US. He gave me list of Americans in China which appears include some names additional to those our lists. Complete report on meeting follows.

Next meeting August 4, 10 A.M.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copies to SSR and FE 11:05 A.M. 8/2/55 CWO/FED.

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## **11. Telegram 243 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 2, 1955, 3 p.m.

243. From Johnson.

Following some additional highlights gleaned from Menon's remarks to me yesterday.

1. CHICOMS expect US concretely respond to gesture of flyer release by relaxing trade embargo, that is bring US trade controls to UN level. (Impossible say what extent this is message from CHICOMS or may only represent Menon's opinion.) US goods going to Chinese through UK, many new US autos Peiping, self-denial on our part quixotic, etc.

2. CHICOMS had previously promised Menon to release 11 flyers and were all prepared to do so but handling release of four had irritated them in spite Menon's warnings to US. What Secretary and President had said at time of release was good but what said subsequently by some had interfered. (I was not very clear to what he was referring by subsequent developments but there was some suggestion that giving public credit to UN was involved.) Protestations ad nauseum by

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–255. Secret.

Menon he had carefully refrained from claiming any credit; important point was only how he and India could quietly help etc.

3. GOI (Menon's) work at Bandung etc. had made possible holding present talks.

4. Cease fire agreement possible on basis evacuation Quemoy and Matsu.

5. CHICOMS anxious for agreement with US but also must consider Chinese "public opinion".

6. Not fair to say CHICOM position is they will fight obtain demands if not successful in obtaining them by negotiation. Also in Chinese eyes question guns 7th Fleet pointing at them. Important point (according Menon) is they willing negotiate and important get negotiations going. (In context he was obviously pointing to Foreign Minister meeting.)

7. CHICOM revolutionary phase now finished and they are no longer "hanging people".

CHICOM different from Soviet Union or satellites. Political parties with views different from commies tolerated and are not just commie stooges. Many former ChiNat officers successful in Chicom Army. CHICOM attitude toward Formosa "very liberal" and (according Menon) not many years until Chiang will be a "Governor General" of Formosa. Chiang entirely discredited on mainland and no serious opposition to commies.

8. Without directly referring travel relatives prisoners Menon raised desire CHICOMS receive American visitors, cultural exchanges etc.

I made no response except where it was possible do so without giving away my hand as I was convinced he was going to run and tell Wang anything I said. However I bore down heavily on renunciation of force by CHICOMS and gave him copy Secretary's July 26 press conference statement with recommendation he carefully read it.

Menon called again this morning to say goodbye. He had seen Wang last night and said Wang was anticipating these talks will not last more than one week if "Americans are sincere". Wang will raise trade embargo and few other matters but does not intend get down much serious business on "other questions". All this to be left for ForMin's meeting. Chinese realize probably cannot take place for some time but want agreement in principle and definite settlement date. Will more fully report this morning's talk in later telegram.

Gowen

12. Telegram 244 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 2, 1955, noon

244. From Johnson.

Second meeting with Chinese held August 2, 10 A.M. I led off with statement on Americans detained in China. I expressed deep concern of American people at continued detention of civilians pointing out many imprisoned over four years and others under house arrest or denied exit permits. I said despite my government's efforts through various channels and direct talks initiated by Wang and me last year and continued at consular level results have not been entirely satisfactory as Wang himself stated yesterday. At least 36 American civilians still detained in China mostly in prison. I emphasized this causes continued deep concern to American people and inevitably heavily influences attitude of American people and government toward Wang's government. I handed Wang list of 36 American civilians. I continued that although gratified at release 11 rpt 11 Air Force personnel I must in all frankness stress that only release of all Americans both civilian and military detained by Wang's government would serve dispel ill feeling existing in US over this issue and bring about atmosphere permitting fruitful discussion other practical matters. I then told Wang I was aware his government's interest in discussing question of some Chinese civilians in US. Said I would be glad hear his views.

Wang replied he had noted my statement, that he would answer some questions raised there this morning and others later. Then proceeded read prepared statement qte status of American nationals from our viewpoint unqte as follows:

American nationals treated like all other aliens in China and accorded protection so long as they respect Chinese law.

If they breach Chinese law treated as law provides.

Wang said his government had been informing US from time to time of status Americans in China and was now rpt now willing advise US once again of status of Americans and measures they intended to take out of special consideration. Classified Americans in four categories:

1. 42 ordinary Americans. This includes those who had applied to leave China and those who had not. Those under this category may apply and leave any time provided they not involved in unfinished

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–255. Confidential. Attached is a message stating that the date of telegram 244, "received as August 2, midnight should be corrected to read August 2, noon."

cases. Chinese Government is now rpt now reviewing cases those who applied and will advise results later.

2. 27 American civilians who have committed crimes. Persons this category always leniently treated considering crimes committed and their behaviour. Those with good behaviour may be granted early release. Out of humanitarian considerations Chinese Government will allow relatives these persons visit them. Chinese Government individually reviewing all cases and will advise later regarding each.

3. 16 American captured personnel of Korean War who refused repatriation. These may leave at any time according own will. Only recently three captured personnel of Korean War have returned US. Persons this category will be granted permits promptly on request and relatives may visit if desire.

4. American military personnel who have committed crimes. Besides 15 such persons already released at different times only two remain. Their crimes made known in past and US Government knows what they are. Relatives these persons will be permitted visit if desire.

At my request Wang handed me lists persons mentioned above. Comment on lists by separate tel.

Wang then took up question Chinese nationals in US. Said great majority these have families on China mainland. For long time due American Government restrictions and practical difficulties these nationals unable freely return home join families. This is pressing question demanding solution, one which Chinese Government always concerned about.

Wang continued both sides had concretely discussed question freedom Chinese nationals including students at Geneva during past year. On four occasions US had informed his government of Chinese leaving US. Of 27 such persons mentioned on first three occasions, six have still not returned to China. On fourth occasion, April 8, 1955, US representative stated 76 Chinese permitted leave but no name list given so impossible verify whether they have returned. There have not been necessary improvements in return of nationals including students from US. Wang said might as well point out that when his side issued exit permits to 27 Americans they always prompt and concrete in informing US.

Wang stated they recently informed that US Immigration Service notified many students they must leave US not later than September sixth and that those failing depart by that date were advised apply for permanent residence under Refugee Relief Act of 1953. Short time limit confronted Chinese with many practical problems. As result many may not be able leave in time and no choice but apply for permanent residence which will increase difficulties their return to mainland.

Wang declared both our governments deeply concerned over fate nationals. On basis mutual conciliation and mutual respect both sides share desire safeguard interest of nationals in other country including right return home. In order that nationals each side who desire return may receive attention Chinese propose:

1. Each side advise other status latter's nationals residing their territory in same way Wang had just done re US nationals in China. Expressed hope name list would include all Chinese nationals in US including students.

2. US revoke all prohibitions and measures preventing departure Chinese including time limit which adds to difficulty their return.

3. US supply Chinese with name list 76 persons granted exit permits as reported April 8, 1955.

4. China and US each entrust third country of own choice take charge affairs of nationals each country, first of all, question their return. Chinese Government proposes India.

Wang expressed hope we would give his proposals due consideration.

I replied I wanted study his proposals carefully and would give him detailed reply later. In meantime however I wanted to state that concern his government regarding Chinese students in US appears largely on misunderstanding of true situation. I said I was authorized formally assure him US imposing no restraints on Chinese civilians in US desiring proceed territory under control his government. I repeated that I could formally and categorically say to him that no Chinese student was being prevented from leaving US. I asked if he knew any Chinese student prevented from departing he let me know and I would have case investigated at once. I expressed hope in such event he would give me as much data as possible on each case just as I had done regarding cases of Americans detained in China.

Wang replied he would carefully study all I had said and reply at later meeting. He then proposed that since discussions had entered concrete stage meetings be held as a rule only every other day unless special reasons demanded more or less frequent meetings. I agreed to this proposal.

Referring to my proposal not to release information to press without prior agreement Wang said he had given matter careful study and agreed in principle. Said if any statement considered necessary by either side agreement should be reached with other or prior notification given. In this way discussions could be completely frank and informal.

I told Wang I pleased he agreed with me that adoption this procedure would contribute to frankness and informality of discussions. I suggested that any prior notification give reasonable time say one or

two days although I did not believe it necessary specify exact limit. Wang concurred in this.

Wang then proposed we inform press we had discussed first item of agenda and that next meeting to be held August 4, 10 A.M. I agreed proposing we say nothing else concerning meeting to which Wang agreed.

I said I presumed Wang would concur that both governments should share equally cost of meeting room. Wang said that was reasonable arrangement and he felt cost unimportant compared with results talks might achieve.

As business concluded and we arose leave I told him Mr. Martin whom he would undoubtedly recall would be joining us at next meeting. He then said in not unpleasant fashion that I would probably recall Mr. Li his interpreter at meetings at Geneva last year. He had been "murdered by agents of Kuomintang bandits" who sabotaged plane on which he flying Bandung. I expressed regret.

Gowen

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### 13. Telegram 246 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 2, 1955, 5 p.m.

246. From Johnson.

Further my conversation with Menon this morning.

He again pushed question relaxation trade restrictions qte or some other such gesture unqte but I received impression this may be somewhat more his own idea than that of CHICOMS and that he may also be pushing it with them. Talked about Wang and I arriving at agreement qte in principle unqte in this, details to be left to lower level officers—possibly Consuls Generals in Moscow, Delhi or London. London would be good as CHICOM Consul General there good man. Geneva poor place as CHICOM Consul General here poor negotiator.

Much talk about importance agreement on ForMin meeting, CHICOM desire eventual formal recognition as qte this will add greatly to their prestige unqte, again talk about coastal islands qte which are held by Nationalists only by virtue US support unqte, my

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-255. Secret.

information situation quite not correct as Nationalists are carrying out raids most recently in July and this obviously difficult situation for CHICOMS etc.

CHICOMS interested in internal development and do not want war. Are making great strides, while still behind India work together much better and with more enthusiasm than Indians and before long will pass India. CHICOMS do not like present great dependence on Soviets and want diversify trade to West including US.

Also much talk about not important whether public knew role he and India had played in release Air Force personnel and other developments; qte he and I unqte and China, US and India knew. That was all that counted. India entirely disinterested this aspect, only interest was in helping where they could and when they were wanted. Fully appreciated domestic political and public opinion problems faced by Secretary and President. However he had been received in US qte much better unqte this last trip than previously.

He was still fishing hard for invitation stay in Geneva while dropping inconsequential tidbits of his conversation yesterday evening with Wang. He was apparently hoping I had since yesterday asked for and obtained authority from Washington to ask him to stay.

Dept fully aware Menon's conversational style and difficulty pinning down his exact meaning. I also deliberately refrained from much questioning as I did not desire get drawn into discussion as he was carefully probing for anything he could carry back to Chinese. However I believe foregoing and previous tels represent substantially accurate account.

I did keep coming back CHICOM renunciation use of force but without any immediately apparent constructive result. I did let him know I was planning request some explanation from CHICOMS for 461 personnel still missing from Korean War as well as 11 Navy and Coast Guard personnel missing off Swatow. I went into some detail regarding our efforts this regard MAC and elsewhere. He suggested some agreement send someone China investigate. I said this was not problem—obviously if any other Americans held in China no investigator was going to find them. Only CHICOMS knew whether any these men alive their hands and question was CHICOM good faith in giving us honest and reasonable answer. In reply my flat question he said he did not believe any were alive in CHICOM hands as he could not see any political advantage to CHICOMS in holding them without letting us know they had them. (I think he is right on this.)

I also gave him fairly detailed account CHICOM treatment our Consulates and Embassy in China during period CHICOM take-over taking line in light customary practice during such periods particularly in China as well as elsewhere CHICOMS qte had refused recognize US unqte rather than other way around and had made it impossible US

pursue any other policy even if it had desired to do so. This seemed to be new information to him.

I have refused say anything to any correspondents on Menon's visits.

Because length have not repeated these tels to Cooper but presume Dept will pass as considered desirable.

**Gowen**

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#### **14. Telegram 248 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 2, 1955, 8 p.m.

248. From Johnson.

Before departure today Menon fed some correspondents story his mission here accomplished in selling both sides India as "intermediary" in exchange nationals, civilian question now settled and talks will be over before end of week with agreement reached on FonMin conference. I have done best deprecate story with few selected correspondents I have been able see but fear it will nevertheless receive considerable play.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-255. Confidential.

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#### **15. Telegram 249 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 2, 1955, 8 p.m.

249. From Johnson.

This morning CHICOM Ambassador Berlin told same source mentioned Mytel 226 that American civilians under arrest in China

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-255. Confidential.



now being collected near Peiping in anticipation early repatriation; that CHICOMS are going propose bilateral agreement with US to renounce use force settlement any “international” questions; CHICOMS willing agree not use force against Formosa if can obtain possession Matsu and Quemoy and US recognizes CHICOM “peaceful claim” to Formosa; CHICOMS will not agree any internationalization Formosa; and Wang is going press me for early FonMin conference preferably September at which all outstanding issues would be discussed. Also last week CHICOMS delivered strong note to Soviets expressing “disapproval” of failure Soviets press Far Eastern matters harder at conference.

CHICOMS very “irked” with Soviets at this.

Gowen

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#### 16. Telegram 250 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 2, 1955, 8 p.m.

250. Some correspondents have learned from CHICOM newspaper sources CHICOMS gave me “lists” at this morning’s meeting and will be carrying stories this effect. I have closely questioned them and appears leak probably occurred before Wang had returned from meeting. Correspondents say CHICOM group including press spokesman thus far scrupulously observing secrecy agreement. I have assured correspondents if CHICOMS do not observe I will give them backgrounder. They seem satisfied if not happy.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–255. Official Use Only.

## 17. Telegram 255 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 2, 1955, 7 p.m.

255. From Johnson.

List of Americans handed me by Wang August 2 headed "name list of all Americans in China". Gives names both English and Chinese and city of residence.

Category (A) totalling 42 names and headed "Ordinary American nationals" includes ten of 13 listed under tab (B) in document "brief biographical sketches of Americans detained in China," dated July 29. List omits Bradshaw, Huizer and Lai Mee Sen. In addition includes Walsh, James Edward; Kelley, William; Henkel, Louis A.; Henkel, Mrs. Louis A.; Erwin, Engst; Hinton, Joan Chase; Hodes, Robert; Hodes, Jane; Hodes, Billy; Hodes, Nancy; Hodes, Peter; Chaidien, Eleanor; Snek, Hinton Bertha; Hinton, Caymelita; Gerlach, Talitha Agnes; Ilo rpt Lo, Ruth Earnshaw; Pu, Lucille Steward; Yap, Marcelia Vance; Shapiro, Sudney; Rittenberg, S.; Winter, Robert; Tannebaum, Gerald; Kemp, Donald Murray; Cheng, Dorothy Fischer; Liu, Bertha Jee; Wu, Elma Keen; Liu, Grace Divine; Lau, Laura Louise; Chandler, Elizabeth Mildred; Su, Sophie; Liang, Chuan-Ling; Wilcox, Vella M. List does not indicate which persons have applied for exit permits.

Category (B) totalling 27 names and headed "American civilians who have committed crimes" includes 23 of 25 listed under tab A-1 referenced document. Omits Downey and Fecteau. Also includes the three listed under tab A-2 and Mrs. Bradshaw.

Category (C) totalling 16 and headed "Former American captured personnel in the Korean War who refused repatriation" contains following names: Adams; Gordon; Dunn; Fortuna; Hawkins; Sullivan; Webb; White; Wilson; Wills; Adams; Skinner; Pate; Rush; Tenneson; Veneris.

Category (D) totalling two and headed "American military personnel who have committed crimes" lists Downey and Fecteau.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-255. Official Use Only.

**18. Telegram 341 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 2, 1955, 4:17 p.m.

341. For Johnson.

1. AFP Taipei reports National Government August 2 made clear “its resolution to withdraw immediately” from UN in event Chinese Communists admitted.

2. Ch'en Ch'eng July 29 announced resignation Sun Li-jen as Chief Military Aide to President Chiang Kai-shek because of “fault of implication in recent case of sedition.” Board headed by Ch'en will investigate case.

3. Communist China and Nepal have signed agreement to establish diplomatic relations. Chinese Communist ambassador New Delhi to be accredited Katmandu, presumably on Nehru's urgings.

4. Registration of foreigners in Hanoi began last week July with DRV showing clear intent harass and annoy. Objection to use of Consular titles by US personnel and many petty objections raised in completion of forms. At week's end attitude shifted to near politeness and forms accepted. Consul unsure whether change indicates real change in behavior toward Westerners, effort to expedite registration with further difficulties postponed until data studied, or calculated alternation between cajolery and admonition.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–255. Secret. Drafted by Jacobson (DRF); cleared in substance in CA.

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**19. Telegram 257 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 3, 1955, 3 p.m.

257. From Johnson.

Had Hammarskjold to dinner last night. He had called on Wang earlier in afternoon to ask him transmit reply to Chou's message informing him release flyers text of which he showed me and which

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–355. Confidential.

Cordier has been requested transmit Lodge. Cordier will also give Lodge copy reply which he also showed me. He interprets Chou's message as encouraging effort keep UN channel open. He is also obviously and understandably still very sensitive on Menon role.

He gave me detailed account all his efforts particularly his conversations with Chou on Downey and Fecteau. This very helpful to me although I do not believe any information was brought out not already known to Department.

I outlined to him present state my negotiations with Wang and consulted with him on my plans for handling question other missing military personnel. Told him my present thinking was when "other practical questions" reached to hand Wang list 461 missing military personnel outlining history list and asking CHICOMS whether any persons listed were in territory under control CHICOMS pressing as necessary for definite answer.

He expressed full approval and requested I inform Secretary that in reply Secretary's message on coordination our efforts he planned take no further action pending outcome my efforts here. At that time he would decide what further action take not only with regard missing American personnel but those of other nationalities.

He will be here until August 8 and I promised keep in touch with him.

Gowen

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## 20. Telegram 358 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 3, 1955, 6:07 p.m.

358. For Ambassador Johnson.

1. Reuters Taipei states Nat Legislative Yuan members August decided cable protest to President Eisenhower against Geneva talks. George Yeh assured legislators US policy toward China unchanged. AP report adds Yeh informed Foreign Affairs Committee China would not recognize any Geneva decision affecting its interests.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-355. Secret. Drafted by Jacobson; cleared in substance in CA and IAD.

2. Recent report on Americans in China, which you may use at your discretion, claims mid-June 1955: (a) Ralph S. Boyd had applied exit visa but without success possibly because Chinese Communists have claims against company; (b) Marcella and Peter Huizer in poor health; Chinese Communist claims against China Portland Cement Co of US \$400,000 unsettled; (c) Dilmus Kanady in jail on espionage charge; (d) octogenarian Robert H. Parker bedridden with heart ailment; (e) Hugh Redmond not heard from since early 1954; reported executed by Shanghai press; and (f) exit of Howard Ricks and wife held up pending settlement of claims against firm.

3. Burmese Prime Minister U Nu in press conference 27th welcomed US CPR talks, endorsed Senator George's suggestion talks at FONMIN level next step. U Nu counseled patience and disregard for prestige considerations. August 1 issue Rangoon daily Nation quotes government sources (Embassy identifies as U Nu's personal secretary U Thant) to effect GUB welcomes Chou En-lai proposal for Pacific pact including US. Article asserts U Nu and Nehru in correspondence to bring about ChiCom-ChiNat talks, hopeful of success. Other sources report U Nu's willingness go Taipei personally if can be arranged in non-official capacity.

Dulles

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## 21. Telegram 359 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 3, 1955, 7:10 p.m.

359. For Johnson.

Reference your list of 36 American civilian detainees handed to Wang. We believe as your talks constitute new stage of discussions regarding Americans detained Communist China you should present Wang with full list all Americans we believe being prevented from leaving mainland including Mrs. Huizer, two Romanoffs and Mrs. Bradshaw. Bishop James Edward Walsh authorized by his Maryknoll Mission superior here to leave.

You should transmit to Wang these four names to supplement your lists of Americans being detained and add note that superiors of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A251/8–355. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by McConaughy and Forman.

Bishop Walsh have now authorized him to leave. If you have definite reason for not submitting this supplementary list, inform Department.

Case of Lai Mee-sen and other Americans of Chinese race under consideration by Department to determine whether your intervention on their behalf at this time might endanger them.

**Dulles**

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## 22. Telegram 360 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 3, 1955, 7:50 p.m.

360. For Johnson. Your 244 section 2 and Deptel 349.

Chicom points one and four obviously require some time for study. As to these two points, the pace should not RPT not be forced. You might suggest they be deferred until after brief recess. This would enable you in your discretion make quick visit your post. In meantime points will be receiving full consideration here.

Point two met by our blanket statement as to non-interference with departure of Chinese which you have been authorized to make and by first sentence second para our 349. Point three met by our telegram 347.

It seems to us that, given full satisfaction we have afforded on points two and three, you are in strong position to press insistently for release forthwith of all Americans. Hope you will be able make Wang feel that next move up to his Government and that only immediate all-inclusive action on US nationals will meet obligation resting on his Government in existing circumstances.

FYI we are considering with top people of Immigration and Naturalization Service certain problems which may arise as to Chinese aliens of various categories resident in US.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-255. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Dulles.

**23. Telegram 310 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 4, 1955, 1 p.m.

310. From Johnson. Highlights third meeting follow:

Handed Wang list five names suggested Deptel 359. Made brief comments their list Americans pointing out inter alia Downey and Fecteau civilians not military (Wang subsequently explained listing Downey and Fecteau referred to nature their “crimes” which military). I then discussed Wang’s 4 proposals of last meeting. Re first said seems go beyond terms reference talks, also involves thousands names. Need further time consider. Re second and third proposals handed Wang list 76 names, reiterated assurance all restrictions lifted on return Chinese to mainland, explained no general deadline for departure students but cases dealt with individually and postponements departure granted for good cause. Re fourth proposal said could not yet give reply. Concluded by contrasting present freedom Chinese in US depart and continued detention 40 odd US citizens China.

After 10 minute recess requested by Wang, he again asked complete list Chinese nationals in US, denying this request exceeded terms reference; welcomed receipt list 76 but expressed dissatisfaction lack of info on all Chinese in US, similar that given us on all Americans China; reiterated familiar contention only US citizens detained China guilty crimes who dealt with by law, therefore no basis US ill feeling. Also made statement on alleged causes “Chinese ill feeling” toward US. Said will examine individual cases Americans and prepared accord lenient treatment. Welcomed US willingness take time consider his fourth proposal.

I replied briefly Wang’s remarks reserving right reply more fully next meeting which I suggested be postponed to August 8. Wang readily agreed, exhibiting no anxiety force pace talks. Wang stressed his compliance our agreement re press, saying Chinese hoped meetings would settle matters under discussion not become propaganda forum. I affirmed our full adherence press agreement.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A251/8–455. Confidential; Priority.

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**24. Telegram 314 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 4, 1955, 5 p.m.

314. From Johnson. Deptel 360.

Fully appreciate Dept's desire not force pace but feel it also important that we avoid giving any impression to CHICOMS or public that we are dragging feet on getting Americans out of China. Press would be quick exploit in face Chou's statement ability readily resolve this problem and rumors started by Menon which have received wide currency that problem would be resolved at latest by end this week. In light these considerations which I have been trying keep in balance I did not consider it desirable at today's meeting to propose recess beyond Monday. By same token I am certain there would be adverse reaction among correspondents here which CHICOMS would be quick exploit if I were to make trip to Prague at this particular stage.

I am convinced that CHICOMS do not seriously expect obtain point one Wang's August 2 proposal and should not be led to belief there is any possibility success although they will continue using it to strengthen their case for point 4. I had therefore planned at today's meeting flatly to turn it down as outside agreed scope talks. In order not give them too much encouragement on this point and carry out instructions Deptel 360 I did say while not in position reply it seemed to be outside scope our discussion.

I am satisfied something in field of point four of Wang's proposal is Chou's minimum price for release remaining Americans. Under best circumstances I do not now feel any mass release is to be expected and fear most difficulty will be encountered over Downey and Fecteau with difficulties also over those being denied exit permits pending settlement financial "claims".

I feel we are not going to get them move very far on Americans until we give them some indication on point four. On other hand I have feared that if we agreed on something along lines point four their tactic would be to attempt to claim that question of civilians now resolved at our level and "details" should be left to representing countries.

Therefore tactic which I had planned prior to receipt Deptel 360 was to put forward in informal conversational style a representation proposal in strict accordance with my instructions as something I was willing recommend my government's consideration but didn't feel I could do so until they had come further on Americans in China. My

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-455. Secret.



hope was that without necessarily freezing on any particular position or bargaining point four for Americans I could get myself in position to keep representation cheese dangling in front of them in return for performance on Americans while also avoiding danger their claiming settlement civilians accomplished when agreement reached on representation.

I continue feel this is best tactic and should be carried out at Monday's meeting although in view passage time would now present in form of something tentatively being considered by my government.

Gowen

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Waddell (FE) 3.30 pm 8/4/55 CWO/FED

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## 25. Telegram 315 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 4, 1955, 7 p.m.

315. From Johnson.

At third meeting 10 a.m. August 4 I handed Wang supplementary list 5 Americans as instructed Deptel 359 describing them as persons we had "some reason" to believe were being prevented from leaving China. With respect to list of 36 previously given Wang I had indicated we had firm knowledge all these people desired leave China.

I next pointed out Wang had listed Gordon, Joyce and Hyde as "persons who had committed crimes". Noting Chinese representative had told ConGen last June they were not in prison but being investigated I inquired whether they now in prison.

I said we understood Mrs. Bradshaw released from prison and asked why she was listed under category (B) Wang's list. I also pointed out Downey and Fecteau, whom Wang had listed as military personnel were actually civilians and should have been listed among imprisoned civilians.

Referring to Wang's first proposal previous meeting I stated it appears go beyond terms of reference envisioned by two governments when talks agreed upon. Reminded him talks were to consider "repatriation civilians who desire return their respective countries". Pointed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A251/8–455. Confidential.

out also Chinese nationals in US number thousands and added US Government required further time to consider.

I then referred to Wang's second and third proposals and handed him list of 76 Chinese students. I told him his reference to "exit permit" in connection with 76 students was inaccurate since no exit permit required of aliens desiring depart US. I then carefully summarized in some details US immigration procedure, emphasizing absence exit permit system and explaining that US Government neither preventing Chinese from leaving nor unreasonably forcing them to leave.

I informed Wang I not in position reply regarding fourth proposal which required further careful study. I added that as I already pointed out as result of rescinding by US Government all preventive departure orders previously issued against Chinese civilians there was not to best of my government's knowledge any Chinese civilian in US whose departure for China was being prevented. However I continued "we both know of the American civilians in your country whose departure is being prevented by reason of their imprisonment or otherwise". I said I was therefore awaiting the specific information regarding measures which Wang had said at last meeting his government intended take with respect Americans.

I then asked Wang for names of 6 Chinese he referred to last meeting as not having returned China, saying I would have their cases investigated.

At this point Chinese requested 10 minutes recess.

Wang commenced stating he wished clarify a few points. Regarding classification Americans on his list, said Gordon, Hyde and Joyce had committed crimes but not now in prison. Said Mrs. Bradshaw had been in prison but now out on bail. Regarding Downey and Fecteau said their crimes already publicly made known and unnecessary go into here.

I interjected that my question referred not to crimes but to their classification as civilians. Wang replied they "classified according character of their crimes which were military in nature and not according their personal status".

Wang then handed me 6 Chinese names I had requested which I said we would investigate. Names by separate tel.

Wang then said I had stated his first proposal beyond scope item one of agenda. Since this item dealt with return civilians both sides it entitled US to request complete list Americans in China, similarly entitled Wang request complete list Chinese in US. He was glad know US Government willing take further time consider this proposal.

Problem now facing us Wang continued is problem return civilians both sides to respective countries. Both sides should make same arrangements in order arrive at reasonable settlement. Regarding Americans in China he had already submitted complete list including

place residence as well as classification of individual. Requested US side respond this action by providing complete list Chinese nationals in US, including students whose families on Chinese mainland, and giving whereabouts each individual.

Wang said persons on list of 36 given him August 2 all included in list American nationals in China he had provided, including those guilty and not guilty of crimes. Those guilty must be treated under Chinese law just as Chinese nationals residing US should be subject US law. He had already made clear position Chinese Government regarding treatment Americans in China and told me he would inform me later results of review of cases.

Wang went on to say at August 2 meeting I had demanded complete release all Americans in China. This not compatible with factual situation and his side could not comply. There was no question concerning release those Americans in China who never committed crime. Those found guilty of crimes must be treated under Chinese legal procedure. Their cases not simply matter of releasing or not releasing. As he had indicated his government would take lenient measures toward these. His government would individually review each case and advise results later.

I broke in to inquire if he could estimate how long it might take make this review. Wang replied noncommittally that it would depend on time required by responsible authorities to make review.

Wang then declared reading from prepared statement he would like to make a few remarks on ill feeling American people toward China. Detailed account of status Americans in China as well as of policy his govt was given me at last meeting. If this could have been made known to American people in its entirety ill feeling never would have arisen. Regarding handful of Americans who violated Chinese law, every sovereign country is entitled take action against such persons. Out of humanitarian considerations, Chinese Government willing give lenient consideration cases by further review and also willing that relatives visit prisoners. This all the more proves that treatment given Americans by his govt is "fair and friendly".

He considered "alleged ill feeling of Americans" intimidated by me "devoid of factual basis". On other hand things causing ill feeling among Chinese people toward American Government beyond enumeration. Take subject Chinese nationals, particularly return Chinese students, without mentioning other remote subjects. Chinese people very dissatisfied. It is violation humanitarian principles for government prevent by government order innocent person return home for inter-course and reunion with family. Might as well cite an incident which greatly irritated Chinese people. More than 14,000 personnel of Chinese

People's Volunteers in Korea were not permitted listen to explanations but forcibly removed to Taiwan to become "cannon fodder for Chiang Kai-shek brigands". Their families on mainland unable effect their return. Wang said he had heard both Martin and I were in Korea at time Korean armistice and knew this case well therefore unnecessary say more. He did want to add that this is still pending case which enrages Chinese people. He could mention others similar character. However, considering atmosphere present talks perhaps not necessary enumerate more. It was only because I had mentioned alleged ill feeling in US he thought it might be useful explain how Chinese people feel toward US Government.

Wang then started reading from another long prepared statement which opened by stating I had made repeated references to Chinese students in US and had said that US Govt had never exercised any restraint on them.

I interrupted to state that was not what I had said. This morning I had again said that there had been restraints against some few Chinese students but that these had been removed and forcefully reiterated my previous statement no Chinese being prevented depart.

Wang completely nonplussed at this point and fumbled through prepared statement seeking a reply. Only after full four or five minutes was he able continue.

Changing his approach Wang declared he welcomed statement by me that restraints on Chinese rescinded. However this statement only very "general" to effect Chinese not restrained from returning their country. In the first place, US Govt failed provide complete list including names and addresses so it impossible check which actually desired return. It was not only impossible Chinese Govt communicate these people but also impossible families communicate with them and transmit funds. Secretary Dulles in press conference August 2 admitted he could not answer question whether Chinese have financial difficulties and could not pay their travel. This is sharp contrast with Premier Chou's statement regarding American nationals July 30. "Our nationals in US are confronted by great difficulties". Consequently appropriate solution of return civilians both sides must be sought which beneficial both parties not one unilaterally. Otherwise apparently "unfair" solution would not be understood by people of world and Chinese people could not accept. It precisely for this reason that he had proposed China and US each name third country to handle affairs of nationals of each in territory of other, in first place, return of nationals to respective countries: Wang welcomed statement that US willing take further time consider this proposition. Also expressed appreciation receipt list 76 students.

I replied expressing regret Wang felt it necessary discuss matters outside terms of reference this meeting. Said I spoke to him of ill feeling people in US, as I knew it, arising from issue we now discussing. I added I did not intend engage in controversy, just wanted frankly explain to him factual situation.

Referring to Wang's remark that my statement on freedom Chinese depart as being "general", I said if general it was because it was broad, categorical and without exception. I said I was unclear what Wang meant by an unfair solution. I said there had been restraints on some Chinese and these no longer exist. Told him again if he knew of exception would be glad investigate. Also pointed out all Chinese in US have complete freedom communicate, nothing prevents their writing parents in China or communicating any way they desire. I informed him that for long period US Govt had directly aided Chinese in US to pay travel to mainland China. Where students did not have money US Govt has helped by paying all or part of travel expenses. From April 1, 1949 to June 30, 1951 637 students assisted by US Govt to go mainland China via Hong Kong. From July 1, 1951 to December 31, 1954 figure was 109. From January 1, 1955 to June 30, 1955; total 767. I emphasized this not total of those returning mainland China, just those given financial assistance by US Government.

I dwelt on strong contrast present time between situation Chinese in US and Americans in China and found it hard to understand why he described it as unfair to China. As I had said previously, no Chinese to best knowledge my government being prevented departing. Whatever reasons may be this contrasts considerably with situation in China of those Americans on list given Wang. Added I hoped Wang accepted these remarks in spirit in which given.

Wang replied on their part they respect present talks with all sincerity. They willing settle questions. That is why he did not want make any statement irritating to American people nor hear any statement which would irritate Chinese people. He did not want to bring up old debates at conference table. He had thought it useful make few remarks referring to ill feeling of American people. Also glad to note I not desirous any more debate this subject. This also our desire Wang said. He concluded that he would make few comments on Chinese students in US at next meeting.

I then proposed since we both had work to do to make next meeting more fruitful that we postpone our sessions until Monday at 10 a.m. Regarding press, I suggested following press agreement and that concerning day's meeting we give only subject discussed and time next

meeting. Wang agreed adding “we keep our part. If we agree to say two sentences we never say two and a half”.

I said to Wang he no doubt as disturbed as I at some of press stories which we both knew to be inaccurate and which could not have come from either of us. I added we could only surmise what source was. Wang announced “we are always faithful in keeping agreements. We are working to settle questions not making propaganda”.

**Gowen**

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## **26. Telegram 368 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 4, 1955, 5:14 p.m.

368. For Ambassador Johnson.

Preliminary G-2 study August 2 estimates Chinese Communists have present capability utilizing air superiority over Nationalists in Taiwan Straits to: (1) participate in joint operations to seize and hold offshore islands; and (2) destroying Nationalist Air Force in all-out air war in which US did not intervene. G-2 further estimates when present airfield construction and stockpiling completed Communists will have capability—unless US intervenes—of: (1) denying effective Nationalist air reconnaissance of the mainland; (2) protecting coastal shipping; (3) establishing practical control air space over Taiwan Straits thereby rendering Nationalist occupation offshore islands untenable; and (4) subjecting Taiwan to prolonged air siege.

G-2 study not coordinated with other intelligence agencies, except informally with Air Force at working level.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-455. Secret; Special Handling Required—No Distribution to Foreign Nationals. Drafted by Colm; cleared in substance by Moore (G-2) and Forman.

**27. Telegram 373 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 4, 1955

373. For Johnson.

Reference Downey and Fecteau cases, it would appear the Chicoms have given us useful talking point by their own official reference to eleven POWs as QTE US spies UNQTE (NCNA despatch of August 4). By giving eleven fliers same appellation they apply to Downey and Fecteau, they themselves have destroyed any basis for differential treatment. This would appear to give you excellent opening for hammering home the point that Downey and Fecteau cases should be disposed of on precisely same basis as others which Communists themselves have bracketed in same category.

Give Department your reaction to this line of argumentation in time for further consideration here before your next meeting.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-455. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of transmission is illegible.

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**28. Telegram 317 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 5, 1955, 11 a.m.

317. From Johnson.

Would appreciate Department's guidance on what form it envisages for conclusion and announcement any understanding that may be reached on representation interests nationals with CHICOMS. It appears to me that form of agreed public statement issued here by Wang and myself would be most natural one and one which CHICOMS will expect. It would also seem from our standpoint preferable to possible alternative of Peking-Washington statement.

I believe any such statement should include CHICOM action with respect Americans and CHICOMS will desire include something on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-555. Confidential.

students. Such a statement would thus in effect become final statement on conclusion discussions of return civilians. Thus it would also be useful negotiating device by enabling us maintain position CHICOMS must take acceptable action on Americans before understanding on representation can be consummated.

Gowen

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**29. Telegram 320 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 5, 1955, 4 p.m.

320. From Johnson. Bonn's 413 to Dept repeated Geneva 38.

FYI. Have seen Feine several times and as last year have confidentially given him general information on talks on civilians on basis German interest German civilians in China. When discussion "other practical problems" reached hope arrangements such Germans will receive all info thru Dept and Bonn.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-555. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn as telegram 46.

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**30. Telegram 321 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 5, 1955, 11 a.m.

321. From Johnson. Deptel 373.

Presume Deptel 373 crossed my reports on yesterday's meeting containing my exchanges with Wang on Downey and Fecteau.

It will be seen I carried out my original plan of trying avoid highlight Downey and Fecteau but keep them grouped with civilians making clear we expected same treatment as for other civilians many of whom

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-555. Secret.



are also called "US spies". This also has advantage of enabling me maintain discussion Downey and Fecteau under agenda item one. As will be seen from yesterday's meeting Wang did not contest my claim they were civilians but his ambiguous answer and separate classification lead me believe these are probably going to be the most difficult cases. However do not believe productive for time being take any further initiative with regard to them but await developments from CHINCOM side. Am trying avoid being drawn into futile arguments on merits individual cases. It is however probable specific discussion of Downey and Fecteau eventually will be necessary and CHICOMS will maintain previous position each "criminal case" decided on merits accordance law and Downey and Fecteau simply more serious than others and therefore "take more time". Should be noted CHICOMS very careful maintain legalistic position on Air Force personnel (as well as all previous cases) and may be expected do so on all remaining cases. In general my position has always been that I am not interested in what legalistic mumbo jumbo they desire use as face saving device but only in fact of release.

If and when specific discussion Downey and Fecteau required I will certainly include argumentation on discrepancy of treatment with Air Force personnel accused of same offenses but in view forgoing do not now believe line that release Air Force personnel destroyed basis for differential treatment would be useful or persuasive.

**Gowen**

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### **31. Telegram 328 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 5, 1955, 6 p.m.

328. From Johnson.

Believe public statement along following lines would be very helpful in handling press situation here and counteracting possible adverse effect on negotiations of numerous erroneous press reports many of which originating American press services.

"In order to correct misunderstandings which may exist concerning the present talks, it has been agreed to release the following information about the discussion to date:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–555. Official Use Only.

With the exception of Ambassador Wang's opening statement announcing the release of the eleven Air Force personnel, the talks so far have been confined to the matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries. The two ambassadors have exchanged views on various aspects of this matter.

The ambassadors desire to point out that the subject is complicated and that it would not facilitate the course of the negotiations if all details concerning them were made public at this time. Both ambassadors have agreed, in the interest of seriously seeking solutions to the questions which they have been empowered to discuss, to refrain from making any public statement concerning the developments at each meeting, except by mutual agreement or prior notification by one to the other."

Garnish concurs.

If Dept concurs I will attempt obtain Wang's agreement Monday's meeting.

Gowen

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### 32. Telegram 384 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 5, 1955, 5:46 p.m.

384. For Ambassador Johnson.

Department (OIR) has noted indications, including rumors reported by Congen Geneva and by press reportedly originating with Chicom diplomats, that Chicoms may be preparing basis for agreement to renounce use of force. Chicoms have probably concluded from US statements that US may seek such agreement; may possibly be preparing for propaganda advantage by initiating proposal at Geneva or as agenda item for proposed Foreign Ministers conference.

Chicoms could enter into such agreement without altering present propaganda position by limiting renunciation to international matters, thus excluding the quote domestic unquote issue of quote liberation of Taiwan unquote. Note that other unresolved issues in Asia—Vietnam, Laos, and Korea—likewise classed by Communists as domestic issues.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-555. Secret. Drafted by Colm; cleared in IAD and in substance in CA.

Alternatively Chicoms might go so far as to renounce use of force specifically against Taiwan, on condition of major US concessions to Chicom demands. Note Chou En-lai statement July 30, echoing earlier statements: quote conditions permitting, the Chinese people are ready to seek the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means unquote. Conditions Chicoms would demand almost certainly include US military withdrawal from Taiwan straits area and abandonment of Chiang K'ai-shek government. Chicoms would then presumably expect gain eventual control of Taiwan by subversion.

Renunciation proposal might take form of bilateral statement similar to quote five principles unquote statements entered into by Chicoms and Soviets with neutralist countries, or might be placed in context of quote collective pact of peace unquote proposed by Chou En-lai to replace present quote antagonistic military blocs unquote in Asia, i.e. the Manila Pact and bilateral alliances. Such proposals would be in line with current Chicom domestic propaganda that Chicom domestic program requires quote peaceful international environment unquote (Chou En-lai July 30) and that in course of prolonged period of peace, Communist China will quote surpass the so-called capitalist advanced countries unquote (Lo Lung-chi to People's Congress July 26).

Dulles

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### 33. Telegram 389 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 5, 1955

389. For Johnson.

Do you have text June 3 statement Immigration Commissioner J.M. Swing? If not we will telegraph text since it may be of use at next meeting.

Dulles

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–555. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of transmission is illegible.

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**34. Telegram 391 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 5, 1955

391. For Johnson.

1. Department concurs in general approach you have proposed for fourth meeting Aug 8 and commends your clear analysis existing situation and your resourcefulness in devising tactics to meet it.

2. U.S. has already met Chinese Communists on points two and three. With respect to point one we have already advised as to status of Chinese nationals, which is that they are free to depart if they wish.

3. U.S. will not supply a name list of all Chinese nationals in U.S. For your discretionary use (a) this could not be done without subjecting many who hold allegiance to Republic of China and their relatives in China to harassment, (b) it is not our policy to give any other government a list of all of their nationals in U.S. and (c) we recognize Republic of China as government of China.

4. Whenever CPR takes the same position with respect to U.S. nationals in China that the U.S. has taken, namely, that they are free to return and will be given exit visas on request, U.S. will take further step of authorizing Indian Embassy in U.S. to facilitate travel of Chinese here who desire to return to mainland and to transmit funds for this purpose. Indian Embassy may publicly make known that it is prepared to facilitate travel to mainland of any Chinese nationals who desire to return.

5. U.S. would expect on its side to avail of the services of U.K. in Communist China to facilitate return of U.S. citizens who desire to return.

6. Dept prefers that agreement if reached on return of civilians be announced by you and by Wang in Geneva. Announcement should be identic. Announcement in Washington and Peiping would not RPT not be considered desirable. Dept will be prepared to give you advice on wording of statement when agreement is in prospect.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles; cleared by McConaughy. The time of transmission is illegible.

**35. Telegram 333 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 6, 1955, 5 p.m.

333. From Johnson. Re Deptel 389, August 5.  
Telegraph text.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Bardach (FE) informed 3:05 p. m., 8/6/55 CWO/FED

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–655. Official Use Only.

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**36. Telegram 334 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 6, 1955, 5 p.m.

334. From Johnson.

Regret point out August 3 Washington datelined story appearing August 4 New York Times (which undoubtedly read by CHICOMS) giving accurately substance position on representation which I will present CHICOMS Monday not helpful my negotiating position and complicates my present difficulties with correspondents here who were finally coming to accept my refusal give any info on talks especially on future plans.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Bardach (FE) informed 3:25 p.m. 8-6-55 CWO/FED

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–655. Official Use Only.

**37. Telegram 398 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 6, 1955, 2:41 p.m.

398. For Johnson.

Your 328. First sentence third paragraph might irritate American correspondents, and appears unnecessary. Therefore it should be deleted. Department authorizes you to seek Wang's agreement to remainder proposed public statement.

Bear in mind that you are still authorized to hold backgrounder for American press if in your judgment it would serve useful purpose. Indications here are that Wang probably leaking to Communist correspondents who in turn are supplying Americans.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-555. Confidential. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in substance by Dulles, McCardle, and Robertson.

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**38. Telegram 399 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 6, 1955, 2:40 p.m.

399. For Johnson.

You will recognize Deptel 384 is only speculative intelligence round-up and does not represent any agreed Departmental estimate of probable Chinese Communist course of action.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-655. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.

**39. Telegram 400 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 6, 1955, 2:41 p.m.

400. For Johnson.

Do you have any clue as to source Scripps-Howard dispatch Geneva August 4 written by Ludwell Denny? On surface some of information would appear to be from American official source.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–655. Confidential. Drafted by McConaughy.

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**40. Telegram 335 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 7, 1955, 11 a.m.

335. From Johnson.

Hammar skjold called on me this morning to give account call Wang made on him Saturday morning. Wang delivered written message from Chou thanking Hammar skjold for his last message stressing release flyers not because UN resolution or UN pressure, expressing disturbance at “propaganda” on UN role, stressing desire maintain “personal” contact with Hammar skjold, and intimating desire Hammar skjold play go-between role in my negotiations with Wang. Hammar skjold transmitting copy to New York for delivery Lodge.

Wang then went on with oral presentation concerning now is time for deeds (inferentially by U.S.—not clear whether this element also included in written message). Wang then laid entire stress on representation as issue as field in which “deeds” expected indicating some flexibility in choice of country and exact formula.

Hammar skjold said in reply he stressed he could not and would not play any “go-between” role but willing do anything he properly can as “third-party”.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–755. Confidential.

I outlined to Hammaraskjold exact situation on Chinese students, assurances I had given CHICOMS this regard, expectation performance CHICOMS with respect Americans to equalize situation, problem we faced on representation and our present thinking this regard. He expressed full understanding.

Hammaraskjold thinks that as "Menon channel has not produced anything" Chou now hopes use him. My feeling, which I did not state to Hammaraskjold, is that Chou hopes to continue playing both lines.

**Gowen**

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**41. Telegram 345 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 8, 1955, 1 p.m.

345. From Johnson.

Haguiwara asked me dinner Saturday night during which he outlined steps thus far taken at Geneva enter into contact with CHICOMS on repatriation Japanese and tried sound me out on raising level contacts. Spoke of government sending some one to Peiping.

I confined myself to general discussion present stage my talks, my hope experience and possible result my talks would be helpful Japanese and suggested question any further steps be taken by Japanese be discussed Tokyo or Washington.

He said no reply had yet been received from CHICOM Consul General here and Tatsuke was again going to press for reply this week.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Waddell (FE) Noon 8-8-55 CWO/FED

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-855. Confidential.



**42. Telegram 346 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 8, 1955, noon.

346. From Johnson.

Ben Limb saw me Saturday under “urgent” instructions to ask me to take up in my talks with Wang questions unaccounted for Korean POW’s and civilians and “reunification” of Korea.

I expressed great surprise at particularly latter request as I said always my understanding basic principle ROK foreign policy Korean reunification should not be discussed without presence of ROK and we had always supported them in this. Of course also pointed out strictly bilateral nature my present talks and referred Secretary’s statements we would not discuss anything involving rights of others. Said in any event this is question should be taken up in Seoul or Washington and not with me here. Limb said “ROK’s had great confidence in me” etc and hoped I would see what I could do.

After discussion Limb took back letter on reunification which he had prepared. Sent me one somewhat more vaguely worded to which I am simply replying that matter should be taken up in Seoul or Washington.

On prisoners I also explained impossibility my discussing matter with Wang and assured him my deep sympathy with this problem and hope that if I was able develop anything on Americans it would be helpful to Koreans.

Am submitting copies correspondence.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Waddell (FE) Noon 8-8-55 CWO/FED

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-855. Confidential. Also sent to Seoul unnumbered.

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**43. Telegram 347 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 8, 1955, 1 p.m.

347. From Johnson.

Highlights fourth meeting lasting two hours twenty minutes.

Wang opened with long statement CHICOM grievances re students. Said up to now some students continue be prevented leave, citing in great detail case of Dr. Tsien, Cal Tech Rocket Expert. Claimed latter wrote Peiping authorities June 15, appealing assistance return China. Handed me list names 44 of 76 students given him last meeting who he said not yet returned China. Wang also made familiar allegations students afraid express desire return, being forced leave by unreasonable deadline, or apply permanent residence, unable receive travel funds, et cetera.

I replied various points, stressing repeatedly restrictions on Chinese students, including Dr. Tsien now rescinded and all without exception free depart if desire. As result my reiteration no restrictions against departure and contrasting with situation Americans in China Wang shifted emphasis to "practical" difficulties faced by students saying while these restrictions may have been lifted practical difficulties mounted to restraint on students. Way to solve these difficulties was to have third country look after affairs Chinese nationals in United States.

I then read prepared statement (A) turning down Wang's first proposal August 2 re list all Chinese in US; (B) pointing out we had fully met second and third proposals; (C) outlining "arrangement being considered" re fourth proposal and (D) again contrasted situation Americans in China emphasizing US expected all US civilians be released promptly and whatever measures necessary bring this about should be taken by Chinese. Explicit information concerning measures being taken this regard "would facilitate and expedite discussions."

Wang repeated his request for names all Chinese US and reserved right comment on our suggestions re his fourth proposal at next meeting.

I then handed Wang text proposed press announcement modified according Deptel 398. Wang agreed to release with last portion first sentence second paragraph reading as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-855. Confidential; Priority.

“The talks so far have been confined to the matter of return of civilians to their respective countries.” Since this wording conforms text of first agenda item I agreed to change.

Next meeting 10 a.m., August 10 at Wang’s request.

Gowen

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Waddell (FE) 10:30 a.m., 8/8/55, CWO/FED

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#### 44. Telegram 354 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 8, 1955, 6 p.m.

354. From Johnson.

At fourth meeting August 8 10 am Wang began referring my statement restraining orders previously placed by US Government on Chinese now all rescinded and that foreign nationals in US including Chinese could leave without applying for permission. Wang said he welcomed my statement but added he must frankly point out it not altogether consistent with actual situation prevailing to date. Actual situation is that although US Government has rescinded departure restrictions on number of Chinese students who applied to leave long ago, Chinese students are still subjected all sorts of obstructions and many prevented from leaving up to present. All Chinese nationals who want to leave subjected to interrogation by Immigration Service and FBI and forced express their political opinions. Some even detained for this reason. Many others for fear of interrogation do not apply to leave and many who previously applied have reconsidered for same reason. Many Chinese nationals who applied to leave long ago up to present unable depart.

An example this is case Dr. Tsien who went US 1934 to study aeronautics. After graduation 1938 was engaged in teaching at California Institute of Technology and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Now holds position at Cal Tech. Is one of few authorities on rockets in US. When Dr Tsien was leaving US August 1950 US Secret Service seized his baggage on charge contained classified material. August 23 he further notified not to depart and that investigation his activities pending. September 7 arrested by Immigration Service and not

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–855. Confidential.

released until put up \$15,000 bail Sept 23. Later Dean of Cal Tech stated Dr. Tsien not carrying classified material of US Government but only his own research work and published books. Returned students in 1955 reported Tsien's movements restricted to county of residence. In letter June 15, 1955 to Vice Chairman People's Republic Dr. Tsien restated his anxiety to return and appealed for assistance.

Wang continued he could cite further evidence from American newspapers. UP reported September 23, 1953 indicating no evidence discovered connecting Dr. Tsien with Communists. However he unable return to his country and awaiting trial in US. On March 6, 1953 *New York Times* stated Dr. Tsien had been ordered deported to China but that at same time had received orders preventing him from leaving US. *Times* added this contradictory situation revealed by Chief of District Immigration Los Angeles.

Case of Dr. Tsien vividly explains how many Chinese doctors in US desire return and unable to do so. Up to present Dr. Tsien's movements still restricted to county of residence. Only charge against him is desire return to motherland and reunite with family. This utterly unreasonable situation suffices to show appropriate way must be found to assure return of nationals.

Wang referred my statement August 4 that no general deadline existing on departure individuals from US and those required leave only those who no longer held student status. Wang declared even those no longer students should not be subjected to unreasonable departure time limit causing them difficulty. Especially unreasonable aspect is that these people given unreasonably short time. If cannot leave within limit suffer "torture" of Immigration Service procedure including interrogation, payment of bail, arrest and other actions which cause pressures on their minds. At same time they notified can spare selves such tortures if they apply for permanent residence. This means they compelled remain US against their will.

Wang then referred my statement that even if alien had applied for and was granted permanent residence he still could proceed to any place of his choice at any time. Wang said this is "matter of course". Whether Chinese national applied under immigration laws or Refugee Relief Act still should be able to go to any place of his choice without stating reason therefor. In order that those Chinese nationals compelled to apply for permanent residence under Refugee Relief Act or other regulations not be prevented from leaving in future is necessary find appropriate way give them assurance.

Wang said he had checked list of 76 given him last meeting and found 44 not yet returned China. Handed me list these names for investigation. Referring to Department's April 2, 1955 press release concerning rescinding restraining orders these students he pointed out

reference made there to number of cases still under review. Wang said he would also like to know names these people. On basis statements I had made in course talks his government believed return these people should not be subjected any obstruction. Question of return civilians both sides not only involved return those who had applied to leave, but also involved return all civilians. Those who may want return any time in future should also be allowed to go. That is why he had given me list of all American nationals in China for our convenience. He expressed view his government also entitled request US make reciprocal arrangement by offering him list all Chinese nationals, including students. Said this was not beyond terms of reference but was precisely what he and I should be dealing with.

Wang continued that many Chinese nationals US who have expressed inherent desire return motherland treated as political problems. As result they restricted for long time from departing and subjected all kinds of pressure such as interrogation procedure and time limit for departure. Obstructions still prevail. Many Chinese nationals have apprehensions regarding applying to leave. State Dept's April 2, 1955 press statement acknowledged some Chinese students may refrain from applying to Immigration Service for permission to depart for fear of being refused. "If it can be said there is contrast between situation Chinese nationals in US and American nationals in China this is apparently great contrast".

From time of founding Chinese People's Republic to date 1523 Americans left China only 87 remain. Law-abiding American nationals in China can leave any time providing make reasonable arrangement for unsettled civil cases. However many law-abiding Chinese nationals in US dare not apply for permission depart. Furthermore as result of prohibition against remittance money by families of Chinese nationals to them many such nationals no means obtaining travel funds. Therefore it is necessary both China and US should entrust to 3rd country of own choice care of affairs nationals in other, in first place, affair of their return. Arrangements should be based on equality and mutual benefit. This would be reasonable solution to problem of return of civilians of both sides.

With regard to supplementary list five persons given him last meeting, Wang said Bradshaw two Romanoffs and Walsh already included in list Americans given US. Regarding Mrs. Huizer he understood she wife of Dutch national. According his information she was former American but in December 1951 on expiration her American passport she replaced it with Dutch passport. Situation is she married to Dutch national and is now Dutch subject holding Dutch passport. Dutch Charge has repeatedly claimed she is Dutch national and Chinese Government respects claim of Dutch.

I told Wang I would like make few remarks of preliminary nature on what he had said. In first place throughout his remarks he had repeatedly referred to matter of Chinese in US applying for permission to leave. I told him I might not have expressed myself sufficiently clearly at last meeting but I had tried to explain that in US alien ordinarily does not need to make application to leave. We have no such thing as exit permit. In effect if alien wants to leave US he simply buys boat tickets and leaves.

It is for this reason restraining orders had to be issued against some students in past. As I had said repeatedly, these orders now lifted. To best my knowledge no Chinese now being prevented from leaving US for China. Referring case of Dr. Tsien I said statement that US not preventing any Chinese from leaving country also applied to him. If he still desires proceed China US would not prevent. I said most of what Wang said regarding him was past history which it would not be fruitful to go into. I pointed out Wang had referred to many news articles and I suggested that they not be taken as too authoritative since we had both seen recently that the press frequently makes mistakes. I added I would want point out that question whether Tsien tried violate US espionage laws by attempting take with him US classified documents is of course question of fact. Whether he did or did not, I stated I could not refrain from contrasting fact he still free with status our citizens in China charged with similar offenses. However said I did not want to debate his case but only repeat my original statement that if he wants to go he can.

I said in half-serious tone it seemed that Wang on one hand complained we prevented people from leaving and on other that they must leave too quickly. Said he had referred to cases of some who may wish to apply under Refugee Relief Act for permanent residence and that he had asked in future such persons should be permitted to leave if desire to do so. I said as I had told him before they can do so. Regarding question forcing people leave before they ready, I repeated each case sympathetically considered on own merits and if extension justified Immigration Service would grant. No one forced to apply for permanent residence. This purely voluntary. Immigration Service merely points out if persons do not apply they no longer entitled to status as students when have ceased to be students.

Referring to Wang's statement concerning interrogating people on their political opinions, I said this becomes pertinent only if person applies for permanent residence. It is necessary under our law to inquire into a person's loyalties to determine whether such person entitled permanent residence. It is normal and natural procedure applied to all aliens.

Referring to 44 names given by Wang I said I wished point out again original 76 were those against whom restraining order lifted. Individuals were informed orders lifted and they free to depart. This did not

mean they actually left. It is entirely possible some still in US; I did not know. If they are it is of own free will and their departure not being prevented. Some of these might have departed US for other places. We have no way of knowing. Remaining cases referred to in announcement that restraining orders on 76 lifted have now been completed and no Chinese now being prevented leaving US including Dr. Tsien. I told Wang Dept's April 2 press release dealt primarily with question Chinese students who apply to US Government for help in paying transportation to China. As I pointed out US Government had paid or assisted in paying travel of hundreds of those who returned China. That announcement mentioned lifting of restraining orders against 76 Chinese students in context of reassuring Chinese in US desiring obtain transportation from US Government and against whom restraining orders had been issued that they need have no hesitation make application.

I expressed appreciation for receipt information on Mrs. Huizer, adding that Wang undoubtedly familiar, like all persons in diplomatic service, with matter of dual nationality.

I said that while our nationality laws very complicated, in general, since 1922 any American woman marrying alien retains nationality under our law. In many cases under law of husband's country she may also have acquired his nationality. She sometimes will apply for passport of husband's nationality and sometimes for American passport. Under our law this does not affect fact that by our law she is American citizen. This is Mrs. Huizer's case and we desire extend protection to her as American national even though she also may have Dutch passport.

Wang replied that as previously stated he had repeatedly indicated his pleasure at learning that US Government had rescinded restrictions on Chinese nationals in US. However according his info actual state of affairs was at variance with what I had said. He desired clarify possible misunderstanding my part his government's position regarding Chinese in US. It was not that his government dissatisfied in past because Chinese students under restrictions and now dissatisfied again because they compelled leave too fast. Dissatisfaction is based on fact that they should have been able return and had not yet returned.

For long period US Government restricted Chinese. Now that restrictions rescinded Chinese nationals notified to leave before certain date which left them following alternatives: (1) deportation procedure if failed leave before deadline; (2) apply for permanent residence if wanted avoid difficulties of alternative (1). Wang said he cited case Dr. Tsien because well known, but this only one example. His appeal for help in letter June 15 shows he not free to leave at that time. Furthermore Chinese nationals faced with series of difficulties such as financial visa booking tickets etc. All these factors affect their freedom to depart. May be possible under these conditions some dare not express desire



depart. May be cases of people who express desire but may change mind for one reason or another. All these practical difficulties prevent departure. Wang went on to say that all this serves explain why even though I had repeatedly stated Chinese free to leave any time they still faced many difficulties. Therefore he hoped way could be found beneficial to both sides such as formula of 3rd country.

Regarding case Mrs. Huizer Chinese Government not in position determine whether she is Dutch or American. He only knew she married to Dutchman and held Dutch passport. If US and Dutch could agree on status Chinese Government would not oppose. Wang concluded he was only trying clarify few points and did not desire debate.

I told Wang that there was nothing we could agree with Dutch about concerning Mrs. Huizer since according to laws of both countries she was both (repeat both) Dutch and American. Wang interjected in humorous vein that if husband cooperated with wife problem could be settled.

Then talking from prepared statement I referred to Wang's first proposal made August second and said as previously stated I felt this goes beyond agreed scope present discussion and I had also at that time mentioned practical difficulties. I now added it is not policy US Government make such information available any other government. Therefore it not possible agree Wang's proposal.

With regard Wang's fourth proposal I stated I believed it went somewhat beyond first agreed item of agenda. However I told Wang US Government considering arrangement which would be within agreed scope present discussions and fully meet objectives with respect to civilians both countries envisaged by two governments in July 25 statement.

Told Wang seemed to me all that is required carry out this purpose is for each of our governments take whatever steps necessary permit return of civilians who desire do so. As I had explained to him my government has already taken all necessary steps. If Wang's government would do same entire problem would be quickly resolved.

Nevertheless my government was giving consideration to following arrangement:

Indian Embassy Washington could receive requests from any Chinese civilian in US who felt he being prevented from leaving. Indian Emb could investigate case sending officer to interview person if it desired and if Embassy concluded complaint justified could report facts to Dept with request for whatever action Emb considered appropriate. Emb could also act as channel for transmission travel funds and otherwise extend to individuals appropriate assistance. Both my government and Indian Embassy would give full publicity. British Embassy in China would perform same services for American nationals there, Chinese Government agreeing to give and permit publicity in same manner as arranged in US.



I then continued I had been giving particular thought to Wang statement last meeting regarding necessity any solution reached being beneficial to both parties. Said I thoroughly agreed this view but failed to see how it possible to describe situation at present stage of discussions as unfair to Chinese Government or people. Added if I desired to do so could dwell at some length on unfairness present situation to Americans in China but I did not believe it useful engage fruitless debate this subject but rather look at present practical situation.

I said at second meeting Wang had asked for solution to question of restrictions on return to China of Chinese nationals in US. I said I immediately and promptly replied under full authority my government no Chinese being prevented from leaving US. At last meeting I carefully and frankly explained nature of restrictions formerly placed on departure some Chinese students and explained these now entirely removed. I reiterated to Wang that US Government not now preventing departure any Chinese from US. Said it was difficult for me to see how I could be more explicit or more fully meet request Wang had made. I said I had tried make it clear that US Government expects all its nationals in China desiring to return to US will be able promptly to do so and that Wang's government should take whatever measures necessary bring about this result. I concluded stating it would greatly facilitate and expedite our discussions if Wang could shortly give me explicit info regarding measures along this line which I understood were being considered by his government. I emphasized again that my government had taken all necessary steps to meet Wang's requirements and there were no exceptions not even case of Dr. Tsien to my assurance that all Chinese free to leave US.

Wang said noted my statement. Said he had restated own position concerning his original proposals 1, 2 and 3, declaring he agreed with me it was necessary for both sides to make reciprocal or corresponding arrangements for return of nationals which would bring a solution to this problem. He expressed regret I had not agreed his first proposal. Said on his part he had already given me complete list all Americans in China which very convenient for our use. Therefore Wang added which very reasonable his side require similar action from US and would appreciate it if US could reconsider its position on first proposal. Regarding arrangement I had suggested on the 4th proposal he reserved comments until next meeting which Wang proposed be August 10, 10 a.m.

I then proposed press release to which Wang agreed as reported my tel 347.

Atmosphere continues easy and informal.

Gowen

**45. Telegram 356 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 8, 1955, 9 p.m.

356. From Johnson.

Denny article August 4 referred to Deptel 400 not available here.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-855. Confidential; Priority.

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**46. Telegram 357 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 8, 1955, 9 p.m.

357. From Johnson.

Re Wang's allegation today's meeting:

No way families in China can remit funds for travel students from US. If not correct would appreciate any information I can use refute.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-855. Confidential; Priority.

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**47. Letter from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 8, 1955

Dear Alex:

I haven't forgotten the understanding that I would drop you an Official Informal occasionally to give you some of the background and nuances here that would not be reflected in a cable. Bill Sebald returned

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

to work this morning, so I should have more time to devote to your mission now.

There is a pronounced feeling of satisfaction here with the way you have handled the first week of the negotiations. The Secretary himself is following every development closely. He has drafted some of the telegrams to you himself and ordered last Tuesday that henceforth all messages to you which conveyed anything in the nature of instructions was to be personally approved by him. Mr. Robertson of course is following everything. There is a rule now that even the factual and background messages must be approved either by Mr. Robertson or by me. So we will have a look henceforth even at the DRF intelligence messages before they go out.

I am sure you will want to get the general feel of the reaction here to the tactics you are using regardless of whether it is laudatory or not. The only question at all which has arisen, and it is not a criticism, is as to why you withheld the four names (Mrs. Huizer, Mrs. Bradshaw and the Romanovs) from your first list. I have explained that these names had already been given to the Chinese Communists and that the Communists had denied as to three of them that any exit application had been filed and as to the fourth that she was an American citizen. However there was a feeling that it was a tactical mistake not to press these cases continuously by including them in every list. It has been remarked that we have nothing to lose by putting the names in and perhaps something to gain. This was the reason for the follow up instructions to you suggesting that you add the names by means of a supplementary list. The belief that perhaps harm was done was reinforced by the unfortunate Scripps-Howard article by Denny which stated that the names had been omitted because we knew our case was weak on these four.

There has been something of a feeling that you might press harder the point that the great preponderance of the Chinese students in this country maintain their allegiance to the GRC and emphatically repudiate the Communist regime. It is recognized that Wang Ping-nan would be very allergic to this point but it is felt that you do not have to be estopped on that account. We wired you the full text of the Chinese Embassy's statement which makes this point quite cogently. You may find a peg on which you can hang an additional remark along this line when the representation discussion waxes warm.

The only other even half way critical statement I have heard was relative to your decision not to hold a backgrounder for the American press as you were authorized to do last week. We are all profoundly aware of the difficult position you are in with the American press. We have had echos of your press relations problem back here and we have all been casting about for some means of taking the pressure off you. Part of the Secretary's press conference of August 2 was an effort in that

direction. Carl McCardle apparently feels that you should have gone ahead and held the backgrounder when you were authorized, especially since it was pretty clear that Wang was talking to the Communist correspondents. He believes that the attitude of American correspondents would have been improved and there would have been no net loss as to the privacy of the conversations, since so much was leaking any way. I believe he still thinks you should hold the backgrounder, as indicated in our follow-up telegram of August 6 which of course was largely a reflection of his view. If you feel you need a Departmental press officer to help you, in addition to Garnish, Carl is ready to give sympathetic consideration to the matter.

The question of leaks is indeed a trying and baffling one. We feel very badly about the New York Times Washington dateline article of August 4 which you rightly complained about in your 334 of August 6. We were particularly pained since we wanted your limited representation proposal to have maximum impact on Wang, which cannot be obtained when there is no element of surprise. McCardle and Suydam say the information did not come from the P area. I did not talk to the correspondents at all. Dana Schmidt was getting around the Department quite actively about that time and it may be conceivable that he may have picked something up although I have no idea how or from whom.

The Denny item which obviously was based in part at least on a leak also mystifies us. It seems that some of it, particularly the information about the number of repatriated Chinese students who received travel funds from the U.S. Government, might have been based on U.S. official sources.

We have an additional information problem with the foreign Embassies here which are closest to us, namely the British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand, and to some extent the French. So far we have been telling them in confidence about what has already come out in the papers, but they are pressing for fuller and more timely information. This is something of a dilemma for us, . . .

Let us know what you need which you are not getting, and any ways in which we can help you. The meetings of this week should be fairly decisive. If you think you will need Martin for a few days longer than planned, let us know. It would be unfortunate and difficult if he should have to miss a few days at the beginning of the War College, but I do not say it would be impossible to arrange, if his presence in Geneva is important to you. All the best to Ed, Ralph and Col. Ekvall. Our feeling toward you and your staff is a mixture of admiration and sympathy. Regards and good wishes.

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

48. Telegram 362 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 9, 1955, 1 p.m.

362. Eyes only Secretary and Robertson. From Johnson.

In considering future course these talks and our broad objectives I offer following thought.

Present context, particularly in public mind is that talks are in nature conference with definitive ending at some point in time. It seems to me some of difficulties inherent this context would be obviated if and when we reach "other practical matters" we could gradually shift to concept of contact between Wang and myself being of indefinite duration in time and intermittent in nature to be utilized at request either side.

Although possibly presenting some new difficulties I think this concept would best meet our broad objective without difficulties inherent in concept attempting prolong present series of talks.

I realize this is largely question of form rather than substance but believe it important.

What I have in mind is that at some point in discussion "other practical matters" I would attempt obtain agreement that instead of meeting more or less regularly with recesses of varying lengths we would meet only at request of other to be transmitted through Consulates General here.

There could be gradual press preparation for this and would take advantage any opportunity prepare Wang.

While this has advantages must recognize contains disadvantages present situation in heavy public attention whenever Wang and I would appear here. However do not perceive any practicable alternative as long as Wang and I remain point of contact.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–955. Secret.

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49. Telegram 364 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 9, 1955, 1 p.m.

364. From Johnson.

With close yesterday's meeting we have completed presentation our position on civilians and next move is up to CHICOMS. I feel my instructions have enabled me to establish very strong position which has put CHICOMS on defensive and in future meetings plan largely to reiterate position as necessary. I believe we should stand on position performance by CHICOMS re Americans essential to agreement on representation proposal and that agenda proposed by CHICOMS and accepted by US precludes discussion any other matter until civilian problem resolved.

If I get no performance on Americans I plan at appropriate time to suggest fairly prolonged recess "to give them time to give further consideration to cases Americans" thereby reinforcing position on relation their performance on Americans to representation arrangement.

One of decisions we will have to make is what degree of performance on Americans we will consider sufficient for agreement on representation. I do not believe we can or should reach this decision now.

Another decision is whether we will be willing to broaden representation proposal to include inquiries by Indian Embassy initiated by "parents and relatives" in China. I expect Wang will at minimum press very hard for something this nature. This raises obvious problems but it seems to me that even under our present concept it will in fact be very difficult prevent or refuse "humanitarian" requests from Indian Embassy do this. If this case should obtain from it whatever negotiating advantage it gives us here, it does not seem to me this would increase danger of use of families for coercion as even under present circumstances families free write to Chinese in US. Would also think Indian Embassy would be very careful avoid giving any basis for charges it was agent for coercion. From standpoint UK protection Americans in China it also gives US something of much more value than present formulation.

I plan present list 461 American POW's missing from Korean War and 11 Navy and Coast Guard personnel as first item under "other practical matters".

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-955. Confidential; Priority.

**50. Telegram 369 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 9, 1955, 3 p.m.

369. From Johnson.

Some members congressional group here for Atomic Energy Conference have indicated to Claxton desire obtain information from me re my talks with Wang.

Claxton and I inclined feel probably useful if I do not (repeat not) get ahead of whatever Department is doing keep Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees informed.

If Department approves I would propose talk rather fully about what has happened thus far on civilians including representation proposal I made yesterday and confine myself to reference material Secretary's press conference on other problems.

Tomorrow is probably last day group will be here.

Would appreciate Department's instructions and guidance.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–955. Confidential; Priority.

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**51. Telegram 428 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 9, 1955

428. For Johnson.

Your 369. You are authorized in your discretion to brief members congressional Atomic Energy Group on discussions to date regarding civilians. You may also give them general idea of what is involved in representation issue but you should avoid mention name of any third country in this connection.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–955. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; substance approved by Dulles and Morton (H). The time of transmission is illegible.

**52. Telegram 429 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 9, 1955

429. For Johnson.

Your 357. FYI as of now US Treasury Foreign Asset Control Regulations prohibit remittance dollars to US from Communist China for travel or other purposes unless special Treasury license obtained. A few licenses have been granted for student travel from funds blocked in US. In these cases Treasury required evidence that traveler of good character and acceptable political orientation and that close relatives mainland China believed non-sympathetic Communist regime.

If arrangement authorized Paragraph 11 your instructions should materialize, appropriate understanding with Treasury will be sought.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-855. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of transmission is illegible.

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**53. Despatch 2 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

No. 2

Geneva, August 9, 1955

REF

Geneva Telegram 315, August 4, 1955

SUBJECT

Transmitting Text of Ambassador Johnson's Statement to Ambassador Wang on  
United States Immigration Procedures

With reference to my telegram No. 315 of August 4, 1955, I am enclosing the full text of my remarks to Ambassador Wang Ping-nan on the subject of United States Immigration procedure. These remarks were summarized only very briefly in the reference telegram to reduce its length.

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A251.8-955. Confidential.



**Enclosure****Johnson Remarks<sup>2</sup>**

Geneva, August 4, 1955

"I then referred to Wang's second and third proposals and handed him list of 76 Chinese students. I told him his reference to 'exit permit' in connection with 76 students was inaccurate since no exit permit required of aliens desiring depart United States. Any alien, including any Chinese national, did not need to apply for permission to leave country but simply made travel arrangements and departed. That is why United States Government had to issue restraining orders in cases those few aliens whose departure we desired prevent. Such orders issued against certain Chinese students in past. On April 8 our Consul General informed Chinese representative that 76 students formerly prevented from departing United States free to leave. These students all notified that orders preventing their departure rescinded. They not issued exit permits because there is no such permit. Vast majority Chinese students never subjected to preventive departure orders and always free to depart whenever wished. The few preventive departure orders previously issued all rescinded. I then repeated that, as I informed him last meeting, United States Government not now preventing departure any Chinese wishing return to mainland China.

I said, on other hand, no general deadline imposed for departure Chinese from United States. I did not know where Wang obtained information that Chinese students must depart by September 6 or apply for permanent residence but said I was satisfied this information inaccurate. I explained many Chinese who came to United States as students have completed studies and no longer students. Thus they no longer entitled student visas and in accordance with standard procedures applied all aliens such persons informed by Immigration their visas no longer valid, and they should arrange depart United States by certain date. However each case handled individually and each individual permitted give reasons why departure date should be postponed. Many postponements granted for one or more months or indefinitely at request of individual. Postponements have been and will be granted in order avoid hardships or for other good cause. I also pointed out that even though alien had applied for or been granted status of permanent resident he still free leave country at any time, and I concluded reiterating no exit permit required."

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<sup>2</sup> Confidential.

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**54. Memorandum of Conversation, Koo and Robertson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 9, 1955

**SUBJECT**

Negotiations with Chinese Communists

**PARTICIPANTS**

Ambassador V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Embassy

Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary—FE

Walter P. McCaughy, Director—CA

Ambassador Koo said he had noted the remarks of the Secretary in his press conference of August 2. The Chinese Government was uneasy over the apparent possibility of a high level meeting with the Chinese Communists. The Ambassador was instructed by his Government to state that it would look with strong disfavor on any meeting between the American Government and the Chinese Communists at the Foreign Minister level. He said he would be very gratified if he could be given a confirmation that no such meeting is in prospect.

Mr. Robertson said that there was no change whatever in the American position on this. The situation was the same as when the Secretary held his press conference. There was no likelihood of such a meeting then, and there was none now.

Ambassador Koo expressed his gratification at the receipt of this information. He said his Government was also gratified to have received through the American Embassy in Taipei, a summary of the Secretary's instructions to Ambassador Johnson for the talks at Geneva. He said that his Government felt the instructions were not objectionable "as far as they go".

Mr. Robertson said that Ambassador Johnson's authorization went no further than the instructions summarized for the information of the Chinese Government. The limitations on the discussions were clearly set forth in the instructions, and there were no instructions beyond those which had been paraphrased in the Chinese Foreign Office.

Ambassador Koo said that his Government was interested in learning of the latest developments in the talks at Geneva.

Mr. Robertson said there had been no tangible progress so far on the question of the release of the American civilians. The main purpose of the talks was to get our people out. Wang Ping-nan was trying to make an issue of alleged interference with the travel to the mainland of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-955. Confidential. Drafted by McCaughy on August 12.

Chinese students in this country. These allegations as to restrictions on Chinese in this country were balderdash. It was only propaganda, since the Chinese students actually are free to move about in this country and to leave the U.S. if they wish. We do not want any Communist sympathizers here as permanent residents. They are more than welcome to go to the mainland if they want to.

Ambassador Koo mentioned the Chinese Embassy statement of last week which pointed out that the great majority of Chinese students in this country have been assisted and protected by the Chinese Government and its Embassy and Consulates in this country and that the students are loyal to their Government and still look to it for representation of their interests. They give their allegiance to the Chinese Government and not to the Chinese Communists. It is presumptuous deception for the Chinese Communists to pretend that Chinese in this country should look to the Communist regime for protection and representation.

Mr. Robertson said we had noted the Chinese Embassy statement and had sent it to Ambassador Johnson. He considered it a very good statement. He remarked that we know that the Chinese in this country, with very few exceptions, maintain their fidelity to the Chinese Government. We are aware that the Chinese Government has helped many of them with scholarships, travel arrangements and so on, and that practically all of them came to this country on Chinese Nationalist passports. Mr. Robertson remarked that there is no such thing as an exit visa in this country and Wang Ping-nan's allegations at Geneva that "exit visas" had been denied was nonsense.

Ambassador Koo said that he hoped the American Government would never admit even tacitly any degree of Communist jurisdiction over the general body of Chinese students and other nationals in this country.

Mr. Robertson said the Ambassador need have no fear on this score. The Communists would not be allowed to establish any contact except with those who of their own volition stated that they wanted to go back to the mainland.

Mr. Robertson mentioned that those few students who wanted to go back might have some difficulty in paying for their passage. The United States Government did not propose to pay their way back to Communist territory. However, we were not standing in the way. Anyone who wants to go to a Communist country can go—the sooner the better.

Ambassador Koo mentioned that Mr. Robertson had informed Minister Tan on July 29 that some third party such as India or Great Britain might be designated to assist the Chinese students who want to return to the mainland.

Mr. Robertson said some Embassy might conceivably be the medium for handling travel funds and making other arrangements for the return of those who expressed a wish to go back.

Ambassador Koo remarked that this arrangement would imply no official representation of Chinese Communist interests in this country, since the Embassy role would be that of a travel expediter.

Ambassador Koo reverted to the subject of a possible conference with Communist China at the Foreign Minister level. He said that his Government would appreciate a more definite statement or formal assurance that no such meeting was contemplated. The Secretary's statement of last week was most welcome and President Eisenhower had said that he associated himself with the statement of the Secretary of State. But any doubt on this score would adversely affect the psychology of the problem on Taiwan.

Mr. Robertson said the President and the Secretary had stated most emphatically that this Government would not discuss, on any level, matters affecting the rights of the Government of the Republic of China. He felt there could be no objection to bilateral talks aimed at securing the freedom of our nationals who are held. If there should be any international conference on Far Eastern subjects where matters involving the rights of the GRC were to be discussed, "your Government would have to be there", or give its concurrence. Nothing could be decided "without your presence or your concurrence".

Ambassador Koo said his Government would appreciate a more formal assurance on the lack of any intention of Secretary Dulles to meet with Chou En-lai. He wondered if his Government could obtain a memorandum on the subject.

Mr. Robertson said he did not think there was any question of a memorandum. Both the President and the Secretary of State have stated their position to the American people and to the world. He felt this was as explicit and as binding as anyone could wish.

Ambassador Koo said it was true that very satisfactory statements had been made, but they were rather informal.

Mr. Robertson observed that they were categorical and were on the record. He did not see how they could have more force or more effect. He offered to send the Ambassador a copy of the press conference.

The Ambassador said he already had the record of the press conference. He needed something more formal.

Mr. Robertson said he felt that what had been said could not be more official. A public affirmation of our position before all the world was better than a classified communication. It put the whole world on notice what our position was.

Ambassador Koo said his Government did find much assurance in the statements of Mr. Robertson himself, the Secretary, the President and the American Charge in Taipei. They had all made it clear that there would be no talks involving the essential interests of the Chinese Government without its presence or concurrence.

Mr. Robertson said he could reaffirm that no matter would be taken up with the Chinese Communists which involved the rights of the Republic of China without the presence or concurrence of the GRC.

Ambassador Koo asked if that would still be the U.S. position if talks with the Peiping regime at the Foreign Minister level should ever be held.

Mr. Robertson said yes, that was correct, in the unlikely event that such talks should sometime be held. He remarked that discussions at that level were no closer now than they had been when the Secretary was asked about this subject at his press conference.

NOTE: Separate Memoranda of Conversation have been prepared on the following subjects which were discussed in the same conversation: *Chinese Representation in the U.N.* and *Registration with the U.N. of Mutual Defense Treaty of December 2, 1954 and Exchange of Notes of December 10.*

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## 55. Telegram 389 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 10, 1955, 5 p.m.

389. From Johnson.

Desire call attention FBIS item 091427 Peking International English Service. This probably forecasts line Wang will take when "no force" reached and to which reply some kind will be required.

**Gowen**

NOTE: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 8/10/55 4:37 p.m. EMB CWO

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1055. Official Use Only.

**56. Telegram 439 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 10, 1955

439. For Johnson. Your 362.

While it is useful to be thinking ahead we doubt that it is useful to attempt now to crystallize our thinking.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1055. Secret. Drafted by Dulles; cleared by Robertson. The time of transmission is illegible.

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**57. Telegram 440 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 10, 1955, 6:56 p.m.

440. For Johnson. Your 364 August 9.

1. Concur you should stand on position that the first necessity is for CHICOMS to match US position regarding return if desired. Only when the principle of free return has been conceded is it useful to consider the means, if any, needed to implement this principle. In most cases, certainly in this country and surely for Americans in China, no third party intervention is needed.

2. We question fairly prolonged recess in view of Chou En-lai's July 30 statement that "the number of American civilians in China is small and the question can be easily settled". We believe that we should seek to hold the CHICOMS to this utterance of Chou En-lai.

3. We believe that the right of return should be conceded to all Americans but agree that we should not commit ourselves now to a "all or nothing" position.

4. We are not disposed to broaden Indian Embassy representation to cover follow up of inquiries by parents or relatives in China since this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-955. Confidential. Drafted by Dulles; cleared by Robertson.

would open the way for mass appeals whereby the CHICOMS would in fact gain opportunity to intimidate or influence Chinese aliens here.

5. Agree with your next item.

Dulles

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58. Telegram 441 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 10, 1955, 6:56 p.m.

441. For Johnson.

FYI. Internal Revenue Code provides no one depart from US without certificate of compliance with income tax obligations. In the case of such aliens as Chinese students, this is formality which would probably involve not more than ten to thirty minutes at some local office. These students either have no independent income or, if employed, there has been a withholding of income tax at source so that nothing is due and indeed if they leave before end of year, they would presumably be entitled to a rebate because they would get full year exemption.

Procedures would be slightly different but also simple in the case of alien who was working for himself. Our records indicate that this is not the case with reference to Chinese students but might of course be the case as regards other Chinese aliens. However, here the result would be presumably the same since income tax payments are required to be made quarterly on basis of estimate of income and departing aliens would get a full year exemption.

We would doubt whether foregoing requires you qualify statement which you apparently made, as reported your 354, August 8, since no exit permit is in fact required and since this income tax requirement would as indicated normally be a formality. However, you will have to be judge whether or not your previous statement requires qualification in light of foregoing.

Dulles

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1055. Confidential. Drafted by Hanes (S) and Dulles; cleared by Robertson.

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59. Letter 2 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 2

Washington, August 10, 1955

Dear Alex:

I hope to get off a short note to you by each pouch (Monday, Wednesday and Friday) whether or not there is much that is new to pass on to you.

The report of the 4th meeting on August 8 was illuminating. It was good to see how well you met the cleverness of Wang Ping-nan and kept him on the defensive despite the resourcefulness of his approach and the subtlety of his misrepresentations. We are struck by the fact that the full report of the meetings gives an appreciation of the atmosphere of the talks no condensed summary can convey.

Walter Robertson and I hope to meet with the Secretary today on your 364 which anticipates questions which will probably arise in the near future. We concur that the question of what degree of performance on Americans will be considered sufficient for our agreement on representation ought to be deferred. There is considerable skepticism as to whether we should be prepared to give on the representation proposal to the extent that you suggest. The symbolic significance of the representation issue has become magnified here and every angle of any agreement we make will be exposed to the closest scrutiny in many quarters. The GRC of course is watching us like a hawk on this. Wellington Koo was in yesterday chiefly to stress the dangers implicit in any concession on the representation issue going beyond students who take the initiative to return to the mainland. I am sending you a copy of this memorandum of conversation. It is true that friends and relatives of Chinese in this country can now write them from China, but this is not the same as writing to an officially designated representing Embassy. I have no doubt that the Chinese Communists have the resources to get the names and addresses of great numbers of Chinese students in this country and to arrange for real or pretended relatives in China to address the Indian Embassy in regard to them. Thus the Indian Embassy might get involved in a mass of cases. This would give the Chinese Communists the widespread access they want to Chinese students in this country in practice, whether they have it in theory or not. We hope to get an instruction to you on this by the end of the week.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Printed from an unsigned copy.



The information we got from Elting Arnold of Treasury, who is in charge of Foreign Assets Control (our 429) does not afford you anything useful for your discussions with Wang. As you can see, Treasury has followed a very hard-boiled policy on remittances from Mainland China for repatriation of Chinese. We can not thrash out the matter with Treasury now because your instructions are so closely held. Of course we do not anticipate any difficulty with them if the matter ever comes to a head, since your instructions were explicitly approved by the President. Actually it will be a good thing from an economic warfare standpoint to require the Communists to remit dollars to pay for the travel of those who want to return.

I am enclosing a copy of the Ludwell Denny article from Geneva which disturbed the Secretary and which seems to involve a leak somewhere. Nobody is accusing anyone of leaking. It is just that we are mystified where all the information is coming from and trying to run down all leads. It is not inconceivable that the information could have been deduced by Denny from information supplied by Wang to Communist correspondents.

I suppose you got the copy of the memorandum of conversation of August 3 between Murphy, Robertson, Devaney and myself. I think INS is well in line. I am proposing that we give them copies of those parts of your conversations which directly concern their practices. I believe it will help to keep them happy and insure that they are disposed to cooperate fully.

We are considering your cable on a junior assistant to help you when Ed Martin departs and Ralph Clough moves up. If we can raise the money I would like to send one of our junior China Language officers. It would put a strain on us here but I believe he would be more useful to you than an officer from a European post and it would be very valuable experience for him. I am still awaiting word from you as to whether you think Martin should stay on a few days after the War College opens. I do not want to encourage this unless you consider it highly desirable, but I believe the Commandant would agree if the Department requested it at a high level. And I do not think it would spoil the course for Ed since the first days are largely for orientation. The added insight he will have on Chinese Communist aims and negotiating tactics will be a very valuable contribution to the course at the War College.

The Secretary is holding a press conference in a few minutes. We will send you a transcript of the pertinent portions as soon as we get it.

Good luck and good wishes,

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60. Letter from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 10, 1955

Dear Walter:

This is just a very brief note to let you know that after I arrived here I discovered there is only one pouch a week. For this reason I have covered things more fully than I otherwise would by telegram. It is also undoubtedly for this reason I have as yet received nothing from you. It therefore appears that our plan to keep in close touch by informal correspondence is not of much use as far as short range matters are concerned.

I realize my volume of telegraphic correspondence is very heavy, particularly the record of the meetings. However, I felt it important that all of you know exactly what is being said and pouch service is too slow to be of any practical use. I have followed the practice of attempting to give you the highlights by priority message as soon as we come back from each meeting and then sending the more complete record by following message. I know that during the Korean armistice I found this most helpful. However, if you have any other suggestions or would prefer we further condense the record of the meetings, please let me know.

As I have indicated in my messages, I feel very satisfied with the situation and feel my instructions have enabled me to keep on top of it.

Ed Martin has been of tremendous help and has greatly added to whatever effectiveness I have had. I greatly appreciate the sacrifice he has so cheerfully made as well as you and Walter making him available. I have sent a message on my need for a junior officer when he leaves. In addition to the record of the meetings I receive a quite heavy volume of correspondence which requires replies and there are many other such chores.

Due to the Atomic Conference we are in very crowded quarters although the Consulate General has done its very best. They were successful in getting me a sitting room which has been very useful for meeting people and doing some of our work. They supplied me with a most excellent secretary who the three of us have very badly overloaded but I am hoping our volume of secretarial work will not remain at its present level.

I was sorry not to be able to comply with the suggestion that I go back to Prague last weekend, but it appeared to me here unthinkable at this time. However, I have that part of my instructions [illegible in the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." A handwritten note on the letter indicates it was received on August 15.

original] in mind and in fact desire to take maximum advantage [illegible in the original] for personal as well as official reasons.

I am very happy to see the press beginning to desist and believe we are now getting down to the point we should be. The Secretary's last press conference was very helpful in this regard.

I have continued to shy away from a press backgrounder as it would immediately be known to Wang and I feared it would entirely break down the agreement on secrecy. I also feared it would also encourage the high-powered group of correspondents who had gathered here to stay on. However, I have been giving them individually a little more than previously to offset what the Chinese have been putting out. The Chinese leaks have been very indirect from a Chinese correspondent to the *Humanité* correspondent to a non-communist French correspondent. In the last few days I have particularly been putting out the line that the central issue has been and remains the release of Americans.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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## 61. Telegram 401 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 11, 1955, 10 a.m.

401. From Johnson.

Briefed all members congressional group except Hinshaw yesterday in very broad terms including representation issue. No mention made and no question raised concerning any specific third countries. Only reaction on representation was "why not?". Some concern over slowness talks which spontaneously ascribed Chinese. I said thought no particular significance except narrowness Wang's instructions and slowness his communications.

**Gowen**

NOTE: Reference Deptel 428, CWO-FED.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1155. Confidential; Priority.

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**62. Telegram 402 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 11, 1955, 1 p.m.

402. From Johnson.

Following is text of draft agreement proposed today by Wang:

**QUOTE**

Agreement on the question of the return of civilians of both sides to their respective countries adopted by the Ambassadorial representatives of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America in their talks held in Geneva.

1. Both sides declare that the nationals of each side residing in the other who desire to return to their respective countries are entitled to depart for their respective countries. Civilians of the above description who are involved in unfinished civil or criminal cases under the laws of the country of their residence shall be entitled to the same right upon the settlement of their civil or criminal cases.

2. In order to guarantee the implementation of the above principle, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America will each entrust the Republic of India and the United Kingdom respectively with the charge of the affairs of the return of civilians of the respective countries residing in the other. The countries thus entrusted shall perform the following duties:

A. Upon the request of a civilian of one side residing in the other who desires to return or upon the request of his government made in his behalf the entrusted country shall make representations with the government of the country in which this civilian is residing with a view to settling his difficulty in departure;

B. In the event of a civilian of one side residing in the other who desires to return and who is being prevented from doing so, the entrusted country shall, upon his personal request or the request in his behalf by his government, conduct investigations and make representations with the government of the country in which the civilian concerned is residing in accordance with the findings of the investigation with a view to arriving at a settlement;

C. In the event of a civilian of one side residing in the other who desires to return and who finds difficulty in paying off the return journey the entrusted country shall render him assistance on behalf of his government.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1155. Official Use Only; Priority.

3. Upon the acceptance of the trusteeship described above by the Republic of India and the United Kingdom in response to the requests of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America respectively, both sides shall give wide publicity to the details of this agreement by means of all available news media. The Republic of India and the United Kingdom may also give similar publicity which they consider appropriate in the United States of America and the People's Republic of China respectively.

UNQUOTE.

Gowen

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### 63. Telegram 403 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 11, 1955, 1 p.m.

403. From Johnson.

At meeting this morning issue was clearly joined. In interest expediting agreement and although not completely satisfactory to Chinese Wang submitted "draft agreement" incorporating but somewhat broadening along line anticipated Mytel 364, our representation proposal (text by separate tel) and stated that if concluded "I will advise you very soon concerning results review" cases detained American nationals. During course informal discussion he mentioned release fliers as Chinese gesture and expectation gesture from US.

I stressed degree we have gone meeting their point of view, that is removal all restrictions against Chinese in US, consideration representation proposal, lack substantial results his last year's promise review cases Americans, length time Americans in prison, lack of value representation proposal to Americans in China whose situation could be resolved only by action his government, inequality situation two groups nationals, and repeated with increasing directness agreement representation not possible until action their part Americans.

During course considerable give and take Wang increasingly clear in implication no action on Americans until representation agreement but that such action would promptly follow agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1155. Confidential; Priority.

Movement this morning was also explicitly in context agenda item one completed with agreement on representation and desire move on immediately to agenda item two.

Next meeting Saturday, August 13, 10 am.

While continuing give no info press on meetings am informally taking line central issue has been and remains release Americans.

**Gowen**

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#### **64. Telegram 412 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 11, 1955, 6 p.m.

412. From Johnson.

At fifth meeting August 11, 10 am Wang, reading from prepared statement, said he had carefully studied views both sides on question return civilians to respective countries, especially my statement last meeting. Said he thought there had been approach of views between two sides and progress in talks. Regarding problem Chinese nationals, including students, in US he said he had proposed US should remove all prohibitions and measures preventing their return, including deadlines which increased their difficulties. Had noted with satisfaction that US not restraining any Chinese civilian wanting return. Further, had noted my categorical assurance Chinese students not being prevented from leaving US and that all restraining orders affecting Chinese nationals, including Dr. Tsien, had been rescinded. Continued that I had also agreed Chinese national applying for or granted permanent residence in US should be permitted travel anytime to any destination their choice without giving reason. Regarding deadlines, he had noted my statement each case sympathetically considered on own merits and Immigration Service giving reasonable time.

Wang continued he welcomed all these statements which facilitated progress of talks. Said I had also met his proposal by submitting list 76 names for which he expressed satisfaction. Meanwhile, he felt bound to point out that although given list of Americans in China I had failed provide list all Chinese, including students, in US. This failure regrettable and he reserved right put forward this demand again

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1155. Confidential.

in future. Regarding American nationals in China he had indicated when he handed me list that all ordinary Americans could depart anytime so long as not involved in civil cases or had made reasonable arrangements regarding civil cases. American civilians who had committed crimes would be treated with leniency according to their crimes and behavior and those with good behavior would be granted commutation of sentence and early departure. Captured personnel from Korean War who had chosen not to return could leave at anytime they desired. Regarding military personnel who had committed crimes, 15 had been released at different times. Said he had also informed me that Chinese Government reviewing cases American nationals who have applied return their country. Cases of Americans who had committed crimes being reviewed individually. In order safeguard interests nationals both sides he had proposed each should entrust third country of choice with care of affairs these nationals; in first place affair of their return. He deemed this proposal meets interests nationals both sides. Obviously, affairs concerning return nationals both sides closely connected with other affairs in their country of residence and his proposal should therefore not be regarded as exceeding terms of reference agenda item one.

Wang continued saying at last meeting I had stated US Government considering certain arrangement. He then proceeded repeat almost word for word arrangement I had suggested previous meeting. He went on to say in opinion his government this arrangement could not satisfy demands of nationals both sides, especially Chinese nationals in US. However in interest speedily reaching agreement on first agenda item he was ready agree basically such arrangement as first step in safeguarding interests nationals both sides. Based on statement made by both sides he would like propose draft agreement to be adopted as the agreement reached in these talks concerning question return civilians both sides to their respective countries. Wang then read draft agreement quoted Mytel 402.

Wang then stated I might recall his statement at first meeting that so long as both sides adopted conciliatory attitude would not be difficult agree on question return civilians to respective countries. Now joint agreement had been reached unanimously on majority of points under item one. Expressed hope it possible speedily to adopt draft agreement. After above draft agreement adopted by both sides he would advise me "very soon" re cases US nationals who had applied leave China.

I told Wang I was sorry I unable share his view that we as close to agreement as he appeared indicate. Said we came to discuss question nationals of both sides who prevented from returning their country. As Wang had pointed out this morning US Government had removed all

preventive departure orders against Chinese civilians, including that on Dr. Tsien. There remained no governmental measure preventing departure Chinese. This fully met Wang's request of me this regard.

I said I was confident there are no practical difficulties which would prevent Chinese in US from proceeding their country if they desired do so. However in effort fully to meet his point of view I had outlined an arrangement which my government considering regarding third party representation. I again wanted contrast situation Americans in China who wished depart with that of Chinese in US. All Chinese nationals now free depart. However in case Americans in China situation same as at time talks began. Solely measures taken by Wang's government prevented departure these Americans. No third country representation arrangement could remove those obstacles. Only action by his government could clear road for departure Americans detained against their will in China.

I added I was pleased to learn at meeting August second and repeated today that Wang's government reviewing cases Americans in China including those in jail. I also had carefully noted statement his government intended take measures with respect to them out of special consideration. I expressed hope these measures would be such that Americans now prevented from leaving his country would be free to depart. If this done promptly I was confident it would establish basis on which it would be possible work out arrangement such as I had suggested last meeting and he suggested today. Otherwise I feared it would be very difficult to do so.

I told Wang that speaking very frankly I was sure he appreciated problem of public opinion in US faced by my government on this question. I had referred to this in my statement August 2nd. My government had taken very far reaching measures regarding Chinese in US and also, in response his request, had told him of arrangement on representation we considering. I said I frankly did not believe it possible for my government make any announcement or enter any agreement to be publicly announced at this time without more in way of results on problem my nationals which I had come to discuss. Said I had spoken very frankly because I wanted him understand my problem. In meantime I said my government and I would study Wangs proposal and might have something further to say on it later but wanted him to understand exact situation this regard.

Wang replied he had noted my remarks. Regarding civilians both sides returning their country American side had its viewpoint and his side also had own viewpoint. He recalled that in talks conducted last year he had made clear the general principles of his government on question nationals both sides residing in other country. Said his



government had same policy toward all foreign nationals in China, including Americans. These classified two categories: ordinary aliens and those who breached Chinese law. So long as ordinary civilian free of unsettled case in China he allowed freely to leave. Those who had breached Chinese law also granted lenient treatment according Chinese law. Recent release of 11 airmen was evidence of great contribution made by his government in present talks. He recalled Chou En-lai in statement to People's Congress, July 30, had said number Americans in China small and this problem easily settled. Furthermore as he had just informed me so long as he had agreement on his draft proposal he would advise me very soon on results of review of cases by his government.

Wang continued he must frankly point out, though he did not intend go into it, bitter plight Chinese nationals, including students, in US past years. Chinese people very excited in their sentiments regarding bitter plight innocent Chinese nationals and students in US. Chinese nationals in US including students faced difficulties in US just as I had pointed out US nationals in China facing difficulties. If it were not that nationals both sides having difficulties there would have been no reason to meet here. As result exchange views past four meetings he had indicated to me Chinese welcomed attitude of American side. Although not entirely satisfied with arrangement suggested on fourth proposal in interest of progress of talks he prepared to use conciliation and compromise and was ready accept arrangement proposed by me. Draft agreement he had put forward was only more detailed version of one I had suggested last meeting. In the main it was same one I had advanced. Said he regarded such arrangement as means of settling problem. It showed his side willing avoid more debate this question and reach agreement in conciliatory way.

I replied to Wang that of course our governments each had its point of view and our task was one of reconciling these viewpoints. It seemed to me that my government although Wang not completely satisfied had gone nearly whole way in meeting desires his government. So far as American nationals concerned whatever Wang might feel regarding his nationals in US most Americans had been in jail for long period. At our meetings last year I had understood these cases being investigated. More than year now passed and majority these people still in prison. I hoped his government would now find it possible to expedite measures he had spoken of in order that this problem could be resolved. Said I would examine his proposal in light of what I had just said. Hoped by next meeting he might have some suggestion to meet problem I faced.

Wang replied ways should be found beneficial to both sides in joint effort solve problem our nationals. That is why they had accepted arrangement I suggested last meeting. If we proceed on basis this arrangement future progress on question of nationals would be expedited. He welcomed spirit in which I had spoken this morning concerning talks. In interest of reaching agreement, willingness for conciliation and compromise must exist both sides. We two ambassadors were sitting face to face but if we did not make effort reach one another could not accomplish anything. If each would hold out his hand problems could be solved. Each side must approach other and as he had stated so long as both sides displayed sincerity he would be able to advise me regarding cases of Americans now under review.

I responded that I supposed each thought his side had gone farther than other. I felt that we had gone farthest. Representation proposal did not originate with us but with him. I had proposed my arrangement at last meeting in effort meet his point of view. However did not see how it helped solve problem faced by American nationals. Their problems could only be solved by action his government. Wang replied that in course of talks important thing not what each side claimed it had done but for each side to see what other had done. So long as both sides showed sincerity would not be difficult overcome our problems.

I said I hoped that he could help. So far I had nothing to show my government regarding problem my nationals and asked if he would have something by Saturday. Wang replied there were two separate problems. One was arrangement regarding return of nationals of both sides and the other was measures to be taken by his government. Agreement on detailed arrangement would be test of sincerity each side regarding this question. So long as both sides showed spirit of sincerity he believed it would not be difficult to find solution.

I proposed next meeting Saturday, 10 am.

Gowen

65. Telegram 417 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 11, 1955, 7 p.m.

417. From Johnson. Re Deptel [Embtel] 364 and reports on today's meeting.

As I see situation question of principle is one difficult for me to pursue further since substantially all Americans are being detained on pretext crimes and claims. CHICOMS have consistently claimed they adhere to principle all Americans free depart unless have committed crimes or have civil claims pending against them. On one hand I cannot argue principle we willing permit Chinese depart even if they have committed crimes and on other have been trying avoid being drawn into fruitless morass of discussing CHICOM justice with them. Therefore I have been attempting keep discussion within framework practical situations.

Today's meeting makes clear that CHICOM asking price for further action on release Americans is representation arrangement. Present CHICOM position asking US for performance on representation arrangement in return for promise on Americans is clearly unacceptable.

However problem we will be facing is how many Americans we insist on in return representation arrangement. I have up to this time and will as long as it seems useful talk in terms "all Americans" although in context give and take at today's meeting I left door open for something short of that.

Do not feel we will obtain release any further Americans prior to agreement on representation but that we should strive for simultaneous announcement release Americans with announcement agreement on representation.

At Saturday's meeting I plan again to press Wang on release Americans possibly obliquely suggesting simultaneous announcement as mentioned above and argue against broadening our suggested arrangement on representation.

Would appreciate Dept's preliminary reactions to Wang's "draft agreement".

Gowen

NOTE: Reference believed to be EMBTEL 364 from Geneva. Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 8/11/55 5:24 p.m. EMB CWO

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1155. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

**66. Telegram 418 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 11, 1955, 8 p.m.

418. From Johnson.

Following are our general observations thus far. While Wang has been bargaining hard he has been avoiding uncompromising and extreme positions usually taken by Communist negotiators. At today's meeting in particular his review of my previous statements was notably accurate and devoid of usual attempts at distortion and misrepresentation. In fact he seemed entirely to accept my previous statements as meeting the requests embodied in his points two and three and while mentioning point one in effect dropped it. He is acting much more in tradition of old time Chinese bargainer than Communist diplomat.

He has almost completely avoided usual Communist cliches and language as interpreted by his translator which is basis reports our messages tends be considerably more brittle than in original Chinese.

He is uniformly courteous at meetings and I now have definite impression from manner as well as substance that they desire reach agreements.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1155. Confidential.

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**67. Telegram 466 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 11, 1955.

466. For Johnson.

Your 402, 403 and 417. Our objections to Wang's draft agreement summarized separate telegram. You will be instructed in time for August 13 meeting.

FYI. We wish avoid formal agreement with Chinese Communists. Prefer unilateral US declaration which would be matched by

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1155. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles and McConaughy. The time of transmission is illegible.

corresponding Chinese Communist declaration. We are considering draft declaration reading as follows:

QTE/1. The United States of America declares that Chinese nationals in the United States who desire to return to the China mainland are entitled to depart for the China mainland.

2. The Embassy of the Republic of India in the USA is authorized to assist in such return as follows:

(a) If a Chinese National believes that, contrary to the above declaration, he is encountering official obstruction in departure, he may so inform the Indian Embassy and the Indian Embassy will, if desired by the C.P.R., intervene on such civilian's behalf with the Government of the United States.

(b) If a Chinese national in the USA who desires to return to the China mainland has difficulty in paying for his return journey, the Indian Embassy may render him the financial assistance needed to permit of his return.

3. The Government of the United States will give wide publicity to the foregoing provisions of this Declaration and the Embassy of India in the USA may also do so.

4. This Declaration shall remain in force for at least 90 days and thereafter until notice of termination has been given by the Government of the United States to the Indian Embassy in the USA.

5. The provisions of Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 hereof shall come into force when a corresponding Declaration (with the substitution of the Government of the United Kingdom for the Government of the Republic of India) has been made by the C.P.R. UNQUOTE.

Transmit your reaction immediately so that we may have the benefit of your views before instructions drafted tomorrow afternoon.

Dulles

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## 68. Letter from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 11, 1955

Dear Walter:

Just a very hasty note this morning before I leave for the meeting to thank you for your letter of August 8 which arrived yesterday. I find

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

that because of the Atomic Conference there is a pouch leaving today in which I will send this letter.

With regard to the four names, Ralph states he had left them off because they were not on the list Gowen gave the Chinese on May 30th. They have now been added and I do not see this has necessarily raised any particular difficulty.

As we said in our telegram, we had not seen the Denny article and had no idea what it said until your letter. Ralph is the only one who has seen Denny, and he tells me that he definitely did not make any statement to Denny along the lines quoted and I am sure that this is correct.

I feel very much it would have been a serious mistake for me to press the point that the preponderance of Chinese students in the United States maintain their allegiance to the GRC. Wang has been very careful not to raise the issue of the allegiance of all students, as I am sure that he knows the facts and the problems which this would present. We both have been carefully talking only about Chinese who desire to return. Any such sweeping statement on my part would immediately raise the question of how do we know, and it seems to me clearly lead to a proposal for polling all students by some third country, which is exactly the issue we are trying to avoid. If we get into any hot, heavy debate on the subject, it is something I have very much in the back of my mind but do not expect that we will do so.

I gave you my feeling on the press backgrounder in my last letter, and I still feel that I have been right. I am confident that in spite of the strain to which they have been subjected, my relations with the correspondents are still on a friendly and sympathetic basis. I have taken a great deal of time in seeing them individually, talking about what I could talk about, explaining my position on secrecy and they are very understanding.

I hope you will continue frankly to keep me informed so that I can promptly clear up any questions as to why I do or do not do this or that.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. As another brief note, going back over the record, we noted that when on August 2 Wang gave me a list of Americans and said the cases of those who had been convicted of offenses were being reviewed, he carefully omitted that statement in regard to Downey and Fecteau, who were put in a separate category. This reinforces my belief they are going to be the most difficult and I am not quite sure how best to handle it. While I am of course going to push the maximum on their cases, at

the same time I hope to avoid doing anything that would jeopardize the release of the others. I would welcome any ideas you have on the subject.

UAJ

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**69. Telegram 425 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 12, 1955, 3 p.m.

425. From Johnson. Reference: McConaughy's August 10 letter. Martin departing August 16.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1255. Official Use Only.

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**70. Telegram 4 from Geneva to Hong Kong<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 12, 1955, 3 p.m

426. From Johnson.

It would be helpful if you could inform me number Chinese students from US who have arrived Hong Kong en route Communist China since August 1 and transmit such figures on a continuing basis whenever any significant change.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1255. Official Use Only. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 426.

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**71. Telegram 428 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 12, 1955, 4 p.m.

428. From Johnson.

Deptel 466 just received 2:35 p.m. due to overloaded code facilities here.

1. Believe form should be unilateral simultaneous declarations agreed in advance and issued here as suggested my 317 [417].

2. Do not see necessity for phrase "if desired by CPR" in para 2(A).

3. Believe desirable particularly on behalf Americans in China retain element of investigation validity complaint suggested in my original presentation.

4. Believe 90 day limit as presently worded not (repeat not) desirable as carries erroneous implication that at end 90 days US may no longer be willing permit departure Chinese aliens. If 90 day limitation considered necessary believe should be limited to para two.

5. Para 5 would tend destroy our present bargaining position in using representation agreement as cheese to obtain Americans and would not be necessary under concept in para one above. CHICOMS could well fully subscribe this agreement and continue hold Americans whom they allege have committed crimes or have unsettled claims.

Do not believe it necessary or desirable submit counter proposal tomorrow. Believe we require further time for careful study and decision on any counter proposal and at tomorrow's meeting I can confine myself to debate on CHICOM broadening our proposal, if Department concurs, suggesting form unilateral simultaneous declarations, say we are still studying and will have further observations later. Also will continue press Wang on release Americans along lines I followed at last meeting.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1255. Secret; Niact.



**72. Telegram 429 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 12, 1955, 4 p.m.

429. From Johnson.

Am not clear on thinking underlying draft declaration contained Deptel 466 but from content assume thought might be to issue entirely unilaterally, possibly publicly as final effort in these negotiations. If such is case I do not believe that point yet reached in negotiations here. By throwing down public challenge to CHICOMS at this point seems to me would retard rather than expedite release. If we are willing enter into any representation arrangement before release any Americans I believe we can accomplish much more in context negotiations here by my working out with Wang an agreed public statement which would be in form individual unilateral declarations of which other would take note. I would strive have included in his statement as firm and definite commitment as could be obtained on release imprisoned Americans in particular.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1255. Secret; Niact.

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**73. Telegram 470 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 12, 1955

470. For Johnson.

Your 402 and 417. Department reaction is Wang draft

1. represents no basic advance over Chinese Communist position of 1954 on detained Americans. Cases all detained Americans are classified by Communists as criminal or civil, and there is still no commitment to release them until QUOTE settlement UNQUOTE to Communist satisfaction.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1155. Secret; Priority; Niact. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of transmission is illegible.

2. Provision for QUOTE Investigation upon request of Government UNQUOTE would destroy strictly limited nature contemplated representation arrangement by making it possible for CPR through Indian Embassy request investigation of and make representations regarding unlimited numbers Chinese in US.

Other objections exist in matters of detail but they are secondary to these basic objections which disqualify proposal.

**Dulles**

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#### **74. Telegram 478 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 12, 1955, 7:46 p.m.

478. For Johnson. Your 428.

1. Agree form should be unilateral simultaneous declarations and our 466 was designed to suggest the form of such a declaration.

2. QTE If desired by C.P.R. UNQTE can be deleted at your discretion. We proposed it with a view to creating a situation such that in the C.P.R. Declaration the Government of the United Kingdom would not be obligated to seek the return of American turncoats in China whom we do not want to get back.

3. See no objection to insertion in 2(a) of words QTE if it deems such a complaint valid UNQTE as precondition to intervention on civilians' behalf. Some such language would conform to your original presentation which is unobjectionable.

4. 90-day clause was designed to permit of subsequent modification if conditions change. We do not want to be committed in perpetuity to a situation where Chinese Communist spies could operate in this country, knowing that if caught there would never be any penalty other than their prepaid first-class ticket to China. However, possibly it is sufficient to drop out reference to 90 days and merely provide that the Declaration shall be valid until notice of termination given or possibly nothing need be said explicitly about termination as long as it is understood that it is not necessarily in perpetuity but subject to reasonable termination.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1255. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles; cleared by Robertson and McConaughy.

5. We do not understand what you mean as the Declaration referred to includes of course the whole Declaration, including paragraph numbered one which the Chinese could not subscribe to and continue hold Americans. In other words the Chinese Communists do not get benefit of Indian participation unless and until they have declared that all American nationals in Communist China who desire to return to the USA are entitled to depart.

We do not suggest you should submit counterproposal until in your judgment this is appropriate or until otherwise instructed. At some point, however, we feel it may be necessary to submit a concrete proposal in form which could be subsequently made public in the event that no agreement is reached.

At your meeting tomorrow, we think it of utmost importance that you should firmly reject the objectionable features of the CHICOM proposal (your 402 Depts 470). We doubt whether you should be stating that you are QTE still studying UNQTE giving the impression that we are uncertain and open to persuasion. It seems to us that a firm negative reaction will probably be more productive.

**Dulles**

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## **75. Letter 3 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 3

Geneva, August 12, 1955

Dear Walter:

Thanks very much for your letter of August 10. I understand the same more frequent pouch schedule will be in effect through next week so I will take full advantage of it.

I had thought that my previous telegram on a replacement for Ed Martin had overtaken your letter. Therefore I had not replied to this point. However, I today sent a telegram simply stating that he was leaving August 16th. As I previously said, Ed has been invaluable to me here and I greatly regret his going. If there were any possible way

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

of keeping him without sacrificing his opportunity to go to the War College I would certainly want to do so. However, I do not see that a few days one way or the other is going to make much difference as long as he is leaving in any event, and, therefore, have agreed to his leaving in time for him to get back for the opening. I also feel that it will be very useful to both of us for him to have the opportunity to discuss fully with you in Washington the situation here as we see it. He plans to come to the Department just as quickly as he arrives.

I am particularly anxious that he discuss with you the question of broadening the scope of representation as suggested in my 364. So I will defer any discussion of that in this letter.

I appreciated the information on income tax clearance for departing aliens. I was aware of this requirement when I was discussing the matter with Wang, but I am glad to have the exact information. As you will see from the full report of the meeting, the discussion was in the context of exit permits. I was trying to make my statement just as strong as possible and believe that it is fully correct within the context. It seems to me that it goes without saying that before anyone departs he should take care of his obligations, including taxes. It just points out that Treasury handles income tax matters in the manner it does. It is in no sense a control over the departure of aliens. I intend to stand on statements I have made in this regard.

Thanks very much for the Denny article, which we had not seen. As you observed, most of the article is deduction on the basis of a few scraps of information, and not very good deduction at that.

The Secretary's last press conference was of tremendous help to me. I was able to point out to correspondents here that he said almost exactly what I have been saying to them. Please thank the Secretary for me. I believe our press problem is now rapidly approaching its proper proportion.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

**76. Letter from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 12, 1955

Dear Alex:

We have decided to send Douglas Forman, FSO–4, to assist you when Ed Martin leaves. We are awaiting word as to whether you intend to request a short extension of Ed's stay before we issue Doug's travel orders. He will be severely missed in CA and it does not seem necessary to send him until about the time that Ed will be leaving.

Doug is well qualified for the assignment. He has been doing most of the leg-work on your messages here and is thoroughly familiar with the issues, both from his service here and his experience in Hong Kong. He is an able and dependable officer and is good in Chinese. Ed and Ralph can tell you more about him.

There has been quite a debate here as to whether USIA should be allowed to give normal "straight" news play to the story of the mistreatment of the eleven airmen. Naturally they would not be allowed to "play it up" while the Geneva talks are going on. Everybody is agreed that we should not do anything to inflame the Chinese Communists needlessly or afford them a pretext for continuing to hold the remaining Americans. The question is whether straight normal news play, without comment or beating of the drums, accurately reflecting the attention received by the story in the American press, would be hurtful. The present instruction is for them to play it down—in effect suppress it temporarily, and we understand Defense is instructing the airmen to keep quiet for the present.

One piece of quite sensitive rumor, which is solely for your private background info. Yesterday we saw the interrogation of one of the eleven released airmen, Benjamin. He reported that he had seen quite a bit of Fecteau for a while in prison. He said Fecteau had been able to give him bits and pieces of his story. Fecteau expressed some doubt as to whether the two American pilots of his plane had been killed in the crash. He said the plane landed fairly flat without any lethal impact. He said he regretted to have to admit that he and Downey had left the vicinity of the plane immediately without investigating what happened to the two pilots so he had no real evidence. Personally I am quite skeptical that the pilots are still alive. It is doubtful if the Chinese Communists would have any motive for public announcement that they were dead if this was not the case. In any event it is unlikely the pilots will ever turn up after the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. The enclosure is not printed.

announcement that they were killed. Of course, nothing has been said about this to the next of kin or anyone else outside of a very restricted group.

We are awaiting your reply to our 466 of last night regarding the formula for parallel unilateral declarations. Your report giving the detailed account of the fifth meeting on Thursday has just come in and I have not had a chance to digest it yet. Since the pouch is closing, this letter cannot wait.

Your 418 on Wang's general negotiating attitude is of special interest. I believe there is a tendency here to read less significance into his conciliatory approach than you may be inclined to do from there. The semblance of reasonableness and willingness to go part way may be recognizable, but when his draft agreement is taken apart there is really nothing in the way of tangible concession at all. There is as yet no assurance that the Chinese Communist position on the Americans is any different from what it was last year. Undoubtedly they would be willing to release the Americans in return for the sort of broad representation arrangement which they are seeking. But a concession on this from us is not to be expected. In the absence of a complete yielding by us on the representation issue, can any substantial "give" by the Communists on the detained Americans really be expected? Maybe so, but there is as yet nothing we can rely on.

There is something of a feeling here that you do not need to show a great measure of tolerance of Wang's proposals when their terms reflect no assured advance.

The Secretary does not like the idea of a formal agreement with the Chinese Communists. He feels definitely that parallel unilateral declarations are preferable, as indicated in our 466.

We are well aware of the tough row you have to hoe. The questions coming up now are in a different sense more trying than the relatively superficial press problem you had to wrestle with the first week.

We are naturally troubled as you are by the dilemma we may soon be faced with if we have an opportunity to spring only part of our people in return for a limited representation arrangement.

Enclosed is the transcript of the Secretary's August 10 press conference.

Good wishes,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**  
*Director for Chinese Affairs*

Enclosure:

Transcript of Secretary's press conference of August 10, 1955.

77. **Telegram 448 from Geneva**<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 12, 1955, 1 p.m.

448. From Johnson.

Wang opened this morning's meeting with statement that if I would immediately agree upon his draft agreement he would before announcement thereof made give me and publicly release results review those cases Americans both prisoners and exit permit cases in which review completed. Was clear to us that qte review unqte not rpt not qte completed unqte cases all Americans. In context satisfied qte completion of reviews unqte meant release but was unable obtain any indication number.

During course much give and take there was strong implication that he was probably prepared accept my original formulation for third party representation.

During course give and take I also obtained from him categorical statement that cases all Americans including category (D) his August 2 list (Downey and Fecteau) being qte reviewed unqte.

In reply I referred again to measures taken by US Government permit departure Chinese, our categorical assurances none prevented from departing and stated I had hoped results of qte review unqte on Chinese side would permit him make same statement to me, that is no American desiring return being detained. I stressed inequality of situation and expressed disappointment early settlement forecast by Chou En-lai had not materialized. I could not consider agenda item one settled until all Americans able return.

I then commented on draft agreement stating our original formulation fully and adequately meets situation and that provision for qte investigation upon request of government unqte entirely unnecessary. I said I was not in position accept draft agreement or its present form and reserved right for further comment.

Wang then pressed me to state any other objections. In reply I pointed out second sentence first paragraph his draft offered nothing to Americans detained in China.

I then outlined our thoughts on form of simultaneous unilateral statements giving as rationale those matters "concerned internal affairs" each country. I said any statement we made would include categorical statements I had made to him during course of meeting on freedom Chinese depart from US together with whatever arrangements made

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1255. Confidential; Niact.

for third party representations. I said I would expect any statement from his side to include whatever action they had taken with regard to Americans and that I would hope and expect I would include categorical statement similar to that we have made concerning departure Chinese together with arrangements for third party representation. I said this was my tentative thinking at the moment not a formal proposal but that I would embody my thoughts into a specific proposal at our next meeting. Wang strongly resisted concept saying it would show we had not been able agree. I pointed out that need not be case, that he had perhaps misunderstood my concept which was that the unilateral statements of which the other would take note would be released by joint agreement. He would not agree to concept, pushing hard for "joint announcement" along lines July 25 statement and our agreement on agenda. I said rather than discuss further would give him concrete suggestion next meeting.

I shared Wang's concern over amount of time spent agenda item one pointing out it could have immediately and expeditiously been resolved by release all Americans in China. This would have "laid sound basis" upon which we could enter into mutually acceptable agreement on third party representation and permit fruitful discussion other practical matters.

Next meeting Tuesday, August 16, 10 am. Comments follow.

**Gowen**

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## 78. Telegram 452 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 13, 1955, 6 p.m.

452. From Johnson.

At sixth meeting, August 13, 10 a.m., Wang led off reading prepared statement. Said at last meeting he had advanced draft agreement concerning return civilians both sides to their respective countries, based on arrangement I had suggested. He considered that although arrangement could fully meet requirements American nationals in China could not fully meet those of Chinese nationals US. Nevertheless in interest reaching agreement he had basically accepted my proposal.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1355. Confidential.



Was regrettable I had been unable promptly adopt his draft agreement last meeting.

Wang continued I had stated last meeting that measures taken regarding Chinese nationals fully met desires Chinese side and that no practical difficulties delayed departure Chinese nationals from US. This not in accordance facts. As he had already pointed out to date Chinese nationals especially students encountered all sorts obstacles to leaving US. In every case of Chinese students who wanted return but whose departure had been restricted many still unable to return up until now. How could this be construed as meeting requirements Chinese side? While he had furnished information all Americans in China I had failed provide list all Chinese US. How could this be construed as fully meeting requirements Chinese side? He had also pointed out third party arrangement did not fully meet their needs. Therefore it could not be construed as fully meeting his request. Nevertheless he endeavoring reach agreement in spirit conciliation.

Wang said at last meeting I had raised question public opinion. As he had already pointed out, if status Americans in China could be known to American people in its entirety he believed they would realize treatment these Americans just and lenient. However in present American propaganda many things gravely provoked feeling Chinese people. For example, Chinese Government took initiative release 11 airmen. As result American newspapers and even official spokesmen had seen fit direct all sort slanders against Chinese Government. Up to present Chinese people viewed all such utterly unreasonable slanders with extreme restraint. If one were to talk of things provoking public opinion he would have to raise question of thousands Chinese volunteers from Korea still detained. This caused strong feeling on part Chinese people. However his side had refrained from raising this question both outside and inside talks for if both sides dwelt on this type question results would be propaganda debate unfavorable to talks.

Wang said Chinese Government had released 11 airmen on eve of talks for purpose creating favorable effect on talks. Wang said he had repeatedly expounded reasonable and lenient policy of Chinese Government toward Americans in China. During year from initiation talks last year to present, 38 Americans had left China as result review their cases by Chinese Government. He had also informed me that Chinese Government now reviewing cases Americans in China and that he would advise me of results. In interest speedily reaching agreement on return civilians both sides and in spirit of conciliation, he willing make still another effort. Declared he "hereby instructed" inform me that under condition of an agreement on return civilians both sides (it was clear this referred to representation arrangement) Chinese Government prepared inform US side on results of cases of Americans

in China review of whose cases completed. He would also agree to announcement of results this review prior to announcement on agreement regarding return civilians both sides.

When I asked Wang to clarify this statement he said his government had basically accepted an arrangement proposed by me and had worked it out in practical form. If we could reach agreement on this draft agreement he could promptly inform me of results of review cases of those Americans on whom reviews completed. If agreement could be reached at today's meeting he could tell me results today.

I said I had understood at second meeting when he gave me names of Americans in China divided into various categories that his statement concerning reviewing cases and informing me of results did not apply to those persons under category (D) described as American military personnel committing crimes. I also mentioned our previous exchange on this in which I had pointed out that classification two persons in this category was erroneous as they were in fact civilians.

Wang replied as he had repeatedly informed me his government prepared review all cases involving Americans in China. Asked to repeat this statement he said reviews not confined to any single category of Americans but applied to all and repeated "all cases being reviewed".

I said to Wang we had come here to discuss return of civilians to their respective countries. I had informed him measures taken by my country including the one man he had mentioned as being detained. Said it was difficult for me to understand why it not possible for him to do same regarding American nationals his country. If he was in position now to inform me under certain conditions regarding steps taken regarding some of our nationals it was obviously not completion of review procedure that prevented our being given this information. I would hope that results he able give me of review these cases would be such that he could make same statement to me as I made to him. That is that his government not preventing departure any American in China who desired return to US. I had told him categorically my government had taken all necessary remaining steps to permit return of any Chinese nationals without exception to his country. At outset of talks I hoped and expected he could make same statement to me regarding Americans in China. My government took action it did regarding Chinese nationals in US in order promptly dispose of question under agenda item one. I said it difficult reconcile situation still facing American nationals in China with statement of his Prime Minister to which he had referred that number of Americans in China small and question could be easily settled.

I was expecting it possible equalize situation our two groups of nationals and thus lay basis for mutually acceptable agreement on third

party representation. That was best way lay ground for discussion next agenda item.

Referring to Wang's draft agreement I said it went considerably beyond scope of suggestion I had told him being considered by my government. I reminded him my suggestion was that if any Chinese civilian in US felt he being prevented from leaving he could communicate with Indian Embassy which would take appropriate action. I stressed this would apply to any Chinese civilian in US and that there would be no hindrance whatsoever in their communicating with Embassy any way they wished. We would expect any American civilian in China would have same right with respect to British Embassy there. If this done it seemed entirely unnecessary provide for action at request individual's government. Only each individual himself knew whether in fact he desired return and whether he felt he being prevented from doing so by government his country of residence. I believe formulation which I said my government considering fully and adequately met situation. Therefore I unable accept his draft agreement in present form.

I continued that during talk each of us had talked about measures which our governments had been considering or willing to take, including question third party representation. It seemed almost all these things involved internal matters each country. US had already taken action regarding some these matters as I had said. Said Wang had informed me certain actions his government has taken or willing take. What I was leading up to was form of any understanding we might reach. Seemed to me might be most practicable each make public statement of action we had taken including action on third party representation question. Each could take note in such public statement of statements made by other. While we would agree to making of statements and they would appear together this method would not involve us in same problems as trying to reach agreement on any one text. We would exchange texts of statements each proposed to make, the two texts to embody understanding reached here. They would appear together but would not be in form agreement.

I said what I have in mind was a statement that Ambassador Wang had informed me his government had taken such and such steps regarding Americans in China and making such and such arrangements regarding third party representation. I would make similar statement that US Government had taken such and such steps regarding Chinese nationals US and making such and such arrangements regarding third party representation. My statement regarding Chinese in US would repeat assurances which I had given him here, that no Chinese desiring to leave US being prevented and I would expect him to make similar statement regarding Americans in China. I concluded that this only my

tentative thinking and not formal proposal but I hoped incorporate it in exact form for next meeting.

Wang inquired whether I differed in principle with respect to his draft agreement.

I replied that as I had pointed out I differed on one point. It seemed entirely unnecessary provide for action at request of individual's government. I reserved right make further comment later on draft.

Wang declared we had already held six sessions on agenda item one and that his side not satisfied that so much time spent on it. From beginning he had given complete list Americans in China but American side failed reciprocate. First paragraph draft agreement sets out very clearly that nationals residing in other country wishing to return their respective countries entitled to do so. Said we should not discuss return civilians in abstract but find ways settle their return. As he had already stated he had basically accepted our arrangement and naturally was prepared to listen to our opinion on his draft agreement which was prepared on basis arrangement suggested by US side. He felt there should be concrete ideas on all points rather than abstract. He could perceive only three possible alternatives regarding draft agreement, namely rejection, acceptance or amendment. Since original arrangement had been put forward by American side fourth meeting, he felt it difficult understand why I could not form explicit opinion concerning draft agreement.

Wang continued he could not agree to separate announcements. It was very clear now as result joint declaration our governments that as result initiative taken by US Government we were able sit down together at Geneva. Furthermore at very beginning of talks joint announcement had been made concerning agenda. These two communiques very well received by world opinion. They were directed toward finding ways and means to solve questions facing us.

Said he was puzzled that since we had agreed on common way to find settlement these problems we could not agree to joint announcement. Effect of separate announcement on public opinion would be that we had failed find common method settle return of nationals. Impression would be each side had own way instead of common method which would be reverting to original situation before discussions began. It is not expressing sincerity to suggest separate announcement on this question. This is not first time our governments have made joint announcements or statements. He could not understand why today I should suddenly find I could not agree to joint statement. Said my suggestion was not conducive to progress present talks.

I said possibly I had not made myself clear. I was not suggesting that announcements not be issued together but referred to form they

should take. I said that rather than discuss further I would give him concrete proposal next time.

Referring to draft agreement I said I did not see it solved problem of Americans. Second sentence of first paragraph left every American now being detained in exactly same situation as at beginning our talks. I shared his concern regarding amount of time spent on first agenda item. Also agreed it of little use discuss abstract principles. Said we have practical situation to resolve. First agenda item was return to their countries of civilians desiring to return. Simple and quick way to resolve this. I could not feel so far as Americans concerned agenda item one completed until all Americans in China desiring to return were able to return.

Wang replied it unnecessary again say anything on departure Americans from China. He had repeatedly said cases of Americans in China under review and he would advise me results of review. He wanted me to believe that he would do whatever he said he would do and anything he not in position to do he would not say. For instance, in case American airmen they not released as results these talks but done by initiative on Chinese side to establish favorable atmosphere. As to form for announcement of draft agreement he was ready to listen to any opinion I had. Said there were already two precedents for joint statements or communiques which were very good examples.

Next meeting Tuesday, Aug 16, 10 a.m.

Gowen

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## 79. Telegram 457 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 13, 1955, 9 p.m.

457. From Johnson.

Developments at today's meeting show that our tactics of keeping representation arrangement as bait for release Americans has paid dividends. (I carefully avoided at today's meeting asking "how many" as such a question could not have been put without weakening stand on release of all.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1355. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

Question we now clearly face is whether we can or should pursue this tactic further.

We all have strong impression from today's meeting that it will not be possible further to advance position we have gained without great difficulty and much time.

Question therefore is what approach is going to get most Americans out in shortest time. Related to this is question whether we are justified in taking action which will result those Americans whose release we can now obtain remaining in prison because we strive to obtain simultaneous release large number or all of them. I refrain from commenting on cold-blooded attitude CHICOMS which has brought about this situation but simply say it is fact we must face in dealing with these people however distasteful it may be.

We have carefully discussed among ourselves all aspects problem and have come conclusion that course in best overall interests detained Americans is to reach some agreement on representation at present point.

First we strongly feel that I would not in foreseeable future be able to move Chinese off of legalistic approach to individual American cases. They are not going take simultaneous action on cases all Americans which would jeopardize their ability maintain public pretense action is result workings "justice". I have tried hard avoid backing them into corner where they could not do this and believe any other course would only indefinitely delay release of any Americans regardless strength Chinese desire get ahead to item two.

Second we believe that after release of first group we will be able maintain steady pressure for release of remainder during course talks on "other practical matters". CHICOMS obviously very anxious get to "other practical matters" and while they will want much we not able give believe we should be able play hand so as to continue pressure for release. I now have commitment for "review" all cases including Downey and Fecteau and can take maximum advantage all opportunities exploit this. Of course CHICOMS could continue hold remaining prisoners for further bargaining but they may well estimate prisoners are diminishing asset and I do not exclude possibility of fairly prompt release remainder. Of course, before agreeing proceed second agenda item we would reserve right revert agenda item one as long as any Americans detained.

Third, they have come so far on substance our representation proposal that it is difficult maintain further discussion this except in context straight trade for release Americans. In fact this point virtually reached at today's meeting. In this connection believe it helpful recall that original concept before these talks was that agreeing to representation proposal would assist in obtaining release Americans. I undertook

tactic use as bait obtain release some Americans and avoid anticipated CHICOM tactic of asserting agenda item one completed with agreement on representation. Believe it would be mistake now to extend this tactic to point of making release all Americans price of representation agreement.

If Dept agrees with foregoing position it will be very important that at Tuesday's meeting I have the maximum discretion Dept is willing to give me and instructions on our minimum positions on points at issue.

I would plan at Tuesday's meeting to present Wang with a draft of simultaneous unilateral statements to be issued by joint agreement accordance our agreement on private nature these talks. (See following tel for text.)

For best bargaining position I would require considerable discretion exact language we would be willing accept so that I can press him for agreement and reach firm as possible understandings. Possibility should not be excluded he willing reach immediate agreement and make statement public.

I do not believe I should be in position of asking him how many they are releasing before entering into agreement on representation, or being required to haggle over numbers or in any way ever to imply that we are satisfied with anything other than release of all. Do not believe I should go any further toward bald position of bargaining representation agreement against Americans.

I will also require instructions on our minimum position on enlarging scope of representation proposal to include governmental inquiries or inquiries from families. There were some indications at today's meeting Wang may be prepared recede on this point and I will of course press hard on it. However if we are willing to concede in any way (and I believe we should for reasons set forth my tel 364) it would be of maximum bargaining use to me at Tuesday's meeting.

If Dept does not accept foregoing general approach situation is such I do not at moment see any alternative for Tuesday's meeting other than asking him for numbers of Americans they prepared now to release (which I think undesirable for reasons stated above), indicate number is unsatisfactory, and recess talks, at least on item one, until they have "completed review" of more or all cases (I would have to indicate which) and we would then have to be prepared on that position.

Will remain Hotel Du Rhone tomorrow from 2 p.m. in event Dept believes any phone discussion possible or desirable.

**Gowen**



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80. Telegram 458 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 13, 1955, 9 p.m.

458. From Johnson. Re Mytel 457.

Propose hand Wang following draft text "agreed announcement" next meeting (to be released following Wang's unilateral announcement results "review" cases detained Americans promised today):

"Ambassadors of USA and PRC have agreed to announce the measures which their respective governments have adopted with respect to return of nationals of each located in country of other. With respect to Chinese nationals residing in US, Ambassador Johnson on behalf of US Government has informed Ambassador Wang that:

"1. USA recognizes that Chinese nationals in US who desire return to PRC are entitled do so and declares that no Chinese national who desires depart US for PRC is being prevented from doing so. This includes all those Chinese nationals who were at one time prevented from departing US.

"2. Embassy of Republic of India in US will be authorized assist return to PRC of those Chinese nationals who desire to do so as follows:

"(A) If a Chinese national believes that contrary to declared policy of US he is encountering official obstruction in departure he may so inform Indian Embassy and Indian Embassy will, if it deems such complaint valid and if desired by PRC, intervene on such national's behalf with Government of US.

"(B) If a Chinese national in US who desires to return to PRC has difficulty paying return journey, Indian Embassy may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.

"3. Government of US will give wide publicity to foregoing arrangements and Embassy of India in US may also do so.

With respect to American nationals residing in PRC, Ambassador Wang has informed Ambassador Johnson on behalf of PRC that:

"1. PRC recognizes that American nationals in PRC who desire return to US are entitled to do so and declares that no American national who desires to depart PRC for US is being prevented from doing so. This includes all those American nationals who were at one time prevented from departing PRC.

"2. Embassy of UK in PRC will be authorized to assist return to US of those American nationals who desire to do so as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1355. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.



“(A) If an American national believes that contrary to declared policy of PRC he is encountering official obstruction in departure he may so inform UK Embassy and UK Embassy will, if it deems such complaint valid and if desired by US, intervene on such national’s behalf with Government of PRC.

“(B) If an American national in PRC who desires return to US has difficulty paying return journey, UK Embassy may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.

“3. Government of PRC will give wide publicity to foregoing arrangements and Embassy of UK in PRC may also do so.”

Since Wang will almost certainly reject foregoing statement on grounds that his government is not yet prepared state that all Americans, including those who have been detained, are free to leave, I would like to be in position to agree to substitute paragraph one somewhat along following lines:

Begin quote

PRC recognizes that American nationals in PRC who desire return to US are entitled do so and declares that aside from those American nationals previously prevented from leaving PRC whose release has just been announced PRC has undertaken speedily review cases all remaining Americans whose departure being prevented by reason of imprisonment or otherwise and promptly settle these cases in spirit of foregoing declaration of policy.

End quote

In anticipated event that agreement on representation reached without assurance all Americans are being released, I would also propose following announcement be released to press here:

Begin quote

In view of fact that Ambassador Wang has informed Ambassador Johnson that \_\_\_ Americans, review of whose cases completed, are being permitted depart for US and that his government is proceeding expeditiously with review of cases of remaining Americans detained, two Ambassadors have agreed suspend for time being further discussion of agenda item one pending completion of review these cases by PRC and will at their next meeting proceed to discussion agenda item two. It is understood that discussions of agenda item one may be resumed upon initiative of either Ambassador.

End quote

With reference para 4 Deptel 428 [478] I had always assumed we could not and would not agree blanket return any Chinese whatever crime he may have committed. I have been taking maximum advantage fact as far as we know or CHICOMS have alleged no Chinese desiring return now under arrest. Believe I have thus far been successful

in avoiding issue what we would do this event. Above draft attempts focus on practical situation rather than raising this still theoretical issue. However if we can and are willing assure departure even for limited period of any Chinese regardless crime he may have committed would appreciate being informed. Not sure this would strengthen my bargaining position but would like to be in position use if it seems desirable.

**Gowen**

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**81. Telegram 492 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 13, 1955, 6:19 p.m.

492. For Johnson. Your 448.

We feel very satisfied with the line you have taken.

We would be willing to have a joint statement which would say in effect:

QUOTE The USA and the CPR have respectively declared on the one hand that Chinese nationals in the US who desire to return to the Chinese mainland are now free to do so, and on the other hand that US nationals on the Chinese mainland who desire to return to the US are now free to do so.

If any national so entitled to return believes that contrary to the above, he is encountering official obstruction to departure, he may in the case of a Chinese inform the Indian Embassy in the USA, and in the case of a US citizen inform the UK mission to the CPR which may investigate the facts and intervene on such civilian's behalf. Furthermore, these missions may render financial assistance needed to permit any civilian to return.

Wide publicity will be given in each case to the provisions of respective declarations and the referred-to missions may also give appropriate publicity.

UNQUOTE

We are willing to omit paragraph 4 our 466 relying in substitution upon the word "now" in the first paragraph above. Also, paragraph 5 of 466 would in the present form become unnecessary.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1255. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles; cleared by McConaughy.

**82. Telegram 495 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 14, 1955

495. For Johnson.

Your 457 and 458 presumably crossed our 492 which authorizes you to agree to joint statement as urged by Wang. This is only concession you should make at August 16 meeting apart from minor drafting changes not involving matters of substance. No retreat position as suggested by proposed substitute paragraph in latter part your 458 authorized and no possibility of any retreat position should be intimated.

We believe it essential to hold tenaciously to our basic position on return of all detained nationals as part of any agreement on representation before we proceed to discussion of Item 2 of Agenda. Wang is eager to obtain representation arrangement and to open up Item 2. If we yield on these key points before we obtain firm commitment covering all our nationals we are left without any suitable pressures which we can exert on behalf remaining detained nationals. It would be doubtful if we could obtain their release without responding to new demands made by Chinese communists under Item 2.

You should maintain unrelenting pressure on Wang for acceptance our principle, relying heavily on statements in Chou's July 30 speech that "The number of American civilians in China is small and their question can be easily settled" and "it should be possible . . . to reach, *first of all*, a reasonable settlement of the question of the return of civilians to their respective countries."

Draft text "agreed announcement" your 457 approved subject to observations below based on our 492.

(A) In Para. 1, first sentence, "Chinese mainland" preferable to "PRC". You may concede this point if you consider advisable.

(B) In same sentence, "now" should be inserted before "entitled" and before "prevented" to make clear that declaration is subject to reasonable termination.

(C) Your Para 2 believed slightly less desirable than Para. 2 our 492, in that latter accords clear right of investigation to Embassy after initiative taken by a national entitled to return.

You should cable us promptly exact text you propose submit.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1355. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in draft by Dulles and Sebald; cleared in substance by Robertson. The time of transmission is illegible.

If you are unable induce Wang accept “agreed announcement” at August 16 meeting, you should express your regret at necessity for another meeting on Item 1.

Dulles

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### 83. Telegram 463 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 15, 1955, 11 a.m.

463. From Johnson.

Following is text agreed announcement I plan present Wang August 16 which incorporates observations Deptel 495:

“Ambassadors of USA and PRC have agreed to announce the measures which their respective governments have adopted with respect to return of nationals of each located in country of other. With respect to Chinese nationals residing in US Ambassador Johnson on behalf of US Government has informed Ambassador Wang that:

1. USA recognizes that Chinese nationals in US who desire return to China mainland are now entitled do so and declares that no Chinese national who desires depart US for China mainland is now being prevented from doing so. This includes all those Chinese nationals who were at one time prevented from departing US.

2. Embassy of Republic of India in US will be authorized assist return to China mainland of those Chinese nationals who desire to do so as follows:

(A) If a Chinese national believes that contrary to declared policy of US he is encountering official obstruction in departure he may so inform Indian Embassy and Indian Embassy may, if desired by PRC, investigate facts and intervene on such national’s behalf with Government of US.

(B) If a Chinese national in US who desires to return to China mainland has difficulty paying return journey, Indian Embassy may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.

3. Government of US will give wide publicity to foregoing arrangements and Embassy of India in US may also do so.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1555. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

With respect to American nationals residing on China mainland Ambassador Wang on behalf of PRC has informed Ambassador Johnson that:

1. PRC recognizes that American nationals on China mainland who desire return to US are now entitled to do so and declares that no American national who desires to depart China mainland for US is now being prevented from doing so. This includes all those American nationals who were at one time prevented from departing China mainland.

2. Embassy of UK rpt UK in PRC will be authorized to assist return to US of those American nationals who desire to do so as follows:

(A) If an American national believes that contrary to declared policy of PRC he is encountering official obstruction in departure he may so inform UK Embassy and UK Embassy may, if desired by US, investigate facts and intervene on such national's behalf with Government of PRC.

(B) If an American national on China mainland who desires return to US has difficulty paying return journey, UK Embassy may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.

3. Government of PRC will give wide publicity to foregoing arrangements and Embassy of UK in PRC may also do so."

Comments follow.

Gowen

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#### 84. Telegram 464 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 15, 1955, 10 a.m.

464. From Johnson.

Comments on agreed announcement my telegram 463 follow.

1. Expect Wang to object "China Mainland" and would be prepared agree to PRC for small bargaining advantage from this concession. Assume Department would prefer "PRC" to "China".

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1555. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

2. If Wang appears willing consider substance but objects form I will as concession suggest working gour<sup>2</sup> (Clough from our side) combine text information from along lines Department telegram 492 ad referendum.

Gowen

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<sup>2</sup> As received, verification upon request. [Footnote is in the original.]

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## 85. Telegram 112 from USUN<sup>1</sup>

New York, August 15, 1955, 6 p.m.

112. Verbatim text.

Pre US-Chinese Communist talks.

SYG sent Lodge today "personal and confidential" note enclosing copy of August 4 letter from Chou En-lai and memo of SYG's conversation with Wang Ping-nan. Memo pouched Department, letter reads:

"I thank you for your message of August 2, transmitted to me through Ambassador Wang Ping-nan.

"As I have told you through Ambassador Wistrand, the action taken by the Chinese Government in connection with the release of the 11 guilty American airmen has nothing to do whatsoever with the resolution of the United Nations or with the report to the United Nations. I once again want you to take note of this because the American side is now making propaganda again in an attempt to link this action of the Chinese Government with the United Nations.

"I appreciate your goodwill in expressing to Ambassador Wang Ping-nan your desire to make your best efforts to facilitate the Sino-American talks. The Chinese Government has already acted in a way which will facilitate positive results from the Sino-American talks. I hope you will persuade the American side to respond also by deeds. Signed Chou En-lai."

Wadsworth

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1555. Confidential.

**86. Telegram 496 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 15, 1955, 10:57 a.m.

496. For Johnson.

In event a break threatens over Point 1 of agenda, we think you should inform Wang that we suggest a recess of two weeks or some such time to permit CHICOMS to complete their investigation of certain American cases, a short time which should be ample in view Chou En-lai's July 30 statement that "the number of American civilians in China is small, and their question can be easily settled" and that US at time of recessing would make a public statement somewhat as follows:

QTE The US is prepared to make a joint declaration with the C.P.R. which would confirm formally a) that all nationals of either under the authority of the other who desire to return home are now free to do so; b) that a third party in each country may be designated to assist such return if ever a national desiring to return believes that, contrary to declared policy, he is encountering official obstruction, and c) that such third party may also be the means of providing financial assistance to those desiring to return.

However, this joint declaration is not now being made because the C.P.R. reports that it has not yet completed its investigation of certain US cases. Therefore, the talks are recessed for quote blank unqte weeks at the end of which time we hope the C.P.R will join with the US in making a joint declaration such as the US is now prepared to make.

Despite the present recess, the US is continuing its own policy of permitting Chinese nationals in the US who desire to return to the mainland to do so.

The US hopes and believes that agreement on the release of Americans on the China mainland can be reached by the end of the period of recess, having in mind Mr. Chou En-lai's statement of July 30, 1955 that "the number of American civilians in China is small, and their question can be easily settled." UNQTE

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1555. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dulles; cleared by McConaughy.

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**87. Telegram 361 to New Delhi<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 15, 1955, 8:09 p.m.

361. Your 305 repeated Geneva 27.

You may inform Nehru, stressing information confidential unless and until agreement announced, that we understand Chinese Communists, if agreement on return of nationals reached at Geneva, intend designate India as their representative to assist Chinese in US who express wish to return to mainland. Assure Nehru US will welcome such designation if agreement on repatriation materializes and if Chinese Communists do in fact designate India. US will be glad facilitate discharge of Indian Embassy responsibilities under agreement.

FYI Question of third party representation being discussed Geneva. No disagreement either side regarding identity suggested third parties PAREN UK in case Americans, India in case Chinese PAREN. Delay in agreement has resulted primarily from Chinese Communist unwillingness so far match U.S. position of declaring categorically all other-side nationals free depart. This unwillingness in marked and disappointing contrast Chou En-lai's July 30 statement QUOTE number American civilians in China is small and question can be easily settled UNQUOTE. At meeting Geneva 16th will again attempt secure Chinese Communist agreement joint announcement this basis. On basis of proposal, third-country embassy would, in response complaint from returning national that he encountering obstruction to departure, be empowered investigate facts and intervene on such national's behalf. Could also render financial assistance for travel as needed.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1455. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 513. Drafted by Osborn; cleared by Dulles, Allen (NEA), McConaughy, and Jones (SOA).



**88. Letter from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 15, 1955

Dear Alexis:

Doug Forman left this morning for Geneva. I believe he will be able to give you a useful fill-in on the thinking here and the general background of the decisions which have been taken. We took special pains to bring him in on meetings with both the Secretary and Mr. Robertson so he has the feel of their approach to the various problems.

Walter Robertson left at noon yesterday for a two weeks rest and sick leave at Meadow Farm and at Richmond. He wants us to keep him closely informed of any major developments, either favorable or unfavorable, this notwithstanding the fact that he is supposed to dismiss official cares while he is away. He saw your 457 and 458 just before he left on Sunday, and could not have been more emphatic in his reaction that we should not give up our main trading points in return for half a loaf or less. He felt that to do so would mean throwing in the sponge when we may have come close to the point of agreement on all the Americans. His view was generally shared by all who were working on the matter including the Secretary. Still a lot of thought went into the preparation of our 495.

Enclosed is an excerpt from a report we have received from Airman Benjamin in regard to Snoddy and Schwartz the pilots of the Downey-Fecteau plane mentioned in my last letter:

"1. In a debriefing of the 11 airmen in Hong Kong and Tokyo, Airman Benjamin stated that he and Fecteau had become close friends during the period between 7 to 28 December 1954 when the airmen and Downey and Fecteau were held in the same cells. Airman Benjamin said that Fecteau had stated the following in regard to Snoddy and Schwartz, the pilots of the plane:

'On the second pass the Chinese Communist guns opened up with incendiaries, the aircraft was hit and crashed... The plane was not badly smashed. I ran from the plane and feel badly that I did not check on the pilots. Several minutes later I heard shots and was captured. I was led down a trail stained with blood. Possibly the pilots are alive.'

Benjamin himself said that he thought he had seen the pilots in a group of prisoners and believed they were still alive."

I do not believe that you can usefully exploit this information in your current talks. Let us know if you think differently.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Printed from an unsigned copy.

We are looking forward to Ed Martin's return on the 18th. No doubt he will be able to give us much illuminating background on the talks which will enable us to visualize the situation better.

We intend to arrange for him to see the Secretary shortly after his arrival.

I do not anticipate that Wang will precipitate a complete impasse at tomorrow's meeting, but a message which the Secretary has just drafted suggesting the possibility of a two week recess and a public statement by us will cover that contingency.

Regards and good wishes,  
Sincerely,

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#### 89. Telegram 485 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 16, 1955, 1 p.m.

485. From Johnson.

Two hour twenty minute meeting with no progress. Next meeting Thursday.

Meeting consisted almost entirely of reiteration previous positions of both sides. Wang pressing hard on my unwillingness agree to second sentence first paragraph his August 11 draft and I pressing hard for release all Americans. No sign any relaxation their position but atmosphere was relatively mild and he was not pushing for any break. Stated qte propaganda campaign unqte resulting from release 11 fliers was having qte adverse effect unqte on talks here.

Details and comments follow.

**Gowen**

Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 8/16/ 9:20 a.m. EMB (CWO)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1655. Confidential; Niact.

**90. Telegram 490 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 16, 1955, 5 p.m.

490. From Johnson.

As stated my 485 no visible progress made today on fundamental issue of return of Americans. Wang stuck firmly to his previous position on cases being reviewed and we would promptly be informed results those completed. He raised no objections to form our draft agreed announcement (Mytel 463) and confined objections to para one, pressing for substitution para one his draft and for broadening scope para 2 (A) to include inquiries initiated by respective governments. Only other point was substitution "China" for "China mainland" to which I countered with substitution by People's Republic of China to which he made no definite reply. However he reserved right further comment.

I again argued against broadening scope para 2 (A) as unnecessary and pointed out direct mention of and discretion given PRC our draft that para. Discussion this point inconclusive.

However discussion centered around two versions para one with much talk from Wang about international law, sovereignty, extra-territoriality, jurisdiction over foreigners, attempt by US establish principle Americans not subject PRC law, reciprocal and bilateral nature their para one which recognizes US jurisdiction over Chinese in US, they not asking US exempt from US jurisdiction Chinese in US involved in crimes or having unsettled debts, why should we ask them do so for Americans in China etc.

In reply I disclaimed intention raise theoretical questions jurisdiction. Our para one dealt with practical situation and we asked them say no more than we said ourselves. Said I recognized their desire handle matter within framework their law, para one our draft specifically designed enable them to do so, was not something imposed but simply statement what each government decided do within framework its sovereignty and laws. Chou's statement before talks led me believe would promptly and easily be done with respect Americans. Puzzlement at time thus far consumed with no results whatever on Americans. All I had were vague statements cases being "reviewed". Simultaneous release of flyers who had received varying sentences pointed up what could be done when they wanted to (he had previously alluded to flyers) etc. In reply my specific questions as to what he objected in para one our draft he indicated might be acceptable if second sentence first para his draft added. I immediately rejected pointing out that as far as

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1655. Confidential; Priority.

Americans in China concerned this took away [garble] give to two sentences our draft and still left Americans where they were when these talks started. Said I held no brief for exact wording our para one, what I was interested in was substance which I considered vital. Willing consider any wording he might suggest with same substance. At end long discussion these lines both tacitly agreed neither had anything more to say and agreed meet Thursday with usual fencing as to who was going to do most thinking over subject during interim.

At close this phase he said wished "raise another point" and brought up "propaganda campaign" which had been "launched in order slander Chinese people" etc. Since beginning talks PRC "has repeatedly made clear its conciliatory attitude" questions "mistreatment" raised. PRC could "endlessly recount miserable treatment" captured Chinese in Korea, campaign was having "adverse effects" talks here etc. I had clear feeling he had received specific instructions make statement and that he was somewhat reluctant do so. I deliberately showed anger and curtly replied I did not understand his motive in raising, accounts I had seen were factual interviews with men released. Our free press, accounts not unique almost all released have told similar accounts, fault was not with accounts but with treatment that gave rise to accounts, these reports had raised anxiety in US over Americans in China and made it all more important find early resolution to problem. He was somewhat taken aback and endeavored smooth atmosphere before we left.

**Gowen**

NOTE: Mr. Waddell's Office (FE) notified 8/17/55 3:25 p.m. EMB (CWO)

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## **91. Telegram 499 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 16, 1955, 8 p.m.

499. From Johnson.

At 7th meeting August 16 I began by referring to Wang's statement last meeting that he desired deal concretely with problem of return civilians of respective countries rather than in abstract terms. Said I agreed entirely this approach and I had come here to seek concrete,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1655. Secret; Limit Distribution.

practical way of effecting return to US of American nationals detained his country and was prepared make every reasonable effort meet his viewpoint concerning Chinese nationals US. With regard to latter he had made certain proposals and I had immediately informed him my government had taken most far-reaching action within its power to meet basic question raised by his proposals. That is US Government had rescinded all measures heretofore restricting departure some few Chinese and there now was no measure preventing any Chinese desiring do so from freely departing. In additional effort meet his viewpoint I had told him consideration being given his proposal on third party representation.

I continued I had consistently attempted make it clear I expected his government would take similar measures regarding Americans detained his country. That is take whatever measures necessary permit return to US of all who desired return thus equalizing situation two groups nationals this regard in respective countries. Said I had tried make clear I not attempting dictate what action his government should take to bring about this result since this obviously something only his government could and should decide. Pointing out this was 7th meeting and 3rd week these talks, I said I did not know of single American civilian previously detained his country who had been able depart since beginning of talks. He had only informed me cases all detained Americans being reviewed and that he would inform me results those cases in which reviews completed if I would meet certain conditions. I commented that action taken by US Government with respect Chinese nationals in US was without conditions.

I said I found myself puzzled by situation and amount of time it was taking to settle problem, particularly in view statement his Prime Minister that number American civilians in China small and question easily settled. Prime Minister also had said it should be possible reach first of all reasonable settlement question return civilians their respective countries. I had been patiently hoping and expecting his government would take action to bring about this result but my hopes thus far in vain.

I told Wang I had given much thought to seeking resolution situation we faced and had also attempted meet his desires with respect to single agreed text. I then read text of draft agreed announcement (Mytel 463). I pointed out language in draft identical with respect each country. I was not proposing or suggesting anything with respect Americans his country that I was not prepared to say with respect Chinese in US. It seemed to me this agreed announcement fully met needs nationals both countries on basis full equality and reciprocity. It was based in large part upon proposal he first made August 2 and also contained much from his

August 11 draft proposal. I concluded I was prepared immediately agree with him on this draft and announce it today.

Following 10 minute recess requested by Wang, he stated he had made preliminary comparison my draft with his August 11 draft. He noted my draft did not include a few points in his.

1. Quoting first paragraph his August 11 draft, Wang declared we should not object provisions this paragraph. At last meeting he had stated that under condition that agreement reached on question return civilians both sides Chinese Government would be in position inform me of results investigation cases of Americans on which investigation completed. In my draft no mention made of nationals involved in civil or criminal cases. International law recognizes right of sovereign state exercise jurisdiction over civil or criminal cases in its territory. To demand a state refrain from exercising jurisdiction is obviously infringement on its sovereignty. In past used to be such things as extra-territoriality in China but such unreasonable things now gone forever. Wang said I had repeatedly indicated my aim was to secure return all Americans in China who desired return. As he had repeatedly pointed out all those not involved in civil or criminal cases able to leave anytime. Even with respect to Americans involved in unfinished cases, Chinese Government would review cases and grant lenient treatment making allowance for nature of crime and conduct of individual in accordance Chinese legal process. Such persons could leave promptly on completion their cases. He was sure I could appreciate sincerity of this offer. However if my intention was that American nationals now or in future should be permitted leave prior to settlement their cases he must point out frankly this impossible. There might also be few cases of Chinese in US involved in civil or criminal cases though he didn't know of any. Could be seen situation two sides quite different. US maintained liaison station Hong Kong to gather information on American citizens in China. He had also given me information on all American nationals in China. However his government had no liaison station close to US and he had been unable obtain list Chinese nationals from me. Hence he not in position know whether any Chinese nationals involved in civil or criminal cases. He did not believe I had intended propose Chinese nationals involved in civil or criminal cases should never come under jurisdiction American law and should be permitted leave prior settlement their cases. Hence he held that reference in draft to nationals involved in civil or criminal cases was reasonable and applied equally both sides.

2. Reference was made in draft to cases American nationals previously detained in China. He must point out as general principle Chinese Government did not detain American nationals in China. So there was nothing in common with the situation in US where orders issued to

prevent departure Chinese students. All Americans in China applying to depart granted exit permits promptly. Where such application involved procedural questions they granted permission promptly on completion procedural question. Even in case American civilians violating Chinese law they dealt with in lenient spirit and in accordance legal procedure. Therefore he must point out allegation that Chinese Government had detained American nationals was quite contrary to fact.

3. In August 11 draft he had proposed government of each side might on behalf its nationals request intervention of entrusted power in order solve difficulties in connection their departure or conduct investigation so as to make representations on basis investigation. He considered this proposal reasonable and necessary. After implementation of third party arrangement it goes without saying that nationals could request without restriction intervention by third party. However among those desiring return might be some who wanted to let their government know their difficulties. In past there were number of Chinese nationals who appealed his government assist their return. Dr. Tsien was one such case. Under such circumstances government concerned obligated to request third party take necessary action. Furthermore since outset of discussion first agenda item he and I had been making representation on behalf nationals each side desiring return. Obviously we could not make such direct representations regularly as there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries. After implementation third party representation arrangement questions of nationals desiring return could always be referred to third country. Hence it was necessary provide for action of national's country on his behalf.

4. Wang added he objected to one minor point of wording, the reference to "Chinese mainland". He did not think this term appropriate and suggested replace with "China". Wang concluded these were preliminary comments and could be regarded as amendments to my draft. He was ready listen my comments and if I agreed his few amendments he hoped agreement could be reached today.

I replied major difficulty between us seemed paragraph one. We both agreed we were here to deal with practical situation—that of our nationals in other country. I had tried in paragraph one to avoid theoretical concepts and issues and tried to keep to practical situation. I didn't think anything in paragraph one infringed on or raised question of sovereignty or jurisdiction. This was one reason it contained two parts. It simply a statement each government would make in its own right and in full recognition its sovereignty. It was not intended to establish any theoretical concept for future. Intent was to deal with practical situation now facing us under conditions of complete reciprocity and equality. I had carefully tried avoid any attempt dictate to or demand of his

government what it should do. Only his government could and should decide measures to take to deal with practical situation.

I pointed out I had not used the word "detained" in agreement and as used in my statement meant to refer only to those Americans prevented from leaving China. Whatever the reasons we both recognized that Americans being prevented from leaving his country. I was not suggesting his government say anything my government was unwilling to say. As I had pointed out, his paragraph one did not in any way solve problem American nationals.

I had thought it possible we could quickly reach agreement on some form that would resolve situation our nationals. Seemed to me my paragraph did that. I didn't hold any brief for exact wording but thought contained there must be embodied in any announcement. I had come here to discuss return of American nationals. Statement their cases being reviewed did not bring about their return. I was not suggesting how Wang should handle matter but asked him how we were to solve first item, that is, return of our nationals.

I said these were my preliminary remarks, that I was always willing consider minor changes in wording. As for term "China mainland" if he preferred to substitute "People's Republic of China" would not object.

Referring to Wang's desire that draft announcement provide for action by individual's government on his behalf I repeated my statement at last meeting that this unnecessary. Said Wang had pointed out some nationals in past had written directly to his government. However if arrangement we were suggesting were in effect this would be unnecessary as Chinese in US could communicate directly with Indian Embassy. I pointed out my draft specifically provided that representation by the Indian Embassy on behalf of Chinese nationals would only be undertaken if desired by his government.

Wang said problem lies in first paragraph of proposed agreement. First paragraph his draft already included idea of ours. Of course he agreed we were here to resolve practical issues rather than discuss theoretical concepts. Two points were involved. One that both sides declare nationals of each in other desiring return be allowed to do so without restriction and other that any such national involved in civil or criminal case might also return as soon as his case settled. There was no intention include anything unfair to one side. Merely attempt settle practical issues. Point to keep in mind was mutual respect of each for other's law or sovereignty. Wang said he had not been in US and not familiar with situation there but could easily imagine case of a foreign national doing business there who happened incur debt he unable to clear. Could US Government allow him leave before he had cleared debt? Suppose foreign national driving automobile killed someone. Could American Government permit him leave without



first settling case? He hoped I was considering problem from both sides instead just one. He was sure both of us willing seek formula to solve problem facing us. First paragraph his draft should be acceptable since not harmful either side.

I replied I had never suggested cases of Americans should be settled outside framework his law. I understood his viewpoint. However I had understood from public statement his Prime Minister that since American cases few they could be settled easily and promptly. I assumed he desired to do so within framework his law. I had tried to find formula which would accomplish result I was seeking and still not go beyond framework his law. There might be other ways to do this but this was my idea.

Wang replied that statement by Prime Minister Chou and provisions of first paragraph were of course within framework of laws of sovereign state permitting departure of those nationals who desired go except those involved in civil or criminal cases. Prime Minister's statement was put forth in spirit conciliation in order settle questions between two countries.

Wang continued that he recalled when we first met last year I had inquired whether Chinese legal procedure provided for commutation of sentences or pardon. He had replied that in cases persons violating Chinese law Chinese Government could consider commutation in light degree of crime and person's conduct. Also recent release of American airmen provided clear example this regard. They already sentenced but to give these talks good atmosphere and as token goodwill to American people, Chinese Government had granted early release. Provisions in first paragraph his draft very reasonable providing those desiring return may do so and those violating law or involved in civil cases may promptly return upon settlement their cases. Suppose American merchant in China should be involved in debt case. Chinese Government willing help him clear debts and resolve case so that he can return at early date. Chinese Government always willing give greatest cooperation help settle these questions. In light all this he hoped his paragraph one could be retained in joint announcement.

I asked Wang how he felt my paragraph departed in principle from statements he had made. It didn't deny Chinese Government's right to handle matters any way it desired. It simply stated solution to practical problem.

Wang then suggested amending my paragraph by inserting second sentence his paragraph. I pointed out second sentence his paragraph took away from American nationals everything granted them in rest of paragraph since American nationals prevented from departing China were described by him as involved in crimes or civil cases. So far as Americans concerned, this put us back where we started.

Wang denied this could be regarded as returning us to status quo ante. He repeated he only wanted indicate that both sides do not restrict return of civilians and that persons involved in civil or criminal cases could return as soon as cases completed. This applied both sides equally and he hoped I would agree.

I replied I couldn't agree since it left practical situation of detained Americans in exactly same situation as when talks began.

Wang then proposed I study his proposed amendment to see if we could agree on text at next meeting.

I replied I would gladly study it but could not see how it solved question my nationals his country. How were we to resolve practical problem of return American nationals? I said Wang had mentioned the eleven fliers. We had our own opinion concerning that and I didn't want to engage in controversy. However I understood although all were sentenced to different terms that all released together. It seemed to me would not be impossible find solution to rest of American cases. Said I would be glad to hear Wang's ideas next meeting on problem I was here to discuss, namely return of Americans. Added I had made my best effort find formula to meet his viewpoint.

Wang commented he hoped I would note that comments he had made were not only of benefit to one side but both. He hoped hear at next meeting results my consideration his comments.

Wang then said would like to raise another point. He had noted lately propaganda campaign had been launched regarding release of 11 airmen in order slander Chinese people. This propaganda provoked feelings of Chinese people. Since talks began Chinese Government had repeatedly made clear conciliatory attitude. Chinese public opinion always cautious regarding progress these talks. If one were to draw on question of mistreatment there would be no end to his recounting miserable treatment of Chinese People's Volunteers captured in Korea. He had avoided raising this sort of question since it would not be in interest present talks. He only wanted express feeling on their part which he hoped I would note.

I replied I didn't know Wang's motive in rising this matter. First, I didn't know what he meant by "propaganda campaign". All I had seen were factual interviews and accounts of the men released. I told Wang he was perfectly aware American press practice and our free press. Also perfectly aware US Government could not, even if it would, prevent publication such accounts. Furthermore these men's accounts not unique. Almost every person released from prison his country has given similar accounts. Fault does not lie with these accounts but in treatment that gave rise to them. Accounts of eleven fliers had tremendously increased anxiety of American people over those Americans remaining

in his country. This made it all the more important to find solution for return those who remain. Said I had no desire discuss this with Wang but since he had raised it I had been forced to do so. I didn't see how it contributed to solution of problems we had come here to solve.

Wang said he didn't intend for us to debate this question and had raised point only to remind me there should be conciliatory atmosphere around our talks. As things stood, if anti-Chinese propaganda allowed continue it would not contribute but do harm to our discussions. If I had any concern of this sort he hoped I would tell him of it. He was simply being very frank and telling me what they felt. He saw no reason to engage in further debate here.

Next meeting August 18, 10 a.m.

Gowen

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## 92. Telegram 500 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 16, 1955, 10 p.m.

500. From Johnson.

Believe following are among considerations in planning our next moves:

1. Do not believe we should minimize importance CHICOM devotion to "legal forms" in spite their agility in adopting their forms to suit their political needs. It will be seen from today's meeting as well as previous I have tried hard to leave them a "legal" way out and believe this should be continued.

2. Also believe they now consider flyer release was probably tactical mistake that has largely backfired on them rather than producing hoped-for results. This has not increased standing Peiping proponents of release of American prisoners.

3. Possible additional factor is suspicion from our tactics we have been trying trick them into releasing Americans while holding out bait third party representation which we intended find excuses for withdrawing after release accomplished. Our proposal today will have removed any doubts they may have had this regard.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1655. Secret; Limit Distribution.

Believe present tactic can be continued for little while longer particularly at Thursday's meeting when Wang will have had opportunity receive Peiping reaction our today's proposal. Now believe we should if possible avoid any prolonged recess which would require public explanation and inevitably return problem to public propaganda forum while Americans remained in prison. Therefore believe that I should strive as necessary keep discussion going while continuing maintain my present position.

In order accomplish these purposes and in light today's discussion, request authorization propose at next meeting amendment first sentence numbered paragraph 1 draft "agreed announcement" (Mytel 463) by insertion phrase "as a result of official action taken in accordance with its governmental processes" following words "and declares that". Same amendment to be made in paragraph one PRC section.

Would appreciate any other suggestions Department may have in this regard.

I do not anticipate Wang is going to attempt precipitate any "break" in discussions but rather that he will face me with statement they have gone as far as they can go and there is nothing further to talk about under item one.

At that point I perceive no alternative under our present tactic except to propose a recess as suggested in first paragraph Deptel 496. However I believe that to publicly explain the recess I should first propose to Wang we make a simple joint statement somewhat to the effect that two of us have decided that a recess would be helpful in resolving the remaining problems standing in the way of final agreement. I feel we should if possible avoid unilateral public statement along lines suggested Deptel 496 as seems to me this would constitute a public challenge and return problem to propaganda forum.

Dept will observe Wang pressed me hard today on question raised last para Mytel 458 and my efforts avoid direct reply. Would appreciate Dept's suggestions on what further I might usefully say if as anticipated he continues press me on this.

Gowen

**93. Telegram 523 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 16, 1955, 5:18 p.m.

523. For Johnson.

Code Room: Please repeat USUN's 112 of August 15, 1955, Control Number 7865.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1655. Confidential. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Bond (IO).

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**94. Telegram 526 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 16, 1955, 8 p.m.

526. Personal for Johnson from Secretary. Your 490.

I have the distinct impression that the CHICOMS had intended after announcing release of flyers to proceed promptly at your conference to announce release of US civilians, all in expectation this would create wave of good feeling toward them which would enable them to make gains in discussing other matters. I have also impression they have altered this policy because release of flyers and report of their treatment has created considerable wave of indignation and indeed the editorial and press comment expresses itself with greater hostility toward CHICOMS since the release of flyers than before. Parenthetically, I might mention that after first report of torturing of Colonel Arnold came from Tokyo we asked Defense to try to moderate this theme in interest of civilians and they are cooperating this end.

CHICOMS should realize that whenever prisoners are returned there is inevitably initial wave of resentment as they tell their stories. This is a phase which CHICOMS must live through and they do not get anywhere by postponing it. However, once the American civilians are out of China, then we may be compelled to alter our policy toward

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1655. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Dulles.

visitors to the China mainland because principal reason for deterring those visitors will have ceased, namely that we do not want more Americans to get in until it has been demonstrated that those now there can get out. Subject to possible restraint of Foreign Assets Control Regulations visits will then occur which would bring back reports which if facts justify may lead to a different judgment. I do not know whether CHICOMS realize this possible sequence of events or whether you will want to intimate it to them in a very cautious way without of course any promises. In any event, it may be useful for you to know my thinking on this matter.

Dulles

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95. Telegram 504 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 17, 1955, noon

504. From Johnson.

On re-reading my telegram 500 this morning believe I overstated case against recess in first paragraph following "three considerations." Still believe prolonged recess should be avoided if possible but if it could be carried out as suggested second sentence penultimate paragraph my telegram 500, do not (repeat not) believe it would "inevitably remain problem to public propaganda forum." I would put recess to Wang as constructive helpful suggestion rather than any challenge and attempt agree on simple joint statement of public explanation. Of course any recess this context would be conditional on Wang's agreement and believe he would probably resist. I do believe issuance unilateral statement as suggested Department's telegram 496 would have adverse effect and should be avoided unless and until it is clear I can make no further progress in private talks and it is desirable return to public forum.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1755. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

**96. Telegram 516 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 17, 1955, 7 p.m.

516. From Johnson.

Reference penultimate para Mytels 500 and 504. Following is text of draft agreed announcement which I would propose to Wang in event recess agreed upon.

“During the course of the talks being conducted by the Ambassadors of the USA and the PRC, it has become evident that a certain period of time will be required before it will be possible to agree on a satisfactory solution to agenda item one. Therefore it has been agreed that their next meeting will be held (blank). This will also give the two Ambassadors an opportunity to attend to affairs at their regular posts. It is hoped that at the next meeting it will be possible to reach a mutually acceptable settlement of the problems raised in the discussion of agenda item one so that the Ambassadors can proceed to agenda item two.”

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1755. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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**97. Telegram 541 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 17, 1955

541. For Johnson. Your 500 last paragraph.

Department presently unable to give you anything which would enable you make additional statement on still theoretical problem Chinese possibly in prison US who might wish return to mainland. Your handling Wang queries on this subject based on fact it is not practical problem has our approval and commendation. As you are aware this question in principle has difficult constitutional, administrative and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1655. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; approved in draft by Dulles and Sebald.

political ramifications. It will be looked into by Office Legal Adviser but it is doubtful we can come up with anything which would be helpful to you in context present talks. If no concrete problem this sort arises we anticipate you will be able continue parry Wang's thrusts along lines already established.

Dulles

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98. Telegram 542 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 17, 1955, 7:31 p.m.

542. For Johnson. Your 499, 500, 504, 516.

Department agrees with your analysis situation following seventh meeting. You are authorized in your discretion at eighth meeting tomorrow agree insert phrase QUOTE as a result of official action taken in accordance with its governmental process UNQUOTE in numbered paragraph 1 both sections of draft QUOTE Agreed Announcement UNQUOTE, following words QUOTE and declares that UNQUOTE. Our only reservation on this language stems from fact that US has no exit permit system and statement on US side does not seem completely consistent with our position that no US Government approval ordinarily necessary in order for alien depart from US. However, this objection not fundamental and can be disregarded if you believe incorporation of phrase might be helpful.

It would seem undesirable for you take initiative in proposing recess at next meeting. Our position is that no reason exists for delay in settling all matters under item 1. Therefore, if recess needed it would be only because required by Chinese Communists, and they should take responsibility for proposing it. We should be prepared meet again on item 1 after usual two-day interval if other side does not propose recess. Proposal of recess by us except in case of threatened break would not be consistent with our desire maintain continuous strong pressure on Wang and encourage general impression that action by Chinese Communists to match ours is awaited and expected.

FYI Our 496 was designed primarily to enable you demonstrate to Wang that we were in a strong public relations position. If matters

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1755. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles and McConaughy; cleared in draft by Sebald.



should break we assumed that if Wang were informed as suggested he would ask for time and perhaps reconsider his own position and would most probably strive to avoid recess.

We do feel however that if there should be any extended recess, it would be necessary to state the issue more than indicated your 516. Bear in mind that we do not know anything whatever now that we did not know before regarding return our citizens. They have given nothing, not even information. Also we do not want ourselves to become committed to proposition that it will take time to clear up Item One of the Agenda. In view of Chou En-lai's July 30 statement the interpretation unless rebutted would be that we are making difficulties. Furthermore, we do not want to let Chou off the hook.

Dulles

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**99. Letter from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 17, 1955

Dear Alex:

Since my last letter I have received your first three letters, of August 10, 11, 12. The pouch service seems to be working better now. I hope we can make some arrangement for pouch service more frequent than once a week after the Atomic Conference closes.

Last evening the Secretary sent you a personal message from him concerning the likelihood of travel by Americans to China after all detained Americans are released. You will note that a qualification was put in concerning the possible effect of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations. This is something that would have to be discussed with Treasury and Commerce. If we made exceptions for American travelers there would be immediate pressures to make corresponding provision for Americans who wanted to buy Chinese Communist merchandise. The whole economic warfare effort to deny dollars to the Chinese Communists might well be undermined. So the question will have to be considered in the broader context of our entire policy of total severance of financial, trade and transportation relations with the China mainland. There is still food for thought in the Secretary's suggestion though it

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Printed from an unsigned copy.

may not be entirely clear how you can best exploit it, if at all in your talks with Wang.

Ed Martin is due here today and we hope that he will have a chance to talk to the Secretary this afternoon.

You are certainly getting a better press here now. The American press sees clearly the failure of the Chinese Communists to match our position on unrestricted right of return of nationals. You are getting a sympathetic press and there seems no longer to be any feeling that you are less out-giving to the press than is Wang Ping-nan.

I might mention, not for any use by you, but merely that your background may be as informed as possible, the fact that we are undoubtedly paying quite a stiff price in Taiwan for these conversations. There has been a subtle but none the less perceptible decline in morale and inclination to follow through with full energy and cooperativeness on various programs there. The MAAG, ICA and CAS missions in Taipei have all felt this and to some extent have been handicapped by it. There is a let down which we must hope will be temporary. The informed people in the Government, of course, know in considerable detail of your instructions and the progress of the talks. They know that they are not going to be let down but this assurance apparently does not extend to the Legislative Yuan, the press and the general public. Even those who know that we are not going to undermine their interests at Geneva feel that the mere fact of the talks improves the status of the Chinese Communists and betters the prospects of success in their campaign for general acceptance as the only Chinese Government. Foreign Vice Minister Shan is here on a brief visit. He has received further assurances from us. Just to show the trend of the thinking of our people in Taipei, the following is quoted from a letter received from Bill Cochran our Charge at Taipei, while Karl Rankin is on home-leave:

"Saigon's 3 August 5 (585 to Dept.) reports considerable uneasiness there as regards the Ambassadorial talks in Geneva. This, added to the bad effects caused here, raises in my mind the question: will the benefits obtained from the talks outweigh the damage done to the confidence of our real, fighting friends (as distinguished from our fair-weather friends, the fence-sitters, and the *amici hermaphroditi* who aren't sure what they are) in our resolution, persistence, and dependability. If not, won't we have lost something more valuable than we have gained?—for we can never satisfy the avidity of the neutralists for concessions on our part."

The Secretary has been informed of the message of appreciation conveyed in your letter of August 12. He in turn is pleased at the way you are handling the negotiations. You have undoubtedly carried out your instructions to apply unrelenting pressure to Wang at the August 16 meeting. We feel that he is on the defensive on the basic issue, despite all

his efforts to transfer the onus. We will be interested to see if you consider it advisable to use the authority you have to suggest a recess if there is no progress at the eighth meeting on August 18. We feel that only you can determine this in the light of Wang's position and demeanor at the next meeting. It should be becoming increasingly apparent to Wang that there is no give in our position on this fundamental issue.

We have authorized Cooper to tell Nehru of the prospective arrangement for limited Indian representation, emphasizing the fact that it is sensitive information and that no agreement has yet been reached. Cooper is authorized to assure Nehru that if the arrangement goes through, we will welcome the proposed Indian role and will accord all facilities for its discharge.

I am letting Carl McCardle know of the pretty cogent reasons you gave why you decided against holding a backgrounder. In Walter Robertson's absence Bill Sebald is being kept closely informed of the contents of your official-informals, and anything which we think would be useful for the Secretary to have is being passed on to him.

Congratulations on your adroit handling of countless difficulties and good luck,

Sincerely,

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#### 100. Telegram 520 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 18, 1955, 2 p.m.

520. From Johnson.

Two hours and 20 minutes this morning repetition same themes both sides with no progress.

Wang presented proposal virtually identical with our August 16 draft agreement announcement except for vital first paragraph which he proposed be amended read as follows:

"1. The People's Republic of China recognizes that American Nationals in the PRC who desire to return are entitled to do so and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can exercise their right to return."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1855. Confidential; Niact.

His theme was this was "key which would open door" to solution problem Americans in China and again offered promptly give me names whose cases "review completed" making clear this grant release.

My theme was contrast action we had taken Chinese US. He was asking I open door without showing me what was behind it, that if he would show me what was behind it and if it met my request on release all Americans question timing could be worked out.

He inflexibly resisted my persistent pressure give me any assurance or even indication that his solution would bring about release all Americans. Result was complete deadlock *but* no effort by him to precipitate any break or hint at recess. Next meeting Saturday, 10 a.m.

**Gowen**

NOTE: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 8/18/11:52 a.m. EMB (CWO)

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#### 101. Telegram 537 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 18, 1955, 7 p.m.

537. From Johnson.

1. In addition my 520, at this morning's meeting many references by Wang to "pressure", "demands", "would never respond pressure" etc all of which I of course attempted counter. When on this theme he showed more feeling than on any other point.

2. However irrational, their position seems to be that if they release all Americans before or simultaneous with representation agreement it would publicly be interpreted as "yielding to pressure". They are willing announce release some Americans as purely unilateral act prior to public announcement representation arrangement but must first have firm commitment. They will then subsequently announce further release Americans but will not commit themselves to all as this would be "interference with *their* sovereignty, legal processes" etc. etc.

3. I went as far as I felt I could under my present instructions to meet whatever substance this may have in their minds by stating

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1855. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

that if their solution encompassed release all Americans and it was only question timing in relation announcement representation arrangement this could be worked out. However, Wang showed no interest. He also showed no interest in my amendment para one by insertion phrase “as result official action taken in accordance with its governmental processes”.

4. His replies to my references Chou’s statement were weak and beside the point. He avoided direct reply to my reminder that he had promised me last year “review” cases and that in interim only five civilians out of thirty had been released from prison.

5. Deadlock is now very tight and little scope for further discussion until there is some shift in position one side or other.

6. Subject to Dept’s suggestions or instructions believe I can do little at next meeting but reiterate our positions as necessary and pick up remaining questions on representation arrangement which is subject separate tel.

(I deliberately avoided details representation arrangement today in order concentrate on and highlight fundamental issue.)

7. Would appreciate Dept’s instructions on whether if negotiating situation permits it would approve my attempting explore possibility release some now with commitment release remainder within definite time limit, say three months. Even if it could be obtained CHICOMS would in all probability not be willing make such commitment public.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell (FE) notified, 8/18/55, 5:30 PM, LWH.

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## 102. Telegram 538 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 18, 1955, 6 p.m.

538. Eyes Only for the Secretary. From Johnson.

I have feeling now would be useful time for me to invite Wang to private dinner with only interpreters present. Have available place I believe safe from press attention.

If we are going maintain our present position believe I can do much in such an atmosphere reinforce firmness our stand and at same

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1855. Secret.

time put across thoughts contained Urtel 526 in way that is not possible in atmosphere meetings.

He is obviously at end his instructions and I have feeling gesture such as this at this time might help in moving Chou.

However would appreciate your advice.

Gowen

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### 103. Telegram 540 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 18, 1955, 5 p.m.

540. From Johnson.

1. Revised draft given me by Wang August 18 made following changes in draft transmitted Mytel 463:

A. Numbered paragraph one revised as reported Mytel 520.

B. Words "the USA agrees that" inserted at beginning numbered paragraph two.

C. Word "official" omitted from phrase "encountering official obstruction" in paragraph 2 (A).

D. "Office of the Charge d'Affaires of the UK" used throughout in place "Embassy of the UK".

E. Paragraph 2 (A) reworded to read: "(A) If any Chinese national believes that contrary to declared policy of the US he is encountering obstruction in departure he may so inform the Indian Embassy and request it to make representations on his behalf with the US Government. If desired by the PRC the Indian Embassy may also make investigation on the facts."

F. "PRC" substituted throughout for "China mainland".

2. In addition to above changes in text Wang also read and handed me copy of statement intended to establish supplementary understandings not to be incorporated in text of agreed announcement. Gist of points made was:

A. I had stated that nothing in agreed announcement in any way infringed on sovereignty or jurisdiction and that I presumed cases of Americans would be settled within framework Chinese judicial procedure. On basis Wang's understanding of these statements of mine he

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1855. Confidential.

willing to omit sentence his original draft referring to persons involved in unfinished civil or criminal cases.

B. If nationals either side reported to own government they being prevented from leaving, their government could refer such complaint to the third country for investigation or representation. If we would agree to understanding to this effect, Wang would be willing omit this provision from agreed announcement.

3. Comments on para one above.

A. Obviously unacceptable.

B. Do not see this is materially objectionable in context but prefer language our draft.

C. Believe it important retain “official” as in our draft.

D. Would appreciate being informed whether UK objects to this terminology.

E. Not clear on motive behind this ostensibly slight change but may be related to their proposal on “understandings” mentioned para two (B) above. Would appreciate Dept’s instructions.

F. Unobjectionable.

4. Comments on para two above.

A. Meaningless unless agreement reached on release all Americans. However this again raises point of their jurisdiction over Americans and conversely our jurisdiction over Chinese. Believe at same point it is going be necessary for me say jurisdiction not questioned at least for future. That is make clear we not attempting re-establish any extraterritorial principle.

B. Will maintain our present position.

Gowen

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#### 104. Telegram 543 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 18, 1955, 8 p.m.

543. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened meeting with prepared statement and revision text proposed announcement. (Text revisions in separate tel). He said his agreement to revised text based on understanding two points:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1855. Confidential.

A. That announcement in no way infringed upon or raised question about Chinese sovereignty or jurisdiction over Americans in China and that US did not attempt dictate PRC what measure it should take, that being matter only his government could decide within framework their own juridical procedures.

B. That nationals either side may report to entrusted third country and also their own government in order latter may refer complaints to third country in case their departure being prevented.

2. Wang requested these two points be included in record of meeting as conditions governing his agreement to revised proposal which he stated followed form and content our proposal.

3. I replied I was interested in practical situation Americans his country. Asked what was effect Wang's revised paragraph one with respect all Americans now prevented from returning US for whatever reason.

4. Wang stated Chinese Government never put restrictions on American nationals. Those desiring return free do so but those who violated law quite another problem. These latter Americans may also leave country upon settlement their cases, as guaranteed by proposed agreement. Item one of agenda now settled by provisions this first paragraph because Americans who desired return could do so. US Government in past restricted departure Chinese students but these orders rescinded so no need include in first paragraph.

5. I replied not at all clear to me how statement his proposed text affects American nationals now prevented from returning.

6. Wang repeated these are two different matters, and not possible make concrete stipulation in announcement regarding either Chinese students or American nationals. If agreement reached on announcement then these specific matters could be settled in light of agreement. Added it was his opinion sentence regarding Americans whose cases unsettled could have been included in announcement but because I objected they willing leave out sentence provided understanding reached regarding sovereignty and jurisdiction over such aliens. As to specific cases return certain Americans, he promised inform us results after agreement on announcement and even this morning. He repeated that reference to nationals being prevented from returning applied only to American Government restrictions on students as Chinese never issued orders preventing departure Americans.

7. Wang continued that we had referred to Chou En-Lai's statement number of Americans small and problem easily solved. He said Chou's meaning is clear that if agreement reached on method specified in announcement then specific cases could be solved using this method. Emphasized infringement on sovereign and internal affairs Chinese state clearly could not be tolerated.



8. I replied I could not understand meaning his reference to infringing sovereignty his government. Wang had asked me take measures permit all Chinese in US leave if they desired. Measures we took permit them leave were completely within our law. We did this in response request his government and we did not consider it infringement our sovereignty. In same way we asked him take measures permit Americans China return and we hoped and expected he would do this during talks as we had done, unilaterally and without conditions. However, Chinese had not acted and I could not agree that question announcement and question Americans in China were two different matters.

9. I continued that Wang at last meeting had raised question of sovereignty and jurisdiction over Americans in China. Suggested might help insert following clause in paragraph one draft announcement: "As the result official action in accord with government processes". I suggested this because it reaffirmed that everything we were doing was in accord our laws and government processes.

10. Wang ignored this suggestion and returned his original argument, saying two problems before us were: (A) whether nationals could return freely to their countries, and (B) whether governments doing whatever possible help their return. Ambassadorial talks concerned primarily bring about return nationals desiring to do so and proposed announcement solved this question. He said Chinese tried meet US halfway and listed compromises he claimed his side had already made to meet our objections. He stated specific cases Americans cannot be included in text of agreement in present form which is most just and reasonable solution question. His government has taken steps and is prepared take further steps effect return Americans.

11. I replied perhaps his government had not issued special order preventing departure Americans but in fact they unable leave China. Our two government processes differ and US has no exit permit system. We have each taken measures against some nationals on other side. I had informed Wang exactly what we had done and against which of Chinese citizens. In contrast he told me simply that cases Americans detained China being reviewed. This left my nationals in very vague situation. I asked again whether review and action by his government on American cases would fully meet request I made that all Americans will "now" be permitted depart. I said if I understood his remarks correctly, this was not their meaning.

12. I continued by saying at our meeting a year ago Wang informed me cases Americans being reviewed but during following year only five American civilians imprisoned in China were released and 25 civilians remained in jail. Judging by this experience, his statement cases will be reviewed does not indicate civilians will return

promptly US. I stated I have tried make it as clear as possible I was here to discuss return all US civilians but we are no closer to resolution that problem than when we started three weeks ago. I hoped statement made by Chou meant situation different now from last year but apparently not. I emphasized I had been frank and hoped he would be equally frank because not in interest either party keep this matter dragging on. Simple, straightforward solution problem of civilians was permit them to return.

13. Wang returned previous line argument by saying my remarks deviated from discussion wording proposed announcement. He stated when last year he asked US rescind all restrictions Chinese nationals I had said US laws could not be changed. He said I should not now demand Chinese Government change their law governing civilians involved cases. Said 1,523 Americans left China since 1949, 38 left this year and review of remaining cases are additional indications his government's lenient policy within framework Chinese law. He added if anyone had tried force his government release 11 American airmen they would not have been freed. They were released only to improve relations two countries. Attitude PRC toward Americans in prison is to help them leave as soon as possible. He said they had agreed to changes in text joint announcement and could not see reason for further delay. They had made their best effort and Americans could not object or consider arrangement unjust.

14. I replied again [garble] was not text of announcement but the return of the Americans. Phrase "preventing departure" seemed describe action Chinese regarding American civilians but maybe Wang knew better word. Any solution arrived at must make clear beyond doubt that question return of Americans had been resolved. I emphasized we not attempting dictate how problem should be handled nor ask changes laws or procedures and hoped, in view Chinese statement, PRC able reach solution in accordance their laws.

15. Wang replied agreement is like key and we have only to take it to open door to see results review cases Americans. He said efforts reach agreement should come from both sides but he saw no compromises being made by US.

16. I said hoped he would find it possible next meeting open door wider and tell us whether results his review would be release of all Americans. I added if his reluctance do so was a matter of timing I was sure that could be worked out. The one and only request I had made was the release of all Americans and I would accept changes in wording of text to achieve this objective. I had told him exactly what we prepared to do and expected him reply equally frankly.

17. Wang completely ignored my suggestion that question of timing could be worked out. Instead he replied if we not willing take

key, door must remain closed and could not be opened by “violence”. If Americans forced them do anything, frankly it could not be done. Repeated claims American Government made on basis of list tantamount to obliging Chinese to comply. This they could not do because it would mean repudiation procedures in framework Chinese law.

18. I asked Ambassador tell me what I had said that he interpreted as my attempting use “force”. I came here to find solution with him. If he took action regarding our nationals comparable to our action toward his, agreement was possible. He replied by stating my “repeated claims on basis list” was “obliging them to comply. This they could not do” etc, etc.

19. Meeting closed with much sparring, I repeating theme release all Americans and he repeating theme key was in our hands.

**Gowen**

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#### **105. Telegram 562 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 18, 1955, 6:19 p.m.

562. For Johnson. Your 520.

We presume reference second paragraph to QUOTE August 12 draft Agreed Announcement UNQUOTE actually refers to draft agreed announcement quoted your 463 August 15 which was presented to Wang at August 16 meeting PAREN your 490 PAREN.

Please confirm, giving full text Wang’s draft if you have not already done so.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1855. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy.

## 106. Telegram 545 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 19, 1955, noon

545. From Johnson. Deptel 562.

August 16 draft correct. Understand transmission error already corrected.

Mytel 540 gave Wang's amendments our August 16 draft. However avoid any possibility error following is full text first portion Wang's draft. Second portion same *mutatis mutandis*:

"The Ambassadors of the PRC and the USA have agreed to announce the measures which their respective governments have adopted with respect to return of nationals of each located in the country of the other. With respect to American nationals residing in the PRC, Ambassador Wang Ping-nan on behalf of the Government of the PRC has informed Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson that:

1. The PRC recognizes that American nationals in the PRC who desire to return are entitled to do so and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can exercise their right to return.

2. The PRC agrees that the office of the Charge d'Affaires of the UK in the PRC will be authorized to assist the return to the USA of those American nationals who desire to do so follows:

(A) If any American national believes that contrary to declared policy of the PRC he is encountering obstruction in departure he may so inform the office of the Charge d'Affaires of the UK and request it to make representations on his behalf with the Government of the PRC. If desired by the US the office of the Charge d'Affaires of the UK may also make investigation on the facts.

(B) If any American national in the PRC who desires to return to the US has difficulty in paying the return expenses, the office of the Charge d'Affaires of the UK may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.

3. The Government of the PRC will give wide publicity to the foregoing arrangements and the office of the Charge d'Affaires of the UK in the PRC may also do so."

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 10 a.m. 8/19/55 EMB (CWO)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1955. Confidential; Priority.

**107. Telegram 547 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 19, 1955, noon

547. From Johnson. Re New Delhi's 333 rptd Geneva 28.

Seems to me attempt revise draft agreed announcement (Mytel 463) fully to meet point raised by GOI note raises real problems for US. I would suggest substitution phrase "Republic of India" in place "Embassy Republic of India in US" in numbered para two, remainder draft to be left as is but prior agreement GOI thereto to be obtained. In theory CHICOMS should obtain GOI agreement but as CHICOM interest is in enlarging scope representation believe it would be preferable if we also did so.

Would appreciate instructions prior to Saturday's meeting as Wang will probably raise.

**Gowen**

Note: FE message center notified 8:30 am 8/19 EMB (CWO)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1955. Secret; Niact.

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**108. Telegram 551 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 19, 1955, 5 p.m.

551. From Johnson.

1. Re last paragraph Deptel 542 and previous on statement to be made in event recess proposed by Wang or proposed by me in case threatened break. In either these events believe first step should be proposal by me of agreed announcement to explain recess. If as I anticipate Wang turns down any agreed announcement acceptable to us way would be cleared under our agreement on private nature of meetings for me to notify him that we intended make unilateral statement along lines Deptel 496. Under our agreement feel I am obliged give him at least 24 hour notification. I would of course hope that our threat make unilateral statement would cause him reconsider.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1955. Confidential.

2. Following is text of agreed announcement which I would propose to him:

3. "For the past ..... weeks, the Ambassadors of the USA and the PRC have been seeking a settlement of item one on their agenda, the return of civilians of both sides to their respective countries. Ambassador Johnson has informed Ambassador Wang that all Chinese in the US who desire to travel to the PRC are now free to do so. Ambassador Wang has informed Ambassador Johnson that all Americans in the PRC who desire to leave are now free to do so, with the exception of those involved in unfinished civil or criminal cases. With respect to the latter, Ambassador Wang has stated that his government is reviewing all cases and that he will report the results of the reviews to Ambassador Johnson.

4. "The two Ambassadors, with the approval of their governments, have also agreed in principle to a joint declaration to be made by the two governments which would formally confirm

(A) That all nationals of either under the authority of the other who desire to return home are now free to do so;

(B) That a third party in each country may be designated to assist such return if ever a national desiring to return believes that, contrary to declared policy, he is encountering official obstruction, and

(C) That such third party may also be the means of providing financial assistance to those desiring to return.

5. "However, Ambassador Wang has indicated the PRC is unable to subscribe unconditionally to this declaration pending completion of the review of all American cases by the PRC. In order to allow for the completion of these reviews, the two Ambassadors have agreed to recess their talks for ..... weeks. It is anticipated that when the talks are resumed it will be possible promptly to reach an agreement which will permit the departure from the PRC of all Americans who desire to leave and the issuance of a joint declaration along the lines of that referred to above.

Unquote.

**Gowen**

**109. Telegram 569 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 19, 1955, 11:46 a.m.

569. For Johnson from the Secretary. Your 520 and 537.

We do not yet have full text proposal referred to your 520. Superficially paragraph 1 seems to represent some advance. Indeed if word QUOTE immediately UNQUOTE were inserted before QUOTE further adopt UNQUOTE and if word QUOTE promptly UNQUOTE were inserted before QUOTE exercise UNQUOTE we would believe it might be acceptable. We would however want it clearly understood that QUOTE promptly UNQUOTE meant that a beginning would be made at once and completion effected within some such period as two or three months and that unless this in fact developed we would not consider they were acting in good faith and that further talks might then be broken off. However this understanding need not be made public unless it were breached.

As talks have developed it seems to us that Chinese Communists are frustrating agreed first purpose of resumed ambassadorial level talks. That agreed first purpose was QUOTE to aid in settling the matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries UNQUOTE. Also we again recall Chou En-lai's statement that purpose forthcoming talks at ambassadorial level was QUOTE first of all UNQUOTE to reach a reasonable settlement of this matter.

As we read your cables, Wang's proposal would leave situation in precisely the same unsettled state it was when new negotiations were agreed to. It seems to us that until Wang is prepared agree that Americans in China who want to return can promptly do so, we have no alternative but to stand pat constantly repeating that the agreed first purpose of talks is to QUOTE settle UNQUOTE these cases and what settlement does he propose.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1855. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dulles; cleared by McConaughy.

110. Telegram 582 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 19, 1955

582. For Johnson.

1. Your 540. Department believes principal objective is obtain Chinese Communist agreement our version paragraph 1 as set forth Secretary's 569. In order facilitate Wang's acceptance satisfactory version paragraph 1, we would be willing make some concessions on textual points enumerated your 540. While in each case our language believed somewhat preferable there is no fundamental issue involved as we see it and we would yield in order afford additional face saving to Wang if he agrees on our proposed paragraph 1. Specifically we would accept paragraph B PAREN insertion of QUOTE USA agrees that UNQUOTE PAREN, C PAREN omission word QUOTE official UNQUOTE PAREN, E PAREN rewording of paragraph 2 A PAREN subject clarification garble following words QUOTE if desired by the UNQUOTE, and F PAREN substitution QUOTE PRC UNQUOTE for QUOTE China mainland QUOTE PAREN. Regarding D PAREN substitution QUOTE Office of Charge d'Affaires of UK UNQUOTE for QUOTE British Embassy UNQUOTE PAREN British Embassy perceives no objection but has queried Foreign Office.

2. Your 543. As to Wang's proposed supplementary statement Legal Adviser is working on this and we will not have anything definitive for you in time for tomorrow's meeting. Expect to send definite instructions by early next week. Believe this delay not important inasmuch as it seems unlikely that final agreement will be reached at tomorrow's meeting. Our preliminary reaction to paragraph 1. A. is that we could accept some sort statement making clear that each side is acting entirely on its own and that no question interference jurisdiction arises on either side. We will naturally desire avoid language which would imply US recognition CPR attributes of sovereignty.

As to paragraph 1.B. you should take position this point is adequately covered by representation provisions agreed announcement and it therefore is unnecessary.

3. Your 547, New Delhi's 333 repeated Geneva 28. We will respect wishes Indian Government in regard nomenclature. Presume Wang will introduce this question. You should be prepared accept language QUOTE Government of the Republic of India UNQUOTE in place of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1855. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McConaughy and Sebald; cleared in substance by Dulles. The time of transmission is illegible.



QUOTE Indian Embassy UNQUOTE only in first sentence paragraph 2 of agreed announcement. Subsequent references to Indian Embassy should be retained. We plan make it clear to GOI in our reply that it is our understanding Embassy would be agency GOI for implementation agreement and that no Indian Commission or special team would be sent to US for this purpose.

Dulles

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# 111. Letter 4 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 4

Geneva, August 19, 1955

Dear Walter:

I received your letter of August 17th today. This is very good pouch service and if it could be maintained would certainly be most helpful. I also received your letters of August 12th and 15th but did not reply in view of Ed Martin's return as I knew that he would fill you all in much better than I could by letter.

Doug Forman has arrived, and I greatly appreciate the effort which was made thoroughly to brief him before he left. It has been very helpful to me.

Frankly I am still bothered by what might not entirely accurately be described as our present "all or nothing" position. I fully appreciate that it is a question of judgment upon which it is not possible to be categorical one way or another. You may be entirely right that their desire to move on to item two is so strong that they will eventually concede, but I, nevertheless, stick to my original estimate even if this is true it is going to be a long, hard struggle. There is no question on the moral rightness of our position, but, unfortunately, that seems to have little influence on the people with whom I am dealing. What particularly bothers me is that our position is resulting in the retention of persons whose release could otherwise be obtained while we wrestle with getting all the others. I am finding it hard to equate the cases of say Harriet Mills and some of the missionaries with some of the other cases, much though we intend to get them all out. Of course, all this in turn largely depends upon whether it is Chou's intention to exploit

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

those remaining for further concessions from us. Of course one cannot be sure, but I still have the feeling that they consider just about the maximum amount of capital has been squeezed from the prisoners and that the others would gradually be released in their own way and in their own time.

It seems to me that also we are running some risk, slight though it may seem at the time, that the maintenance of our present position just might result in a breakdown of these talks, if not because of developments here but because of incidents elsewhere and that this would result in indefinite detention by the Chinese of those whose release we could have otherwise obtained. Of course, the only way in which I could fully and finally test the Chinese Communist position on this and bring maximum pressure would be to force the issue to the point of threatening a breakdown from our side. We would be gambling that their desire is so strong to go on to item two that they would not permit it to happen, but, on the other hand, if they called my bluff it would indefinitely delay the release of any Americans.

I do not say our present position is wrong and will, of course, continue to present it to the best of my ability. However, I hope that in reaching a decision full weight has also been given to these other considerations. I have never felt the situation was so simple as throwing in the sponge when we were near agreement on all Americans because I did not feel that we were that near that point. I hope that I am wrong.

I sent an "eyes only" to the Secretary last night on the possibility of my very privately having Wang to a meal, and, if it is our intention maintain our present position, putting it to him just as forcefully as I can. It is my feeling that if I would do this in this atmosphere it would be much more effective than anything further I might say in our meetings and that the gesture of inviting him to dinner just might help in bringing Chou around. I think that it is a situation which calls for using all the arts of our profession.

If I do not do this, it seems to me that I should probably adopt the opposite tack and, while trying to avoid anything that would precipitate a break, could take a much less "reasonable" attitude at meetings and attempt to give him a feeling that if we don't get what we are asking for we would be willing to see a break develop. This would be a difficult operation to perform without its leading to a break if they are in fact willing to break over the issue.

I am also glad to see the improvement in the press. From what Doug Forman tells me, I fear that I had perhaps in the past not made clear enough to all of you, including Carl McCardle, that I have been spending a great deal of time seeing individual correspondents and believe that it has done some good.

The Department's telegrams of instructions are most prompt and helpful, and I greatly appreciate the tremendous amount of most urgent work that I know goes into each of them. The regional communications supervisor came over here from Paris and there has been a considerable improvement in our code room problems. With the ending of the Atomic Energy Conference, there should be further improvement. I am still distressed at the amount of time it takes things to move between us.

With kindest regards, I remain  
Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. I assume that you, Sebald and Robertson will see any "eyes only" transmitted to the Secretary. I will only very occasionally use this when I am particularly anxious matter not be given any further circulation in the Department.

You might tell the Secretary that he owes me a franc for the use of "conference" in his 526.

UAJ

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## 112. Letter 6 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 6

Washington, August 19, 1955

Dear Alex:

The pouch service may be less frequent from now on. If there is going to be only one a week, we cannot depend very heavily upon the official-informal letter channel. I hope we can find some means of exchanging letters at least twice a week.

The deadlock seems pretty tight following the August 18 meeting. We thought, on the basis of your 520, that the Wang Paragraph 1 proposal might give some hope of progress, but your 537 affords less ground for optimism. The Secretary's telegram 569 of last night gives you as much negotiating leeway as is possible under present

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Printed from an unsigned copy.

circumstances without compromising the essential principle. This telegram gives the Chinese Communists an easy way out if they are willing to take it, for it means in effect that we would accept their promise as to Americans who would not be released immediately and the understanding on the remaining Americans would not have to be publicized at present. This is going a pretty long way. If we went any further to meet their demands, we would not even have a Communist promise in exchange for U.S. performance. We would indeed be "buying a pig in a poke".

The August 20 meeting might be fairly decisive. The added negotiating latitude given you in the Secretary's 569 probably will enable you to ascertain whether Chou's July 30 statement which you have hammered so hard, really means anything. If there is no affirmative action from Wang, the deadlock on Item 1 is indeed a tight one.

Ed Martin arrived here on Wednesday the 17th and gave us very full and illuminating reports over a period of several hours. He saw the Secretary for over half an hour in the afternoon and conveyed a clear picture of the atmosphere of the negotiations and the nuances of the give-and-take which cannot be obtained from the telegrams. We have a better grasp of what you are up against and a better visualization of the general environment of the talks.

The head of Foreign Assets Control of Treasury Department gave the Secretary a full briefing on the 17th regarding the relationship of Foreign Assets Control Regulations to possible travel of American citizens to Communist China. This was in relation to the Secretary's 526 to you. He made it clear that the licensing procedures under the Regulations are flexible and Treasury will of course readily accept foreign policy guidance from State.

We have informed Cooper on August 17 of the general nature of the impasse we have encountered and he has informed the Indian Government of the failure, as we see it, of Wang Ping-nan to live up to Chou En-lai's July 30 statement. Cooper has informed the Indian Government that Chinese nationals in the U.S. who wish to return to Communist China are free to do so and that the Chinese Communists have entirely failed to match this position. Cooper was authorized to inform the Indians that we were not prepared to go on to discuss other matters until the agreed first item was disposed of. Bohlen in Moscow has also been informed. It is conceivable that the Indians or the Soviets or both may [unclear—exert?] some influence on Peiping to moderate its position, although we have carefully avoided a request of any intervention by either Government. If they do anything it will be on their own initiative and responsibility.

There is nothing but admiration for the ingenuity, resolution and patience you are showing in holding Wang to the basic issue through these seemingly interminable exchanges.

I hope you were not disappointed when no telephone call came through last Sunday. You will understand it was not as a result of any lack of desire to talk, but solely because we are apprehensive about possible monitoring and the difficulty of having a meaningful conversation which does not skirt on sensitive matters.

All the best and sincere regards,

Sincerely

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### 113. Telegram 560 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 20, 1955, 1 p.m.

560. From Johnson.

One hour and half meeting this morning again with no visible progress. I opened with statement to effect our agreed purpose was settle matter return civilians, I had told him exactly what we had done with respect Chinese and were prepared to do representation, was still waiting know settlement his government proposed make Americans. When this information available could readily agree exact language public announcement but futile further discussion form words until both clear as to substance of what we are announcing. He replied reiterating previous positions but during course give and take I asked him series questions to which his replies made clear all repeat all cases being qte reviewed unqte, qte completion review unqte means persons can promptly depart for US, review all cases not qte completed unqte, qte he could not forecast time required complete remaining cases unqte which was dependent on qte nature case, conduct individual, improvement relations between two countries unqte. Talks were one indication improvement and agreement on putting third party representation into operation would be additional improvement. All this would qte make settlement of cases easier than in the past unqte.

Had made their qte best effort unqte. All argument that he would reciprocate frankness with which I had made detailed explanation action taken respect Chinese in US was evaded or brushed aside. My

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2055. Confidential; Niact.

efforts this regard were qte infringement of sovereignty and interference their juridical processes which they could never accept unqte.

I deliberately avoided any discussions details representation arrangement in order keep discussion focused on central issue. For same reason I also avoided answering familiar allegations treatment Chinese in US and their treatment Americans China.

Next meeting Tuesday, 10 A.M.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 8/20/55 9:52 a.m. EMB (CWO)

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#### **114. Telegram 563 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 20, 1955, 5 p.m.

563. From Johnson.

1. Following is full text Wang's proposed "understandings" as given me August 18 meeting which may be helpful in study referred to Deptel 582 paragraph two.

2. "In your proposed agreed announcement no specific provisions have been made of those nationals with unfinished civil or criminal cases. At our last meeting, however, you stated that you did not think anything that you said in the agreed announcement in any way infringed upon or raised a question of sovereignty or jurisdiction and that you did not in any way attempt to dictate to my government on what measure or action it should take, that being matters only my government could decide. You also stated that you had never suggested cases of Americans should be settled outside the framework of our law and that you had always presumed that the measures taken by my government were within the framework of our juridical procedures.

3. On the basis of our understanding of your statements we are ready to agree to write down in the agreed announcement that both sides announce that they have adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures to enable the nationals of the other side who desire to return to exercise their rights to do so, without specifically raising

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2055. Confidential; Priority.

the question of those being involved in unfinished civil or criminal cases.

4. As regards the question of one government making requests on behalf of its nationals towards the entrusted country, I have proposed that the respective governments should be able to request, on behalf of their own nationals who desire to return, the entrusted country to investigate the facts and to make representations with the government of the other side in order to resolve the difficulties of such civilians in their departure. However, your proposed agreed announcement also failed to provide for this point. At our last meeting you indicated that after the implementation of the third country arrangement nationals of each side can directly approach the diplomatic mission of the third country concerned. If, however, nationals of any side report to their government about their departure being prevented the government concerned can also refer these complaints to the third country for the latter to make representations or to carry out investigation. I believe you certainly will have no objection to that. With this understanding we will also agree to make no provision on this point in our agreement.

5. I request that the above two points be included in the record of the meeting.”

**Gowen**

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### 115. Telegram 564 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 20, 1955, 5 p.m.

564. From Johnson.

1. I did not at today's meeting introduce textual changes mentioned first para Secretary's tel 569 nor those mentioned para one Deptel 582 as it was very clear that question is not verbal formula but factual situation and no concession on words was going to move him to any substantive concession on Americans. Wang will probably agree almost any verbal formula for para one but will insist on understanding that agreement does not infringe on CHICOM sovereignty and jurisdiction which he

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2055. Secret; Priority.

will interpret to mean that qte unfinished civil and criminal cases unqte will be settled in own way and own time.

2. Issue is very clear and there is little left to say until shift in position one side or another.

3. My present thinking is that at Tuesday's meeting I might introduce redraft qte agreed announcement unqte based upon Wang's August 18 draft (Mytel 545) modified as suggested first para Secretary's tel 569 and para one Deptel 582 together with an qte understanding unqte on jurisdiction to be based on legal study mentioned para 2 Deptel 582 in which I would include a statement on timing of CHICOM completion review qte unfinished civil and criminal cases unqte. I would think that a phrase somewhat as follows would be sufficient: qte It is understood that the PRC has completed the review of some unfinished civil and criminal cases involving Americans and that these Americans will be able promptly to depart for the US. It is understood that the review of all remaining civil and criminal cases involving Americans will be completed within ..... weeks and that they will thereupon be able to depart for the US. Unqte

4. My tactic would be to present Wang with full text of draft agreed announcement and qte understanding unqte pointing out how far we have gone to meet his point of view and stating it is only for him to insert some reasonable number of weeks in blank to conclude matter. I would state qte understanding unqte would not be made public. In event qte understanding unqte breached it seems to me we would have full freedom make public.

5. Clear that under his present instructions Wang could not accept foregoing but it would place me in strongest possible negotiating position.

6. Only other suggestion I have for action on our part which might resolve impasse would be to enter into agreement without any qte understanding unqte on time period during which release of Americans would be completed but take position that agenda item one not settled until release all Americans who desire leave and therefore not possible proceed to item two until that time. I merely suggest this as a possibility which I have not thoroughly thought through.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 1:45 p.m. 8/20/55 MTB



**116. Telegram 566 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 20, 1955, 6 p.m.

566. From Johnson.

1. At 9th meeting today I opened by reading prepared statement. I said our two governments agreed first purpose discussions was to settle matter return civilians who desire to do so. I had told Wang exactly and precisely what we have done and are prepared to do regarding Chinese in US and of arrangements we willing make for their assistance by Indian Embassy. I repeated I was still waiting hear settlement proposed regarding American nationals desiring return and, while not attempting dictate action to be taken by Chinese, emphasized purpose our talks was to discuss all civilians desiring return. I concluded futile to discuss form of words used in public announcement until both clear in our minds substance of what we were announcing. Therefore difficult for me see how we could make further progress until this was done.

2. Wang reverted to his line argument last meeting accusing us raising same old points and introducing nothing new. Stated if we agreed to text announcement then he would tell procedures his government willing take and results cases of Americans which have been reviewed.

3. I then asked series simple, direct questions in attempt further clarify his exact position.

4. I asked if his government was reviewing all civil and criminal cases involving Americans. He replied he had answered this question in affirmative many times.

5. I asked whether as soon as governments agreed arrange third party assistance for civilians who wished return he would inform us results cases Americans reviewed. He agreed.

6. I asked whether reviews cases all Americans completed. He hedged. I stated implication was that all not completed. He returned to standard formula that they would advise on results when reviews completed. Later he stated very clearly reviews had been completed on some but not the others.

7. I then asked whether completion review meant that persons concerned would be able return promptly to US. He replied clearly that they could depart China promptly.

8. I asked whether possible give estimate time required complete reviews remaining cases in accordance laws and procedures his government. He replied time required complete reviews depended upon two

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2055. Confidential.

factors: (1) nature of cases involved, which included conduct of persons themselves; and (2) the state of relations between our two countries. In amplifying latter, he said these talks represented improvement. Also their release of "guilty" airmen done in effort improve relations. Later he added agreement on third party representation would also constitute improvement relations.

9. I stated it takes two to improve relations and that I knew of no single thing which from our standpoint would do more to improve relations than reaching solution on question return our nationals. Added that if he could state specific period time required to review cases Americans and permit them return, this would be of great help in improvement relations. Wang replied impossible and unrealistic predict time required such review, but if agreement reached on representation and relations between our countries improved things would move easier than in the past. He commented he could not expect me to say when Chinese students would be able leave US. I replied immediately that I could and repeated my categorical assurance when he endeavored qualify it.

10. At this point he began reading long prepared statement reviewing all points he brought up at last meeting. These included: their alleged willingness agree our text; their assurance they had made greatest effort reach agreement and responsibility for failure not theirs; claim that Americans at no time were prevented from leaving China and more had left proportionately than Chinese had left US; statement all cases were being reviewed and civil cases could leave upon reasonable settlement while criminal cases would receive lenient treatment; and their objection that our insistence release all Americans held constituted interference their law and juridical processes which they could never accept.

11. Statement concluded alleging difficulties Chinese students departing US due harassment by immigration officials, delays due loss their files by authorities, inconvenience due confiscation of funds sent for their travel and intimidation students go to Taiwan or apply for refugee status in US. He said some recently returned Chinese received official obstruction even after they had left US and obstruction extended even to Hong Kong. He said these criticisms concerned only ordinary Chinese in US and I could not tell him offhand how many more Chinese were detained and jailed under federal and state laws due to unfinished civil and criminal cases. He requested our side investigate such cases and added third party would also look into matter. He concluded on theme which he emphasized often before to effect that demands amounting to infringement on their sovereignty and juridical process could not be tolerated.

12. I said in reply only that I knew of no Chinese who desired return involved in what he termed unfinished civil and criminal cases and furthermore that if he would provide me with names I would immediately

look into any cases Chinese whose departure had been interfered with by official acts contrary to statements I had made.

13. Wang closed meeting by saying if we failed agree on announcement it was not his responsibility as they had made their greatest effort. He said he could not provide me with names of Chinese students in difficulty lest our actions against them should be even more unfavorable.

**Gowen**

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### 117. Telegram 598 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 21, 1955, 9:23 p.m.

598. For Johnson. Your 564 and 566.

We are telegraphing separately, with view to its introduction by you at August 23 meeting, full text of “agreed announcement” as it has now evolved (with drafting changes which we consider essential) and request your immediate concurrence or comments.

You will note from this revised draft that U.S. and PRC sections on repatriation not exactly parallel. This is reflection of fact that PRC so far unwilling to match our position. We feel announcement should state our position accurately. We would naturally welcome matching statement PRC. If they still refuse, deviation from parallel language seems unavoidable.

In general we do not desire any private agreements which add to or subtract from “agreed announcement” or which provide anything other than reasonable interpretation of it. On this basis we perceive no justification for “understanding” on jurisdiction question raised by Wang. Assuming communists unwilling go beyond compromise language on repatriation contained in our draft text “agreed announcement”, you should insist on understanding which would contain reasonable interpretation of time limit, i.e. “promptly” for completion of review of cases of detained Americans as stated Deptel 569. No objection language quoted latter part paragraph 3 your 564.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2055. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sebald and McConaughy; cleared in substance by Dulles.

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118. Telegram 599 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 21, 1955, 9:23 p.m.

599. For Johnson.

Re Deptel 598. Following is text of draft "Agreed Announcement."

BEGIN TEXT

QUOTE

The Ambassadors of the USA and the PRC have agreed to announce the measures which their respective Governments have adopted with respect to repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries.

With respect to Chinese residing in the United States, Ambassador Johnson, on behalf of the US Government, has informed Ambassador Wang that: (1) The US recognizes that Chinese in the USA who desire to return to the PRC are now entitled to do so and declares that it has adopted measures so that they may in fact promptly return. (2) The US will authorize the Government of the Republic of India to assist return to the PRC of those Chinese who desire to do so as follows: (a) If any Chinese in the USA believes that contrary to the declared policy of the USA he is encountering obstruction in departure he may so inform the Indian Embassy in the USA and request it to make representations on his behalf to the US Government. If desired by the PRC the Indian Government may also make investigation of the facts in any such case. (b) If a Chinese in the US who desires to return to the PRC has difficulty in paying his return expenses, the Indian Government may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return. (3) The Government of the US will give wide publicity in the USA to the foregoing arrangements and the Government of India may also do so.

With respect to Americans residing in the PRC, Ambassador Wang on behalf of the PRC has informed Ambassador Johnson that: (1) The PRC recognizes that Americans in the PRC who desire to return to the USA are entitled to do so and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can promptly exercise their right to return. (2) The PRC will authorize the Government of the UK to assist in the return to the US of those Americans who desire to do so as follows: (a) If any American in the PRC believes that contrary to the declared policy of the PRC he is encountering obstruction in departure he may so inform the Office of the Charge d'Affaires of the UK in the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2155. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles; cleared by Sebald.

PRC and request it to make representations on his behalf to the Government of the PRC. If desired by the US, the Government of the UK may also make investigation of the facts in any such case. (b) If an American in the PRC who desires to return to the US has difficulty in paying his return expenses, the Government of the UK may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return. (3) The Government of the PRC will give wide publicity in the PRC to the foregoing arrangements.

UNQUOTE

END TEXT

Dulles

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### 119. Telegram 571 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 22, 1955, 11 a.m.

571. From Johnson.

1. Subject following comments concur text draft “agreed announcement” Deptel 599:

(A) Note that word “nationals” has been dropped following “Chinese” and “American” where appeared all previous texts including those we introduced. Not clear on reason and desire authority restore if question raised by Wang.

(B) Assume omission phrase “and the Government UK may also do so” in numbered paragraph 3 (last sentence Deptel 598) inadvertent. Probably little value under conditions in PRC but do not see why we do not obtain for what it may be worth exactly same privilege for UK in PRC as we give India in US.

In any event as phrased is discretionary rather than obligatory for UK.

2. Believe it will not be possible avoid question “jurisdiction”. As I have previously said they obviously concerned we are attempting in some way reestablish extraterritorial principle for Americans in PRC. Rightly or wrongly I have said in informal give and take substantially what Wang quotes in paragraph 2 my telegram 563 and he will insist I either reaffirm, deny or amend the statement. It still seems to me that my statement is unexceptional and is consistent with language latter part paragraph 3 my telegram 564. My thought would be simply set

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2255. Secret; Niact.

forth in “understanding” that “nothing in agreed announcement is intended raise any question of sovereignty, or jurisdiction over nationals of one country in territory of other and that it is assumed that measures referred to in numbered paragraph 1 of statement by Ambassador Wang contained in ‘agreed announcement’ and measures referred to in paragraph 1 of statement by Ambassador Johnson in ‘agreed announcement’ are taken within the framework of the laws and legal procedures of their respective countries.”

3. It seems to me this is not inconsistent with first sentence paragraph 3 Deptel 598. My thought is that such an “understanding” including language latter part paragraph 3 my telegram 564 would in substance simply be oral statements exchanged between Wang and myself in meeting, although we would, in accordance with our arrangement at opening talks, give to other copy of any remarks we had made which we desired other side have exact words.

4. Believe my ability do this would materially strengthen my negotiating position in attempting extract from him “understanding” on timing release Americans.

**Gowen**

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## 120. Telegram 602 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 22, 1955, 3:52 p.m.

602. For Johnson. Your 571.

1. PAREN a PAREN Word QUOTE nationals UNQUOTE has purposely been dropped minimize possible Chinese claim that we recognize in public document jurisdiction of PRC over Chinese in USA. Not recognizing PRC as legal government China we are unable agree that Chinese in USA are its QUOTE nationals UNQUOTE.

(b) No objection adding phrase QUOTE and the Government UK may also do so UNQUOTE. We purposely omitted phrase because we unable see that it would have any utility and we did not want to seem to think that it had.

2. Deptel 599. Delete word QUOTE residing UNQUOTE in first sentences in second and third paragraphs because QUOTE residence

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2255. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Sebald, McConaughy, and Phleger; approved in draft by Dulles.

UNQUOTE has technical meaning not applicable to many Americans and Chinese within scope of arrangements.

3. After full consideration we believe that basic text our 599 is sound and should be pressed vigorously with oral understanding with Wang that word QUOTE promptly UNQUOTE is defined as indicated Secretary's 569, paragraph 1. We would not be willing proceed to item 2 of agenda until all Americans actually released or acceptable time limit agreed upon.

4. If it should prove utterly impossible get Wang's agreement to foregoing without an QUOTE understanding UNQUOTE, you are authorized indicate you would consider ad referendum an oral QUOTE understanding UNQUOTE which would cover both Wang's jurisdiction point and definition word QUOTE promptly UNQUOTE. If we agreed to QUOTE understanding UNQUOTE it could not repeat not be private. It would have to be announced simultaneously with agreement. Text this QUOTE understanding UNQUOTE telegraphed separately.

**Dulles**

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## 121. Telegram 603 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 22, 1955, 3:53 p.m.

603. For Johnson.

Deptel 602. Following is text of "understanding" authorized as fall-back position:

"Nothing in agreed announcements are intended involve any question of sovereignty or jurisdiction and it is assumed that measures referred to in the announcements are taken within framework of laws and legal procedures of their respective countries. It is understood that the PRC has completed the review of some unfinished civil and criminal cases involving Americans and that these Americans will be able promptly to depart for the U.S. It is understood that the review of all remaining civil and criminal cases involving Americans will be completed within (blank) weeks and that they will thereupon be able to depart for the U.S."

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2255. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Sebald; cleared by Phleger and McConaughy in draft and by Dulles.

**122. Letter 8 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 8

Washington, August 22, 1955

Dear Alex:

This has been a hectic morning with all efforts concentrated on getting out a reply to your 571 in time for a possible further exchange with you before tomorrow's meeting. The pouch is closing now, so I won't be able to put anything substantive in this letter. I just want you to know that the pouch channel is still open and that we are working pretty long hours, seven days a week on the Geneva problems. It is a pity that I can not put full time on Geneva. It is physically impossible to run the office and devote proper time and reflection to your problems.

We hope to establish a semi-weekly pouch service to Geneva so that if all goes well you will receive a letter from me a few days hence.

Sincerely

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Printed from an unsigned copy.

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**123. Telegram 585 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 23, 1955, 9 a.m.

585. From Johnson.

1. Had Wang to dinner last night with Ekvall and Wang's interpreter. Talked from 7:30 until midnight using every device of carrot and stick of which I was capable but made no visible progress.

2. I had not intended enter into detailed discussion negotiations but he took initiative, restating his position and trying to impress on me number Americans that would immediately be released "was very considerable" and number remaining "would not be large". He was obviously trying very hard to reassure me "everything was going be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2355. Secret; Priority; Very  
Limited Distribution.



all right” and that release remainder would not take long without saying anything I could seize upon as commitment. (His instructions are clearly very rigid on this.) In response my pressing him throughout evening on definite time he continued return to an involved and tortuous explanation which I found it entirely impossible to pin down to a definite time period.

However the purport seemed to be that time would be less than year, as would be “doubly easy and doubly quick” over situation during past year. However, ominous note of “state of relations” as one factor in timing continued reappear. I returned again and again to necessity specific promise on time, even private if they desired (Deptel 602 was not received until after I had returned) but he flatly refused. “Absolutely would not be forced into and could not state any exact time.”

3. While touching in varying degree on most of arguments I have used in previous meetings I hammered hard on theme that they were entirely misreading American public opinion if they expected slow piecemeal releases to “improve relations”. Any release involves telling of stories by former prisoners and produced very adverse public opinion reactions. This had to be expected. Best course in their self-interest was carry out immediate release of all. Wang countered we had previously made flyers major factor, they would not release even response UN SecGen, but released unilaterally interest good atmosphere and demonstration good faith these talks. “Did not hold them as bargaining counters and did not intend hold any others as bargaining counters.” They knew Col. Arnold very “antagonistic” but this did not prevent his being included release. Intimation was they very disappointed not only at public reaction to release but that after flyers had been removed as subject these talks we had now raised ante in demanding release all others immediately or in specified time. I countered by returning to theme public reaction to be expected, noted press attention flyers now declining and cited as proof value getting remaining cases completed quickly as possible. Believe this line may have made some impression.

4. I carefully outlined successive concessions we had made to obtain agreement and repeatedly stressed “we could go no further”. “We did not even have a definite promise, much less performance we expected, particularly in light Chou’s statements”. I also made it clear could not proceed anything else until item one settled. (He has never suggested we do so but of course their idea of settlement and ours are still very different.) Also in context importance their meeting our

position on item one said it was important agreement be reached as if we failed probably would be long time until contact such as this could be resumed. He put his own emphasis on latter theme.

5. He give me good opportunity to make clear no possibility even considering American visitors until all Americans now detained released by bringing up their desire for visitors including Americans and mentioning proposal for exchange "Chinese opera" and Porgy and Bess companies. (This regard said they were not "Boxers" desiring expel foreigners.)

6. During first part of evening he made apparently very purposeful lead up to but did not pursue idea American aid their economic development "which would require at least to end of century". Much of this was familiar Chou line with foreign visitors. However there was no reference whatever to USSR, frank admission much difficulty and special reference to "peasant conservatism", China wants no war with US, traditionally friendly, nostalgic reminiscences of friendship during World War II etc.

7. I spoke very frankly on particularly CHICOM treatment US consular and diplomatic personnel at time CHICOM takeover and also on lack justification CHICOM intervention Korea and our unparalleled restraint there. His defense treatment consular and diplomatic personnel perfunctory and almost admission had been mistake. He showed little inclination defend Korean intervention or to retreat behind "volunteers".

8. Subjects Formosa, Seventh Fleet, trade etc. not mentioned any way.

9. We agreed meet as scheduled this morning at which time I will introduce our counterproposal accordance Deptel 571 and previous for which I prepared ground last night. However view last night's talk will keep discussion to minimum necessary.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 9:05 a.m. 8/23/55 DES

**124. Telegram 586 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 23, 1955, 11 a.m.

586. From Johnson.

At 10th meeting this morning lasting 25 minutes I presented text contained Deptel 599.

Presenting draft I noted that contained most language Wang's August 18 draft, called attention to use of "Government of India," difference in wording between paragraphs one of two sections made necessary by difference in situation and their failure meet our position, and particularly pointed out that word "promptly" in first paragraph Chinese declaration. Said must be firm definition this word, need not be written into announcement but could be in form oral understanding. Did not want to labor ground we had previously covered but wanted to make it perfectly clear without any possibility misunderstanding US Government cannot (repeat cannot) accept any arrangement under which it would be possible for release any Americans be indefinitely delayed. Must know all will be able leave within reasonable time. Requested he inform his government that US considers this vital. This draft went as far as I thought we could go in meeting his point of view.

Wang stated desired reserve comment my draft until next meeting but offhand did not see reason for difference of wording of two paragraphs one. Then repeated in summary form previous statements that "could not possibly accept time limit as this would amount to submitting to coercion". Also repeated number immediately to be released "not small" and cases remaining could be considered "favorably, quickly and easily because of factors of attitude prisoners, fact of our agreement and improvement in relations".

I made no detailed reply but expressed hope he would send draft to his government for most careful study as was very important.

Wang suggested and I accepted next meeting Thursday, 10 AM.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2355. Confidential; Niact.

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**125. Telegram 589 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 23, 1955, 2 p.m.

589. From Johnson.

Additional minor sidelights on dinner with Wang last night:

Particularly inquired about Bedell Smith's health and later made point of saying "better relations began" when Smith spoke to Chou in buffet at last year's Geneva Conference expressing hope relations might improve.

Gave usual line on civil war events but with noticeable restraint in treatment Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek.

Were thankful and appreciative American aid to China during World War II even though none received by Communists as it constituted contribution national strength in fight against Japan.

In reply my raising Communist bloc characteristics of super-secrecy and hypersensitivity to criticism as major barriers to fruitful interchange persons and ideas which he had been urging, he did not contest but implied improvement this regard under way. He was very quick reject any implication Chinese Communists identification with satellites when I cited personal experience in Czechoslovakia.

Rejected my suggestion China lacked natural resources, only problem was extraction.

Noted full texts Secretary's and President's statements and speeches on Far East published in Chinese Communist press.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2355. Secret; Very Limited Distribution.

**126. Telegram 594 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 23, 1955, 6 p.m.

594. From Johnson.

Comments on 10th meeting.

1. Text handed Wang differed only as follows from Deptel 599:

(A) Phrase “and the Government UK may also do so” restored in order avoid wording Wang could object to as “unequal”.

(B) Word “residing” deleted accordance Deptel 602.

(C) Full names of Ambassadors given in paragraph two.

(D) Phrase “make investigation of” in paragraph two (A) both sections changed to “investigate”.

2. I assume requirement that “understanding” be public is applicable only to type referred to paragraph 4 Deptel 602 and that “oral understanding” along lines paragraph 3 same telegram would not necessarily have to be made public unless breached. Acting on authority Secretary’s 569 I had previously told Wang such understanding could be private.

3. Wang showed no inclination retreat from position that he could not state definite time limit within which all Americans could be released, since this would amount to submitting to coercion. Made only the slight concession of assuring me that number Americans to be released immediately “not small” and that cases of remainder could be considered favorably and quickly. However latter part of assurance questionable value since settlement remaining American cases linked to “improvement of relations between two countries”. This enables Peiping halt release of Americans whenever they feel we not “cooperating” sufficiently to improve relations. I will continue press Wang hard for firm commitment regarding time but foresee no early change in his attitude.

4. See no reason change assessment in my 457 that only with great difficulty and much time could we budge Wang from his position. Nevertheless, I believe it still worthwhile hammering at him one or two more meetings, even though each of us has already reached a position from which it will become increasingly difficult to back down, should that become necessary to avoid complete deadlock. My tactics will be to hold a very firm line while watching carefully for any hint of compromise on his part. We should be fully aware, however, that these tactics are risky, for they may result only in a corresponding stiffening of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2355. Confidential; Priority.

Peiping's position which will make it that much more difficult to find compromise solution should we decide that is necessary.

5. If no progress is made in next meeting or two we will face very serious decision. Wang's most recent statements suggest strongly that more than half of detained Americans might be released immediately upon our reaching agreement. Fairly early action can probably be expected on a number of others. How long are we justified in delaying and possibly even jeopardizing release of these persons in effort to obtain commitment for release of all within definite time?

6. However logical and justified, difference in language para one two sections is going greatly increase difficulty obtaining substantive agreement we desire. I feel it was worth putting forward as bargaining tactic but would like have authority at time I would consider desirable make language para one US section identical with language of para one Chinese section, of text Deptel 599. In case of US "further appropriate measures" would be understood to refer to acceptance of third-party arrangement. In case of Chinese, would be understood to include also review of "unfinished civil and criminal cases" involving Americans. Thus, texts two sections would be identical and Chinese could not object to "unequal treatment" to which they hyper-sensitive.

**Gowen**

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## 127. Telegram 616 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 23, 1955, 7:38 p.m.

616. For Johnson.

FYI. Secretary has sent following to U Nu in response to inquiry from latter:

QUOTE (Code Room: Please recite here text of letter contained in Department's 150 to Rangoon) QUOTE

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2355. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.

**128. Telegram 599 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 24, 1955, 11 a.m.

599. From Johnson.

1. I offer following thought as possible way out of present impasse in event it continues be impossible move CHICOM off present position on giving time limit in which release remaining Americans will be completed.

2. I would inform Wang that we willing enter into representation arrangement on basis his assurances that remaining cases will expeditiously be settled within framework those arrangements. If this does not in fact result we desire make clear that we reserve full freedom to reconsider the continuation of the representation arrangement for Chinese in US. Also desire make clear that we would consider “expeditiously” to be period of two and in any event not more than three months.

3. I would also inform Wang that at time agreed declaration issued here that my government would find it necessary issue unilateral statement to effect that US had entered into arrangement and agreed to “agreed announcement” on basis of assurances that all remaining cases would be expeditiously settled and that Americans concerned would thereupon promptly be able to return to US. US had accepted these assurances and expected that CPR would expeditiously take necessary further measures to this end so that all remaining Americans desiring to return would in fact be able to do so within reasonable period of time.

4. No specific mention would be made in any such formal unilateral statement of possibility of cancelling representation arrangement nor would “reasonable period time” be exactly defined but it would lay public basis for cancelling the arrangement if remaining Americans are not in fact released within two-three months period.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2455. Secret.

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129. Telegram 607 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 24, 1955, 7 p.m.

607. From Johnson.

1. As the situation has developed do not believe that text of agreed announcement to explain recess contained my 551 is any longer applicable. Believe text somewhat along the following lines would be more appropriate and factually accurate:

2. "For the past . . . weeks Ambassadors of USA and PRC have been seeking settlement of item one of their agenda, return of civilians both sides to their respective countries.

3. Ambassador Johnson has informed Ambassador Wang that all Chinese in US who desire to travel to PRC are now entitled do so and that US has adopted measures so that they may in fact promptly return.

4. Ambassador Johnson has also informed Ambassador Wang when the PRC has agreed that all Americans, including those involved in unfinished civil and criminal cases, can return to the US within specified period of time the US Government is willing authorize Government of India assist return to PRC of any Chinese in US who may request such assistance.

5. Ambassador Wang has informed Ambassador Johnson that PRC has completed review of some unfinished civil and criminal cases involving Americans but that he is willing inform Ambassador Johnson of results of such completed reviews and permit the return of Americans involved only when US has agreed to implementation of arrangement with respect to the GOI mentioned above.

6. Ambassador Wang has also stated it is not possible for PRC to estimate length of time it will take complete review of remaining unfinished civil and criminal cases and to permit Americans involved to return to US.

7. Ambassador Wang has informed Ambassador Johnson that PRC is willing authorize Government of UK to give same assistance to Americans in PRC as GOI would give Chinese in US."

8. In view of fact foregoing statement would be used only in event Wang had proposed recess or recess had been proposed by me to avoid break in talks difficult to complete latter portion of statement explaining reason for recess which would depend upon Wang's position at time. It is now clear he is certainly never going to propose or accept recess for purpose "completing reviews". In absence my proposing recess prevent

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2455. Confidential.



break most likely possibility would be proposal recess by Wang in order that we “could reconsider our position”. My tactic this event would be agree recess if he wants it but reject any implication we would reconsider our position. I would then propose agreed announcement along foregoing lines which I would hope would cause Wang to reconsider as it seems to me puts us in very strong public opinion position. Should he refuse I would tell him that we have no alternative but make unilateral statement along similar lines.

Gowen

Note: Advance copy to Mr. McConaughy (CA) 5:50 p.m. 8-24-55  
CWO/FED

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### 130. Telegram 622 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 24, 1955, 2:38 p.m.

622. For Johnson. Your 586 and 594.

1. Department unable authorize any private understanding with Chinese Communists which would involve any US commitment or concession to them. Hence any private statement implying US acknowledgment of scope or validity their judicial processes would be unacceptable. However, private oral commitment by Chinese Communists as to the maximum period meant by word “promptly” in Chinese portion draft agreed announcement would be acceptable and need not be made public unless breached.

2. We believe you should press Wang insistently for immediate release Americans whose cases they admit have already been reviewed favorably. We do not see that failure to date to reach agreement on proposed announcement should impede release Americans whose cases already favorably reviewed. You may give Wang emphatic reminder that no repeat no Chinese being held this country pending issuance agreed announcement. They are free to leave now. Reciprocity by Chinese expected. You might point out that continued detention Americans whose cases completed is directly contrary Chinese Communist contention that all cases disposed within framework their laws and juridical procedures. Denial departure right to Americans whose cases completed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2355. Secret; Niact; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Dulles and Phleger.

constitutes admission they being held as hostages for political advantage. This is irreconcilable with basic tenet which Wang has maintained.

3. You are given authority requested paragraph 6 your 594 to agree in your discretion bring language paragraph 1 US portion into conformity with language paragraph 1 Chinese portion. It would be understood that "further appropriate measures" on US side would refer only to acceptance limited third party representation arrangement.

4. The policy questions raised in paragraph 5 your 594 and in your 599 will be dealt with later message.

**Dulles**

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### 131. Telegram 627 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 24, 1955, 8:05 p.m.

627. For Johnson.

Following for your background information only.

We have apprised British in confidence of general nature responsibilities British Charge Peiping would assume under draft agreed announcement. O'Neill has commented from Peiping that it cannot be assumed with confidence that all detained Americans will express a desire return to US. He fears that some imprisoned Americans may be so thoroughly brainwashed that they would not take any initiative to return. He indicates possibility that some Americans in prison might not be able communicate with his office. He remarks that the interests of imprisoned Americans would be better safeguarded if his office were accorded right to interview them.

He thinks it would be useful if the agreement additionally mentioned "the Shanghai branch of the Office of the Charge d'Affaires of the UK" so that his Consul General in Shanghai would have the clear right to assist him as to the Americans detained there and in South China.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2455. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.

O'Neill further comments that he would have no effective means giving publicity to arrangement unless he were given right to place a notice in the Chinese Communist press.

Dulles

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### 132. Letter 5 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 5

Geneva, August 24, 1955

Dear Walter:

I have received your letter of August 19th, and I am writing this to go out by tomorrow's pouch. I would hope that you would be able to work out something so that we could have an exchange at least twice a week.

As you can see from my messages, the deadlock is now certainly very tight. I am sorry that I apparently misled you a little in my first flash telegram on the August 18th meeting by not including enough. However, I thought that my statements that I had made no progress, result was complete deadlock, made it clear that I had not in fact got any place.

I believe that I have included in my two telegrams on the subject everything of significance that passed at the dinner I gave for Wang, although it is hard to condense four and a half hours of conversation. As I said in my telegram, he was making a tremendous effort to go as far as he could within his obviously very limited instructions to assure me that everything was going to be all right. I thought you might be interested in exactly what he said, which I had termed as "an involved and tortuous explanation" in paragraph two of my 585. Ekvall and I reconstructed it immediately upon our return as follows: "There is no comparison to be made of the advantages which those who are left will have over those who have been released during the past one year. For there are three favoring factors which will make it clear quickly and easily for them to be released. The three factors are (a) favorable effect release of the others will have on people still there; (b) circumstances of the case itself; and (c) state of our relations." I prodded and poked at this from every conceivable angle and was just unable to obtain any

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

further explanation. His conversation otherwise was very rational and sensible and the only explanation I have for that he had been rigidly instructed to say absolutely nothing more on this subject. The phrasing, to my mind, very much carries the marks of Chou.

I asked him to dinner at the end of our meeting on Saturday, and he replied that he would let me know at 8 o'clock Sunday morning. This seemed a very short time to make an inquiry and get a reply from Peiping, but I suppose that he was able to do so. In any event, his interpreter telephoned Ekvall promptly at 8 o'clock to accept. I had the dinner out at the little pension-type of place on the outskirts of Geneva where Clough and Forman are living. In accordance with my suggestion, he came in a car other than the one he usually uses and without a flag. (Incidentally, he is normally driven around town in a big Zim, while I am using a Chevrolet.) We had drinks down in the garden before dinner. After dinner we retired to the sitting room the boys use. I am satisfied that it was carried off without any leak to the press and don't believe that he will say anything. However, if it did come out, I would simply take the line that I am leaving no stone unturned in making every possible effort to reach agreement on getting our people out. I should think that this would probably be well accepted by everybody except possibly Taipei.

I feel that the dinner was a good idea and that now was exactly the right time to do it. They are, I am convinced, extremely sensitive on the subject of social ostracism and were particularly sensitive at our rejection of their little overtures at last year's conference here. I think that Wang's mention of Bedell Smith's little gesture towards Chou towards the end of the meetings last year particularly significant in indicating their sensitivity to such little things. My having taken the initiative this year represents a major departure, and I believe that it gives me a subtle, though distinct, advantage.

Thanks very much for the information on what we have done with the Indians, as well as today's telegram giving me the text of the Secretary's letter to U Nu. I think it was excellent and presented the situation exactly right. I will, of course, be extremely interested and hope I can promptly receive anything from any source on what the Chinese may tell the Indians or the Burmese in Peiping.

I greatly appreciate the Department's affirmation in 603 of the line that I had taken on "sovereignty and jurisdiction". I had done this entirely ad lib in give and take during a meeting and was a little concerned that the Department may have felt I had gone too far.

We will keep plugging away but I fear that it is going to largely be a matter of saying the same thing over again as I have pretty much run out of ideas on new ways to say things.

I am really going to need help and guidance if and when it comes to a discussion of “no force”. In this regard, I note from recent Taipei Weekas the Nationalists are still carrying out attacks on shipping and various other minor actions, as well as over-flying the mainland. Frankly I just don’t see what my reply is going to be when after I raise the question of no force they raise the question of these Nationalist actions carried out with equipment we have supplied them. Also when I raise our treaty and supplementary understandings with the Nationalists on offensive action, I do not see what I say when they allege this simply goes to prove that these Nationalist actions are being taken with our approval. I hope you all will have some good ideas for me.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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### 133. Memorandum from Dulles to Phleger<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 25, 1955

I have looked at Johnson’s 607 of August 24. I do not like the idea of making our authorization of the Government of India dependent upon an agreement of the PRC as to American civilians.

It seems to me that the right position for us to take and the most effective position from the standpoint of world opinion is that having learned that there exists question in some minds as to the practical ability of Chinese in this country to return to the China Mainland if they so desire, the United States voluntarily asks the Government of India to serve to assist them and to transmit funds to them to finance the expenses of their return.

If this is the right thing to do, then I think we should do it. If it is not the right thing to do, then I do not think we should do it merely because the Chinese Communists want us to. I think we should keep whatever we do on a purely unilateral basis of ourselves doing the right thing even though we are willing to make a joint announcement.

Therefore, if we are to break or have a recess, I would like to see us announce unconditionally that we intend to invite the Government of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2555. Confidential. A copy was sent to Sebald. Dulles initialed “JFD” above his typed signature.

India to serve, and that we should not make it contingent as suggested in Johnson's 607.

I realize that we may thus be giving up a certain bargaining position, but I believe that disadvantage is more than offset by avoiding the appearance of agreeing with the Chicoms to do something which we would not otherwise do. Also, the impact on world opinion will be very much stronger.

**John Foster Dulles**

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#### **134. Telegram 616 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 25, 1955, 2 p.m.

616. From Johnson.

Two hour five minute meeting this morning. No progress.

Wang presented re-draft of "agreed announcement" very close our August 23 text except for substitution "and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt measures so that they can in fact return as soon as possible" for latter portion US section our August 23 draft and substitution "and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can exercise as soon as possible their right to return" for latter portion PRC section our August 23 draft.

(Full text showing other apparently minor changes by separate tel.)

I said his amendment para one US section not necessary as we had already taken all necessary measures but focused attention on substitution "as soon as possible" for "promptly" in para one PRC section.

In fact virtually all of meeting centered around my continued effort obtain definite statement on definite period of time during which remaining Americans would be released and Wang repeating this "could never be done", "impossible" and repeating virtually verbatim his previous line this regard.

During course much give and take I took line contained para two Deptel 622 and after he had in reply clearly related release of flyers to decision hold these meetings, release Americans whose cases review completed to our agreement to "agreed announcement" and again gave "state of relations" as one factor in timing release remainder,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2555. Confidential; Niact.

I very bluntly stated I had not and would not trade the fate of Americans detained by them for political concessions or agreements they desired obtain. Said it seemed clear to me what he was saying was that release remaining Americans would be dependent upon whether in future I willing to agree further agreements desired by them. This I would not rpt not do. I was prepared deal with each problem that we discussed on its own merits, we had taken action respect Chinese US without condition and without attempting extract political concessions from them in return.

I had first hoped and expected they would promptly release all Americans thus paralleling action taken by us with respect Chinese, we could thereupon quickly agree on announcement of what each country had done and announce agreement on representation. I had then attempted obtain his agreement that release Americans would be simultaneous with announcement and had now gone to position that only some Americans would be released at time of announcement (even though I had previously made clear was no justification withholding their release for this reason) and only asked that he give me definite time limit in which remainder would be released. "I do not see how it is possible for me to go any further."

I also argued at some length that agreement on words in announcement without clear and common understanding exact meaning would not contribute to "improvement of relations" in future but could only lead to misunderstanding. If "as soon as possible", "promptly" or whatever word was agreed upon meant to them a period of for example a year "that was one thing" but if it meant period of "two or in any event not more than three months that was something else". Said whatever word or phrase this respect was used American people would expect very prompt action on release remainder and if this did not eventuate "state of relations" could not but deteriorate. From our discussion thus far very clear PRC concept of "as soon as possible", "quickly", "promptly" very different from ours. Could not reach any agreement on words until we were clear what we were talking about.

Wang did not contest my statement release remainder would be conditional on political factors. Now quite clear "political hostage" aspect does not shock them. On contrary they are clearly proceeding on premise that release of Americans is political act of grace and therefore directly related to other political factors in relations between two countries. This position more frankly and clearly stated today than ever before. It was almost complete retreat from "legalities and juridical procedures".

Next meeting Saturday, 10 am.

Gowen

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 11:50 a.m. 8/25/55 DES

### 135. Telegram 617 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 25, 1955, 2 p.m.

617. From Johnson.

1. Following is full text agreed announcement mentioned Mytel 616.

“Agreed announcement of the Ambassadors of the PRC and the USA.

2. The Ambassadors of the PRC and the USA have agreed to announce the measures which their respective governments have adopted with respect to the return of nationals of each located in the country of the other.

3. With respect to Americans in the PRC Ambassador Wang Ping-nan on behalf of the Government of the PRC has informed Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson that:

(1) The PRC recognizes that Americans in the PRC who desire to return to the USA are entitled to do so and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can exercise as soon as possible their right to return.

(2) The PRC agrees that the Government of the UK will be entrusted to assist in the return to the USA of those Americans who desire to do so as follows:

A. If any American believes that contrary to the declared policy of the PRC he is encountering obstruction in departure he may so inform the office of the Charge d’Affaires of the UK in the PRC and request it to make representations on his behalf to the Government of the PRC. If desired by the USA the Government of the UK may also investigate the facts;

B. If any American in the PRC who desires to return to the USA has difficulty in paying his return expenses, the Government of the UK may, on behalf of the Government of the USA, render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.

(3) The Government of the PRC will give wide publicity to the foregoing arrangements and the office of the Charge d’Affaires of the UK in the PRC may also do so.

4. With respect to Chinese in the US, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the USA has informed Ambassador Wang Ping-nan that:

(1) The USA recognizes that Chinese in the USA who desire to return to the PRC are now entitled to do so and declares that it has

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2555. Confidential; Niact.



adopted and will further adopt measures so that they can in fact return as soon as possible.

(2) The USA agrees that the Government of the Republic of India will be entrusted to assist the return to the PRC of those Chinese who desire to do so as follows:

A. If any Chinese believes that contrary to the declared policy of the USA he is encountering obstruction in departure he may so inform the Embassy of the Republic of India in the USA and request it to make representations on his behalf to the Government of the USA. If desired by the PRC the Government of the Republic of India may also investigate the facts;

B. If any Chinese in the USA who desires to return to the PRC has difficulty in paying his return expenses, the Government of the Republic of India may, on behalf of the Government of the PRC, render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.

(3) The Government of the USA will give wide publicity to the foregoing arrangements and the Embassy of the Republic of India in the USA may also do so."

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 11:35 a.m. 8/25/55 DES

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### **136. Telegram 623 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 25, 1955, 6 p.m.

623. From Johnson.

My summary tel 616 on today's meeting may not have made it as clear as I might have that Wang and I both came much closer than any time previously to taking "final positions" from which we could not retreat and logical results of which could only be willingness lead up to point of break. I repeatedly used terms "vital", "essential", "far as we can go", et cetera but avoided going to next and logical point of saying unless he met my position on this nothing further talk about. He spoke with some emotion and probably even greater finality than I, but also avoided going next step.

At today's meeting thinking underlying CHICOM position clearly emerged as follows: US proposed these talks thereby "improving

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2555. Secret; Priority.

relations" and enabling CHICOMS release flyers. This was expected further "improve relations" leading to response by US of agreeing third party arrangement which in turn would enable CHICOMS release further Americans. If talks continued go well and "relations continued improve" all remaining Americans could be released. They reconcile this with Chou's statement on grounds expectation "progress" would be made these talks. They do not attach much real importance what we have done re Chinese in US, nor have they ever attempted directly link future rate departure Chinese in US with departure Americans. Their raising issue Chinese in US is largely to construct "straw man" and give basis for exploiting opening wedge Indian representation might constitute for them.

While not prominent in today's meeting their sensitivity to anything they interpret as "responding to pressure" and their desire maintain appearance of "legality" are also still factors. However question "understanding" on jurisdiction and scope representation arrangement was not raised today by Wang and, of course, I did not mention subject. He may still do so but believe he may now have dropped this although his rewording of paras 2 (A) both sections may be intended broaden arrangement so that CHICOMS could request India "investigate facts" any case.

See little I can do next meeting except reiterate our position and discuss remaining points disagreement in "draft agreed announcement". However I have little hope of making any progress on major substantive issue.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copy to Mr. McConaughy (CA) 8/25/6:30 p.m. CWO/FED

### 137. Telegram 624 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 25, 1955, 6 p.m.

624. From Johnson.

As sidelight on today's meeting there was much inconclusive discussion translation from one language to other terms "promptly", "quickly" and "as soon as possible".

Chinese expression which they insisted be translated "as soon as possible" actually means "most speedily". Wang confirmed this by using as

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2555. Confidential.

synonym colloquial term meaning “very quickly”. Could not clarify why Wang insisted upon inexact translation into “as soon as possible” and unwilling accept my suggestion of “quickly”. He objected to “promptly” on grounds had connotation of command. Although somewhat farfetched believe they may be confusing with use of “to prompt” as verb.

Foregoing is without any real significance to substantive issue but believe Department should be aware of type of problem we face on language.

Gowen

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### 138. Telegram 625 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 25, 1955, 7 p.m.

625. From Johnson.

1. Eleventh meeting, August 25th, was opened by Wang who commented upon our August 23 text proposed announcement (Deptel 599). He said they discovered many changes from Chinese text of August 18 and wished make a few revisions. He had three principal points to make:

2. (A) Replace word “promptly” by “as soon as possible”. Commented in their original text did not have these words but willing insert them to meet our request.

3. (B) Add to paragraph one American section “and will further adopt” measures enable nationals return who wish to do so.

4. (C) Add wording indicating third powers invited by respective sides and agreed to by other power. He commented this in line with international practice and as far as they were concerned conformed to actual situation.

5. Wang concluded by handing me his proposed text and remarking he prepared agree to remainder language we proposed. (Text by Mytel 617).

6. I said word “promptly” was very important, and in fact vital we have clear understanding between us what we meant by this word. However, if we use “as soon as possible” this would change sense of sentence very considerably. Whatever term we used, we must have clear understanding what it means even though it may not be included in the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2555. Confidential; Priority.

proposed announcement or be made public. By this I meant it must be precisely defined in terms of reasonable period of time in which all remaining Americans whose departure being prevented would be able return. If that could be done I thought we could quickly reach agreement on text. I asked if Wang could define "as soon as possible" in precise terms of time more clearly than he had done so previously and state just what this meant as far as return of Americans was concerned.

7. I commented further that statement US "will further adopt measures" seemed unnecessary. US already had adopted measures permit prompt return Chinese and we knew of no further measures we could adopt.

8. Wang replied phrase "as soon as possible" meant cases would be handled "very quickly not slowly". He had clearly stated PRC recognized right Americans return US. Chinese would review cases so that they could return as soon as possible.

9. Regarding phrase "will further adopt measures" Wang said appropriate include this in statement regarding American actions because although preventive orders removed by American Government there were still difficulties because measures taken not sufficient or authorities low level failed carry them out. Therefore US Government should take further measures enable Chinese nationals in fact return as soon as possible.

10. I remarked if "as soon as possible" meant cases would be quickly reviewed why not use either "quickly" or "promptly". Wang replied "promptly" implied certain amount obligation in response to order.

11. I replied this not at all meaning in our minds.

12. Wang said "as soon as possible" more appropriate and meets actual situation so far they were concerned.

13. I then said whatever term used, vital we have clear understanding what word means with respect to time. This kind of terms used in agreements between governments are apt to cause misunderstanding unless clearly understood. It may have entirely different connotation in his mind from mine. If in his mind it connoted one year or something in that order, that was one thing. If it connoted two or at most three months, that was something else. Vital we have clear understanding what this means. If not, fear agreement this nature may give rise increased misunderstanding rather than improve state relations between our two countries.

14. Wang said his phrase meant they would deal with cases quickly and there would be no delay in their review. He said solution of cases involved a number of factors, including conduct of people concerned, whether or not agreement reached as result these discussions and whether relations between two countries developed favorably. He concluded impossible for him give definite period of time in view these various factors.

15. To illustrate point, Wang said release airmen excellent example. Last year someone proposed that Chinese specify definite time when airmen might be released. Longest sentence was Col. Arnold's of ten years. Impossible for Chinese last year to specify time required airmen's release. Only after airmen had proven good conduct and talks at Ambassadorial level agreed upon, then Chinese advanced time airmen's release in accordance their own juridical procedures. He said they had indicated Chinese would review remaining cases Americans and permit their return as soon as possible. Impossible for him to give in any more beyond this limit. He would not say anything which his government could not do. If he promised anything, his government would live up to it without question.

16. In reply I asked Wang if he would disagree my statement very important we each understand what we were agreeing to and that we not agree to words which have different meaning to our two governments. I was very disappointed no change in position of Wang evident to enable us arrive at clear understanding what we meant by words we were using.

17. Wang agreed clear understanding essential or agreement would be empty. He said arrangement designed to resolve problem return our respective nationals and it had been made clear his side would promptly inform us on results review as soon as agreement reached and his government would adopt measures review other cases as soon as possible. He was sure if this arrangement were made known to American public it would be clear that question was settled.

18. I replied if this arrangement were made public American people would expect Americans return from China mainland "very quickly" as he had phrased it, but Chinese idea and my government's idea concerning "very quickly" were quite different. Result this misunderstanding would be expectations of American Government and people would not be realized and this would lead to increasing misunderstanding and deterioration of relations rather than improvement that we both hoped for.

19. Wang said improvement or deterioration depended on action by both sides not one and if I insisted on definite period of time he was afraid we could not reach agreement.

20. I then made statement in which I said I understood from him that as reviews cases Americans completed and cases settled the Americans would be able promptly to return. In August 11 meeting he had told me reviews completed on some cases involving Americans and it was my understanding their cases had been settled. That was two weeks ago and none of these Americans had been able to depart. If I understood his position it was that these Americans would not be able to depart until we had reached agreement here. I found this fact very hard to reconcile with my understanding Americans were able to depart upon settlement

cases in which they may be involved. Also hard to reconcile with fact that my government had without condition taken all action necessary in response his request to permit prompt departure from US any Chinese who desires return to his country. I wanted make very clear no Chinese being held my country pending our agreement here. It was entirely impossible for me or my government to see why our failure thus far to reach agreement on public announcement has prevented departure any Americans whose cases favorably reviewed. If we were to deal here on basis equality and reciprocity at least these Americans should be able to return immediately. I could not help avoid conclusion that fact these Americans not able return appeared due other than purely legal or juridical reasons. Also hard avoid conclusion that as far as return of remaining Americans concerned that also would be based on other than purely legal or juridical reasons. This attitude on part Chinese made it all more essential that a clear understanding be reached on period of time during which it would be possible complete release and return to US of all Americans now being prevented from leaving.

21. I continued saying I expected and hoped when I came that it would be possible for us reach agreement on basis each our governments adopting measures permitting all those desiring return in fact do so. My government took necessary steps so we could make such announcement this regard. I next thought it would be possible agree they could be released simultaneously with our announcement. Now, however, I had gone another step and accepted his position that some Americans will be released later, although I do not see any reason for delay. All I asked him now was that he give me definite statement regarding reasonable time in which steps will be taken by his government in order remainder cases may be completed. This seems very reasonable position and I did not see how it was possible go any further. We came to discuss return our nationals and settle that question. I did not see how simply vague statement that some will be able to return in unknown time in the future and only under certain conditions, one of which has no relation to juridical and legal processes involved, settles matter of return of citizens.

22. Wang replied he could not agree to discuss things which governments both sides unable to accomplish. He said Chinese in US had not committed crimes and so it was not reasonable for US Government to impose restrictions. Furthermore if we had reached agreement two weeks ago Americans whose cases had been reviewed would already have returned to US. Responsibility for their failure to return was not Chinese.

23. He continued that legal and juridical aspects of the cases of Americans were closely linked with agreement on proposed announcement. If agreement reached, that would mean not only that PRC willing improve relations and settle questions but also that

American Government had this desire. Agreement on announcement would show both sides sincerely working for this goal. To talk much about sincerity in reaching settlement but refuse to come to agreement does not give appearance real sincerity. He said only because of real sincerity, PRC has reviewed cases of airmen who according Chinese legal procedure could not have left for very long time. Chinese in making review took into account improvement of relations and act was one of leniency and not part their juridical procedures. Airmen released out of consideration for success of talks. Therefore improvement relations between two countries will make it easier for remaining cases to be settled. This is a lenient policy their part and they link this action with agreement in order to show their sincerity. If no such sincerity present he saw no reason for his side to continue taking unilateral lenient steps.

24. I said he had spoken frankly and I would do the same. He had indicated there was relationship between release of Col. Arnold's group and holding of these talks. He had also clearly indicated relation between return of those Americans whose cases had been reviewed and our reaching an agreement here. I did not now know what relationship there might be between release remaining Americans and whatever future agreements his side might wish to have made. I wanted to say bluntly I did not come with intent to and would not trade fate of Americans in his country prevented from returning for political agreements or concessions he might desire. I was willing discuss each problem on its own merits. I did not ask for nor expect concessions of that nature from his side in return for actions we took regarding Chinese in US. I had also indicated willingness enter into arrangement on assistance to Chinese in US who wish to return. I was not and could not enter arrangement unless we had clear understanding between us as to what action would be taken concerning Americans. I could not consider statements he made regarding action proposed by his side as being satisfactory. I had come long way meet his position and hoped and expected he would be able come a little way to meet mine.

25. Wang returned argument Chinese in US had not committed crimes and although announcement made restrictions lifted they still encountered difficulties in fact whereas no restrictions on Americans in China. He concluded that if I asked whether measures had been taken to speed review of cases Americans to permit their return, answer was "yes". If I asked for understanding on time it would require, answer was "no".

26. He indicated willingness close meeting at this point and I agreed. Usual end of meeting fencing omitted.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copy to Mr. McConaughy (CA) 5:45 p.m. 8-25-55  
CWO/FED

**139. Telegram 92 to USUN<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 25, 1955, 5:14 p.m.

92. For Ambassador Lodge.

Please make the following two telegrams from Ambassador Johnson in Geneva available to Secretary this evening.

616 [Code Room: Please repeat 616 from Geneva, control 13384]

617 [Code Room: Please repeat 617 from Geneva, control 13389]

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2555. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Barnes. Brackets are in the original.

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**140. Telegram 633 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 25, 1955, 6:46 p.m.

633. For Johnson.

Comparison Wang redraft (your 617) with text our 599 indicates following substantial changes: 1) In first paragraph "repatriation of civilians" changed to "return of nationals." 2) Unilateral announcements are couched in terms of an agreement. 3) India is "entrusted" to assist return, and in paying expenses Indian Government is to act "on behalf of the Government of the PRC," thus connoting idea of a protecting power instead of a third party designated by US primarily to confirm that its statement regarding freedom to return is in fact true. 4) Indian Government is authorized to "make investigation of the facts," the words "in any such case" being dropped. Effect of this would be permit Indian Government investigate entire matter, presumably all Chinese in US, and not merely those requesting assistance.

These changes appear to indicate 1) intent to convert announcements into an agreement, 2) to have it apply to all Chinese in US and to describe them as nationals of PRC, 3) to give India right to investigate

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Phleger and Sebald; cleared by McConaughy.



generally and not simply those Chinese who appeal to it, and 4) to establish India as a protecting power. Above objections are in addition to unresolved question of time limit for release of Americans.

Amendments proposed by Wang make his draft entirely unacceptable for reasons indicated above. We believe it preferable that Saturday meeting be postponed until some time next week so as to give us further opportunity study our tactics. You should inform Wang such postponement requested, assigning no repeat no reasons.

**Dulles**

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**141. Telegram 628 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 26, 1955, 11 a.m.

628. From Johnson. Deptel 633.

I have requested next meeting Wednesday, August 31, 10 a.m.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2655. Confidential; Priority.

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**142. Telegram 630 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 26, 1955, 1 p.m.

630. From Johnson.

Re Mytel 617 and Deptel 633 following our comments on Wang's redraft:

1. Doubt that Wang is attaching as much significance as we to term "nationals" but my negotiating position in now obtaining its complete elimination is not good. Also seems to me undesirable attract too much attention to it. Term appears only once in both Wang's August 11 draft

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2655. Secret; Priority.

(Mytel 402) and August 25 draft. It was much more extensively used in draft given Wang August 15 (Mytel 463) which was based upon draft contained Deptel 466. Also first sentence Wang's August 25 draft where this term appears is identical with first sentence our August 16 draft. With respect "return" vs "repatriation" it seems to me former term preferable even though latter was used in July 25 statement by two governments. "Repatriation" could carry connotation of force unless modified by "voluntary" and status of belligerency between parties whereas "return" is broader term and avoids undesirable connotation of "repatriation".

2. (A) While Wang obviously attempting give "agreed announcement" greatest possible character of agreement between two governments believe he has valid point that our phrase "will authorize" does not accurately represent fact that request to GOI made by PRC and US is accepting that designation. Same situation *mutatis mutandis* with respect UK.

(B) On other hand "agrees" as used in Wang's text would also inhibit our ability unilaterally to cancel arrangement unless "agreed announcement" accompanied by understanding or unilateral US statement on time limit for release Americans which if broken by CHICOMS would give basis for cancellation.

(C) To meet these points suggest consideration following language "US accepts designation by PRC of GOI to assist return to PRC of those Chinese who desire do so as follows".

(D) Foregoing language also eliminates "entrusted".

3. Believe important delete "on behalf of the PRC" because protecting power connotation. I would propose argue not applicable case US as payments if any would in most cases probably be on behalf family or firms. PRC can make whatever arrangements it wishes reimburse GOI, need not be mentioned "agreed announcement".

4. Concur deletion words "in any such case" would appear give basis GOI investigate any case at PRC request. Believe we should insist on restoration this phrase.

5. Cannot reach decision on most appropriate wording for "promptly" until tactics for next meeting determined. Several different words could be used, important thing is that whatever word used there be common understanding of what it means.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell (FE) notified 8/26 5:20 pm - E.H.

**143. Telegram 631 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 26, 1955, 3 p.m.

631. From Johnson.

I have accepted Wang's invitation to private dinner Sunday evening. Would appreciate any indications Department could give me by that time our thinking on future tactics. In absence anything from Department will of course adhere same line and do maximum obtain any indication shift in Wang's position.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2655. Secret; Limit Distribution.

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**144. Memorandum of Conversation, Koo and Sebald<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 26, 1955

SUBJECT

Geneva Ambassadorial Talks with Chinese Communists

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador  
Mr. William J. Sebald, Acting Assistant Secretary, FE  
Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Director for Chinese Affairs

The Chinese Ambassador called at Mr. Sebald's request. Mr. Sebald said that he had asked the Ambassador to come in so that he could be informed of the status of the talks with the Chinese Communists at Geneva. There was no progress to report, but even this fact might be of interest to the Chinese Government. Negative information sometimes was important and in any event we wished the Chinese Government to have the knowledge that it was currently informed on the status of our efforts at Geneva.

The Ambassador expressed his appreciation and confirmed that his Government was very much interested in receiving frequent status

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2655. Confidential. Drafted by McConaughy on August 29.

reports for its background information, even though there was nothing positive to report. He inquired as to the apparent reasons for the lack of progress in getting our detained nationals released.

Mr. Sebald said that it was difficult to say exactly what the stumbling blocks were. There were differences over words in the proposed announcement, and differences over the interpretation to be attached to the words. The general concept of the Chinese Communists as to the right of the individuals to return seemed to be different from ours. Wang Ping-nan was not specific on action the Chinese Communists were prepared to take. Wang was, of course, pressing for an enlargement of the very limited role envisaged by us for the Indian Embassy. He wanted it to appear that the Chinese Communists had a right to assert an interest in Chinese nationals generally in this country. We, of course, were not prepared to accord the Chinese Communists any access through the Indian Embassy to Chinese nationals in this country other than the small number who might express a wish to return to the China mainland. There appeared to be no flexibility in Wang's position. Of course, Ambassador Johnson was standing firm on the basic principles inherent in our position. Mr. Sebald summarized the situation as amounting practically to a stalemate, but with no actual break-off of the talks appearing to be in immediate prospect.

Ambassador Koo then referred to what he termed the great anxiety of Chinese communities in all the large cities of the U.S. over the possible outcome of the Geneva talks. His Foreign Office and the Department of Overseas Chinese Affairs at Taipei were greatly concerned over this matter and had instructed him to take it up with the Department of State. He said that there was a general apprehension among Chinese residents of this country that they might be subjected to interrogation by representatives of the Chinese Communists. There seemed to be a fear that they would be exposed to Chinese Communist pressures, either through the Indian Embassy or through their families on the mainland. The Ambassador said he hoped that the American Government could do something to relieve this feeling of uneasiness. He thought it could best be done through an official statement by some high official of the U.S. Government which would assure Chinese everywhere that the U.S. Government would not agree to anything at Geneva which would expose Chinese residents of the U.S. or their families to intimidation at the hands of the Chinese Communists. He mentioned that a large number of letters from Chinese had been received indicating that they were greatly disturbed. He said there was a general feeling among the Chinese that Wang Ping-nan was pressing for information regarding all Chinese in the U.S., and not merely the students. Even the Chinese who had American citizenship and considered themselves "dual nationals" were disturbed and suffered from a feeling of insecurity. The same was true of long-time Chinese residents of this country who did not have

American citizenship but who were legal permanent residents. He said that reports from the Chinese Associations in all the American cities where there was a large Chinese population confirmed the existence of these apprehensions. He felt that only official U.S. action could counteract the mental anxiety.

Mr. Sebald said that the U.S. position was made clear at the time the Geneva talks were announced that nothing would happen at Geneva to betray the interests of free Chinese. The Ambassador surely must be well aware that the U.S. would not do anything which would “sell Chinese residents down the river”. As for an official U.S. statement, he did not see any peg to hang such a statement on at the present moment. If a statement were issued with no apparent reason, and without reference to any current development, it would seem strange and might raise questions as to why it was issued. It might tend to cause confusion and might heighten rather than alleviate the unfounded fears of which the Ambassador had spoken. Mr. Sebald thought that it might be preferable for the Chinese Embassy to take action to reassure the Chinese communities in the U.S., based on the full knowledge possessed by the Chinese Embassy of the U.S. position and the course of the Geneva talks.

Ambassador Koo said that the Chinese Embassy would be glad to do what it could. However, he felt that some form of reassurance from the U.S. Government was also needed. He inquired if the Secretary could not take advantage of one of his press conferences to say something to restore the confidence of the Chinese. If a question along this line were asked of the Secretary, he would be afforded a logical and natural opportunity to say something which would dispel the doubts. In addition, Ambassador Koo requested that the Department reply to the numerous petitions and letters on this subject which he understood the White House and the Department had received from Chinese groups and individuals. He said he understood that ordinarily such petitions were not answered, but he hoped in this case answers could be provided.

Mr. Sebald and Mr. McConaughy stated that they did not recall any petitions or letters from Chinese on this subject. Correspondence along this line ordinarily went to the Bureau of Public Affairs and was handled there. Such correspondence did not ordinarily come to the attention of the geographic bureaus.

Mr. Sebald, in response to a direct question from the Ambassador, said that while Item I of the agenda did not specify that only Chinese students were referred to on the Chinese side, the whole context of the arrangements for the talks showed that the question of the return of Chinese revolved primarily around Chinese students. The actual cases which have become issues were all cases of students, and it was our understanding that it was principally students in whom the Chinese

Communists were interested. The Chinese Communists have not spelled this out specifically, and naturally they would like to enlarge the representation formula if they could. But we would stand firm on the principle that no Chinese in this country could be approached on behalf of the Chinese Communists unless he first expressed a desire to return to the mainland. Those who might express a wish to return presumably would be in the student category.

Note: Separate Memoranda of Conversation have been prepared on the following subjects which were discussed at the same conversation: *Revision of the U.N. Charter* and *Detention of the Soviet Tanker "Tuapse"*.

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#### 145. Letter 9 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 9

Washington, August 26, 1955

Dear Alex:

The communications people have very helpfully arranged a second pouch each week, closing here on Friday morning and reaching Geneva via Frankfurt Sunday evening. The spacing (Mondays and Fridays) is not the best, but it is much better than once-a-week service.

Herman Phleger returned to duty on Monday the 22nd, and from that date has played a large role in the direction of the Washington end of this project. You must have recognized his talented and distinctive imprint immediately. The Secretary asked him on Monday to coordinate and take the immediate responsibility for all instructions to you. So Bill Sebald and I are working directly with him on all your messages. The Secretary has been away in New York since Wednesday.

I believe it is important for you to know the Secretary's general thinking at present on the matter of Indian representation. Last Sunday afternoon he remarked that he thought it was important for it to be clear that the granting of a limited role to the Indian Embassy would be a matter of our own volition. He felt it should be made manifest to all that this was something which we decided to do of our own free will and accord, and not something that we were driven into by the Chinese Communists against our own inclination, as a *quid pro quo* in a deal for getting citizens out. It was even debated briefly whether we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Printed from an unsigned copy.

should not go ahead immediately and announce independently that we were prepared to give the Indian Embassy this role, without reference to any “agreed announcement” at Geneva. It was remarked that our moral and psychological position before the world would certainly be very strong if some such offer were freely made, with no strings attached. We would then wait to see what the Chinese Communists were prepared to offer on their own initiative. It was felt that the intangible pressures on the Chinese to make a corresponding gesture might be considerable. While it was decided not to do this, at least for the present, the basic concept is still influencing the thinking here, as you will have perceived from various of our telegrams during the week. We think it important for it to be apparent to all that whatever we are doing in regard to Chinese in this country who wish to return to the mainland is our own free act, taken because it is right and just, and not because the Chinese Communists have intervened as the pretended champions of the rights of Chinese individuals.

This makes it important for you to avoid implying in the talks that any Indian Embassy role permitted by us would have to be part of an understanding with the Chinese Communists (paragraph 24 of your 624 [625]). Of course, you will not suggest the opposite either. It is simply an aspect to steer clear of at this juncture.

This thinking on the prospective Indian role has also influenced the attitude toward the essential character of the Indian Government responsibility. Herman Phleger feels that we must be very careful to refrain from according even by implication the status of “protecting power” to India, even in a narrowly defined field. We do not recognize that Communist China has any Governmental interests in this country which are entitled to protection by a third power. The Indian Embassy would be acting essentially in behalf of the interests of the individual travelers who want to return to the mainland rather than in the interest of the Chinese Communists as a Government. And it would be serving to verify the truth of our statement on Chinese aliens in this country. This means that the Indian Government would be selected primarily by us, rather than by the Chinese Communists, for its special function. It would be filling a humanitarian role in reference to certain individuals, just as say the Red Cross might have been asked to do. It would not have in any sense the traditional role of a “protecting power” for an established Government when diplomatic relations are severed. So its role would be in no sense comparable to that of the Swiss when they acted on behalf of our nationals in Japanese-occupied territories during World War II. It is believed important to maintain this principle, and it will affect the tenor of our reply to the Indian Government note on representation of August 18.

L also thinks it important to maintain the character of any "agreed announcement" as two unilateral and independent (although interconnected) declarations or announcements, and not an "Agreement". You cannot properly have anything in the nature of a normal Governmental agreement with a regime which you do not recognize. While this may be a fairly fine point, it has validity, and I believe you would be well advised to avoid in the informal oral give and take of the sessions, any references to "agreements between governments" (paragraph 12 your 625).

Any implication that Chinese in this country, even the few who want to return to the mainland, are "nationals" of the PRC, has dangerous connotations in L's view, and is to be carefully eschewed.

Phleger believes that the changes which Wang introduced or reverted to at the August 25 meeting (your 617) are all significant, although the significance may be cleverly disguised. Our 633 may seem to represent something of a hardening of the line, and this indeed may be the case.

The callousness and cynicism with which Wang has dropped the pretence of full adherence to judicial procedures and admitted the political basis of the Chinese Communist handling of the prisoner question has caused a feeling of revulsion here as well as deep disappointment. He has in effect demanded that we ransom our imprisoned citizens with political concessions. Presumably he has done it in the knowledge that we cannot submit to that sort of extortion. Wang's refusal to make any commitment on when the "remaining" Americans would be released, his linkage of the prisoner question with the status of relations between the U.S. and Communist China, and his attempt to blame us for the non-release of Americans whose cases have already been "cleared", create painful dilemmas for us, but they also place the PRC in a most vulnerable position morally and forensically if unhappily this issue should be forced into the propaganda field.

The Secretary returns tomorrow afternoon. I anticipate there will be some weekend soul searching on this whole question.

The request for the postponement of the Saturday, August 27 meeting to next week was prompted by the belief that we have nothing to gain by such an early meeting when we are so close to a deadlock and with nothing new likely to come forth on either side so soon. The meeting after a mere 2-day interval with nothing but repetition in prospect would be likely to tighten, maybe cement, the deadlock. This we want to avoid. We also of course still attach the very highest importance to avoiding a breakdown. We do not even want to take the initiative in proposing a recess on Item 1. Our only hesitation in asking for a postponement of the next meeting was our desire to avoid any appearance of lack of zealotness in pressing for the earliest possible action on our detained citizens. We do not believe, however, that any reasonable person would construe the postponement under the circumstances as



attributable to laxity on this score. The arguments for not hastening either side into a tightly frozen position, and for avoiding aggravations which might lead to the rupture which we must constantly strive to avoid, are extremely cogent. The feeling now is that perhaps at this stage we should not have three meetings a week. The tempo of developments is not sufficiently rapid to justify such frequent meetings. It may be that meetings should be held no more frequently than twice a week. It would be useful to have your reaction to this. We recognize it is a delicate business. We must avoid giving the impression that we are stalling, as well as the impression that we are not pressing to the maximum on Americans. At the same time we must balance this against the danger of too frequent sessions leading up to a situation which might become somewhat comparable to that which Dean ran into at Panmunjom in November and early December, 1953.

You will have noted O'Neill's misgivings from Peiping. It is significant that the British are almost more skeptical of Chinese Communist "performance" than we are. O'Neill thinks there would be a strong possibility of bad faith on the part of the Chinese Communists when only a few Chinese express a desire to return to the mainland.

The loopholes which we have necessarily left in the announcement in order to protect Chinese in this country would make it easy for the Chinese Communists to prevent some Americans from informing the British Embassy of a desire to return to this country. Undoubtedly he wishes his Embassy could be given authority to get in touch with the Americans on its own initiative. We wish it could be done too. But how, without departing from our basic principle on Chinese in this country?

Your reporting is giving us the best possible visualization of what you are up against. We feel that your reports and analyses have imparted to us a good understanding of the Chinese Communist strategy as well as tactics. There is nothing but praise for your handling of the appalling difficulties, along with a keen desire to uphold your hand in every way we can.

Your letter of August 19 came through promptly and was most helpful. The appropriate portions got the needed circulation to the interested parties.

Walter Robertson will be out all of next week too. He is still in Richmond, bothered with bronchitis. Bill Sebald is nobly carrying a heavy load on Geneva, the Shigemitsu visit, and a myriad of other things. He sends his best to you.

Regards and all the best,  
Sincerely,

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146. Telegram 642 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 29, 1955, 1 p.m.

642. From Johnson.

Although not received until this morning I in fact very closely followed line in first para Deptel 648 at dinner with Wang last night.

I indicated had nothing further to add to what I had said previously, no enthusiasm for again covering same ground, and hope he had something new. However, Wang insisted on again going over their position in considerable detail and much earnestness thinking of which followed general line given first portion second para Mytel 623.

Chinese in US brought up in context number much greater than number Americans in China and therefore as set forth by Chou problem latter much more easily resolved. Implication may be that problem former resolved only by workings representation arrangement and that proportion Chinese students in US who go CHICOM territory is one test "improvement relations" and "facility" with which "problem remaining Americans" resolved. Again repetition theme unilateral release flyers had resolved what we had made major issue and therefore now "our turn" make gesture. Also brought up release flyers as example how impossible forecast when remainder could be released but at same time how quickly this could happen following favorable developments (sic). Their "many concessions", no list Chinese US, representation arrangement not satisfactory but willing agree, our form "agreed announcement" accepted etc.

I worked briefly but hard at theme we had agreed discuss return civilians, way to resolve issue was permit them return, dragging out releases not conducive "improvement relations", but produces opposite effect, "let's get it finished", again brought up possibility travel by correspondents if all released (said was speaking personally could make no promises) our very adverse reactions to linking releases Americans to "improvement relations" etc. He rose to correspondent bait and was obviously interested. His replies reinforced my feeling that they unable see anything reprehensible in linking releases to "improvement relations". They start from premise that imprisoned persons have "committed crimes" and that commutation sentences for other than "good behavior" is political act for political purposes.

However unable detect any signs whatever any shift their position and do not believe I gave him any grounds for believing we were going

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2955. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

shift. When he made mention at beginning conversation, gap until next meeting I said he should realize their position was facing us with “very serious situation”.

During preceding dinner table conversation again much talk by Wang on economic backwardness China (steel production now three million tons only three and one-half million by 1957 etc.) economy would long be primarily agricultural and therefore complementary to advanced industrial economy US thus providing good basis economic relations, US industry very advanced—by implication better than USSR (Soviet autos not good, low powered and old fashioned wanted US cars etc.), wanted send students to US, China and US long been good friends should be friends again etc.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Waddell (FE) 10:30 am 8/29/55 (FMH)

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#### **147. Telegram 654 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 29, 1955, 8:20 p.m.

654. For Johnson.

Your 630. Instructions for August 31 meeting.

1. Propose solve problem reference “nationals” by returning to phraseology of July 25 identic announcement: “repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries”. Object is to avoid any language which might be construed as implying that US acknowledges that any Chinese in this country have PRC nationality.

2. It should be specified in announcement that we are authorizing GOI to act. It would not seem essential for announcement to take note of fact that PRC has requested GOI to act. If necessary obtain agreement, we would be prepared consider insertion of modifying phrase such as “which has been requested by the PRC to serve in this capacity” following “will authorize the Government of India.”

3. You should stand firm on: (a) refusal to use term “US agrees”, (b) avoidance “on behalf of the PRC”, and (c) restitution of phrase “in any such case”.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2655. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Dulles.

4. Satisfactory definition of maximum time period for release of Americans considered essential.

5. If you consider it would be useful, you may state you have been instructed to request immediate, circumstantial and authentic report on health and welfare each detained American civilian. Then you should point out cumulative deleterious effects of prolonged imprisonment of sort to which Wang's Government has subjected US citizens grow rapidly more pronounced after several years have elapsed. Letters from numerous relatives indicate increasing anxiety on this score. In this context you may suggest next meeting be fixed for date on which this report will be ready or in any event not before next week.

**Dulles**

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#### **148. Letter 10 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 10

Washington, August 29, 1955

Dear Alex:

There have not been many developments here since my last letter of August 26. Phleger, Sebald and I met briefly with the Secretary this morning and are to meet again late this afternoon on your instructions for the Wednesday meeting. This is an unusually busy week, what with Shigemitsu here and other matters also demanding time.

It is unfortunate that our 648 did not reach you before your Sunday night dinner. Through some inadvertence the priority label was omitted from the telegram but it was sent early Saturday afternoon and you still should have had it before your Sunday evening engagement.

The feeling here is that we should get back to the language of July 25 identic announcements which was "repatriation of civilians who desire to return". We do not see that there would be any connotation of involuntary repatriation or any other undesirable connotation in the use of the word "repatriation" since it is used in the context "those who desire to return".

There is concern felt here in the obvious attempt of the Chinese Communists to enlarge the repatriation concept. Clearly they wish to assert a large measure of interest in and a right to claim the allegiance of all Chinese in this country. They believe that even a limited degree of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

Indian representation will be a useful entering wedge, especially if they can sell the concept of India as a protecting power. Phleger remarked that it would have been better if we had insisted on some non governmental agency such as the Red Cross, to serve as a contact with those Chinese who wish to return to the Mainland.

Your 642 has just come in. The dinner conversation certainly does not bring up anything new or add to our hopes for a successful outcome of item one. The one comforting thought is that it certainly does not indicate any intention on the part of the Chinese Communists to precipitate an early break.

We are trying to assemble information for you on current departures of Chinese for the Mainland via Hong Kong. Immigration tells us that it takes at least 60 days to process the outgoing passenger manifests of the American President Lines and the air lines. This is bureaucratic red tape at its worst. We hope to get the information promptly, perhaps using our Consulate General at Hong Kong to monitor all arrivals of Chinese in transit to the Mainland.

At Phleger's suggestion we are working on an outline which spells out our objectives at Geneva, the limitations imposed, the courses of action that are called for and under this the arguing points that might well be brought up in the course of the talks. The outline also includes some thoughts on the sort of statements the two sides might issue by agreement if there has to be a recess. This statement would explain the postponement of discussion of item two until all U.S. civilians are released. We believe that there are some telling points you could make to Wang regarding the unusual efforts we have made to reduce tensions and the Chinese Communist actions which have actually increased tensions. For instance our restraint in not giving publicity of the story of Bersohn, who has now come around and whose account is utterly damning to the Chinese Communists, is something of which note might well be taken at some stage. The same is true of the forbearance we have shown in suppressing the full story of the 11 airmen. We have even gone to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in order to make sure that the airmen do not tell any more of their stories for the present.

We are anxious to get your reaction to the suggestion that meetings be reduced to twice a week.

Good luck and regards,

Sincerely,

Walter P. McCaughy

**149. Telegram 651 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 30, 1955, noon

651. From Johnson.

I doubt if it would be useful carry out suggestion first sentence paragraph 5 Deptel 654. It seems to me Wang's immediate and obvious reply would be that if we had reached agreement "large number" of those with whom we concerned could have by now returned to US and that if representation arrangement they proposed was in effect reports on condition those remaining could be transmitted by or through such channel. Also seems to me probable Wang would feel required to reintroduce old demand for list Chinese in US or introduce some new demand re Chinese in US in order balance our action. All of this would serve further to take focus away from central issue of when all Americans are to be able return, enable CHICOMS to becloud this question, and possibly cause them further harden their position.

Will, however, use as it seems useful second and third sentences paragraph 5, although here again Wang can always also retort along foregoing lines.

Am I correct in interpreting last sentence paragraph 5 as desire I attempt fix next meeting for next week even though I do not use line in first sentence paragraph 5? I would plan suggest Tuesday September 6 with thought following meeting Friday September 9. However I may encounter difficulty with Wang and in this event would agree Saturday September 3. I am bothered by tending give any appearance I am less anxious than he to dispose item one.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-3055. Secret; Priority.

**150. Telegram 658 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 30, 1955, 6:17 p.m.

658. For Johnson. Your 651.

It would seem desirable hold next meeting September 6 unless there are indications Wang may have something present before then. If he requests meeting Saturday September 3, and you consider it desirable, you should agree, leaving date of following meeting to be fixed on September 3. You may have opportunity establish pattern semi-weekly meetings Tuesdays and Fridays in absence specific reason for meeting on other days. We are confident your approach will make it clear wider spacing meetings not due to any lessening of interest our part in earliest possible completion item one but rather desire avoid useless meetings while awaiting Chinese Communist decision take position necessary for conclusion item one, as we have already done.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–3055. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in draft by Phleger.

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**151. Telegram 657 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 31, 1955, noon

657. From Johnson.

Two hour and fifteen minute meeting this morning. Wang showed great flexibility on text “agreed announcement” and agreed with the draft which I believe should be acceptable to US. (Text by separate telegram.) Believe I have been successful in walking back almost the entire way from our August 16 draft.

No progress on timing release remaining Americans but only reiteration previous positions.

Readily agreed to next meeting Tuesday, September 6th.

I am planning leave for Prague this evening, returning Sunday.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–3155. Confidential; Niact.

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152. Telegram 658 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 31, 1955, 2 p.m.

658. From Johnson.

Following is text "agreed announcement" which Wang now appears prepared accept. Believe it contains none of undesirable features mentioned Deptel 654 and that we should be able accept it.

"The Ambassadors of the USA and the PRC have agreed to announce the measures which their governments have adopted with respect to return of civilians to their respective countries.

With respect to Chinese in the US, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the US Government, has informed Ambassador Wang Ping-nan that:

1. The US recognizes that Chinese in the USA who desire to return to the PRC are now entitled to do so and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return.

2. The Government of the Republic of India will be invited to assist the return to the PRC of those Chinese who desire to do so as follows:

- A. If any Chinese in the USA believes that contrary to the declared policy of the USA he is encountering obstruction in departure he may so inform the Indian Embassy in the USA and request it to make representations on his behalf to the US Government. If desired by the PRC the Indian Government may also investigate the facts in any such case.

- B. If a Chinese in the US who desires to return to the PRC has difficulty in paying his return expenses, the Indian Government may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.

3. The Government of the US will give wide publicity to the foregoing arrangements and the Embassy of the Republic of India in the USA may also do so.

With respect to Americans in the PRC, Ambassador Wang, on behalf of the PRC, has informed Ambassador Johnson that:

1. The PRC recognizes that Americans in the PRC who desire to return to the USA are now entitled to do so and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return.

2. The Government of the UK will be invited to assist in the return to the US of those Americans who desire to do so as follows:

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-3155. Confidential; Niact.



A. If any American in the PRC believes that contrary to the declared policy of the PRC he is encountering obstruction in departure he may so inform the office of the Charge d’Affaires of the UK in the PRC and request it to make representations on his behalf to the Government of the PRC. If desired by the US, the Government of the UK may also investigate the facts in any such case.

B. If an American in the PRC who desires to return to the US has difficulty in paying his return expenses, the Government of the UK may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.

3. The Government of the PRC will give wide publicity to the foregoing arrangements and the office of the Charge d’Affaires of the UK in the PRC may also do so.”

**Gowen**

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### 153. Telegram 659 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 31, 1955, 6 p.m.

659. From Johnson.

Comments today’s meeting.

Wang was relaxed, made no serious effort press to any showdown, and showed no great sense of urgency. He quickly reached decisions at table on language draft and while immediately noting I had gone back on language our August 16 draft particularly on introductory para did not press his advantage this regard. Degree to which he conceded disputed points in draft also indicated they may not have been attaching same value thereto as we had assumed. While I succeeded in avoiding expressly committing myself to draft in face his willingness reach immediate agreement on text I will have to have very cogent reasons for introducing any further changes.

Thus only remaining issue appears be Wang’s refusal set any definite time for release remaining Americans. Both of us repeatedly and categorically stated our positions on this issue and there seems little left to say.

In considering our future course of action believe must recognize that we have cut back representation arrangement to point it is much less attractive to CHICOMS than something along lines their original

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–3155. Secret; Priority.

proposal. Therefore its bargaining value is correspondingly reduced. Thus their desire to get to item two is probably principal lever which would move them towards accepting our position. Effectiveness lever difficult estimate and Wang may be doing good job dissimulation. However I have feeling their desire get to item two still far from strong enough to overcome their very strong reluctance give up their position to degree that would be required to give advance commitment on time limit for release remaining Americans. Believe it would be mistake to interpret Wang's flexibility on wording "agreed announcement" as any indication softening their position on substantive issue remaining Americans.

While at moment risk may not seem great I continue be concerned that there could at any time be development which would further delay release those Americans whose release can now be obtained.

Gowen

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#### 154. Telegram 661 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 31, 1955, 8 p.m.

661. From Johnson.

1. I opened 12th meeting today by handing Wang revised draft agreed announcement incorporating changes Deptel 654. Full text my remarks and draft as given Wang being forwarded air pouch tomorrow.

2. In my remarks I noted changes from and similarities to his August 25 draft noting (a) I had added "will further adopt appropriate measures" to paragraph 1 US section this to be applicable to authorization to be given GOI; (b) use of "will authorize" in paragraphs 2; (c) restoration "in any such case" in paragraph 2(A) to make clear functions to be performed only with regard to those who desire return; (d) deletion "on behalf of government of" paragraphs 2(B) on grounds assistance to Americans largely from private sources. PRC could make whatever arrangements it wished with GOI; and (e) suggestion restoration July 25 language in introductory para.

3. I concluded that on important question time his phrase "as soon as possible" not satisfactory and urged acceptance "promptly" instead.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-3155. Confidential.

I emphasized essential point was for both to clearly understand what term meant and expressed hope he would be able define for me much more clearly than in past and terms of definite period of time further appropriate measures to be taken by his government which would enable all detained Americans exercise their right return.

4. Wang studied our draft carefully and commented in detail.

A. He said “return of nationals” had been used in our August 16 draft and conformed with announcement on agreed agenda made following first meeting August.

B. “As soon as possible” was translation they desired for Chinese term (*chin su*) and they felt “promptly” has feeling of compulsion. He added however as each side had own opinion on appropriate word perhaps best find another English translation while retaining original Chinese. He suggested “expeditiously”.

C. In paragraph 2 he said [garble—the] phrase “US agrees that [garble—GOI is entrusted] to assist” implied authorization. However they willing delete “US agrees” and simply say “GOI will be entrusted to assist”. Since announcement comes as result Ambassadorial discussions such a statement would imply agreement on part our two governments.

D. He agreed to deletion “on behalf of PRC (USA)” in paragraphs 2(B). He concluded that they had with these changes met requirements our side to a very large extent.

5. I replied that his draft still contained word “entrusted” while ours contained “authorized” which expresses exactly and more clearly what each government will do. I asked if he would be willing use “authorize” in place of “entrusted”.

6. Wang said “authorized” did not convey same feeling of politeness toward third power which they were trying to indicate by using word “entrust” which implied request.

7. I said possibly we could use “request”.

8. Wang objected because “request” too had some feeling of an order in Chinese which he did not desire in speaking of third party.

9. I agreed to see if we could find a suitable word. I then said in introductory paragraph announcement we simply returned to language our two governments used in July 25th announcement. After considerable discussion in which it appeared he was objecting to word “repatriation” but not to “civilians” I agreed consider “return” in place “repatriation”.

10. Wang then read introductory paragraph leaving out “who desire to return” following word “civilians”.

11. I asked that “who desire to return” be included. He replied it was naturally included by implication and had not appeared in agenda announcement of August 1st. He said not necessary include “who

desire to return" because so explicitly stated in succeeding paragraphs that arrangement applied to persons "who desire to return". He said introductory paragraph intended give general idea of problem, details of which spelled out later.

12. I said I thought we could agree to elimination "who desire to return" from introductory paragraph.

13. I then suggested in paragraph 2, we could use word "invite" instead of "entrust". Wang agreed to use of "invite" in English text and said they would keep original Chinese (wei t'o) which meant substantially same.

14. I said I would consider it. With respect his substitution "expeditiously" for our word "promptly" I agreed to consider it although I did not feel "promptly" had the meaning he was giving it. I then repeated that I considered it vital that we have clear understanding what the word will mean with respect to release of Americans. I added I was anxious for anything further he could tell me concerning timing their release.

15. Wang then resorted to prepared statement. He said they had considered text of "agreement", as a result it appeared we were fundamentally agreed on wording and expected no further problems in wording. He welcomed fact that as result efforts made, distance now dividing us had been lessened. He said now we seem to be returning to old problem of trying to define "expeditiously" in exact terms of period of time. He said they had made clear their position on this old problem many times, but as I had raised question again, he would repeat their viewpoint. He said in past meetings I had insisted they should release all Americans in a specified time before improvement relations between China and US could be brought about. But it was his opinion such a position was devoid of any justification because Americans detained not ordinary Americans but violators of Chinese law and handling their cases was Chinese sovereign right. Chinese had released 4 American prisoners in May and 11 more before commencement these talks, but guilty persons must be treated according to Chinese juridical process and impossible predict time limit for handling their cases. Chinese Government would continue reviews and lenient policy would be extended only if agreement reached and relations between the two countries improved.

16. He said at last meeting I had charged him with relating political concessions to release Americans. This accusation surprised him since Americans concerned were law breakers. Showing leniency toward them as result improvement in international relations was not "exploiting them" for political concessions. On contrary he said we were asking for concessions when we insisted on reaching agreement only after they released all Americans. They hoped agreement would

be reached regarding civilians but they would never give up their sovereign rights. He then repeated familiar arguments that: his side had made greatest concessions; his side had provided list all Americans; we refused list Chinese; his side was giving lenient treatment Americans but we were obstructing departure any Chinese and they were greatly dissatisfied present state of affairs. He said very few Americans in China, and Chinese Government had offered easy and simple solution their return. However, Chinese had “tens of thousands of nationals in the US” and their return depended upon US implementation of agreement.

17. He concluded by saying we had spent much time on text and he would like to know if we could reach agreement on announcement today.

18. I replied I was very sorry his statement did not add anything to what he had previously said which would enable us to make further progress today. I had not suggested anything which would infringe upon their sovereignty and it was for them to decide what they would do with respect to Americans. I had not said we would not conclude understanding until all Americans were released. I had made many concessions, first hoping all Americans would be released during talks, then that they would be released simultaneously with announcement and now I was asking for interpretation of word “expeditiously” in terms of reasonable period of time. I was disappointed it was still impossible for him to give me even that statement.

19. I said his statements regarding treatment Chinese in US called into question good faith my statements this regard. I was satisfied facts not correct but if he would give me information I would immediately look into any cases he knew of.

20. Wang said problem now has boiled down to question of defining “expeditiously” in terms of a period of time. He said Chinese sovereign right did not permit him to say they would release Americans at any given time irrespective of their juridical procedure. If they gave tomorrow or some other time in future not much different from saying Americans would be released right now. They could only say they would give results when reviews completed and with favorable conditions review would be carried out very quickly. This he said was greatest extent to which he could go today. He then repeated his statement great dissatisfaction regarding status Chinese nationals in US, complained his govt had no complete list and that since opening of talks not a single Chinese national had been allowed freely to return to China. He had mentioned case of Dr. Tsien but even he not able to return yet.

21. I tried to probe further by saying he must have something in mind as to meaning "expeditiously". His government must be thinking in terms of one week, several months or several years.

22. Wang laughed and said nothing would come from discussion of this point. They would talk only about things of which they were sure. However, it would be easy for him to give the length of sentence of each American imprisoned. It was not possible to say how much these sentences could be shortened. Col. Arnold was sentenced to ten years and yet was given early release. Speed-up release Americans linked with reaching of agreement and improving relations.

23. I asked whether he could give me a definite time after the announcement was issued.

24. Wang replied issuing of announcement would show progress in improvement relations which would help to settle remaining cases.

25. I said if he could tell us now about some cases, why not give us a definite time on remainder?

26. Wang said not possible deal with all cases at once or give them all same treatment as they differed in various respects. I then stated I was sorry no further progress had been made this morning and hoped he would tell me something more definite at next meeting. I suggested in order he have time for full consideration this important question we meet on Tuesday, September 6.

27. Wang agreed immediately. Smiled and said he hoped I would have good news for him.

Gowen

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## 155. Letter 6 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 6

Geneva, August 31, 1955

Dear Walter:

I have received both your letter of August 26th and August 29th, and I am writing this this evening before getting off to an early start for Prague tomorrow morning.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

I want you to know how tremendously helpful your letters are for the background and suggestions that they have contained, and I enormously appreciate the time that I know that they have taken in your extremely harried life.

Tell Herman that I certainly have noted his hand, and a very wise one it is indeed. My only regret is that he was not there to make it manifest sooner as I have had a feeling that I have been required to back-up to a degree that is very difficult, particularly at this stage. However, as I let myself go sufficiently to say in my summary telegram today, I feel that I have been fairly successful. Speaking very frankly, I feel that I have been required to back-up a long way from the line taken in the Department's 466, as well as the Department's 492, particularly with respect to this question of "nationals".

I also have a feeling that we are becoming increasingly reluctant to recognize the implications of having agreed to these talks. I am thoroughly in sympathy with doing everything possible to avoid all the apparent pitfalls but believe it hard to maintain the fiction that two Ambassadors can discuss and decide on matters without agreeing thereto.

As far as our position is concerned, I have tried to make my opinion very clear in my telegrams. I came here hoping and expecting, particularly in view of Chou En-lai's statement, that we were going to be able to obtain the reasonably prompt release of all Americans. I am now inclined to believe that we probably read more into Chou's statement than we should have and that this never was their real intention. I am inclined to think that what Chou was saying was that the number of Americans is small and their problem is relatively easy to settle compared with the problem of the large number of Chinese in the United States. Just as in the Korean armistice negotiations, they find it entirely impossible clearly to admit that any Chinese does not want to return to their Communist paradise. I also believe that there is a genuine inability to really understand the lack of restrictions upon return of Chinese from the United States. I therefore now believe that there has from the beginning and still continues to be a linkage between return of Chinese from the United States and our response to other efforts to "improve relations". However, as I have previously said, I also believe they recognize that prisoners have reached the point of diminishing returns and that they cannot play this line too far.

I would certainly not go so far as to say that they would never under any circumstances release all Americans simultaneously. (I believe that Wang was probably right in saying today that they regard a definite time period on the release of the remainder as being approximately

equivalent to simultaneous release.) However, I do feel that they are still a very long way from this point.

The question, therefore, is whether or not we can expect and hope to work them up to this point within a reasonable period of time and without subjecting Americans whose release can now be obtained to undue risk of unreasonably prolonged detention. While frankly admitting to the narrow viewpoint of the man in the field, I am inclined to be very doubtful.

One aspect that worries me is that the longer we continue in the present deadlocked position, the more hardened positions on both sides tend to become and the more difficult it becomes to shift therefrom. Looking at it solely from the standpoint of the overall welfare of the detained Americans, I find it hard to work out the equation but believe it important that we do so. We are today able to obtain the release of X number of Americans and within the next month or two Y number may well have been added to that. How large the remaining Z will be I have no way of telling, but it will certainly include the three or four "difficult" cases. I am convinced that these latter cases are, under the best of circumstances, going to take a long time and doubt whether what we now have to offer under agenda item one is going to obtain their release. Of course I know that the answer is that under the present outlook neither under agenda item two are we going to be able to offer anything that would obtain their release. This may well be the case. However, should X and Y be indefinitely detained in what may be a futile effort to obtain Z?

Also it seems to me that the price we would be paying for X and Y is in reality very small. The third party arrangement is very limited in scope, and I believe that we would be in a position to withdraw it at any time that we considered it desirable.

There is a very small point which struck me today and which I am surprised Wang has not caught me up on—I have been pushing very hard the thesis that we came here to settle the repatriation of civilians, but in re-reading the July 25th announcement today, I was struck by the fact that it refers only to "in order to aid in settling the matter of repatriation . . ."

I am a little concerned that we may be permitting our bargaining positions to become our final position without enough ammunition in our belt to overcome the resistance.

With respect to the thought that we might go ahead and independently announce the Indian representation arrangement, it seems to me that this would be most unwise. If we are prepared to do this, we can get the U.K. representation in Communist China for whatever it is worth but, much more importantly, the release of at least a considerable



number of Americans. If we do it independently while Wang and I are still negotiating here, it seems to me that we at the minimum set back the release of Americans whose release we could now obtain. I also wonder what the reaction of the Indians would be.

While I will appreciate any and all suggestions on arguments I might use with Wang, as I have run dry myself, I want to make it clear whatever debating satisfaction this may give, I do not believe that any arguments or logic, no matter how irrefutable, are in themselves going to produce any change in their position.

I hope that all of this does not sound too cynical or discouraged, but at this late hour in the evening I simply wanted to share with you very frankly and personally some of the thoughts that we are having here on the other side of the coin.

With kindest regards from all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**156. Letter from Clough to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 1, 1955

Dear Walter:

I am enclosing copies of our draft agreed announcement and the Ambassador's statement explaining the changes in the draft, both of which were used at the 12th meeting with the Chinese Communists on August 31. These are the texts promised you in telegram No. 661, August 31st, paragraph one.

Alex is now in Prague and the rest of us are holding the fort here until his return Sunday night.

Sincerely,

**Ralph N. Clough**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Enclosure 1, "Draft Agreed Announcement," is attached but not printed.

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**Enclosure<sup>2</sup>****AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S REMARKS**

12th Meeting, August 31, 1955

Mr. Ambassador, I have given careful consideration to the draft of the agreed announcement which you gave me on August 25th and the observations which you made at that time.

I have prepared a new draft in which I have gone a long way to meet the points raised by your draft which departed somewhat from the suggestion which I had made.

You will note that although I consider it entirely unnecessary I have made the first paragraph of our respective statements identical in line with your views on the subject. Although, as I have often stated, I know of no further measures which my government needs to take in order that Chinese in the United States can promptly exercise their right to return, I have inserted the phrase "will further adopt appropriate measures" with the thought that this will be applicable to the authorization to be given to the Government of India.

You will also note that numbered paragraph (2) of our respective statements I have used the phraseology that our governments will authorize the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Government of the Republic of India, to assist the return to their respective countries of those who desire to do so. It seems to me that this much more accurately describes the exact situation since obviously neither of the third countries named could carry out these functions without the authorization of our respective governments. The essential element, therefore, is that our respective governments give this authorization and that this is clearly set forth in our respective statements.

With respect to paragraph 2 (a) of our respective statements, I have made a slight addition to the last sentence of your draft in order to make it clear that these functions are to be performed only with regard to those persons who desire to return.

With respect to paragraph 2 (b), I have deleted the phrase in your draft "on behalf of the Government of the United States of America", in the one case, and "on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China", in the other case. In the case of Americans, any financial assistance in most cases would originate with the relatives or firms of the persons concerned. You are, of course, entirely free to make whatever arrangements you may desire for reimbursement by

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<sup>2</sup>No classification marking.

the Government of India and there is no reason for specifying this in our agreed announcement.

With respect to the introductory paragraph, I feel it appropriate that we retain the words contained in the statement issued by our two governments on July 25th announcing these talks.

You will note that I have accepted the revised wording which you suggested for paragraph (3) of our respective statements.

With reference to our discussion at our last meeting of the word “promptly” as used in the first paragraph of our respective statements, I have retained this word as I have not been able to think of any other that would be more appropriate. From the interpretation which you gave me at our last meeting of the Chinese term which you had suggested, it seems to me that “promptly” is the best and most adequate translation into the English. It does not in the English carry with it any connotation such as you suggested of command but rather carries the connotation of quickly or very quickly which I understood from you was the sense of the Chinese term. However, in the English usage it is a more appropriate word in a context such as this than simply the word “quickly” or “very quickly”.

However, as I said at our last meeting, the essential point with respect to whichever term is used is that we both clearly understand what it means. I would hope that you would today be able to define for me much more clearly than you have in the past and in terms of a definite period of time the further appropriate measures mentioned in the draft of the agreed announcement which will enable all Americans now detained in your country to exercise their right to return.

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**157. Telegram 677 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 2, 1955, 6:56 p.m.

677. For Johnson. Your 658.

Agree text proposed announcement quoted reftel as good as can be expected. While we would like agreement as to time release Americans it should not be pressed so as to jeopardize agreement on proposed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–3155. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Phleger and Sebald; cleared by McConaughy and cleared in substance by Dulles and Robertson on September 1.

announcement. You should argue on Tuesday for time agreement but if not forthcoming you should indicate your agreement ad referendum that in next meeting PAREN presumably on Friday PAREN there should be agreement on announcement quoted reftel and manner and timing thereof without our insisting agreement on time release Americans. Make clear however that word QUOTE expeditiously QUOTE means just that and we expect announcement to be carried out in that sense. Would like your views on timing of publication of announcement. We believe announcement should be simultaneous Geneva, Peiping and Washington or Denver at agreed time.

FYI Following announcement we believe meetings should continue not oftener than twice a week at which the subject for discussion would be implementation and details and progress in carrying out agreed announcement. Discussion about item two should not be engaged in until it is clear that agreed announcement is initiated in good faith. Under such circumstances discussions can be had as to what should constitute item two on agenda. Such discussions should be recessed whenever it becomes apparent Communists are not carrying out agreed announcement in good faith.

**Hoover**

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#### 158. Telegram 678 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 2, 1955

678. For Johnson.

Your 661. You may your discretion use following information in reply Wang's remarks on Chinese in US.

Paragraph 16: INS affirms no restraining orders in force since March 24, except in case Tsien, whose restraining order revoked August 3. Hence return to PRC of any Chinese National in US, and timing such return, depends on volition individual, not on implementation agreed announcement.

Paragraph 20: Wang's request for list all Chinese in US of course will not be considered. Tsien Hsue-shen, only specific case mentioned by Wang, has advised INS his intent depart Los Angeles September 17

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-3155. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Nagoski and Osborn; cleared by Sebald and in draft by Phleger. The time of transmission is illegible.

abroad President Cleveland destination China mainland. Tsien entered US as student in 1935, admitted for permanent resident in 1947. Has studied aeronautical engineering at institutes of technology of Massachusetts and California. Has recently been engaged in research on rockets and jet propulsion and has worked on classified projects.

Also signifying intention depart same time same ship as Tsien are two other former restraints, Li Cheng-wu and Lee Sun-hsiang. Kao Fa-ti (prevention order revoked March 24) departed August 27 abroad President Wilson destined Hong Kong. Presume his eventual destination is PRC.

Chinese constantly being allowed freely depart US. From July 11, when initiative for Geneva talks occurred, to August 31, 83 Chinese Nationals departed US for Far East. No information now available how many these intended proceed Communist China, but obvious they completely free to do so, as far as US concerned.

Information (FYI from Hong Kong authorities END FYI) indicates 47 Chinese passed through Hong Kong in transit status to Communist China from US between January 1 and August 31. Figure does not include Chinese who may have entered Hong Kong without specifying intention proceed PRC, then crossed border.

**Hoover**

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#### **159. Letter 11 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 11

Washington, September 2, 1955

Dear Alex:

Again there is a great rush on with just a few minutes to get this note to you in the pouch. The momentous telegram authorizing you to button up the Agreed Announcement at the next meeting on Tuesday the 6th is just going out. The Secretary personally reviewed, amended and approved this telegram before he left yesterday afternoon for a two week vacation at Duck Island. As this request I flew to Richmond yesterday afternoon to get WSR's approval. I had an hour and a half with him in Richmond. He readily gave his clearance.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

You will be interested to know that when WSR read the latest text of the Agreed Announcement "cold", without having any of the recent background, he was amazed at what you had accomplished. He felt that we had just about written our own ticket so far as the phraseology went. The wording could hardly be better from our standpoint. He felt that we did not need to worry too much about fixing an express time limit in terms of so many days or weeks, in view of the very explicit terminology used in the Agreed Announcement. He observed that if the Communists did not release all the Americans "expeditiously" in the literal sense of the term, they would be in an absolutely indefensible position. We would have the best club imaginable to beat them with. Not even their best apologists, such as the Indians, would excuse them if they failed to act promptly on all Americans. WSR thinks that their prestige is involved and they know it. They may have consciously and deliberately decided to release all the Americans in a hurry, if we allow them to do it in their own way and without any suggestion of an ultimatum in terms of so many days. It would seem to be part of their general diplomatic campaign to win widespread acceptance and respectability.

WSR thinks it very important for you not to imply in any way that we think it might take sixty or ninety days to complete the implementation. "Expeditiously" obviously means a shorter time than that. There is a chance that the Americans might be released practically en masse in ten days or two weeks. This is what it ought to mean. If we show that we don't really expect them to move with celerity probably they won't, but if we make it clear that we take speedy action for granted, they will be put on their mettle, and probably live up to what is expected of them on this since it fits in with their accelerated diplomatic campaign. Obviously you don't put them on their honor because you expect them to act for honor's sake, but sometimes it may serve their calculated purposes to deliver when they are put on their honor, and this may be such an instance.

It is clearly important not to get into the *substance* of Item Two until all the Americans are out. When we talk about "discussion about Item Two" and "what should constitute Item Two" we mean the topics that might be appropriate for acceptance under Item Two. Even this discussion of what would be appropriate topics should be recessed if the Agreed Announcement is not carried out in good faith. WSR's last injunction to me in Richmond yesterday afternoon was to stress the importance of not getting into actual substance of Item Two until all the Americans are out and that includes of course the hard-core cases. We would probably never get the most difficult cases out if we move into Item two while they are still held.

We probably won't inform the Indians of the contemplated arrangements until after the Tuesday meeting. We have already informed the British and they are ready to assume their role.

Joe Nagoski is working full time on the assembling of information on Chinese in this country who have been assisted, who have left, and who are about to leave. A wealth of information is available and it will be sent to you as it seems needful. Herman Phleger thinks there is enough grist to keep the mill going for sometime if needed.

WSR is to return to the Department on Tuesday the 6th. Carl McCardle is on leave and Bob McIlvaine will help us handle the press and public relations aspects which will undoubtedly involve some problems. The Secretary said yesterday that probably we should have some sort of backgrounder for the press when the Agreed Announcement comes out making it particularly clear just what the limitations are and what the announcement does not signify.

We are getting out a circular to all our Chiefs of Mission from the Secretary right after the announcement is released, spelling out for them that the Agreement does not signify any relaxation to our opposition to recognition of UN seating of Communist China, and that there is no change in our policy of support of the GRC. The circular will also point out that the continued Chinese Communist military build-up in the South China coastal area and their direct and indirect support of threat of force and subversion against the Governments of Korea, Vietnam and Laos are serious unsettling factors in the general Far Eastern situation.

Bill and I were particularly happy to see the Secretary's personal telegram of commendation to you. It is well deserved and it means a lot. Congratulations and regards,

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

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**160. Telegram 672 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 3, 1955, 6 p.m.

672. From Johnson. Re: Deptel 677.

Following are my preliminary thoughts on timing announcement:

Had assumed Department continued desire release "agreed announcement" by Wang and me here accordance paragraph 6, Deptel 391. "Agreed announcement" drafted in this form. Simultaneous release

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–355. Secret; Priority.

Washington or Denver and Peiping would it seems to me tend give intergovernmental character which we been trying avoid. Also would be very difficult coordinate three way simultaneous timing between Peiping Geneva and Washington or Denver. Would probably require several negotiating sessions with Wang with ever present possibility leaks and would in fact delay announcement and release Americans after substantive agreement had been reached.

One aspect to be kept in mind is that CHICOMs will if given any opportunity attempt, as with flyers, steal show with magnanimous unilateral gesture of release Americans prior release "agreed announcement".

My thought is that only at Friday's meeting would I reach final agreement with Wang on "agreed announcement", he will thereupon in same meeting inform me of Americans being released. (Wang would presumably do same.) In this way Peiping would be forestalled from making any prior statement on release Americans as they would not finally know until meeting whether or not I would in fact agree to "agreed announcement".

I should think that Washington or Denver should be prepared make text "agreed announcement" available immediately upon confirmation release accomplished here together with any comments that might be considered desirable.

Would appreciate Department's guidance prior Tuesday meeting.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Hodge (CA) 3:45 p.m. 9/3/55 CWO/FED

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#### **161. Telegram 682 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 3, 1955, 6:46 p.m.

682. For Johnson.

Reur 672. In light very cogent reasons set forth reftel we concur QTE agreed announcement UNQTE should be released by you and Wang accordance paragraph 6 Deptel 391.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-355. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sebald; cleared by Murphy.



We also concur tactics for Friday's meeting suggested reftel but would hope Dept could be informed immediately announcement made Geneva thus enabling public relations aspect be taken care of in Washington and possibly Denver almost simultaneously with Geneva announcement.

Hoover

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**162. Telegram 673 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 4, 1955, 2 p.m.

673. From Johnson.

Would appreciate amplification last three sentences second para Deptel 677.

Am I correct in understanding that our purpose at that stage would be attempt draw Wang into discussion which would have purpose agreement on subpoints to be discussed under agenda item two with implication substantive discussion subpoints only after release all Americans?

Gowen

Note: Mr. Rinden (FE/DO) informed 10:35 a.m. 9/4/55 CWO/FED

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–455. Secret; Priority.

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**163. Telegram 685 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 5, 1955, 10:55 a.m.

685. For Johnson.

Your 673. Our 677 intended map out general approach during period immediately following release of agreed announcement and in endeavor make possible reasonable time during which we can

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–455. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sebald; cleared by Hodge (CA).

determine whether CHICOMS are carrying out their agreed announcement in good faith. For this purpose we envisage possibility discussing implementation, details and progress of CHICOM undertaking during at least several meetings. If agreed announcement then being carried out in good faith we have no objection beginning discussion about repeat about item two with view determining what should constitute item two on agenda.

We do not now wish foreshadow when substantive discussion subpoints of agenda item two might begin.

**Hoover**

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#### **164. Telegram 678 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 6, 1955, 2 p.m.

678. From Johnson.

Two hour and twenty minute meeting this morning. Wang opened with statement on Americans granted exit permits.

I renewed request for time limit on release imprisoned Americans, pointed out still none able depart, measures taken by my government without condition permit Chinese depart, 83 departed since July 11, etc.

Wang repeated his former line this subject from prepared statement and after some give and take along familiar lines I asked series questions on "expeditious" confirmation imprisoned Americans whose cases reviewed would be able promptly depart on issuance "agreed announcement" etc to which he made replies identical with his previous statements.

I then indicated I was prepared recommend my government authorize me accept "agreed announcement" and desired compare texts with him. I gave him text which I pointed out represented my understanding our discussion last meeting, introduced no new changes, and hoped we could issue after next meeting.

After studying my draft and discussion of a few small nitpicks of which he accepted my version, discussion centered around "now" in para one PRC section and "in any such case" in paras two both sections, he requesting deletion. I pointed out he had raised no question on "in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-655. Confidential; Niact.

any such case" last meeting, and he noted I had not called their attention to "now" at last meeting.

Only voiced objection to "in any such case" was that it was clear without it and phrase was therefore "unnecessary". In reply my direct question said did not object in principle to phrase and I pressed my advantage to maximum. His argumentation was weak and he several times appeared to waver toward accepting phrase but appeared he had received instructions since our last meeting and he was not clear whether he was able concede.

Opposition to "now" in PRC section was very much stronger, implication of word not in accordance facts as far as PRC concerned, could never accept this word etc. I pointed out always included our drafts, while not in PRC drafts, they had not at last meeting or previously specifically raised issue, did not do violence to even their interpretation facts etc. Clearly his instructions on this very categorical and although I used to maximum my very strong negotiation position was entirely unable shake him.

He was very anxious propose next meeting be Saturday and I agreed.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 1:20 pm 9/6/55 (DES)

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## **165. Telegram 682 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 6, 1955, 6 p.m.

682. From Johnson.

1. Following verbatim text draft "agreed announcement" given Wang meeting September 6:

2. "Ambassadors of USA and PRC have agreed to announce measures which their governments have adopted concerning return of civilians to their respective countries.

3. With respect to Chinese in US, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of US, has informed Ambassador Wang Ping-nan that: (1) US recognizes that Chinese in US who desire to return to PRC are now entitled to do so and declares that it has adopted and will further

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–655. Confidential.

adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return. (2) Government of Republic of India will be invited to assist in return to PRC of those Chinese who desire to do so as follows:

A. If any Chinese in US believes that contrary to declared policy of US he is encountering obstruction in departure, he may so inform Embassy of Republic of India in US and request it to make representations on his behalf to US Government. If desired by PRC, Government of Republic of India may also investigate facts in any such case.

B. If any Chinese in the US who desires to return to the PRC has difficulty in paying his return expenses, the Government of Republic of India may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.

(C) The US Government will give wide publicity to the foregoing arrangements and the Embassy of the Republic of India in the US may also do so.

4. With respect to Americans in the PRC, Ambassador Wang Pingnan, on behalf of the PRC, has informed Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson that:

(1) The PRC recognizes that Americans in the PRC who desire to return to the US are now entitled to do so, and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return.

The Government of the UK will be invited to assist in the return to the US of those Americans who desire to do so as follows:

A. If any American in the PRC believes that contrary to the declared policy of the PRC he is encountering obstruction in departure, he may so inform the office of the Charge d'Affaires of the UK in the PRC and request it to make representations on his behalf to the Government of the PRC. If desired by the US, the Government of the UK may also investigate the facts in any such case.

B. If any American in the PRC who desires to return to the US has difficulty in paying his return expenses, the Government of the UK may render him financial assistance needed to permit his return.

C. The Government of the PRC will have [*give*] wide publicity to the foregoing arrangements and the office of the Charge d'Affaires of the UK in the PRC may also do so".

**Gowen**

**166. Telegram 684 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 6, 1955, 6 p.m.

684. From Johnson.

With respect to remaining two disputed points in “agreed announcement” I feel we must and can retain “in any such case”. Wang’s motive for deletion is clear even though his argumentation is weak and there is no reason we should concede.

I do not feel “now” is of same order importance.

It originally appeared in Deptel 492 which was drafted in form joint statement in order meet point contained para 4 Deptel 466. Since then we have shifted to “agreed announcement” form of unilateral statements which do not have force of intergovernmental agreement and which it seems to me we are free renounce any time we consider such action justifiable and desirable.

Since that time I have continued to use word with thought that in PRC rpt PRC section it signified all Americans were as of date of statement able to depart. We are now accepting situation in which this not case and from standpoint Americans in prison key portion para is “will further adopt appropriate measures” and “expeditiously”.

While at today’s meeting Wang argued for its deletion from only PRC section and may well argue for its retention.

US section his motives are of course entirely different from ours. Certainly if retained in our section they will cite as admission Chinese have in past not been free leave US.

Therefore believe it should be either retained or deleted in both sections and that its deletion from both sections would not materially weaken force of announcement. My ability accept deletion would also of course strengthen my negotiating position for retention of “in any such case”.

Also seems to me our interest now lies in getting announcement issued as quickly as possible so as accomplish release some Americans and bring into play public pressure on PRC for “expeditious” release remainder.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–655. Secret; Priority.

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167. Telegram 687 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 6, 1955, 7 p.m.

687. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 13th meeting today with statement that 12 Americans who we had said were being detained would be free to leave. He said on basis reviews completed following seven Americans could leave any time: Emma A. Barry, Ralph S. Boyd, Juanita B. Huang, Robert H. Parker, Mr. and Mrs. Howard L. Ricks and Eva Stella Dugay. Two Romanoffs who had recently applied exit permits could also leave. Charles Miner, now in process clearing up debts incurred by firms in his charge, was being given every assistance by local authorities and should be able to complete procedures in two or three months, at which time he also free to leave. James Edward Walsh had not applied for exit permit, but since not known to be involved in any unsettled cases, he also free to leave. Mrs. Huizer not on list of Americans in China and claimed by Dutch reps as Dutch citizen, however, she free to leave also and he said later her husband making arrangements wind up affairs so he too would be able depart. He added that cases of remaining American citizens who have committed crimes are different from these twelve. When agreement reached, their cases will be reviewed and in light circumstances of each and lenient attitude his govt reviews will be quickly conducted and we will be informed upon completion.

2. I said I appreciated the information he had given re Americans now free to depart. I then asked if I was correct in understanding that Chinese Communists had completed reviews some cases civilians accused of committing crimes and that he would inform me their names at time when agreement reached on agreed announcement.

3. Wang agreed.

4. I asked if those Americans whose cases had been reviewed would then be able to leave promptly.

5. He agreed.

6. I then said this brought us to what he had termed the "old question" of time it will require for his government to complete review of remainder cases. This central question I had raised in second meeting and we had been discussing it ever since. I could see no compelling reason why his govt could not if it wished release these persons immediately. Nevertheless I was willing accept simple statement of reasonable length of time during which release could be completed. But he had only

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-655. Confidential.

told me that cases remaining Americans would be dealt with “expeditiously”. I had no way of knowing what he meant by this term. Furthermore he implied it dependent upon fulfilment various conditions. These conditions were such that his govt could at any time halt release Americans merely by alleging one or more conditions not being fulfilled. He was asking my govt accept most unsatisfactory arrangement. We being asked take certain concrete action in addition steps already taken to assist departure Chinese wishing return. However he giving me only vague promise re persons described as having committed crimes. Any reasonable person would understand my govt’s reluctance accept such vague arrangement.

7. I said he frequently referred to so-called obstructions hindering departure Chinese from US. I was satisfied these so-called obstructions nothing more than normal problems anyone encountered when he moved from one country to another. Between July 11 and August 31, 83 Chinese had departed US for Far East. It was thus clear that any Chinese perfectly free depart US for his country or any other destination. I emphasized my govt took all measures necessary this end without condition. We know number these persons reached his country because their arrival reported official broadcasts. I contrasted this fact with situation facing Americans in his country and fact that not one American civilian had been able depart during period our discussions. That is why it was so important to know in more exact terms what effect arrangements agreed upon here would have on Americans accused of having committed crimes.

8. Wang replied he had clearly, explicitly elaborated his position and he considered renewal demand for specific period time in which Americans would be released served no useful purpose in these talks. In reference statement at last meeting he denied questioning my good faith on statements I had made concerning action taken by my govt permit Chinese freely depart. Although he had information Chinese nationals and students departure still being obstructed he now prepared accept my statement there were now no restrictions on their departure and therefore willing accept agreed announcement. Despite my statement 83 Chinese departed US, none had left US and arrived in China since talks began and all those recently arrived had left prior opening of talks.

9. Wang then read prepared statement going over old ground repeating that if we continued insist on release guilty American civilians within specified time this raised question his good faith, violated his country’s sovereignty, was utterly unreasonable, and could not possibly be met. He said he had announced granting early release 11 airmen and today that exit permits would be granted 12 more. Also, once agreement reached, reviews remainder cases would proceed. All these acts showed they had repeatedly made efforts resolve question return American nationals.

10. I interjected he said 12 but actually Miner not able leave immediately.

11. Wang replied Miner being assisted every way possible by local authorities and speed settlement was influenced by his own efforts, he said if, as in Miner's case, it were possible for them to give definite period of time they would do so but they could never give definite time regarding all cases. He said their solution explicit and clear and no question of vagueness in terms they used. But if we insisted on definition of period of time, then it would not possible for talks to make further progress.

12. I asked if my understanding correct that his statement cases of Americans could "easily be solved" applied also to those accused of crimes.

13. Wang said in light of conditions mentioned before their cases also would easily be solved.

14. I said I also understood their cases would be expeditiously handled in conformity with draft agreed announcement. He agreed.

15. I said I understood with respect to period of time it would not bear any relationship to time it had taken in past to solve some of these cases.

16. He answered that if agreement reached and relations between two countries improved and conduct of persons concerned was good then handling of their cases would be easier.

17. I then told him I could not consider his statements satisfactory to my government. Nevertheless in light of information given me this morning and relying on his statements remaining cases could be easily and expeditiously resolved, I was prepared recommend my government consider authorizing me agree on announcement along lines wording discussed at last meeting. I would do this also on understanding when we reached agreement on wording announcement, which I hoped might be at next meeting, he would immediately inform me results reviews completed cases of persons accused having committed crimes. I then gave him text agreed announcement (Mytel 682) saying it introduced no new changes.

18. After studying text, Wang suggested use full term "USA" instead of US throughout. After my explanation normal practice use abbreviated form after first mention, he agreed. After first objecting to deletion phrase "the Government of" from introductory paragraph each section he finally accepted deletion.

19. Wang objected to inclusion phrase "in any such case" conclusion para 2(A). He said very clear from context which cases referred to therefore unnecessary specify by adding phrase.

20. I asked if he agreed with sense of phrase but not the words. When he agreed, I said we would then like to keep words in order that English text be absolutely clear. He said he would consider.



21. Wang then raised objection to word “now” in para one Chinese section although he said appropriate to keep it in American section. He said people would misunderstand actual situation and think Americans could not depart from China before these talks whereas actually over 1500 Americans had left China.

22. I replied impression would be given talks had not accomplished anything and situation no different from past. Furthermore, paragraphs would thus be identical.

23. Wang said “now” should remain in American paragraph because in past we prevented Chinese from leaving and now we had removed restrictions, so word appropriate in American section but not in Chinese section.

24. I replied I could not see his distinction because thousands of Chinese had also left US before these talks. Furthermore, we had made concessions in order that both paragraphs could be identical and we had accepted phrase “and will further adopt” which did not really apply to our case, but we agreed to it in deference to his desires.

25. Wang said there was a great distinction between a country which restricted departure and one which did not. He would accept anything which conformed with actual situation, but not otherwise.

26. I replied sorry we were not as close to agreement as I thought we were. Furthermore, any American who desired to leave in past had not been able to do so.

27. Wang said he had not raised question of word “now” at last meeting because we had indicated this change from his draft.

28. I said if he would agree to this draft I felt sure we could reach agreement on text next meeting and release announcement. However, if his intention now to introduce concept different wording two paragraphs there were many changes to be made and entire question reopened.

29. Wang said most important word is “now,” and they could not agree on its inclusion their paragraph.

30. I replied if we eliminated it, it would make two paragraphs different and also it would indicate we were not announcing something of real substance.

31. Wang said no matter how we explained it, he could not accept the word. He then turned to discussion “in any such case.”

32. I asked again if he objected in principle to idea it conveyed.

33. He said idea completely contained in paragraph and not at all necessary add these words on end.

34. I said we should not leave anything implied that could be clearly stated. It was consistent with rest of paragraph and necessary

to make meaning absolutely clear in English text. In this paragraph we were giving frame of reference to third government and it was doubly important to make clear to that government what its mandate was. I therefore thought important to retain phrase. He replied he would consider this point and reserve comment until next meeting.

35. I concluded that I had come tremendous distance to meet his point of view on substantive issue and I had indicated I was prepared to consider issuance announcement even though we did not feel situation with respect to Americans satisfactory. I hoped we could agree on wording so that I could request authority to issue statement. Wang said "me too".

36. I then said I thought press should be promptly informed of names he had given me of those Americans who were now free to leave because our people very much interested. I read to him text my proposed release.

37. Wang agreed we could release information and read back to me announcement he had made at opening of meeting. There was implication he desired joint announcement or that we use substantially his wording.

38. I said he could make his own announcement and we would make ours in somewhat shorter form. After I accepted a few minor suggestions to make our announcement consistent with his own essential points, he said he had no objections to my proposals.

39. He then said announcement for his side would be made in Peiping.

Gowen

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## 168. Telegram 693 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 7, 1955, 7:39 p.m.

693. For Johnson. Your 682 and 684.

1. You should stand firm on retention phrase "in any such case".

2. Department accepts your reasoning on decreased significance of word "now". Would still like inclusion "now" in PRC section and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-655. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy and Sebald; cleared in draft by Phleger and Suydam (P).

would be agreeable to having it in both sections but would not repeat not find acceptable having this word in U.S. section only.

Under present circumstances we would acquiesce, upon Wang's request, in deletion of word "now" from both sections in order to come to agreement.

3. Believe foregoing provides basis for reaching agreement at 14th meeting September 10. You will be in strong position to press acceptance of "in any such case" on Wang, particularly with our concession on deletion of "now".

4. You should make every effort to have announcement agreed upon and released September 10. Press for agreement then without further reference to principals. Immediately announcement released by you in Geneva we plan to issue Departmental press release here referring to your announcement in Geneva. Simultaneously background briefing of press here would be undertaken by Robertson. In order to schedule press release and background briefing at reasonable hour here, you should seek Wang agreement to release of Agreed Announcement in Geneva at 3 PM local time (10 AM Washington time).

5. If agreement on text of announcement reached, you should notify Department by fastest possible means, using both Niact plain language telegram and international telephone. Have circuits open on stand-by basis if feasible.

6. Talking paper which Robertson will use in background no-attribution briefing of press being telegraphed separately.

7. Cable your considered estimate of likelihood that agreement on foregoing basis can be reached and released on September 10.

**Hoover**

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**169. Letter 7 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 7

Geneva, September 7, 1955

Dear Walter:

I find that the second courier which arrives here Sunday evening with your mail does not go directly back to Frankfurt and, therefore,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

while he is extremely useful in giving me a channel twice a week from you, for practical purposes I have a channel only once a week to you.

I greatly appreciated your letter of September 2 which expanded on the second paragraph of the Department's 677. I thought I knew what the paragraph meant, but I wished to be absolutely sure. I am sorry that I bothered you by sending a telegram over the Labor Day weekend.

Before going on with anything else, I would greatly appreciate your having someone look into the situation in our code room staff here to see if something can't be done. Gowen has sent many telegrams on the subject and I have sent one, but apparently all he gets back are repeats to other posts asking them whether they can spare anybody and, of course, they never can. While our traffic is lighter than it was, it still comes in big bunches and it is very important that it move promptly. The Department's telegram to me last weekend on my dinner with Wang is a good example. They were short-handed, no one was on duty to decode it, and, as a result, I did not receive it. No great harm was done, but this well could happen in much more important matters.

Going back to the talks, I know that you all must have been as disappointed as I was that I was unable to sew-up the announcement at yesterday's meeting. I have a feeling that Wang had probably gone somewhat farther than Peiping approved at our last meeting, and he had received instructions to back-up. However, I am very hopeful that if you agree with me upon the "now" question that I will be able to tie it up at Saturday's meeting.

I do not know quite how to interpret the release of the nine. I must confess that it came as a complete surprise to me although I have always recognized that this was a possibility. Of course, it was designed to put public pressure on us—they first released the flyers, now they release the nine—probably the reaction of most people is the same that I found even among friendly newsmen; that is, what are we now going to do.

I am impressed by the success that the Communists have had in building up the issue of the Chinese in the United States. Last night Wolf and de Traz of the ICRC were in to see me (I am sending a separate memorandum of conversation), and it was quite clear that even they thought that there was a problem with respect to Chinese departing from the United States. I, of course, gave them the facts, but believe that as soon as the agreed announcement is released we should do a much better job than we have in the past of telling this story.

I presume that you are reconciled, and prepared for Wang screaming loud and hard when I refuse to go on immediately to item two following the announcement. I hope we will be successful in our tactic but believe we must recognize that the July 25th announcement does not in any way imply that we would not talk about other practical matters until all the Americans were released. In fact, if they had not released

the flyers, I would have had from the very beginning to have talked about that “other practical matter”. Of course the agenda proposal which they made greatly helps and strengthens our ability to maintain this tactic, but I see some rough seas ahead.

While it may be true that if we do not get all the Americans out before we undertake discussion of item two, we will not be able to do so, at the same time I am not sure it is going to be at all easy to get the PRC to fall in with this. I most certainly do not expect any mass release in any ten days or two weeks and think it would be wrong to base our plans on this even being a possibility. In spite of the satisfactory nature of the “agreed announcement” and our ability to use it to put public pressure on them, we must recognize that “improvement of relations” is still being maintained by them as a factor in the release of all Americans. If we too obviously stall on coming to grips with item two, they may well get their backs up on the release of further Americans, and we will again face another impasse. We can, of course, publicly beat them over the head with the “agreed announcement” and will do so, but the entire operation is not going to be easy or simple.

I will greatly appreciate all the thoughts and suggestions that you can give me on how you visualize my handling of “what should constitute item two of the agenda”. That is, do you visualize a program which would have for its ostensible purpose the establishing of an agreement upon the sub-points to be discussed under agenda item two? If so, how do you visualize my formulation of our points, particularly the “no force” point?

As soon as you have a chance to do so, I would greatly appreciate an outline of the whole trend of our thinking on our tactics under agenda item two. There are, of course, many difficulties in attempting just to keep talking without asking for or giving concessions. We have a great paucity of subjects which can be raised without involving the interests of the GRC. If the PRC has definite objectives, as it probably does, under item two, it will be easy for them to seize and retain the initiative and I will be continually on the defensive. It seems to me that it will also be difficult in such circumstances for me to avoid being too obviously in the position of simply stalling. I wish I could think of some positive and offensive approach we could make, but thus far have not been able to do so.

On the whole question of renunciation of force, I believe it important that we have a carefully thought out program. We have clearly renounced force in Article I of our treaty with the GRC, as well as under our United Nations obligations, but it does not seem to me at all clear that the GRC has done so since it considers action against the mainland as an internal matter. It seems to me that the PRC is playing the present situation very cleverly by talking softly, apparently engaging in no overt offensive operations, while the Nationalists still continue their small-scale raids, their reconnaissance flights and their belligerent statements. How do

I answer PRC allegations that our Treaty with the GRC and the accompanying exchange of notes, together with our supply and equipment to the GRC, simply proves that we are approving and supporting the military activities of the GRC against the mainland? Also what do I say when the PRC quotes GRC official statements in questioning whether the GRC has in fact accepted the principle of non-recourse to force with respect to the mainland? Perhaps there are easy answers to these questions, but I must confess that I do not know what they are.

When this entire question comes up, I believe we should anticipate the possibility of PRC proposing to us a joint declaration perhaps something along the lines of Chou's "five principles" or perhaps even Article I of our Treaty with the GRC which would not in the slightest affect their "right" to use force to "liberate" Taiwan as long as they treat it as an internal matter. If, as I assume, we reject any joint declaration, what are we proposing in its stead? Do we want a general unilateral declaration on renunciation of force so worded as also to specifically apply to the Formosa situation, and, if so, are we not asking for something which the GRC would refuse to do? Or rather than a renunciation of force, are we looking for a *de facto* cease fire between the PRC and GRC? If so, this seems to be outside the scope of these talks as clearly something that directly involves the GRC.

All the foregoing I realize is very confused as it simply reflects my very confused thinking which I am sharing out loud with you and know that you will treat it as such. I will appreciate all the thoughts you can send me, however preliminary they may be, as I would very much like to have this thought through clearly in my own mind before I come up against it. I am sorry that there was not sufficient time while I was in Washington really to talk these things through. I hope that you will have an opportunity thoroughly to do so with the Secretary and Walter Robertson.

Give Walter my best and tell him I am glad to know that he is back on the job.

I would appreciate your having someone stick into an envelope for us:

- a. The Sino-Soviet Treaty,
- b. Something containing Chou's "five principles",
- c. DRF study on the Bandung Conference, including the Chou En-lai speech,
- d. Something giving quotations by Chinese Communist leaders on the liberation of Taiwan (We have DRF study No. 6858, "Chinese Communist Views on Taiwan", which is primarily historical, and
- e. Indochina Armistice Agreement.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

**170. Telegram 691 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 8, 1955, 10 a.m.

691. From Johnson.

Appreciate Deptel 693 and agree it puts me in very strong negotiating position.

On basis Tuesday's meeting believe better than even chance agreement can be reached and released on Sept. 10. Only aspect that somewhat bothers and puzzles me was Wang's eagerness to have next meeting on Saturday. Fear they may have something further up their sleeve but do not know what it might be.

Am pleased backgrounder being held by Robertson. As no American correspondents now here except regular staffers who mostly non-American nationality plan no backgrounder here.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–855. Secret.

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**171. Telegram 694 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1955, 10:59 a.m.

694. For Johnson.

Departments 693. Following is text of talking paper on which Robertson plans to base his background no attribution briefing of press September 10 if Agreed Announcement issued:

QTE The Announcement issued September 10 at Geneva by U.S. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang Ping-nan relates to the repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries. The discussions which resulted in this Announcement required 14 meetings over a span of six weeks. The Announcement means precisely what it says. There are no hidden or

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–855. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy.

ambiguous meanings to be read into it. There are no side understandings or agreements whatever in relation to it.

The United States has consistently recognized in principle the right of Chinese in this country to return to the mainland of China if they so desire. During the Korean War, this right was temporarily suspended as to 129 Chinese students with advanced technical training which could be used against the United States by an enemy. The restraining orders against this small group of Chinese (less than 3% of the Chinese students who have come to this country since 1945) were rescinded before the current Ambassadorial talks at Geneva began, and Chinese who wish to depart from the United States for any destination have been and are free to do so.

#### WHAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT DOES SIGNIFY

1. It commits the PRC to permit the civilians *expeditiously* to exercise their right to return.

2. The Government of India by invitation of the U.S. Government plays a limited role in assisting those Chinese who of their own volition and on their own initiative approach the Indian Embassy in Washington for facilitation of their return to the China Mainland.

3. The Office of the Charge d'Affaires of the United Kingdom with the agreement of the U.S. Government likewise plays a limited role in assisting those Americans who approach it for facilitation of their return to the United States.

#### WHAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT DOES NOT SIGNIFY

1. The Announcement does not constitute an Agreement of any kind, governmental or otherwise. The Announcement is in the form of two parallel and interrelated unilateral announcements, the text of which has been mutually agreed upon. The only agreement was that the unilateral announcements were to be made.

2. It does not accord any degree of diplomatic recognition on the part of the U.S. Government to the Chinese Communist regime or change in any way the U.S. position in that regard. The conversations were conducted on the basis stated by Secretary of State Dulles at Berlin in February 1954 when he enunciated the principle that the U.S. Government would be prepared to deal with the Peiping authorities in regard to limited subjects where they are necessarily a party at interest.

3. The Announcement does not give the People's Republic of China any claim to the allegiance of the Chinese in the United States. The Announcement covers only those Chinese in the United States who voluntarily express a desire to return to the China Mainland. The vast preponderance of the many thousands of Chinese in this country who



continue to give undivided allegiance to the Government of the Republic of China are in no way affected.

4. The Indian Government will not be a “Protecting Power” in this country for the Chinese Communists. Other than the limited assistance afforded by the Indian Government to individuals covered by the Announcement, all Chinese interests in this country are the responsibility of the GRC. The Indian Government, as the Announcement makes clear, is assuming its function at the invitation of the Government of the United States. Its role will be limited to facilitating the travel to Mainland China of those Chinese who communicate with the Indian Embassy in Washington in reference to their desire to return to Mainland China. The Indian Embassy will not be expected to make any inquiries with reference to Chinese who do not first communicate with it.

5. The discussions so far have been devoted exclusively to the return of civilians. UNQTE

**Hoover**

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**172. Telegram 695 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1955, 5:35 p.m.

695. For Johnson.

Re “List of US Armed Forces Personnel Believed Held by the Chinese Communists”, Defense Prisoner Officer advises case summaries therein of Ashley, Ishida, Olsen, Shaddick, and Turner contain classified information. Pouching revised case summaries, to be substituted for originals in your copy of roster. Return original summaries these five cases to Department for destruction.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–855. Confidential. Drafted by Osborn.

**173. Telegram 696 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1955, 6:01 p.m.

696. For Johnson. Department's 678.

Immigration Naturalization Service reports 90 Chinese left Honolulu for Far East between July 11 August 31 inclusive. Total departures given next to last paragraph should be changed to 173.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-455. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Osborn.

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**174. Telegram 555 to New Delhi<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1955, 7:40 p.m.

555. Your 333. Request Embassy reply to Ministry of External Affairs note of August 18 along following lines:

QTE American Embassy has honor to acknowledge the receipt of MEA's Note of August 18 and to assure it that the position of the Indian Government as set forth therein is appreciated and will be respected in any arrangement which the U.S. Government may make. The Indian Government will be promptly informed of any such arrangement.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1855. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Phleger, Sebald, and in substance by Robertson. Repeated to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 702.

**175. Telegram 700 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 9, 1955, noon

700. From Johnson.

With reference Deptel 694 know Dept appreciates more we deprecate announcement and more we emphasize what it is not, less value it has in obtaining release remaining Americans. I fear that whatever we say for background, headlines are inevitably going be “agreement”.

While minor point believe amendment first section numbered para one under “what announcement does signify” to read “PRC commits itself to permit etc” would be more consistent with our overall position. Believe press will be quick pick at points two and three same section and that New Delhi will put out contradictory interpretation. Do not see we weaken our position and believe we help avoid foregoing difficulties if we simply state fact PRC suggested India, we concurred and have extended invitation. PRC has concurred in UK having same role on mainland China.

Particularly in view large amount press speculation on subject, possible Wang will raise agenda item two issue at tomorrow’s meeting by proposing we tell press next meeting will start on item two or something to effect we have concluded discussion agenda item one. I will of course reject but will attempt handle by minimizing issue at Saturday’s meeting so as not jeopardize issuance announcement suggesting we postpone discussion to next meeting and in addition “agreed announcement” and info on Americans released, only tell press time next meeting. In reply any press inquiries this point will only say have nothing to add to press release.

Will do best obtain 3 pm release time but Wang may want earlier hour as that about midnight Peiping time. As meeting will undoubtedly finish before opening Dept will place telephone call to McConaughy home for immediately following meeting in addition to Niact telegram.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–955. Secret; Priority.

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**176. Telegram Unnumbered to Hagerty in Denver<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 9, 1955, 7:30 p.m.

Text and substance of background press material on prospective Geneva announcement has been changed. I will brief US press in this sense, not Robertson. Other arrangements stand. New guidance text follows:

The Announcement issued September 10 at Geneva by US Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang Ping-nan relates to the repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries. The discussions which resulted in this Announcement required 14 meetings over a span of six weeks. The Announcement means precisely what it says. There are no hidden or ambiguous meanings to be read into it. There are no side understandings or agreements whatever in relation to it.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT COVERS THE FOLLOWING:

1. People's Republic of China recognizes that Americans on the Chinese Mainland who desire to return to the US may do so and commits itself to permit them *expeditiously* to exercise their right to return.

2. The Office of the Charge d'Affaires of the UK, at the request of the US Government and with the concurrence of the PRC, will assist those Americans who request its aid in facilitating their return to the United States.

3. The Government of the United States reaffirms the right of Chinese in the United States who wish to return to the China Mainland, to do so. The Government of India by invitation of the US Government will aid those Chinese who voluntarily ask the Indian Embassy in Washington for facilitation of their return to the China Mainland. The PRC suggested India and the United States concurred.

The United States has consistently recognized in principle the right of Chinese in this country to return to the mainland of China if they so desire. During the Korean War, this right was temporarily suspended as to 129 Chinese students with advanced technical training which could be used against the United States by an enemy. The restraining orders against this small group of Chinese (less than 3 percent of the Chinese students who have come to this country since 1945) were rescinded some time before the current Ambassadorial talks at Geneva

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-955. Confidential. Drafted by Suydam.

began, and Chinese who wish to depart from the United States for any destination have been and are free to do so.

The Announcement does not constitute an Agreement, governmental or otherwise, but is in the form of parallel unilateral statements.

The Announcement does not accord any degree of diplomatic recognition on the part of the US Government to the Chinese Communist regime or change the US position in that regard. The conversations were conducted on the basis indicated by Secretary of State Dulles at Berlin in February 1954 when he stated that the US Government would be prepared to deal with the Peiping authorities in regard to limited subjects where they are necessarily a party at interest.

The Announcement does not give the People's Republic of China any claim to the allegiance of the Chinese in the United States and covers only those Chinese in the US who voluntarily express a desire to return to the China Mainland.

The Indian Government will not be a QUOTE Protecting Power ENDQUOTE in this country for the Chinese Communists but will afford limited assistance to individuals as provided in the Announcement.

**Henry Suydam**  
*Chief, News Division*

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**177. Telegram 705 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 9, 1955, 7:39 p.m.

705. For Johnson.

Your 700. Following is text of revised press background talking paper. Now planned for Suydam rather than Robertson meet with Press September 10.

Code room: Please repeat Department's Tel. \_\_\_\_\_ omitting first paragraph and submitting the above paragraph.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–955. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Robertson.

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**178. Letter 12 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 12

Washington, September 9, 1955

Dear Alex:

Events are moving so fast that this letter is sure to be out of date when you receive it. Either the Agreed Announcement will be issued tomorrow, or the Chinese Communists will make some new move which will change the complexion of the negotiation.

Today we have the difficult task of making complete preparations for the possible issuance of the Agreed Announcement tomorrow, while keeping everything on an extremely closely held, need-to-know basis. There is strong pressure from Cooper in New Delhi and Butterworth in London to be given the full story to date. Also USIA feels that the VOA and their Public Affairs officers around the world need to be given guidance in advance on a secret basis, so that they will not be caught flat-footed if and when the story breaks. But the Department is resisting these pressures because it is strongly felt by both Walter Robertson and Herman Phleger that any leak which might expose an assumption on our part that agreement on Saturday is likely or indicate that we put a quite limited interpretation on the scope and significance of the Agreed Announcement, might well endanger both the prospects of the 28 Americans in jail and the continuation of the talks. When the stakes are so high, not even a remote chance of a slip can be taken. Hence we are prepared to incur the displeasure for the time being of various people who understandably feel they have a legitimate right to know more than they are being told. Nothing is now being sent to London, nothing to New Delhi (except the routine acknowledgment of the Indian Government's Note of August 18, repeated to you as the Department's 702), and no advanced guidance is being given to USIA or our P area. The text of the proposed Agreed Announcement and the backgrounder talking paper have been sent to Hagerty at Denver.

We have a carefully blocked out schedule of actions to be taken tomorrow if the Agreed Announcement is issued. The whole thing would be triggered by a green light from you.

In case the Agreed Announcement is issued tomorrow, both WSR and HP feel that you can keep Wang fully occupied for some time in talking about the implementation of the Agreement. You should endeavor to keep him so busy reporting on the progress of the departure of Americans and telling him about the Chinese who wish to return to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

the Mainland that he will be in no position to press for immediate discussion of the topics which might be considered under Item Two. We will want to know for example how and where the Chinese Communists have given publicity to the announcement; the nature of arrangements for the imprisoned Americans to communicate with the British Charge in Peiping; the nature of the financial settlement requested of Miner; the status of the exit applications of Mrs. Huizer and Bishop Walsh; the whereabouts of the jailed Americans; the movements of Americans following the issuance of the announcement; their various ETA's at the Hong Kong border; arrangements for the British Embassy to "investigate the facts", and to make representation as necessary; etc. Of course we will expect to send you information about the arrangements for the fulfillment of the Indian Embassy role in this country too, although we will be careful not to bring up anything concerning Chinese who have not taken the initiative to return to the Mainland. The idea is for you to keep Wang so engaged in demonstrating that the Chinese Communists are making good on their obligations under the Agreed Announcement that they cannot yet get you involved in Item Two. For the time being you should refuse to get engaged in any discussion of what topics might be acceptable for discussion under Item Two.

Your Letter No. 6 of August 31 arrived September 6 and was illuminating and useful to all of us who are working with you. Everybody feels that you have done notably well in bringing Wang to the brink of agreement without sacrificing anything essential. I hope our 693 strengthened your hand and allayed some of your misgivings.

You will be glad to know that WSR returned to duty on Tuesday the 6th looking very well and rested. He plunged into your problems immediately and of course is actively in on every decision and message.

We are in an extremely bad way in CA, with no replacements yet for Clough or Forman, with Joe Nagoski (who has been doing the leg work on Geneva matters) down with an ailment variously diagnosed as stomach ulcers and malaria, and with Steve Comisky suffering from asthma. We hope to get some reinforcements and I would not think of asking you to give up either Ralph or Doug, with a very difficult stage of the discussions now looming on the horizon.

Regards, accolades and good wishes from all of us,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

**179. Telegram 708 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 10, 1955, 5 p.m.

708. From Johnson.

At today's meeting Wang struggled hard to retain "now" in US section trying various combinations and at one time even suggesting both "now" and "in any such case" be retained US section while both deleted from CHICOM section.

Also tried hard to insert "the problem of" or "the question of" before "Chinese" in introductory paragraph US section same change Mutatis Mutandis in CHICOM section so it would read "with respect to the problem of Chinese in US Ambassador Johnson etc." Finally compromised by leaving agreed English text as is Chinese text to contain phrase this effect. Ekvall and Clough feel he had valid Chinese Stylistic point.

At very end meeting said names of additional Americans released in future would be notified to US through UK. I then replied I hoped in accordance with announcement other cases would be expeditiously handled and settled that during course of talks here he would inform me as well as UK of names those released and said I would be prepared report to him on our implementation statement. He carefully ignored all reference to making any report here simply reiterating UK Charge would be notified. Neither of us attempted further to pursue subject.

Next meeting September 14.

**Gowen**

Note: Passed USUN 9/10/55 1:15 p.m. JRL.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1055. Confidential; Priority.

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**180. Telegram 709 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 10, 1955, 7 p.m.

709. From Johnson.

At 14th meeting today, after trying to get Wang to speak, I opened by stating there was little I could add to what I said last time regarding

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1055. Confidential.



the inclusion of two phrases in text agreed announcement: “now” in paragraphs one and “in any such case” in paragraphs 2 (A). I had explained importance we attached to inclusion these two phrases in text agreed announcement. I had hoped Wang would agree with me on this text and that we could issue it today.

Wang replied he also wanted agree on text of agreement very quickly. Two sides had identical opinion regarding major portion text and it only remained to resolve two points of wording I had mentioned. He continued both sides had mutually discussed text statement for long time and each had put forward amendments in order make statement consistent with actual situation and to facilitate return nationals by this agreement. We should not at this final stage get into argument preventing agreement.

Wang said regarding “now” in their part of statement, any words must be consistent actual situation, therefore, not acceptable include “now” in his part. In past years great numbers Americans returned from China, indicating civilians always able return. Therefore, not reasonable at final stage discussions insist “now” should be included his part. If failed reach agreement on this point he did not see how they could agree at all. They would consider carefully anything reasonable but, as they indicated during course of talks, anything not consistent with facts was not acceptable his side.

I said I understood him to say now only two points outstanding were these two phrases, and he agreed. I stated I was prepared make suggestion I hoped he would take. I willing delete “now” in both his section and my section of statements.

Wang insisted word should be deleted his section and included our section and this more reasonable and appropriate because this was merely statement of fact affecting nationals both sides. In past Chinese had no restrictions on departure American nationals and overwhelming majority returned US. Those who remained were very small handful. However, in America restrictions prevented return Chinese students. He appreciated these restrictions now withdrawn. However, to satisfy public on this point and show difference two situations it was important have word “now” in American section. There were restrictions on Chinese students before, now they have been raised and thus a change has been made. Status of nationals on two sides different so two sections announcement should also reflect this different status our nationals in past.

I replied I did not intend engage in long discussion, but if we introduced idea our two sections in announcement should be different, this opened up entirely new field and we would have to reconsider wording whole paragraph. For instance, I had accepted “and will further adopt” in paragraph one which I did not think necessary, but included

in order have same wording as his section. We would have to make this and other changes if two sections not identical. I said I must make clear that suggestion I made was maximum effort our part reach agreement and issue announcement. I entirely unable accept his suggestion "now" remain in our section and be deleted from his. I made my suggestion only on condition that rest of text remained exactly the same and on that basis we could issue announcement today.

Wang replied he also wanted promptly settle this question. He said inclusion phrase "and will further adopt" in order to make two paragraphs identical was reasonable and necessary. This phrase was same in both sections because reason for it was same. It indicated that in future if nationals two countries encountered difficulties, governments would assist them in departing. If this phrase were deleted governments would not have to help nationals encountering difficulties in future. He said he failed to see why not appropriate retain "now" in only our paragraph.

I replied I understood he rejected my suggestion regarding deletion "now".

Wang smiled and said my suggestion resolved only half of problem.

I said I had made very clear I could not consider making this difference between two sections and suggested we agree on basis my suggestion which I believed met both points of view.

Wang said we had raised two points of difference and that he would be willing consider deletion "in any such case" from both sections if we would consider his proposal regarding "now". He believed meaning of paragraph 2 (A) sufficiently clear without inclusion "in any such case".

I said my suggestion regarding deletion "now" was based understanding remainder text would remain unchanged. I had met his objection word "now" and believed text should be issued with that change. He might consider phrase "in any such case" unnecessary, but he said it was consistent with rest of paragraph and because consistent, and in order paragraph remain clear, I insisted that it must be included. I said that at last meeting he did not object to principle behind "in any such case"; thus after six weeks discussions we came down to one word "now" and I had made suggestion it be deleted. I could see no reason further discussion or delay agreement on text.

Wang said from outset they had wanted reach agreement. Then suggested further compromise in which he would delete both "now" and "in any such case" from his section and we would retain both in ours. Thus desires both sides would be met and each would meet point raised by other. Thus they had given consideration my suggestion.

I said this introduced even greater differences in two paragraphs and as soon as we did this we would encounter whole new host of

problems. Actually only difference between us was the word “now” in our section. I was entirely willing leave word in both sections or take out of both sections and I left choice up to him.

Wang said we could also delete “in any such case” from both sections, but I insisted it must be retained. Wang then repeated his earlier arguments and continued maintain his proposals were reasonable.

I said Americans to leave China all required obtain exit permits whereas in US no exit permits required and thousands Chinese able freely depart except group 120-odd whose restriction orders have since been withdrawn. It would be extremely difficult try to reflect all these facts in single sentence. I did not see any purpose in trying to cover again all ground we had been over. I made suggestion quickly this morning with idea it would enable us quickly reach agreement on announcement. Wang said we will reach agreement if we are both willing to do so. He suggested although his earlier proposal very reasonable, he now willing consider deletion both phrases “now” and “in any such case” from both sections. Thus both sections identical and he had made substantial compromise.

I rejected his suggestion saying at beginning of meeting I had suggested deletion “now” on understanding remainder statement would remain unchanged and I could not agree deletion phrase “in any such case” from our section.

Wang said my side might be satisfied but that his was not and no purpose served continue argument. Main point was he wanted announcement reflect exact situation as it was and solve question return civilians. Under these circumstances, although he not satisfied with two points I had raised, he would make greatest effort we could expect of him and delete “now” in both sections and retain “in any such case” in both. He said he could not go any further to meet my request.

I accepted his proposal and asked whether remainder of text would be same as my draft text of September 6. We exchanged texts and after checking, he raised question why I had deleted word “respective” before “governments” in introductory paragraph.

I explained it deleted in order make smoother English text and not to change meaning in any way. Following some discussion I agreed to include it.

Wang then said in second paragraph Chinese text he had words “the question of” preceding “Chinese”. I remarked that if we said “with respect to the question of Chinese” instead of “with respect to Chinese” it involved some difference in substance.

Wang explained it was necessary to use this wording in Chinese because we were not discussing all the tens of thousands of Chinese in the US but only the question of those who desired to return.

I said it was very clear as it stood, and addition of this phrase introduced new ideas. It was very clear from introductory paragraph we were discussing "measures" taken by respective governments and obviously remainder announcement referred to these measures. If we introduced word "problem" or "question" it would break-up central thought which was "measures" taken by governments.

Wang asked if we agreed inclusion "the question of" in Chinese text and leave English text as it was. I agreed. He then asked if title for announcement could be made to read: "Agreed Announcement of the Ambassadors of the USA and the PRC". Our title "Agreed Announcement" was very simple and not very formal.

I objected that such a change made title longer and said there was virtue in simplicity. Full subject was already stated in opening paragraph. However, after some discussion I agreed to use full title as given in Chinese text.

At Wang's request I initialed changes inked in on carbon copy September 6 draft and he furnished me with clean copy Chinese announcement. He then said, "have we reached formal agreement?"

I replied "we have now agreed to release the announcement".

Wang asked if we could release it simultaneously at 5 pm Geneva time, as that was most convenient for Peiping. I said I was prepared agree earlier hour but 5 pm acceptable.

Wang then read from a prepared statement. He said he was glad we had finally reached agreement at our 14th meeting after long discussion. In accordance with his earlier statements he wished to advise me of the results of the reviews of cases of Americans who had committed crimes: first, his government had decided upon the early release prior to completion of terms of their sentences of three Americans: Harold W. Rigney, Walter A. Rickett, Levi A. Lovegren. Second, following seven Americans would be deported: Lawrence Robert Buol, Frederick D. Gordon, Joseph Eugene Hyde, James Gerald Joyce, Dilmus T. Kanady, Dorothy Middleton, Sarah Perkins. These 10 Americans who had violated laws of China would be deported to Hong Kong within a few days.

He continued that, with respect to other American civilians, cases would be individually reviewed in consideration of agreed announcement and with regard to crimes committed by each one. We would be advised from time to time of results these reviews through office of Charge d'Affaires of UK in China.

I thanked him for this information and said I hoped in accordance with announcement other cases would be expeditiously handled and

settled. I hoped that in addition to informing Charge of UK, Wang would also inform me here during course of our talks.

He replied they were prepared inform us through UK. He added he hoped US Government would help Chinese in US overcome difficulties and depart.

I said I prepared tell him at these meetings steps we took to implement announcement.

He replied he happy agreement completed and they were prepared faithfully to implement. He hoped from now on nationals of both sides would in fact enjoy right of return to their homelands.

After close meeting he fervently shook my hand while expressing pleasure we had reached agreement.

Gowen

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#### 181. Telegram 715 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 12, 1955, 4 p.m.

715. From Johnson.

Request names and other information Americans imprisoned Communist China from whom no letters received, no acknowledgment packages delivered, and no other data on health or whereabouts. Believe if I am able cite specific cases indicating failure Communists provide even these most elementary facts despite their promises of year ago, I will have additional argument support my requests complete information Americans still imprisoned and press for their right to communicate and their early release.

Latest material here obtained Hong Kong Despatch 141 and Deptel 705, February 25.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A251/9–1255. Confidential; Priority.

**182. Circular Telegram 163<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 12, 1955

163. Sent to: All American Diplomatic and Consular Posts.

For personal attention Chief of Mission from the Secretary.

Reports indicate widespread erroneous impression abroad that Ambassadorial talks Geneva signify relaxation US opposition recognition or UN seating Communist China. US continues oppose recognition Communist China. US recognizes and supports Government Republic of China for reasons set forth CA 7316 of April 23.

Continued Communist military buildup South China coastal area and direct and indirect support of threat of force and subversion against Governments of Korea, Vietnam and Laos are serious unsettling factors in general Far Eastern situation.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1255. Official Use Only. Drafted by McConaughy and Osborn; cleared by Sebald, Robertson, and in draft by Phleger. Approved in draft by Dulles on September 1 for release when the Agreed Announcement was issued at Geneva. The time of transmission is illegible.

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**183. Letter 13 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 13

Washington, September 12, 1955

Dear Alex:

Congratulations on your achievement in bringing off the Agreed Announcement in a form so acceptable to us. It was a masterly piece of negotiation on your part. Everyone working on the subject here is full of praise for you. The imprisoned Americans and their relatives will certainly feel that they are permanently indebted to you. It is an accomplishment in which you can justly take an immense satisfaction. I wanted to tell you this over the phone on Saturday, but as you no doubt understood, we felt that if the conversation were being

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

monitored we would not want the extent of our elation to be clearly apparent.

Friday and Saturday were days of furious activity. The stage was all set by the close of business on Friday. We were concerned by the extent of the press leaks here which we feared might actually jeopardize the issuance of the Agreed Announcement. John Hightower of the A.P. had practically the entire story on the ticker at noon on Friday. He obviously had been in touch with someone who had read all or virtually all of the telegrams. We are baffled and troubled by these leaks. We are taking steps to reduce the distribution of the telegrams to and from you. They have had entirely too wide distribution, up to now having gone not only all over the Department but all over the Government. Henceforth I would recommend that you mark all of your telegrams other than completely non-sensitive routine factual ones "limited distribution".

Suydam's background briefing of the press went well. The points were effectively made and registered with the correspondents. Not all of the accounts reflected this briefing but a number of influential papers carried accounts which did.

We are meeting at 11:45 to consider instructions for your next meeting on Wednesday. This undoubtedly will be a tough one, as will succeeding ones. I doubt if Wang actually expects to get much if anything in the way of real substantive gains under Item Two from these Ambassadorial talks, but he undoubtedly is going to press very forcefully for immediate entry into Item Two. He will try hard to raise a number of subjects which are high on their priority list. He will want to get his debating points in the record and he will want to lay the groundwork for urging a later meeting at a still higher level.

The disposition here still is to refuse to enter into any discussions even of the topics which might be suitable for consideration under Item Two until all the Americans are out. As set forth in my last letter, it is the view that there is ample grist for the mill on the implementation of Item One, for the Wednesday meeting and the one after that. We will supply you with more information on the steps we have taken both as to publicity for the Agreed Announcement, measures to assist the Indian Government in discharging its function, and the movements of Chinese who have manifested a desire to return. It is true that it takes two to carry on a discussion and if Wang is absolutely adamant in refusing to say or listen to anything more on Item One, we would be face to face with an impasse. How to avoid a possible breakdown of the discussions if he takes an absolute rigid negative position is a poser. We hope it will not come to this. We are relying heavily on your negotiating skill; on a probable Communist analysis that it is not in their interest to take an absolute intransigent

position at this stage which might lead to a rupture; and on the Good Lord.

Good wishes and assurances of every support we can extend you. We know you will need both.

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McCaughy**

P.S. Enclosed is a document on Charles Miner's difficulties at Shanghai, which was left with me on September 9 by Mort Rosen. This is for your background information. I do not know that you will want to get down to such details as this in the talks, but you are free to use it in your discretion in any way you wish.

Enclosure: Memorandum re Charles Minor.

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#### **184. Telegram 713 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 13, 1955, 4:54 p.m.

713. For Johnson. Your 715.

Following are detained Americans from whom so far as we aware no mail been received in United States despite assurances June 10 1954 Communists would arrange for exchange mail through Red Cross:

Dr. Bradshaw

Clifford

Proulx

Redmond.

FYI Defense affirms Downey Fecteau been heard from END FYI.

Despite many US requests through Geneva contact no specific information as to health these persons. Red Cross parcels been addressed to all these persons but no acknowledgment from them. No response to US Red Cross request that Chinese Communist Red Cross confirm delivery other than perfunctory reply "packages delivered to proper department" from Communist Red Cross.

No pertinent information above persons subsequent to material you have.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1255. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Osborn; cleared by Glover (SCS) in substance and Robertson.



**185. Telegram 717 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 13, 1955, 7:41 p.m.

717. For Johnson.

Instructions for September 14 meeting.

1. Basic position remains as stated second paragraph Deptel 677.
2. While discussion concerning Item Two should be postponed if possible until Item 1 completed and in any event should not be engaged in until it clear Agreed Announcement initiated good faith, important bear in mind necessity avoiding breakdown talks.
3. It appears to us here that avoidance Item II topics can best be accomplished by taking positive position that urgent necessity exists for detailing numerous steps called for on both sides in implementation Agreed Announcement. Progress in effectuating Item 1 necessary preparation discussion Item 2.
4. You may make extensive statement on US implementation responsibilities it has assumed under its announcement. You will be given enumeration of US steps by separate telegram.
5. You should call for corresponding detailed account steps taken by PRC fulfill its responsibilities. This might include report on invitation office of UK Charge, listing measures facilitate contact American citizens with him, itemization steps taken assure widespread publicity for Announcement in places where it will become known to all detained Americans, whereabouts all Americans who wish to leave, welfare jailed Americans, progress 9 Americans already granted exit permits, status 3 other Americans not in jail who do not yet have exit permits, and movements and approved travel routes Americans enroute out of country or preparing depart.
6. There is no objection to a recess if desired by Wang, in which case it should be by agreed announcement.
7. If Wang endeavors obtain priority for his proposed Item Two topics by prematurely presenting a list to you at next meeting you should counter by telling him that you have Item Two topic in your pocket also (FYI missing American servicemen), but you are not presenting it yet because time is not yet ripe and same restraint expected from him.
8. Meetings should not be oftener than twice a week.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1355. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Sebald, Phleger, and Hoover.

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**186. Telegram 718 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 13, 1955, 7:42 p.m.

718. For Johnson.

Our 717 paragraph 4.

Following is enumeration of US steps in implementation Agreed Announcement.

1. On September 11 Indian Ministry External Affairs informed of Agreed Announcement by American Embassy New Delhi and formally invited assume described role. Indian Ambassador Washington informed September 10.

2. Official press release quoting Agreed Announcement issued by Department 1:00 PM EDT September 10. Press corps Washington specially assembled receive announcement and explanation thereof same hour.

3. Announcement carried in full by all major US wire services including AP, UP, and INS.

4. Announcement constituted leading news item September 11 papers all over US. Circulation American papers Sunday far greater than any other morning of week. Announcement prominently carried US Sunday newspapers numbering nearly 500 with circulation of over 45 million. Verbatim text announcement carried in major newspapers. Substantially all Monday newspapers, numbering over 1,860, with circulation of over 54 million, also gave wide publicity to announcement. See Deptel 714 for further particulars on US press coverage.

5. Agreed Announcement prominently carried all nation wide radio news broadcasts evening Saturday September 10 and all day September 11. Announcement also prominently featured television news programs September 10 and 11.

6. It has been specifically verified that announcement was prominently carried all newspapers in all US cities containing large Chinese population, namely New York, San Francisco, Chicago, Washington and Boston. Announcement obtained wide coverage in US areas where Chinese students chiefly concentrated, namely Pacific Coast, Mid West, and New England.

7. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, has been specifically apprised of the Announcement and arrangements made for district directors of all I & NS districts throughout the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1355. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by McConaughy and Henderson (FE/P).

US be informed of Announcement and of the right of Chinese who express desire return mainland China to communicate with Indian Embassy if they wish to do so.

8. The Indian Government of course is aware that it is always free disseminate any type public information it may desire in US including full information concerning its function under Agreed Announcement, without reference to US Government.

**Hoover**

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**187. Telegram 722 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 14, 1955, 1 p.m.

722. From Johnson.

1) I opened this morning's meeting with a prepared statement along lines of Deptel 718 closing with hope Wang would give me similar detailed information on implementation announcement. He replied with some general statements that wide publicity given in China and proposed US "present official text agreed announcement to UK" and they would do likewise with India "which would complete official procedures after which PRC would formally notify UK Charge in Peking".

2) I replied by asking series questions on method whereby Americans in China unable to read Chinese would obtain information on announcement, how those in jail would be informed, facilities for those in jail communicate with UK Charge (particularly concerned this point as still 4 persons in jail from whom no letters whatsoever received), arrangements for UK Charge interview Americans in jail when in accordance announcement US desires facts be investigated, meaning "prescribed period" within which Fathers Gordon, Hyde and Joyce ordered to leave, date and time 10 Americans notified last meeting will arrive Hong Kong, and specific information on health and welfare each American in jail not yet released.

3) Wang replied full text announcement would be carried in English language publications in PRC, those in jail would have announcement translated and read to them. Did not reply on freedom prisoners communicate with UK Charge, said investigations by Charge would be "in accordance with terms of announcement", would subsequently inform

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1455. Confidential; Niact.

me of anticipated dates of arrival Hong Kong released Americans and on health and welfare those still imprisoned. He then returned to his proposal formal text announcement be given UK by US and India by PRC. PRC will then give full information to UK on their responsibilities "entrusted" to them by US.

4) He then asked my assent to his speaking, on which I indicated I had nothing further to say this morning and indicated no objection. He then pulled out and read a long prepared statement to effect now that "agreement" reached on item 1 should turn to item 2 under which desired raise two points: US economic blockade and embargo and preparation for "negotiations at a higher level on easing and elimination of tensions in the Taiwan area". Also asked what I thought should be discussed under item 2.

5) At close his statement I said I had "noted it" and stated that I also had matters which I wished to discuss under item 2 "at the proper time" but felt it was premature. "I cannot consider item 1 finally disposed of until all Americans in PRC who desire return are able to do so." "Agreed announcement represented advance but way in which carried out cannot but help influence atmosphere in which discussion item 2 carried on." Hoped we could quickly get to item 2.

6) Wang apparently surprised and not prepared for my position which he characterized as very strange and regrettable. In much inconclusive give and take along these lines, I pointed out item 1 could have been quickly and completely resolved if they had permitted all Americans return but 19 Americans still detained, etc. In reply specific question as to when I would consider it "proper time" proceed item 2, I stated "when it is clear the terms agreed announcement being faithfully implemented."

7) At end of meeting when usual question arose as to what to say to press, he said "I will inform press of the two items I have raised and you are free to tell them what you wish". I misunderstood and interpreted his statement as meaning only that he was going to tell the press we had discussed agenda items 1 and 2, and replied that I was going to inform press simply that we had exchanged information on implementation agreed announcement. On comparing notes my advisors after meeting I am now clear that what he meant was that he was going to inform press two subjects raised his prepared statement this morning which he has done. Regret I did not realize this was his intention or I would have protested as contrary spirit our agreement on private nature talks.

8) Next meeting Tuesday, September 20.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 9/14/55 10:53 a.m. EMB (CWO)

**188. Telegram 724 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 14, 1955, 6 p.m.

724. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting:

1. There was no practicable way I could prevent Wang making his statement on item two this morning's meeting.

2. While as stated para 7 Mytel 722 regret that because misunderstood I did not protest Wang's unilateral public statement on item two, am convinced he was under instructions and determined do so in any event and my protest would not have been effective except for record. Believe final result may have been useful as it enabled me make statement here and thus serve publicly clarify issue upon which there have been many conflicting press reports and much misunderstanding. In view all circumstances would not plan directly raise issue during course next meeting but at close meeting when usual question of what press will be told arises will debate to extent seems necessary issue of private nature of talks.

3. Also quite clear at this morning's meeting that in spite precise wording agreed announcement Wang still attempting maintain position India to be "invited" by PRC to which U.S. has agreed, same position mutatis mutandis with respect UK. I had made it very clear in my opening prepared statement we had already "invited" India and expected they would do same with respect UK, and since he was not too well prepared on subject, I deliberately did not pursue debate with thought would wait and see what PRC in fact does this regard by next meeting and, if not accordance terms agreed announcement, would be useful subject next meeting.

4. Wang's attitude at today's meeting was that of entire willingness exchange information on implementation agreed announcement but at same time inability see reason we should not also proceed with discussion item two.

5. He will undoubtedly have strong prepared statement on entire subject at next meeting and it will be important I be well prepared to counter. I can again as I did today keep him engaged for period on implementation agreed announcement but this does not stop him from raising issue between us on timing discussion item two.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1455. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

6. Will submit recommendation on tactics for next meeting in subsequent message.

Gowen

Note: Mr. Waddell (FE) notified 9/14/55 5:30 p.m. EH

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### 189. Telegram 725 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 14, 1955, 9 p.m.

725. From Johnson.

1. At 15th meeting today which lasted one and half hours, I opened with prepared statement saying that as I had told him last meeting, I was prepared fully report exact steps my government had taken to implement agreed announcement. I made very detailed statement including following points: official press release giving full text issued by Department September 10 and Washington press corps especially invited to receive it. Full text carried all major US wire services which serve virtually all daily newspapers in US. It constituted leading news item September 11 when circulation Sunday papers far greater than any other morning of week and I gave circulation figures. Stated announcement carried in radio and television programs two days. Verified that announcement given wide coverage cities with large Chinese populations and areas where Chinese students chiefly concentrated. Indian Ambassador Washington informed Saturday and in Delhi Sunday GOI informed and invited assume functions set forth in announcement. Arrangements made Immigration and Naturalization Service inform district directors rights Chinese desiring return. Concluded by saying hoped he able give me similar detailed information steps taken his government to implement statements in agreed announcement. I added correction in my statement September 6 that 83 Chinese have departed US between July 11 and August 31. Actually additional 90 Chinese departed from Hawaii making total 73. Had no way of knowing how many of these people intended proceed China mainland.

2. Wang replied he noted my statement regarding dissemination agreed announcement and that full text published all newspapers in US. Said large circulation showed general public also greatly interested in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1455. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

talks here. He too had paid attention to articles carried American press and found a number of newspaper comments on announcement which were not appropriate. For instance, some said PRC invited UK to take care of American nationals in China. This did not correctly reflect agreement because PRC agreed UK would be invited to implement a portion of agreement. Wang said he wished inform me full text carried all media throughout China at specified time agreed upon and given prominent headlines all newspapers so he believed all people could learn of news and read announcements; radio stations broadcast full text in Chinese and English.

3. Wang then proposed US Government present official text of agreed announcement to UK and he would present same to GOI thus completing official procedures regarding invitation of third powers. After these official procedures concluded his government would formally notify UK Charge in Peking.

4. I replied I noted his statement on publication announcement in Chinese press and radio. I asked how it would be brought to attention of Americans many of whom do not understand Chinese. Was there any English language newspaper which Americans read? Also since Americans in jail do not have access to normal media of communication, by what means would they be informed of terms agreed announcement? We had informed GOI and invited it in accordance with terms announcement to assume its functions in US. Apart from whatever action we may take with reference to UK, I was interested to know action his government had taken to invite UK perform its functions under agreed announcement. I requested information on steps taken to inform Americans in jail and permit them to communicate freely with UK Charge. I particularly concerned on this point because I understood during meetings last year that he had agreed all Americans in jail would be permitted send and receive letters. However, still four in jail from whom no letters whatsoever received. I found it hard believe persons incarcerated so long would not want to write their friends and relatives if given opportunity. I also asked what arrangements made for UK Charge interview Americans when Charge received request from imprisoned American and my government desired facts investigated. I asked what was "prescribed period" mentioned in NCNA September 11 announcement regarding release Fathers Gordon, Hyde and Joyce. I requested dates and time when 10 Americans released would arrive in Hong Kong. Also requested specific information on health, welfare each detained American not yet released. Explained this question raised several times in talks during past year but only information we received was that all were in good health except Mrs. Bradshaw. However, we had learned several persons had been seriously ill.

5. Wang said his government gave agreement wide publicity to inform Americans and not to prevent them from being informed.

Publications in English are available to them. In prisons there were people who would read newspapers to Americans. All persons concerned would certainly be informed without exception. He said according to Chinese Red Cross 2,547 letters and 277 small parcels handled for Americans in year ending June. Figure included letters sent and received. Furthermore Chinese Government on many occasions notified persons they could write their families and Chinese Red Cross also offered deliver letters. Therefore all persons had full freedom send mail if they wished.

6. Wang said investigation of cases would be carried out according provisions agreed announcement. Regarding third power implementation and functions he repeated his proposal US deliver formal complete text to UK and PRC the same to GOI. Added of course his government would give full information to UK Charge on carrying out functions entrusted to it by US Government in agreed announcement. Proposed formal text be handed promptly to third parties.

7. Wang said he would give information regarding times departure those released and health persons in jail after communicating with his government. He then asked if he could make a statement.

8. I replied I had nothing more to say today.

9. Wang then read prepared statement. (See following tel for full report).

10. Following this statement I replied I had noted what he said and I too would have matters I wished discuss with him at proper time under agenda item two. I could not help but feel it premature enter this discussion at present moment. Item one concerned return civilians and I could not consider it finally disposed of until all Americans in his country who desired return were able to do so. We had issued agreed announcement which he assured me would permit them return expeditiously. Way in which terms agreed announcement carried out could not but influence atmosphere in which we discussed questions under item two of agenda. I hoped possible very quickly establish atmosphere and situation in which we could fruitfully and helpfully discuss these other items. I considered information we exchanged this meeting on implementation agreed announcement very useful and helpful.

11. Wang replied agenda provided two items: one, return civilians; two, practical matters which he was discussing. This agenda based on original US proposal. We had spent 40 days discussing first item which resulted in enabling number Americans return and arrangements for remainder would be made in accordance with agreement. Now arrangement reached on first item we should go on to second. Agreement must be implemented by both sides but implementation could not be completed in a day or a week. He could not expect Chinese civilians and students in US return in such short time. He failed



see purpose remaining on first item agenda after 40 days of discussion and after reaching agreement. Under second item both sides could raise questions at issue between two countries in accordance original proposal of US which was confirmed at beginning of talks.

12. I said it was not my choice we spent 40 to 45 days discussing item one. At outset I suggested quick expeditious way resolve item one was permit those who wanted to return to return. He did not find that suggestion acceptable and I acceded to his position. Of those Americans about whom we started our discussion August 2 there are still 19 not yet able to return. We agreed on the agenda. I fully honor that agreement and was prepared enter into discussions item two at proper time.

13. Wang asked what “proper time” meant and when could item two be discussed.

14. I replied it was very simple matter. It would be when it was clear terms announcement were being faithfully implemented. I stated announcement says “further appropriate measures will be adopted so they can expeditiously exercise their right to return”. He had informed me names some Americans now being enabled to return and I hoped he would soon be able inform me of others as well. My government intended fully and faithfully carry out terms announcement and I would keep him fully informed on measures taken to this end. He had told me some measures his government had taken. This was helpful and useful and I hoped next meeting he could give me further information this regard.

15. Wang insisted he failed see connection between implementation of agreement and second item of agenda which we were going to discuss. He said we have already discussed at great length means for return of nationals of both sides and he could not see why we remained on item one and did not enter on discussion item two. Did we desire return to old ground covered in discussing return civilians? He thought it would be meaningless if we returned to arguments on item one because agreement reached and consent of both governments had resolved and settled that question. He failed to see how we could put aside item two and return to item one.

16. I replied I was as interested as he in item two but it was of tremendous importance we have best possible atmosphere in which to discuss these matters.

17. Wang said he thought my line of argument very peculiar and regrettable. He was disappointed after we reached agreement on item one we should put aside item two and return to item one.

18. I said we were not returning to item one but we were only still discussing it. Agreed statement represented progress. I had no desire go over old arguments and no such intention, but discussion of implementation was very useful and I had hoped he felt the same.

19. Wang said he thought discussion implementation agreement useful but should not prevent discussion item two. He had presented his views item two and hoped I would give consideration his views next time. He asked if we should end meeting.

20. I suggested we meet again September 20 and asked what announcement should be given to press.

21. Wang replied he would tell press he had raised two topics. We would be free to tell them what we wished.

22. I said I would tell press we had exchanged information on implementation of agreed announcement.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr Waddell (FE) notified, 9/14/55, 6:50 pm, EH

## **190. Telegram 726 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 14, 1955, 10 p.m.

726. From Johnson.

1. Reference paragraph 9 Mytel 725, following is substance Wang's prepared statement:

2. Now having reached agreement on question return civilians both sides to respective countries according to agenda, we should go on to discussion settlement other practical matters of concern to both sides. On basis same spirit negotiation and conciliation should be possible reach agreement quickly on this item also. He proposed each side put forward questions which each thought involved relations between two countries in order all could be considered. He then said he would like to put forward two points.

3. First point was question of economic blockade and embargo imposed on China by United States. This was a major factor leading to tense relations between two countries. Shortly after PRC established US instituted embargo. Outbreak Korean War was seized upon as further pretext to intensify economic embargo and blockade. Such a policy was extremely unreasonable and unjust. Now that Korean War stopped long ago, less excuse than ever for continuation this policy which

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1455. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

hindered improvement relations and created artificial barriers to trade and economic relations among nations. Frankly raising this question did not imply embargo caused formidable difficulties for Chinese, but policy unreasonable and unjust and did not benefit friendly relations between our countries and economic welfare [*warfare*] therefore should be revoked. Since opening of talks many countries expressed hope we could agree on lifting embargo. He hoped we could meet aspirations these countries and improve relations between China and US.

4. Second point he wished raise was preparation for Sino-American negotiations at higher level. Tension in Taiwan area key question between China and US. Chinese Government had made series efforts ease tension Taiwan area. At Bandung Conference Chou En-lai stated Chinese and American people were friendly, and Chinese did not want war with United States. He proposed we sit down to negotiate elimination tensions Taiwan area. Dulles stated July 26 press conference whatever differences existed should not be settled by recourse to force which might lead to international war. Wang said we should proceed with concrete arrangements for negotiations to ease and eliminate tension in Taiwan area. Obstacles could not be resolved in these talks but must be settled in conferences at high level for which our talks should and could prepare.

5. Wang concluded saying easing tension required effort both sides. Resolution these two questions would aid greatly in easing tensions. He willing listen my views on these two and also on what should be discussed and settled under agenda item two.

**Gowen**

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#### 191. Telegram 729 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 15, 1955, 11 a.m.

729. From Johnson.

Word “conferences” in last sentence paragraph 4 my telegram 726 should be corrected read “conference”, that is singular not (repeat not) plural.

**Gowen**

Note: FE Message Center notified 9/15/9:36 a.m. EMB (CWO)

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1555. Confidential; Priority.

**192. Telegram 732 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 15, 1955, 6 p.m.

732. From Johnson.

1. With reference paragraph 3 Deptel 678, I have not yet advised Wang of intention Tsien depart Cleveland as I felt it preferable wait determine whether he actually does depart. Would appreciate confirmation his departure for use next meeting together with information on number other Chinese departing same ship.

2. Assume I will also be fully informed just prior to our next meeting on situation with respect to assumption of functions under agreed announcement by India and UK.

3. Believe it also useful if I could have information on publicity given agreed announcement in Chinese language press in United States.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1555. Confidential.

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**193. Telegram 728 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 15, 1955

728. For Johnson.

Following is text London's 1034:

(Code Room please repeat London's 1034, Control 7183)

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1455. Official Use Only. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of transmission is illegible.

**194. Letter 8 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 8

Geneva, September 15, 1955

Dear Walter:

Thank you very much for your letter of September 12 which arrived here yesterday. We get most excellent pouch service on your letters to me and they are most timely and helpful. However, I am discouraged at the time it seems to take my letters to reach you. I fear that most of them are out of date and overtaken by events by the time they do arrive. I am going to see what I can do from this end, but fear that there isn't much as we are up against complicated courier schedules.

Wang moved yesterday under item 2 much more decisively than might have been expected. It is quite clear that by offering only the two topics they hope to get out of this stage very quickly in order to pass on to the Foreign Ministers' meeting. With the exception of "no force" the two items that we have to propose are of a very miniscule nature as far as the length of the negotiations here are concerned. Chou's proposal for a Foreign Ministers' meeting is their answer to our "no force" point, and they will probably reply to "no force" proposals by saying that this would be something for the "higher level" and attempt to avoid discussion. Of course we can counter by making something acceptable to us in the field of "no force" pre-condition for even discussion of a higher level meeting. This, of course, carries with it the difficulty of the more or less implied commitment to a higher level meeting if they come through with anything remotely responsive to our request.

Related to all this, of course, is what we really want and expect to get under "no force". I would hope to be very clear on this before I would start. I find it entirely impossible in my own mind to think through to any logical demand on the Communists that would have effect of at least a promise of a cease fire in the Formosa area without relating it to what we could ask or obtain from the PRC in the same sphere.

With the paucity of subjects suggested by the PRC as well as the paucity on our side, I wonder how much scope there is actually going to be for discussions on what we are going to discuss under item 2. We are faced with some real dilemmas. A flat refusal even to consider a meeting at a higher level as a subject for discussion under item 2 would, it seems to me, not be consistent with our tactics. On the other hand, the longer it is left alive without challenge, the greater the implication that we may agree to it. Eventually we have only two

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

choices: to turn it down; or expressedly, or impliedly, agree to it under certain conditions. The question is what conditions we would establish. Of course the best tactic is to try to prevent it coming to a head any time in the near future, but to do this I will need substance with which to work. If we have a clearly defined goal under "no force", we could, of course, probably work this vein for a considerable period, but our success in this would be considerably dependent on whether the Communists saw, or thought they saw, a pot of gold of the higher level meeting at the other end.

The only other vein I see that I could work is the embargo, and that is entirely dependent on decisions taken back there. It is my understanding that there was some discussion of this subject and, as I urged the Secretary before I left, I think it of the highest importance, if any shift in our position is going to take place, that the decision be most closely held and given to me to trade with here.

I forgot to mention in my last letter that Wang had invited the four of us to the gala opening of the Peking Opera here. He was very correct in calling to see whether I would be willing to accept the invitation, to which I replied that, although I would be glad to see the opera, I could not accept his invitation to the opening and invitational night where he and other officials would be present and there would be inevitable publicity. He immediately accepted my position and sent us tickets for the following night with the promise that there would be no publicity over my presence. We went and he faithfully kept his agreement. Incidentally it is an excellent show and magnificent propaganda in Europe for them just because there is no overt propaganda whatever in it.

I am returning the courtesy by sending him tickets for the New York Philharmonic Orchestra concert here next week.

I wanted you and a few others concerned to know that I was doing this and doing it every deliberately, with the thought this type of thing will help me carry out our objectives in the difficult days ahead. I am going to have little or nothing in the way of substance to give them, but feel that by maintaining a reasonably easy personal relationship to which he has been responsive, I can do much to avoid or postpone a break when the going gets tough. I hope all of it will also keep them guessing a little without committing us to anything.

With reference my remarks on the telephone that Washington stories were saying we had finished item one, even USIA went way out on the limb on this. With our help the USIA man wrote a very careful story which some bright boy in Washington saw fit to rewrite. I recommend you take a look at the September 12 radio bulletin which carries a September 11 story under a Geneva date line which says almost all the wrong things and is far different from the story the USIA man filed

from here. After all our struggle on the phrase the lead says Americans are going to be released “as soon as possible”. Then down in the story it makes the flat statement “the announcement completed the first item of business on their two point agenda”.

I can understand Wang’s confusion at yesterday’s meeting if, as is likely, they had read this in our own official output.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**195. Telegram 733 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 16, 1955, noon

733. From Johnson.

1. Anticipate that at next meeting Wang will insist on opening to which I cannot object as he deferred to my insistence on opening last meeting.

2. He may as promised at last meeting answer few of questions I asked on implementation agreed announcement, dependent on developments at that time raise question “invitation” to third countries, and then launch into attack on our refusal discuss item two at this time.

3. I will reiterate any unanswered questions on PRC implementation, deal as necessary with question “invitations”, give further info on our implementation, and then deal with question of taking up agenda item two.

4. I will appreciate Department’s suggestion or instructions on how I handle questions of “invitations” and agenda item two.

5. On first question of “invitations” have choice of squarely meeting issue if they show similar disposition or attempting avoid direct issue in meeting while being careful not accept his position. We have made our position entirely clear at last meeting as well as publicly, agreed statement is also clear, and it might be that to engage in sharp debate on this with Wang would give them pretext fail implement agreed announcement particularly in view our position on discussion agenda item two. I should be able avoid issue by avoiding further use of word “invitation” simply stating fact both United Kingdom and India now

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1655. Secret.

officially informed by US of agreed announcement, if they have done same no reason United Kingdom and India should not assume functions. However, believe we cannot finally decide how handle this until we know what attitude India is taking with respect our invitation on which I have no info here.

6. With respect second question of timing of discussion about agenda item two will desire make carefully prepared statement and in this regard would appreciate Department's instructions in light what I said in last meeting and my subsequent public statement.

7. Am confident I can avoid any question of a break at next meeting but believe it important do maximum handle matter so as avoid ultimatum or challenge which could lead to freezing positions.

**Gowen**

Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 9/16/10:31 a.m. EMB (CWO)

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## **196. Letter 14 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 14

Washington, September 16, 1955

Dear Alex:

You raise some basic questions in your letter No. 7 of September 7. Of course these questions had occurred to us and had already been given some thought. But the answers are not easy and Messrs. Robertson and Phleger feel I should not write anything on policy questions to you until the Secretary returns and gives us some guidance. He is due back tomorrow the 17th from Duck Island. He leaves after the close of business on the 19th for the opening of the UNGA Session in New York. We hope to have some time with him over the week end. The telegram containing the instructions to you for your Tuesday meeting will not be drafted until after we get the benefit of the Secretary's thinking. I hope to be able to give you some helpful background thinking in my next letter of Monday morning the 19th. We have prepared a summary of developments at Geneva since September 1 for the Secretary to read on the plane enroute to Washington so that he will be fairly current when he gets here. For your background information the Secretary will return to the Department from New York on Friday, September 23. He will be absent again from September 26 through September 28.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.



We have been concerned about insuring that the Americans in jail get word of the Agreed Announcement and can get in touch with O'Neill. We are of course caught in a box because we must avoid giving the Chinese Communists and the Indian Embassy access to Chinese in this country other than those who express a wish to return to the Mainland. We are considering sending individual letters to each of the 18 Americans still denied permission to leave, signed by Mr. Robertson, for delivery by Wang Ping-nan with the request that he effect their delivery to the addressees. The letter would read as follows: (attached).

We have some misgivings about this since it may give Wang an opening wedge for insisting that you accept undesirable communications from him for delivery in this country. Please give us your reaction to (1) the idea of direct Departmental communication with the detained Americans, (2) the proposed mode of transmittal through Wang Ping-nan and (3) the content of the draft letter which is attached. If you do not like this proposal we would like your recommendations for alternative means of satisfying ourselves that all American have the word.

I have taken up your code clerk problem with senior administrative people in the Department. They asked me to tell you that two regular code clerks who have just been assigned to European posts are leaving Washington this week end for Geneva. They are assigned elsewhere but our instructions read that they should stay on detail at Geneva until further notice. The intention is to keep them there as long as your talks continue. They are due to arrive in Geneva on Monday. It is true that these two will merely take the place of two others who have been detailed to Geneva who are going back to their regular posts but the situation will be more stable since you can count on having these people as long as you are there. This will give Geneva a total of four people in the code room staff, and the specialists here say that this is enough to give you good service on Saturday and Sunday as well as some overtime on regular working days. The volume is down a lot since the Atomic Energy Conference ended. They think the problem is essentially one of overtime rather than heavy volume. They believe these four can handle the occasional peaks as well as the overtime. Bob Stufflebeam asked me to assure you that the Department has not dealt lightly with this problem. The seriousness of it is recognized and a special effort has been made to solve it. The administrative people are confronted with a chronic shortage of code clerks coincident with an increase in volume in all geographic areas. They feel that Gowen has chiefly been worried by the uncertainty of the temporary assignments. That problem is now solved. You may wish to pass the foregoing on to Gowen as coming from authoritative administrative sources here, if he has not already received it by telegram. If your talks are still going on around mid-October, you will be

more than amply covered for a big influx of code people will be going in in preparation for the Foreign Minister's Meeting, October 27.

The telephone exchange on Wednesday was very satisfactory from our standpoint although we were sorry to have kept you waiting on the line so long. You handled Wang's unexpected move well and there is no reason to worry about the slight misunderstanding of his intentions in the course of the session. I would have expected Ralph or Doug to pass you a note if they suspected that you did not get the purport of what Wang intended to do, but it turned out all right. Under separate cover we are sending you the five items you requested in your last letter.

We are instructing Drum to try to record very systematically the stories of all the Americans who are now beginning to come out. The same instructions will go to Japan. We are also going back over the old records here in an effort to compile a complete story of the maltreatment of Americans from the beginning. There may be no occasion to use it at Geneva but we want to have it in reserve in readily useable form in case it should be needed.

I take Wang's sudden unilateral public move on the 14th as a bad augury. I doubt if he would have made a public demand for moving the talks to a higher level at that moment unless a Communist decision had been made which depreciated the value of further talks at the Ambassadorial level, from their standpoint. It may be increasingly difficult to keep the ball rolling. We will give you all the ammunition we can before your next meeting.

Good luck and warmest regards,  
Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

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**197. Telegram 739 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 17, 1955, 4 p.m.

739. From Johnson.

1. Have just received letter from Wang referring his Sept. 14 proposal US "should formally entrust UK" and PRC "should formally entrust" GOI so as "to complete procedures of entrusting third powers".

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1755. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

Then PRC “should notify UK and US GOI extending their agreement to respective third powers being entrusted assume functions stipulated” in agreed announcement. Wang instructed inform me that after US “has formally entrusted UK” PRC “will notify UK of its agreement to latter’s being entrusted by USG to offer Americans who desire return various assistance specified” in agreed announcement.

2. My notification to him at Sept 14 meeting US has invited GOI assume functions can only be interpreted USG aware PRC “has previously indicated its readiness to GOI entrust India extend assistance in matter concerning return Chinese nationals residing in US” during talks. “I again indicated to you on many occasions that PRC would entrust GOI extend assistance to Chinese nationals residing in US who desire return; hence notification of USG to GOI means former’s agreement to GOI being entrusted by PRC and PRC interprets and understand as such Sept. 11 notification of USG to GOI”.

3. “It must be pointed out that our side has taken into account of difficult position in diplomatic relations in which USG finds, and has acceded to your proposed text on entrusting of third powers in its present form in agreed announcement. However, on concrete content with regard to PRC’s entrusting GOI and USG entrusting UKG both sides cannot have any other interpretation”.

4. “After publication agreed announcement American press including USIS invariably made distorted interpretation at variance with actual fact of text agreed announcement regarding entrusting of third powers alleging PRC would entrust UKG on one hand and USG would entrust GOI on other. USG ought not agree to such distorted interpretation”.

5. Desire know “if USG has formally entrusted UKG and will appreciate confirmation” by letter if done so will be able report his government which will inform UKG of “its agreement to latter’s being entrusted by USG”.

6. Comments follow.

**Shillock**

FE Duty Office notified 9/17/12:53 p. m. EMB (CWO)

## 198. Telegram 740 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 17, 1955, 6 p.m.

740. From Johnson.

1. Do not believe I should send written reply but should handle at Tuesday meeting when I will refer to his letter and if he requests give him copy my prepared remarks according to standing arrangements between us.

2. Indian acceptance (New Delhi's 542, repeated Geneva 36) removes what might have been problem. I suspect that if GOI also receives "invitation" from PRC it has made identical reply to PRC. However, interesting note neither in September 14 meeting nor in letter has Wang made reference to any action taken by PRC with respect India. In any event main points are US immediately took every possible action implement announcement and with respect to portion of principal PRC interest all action completed permit GOI function in US while UK apparently still not able function in PRC. (In this connection would appreciate most recent information available from O'Neill prior Tuesday's meeting.)

3. Of course, I have not yet informed Wang of action we have also taken with respect UK as I did not have that info at last meeting.

4. As parenthetical note with respect use of word "entrust" in Wang's letter Dept will recall discussion this word versus "invite" particularly para 13 Mytel 661. Believe Wang may have agreed to "invite" in English text without fully realizing implications and is now trying to recover lost ground. While use of word "entrust" in place of "invite" would have been somewhat more advantageous to PRC position do not see even this invalidates our position.

5. Suggest my reply to Wang be along following lines:

A. As I informed him Sept 14 USG has formally transmitted agreed announcement to GOI and invited it undertake in US functions set forth in announcement. GOI has formally replied accepting invitation.

B. USG has also transmitted agreed announcement to UKG and formally requested it undertake in PRC functions set forth announcement.

C. USG has therefore taken all action required of it in order that third countries concerned may undertake their functions. What action has PRC taken?

**Shillock**

Note: FE duty office notified 3:07 pm 9/17/55 EMB (CWO)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1755. Secret, Priority; Limited Distribution.

**199. Telegram 743 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 19, 1955, 2:36 p.m.

743. For Johnson. Urtel 732.

Following is summary of Chinese language press coverage for Johnson and Wang statements of September 10. Reports on 8 RPT 8 of 11 RPT 11 Chinese dailies have been received:

1. *Chinese World*, San Francisco, 12 September 1955, published United Press and Associated Press releases in full in both English and Chinese sections without editorial comment. (AP and UP dispatches contained full text of agreed announcement)

2. May Tong, Chinese newscaster over San Francisco Station KSAN broadcast a much condensed version of the communique without comment.

3. *Chinese Pacific Weekly*, San Francisco, did not publish news release but commented editorially briefly to effect that US for some time had been permitting any Chinese to leave who wished to do so.

4. *Young China News*, San Francisco, published translation of International News Service release without editorial comment.

5. New York papers, *Chinese Journal*, *China Tribune*, *Chinese Nationalist Daily*, *United Journal*, carried statement in entirety as carried by United Press.

6. *China Daily News*, New York, Communist publication, has representative in Geneva and published entire text as filed by their correspondent.

7. Chicago papers not heard from yet. Los Angeles weekly *Kwang Tai* did not carry item last week.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1555. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Jacobson (DRF); cleared by Pope (IAD) in substance, McConaughy, and Lindbeck.

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**200. Telegram 745 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 19, 1955, 3:45 p.m.

745. For Johnson.

Instructions for September 20 meeting.

1. Department approves your suggested oral reply to Wang question invitation to GOI and UKG, as contained paragraph 5 your 740. While question raised by Wang seems trivial and without merit, considering explicit language of Agreed Announcement, it would seem desirable for you to explore fully with him subject of respective communications to GOI and UKG. Department expects obtain further information from British Embassy later in day regarding ability UK Mission in Peiping to perform agreed function. Wang should be queried insistently in regard to action taken by PRC with UK Mission in Peiping until you are satisfied that necessary facilities accorded.

2. Department will send you separate report today on publicity for Agreed Announcement in Chinese language newspapers in U.S.

3. Department has received note from Indian Embassy containing formal GOI acceptance role assigned to it. Indian Ambassador calling at Department September 20 to discuss Indian Government responsibilities under Agreed Announcement. UK has orally indicated in answer to our formal note that it is prepared to accept function requested. Written confirmation expected shortly. We of course do not object to PRC approaching GOI in same vein that we have approached UKG. We consider it mandatory on PRC to approach UK as we have approached GOI.

4. We hope to have additional information for you from I & NS in time for tomorrow's meeting on latest departures Chinese for Far East.

5. You are requested to raise question of unilateral public statements. You should make it clear to Wang that you are not charging him with act of bad faith on September 14, since it now appears that he did give notice at last meeting that he intended issue statement. However his statement of intention was not clearly understood by you at the time and created necessity for you put out unilateral public statement. You should propose that both sides get back to original agreement of no unilateral public statements without clear understanding or explicit advance notice.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1955. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McConaughy and Phleger; cleared by Sebald and in draft by Dulles.

6. If necessity develops you are authorized inform Wang at Tuesday meeting that while Item One has priority on Agenda until implementation complete, you will be prepared at following meeting (not before Sept. 24 but preferably following week) begin task of making up Agenda under Item Two. You will propose that each side come to following meeting with list of items which it wishes raise under Item Two. Lists would be exchanged at that meeting. After interval of about a week in which each side could consider items proposed by other, meeting would be scheduled at which agreement would be sought on topics to be considered under Item Two. At that meeting effort would be made determine order in which topics would be considered.

7. You should inform Wang at Tuesday meeting that request which he has publicly made for talks at higher level is procedural and not substantive and cannot be considered by us as "practical matter at issue". Request does not fall within agreement regarding Geneva talks represented by mutually agreed communique of July 25. It would nullify the agreement we now have to discuss "practical problems now at issue" at the Ambassadorial level. We are not prepared substitute another forum for this one nor to discuss or agree now as to what would happen when current Geneva talks concluded which we would hope would be when all practical matters at issue disposed of. Both sides should make maximum effort settle "practical matters now at issue" at Ambassadorial level as already agreed.

8. You may remind Wang that during discussion topics for item two we will feel free return to implementation Item One which will always remain in priority position on agenda and we will continuously observe such implementation. We have taken due note of fact that 7 of 29 imprisoned American have arrived Hong Kong. We confidently anticipate early release of remainder as well as 12 Americans previously denied exit permits.

9. FYI ONLY. Topics we propose raise under Item Two are following: (1) unaccounted for American servicemen from Korean war and (2) renunciation of force. We consider proposing (3) "restitution of seized American diplomatic and consular property on China mainland" and request your comment on this item.

**Dulles**

**201. Telegram 750 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 19, 1955, 6:39 p.m.

750. For Johnson.

For completion our records forward exact text statements released by you and Wang to press September 14.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-955. Official Use Only. Drafted by McConaughy.

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**202. Telegram 751 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 19, 1955, 6:39 p.m.

751. For Johnson.

Following is text of note received from Indian Embassy dated September 16:

QUOTE The Ambassador of India presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to acknowledge on behalf of his Government the note dated 10th September, 1955, presented to the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India extending the cordial invitation of the Government of the United States to assume the functions described in the Agreed Announcement of the Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China concerning the repatriation from the United States of Chinese nationals who express a desire to return to the People's Republic of China. The Ambassador has now been asked by his Government to state that they have agreed to assume these functions. The Embassy of India has been asked to carry out on behalf of the Government of India the responsibilities which are to be discharged in the territory of the United States.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1955. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Robertson and Sebald.



The Ambassador wishes to state that he proposed to provide both in his Embassy in Washington, D. C. and in the two Consulates-General of India in New York and San Francisco, necessary facilities for Chinese nationals wishing to return to China to bring to notice any difficulties which they might encounter.

The Ambassador of India avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration.

UNQUOTE

Dulles

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### 203. Telegram 752 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 19, 1955, 9:26 p.m.

752. For Johnson.

1. Re your telephone call to Robertson today, on reconsideration Dept finds it difficult deal with only one phase Wang statement, thereby tacitly implying it has no answer to remaining Wang charges. Dept has decided to put out no repeat no press release on any aspect Wang statement and believes that any reply should come from you. Matter is left your discretion. If you decide take cognizance Wang statement with press, it may take form either press release or backgrounder for press as your judgment dictates. You might wish use something along following lines:

(A) Wang's statement regrettably misconstrues motives and actions U.S. Sept. 14 statement based on fact U.S. had already announced measures to implement Agreed Announcement whereas Chinese had not yet indicated steps taken to release Americans except for those cases which had been reviewed. Chicom indication of steps proposed for implementing agreement appear to us to be first order of business and one that U.S. has already fulfilled.

(B) There is no basis for Wang's contention that U.S. has prevented departure of Chinese. As of March 24 Immigration orders against departure from this country were outstanding for 129 technically trained

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1955. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Lindbeck; approved in draft by Robertson.

Chinese students. Since then 36 rpt 36 have left this country and 3 rpt 3 more are reported about to leave. All now free to leave.

2. Wang's action today does not appear to call for any change in your instructions (Deptel 745) except possibly in paragraph 5. If you believe that in light Wang's latest action we go too far in exonerating him from any imputation bad faith, you may wish to strengthen tone of your presentation on unilateral public statements. Need for emphatic representations on this question further confirmed by Wang's statement.

3. Immigration has not yet confirmed departure three Chinese, including Tsien, on Cleveland, September 17.

4. British Embassy has had no recent word from O'Neill in Peiping. We instructing Embassy London query Foreign Office as to whether PRC has yet extended invitation to UK Charge, and as to actual and prospective difficulties confronted by British Charge.

**Dulles**

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**204. Telegram 744 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 20, 1955, 3 p.m.

744. From Johnson.

In reply press inquiries am informing them for background that agreed statement following today's meeting should not be interpreted as representing any change in US position set forth my September 14 statement. Today's statement merely expresses what is already public knowledge, that is there is difference of view between Wang and myself on timing discussion item two of agenda.

**Shillock**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2055. Official Use Only; Niact.

**205. Telegram 745 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 20, 1955, 3 p.m.

745. From Johnson.

1. At today's meeting two hours ten minutes, apparently on theory best defense is offensive, Wang opened with statement accusing me of violating understanding on private nature talks reaffirming desire to keep talks private.

2. I replied with statement explaining my misunderstanding his intention at last meeting, pointing out his statement disclosed substance his remarks therefore required me make public substance our position. Regretted his statement yesterday, noted I had made no response and hoped "I will not have to do so". Glad he agreed meetings should continue to be private. This followed by some give and take on whose fault but reaffirmation of agreement on private nature talks.

3. I then made reply his letter along lines paragraph 5 my 740 adding only Indian Ambassador today discussing with Department responsibilities being assumed.

4. There was then long give and take with Wang on one hand trying twist my remarks into statement we had "invited" UK and "agreed" to PRC invitation to GOI. I expressed surprise Wang's effort make issue out of this, pointed out clear language agreed announcement, and emphasized substance of situation, that is, US had immediately taken all action implement agreed announcement with respect to third countries, India now able function in US, UK apparently still not able function in PRC. Said it was imperative they take with UK action similar that US had taken with GOI. Wang said PRC had extended "invitation" to GOI and Nehru had announced in Parliament its acceptance. Towards end I pressed hard for statement PRC would contact UK Charge Peiping and do necessary permit UK immediately start functioning. After unsuccessfully pressing me hard to say we had "invited" UK in accordance with announcement he apparently chose to accept my statement that we had informed UK and requested it undertake functions and while avoiding direct reply my insistence that PRC contact UK Charge, appeared to indicate they would do necessary permit UK function.

5. I then made statement on publicity agreed announcement Chinese press in US and referred to unanswered questions I had asked him

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2055. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.

in last meeting specifically pointing up health and welfare each American not released and information on agreed announcement to Americans still in jail.

6. On health and welfare he countered by renewing demand for names and addresses all Chinese in US but avoided direct reply to my question as to whether he now refusing give me information on health and welfare Americans in jail. With respect informing Americans in jail he said "I told you last meeting what is done and that still holds".

7. After some additional give and take along these lines during which I expressed disappointment he had no information for me today on implementation, I made statement accordance paragraph 7, Deptel 745.

8. Wang made impromptu reply to effect that understanding at outset of talks was that either side could bring up anything it considered be practical matter at issue, not possible settle all practical matters at issue these talks, therefore higher level meeting necessary. Such meeting also desired by "some high American officials". I made no reply and he indicted nothing further say today, suggesting next meeting Friday, September 23, to which I agreed.

9. There was then considerable discussion as to exact wording of statement to press.

**Shillock**

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## 206. Telegram 1119 from London<sup>1</sup>

London, September 20, 1955, 5 p.m.

1119. Foreign Office has drawn Embassy's attention to commentary in Peiping People's Daily denouncing "distortion by USIS" of US-CHICOM "agreement" of September 10 at Geneva. Although involved and confused, commentary appears make two basic points:

(A) US delaying invitation to UK assume functions set forth in announcement in order postpone consideration of "item 2", and

(B) CHICOMS insist they, and not US, should invite Indians.

Re (A) Foreign Office has prepared for Macmillan's signature reply to Ambassador's letter of September 13 (Embtel 1018) agreeing assume

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2055. Confidential.

functions. It is hoped reply can be delivered today. Foreign Office will then be able inform press it has done so.

Re (B) Foreign Office notes that in the background statement read to press in Washington on September 10 (substance of which was given Foreign Office on basis Deptel 1363) US is to invite both UK and India to assume their respective functions, although agreed announcement was far from specific (and perhaps intentionally so) on this point.

Foreign Office requests informal and confidential clarification on this point, including whether this ambiguity of language was accepted by CHICOMS in apparent good faith and is now being aired by them, perhaps, for political purposes.

New subject: Has Department any comment to make on points made by O'Neill (Embtel 1034) especially paragraph 4.

**Butterworth**

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## 207. Telegram 747 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 20, 1955, 7 p.m.

747. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting:

1. Wang's entire attitude throughout meeting was deliberately much more brusque and in general harder than at any previous meeting. This change in attitude was particularly marked in comparison with last meeting with respect to his refusal to give us further info on Americans and implementation announcement. Had feeling he was acting under definite instructions regarding his tone and that at last meeting he had promised more than Peiping willing deliver with respect information on Americans.

Believe this change derives from a) our attitude on proceeding to agenda item two; b) our attitude on "invitation" under agreed announcement (possible Wang is in trouble with Chou over this point); and c) our immediate and sharp reaction to his September 14 public statement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2055. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

2. Although he continued press me throughout meeting start discussion agenda item two there was no move on his part to bring matters to a head and I felt no necessity of using authority given me in paras 6 and 8 Deptel 745. Also my ability make statement contained para 7 Deptel 745 was of great assistance in keeping situation fluid. My thought in permitting him for first time in several meetings to suggest date for next meeting was to test his anxiety to move on and, in agreeing to his suggestion of September 23, to use authority in paras 6 and 8 Deptel 745 at that meeting if it seems desirable do so.

3. Felt I was completely on top of "invitation" situation today and that Wang fully realized weakness his position. Notable that today he entirely avoided use of word "entrust" which so heavily employed his letter. Doubt he will take further initiative this regard but we may want do so dependent on developments with UK Charge Peiping by next meeting.

**Shillock**

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**208. Telegram 748 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 20, 1955, 1 p.m.

748. From Johnson.

Re telcon with Robertson, regret necessity replacing either Clough or Forman at this time. Both have done excellent work and are very helpful to me. Had hoped when replacement made he could have had advantage intimate association over a period with Departmental work on these talks. However, realize pressure work in GA may make earlier action imperative. Balancing all considerations, including Department's needs and new phase talks entering here, believe best Clough return. Hope whoever sent will be given maximum opportunity familiarize self with Department's thinking.

**Shillock**

Note: Delayed in transmission.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2055. Confidential.

**209. Telegram 750 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 20, 1955, 7 p.m.

750. From Johnson. Re Deptel 752.

Press interest here Wang's statement now dead and believe it not desirable attempt revive. Our exchange at today's meeting reaffirming desire maintain privacy meetings makes press release inadvisable and considering present composition press corps here background not practicable. Press stories I have seen have reflected individual background guidances I gave on Wang initiating break in privacy talks, talks arranged solely through UK, my September 14 statement answers para 3 his statement, and picking up Suydam September 10 statement 173 Chinese left US between July 11 and August 31 as counter to fourth para his statement.

Very much hope I can have by next meeting confirmation departure Tsien.

**Shillock**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2055. Secret; Priority.

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**210. Telegram 751 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 20, 1955, 10 p.m.

751. From Johnson.

1. At 16th meeting today Wang asked if he could make first statement. He said that at outset of talks we agreed abstain from making public statements regarding proceedings to press without prior notification or agreement. He asked if we considered this agreement still valid and said I had given to press a statement regarding disputed points our last meeting and had even given a distorted interpretation.

After giving matter considerable thought he believed he could not remain silent and therefore issued statement on September 19.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2055. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

Concluded by saying he hoped we would return to original agreement regarding press releases.

2. I replied I was glad he mentioned subject as I had also intended to do so. At close of last meeting he informed me he intended making statement to press regarding two questions raised at meeting. I did not understand he intended reveal substance his remarks on two points he had introduced. Frankly what I thought he said was that we had discussed items one and two of agenda. However, when I learned of his statement after meeting it seemed to me very definitely to go into substance his remarks and this necessitated my also releasing statement going into substance our position. I did this in press release which I made as brief and non-controversial as possible. I was not alleging he did not inform me but simply that I did not understand his intent. I regretted he considered it necessary make a second statement to press. I had made no response and hoped I would not have to do so. I was glad to know he shared my feeling that our practice in past of not issuing press releases on substance of talks here was right. Our ability keep these matters private has been beneficial both parties and to progress our talks. I would be entirely willing and hoped he would agree to proceed on same basis we have in past and not discuss substance our meetings with press by unilateral public statements.

3. Wang replied he could not agree my explanation this regard. At last meeting we agreed on release, his statement had been clear and there could have been no misunderstanding.

His statement had been in conformity with our agreement and he had made prior notification. What he said to press did not go beyond scope of what he told me in meeting he would say. But my statement was not in conformity with agreement. If US still desired keep situation as it was before, then he hoped there would be no recurrence such action. Hoped in future we would adhere to agreement regarding releases to press.

4. I said I could not agree my statement had been in violation our agreement on private nature of talks. I told him I did not understand his intention and, if I had, then I would have objected because his release went into substance his remarks and I would have to make reply. Furthermore, I reminded him that when I had proposed private nature of talks I had also suggested that prior notice of unilateral statements should be reasonable in time, for example a day or two before release. I would give him such advance notice if I made a statement. I did not believe useful purpose served pursue this subject further and hoped he agreed abide by understanding in future as I intended so to do.

5. Wang said he had nothing more to say except that facts spoke for themselves and could not be refuted. He then suggested we discuss item two and said he would be happy to hear my comments on two



points he raised last time. Also in referring my earlier indication I had reply his September 16 letter, said he would be glad receive reply.

6. I replied with prepared statement in which I said I had informed him September 14 that US Government had formally transmitted to GOI terms of agreed announcement and had invited GOI undertake in US functions set forth in agreed announcement. US Government had received formal reply from GOI saying it pleased accept invitation. Arrangements made to discuss today with Indian Ambassador Washington carrying out responsibilities assumed by GOI under agreed announcement. US Government also transmitted to Government UK terms agreed announcement and formally requested UK undertake on behalf American nationals in PRC functions set forth. UK indicated it was prepared undertake these functions. US Government had therefore taken all action required in order third powers might undertake their functions. I said I would appreciate being informed what action PRC had taken this regard.

7. Wang said he noted my statement US Government had invited GOI. He could not agree, because GOI was being invited by PRC and not by US. Clearly provided in agreed announcement that PRC should invite India take care Chinese nationals in US. If PRC invited GOI then US should accept this arrangement and confirm that GOI assume functions. It was not a question of GOI being invited by US. In same way could not say PRC should invite UK. PRC could only agree to UK being invited by US to carry out functions set forth in agreed announcement. In our discussion and in text agreed announcement this point very clear and allowed of no misinterpretation.

8. He stated US press and official USIS misrepresented and misinterpreted agreed announcement, alleging US will invite GOI and PRC will invite UK. He could not agree to such distorted interpretation.

9. He continued by saying PRC had formally invited GOI take care welfare of Chinese nationals in US. Nehru in statement made Indian Parliament had said India had accepted this invitation from PRC. If US Government has completed its formal invitation to UK, then PRC can inform UK it agrees to UK performing functions set forth regarding American nationals. However, PRC had made no formal contact with UK because did not know if US had completed formal invitation to UK.

10. I said I was genuinely puzzled by his statement and had no intention of reopening, as he appeared to desire, whole question our negotiations on text agreed announcement. Latter is clear as can be on this subject and US Government has done everything which could be required of it in order agreed announcement could be put into effect. Here I quoted pertinent sections agreed announcement adding I did not want to engage in semantic argument over text but rather look at substance of arrangement. At very outset of talks he indicated PRC wanted GOI assume certain functions regarding Chinese in US who desire return. We

had agreed in announcement what these functions should be and they were ones which had to be undertaken in the US. We had immediately taken all action necessary to permit GOI undertake these functions. That was substance of situation. We had done everything we could to permit GOI undertake functions his government wanted and Indian Ambassador was today discussing implementation announcement in US. In contrast with US action, I understood from him that UK still was not in position undertake functions agreed announcement in PRC. Imperative whatever words might be used, his government take same action with respect UK as we took with respect to India so that UK can undertake functions under agreed announcement.

11. Wang asked whether UK was "invited" by US.

12. I repeated that UK had been formally requested undertake functions set forth and this done even before our last meeting and very promptly, as with other matters relating agreed announcement. I did not know of this action at time of last meeting or I would have informed him then.

13. Wang said, "Do I understand US invited UK and agreed to invitation GOI by PRC".

14. I said that was not what I had said.

15. Wang asked if what I meant was PRC had invited GOI and US had invited UK, or was there difference of opinion between us.

16. I said I thought it important to get into substance situation which was that US had done everything permit GOI undertake its functions in US. I understood that was what he was interested in, and that had been done.

17. Wang said he concerned with two points: one was invitation to third government, and the other was agreement to this invitation. He was ready agree my statement that UK invited by US but he wanted be clear whether GOI being invited by PRC or US.

18. I said it was our clear understanding of agreed announcement that we should invite GOI perform functions. At same time I had no objection his government taking whatever action it desired with respect GOI, and whatever words they used between them was up to him. His government had suggested GOI undertake functions in US, but, as we had discussed in previous meetings, third parties could undertake functions only if authorized. Essential element is that each government permit functions be undertaken within own territory. If we invited someone to do something of course we agree to their doing it and would assist them.

19. Wang said "to agree" and "to invite" were two different things. If US had invited GOI, then it appeared US had invited both UK and GOI. PRC had never invited UK to do anything. Merely said they

would agree to UK performing functions and assist them. He had indicated when UK invited by US, then PRC would agree and assist. There would be no differences of opinion if I meant GOI invited by PRC and US would agree and assist, but if I meant GOI was invited by US, then he would have to consider statement was intentional distortion and misrepresentation of agreed announcement. If by my statement that US formally informed UK I meant US had formally invited UK, and if I formally declared this to be so in this meeting, then his government would contact UK and express agreement it assume functions set forth in agreed announcement with assistance PRC.

20. I said we had formally notified both UK and GOI immediately and wonder what more we could do to put agreed announcement into effect.

21. Wang replied if my statement today meant that I was formally notifying him US had completed invitation UK, then PRC would contact UK and give assistance.

22. I asked if, whatever word was used by his government, his government would promptly take action with respect UK so that it could promptly undertake functions under agreed announcement.

23. Wang said if we had completed invitation process PRC would certainly do its part and that what he meant was if US had transmitted formal text to UK.

24. I said this had been done.

25. Wang said, very well, that meant we had invited UK and that PRC had not, but that PRC had only agreed.

26. I asked if PRC would contact office of UK Charge in Peiping.

27. He said as a matter of course they would do whatever was required under the agreement.

28. I then told him I would like to inform him about the publicity carried in Chinese language press in US regarding agreed announcement. I said in New York full text announcement carried in five Chinese papers, and gave names. In San Francisco text carried in Chinese World while news and editorials carried two other papers. Since these publications circulate freely throughout US it was assured even Chinese in US who did not understand English could have access text agreed announcement.

29. I said at last meeting I had raised several questions regarding implementation of agreed announcement with respect to Americans on China mainland. I would appreciate it if he could give me fuller answers to my questions than he had been able to last time.

30. Wang said he had nothing to tell me beyond what he had said in the last meeting because at that time he told me all he was able to.

31. I said I particularly wanted specific information on the health and welfare of Americans not yet released.

32. Wang said he had nothing new to tell me. Reporting on the condition of Americans in China was related to information on Chinese in US on which he had received no information. He said he would appreciate it if I could provide this information, and first of all provide a list of their names and addresses. If I would give him information on Chinese nationals then he would also give me information on Americans in China.

33. I asked what nationals he wanted information about. As far as I knew no Chinese nationals in the US were in jail.

34. Wang snapped that he wanted information on all his nationals in the US including their names and addresses.

35. I asked if I understood him to say that his government was unwilling to give us information on the health and welfare of Americans in jail for which his government had a special responsibility and whose names I had given him. I considered this very important. At last meeting I had asked him how the Americans in jail who did not have access usual forms of communication would be informed of agreed announcement. I understood from him they would be informed by persons reading and translating newspapers for them if they did not understand Chinese language. Was he able to assure me this had been done?

36. Wang replied this was an internal matter of concern to his government. He had already told me what was done and what he said still holds. He added that health conditions of prisoners had already been discussed during the talks between consular representatives. Also he had informed me regarding implementation of agreed announcement and notifying persons concerned and he would not repeat his remarks. He hoped I would give him my opinion on the two items he had put forward under agenda item two.

37. I said our first order of business was the return of nationals and that I still considered it so. I had attempted fully, frankly and immediately inform him what we had done to implement agreed announcement. Only by its implementation could we completely dispose of first order of business we came here to discuss. I had hoped he could give me information on implementation as he did at last meeting. I was disappointed he had not given further information to me today. As he was unable to do so, I said I wished refer briefly to that portion his statement at last meeting and his public statement regarding talks at higher level. I then read from prepared statement as follows:

38. A. "I simply want to say my government considers this to be a procedural rather than a substantive matter. Therefore, it considers that it cannot be properly included as a 'practical matter at issue between

the two sides' under the mutually agreed communique issued by our two governments on July 25, and our agreed agenda.

B. I cannot but consider that such a proposal would nullify the agreement we now have to discuss at the Ambassadorial level practical problems at issue between our two governments.

C. My government is not prepared to substitute another forum for this one. Neither is my government prepared now to discuss or agree as to what will happen after our talks here have been concluded. We would hope this would be when all practical matters at issue had been disposed of. We feel that both sides should make a maximum effort to settle 'practical matters at issue' in our talks here as already agreed rather than propose another forum even before the two of us have undertaken discussion of the second item of our agenda."

39. Wang countered that according to the agreement at the outset of our talks and with respect to his statement at the last meeting he believed each side could raise issues it considered should be discussed under item two. He had suggested two problems: embargo; second, preparations for Sino-American negotiations at a higher level. He considered objective of talks was improvement relations two countries and easing of tensions in Far East. Therefore, PRC did not consider that all practical issues between US and China could be settled in these Ambassadorial talks. He thought it would be more significant to refer these issues to a meeting at a higher level. This proposal not only conformed with desire two peoples and world public opinion but also conformed with desire some high officials in US Government. Of course this was his opinion regarding agenda item two and he was prepared to listen to anything I wished to put forward.

40. Said I had nothing further to say this morning.

41. Wang said he had nothing further to say. He suggested we meet again September 23.

42. In discussing release to press Wang suggested we issue statement saying we had discussed (a) implementation of agreed announcement and (b) item two.

43. I suggested we say we "discussed points of view with respect to item two".

44. We finally agreed on text Mytel 743.

**Shillock**

**211. Telegram 752 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 21, 1955, 10 a.m.

752. From Johnson. Deptel 757.

Name second Chinese listed apparently incomplete as received. Confirm whether it Lee Cheng-Wu (repeat Lee Cheng-Wu).

Total number Chinese who departed US (repeat US) on Cleveland September 17 would be useful to me for next meeting if available.

Helpful for me receive figures (not names) Chinese departing US (repeat US) as promptly after their leaving as possible.

**Shillock**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2155. Official Use Only; Priority.

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**212. Telegram 753 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 21, 1955, 11 a.m.

753. From Johnson.

1. Re para 9 Deptel 745. Following appear to be some of considerations to be taken into account with respect listing restitution seized diplomatic and consular property:

A. Listing item will inevitably be interpreted by CHICOMS and others as possibly remote but nevertheless definite step in contemplation eventual recognition. From narrow standpoint continuation these talks and release Americans this would be useful. Principal adverse factor to be considered is effect in Taiwan.

B. What legal aspects may be; that is, can matter be handled without sacrifice our position on GRC as de jure government of China?

C. CHICOMS may counter with item on release blocked accounts in US.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2155. Confidential; Limited Distribution.

D. CHICOMS may alternatively counter with position this not “practical matter” unless and until recognition contemplated at which time “will be easy to resolve”.

E. In unlikely event properties restored this would lead directly to question UK representation US interests in PRC and reciprocal representation PRC interests in US by GOI.

F. Have imperfect recollection concerning our returning title to GRC properties acquired under surplus property agreement following World War II. Am not clear what effect this would have on extent restitution demand we would make on CHICOMS.

**Shillock**

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### 213. Telegram 758 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 21, 1955, 4 p.m.

758. From Johnson.

1. Subject Department’s suggestions, at Friday’s meeting I plan give Wang all further available info on our implementation of announcement, inform him departure Tsien, numbers additional Chinese who have departed, etc. Would hope could make unqualified statement Indian Embassy already functioning as envisaged agreed announcement.

2. Will then make carefully prepared and balanced statement noting progress thus far made with respect PRC implementation announcement but with note being serious dissatisfaction with rate of progress release of Americans in jail. Of 29 Americans in jail or under house arrest beginning these talks have thus far promised release 10 of whom 9 out and 19 still remain jail with no apparent steps taken effect their release. This is not “expeditiously.”

3. Will also express dissatisfaction with his attitude at last meeting on my request for info on health and welfare of Americans still in jail and unanswered questions on implementation announcement.

4. Will also contrast our prompt action with respect India with their dilatoriness with respect UK, working in latest available information on this situation at time of meeting.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2155. Secret; Limited Distribution.

5. Will express regret thus far been unable turn to item two because their slowness disposing these matters and express hope they will promptly remedy situation. On timing discussions item two would maintain note in second sentence para 14 Mytel 725, that is "when it was clear terms agreed announcement being faithfully implemented."

6. I would not plan at this meeting to use authority contained paras 6 and 8 Deptel 745 except in unlikely event it appeared necessary prevent break, but would close on note of continued dissatisfaction and waiting for them to act.

7. Wang will probably react sharply and meeting may well become somewhat acrid but I feel it may be useful move at this time.

8. However in event that he informs me at meeting of release additional Americans and it also appears announcement has been implemented with respect UK functions in PRC, I would respond with line in paras 6 and 8 Deptel 745.

**Shillock**

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**214. Telegram 761 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 21, 1955, 7:03 p.m.

761. For Johnson.

(a) Second name is Lee (or Li) Cheng-wu.

(b) INS reports total 56 Chinese left Los Angeles September 17 by ship (presumably on Cleveland) of whom 38 reported destined mainland China.

(c) As of September 21, cumulative total of confirmed departures of Chinese for Far East since July 11 is 380.

(d) FYI. Cumulative total of Chinese who have left U.S. for all destinations during same period is 714. Recommend you not volunteer latter figure to Wang unless you deem it has utility overriding undesirable implication that Chicoms have legitimate interest in movements all Chinese to other parts of world. End FYI.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2155. Confidential. Drafted by Nogoski; cleared in draft by McConaughy.



**215. Memorandum of Conversation, George and Robertson<sup>1</sup>**

Vienna, Georgia, September 21, 1955

SUBJECT

U.S.-Red China Geneva Talks

PARTICIPANTS

Senator Walter F. George

Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

I arrived at Senator George's office (in Vienna, Georgia) at 10:15 a.m. EST and talked with him until 11:45 a.m., at which time a party of several people arrived to see him by appointment. There was ample time, however, for a complete review and discussion of the Geneva talks. I opened the conversation by saying that the Secretary had wanted me to come down to see him, to bring him up to date on the progress of the Johnson-Wang talks, to explain the strategy we had followed and planned to follow, to answer any questions he might have in mind, and to receive any suggestions he cared to make.

I reviewed in some detail the situation with respect to Chinese students in this country and of American nationals in China. Apparently, he had not been entirely clear as to the facts of either situation and was obviously interested in obtaining accurate information.

I reviewed the negotiations to date, calling his attention to the fact that, despite Chou En-lai's public statement that the repatriation of civilians could quickly be settled because of the fact that so few Americans were involved, it had taken six weeks and fourteen meetings of dogged insistence to get the Reds' public commitment to release all civilians who desired to go home.

Senator George had not seen the full text of the September 10 Geneva announcement and read carefully, the copy I handed him. He was very pleased with the implications of the wording but added that in view of their protestations it was surprising that the Reds should have taken six weeks to agree to the release of our nationals when two weeks should have sufficed.

I then explained the respective positions of the Chinese Reds and ourselves with respect to Item 2 of the agenda. I pointed out that the subjects likely to be discussed under Item 2 would almost certainly generate emotional outbursts and prolonged deadlocks. We therefore felt that we should not proceed to the discussion of other matters until we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2155. Secret. Drafted by Robertson.

were satisfied that the public commitment to free all Americans desiring to come home was being implemented in good faith. Otherwise, their release might be long delayed and conceivably jeopardized altogether. Senator George agreed. He said we were entirely correct, in our long six weeks of negotiations, to accept nothing less than a public agreement to free all Americans and, further, that in his opinion we should not now proceed with other discussions until we were certain that the 19 imprisoned Americans had been notified of their rights under the agreement and that the British Chargé had been given access to the prisoners.

I then referred to the Red Chinese proposal that plans for negotiations at a higher level be a subject for discussion under Item 2 of the agenda. This presented a good opening to refer to the Gonzales (United Press) story in the "Washington Post" of September 12 in which Senator George was quoted as renewing "his call for a Foreign Ministers meeting between the United States and Red China later this year." Upon reading the clipping I handed him, Senator George remarked that as usual the reporter had reported only part of what he had said. I also informed him of Wang's statement (at the September 20 meeting) justifying his request for a high-level meeting on the ground that such meeting was also desired by "some high American officials." We both agreed Wang was probably referring to the Gonzales story.

I explained our position that as Wang's request for talks at a higher level was procedural, not substantive, we could not consider it "a practical matter at issue" falling within the agreement for the Geneva talks represented by our mutually agreed communique of July 25, that we are not prepared to nullify the agreement we now have to discuss "practical matters at issue" at the ambassadorial level, by substituting another forum for this one, and further that maximum effort should now be made to settle "practical matters at issue" at the ambassadorial level without prior commitment as to what would happen when the current talks are concluded.

I informed Senator George of the two subjects we would push for discussion. He did not recall that military personnel were still unaccounted for and agreed that we should press for an accounting.

I reviewed the Red Chinese armistice violations in North Korea, their covert activities in Indochina, and the war-like preparations on the mainland of China opposite Formosa, as reasons why it seemed to us that "Renunciation of Force" was a *sine qua non* for present discussions in Geneva.

Senator George heartily agreed that we should press for a renunciation of force at the Ambassadorial level and stated further that, unless the Communists would agree to renounce force in the settlement of the Formosa problem, we should not consider a conference at the foreign ministers level.

Senator George was obviously appreciative of my visit. Throughout our discussions he was friendly, intensely interested and thoroughly cooperative in his attitude. He did not express a single dissent from the positions we had taken or propose to take. As I left, he sent his warm regards to the Secretary and asked me to assure him of his entire approval of the course he was following.

I am certain that Senator George means to be helpful. However, he is aging fast, has a poor memory and is an easy target for enterprising reporters seeking a story. I do not believe he realizes that his telephone interview with Gonzales was a violation of the promise he made the Secretary some months ago to stop making public statements on delicate matters of foreign policy. Probably the best way to minimize his getting off the track is to keep in constant contact with him.

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## 216. Despatch 5 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

No. 5

Geneva, September 21, 1955

REF

Geneva's Telegram 739, September 18, 1955

SUBJECT

Transmitting Letter Received from Ambassador Wang Ping-nan Regarding Implementation of the Agreed Announcement

There is enclosed a copy of the full text of the translation of a letter addressed to me in Chinese by Ambassador Wang Ping-nan on September 16, 1955. The signed original of the Chinese letter was accompanied by this translation which was evidently hastily done and contains some inaccuracies. However, it has been checked with the Chinese text and was found to be correct in its essential substance.

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2155. Confidential. Drafted by Forman. Sent via air pouch.

## Enclosure

### Letter from Wang to Johnson<sup>2</sup>

Geneva, September 16, 1955

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson:

At our September 14 meeting I informed you that the Chinese Government had published the full text of our Agreed Announcement at the agreed time. I also proposed that the United States Government should formally entrust the United Kingdom Government on the one hand and the Chinese Government should formally entrust the Indian Government on the other so as to complete the procedures of entrusting the third powers. Then the Chinese Government should notify the United Kingdom Government and the United States Government should notify the Indian Government respectively extending their agreement to the respective third powers being entrusted to assume the functions stipulated in the Agreed Announcement of the Ambassadors of China and the United States.

I am hereby instructed to inform you that after the United States Government has formally entrusted the United Kingdom Government the Chinese Government will notify the United Kingdom Government of its agreement to the latter's being entrusted by the United States Government to offer the Americans who desire to return the various assistance specified in our Agreed Announcement.

At the September 14 meeting you advised me that the United States Embassy in New Delhi had informed the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on September 11 and formally invited it to assume the functions stipulated in the Announcement. This notification of the United States Government can only be interpreted in the following manner: The United States Government is aware that the Chinese Government has previously indicated its readiness to the Indian Government to entrust India to extend assistance in the matter concerning the return of Chinese nationals residing in the United States. During these talks I again indicated to you on many occasions that the Chinese Government would entrust the Indian Government to extend assistance to Chinese nationals residing in the United States who desire to return. Hence, the notification of the United States Government to the Indian Government means the former's agreement to the Indian Government being entrusted by the Chinese Government and

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<sup>2</sup>Confidential. The letter is marked "Translation."

the Chinese Government interprets and understands as such the September 11 notification of the United States Government to the Indian Government.

It must be pointed out that our side has taken into account of the difficult position in the diplomatic relations in which the United States Government finds, and has acceded to your proposed text on the entrusting of third powers in its present form in the Agreed Announcement. However, on the concrete content with regard to the Chinese Government's entrusting the Indian Government and the United States Government's entrusting the United Kingdom Government both sides cannot have any other interpretation.

After the publication of our Agreed Announcement the American press including the United States Information Service invariably made distorted interpretation at variance with the actual fact of the text of the Agreed Announcement regarding the entrusting of the third powers, alleging that the Chinese Government would entrust the United Kingdom Government on the one hand and the United States Government would entrust the Indian Government on the other. The United States Government ought not to agree to such a distorted interpretation.

We desire to know if the United States Government has formally entrusted the United Kingdom Government and will appreciate a confirmation in a reply letter to this effect if it has already done so, so that I will be able to report promptly to my Government. Then my Government will inform the United Kingdom Government of its agreement to the latter's being entrusted by the United States Government.

(Signed) Wang Ping-nan

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## 217. Telegram 6 from Geneva to Hong Kong<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 22, 1955, noon

6. Would appreciate any immediately available information whether nine jailed Americans released from Communist China were informed by prison officials of these negotiations or terms of agreed announcement before their release. Wang has alleged remaining

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A251/9–2255. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 760.

prisoners will be informed agreed announcement by having newspapers read and if necessary translated to them.

**Shillock**

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**218. Telegram 764 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1955, 4:53 p.m.

764. For Johnson.

(Code Room: Please repeat London's 1119, Control No. 10430, dated September 20, 1955)

**Hoover**  
*Acting*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2055. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy.

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**219. Telegram 766 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1955, 4:56 p.m.

766. For Johnson. Your 758.

1. Your general course of action for September 23 meeting as proposed reftel approved.

2. Department strongly endorses your intention make vigorous representations regarding slow PRC implementation Agreed Announcement, and totally unsatisfactory status PRC arrangements for performance UK function. In fact such arrangements non-existent so far as US Government aware. Wang should be severely taxed with PRC non-compliance this obligation. It should be put to Wang that it pressingly incumbent upon PRC afford conclusive evidence American

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2155. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Sebald and Phleger.

nationals, including those in jail, have been informed their rights under Agreed Announcement and that Office of UK Chargé has been given necessary advice and facilities by PRC. As to those in jail, we should insist that UK Chargé be given access to them, since they have no access to him. US Government does not care whether PRC calls this approach to UK Government invitation, notification or request. US Government unable see that this is more than mere quibble. Essential objective is inform Americans and enable UK Chargé to act. We will not allow this question rest until satisfaction afforded.

3. Department requesting Embassy London inform you by direct cable if possible in time for tomorrow's meeting whether written Foreign Office reply yet received to our note of September 12, and whether any word yet received by Foreign Office from PRC as to arrangements for performance UK function. Our reply to London's 1034 has been delayed from day to day in anticipation early word from Peiping. Replies to London's 1034 and 1119 will be repeated you in any event before tomorrow's meeting.

4. Re paragraph 5 reftel concur most unlikely that discussion anything in regard to Item Two can appropriately take place at next meeting in view scope and seriousness our unanswered questions on implementation Agreed Announcement.

5. Indian Ambassador called at Department September 20 to discuss Indian role. He reaffirmed Indian acceptance and satisfactorily cleared up all questions of interpretation which had occurred to him. Expressed appreciation for US assurances full cooperation. Said discharge Indian function will begin promptly.

6. FYI. We are working on draft letter from you to Wang requesting accounting for 450 missing American servicemen, and on renunciation force study. These are for possible introduction next week or later.

7. Re your 753, Subject Secretary's approval we have discarded idea of raising subject seized US Government properties on China mainland in course these talks. END FYI

8. Department believes we should concentrate efforts and attention on implementation Agreed Announcement. We question advisability devoting emphasis to demands for reports on health and welfare jailed Americans about which we could do nothing. Most constructive approach problem health and welfare prisoners would be their release. However, you may wish seek reason why Kanady has not yet departed and why Sister Dugay apparently unable leave Shanghai on SS HUNAN (Hong Kong's 630). We are suggesting to Maryknoll Mission that it repeat its orders to Bishop Walsh (your 761) apply for exit permit.

**Hoover**

**220. Telegram 1624 to London<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1955, 7:59 p.m.

1624. Your 1119. Department considers it mere Chinese Communist quibble whether GOI and UK should be "invited", "notified" or "requested" to perform allotted functions. Department naturally communicated with both GOI and UKG in regard U.S. interest in their functions. It assumed PRC would do likewise.

PRC clearly obligated make arrangements necessary to enable UK Government function. U.S. Government promptly discharged its obligation to enable GOI to function.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2055. Confidential. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Sebald and Robertson. Repeated to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 772.

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**221. Telegram 1625 to London<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1955

1625. Your 1034. Department considers that under Agreed Announcement, O'Neill should have access to detained Americans if they are not given unimpeded access to O'Neill. Imprisoned Americans in special situation where they unable exercise their rights under Agreed Announcement unless PRC provides special facilities for information and communication. Good faith on part of PRC in implementation Agreed Announcement calls for extraordinary treatment these unfortunate persons. PRC has particular responsibility to these persons made helpless by its action. Repeat priority direct to Johnson Geneva any information from Foreign Office re provisions made by PRC for O'Neill to perform agreed function.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1455. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Robertson. Repeated Priority to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 773. The time of transmission is illegible.



**222. Memorandum of Conversation, Richards and Robertson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1955

SUBJECT

U.S.-Red China Geneva Talks

PARTICIPANTS

Congressman James P. Richards

Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

Congressman Richards had luncheon today with me at the Carlton Hotel. I briefed him at length on the status of our talks with the Red Chinese in Geneva, explaining the strategy we had followed in the negotiations to date, would follow for the present and intended following in the future, along substantially the same lines as reported in my conversation with Senator George in Vienna, Georgia on yesterday, September 21st.

Congressman Richards heartily approved our position, recommended that we be unyielding in insisting that the British Chargé in Peiping be permitted personal contact with our imprisoned citizens before discussing any subjects under Item 2 of the agenda and further that we insist upon the Communists carrying out the agreement to discuss “practical matters” at the Ambassadorial level without any commitment from us as to a later conference at the foreign ministers level.

Congressman Richards repeatedly emphasized that while he could not speak for the Senate that the House would give overwhelming approval to a firm line at this time.

*[text not declassified]*

Congressman Richards expressed deep appreciation for our courtesy in bringing him up to date on our Geneva discussions and said that we could count upon his full support in the course we were now following. He expressed fear, however, that pressure upon the President by some of our allies and certain groups in this country would be such that we would be tempted to weaken on the strong positions we had heretofore taken on trade, recognition and UN membership.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2255. Secret. Drafted by Robertson.

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**223. Letter 9 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 9

Geneva, September 22, 1955

Dear Walter:

First, let me thank you and all the others concerned for the instructions contained in Deptel 745. They were a model of clarity and gave me enough latitude and alternative positions so that, on entering the meeting, I felt completely confident of being able to meet any situation that might arise.

Next, I refer to the suggestion contained in your letter of September 16 that individual letters signed by Mr. Robertson be sent to each of the remaining Americans. I have serious doubts of the wisdom of this, largely for the reason set forth in your letter. If I thought that by so doing we might advance even by a single day the release of any of the individuals, it would be a somewhat different matter. However, I do not see how it would do so and the only value might be in whatever lift it would give to their morale. I intend to keep hammering at Wang on this subject and we will see what the results will be. In the meantime my alternative thought is that we suggest to each of the relatives who write to the prisoners that they send them a copy of the Agreed Announcement with one of their letters if they have not already done so. We might send to each of them a mimeographed text for the purpose, but, in order not to prejudice its delivery, would suggest that the relative not mention this was being done at the Department's instigation.

The code clerk problem is now very satisfactorily resolved through your help as well as that of Mr. Carpenter with whom I raised the problem when he was through here last week. Please thank Bob Stufflebeam for me. I know the problem that he faces.

I agree with the analysis that Wang's unilateral public move on the 14th probably means that the Communists have made the decision that further talks at this level have little or no value to them, and it will, therefore, become increasingly difficult to keep the ball rolling unless I am in a position to introduce something that has even a slight substantive value from their standpoint. All of this, of course, is related as well to the speed with which we obtain the release of the remaining Americans.

I noted the policy information statement to USIA (Department's CA-2241, September 16) cautioned against the use of the term "agenda". Although this is a new thought to me, I see the Department's point. However, at least Wang and I have talked so much about agenda item

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." A handwritten note on the letter indicates it was received on September 26.

one and agenda item two, and have also used the term in our routine communiques of meetings, that the vocabulary has been well established and it seems to me now difficult to avoid the use of the term.

With kindest regards to all,  
Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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## 224. Telegram 767 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 23, 1955, 1 p.m.

767. From Johnson.

1. As expected today's meeting became very acrid. I opened with long statement along lines my 758, closing with statement when PRC has "by its action, demonstrated that it is expeditiously carrying out terms of agreed announcement, way will be cleared for discussion issues each side wishes bring up under item two". Hoped PRC will act promptly so can quickly proceed to those discussions.

2. Wang replied by "formally informing" me that on September 22 note was sent to UK Charge Peiping in reply to note received from him stating "UK had accepted US invitation" and way therefore cleared for UK act in PRC.

3. Ignored remainder my questions, general line being all these matters now for third power, agreed announcement disposed agenda item one, PRC will faithfully implement, and launched into strong attack on my mention of 19, no Americans detained, only criminals in jail, have admitted crimes of espionage and subversion, do aliens in US have freedom carry out subversive activities, etc., etc., and then at some length flatly accused US of raising these issues deliberately in order to stall on discussion item two, difficult understand since US had made original July 25 proposal, etc.

4. He then continued with statement replying to my statement last meeting on higher level meeting (text by separate tel). There was then much vigorous give and take during which I ignored his reply on higher level meeting and while acknowledging his statement UK now finally

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2355. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.

able function, concentrated entirely on our dissatisfaction with implementation announcement. Of 29 Americans in jail when these talks began 19 still there, this not "expeditious" release, no replies our request for specific assurance each American in jail had been informed of agreed announcement, freedom of communication with UK Charge, and ability UK interview. These all problems of PRC implementation and not for UK Charge. Stalling had been by PRC which unwilling to accept our original proposal way to resolve item one was simply permit civilians return.

5. He expressed dissatisfaction I unwilling say anything this meeting on item 2 and pressed me hard for commitment to discuss item 2 next meeting, to which I expressed my strong dissatisfaction his lack of replies on implementation announcement and refused make any commitment on discussion item two. At close of meeting he stated that if at next meeting we still refused discuss item two, "they would have to consider making a public unilateral statement".

6. Agreed on press communique identical with last meeting (Mytel 743) except for substitution "they continued to exchange information" first portion second paragraph.

7. Next meeting Wednesday September 18.

**Shillock**

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## 225. Telegram 768 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 23, 1955, 2 p.m.

768. From Johnson.

Believe it important O'Neill be well informed on substance my exchanges with Wang on implementation agreed announcement with respect UK and that he follow up at Peiping particularly with respect info on agreed announcement to Americans in jail, their freedom communicate with him and his ability interview them when US desires have facts case investigated accordance agreed announcement.

Would hope that prior next meeting I could have full info on whatever has up to that time transpired between himself and PRC this regard.

**Shillock**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2355. Confidential; Priority.

**226. Telegram 770 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 23, 1955, 5 p.m.

770. From Johnson.

1. Believe today's meeting very useful in bringing home to PRC depth our dissatisfaction on implementation agreed announcement and making it unmistakably clear we continue expect prompt action on remaining 19.

2. As of today Wang is somewhat in doubt as to what exactly we intend to do with respect item two. Last meeting I dealt with something they had raised under item two, today I refused to deal at all with item two, and my remarks have been sufficiently ambiguous that they are now not entirely clear as to whether our intent is flatly to refuse discuss item two until all remaining Americans are released or something short of that. However it cannot but be perfectly clear to them that we expect additional performance. I did not feel that I could today debate, however lightly, his reply to my statement at last meeting on higher level talks without weakening impression I was attempting create.

3. Do not believe I could state our position any more forcefully than I did today without going to next step of flatly refusing enter any substantive discussion item two until every American released. In present atmosphere I would have to quickly reveal whether or not we prepared maintain such position up to point of break.

4. Although he today avoided word "break" this was somewhat implied in his threat make public statement if we continue through next meeting our refusal discuss item two. Do not believe their impatience is feigned and it would not be possible keep talks going solely on today's note useful and important though I feel it has been.

5. Question is what we do if by time of next meeting there has been no additional performance on their part. Believe that some sort additional reply to his statement today on higher level meeting and line in paras 6 and 8 Deptel 745 would with some difficulty carry me though next meeting or two but problem will be where we go from there. With our having already rejected one of his two items and we apparently having only two items there is not going to be much scope for an agenda argument. It would, under these circumstances seem to me to be our best tactic to attempt to focus on a substantive exchange on "no force" for as long as we could keeping their item of trade embargo on ice for as long as we could.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2355. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

6. It occurs to me that we may raise problems by attempting to arrive at any formal agenda agreement on item two. For example, our rejection of a higher level meeting as a suitable agenda item but our acceptance of trade embargo may carry with it implication that we are prepared to do something, however conditional, with respect to latter. This implication might be avoided if no [omission in the original—attempt?] was made to establish formal agenda. They in turn will probably reject our item on persons missing from Korean War, or accept it if we accept their item on higher level meeting. With respect to missing personnel from Korean War I find it difficult to formulate it as an agenda item but am very clear that I could easily present simply as a list of names and asking for a categorical yes or no as whether any are alive in territory under their control.

7. With reference para 6 Deptel 766 I am doubtful desirability letter from myself to Wang. I would prefer make presentation on missing servicemen entirely informal and oral. With respect renunciation force believe oral statement in meeting best form but could accordance our standing arrangement give him copy my remarks this regard.

8. Depending upon nature my instructions for next meeting we should be prepared for possibility Wang may implement his threat issue public statement on our “stalling” on discussion item two. I will submit draft for Department’s approval.

**Shillock**

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## 227. Telegram 772 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 23, 1955, 10 p.m.

772. From Johnson.

1. At 1715 meeting, lasting one hour forty-five minutes, today I opened with prepared statement.

2. I informed Wang that Dr. Tsien Shue-shen had departed Los Angeles September 18, and 56 other Chinese had departed on same ship. 151 others had departed by other means, so that cumulative total of those who had left for Far East between July 11 and September 21 was 380.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2355. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

3. As I informed him at our last meeting, Indian Ambassador was that day discussing with Department carrying out in US responsibilities of GOI set forth in our agreed announcement. Those discussions were quickly and successfully concluded and Ambassador informed Department that Embassy of India was immediately undertaking to discharge its functions in this regard.

4. I had given him foregoing information as further evidence that my government was faithfully carrying out obligations it assumed in issuing agreed announcement. As I had told him repeatedly, and as agreed announcement confirmed, all Chinese in US who desired to leave were free to do so. Furthermore my government promptly took all necessary action so that GOI might undertake in US, at earliest possible date, functions provided for under agreed announcement. My government was taking every possible action faithfully and expeditiously to fulfill obligations assumed under agreed announcement.

5. On other hand, I had only very limited information as to extent his government was fulfilling obligations which it had assumed under agreed announcement. In first place, although my government acted immediately to permit GOI undertake in US its responsibilities under agreed announcement, I did not have any information whether Government of the UK was yet able to carry out its responsibilities in his country. I hoped he could give me definite information in this regard.

6. I said I was also disturbed by fact that at our last meeting he did not give me any additional information concerning further appropriate measures being taken by his government so that 19 Americans still in jail could expeditiously exercise their right to return. Principal reason that it took us so long to formulate and issue agreed announcement was not only due to fact that his government refused release all Americans detained in his country, but also because he had refused even to state how long it would take before all Americans could be released. However, he had said that if we could agree on and issue agreed announcement, it would not only be possible to release a number of Americans immediately, but that this would also facilitate release of the others. He had assured me that his government would act promptly to complete review of these additional cases. We had agreed on word "expeditiously" in agreed announcement, Chinese equivalent of which he explained meant "very quickly." Although I had not been satisfied with lack of an express statement on when all Americans would be allowed to leave his country, I finally accepted his assurances that time would not be long.

7. Nearly two weeks had now passed since issuing of agreed announcement. Of twenty-two people on whom he had told me action was being completed to permit their departure, nine had come out, and we looked forward to early arrival of the others. However, with respect to 19 others I have still heard nothing. I was beginning to be concerned

over his government's interpretation of word "expeditiously." Not only had none of these 19 persons been released, but he had refused to tell me anything about their present health and welfare, to confirm whether they had been individually informed of terms of agreed announcement, to say whether and how long they would be permitted to communicate with British Charge d'Affaires, or to say whether latter would be permitted interview them. His refusal thus far give me this information regarding implementation of agreed announcement increased my concern over these 19 Americans and raised serious question in my mind as to whether his government would permit these persons depart "expeditiously" as provided in agreed announcement.

8. I said that at our 15th meeting he had said he regarded it as "peculiar and regrettable" that I expressed unwillingness to begin discussion of item two before it was clearly apparent that agreed announcement issue under item one was being faithfully implemented. I could not agree with him on this. It seemed to me that when two parties were attempting to settle issues between them, only the faithful carrying out of obligations assumed could establish essential basis of mutual confidence for going on to settle other issues. Surely, it was not going to be possible for us to settle other issues until each of us was satisfied that other party was promptly and effectively implementing undertakings arrived at under item one of agenda. Once his government had, by its action, demonstrated that it was expeditiously carrying out terms of agreed announcement this would clear path for discussion of issues which each side wished bring up under item two. I hoped that his government would promptly act with regard to this matter so that we could quickly proceed to those discussions.

9. Wang said, first he wished formally inform me that in formal note to his government, Government of UK had said it accepted invitation of Government of US to take care of American nationals in China. In formal reply to Government of UK on September 22 PRC had agreed that UK would assume functions in China set forth in agreed announcement.

10. He said after some 40 days of discussion agenda item one regarding return of civilians we finally reached agreement and this item had now been disposed of. Question now before us was faithful implementation of agreement by both sides. His government was entirely willing to carry out agreement faithfully and he hoped US Government would do same. After agreement had been concluded both sides respectively invited third powers perform functions provided for. Therefore, for implementation of agreed announcement in future we would especially rely on government of third powers entrusted by each side.



11. Reference had been made in my statement to the 19 Americans who had committed crimes and to others being detained in his country. He resolutely opposed allegation that Americans being detained. Only US Government had illegally detained Chinese in US. Innocent Chinese nationals had been illegally detained by US. This action was violation of legal freedom of Chinese nationals and also violated practices under international law. As to Americans in China his side had never detained any of them. Those who were in prison had been prosecuted according to Chinese law because they had violated Chinese law. Recently a number of Americans who had violated Chinese law had been released. He was sure I was well aware of crimes they had committed in his country because their account had been reported in newspapers. All of them had admitted they had committed crimes and also admitted they were punished lightly. According to statements made by Americans themselves they admitted they had carried out espionage. He asked if any aliens in US had right to carry out subversive activities against US Government. Were all those in US jails Americans, or were there also some aliens?

12. He said I had put forward repeated claims regarding the 19 Americans and that he had repeatedly made clear his government's stand. He had made clear his position in a spirit of maximum conciliation. His government had reviewed a number of cases, had released a number and had advanced release of a number who had committed crimes. As to remainder, he had made clear his government's attitude on way their cases would be handled and that had been made a matter of record in our talks. PRC willing to conduct reviews of cases in light of agreement, in accordance with degree of each offense and also taking into account improvement of relations between our two countries. When results these reviews available, his side would inform third power concerned.

13. He said he had made very clear his government's position on countless occasions, but in spite of this I again put forward question of 19 Americans. He recalled I had on more than one occasion stated I was not attempting interfere internal affairs or violate sovereignty of China. However, it hard for him to explain why I again brought forward question 19 Americans if it was not interference in juridical processes and violation of sovereignty China. His country had no desire violate sovereignty other states but on other hand had no intention permit anyone else violate its sovereignty.

14. He said reference had been made to idea that agreed announcement should be implemented immediately without regard for fact that not all Chinese in US could return immediately to China. This interpretation of agreement was being used as pretext to intentionally stall talks. This intentional stalling was not conducing to success of talks nor to implementation of agreement. It was intentional stalling. We had

spent 40 days to reach agreement and after agreement two more weeks had passed. It would not contribute to progress of talks if we now retrogressed. This was an obstruction to our entering upon discussion of item two. (He then made statement on higher level talks contained immediately following tel.)

15. I replied I was pleased to note arrangement apparently being made so that UK could undertake functions in his country as set forth in agreed announcement.

16. I had to make it clear I could not consider that agenda item one was finally disposed of until it had been made clear all Americans in his country who desire to return had been enabled to do so. We had issued agreed announcement which I expected would facilitate resolution this question. We each undertook obligations in that announcement. We each agreed third countries would have certain functions in each of our countries. Third countries could be of some assistance, but there were portions of announcement which could only be implemented by our own governments. I had fully, frankly and completely informed him immediately of action we had taken to implement announcement. I thought it entirely reasonable that we should expect from his side information regarding steps taken to implement announcement. In announcement each government had stated it would further adopt measures so that Chinese and Americans who desired to do so could expeditiously exercise their right to return. He had asked whether all Chinese in the US who desired to leave could immediately do so. My answer was, yes. There was no action my government had not taken which it could be expected to take in order to permit Chinese in the US to return. I had already informed him of the numbers who had left US for Far East. If any Chinese were still remaining in US today it was entirely at their own choice.

17. Although he had said he could not accept my statement that 19 Americans were still detained in his country and although he had accused me of again putting forward question of 19 I had done so and must continue to do so until they were enabled to return. Whatever reasons might be given, there certainly was no more effective measure which could be taken for detaining a person than keeping him in jail. He had said I stated I had no intension of interfering with his legal processes or sovereignty or of dictating to him what measures he should take, and that was correct. I referred only to that portion of agreed announcement which contained a statement by him on behalf of his government that his government had adopted and would further adopt measures so Americans could expeditiously return. I was not attempting to tell him how to implement the agreement. I was merely asking for information on how it was being implemented.

18. I continued that release of Americans in jail was something over which third power could have no control. It was something which only action by his government could resolve. I had asked him few, simple, straightforward questions on aspects of implementation on which I did not consider I had received satisfactory replies. I had asked for specific information whether each American in jail had been informed of terms agreed announcement. I understood there was general arrangement for giving news to people in jail by which they would normally have been informed. It certainly should be possible for his government to let us know and confirm whether this had been done with respect informing American prisoners of agreed announcement. I had also asked for information on arrangements for such persons to communicate with office UK Charge. It should certainly be possible for him to tell me whether these arrangements had been made, also whether arrangements had been made so that UK Charge could interview these persons. These were all matters which we considered very important in implementation of announcement.

19. I then said he had spoken of stalling. When we came here August 1, I had proposed arrangement which would immediately and quickly dispose of first item so that we could go on to second item. I proposed simply that his government take same action as my government: that is, any action necessary permit Americans leave. This would have been simple, straightforward, natural way solve this problem. His government did not see fit accept this proposal. I did not intend go back over that argument, but delay was due entirely his government's unwillingness accept that reasonable, simple proposal. Of 29 Americans in jail August 1, who [all?] were still there.

20. Wang replied since we now have agreement, question is implementation of agreement. There was no question about fact that measures would be further adopted as provided in agreed announcement. He had made it very clear actions and measures his side had adopted to implement agreement, and they showed that his side was earnestly implementing agreement. This was a matter of common sense used in implementing agreement. He was not a machine like a gramophone to play the same record every time I asked. He wanted to point out clearly that there was no provision in the agreement that any particular individual would depart from China at a certain fixed year, month, day or hour. If we had been able to arrive at an agreement providing for a precise date and hour on which each individual would return, what would have been the use of an agreement of the kind we concluded? This agreement had concerned civilians and not the return of criminals or law offenders. He stated I had said that all Chinese who desired return could. However, how could they return in a matter of weeks? He again requested me for a complete list of names and addresses of

his nationals so that his government could confirm whether those who desired to return could actually do so.

21. He said delay in past during first phase of talks was entirely due my insistence on return these criminals. My insistence and demands contained an element of infringement on his sovereignty. The implementation of the agreement on the return of civilians could never be made an obstacle to the discussion of item two. His side considered this argument was an excuse and a pretext which he interpreted as an attempt at intentional stalling. He could not see why we should again return to our repeated discussion of item one.

22. He said we had come here for talks as a result proposal initiated by our side. Furthermore his side had accepted an agenda which had been proposed by our side. He had come to talks to resolve questions and to make progress. He was not here to further discuss agreement concluded two weeks ago, and he could see no reason for our stalling these talks. He had put forward two topics for discussion under agenda item two. At last meeting I had given my opinion and now he had commented on my opinion. I had said I would discuss practical matters at issue between the two countries and he was prepared to do likewise.

23. I replied he had said something which I wanted to be sure I understood. Was it correct he considered terms of agreed announcement did not apply to persons in prison in his country?

24. Wang said he did not say that agreed announcement did not apply to persons in prison. Agreement concerned return of civilians rather than return of persons who had committed crimes. Cases of latter must necessarily be handled according to Chinese law. It was a matter of course for a sovereign state to deal with these cases, as it also conformed with practice in international law. Any demand that these persons did not come under Chinese law was tantamount to an unequal treaty known as extraterritoriality. A country which could be so humiliated had perished forever.

25. I remarked I simply wanted to say that I had asked what I thought are reasonable questions regarding implementation of agreed announcement. I was sorry I could not say replies I had received had been satisfactory. I had noted UK Charge now being able assume his functions. I hoped at next meeting I would have replies to questions I had raised today.

26. Wang asked if I had any comment regarding his proposals for topics under item two.

27. I said I had no more to say today.

28. Wang asked if I could state whether next time I would be able to comment on his proposals.

29. I replied I had nothing more to say than what I had said already.

30. Wang said he could not consider way these talks are being conducted as satisfactory. Did I mean to say US was not willing to discuss item two?

31. I stated I had not said that. I had made some remarks on subject at last meeting.

32. Wang asked whether then I agreed to enter into discussion item two at next meeting.

33. I asked if he would at next meeting give me answers to questions I had asked him today on implementation.

34. Wang said he had already replied to my questions. He had told me that UK had been formally notified by his government. These talks between the two countries had been initiated by the US. Communique issued by two governments had confirmed the two items for agenda. On August 1 we had agreed on these two items of agenda. At 14th meeting we had reached agreement on first item. Talks should immediately proceed to second item after agreement reached on first. At 15th meeting he had put forward two proposals to discuss under second item. At 16th meeting US side had made observations on one of his two proposals under second item. Today at 17th meeting I had not been willing discuss second item at all. It seemed somewhat farcical to him that such serious talks between our countries should be conducted this way. If we were to go on like this he would have to consider it intentional stalling and wasting of time on our part. If at next meeting US still not in position to discuss item two, his side would have to consider issuing a public unilateral statement to let public opinion pass on this matter.

35. I said I had nothing more to say and suggested we meet again September 28.

36. We agreed on statement for press identical with one issued following last meeting with addition word “continued” paragraph two.

**Shillock**

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228. Telegram 773 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 23, 1955

773. From Johnson.

1. Following is full account Wang's prepared statement referred to in para 4 Mytel 767.

2. He said he was now going to make some observations regarding two points he had raised at 15th meeting. He recalled that at last meeting I had said that his proposal regarding preparations for Sino-American negotiations at a higher level was a procedural and not a substantive matter. He had indicated he could not agree with this position. Now he wished to further clarify point of view of his side.

3. He said it had been stated in July 25 agreed announcement on convening of these talks that they would be conducted "in order to aid in settling matter repatriation civilians who desired return their respective countries and to facilitate further discussions and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between both sides." At outset of talks two items had been agreed upon for agenda on basis July 25 agreed announcement. Obviously item two had never meant to exclude discussion and settling at conference on higher level those practical matters this conference not able to solve. On the contrary it was the function of these talks to make arrangement for practical and physical channels through which these practical matters might be solved. Hence his proposal was consistent with both the agreed announcement of July 25 and the agenda for these talks. It was of very great practical significance to discuss the removal of tension between China and US in Taiwan area. Importance this matter recognized by general public opinion and many important leaders in US. If we had any concrete opinions on relaxing tensions in Taiwan area he certainly would be glad to hear them. When we came to a discussion of agenda item two each side could raise problems it thought should be considered and so we would be free to exchange views. He said I had approved this idea but now nearly two weeks had passed since agreement reached on agreed announcement and, while he had put forward two items for discussion, I had today failed to express any views on them or to put forward any ideas of my government.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2355. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

4. Wang said he could not but feel that this state of affairs was unsatisfactory and he hoped I would put forward concrete views without further delay.

Shillock

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## 229. Telegram 776 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 23, 1955, 6:11 p.m.

776. For Johnson.

Chicom propaganda on international subjects during past week continued stress Communist efforts ease international tensions and gave considerable attention Geneva talks. Peiping states agreement item one welcomed by world opinion as “new event in Sino-US relations.” Nevertheless regarding Geneva talks, Peiping took occasion criticize US on three points. US charged 1) with refusal move on to item two of agenda before implementation of agreement item one; 2) of distorting agreement on item one; and 3) violating agreement procedure releasing news. Peiping asserted these actions perpetrated “with ulterior motives” for purpose “obstructing” talks and “preventing conciliation.”

Regarding first criticism Peiping harped on alleged US violation “normal procedures of international conferences” stating that when agreement reached on item one it “common sense” proceed to item two. US “return” to item one portrayed as contrary to “unanimous wish of peace-loving people” and *Times of India* quoted to effect US stand “may virtually block further progress.” US also accused attempting keep item one open to put pressure on Peiping in conduct domestic matters and prevent further negotiation since US has “5000” Chinese students “return” of whom would require long time.

Criticism two maintained US had stated China would invite UK assist return to US of Americans wishing return to US while US would invite India. Peiping appeared to read into alleged USIS treatment indication US intends not repeat not invite UK and charged US with scheming to stall current talks and “obstruct operation of agreement.”

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2355. Confidential. Drafted by Jacobson; cleared by McConaughy and in IAD.

In third criticism Peiping claimed US had violated agreement news release when US delegation unilaterally on evening after 15th meeting reportedly released statement on "contents of the talks" together with announcement that Johnson regarded it "premature" proceed to item two. Peiping also gave much publicity two topics Chicoms introduced for consideration under item two.

*People's Daily* September 19 published article by one Stetson Kennedy, identified as US writer, on "plight" Chinese students "forcibly detained" in US. Article charged students treated "like criminals" through curtailment movement, "relentless surveillance" and interrogations.

Taiwan receded further in background. Chiang reported forming committee for return of 6,000 students from US in order gain control over students and prevent foreign minister level talks between Chicoms and US.

NCNA publicized "mass airlift exercise recently" of US Air Division, saying US aircraft completed airlift of 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing from Okinawa to "forward bases" on Taiwan. Same report charged US had earlier increased jet fighter force on Taiwan, which now training under "combat simulated conditions."

Commenting on UNGA session *Ta Kung Pao* charged US has compelled UN become tool of its "policy of strength." Paper added UN founded on principle "universal membership" and should be open all countries and that through US "obstruction" 600 million Chinese deprived of "legitimate rights."

Dulles

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## 230. Telegram 777 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 23, 1955, 6:34 p.m.

777. For Johnson.

Chinese departures. In future telegrams this subject code word FEDEP rpt FEDEP will mean cumulative total as of given date of confirmed departures Chinese nationals destined Far East since July 11.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2355. Official Use Only. Drafted by Nagoski; cleared in substance by Newton (Telegraph Branch).



Code word ALDEP rpt ALDEP will refer total for all destinations. Latter figure to continue FYI at your discretion.

As of September 23, FEDEP 378. ALDEP 721.

Dulles

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**231. Telegram USITO 51 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 23, 1955, 6:36 p.m.

USITO 51. Joint State-USIA Message. For Johnson and Garnish.

View criticalness Geneva talks, Garnish stories for wireless file will be accepted here as definitive subjected no editing that may distort meaning on understanding clearance Ambassador Johnson obtained all items filed on Talks.

Streibert

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2355. Confidential. Drafted by Meiklejohn; cleared in USIA by Hutchinson, Zorthian, and Stephens and by Lindbeck, and McConaughy.

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**232. Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 23, 1955

SUBJECT

Conversations with Senator George and Congressman Richards

I visited Senator George at his office in Vienna, Georgia, on the 21st and had luncheon with Congressman Richards here in Washington on the 22nd. Memoranda of the conversations are attached.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2355. Secret. Drafted by Robertson. The attachments are printed as Documents 215 and 222.

I briefed them both in detail on the subject of our talks with the Red Chinese in Geneva. I explained the positions we had taken up to the present and planned to take in the future. Both gentlemen expressed unqualified approval of the course we were following. Both stated that in their opinion we should not proceed to a discussion of "practical matters" under item 2 until we were satisfied that our jailed citizens in China had been notified of their rights under the agreement of September 10th and further that the British Chargé in Peiping had been allowed personal communication with them.

They both agreed that we should insist that the Communists carry out their agreement for the discussion of "practical matters" at issue at the Ambassadorial level. Both agreed that the renunciation of force was a proper subject for discussion under item 2.

Senator George emphasized that we should not consider a conference between you and Chou En-lai until the Communists had publicly renounced the use of force in the settlement of the Formosa problem. I inferred from Congressman Richards' conversation that he did not consider that a foreign ministers conference was called for under any conditions.

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### **233. Letter 15 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 15

Washington, September 23, 1955

Dear Alex:

The threat of hurricane Ione caused the last courier plane to leave Washington ahead of schedule and knocked out our September 19 pouch. Hence the long interval.

Despite the uncertainty as to when you will get into the substance of Item Two, we are going ahead with work on our two items. Bill Godel and Kelleher of Defense have worked up a draft letter from you to Wang on the 450 missing servicemen which they are to submit to us for our comments today. They say it is a forthright and fairly strong presentation although it carefully avoids alleging that we have evidence that any of the men are presently alive and in Communist hands. Enclosed is a memo on this subject which we received from Defense

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

on the 16th. We understand this was drafted by Godel and it does not accord in every respect with what Col. Monro, the Defense Prisoner Officer, had told us the day before.

On the “renunciation of force”, we expect to work up a brief study with the assistance of Mr. Phleger. It will be based on the thinking of the Secretary which has been reflected in a number of his speeches and conversations. It was touched on lightly in his UNGA speech yesterday. We will follow this line closely but will try to elaborate somewhat on it. The Secretary read the latter half of your letter No. 7, when we briefed him and received new guidance from him at his home on September 18 right after his return from Duck Island. So the Secretary is aware of the general nature of your forebodings about the “no force” issue. In general we attach more weight than you apparently have so far to the commitment we have from the GRC in the Exchange of Notes of Dec. 10 pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. Admittedly this commitment has not prevented and will not prevent minor sea, air and artillery incidents. But these are mere pin pricks which are going to have to be considered as something which must be lived with in the present situation. We must look to the central issue which is major invocation of force for a general offensive purpose. On this we have commitment from the Nationalists which ties in with our own renunciation. We believe this should give you a somewhat stronger position than you have recognized. But admittedly you would have to develop a tactic for brushing aside the small incidents as trivial and inevitable, as not essentially bearing on the central issue.

Mr. Robertson flew to Georgia to see Senator George on Sept. 21 and had a long luncheon talk with Cong. Richards yesterday. Both talks were extremely satisfactory. They both expressed the very emphatic view that we should not be drawn into any substantive discussions of Item Two until all Americans have been informed of their right to return and given access to the British Charge. Sen. George felt that the position on a Foreign Ministers Conference attributed to him in the newspapers on September 12 was inaccurate. He said that he had never unequivocally advocated a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in the present situation. He felt that the talks should be continued at the Ambassadorial level which is appropriate for all the pending questions. He felt that in no event should a high level meeting be considered so long as the PRC has not renounced the use of force.

It will be a great help to us to get Ralph Clough back here. We expect to send his orders as soon as we can line up an able officer from Geneva or nearby post to help you on a part time basis. We would expect him to take the notes at the meeting and help draft the reports

afterwards. We may have to rely on some of our friends to help us out in view of the acute personnel shortage at all our Swiss posts.

Army and Defense are working on the Ekvall problem. They are wondering how they can maintain the present basis, much less improve the basis. But we hope to work it out.

Your letter No. 8 of Sept. 15 came on the 21st. Our telegram 745 would seem to answer the points raised in the first paragraph on page two of your letter.

I know of no disposition to change the basic trade policy at this time. Undoubtedly other countries are going to raise the question of multilateral relaxation in the CG and COCOM meetings next month. Admiral Delaney and Bob Barnett are already in London for a preparatory discussion. Our position on the multilateral issue has not yet been passed on by the highest level, and there may be a little more flexibility than on the domestic total embargo policy.

Our FE/P are looking into the matter of the objectionable Sept. 12 radio bulletin put out by USIA. I don't know how they got off base on this, but we intend to find out. I am enclosing a study prepared by Jacobson of DRF on "Reactions in Chinese Communities to the Geneva Announcements".

We were interested in the Peking Opera and the New York Philharmonic items. Mr. Robertson read your entire letter with interest.

Regards and good wishes,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Defense Memo on Missing Servicemen.
2. DRF Memo on Reactions in Chinese Communities to Geneva Announcements.

**234. Telegram 7 from Geneva to Hong Kong<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 26, 1955, 5 p.m.

7. From Johnson.

Nicholson, American Red Cross, would appreciate information from you and/or Tomlin on whether American civilians recently released from prison report having received packages transmitted at Hong Kong through Red Cross channels.

**Shillock**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2655. Official Use Only. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 775.

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**235. Telegram 777 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 26, 1955, 5 p.m.

777. From Johnson.

1. Reference para 8 Mytel 770 following is draft of suggested statement to be issued here by “US spokesman” under circumstances set forth that para. Statement might, of course, require some revision in light developments at meeting but it would be important it be issued immediately following any statement by Wang.

2. “The present series of talks between Ambassador Wang and Ambassador Johnson were undertaken on the initiative of the United States Government in the hope that this might bring about the release of the Americans still detained in mainland China and thus provide basis for discussing and settling other practical matters at issue between the two sides. After more than five weeks of discussion, an agreed announcement was issued on September 10, in which the PRC publicly acknowledged that Americans in the PRC who desired to return to the US were entitled to do so and committed itself to adopt further appropriate measures ‘so that these persons could expeditiously exercise their right to return’. In the same announcement, the PRC also set

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2655. Secret; Limited Distribution.

forth certain functions which representatives of the UK in the PRC were to undertake with respect to the departure of Americans who desired to return to the US.

3. "The United States Government hoped and expected that this clear commitment by the PRC would be promptly and faithfully implemented and that the talks could then immediately proceed to the discussion of the other practical matters in accordance with the statement of July 25 issued by the US Government and PRC. Unfortunately, although nearly three weeks have passed since the issuance of the agreed announcement, nineteen Americans still remain imprisoned in the PRC and the PRC has refused to give any indication when they may be able to return. This raises serious question as to how the PRC interprets its commitment to allow these persons to 'expeditiously exercise their right to return.'

4. "The United States Government is also concerned because it has not been possible, up to the present time, even to learn whether and how the PRC is implementing its undertaking to arrange for the United Kingdom to assist the return of Americans. It was not until September 23, or 13 days after the issuance of the announcement, the US was informed by the PRC that the UK had been enabled to undertake its functions in the PRC. Furthermore, despite continued requests, the PRC still declines to confirm whether all jailed Americans have even been informed of the terms of the agreed announcement and whether they will be granted access to the UK representative in the PRC. It is particularly difficult to understand this situation in the light of Mr. Chou En-lai's statement just prior the opening of these talks to the effect that it would be easy to resolve the problem of Americans in the PRC.

5. "The fact is that today—more than 8 weeks since the start of the talks—only one-third of the jailed Americans have been released.

6. "The United States Government, for its part, not only reiterated in the agreed announcement its previous assurance that Chinese in the US who desire to return to the PRC are free to do so, but also promptly arranged for the GOI to undertake the functions set forth in the announcement. The PRC has been kept currently informed of all steps being taken by the US Government in this regard.

7. "The US continues to hope that the PRC will, for its part, quickly take steps to implement its commitments so that these talks may promptly move on to the discussion of other practical matters".

**Shillock**

**236. Telegram 4 from USUN to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 26, 1955, 11 p.m.

4. For Johnson.

Your 770. Following instructions for your September 28 meeting have been personally cleared with the Secretary in New York.

1. You are to conduct discussions so that no legitimate basis given for other side to break them off.

2. You should continue pressing implementation agenda item one, pointing out failure to give information to Americans, etc., as disclosed Hong Kong's 66 to Geneva and lack action remaining detained Americans.

3. We note with satisfaction your refutation Wang's attempt to contend that imprisoned Americans not included agreed announcement. Announcement applies to all (repeat all) American civilians without distinction and Communists must be held absolutely to this.

4. After covering implementation item 1 you can proceed to discuss subjects for listing item two. You should note as subject we propose (a) accounting for US military personnel and (b) renunciation of use of force in Taiwan area. Continue maintain position high level talks out of order on grounds set forth our 745. After discussion as to items for listing agenda item 2 further consideration should then be put over until next meeting, set as far in future as possible.

5. By separate telegram we are sending you substance statements on accounting for military personnel and renunciation use of force. Request your comments. These designed for use subsequent meetings but could be used on emergency basis this meeting if you believe break imminent.

6. With respect to Wang's item "question of embargo", you are authorized to accept it for listing, provided he accepts our items, and subject to condition that item "renunciation of force" has priority.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2655. Secret; Priority; Repeated to the Department of State as telegram Dulte 1.

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**237. Telegram 779 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 27, 1955, 11 a.m.

779. From Johnson.

1. Greatly appreciate instructions contained New York's 4 repeated Dept Dulte 1.

2. With respect second sentence para 4 suggest "possible presence in PRC of missing US military personnel" for listing missing US military personnel item.

3. This would be consistent with form presentation this subject I discussed while in Washington and with Hammarskjold (Mytel 257).

4. While I have not yet received statements mentioned para 5, New York's 4, believe that demand for "accounting" open to following objections:

A. Question of "accounting" is primarily between UN and Communist commands in Korea and thus subject for MAC.

B. Raising question as "accounting" gives CHICOMS opportunity of rejecting question on foregoing grounds as not properly "practical question" involving only US and PRC or introducing here our accounting for 21,000 Chinese.

C. Our raising question as "accounting" in these talks tends weaken our position on UN character command in Korea and by making one aspect Korean armistice implementation subject of US-PRC bilateral conversations.

5. It seems to me type of presentation I have in mind which is forecast by form I propose for listing not subject foregoing objections.

6. With reference para 6 New York's 4 it will be difficult for me maintain position priority for both our subjects over only PRC subject we willing accept. While I would of course do so in initial presentation do not see how I will be able maintain priority for "renunciation of force" over "embargo" unless I concede lower position to "missing military personnel".

7. Would appreciate Department's comments and instruction prior to tomorrow's meeting.

**Shillock**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2755. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution.



**238. Telegram 780 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 27, 1955, noon

780. From Johnson.

1. Nicholson AmRedCross who is here for League Executive Committee meeting called on me yesterday. He said CHICOMS as well as Soviet bloc delegations were here in full force exuding sweetness and light. Soviet delegation was attempting “team up” with US group and suggesting “close cooperation”.

2. He mentioned to me possibility some resolution on Commie holding prisoners as political hostages. Told him I could not speak for Department on general subject but with respect CHICOMS suggested most useful line for him in and out of meetings would be concentrate on welfare aspects such as packages, mail etc., where CHICOM performance very unsatisfactory and matter was direct and immediate Red Cross concern. Explained to him why I had not done so. Thought it would be useful for him do so both from standpoint improving plight remaining prisoners and offsetting pious expressions by CHICOM Red Cross group.

3. Also spoke to him concerning Czech attitude toward US on distribution flood relief grain last year.

4. He expressed appreciation my offer see and consult with him as he considered desirable.

**Shillock**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2755. Confidential.

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**239. Telegram 784 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 27, 1955, 4 p.m.

784. From Johnson.

1. Frederic C. Harnden, Shanghai representative, First National City Bank of New York is as far as I know only remaining foreigner

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2755. Confidential. Repeated to London as telegram 558.

Communist China prevented from leaving at least in part because of unsettled Communist claims against American company.

If Department approves, I believe it might strengthen Harnden's chances of receiving an exit permit if I mentioned his case to Wang during a meeting in near future when atmosphere is reasonably good.

2. I would point out that cases of a number of American businessmen had been settled recently, permitting their departure; that while he was a British subject and therefore not strictly our responsibility, he represented an American bank and we felt a certain obligation to bring his case to the attention of the PRC; and that it was hoped he might be shown the same consideration in speedy handling of his case as others had received in recent weeks. I would add I did not expect that Wang and I should get into a discussion of details of case, but would hope he could simply convey our interest to his government.

3. I have received a second request to take up Harnden's case from Carl Hayden, Vice President of the First National City Bank in London. Suggest Department consult UK before advising me on action it believes I should take.

**Gowen**

#### **240. Telegram Dulte 3 from USUN<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 27, 1955, 6 p.m.

Dulte 3. Regarding Geneva 790 following is proposed as Niact cable to Johnson: BEGIN TEXT. For Johnson.

Text statement sent you 790 about request for accounting US Military personnel was drafted by Defense, and has not been cleared by Department. Opening paragraph reciting that Department cleared is in error. Statement will require further consideration and conferences with Defense and draft sent you should not (repeat not) be used. You should propose "accounting for US Military personnel" as one of subjects for listing Agenda item 2 leaving until later meeting more precise formulation regarding which we will further advise you. Request your comments Defense draft.

END TEXT.

**Dulles**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2755. Secret; Niact.

**241. Telegram 789 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 27, 1955, 10:36 a.m.

789. Verbatim text. For Johnson.

New York's 4, paragraph 5. Following is text of statement on renunciation use of force:

"One of the practical matters for discussion between us is that we should reciprocally renounce the use of force to achieve our policies when they conflict. The U.S. and the PRC confront each other with policies which are in certain respects incompatible. This fact need not, however, mean armed conflict, and the most important single thing we can do is first of all to be sure that it will not lead to armed conflict.

Then and only then can other matters causing tension between the parties in the Taiwan area and the Far East be hopefully discussed.

It is not suggested that either of us should renounce any policy objectives which we consider we are legitimately entitled to achieve, but only that we renounce the use of force to implement these policies.

Neither of us wants to negotiate under the threat of force. The free discussion of differences, and their fair and equitable solution, become impossible under the overhanging threat that force may be resorted to when one party does not agree with the other.

The United States as a member of the United Nations has agreed to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force. This has been its policy for many years and is its guiding principle of conduct in the Far East, as throughout the world.

The use of force to achieve national objectives does not accord with accepted standards of conduct under international law.

The Government of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Treaties, and the Charter of the United Nations reflect the universal view of the civilized community of nations that the use of force as an instrument of national policy violates international law, constitutes a threat to international peace, and prejudices the interests of the entire world community.

There are in the world today many situations which tempt those who have force to use it to achieve what they believe to be legitimate policy objectives. Many countries are abnormally divided or contain what some consider to be abnormal intrusions. Nevertheless, the responsible governments of the world have in each of these cases

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2755. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Phleger and McConaughy; statement revised and approved by Dulles.

renounced the use of force to achieve what they believe to be legitimate and even urgent goals.

It is an essential foundation and preliminary to the success of the discussions under Item 2 that it first be made clear that the parties to these discussions renounce the use of force to make the policies of either prevail over those of the other. That particularly applies to the Taiwan area.

The acceptance of this principle does not involve third parties, or the justice or injustice of conflicting claims. It only involves recognizing and agreeing to abide by accepted standards of international conduct.

We ask, therefore, as a first matter for discussion under Agenda Item 2, assurance that your side will not resort to the use of force in the Taiwan area except defensively. The U.S. would be prepared to give a corresponding assurance. These reciprocal assurances will make it appropriate for us to pass on to the discussion of other matters with a better hope of coming to constructive conclusions."

**Hoover**

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#### **242. Telegram 790 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 27, 1955, 12:52 p.m.

790. For Johnson.

New York's 4, paragraph 5. Following is text of statement which has been cleared with Defense regarding unaccounted for American military personnel.

"On July 16, 1952, the Foreign Minister of the PRC notified the Swiss Government that the Government of the PRC had decided to recognize the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on Treatment of Prisoners of War.

"On July 27, 1953, the responsible leaders of the communist forces in Korea signed the Armistice Agreement which resulted in the cessation of hostilities in Korea and provided clear agreement on the handling of prisoners of war, including the specific requirement of each side to furnish a full and complete accounting on all

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2755. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated Niact to USUN as telegram Tedul 5. Drafted by Godel (Defense) and Osborn; cleared by Godel in draft, McConaughy, and Sebald.

prisoners of war and deceased combatants of which either side had any knowledge.

“The terms of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War and the solemn obligations accruing to the communist forces in Korea under the Armistice Agreement have, in part, been ignored and violated by those forces and by your government during the intervening period.

“September 27, 1955, was the second anniversary of the final date established by the Armistice Agreement for the delivery and accounting of all personnel captured as a result of the Korean War. The UN Command in accordance with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war has rendered a full accounting of all prisoners of war and deceased combatants of which it has knowledge. Your Government, however, has continued to hold personnel who were so captured.

“I hand you herewith a list of 450 names comprised exclusively of persons who have spoken over the communist radio, have been referred to in communist broadcasting, have been actually listed by the communist side as being captives, have written letters from communist prison camps, have been seen in communist prisons, or have been seen in communist territory, either in China or in North Korea.

“I therefore reiterate the previous demands made upon your government to render an accounting forthwith of American military personnel on this list and of any others known to you.”

New York note that any changes which Secretary and Phleger may wish to make should be wired Niact direct Johnson.

Hoover

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#### 243. Telegram 797 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 27, 1955, 9:26 p.m.

797. For Johnson.

Your 777. Suggested text approved for use in contingency stated with changes noted below:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2655. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Osborn.

Change last clause in first sentence, paragraph two to read QUOTE and thus facilitate discussion and settlement of other practical matters at issue between the two sides UNQUOTE.

Change figure in latter part second sentence paragraph 3 to read eighteen instead of nineteen.

FYI Our records show only eighteen actually in jail following departure all ten named September 10 list.

**Hoover**

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#### **244. Telegram 798 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 27, 1955

798. For Johnson. Deptel 790.

Statement based on Defense draft about which Department still has some reservations. Statement will require further consideration and conferences with Defense and draft sent you should not repeat not be used. You should propose QUOTE Accounting for U.S. Personnel UNQUOTE as one of subjects for listing Agenda Item 2 leaving until later meeting more precise formulation regarding which we will further advise you. You may concede lower priority on agenda for this topic in your discretion. Request your comments on statement.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2755. Secret, Niact, Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN as telegram Tedul 7. Drafted by McConaughy based on telephone conversation with Phleger and on telegram Dulte 3 (Document 240).

**245. Telegram 790 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 28, 1955, 4 p.m.

790. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened this morning's meeting with long prepared statement to effect agreed announcement completed agenda item one, we were entangling agenda items one and two, if our intent was delay discussion agenda item two until all remaining Americans released "this sure to fail", will not submit to threats, etc., etc., suggested if we had any "specific opinion" on implementation announcement PRC willing give consideration and that discussion thereof be referred to assistants. Will inform UK results of reviews as completed. Criticism US implementation, 76 who applied for departure whose names we previously gave him 42 not yet returned, none has returned who left since beginning of talks, knows of no one who has left US to return to China except Tsien, students fearful to apply for departure, etc. Our attitude will "impair the improvement of Sino-American relations and is bound to have a bad effect on our lenient way of solving the problem remaining Americans".

2. I replied with long statement stating no need spend much time on these subjects if he would give me straightforward answers to my straightforward and simple questions on implementation, unless were willing to keep each other fully informed on implementation will be difficult to make progress discussion other matters, implementation too important to leave to assistants, then refuted his statements on Chinese students in US, welcomed statement they willing give consideration suggestions on implementation, pointed out my repeated questions this regard, repeated them and also reframed as suggestions asking for specific replies, in referring statement on threats said I could not understand how my questions on implementation could be interpreted as threats, he could be certain we would not respond to threats, PRC should be absolutely clear we not willing trade fate remaining persons for political concessions. Three weeks since agreed announcement and not one of 19 yet released, our concern increases with passage of time no information on this vital point, only prompt full and faithful implementation announcement can dispose agenda item one, only implementation words of announcement can dispose of problem return of Americans, until this accomplished first item of agenda remains first

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2855. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.

order of business, have returned to it today and will continue to return to it as long as questions remain.

3. I then took note of fact 10 imprisoned Americans arrived in Hong Kong and some of 12 had also arrived and in expectation PRC will act expeditiously with remaining 19 and further effort demonstrate our desire talks should progress, desired discuss with him today topics which we should discuss under agenda item two. Referred my rejection of higher level meeting and put forward two subjects "renunciation of use of force for achievement national objectives" and "accounting for US personnel". Consider renunciation of force of fundamental importance to discussion agenda item two, should therefore be discussed before economic embargo. Therefore suggested subjects in order of (a) accounting US personnel (b) renunciation of force and (c) economic embargo.

4. In reply Wang reiterated previous points on implementation and then referring my suggestion renunciation of force as topic read short prepared statement which was largely non sequitur in terms of what I had said but repeated usual Communist line "not wanting war with US, PRC had renounced force in international relations, tension in Formosa Straits, caused by presence US forces" etc. All this could be resolved only by higher level meeting. Expressed puzzlement by what I meant under subject "accounting for US personnel", said thought this taken care of under agenda item one.

5. In reply I returned to implementation repeating my questions and again also reframing as suggestions asking for reply next meeting. Then briefly discussed higher level meeting repeating previous position and adding his proposal indicated pessimism which I did not share on what two of us should be able to accomplish. Pointed out I had presented our two items in as neutral terms as possible and would be prepared subsequently discuss them.

6. He then stated prepared to continue discussion next meeting but wanted to make clear had not committed himself on subjects or their order. I agreed and he accepted my proposal for Wednesday, October 5 for next meeting.

7. He tried hard obtain press communique omitting reference to discussion implementation agreed announcement but we finally agreed upon communique identical with that of last meeting. He said would not regard this as precedent for communique next meeting.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copy to Mr. McConaughy (CA) 12:30 p.m. 9/28/55  
CWO/FED



**246. Telegram 791 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 28, 1955, 3 p.m.

791. From Johnson.

1. Today's meeting left situation in very satisfactorily confused state with respect agenda item two which should provide considerable scope for further discussion. Wang was not prepared for type of approach I made to subject and was obviously confused as to what I meant by item on "accounting for US personnel." (Part of difficulty was there is no satisfactory Chinese term for "accounting" in sense we have used it here.)

2. In absence decision on our part concerning form of presentation this subject I avoided any effort enlighten him which would have required my entering into substantive aspects. I simply said it was quite different from what we had been discussing under agenda item one and he did not press me further. However, by next meeting he will be certain to have connected this with our previous public statements on subject and be prepared to handle.

3. He was prepared to handle statement from me on renunciation of force which included an attack on CHICOM policies, was somewhat nonplussed that I did not make any such statement but felt he had to say something.

4. As sidelight NCNA correspondent told other correspondents while meeting was going on that "if there was no progress" CHICOMS would have public statement and US would probably also have one. Thus appears they were fully prepared for public debate although probably not break and were forestalled by our tactics.

5. Will subsequently submit recommendations for handling next meeting.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copy to Mr. McConaughy (CA) 12:30 p.m. 9/28/55  
CWO/FED.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2855. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

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**247. Telegram 793 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 28, 1955

793. From Johnson.

1. I am strongly opposed to general approach as well as entire tone of draft statement contained Deptel 790. It might be useful as public propaganda document, I might well use some of the material it contains in the give and take of debate, but as an initial approach to subject it cannot produce any favorable results. It could only result in a retrogression to Panmunjom rhetoric which I have thus far been successful in avoiding here and prejudice attainment of our other objectives in these talks.

2. As suggested para 4 Mytel 777 it seems to me that to base our approach primarily on implementation of armistice logically leads opening other aspects of armistice and starting us down a road on which armistice tends become bilateral PRC-US matter rather than UN matter.

3. Subject is at best difficult handle constructively but it seems to me that type of approach I have had in mind less subject to foregoing difficulties. We know some of 450 as well as others subsequently released at Panmunjom were at one time in PRC, we know Downey and Fecteau were produced after long months of silence, it is perfectly natural and clearly a bilateral PRC-US matter to ask whether any of 450 are now in territory under their control or whether they know anything about them.

4. Will submit draft for Department's approval.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2855. Secret; Limited Distribution.

**248. Telegram 794 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 28, 1955

794. From Johnson.

1. I feel statement on renunciation of force contained Deptel 789 is truly outstanding and if Department agrees would like hand Wang copy when it is made.

2. Presume Department recognizes that in context at moment reference to "other matters" in last sentence will insofar as PRC concerned suggest economic embargo. While we have rejected discussion higher level meeting it may nevertheless carry some implication in this regard as well. Am not suggesting any change but only pointing out implication I believe statement will carry for PRC.

3. Depending on outcome our discussion on order subjects under agenda item two first portion first sentence last paragraph might require slight revision.

4. Although I will subsequently submit suggestions on handling next meeting my present inclination is to take advantage of any opportunity I might have at that meeting to make this statement in context of supporting priority for discussion this subject.

5. For my background only would appreciate being informed whether Department envisions suggested assurances might follow pattern of "agreed announcement."

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2855. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

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249. Telegram 795 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 28, 1955, 9 p.m.

795. From Johnson.

1. At 18th meeting lasting one hour 20 minutes today Wang opened with long, prepared statement. He said that after reaching agreement on first item of agenda more than half month had passed. In accordance with suggestion our side he had tabled two subjects for discussion under agenda item two: 1) question of embargo, 2) preparations for Sino-American negotiations at a higher level. However, our side was still "entangling" talks on agenda item one. We had failed present our position on his points and also failed present our concrete views on subjects to be discussed under "practical matters." This position of ours he considered entirely unsatisfactory.

2. He said I had mentioned at last meeting provision in agreed announcement that our governments would "adopt appropriate measures" to enable persons return their countries. I had also raised question those Americans who had violated laws in China. I had expressed hope his government would act promptly to implement this provision so that we could in our talks enter promptly upon discussion agenda item two. Had I meant to imply by these statements that only when all Americans had been released would we discuss and settle the questions under item two? If this were so, his side could not agree to it. In discussion on return of civilians he had repeatedly stated that cases Americans must be dealt with individually and in accordance with Chinese juridical processes taking into account the seriousness of the individual offenses. Only in a state of improved relations between our two countries could his government make its lenient policy toward the law-breaking Americans more lenient. He had made these statements formally and they were in the record of meeting and only after they had been made was agreement reached on agenda item one. Furthermore, during the discussion I had "demanded" release of all Americans in China within specified time. He had categorically rejected this demand as infringement on China's sovereignty, this had been formally entered in record of meeting, and only after that had agreement been reached.

3. He said now agreement had been reached and no use to go back over that discussion. His side would faithfully implement agreement. But to use implementation of agreed announcement as excuse to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2855. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

obstruct discussion and settlement of practical matters under agenda item two would not result in any good, but rather do harm. Peoples Republic of China was not going to be brought into submission by whatever threat we might make.

4. Agreement on item one had been reached and at that time he had provided specific information on Americans who would be permitted to leave and on law violators whose cases had been reviewed. Those Americans permitted to depart had personal affairs to attend to and they could leave at their discretion, as some had already left. All 10 who had violated laws and were to have been sent out of the country had left. Since beginning of talks 33 Americans had returned or were going to return as result action his side. Remaining handful Americans who had violated laws would have their cases reviewed in light of agreement and within framework of Chinese juridical procedure. Results of review their cases would be given UK.

5. He continued that there was no justification for entangling talks over question Chinese implementation of agreement. On contrary our side should make active efforts implement agreement. During talks I had given him names 76 Chinese who had applied depart US but not permitted do so. 42 of these had not yet returned. Although our side had said all restrictions removed, nevertheless he knew of no one else who had left US to return to China except Tsien. I had said between July 11 and September 21, 380 Chinese left US, but I had failed submit list of names so PRC had no means making check. I had admitted Chinese students afraid apply INS for permission leave US because feared being rejected. Evidently many Chinese still do not have courage apply to depart because of long period threats and intimidation. PRC had great number of nationals in US and whether they could exercise right to return would be test whether US faithfully implementing agreement. Up to now PRC had not seen any actual outcome from all my statements.

6. He said I was still trying entangle talks on first item and hamper discussion of second item. Frankly, such an approach impaired improvement of Sino-American relations and was bound to have bad effect on lenient way PRC solving problem remaining Americans.

7. He said I had raised detailed questions last meeting on functions of third powers under agreement. These functions were clearly set forth in agreed announcement, but if I wished put forward specific opinions on details of functions, and if opinions reasonable, he would consider them. He suggested that such specific opinions on implementation agreed announcement be reserved for meeting of assistants so as not to interfere with discussion second item in these talks. People in all countries in world unanimously called for discussion second item agenda immediately following agreement on first thereby contributing

to easing tensions and improving relations between two countries. He had put forward two subjects for discussion: lifting of embargo was demand voiced by many countries, and preparation for Sino-American negotiations at higher level was desired by people many countries as well as by high officials of US. He hoped we could enter upon discussion these problems without delay and he would be glad to hear any positive views I might put forward on agenda item two.

8. I replied I pleased note his statement he would consider any specific opinion we wished put forward regarding implementation announcement. In previous meetings I had put forward a few simple questions on implementation which carried with them clear implication of suggestions. I did not want any more than he did to spend our time on these subjects and I did not think we need do so. Questions I had previously asked were simple and straightforward and they required only simple and straightforward answers. Unless we were willing to keep each other fully and frankly informed on steps our governments had taken it was going to be very difficult to discuss successfully other matters. I thought these matters too important to be referred to our assistants, but hoped we could quickly complete their discussion between the two of us.

9. I said he had mentioned certain matters regarding our implementation of agreed announcement upon which I wished to comment briefly. He said I had admitted students in US afraid make application to depart. I could not imagine what statement I had made which could be so interpreted and I rejected that implication from any statements I may have made. He stated some students did not have courage now apply depart but I could not see what he referred to, because it was not necessary for them to make application to any government agency to depart. In addition, arrangement with Indian Government in full effect and any student had full right communicate with Embassy GOI if he thought his right depart being interfered with. He had spoken of list I gave him of 76 Chinese against whom restraining orders had been lifted and said 42 of 76 not yet returned. I did not know of any Chinese in US who desired to return who was now prevented from doing so. I had no information whether any of 42 had postponed their departure or had changed their minds. Maybe, as had been said in NCNA broadcast September 20, some these Chinese wanted postpone departure in order complete work or studies in US. Whatever reason, basic fact was Chinese in US free to do what they wished. If there were other aspects our implementation of announcement he wished discuss I would certainly be glad discuss with him.

10. I said one question I had raised previous meeting concerned ability Americans imprisoned to learn of terms agreed announcement. I had understood from him there were arrangements for reading and

translating newspapers to persons in prison and that they would thus learn of terms of agreed announcement. I asked simply for confirmation that this had been done. My concern this regard had increased because learned most Americans recently released either did not hear about or received only fragmentary account of terms agreed announcement. One American recently released who had heard of agreed announcement was refused his request see full text. Therefore, framing matter in terms he had suggested this morning, I wished suggest his government confirm to me whether or not in fact each individual American in prison had been fully and specifically informed of terms agreed announcement.

11. I said another question I had raised was simply whether Americans would be permitted to communicate with or otherwise have access to UK Charge, and particularly if he would be able interview them in accordance with terms agreed announcement if my government wanted facts in case investigated. Again framing this question as specific suggestion in accordance his proposal, I wanted specifically ask that this be done. I had hoped at this meeting he would give me specific answers to these two questions which were perfectly simple and straightforward.

12. I said most important of all I wished ask again what steps his government taken to enable remaining 19 imprisoned Americans expeditiously exercise their right return. He had said his government would not be forced into taking action by means of threats. I did not understand why he interpreted my statement on this matter as threat. I had not during these talks ever made any threat and I did not intend to do so. Certain statements had been made in agreed announcement and I was merely asking for information on how they were being implemented. Equally, he could be certain that I would not respond to threats. I had made clear and wanted to repeat, I was not willing trade fate these persons in prison for political concessions on our part. I wanted make entirely clear that any thought on part his government of delaying release these prisoners in order obtain political concessions was doomed to failure.

13. I added that I had never said that only when all Americans were released would I enter into discussion agenda item two; I merely asked how agreed announcement was being implemented. It seemed to me that delay by his government in implementing agreed announcement with respect release these Americans was inevitably entangling these two subjects. There certainly was no intent or desire on my part to entangle them. Nearly three weeks had passed since announcement issued and not one of remaining 19 persons had been released. It was perfectly natural my government's concern increased with passage of time and no information on this vital point.

14. I said only prompt, full and faithful implementation agreed announcement could dispose of agenda item one. Self evident that words of announcement in themselves dispose of nothing. Only implementation of words in announcement could dispose of problem return of Americans. Until this accomplished I had to continue consider that first item agenda remained our first order of business. I had returned to it and would continue return to it as long as there remained question with respect implementation agreed announcement.

15. I said I had, however, taken note of fact that 10 Americans whose release he informed me of September 10 had arrived Hong Kong and that some of 12 Americans whose exit permits he had promised had also departed. Therefore, in expectation his government would act expeditiously on remaining 19 Americans and thus dispose of agenda item one, and in further effort demonstrate my government's earnest desire these talks should progress I desired today to discuss with him topics we should discuss under agenda item two.

16. I said he had proposed two subjects one of which my government considered procedural matter which could not be considered practical matter at issue between our two countries. My government desired put forward two subjects: one was "renunciation of use of force for achievement of national objectives" and other was "accounting for US personnel."

17. Wang asked for repetition subject headings and then asked what we had in mind under second heading.

18. I replied we would get to that when we discussed the topic. I then continued by saying my government considered subject of renunciation force of fundamental importance to our discussions under agenda item two and that this subject should therefore be discussed before subject he termed economic embargo. I suggested we agree to discuss subjects each had raised in following order: (a) accounting for US personnel, (b) renunciation use of force for achievement national objectives, and (c) economic embargo.

19. Wang replied he had made it clear many times his side willing implement faithfully agreement under agenda item one and his side certainly would do things according to agreement. It provided that agreed announcement should be given wide publicity, object of which was to inform everyone about it, and PRC was giving wide publicity in this manner. If I had concrete opinions on agreed announcement, provided they were reasonable, he suggested assistants both sides hold meeting to discuss them. In past US had taken steps detain and obstruct departure Chinese students and these measures had left deep impression on minds of students. Therefore, in future necessary US in fact



faithfully implement provisions agreed announcement so that these persons could in fact freely return to homeland.

20. Wang said he had clearly stated many times principles governing handling by his government of cases 19 Americans who had committed crimes. If US Government refused respect Chinese law and insisted on unconditional return these persons this idea doomed failure and would never succeed.

21. Then referring frequently to prepared statement Wang said topic he suggested on preparations for higher level meeting was not procedural matter but most important matter of substance in relations of two countries. He could not agree to removal of subject from agenda. Regarding our proposal on so-called renunciation of force he said his government fully endorsed principle no recourse to force or threat of force in international relations. China did not intend to resort to force against US or any other state. State of tension in Taiwan area was not at all caused by Chinese threat use force against US. Tension on contrary was caused by US use force against Chinese territory of Taiwan. Therefore, in line with the principle of non-recourse to force the point in question was not one to be solved by declaration by Chinese not to use force against its own territory, but rather by removal of US forces from Chinese territory, China had not made withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan a prerequisite for Sino-American conversations on easing tensions in Taiwan area as that would have blocked efforts to have negotiations.

22. He said he did not deny that tense situation in Taiwan area might lead to extremely grave danger of conflict between China and US. It was precisely for this reason he had proposed that our talks should make preparations for convening conference at higher level. Major problem of easing and limiting tension between China and the US should be discussed at higher level. In this conference at higher level both sides should raise questions which could be discussed to ease tensions in Taiwan area.

23. Wang said my second subject of “accounting for US personnel” had been dealt with under agenda item one and, therefore, there was no point in raising again so-called accounting for Americans. Moreover, they had at very beginning of talks given full list of all Americans in China so there was no point at all in having a continuous accounting on Americans in China.

24. I said that I had put forward what he had termed concrete opinions regarding the implementation of the announcement. First suggestion I made was that he should confirm that 19 remaining Americans be given full text agreed announcement in language they understood. Second suggestion was that we be assured arrangements established so 19 could communicate or otherwise have access to UK Charge. Third suggestion was that, if in accordance terms agreed announcement US wanted facts investigated, UK Charge would be permitted interview

these Americans who desired return. I hoped at next meeting he could give me definite answers on these suggestions. I believed it could be done quickly and need not involve our assistants. I added if he had any specific questions or suggestions regarding US implementation agreed announcement I certainly would be glad consider them. I hoped his suggestions would be concrete and specific, as mine had been.

25. I said I found it difficult understand his position regarding discussion of higher level meeting. I could not see how higher level meeting in itself was practical matter between our governments. Both our governments had agreed to have the two of us meet here as representatives of our respective governments to discuss "practical matters" as second part our talks. It seemed to me his suggestion meant that we had decided, even before we had discussed these questions, that it was not possible for us to make progress and therefore higher level meeting must be called. I did not see why we needed to be so pessimistic. I had faith and hope when I came, and I hoped he had same, that two of us as Ambassadors representing our governments would be able to make progress these two questions. I still had such hope and would earnestly strive best my ability realize that hope. Question higher level meeting could arise only after our talks here had been concluded. My government not prepared now to discuss or agree to what would happen after our meetings here had been completed. Therefore we did not agree higher level meeting was suitable subject discussion item two.

26. I said I frankly puzzled by his statement on my suggestion we should include renunciation of force as a subject for discussion. I had not made demands on his government and I had framed subject for discussion in just as neutral terms as I could. I simply wanted call attention fact subject framed in somewhat different manner than he implied in his statement. I said I expected have more to say this subject at next meeting. Similarly, I had tried to frame subject of accounting for US personnel in as neutral a manner as I could. What I had in mind was entirely separate from what we had discussed under agenda item one. I would be prepared at our next meeting to discuss it with him in detail.

27. Wang said he agreed to continue discussion these subjects at next meeting. He said this did not mean he agreed to inclusion these two subjects under agenda item two and he thought order for discussion of subjects still open and no definite arrangement made.

28. I agreed and suggested meeting Wednesday, October 5.

29. In discussion over press release Wang suggested statement eliminating all mention implementation agreed announcement and saying simply we discussed agenda item two. When I said it would be more appropriate use same announcement used last time, he countered

with suggestion we omit all reference to subjects discussed and simply state that we met and give date next meeting.

30. I stated if we said anything different at all it would arouse a great deal of press speculation which we both wanted to reduce. If we used previous statement, newspapers would not speculate, and it was also a factual statement.

31. Wang objected that if we went on making same statement public would think we were making no progress.

32. I said we had made identical statement after each meeting for 40 days and public saw eventually we had made progress.

33. Wang agreed to use same statement but on condition it would not be precedent for using it again after next meeting.

34. I said we could discuss that at end of next meeting.

Gowen

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## 250. Telegram 796 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 28, 1955, 10 p.m.

796. From Johnson.

Department's unnumbered Niact September 28 correcting text Deptel 798 not received until 5 p.m. Geneva time. As will be seen from report today's meeting (Mytel 795, paragraph 6) I used phraseology "accounting for US personnel." Although I was bothered by omission of "military", there was no time for confirmation. Believe I was successful in skirting around subject and I can pick up matter at next meeting.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2855. Secret.

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**251. Telegram 797 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 28, 1955, 11 p.m.

797. From Johnson.

1. Re paragraph 4 my telegram 793. Following is draft of type of presentation I feel should be made on subject missing military personnel.

2. I desire to discuss with you today the question of what I have termed missing US military personnel. With respect to those missing from the Korean War there have been many discussions of the subject in the MAC. I have no desire or intent to repeat or duplicate those discussions with which I assume you are fully familiar but only to discuss with you those aspects which clearly come within the category of a practical question between the two of us.

3. I simply want to point out the fact the responsible leaders of the forces on your side entered into an armistice agreement which clearly provided that full and complete accounting be provided on all prisoners of war and deceased combatants of which they had knowledge. When the prisoner of war exchange was completed there remained many hundreds of US personnel of the United Nations Command who it was definitely known or there was solid reason to believe were at one time prisoners of your side but who were not returned or otherwise accounted for. The military authorities of my country have by tremendous effort gradually accumulated information with regard to many of these individuals so that the number unaccounted for has been gradually reduced. In some few cases this information was obtained from your side or determined upon the basis of bodies returned by your side. However, there remain about 450 persons on whom it has not been possible to obtain any firm information whatever concerning their fate or present whereabouts. There is no way that the military authorities of my country can definitely inform the families of these men whether they are dead or alive or what their fate may have been.

4. In many of these cases their names were at one time listed as prisoners of war in publications in your country, the names of others have in various connections been broadcast over your radio, some were actually identified as having spoken over the radio, some had at one time written letters from prison camps and others were known and seen in prison camps by prisoners who were subsequently returned.

5. However, even more important from the standpoint of my discussion with you, it is quite possible that some of these persons were

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2855. Secret; Limited Distribution.

taken into your country for it is definitely known from prisoners who were subsequently returned that such movements did take place. Furthermore, there have been cases of Americans, not known to my government to be in your country, and later revealed by your government to be held there.

6. My purpose in reviewing all of these facts is not to engage in controversy with you over them but only to point out that the authorities in my country and the families of these men have a sound basis for believing that at least some of these persons have been in territory under your control outside of Korea.

7. I therefore, am giving you a list of the names of these persons with the request that your government conduct a thorough investigation to determine whether any of them are in your country or whether your government is in the possession of any information whatever concerning any of the persons listed.

8. I am not unmindful of the fact that early in these talks you gave me a list of various categories of Americans in your country, but it is possible that some persons on this list may be considered by your authorities to be in a different category or they may otherwise have information with regard to them.

9. I am also giving you a list of the names of the 11 Naval and Coast Guard personnel lost off Swatow whom we discussed last year in the hope that since that time your authorities may have obtained some information with regard to these men.

10. I do not ask that you give me any reply with regard to this matter today but only that in due course you inform me of the results of your government's investigation.

Gowen

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## 252. Telegram 798 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 28, 1955, 11 p.m.

798. From Johnson.

1. One of questions we face for next meeting is whether by that time there have been any releases of remaining 19 Americans and what we do

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2855. Secret; Limited Distribution.

if there are not. Latter even will of course require very strong renewal my stress on implementation. If one or more released before next meeting presentation on implementation could be milder and could show more disposition move on to discussion topics under item two.

2. In any event major subject will undoubtedly continue be his insistence on inclusion higher level meeting. I will of course stick to our position but would appreciate Department's suggestions on any further debating points it feels I might make. Can without difficulty keep discussion going on this subject for at least next meeting but we should be looking ahead to probability deadlock will develop over this point.

3. As stated my telegram 794 believe it may be useful for me make renunciation of force statement at next meeting if opportunity develops. Believe this would assist in keeping situation fluid without giving away anything to CHICOMS.

4. My present plan is not to go into any detailed presentation missing military personnel at next meeting but only touch on it as required to support its inclusion as subject for discussion.

5. Hope Department will assure I promptly receive any information CHICOMS may give O'Neill on releases or other aspects implementation.

Gowen

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### 253. Letter from Clough to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 10

Geneva, September 29, 1955

Dear Walter:

Alex took off at 4:00 a.m. by automobile for Prague. Since we had worked until 11:00 p.m. getting off yesterday's telegrams, he was unable to write the usual weekly letter to you and asked me to get a note into the pouch in explanation. He expects to leave Prague for the return trip on Sunday, arriving here late Monday night. He hopes that you will repeat to him in Prague any important telegrams.

Actually, there is nothing on the substance of the talks to be added to yesterday's telegrams. We tried to cover the situation as thoroughly

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Clough signed the original "Ralph." A handwritten note on the letter indicates  
it was received on October 3.

as we could. The discussion is developing very much as anticipated and our principal worry at the moment, as pointed out in the telegrams, is how to prevent a complete deadlock from arising over our refusal to admit the “higher level conference” as a subject for discussion.

I am glad to know that arrangements are underway for bringing me back to Washington. This has been a most interesting and useful experience for me and I am, in some ways, reluctant to leave at this point. However, as we seem to be moving toward a one meeting a week schedule, there really is not enough work here to justify keeping two officers away from CA when you are so short-handed.

Bob Ekvall was glad to know that you were consulting with Defense on trying to improve his position here. At the moment, his orders have expired and he is technically AWOL, so some action will have to be taken rather quickly.

Doug and I have been reading with interest the despatches from Taipei and Hong Kong which you have been sending. We also appreciate the trouble you took in rounding up the collection of documents that we had asked you for. They will be helpful to us as we move further into the next phase of the talks.

Best regards,

Ralph N. Clough

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#### 254. Telegram 86 to Prague<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 30, 1955, 3:07 p.m.

86. Verbatim text. For the Ambassador.

Deptel 789. First paragraph draft statement on renunciation use of force, amended to read as follows:

“One of the practical matters for discussion between us is that each of us should renounce the use of force to achieve our policies when they conflict. The United States and the PRC confront each other with policies which are in certain respects incompatible. This fact need not, however, mean armed conflict, and the most important single thing we can do is first of all to be sure that it will not lead to armed conflict.”

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–3055. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated Priority to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 805. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Sebald and Phleger.

Amend final paragraph to read as follows:

"We ask, therefore, as a first matter for discussion under Item 2, a declaration that your side will not resort to the use of force in the Taiwan area except defensively. The United States would be prepared to make a corresponding declaration. These declarations will make it appropriate for us to pass on to the discussion of other matters with a better hope of coming to constructive conclusions."

**Dulles**

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**255. Telegram 809 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 30, 1955, 6:50 p.m.

809. For Johnson.

Peter Colm of DRF being detailed Geneva assist Johnson. Arrive about October 11. Clough should return Department as soon as practicable.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-3055. Official Use Only. Repeated to Prague for the Ambassador as telegram 89. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Furnas (R) and Yager (DRF) in draft and by Capella (FE/EX) and Sebald.

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**256. Letter 16 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 16

Washington, September 30, 1955

Dear Alex:

Your letter No. 9 of September 22 came on the 26th, in the midst of our efforts to get out the instructions for your September 28 meeting. The drafting and clearance of the instructions was a complicated

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.



business with the Secretary first in Ottawa, then in New York; and with Herman Phleger also in New York part of the time.

The “renunciation of force” statement started with an excellent Phleger framework which was fleshed out by the Secretary. This morning we are telegraphing you some minor revisions in the first and last paragraphs. The intent of these changes, as you will immediately see, is to get away from any remote implication of a non-aggression pact or indeed any sort of bilateral agreement with the Chinese Communists. Anything which smacks of a pact or executive agreement with the Chinese Communists is of course out of the question. We are thinking in terms of separate unilateral public declarations and not pledges or assurances to each other.

We feel reasonably confident that you are on a good wicket now and that there will be plenty to talk about. It is hard to see how Wang can reject this item out of hand. My guess is that he may try to maneuver in the direction of something resembling the famous “Five Principles”; or try to make a false distinction between “international” and “internal” resort to force in the Taiwan area.

We have had a difficult time with Defense on the confused problem of the unaccounted for military personnel. So far as have not been able to get what we consider a consistent statement of principle or position out of them. In one document they will make sweeping claims and assert that the claims can be supported; in another they will indicate they do not have much basis for any very positive allegations. They blow first hot and then cold. We still do not understand what criteria they have applied in determining what names should go on the list. They seem to have conclusive evidence that some of the people on the list are dead. In some cases the bodies presumably have been recovered. In other cases, the personnel apparently were never in the custody of the Communist side, having been lost over the high seas. On the other hand, it seems that some of the names which were on the original list of 970 should not have been dropped. A case came to our attention this week where an officer was last seen alive in a prison camp by fellow American officers. His name was dropped from the list merely because he was in bad shape from injuries and gangrene and the Americans thought he could not have lasted much longer. This was a lay opinion, not a medical opinion. Defense did not stop with a presumptive finding of death, in this case, but made a definitive finding of death. It is incomprehensible to us and gives us misgivings about the whole subject. But the casualty determinations are not within our province and there is not much we can appropriately do about it. It is a dilemma. We are trying to arrange a meeting today with Deputy Defense Secretary Robertson, General Erskine and Bill Godel to get Defense clearance of a draft presentation for you to make to Wang on this subject. It represents a considerable departure from the text contained in our 790, which was basically a Defense document, modified slightly but unsatisfactorily by

us. The new draft follows more the approach recommended in your 797 but is somewhat firmer in tone. We have to bear in mind U.S. considerations of course, Congressional as well as Pentagon, & could not go quite as far in the direction of mildness as you suggested.

You handled Wang at the 18th meeting on September 28 with consummate skill. Satisfaction at the adroitness with which you met every situation is expressed on every side. No one is unmindful of the fact it takes two to keep a discussion going and that Wang has it within his power to bring the talks to a close at any time. But we now assume that this is not likely to happen in the immediate future. Peiping would be in a highly vulnerable position if it broke while our renunciation of force statement is up for consideration.

You will not be surprised to learn that the President's illness has given the continuation of these talks added importance in the eyes of the Secretary.

Various prominent newspaper and publishing people are putting redoubled pressure on the Department to give them passports for travel to Communist China. The influence mustered by some of these people makes their demands difficult to resist. No one is thinking in terms of dropping the barriers of course. But it has occurred to the Secretary that it might be useful to intimate publicly that in view of the Agreed Announcement which assures the early departure of all detained Americans we are considering validating the passports of some of the newspaper and publishing fraternity who have applied to travel to mainland China. It would be added that of course no actual travel to mainland China could be approved until all the detained Americans are out, but it is assumed that this is a matter of only a short time in view of the explicit terms of the Agreed Announcement. The thinking here is that this might be added bait to the Chinese Communists to proceed rapidly with the release of all the remaining Americans. We know that they are very anxious to arrange visits by various newspaper people and authors to the PRC. Of course, we could not introduce travel as an agenda item on our side at Geneva, but a little restrained publicity along this line outside of Geneva might strengthen your hand. Do you have any comments?

We do not much relish the trade embargo item on the Agenda, but since it would come after the renunciation of force, we do not anticipate that we will have to cross that bridge any time soon. If it ever comes up, we can seize the opportunity to present the rationale behind our trade controls.

We are troubled at the conspicuous absence of any release announcements since September 10.

The blunt tie-in by Wang of further releases with Item 2 progress gives us forebodings, as does the conversation of O'Neill with Chang Han-fu in Peiping a week ago.

We still have no word of any arrangement for British Embassy contact with the detained Americans.

The Indian Embassy here says it is making no arrangements for travel of Chinese to the PRC until it receives assurances of reimbursement from the PRC for travel funds advanced.

You will be glad to know that Hubert Graves is reassigned to the British Embassy here as Minister to handle Far Eastern matters. He is arriving next week. Rob Scott left on Wednesday for Singapore via London.

After a lot of discussion and some confusion we have arranged to send Peter Colm of DRF to assist you thus releasing Ralph Clough to help me in the chronic jam which I confront. Colm is one of the ablest and quickest men in DRF. He has been following all the documents on the talks closely. We will see that he gets something of the thinking of the people who are closest to the talks here before he leaves. We would have preferred to send one of our own CA men—Osborn or Comiskey—for the sake of the experience, but in view of the backlog of work here it could not be justified. It would make no sense to largely cancel out the return of Clough.

*[text not declassified]*

I hope you have a good interlude at Prague and return refreshed to the fray.

Warmest regards,

Walter P. McCaughy

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## 257. Telegram 819 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 1, 1955, 1:41 p.m.

819. For Johnson.

OIR review Chicom propaganda:

Chicom propaganda on international subjects during week ending September 30 gave only slight attention Geneva talks in contrast to previous weeks. General tone comment on US appeared somewhat more hostile. US denounced for obstructing Chicom admission to UN,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–155. Confidential. Drafted by Jacobson; cleared by McCaughy.

violating Geneva spirit, seeking intensify cold war and continuing rely on "policy of strength."

Regarding Geneva talks NCNA September 23 gave brief account of meetings stating that delegations had "exchanged views" regarding item two of agenda. NCNA announced September 24 that PRC had "approved" US invitation to UK.

Taiwan issue given slight attention during past week. *Ta Kung Pao*, September 25, stated CPR willing to negotiate "international question" of Taiwan, but US "reluctant" to negotiate. NCNA September 25 reiterated familiar charge US policy *re*: Taiwan based on "aggressive principles" and represents interference Chinese internal affairs. Liberation of Taiwan stressed as task for Chinese youth at recent conference of Young Activists in Peiping.

Major attention past week focussed following topics:

1) *UN membership*. *People's Daily* editorial September 24 accused US of "obstructing" admission Communist China to UN, in "open violation" of Geneva spirit and asserted admission PRC to UN essential for further easing international tension and solution major international problems.

2) *Dulles speech to UN* (September 22). NCNA commentary September 25 interpreted speech as indicating continued US reliance on "policy of strength"; accused US of "departing from spirit of Geneva" and seeking intensify cold war. Secretary's comments on Taiwan cited as evidence US policy still based on "principles of aggression." Secretary's account Geneva talks criticized as deliberate effort "distort significance" of Chinese action in releasing 11 Americans.

3) *Japan-US relations*. *People's Daily* editorials September 23 and 28 on Shigemitsu visit to US revived familiar theme that US seeking to remilitarize Japan and use Japan as base for "aggression." Shigemitsu policy seen based on "making China a hypothetical enemy of Japan," and on complete subservience of Japan to US. NCNA saw possibility Japanese troops would be sent abroad, to Korea or Taiwan. Also noted possibility of Japanese alliance with Taiwan and ROK commenting such action would be evidence of "intended aggression" against PRC.

4) *East-West trade*. *People's Daily* September 28 noted that easing of world tensions had created new prospects for promotion of East-West trade; saw good prospects for development of trade between China and the West. Expressed hope that forthcoming Ministers Conference would adopt specific measures for removal of "artificial barriers" to trade.

**Dulles**

**258. Telegram 823 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 3, 1955, 7:15 p.m.

823. For Johnson.

Your 798. Guidance for 19th meeting Oct 5.

1. You are reminded that your basic instruction provides that no legitimate basis be given for Wang break off talks.

2. Failure Communists to implement agreed announcement should be strongly pressed. British report no RPT no word from any imprisoned Americans so far and no RPT no indication of Chinese Communist disposition to give detained Americans access to British Charge. In view conspicuous absence of any Chinese Communist move to carry out terms of Agreed Announcement as regards remaining detained Americans 3½ weeks after Agreed Announcement issued, Communist non-compliance with their obligation under Agreed Announcement should be principal topic next meeting. You should call Wang's attention appropriate portions London's 1212 and 1312 to Dept. Ask for explanation of evident inability imprisoned Americans communicate with O'Neill. Make it clear that in our view Announcement not being implemented by PRC and that Chinese Communist neglect so far to give imprisoned Americans benefit of Agreed Announcement makes it meaningless. Anyone in jail would certainly desire to be repatriated and in fact we know that at least 15 of imprisoned Americans applied for exit permits even before they were seized and imprisoned by the Chinese Communists.

3. You have authority to discuss subjects which might constitute Item Two and order of priority. First priority should be renunciation of force. Accounting for US military personnel should be placed next but may be placed below PRC item on QTE question of embargo UNQTE. If in your judgment it should be done, you are given discretionary authority to make revised presentation which has been telegraphed to you on renunciation of force, although it may be preferable hold off on this until following meeting. We must insure that presentation on military personnel is made at some stage but this can be put over until another meeting if you consider that this may safely be done. (Text revised presentation telegraphed separately.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2855. Secret; Priority; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Sebald; cleared in substance by Phleger.

Department believes that you have sufficient material spelling out our rejection of Communist subject QTE negotiations at a higher level UNQTE.

4. Next meeting should be as far in advance as reasonably possible.

**Dulles**

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## **259. Telegram 824 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 3, 1955, 7:13 p.m.

824. For Johnson. Deptel 798 and your 797.

Following is text of presentation on "accounting for U.S. military personnel" which Department and Defense have agreed upon:

"Dear Mr. Ambassador:

"My Government has, since the conclusion of the Armistice in Korea undertaken a careful and complete analysis of all of its casualty figures and of the ultimate disposition of all unaccounted-for members of its Armed Forces who served in Korea.

"The American servicemen for whom no accounting has been obtained total 450 persons. Each of these was last seen or last heard of under circumstances indicating that he was either captured or killed in action by forces of the opposing side, and that he or his remains should be in the custody or possession of the opposing side. The names of many of these persons were at one time listed as prisoners of war in publications in your country, the names of others have been broadcast over your radio, some were actually identified as having spoken over the radio, some wrote letters from prison camps and others were known and seen in prison camps by prisoners who were subsequently returned. It is definitely known that some prisoners were taken into your country. Furthermore, there have been cases of Americans not known to my Government to be in your country, and later revealed by your Government to be held there.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2855. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy and Osborn; cleared in draft in Defense and by Sebald and Phleger.

“Repeated efforts have been made by my Government, through the United Nations Command and the Military Armistice Commission, to obtain an accounting for these 450 men of the United States Armed Forces. These efforts have elicited no satisfactory response, despite the clear obligation of the side of your Government under the Korean Armistice Agreement to provide a full and complete accounting on all prisoners of war and deceased combatants of which it had knowledge. The failure of your Government to respond to my Government’s requests, thus preventing the military authorities of my country from definitely informing the families of the fate of these men, has caused deep concern to the American people, and has thus created a real and grave matter of concern between our two sides.

“Apart from the question of the members of the United States Armed Forces who served in Korea, there remains the question of the fate of the 11 Naval and Coast Guard personnel who disappeared in the crash of two U.S. planes in the sea near the harbor of Swatow in January 1953. The circumstances of this incident would indicate that some of the members of the crew or their bodies may have been recovered. The inability to date of my Government to determine the fate of these men is also a source of deep concern to the American people.

“Accordingly, as this is one of the practical matters at issue between us and in keeping with the purpose of these talks, I am enclosing separate lists of the 450 American servicemen and the 11 Naval and Coast Guard airmen missing off Swatow, to whom I have referred and, on behalf of my Government, I request that you present to the appropriate authorities in your government my Government’s demand for an accounting for the fate of each of these men.

“Enclosures:

List of 450 servicemen.

List of 11 Naval and Coast Guardsmen.”

End letter.

**Dulles**

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**260. Letter 17 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 17

Washington, October 3, 1955

Dear Alex:

We are pushing hard to get something out to you today for the October 5 meeting. I feel it is not fair to make you wait until the last day preceding the meeting, especially since I believe the time spread now is six hours since Washington reverted to Standard Time on September 25. We think the telegrams will give you adequate guidance and sufficient leeway. There will be considerable for you to say on the non-implementation of the Agreed Announcement. The amended statement on the use of force item will undoubtedly lead to extensive comments. The item on unaccounted for U.S. military personnel can be dropped to a spot below the embargo item if this seems advisable to you. We are now thrashing out with Defense a final version of the statement on the unaccounted for personnel. Every word is important and there is quite a bit of give-and-take with Defense on it. Defense is naturally concerned at the reaction in this country, especially among the relatives and Congress. When we got the corrected copy of your recommended draft (about half of which had been omitted in the original garbled text of your message) we found much in it that was useful and telling. So we worked out a draft which represents a meld of our revised text and what we consider the best of yours. This is being cleared with Defense urgently now and we hope to be able to get it to you by the close of business today unless Defense raises further objections.

The British are doing their best to be helpful on the problem of access and assistance to the imprisoned Americans. They are being brought into the picture increasingly. I am seeing Barbara Salt of the British Embassy (who is handling Far Eastern matters until Hubert Graves gets here) every two or three days. I am giving her a pretty full rundown on your discussions with Wang on the implementation of Item One. The substance of this is being telegraphed to O'Neill in Peiping, who feels that he will be in a better position to determine what tack he should take there if he has this for his confidential background. About September 29 O'Neill had received no letter or appeal from any American. He has no confirmation of Chang Han-fu's assertion that all remaining American prisoners have been notified of the Agreed Announcement. O'Neill doubts if representations or attempted publicity on his part would be useful at this stage. But he is inclined to think that he should make a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret. Printed from an unsigned copy.



formal inquiry to the Chinese as to whether the imprisoned Americans will have access to him. He is awaiting our reaction to this problem. We must consider whether a formal inquiry would tend to encourage the Chinese to take a negative position. It is a difficult question for we do need to know definitely what their position on this critical issue will be. O'Neill fears that we are going to have no way of establishing that the Americans wish to return and wish to get in touch with him. He feels that we are at the mercy of the Chinese Communists on this and that we can not prove violation of the Agreed Announcement. He thinks we are dependent on Chinese Communist good faith. O'Neill feels that perhaps you can clear up these issues with Wang better than he can in Peiping. He points out that "you have some bargaining counters at Geneva," while he has none in Peiping. I would like your reaction as to whether we should run the risk of having a show down with them at Peiping on the granting of access to O'Neill. I have reminded the British that all of the Americans except Redmond, Downey and Fecteau are known to have applied for exit permits before they were arrested. This establishes that they have expressed a desire to return to the U.S. However, it is true that this was done long before the Agreed Announcement. They have had no opportunity to reaffirm their desire since then.

The pouch is closing. Regards and may fortune favor you.

Sincerely yours,

P.S. In my letter No. 16 of September 30, on page 3, line 13, change "by way" to read "by Wang".

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## 261. Telegram 804 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 4, 1955, 11 a.m.

804. From Johnson.

1. Although first para Deptel 824 speaks of "presentation" text is drafted in form of letter. Unless otherwise instructed will assume Department concurs my view should be oral presentation and will make slight changes necessary for this form.

2. Again desire call attention to fact that by basing our approach on "accounting for" rather than presence in territory under control PRC as

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-455. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

suggested draft Mytel 797 we provide better basis for PRC introduce demand for "accounting for 21,000".

3. If this form approach retained desire to amend first portion last sentence third para of statement to read "this failure of your side has prevented the military authorities of my country etc". Such wording broadens statement so that "failure" refers both to armistice obligations and lack of response to requests through MAC while also avoiding erroneous implication "requests" have been from USG to PRC Government.

4. With respect 11 Naval and Coast Guard personnel must make some reference to our discussion same subject last year. Suggest adding "which case we discussed last year" to first sentence penultimate para statement and adding sentence to end same para "I would hope you would now be able to give me some info with respect to these eleven men".

**Gowen**

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## 262. Despatch 7 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

No. 7

Geneva, October 4, 1955

SUBJECT

Dispute over Interpretation of Word "Invite" in Paragraph (2) of "Agreed Announcement"

In view of the fact that the Chinese Communists chose to make an issue, both in the meetings in Geneva and in their propaganda, of the interpretation of Paragraph (2) of the Agreed Announcement of September 10, 1955, and the possibility that the point may have some importance in the future, I have thought it advisable to review the negotiations and subsequent developments related to the wording of that paragraph.

The point in question was the interpretation of the first sentence in Paragraph 2 of the Agreed Announcement, which reads as follows:

(U.S. Section)

"2. The Government of the Republic of India will be invited to assist in the return to the People's Republic of China of those Chinese who desire to do so as follows:"

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-455. Confidential. Sent via air pouch. Drafted by Johnson and Clough. Brackets are in the original.

## (PRC Section)

“2. The Government of the United Kingdom will be invited to assist in the return to the United States of those Americans who desire to do so as follows:”

Enclosure No. 1 shows the wording of this sentence proposed by each side during the course of the negotiations.

It is readily apparent from a perusal of these successive proposals that each side clung consistently to its point of view throughout the negotiations, at least up to the time that the final wording was agreed upon. The Chinese side sought a wording which either stated or implied that the PRC would *entrust* India with the function of assisting the return of Chinese from the United States, to which the United States would *agree*. In like manner, the United States would *entrust* to the U.K. the function of assisting the return of Americans from China, to which the PRC would *agree*. We consistently opposed this wording, proposing instead a statement to the effect that the United States would *authorize* India to act in the United States, while the PRC would *authorize* the U.K. to act there. Nothing was said in the United States texts or in my statements to Wang concerning the action to be taken by the PRC with respect to India or the U.S. with respect to the U.K.

These apparently irreconcilable positions were held to tenaciously by both sides until the crucial 12th meeting of August 31. It was at this meeting that the compromise wording was agreed on, whereby we agreed to drop the word *authorize* as well as the specific mention that the action would be taken by the U.S. and the PRC and Wang agreed to drop the words *entrusted* and *agrees*. The compromise word agreed on was *invited*—“India (or the U.K.) will be invited . . .”, without specifying except by implication who was to do the inviting. Wang retained in his Chinese text the word *wei t’o*, which he had formerly translated *entrust*, but which, he explained, also meant *to invite*.

It seemed to me and to my advisers at the time that this was an agreement on wording rather than a full meeting of minds on substance. Each side could interpret the new, somewhat ambiguous wording in its own way and neither was compelled to retreat from its basic position. Each side was left free to approach both the U.K. and India and describe these actions in terms appropriate to its own interpretation of Paragraph 2.

I feel sure that in accepting the compromise wording, Wang was not under any illusion that we had abandoned our position. The fact that he chose to retain a Chinese word in his text which means *entrust* and only very imperfectly translates the English word *invite* clearly suggests that he had accepted the idea that each side would interpret Paragraph 2 in its own way.

Thus, it appeared, following the August 31 meeting, that once the Agreed Announcement was issued each party would take the action

it considered necessary to enable the third countries to assume their functions. It would not be necessary to debate, either in the meetings or publicly, who was inviting whom.

The first indication that Wang was going to make an issue of the interpretation of Paragraph 2 came in the 15th meeting on September 14, the first one following the issuance of the Agreed Announcement. At that meeting I informed Wang that the United States had invited the Government of India to undertake the functions set forth in the Agreed Announcement and asked him what action his government had taken with respect to the United Kingdom. He was apparently caught unprepared by our prompt action with respect to India, as he did not say that the PRC had extended an invitation to India. The best he could do was to propose that the U.S. and the PRC deliver to the U.K. and the GOI, respectively, official texts of the Agreed Announcement, which would "complete the official procedures regarding invitation of third powers". He also complained that some press accounts were distorting the meaning of the Announcement by alleging that the U.S. was to invite the GOI and the PRC the U.K.

Before the next meeting (the 16th on September 20) it became obvious that the PRC was prepared to argue vigorously for its interpretation of Paragraph 2. A commentary, entitled "Forbid the Misinterpretation of an Agreement" appeared in the *Jen Min Jih Pao* on September 16, which alleged that the USIS was distorting the Agreed Announcement by stating that it was the U.S. which should invite India and the PRC which should invite the U.K. The commentary rejected this interpretation, declaring that the "attempt" by the USIS to "juggle the facts to hoodwink world opinion" was "not a very smart trick".

On the same day, September 16, Wang, acting under instructions from his government, sent me a letter (my despatch No. 5, September 21, 1955) in which he referred to my statement on September 14 that the U.S. had formally invited India and declared that this statement would be interpreted and understood by the PRC as meaning that the U.S. *agreed* to India's assuming the functions *entrusted* to it by the PRC. At the same time he asked me to inform him whether the U.S. had formally "*entrusted* the United Kingdom", adding that when this had been done, the PRC would notify the U.K. of its *agreement*.

At the 16th meeting, on September 20, Wang sought persistently, but unsuccessfully, to get me to agree to his interpretation. Finally, he accepted my statement that the U.S. had requested the U.K. to assume the functions set forth in the Agreed Announcement choosing to interpret it as a formal invitation and said that the PRC would notify the U.K. of its agreement. He also stated at this meeting, for the first time, that the PRC had formally invited the GOI. Although it must have been clear to Wang after this meeting that the difference of interpretation of Paragraph

2 remained as sharp as ever, he and his government apparently decided to make the best of it, for the issue has not been raised again.

A possible explanation of the PRC's decision to make an issue of the interpretation of Paragraph 2 is that both Wang and his government thought the U.S. was interested only in getting a satisfactory wording in the published Announcement and would tacitly accede in the execution of the Announcement to the position maintained by the PRC. Some support is lent this hypothesis by the following statement in Wang's letter:

"It must be pointed out that our side has taken into account the difficult position in diplomatic relations in which the U.S. Government finds [itself,] and has acceded to your proposed text on the entrusting of third powers in its present form in the Agreed Announcement. However, on the concrete content with regard to the Chinese Government's entrusting the Indian Government and the U.S. Government entrusting the U.K. Government, both sides cannot have any other interpretation."

If Wang and his government did actually believe that the U.S. was interested primarily in words rather than substance, it would have been natural for the PRC to react with surprise and indignation when it discovered its belief ill-founded.

It is hard to believe that Wang himself, at least, held any such opinion. He had listened at length to our reasons for insisting that the U.S. Government *authorize* the GOI to act in the U.S. In agreeing on the somewhat ambiguous wording of Paragraph 2 using the word *invited* we were careful to give Wang no cause to infer that we had yielded to his view of what actually should be done with respect to the third countries.

The most likely explanation of what happened, in my opinion, is that Wang, possibly not appreciating the clear implication of the English text, failed to inform his government accurately of the situation. The fact that he had retained in the Chinese text the word *wei t'o* (to entrust) as a translation of the verb *to invite* may have misled Peiping into believing that we had, in substance, accepted their position. Wang may have failed to take sufficiently into account the fact that the Chinese text would be read only in China, while the rest of the world would interpret the Agreed Announcement according to the English text. In the meeting on September 20 Wang certainly gave every appearance of a man who had been caught off base and was trying desperately to retrieve his error.

Possibly the key to the incident lies in the timing of the actions taken by the two sides. It happened that I was able to inform Wang on September 14 that we had invited the GOI to assume its functions in the U.S., but was unable to tell him at that time what we had done with respect to the U.K. The PRC Government may have assumed that we were attempting to force it to invite the U.K. for the purpose either of

compelling it to accept our interpretation of Paragraph 2 or as a pretext to delay going on to Item 2 of the Agenda.

The Jen Min Jih Pao commentary suggests that something of this sort was in the minds of responsible persons in Peiping, for it alleges that the USIS interpretation “gives the impression that the U.S. Government is unwilling to act according to the agreement by commissioning a third country [i.e., the U.K.] to assist, but would like to make China responsible for this matter”. The same commentary goes on to warn that “should the U.S. fail to commission the Government of the U.K., the execution of the agreement would be hampered”.

It may be that had I been able on September 14 to inform Wang of our action regarding the U.K., the issue would never have attained the proportions that it did, for that would have removed from their minds the unfounded suspicion that we did not propose to act at all with respect to the U.K.

Whatever may be the true reason for the Chinese acting the way they did, one thing is certain—in accepting our compromise wording for Paragraph 2 of the Agreed Announcement Wang burned his fingers, and he will be much more cautious in the future.

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

### Enclosure<sup>2</sup>

#### “Invitation” to Third Country—Comparison of Successive Texts

August 2	Wang proposed that China and U.S. each entrust third country of own choice to take charge of affairs of nationals of each country, first of all their return.
August 11	Chinese draft—“The People’s Republic of China and the United States of America will each entrust the Republic of India and the United Kingdom respectively with the charge of the affairs of the return of civilians of the respective countries residing in the other.”
August 16	U.S. draft—“The Embassy of the Republic of India in the United States will be authorized to assist the return to the China mainland of those Chinese nationals who desire to do so.” (same wording, <i>mutatis mutandis</i> , in Chinese section)
August 18	Chinese draft—“The People’s Republic of China agrees that the Office of the Charge d’Affaires of the United Kingdom in the People’s Republic of China will be

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<sup>2</sup>Confidential.

- authorized to assist the return to the United States of those American nationals who desire to do so.”  
(same wording, *mutatis mutandis*, in U.S. section)
- August 23 U.S. draft—“The United States will authorize the Government of the Republic of India to assist the return to the People’s Republic of China of those Chinese who desire to do so.”  
(same wording, *mutatis mutandis*, in Chinese section)
- August 25 Chinese draft—“The People’s Republic of China agrees that the Government of the United Kingdom will be entrusted to assist in the return to the United States of America of those Americans who desire to do so.”  
(same wording, *mutatis mutandis*, in U.S. section)
- August 31 U.S. draft—“The United States will authorize the Government of the Republic of India to assist the return to the People’s Republic of China of those Chinese who desire to do so.”  
(same wording, *mutatis mutandis*, in Chinese section)
- September 6 U.S. draft—“The Government of the Republic of India will be invited to assist in the return to the People’s Republic of China of those Chinese who desire to do so.”  
(same wording, *mutatis mutandis*, in Chinese section)
- September 10 Agreed Announcement—same as above
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## 263. Telegram 811 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 5, 1955, 4 p.m.

811. From Johnson.

1. Two and one-half hour meeting this morning. At opening I referred to questions and/or suggestions on implementation I had raised last meeting and hoped Wang had replies this morning. He launched into long prepared statement terming discussion of item two “thus far unsatisfactory”, were spending time on “details” concerning agreed announcement and I was raising questions in this regard to “prevent discussion

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–555. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.

substance item two". Renewed suggestions be discussed by assistants or through UK Charge Peking.

2. Then referring to my suggestion on subjects we discuss under item two stated "each side may raise subjects it considers should be discussed and not necessary to limit subjects or to fix their order". There is no necessity carry on any prolonged argument on subjects to be discussed, "will not agree removal any subjects", then went on with long justification for discussion higher level meeting largely repeating previous line. He then referred my two subjects stating he had already given me list all Americans in China including military personnel, if by raising subject I intended imply more Americans in China "this was sheer fabrication", we have not given them list of Chinese in US, if there is to be any accounting of personnel up to us to do accounting.

3. Then turned to renunciation of force, should distinguish between civil conflicts which outside scope of these talks and international disputes. "Even in civil conflicts China had striven for peaceful solutions when circumstances permit." "Chiang clique under wings of foreign forces has refused peaceful settlement and carries on harassing activities;" China has consistently upheld peaceful settlement international disputes, consistently supported principles UN Charter on peaceful settlement international disputes, references to Bandung, Five Principles, etc. "Chinese do not want to fight with US" and Dulles said no fighting in Taiwan area between Americans and Chinese. Therefore no question cease-fire between China and US. US is one using force achieve national objectives, Taiwan is Chinese territory, was restored to China World War II and yet US encroaches on and occupies and has said it will use force prevent liberation. PRC wishes discuss withdrawal all US forces from Taiwan and coastal islands. If I fully empowered discuss and settle this question he ready to do likewise. In closing referred my statement previous meeting I had faith and hope and said he shared but "we would have to strive harder and prove our desires by deeds".

4. I said I first wanted to deal with implementation. I did not want to spend time on details, did not see why it was necessary. All that was required were simple answers to my simple questions, could be disposed of in few minutes. In reply his suggestion on UK taking up questions Peiping, pointed out agreed announcement had two aspects: one, actions to be taken by our governments which were intergovernmental matters between us, and two, functions third powers. Words of agreed announcement resolved nothing, only implementation resolved questions. Some of questions I had raised also taken up by UK in Peiping but no satisfactory replies. Repeated in full three questions on whether Americans in jail informed of text announcement, their access to UK Charge, and authority UK Charge interview them. Said simple affirmative answers would immediately dispose of these questions here. Difficult understand why he couldn't give me simple answers, pointing out his failure to do



so was what was delaying talks. Then made detailed statement pointing out none of remaining 19 yet released, could not consider this faithful implementation of announcement, PRC failure give benefit agreed announcement 10 imprisoned Americans makes it meaningless as far as Americans in PRC desiring return are concerned. In view of continued delay becoming more concerned over his statement September 23 meeting implying persons in jail not covered by provisions agreed announcement, could not accept any such construction and asked for confirmation all American civilians whether or not in jail covered by announcement. Could not agree to his implied interpretation our not insisting on definite time limit for release constituted agreement to indefinite delay in release. Must insist implementation agreed announcement provisions for expeditious departure all Americans who desire to return including those still imprisoned. His continued reference to improved relations as factor in release could not but be interpreted as intent disregard explicit terms of announcement and "to hold these human beings as hostages for political advantage". My government had promptly implemented announcement and had not and would not attach political conditions to carrying it out. Chinese have been and still were free to leave. Failure his government match our promptness in implementation was what was slowing progress talks. Referring his previous statements on pressure, did not see why it was submission to pressure for PRC "to do what it publicly declared in our agreed announcement it was going to do".

5. He objected all my remarks as falling into item one and again raising matters which already discussed and settled. PRC would "faithfully carry out agreement but would not allow any distorted interpretation" of announcement. Will continue review cases but action must be accordance Chinese law, cases will be reviewed "in light of the agreement, degree of the offense, conduct and improvement of relations." There was then much give and take until he clarified and corrected interpretation of previous statement by saying cases Americans being reviewed "accordance" agreed announcement and, in light of discussion, I interpret as being satisfactory statement that all Americans including those in prison included within announcement. I also pressed him hard on other three questions and although his answer vague and unsatisfactory with respect to specific assurance each American in prison had been informed of announcement, reiterated previous assurances wide publicity included measures to assure every American informed. In spite continual pressure he flatly refused answer other two questions saying this not the place for discussion. After long and unsuccessful prodding I expressed hope he would assure me UK Charge would promptly be given replies. He kept repeating he had nothing more to say.

6. I then referred to remainder his statement and said I wished to study and give detailed reply later. However I pointed out my suggestion on order of discussion of subjects was designed to contribute to orderly progress. I defined what I meant by US personnel by stating this concerned American military personnel still missing from Korean hostilities concerning whom there was reason to believe his authorities had information. Then said considered renunciation of force most important, therefore probably should be discussed first, and I would be prepared say more on subject next meeting. Then repeated arguments against higher level meeting stating nothing he had said this morning had changed my mind.

7. He replied stating question US military personnel had been fully covered at Panmunjom, no reason for raising it here, and if we did so he reserved right raise question of US accounting for personnel detained in Korean War. Repeated his arguments on higher level meeting as well as statement that if I had full authority deal with "important and outstanding questions arising in the Taiwan area" he was ready to discuss.

8. I agreed his proposal next meeting Saturday, October 8. There was then considerable argument on press communique, he insisting communique be confined to statement we had continued discuss agenda item two, and I insisting on previous communique. We finally agreed on simply stating we had met and give time next meeting.

**Gowen**

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## 264. Telegram 815 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 5, 1955, 4 p.m.

815. From Johnson.

1. In spite of his efforts at today's meeting to avoid being drawn into discussion of implementation Wang could not refrain from some replies and thus again let himself be trapped into such discussion. In fact outside of his opening statement probably 85 per cent of today's discussion was devoted to implementation. However towards end he realized what he had done and is going to be much more cautious and difficult this regard at next meeting.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-555. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

2. However, he has neatly avoided being drawn into any discussion of “agenda” under Item 2. They have divided our purpose this regard and it is difficult to argue with his position which is substantially that either of us can bring up any subject within agenda Item 2 he wishes any time he wishes. We find ourselves on the other side of our usual controversy in this regard when dealing with Communists.

3. Felt it was in our best interest to agree to Saturday meeting. Neither of us has thus far opposed other’s proposal for date of meeting. While we have tacitly alternated on suggested date for next meeting I had in fact made suggestion at both of last two preceding meetings and he well realized it was past his “turn” at today’s meeting. Also I felt that as I was successful in getting through today’s meeting without use any of additional material Department has authorized under Item 2 I was in relatively good position for Saturday meeting.

4. With respect implementation feel that I was successful today in obtaining full retreat by Wang from his previous implication announcement did not apply imprisoned Americans. Feel I pressed other questions at today’s meeting give O’Neill excellent basis for formal approach on unanswered questions affecting UK functions and I hope he will promptly follow up.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell’s office (FE) notified 10/5/55 3:36 p.m. EMB (CWO)

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## 265. Telegram 817 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 5, 1955, 5 p.m.

817. From Johnson.

1. Two of problems I face with respect to next meeting are Wang’s probable refusal be drawn into any discussion implementation and his already expressed refusal be drawn into discussion of an “agenda” under item two. Have managed maintain present line for almost one month with negative results thus far on return additional Americans. Within narrow frame of obtaining return Americans I would be inclined to continue on and harden our present line up to point of threatening

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–555. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

take issue to public and facing break if necessary. However within large frame of reference this is not practical.

2. Therefore, my inclination for next meeting or two is try out tactic of what might be termed softening our line by omitting all reference to implementation and concentrating on renunciation of force. I do not see we lose anything by this and hope we might gain something with respect release Americans. I have in every possible way expressed our dissatisfaction with implementation and have thoroughly preserved my ability return to it at any time. If this tactic produces no favorable results on release Americans during course next meeting or two I am in a position to return to implementation in stronger terms than ever.

3. Renunciation of force is nothing they desire discuss and it gives them nothing. My thought would be to open next meeting with prepared statement, giving Wang a copy, and see where this leads. It is also an excellent reply to his statement at today's meeting to which I would attempt no direct reply at this time.

4. With respect to future offer for consideration thought that I might at some time suggest either of us could at end these talks bring up any procedural matters we considered appropriate and any discussion higher level meeting should be deferred until that time. This would be consistent our present position and still keep pot of gold dangling. Unless we do something this nature seems to me in spite our best efforts going to become increasingly clear to CHICOMS that there is nothing for them in item two. We must postpone as long as possible their coming to this conclusion, and this is becoming increasingly difficult.

Gowen

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## 266. Telegram 818 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 5, 1955, 6 p.m.

818. From Johnson.

NCNA correspondent here has today apparently dropped line imprisoned Americans not covered by agreed announcement. Is now

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-555. Confidential.

feeding line cases being reviewed and “pressure” on CHICOMs release raises problem of face, making action difficult.

Gowen

Note: Mr. Waddell’s office (FE) notified 10/5/55 3:39 p.m. EMB (CWO)

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## 267. Telegram 819 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 5, 1955, 10 p.m.

819. From Johnson.

1. At 19th meeting October 5, I asked Wang if he had some replies to questions I had asked him last meeting.

2. Wang read from long prepared statement. He said he believed both of us recognized our discussion agenda item two thus far had been unsatisfactory. It had been nearly a month since agreement on return of civilians from both sides concluded, but we were still spending time on details of implementation thus preventing us from proceeding to discussion agenda item two. At last meeting I had raised questions which went into details of implementation of agreement. Such questions might well be put to Chinese Government in accordance with terms of agreement by third state entrusted with functions. In our case it would be United Kingdom. Since both sides had entrusted respective third states perform functions, we should trust Embassy or office of Charge of third states to handle detailed questions on implementation of agreement instead of interfering with our talks here.

3. Wang said he could not agree with way questions on implementation being used by me to prevent discussion substance of item two. He had suggested at last meeting that our assistants get together to discuss details of implementation and consider any reasonable suggestions I might wish make. I had turned down proposal, however, so under circumstances he thought questions on implementation should be addressed to Chinese Government through UK Charge.

4. He said I had also put forward two subjects under agenda item two and had raised question of order of subjects. He had indicated he could not agree to removal any of his subjects nor to any fixed order for discussion. There was no necessity for carrying on prolonged

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–555. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

argument on such procedural questions. Under agenda item two "other practical matters" we had agreed each side could raise any question it thought should be discussed so that there would be free expression of opinions. Therefore, it was not necessary limit subjects for discussion nor to fix order. Both sides could express opinions on all subjects raised and proceed take action first on points on which we able reach accord. Thus we would keep from falling into controversy over procedural matters and not hinder talks from making further progress.

5. He said on September 14 he had put forward two subjects for discussion under agenda item two: "question of embargo" and "preparations for Sino-American negotiations at a higher level." He had explained what he meant by two subjects. He could not agree that higher level meeting was not a "practical matter." I had said at last meeting his suggestion appeared to imply a decision even before discussion at this level that it impossible for us settle practical matters in these talks. His suggestions, on contrary, did not contain this implication at all. His proposal that each side could raise any subject it wished discuss should have removed any misunderstanding this score. Opinion his side it more practical to negotiate at a higher level such major questions as easing and eliminating tension between China and US in Taiwan area. It was definitely practical matter and fit subject for these talks to arrange such practical and feasible channels as might be needed to settle issues of outstanding importance between China and US.

6. Wang continued by saying I had maintained a higher level meeting could only be held after these talks. His side had also envisaged that the higher level meeting should come after these talks were completed. That was no reason we should not arrange for convening higher level conference here. If we fail to make arrangement here it would make convening higher level conference more difficult.

7. He said he also wanted to know my opinion on question of embargo. I had stated last meeting I had two subjects: accounting for US personnel and renunciation of use of force. However, I had not given any explanation of these two subjects. He found it hard to understand why subject "so-called accounting" had been raised. At outset of talks on agenda item one he had given list 87 Americans which represented all Americans in China. It included all Americans both civilian and military. If by raising subject I had intended imply there were still more Americans in China this was sheer fabrication which his side not able accept. Up to now our side had not submitted to his side list of all Chinese in US. If there was to be any accounting at all it was up to our side give him complete list Chinese.

8. Wang said with respect to question renunciation of force, we should distinguish between civil war (internal conflicts) and international disputes. Civil conflicts clearly would fall outside terms of reference these talks. But even with respect to civil conflicts China had striven for peaceful solutions when circumstances permitted. Fact was that Chiang clique under wings of foreign forces had refused peaceful settlement and carried on harassing activities. Wang's side could not stand by and do nothing.

9. He said that with respect to international disputes, they had always upheld their settlement by negotiation. China in association with other countries had initiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. They had consistently supported the provisions of Charter of United Nations concerning settlement of disputes by peaceful means and calling for no recourse to force. During Asian African conference in Bandung China had explicitly stated its position this regard and joined with others in issuing statements. With respect Sino-American relations Chou En-lai had repeatedly and explicitly stated that there was no war between China and United States, that Chinese people did not want to fight with America, and we should sit down and negotiate. Secretary of State Dulles had also said that no fighting going on in Taiwan area between Chinese and Americans. Therefore, there was no question of arranging cease-fire between China and America.

10. He said if we were to discuss renunciation of force that it was precisely US which was using force to achieve national objectives. Taiwan was Chinese territory. It was restored to China after World War II. And yet US had encroached upon it, and occupied it and would use force to prevent liberation of Taiwan and islands off coast China. If we discussed question then we would have to discuss withdrawal all US forces from Taiwan and islands. They had recognized that it would be very difficult to settle this question in these talks so they did not raise it. However, if we wished to discuss it here and I had full authority to discuss and settle this problem he was ready to discuss it with me.

11. He concluded saying that in previous meeting I had said I had faith and hope that two of us would make progress on practical matters and would strive to do so. He warmly welcomed this statement and assured me he would strive to best his ability realize that hope. Meanwhile, he wanted point out in all frankness that if we were to realize hope of both of us we would have to strive harder than before, and both should prove desire we had expressed by our actual deeds.

12. In reply I said he had made a long statement and I wanted to carefully study and consider it. But first I wanted to deal with question of implementation agreed announcement. He had expressed desire not to spend too much time on details and I certainly agree as I had told him at last meeting. Furthermore, I did not see why it should be necessary

for us to do so. He had suggested that these be dealt with through UK Charge or Indian Embassy. I wanted point out agreed announcement provided for certain actions to be taken by our respective governments and provided for other functions to be performed by other countries. Those matters which according to agreed announcement concerned actions by our governments were an intergovernmental matter between us. Words of agreed announcement resolved nothing, but only implementation of these words would resolve problem with which we were concerned under agenda item one. Some of questions I had raised had also been raised by UK Charge in Peking but satisfactory replies had not been received by him.

13. In addition to question of 19 Americans in jail, I had raised three simple questions at several meetings. In accordance with his suggestion I had rephrased these questions in the form of suggestions which he had said his government would be willing to consider. These three suggestions were simply: (1) I asked whether or not he could confirm that Americans in jail had been given text of agreed announcement in language they could understand. We had received no information from UK Charge confirming this done. It seemed very simple matter and he could simply answer with yes which would dispose of this question. (2) I asked whether or not those persons in jail could freely communicate with or otherwise have access to UK Charge in accordance with terms agreed announcement. Again very simple affirmative answer could dispose of this question here. (3) I asked whether or not UK Charge would be permitted interview persons who desired return if under agreed announcement US wanted facts in any such case investigated. Again simple affirmative answer would dispose this question here.

14. I considered these matters of implementation of announcement ones which concerned both our governments. These questions had also been raised by UK Charge and replies satisfactory to US had not been received through him. I found it difficult understand why I could not have answers to these simple questions. Difficult understand why his government appeared be moving so slowly in implementing agreed announcement and thus delaying our talks here. Best way make progress would be for his government implement announcement and for him frankly inform me here in this regard. At last meeting he had assured me that his government would faithfully carry out agreed announcement. He told me that cases of remaining 19 Americans were being reviewed individually and that British Charge would be notified of results of these reviews. Yet, up to present time, I did not know of a single such case which has been reported to British Charge, despite fact a month had passed since issuance of agreed announcement. I found difficult see how this was "faithful implementation" of the announcement. Apparent failure his government, up to the present, to



give benefit of agreed announcement to imprisoned Americans made it meaningless as far as Americans in his country were concerned.

15. I said in view of his government's continued delay in permitting any of 19 Americans to return, I was becoming more concerned over a statement which he made at our 17th meeting on September 23. He had said that agreed announcement concerned civilians, and not those he termed criminals or persons who had violated laws. He implied that persons in jail were not "civilians" and therefore not covered by provisions of agreed announcement. He did not mention nor even hint at such an interpretation of agreed announcement during course of our discussions prior to September 10 and I wanted to make it clear that I could not accept any such construction of announcement. I asked him to confirm to me that agreed announcement applied to all American civilians whether or not they were in his jails.

16. I said that at our last meeting also he had referred to my proposal, made during course of our discussions, that he specify a definite period of time within which all Americans in his country would be allowed to leave. As he had pointed out, he refused to specify any length of time. I had expressed to him a number of times my government's dissatisfaction with his government's refusal to accede to this reasonable proposal. Nevertheless, in interest of advancing these talks and on basis of his assurances that imprisoned Americans would be released expeditiously, my government did consent to issuance of the agreed announcement, even in absence of a specific time limit for release of Americans. His remarks at last meeting made it appear he interpreted my government's concession in not insisting on a definite time limit as constituting agreement to indefinite delay by his government in releasing Americans. I emphatically rejected any such interpretation and stated clearly and unequivocally that my government considered that agreed announcement provided for expeditious departure from his country of all Americans who desired to return to United States, including those Americans still imprisoned.

17. I said he had also repeated several times at our last meeting that only improved relations between our two countries could enable his government to take "more lenient" attitude toward Americans in prison. It was difficult for us not to interpret this as an intent by his government to disregard explicit terms of our announcement and to hold these human beings as hostages for political advantage.

18. I said my government had issued agreed announcement in good faith, promptly and energetically began to implement it and fully expected that his government would do same. My government attached no political conditions to its carrying out of terms announcement and does not intend to do so. Chinese were permitted to leave United States freely even before issuance of agreed announcement and

since that time have continued to depart freely. From July 11 to October 3, 402 Chinese left United States for Far East.

19. I said he had accused my government of intentionally stalling in order not to begin discussion of subjects introduced under agenda item two. I did not see any basis for such an accusation. My government acted with great promptness to implement agreed announcement and thus cleared way for promptly going on to item two. It was only failure of his government to act with equal promptness which had resulted in slowing progress of talks. If stalling was involved, it should be obvious that that was where fault lay.

20. I said he had also implied that if his government were to release all Americans promptly, this would be submitting to pressure. I did not see how carrying out promptly an obligation which a government had freely and publicly accepted could be regarded as submitting to pressure. My government certainly did not consider it was submitting to pressure in setting up arrangements for India to assist departure of Chinese from the US and taking other action it had taken with respect to Chinese in the US. Why should it be considered any more submission to pressure for his government to do what it publicly declared in our agreed announcement it was going to do?

21. I said I would comment later on some other points raised in remainder his statement.

22. Wang replied he considered all remarks I had just made belonged in field agenda item one which we had already covered in our discussion and to which his side had already replied. Regarding implementation agreement he had repeatedly said his side would carry out agreement faithfully. However he would not allow any distorted interpretation of agreement question return of Americans in prison had to be dealt with according Chinese law. His side would continue review cases these people but action on part his government could only be carried out in light of conditions which he had told me. That is their cases would be reviewed by taking into account degree of their offenses, their conduct, and improvement relations between two countries in light of agreement we had reached. Only under such circumstances would it be possible his government adopt measures more lenient than present very lenient measures being taken. He could not agree to changing legal procedures of China and conditions he had informed me of and demand that Chinese Government do certain things unconditionally.

23. Wang said with respect question details implementation agreement he had suggested assistants both sides hold meetings at which our side could put forward any reasonable suggestion it wished. As he had said in statement this morning these questions might also be raised by UK Charge with his government. In his view if we continued

entangle talks in such details it would not contribute to progress in our talks. Fault for stalling talks which prevented a full exchange of views on agenda item two was not theirs and they were not satisfied with state of things.

24. I said I was not satisfied either. I had asked him again in this meeting questions which I had asked in previous meetings. Instead of discussing where these questions should be discussed, referring them to third country or referring them to our assistants, these questions could be disposed of in a few minutes between us. He had spoken of my distorting the interpretation of announcement. If I had distorted it in any way that was what I wanted to know. I had asked him to confirm to me whether his government interpreted announcement to apply to all civilians whether or not they were in prison. This was vital matter between our two governments and not one which could be dealt with by assistants or third powers. Other three questions I had asked him had also been raised by UK Charge in Peiping and he had not received any satisfactory replies to them. Certainly Wang could simply say yes, Americans in prison had been given text agreed announcement in language which they understood. Certainly he could say yes those Americans have been given freedom communicate with UK Charge. Certainly he could say yes UK Charge would be permitted interview these persons who desired return if my government wanted facts in their cases to be investigated. I did not see why we spent so much time on this matter either but I did not see why direct replies should be avoided. I never suggested that action his government took to implement announcement should disregard Chinese legal processes and it was assumed that his government had taken this into consideration when he agreed announcement. Again I wished to say I had made no demands. I was merely asking how announcement was being implemented.

25. Wang said he had already answered some of questions I had raised previously and this was not place for discussing other questions. If we continued to put forward all questions dealt with in our meetings in past he would have to say these questions were being used to stall progress of meetings. If we discuss questions which should not belong within field of discussion in this meeting then their discussion for even one minute was a waste of time. He could not understand why we repeat work which could be done by the third states after we had entrusted these third states in accordance with agreed announcement. If we had any reasonable suggestions these could be raised in a meeting of assistants instead of continuing discussion here and thus preventing progress. No necessity discuss these questions at this meeting because if I felt I had reasonable suggestions to make we might as well arrange special meeting of assistants to consider any reasonable suggestions.

26. Wang said since 15th meeting we had held four sessions and discussion agenda item two was still in beginning stage so easy see why he was dissatisfied with progress of talks. He hoped at meeting of Ambassadors when we had limited time at our disposal we would not bring up over and over again those questions we had dealt with in past. If we went on this way it would prevent discussion of major issues we came here to discuss. Points I have raised had been dealt with by his side many times. Remaining Americans who had violated laws were only handful and they would be dealt with in light of agreement reached, in accordance with Chinese legal procedures, and considering the seriousness of their crimes and their conduct. Individual reviews of their cases would be made and when completed his side would inform UK which was third country entrusted by our side. It not necessary for us to discuss at this meeting questions of this nature.

27. I asked if it was correct that his government did consider terms of agreed announcement applied to all American civilians including prisoners.

28. Wang said he had already replied to this question and he could not make any interpretation beyond his statement.

29. I said it was very simple question but I had difficulty interpreting his reply. All I had asked for was clarification.

30. Wang asked if I was not clear about answers he had given me.

31. I said no, I was not.

32. Wang read again from prepared text which he said was only reply he could give because it was in conformity with agreed announcement.

33. I asked whether phrase "in light of agreement" could be translated as "in accordance with agreement." At that point there was some discussion between interpreters during which it appeared "in light of" should from beginning have been translated "in accordance with."

34. I said I had no intention of belaboring point but he had said he had also answered my other questions. If he had done so in previous meetings I may have missed his answers. I asked if he felt he had answered my other questions.

35. Wang replied he had answered some of them.

36. I said I could not recall when.

37. Wang said I might refer to record of meetings.

38. I said I had done so and I could not find his answers. I had no intention of belaboring point, but I wanted to know if each American had received text of agreed announcement in English.

39. Wang said this question had been answered in past.

40. Was answer "yes"?

41. He said, “yes, of course.” It was provided that agreed announcement be given wide publicity.

42. I said may be some did not see announcement and there was special responsibility on part his government to see that those in prison had been given copies of announcement. I simply wanted to know if that had been done.

43. Wang said he had told me that agreed announcement provided for wide publicity which meant that everyone should know about it. He had told me his side was faithfully carrying out agreement. This question was one of those which arose out of implementation of agreement. Didn’t I trust them to faithfully implement agreement?

44. I said I was not raising question of trust and accepted his statement. I naturally had a question because some of those Americans released from prison had not heard of agreed announcement. I merely wanted him to assure me that the appropriate authorities in his country had made sure the text of agreed announcement was given to prisoners. I was willing accept his assurances this had been done.

45. Wang said his side would implement fully anything required of them by agreed announcement. He did not believe information on which I had based my statement was accurate.

46. I replied I had merely passed on to him information which those who had been released had given to us. I hoped he would assure himself that others had been informed. I hoped I could accept his statement regarding implementation of agreed announcement as indicating persons in jail would have freedom to communicate with UK Charge and that he would be permitted to interview them. UK Charge had received no communication from any of individuals concerned although almost one month had now passed since agreed announcement issued. This was difficult for us to understand.

47. Following long pause Wang said he had nothing to say in this regard. He asked if I had anything to say on points he had raised.

48. I asked if he were unable to give me an answer to these two questions. I did not want to discuss them at length.

49. Wang said he did not consider it necessary to answer these questions here. As he had suggested, they could be handled in a meeting of assistants or through third powers.

50. I said these questions had already been raised by UK Charge and no replies received. I hoped he could assure me that replies would be received by UK Charge promptly. If he received replies it would not be necessary raise questions here.

51. Wang said he had nothing to say.

52. I said this was very disappointing to me. Regarding remainder of his statement I wished to study it carefully because it was long and

I would reply in detail at next meeting. I would hope at next meeting question implementation would be satisfactorily resolved so not necessary to spend time on that.

53. I said I had made suggestion last meeting regarding subjects we might discuss and order in which we might discuss them. It seemed me it would contribute to orderly progress our discussion if we had some understanding regarding order we would discuss questions. Regarding item on accounting for US personnel I had in mind question of military personnel still missing from Korean hostilities concerning whom my government had reason believe authorities in his country might have some information. However I considered problem of renunciation of force as most important and most fundamental subject with which we had to deal. Therefore, I considered we should discuss that first and we would be prepared at next meeting to go into that subject.

54. I said I welcomed his statement that he shared my hope we could make progress in dealing with some of these problems here. I believed we could. It seemed to me, only after we saw what progress we were able to make here, that question of what would happen after these meetings would arise. I had given my thoughts regarding discussion of meeting at higher level and what he had said in that regard did not change my view previously expressed that this was procedural matter. I honestly did not see how question of where or in what forum we discussed these issues between us was an issue in itself. These were two different matters. First was practical questions between two countries. Entirely apart from these was where they should be discussed and by whom. My government had agreed to our discussing these practical questions here. I could not see how proposal of another place to discuss these questions was in itself a practical matter, and nothing he had said had served to change my mind on this. I desired to make a careful reply to rest of his statement at next meeting.

55. Wang said by item "accounting for personnel" had I in mind personnel in Korea conflict?

56. I said American personnel.

57. Wang said he thought there was no reason for raising this question which had already become famous because of discussions regarding it at Kaesong and Panmunjom. He felt it regrettable that questions of Korean War which had already been discussed were being put forward at this meeting. If there was to be any talk about accounting for personnel it was for United States to account for personnel it detained in Korean War. If I wanted to raise this question he would also reserve right raise similar question of this nature.

58. Wang said he could not accept our contention that discussion preparations for higher level meeting was merely procedural matter. He had in mind that issues outstanding importance between China

and US would be more practically discussed between two governments at higher level. This did not mean that higher level conference would replace our talks, but simply that there were number of questions which could be more appropriately discussed in certain forums at certain places. He said an illustration was fact that before our talks started here, contacts were made between our consular representatives. The American side had proposed these contacts be raised to Ambassadorial level because it was found that there were some questions which could not be settled by consular representatives and which could be resolved in a conference at Ambassadorial level. His side considered there were still other questions which could be more practically resolved in higher level conference. If I had full authority to resolve important and outstanding questions arising in Taiwan area, then he was ready discuss these questions with me. At next meeting when I made more detailed reply he would comment further.

59. I said I had nothing more.

60. Wang proposed we meet again October 8 and I agreed.

61. I said I would like to issue the same press statement we had made after last meeting.

62. Wang said he had indicated he would not agree to issue any more statements similar to one after last meeting. He suggested a statement saying we continued discussion on second item of agenda and omitting any reference to agenda item one. He added this form was exactly similar to press releases during discussion agenda item one and suggested we might use it for entire period of discussion agenda item two.

63. I said I did not want to go back over our substantive discussion, this release was not entirely factual because we had also discussed implementation of agreed announcement.

64. Wang said implementation of agreed announcement was supplementary question and not main issue. Furthermore implementation was not listed on agenda, therefore, no justification for including statement on implementation item one.

65. I said I disagreed because I considered implementation agreed announcement as major item and whether or not he agreed in this position, it was one I had taken at meeting. I was unable agree with his suggestion and if he was unable accept mine may be best follow his suggestion last meeting we say nothing about subjects discussed.

66. He agreed to release: "The Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China held their 19th meeting today. The next meeting will be held at 10 am Saturday, October 8."

Gowen



**268. Telegram 834 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 6, 1955, 5:35 p.m.

834. For Johnson.

Penultimate paragraph Department's 826.

Father McGuire of NCWC advises Belgian priest's report not based on recent contact with Walsh. Walsh's superior sent him telegram September 23 instructing him leave Red China and report travel plans soonest. Although no word yet from Walsh, McGuire assures us Walsh will comply these instructions.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-655. Official Use Only. Drafted by Nagoski.

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**269. Telegram 838 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 6, 1955, 7:16 p.m.

838. For Johnson.

Your 817. Guidance for 20th Meeting Oct. 8.

1. Omission of any reference at next meeting to serious Chinese Communist dereliction in implementation Agreed Announcement would result in failure to reflect our continuous concern at absence any evidence Chinese Communist good faith in last four weeks. It would be inappropriate to conceal our preoccupation with this all-important issue at any meeting while Chinese Communist compliance remains incomplete. We wish keep box score on detained Americans constantly before Wang until all released.

2. However we recognize that repetitive debate on this question at next meeting might be counterproductive. You are authorized to confine your remarks on this subject to a short but emphatic recall of total Chinese Communist non-performance since September 10. Remind Wang that British Charge d'Affaires so far has been entirely unable

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-555. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in draft by Phleger and by Sebald.



perform any functions envisaged for him under Agreed Announcement; register our profound dissatisfaction and concern; state that there has been no announcement of release any Americans in last four weeks although QUOTE expeditious UNQUOTE release pledged; and end with observation that we shall continually scrutinize record of Chinese Communist performance or non-performance most closely.

3. After making this brief statement and without insisting on further discussion, you may then proceed with renunciation of force item. Presentation of statement approved. Material for your use in later discussions now being prepared.

4. It is not essential to fix a rigid order of all agenda items under Point Two at next meeting although this may serve as subject for discussion.

5. We have requested Foreign Office to instruct O'Neill to put your three unanswered questions to Chinese Communist Foreign Office through formal approach. Text of our memorandum to British being sent you separately.

6. Meetings only three or four days apart are too frequent. FYI Other demands on Secretary and senior officers Department are so heavy that Geneva developments cannot be appraised and new instructions approved at such short intervals. In future endeavor arrange minimum one week interval.

Dulles

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## 270. Letter 11 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 11

Geneva, October 6, 1955

Dear Walter:

I have received both your letters No. 16 and No. 17 and found them very interesting and helpful. I know the time these take from your hectic day, but want you to know that from my standpoint it is well worth while.

I was sorry to miss writing you last week, but just could not make it and felt I had thoroughly covered the situation in my telegrams. At the last minute I decided to drive to Prague in the new Oldsmobile I had delivered to me here. Left at 5 a.m. and got to Prague at 9 p.m.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

clocking exactly 635 miles on the speedometer. I drove back on Monday the same way, but do not think I will repeat as it is pretty strenuous. However, I was very glad I went. Harold Vedeler has just arrived up there as Counselor and we had a good chance to talk things over. Also made a lot of calls including the Acting Foreign Minister, picked up much information, and made arrangements with the Czechs for Vedeler to start on the extensive economic negotiations which I had been hoping to carry out but which could not wait any longer. Also made arrangements for me to keep track of the negotiations here. There will come a time when I should probably go up there for about a week to help out. Found to my surprise the Czech press and radio are reporting my movements in considerable detail.

While I think of it, would you ask Newt to send to me here the FE and UN tear sheets from the Daily Summary that he has been sending to Prague. I will find them very useful here.

As I indicated in my telegram, I felt the renunciation of force statement to be a masterpiece and am anxious to use it. I was sorely tempted to do so at yesterday's meeting but as I got along all right without it decided to hold off in pursuance of the objective of stringing things out.

As I have also indicated I am still far from happy with the missing military personnel statement although it is an enormous improvement over the first draft you sent me. I hope that I did not ruffle too many feelings in my comments on it, but I wanted to make it absolutely clear that I had no doubt it was just the wrong way to go about things. Frankly, I do not see why we have to let Defense have such a big voice in exactly how I handle the matter here. It does not seem to me that is their business. They should give us the problem and the information and then it should primarily be our decision on how it is handled. It seems to me that too much attention is being paid to the public aspects of my presentation. After all the meetings are closed, there should not be any occasion to make the details of what I say on the subject public, and when publicity is given to the matter it can be handled in way we and Defense desire. It still does not seem to me that a sterile rehash of the Panmunjom approach is the way to go about the matter in this forum. I was, therefore, seeking for some new approach in a maximum effort to achieve some results rather than approaching the matter from the standpoint of building up a public record that looks good on paper to the "give them hell" school of thought. I am sorry, but I wanted to get this off my chest, and having said it will go ahead and do what I am told. It probably does not make too much difference as we are not likely to get anything in any event. Perhaps it might have the good effect of goading them into raising the subject of the 21,000 and this could furnish material for much discussion.

Incidentally, I fully share your concern over the detailed material I have available to support my position on the 450 and hope I am never forced into details.

There is another subject I have never raised in my telegrams on which I would appreciate some word in a telegram if you do not agree with my understanding. It has not yet arisen in our meetings but may well do so. Even accepting our present position on a list of subjects for discussion under item two, I do not interpret this as precluding the raising of other subjects by either side during the course of the talks. We, of course, do not in any way commit ourselves in advance to discuss any subject, but it seems to me that either side can raise any subject it might desire. We might change our mind about old subjects, or something entirely new might come up which it would be desired I raise here. In any event it seems to me consistent with our position that we not close the door to the raising of new subjects.

I believe that the suggestion with regard to giving some restrained publicity to the possibility of travel to the PRC when detained Americans are out to be excellent. You will recall that in my dinner conversations with Wang he showed considerable interest in this and believe that it is a very definite bait for them. I would think it well that anything that is said not be in too black and white terms; i.e., not to say that never will any passport be issued until all Americans are out, but rather somewhat blandly to assume that implementation of the Agreed Announcement will shortly be completed and then passports could in appropriate cases be validated.

Incidentally, I thought the Secretary's press conference statement on Tuesday was excellent and very helpful. Just as a small note I have got some ribbing from the correspondents here that after all my explanations of the difference between an "Agreed Announcement" and an "Agreement", the Secretary uses "Agreement" in his statement although I feel his usage was entirely unexceptional.

I am also sorry about all the confusion with the CAS man and Colm. He was a very nice fellow and I hope that CAS does not feel I was ungracious, as it certainly was kind of them to offer to help. As I told you, he stoutly said CAS had no desire to keep him here to gather background although I made it entirely clear to him that he was entirely welcome to do so and I would give him full cooperation.

I do appreciate your successful efforts to get my instructions to me at least the day before the meeting although I know the problem this represents at times. For a time I was receiving them on the morning of the meeting and this makes things pretty tight for me. One of the difficulties with this is the danger that because of decoding difficulties I would miss something. One morning I had to go to a meeting with the knowledge that there was a NIACT for me which they

had not yet been able to unscramble as it required servicing by the Department. Fortunately, it did not turn out to be anything of great importance for that particular meeting but it gave me a very uneasy feeling for the time being.

I am very glad that you have established direct contact with the UK Embassy in Washington so as to keep them fully informed on matters of direct concern to them. It seems to me very important that O'Neill and I know very promptly and fully what the other is doing. Give Hubert Graves my very best. It is a comfort to know that he is back.

I think I have rather fully covered the major questions in my telegrams and will not repeat them here. I hope shortly to receive the Department's study on renunciation of force. The prepared statement gives me an excellent opening but am anxious to have the full background of our thinking.

If and when we ever get around to "embargo", I wonder whether a simple explanation of the rationale behind our trade controls is going to be the best approach. It seems to me we have a choice between a presentation that assumes they are never in our minds going to qualify for any relaxation, or that there are certain standards which if they met we would consider relaxation. We have also got to be clear as to when we are talking about our total embargo, the CHINCOM level and the Soviet level.

As you know I never did feel that we were going to obtain any quick or mass release of the remaining Americans, and still feel it is going to be a long slow process. If there were no compulsion to keep the talks going, there would be many things we could do which might or might not be successful. However, I do not see how I can go much farther than I have and still keep them going. There is no doubt their asking price for the release of all of the remainder is something on the embargo, but most important of all the Foreign Ministers' meeting. It is a dirty business on their part, but that is the way they are playing the game. How much less they would settle for remains to be seen. If we are going to keep the talks going, I do not see much choice but to keep postponing as long as possible any final conclusion on their part they are going to get nothing out of them. I think Americans will begin shortly to trickle out but doubt that we are going to get them all any time soon. Perhaps the Secretary can use Molotov during the Foreign Ministers' Conference here quietly to bring some pressure on them. However, the difficulty is what we are able impliedly to promise or threaten. I do not see we have much ammunition in the way of threats, neither do I see we are able to say much in the way of implied promises. The only real weapon we have is using the pressure of foreign opinion on their performance under the Agreed Announcement and I think the time is approaching that we should do so. I do not

think public opinion is too much of a factor. I think we might consider rather fully briefing our Ambassadors in such countries as India, Indonesia, Burma, Moscow, etc. so that they could at suitable opportunities point out to the government leaders there how the CHICOMS are failing to live up to their pledged word and this would filter back to Peiping.

I wonder how we will organize things when the Secretary is here for the Foreign Ministers' Conference. It will be important that things not operate so as to tend to cut you and Walter out, and hope that you will discuss it with the Secretary before he leaves.

Your praise of my handling of things is most generous and heartening, but I hope you will be equally frank in passing on any criticisms that you feel should be considered. I know that there are many opinions on how to handle something like this and it is only by my sifting out as many of them as possible that I can reach what I hope are sound conclusions.

All the best.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. I would appreciate your continuing to pass on anything you pick up on what is happening with respect to the Indian arrangement. I suppose they will get a certain number of approaches from persons hoping to get a free ride home.

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**271. Telegram 841 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 7, 1955, 1:24 p.m.

841. For Johnson. Deptel 809.

Telegraph Clough's departure date. In absence special considerations not known to Department, request he endeavor depart immediately after reports completed October 3 meeting.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-755. Official Use Only. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in FE/EX and by Sebald.

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272. Telegram 847 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 7, 1955, 6:48 p.m.

847. For Johnson.

Chicom attention to Geneva talks and Taiwan issue during past week slightly increased over previous week, but still relatively small in proportion total propaganda output. General tone Peiping propaganda continues to be rather hostile to US. US accused of delaying talks and having "negative attitude" at Geneva. US also again accused of causing tension in Taiwan area. However Peiping reiterates need for "peaceful international environment" and willingness hold direct talks on Taiwan issue with US.

Main commentary on Geneva talks given by Observer PEOPLE'S DAILY October 3 alleged US does "not want fast progress in discussions." Concerning Americans still held on mainland observer stated that "all cases of Americans who have committed crimes in China must be dealt with individually according to Chinese legal procedures." This asserted to be "inviolable sovereign right" of China. Peiping will inform US through UK as to "results of investigations." Turning to question of Chinese nationals in US observer commented there were still many in US who did not dare apply for return China due to "long years of intimidation and persecution." US willingness permit return would be test of US "sincerity."

Major commentaries on Taiwan issue given in speeches celebrating National Day October 1. Order of Day from Min of Defense P'eng Te-huai ordered troops "be prepared for combat duty at all times," and stressed need for continued vigilance against "traitorous Chiang clique on Taiwan . . . plotting to stage a counterrevolutionary return" to mainland; Emphasized progress made in strengthening armed forces; Stated that China needed "peaceful international environment for long period," in order build socialism; Outlined basic aims of Chicom foreign policy as establishment normal relations all countries, easing of tensions, attainment peaceful coexistence; Reaffirmed Chicom willingness strengthen Geneva spirit and hold direct talks US on Taiwan issue and reiterated Peiping's determination liberate Taiwan.

Chou En-lai speech Sept. 29 at National Day celebration banquet noted growing world demand for relaxation tension and peaceful coexistence and stated Chinese people need peaceful environment to build their nation. Chi Ambassador Moscow Liu Hsiao in PRAVDA article

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-755. Official Use Only. Drafted by Jacobson; cleared in CA and IAD.

October 1 stated Peiping “consistently defends need to solve all international questions by peaceful means.”

Article by Louis Saillant, WFTU Secty Gen, appearing Peiping DAILY WORKER Oct. 3 stressed importance Summit conference as landmark in easing tensions and as factor causing “retreat” of those advocating positions of strength. But added that many unsettled problems remain including Taiwan Korea and Indochina and this no time for complacent optimism.

Dulles

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**273. Telegram 852 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 7, 1955, 8:34 p.m.

852. For Johnson.

Your 819, para 13, cites 19 still in jail. Your despatch No. 1 of August 3 lists 25 in jail. Seven of these since released, making balance still in jail 18. Comment.

Dulles

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–555. Official Use Only. Drafted by Nagoski.

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**274. Telegram 833 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 8, 1955, midnight

833. From Johnson.

1. This morning’s meeting one hour twenty minutes. I led off with relatively brief but pointed statement on dissatisfaction with

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–855. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.

implementation, then made statement on renunciation of force giving Wang a copy.

2. Wang then made very long prepared statement replying my charges at last meeting on implementation, saying nothing new and rehashing old statements on item two. Alleged I had violated secrecy of talks by informing press I had raised subject missing military personnel.

3. In reply my brief rebuttal pointing out best my knowledge UK Charge had no answers questions on implementation, replied so far as he knew no "formal" approach from UK Charge.

4. He made brief ad lib reply our renunciation of force statement using same arguments as previous meetings.

5. I replied briefly emphasizing importance and carefully considered character our statement, made no charges against PRC, did not propose his government say anything my government not prepared to say, was made in most earnest desire contribute progress these talks, and was put forward as earnest, constructive effort deal with problems he and I called upon deal with here. Asked for careful study and considered reply by his government.

6. He asked I be prepared next meeting discuss embargo. I pointed out my statement today dealt with timing discussion this subject. In reply he again rejected any concept of fixed order of discussion. I pointed out today's statement dealt with matter from important substantive aspect rather than procedural.

7. With respect allegation on leaks to press replied both he and I knew reports were not accurate, therefore clearly did not originate with me but were probably assumptions based on earlier public statements made in US even before beginning these talks. He did not pursue subject.

8. Next meeting Friday, October 14.

**Gowen**



**275. Telegram 835 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 8, 1955, 5 p.m.

835. From Johnson. Deptel 852.

Communists list 19 Americans “who have committed crimes”. All in jail except Mrs. Bradshaw who apparently removed from jail due deterioration her health, but still held under some sort bond or guarantee arrangement and is therefore under restraint. Wang has never corrected me on use this figure and has in fact used it himself. (My telegram 795, paragraph 20). Her situation with respect to departure is therefore exactly same as 18 others; that is, she cannot depart until favorable review of her “criminal” case. I cannot of course accept Wang’s terminology and my use of “Americans in jail” is I believe reasonably accurate and also seems acceptable to him.

For purposes of any public statement it would be best speak of 18 in jail and one accused of crime and under house arrest.

**Gowen**

Note: Copy to Mr. Carwell (FE:DO) 2:50 p.m., 10/7/CWO–JRL

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–855. Confidential.

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**276. Telegram 836 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 8, 1955, 5 p.m.

836. From Johnson.

1. Today’s meeting held no surprises except at amount of time Wang devoted to answering my charges on implementation. Contrary to my expectation he was prepared for violent debate with me on this. However I believe our tactics worked out well. They threw him off balance and at the same time permitted us make our point without becoming involved in possibly counterproductive discussion.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–855. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

2. Should have noted in Mytel 833 that during course of complaints our implementation to effect we have not given him names of Chinese departing from US for Far East he stated they were going to ask Indians investigate matter. Presumption was were going request Indians obtain from US names of Chinese departing for Far East "so that they could check." I did not pick up this obvious effort enlarge Indian functions beyond scope agreed announcement as I thought it preferable to see whether GOI attempts to act on request. If GOI acts believe we should be prepared immediately and categorically point out to GOI request for such info beyond agreed scope GOI functions. If feasible would believe it preferable informally intimate this to GOI before any request received and attempt encourage GOI turn down request on own responsibility.

3. As far as next meeting is concerned believe my tactic must be to do everything possible keep issue focused on renunciation of force as first and essential question. If his reply to my statement today shows any flicker of constructive response I would endeavor pin down and clarify by questions but avoid any substantive reply. If he repeats old line on Taiwan I would propose point to today's statement that renunciation of force essential foundation and preliminary to success discussion this or any other his matters under item two.

4. Handling of implementation will depend on what if anything has developed in Peiping by time next meeting.

5. I do not for time being propose use statement on missing military personnel but will be alert immediately do so if it appears could not safely be further postponed.

**Gowen**

Note: Copy to Mr. Carwell (FE:DO) 2:50 p.m., 10/7/CWO-JRL

## **277. Telegram 837 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 8, 1955, 7 p.m.

837. From Johnson.

1. I opened 20th meeting today with a prepared statement saying I was anxious for our discussions to move ahead. I regretted as much

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-855. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

as he did that at every meeting I had to devote time to discussion of implementation of agreed announcement. I had to remind him again that it was only his government's failure to act promptly to implement agreed announcement which made this necessary.

2. In four weeks since September 10 his government had failed to release single one of 19 Americans whose cases, he assured me, were to be "expeditiously" reviewed. United Kingdom Charge had so far been entirely unable perform any of functions envisaged for him in agreed announcement. Neither had Wang been willing to assure me here whether Charge would in fact be enabled by Wang's government perform these functions.

3. I said my government was profoundly dissatisfied with his government's failure to implement agreed announcement. We could not but conclude that announcement had thus far been meaningless with respect to these 19 Americans. It was very disappointing that four weeks had passed without any improvement whatsoever in this unsatisfactory situation. I wanted assure him that my government would continue to be concerned so long as Americans in his country were not allowed expeditiously to exercise their right to return, as provided in agreed announcement, and would scrutinize most closely his government's performance this regard.

4. I had brought up this matter of implementation of agreed announcement before any other subject this morning again to indicate how important it was for progress of our talks here. I wanted him to know that these questions on implementation must continue to be uppermost in my mind and that I could not devote my full attention to other matters before us so long as Americans were denied their right to return.

5. I pointed out that at our last meeting Wang had made some remarks with respect to my proposal that under our second agenda item we first discuss question of renunciation of force for achievement of national objectives. Said from his remarks I believed he might not have had clear idea of what I had in mind this regard. In accordance with what I had told him at last meeting, I was prepared today to amplify and more fully explain this proposal.

6. I then read full text statement renunciation of force (Deptels 789 and 805) and handed Wang copy.

7. Wang then read from long prepared statement. He said I had alleged his government had not acted promptly on implementation agreement and thus delayed our talks. He could not accept this allegation. Already five meetings had been held since agreement reached on return of civilians of both sides. At first meeting following agreement his side introduced two subjects for discussion in accordance with agreed agenda and our side had complained that it was premature discuss these

before carrying out of agreed announcement. At two succeeding meetings I had not only failed present positive views regarding his suggestions but also failed put forward subjects I thought should be discussed. I had not put forward my subjects until September 28 but even then I had not given explanation of them. At meeting October 5 I had refused enter into substantive discussion on subjects put forward.

8. He said our side had in these five meetings also repeatedly raised questions which should have been raised by third powers and thus had prevented talks from making further progress. This I had done in spite of specific provisions regarding functions third powers in agreed announcement and in spite fact US had asked UK to assist in return of Americans in China to which his side had agreed. Nevertheless, in interest forestalling further hindrances, his side had suggested our questions on implementation agreement might be taken up by assistants. However, I had also turned down this reasonable suggestion. Now it was very clear and permitted of no distortion where responsibility for delay of talks lay.

9. He said that all allegations his government had not acted promptly on implementation agreement were without factual basis. Upon reaching agreement he had informed me of results reviews cases Americans who had violated laws. Chinese Government took appropriate measures in accordance with agreement and in line with Chinese legal procedures and had advanced release of 10 Americans who had since left country. With respect remaining Americans who had violated laws in China his side would adhere promise review individual cases in accordance Chinese legal procedure and report results to US through UK. But cases these Americans must be dealt with in accordance Chinese legal procedure. Any demand release them within specified period time or under some other cloak would be categorically rejected by his side and they would steadfastly refuse comply in any way with such demands which violated agreement.

10. He said, during period from beginning of consular talks to issuance agreement, his side had given concrete information on departure 27 Americans who had returned to US. Furthermore, since Ambassadorial talks began he had given me information on 33 Americans who "should or may" leave China, and bulk these had already left. These facts proved his side would make good whatever they said. As for Americans who had not yet departed, it was left to their own discretion when they would depart. If I had any further questions, I could communicate them to UK Charge. At outset these talks his side had made available to me list of all Americans in China, but I had failed make available to him information concerning all Chinese in US.

11. Wang said during contacts past year and in present talks my side had given him names 103 Chinese who had applied leave United

States but were prevented from doing so by US Government. However, up to present 47 of these had not left United States and this showed my side had failed implement agreement. I had said 402 Chinese left between July 11 and October 3, but I had failed provide names so they had no means check up on these persons. His side was going to request GOI as third power entrusted under agreed announcement to make investigation this regard.

12. Wang said in spite his dissatisfaction on return Chinese he had not obstructed progress of talks for that reason. On other hand, I continued entangle talks with question implementation and he bound to ask if my side was unwilling discuss second item agenda.

13. Regarding his two subjects Wang said my side had not expressed specific opinion on question of embargo. American policy of embargo had been major factor in leading to tension between China and US and in preventing economic development and trade of many countries. He could not understand why I not able express opinion on this question.

14. Wang asked how I could consider his subject of preparations for higher level negotiations was anything but practical matter. It was certainly practical matter which should be settled. Arranging practical and physical channel for settlement and easing of tension between China and US in Taiwan area was certainly practical matter. I had said only after we had seen what progress we could make here could we then talk about what to do next. Did I mean to impose a prerequisite on holding of higher level negotiations?

15. He said that on question missing US military personnel he had repeatedly pointed out his side had accounted for all Americans in China including military personnel my side. No justification whatsoever and fabrication without basis for me to demand his side account for US military personnel missing in Korea. I must be aware reply this question already given in appropriate organ in Korea.

16. Wang said he bound point out after last meeting I had violated agreement on privacy these talks by discussing with newspaper men what our side had introduced as first item of agenda, namely missing personnel. This action would compel him consider making public statement on this question.

17. Wang then commented extemporaneously on my statement regarding renunciation of force. He said he had given specific opinion on this question when he put forward his two subjects for discussion and again in subsequent meetings. Since foundation his government its foreign policy had always been peaceful policy. It was well known his government together with other governments had initiated Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. They were resolutely opposed settlement disputes by force and always upheld principle peaceful negotiation for settlement international disputes. In same manner they

upheld principle of negotiation for peaceful settlement of disputes between China and United States. Cooperation between these two countries would not only benefit peoples of two countries but also serve cause world peace. Chinese people were friendly to Americans and they did not want war with American people.

18. He said if renunciation of force was to be subject discussion it was clearly known Chinese never applied any force to American territory. China had never sent armed forces to Honolulu or San Francisco. On contrary Americans had sent armed forces to Taiwan which was Chinese territory.

I had said US as member of UN adhered to principles of Charter and I had also listed a number of other international treaties. China had always fully supported principles of UN Charter despite fact China still obstructed from being restored to her rightful place in UN. However, there was no provision in Charter of UN or in international law for one state to interfere in internal affairs of other states or to use force to occupy territory of other states.

19. He said there was a distinction between international disputes and civil conflicts. Taiwan was Chinese territory and liberation of Taiwan was an exercise of sovereign and territorial rights. All actions which involved forceful occupation of Taiwan and used force to interfere with liberation of Taiwan by Chinese people violated principles of UN and international law. Chinese people would continue oppose any such action. He concluded saying he would comment on remainder my statement later.

20. I said with respect to implementation agreed announcement I had today again set forth my government's views and would not take time to repeat them. I simply wanted to say that matter could have been disposed of in few minutes if I could have received answers to few simple questions I had asked. To best my knowledge UK Charge in Peking had also received no answers to these questions.

21. I said he had asked whether or not I was willing to discuss subjects under agenda item two. The answer was certainly yes. I had given him at some length and several times my opinion on one of his subjects. I had indicated my willingness to discuss his other point as well. This morning I had given him a very carefully prepared and very carefully considered statement with respect our point on renunciation of force. I wanted to emphasize this was very important statement. It was made in most earnest desire that it would contribute to progress our discussions here. I wanted point out my statement had made no charges against his government, also it did not propose his government should say anything which my government was not prepared to say. It was put forward as constructive and earnest effort to deal with problems we were called upon to deal with here. I hoped his government

would give thought to statement before our next meeting and hoped at that time I could have his very considered views on statement.

22. He had raised question of press statement. I assured him I did not give any information to press regarding our last meeting. It should be quite apparent from newspaper stories themselves that information they published was not accurate. Newspaper articles which I saw had said I presented and discussed in detail the question of missing military personnel. We both knew that was not correct. I could only assume that in light public statements and discussion this subject, which had taken place in United States even before these talks, that newspaper men assumed that was what we had discussed. I certainly gave them no information whatsoever.

23. Wang said I had stated UK Charge in Peking not able perform his functions and that he had not received replies to questions he had raised. This was not accurate. As he understood situation British Charge had not up to that time made formal approach to Chinese Government. If UK Charge formally contacted Chinese Government regarding UK functions assumed under agreed announcement, Wang's government would certainly be available to him. Chinese Government willing consider any proposal which reasonable and served improve relations between China and the US and thus facilitated progress our talks.

24. I said I had no more to say and hoped at next meeting to have his government's very considered views on statement I had made this morning. I suggested we meet again Friday, October 14.

25. Wang said he hoped I would be able to give concrete views concerning embargo question introduced by his side.

26. I replied our view on timing discussion of that question was contained in statement I made this morning.

27. Wang said he could not agree to any fixed order of discussion. His side would continue to comment on our subjects and hoped we would do likewise. He agreed date for next meeting.

28. I said point I had made on timing was not made in procedural sense but in substantive sense.

29. We agreed without discussion on press release identical last meeting.

**Gowen**

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278. Letter 18 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 18

Washington, October 10, 1955

Dear Alex:

I have just taken Peter Colm, who is leaving for Geneva tomorrow morning, in to meet Messrs. Robertson and Sebald and to get a sense of Mr. Robertson's reaction to the course of the talks. He should be able to give you something of the feel of things at this end. He has not seen the Secretary but I don't think there is any particular new development in the Secretary's thinking to be conveyed to you at the moment. Everyone seems to be well satisfied with your conduct of last week's meetings. The feeling is that the lines which you have blocked out yourself for the near future are sound.

The feeling in FE is that it will be desirable for you to make your presentation on "unaccounted for military personnel" at the next meeting. American public opinion demands that a high priority be given to this item. We cannot afford to take any chance on some untoward development causing us to fail to get this on the record. Hence it may be necessary to present this before touching on the trade embargo question. We do not see that there is anything to lose by putting the military personnel statement in now, particularly since we are trending in the direction of a more flexible and less systematic approach to the Agenda items under Point Two. With a less formalized treatment of the Agenda list under Point Two presumably topics may become intermingled and reverted to.

After talks with D'Orlandi, the COCOM and CHINCOM Chairman, we are more than ever convinced that the present time would be highly inopportune for relaxation in the multilateral system of trade controls. It is significant that D'Orlandi was strongly of this opinion. The Japanese Ambassador Iguchi has indicated to us that the Japanese Government may not be as strongly committed to a program of relaxation as we are sometimes led to believe. The critical time of decision will probably be at the CG meeting at Paris early in December. With strong U.S. leadership at that time we may be successful in holding the line. But it cannot be done without aggressive U.S. leadership. Pressure will have to be exerted on the French and British particularly. All this indicates that any disposition to give on the embargo question at Geneva before December will be premature. In any event we do not have the say unilaterally on multilateral controls. As for our own

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.



complete domestic embargo, that policy is fixed by NSC decision and I know of no disposition in any responsible quarter to urge an abrupt change in that policy.

Bill Sebald is working with Judge Phleger on additional material on the renunciation of use of force. This material is aimed for your use in the course of detailed discussions on the item, assuming that a detailed discussion stage will be reached eventually.

The foregoing thoughts on the missing personnel item and the trade embargo are of course subject to confirmation by official telegram. We have not yet cleared with the Secretary.

I presume O'Neill will put your three questions formally to the Chinese Communists today or tomorrow. The Foreign Office instructed him to do so (subject to his concurrence) on October 7.

We have told the British we do not like O'Neill's suggestion that he refer to the PRC promise to notify him of the result of trials of Americans, and inform the PRC authorities that he looks forward to early notification of reduction of sentence in all cases.

This sounds too much like accepting the PRC thesis, and giving up on the implementation of the Agreed Announcement.

We are looking forward to the arrival of Ralph Clough this afternoon. No doubt we will get a better feel of the current atmosphere from him, although I must say that your telegrams have given us a very full and complete picture. We have felt that we have almost had a front center seat.

Regards,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

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## 279. Telegram 865 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 11, 1955, 6:49 p.m.

865. For Johnson. Your 837, Section 1.

1. Re your mention paragraph 2 of cases which QUOTE were to be expeditiously reviewed UNQUOTE, Department prefers that you

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–855. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Phleger.

adhere strictly to language of Agreed Announcement that Americans may QUOTE expeditiously UNQUOTE exercise their right return U.S. Department aware that Wang made frequent mention of review of cases in discussion leading up to Agreed Announcement but this has no bearing on obligations of PRC under Agreed Announcement. Endeavor avoid any statement which might be construed as implying U.S. tacitly recognizes Wang's talking points as modifying in any way explicit PRC commitments under Agreed Announcement.

2. FYI. We have informed British Embassy we do not repeat not wish O'Neill to follow up on his tentative suggestion that he might press PRC Foreign Office for expedited notification of trial of remaining Americans and reduction of sentences. Our reason for rejection this suggestion same as above.

Murphy

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## 280. Telegram 870 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 12, 1955, 7:37 p.m.

870. For Johnson.

Guidance for 21st meeting October 14.

1. You should again place on record US dissatisfaction with continued Chinese Communist non-implementation Agreed Announcement. Recall that approximately five weeks have passed since Agreed Announcement issued, with no action on remaining detained Americans. The Americans have not been allowed exercise expeditiously their right to return, a right expressly recognized by PRC in Agreed Announcement. PRC has not carried out its publicly assumed obligation adopt measures necessary to enable Americans exercise their right. No detained American, so far as US Government can ascertain, has yet been allowed see British Charge Peiping or any other British diplomatic or consular representative. British Charge has been unable perform any function whatever under Agreed Announcement. British Charge has been given no information other than statement that all Americans have been informed of Agreed Announcement. His request for particulars as to when, where and how imprisoned Americans were notified has not been answered.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1255. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Phleger and Sebald.

October 12 news release attributed to Peoples' Daily alleging that "the Chinese side is faithfully carrying out the Agreement" appears to represent attempt cover up PRC non-compliance by directing attention to 47 Americans who have not applied for exit permits "who can leave China at any time". The Agreed Announcement deals with those who want to leave, not those who do not. Implication in later paragraph this news release that Agreed Announcement provides for examination case of Americans, one by one, is not supported by language of Announcement. US Government can only conclude that PRC is deliberately misleading public as to its obligations and actions under Agreed Announcement.

Record shows that PRC so far has evaded rather than implemented requirements of Agreed Announcement. US Government bound to take increasingly serious view PRC failure implement provisions Agreed Announcement if this failure should be further protracted.

2. Department will send you for possible introduction at later meeting text draft parallel declarations renouncing use of force particularly in Taiwan area. If Wang adopts anticipated line that Taiwan is domestic issue and only necessity is that US forces withdraw from Taiwan area you may wish reply along following general line:

"US and PRC views status Taiwan and US relationship to area differ sharply. Immediate and urgent problem is not attempt reconcile these views, but remove danger of resort to force which might provoke international conflict. It is impossible freely negotiate under threat of force. Only if this threat removed is there any hope of constructive solution of basic political problems."

3. You are given discretion as to whether you should make presentation on unaccounted for military personnel at 21st meeting. Essential that this presentation be made at some point.

4. While Department does not insist on rigid adherence fixed order agenda items under Point 2, it is US position that there is no basis for constructive exchange views on trade embargo question while threat of use of military force by PRC remains. Hence, there is no point in discussing this issue in absence renunciation use force by PRC. It is believed postponement discussion this item should be put on this practical basis. In taking this position, however, you need not object to Wang presentation this item.

5. While it would be our purpose to avoid any discussion of the embargo item until after we have gotten some positive assurances about renunciation of force, you are authorized, if you deem it necessary to keep conversations going, to indicate that we recognize that the formulation of declaration on renunciation of force is a matter of delicacy which would require considerable thought and that while any positive conclusion on the matter of trade would inherently have to depend greatly on the Chicom response on renunciation of force, nevertheless while the

Chicoms are considering the renunciation of force matter we would be willing to hear their views about trade, particularly:

- (1) Are they referring to the US total ban on Chicom trade?
- (2) Are they referring to restrictions on strategic materials as administered by CHINCOM?
- (3) Are they proposing modification of UN resolution adopted during Korean War?

Dulles

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## 281. Telegram 855 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 13, 1955, 2 p.m.

855. From Johnson. Re Deptel 869.

1. I would think it desirable that whenever opportunity arises, such as in reply to Chang Han-fu's question on O'Neill's interpretation of agreement, O'Neill should state UK interprets portion of agreed announcement reading "and will further adopt appropriate measures so they can expeditiously exercise their right to return" to mean exactly what it says. Appreciate that probably neither O'Neill nor UK would desire become deeply involved at this stage in our controversy with CHICOMS their implementation this point. However believe UK would desire avoid any implication it agrees with CHICOM interpretation and lay best possible basis for invoking this portion announcement in representations in individual cases.

2. In view continued CHICOM vagueness on delivery text announcement to imprisoned Americans suggest consideration be given have O'Neill invoke portion of announcement stating UK Charge may also give publicity to request facilities have copy personally handed by member his office to each imprisoned American in event refusal he could request delivery letter from him containing text announcement, and information on how to communicate with him, to each prisoner.

3. Department will desire consider this from standpoint any precedent it may establish for Indian functions in US but it appears to me we could without harm agree to same interpretation by Indians if question were raised.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1355. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

4. In general believe O'Neill should avoid any implication UK considers its special functions under announcement to be primarily "welfare" in nature and that CHICOMS have implemented announcement with respect imprisoned Americans if some "welfare" functions conceded to UK. Believe he should concentrate maximum possible on the "assist in the return" aspects invoking "expeditiously" as appropriate.

Gowen

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282. Telegram 856 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 13, 1955, 2 p.m.

856. From Johnson.

In reply press inquiries here concerning NCNA October 12 article quoted FBIS 121355Z particularly concerning "47 Americans" am replying for background that mention these persons entirely irrelevant and is attempt befog issues as announcement concerns persons who desire return. Am stating figure 47 only approximately correct as there are possibly other civilians particularly dual nationals. Am stating that 47 include 16 non-repats, American wives Chinese, children, and persons who have been working for CHICOMS. Am referring inquiries on names to Department. Understand that most of names have in past in one way or another been made available to press but believe any info this character should come from Department.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1355. Official Use Only.

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**283. Letter 12 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 12

Geneva, October 13, 1955

Dear Walter:

Yesterday I received your letter of October 10. This will be a very short note as I have little to add to what I have already said.

Peter Colm has arrived and I am very glad to have him. He seems like a good man.

Received my instructions this morning for 21st meeting and again feel that they are excellent. I greatly appreciate your getting them to me in time to ponder a little before the meeting.

I do not plan to tie my presentation on implementation to their newspaper articles or broadcasts. I have avoided this as it simply opens the door for Wang to throw USIS and American newspapers at me, and he can almost always find something to quote to serve his purpose. In any event the articles so closely follow his presentation in the meetings that there are ample statements by him to which I can tie.

I am a little concerned by the questions it is suggested that I ask him, if necessary, under paragraph 5 of the Department's 870. It seems to me that I should avoid any implication that such multilateral subjects as Chincom and U.N. resolutions could be discussed here, or that these are matters within the control of the U.S. However, I think the idea of asking the questions is very good but will try to formulate something along these lines for use, if necessary, which avoids what I believe are the undesirable implications of the questions as presently framed.

I fear that the presentation of unaccounted for military personnel at this stage would fuzz my position on priority for renunciation of force, and I am, therefore, reluctant to make it at tomorrow's meeting. On the other hand, I don't want Wang to so freeze his position on this that he is obliged to reject the lists when I hand them to him. Therefore, I will play it by ear and make the decision at the meeting as to what I will do.

Chincom people have been very helpful in giving me information on their present negotiations in Paris. Certainly the present moment would be the worst possible time to release the Chincom controls, but I can see that the pressures are extremely strong. What I have trouble thinking through is how effectively to relate what

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

may or may not happen in these talks to how things are handled in Chincom.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**284. Telegram 864 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 14, 1955, 9 a.m.

864. From Johnson.

Would appreciate prompt extension by Defense of Colonel Ekvall's orders which expired September 20.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1455. Confidential.

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**285. Telegram 865 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 14, 1955, 1 p.m.

865. From Johnson.

1. One hour forty minute meeting this morning. Wang opened with long prepared statement dealing exclusively with my last week's statement on renunciation of force. While relatively mild in tone consisted almost entirely rehash previous positions. Said key to situation was withdrawal US forces from Taiwan. Our proposal was "abuse of principle non-recourse to force". "Are you willing to discuss question withdrawal US forces from Taiwan?" Liberation Taiwan "cannot be made subject present talks".

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1455. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.

2. I replied with statement on implementation along lines Dep-tel 870 and then expressed disappointment lack of responsiveness his statement our proposal. I then made statement using material latter portion para 2 Dep-tel 870 and pertinent material previous statement on renunciation force. There was then some give and take during which both of us largely reiterated previous statements. However he did not challenge my statement that I hoped I could interpret his remarks as meaning he did not entirely reject our proposal. Towards end he gave me opening which I used to close on theme of implementation.

3. At close I proposed normal schedule weekly meetings and he agreed subject next meeting being Thursday. Understanding is subsequent meetings will be on Thursdays.

4. Am departing for Prague tomorrow morning returning Tuesday.

**Gowen**

Mrs. Welch (FE) notified 10/14/6:35 a.m. EMB (CWO)

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## 286. Telegram 867 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 14, 1955, 4 p.m.

867. From Johnson.

1. Notable aspect today's meeting was Wang's willingness discuss exclusively, albeit negatively, our renunciation of force proposal. He made no effort whatever force any discussion either of his items and his reaction to my renewed discussion of implementation was very mild. In fact as will be seen from full meeting record, during give and take he perhaps somewhat inadvertently gave us credit for full implementation agreed announcement. He also readily agreed to my proposal for normally weekly meetings. His manner and tone of delivery of his opening statement was also mild and again full record of meeting prepared on basis his interpreter's translation give somewhat harder impression than original Chinese.

2. There was no need to and I felt it undesirable make presentation on missing military personnel at today's meeting.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1455. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.



3. While using it as a peg on which to hang his criticism of US policy, Wang's presentation today shows a disposition to acquiesce in discussion around our renunciation of force proposal which we should try to explain.

4. His reply today was to be expected. Stripped of propaganda verbiage one of his theses appears to be that presence of US forces in Taiwan is in itself "threat of force." He is taking an obviously extreme bargaining position in asking for withdrawal US forces from Taiwan and one of our problems will be to probe for their real position for as long as possible while at same time not running into a deadlock or in any way sacrificing our position on renunciation of force or scope these talks.

5. Parliamentary situation is such that he will be expecting fairly comprehensive statement from me at next meeting. Believe statement must include at least some refutation his charges on "American aggression against Taiwan."

**Gowen**

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## 287. Telegram 869 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 14, 1955, 4 p.m.

869. From Johnson.

1. During today's Ambassadorial talks Chen Shih-wu of NCNA talked with several correspondents, particularly agency men and about half British, individually or in groups. Gist his comments as reported to Garnish by participants follows:

2. Said Wang going to tell me today they cannot discuss renunciation of use of force until these other questions settled: Seventh Fleet, blockade, Formosa, embargo. Said these are subjects for FonMins and their settlement would make question of renunciation of force timely.

3. According to another correspondent, Chen referred to Chou statement that question has international and national aspects. Under former he mentioned UniStates interference, Seventh Fleet, blockade, embargo and UniStates military advisors on Formosa. Said must remove this interference. Under national aspect he mentioned liberation Taiwan by

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1455. Official Use Only.

peaceful means, said Chou already has pointed out he ready to negotiate with Taiwan authorities without hard and fast conditions. To query whether "authorities" meant Nationalists or Taiwanese Chen said Chou did not (repeat not) want commit himself but added some Chiang people ready to negotiate. To further query Chen refused commit himself that this meant any member GRC ready negotiate.

4. Responding to correspondent's other questions, Chen said talks making progress though slowly and spirit good. Said talks will continue through FonMins conference and Dulles' presence may give impetus to them. Expressed doubt Wang will try to see Dulles.

5. Chen said talks now approaching crucial stage, with subjects of such scope and importance that they belong on FonMins level.

6. To question about nineteen jailed Americans Chen said I always raise question as matter of routine. Added this no longer matter for Ambassadors at all but matter for British Charge to settle. Also said missing military personnel matter does not (repeat not) belong in Geneva talks.

**Gowen**

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**288. Telegram 871 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 14, 1955, 5 p.m.

871. From Johnson.

In discussing missing military personnel I will desire to have available for use as may seem appropriate a few of as good examples as possible reasons we believe Chinese Communists have some information on these men. Unfortunately information I have available here is in most cases too vague for effective use in debate.

Request Department ask Defense endeavor supply me any more concrete information from CHICOM, other Communist, or neutral sources that may be available in a few good exemplary cases such as following:

Army Sgt Casimire T. Demoll. What were dates and facts in reports of IRC, Peking Radio, and reported source National Guardian?

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1455. Official Use Only; Priority.

Army PFC James Howell. What was date and content China monthly review report?

Army Corporal John E. Jennings. What were dates and contents China monthly review and IRC reports?

Similar info on few Air Force and Marine personnel would also be helpful. For example more detailed info on “enemy broadcast over Radio Peiping” mentioned file Air Force First Lieutenant Scott A. Holz would be useful.

Would appreciate some information by next meeting if possible.

Gowen

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**289. Telegram 872 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 14, 1955, 8 p.m.

872. From Johnson.

1. At 21st meeting, October 14, Wang Ping-nan opened with prepared comments on my statement on renunciation of force. He stated that to carry on useful and sensible discussion, civil conflicts within either China or the US must be distinguished from international disputes. Former are obviously not within competence of present talks. Issues between Chinese people and Chiang Kai-shek clique cannot be made subjects of these talks. It is inadmissible to introduce question of right of Chinese people to liberate own territory Taiwan in execution of sovereign rights.

2. He continued that in regard to international disputes, People's Republic of China had from its inception always stood for peaceful settlement and had opposed infringements of territorial integrity by threat or use of force. China's conduct in international relations had demonstrated that it was faithful to this stand. He drew attention to “universally recognized role” of China in Korean and Indochinese armistices and to “Five Principles,” on the basis of which he stated China had established relations of friendly cooperation with many countries. He stated that at Asian-African Conference China together with others adopted decisions affirming these principles.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1455. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

3. In regard to Sino-US relations, Wang stated that Premier Chou had repeatedly declared that China did not want war with US and that China and US should sit down and enter into negotiations. This, he stated, was objective of introducing into present talks question of higher level Sino-US negotiations.

4. Wang quoted paragraph 4, article 2, of UN Charter. He referred also to my statement at last meeting that US as member of UN had agreed to refrain from threat or use of force. Wang stated that he welcomed my statement to this effect on behalf of my government, and that he very much desired that this principle should become guiding principle of US in Far East and rest of world. He stated that there was no dispute between China and US regarding the principles guiding United Nations. Question was how these principles could be concretely implemented. In this connection he cited Taiwan situation.

5. He stated that Taiwan was Chinese territory and that this was specifically provided in solemn international agreements in which US had participated. Wang quoted a statement of January 5, 1950 by President Truman to effect that US Government had always stood for good faith in international relations and specifically in Formosa (Taiwan) situation, that in Cairo Declaration of 1943 the US, UK, and China had announced objective of restoring to China territory stolen by Japan from China, such as Formosa, that US was a signatory to Potsdam Declaration which declared that the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out, that the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration were accepted by Japan at time of surrender, and that for four years the US and other powers had accepted the authority of Chinese authorities over Formosa. Wang stated that President Truman had added that US had no predatory designs on Formosa or other Chinese territory and that US desired to avoid courses of action leading to involvement in civil disputes in China.

6. However, Wang stated, the US now occupies Taiwan with its armed forces and has openly declared it would use force to encroach upon Chinese territorial integrity. He declared that this was origin of tension in Taiwan area and that China had never used or threatened force to encroach on territorial integrity of the US. China had repeatedly stated that China and US should respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and settle disputes between each other by negotiations.

7. He said that since I had stated at last meeting that US had agreed to refrain from threat or use of force, it followed that US should withdraw its armed forces from China's Taiwan. Wang declared that he would like to know whether US was prepared to do so.

8. Wang stated that at last meeting I had failed to mention fact that US had used force against China's Taiwan, had dodged the question of US withdrawal, and had unreasonably tried to introduce question

of renunciation of force against China's Taiwan. Chinese Government, circumstances permitting, would seek liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means. However, the question falls within framework of China's sovereignty and internal affairs and cannot be made subject of present talks.

9. Wang closed his prepared comments with statement that question of America's withdrawal from Taiwan area should be discussed and that he would like to hear my views on this question.

10. In reply I stated that before commenting on his statement I must first bring to his attention my government's dissatisfaction with his government's continued delay in implementing agreed announcement with respect to remaining 19 Americans in prison. I stated that so far as my government had been able to ascertain, no American in prison had even been permitted to communicate with or see UK Charge in Peking or any other British diplomatic or consular representative. I stated that there could be no doubt that these Americans desired to return.

11. I continued that furthermore almost five weeks had passed since announcement was issued and that I had hoped he would have some information for me today. However, thus far government has not taken appropriate measures mentioned in agreed announcement which would permit these 19 Americans to exercise expeditiously their right to return. This right was expressly set forth in the agreed announcement.

12. I said that in discussing this question at previous meetings, Wang had continued to mention his government's request for a list of all Americans in US and had continued to mention supposed time it would take for the many Chinese in the US to return to his country. I said he had also referred to the 47 Americans in his country who had not applied for exit permits. In this connection, I pointed out that agreed scope of our discussions on this point and agreed announcement concerned only persons who desired to return.

13. I stated that I raised these points again in order to indicate to Wang reasons why my government feared his government was evading rather than implementing the provisions of the agreed announcement. I declared that it should be evident that my government was bound to take an increasingly serious view of his government's failure to implement provisions of agreed announcement with respect to these 19 Americans if this failure should be further protracted.

14. I continued with what I described as my preliminary comments on Wang's statement at opening of meeting, pointing out that I desired to study his statement carefully and reply in greater detail later.

15. I pointed out that, as I had emphasized at last meeting, my proposal was not couched in terms of charges against Wang's government, but was made in a most earnest desire of contributing a suggestion constructive to course of talks. I said that Wang's statement pointed up fact known to both of us that views of Wang's government and mine

differed widely on status of Taiwan and on my government's relations to Taiwan. I said that there was no use in pretending that these differences did not exist or that they could be easily resolved. I said that my suggestion did not involve third parties or question of justice or injustice of conflicting claims in the area.

16. I stated that immediate and urgent problem we faced was not to reconcile conflicting views but to remove danger that a resort to force in the area might evoke international conflict. I stated that I believed Wang himself had previously recognized that this possibility existed. I said that these questions were grave and complicated and that negotiating their solution would take time and patience.

17. I pointed out that neither of us wanted to negotiate under threat of force and that there was hope of a constructive solution to the basic problems of the area only if threat of force were removed. I stated that the fact that our policies differed need not mean armed conflict. I stated that many countries were abnormally divided and that many governments faced situations which they considered abnormal intrusions into their territory. I pointed out that responsible governments nevertheless had renounced use of force in achievement of what they considered urgent and legitimate objectives of national policy. I stated that my suggestion did not call upon either his government or mine to renounce their objectives, but simply suggested we renounce use of force to implement our policies. I stated that this was to me an eminently reasonable, simple, and straightforward proposal which could provide the basis for constructive solutions to other problems.

18. I concluded by expressing hope that Wang's government would again consider suggestion we had made and that such reconsideration might lead to progress in the talks.

19. Wang replied that he could not agree to what I had said concerning his government's continued delay in implementing the agreed announcement. (Wang's interpreter initially said "continued failure" but corrected this to "continued delay." Ekvall states that "continued stalling" would have been more accurate English.)

20. Wang said that during discussion of first item of agenda before and after agreement was reached, his side had devoted great efforts to question of returning Americans from China. He said that this did not include only "ordinary" Americans but also Americans who had committed offenses. He stated that his side was still faithfully implementing the agreement on return of civilians. He said that there was therefore no reason to charge that his government had delayed in implementing agreed announcement and that he could not agree to this unjustified charge.

21. Wang continued with comments on my preliminary views on his opening statement. He said that it was wrong that there should be

difference of view between China and US on status of Taiwan since status of Taiwan was very clear and precise. He said that Taiwan was indisputably an inalienable part of Chinese territory. He then expressed agreement with me that on this question disputes did exist between our two sides. He expressed agreement also that the Taiwan situation had “led to a grave and explosive situation” and that there was “danger of the situation being enlarged.” He said that this was why it was necessary to call Sino-US conference to discuss situation in Taiwan area.

22. He said that while he agreed discuss this problem, he could not but trace “root causes” leading to present grave situation. He stated that failure find these causes would be similar to patient in whom doctor fails find cause of illness. Wang cited Chinese proverb that doctor should make prescription according to illness of patient. He said that failure to find cause of illness makes cure impossible.

23. Wang stated that his government had always opposed resort to force and has stood for peaceful settlement of problems. He agreed with me that negotiations cannot be conducted under threat of force. He said that if we are to discuss threat of force, we have to ask who is threatening whom. Wang declared that he considered that American armed forces which occupy Taiwan are precisely threat in question.

24. Wang said that I had said that it is necessary to renounce use of force to prevent situation from leading to armed conflict. Wang declared that as he had stated this morning his side welcomed this point of view. However, a mere statement outlining principles does not solve problem. Wang stated that if US were to withdraw its armed forces from area, it would show that US is sincere in this regard. Wang stated that therefore he hoped after consideration of his proposal I would express my views on this point. He concluded by stating that such withdrawal would indicate that present talks can really solve questions and are not mere discussions. He said he hoped this was case.

25. I replied that questions Wang had raised are complicated and that I still did not see why he rejected my suggestion. I stated that I hoped I was right in interpreting Wang’s remarks as not a complete rejection of my proposal. I said that first and simple thing we can do is to say to each other that we would not resort to use of force except defensively. I stated that I agreed that this would not by itself solve basic problems in area, but that it would remove danger of conflict and establish atmosphere in which we can freely negotiate and in which there would be hope of finding solutions to basic problems.

26. Wang replied that we can certainly consider that a mere statement would not remove danger or resolve disputes between China and US in area. Only actual deeds by US will convince people that questions are being resolved. Wang cited example of return of Chinese in US. He said that if merely a statement had been made that they would



be able to return without action, the Chinese would not have been able to return. Basic cause underlying failure of Chinese to return from US was existence of restricting order by US Government against them. Only after American Government rescinded restricting orders were basic difficulties involved in return resolved. Wang said that when the US rescinded these orders, his side expressed welcome to this action because those orders were unreasonable and because it was reasonable they should be rescinded.

27. Wang said that same is true in Taiwan area. Cause of tension in area is chiefly because US has used force in area. He stated that his side considered such action inconsistent with UN Charter and that if US would withdraw all its armed forces it would naturally change situation in area. Only by doing so would it convince people of practical significance of American proposal on renunciation of force.

28. I replied that I could not refrain from pointing out that we did not make agreed announcement until we were fully prepared implement it. I agreed to his thesis that mere statements do not solve problems. We did not make the statement that all Chinese were free to depart until they were in fact able to do so. This led me to my point in regard to remaining imprisoned Americans. I stated that only action by his government can permit them to leave. I had hoped and expected that they would be able to leave expeditiously. However, almost five weeks had passed since the announcement. I recalled that he had used many words in our discussion of time Americans would be able to leave, including "very quickly" and other such terms. I said "expeditiously" had finally been decided upon, and yet in five weeks not one of nineteen has been able to leave. I stated that I failed to see how this can be termed expeditiously.

29. Wang replied that he had nothing more to say.

30. I stated that I had a suggestion to make on timing of the talks. I pointed out that we have been meeting at irregular intervals and that both of us had other responsibilities as well. I stated that talks were entering phase of utmost gravity and importance and that I and my government wanted time carefully to consider course of talks here. In light of this, I suggested that we normally meet once a week. I said Friday or any other day would suit me but did not exclude occasional more frequent meetings if we considered desirable.

31. Wang immediately concurred in my suggestion, requesting that meetings take place on Thursdays for time being. We agreed to release customary statement to press.

32. Next meeting Thursday, October 20, 10 am.

**Gowen**

Note: FE Message Center notified 10/15/55 10:40 a.m. EMB (CWO)



**290. Telegram 886 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 14, 1955, 6:20 p.m.

886. For Johnson. Your 864.

Defense arranging assign Ekvall European post and detail Geneva for duration talks. Letter from Godel enroute.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1455. Confidential. Drafted by Clough.

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**291. Letter 19 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 19

Washington, October 14, 1955

Dear Alex:

Your long letter No. 6 of October 6 came on the 11th. It was of singular interest and gave us some very valuable sidelights on some of your collateral problems as well as on your general thinking. Walter Robertson, Herman Phleger and Bill Sebald have all read your letter and commented on its particular interest and value.

I have discussed with Rod O'Connor the problem of coordinating the Departmental direction of your talks while the Foreign Ministers Conference is going on. It will be difficult, with the Secretary and Judge Phleger in Geneva, and Robertson, Sebald and myself here. Rod is sure that the Secretary will want to see you from time to time in Geneva, notwithstanding the great pressure of affairs directly related to the Conference. Judge Phleger will also be tied up with the business of the Conference, but naturally will wish to keep close to your negotiations. The regular work on your instructions will almost have to be done from here since our Delegation at Geneva will not have the time, the FE personnel or the files. (As you probably have heard, the Secretary has decided not to take any FE personnel or to engage in discussions of FE subjects. Molotov may be allowed to bring up some FE subjects if

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. McConaughy initialed the original “WPM.”

he insists, but he will have to do the talking and our Delegation would only listen.) We expect to present a recommendation to the Secretary on Monday for coordination of the direction of the talks while the Conference is going on. We are passing on to the Secretary your expression of hope that he may be able in some way to use Molotov during the Conference quietly to bring some pressure on the PRC to release the detained Americans. We don't know yet what if anything may be possible along this line.

You will have noted the conspicuous absence in our telegram of any response to your suggestion that we not rule out the introduction of procedural questions near the end of the talks. We appreciated that this might look like "a pot of gold" which could help to keep the talks going. But there is no inclination here now to take a position on this in our telegrams. The Secretary was quite specific in his talk with Foreign Minister George Yeh on Oct. 4 (a copy of the memorandum of conversation is being pouched to you), and on other occasions as to his aversion to the idea of a higher level Conference, his intention to avoid it, and his belief that there is nothing appropriate for discussion which cannot be handled in your conversations. Of course this does not preclude us from keeping the Chinese Communists guessing a little, but on principle there are arguments against seeming to equivocate.

Incidentally the Secretary was quite frank with George Yeh in spelling out to him the extent to which the continuation of the talks is in the interest of the GRC. I think it may tend to soften the criticism of the talks which has been coming out of governmental quarters in Taipei although I doubt if the tone of the Taiwan Press will be changed much.

We have noted your query as to whether it might be permissible for either side to raise new subjects under Item Two. There will be some response to this query by early next week either in my next letter on the 17th or in a telegram.

Yesterday I gave Joy of the British Embassy the observations contained in your 855 concerning O'Neill's responsibilities. We endorsed your suggestions and requested that they be relayed to O'Neill with a recommendation that he act on them if he and the British Foreign Office perceive no objection. The British are being quite diligent on the implementation problem although they are somewhat concerned now at apparent leaks to the press (Reuters and AP) which hint at the difficulties O'Neill is encountering. I do not know the source of the information which the press is obtaining. I doubt if there is much of a leak since the information is somewhat garbled. Also the stories may indirectly be somewhat helpful rather than harmful since they will add a bit to the public pressure on the PRC to act. Still we must respect British wishes where the protection of their reporting is concerned, so we

are taking steps to limit the distribution in the Department of O'Neill's reports on his conversations with the PRC Foreign Office. There is great interest among the press in O'Neill's efforts so our P and FE/P people are somewhat on the spot, as is the British Embassy here.

We are hoping that some additional pressure will be exerted on Peiping through U Nu. The Secretary sent him a good strong message in response to U Nu's extraordinary appeal for a higher level Conference. We assume of course that U Nu will pass on to Chou En-lai the text of the Secretary's reply. We have endeavored to capitalize on this probability. There is a chance that U Nu will associate himself to some extent with our expression of dissatisfaction over the failure of the PRC to implement the Agreed Announcement. A copy of this exchange of messages will be sent to you.

Mr. Robertson is making a speech at Davidson College, North Carolina tomorrow which will have some pretty explicit things to say on the question of implementation of the Agreed Announcement, and on the need for a PRC renunciation of the use of force. We think that this speech will fit well into our strategy. Some very specific questions are posed in this speech. You will get a copy.

On the renunciation of force item, we may have unintentionally misled you somewhat in talking about a "study". Nothing as elaborate as what that probably signifies to you is underway here. What is being worked on by Bill Sebald and Judge Phleger is a draft declaration proclaiming the renunciation of the use of force, except defensively, with specific reference to the Taiwan area. The form would be analogous to that of the Agreed Announcement of September 10: —two parallel unilateral statements or declarations. The Secretary and Mr. Robertson had some reservations about the first draft and a new version is now in the works. It would be quite simple—only a half a page or so. We hope a draft of this will be ready to send you some time next week for your comments. With the help of Doug Forman and Peter Colm you probably will be able to prepare all the material you will need for expanding on the subject in the course of discussions. Your men certainly have more time to work on this than anybody in CA. However, it is true that they may be somewhat handicapped by not having the feel of all the current thinking here. We hope that Ralph Clough or someone else who is well qualified can be given a few hours of free time in which he can work up some argumentation under informed guidance.

On the embargo question, you may have sensed that the Secretary himself drafted numbered paragraph 5 of your instructions dated October 12, Deptel 870. There seems to be a good chance that we can get some negotiating value from drawing the Chinese Communists out

as to just what aspects of the so-called "embargo" they are complaining about. We are troubled by the pressure from the British and the French, and to a much lesser extent the Japanese, for relaxing the COCOM controls and abolishing the differential altogether between CHINCOM and COCOM. Kalijarvi and Barbour met with Robertson on this yesterday. EUR and E are more pessimistic than FE on the possibility of maintaining the higher level of Chinese controls for the present. It is clear that it would be very poor tactics for us to throw away our China control cards now without getting anything in return. We believe we can hold the Japanese in line and we are going to urge the Secretary to make a strong approach to Macmillan and Pinay in the tripartite talks preceding Geneva. Probably the Secretary is the only one who would be able to prevail on the French and British to stay in line. If this can be done our hand will be much strengthened with the Chinese Communists. Undoubtedly the trade controls are the one really effective pressure we are able to exert. We are convinced that those who minimize the value of the higher level of China controls are mistaken. FE is making its own recommendations to the Secretary on the subject. They differ somewhat from those of EUR and E.

We are glad that you expressed your views with complete frankness on the various draft documents on the question of the unaccounted for military personnel. It goes without saying that complete candor both here and in Geneva is essential. There is no hypersensitivity here or among the Pentagon people who are working on this subject, and we know you do not suffer from this affliction either. We want you to react with complete candor and we are doing the same. It is natural that somewhat more weight should be given to the importance of the record here than you would give it in Geneva. While there is plenty of room for argument as to what is the best tack from the standpoint of getting a cooperative response out of the Chinese Communists, I do not think the final version telegraphed from here is actually provocative. Since it is probably a sad fact that we are not going to get any satisfaction out of the Chinese Communists in any event on a single one of these names, it may be just as well to adhere to the stronger text.

We were glad to get Ralph Clough back on the 10th. He has already been of inestimable help to me in the regular work of the office as well as on Geneva matters.

I am surprised to learn that Colonel Ekvall's new orders have not gone out yet. We had understood from Bill Godel and from Colonel Rasmussen that everything was all squared away for him to be detailed as Assistant Military Attache. We wrote a letter some time ago confirming the continued need for his services and requesting an extension of his assignment. We were assured that this was all that was needed. I will have Ralph check again with the Pentagon today.

Bill Sebald sends his regards and tells you he hopes to find a few minutes some time soon to write you a note.

Regards and continued commendation for steering a good course.

As ever,

WPM

P.S. Please send one carbon copy of your letters in the future, if convenient.

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## 292. Telegram 900 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 17, 1955, 11:53 a.m.

900. For Johnson.

Chicom propaganda on international issues during past week continued maintain hostile attitude toward US, accusing US of obstructing Geneva talks and pursuing policies in Far East contrary spirit of Geneva. US said to be still relying on force to achieve objectives. NCNA commentary on Dulles Legion speech October 10 asserts US request for Chicom renunciation of force tantamount demand Chicom renounce sovereignty over Taiwan.

Geneva talks received more attention than previous week. People's Daily "Observer" editorials October 12 and 13 accused US of obstructing talks and failing take "any steps conforming to Geneva spirit." October 13 editorial focused on question US military personnel missing in Korea. Editorial charged publicity given this subject in US press raises question US willingness abide by agreement on press release procedures, and hinted if issue is raised by US, Chinese side will have "ample reason" raise issue of 14,000 POWs "forcibly detained" by US.

Peiping publicized return from America October 8 of jet propulsion expert Chien Hsueh-sen and Li Cheng-wu. Alleged Chien and Li

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1755. Confidential. Drafted by Dawson; approved in IAD and CA.

had been "illegally arrested" in 1950 and "searched" by US officials on exit from US Sept. 17. Couple feted in Canton October 9.

Comment on Taiwan during week relatively slight, consisting largely of broadcasts beamed to Taiwan, concerning US "exploitation" of Taiwanese. NCNA Oct. 8 noted Taiwan press reports of build-up in MAAG staff Taiwan and stepped-up US training program. Peiping commentary on Dulles speech October 10 charged US holding Taiwan "by force," while demanding China renounce force. Reiterated usual line that "liberation" internal affair, while US "use of force" in Taiwan area an international issue requiring negotiation.

Commentaries on Hoover trip noted pace of Japanese rearmament being quickened at US instigation and accused US of plans send Japanese troops abroad, to further US "aggression" in Asia.

Question of "normalizing" relations between China and Japan apparently discussed at some length by Mao and Chou in interviews with Japanese Diet members visiting Peiping, October 3. Account of interviews given in Hong Kong and Japanese press indicate Chicom now seeking restoration "normal relations" prior discussion outstanding issues. Chou reported to have offered "normalized" relations, without conditions, and to have taken conciliatory line on question Japanese relations with Taiwan, stating Peiping would not insist on rupture prior to talks. Mao reported to have promised release of Jap "war criminals," once state of war ended with Japan. Mao and Chou also reported to have suggested inauguration of talks on "normalization" of relations, at ambassadorial level, or higher, and Chou reported to have renewed invitation to Hatoyama visit Peiping. NCNA October 13 accused Japanese government of turning deaf ear to Peiping's efforts to normalize Sino-Japanese relations.

Daily editorial October 12 hailed withdrawal six Chicom divisions from Korea as "major contribution to promotion peaceful settlement Korea question."

**Dulles**

**293. Letter 20 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 20

Washington, October 17, 1955

Dear Alex:

This letter will be short since not much has transpired since I wrote you on the 14th.

The Secretary has noted that it would seem at some point we should try to smoke out the Chinese Communists by asking them whether the matters they have proposed constituted the *only* matters they have at issue with the U.S. The Secretary observes that the purpose of the talks was to discuss such matters and he thinks we might ask that they should bring out everything that is in their minds. Otherwise the talks cannot serve their agreed purpose.

The foregoing is related to your remarks about whether the raising of other subjects by either side is precluded. I do not believe that anyone on our side thinks that as of now the raising of subjects other than the four mentioned under Item Two is ruled out. The only question is whether a deadline should be established for the introduction of new subjects.

Some of Judge Phleger's people and also Ralph Clough, are working on material for your possible use in connection with the renunciation of force item. We are in something of a dilemma in that any elaboration of our position on support of the GRC, the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Mission of the 7th Fleet, and the presence of MAAG units in Taiwan tends to get us involved in a discussion involving the essential interests if not the rights of the GRC. Yet avoidance of all mention of these matters and of our position on the juridical status of Taiwan puts us in a false position of seeming to have no defensible position and nothing to say in response to Wang's ripostes. It would look as if our position were entirely defensive and untenable. It would almost seem that we were ashamed to even attempt to defend our position. Somehow we must work out a means of addressing forthrightly our basis stance without getting bogged down in a counter productive dispute.

I am enclosing a copy of an important speech which Mr. Robertson made at Davidson College on October 15. This will be of considerable background use to you. You will note that our problems are specifically dealt with beginning on the bottom of Page 5, running through Page 9. This speech is being given heavy play by the VOA throughout the FE

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

although it was not carried as a State Department press release. We expect to put it in the State Department Bulletin soon.

The Secretary is still taking a firm position against travel of American correspondents to Communist China while the 19 are still held. He reaffirmed this position to a CBS Executive recently. The pressure for immediate relaxation is undiminished.

The pouch is closing. We are meeting this afternoon on the guidance for your Thursday meeting. We hope to get this out tomorrow so you will have time to assimilate the telegram and come back at us if necessary before your meeting. You did well to get the meetings established on a weekly schedule without any adverse reaction from Wang.

Krishna Menon saw the Secretary alone on the 15th. I do not have any report on what transpired yet. I hope we can send a report on anything of direct interest within the next few days.

Good wishes,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosure:

Speech of Mr. Robertson

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#### **294. Telegram 914 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 18, 1955, 6:36 p.m.

914. For Johnson.

Guidance for 22nd meeting October 20.

1. You should continue stress emphatically US dissatisfaction with PRC failure implement Agreed Announcement along lines Deptel 870 numbered paragraph 1. Situation remains unchanged regarding nineteen Americans and ability UK Charge carry out his agreed functions. Conviction growing in US that Americans being held as hostages for political purposes. As evidence hardening of US public opinion you should quote verbatim New York Times editorial October 17 which

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1855. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and Sebald; cleared by Phleger and McConaughy and in draft by Dulles.



illustrates growing concern US over Chinese failure implement their agreement. (Deptel 910) US Government seriously concerned by PRC's continued evasion its express commitments, which cannot fail have unfavorable effect on other aspects these talks.

2. At last meeting Wang introduced subjects such as status Taiwan and presence US forces in area on which US and PRC hold different views. These not subjects which can be usefully discussed under present conditions. Remind Wang that fundamental and pressing need is for both parties renounce use force so as to remove threat of war. Whenever Wang attempts divert discussion to other topics you should endeavor bring it back to this simple basic proposition.

3. With reference Wang's demand that US withdraw its forces from Taiwan area you should point out that this is in effect a demand that US change its policy and abandon those whom it has pledged to defend from attack, under threat that armed force will be used if US does not accede to that demand. US does not intend yield to threat of force. Force is not an admissible means settling differences between us. US is not demanding that PRC alter its views and objectives. We only ask that both sides declare their willingness renounce force. Then and only then can differences be freely discussed.

4. Discretion on unaccounted-for military personnel continues in accordance with Deptel 870 paragraph 3 and on embargo accordance paragraph 5 same telegram.

5. As opportunity arises endeavor smoke out Wang on what other issues PRC may wish discuss under Item 2 so that we may know of all questions Chinese Communists want settled. Purpose questions raised latter paragraph is to lay basis for our inability solve embargo item unilaterally (your letter Oct. 13).

6. While Secretary in Geneva, responsibility for issuance your regular instructions will remain in Department. Telegraph promptly any instructions you may receive direct from Secretary in order keep Department fully informed. Department will keep Secretary informed of all instructions to you.

**Dulles**

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**295. Telegram 915 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 18, 1955, 6:37 p.m.

915. For Johnson.

Following draft declaration on renunciation of force has not repeat not received final approval in Department but is transmitted for your comments:

QUOTE

Agreed Announcement  
of the Ambassadors of the United States of America and  
the People's Republic of China

The Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China in the discussion of the practical matters at issue between the two sides have agreed to announce the following declarations:

Ambassador Wang Ping-nan informed Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson that:

In general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, The People's Republic of China renounces the use of force, except in individual and collective self defense.

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson informed Ambassador Wang Ping-nan that:

In general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, the United States renounces the use of force, except in individual and collective self defense.

UNQUOTE

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1855. Secret. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Dulles in draft and by McConaughy, Sebald, and Phleger.

**296. Telegram 896 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 19, 1955, noon

896. From Johnson.

1. Re penultimate sentence paragraph 1 Deptel 914.

2. For following reasons I question desirability quoting newspaper editorial in meeting:

A. I open door to Wang quoting back to me as expressions US public opinion other American newspaper editorials favoring higher level meeting, even recognition, admission to UN, et cetera. (He can always find something our press quote against me while we can be sure we will never find anything CHICOM press quote against him.)

B. While cited editorial is excellent and I have in past and will continue make its principal points, my quoting it in meeting constitutes degree of endorsement which may require me to defend in detail. For example while phrase "Red China" is perfectly proper in context editorial and even public statements in US, it is type of phrase which I have thus far avoided in meeting and if Wang were to use corresponding Communist phrases in characterizing US Government or its officers I would expect immediately call him on it. Next, reference in fourth sentence editorial to "still larger number supposedly free to leave" presumably refers to "47".

I do not believe we have any evidence or even indication support implication these persons most of whom probably working for CHICOMs desire to leave or are being prevented from leaving. In fact at last meeting I rejected Wang's efforts confuse issue with this group. While editorial speaks of "top level" meeting "between Secretary of State Dulles and Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai" Wang has spoken only of "higher level" meeting and while implication of Dulles-Chou meeting is clear it has never been specifically identified as such.

C. It seems to me I weaken my position as spokesman in these negotiations for a representative government presumably able to speak for and assess public opinion much better than any newspaper by formally introducing a newspaper editorial to support our position. He will be able throw back at me my previous statements early in negotiations on undesirability using press as authoritative source. (See 11th paragraph Mytel 354).

3. I can and will in meeting strongly make point on hardening of US public opinion because CHICOM failure implement announcements.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1955. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution.

CHICOMs closely follow US press and well know which papers are authoritative and influential, and will well know accuracy my statements without my reading editorials to them.

4. Therefore believe best use this and similar editorials in repetition to China by VOA and inclusion in Wireless Bulletin which they able closely follow.

**Gowen**

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**297. Telegram 931 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 19, 1955, 4:09 p.m.

931. For Johnson. Deptel 914.

Second sentence para 5 should follow first sentence para 4.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1855. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sebald.

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**298. Telegram 934 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 19, 1955, 6:39 p.m.

934. For Johnson.

Your 896. Department leaves to your discretion use of New York Times editorial Oct. 17. If you prefer you may cite principal points that editorial as widely representative American opinion without identifying with New York Times.

VOA requested give prominent play to this editorial in its Far Eastern output.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1955. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Phleger, Sebald, and Henderson.

**299. Letter 13 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 13

Geneva, October 19, 1955

Dear Walter:

Your letter of October 14 was here when I returned yesterday afternoon. Your letter of October 17 arrived today. As always they are tremendously helpful and appreciated.

With the pouch going out tomorrow noon and my having a meeting at the same time, there is not much that I can write at this time. I have been steadily at work all day on my material for tomorrow's meeting on the basis of Deptel 914. I very much hope that you agree with me on the use of the New York Times editorial on which I sent you a message this morning as soon as I had read the instructions. Otherwise I felt the instructions were excellent and very helpful.

I am bothered by the absence of any word whatever from O'Neill and hope that something will arrive before tomorrow morning's meeting so that I do not go out on any limbs.

I thought the Secretary's press conference statement yesterday was excellent. I am glad that he brought out the extent to which we are actually on Item 2 although it has necessitated my doing a little explaining to correspondents here with whom I have thus far been less forthcoming in this regard.

I do not expect anything dramatic in tomorrow's meeting and will try to write you more fully on Friday. With the Foreign Ministers' Conference opening, we will be able to take advantage of much more frequent pouch service.

I will probably return again to Prague on Saturday, again coming back here on Tuesday with the expectation of remaining here steadily during all or most of the Foreign Ministers' Conference.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

Oct. 20

P.S. Have just come back from today's meeting & this must go into pouch. Think meeting went as well as could be expected & think I made some progress on [illegible in the original] with which we [illegible in the original] with implementation problem. Would not be surprised if we got a few out before opening Fonmin conference next Thursday. Suggested to UN

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

they take initiative in moving our meetings to another area in same building so that we are entirely out of Fonmin area where we are now meeting.

UAJ

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**300. Letter from Robertson to Erskine<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 19, 1955

Dear General Erskine:

I refer to our previous correspondence regarding unaccounted-for United States Military personnel and our exchanges of views regarding the accounting to be demanded at Geneva by Ambassador Johnson from the Chinese Communist representative.

It appears that the Chinese Communist representative may respond to Ambassador Johnson's request for an accounting by making a counterdemand for an accounting for Chinese military personnel, including those who, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, chose not to be repatriated.

I believe that our chances for favorable action on the release of the imprisoned civilians, as well as on our demand for this accounting, will be improved if we are able to render as full an accounting as possible for any list the Chinese Communist representative may submit. I understand an extensive accounting for Chinese personnel on lists previously submitted by the Communist side through the Military Armistice Commission in Korea has already been prepared, but not handed over to the Communists because of their refusal to account for our side's unaccounted-for personnel.

I would appreciate receiving from you any general suggestions and comments you may have as to how Ambassador Johnson might be instructed to respond to a Chinese Communist demand for an accounting for their personnel from the Korean War. I would also like to know your estimate, based on past Communist demands through the MAC, of the probable size and breakdown of the list which the Chinese Communist representative may submit, together with our position and capabilities with respect to furnishing the desired recounting.

Sincerely yours,

**Walter S. Robertson**  
*Assistant Secretary*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1955. Secret. Drafted by Osborn on October 17.

### 301. Telegram 910 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 20, 1955, 1 p.m.

910. From Johnson.

1. Two hour twenty minute meeting this morning, somewhat over hour of which devoted to implementation.

2. I made prepared statement along lines para one Deptel 914 and including info on O'Neill's inability perform functions contained Deptel 933.

3. During considerable give and take in which he said nothing new, I strongly stressed to Wang increasing seriousness present situation, increasingly unfavorable effect it would have on other aspects these talks, referred to increasingly hard tone American press and read portion of letter I had received from mother of Father Houle. Theme was Americans believe announcement meant what it said and as time passes with no results in this our first common public act, he must expect strong reaction. Conviction 19 being held for political purposes strengthened by continued reference PRC public statements on "improvement of relations" as factor in timing release. Believe I was successful in some degree impressing on him seriousness with which we view situation.

4. I then made prepared statement on renunciation of force along lines paras 2 and 3 Deptel 914. Wang replied with short prepared statement to effect our proposal was abuse non-recourse to force principle in international relations to prevent their exercise of sovereign rights in Taiwan, Taiwan was domestic problem, discussion inadmissible in scope these talks and mere statement principle cannot resolve tension in Taiwan area. Deeds, that is US withdrawal from Taiwan, required. Repeated theme "circumstances permitting Chinese Government willing to strive for liberation Taiwan by peaceful means". In give and take he regularly spoke of "American invasion and armed occupation of Taiwan". Rejected any parallel between Taiwan situation and other divided countries. PRC "will never recognize status quo".

5. I ignored challenge our policy and kept coming back to theme first and fundamental step was non-recourse to force declaration to which his reiterated reply was withdrawal US forces in implementation US acceptance of principle non-recourse to force or threat of force.

6. Next meeting Thursday October 27.

7. I am departing for Prague Saturday returning Geneva Tuesday.

**Goze**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2055. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.

**302. Telegram 915 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 20, 1955, 4 p.m.

915. From Johnson. Joint State USIA message.

Garnish informs me he has been assigned full time as Chief USIS Coverage Team FONMIN Conference, and is departing Geneva immediately thereafter for home leave. No information here on arrival his successor but appears may be at least few weeks. With mass arrival correspondents for FONMIN Conference it can be expected will be considerable increase in demands on information officer for my talks. Thus important information officer with clear responsibility my talks be available not later than October 26. From policy standpoint would not think it desirable such officer be actively identified with FONMIN Conference. Would appreciate Department promptly discussing appropriate action with USIA.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2055. Official Use Only.

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**303. Telegram 921 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 20, 1955, 8 p.m.

921. From Johnson. ReDeptel 915.

1. In general I think it important that whatever our minimum position on text of declaration may be we start with something more so as to preserve bargaining room. Would never be able convince Wang our first position was final position and first text should have some negotiating latitude built into it.

2. At same time do not believe text this declaration can be made framework for negotiations on subject to same degree as was possible with agreed announcement on release civilians. That is, do not rpt not believe it would be productive introduce any text unless and until

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2055. Secret; Limited Distribution.



negotiations reached point appeared some agreement in principle in sight.

3. I perceive no objection to draft text but have difficulty in visualizing at this stage how negotiations thereon might develop. In event some agreement in principle is reached it is possible CHICOMS may desire inclusion some language in their section reaffirming their position on Taiwan etc. This of course would open door for us to insist on inclusion counter-balancing statements our section. CHICOMS also likely insist on inclusion UN Charter language from article 2 para 4 on “international” and “threat” use of force.

4. Have no further comments at this time.

**Gowen**

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#### 304. Telegram 922 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 20, 1955, 9 p.m.

922. From Johnson.

1. 22nd meeting today lasted two hours and twenty minutes. I opened with prepared statement as follows:

A. Mr. Ambassador, I first wish to discuss with you this morning question of implementation of announcement with regard to return of civilians which we issued on September tenth. This Saturday six weeks will have passed since that announcement was issued. In our last few meetings I have expressed to you increasing concern over delay by your government in implementing that announcement. At our last meeting I stated that it should be evident that my government was bound to take increasingly serious view of your government's failure to implement announcement with respect to 19 Americans in jail if this failure should be further protracted. However, I have not taken up valuable time at these meetings to discuss this matter in detail.

B. I have done this in deference to your wish that we should proceed to discussion of matters under agenda item 2 as rapidly as possible. This is my desire too, but you must understand that in order for discussion of these complex subjects to proceed with some hope of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2055. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

success, there must be present an atmosphere of mutual confidence and assurance that agreements reached will be carried out.

C. This atmosphere of mutual confidence is rapidly and seriously being jeopardized by your government's failure to implement agreed announcement with respect to remaining imprisoned Americans, as well as by continued inability of UK Charge in Peking to carry out functions envisaged in announcement. When agreed announcement was released, people of United States and world promptly took it to mean simply what it said. They believed that Americans in your country who wanted to return would be permitted expeditiously to exercise their right to do so, this encouraged American people and my government and me to believe that we could promptly go on to fruitful discussion of other matters at issue between our two countries. We hoped and expected that in this atmosphere it would be possible to move ahead on these other important and difficult matters.

D. I must in interest of our talks frankly tell you that favorable atmosphere created by issuance of the announcement is being rapidly dissipated. Up to now no action whatever has been taken to permit return of remaining 19 Americans. Furthermore, you told me that your government would promptly consider suggestions with regard details of implementation submitted by British Charge in Peking. Although more than five weeks have now passed since I first raised these questions here with you and several weeks have passed since British Charge raised these same questions with your government, he still has not even received reply. Nor has any imprisoned American been permitted by your government even to communicate with him. This is causing serious doubt in my country concerning willingness of your government faithfully and promptly to carry out this, our first common public act. Feeling is gaining ground that cases of these Americans are not being handled in light of agreed announcement, but rather that these individuals are being held as hostages for political purposes. I would not be honest if I did not tell you that continuation of this situation cannot fail to have an unfavorable effect on other aspects of these talk.

E. If this is to be result of our issuing an agreed announcement, it would have, perhaps, been better if it had never been issued. However, I am very reluctant to come to this conclusion. I want to believe that your government will take action to complete carrying out of its commitment and thereby restore an atmosphere in which it will be possible to make further progress in these talks.

F. Before turning to any other matters this morning, I would like to hear what you have to say with regard to this situation.

2. Wang replied that he regarded my again raising question of implementation regrettable. He could not accept my statement that his government had neglected implementation of agreed announcement.

There were still Chinese nationals in US who desire to return but have not been able to do so. His government had not received lists of names even of those individuals I had informed him had departed US. Wang said that this was not satisfactory.

3. He continued by stating that 66 American nationals remain in China, including 47 “civilians”. Any of these “civilians” who desire to return to US may do so in accordance with agreement. As to another 19 who have “committed offenses”, Wang said that he had previously indicated that his government is willing to review case of each of these people in accordance with Chinese law.

4. Wang said that “alleged doubt” in US concerning willingness of his government to carry out agreement is not justified, and that he opposed strongly “alleged statement” that remaining 19 are held as hostages. He termed this “deliberate distortion of facts”.

5. He said that each side had invited third country and that all matters concerning implementation should be referred to these countries. It is unnecessary further to bring up matter in these talks. If matter is further raised in these talks, he cannot but take it as questioning their good faith in implementation of agreed announcement.

6. Wang stated that his side was not raising question of US implementation in spite of its dissatisfaction on return of Chinese nationals in US. He stated he would not raise question of good faith of US in carrying out agreement.

7. I replied that advantage of our meeting was informal atmosphere without publicity that enabled us to talk frankly with each other. I stated that I hoped we would be able to continue to do so. I told him that what I had said this morning was motivated by earnest desire to explain frankly situation in my country in regard to talks. I told him that if he is dissatisfied with progress of returning Chinese nationals from US he should tell me so frankly.

8. I stated that to best of my knowledge no Chinese national who wants to return is being prevented from returning by any action by my government. I said that any Chinese national who feels he is being hindered is free to communicate with Indian Embassy, and that we had previously stated that we would accept representations from Indian Embassy on behalf of any such nationals. I said that I knew of no case thus far in which such representations had been received and that we would act promptly should any such case arise.

9. I said that case of 19 Americans is entirely different. I said that only action by Wang’s government can permit them to leave. Whatever he may feel concerning justice or injustice of my statements regarding public opinion in US, it is fact that has to be considered. I am sure his government follows US press and knows statements I made are not based on figment my imagination.

10. I said that press releases by official agencies of his government have done much to feed feeling that these Americans being held as hostages. These press releases and statements continued to speak of improvement in relations as factor in release of these Americans.

11. I said that American press and public are putting same interpretation on these statements that I had told him in earlier meetings I could not but place on similar statements he had made. I said that I am very disturbed about this situation.

12. I told him that I earnestly hoped this situation can be corrected and that atmosphere created by agreed announcement can be restored. I said I greatly feared consequences of continuation of present situation, and that I was saying this not to be provocative or to make threats, but simply in order to share frankly with him trend of opinion in my country with its inevitable consequences on the talks.

13. Wang replied that he shared my view that we should speak frankly in these talks. However, frank exchanges should facilitate rather than hinder progress of talks. Insofar as public opinion is concerned, there is also public opinion in his country. In his country "public opinion is truly representative of opinion of Chinese people", and this fact could not be distorted in any way.

14. He said that our positions in these discussions must be based on genuine facts. If our deliberations were based on inaccurate speculations, we could not possibly come to correct conclusions. In same manner he hoped that there would be conciliatory attitude in public opinion. This required efforts on both sides.

15. I replied that I agreed that discussion should be based on facts, and that I was trying to explain fact regarding situation in my country. I said I hoped he and his government would earnestly consider what I had said because it was said to facilitate talks.

16. I said I wished to stress the fact that people in my country expected agreed announcement to lead to expeditious return of detained Americans and that adverse reaction of disappointment was increasing with time. I said that as personal touch I had letter from lady in my own home town, Mrs. Houle, mother of Father Houle. I read excerpts from letter, expressing Mrs. Houle's expectation at time of announcement her son would promptly return and increasing disappointment at no word on his return.

17. I concluded that it was hard for me to answer letters like that, but that I would not pursue subject further this morning.

18. Wang replied that there are people who express same feelings in letters to him and that there have been various views concerning the advance release of Americans who have committed offenses. He said that questions have been raised why such people who have been

unfriendly to China and carried out acts against it should be released early. He said he did not propose to deal further with this point.

19. I next presented prepared statement on renunciation of force as follows:

A. Mr. Ambassador I have very carefully studied remarks which you made at our last meeting concerning proposal of my government that each of us should renounce use of force to achieve our policies when they conflict and specifically that both sides declare that they would not resort to use of force in Taiwan area except defensively.

B. During your discussion at our last meeting you introduced several subjects, in particular that of status of Taiwan and presence of United States forces in that area. These are subjects upon which our respective governments hold different views. I have carefully avoided attempting to force on you views of my government with regard to these complex matters. Although my government is entirely convinced of rightness and justness of its position with regard to these matters, it is not now asking your government to accept our views. My government full well recognizes that its views are different from those of your government and that each of our governments has policies which are in certain respects incompatible with each other.

C. On other hand I have noted your demand that my government should withdraw its forces from Taiwan area. In effect you are demanding that United States should change its policy and that my government should abandon those whom it has solemnly pledged to defend from attack. You state that your government will, if circumstances permit, seek what you term the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means. I cannot but read into your statement the clear implication that if you are not able by peaceful means to achieve your national objectives with respect to Taiwan area, you will resort to force. What you seem in effect to be saying is that you will use peaceful means as long as your national objectives can thereby be achieved but that if they cannot be achieved by such means, you threaten to use force. Therefore, it seems to me that what you in effect have said is that if United States does not accede to your government's demand that my government change its policies, your government threatens use of armed force.

D. Just so that we may be entirely clear, I want to say very frankly and very bluntly that United States does not intend to yield to threat of force.

E. My government does not consider that force is admissible means of settling differences between us. My government is not demanding that your government alter its views or its objectives. Proposal which I have made is only that both sides declare their willingness to renounce force to implement these policies. Then and only then can these differences between us be freely and hopefully discussed. They cannot

be usefully discussed under present conditions in which one party is threatening use of force if its views do not fully prevail.

F. I have sought to determine aspects of this principle on which we agree and hope that whatever common ground we do have may be extended and provide a sufficient base for making declarations which I have suggested. Solemn duty which both of us have toward our respective governments and peoples is to attempt to widen area of whatever agreement exists between us and to narrow and eventually eliminate areas of disagreement. You have stated that your government is in agreement with my government regarding principles of United Nations Charter with respect to use of force. However, if I understand your remarks correctly, your government is not willing to apply those principles to situation in Taiwan area. As I pointed out in my statement at our 20th meeting, there are many countries in world today which are abnormally divided. In each of these cases resort to force by one side or other cannot but result in war. A determination that such situations should not be permitted to bring about war has been voiced by responsible governments. In such an atmosphere there can be hope that equitable, just and peaceful solutions can, with patience, be found. Such solutions are impossible in atmosphere of overwhelming threat of one side to resort to force if its views do not prevail. Only when threat of force is removed can there be hope of coming to constructive conclusions.

G. I fail to see why or upon what moral or legal basis your government considers that situation in Taiwan area differs from these other situations. I fail to see why your government considers that it should be entitled to disregard accepted standards of international conduct with regard to this particular situation.

H. I again most earnestly express hope that your government will be able to agree with mine upon this simple but fundamental principle so that other matters can be discussed with a better hope of reaching constructive conclusions.

20. Wang replied with prepared statement. He said that he had previously pointed out that principle of non-recourse to force must not be abused with respect to China's exercise of its sovereign rights to its own territory of Taiwan. He said that Chinese Government has already stated that "circumstances permitting it will strive to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means". However, this Chinese domestic affair is not within scope of our present talks.

21. He said that second agenda item covered only practical matters at issue between China and US and that I had repeatedly indicated that discussion could involve only China and US. Hence he considered domestic affairs of China or US could not be made subjects of talks.

22. He stated that as he had previously pointed out, China has always advocated peaceful solutions of international disputes rather than recourse to force and that China is opposed threat or use of force to undermine sovereignty and territorial integrity of any state. He said that I had stated that US as member of UN agreed to refrain from threat or use of force in international relations. He stated that US by using force against China's Taiwan has already broken principle of non-employment of force in international relations.

23. At approximately this point Wang abandoned his manuscript and continued extemporaneously. He said that mere statement of principle cannot resolve tension in Taiwan area. Practical question is how US is going to implement principle by actual deeds.

24. He could not accept the way I had raised question of status of Taiwan. Taiwan is Chinese territory and this cannot be disputed. That question has been settled long ago. Taiwan is as much Chinese territory as New York is American territory and cannot be separated from China.

25. He said that I had on one hand proposed to make announcement regarding renunciation of use of force. On other hand, I had openly made a statement this morning concerning justice of use of force by US in Taiwan area. If such American use of force is justifiable one is bound to question significance of Cairo Declaration, of Potsdam Agreement on which signature of US President is affixed, of public statements by American Presidents, and of UN Charter stipulations. If American use of force against Taiwan is justified, what was meaning of resistance against Japanese aggression. If American use of force against Taiwan is termed justified we are bound to say it is making farce of normally accepted standards of international law.

26. Wang stated that he also wished to say frankly that US armed occupation of Taiwan is not merely threat to security of China but also threat to security and peace in Far East. Chinese people consistently advocated peaceful settlement of international disputes and opposed settlement by force, but they will never yield to threat of force and will never recognize status quo.

27. He said that examples of divided nations that I had cited can never explain or justify American armed occupation of Taiwan.

28. He said that chief cause of tension lies in fact that US used force in the area. Such use of force greatly threatens China and other countries in that area. That was why it was necessary to carry on talks here. Purpose of talks is to improve relations between China and US and to ease tense situation in Far East. He said that if as proposed by China US applies principle of non-recourse to force and withdraws its armed forces from Taiwan area, then it would not only improve relations between our two countries, but at same time greatly reduce tension in that part of world.



29. He concluded by stating that the question in what manner China will liberate Taiwan is solely a domestic affair and not for discussion here and that Chinese people resolutely oppose any state that tries to interfere in their domestic affairs. He reserved comments on remaining parts of my statement for the next meeting.

30. I replied that if one government were entirely to concede to the views of another government, many situations would be resolved, but only in a one-sided manner. What governments can do is to say that differences must not lead them to war and that they will discuss problems in peaceful atmosphere free from threat of force from either side. I said that I was proposing no more at the moment. I was not asking him to concede to our point of view, but simply asking that we agree we will not fight over our points of view. Then we would be able to discuss other matters with a better hope of finding solutions.

31. Wang replied that of course we were trying to find better solutions in our talks and that it was certainly correct when I said that different points of view should not lead to war. He said that as he has stated on many occasions and as Premier Chou En-lai has also stated, Chinese people are friendly to the American people and do not wish to fight Americans. However the present situation can be described as dagger thrust into the body of China. Those who suffer are Chinese people.

32. Wang said that I had stated that no government can resolve a dispute with another government entirely in accord with its own views. He said he recognized that each party to a dispute has its own reasons, but one cannot say all reasons are correct. That is why it is necessary to have international law and standards of conduct such as UN Charter. That means each state must respect territorial integrity and sovereignty of other governments. If any government could interfere in internal affairs of other states in disregard of international law, outlook of world would indeed not be optimistic.

33. I replied that if his government was determined that the situation should not lead to war and if, as I had told him, my government is so determined, why should it not be possible for us simply to say so.

34. Wang replied that if declaration of renunciation of use of force is to be made then why cannot US specifically withdraw its armed forces from this area. He cited a Chinese proverb: only a person's deeds can verify a person's words. Only deeds give effect to words.

35. I replied that Wang was asking the US to abandon solemnly pledged words and agreements with others and to change its policies in area. I said I was not excluding discussion of other subjects but I was simply saying that we cannot discuss such subjects unless we have said we will not let differences lead us to war. That is fundamental to any fruitful discussion of differences. If his government shared my government's determination that differences should not lead to war, I saw no



reason why we should not say so. Once we had done this, we could have better hope in discussing other matters.

36. Wang replied that US is member of UN, and that he was asking US to abide by solemn pledge it has made in UN Charter and other international documents to which it is signatory. He said that if that spirit can be specifically implemented with deeds, we can expect progress in the world.

37. I added that there were two indisputable facts: one, there is a dispute between us; and, two, the spirit of the UN Charter is that disputes shall not be settled by recourse to force. I said that regarding our specific dispute, we were willing to state we would not resort to force. If his government would say the same thing, then we could start talking about the dispute in an atmosphere free from threat of force by either side.

38. Wang replied that if the US would withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan, it would certainly create peaceful atmosphere. He said that he hoped I would very carefully study his proposal and put forward constructive views.

39. I said I had nothing to add at this time. The meeting concluded with confirmation our previous agreement that the next meeting would be Thursday, October 27, and that the usual statement would be made to the press.

Gowen

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### 305. Telegram 924 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 21, 1955, noon

924. From Johnson.

1. At yesterday's as well as preceding meeting Wang was relaxed and made no effort force pace of meeting or press discussion his subjects. Yesterday words "higher level meeting" or "trade embargo" were not mentioned even obliquely. His entire attitude last two meetings as well as readiness with which he agreed my proposal for weekly meetings give general impression of willingness, at least for time being, permit talks continue at leisurely pace without making effort bring any

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2155. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

issues to head. This represents sharp contrast to his attitude at beginning discussion item two.

2. It may be they have now reached conclusion it is in their interest keep talks going more or less indefinitely even though they obtain no concrete results. On other hand their present tactics might be related to FonMin meeting and may undergo change following that meeting.

3. Possibility that should be considered is that, if their present desire is to keep talks going for their own sake even though no concrete results obtained, they may estimate our only interest in talks is to obtain release of Americans and when that is accomplished we will cut them off. They may thus be estimating that it is necessary for them continue hold some Americans to accomplish even limited objective of continuation talks. Not sure how we can meet this possibility but will be alert for any opportunity to confirm this theory and do what I can to refute.

4. Wang will probably make opening statement next meeting replying my statement yesterday's meeting on renunciation force. Question is what I can usefully say in reply other than reiterating points already made.

Gowen

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### 306. Telegram 966 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 21, 1955, 6:27 p.m.

966. For Johnson.

General tone of Peiping propaganda during week ending October 20 continued hostile toward US. Commentary on Dulles speech of October 10 accused Secretary of trying to "undermine the cordial atmosphere" Summit Conference and seeking to "sabotage" coming Big Four Ministers Conference. US accused of continuing to rely on force to achieve "aggressive" goals and of showing off atomic power to maintain tension. US said to be converting Japan into "atomic war base," and frantically trying to subvert PRC.

Attention given to Geneva talks past week relatively slight. NCNA October 19 gave brief summary Dulles press conference October 18

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2155. Official Use Only. Drafted by Dawson (DRF); cleared in IAD and CA.

without comment. NCNA October 20 quoting Special Correspondent Ch'en Shih-wu, accused US of "consistently obstructing and delaying discussion" of substantive issues under Item 2 by unilateral disclosure of "controversial issues" to press, and by press fabrications. NCNA cited as example of latter, NY Times article October 15 quoting NCNA representative in Geneva to effect that Wang instructed not to discuss renunciation of force prior to discussion trade embargo and Seventh Fleet removal. Accused *Times* correspondent of adopting "hostile attitude" toward talks, and hinted he has close connections with US Consulate.

On Taiwan issue, NCNA October 17 stated US still creating tension Taiwan area, hence continued need for "vigilance"; stressed need to "prepare for liberation of Taiwan," while Geneva talks continue. *People's Daily* editorial October 19 stated "Chinese people willing to strive to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means." Cited Tibet as example of "peaceful liberation." Contrasted US "use of force" in Taiwan area, with Chinese peaceful intentions. Concluded that "If Dulles principle of renouncing force is to have practical significance, US should discard use of force . . . and materially contribute to easing of tension in Taiwan area."

Considerable attention in Peiping press during past week to need for early "normalization" relations with Japan. Address by Liu Shao-ch'i to group Diet members October 16 followed general line established by Chou-Mao interviews October 3—i.e., achieve "normalization" first, then settle specific issues. Liu called for early holding of "diplomatic negotiations" with Japanese government and continued expansion of informal contacts, through trade, cultural, and parliamentary missions. Liu address followed by joint communique October 17 calling for "positive efforts" normalize relations; relaxation of COCOM controls; increased cultural contacts. Mao Tse-tung quoted by Reuters as having told Japanese Diet members he was willing to visit Japan or US if invitation offered and would extend return invitation to Hatoyama. Mao reported as having said that international situation "might change" hence he sought to promote friendship with all countries. Meanwhile Peiping continued take harsh line toward Hatoyama government strongly protesting Japanese decision send 150 Chinese residents of Japan to Taiwan and hinting this was due to "American influence."

**Dulles**

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307. Letter 14 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 14

Geneva, October 21, 1955

Dear Walter:

I do not know when this letter will reach you but I hope that it may be of some value in contributing to your more long range thinking back there. It is very much in the nature of "thinking aloud" and represents distillation of many "bull sessions" we have had here on the subject.

We have now for several meetings discussed primarily renunciation of force. One of the things about which we have been puzzling is why Wang has been so willing to drop his subjects and at least talk around our subject. One theory, which I set forth in my telegram 924 of today, is that they are willing to see the talks kept going either more or less indefinitely or at least through the Foreign Ministers' Conference and do not desire to take any steps that would tend to bring matters to a head.

Another theory we have been discussing since I sent my telegram is that they see in this subject possibility of pressing their undoubted desire for the withdrawal of our forces from the Taiwan area within such a framework, whereas they full well realize that its introduction as a subject by them would have been rejected by us as outside the scope of these talks.

This leads me to an attempt to analyze what their thinking may be with respect to our renunciation of force proposal. Despite its surface appearances, I believe the Chinese Communists may well view the proposal as very unequal from their standpoint. They may well feel that it would require them to make substantial political concessions while we are making virtually none.

It would not increase the assurances which they now have from us against military attack contained in our treaty with the GRC, our general obligations under the UN Charter and our public statements. At the same time we would continue to maintain in close proximity to them our present heavy preponderance of air and sea power.

Also, the Chinese Communists may estimate that such a declaration would carry with it for them the following other disadvantages:

a) It would carry with it a tacit acknowledgment of the existence of the GRC far more than any other act they have thus far taken. The PRC is in a much stronger international position than any of the rump Communist governments in other divided countries which for the most part have no status outside the Communist bloc. The tacit recognition

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

that a no force declaration would give to the status quo, and the GRC as a government which claims sovereignty over all of China and is recognized by most free world countries, would greatly weaken the PRC claim as the only government of China and the government entitled to occupy China's seat in the UN.

b) The renunciation of force declaration by the PRC would virtually eliminate the possibility of its obtaining even the offshore islands in the foreseeable future. PRC estimates that there is a good possibility it could attack those islands without too serious risk of U.S. intervention and without serious political loss. It also estimates that if the U.S. were to intervene to prevent capture of the offshore islands and any considerable hostilities should develop therefrom, the PRC would have considerable political support in Asia as well as elsewhere, while the U.S. would tend to become politically isolated on this issue.

c) The renunciation of force declaration would be interpreted in Taiwan and by the overseas Chinese as an acceptance of the status quo by the PRC and would, therefore, greatly increase the difficulties of PRC subversion of Taiwan and decrease PRC influence among overseas Chinese.

d) Such a bilateral declaration would not bind the GRC or bring about any cessation of GRC harassment of the mainland and shipping destined for the PRC.

The only factors that I perceive that might move them toward making such a declaration are the following:

a) It would contribute to their current diplomatic peace offensive.

b) It would increase pressure on U.S. to agree to a higher level meeting and, in turn, speed up relaxation of trade controls, membership in the UN, etc.

c) If they genuinely fear that the U.S. intends to put Chiang back on the mainland, they would enter into the declaration in the hope that it would tie our hands.

d) They could use such declaration to bring pressure on us to restrain GRC from its harassing tactics.

None of the foregoing points seems very persuasive to me from their standpoint, and I doubt if they outweigh what they consider to be the disadvantages. My estimate of the situation at present is that I see little or no possibility of their entering into such a declaration unless it were accompanied by the withdrawal of our forces from Taiwan or, much less likely, a firm commitment to a Foreign Ministers' meeting. I would not even be sure that they would enter into it even if both things were done. I am also not sure where Quemoy and Matsu might fit in. I certainly thus far have not perceived any support for the oft repeated thesis that a ceasefire could be obtained in the Formosa Strait if Matsu and Quemoy were turned over to them. However, by stretching things a bit, one might be able to read into Wang's remarks thus far

that they would be willing to agree to renunciation of force declaration in exchange for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan. He has never defined or been specific about this. I am not sure whether he is talking just about the air unit which we have stationed there, which is, I understand, our only tactical unit on the island, or whether he is talking about the whole complex of the MAAG and the Seventh Fleet.

It might be, as indicated in my today's telegram, that they are willing to keep these talks going indefinitely as an alternative to making decisions on these problems which are even more difficult for them than for us. However, it is too early to come to any firm conclusion on this.

I am not sure where all of this leads us but simply wanted fully to share with you some of our talk on the subject. If the opportunity arises, I hope to talk some of these things through with the Secretary while he is here, but before doing so would appreciate having FE reactions to some of these hypotheses.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. In case you haven't seen it, I thought you would be amused at the enclosed FBIS. You should have somebody get out the original New York Times story to which it refers.

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### 308. Letter 21 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 21

Washington, October 21, 1955

Dear Alex:

The Secretary is due to arrive in Geneva on Wednesday afternoon, October 26. I have just talked to Rod O'Connor for the second time regarding contacts with you. We think the arrangement for the handling of your instructions during the Foreign Ministers Conference should work all right. The regular instructions to you will continue to be handled in the Department, but will be repeated to the Secretary in the TEDUL series. We will take particular pains to get these instructions out on the Tuesday before the Thursday meetings, so there will be time for the Secretary to amend or comment on the instructions if he wishes to do

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

so. It would be well for you to give the Secretary's staff in Geneva a copy of all your messages to the Department simultaneously with the dispatch of the messages. This in addition to the arrangement for you to inform us of any instructions you receive direct from the Secretary should give us a pretty complete cross-check. In addition, there may be some direct exchanges between the Secretary and/or Herman Phleger in Geneva and the Department on policy considerations involved in your instructions. There will always be a risk of some confusion or misunderstanding in a situation like this but we hope that this arrangement will give us maximum insurance against any serious crossing of the wires.

Ralph Clough has had Joe Nagoski prepare an up-to-date box score on the status of the 76 Chinese in this country who were mentioned to Wang. It is enclosed as of possible background use to you.

The mild and cautious tone of the Secretary's remarks about the Geneva talks at his Press Conference on October 18 has created an impression in some quarters that we are not particularly dissatisfied with the PRC's record of implementation of the Agreed Announcement, and that a Foreign Ministers' level meeting might be seriously considered immediately after your talks are terminated. Senator Knowland telephoned from California on October 19 to express his surprise over the press reports on the Secretary's remarks and to go on record as being opposed to any discussions under Item 2 "until the 19 Americans rotting in Communist jails have been released". He thought we had abandoned our firm position. Mr. Robertson explained that we had not abandoned Item 1 and would not do so until the last civilian was released. He also pointed out that the only substantive discussion under Item 2 concerned the renunciation of force, which was our topic. The discussion of this topic was in our interest and in no way indicated a weakening of our position or a concession to the Communist viewpoint.

We are doing what we can to counter any impression abroad that we are satisfied with Chinese Communist performance under the Agreed Announcement, that we are about ready for a Dulles-Chou En-lai meeting, or that our stand on the recognition issue has changed.

We are sending you a memorandum of the latest conversation between Ambassador Koo and Mr. Robertson on this subject which took place October 20.

The British Embassy here is giving us somewhat fuller abstracts of O'Neill's reports than the Foreign Office in London is giving to our Embassy there. There is some duplication involved since you are receiving this material both from London and from us. We would like to have an indication from you as to whether the somewhat greater detail you get in our telegrams justifies the added expense.

We are awaiting your reaction to the short and simple draft declaration on renunciation of force. It may not be the best form of statement

to propose to Wang but it is a starter anyway. We want to avoid high-flown language suggestive of a treaty. So it will have to be short and simple. We feel we must get in a specific inclusion of the area of Taiwan without diluting the force of the general statement. This creates something of a dilemma for us. The introduction of the "collective" reference is an added complication.

The report of the 22nd meeting yesterday indicates that you are just about on the merry-go-round in the discussion of the renunciation of the use of force. There is a need for introduction of new material to avoid repetition *ad nauseam* of the hackneyed phrases. It seems to me we must rebut in some way the Communist canard that we are in military occupation of Taiwan. How to do this without getting side-tracked, and without being led into matters dealing with the rights and essential interests of the GRC, is a poser.

A good sojourn in Prague, and I hope that you won't mind being deprived of the limelight during the Foreign Ministers Conference.

Regards,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosure:

Status of 76 Chinese

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### **309. Telegram 980 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 24, 1955, 6:59 p.m.

980. For Johnson.

Your 915. USIA detailing Lawrence Howse, Press Attache at Paris, as your press officer.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2055. Official Use Only. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Henderson.



**310. Telegram Tedul 8 to Paris<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 24, 1955, 7:24 p.m.

Tedul 8. From Robertson.

1. We have been considering in what way Johnson might bring about three week recess in talks to prevent Wang and Chinese Communists from exploiting increased status and prestige which would result from continuation Johnson-Wang conversations simultaneously with Foreign Ministers Conference.

2. If release of Americans were sole objective of talks, we would favor very forceful presentation our case at this point, including public statement, and insistence on three-week recess as method of exerting pressure on Communists and demonstrating we do not propose continue talking indefinitely with representative of government which failing to live up to its express commitments. However, this tactic would make it very difficult for us to resume talks if Communists failed to act within three-week period. To do so would be interpreted as weakness by Communists and would certainly be criticized in US. Alternative would be indefinite recess at least until such time as Communists decided release some Americans. Results this tactic probably would not be consonant with one of major objectives, namely, keeping talks going.

3. It would be possible, however, for Johnson to present recess proposal in manner giving least impression of pressure and with due regard for Chinese Communist considerations of face. He would point out to Wang that Wang himself had emphasized need for time to carry out judicial processes required in release of Americans and that we were therefore proposing three-weeks' recess for this purpose. He would seek Wang's concurrence in recess and would not insist if Wang objected. It is problematical whether Wang would agree and whether, if he did, any Americans would in consequence be released, but this tactic would avoid risks to major objective of talks which are inherent in that proposed in paragraph 2.

4. A third alternative would be to have Johnson make forceful statement expressing US dissatisfaction at Chinese Communist non-performance and informing Wang that if no action on Americans had taken place by following meeting we would be compelled to consider making public statement. This type of threat once used by Wang on us

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2455. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated Priority to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 981. Drafted by Clough; cleared in draft by Robertson and Sebald and in S/S.

and implications would not be lost on him. It involves some risk, but has advantage of giving Chinese Communists chance to act before any public exchange of recriminations had occurred.

5. We have also considered whether time has not arrived to take harder line in our conversations with Wang even if this would cause a deterioration in tone of talks. Public and Congressional opinion hardening here in face continued inaction on release of Americans by Chinese Communists.

6. Would appreciate early reply so Johnson can be instructed prior to October 27 meeting.

**Hoover**

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### 311. Telegram 957 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 25, 1955, 6 p.m.

957. From Johnson.

Have just returned and seen Robertson's Tedul 8 repeated Geneva 981 and have following comments:

1. Re para 1 reference telegram, while I am not in best position to judge it does not seem clear to me CHICOMS obtain any increased status and prestige from continuation talks during FonMin conference. In fact would seem to me talks at only Ambassadorial level with CHICOMS while four Foreign Ministers meeting same city does not give CHICOMS any special advantage they not already deriving from talks and may be somewhat our advantage.

2. Re para 2, am convinced that at least for time-being public pressure, and particularly to extent of recessing talks, on CHICOMS would be counterproductive in expediting releases.

3. Para 3, Wang is never going to agree to any recess for purpose allowing time completing "judicial processes" for release.

4. I believe there is much merit in third alternative set forth para 4. However in order set stage to obtain maximum benefit suggest following course of action:

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2555. Secret; Niact. Repeated Priority Niact to Paris eyes only for Dulles as telegram 132.

(A) At October 27 meeting I would make presentation on missing military personnel and would suggest to Wang agreed communique following meeting would include statement we had continued discussion implementation agreed announcement and under item two U.S. had introduced topics renunciation force and missing military personnel and, as previously stated, PRC had introduced trade embargo and FonMin meeting. I would expect Wang reject whereupon I would inform him I would issue unilateral statement along similar lines except that I would omit reference to two PRC topics. Purpose of this would be supplement Secretary's October 18 press conference statement and make clear to world opinion US reasonableness in entering into discussion item two even though PRC had not implemented agreed announcement.

(B) At November 3 meeting I would make threat of public statement on our dissatisfaction with implementation and

(C) If necessary would implement the threat at November 10 meeting which would be just two months from issuance agreed announcement and during midst Foreign Ministers Conference.

**Gowen**

**Attachment**

**Note to Barnes**

Washington, October 26, 1955

Mr. Barnes

Mr. Cladouhas of FE would like two extra copies of the attached. He said that they needed one for Mr. Sebald, one for Mr. McConaughy and one for himself. He wanted to know why they only got one and I told him that was usually the practice on eyes only and he said it wasn't that he had received as many as 4 copies of one, but on checking it was one slugged E.O. for Robertson, etc.

Approve     OK    

Disapprove                     

**Attachment**

**Note from Barnes to Murphy**

Washington, October 25, 1955

G—Mr. Murphy

Action has been sent to:

FE—Mr. Robertson

Robert G. Barnes

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312. Telegram 989 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 25, 1955, 5:49 p.m.

989. For Johnson.

FYI Senator George delivered following confidential letter to Secretary shortly before his departure on 21st:

QUOTE On the eve of your departure for the Geneva Conference, permit me, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to wish you a pleasant and a successful conference.

I hope it may be of some help to you to know that as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and as far as I am authorized to speak for the Committee, my position is that there are some matters before the ambassadorial conferees that ought to be concluded before any further steps are taken.

The Chinese Communists first should release the American prisoners they have promised to free and they should give some accounting of the 450 soldiers who remain unaccounted for after the Korean War.

If they will do these things and make a public pledge to give up the use of force in any settlement of the Formosa issue, then we should be prepared to go ahead with a high level conference.

With my cordial regards to you for a pleasant trip and a safe return, I am UNQUOTE.

Hoover

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2555. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy.

**313. Telegram 996 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 25, 1955

996. For Johnson.

Partial guidance for October 27 meeting:

1. On renunciation of force item, although it is undesirable for you to engage in extensive debate with Wang in Defense US policy regarding Taiwan, his accusation that US has occupied Taiwan by force of arms cannot be permitted rest unchallenged. You should briefly and factually state our position: that Taiwan is seat of GRC which we recognize; that US has signed Mutual Defense Treaty with GRC under which we assumed obligations to assist in defense of Taiwan against outside attack; and that such units of US armed forces as are stationed on Taiwan are there in accordance with treaty provisions and with full consent of GRC. To describe this situation as "US armed occupation of Taiwan" is distortion of truth.

You should then reiterate, along lines followed last meeting, that in best interests both countries and world at large urgent requirement is not to sit in Geneva arguing whose position right and whose wrong, but for both parties renounce use of force to settle differences, with particular reference to Taiwan area.

2. Your 957 approve your recommendation that statement on unaccounted-for military personnel be presented.

3. Awaiting reply from Secretary before sending additional instructions concerning manner of presentation item on release Americans.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–2555. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated Priority to Paris as telegram Tedul 11. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Barnes and McConaughy and in draft by Sebald.

**314. Telegram 962 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 26, 1955, 10 a.m.

962. From Johnson.

Would appreciate some reply my 871 prior to tomorrow's WPP Meeting.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2655. Official Use Only; Priority.

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**315. Telegram Dulte 12 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 26, 1955, 7 p.m.

Dulte 12. For next meeting agree your guidance in Geneva 996. Suggest that forceful statement be made about failure implement declaration about repatriation, then present statement on unaccounted-for military personnel and continue on item renunciation of force. Do not believe advisable suggest recess of talks, in view of risks, at least at this time, or to give notice we will make public statement. These tactics can be considered later.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2655. Secret; Niact.

**316. Telegram 1003 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 26, 1955, 12:29 p.m.

1003. For Johnson. Your 962.

Defense unable supply specific information requested your 871 from Washington files. Have asked Army to have search made of more complete files stored Kansas City.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–2655. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Clough.

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**317. Telegram 1013 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 26, 1955, 8:35 p.m.

1013. For Johnson. Deptel 996 paragraph 3.

In absence other instructions from Secretary or last minute favorable news regarding detained Americans, lead off 23rd meeting with renewed demand for prompt PRC compliance terms of Agreed Announcement. Follow lines your statement last meeting reported your 922, but make tone somewhat more insistent in view passage additional week with no performance. Remind Wang that American Government and people have been extremely patient in waiting for PRC to carry out Agreed Announcement, but as time continues pass with no action whatsoever, not even authorization for nineteen imprisoned Americans to communicate with British Charge or be seen by him, patience wearing thin.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–2655. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Geneva as telegram Tedul 18. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy; cleared by Sebald and in S/S.

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**318. Telegram 968 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 27, 1955, 5 a.m.

968. From Johnson.

Following is text draft "agreed statement" submitted by Wang at today's meeting:

1. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on behalf of the Government of the United States of America jointly state that,

2. Pursuant to paragraph 3, article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, "all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered"; and

3. Paragraph 4, article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations";

4. The People's Republic of China and the United States of America are agreed that they should settle disputes between their two countries by peaceful means without resorting to the threat or use of force; and

5. In order to realize their common desire the People's Republic of China and the United States of America have decided to hold a Foreign Ministers' conference to negotiate a solution of the question of easing and eliminating the tense situation in the Taiwan area.

**Dulles**

Note: Advance copy to (FE) 8:45 a.m. 10/27/55, CWO/FED.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2755. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.



**319. Telegram 970 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 27, 1955, 7 p.m.

970. From Johnson.

1. Two hour forty-five minute meeting this morning opened by Wang with somewhat milder rehash CHICOM position on Taiwan which avoided renewal demand for US withdrawal and ended with presentation draft statement transmitted by separate tel.

2. I replied with statement along lines para one Deptel 996 and stated I would study and reply later concerning his draft statement.

3. He replied with long ad lib statement “rejecting” my statement on Taiwan. After some sparring and give and take I tried to probe further for meaning para 4 his draft statement to determine whether it was any move toward meeting our position on renunciation of force in Taiwan area. While his replies followed Chou En-lai formula they were somewhat more ambiguous than previously. Replying to my specific question he stated para 4 “included disputes between US and China in Taiwan area”. My specific probing on significance his continued use “conditions permitting” with respect “liberation” Taiwan led to no definite conclusion.

4. I then reverted to implementation in brief but strong terms to which he replied my information was not current with respect ability UK carry out its functions and rejected in harder terms than previously my raising question these meetings. He rebuffed all my efforts determine what he meant by my information not current.

5. I then made statement on missing military personnel in accordance Deptels 824 and 828. In reply he read prepared statement “rejecting assertion 450 Americans still allegedly being held” and flatly refused accept lists.

6. I replied by pointing out I had not alleged 450 “still being held” but was asking for information with regard to their fate. I then cited as example case of Army PFC. Paul E. Craig, pointing out his specific mention in Peiping broadcast and that they could not deny they had info with regard to him. If he were dead, all we were asking was when and where. There was then long and increasingly acrimonious discussion which I centered around facts in Craig case and humanitarian aspects. He rehashed position on fourteen thousand and reiterated entire matter should be taken up in MAC. He claimed he had answered our query by giving us list all Americans in China, including list last year all those

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2755. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.

who had died in China. He made direct request for information on fourteen thousand. I pointed out no relation between 14,000 and list 450, the case 14,000 analogous to Americans who remained their side and went to PRC. I said his refusal accept list was not in keeping with spirit our talks and made repeated efforts get him accept. After I had pushed him into tight corner by continually coming back to Craig case, he simply clammed up and refused to say anything more. It was clear he was under categorical instructions not to accept list and nothing I said was going to change this fact. Meeting closed on this very hard note with my reserving right revert to matter.

7. Next meeting November 3.

**Gowen**

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### 320. Telegram 977 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 27, 1955, 9 p.m.

977. From Johnson. Mytel 871. Deptel 1003.

Suggest DRF may be able obtain some of information required from its files of FBIS. Need texts of CHICOM broadcast or press item with precise date and source. For possible use next meeting require data on:

Paul E. Craig, Army, Peiping broadcast 27 June 1951.

Casimire T. Demoll, Army, Peiping broadcast 22 June 1951.

Myron Johnson, Army, Peiping broadcast 29 June 1951.

Russel F. Morris, Army, China Monthly Review August 1951.

William D. Schofder, Jr., Army, Peiping broadcast 23 June 1951.

Gerald G. Schuring, Army, (possibly Peiping) broadcast 7 May 1951.

William R. Seggie, Army, (possibly Peiping) broadcast 22 June 1951.

For subsequent use require data on any others on list of 450 missing personnel.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2755. Official Use Only.

**321. Telegram 994 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 28, 1955, 10 p.m.

994. From Johnson.

Wang's office today sent over revised English translation of draft he handed me yesterday which contains following changes from text given Mytel 968.

A) Title change from "agreed statement" to "agreed announcement".

B) "State that" end para one changed to "declare".

C) First portion para 2 changed to 2 in accordance with article 2, para 3".

D) First portion para 3 changed to "and in accordance with article 2, para 4".

E) Para 4 "are agreed" changed to "agree", and "and" at end of para deleted.

F) All of para 5 changed to read as follows: "In order to realize their common desire, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America decide to hold a conference of Foreign Ministers to settle through negotiations the question of relaxing and eliminating the tension in Taiwan area."

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2855. Confidential; Limited Distribution.

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**322. Letter 15 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 15

Geneva, October 28, 1955

Dear Walter:

I hope to take advantage of the more frequent pouch service for the next few weeks.

The Secretary arrived Wednesday evening, and Herman Phleger immediately got in touch with me to show me the message which he

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." A handwritten note on the letter indicates it was received on November 2.

and the Secretary drafted on the plane on the way over replying to your 981. I made no suggestions for any changes and they sent it off immediately Niact at about 8 p.m. Geneva time, but I was sorry to see from your 1013 that it had apparently not arrived.

The Secretary asked to see me the same evening and I had some general discussion with him, primarily on the trade question. I gathered that he had talked with Macmillan on the CHINCOM question and that he had come to the conclusion that some drop in the CHINCOM level, toward but not all the way to a COCOM level, is shortly inevitable. (I understand a telegram on the subject went from Paris to the Department but I have not seen it.) We had some general discussion on how this could be tied in with my talks here but came to no conclusion, except that I gathered that it is the Secretary's desire that if this development is in any event going to take place, I should attempt to capitalize on it here. I told him that, without expressing any opinion on whether or not the level should or should not be dropped, my strong feeling was that if we had come to the conclusion that it was going to be dropped, I thought it important solely from my standpoint here that it would appear we had agreed, or at least acquiesced, rather than that it had happened in spite of our opposition.

If I am going to make any capital out of it here, it would be important that Wang and I have had at least some discussion of the subject prior to any reduction becoming known to the Chinese Communists. Obviously I cannot and would not in any sense negotiate with him on the level of CHINCOM controls, but believe I could at the most intimate a causal relationship. It seems to me that this would assist in the objective of keeping these talks going by giving the Chinese Communists a feeling that the talks were not entirely devoid of results for them. It just might also help somewhat in release of Americans.

Yesterday's meeting went about as expected except for Wang's introduction of his draft agreed statement. It is clearly a very clever piece of work, and if published, would have much public appeal. As I noted in my 970, I feel that it does represent some slight advance inasmuch as it relates some form of renunciation of force to a Foreign Ministers' meeting rather than to the previous position on withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Taiwan area. Of course, this latter objective is merely deferred to the Foreign Ministers' Conference.

I am very provoked at Wang's attitude yesterday—sitting back and smugly telling me that he knew something I didn't know with regard to implementation but would not tell me what. It was only after I got back to the hotel after the meeting that I learned that the press tickers reported the release of Harriet Mills and Father Proulx. I was put in a somewhat foolish position at the meeting by not knowing this. This was probably their intent. Technically I have no basis for

real objection, as under the Agreed Announcement there is no obligation on their part to inform me here (nor to inform O'Neill, for that matter), but it is hardly in the spirit of relationship which I have been trying to establish with Wang. Of course he was under instructions, and it is clear that their objective is to make clear that these releases are their unilateral act and that any credit in the matter will go only to the British. They are not going to let me obtain any credit by giving out the announcement here.

What I am disturbed by and am sending you a telegram on is that from Hong Kong's 84, sent Department 883, it appears O'Neill was informed of these releases on October 26, but I had no word here until Hong Kong's 84 was received today.

The missing military personnel item went about as I expected. I was sorely tempted to put it off as it was late, we had already exchanged many recriminations on our occupation of Taiwan and implementation, and the atmosphere was poor. However I decided to get it over with and, as it turned out and was to be expected, he was under clear instructions and no matter when or how I did it, the result was going to be the same. I felt that I was able to back him into a corner for whatever satisfaction there was to be derived from that. I don't think we should drop the subject too quickly or easily, but feel that we are not going to get any real satisfaction. I should think that, in light of our discussion at yesterday's meeting, we might consider again also pushing the matter in the MAC.

Herman Phleger has just been in while I have been dictating this letter. We have been having some preliminary discussion of Wang's draft agreed statement of yesterday. He talked with the Secretary a little about it during the course of yesterday's Foreign Ministers' meeting. We are seeing the Secretary this afternoon. I will save any comments, as I presume the Secretary will want to send you a message during the course of the day on the subject.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**323. Telegram 999 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 29, 1955, 10 p.m.

999. From Johnson.

1. Believe that at next meeting I should not and need not enter into any detailed reply to his draft agreed announcement. However believe it would be useful to ask him additional questions and would appreciate Department's suggestions in this regard.

2. With respect implementation believe circumstances call for some different approach for at least one meeting and I suggest my line be to note release Mills and Proulx and express hope this signifies all others will be following shortly.

3. Believe I should follow up missing military personnel item taking another name and pressing in same manner as with Craig's case last meeting but without again attempting force him accept lists unless appears he willing accept. Hope reply Mytel 977 will contain well documented facts on at least one additional name.

4. In order capitalize on probability some action will take place in next few months to remove some items from CHINCOM control list, suggest I invite his views on trade embargo in context para 5 Deptel 870, asking questions outlined therein as seems useful. I would offer to accept any material he desires give me this regard contrasting with his refusal accept list missing military personnel. Request Department's comments on desirability my soliciting at this or subsequent meeting views on specific items present CHINCOM list they consider non-strategic and in whose removal from list they particularly interested for non-military purposes.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2955. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

### 324. Telegram 1053 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 29, 1955, 5:10 p.m.

1053. For Johnson. Also for the Secretary. Guidance for November 3 Meeting.

1. Implementation Agreed Announcement: Note that two of nineteen Americans now released and inform Wang U.S. Government expects this to be followed by expeditious release remainder, as provided in Agreed Announcement. Point out that although PRC has now recognized in principle right of British Charge to correspond with and visit jailed Americans, he has been subjected to regulations which so circumscribe his freedom of action as to make it impossible carry out effectively his functions under Agreed Announcement. There is no justification for applying to British Charge regulations intended for “prisoners’ receiving and corresponding with relatives.” No restrictions imposed on Indian Ambassador in carrying out his functions under Agreed Announcement in US. Call Wang’s attention to specific regulations which interfere with Charge’s functions such as prohibition on speaking to prisoner about his case which would prevent investigation facts provided for in Agreed Announcement.

2. Unaccounted for military personnel: present lists again, using argumentation similar last meeting, emphasizing this unquestionably an issue between us and therefore appropriate subject for inclusion in talks. Additional material individual cases being forwarded. Prepare ground for possibly reading lists to Wang next meeting if he still refuses accept.

3. Renunciation of force: Again reject Wang’s allegations that U.S. occupying Taiwan, violating UN Charter, etc. Inform him that although PRC’s willingness to consider renunciation of force is contribution to progress of talks, his draft statement unacceptable. It completely avoids main issue, which is that both sides renounce use of force, with particular reference to Taiwan area. Paragraphs 2 and 3 deal exclusively with renunciation of force in international disputes and Wang has clearly indicated PRC would not consider itself prevented by these provisions from using force against Taiwan. Whatever language chosen for declarations must be applicable to situation, which one party considers solely domestic issue and other does not. Both must pledge not to use force in this situation, except defensively. Paragraph 5 introduces extraneous subject, Foreign Ministers

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–2955. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy, in draft by Sebald, and in S/S.

Conference, which as previously pointed out, not considered suitable subject for discussion these talks.

4. In view information contained Deptel 1052 endeavor discuss our draft (Deptel 915) with Secretary and Phleger with view introducing it as counter proposal at Nov. 3 meeting.

**Hoover**

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**325. Telegram Tedul 28 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 29, 1955, 5:10 p.m.

Tedul 28. Secretary should see Deptels 1052 and 1053 to Geneva FOR JOHNSON.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2955. Secret. Drafted by McAuliffe (S/S).

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**326. Letter 22 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 22

Washington, October 29, 1955

Dear Alex:

Your letters 13 and 14 of October 19 and 21 arrived together on October 24. Your No. 14 successfully visualizes the issues as the Chinese Communists probably see them. Your analysis seems to us generally valid. It casts a rather novel and revealing light on various aspects of the renunciation of force question. We would depart from your analysis only in giving more weight to the attraction of the "renunciation of force" item to the PRC which stems from their capability to exploit it for their own purposes by espousing a perverted but rather plausible form of renunciation of force declaration. Admittedly

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.



we have the benefit of hindsight in making this observation. Mr. Robertson commented after reading the letter that your exposition of the probable Chinese Communist reasoning constituted the best possible reinforcement of the argument for pressing vigorously our demand for a *bona fide* renunciation of force declaration, with specific inclusion of the area of Taiwan.

Presumably Wang's draft represents only an opening bargaining position, but I personally am skeptical as to how much "give" is built into the draft. I am inclined to think that the PRC would not accept any language clearly at variance with its position that Taiwan is a domestic issue. We find Wang's draft to be solidly based on the constantly reiterated Chinese Communist position. On analysis it reflects no concession whatever, although it is so cleverly drafted as to give the impression to the superficial observer that it represents a reasonably complete renunciation of force. We fear it would commend itself to a lot of unthinking and partially informed people and therefore may spell trouble for us.

The instructions for the next meeting which we are drafting will point out, in very general terms, the respects in which paragraphs two through five are unacceptable to us. We haven't yet made up our minds as to when a U.S. draft should be submitted. The thinking is that it should be very soon. Wang has in a sense already stolen the ball from us and made a run with it, by getting in his draft ahead of ours. He has to some extent seized the initiative on our own item. We don't have final agreement yet on the language of our draft, but we should have it soon. The willingness of Wang to debate the renunciation of force item provides a lot of grist for the mill, even though the grinding may be a trying process.

We have given the British Embassy here the text of Wang's draft. We decided that it would be helpful to have O'Neill's estimate of Chinese Communist tactics in the light of this document. His comments so far have impressed us as shrewd and perceptive. We have kept the British very fully informed on the discussions regarding the Agreed Announcement. This has tended to let them in on other aspects of the discussion to a somewhat greater extent than would normally be the case.

Enclosed is the full text of the telegram from O'Neill giving the PRC rules and regulations governing visits to the imprisoned Americans, together with O'Neill's report of his conversation with Chang Han-fu on October 26, when the rules were handed to him. This is as promised in our 1031. In my conversations with Joy here I have encouraged the British to take a somewhat stronger line in opposition to any such rules and regulations as applied to the Americans covered by the Agreed Announcement. The British are somewhat inclined to regard these rules as representing a rather satisfactory advance in the situation.

They tend to overlook or minimize the fact that O'Neill's contact with the Americans should be governed by the provisions of the Agreed Announcement, not a penal or POW code. Hubert Graves remarked that the rules seemed to him to represent a considerable advance over the rules applied by the Japanese to enemy aliens during World War II. This is the sort of irrelevancy which we regret to hear from the British.

I am also enclosing a copy of O'Neill's report on the announced release of Harriet Mills and Father Proulx. We are mystified by the delay in the arrival of these two Americans in Hong Kong. We still assume that they will come out shortly.

I discussed with Joy the embarrassment (your 987) that resulted from the failure to get word to you before your Oct. 27 meeting of O'Neill's conversation with Chang Han-fu, when he received the rules and regulations regarding visits and the word of the impending release of Mills and Proulx. This interview took place on the evening of October 26 (about noon on Oct. 26, Geneva time). This was almost a full day before your meeting and with prompt service you would have had the word in time. O'Neill did get his message out Wednesday night. It was received by the British Foreign Office fairly promptly. It reached the British Embassy here, marked Priority, on the evening of the 26th, Washington time. If Joy had been notified by the Embassy duty officer, he would have telephoned me and you would have had the information before your meeting. Unfortunately the duty officer did not see the urgency, and took it upon himself to disregard the priority marking. Joy did not see or hear of the message until the opening of business on Thursday, the 27th, which was too late to do us any good. It seems that the Chinese tried to time their release of this information so as to make it difficult for you to receive the news before the meeting. Their hopes were realized, through a failure in the British Embassy here. I have pointed out to Joy the awkward position in which you were placed as a result. I mentioned particularly the fact that it gave Wang a talking point in support of his contention that these implementation matters should not be discussed in Geneva. The British are taking special measures to insure that a similar slip will not happen again. A special alert will be in effect on Wednesdays, day and night.

Enclosed is what sketchy material we have been able to obtain from Defense on the cases of certain of the missing servicemen, as requested by you. The information we are able to get from Defense on this subject is still inadequate and the handling unsatisfactory. They tell us that they will have to go to central files in another city for some of the needed material and that this material will probably not add anything to what is already known. Monroe has been out of town for some days. He is due to return on the 31st and we may be able to get a little help from him then.

We have had a lot of difficulty in trying to resolve Ekvall's status. The Department of the Army and Defense have wanted to use Ekvall's case as a lever to obtain a permanent additional slot for an Assistant Army Attache in Berne. Any enlargement of the Service Attache staff is strongly opposed by Miss Willis and EUR. Defense feels that at the very least State would pay Ekvall's per diem and there is some merit in this argument. However they have mentioned their belief that he should get \$25.00 per day, which seems out of all proportion. And it would not solve his family problem. We have explored the possibility of assigning either Stanley or Al Harding from DRF to take Ekvall's place about six weeks hence. This might be possible but we suspect you would prefer to retain Ekvall, with whom you are accustomed to working. It is embarrassing for us to have to depend on the Army for an interpreter in a diplomatic negotiation, especially when we are not able to let the Pentagon in on the direction of the negotiations, as they would like. As of now I am hopeful that we can solve the problem by getting Defense to assign Ekvall to an Army command in Heidelberg, Bonn or Paris, with temporary duty in Geneva. This should be acceptable to Defense, but Army G-2 may object.

The courier service to Geneva is almost daily during the Foreign Ministers' Conference so you will be hearing from us a bit more frequently. I hope you are having an opportunity for some talks with the Secretary and Herman Phleger.

Regards and good luck,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Six communications from British Embassy, Washington, based on reports from British Charge, Peiping.
2. Letter from Lt. Col. Monroe, with attachments regarding certain unaccounted for military personnel.

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**327. Telegram Dulte 34 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 31, 1955, 2 p.m.

Dulte 34. Re Deptel 1053 to Johnson.

1. Paragraph 1. As CHICOMS have now released two of 19 think Johnson should express expectation this will be followed by expeditious release remainder. Agree Johnson should express dissatisfaction with CHICOM regulations along lines Department's guidance taking into consideration what further information may be received from O'Neill with respect visits by time next meeting.

2. Paragraph 2. Concur except suggest leave to Johnson's discretion whether it would be desirable again present lists this meeting or attempt read lists. Important he have information to present of at least one additional case where clear individual was in Chinese custody.

3. Paragraphs 3 and 4. Think not desirable to present counterproposal of agreed statement on renunciation of force until we have probed meaning of CHICOM proposal. Think at next meeting Johnson should probe meaning and application of Chinese proposal including questions designed to bring out points mentioned latter part paragraph 4 Urtel. Would expect Wang might postpone replies to some questions to next following meeting and thus give us additional time.

4. We are being hard pressed here to agree accept that level CHICOM control should be identical with Soviet Bloc control levels and that these should be reduced and we must anticipate that within near future we will be faced with irresistible demands such reduction. Therefore important to utilize this bargaining point in CHICOM discussion and believe Johnson should at next meeting use authority given him in paragraph 5 of Ourtel 870 to him.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-3155. Secret; Priority.

**328. Telegram 1064 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 31, 1955, 5:18 p.m.

1064. For Johnson. Your 871 and 977.

FBIS check negative.

Nine of names and serial numbers you mention are cited in 1951 issues of China Monthly Review published Shanghai which carried regular feature: "New List of American POW's". This heading always followed by explanatory note of which August issue typical: "Following names of American POW's are additions to lists published in May, June and July issues of Review. These names have been compiled from files of New China News Agency (Hsinhua) and do not constitute an official list, being only names of POW's who have broadcast statements over Peking Radio or who have asked Chinese correspondents in Korea to publish their names so that their families may learn that they are prisoners.—Editor."

Citations, August issue: Craig, Demoll, Howell, Jennings, Johnson, Morris, Seggie, Schonder. June issue: Schuring. Morris cited also in The Shanghai News, June 30, 1951, as POW.

Research these and other names continuing in Chinese language press. State whether you want evidential publications airpouched to you.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-2755. Confidential. Drafted by Nagoski.

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**329. Telegram Tedul 42 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 31, 1955

Tedul 42. Re Dulte 34.

1. Information contained Deptel 1064 responsive paragraph 2 reftel.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-3155. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy; cleared in S/S and in draft by Sebald. The time of transmission is illegible.

2. Your paragraph 3. Our recommendation, which is herein renewed, that US draft declaration be introduced next meeting based on following considerations: (a) Undesirable allow Wang draft remain sole basis for negotiation. Renunciation of force is our item, not his. By his action he has seized initiative from us and to some extent placed us on defensive. Our best counter action and our best refutation of his draft appears to us to be immediate submission of US draft which is natural outgrowth of our initial presentation; (b) so long as Wang draft is only one in hands British and Indians, their thinking likely to crystallize in terms that draft. We believe we can counteract this tendency only by presenting our draft and also furnishing copies on informal basis these governments; (c) Deptel 1052 paragraph 8 indicates Chou En-lai endeavoring to press initiative gained by presentation first draft on renunciation of force and strongly implies tactics on our part suggestive of stalling may play into Chinese Communist hands.

Believe above considerations outweigh advantage of gaining time.

3. Re Johnson's 921 paragraph 1, believe our draft's leanness contrasted with Wang draft's fatness provides necessary negotiating latitude. So long as we do not sacrifice essence of our draft we can afford make certain concessions in direction accepting addition of statements general principle although not specific language that Wang has presented.

4. Your paragraph 4. Concur advisability initiating embargo discussion along lines Deptel 870 paragraph 5. Re Johnson's 999 paragraph 4 believe probing should be strictly confined at this stage to context Deptel 870 paragraph 5, avoiding discussion specific commodities. Any such indication we prepared enter into bilateral negotiations with Chinese Communists in direction of reducing controls would greatly weaken our position in current and forthcoming negotiations with British and French. Chinese Communists could be expected promptly leak such information to British and French for this purpose.

Repeat to Johnson.

**Hoover**

**330. Telegram 1027 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 1, 1955, 3 p.m.

1027. From Johnson. Re Deptel 1064.

Pouch publications where available.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–155. Official Use Only.

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**331. Telegram 1079 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 1, 1955, 7:20 p.m.

1079. For Johnson.

Peiping propaganda on international issues during week continues to accuse US of obstructing ambassadorial talks, intensifying military preparations and seeking prolong cold war. General tone not quite as hostile as previous week. Coverage on Taiwan issue somewhat increased with renewed emphasis on theme of “peaceful liberation.” New element injected by warning to Portuguese government that Chinese would “definitely recover” Macau but would prefer to use peaceful means.

NCNA commentary October 22 Geneva Ambassadorial talks focussed on POW issue, demanding that US account for 21,000 Chinese-Korean POW’s “abducted” by UN Command. Hong Kong press October 28 reported that Chou had told British Quaker group that US insistence on repatriation all Americans before discussion other issues was “unacceptable” to Peiping; Chou also quoted as having expressed hope that present talks will lead to higher level talks on Taiwan issue. NCNA continues to urge convening of Far Eastern Conference with “wide representation Asian countries” to discuss “pressing issues.”

Peiping commentary on Big Four Ministers conference characterized by tone of guarded optimism. Conditions said to be favorable but

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–155. Secret. Drafted by Dawson; cleared in IAD and CA.

"influential forces" in US alleged to be seeking to prolong cold war tensions.

Peiping international broadcasts on Taiwan revived emphasis on Chou En-lai formula for "peaceful liberation" with Tibet again cited as example. TA KUNG PAO October 25 cited Chou statements of May 13 and July 30 regarding talks with "responsible local authorities" on Taiwan. NCNA October 26 explained that such negotiations would be of nature of negotiations between "central and local government" and methods should be chosen by "Chinese people themselves."

Portuguese plans to celebrate 400th anniversary of rule in Macau provoked bitter propaganda blast from Peiping. *People's Daily* October 26 issued stern warning to effect that "Macau is Chinese territory and Chinese people have right to demand its recovery." Stated that Chinese people would "not long tolerate" Portuguese occupation. Mass rally held Canton October 27 marked by speeches demanding cessation of "provocations" by Portuguese Government and accusing Portuguese authorities in Macau of "sheltering" Nationalist agents and collaborating with US and Taiwan in effort "sabotage" ChiCom regime. Added however that "Chinese people" favored settlement Macau question by "peaceful means."

Other highlights week were Peiping's overtures to Philippines and Italy in line with recent effort "normalize" relations with non-Communist countries and isolate US. According to Manila press Chou En-lai held interview with Filipino correspondents October 23 at which he asserted Taiwan's liberation "inevitable" and urged that Philippine Government conclude treaty of non-aggression with Peiping based on Chou-Nehru Five Principles and Bandung Ten Principles. ChiCom press October 25 stated that time was now ripe for establishment of diplomatic relations with Italy and suggested that negotiations for same be tied to discussions for extension of trade and cultural relations.

NCNA commentary on Japan accused Hatoyama government of protracting talks with USSR and of adopting "passive attitude" on subject of normalizing relations with north Korea. NCNA commentary on Diem government referendum views it as US plot to undermine Geneva agreements and turn south Vietnam into separate state.

**Hoover**



**332. Letter 16 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 16

Geneva, November 1, 1955

Dear Walter:

Herman Phleger and I had dinner with the Secretary Friday evening during which we discussed the Chinese draft in a general and preliminary way but without coming to any conclusions. The Secretary has apparently not made up his mind on how he wants to handle it, and clearly wanted to have time to think about it, which was difficult with the extreme pressure on him of other events here. Therefore, in the telegram of suggestions for the next meeting, which I sent you on Saturday, I suggested that we not get into any detailed discussion.

The Secretary was also obviously very anxious that I get started on the trade embargo item, and, hence, my suggestion in that regard. I also want you to know that it was the Secretary's thought that I should query Wang with regard to specific items on the CHINCOM list, set forth in the last sentence of my 999. I told him that I had serious doubts about the desirability of this, but put it up in my telegram as my own query so that the Department would not feel any inhibitions in commenting on it. I have talked to Goodkind about it but he was understandably very reluctant to commit himself on the policy considerations involved. He saw no objection from the purely technical CHINCOM standpoint.

It has been a big help to have Goodkind and Doherty here to get myself thoroughly briefed on all aspects of CHINCOM controls, as it is a subject with which I was not familiar in detail. I want to let both you and Walter know that, except for the foregoing background against which I sent my 999, it represented only my own thoughts and I deliberately avoided showing it to or discussing it with the Secretary, because I feel that he should have the advantage of thoughts and recommendations of you and Walter in each case before making up his mind. I do not feel it right that my temporary proximity to him here should operate so as to cause him to give any undue weight to my opinions and without having FE opinions in front of him. This gets to be a little difficult, but I want you to know that I have it very much in mind, as I know he does. I am sorry that my 999 crossed with your 1053. I sent it priority quite early Saturday morning and do not understand why you did not have it prior to sending your 1053. However, I believe it worked

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." The postscript is handwritten. A handwritten note on the letter indicates it was received on November 2.

out all right as the Secretary had both messages in front of him yesterday and he and Herman did up a Dulte on the subject to you.

The one specific question which I particularly desired to, and did, discuss with the Secretary and Herman Friday evening was this: As I told him, it seemed to me that in the context of our talks my continued reference to "other matters" which could be more hopefully discussed following a satisfactory renunciation of force statement included, in Wang's mind, the presence of our forces in the Taiwan area. As I told the Secretary, I have very carefully avoided any specific statements and have carefully kept to simply the "other matters" formula. Wang has also not pressed me to be specific in this regard but he might well do so. In any event I want it to be clear in my own mind as to whether we would admit to discussion of the presence of our forces in the Taiwan area as an "other matter" if there were the satisfactory renunciation of force statement. Admitting to discussion, of course, would not carry with it any implication that we might be willing to agree with their demand for withdrawal or otherwise accept their point of view. However, I said it seemed to me that it would, as Herman phrases it, carry with it an implication of willingness to "bargain in good faith" and not simply sit and say "No". I particularly raised the question as to whether any such discussion would be within the agreed scope of our talks or whether it would be something involving the rights and interests of the GRC and, therefore, outside the scope of our talks.

I believe the Secretary's view can be summarized as follows: We cannot, of course, give any consideration, under present conditions, to withdrawal of all of our forces from the Taiwan area. Apart from any other considerations, the presence of at least symbolic forces is essential for the maintenance of morale on Taiwan. However, the United States has no desire to maintain forces in forward positions except as we consider essential in the light of our estimate of security situation in the particular area. This policy has been demonstrated by a reduction of strength in Korea and Japan. Similarly, the forces we maintain in the Taiwan area will be dependent upon our estimate of the security situation in that area. If the Chinese Communists unequivocally renounce force in the Taiwan area and otherwise demonstrate their peaceful intent, it could be expected we would give consideration to unilateral reduction in whatever strength is being maintained by us in the area. This would be a purely unilateral act on our part and not subject in any sense to agreement with the Chinese Communists. Such decisions on our part do not involve the rights or interests of the GRC nor our agreements with the GRC. Therefore, "discussion" of the subject with PRC in the light of the foregoing could be admitted to.

The foregoing is merely my reconstruction of dinner conversation in which the Secretary was simply thinking out loud, and I am passing it on to you simply in that context.

The Secretary has taken with him on his trip to Madrid today the renunciation of force file, including the PRC draft and the Department's draft. One aspect of the PRC draft that I am not clear on how I am going to handle in debate is that the 4th paragraph is very cleverly and carefully confined to disputes between PRC and the US. Thus, it is strictly within the agreed scope of our talks. What we want, of course, is for their renunciation to include the GRC, including Quemoy and Matsu. How do I justify this within the agreed scope of our talks? Is this not something which involves the rights and interests of the GRC and PRC-GRC relations? Another factor that occurs to me is if the PRC has renounced force as between itself and the US, how could it attack Taiwan as long as US forces are there without clearly breaching its renunciation of force with the US? Of course this leaves Quemoy and Matsu out. The Foreign Ministers' Conference is, of course, easy to handle as they are in an insupportable position in attempting to make any renunciation of force conditional upon the Foreign Ministers' Conference.

I am sure of only one thing: there is room for much and long discussion during which I will need all the ideas that you can give me.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. I have just read & briefly discussed with Herman your Tedul 42. Herman very much feels I should not introduce any [illegible in original] draft at this meeting & that we can [illegible in original] factors mentioned in para 2 Tedul 42 by circulating our original statement on renunciation of force. However, as Secretary does not return until late tonight we will not be able to obtain his decision until tomorrow morning.

**333. Telegram 1033 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 2, 1955, noon

1033. From Johnson.

[*text not declassified*] correspondent has informed me in confidence he has learned that CHICOMS here have told Yugoslav UNESCO rep now in Geneva that they are very unhappy with Soviet maneuvers in Middle East as it is spoiling atmosphere for working out their plans in FE. CHICOMS are supposed to have so informed Soviets.

[*text not declassified*] who is reliable believes story is correct. My recollection is not certain as to whether Yugoslav was rep UNESCO or other such UN organization.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-255. Confidential.

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**334. Telegram 1036 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 2, 1955, 2 p.m.

1036. From Johnson. Reference: Deptel 1078.

Presume Department will request UK instruct O'Neill immediately attempt arrange visit to Downey. I do not see how any question priority is involved and would hope O'Neill would in interview particularly attempt test CHICOM regulation on "discussion case in which prisoner involved".

In this connection Department and O'Neill should have in mind usual Communist (as well as former Japanese and some European) practice of keeping prisoner incommunicado until "investigation" case completed. As Downey has been tried and sentenced such consideration should under any circumstances no longer apply his case. Also should note fact censor passed Downey's letter specifically asking "to discuss his case".

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-255. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

**335. Letter 23 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 23

Washington, November 2, 1955

Dear Alex:

This will be a short note, mainly to submit a few factual items.

Indian Ambassador Mehta saw Mr. Robertson on October 27 to discuss certain phases of the Indian Embassy's function under the Agreed Announcement. A memorandum of the conversation is enclosed. The Indians are inclined to bring up various hair-splitting points although fundamentally they are obviously satisfied that all Chinese in this country are free to return to the Mainland if they wish to do so. Mehta seemed worried by what he termed evidence of fear on the part of several Chinese who have made preliminary inquiries, mostly by telephone, of the Indian Embassy here and the Indian Consulate General in New York. He seems to think they fear a certain intimidation of some sort, as if they think they will be penalized in some way if their interest to return to the Mainland should be known. He wants us to find some means of giving reassurance to Chinese who may be deterred by vague fears from contacting the Indian Embassy. We pointed out to Mehta that there is no possible reason for any Chinese fearing any action by the U.S. Government if he should express a wish to return to the Mainland. We do not know of any further action which we could take to make their complete freedom to depart more explicit. Mehta also brought up the question of Chinese who are dual nationals. He wanted to know if Chinese with a valid claim to both American and Chinese citizenship are covered. He also inquired about native American wives and minor children of Chinese who wished to return and take their families with them. These questions seemed to be largely hypothetical at this stage.

Hubert Graves on yesterday brought in O'Neill's message of October 31 reporting the receipt of a letter from Downey. We see no reason why O'Neill should not play this straight and seek to interview Downey immediately. We are informing the British Embassy to this effect today. We are also replying to numbered paragraph 3 of O'Neill's comments on the release of Mills and Proulx, which we received from the British Embassy on October 28. (We sent you this document as an enclosure to my last letter.) Our reply will recommend that O'Neill proceed to dispatch immediately an identical letter to each prisoner. This letter will reiterate the terms of the Agreed Announcement, and confirm the readiness of the British Embassy in Peking to contact the addressee. We

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

will give O'Neill a certain amount of latitude in drafting the letter so as to enable him to get around the objection that any repetition of the Agreed Announcement would seem to indicate a lack of confidence in the assurances that Chou En-lai personally gave to O'Neill that each American had been notified. We do not know what O'Neill meant by saying that "I do not think the Chinese will allow me to act until they have confirmation that Indians in United States will receive reciprocal rights". We are asking for clarification of this.

Chou En-lai's conversation with O'Neill of October 29 is undoubtedly of considerable significance. We take it as signifying that the PRC is likely to increase the pressure for a higher level conference and that our difficulties in indefinitely maintaining the conversations at the present level will increase.

You will be interested to know that Joe Alsop remarked to me on yesterday that our tactic of dragging out the talks, and our motivation for doing so, were transparently clear to him. He said that Krishna Menon had revealed in a recent conversation with him that he (Menon) also saw this clearly. Naturally Alsop thinks the Chinese Communists see this with increasing clearness, and are likely to manifest growing impatience.

I hope you get some conclusive word from the Secretary on our guidance for your next meeting in time for you to map out your campaign without undue haste. His visit to Madrid probably complicated matters somewhat for you. I suppose there is not now much chance of submitting our draft on renunciation of force at the next meeting, but we would hope that it could be done on November 10 at the latest.

Our people are working actively with Colonel Monroe of Defense on assembling the information on the best cases among the 450. It is slow and frustrating business.

Do you have in your files a copy of the DRF Intelligence Report No. 6858 of March 22, 1955, entitled "Chinese Communist Views on Taiwan"?<sup>2</sup> This is useful background historical material. We will send you a copy at once if you do not already have it. This study shows that back in the 30's the Chinese Communists pretty consistently took the stand that Taiwan should be independent and was not a part of China.

Regards and good fortune to you,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosure

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<sup>2</sup> Drumwright is in Geneva & I am [illegible in the original] WPM of this. RHC [Handwritten footnote by Clough in the original.]

**336. Telegram 1044 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 3, 1955, 10 a.m.

1044. From Johnson. Re paragraph 2 Tedul 42.

Secretary feels our draft agreed announcement too “bare” for introduction as counterproposal today’s meeting and there was not sufficient time to obtain your comments on new draft we have prepared here. I am transmitting new draft by separate telegram for your comments.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–355. Secret; Priority.

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**337. Telegram 1048 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 3, 1955, noon

1048. From Johnson.

Following is suggested redraft of agreed announcement on renunciation of force which has been shown to the Secretary and Phleger and has their general concurrence. However desire to receive Department’s comments. In particular desire comments on inclusion phrase “to achieve its national policy objectives when this would threaten international peace” in last two paragraphs. There is some thought this might be omitted from first draft presented to Wang and possibly retained for later introduction during course negotiations.

1. The Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China in the discussion of the practical matters at issue between the two sides have recognized that the two countries confront each other with policies which are in certain respects incompatible. Their governments are determined, however, that their first objective will be to see that these differences do not lead to armed conflict.

2. Their determination not to resort to war does not mean that either government must renounce any policy objectives which it considers it is legitimately entitled to achieve or renounce the right of individual or

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–355. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

collective self-defense. It does mean that neither will initiate the use of force to implement its policies.

3. Their determination not to resort to the use of force to make the policies of either party prevail over those of the other does not involve the interests of third parties nor does it involve the justice or injustice of conflicting claims.

4. They recognize the basic principle that the use of force to achieve national objectives does not accord with accepted standards of conduct under international law if it constitutes a threat to international peace and security and justice.

5. Furthermore, they recognize that the determination not to resort to the threat or use of force is essential to the just settlement of disputes by peaceful means, for negotiations cannot achieve fair and equitable solutions if conducted under the overhanging threat that force may be resorted to when one party does not agree with the other.

6. Accordingly; Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson informed Ambassador Wang Ping-nan that: in general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, the USA renounces the use of force to achieve its national policy objectives when this would threaten international peace, except in individual and collective self-defense.

7. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan informed Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson that: in general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, the PRC renounces the use of force to achieve its national policy objectives when this would threaten international peace, except in individual and collective self-defense.

**Gowen**

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### 338. Telegram 1054 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 3, 1955, 6 p.m.

1054. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting.

It will be noted that although I did not present any counterdraft I kept very much in mind considerations mentioned para 2 Tedul 42 and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-355. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.



accordingly my presentation focused around our formulation renunciation of force.

Wang did not attempt force issue of his draft and I would characterize his discussion as somewhat desultory, giving an impression of willingness to “mark time” for today. Believe this probably related to maneuvers reported Deptel 1052.

With respect missing military personnel suggest consideration be given to making fresh approach to MAC which takes account my exchanges here with Wang on subject. I might drop subject for meeting or two here while we see whether any progress can now be made in MAC.

**Gowen**

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### 339. Telegram 1056 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 3, 1955, 9 p.m.

1056. From Johnson.

1. I opened twenty-fourth meeting today by presenting prepared statement on implementation of item one, as follows:

A. Mr. Ambassador, I was pleased to learn after our last meeting that two imprisoned Americans had been released—Miss Harriet Mills and Father Armand Proulx. It is encouraging to see that appropriate measures have been taken to permit return of two of 19 Americans. I earnestly hope and expect that release of these 2 will be followed by expeditious release of the remainder as provided in agreed announcement.

B. I was also gratified to learn that day before our last meeting British Charge in Peking was informed that he could, in accordance with agreed announcement, visit and correspond with Americans in prison. This is another gratifying indication that some steps are being taken to implement agreed announcement and to enable UK Charge to undertake his functions.

C. I must add, however, that I was surprised that British Charges visits and correspondence with imprisoned Americans is to be in conformity with “rules and regulations governing prisoners’ receiving and corresponding with relatives.” Of course, British Charge is not relative but official of his govt charged under agreed announcement

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–355. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

with specific official functions. I expect that he will not be restricted by these regulations in performance of his official functions under agreed announcement.

D. As I have informed you at our previous meetings, Indian Embassy was fully authorized to undertake its functions in US immediately following issuance of agreed announcement. Of course we, too, have regulations governing visits by families to prisoners. However, my govt has authorized me to inform you that no restrictions are imposed on Indian Ambassador in carrying out his functions under agreed announcement.

E. Important fact, of course, in all this discussion of the details of implementation is that in our agreed announcement on September 10 we stated that all those who wanted to return were free to do so and that appropriate measures could be taken to enable them to do so expeditiously.

2. Wang replied that he had been telling me for long time his govt would be faithful in implementing agreed announcement and that third state would be able to carry out functions.

3. I continued with extemporaneous statement on renunciation of force. I acknowledged receipt of revised English version and stated we were continuing study of his draft agreed announcement.

4. I said renunciation of force was subject on which it was important there be full understanding between us. It was not an area in which problems could be resolved by unclear or cloudy language that may mean one thing to one side, another thing to the other side.

5. I said we both recognized that we faced practical situation in Taiwan area. My govt is determined insofar as it lies within its powers that there be no hostilities. If his govt has same determination, question of possibility of hostilities arising in area can be resolved.

6. I said in considering his draft agreed announcement, I would like to be able to inform my govt exactly to what degree it meets points raised in statement I made at time of raising this subject. In that statement I had said to use force to achieve national objectives does not accord with accepted standards of conduct under international law. I had cited instances and examples in which this principle was enunciated. I had said US has in past and is willing again to enunciate this principle.

7. I said question I would like to be able to answer to my govt is whether or not draft is intended incorporate this principle.

8. I said I had also noted in draft announcement inclusion of agreement on meeting of Foreign Ministers of our two countries. This appeared to link question of declaration that force not be used to settle disputes with a particular form of negotiations. These two things are quite different from one another. If principle non-recourse to force is

sound, it is sound for its own sake and not proper to link it with any particular form of negotiation. Neither UN Charter, portions of which he had quoted, nor any other principle I know of, states problems must be negotiated between Foreign Ministers of countries.

9. I said UN Charter and other statements this subject refer to peaceful settlement disputes. Many ways of peacefully settling disputes and many channels through which negotiations between govts can be carried on for purpose peacefully settling disputes. As we both knew, normal channel is between Ambassadors or between Ambassador and Foreign Office.

10. I said my govt had suggested the present talks for purpose peacefully discussing and settling disputes. I did not see how question of another level of talks arose until we had completed the talks here.

11. I said the important point was that whatever words were used or whatever form we adopted, it be perfectly clear that neither of us would use force in Taiwan area.

12. I said that in my original statement I had said we should both of us clearly renounce force to make policies of either of us prevail over those of other. We considered that this applied particularly to Taiwan area.

13. I said this involved no third parties, nor did it involve justice or injustice of conflicting claims.

14. I said I would appreciate his observations on whether his announcement intended to cover points I had raised in my original statement, which was proposal his side declare it would not resort to force in Taiwan area except defensively. As I had said at time, US prepared make corresponding declaration.

15. I concluded that whatever answer he might give me would be of great help in considering his proposal.

16. Wang replied that he shared my view that purpose of talks is to settle disputes between two countries peacefully, and in particular disputes in Taiwan area.

17. Wang continued with prepared statement on this subject, which he elaborated extemporaneously. He said that I had said at the previous meeting that Taiwan had been restored to China from Japan. That is exactly what former President Truman said in statement of January 5, 1950. No matter what was then Chinese Govt, no one can deny Taiwan is Chinese territory. As this is case, liberation of Taiwan cannot but be admitted as domestic affair of China.

18. Wang said US cannot cover up US armed encroachment Taiwan and interference Chinese People's liberation Taiwan and coastal islands by concluding treaty with Chiang Kai-shek clique. Nevertheless I had gone so far as to try to mix up civil conflict in China with international

matters by invoking treaty. His side could never accept this. Wang said I had stated I had no intent debate conflicting policies Taiwan in order to avoid long futile controversy. However, if we to discuss how non-recourse to force may be applied to Sino-US dispute in area, we cannot evade fact US resorting to threat and use of force. That fact gave rise to Sino-US dispute in area, which is pressing for solution.

20. Wang said he had repeatedly pointed out that in discussing principle of non-recourse to force, distinction must be made between internal conflict and international dispute. Internal conflict no business of present talks. Announcement should not have anything to do with internal matters of any country.

21. Wang said Chinese people always strive for peaceful solutions even in realm of internal matters. But it was Chiang Kai-shek who started large scale internal conflict in 1946, as even State Dept White Paper admitted. Chinese people compelled resort to war to overthrow Chiang rule and establish PRC.

22. Wang said today remnant elements Chiang clique still haunt Taiwan, waging disruptive war against mainland China. Nevertheless, Chinese people still willing, conditions permitting, strive liberation Taiwan by peaceful means. This internal matter, not subject present talks.

23. Wang said US Govt had indicated it does not intend speak for Chiang Kai-shek, nor can his side accept US to represent Chiang in talks. He cannot agree to a public announcement which would touch on a Chinese internal affair.

24. Wang said I had spoken of situations of division in other parts of the world. As far as China concerned, this metaphor out of place and cannot justify US encroachment on Taiwan. Any attempt split China into two Chinas unacceptable to Chinese people.

25. Wang said his draft announcement on basis UN Charter called for peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to threat or use of force. This met spirit of my statement concerning settling disputes between our two countries peacefully.

26. Wang said, in order realize this desire, appropriate both sides hold conference of Foreign Ministers to settle question of and eliminate tension in Taiwan area.

27. Wang concluded if US genuinely seeking peaceful settlement, there no reason we cannot agree make such announcement. No justification for stalling in issuing such announcement.

28. I replied that I did not see how his remarks advanced the situation very much. Was I to take it as his position that negotiations between our two countries could be carried on only at the Foreign Ministers' level?

29. Wang replied that his side regarded dispute in Taiwan area as gravest existing dispute between China and US, affecting not only relations between China and US but also security and peace in Far East. Therefore it his view that it would be more practical refer such grave problem to conference of Foreign Ministers of our two countries.

30. Wang said if I considered myself fully authorized and able assume responsibility for settling question of withdrawal US armed forces from Taiwan area, he would join me in discussing this question here.

31. I replied that I understood then that negotiations could be carried on at level other than Foreign Minister.

32. Wang said that if I had power settle question to which he had referred, he would join me in discussing the problem. He was not trying to evade discussion of the question.

33. I said that next question I wished to raise was one I had raised before. We have different views with respect nature of dispute Taiwan area. Did he agree that first and most important task is make sure different views do not lead us to war? We recognized there is practical situation in area. Overwhelmingly important question of principle was that practical situation should not lead us to war.

34. I said he had referred to situation as internal matter and had said "conditions permitting" his side would strive for peaceful settlement. As I had pointed out at last meeting, that is very different from saying force will not be resorted to in area except defensively.

35. I said obligation to seek peaceful settlement and not to resort to force did not revolve about the question of internal matter or international matter. Question is whether use of force would endanger international peace and security.

36. I said he had quoted portions of UN Charter. I would like to quote another portion that has pertinence to the situation. I read paragraph 1, article 33, chapter VI, of Charter.

37. I said test is not whether question is internal or external, but whether it affects international peace and security. Same point made in article 1 of Charter, which refers to "situations which might lead to breach of peace".

38. I said my purpose is not to get into legalistic argument over interpretation of Charter. I simply mean to point out that Charter is one of places where principle was enunciated that it is contrary accepted standards of international relations use force in situations likely to endanger international peace and security.

39. I said I was not asking him accept proposition that problem in Taiwan area is not internal. To say force will not be resorted to in Taiwan area does not prejudice his position in regard to nature of dispute.

I was not suggesting he say anything that would prejudice his position. I was simply asking whether it is intent of his draft to make clear that force will not be resorted to except defensively.

40. I said it was of extreme importance that we be absolutely clear between ourselves on this. It would be most unfortunate and discussions here would be counterproductive if we produced words that meant one thing to him and another thing to us.

41. I said that I was honestly not clear what his position was.

42. Wang replied that his side "used to maintain" in discussions between us that US should withdraw its armed forces to express its sincerity. I had repeatedly urged that a statement be issued to effect that all disputes should be settled peacefully without resorting to force. Draft was intended to satisfy this request by our side.

43. Wang said any draft must represent common point of view between our two countries. His draft contained three points suitable to both of us:

A. First, it contained article from UN Charter on which he was sure we could have no difference of opinion. Nearly everyone has learned stipulations of UN Charter by heart.

B. Second, draft provided for peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to force. He was sure we could agree on this point. Draft provided that both China and US will not resort to force.

C. Third, draft suggests conference at higher level should be held to settle question of tension Taiwan area. Even some responsible personages in US had expressed this desire.

44. Wang said it seemed therefore his draft proposal was reasonable and able to facilitate our talks. The position of his side was quite clear, and if I had intent to understand it, I would be able to do so.

45. Wang said his side was in full agreement with provision UN Charter I had quoted. Articles quoted provide for peaceful settlement international disputes without resorting to war. That is what his side is striving for. However in these articles and in other portions of UN Charter there are no provisions permitting one country to interfere in internal affairs of another.

46. Wang said that is why he had stated we must not mix up two distinct problems. Distinction must be made between internal and international issues. First point we must be clear on is that internal conflict is not mixed up with international.

47. Wang said second point is question of interference in internal affairs of other countries. Fact that US has used armed force against Taiwan has brought us together in present talks. We should discuss question of interference in Chinese internal affairs on part of US. If American armed force is withdrawn from Taiwan and US avoids interference in

internal affairs of China, a new page in relations between China and US would emerge.

48. Wang said if US could meet two points mentioned above, question how Chinese people will deal with Chiang clique is matter of China's internal affairs. Chinese people have consistently expressed willingness deal with Chiang by peaceful means. That is to say, China also willing settle internal issues by peaceful means.

49. Wang said in same manner his side willing settle disputes between US and China. He was sure he had made his position quite clear.

50. Wang said any sovereign state must and should adopt such position. In past US always stated its desire maintain territorial integrity China. US even made pledge it would not interfere China's internal affairs. These two statements in US history are quite just and welcomed by Chinese people. Grave test facing US is implementing now two solemn pledges made in past.

51. Wang said US has stated history of China full of humiliations, foreign occupation, special privileges on part of foreigners, and encroachment on territory. Foreign countries encroached on and occupied territory including Taiwan and Manchuria and explained as foreign encroachments Chinese sovereignty contrary to UN Charter.

52. Wang said such statement on part of US was in accord with history of China. However, breaches of Chinese sovereignty and integrity of Chinese territory have now become matters of Chinese history and these could only be inflicted on a weak government. Humiliation could only be inflicted upon weak state such as old China of past. Things have changed entirely. Today great, strong China will never allow that history to repeat itself.

53. Wang said his present requirement is a minimum one. What he sought was to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity of his country. Such was his position. He hoped I would understand his position.

54. I replied that it was getting late and that I had two other matters I wished to take up. The discussion so far had been helpful. I would like to ask one question, not in an argumentative spirit but to see whether we were getting closer together. Did the Ambassador agree with me that whatever our differences of interpretation and views in regard to Taiwan situation may be, present factual situation is such that resort by either side to force in area would endanger international peace?

55. Wang replied that he agreed so long as China's internal affairs were not involved, so long as disputes between China and US did not involve China's internal affairs. In same spirit his Premier had stated Chinese people and American people were friendly, Chinese people do not want to fight American people, provided both respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of other side. His side was willing to reach a



reconciliation with US. He hoped US would also show its reconciliation by actual deeds.

56. Wang said I had stated that no third parties were involved.

57. I replied that he had not quite grasped my question. My question was whether or not the Ambassador agreed that factual situation Taiwan area was such that initiation of hostilities by either side would endanger international peace.

58. Wang replied that of course international peace was being endangered. It was not question of resort to force by both sides. In fact US already using force in area.

59. Wang said he was sure all his statements today were intended answer my questions. If I would study his remarks I would get my answers.

60. I replied that I could not agree that US using force in area but that I was trying to avoid controversy this point. I had presented views of my government at preceding meeting and would not take time to repeat. I would study what he had said and would discuss this subject further at subsequent meeting.

61. I then presented prepared statement on missing military personnel as follows:

A. At last meeting when I raised question of missing military personnel, you used phrase "non-existent". I do not know whether you interpret this to mean missing men are now non-existent or were non-existent.

B. I mentioned Mr. Craig at our last meeting. Evidence indicates he was alive and in your hands at one time. I want to assure you our purpose is not to embarrass or make charges but simply to obtain information for families of these men. I would like to mention another name in list I discussed last week. Name is Corporal Russel F. Morris of US Army. Corporal Morris' name was listed as prisoner of war in Shanghai News of June 30, 1951. August 1951 issue of China Monthly Review also listed his name.

C. In listing his name along with others, China Monthly Review states list compiled on basis New China News Agency list of POW's who have broadcast statements over Peking Radio or who have asked Chinese correspondents in Korea to publish their names so that their families may learn that they are prisoners.

D. In regard to your statement last week, I want to ask whether this means that responsible correspondents of your side in Korea would take names of missing Americans and state that they are POW's in order to mislead their families? Would your authorities permit such false information to be circulated by New China News Agency? It is difficult for me to believe that this is case. If it is not case, this man was



alive as prisoner of war of your side. He was not returned, no report of his death has ever been received, his body has not been returned. I am simply asking that your authorities investigate case and tell us what happened to him. There must be some record of what happened to Corporal Morris after August 1951. There surely can be no objection to informing what that record is so that his family can be informed. In spite of our efforts, we simply have not been able to find out. This is all I am asking. Just as in case of Corporal Morris, I do not see why this cannot be done along with other names.

E. This matter is one of deep concern to families of missing men, to all Americans, and to my government. It is clearly matter at issue between our two governments.

62. Wang replied that he had made his position clear at last meeting and could not accept discussion this matter. As all cases enumerated happened in 1951, they happened during Korean War. There is a Military Armistice Commission which specially deals with prisoners and missing personnel. American side has some men missing and not accounted for. On part of Chinese and Korean side in same manner there are missing men not accounted for. If he were to ask for information concerning these men, these requests could only be referred to armistice commission in Korea. These matters within scope of Korean War.

63. Wang said as to Americans in China, he had in spirit conciliation given me information on all Americans in China. He believed I could have no doubt concerning his good will this regard. Facts in past have borne this out.

64. Wang said he could not accept discussion of matter of missing personnel in Korean War. Even Secretary of State Dulles stated in August 18 press conference that list of missing personnel must not cause hope any these men still alive.

65. I replied that was correct. I had not alleged these men were alive. I was merely asking that if they have died we be told that.

66. Wang replied he had already informed us of what he knew. What he did not know he could not tell us. If I agreed with Secretary Dulles concerning fate these men and that list must not cause hope that they are alive, he did not see why I raised question non-existent men.

67. Wang said he sympathized with families these men. They must blame the criminal war. The suffering and losses of Chinese and Korean people were even more severe.

68. I replied that his remarks concerning Korean War were entirely uncalled for but that I did not intend to debate matter.

69. I asked whether his linking of question of our personnel with question of his side's personnel meant that his authorities did have information that they would under certain circumstances be willing to furnish.

70. Wang replied that he would not have made remarks about Korean War had this issue not been put forward. He had no intent discuss question. He had no information to give concerning men enumerated.

71. I replied that he did not even know names of men. All I was asking that he take names and ask for information. Immaterial whether answer supplied here or in MAC. All I asked was that he take names, ask his authorities to look into matter. If information is that men are not living we should be told.

72. Wang replied that since this question had been raised in Korea, it should be put through the same channel. He did not think this was proper place to discuss. He had no intent engage in debate with me.

73. I asked him whether his government was willing instruct its representative in MAC to discuss question there. It was precisely because his side had refused to discuss matter and accept names there that it had become necessary raise matter here.

74. Wang replied this was not suitable place raise question.

75. I said I would not pursue the matter further this morning; that I wished to raise another matter. I then presented prepared statement on subject of trade, as follows:

A. Mr. Ambassador, as I have indicated to you, we are continuing our study of your draft statement on renunciation of force. I believe our discussion of this subject this morning has been useful.

B. I full well recognize, and I am sure you do, that the formulation of any declaration on this subject agreeable to both of our governments is going to be a matter of delicacy that will require some thought and time.

C. At our last meeting you suggested that, following any agreement we may be able to reach on a renunciation of force statement, we should undertake discussion of what you term trade embargo.

D. I am glad that you have thus recognized the inherent relationship between the two subjects and that my response to the questions which you may raise under your item of trade embargo must greatly depend upon the degree of agreement which we are able to reach with respect to renunciation of force.

E. The two subjects are fundamentally related as the measures which the United States and other like-minded countries have taken with respect to trade with your country are in response to considerations of national security and must be considered in that light.

F. However, while the question of renunciation of force is being considered, I would, in the interest of expediting our discussions, be glad to hear whatever views you desire to put forward with respect to trade.

G. I do this with regard to your subject even though you have thus far refused seriously to discuss or even consider with me the question of missing military personnel which is a subject of deep interest to my government and people and which clearly is a matter at issue between us. I also say to you that I would not consider it within the spirit of these talks to refuse to accept any material which you may desire to give me with respect to your subject.

H. In discussing the matter of trade at our meeting of September 14 you referred to what you termed "economic blockade and embargo imposed by U.S." I am not clear as to what you have in mind in this regard. I know of no blockade and I know of nothing imposed by the U.S. on anyone else.

I. I do know of various sovereign measures taken by my government with respect to economic intercourse between my country and your country. I also know of common measures taken by several other countries in consultation with each other as well as with the United States concerning the export to your country of strategic materials. I also know of the resolution of May 18, 1951 by the General Assembly of the United Nations recommending an embargo on the shipment to your country of arms, ammunition, implements of war and other strategic materials.

J. Therefore, when you present the views of your government, I hope that you will clarify exactly what aspects of this matter you have in mind.

76. Wang replied that at the last meeting he had stated that after discussion of question of agreed announcement, we should go on to question of embargo. He had not said there was any connection between these questions.

77. Wang said he had never intended create impression that discussion of certain subject is precondition for discussion another. Question of embargo is precisely one of issues between US and China. It is exactly one of items which should be discussed. Discussion and solution of these issues aimed at improving relations between two countries.

78. Wang said he regarded embargo unreasonable by principle. Such policy runs against peaceful trade relations between nations. Therefore it is his view that to improve relations policy of embargo must be abolished. Abolition of embargo policy is in accord with desires and wishes all people including US people.

79. Wang said he reserved further discussion at next meeting. He asked whether he could be given a copy of my statement since they had not taken complete notes.

80. We agreed that a copy would be sent this afternoon.

81. Wang asked whether it would be convenient that the next meeting be advanced to Tuesday, November 8.

82. I explained that I had made plans which it would be somewhat difficult for me to change so as to be able to meet with him on November 8, but said I would be agreeable to meeting on Friday, November 11.

83. Wang indicated he would prefer to meet on the regular schedule on Thursday, November 10. We confirmed that the usual press statement would be made. Meeting ended at 12:50.

**Dulles**

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### **340. Telegram 1061 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 4, 1955, noon

1061. From Johnson.

1. Suggest that at next meeting I present counterdraft on renunciation force along lines Mytel 1048. Would appreciate Department's suggestions on any additional points I might make in this regard.

2. Request Department's views on transmitting after November 10 meeting copies our original renunciation force statement together with copies our counterdraft to Nehru through Cooper, to UK through Embassy Washington, and whether and by what means to Soviets.

3. Wang will presumably make statement on trade to which I will make no reply at this meeting, except to ask any questions that might appear useful.

4. Suggest that regardless of action that is taken on recommendation last para Mytel 1054 for fresh approach to missing military personnel item in MAC, that I make no mention this item at next meeting. Consider it much more effective to drop this item for meeting or two and then return to it rather than invariably bring up each meeting with result it tends take on aspect routine matter. Believe same consideration applies to implementation, particularly until O'Neill has time more fully to test his ability to act.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-455. Secret; Priority.

**341. Letter 17 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 17

Geneva, November 4, 1955

Dear Walter:

I have received your letters of October 29 and November 2.

I first want to say that I greatly regret that it was impossible to discuss your TEDUL 42, in particular paragraph 2, with the Secretary until just prior to my meeting yesterday morning. The Secretary's Madrid trip and then the extreme pressure of his other appointments here made it impossible even to discuss it Wednesday night, so Herman and I were not able to get to him until 8:45 yesterday morning. We talked for about 30 minutes and then I got off my very short 1044 to you before going to the meeting so as to let you know as quickly as possible what had happened. I had prepared for the meeting on the basis of asking Wang questions, and with the shift of emphasis I had no time to prepare anything else and so talked entirely extemporaneously. I don't feel I made any bad slips and, on the whole, it was probably more effective than sitting and reading a prepared statement.

Our redraft here of the Agreed Announcement is, as you will recognize, simply a plagiarized and adapted version of the opening statement on the subject, which, however, it seems to me, well lent itself to the purpose. It seems to me that all the added "spinach" gives us something with much more political sex appeal and much more to talk about.

In the meeting yesterday I tried to partially lay the ground for introduction of some such draft and, particularly, to try to make the point to Wang that they need not sacrifice their position on Taiwan being a domestic issue by accepting our formula.

In view of the longer gap now between meetings, I plan to send my next summary report by priority rather than niact, and the full report by routine. Let me know if this does not work out satisfactorily from your standpoint.

You are entirely right that I would be very reluctant to lose Ekvall. We are used to working with each other and he does very well at a very difficult job, particularly when I start extemporizing and get myself

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-455. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." A handwritten note by Robertson next to the last paragraph about missing military personnel reads: "Walter—Has this been done in any way?" An attached handwritten note from Robertson to Sebald reads: "I agree we should advise Hammarskjöld of our request for accounting [illegible in the original] personnel."

wound up, as I often do, in long involved sentences which are by no means easy to put into Chinese. I also value his judgment, and particularly his assessment of reactions of the other side. I have had to change every member of my little group here except Ekvall. I would be very reluctant to have any more changes at this time.

I am having to go up to Prague this week-end because of a personnel emergency arising in the staff up there. As I mentioned in my telegram, I plan, as usual, to come back on Tuesday. I talked it over with Rod and Herman, as I could, if essential, have come back on Sunday, but I think that that will give us plenty of time. The Secretary is going to be away in Vienna and Yugoslavia over the week-end.

I sent off to you today my thoughts with regard to the next meeting and will presume that by Tuesday evening we will have your instructions, which I can, if necessary, Rod assured me, discuss with the Secretary Tuesday evening in time to get something back to you before Thursday's meeting.

My travel to Prague has now been complicated by the fact that they have taken off the early morning plane from Geneva to Zurich, which means there is no way for me to get there except to go up to Zurich Friday evening by train and stay overnight and take the plane to Prague the next morning. However, I can still come back directly, arriving here at 3:45 p.m. Tuesday afternoons.

I was very interested in the conversation with Mehta. It does not shed any light on whether or not they have actually thus far "assisted" anyone, but I would presume from the conversation that they have not done so.

Yesterday and today I have quickly and firmly knocked down several press rumors—one to the effect that yesterday I agreed with Wang on a Foreign Ministers' meeting, and another today to the effect that the Secretary and Chou have recently exchanged letters.

I will have to cut this short in order to make the pouch, but you can be sure that we will continue to try to keep things under control.

I assume the Department will do whatever it considers necessary to keep Hammarskjöld informed of our discussion on missing military personnel.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

**342. Letter from Sebald to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 4, 1955

Dear Alex:

I have been wanting to write to you for some considerable time, but as Walter McConaughy has been doing the corresponding, I thought it best to keep all the “official informals” in his hands. Furthermore, I feel sure that, as an old hand on this job, you have some idea of the harassment under which the occupant of my seat usually operates.

However, I do wish to tell you that I feel you are doing a beautiful job in handling the negotiations with Wang. Having had some experience with the Soviets in Japan, I know what it means to face up to the difficult problems such as you have week after week, never knowing when the end will come or, in fact, just what the negotiations will lead up to. In any event, I hope you know that you have our complete confidence and full support.

Now down to business. On the question of the Agreed Announcement concerning renunciation of force, I have carefully gone over the proposed text which you sent along in your 1048 and the following are my preliminary remarks. We will send the Department’s comments by telegram.

As a matter of form, I believe that this draft too closely presents the two “governments” as determining or recognizing, jointly, certain policies or principles. It seems to me that this results in giving greater stature to the PRC than is desirable. It also brings the Announcement close to an agreement.

The draft also seems to place emphasis upon the divergence between the U.S. and PRC views as the source of tension. It would seem preferable to shift the emphasis simply to a desire to remove tensions. It also appears to accept the theory that the problem is international, thereby affording some leeway to the PRC to claim that the civil strife between them and the GRC is not comprehended within the Announcement.

I am also concerned with the apparent wordiness of the draft which I believe should be as brief and direct as possible. I agree that it might be preferable to have some bargaining points built into any draft which we present, but we should bear in mind that it will come

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

into comparison with Wang's draft which is ostensibly simple and direct.

While you have already mentioned the point (in your 1056) that the UN Charter does comprehend domestic matters if they affect international peace and security, I think we must be extremely careful in our draft not to give the PRC the slightest peg on which to hang the argument that the renunciation of force applies only to international matters. You have noted, I am sure, that the UN Charter provisions quoted by Wang are designed to place this problem on an international plane. For this reason I would prefer relating the renunciation of force to the Taiwan *area* rather than to a renunciation between the two parties.

Paragraph 3 of your draft is difficult to understand and would seem to give a good ground for argument that Taiwan is entirely excluded and hence that force could be used against it with impunity.

In paragraph 4 the phrase "if it constitutes a threat, etc." raises the question, who decides? And what about domestic affairs if they should constitute a threat to peace?

Paragraph 5 seems to limit the declaration to the two parties and again seems not to preclude the use of force against the GRC. In paragraph 6 the clause "when this would threaten international peace" seems to provide an escape clause in the Taiwan situation. Paragraph 6 also appears to be inconsistent and in conflict with paragraphs 2 and 5.

Entirely informally and without the slightest pride of authorship, I am sending along a draft which incorporates my views as to a possible "Agreed Announcement". If you think the approach of this draft has merit, you might wish to discuss it with Herman Phleger and possibly the Secretary. Alternatively, it may be that some of the language of this draft could be used to overcome some of the apparent objections mentioned above.

This letter is written in a great rush and late in the day, so I hope you will pardon any shortcomings.

With all best wishes,  
Sincerely yours,

William J. Sebald

Enclosure:

Draft Agreed Announcement (3 copies)



**343. Letter 24 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 24

Washington, November 4, 1955

Dear Alex:

There is enclosed a copy of a letter from General Erskine to Mr. Robertson concerning the possibility of rendering an accounting to Wang of Chinese personnel from the Korean War should he demand it. As you will note, General Erskine says that we are still prepared to render such an accounting if Wang will respond to our demands. He also refers to suggestions being prepared in Defense regarding a possible position for us to take in the Geneva talks. We will study these when they arrive and pass along to you any that may seem useful.

We have your report on the November 3 meeting, but haven't yet had the time to give it and your draft Agreed Announcement the study that they deserve. As usual, everybody is swamped around here. I expect that Bill Sebald, Walter McConaughy and I will get together tomorrow (Saturday) morning and discuss future moves. Walter hopes to get a letter off to you Monday which you should receive when you return from Prague.

Best regards,

**Ralph N. Clough**

*Deputy Director for Chinese Affairs*

Enclosure:

Letter from General Erskine, November 1, 1955.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

### 344. Telegram 1136 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 5, 1955, 4:19 p.m.

1136. For Johnson. Your 1048.

Consider redraft too wordy, opening door to variety of undesirable possible interpretations and implications. Also question wisdom of abandoning original concept of separate, unilateral declarations in favor joint declaration. Specific comments by paragraph follow:

2) Undesirable because places U.S. in position of publicly acquiescing in PRC's right to hold any policy objective, even though we might consider such objective inimical to survival of free world. It seems to us we cannot, even implicitly, accept the PRC's right to hold such policy objectives as, for example, subversion of free governments.

3) Statement that renunciation of force does not involve interests of third parties could be construed as leaving Communists free to attack off-shore islands, which not specifically covered by Mutual Defense Treaty.

4) Provides loophole for Communists to insist this does not apply to Taiwan, which domestic matter.

5) Contains too strong an implication that U.S. willing enter upon far-reaching negotiations if Communists renounce force.

6) and 7) Inclusion phrase "when this would threaten international peace" again provides loophole for Communists to argue Taiwan domestic matter and only threat to international peace arises from U.S. "use of armed force" against it.

Believe we should strive for simple wording which pins Communists down clearly and unmistakably not to use force in Taiwan area. They obviously seeking meaningless wording which would not tie their hands. We would rather, if necessary, face up to Communist refusal to agree to clearcut statement, provided latter appeared reasonable to most of world, than get their agreement to ambiguous document which they would then proceed to evade.

For reasons set forth paragraph 3 Tedul 42 as well as above considerations believe draft contained Deptel 915 most satisfactory produced to date. If considered too bare, it might be prefaced by reference to general principles to which all civilized nations subscribe, without using exact UN Charter language in Wang's draft. Would be interested in Phleger's comments this telegram.

Repeat to Secretary.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-355. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Sebald in draft and by McConaughy.

**345. Telegram 1140 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 5, 1955, 7:47 p.m.

1140. Eyes Only for Johnson from Robertson.

Reference Deptel 1048, Sebald's draft of renunciation of force pouched to you with personal letter from him November 5 had not been staffed. Sebald now agrees should not be used as basis for negotiation.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Robertson; cleared in S/S.

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**346. Telegram 161 from Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, November 7, 1955, 4 p.m.

161. Re Deptel 1136 to Geneva.

Did not consider draft Mytel 1048 departed from concept separate unilateral declarations but only that preamble lengthened over draft in Deptel 915 in order give document more "political appeal" better to meet CHICOM maneuvers with GOI, UK and Soviets as well as give us better public position if publicity becomes necessary.

It does not seem to me bare more or less legalistic language draft Deptel 915 is best for this purpose. It is also best answer to inclusion UN Charter language in CHICOM draft.

Draft contains nothing we have not already said to CHICOMS in our formal opening statement on renunciation force copy of which was given Wang.

Specific comments by paragraph:

2. Do not see question "right to hold" policy objective is involved. Paragraph simply states unquestioned fact two sides do have policy objectives and that in certain respects these incompatible. Do not believe anyone could interpret paragraph as US recognition right PRC hold such policy objectives as subverting free government.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Geneva for Phleger and Forman as telegram 14.

3. In view publicly stated US attitude toward off-shore islands and specific reference to "Taiwan area" in paragraph 7 seems to me difficult construe statement as whole as leaving CHICOMS free attack those islands. While it seems to me preferable include some disclaimer re third parties, could delete this paragraph without weakening statement.

4. It seems to me difficult to enunciate principle that use of force in purely internal matters is not permissible. Police in all countries continuously use force maintain internal order. Whereas we strongly disagree with some of policy objectives internal police use force Communist countries it clearly becomes international matter only when international peace, security and justice involved. Test is not whether country considers matter domestic or international, but rather whether in fact use of force would endanger international peace. In view existence GRC and US treaty relationship thereto there can be no question that use force against GRC constitutes threat to international peace however PRC regards matter. It will be seen that at last meeting I strongly pursued this point with Wang.

5. Implication is no stronger than in original statement I made to Wang. Entire context discussion renunciation force has been willingness discuss "other matters" in these talks if PRC renounced force in satisfactory terms. If this removed there is little left in my negotiating position. We have made clear our refusal discuss any matters involving rights and interest GRC.

With different emphasis and of course for opposite reasons Wang has also disclaimed any intent discuss GRC matters with US.

6. and 7. See comments on paragraph 4 above.

Entirely concur penultimate paragraph Deptel 1136 to Geneva. Question is formulating a document that accomplishes both purposes of tying them down and appearing reasonable to world if negotiations break on this point. In my opinion draft in Deptel 915 accomplishes former purpose but not latter.

**Johnson**

**347. Telegram 2561 to London<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 7, 1955, 4:29 p.m.

2561. Your 1877.

Cable priority unclassified to Johnson full text Daily Worker story.  
Repeat Department.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–755. Official Use Only; Priority. Repeated Priority to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 1142. Drafted by Clough; cleared in draft by Beale (BNA).

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**348. Telegram 1143 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 7, 1955, 6:01 p.m.

1143. For Johnson.

Daily Worker story referred to our 1142 is Communists' most flagrant violation to date of agreement that substance of talks will not be revealed without prior agreement or notification. Obvious purpose is to take initiative this subject away from US. You should promptly deliver strong written protest to Wang. You may wish mention numerous earlier violations agreement by leaks to NCNA correspondent which we refrained from protesting in interest progress talks, but this last leak too glaring to overlook. Matter should be taken up with Wang at November 10 meeting, but protest should be delivered soonest to show Wang how seriously we regard his breach and forestall if possible further Communist efforts publicly exploit this subject prior next meeting.

Department neither confirming nor denying Wang has proposed joint declaration renouncing use of force.

Repeat to Secretary.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–755. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy and Sebald.

**349. Telegram 1096 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 8, 1955, 9 p.m.

1096. From Johnson. Reference Department telegram 1143.

Immediately following my return from Prague this afternoon I sent the following letter to Wang:

1. On my return from Prague this afternoon my attention was called to a newspaper story in the London Daily Worker of Monday, November 7, by Sam Russell from Geneva.

2. I was most seriously disturbed to note that this story contained a detailed and accurate report of the substance and even some of the exact wording of the proposal which you made to me in our meeting of October 27.

3. This very clear and explicit violation of the understanding that we have with respect to the privacy of our meetings cannot but cause my govt to have grave doubts concerning the intent of your govt with respect to our talks.

4. I would appreciate being promptly informed what action will be taken to rectify this situation which inevitably prejudices the hope for progress in our talks.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-855. Confidential; Priority.

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**350. Telegram 1097 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 8, 1955, 9 p.m.

1097. From Johnson.

Following from [*text not declassified*] correspondent, from source in CHICOM Embassy in East Germany: Wang Ping-nan under instructions continue Geneva talks as long as necessary; CHICOMS willing continue talks for possibly a year. According to source, at last meeting Wang informed Johnson that Peiping prepared negotiate with Chiang

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-855. Confidential.

Kai-shek, willing grant Taiwan “autonomous area” status under Chiang for a period of time.

Gowen

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**351. Telegram 1099 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 8, 1955, 7 p.m.

1099. From Johnson.

Following is redraft of renunciation of force statement which takes account of comments Deptel 1136. Subject to Department’s views, it has concurrence of Phleger and the Secretary. Would hope I would be able introduce this at Thursday’s meeting.

1. The Ambassador of the United States of America and the Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China during the course of the discussions of practical matters at issue have expressed the determination that the differences between the two sides shall not lead to armed conflict.

2. They recognize that the use of force to achieve national objectives does not accord with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter or with generally accepted standards of international conduct.

3. They furthermore recognize that the renunciation of the threat or use of force is essential to the just settlement of disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

4. Therefore, without prejudice to the pursuit by each side of its policies by peaceful means they have agreed to announce the following declarations:

5. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan informed Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson that:

6. In general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, the People’s Republic of China renounces the use of force, except in individual and collective self defense.

7. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson informed Ambassador Wang Ping-nan that:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–855. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.

8. In general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, the United States renounces the use of force, except in individual and collective self defense.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 11/8/3:47 pm EMB (CWO)

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**352. Telegram 1101 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 8, 1955, 8 p.m.

1101. From Johnson.

Renew recommendations my 1061 except as follows:

1. Pursue question of CHICOM press leak subject to whatever reply if any I have received to my today's letter.

2. Make brief statement on implementation.

3. While CHICOM purpose in Daily Worker leak clear and I will continue vigorously pursue violation by Wang private nature our talks believe we should ourselves recognize it has some compensating advantages. By leak CHICOMS have tended create public impression they have renounced force substantially on our terms. They now face problem of attempting publicly to explain "fine print" of their conditions and reservations and we should not help them in this.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-855. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution.



**353. Telegram 1162 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 8, 1955, 1:17 p.m.

1152. For Johnson.

ChiCom propaganda during week ending November 6 contained little direct reference ambassadorial talks and comment on Taiwan was slight as compared previous two weeks. Major attention during week focussed on Big Four Foreign Ministers' Conference, Middle Eastern situation, and the problem of increasing contacts between East and West.

Ambassadorial talks mentioned only in passing, connection with question of trade controls. NCNA noted question of the embargo had been raised at Geneva, and expressed hope that solution to problem could be reached. Comments on Taiwan confined to internal developments and avoided international aspects. NCNA broadcast to Taiwan November 2 reported interview with Chien Hsueh-sen, former Cal Tech scientist who arrived Peiping October 28.

NCNA commentary on Big Four Ministers Conference adopted line conference was test of Western powers, and that success of talks was imperilled by "counter-current" of Western opinion which favored continuation of Cold War. Peiping strongly supported Soviet proposal on collective security, and endorsed Soviet proposal both Germanys be represented at Geneva. Peiping also urged that Ministers Conference work out measures to remove obstacles to international trade.

Peiping propaganda paid considerable attention problem of increasing East-West contacts, including trade. *People's Daily* November 3 supported Soviet proposal on East-West contacts and attacked alleged US and Western effort to restrict area of contact. It cited US "embargo" policy as chief obstacle to increased East-West contact. Other NCNA comments focussed US ban to travel to Communist China, accusing State Department of setting up "iron curtain" between China and US in order prevent Americans from learning truth about New China.

NCNA commentary on Middle Eastern crisis accused US of stimulating arms race between Israel and Arab states, and infringing on Egyptian sovereignty. Peiping viewed growing "unity" and "neutrality" among Arab states as factors which would deal setback to US policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-855. Official Use Only. Drafted by Dawson; cleared in IAD and CA.

Peiping radio continued stress need for normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, while at same time denouncing Japanese Government for detaining Japanese nationals and "forcibly" sending them to Taiwan. NCNA continued to criticize Shigemitsu for dragging out Japanese-Soviet talks London, and placed blame on "US manipulation."

Hoover

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**354. Telegram 1162 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 8, 1955, 8:01 p.m.

1162. For Johnson.

Instructions for 25th meeting.

1. Tax Wang severely with violation secrecy agreement represented by Daily Worker article.

2. Department considers your revised draft renunciation of force statement (your 1099) excellent. You should present it this meeting unless Secretary instructs otherwise.

3. By introducing draft renunciation of force statement first followed by Daily Worker leak Communists have taken initiative from us on this subject. Their violation agreement on private nature talks makes essential for us to regain initiative and provides opportunity place our case graphically before world. Subject to Secretary's concurrence you should inform Wang that unilateral release by his side of substance last meeting leaves you no recourse but to set record straight by releasing explanatory statement together with our draft renunciation of force declaration (your 1099) immediately following meeting. While publication our statement would tend to freeze our negotiating position, in our view there is nothing Wang could seriously object to in paragraphs one through four, and paragraphs six and eight are so tightly drawn, we could not accept change in any case. Explanatory statement mentioned above would be substance of statement Deptel 789 as amended Deptel 805 with minor revisions. Department's suggested text will follow Wednesday.

4. Implementation Agreed Announcement. You should remind Wang that two months have passed since PRC declared it would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-855. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Clough; cleared by Robertson and in S/S.

adopt appropriate measures permit Americans expeditiously return. Only two of nineteen Americans permitted depart during this lengthy period. Letter from only one of remaining seventeen so far has been received by British Charge and Charge has not been permitted see any of them. US Govt and people will judge dependence to be placed on PRC promises by its performance.

5. Military Personnel. Concur your omitting subject this meeting. Department exploring with Defense possibility raising again in MAC, but this complicated by fact that in past lists presented there included all missing UN personnel, not just American.

6. Embargo. Listen to what Wang has to say but refrain from substantive discussion this subject.

Repeat to Secretary.

Hoover

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### 355. Letter 25 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 25

Washington, November 8, 1955

Dear Alex:

I enclose a copy of the latest communication from O'Neill dated November 4.

We have told the British Embassy that we would like O'Neill to visit Downey as soon as possible unless he feels that it would constitute a precedent and actually interfere with his plans to visit all prisoners. We have said that of course O'Neill himself is the best judge of this and that we would leave the decision to him. Naturally, we want him to visit all prisoners whether they write him or not if the Chinese will permit him. We have just heard from the British Embassy that O'Neill requested an appointment with Chang Han-fu for Monday November 7 in order to turn over to him the letters to the 17 prisoners and to request permission to visit prisoners. However, he was told that Chang could not see him on that day. He has requested an appointment for November 8 and if that should also be turned down, he proposes to act by letter instead.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. McConaughy initialed the original "W."

I hope to get off a longer letter to you by pouch tomorrow, but am preparing this first so that it will not be delayed in case I am prevented from doing the other letter.

Sincerely yours,

Walter P. McConaughy

**Enclosure**

**Communication from the British Embassy<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, November 5, 1955

*Message from Mr. O'Neill dated November 4*

*AMERICANS IN CHINA*

I am now preparing letters to the 17 prisoners. I propose enclosing text of agreed announcement and to avoid danger impugning Chinese good faith by saying that I understand that the Chinese have already communicated the text to the prisoners, but I am attaching a copy for their convenience. The letters will then draw attention to my functions under the agreement and say that I am ready to help in any way I can, and that I hope the prisoners will not hesitate to communicate with me as I understand the Chinese authorities agree they may. The letters will end by saying that the Chinese authorities have agreed that members of my staff should visit the prisoners and that I hope to arrange this soon.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 of my telegram of October 27, the Chinese were not complaining of any restrictions placed on the Indian Ambassador. I think that, before implementing a concession which went rather beyond the letter of the agreement (in not insisting on some initiative by the American prisoners before I could contact them) [they will require a formal assurance of reciprocity?]. If the Chinese raise this again I shall say that I understand that no restrictions are imposed on the Indian Ambassador in carrying out his functions under the agreement. But they may yet require a more specific assurance before they deliver the letter or authorise visits. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on October 26 was particularly insistent that the arrangements he proposed were subject to reciprocity.

3. My chief reason for suggesting that I should not arrange immediate visit to Downey was that which the State Department give in asking me to do so: namely that no distinction should be made between any of the detained Americans. Moreover, if I now ask to visit Downey

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<sup>2</sup>Confidential. Brackets are in the original.

only this might give the Chinese the impression that I shall only ask to visit the prisoners who have succeeded in communicating with me. I am anxious not to prejudice the wider concession now made by the Chinese that my staff may visit all the prisoners, whether or not they write to me first. No other prisoners have so far written. If the State Department agree I suggest that I should ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at once to arrange visits by members of my staff to Downey and any other United States prisoners at present in Peking. This would meet my point.

4. The letters will probably not be ready for delivery till Monday November 7. It would be convenient if the State Department could authorise by then simultaneous requests for visits as proposed above.

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**356. Telegram 1108 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 9, 1955, 2 p.m.

1108. From Johnson.

Ekvall informed by M.A. Bern his orders as now amended expire November 26 and cannot under Army regulations be further extended as TDY. On basis info from Defense arrangements would be made between Department and Defense which would permit him bring family to Geneva, Ekvall had made preliminary arrangements with regard to home and personal property and any change at this time will cause him considerable financial loss.

As Department knows I would be most reluctant be required change interpreters at this time and would not consider it in interest my mission do so. Therefore hope something can promptly be worked out that will enable me retain Ekvall and also resolve his reasonable desire concerning his assignment on an indefinite or long term basis.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–955. Official Use Only.

**357. Telegram 1110 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 9, 1955, 2 p.m.

1110. From Johnson.

In private background discussions with press here we are taking general line of Secretary's letter to U Nu transmitted by separate telegram and suggest Department may desire do same.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-955. Confidential; Priority.

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**358. Telegram 1183 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 9, 1955, 6:51 p.m.

1183. For Johnson.

Following is suggested explanatory statement mentioned last sentence paragraph 3 our 1162:

One of practical matters which United States has introduced for discussion at Geneva talks is proposal that both United States and Peoples Republic of China renounce use of force to achieve their policies when they conflict. The two Governments confront each other with policies which are in certain respects incompatible. This fact need not, however, mean armed conflict and the most important single thing to do is first of all to be sure that it will not lead to armed conflict.

Then and only then can other matters causing tension between the parties in the Taiwan area and Far East be hopefully discussed.

Neither side wants to negotiate under threat of force. Free discussion of differences, and their fair and equitable solution, become impossible under overhanging threat that force may be resorted to when one party does not agree with other.

United States as member of United Nations has agreed to refrain in its international relations from threat or use of force. This has been

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-955. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy and Sebald.

its policy for many years and is its guiding principle of conduct in Far East, as throughout world.

Use of force to achieve national objectives does not accord with accepted standards of conduct under international law.

Government of League of Nations, Kellogg-Briand Treaties, and Charter of United Nations reflect universal view of civilized community of nations that use of force as instrument of national policy violates international law, constitutes threat to international peace, and prejudices interests of entire world community.

There are in world today many situations which tempt those who have force to use it to achieve what they believe to be legitimate policy objectives. Many countries are abnormally divided or contain what some consider to be abnormal intrusions. Nevertheless, the responsible governments of world have in each of these cases renounced use of force to achieve what they believe to be legitimate and even urgent goals.

Acceptance of this principle does not involve third parties, or justice or injustice of conflicting claims. It only involves recognizing and agreeing to abide by accepted standards of international conduct.

In order to accomplish end outlined above, Ambassador Johnson has today presented to Ambassador Wang Ping-nan following draft declaration on renunciation of use of force and proposed that it be accepted.

Hoover

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### 359. Letter from Clough to Forman<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 9, 1955

Dear Doug:

I would have written sooner after I returned, but I have been confronted with so many not-too-familiar problems since returning to CA that I have had my hands full. Part of the time, of course, I have devoted to working from this end on the task you face in dealing with the wily Wang, but there is just not the same amount of time here for thoughtful

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Official Use Only; Official–Informal.

meditation that there was in Geneva. Dave Osborn has been on leave the last two weeks, which has also complicated things somewhat.

You have a direct personal interest in Dave's leave, since we suggested he take it now with the thought in mind that he might be sent to replace you around December 1. Final decision on that will have to be up to Alex, of course, and I want to set down our thinking on this so that you can discuss it with him.

As you know, Walter and I both feel that officers in CA profit considerably from this rare experience of first-hand contact with the Chinese Communists, and we would like Dave to have that experience. He has been informed on the talks from the beginning and we would see that he is brought closely into the planning from now until he leaves. This experience at the Departmental end of the wire should be helpful to Alex. As you know, Dave is a highly competent officer and has had much longer service in the Department than either you or I. Walter places great confidence in him and I am sure Alex would find him a worthy replacement for you. His only disadvantage is his limited knowledge of Chinese. Whether that disadvantage would be serious enough to rule him out would be up to Alex to decide. If he believes it essential to have at least one of his advisers fully qualified in Chinese, we would send Steve Comiskey in Dave's place. Steve is also a very reliable and capable officer, although he is somewhat younger and less experienced than Dave. We would like to have Alex's reaction to this proposal as soon as possible so we would know which man to bring into the planning for the talks. Walter will probably mention this also in his next letter.

We had quite a hassle last week with Defense over Bob Ekvall. After Bern turned us down on the proposal to make him Assistant Military Attache, Defense was practically ready to recall him and we were considering sending Al Harding or John Stanley from DRF to replace him. However, we knew Alex would be very reluctant to change interpreters and Mr. Robertson finally had a talk with Godell, in which the latter indicated it would be possible to assign Bob somewhere else in Europe and detail him to Geneva. This would enable him to bring his family over and remain in Geneva as long as the talks lasted. Mr. Robertson sent a letter to General Erskine formally requesting that this be done, but we have not yet had a reply. Tell Bob not to think he is the forgotten man, because at least 20 people in Washington have been involved in some aspect of the discussions concerning him during the past week.

We have a staff meeting coming up and I want to get this into today's pouch, so I will stop here. Best regards and keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

Ralph N. Clough



**360. Telegram 1115 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 10, 1955, 9 a.m.

1115. From Johnson.

This morning I received the following letter from Wang:

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 8. Our side does not bear any responsibility in connection with the news report mentioned in your letter. The groundless charges in your letter are unacceptable at all. However, since reference has been made in your letter of leakage of the contents of our talks I am inclined to point out that it is precisely American official quarters and Western news agencies which have on many occasions made disclosures of the contents of our talks. During the course of our discussions on the first item of the agenda as well as after agreement on that item was reached the spokesman of the U.S. Department of State and Western news agencies had been making side disclosures on certain substance of our discussions on the first agenda item as well as on the United States attitude in refusing to undertake discussion of other matters under the pretext of implementation of agreement.

You will certainly recall when on September 14 you violated the agreement between both sides on the publication of information by openly making a statement disclosing the points at issue in the talks. Since we entered into the discussion of agenda item two the disclosing of the contents of our talks by American official quarters and Western news agencies has assumed an even more serious nature. Following your proposal at our meeting of October 8 for both sides to make a statement on the renunciation of force to achieve national objectives, the U.S. Secretary of State Mr. Dulles in a speech delivered before the annual convention of the American Legion asked that China accept the principle that "military force should not be used aggressively to achieve national goals". The United States Government was thus implicitly and intentionally leaking the substance of our talks through its Secretary of State. At a press conference on October 18 Mr. Dulles made yet another disclosure of the substance of our talks. He not only stated the intention of the United States with regard to the first item of the agenda but also disclosed that our talks were already discussing the question of renunciation of force. In view of the repeated disclosure of the substance of our talks by American official quarters and Western news agencies which has already created an extremely confused impression in public

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–1055. Confidential.

opinion, the Chinese Government is therefore considering a clarification of its position to the public.

Gowen

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**361. Telegram 1116 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 10, 1955, 10 a.m.

1116. From Johnson.

Re para 3 Deptel 1162, Secretary has instructed that I not repeat not make public release of explanatory statement or our draft renunciation of force declaration.

With reference to Wang's threat contained in last sentence his letter to me this morning to make official public statement, I will of course at this morning's meeting try to tie this down and unless he clearly reaffirms private nature of talks, will reserve our position on also making public statement. However feeling here is that we should wait until he actually makes statement before releasing any statement of our own.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1055. Secret; Priority.

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**362. Telegram 1122 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 10, 1955, 2 p.m.

1122. From Johnson.

1. This morning's meeting two hours and ten minutes. I opened on press leaks, referring to unsatisfactory nature his reply my letter, asking for reaffirmation our agreement on privacy talks, requested clarification statement his letter they considering issuing public statement,

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1055. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

and notified him that if they did so I reserved my right promptly reply by public statement. There ensued one hour's discussion on this subject with charges and counter-charges during which I referred to leaks by NCNA correspondent as source many press stories. Believe net result was reaffirmation agreement on privacy talks and do not believe he is going to issue any statement, but some indication decision is not entirely his.

2. He then made long prepared statement on their draft renunciation of force repeating usual arguments but somewhat stronger in tone, particularly as to their unwillingness ever to recognize "US encroachment in Taiwan", status quo, or that Taiwan was not domestic matter. Somewhat more emphasis upon withdrawal of US forces from Taiwan area.

3. I then made short statement on implementation to effect by no stretch of imagination or interpretation can their performance be considered expeditious, and that this situation closely related to other aspects our talks and my government's view of reliance which can be placed on commitments by his government.

4. I then made statement introducing our draft agreed announcement on renunciation of force, giving him copy. Meeting adjourned after few "preliminary comments" by him along expected lines.

5. He made no statement on trade embargo except for passing reference in his opening general statement to effect unacceptable that discussion of trade be conditioned upon issuance renunciation of force statement.

6. Next meeting Thursday, November 17.

Gowen

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### 363. Telegram 1125 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 10, 1955, 4 p.m.

1125. From Johnson.

Haguiwara (Japanese Ambassador in Bern) called on me yesterday evidently under instructions to obtain information concerning progress in my talks with Wang particularly with respect to trade and to sound me out on our views on relaxing CHINCOM controls.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–1055. Confidential. Repeated to Tokyo as telegram 6.

I spoke to him in general terms of present status with respect renunciation of force and said no discussion yet of trade. In response his further questions concerning our attitude on trade if CHICOM give satisfaction on renunciation of force, pointed out I could not speak for Department on this subject but set forth personal view of close relationship between strategic trade controls and estimate of intentions other side in which satisfactory renunciation of force would be only one factor. Assumption we would not consider relaxation CHINCOM controls until satisfactory CHICOM renunciation of force appeared be implicit in his question.

As in past I gave him current information with respect CHICOM performance re release of Americans. He gave me copy November 5 letter from CHICOM Consul General here to Japanese Consul General replying latter's letters August 29 and October 20 on return Japanese from China which I will transmit by despatch. Purport appears be this and other matters could be better handled if diplomatic relations established and proposes Japanese Government "send delegation to Peking to begin talks on question promoting normalization relations".

**Gowen**

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**364. Telegram 1126 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 10, 1955, 3 p.m.

1126. From Johnson.

With reference Taipei's 426 to Department repeated Geneva 104, assumption here has been Koo has been kept generally informed principal developments my talks with Wang and it should therefore come as no surprise to GRC that renunciation of force declaration being discussed. GRC should also be well aware of this from Secretary's speeches and other public statements on subject.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1055. Secret.

**365. Telegram 1132 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 10, 1955, 4 p.m.

1132. From Johnson.

Have not yet had opportunity discuss text Deptel 1183 with the Secretary or Phleger but my thought is that unless in any statement they make CHICOMS include text their draft announcement we should avoid releasing our text. Am not sure even if they release their text it would serve our interests to release our text. Release of texts would so freeze positions that further negotiation thereon would become very difficult.

As decision is we make no release unless CHICOMS first do so, our statement would probably require some tailoring to meet CHICOM statement. If release made by Wang here, statement in reply should come from me; but if release by Peiping, believe reply should come from Washington.

Subject to foregoing concur general lines statement contained 1183 but consider that if text our draft not released, mention should be made in statement of importance that renunciation specifically apply to Taiwan area. Otherwise to casual reader Wang's proposal would appear almost completely to meet text statement in Deptel 1183. Suggest addition of "including specifically the Taiwan area" at end first sentence. Also better to meet CHICOM FonMin meeting point believe we should be somewhat more explicit concerning our willingness discuss "other matters" following renunciation of force declaration. Suggest this be done by addition of following sentences after end second para statement Deptel 1183: "The United States Ambassador has made clear his willingness within the agreed scope of these talks to discuss these other matters at that time. It is the United States view that until both sides have exhausted a full and honest effort to resolve these problems through this already established and normal channel, the question of other channels or other meetings does not arise."

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1055. Secret; Limited Distribution.

**366. Telegram 1133 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 10, 1955, 4 p.m.

1133. From Johnson. Re para 4 Deptel 1186 and Deptel 1187.

If CHICOMS refuse deliver O'Neill's letters as presently drafted I would think there would still be value, at least from standpoint imprisoned persons' morale in simply transmitting copy agreed announcement under cover letter from O'Neill.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1055. Secret; Limited Distribution.

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**367. Telegram 1135 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 10, 1955, 10 p.m.

1135. From Johnson.

1. I opened twenty-fifth meeting today with discussion of privacy of talks. I acknowledged Wang's letter (Contel 1115) and told him I could not agree that his side bore no responsibility for London Daily Worker report. The Daily Worker article contained first report concerning substance of talks in their present stage and constituted full exposition of Chinese Communist position. It could have originated only from his side.

2. I said that as result of article, rash of speculation had broken out in press. I would have been justified in making public position our side but did not feel this in interests of talks. Have made every effort discourage further press speculation.

3. I said that in spite of my efforts speculation has continued. I had hoped he would have found it possible take action that would quiet this speculation.

4. I said that we must keep in mind distinction between discussion national policies by governments and either of us making available to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1055. Confidential; Limited Distribution.

reporters substance of talks. His press, radio, and public officials have been making statements on aspects of national policy some of which impinge on substance of talks. I did not raise question in that regard. I considered that quite different from publishing specifics of talks between us here.

5. I said my government's officials also make statements concerning national policies but they carefully refrained from making available to press substance of discussion in this room. He should note that Secretary Dulles, in October 18 press conference Wang had referred to in his letter, carefully avoided discussion substance talks.

6. I then read excerpts from Secretary's October 18 press conference dealing with talks.

7. I said Secretary had said absolutely nothing but what was known or made available by Wang's side. Fact trade embargo and higher level meeting had been raised was made public by his side September 14. It was well-known fact even before talks started that US desired discussion renunciation of force. Secretary merely confirmed these were subjects of talks and refused enter into substance of meetings.

8. I said I cited this because I wanted him to understand how carefully we tried keep agreement concerning privacy of talks. We were disturbed by last sentence Wang's letter, in which he apparently indicated intent make farther information available to press. I asked whether this was in fact intended.

9. Wang replied he had made his position clear in his letter. He could not accept charges I had made. In fact, it was his side that was dissatisfied regarding secrecy of talks.

10. Wang said at beginning of talks he had taken stand talks should be open. I had proposed secrecy, and as concession his side had accepted. Subsequently understanding reached that prior to public statement either side, other side should be informed. Thus it would be possible have full exchange of views to find solution to disputed matters.

11. Wang said his side has always followed this line. Chinese press has commented only matters on which agreement reached or which were made public. Has never gone into substance of talks.

12. Wang said members of his group engaged in talks have had no contacts with press. Nevertheless there had been disclosures to press. He wished to cite a few cases. Following meeting of October 27, at which his side put forward draft agreed announcement, press began to talk about important statement by Chinese side in which Foreign Ministers conference was envisaged.

13. Wang said that even this morning he had noted story in November 8 New York Times quoting official American sources and reporting

principal ideas his draft and US position. There were many more examples he could cite.

14. Wang said his side turned down all requests for interviews with press and even refused pose for pictures. He was dissatisfied with what appeared in press. This applied even to story in London Daily Worker. He could not accept responsibility for story many points of which not satisfactory to him.

15. Wang said even Dulles in press conference I had quoted from had mentioned that in talks we were engaged in discussions renunciation of force. He considered this disclosure of what was going on in talks.

16. Wang said there had been distorted press reports concerning proceedings here and that his side could bear no responsibility for these. His side was therefore considering clarifying its position.

17. I said that I was glad he had mentioned press reports following October 27 meeting. I did not question his statements concerning his relations with press. He may be unaware of situation. I would mention it only in privacy of this room, but NCNA correspondent who stands outside this room has for long period of time had remarkably accurate information what goes on inside. He has not been discreet in discussing this information with other correspondents. I was not ten minutes back in my office after October 27 meeting when Western correspondents indicated NCNA correspondent had said Wang had presented important statement renewing proposal for higher level meeting.

18. I said I and members of my staff refused discuss report with press. Nevertheless, places me in difficult position. I was completely satisfied that this and other reports have often come from same source.

19. I said I had not seen November 8 New York Times report. If it contained details of his proposal, it was doubtlessly obtained from Daily Worker article. As for Daily Worker article, it clearly did not originate with us.

20. I said rather than continue discussion this subject, could we not agree do our best prevent press speculation. I did not intend make statement or reply to Daily Worker article. However, if Wang made statement as intimated in letter I of course reserved my right make reply.

21. I said I hoped we would not be reduced debating in public. Progress so far due in large part to fact we able discuss frankly without public debate.

22. I said I did not recall that Wang had proposed open talks. I did propose private talks but did not recall any counter-proposal from Wang. Did Wang reaffirm his agreement to private talks?

23. Wang replied that he could not accept my statement concerning NCNA correspondent. He often received telephone calls from Western



correspondents who said American delegation had said something and reporters asked for comments. He had never made any reply to such inquiries.

24. After October 27 he requested assistance NCNA correspondent in tracing leak, but reporter responsible for information refused disclose source. It was thus groundless to charge origin of leak was on his side.

25. Wang said concerning November 8 New York Times story he did not regard it as objective attitude on my part to presuppose origin of story without having read it. Writer of story attributed it to "US officials". It could not be concluded that these officials were staff of London Daily Worker.

26. I asked him whether he intended issue statement.

27. Wang replied that distorted reports make it necessary consider this step.

28. I asked whether this constituted notification statement would be issued.

29. Wang said the matter was under consideration.

30. I asked whether I would be notified prior to any statement.

31. Wang said he could not say at the present moment.

32. I said that I did not intend to issue a statement unless he did, in which case I reserved my right to make a reply.

33. Wang next presented a prepared statement on renunciation of force. He said two months had passed since agreement on agenda item one. Following agreement his side had introduced two subjects: embargo and higher level meeting. In view of our raising question of renunciation of force, he had submitted on October 27 a draft agreed announcement recommending settling disputes between China and US without threat or use of force in accordance with provisions of UN Charter. In order to materialize this principle draft proposed convening conference of Foreign Ministers to settle through negotiation question of relaxing and eliminating tension in Taiwan area.

34. Wang said after repeated efforts on his part my response so far had not been satisfactory. At last meeting I had raised question whether his draft incorporated renunciation of force to achieve national objectives, as I had proposed. Such general term as national objectives confuses internal with international disputes.

35. Wang said in practical terms renunciation of force to achieve national objectives constituted demand his side renounce sovereignty and recognize status quo of US interference internal affairs and occupation China's territory of Taiwan.

36. Wang said in regard to Taiwan, China's national objective is to liberate island. This lies within framework of China's sovereignty and

internal affairs. China has repeatedly stated that conditions permitting it will strive liberate Taiwan by peaceful means. Means by which Taiwan is liberated, however, is matter China's internal affairs and US has no right interfere. This cannot be made subject Sino-American talks.

37. Wang said on other hand US national objective Taiwan area is to continue encroachment China's territory of Taiwan and continue interference Chinese internal affairs. US has already used force and threat of force attain such aggressive national objective.

38. Wang said I had skipped over this fact and refused discuss such concrete issue as withdrawal US armed force Taiwan area. At same time US has demanded through use of general term national objectives China recognize status quo in Taiwan area, continued US encroachment Chinese territory Taiwan and US interference in Chinese internal affairs. This can in no way be complied with.

39. Wang said at last meeting I had asked whether intent of his draft was that force not be used except in self-defense. Taiwan is Chinese territory and US use of force in that area places China in defensive position. Just as China cannot go to Honolulu to put up defenses in respect to US, so US has no grounds put up defenses in Taiwan area in respect to China.

40. Wang said in spite this situation China proposes settle through higher level negotiation question relaxation and elimination of tension in Taiwan area. If it is intent that China and US settle disputes in Taiwan area by peaceful means, this intent finds expression in his draft agreed announcement. However, if it is intent that China renounce exercise sovereign right over Taiwan and recognize US encroachment, this simply will not do.

41. Wang said I had suggested that point was not whether a situation was internal or external but whether force prejudiced international peace and security. His side could not accept confusion of domestic and international issues.

42. Wang said everyone knew Chinese people had liberated mainland and many coastal islands including Hainan, in process of which they had not at any time threatened international peace and security. On contrary, victory had indisputably promoted stability of situation in Far East and made immense contribution to international peace and security. On other hand, US had encroached on Taiwan and interfered with liberation Taiwan and coastal islands, giving rise to situation which threatened international peace and security.

43. Wang said it was for sake of safeguarding international peace and security that he had proposed Sino-US meeting on higher level to settle through negotiation question of relaxing and eliminating tension in Taiwan area. Yet I had at last meeting objected to linking agreed announcement to conference of Foreign Ministers.

44. Wang said this is proof US intent is to require his side to renounce exercise sovereign rights in regard to China's Taiwan and to accept status quo of US encroachment on Taiwan and interference in China's internal affairs by armed force. He wished categorically to repeat that his side could not agree to this.

45. Wang said he had stated before that mere statement of principle force will not be used in relations between China and US without providing steps to realize that principle would make US inconsistent in words and deeds, would not contribute settlement tension in Taiwan area, and would be likely give rise to misunderstanding that China admitting to US encroachment in Taiwan and interference in China's internal affairs.

46. Wang said he had on many occasions raised question of withdrawal of US armed force from Taiwan area. However, I had failed to make any answers this proved entirely necessity of holding conference of Foreign Ministers.

47. Wang said at last meeting I had said that response to question of embargo must depend on degree of agreement on renunciation of force. The policy of embargo was itself unreasonable and hence must be lifted. That was exactly his intent in the question of embargo and that is unanimous demand of people of whole world. If US after using force in encroaching on Taiwan should further demand China recognize status quo and renounce liberation of Taiwan before US side would consider lifting embargo, his side could not accept.

48. Wang said his draft agreed announcement represented great effort seek concretely apply UN Charter to the situation. If our side were genuinely desirous of peaceful settlement there is no reason why our side could not agree to his draft agreed announcement.

49. I replied that he had properly pointed out that it is now two months since agreed announcement on return of civilians was issued. Only two of those who remained in prison at that time have returned. At this rate it presumably would be 17 months until all have returned.

50. I said that by no stretch of the imagination or any interpretation can this be considered "expeditious" or fulfillment of commitment made by his government in agreed announcement.

51. I said continuation of this situation would inevitably influence my government's view of reliance which can be placed on commitments made by his government and thus profoundly influence other aspects of our talks.

52. I then presented prepared statement on our counter-draft agreed announcement as follows:

A. I have listened carefully to your statement this morning. My government has also given careful study to draft agreed announcement

which you gave to me at our meeting of October 27. It has also taken into consideration our discussions of subject at our last two meetings. I am taking into consideration your statements this morning.

B. It seems to me that we are in agreement that differences between our two sides shall not lead to armed conflict. However, as I said at our last meeting, this is subject too vitally important to our two peoples and to peace of the world to leave to cloudy language that may mean one thing to one side and something else to other side. I consider it essential that we both not only fully understand each other but that any form of words that we use publicly to announce whatever understanding we reach be absolutely clear.

C. In studying your draft it does not seem to me this purpose is fully accomplished. For example, while you cite in your draft some of sound and fundamental principles of international conduct set forth in Charter of United Nations, it is quite clear from our discussion that we have differing views with respect to applicability of these particular principles to situation in Taiwan area. As I noted at our last meeting, there are also other United Nations principles which may be considered also to have applicability to that situation. There are many other equally appropriate citations in United Nations Charter and other international documents. However, it does not seem to me profitable to attempt to cite or include in any public statement upon which we may agree all of provisions of United Nations Charter or other documents which may be applicable to situation.

D. I do consider it important that we make perfectly clear in whatever we agree publicly to say, that without prejudice to our differing views or policies with respect to the situation in the Taiwan area, we are determined it shall not lead to armed conflict.

E. I think it also desirable that whatever we say we make it clear that neither one of us is renouncing right of individual and collective self-defense, which is recognized by United Nations Charter.

F. Also, as I said at our last meeting, I do not consider we can condition our enunciation of such fundamental principle upon any particular form of negotiation between our two countries. I repeat statement which I made at our meeting of October 8, that such declarations would make it appropriate to pass on to discussion of other matters with better hope of coming to constructive conclusions. I have already indicated my willingness to hear your views with respect to what you term trade embargo if following our issuance of such declaration there are other matters properly within the scope of our talks which you desire to bring up, I will also be prepared to discuss them with you.

G. You and I have agreed that our differences in Taiwan area should not lead to armed conflict. We are also in agreement that public statement should be made in this regard. I have therefore prepared

draft which I believe fully takes into account views of both sides and clearly expresses this intent.

H. You will note from this draft that, although my original proposal had in mind separate declarations, I have adopted your suggestion of agreed announcement similar in form to that which we made on September 10.

I. You will also note from this draft that I have taken account of the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as our differing views on the situation in Taiwan area. With particular reference to your statements this morning, you will note that this draft is carefully drawn so as not to require your government in making this statement to renounce or to prejudice its views in this regard. You will also note that draft specifically refers to right of individual and collective self-defense and that it provides for statements by the two governments to be identical. That is, it is not being suggested your government say anything but what my government is willing to say.

J. I would hope we could agree on this draft, issuance of which would mean so much not only for progress of our talks but for world longing for assurance of peace.

53. After reading draft in English original and having it interpreted Wang replied that he had some preliminary comments. We all recognized existence contradictions in policies and disputes between our governments. These disputes must be settled conformity accepted and recognized standards international conduct. That why entirely necessary as in his draft have specific quotations provisions United Nations Charter, indicating intent settle disputes accordance quoted provisions.

54. Wang said we were in agreement that public announcement should be made. However, he could not agree that issuance such announcement should be a prerequisite for discussion of other matters.

55. Wang said he noted that my draft omitted two paragraphs United Nations Charter he had quoted. My draft also omitted provision concerning holding of Foreign Ministers' meeting. My draft contained reference to "national objectives". As he had said this morning, such a catchall term as "national objectives" could solve nothing.

56. Wang said question arises what objectives are meant by term. In 1941 after Pearl Harbor United States joined in war against aggression on basis national objective which was self-defense. Use of force to achieve such national objective justified.

57. Wang said other national objectives concern domestic affairs of country. National objective of self-defense is quite just.

58. Wang said he noted that draft refers to United States self-defense in connection with Taiwan area. He could not see how United States has right to put up self-defense in Taiwan area.

59. Wang said that draft mentions desire settle disputes between two sides by peaceful means. This in conformity with main idea of his draft announcement.

60. Wang reserved further comment for next meeting.

61. Meeting ended at 12:10. Next meeting Thursday, November 17. Same press release.

**Gowen**

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**368. Telegram 1140 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 11, 1955, 4 p.m.

1140. From Johnson.

Presumably at next meeting Wang will have prepared statement commenting on renunciation force proposal I introduced yesterday. I will reply as appropriate reiterating arguments already made. Believe my attitude should be one of willingness consider reasonable amendments in preamble of first four paragraphs but complete firmness on paragraphs 6 and 8.

While statement on implementation will somewhat depend on developments in Peiping and views of UK, in general, believe I should place major emphasis on release and if brought up keep O'Neill's difficulties in functioning in secondary position. Believe there is some advantage to us in present trend of having O'Neill's functions develop into UK-PRC controversy.

If Wang makes statement on trade I would avoid substantive discussion but might ask any questions that would seem useful.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1155. Secret.

**369. Telegram 1141 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 11, 1955, 5 p.m.

1141. From Johnson. ReMytel 1132.

1. I have been reconsidering question of text of any public statement we should issue if PRC makes statement. It now appears to me text in Deptel 1183 would not be best answer to probable type of statement PRC could be expected.

2. There is given below my thought on general lines of what might be said here if Wang issues statement, or it could be modified for issuance in Washington if PRC release was from Peiping. It will be noted this draft attempts to make our points without becoming involved in specific substance of meetings or drafts which I feel should if possible be avoided.

A. It is a matter of disappointment and concern that Ambassador Wang has chosen to issue a public statement at this time. As he and I agreed when these talks started progress can best be made by not giving out details of our exchanges until understandings can be announced, as when we made the agreed announcement of September 10 with regard to the return of civilians.

B. Some time ago I proposed, in order to make progress in the discussion of other practical matters arising between the two sides, that both sides should declare that they renounced the use of force.

C. Ambassador Wang appears to have accepted this principle and we have since that time been discussing an appropriate form for this declaration. Such a declaration must make it clear that force is being renounced as an instrument of national policy in general and also with particular reference to the Taiwan area. My government believes that an unqualified declaration in this regard, such as the United States is willing to make, would be a major step in assuring peace in the Far East and permit hopeful discussion of other problems.

D. I am pleased to note that Ambassador Wang's statement appears publicly to indicate that the People's Republic of China is in fact willing to renounce the use of force. I hope that agreement can soon be reached on an unqualified declaration in this regard.

E. However, the extreme slowness and apparent reluctance with which Ambassador Wang's government is now implementing its commitment of September 10 to permit all Americans in China desiring to return expeditiously to do so is a source of serious concern. Although

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–1155. Secret; Limited Distribution.

more than two months have now passed since the issuance of our agreed announcement of September 10, 17 Americans still remain in jail.

F. It is my hope that Communist China will no longer delay in demonstrating its willingness fully to carry out its freely assumed commitments.

Gowen

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### 370. Letter from Johnson to Sebald<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 11, 1955

Dear Bill:

Thank you very much for your thoughtful and generous letter of November 4. I know that you fully appreciate my problems, but I must say I could not ask for better support. As I have told McConaughy previously, and have repeated here to the Secretary and Herman, I feel my instructions have consistently been excellent and have enabled me to go to meetings with a feeling of confidence in having sufficient elbow room to meet any likely situation. However, as I also told Herman, I would be very happy if someone else were dealing with this renunciation of force item. Prisoners was a subject upon which I could really get my hands and bulldog, but with renunciation of force I sometimes feel as if I am punching at clouds or grabbing at eels which slip out just when I think I have hold. However, I will try to do my best.

It is hard to tell what will happen in the next few weeks. As far as substance is concerned, there is quickly not going to be much more to talk about. It is going to simply come down to a refusal by them to renounce force against Taiwan and our insistence that they do so. I am convinced they are not going to do so unless they get something they want very badly. The Foreign Ministers' meeting is obviously in this category but whether even this would be sufficient is somewhat doubtful in my mind.

It will then come down to whether they are willing to keep these talks going for their own sake. This might be the case, and the louder that Taiwan screams about their continuation, the more it serves to convince Chou that it would be useful to keep them going.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.



Another aspect is that even if they desire to break off the talks, I believe we have them in a position that makes it difficult for them to do so. They will realize that we would be able to present it as a refusal on their part to renounce force, which would carry with it implications that would be difficult for them to handle.

As you can see from my telegrams I still feel it is a mistake to bring up implementation at every meeting. On the one hand it tends to become routine (I have run out of any new ways of saying it), and on the other hand I think it is counterproductive in that it makes it a little harder for them to release them. However, I think we should take advantage of every opportunity to put the heat on them through U Nu, Nehru and others. I know, however, that I am in a minority of one on the former point.

I am having serious personnel difficulties in Prague and, hence, I have been trying recently to get up there as often as possible to lend a hand, but it is becoming more difficult with the uncertainties of flying here in the winter and the curtailed schedules.

Tell Walter Robertson that he need not worry that I will ever do anything rash with ideas that are exchanged in personal letters with any of you. I would hope that I could continue to correspond on a purely informal basis, as I have in the past, and pass ideas back and forth without commitment by anyone.

Tell McConaughy I have, just as I was writing this, received his letter of November 8 and will not be writing him today.

My best to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. I have just read Hong Kong's despatch 579 of October 3 on the release of Buol. I would be interested in knowing from our friends whether there is any probable basis for the report Buol mentions that three Americans missing from the 1951 Li Mi operation are imprisoned.

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**371. Telegram 1219 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 12, 1955, 1:03 p.m.

1219. For Johnson.

Re your 1135, para. 25, *N.Y. Times* article November 8 could not RPT not have been based on any responsible U.S. official source. We have no indication as to origin, although internal evidence points strongly to *Daily Worker* article as chief inspiration.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1055. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in draft by Sebald.

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**372. Telegram 1247 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 15, 1955, 8:09 p.m.

1247. For Johnson.

Guidance for November 17 meeting.

1. Renunciation of force. Concur your agreeing to consider *ad referendum* Department reasonable amendments to preamble our draft declaration, while maintaining completely firm position paragraphs 6 and 8, as proposed your 1140. Reject Wang's continued accusations US "armed occupation" Taiwan and reiterate US position outlined Deptel 996. You should not hesitate to state our position as forcefully as Wang states his, but pointing out that clash of views need not become clash of arms if both sides accept principle that force will not be used resolve differences.

2. Implementation. Agree with your view that major emphasis should be kept upon PRC's failure carry out express commitment to release Americans, with O'Neill's difficulties secondary. Department will obtain from British latest developments Peiping and send guidance this aspect later.

3. Embargo. Concur your 1140.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1155. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Sebald and McConaughy.

4. Military personnel. Defense has requested UNCMAC to present lists again. Since reply not yet received from UNCMAC you should omit subject this meeting.

Pass to Secretary.

Hoover

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**373. Telegram 1186 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 16, 1955, 9 p.m.

1186. From Johnson.

Following is text article my talks prepared by Wesley Pederson USIA for Paul Ford column IPS on Friday if possible. Subject to Department's views I believe release this type article at this time would be useful and concur in text. If Department concurs request text be transmitted USIA Washington.

Geneva—The United States is pressing vigorously for full implementation of Communist China's September tenth pledge to permit Americans in China "expeditiously" to return home.

Seventeen American civilians are still imprisoned on the China mainland, despite the promise given in Geneva nine weeks ago to the U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, U. Alexis Johnson, by Peiping's Ambassador to Poland, Wang Ping-nan.

Johnson and Wang have been holding talks in Geneva since August first. They met for the twenty-sixth time Thursday. There are two items on their agenda: the return of civilians, and "other practical matters at issue between the two sides."

While waiting for Peiping to release the seventeen Americans, the Ambassadors are discussing the question of a mutual renunciation of force, particularly in the Taiwan area. They have not (repeat not) closed their talks on item one, however, and it is clear that in discussions on all other matters the United States will take into account Peiping's implementation of the September tenth pledge as well as its willingness to assure the world of its intent not to start a war.

In its broadcasts Peiping is alleging that in spite of its freely made commitment of September tenth the return of imprisoned Americans

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1655. Official Use Only.

depends upon what the Chinese Communists term "improvement of relations." This is an amazingly frank admission that Peiping considers these persons as political hostages to be bargained for political ends. It also cannot escape notice that Peiping has carefully timed its releases thus far with political events—the eleven imprisoned flyers were released the day the Ambassadorial level talks opened, ten civilian prisoners were freed the day the Ambassadors issued their agreed announcement on the return of civilians, and two more on the day prior to the opening of the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Geneva. No other prisoners have yet been released and 17 still remain.

However, the United States still hopes that the Chinese Communists will, even if belatedly, fully carry out their commitment to permit all Americans who desire to do so to return.

The Chinese Communists have publicly announced the two matters they would like to take up are preparations for a higher level meeting and the question of trade embargo.

Secretary of State Dulles said in a press conference on October eighteenth that the possibilities of the meeting of the Ambassadors should be fully explored and exhausted before there is consideration given to a possible second meeting and that the United States would be willing to discuss the question of trade embargo at the Ambassadorial level. However, it has been made clear that the United States is not prepared to make any arrangements which would prejudice the rights of the Republic of China or other third parties.

The meetings here are conducted in secret because it is the U.S. belief that there is a better possibility of progress if problems can be discussed frankly, without the danger of the talks being distorted for propaganda purposes. Whatever results are achieved, however, will of course be made public, Johnson has emphasized.

There will, in other words, be no (repeat no) secret agreements.

End.

**Gowen**

**374. Telegram 1192 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 17, 1955, 2 p.m.

1192. From Johnson.

1. Two hour meeting this morning devoted entirely to draft agreed announcement on renunciation of force except for statement by me on implementation to which he did not reply. Discussion centered almost entirely around our draft.

2. Wang opened meeting with long and uncompromising prepared statement rejecting our draft as “totally unjustifiable and absolutely unacceptable” and demanding acceptance his draft. Statement reiterated previous positions on Taiwan, GRC, US occupation, etc. Much emphasis upon our draft requiring them to acquiesce maintenance of status quo, US armed interference liberation Taiwan and US encroachment on Chinese territory Taiwan.

3. I replied with long extemporaneous statement rejecting his implication US not seeking peaceful settlement by referring US proposal these talks, statement on renunciation of force, and willingness discuss other matters. I restated our position with respect GRC, defense treaty, etc. Principal point was not now attempt reconcile these differences but assure will not lead to war. I then went through our draft paragraph by paragraph, asking him specifically tell me with what they did not agree.

4. His reply and subsequent give and take was very noticeably milder than prepared statement but did not add anything substantive.

5. I persisted in attempt obtain more concrete expression specific objections our draft which he avoided by referring his opening statement which I characterized as generalized and not helpful in arriving at agreement on text. I pointed out our draft seemed to meet his three principal requirements: A) no violation sovereignty, territorial integrity, B) based on UN principles, and C) concrete arrangements for peaceful settlement already provided for by these talks. In reply he continued refer back to his prepared statement.

6. Meeting closed on this inconclusive note. Next meeting Wednesday, November 23.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1755. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

**375. Telegram 1197 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 17, 1955, 7 p.m.

1197. From Johnson.

Before today's meeting NCNA correspondent was "expressing opinion" to Western correspondents that these talks cannot go on much longer.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1755. Confidential; Limited Distribution.

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**376. Telegram 1272 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 17, 1955, 7:49 p.m.

1272. For Johnson. Your 1186.

AP Tokyo reports Peiping broadcast November 17 announcing release Mrs. Bradshaw, White and Garvey. No confirmation yet but presume will be confirmed due course. View this news believe inadvisable use text article your 1186 Ford column Friday. It would require extensive revision and would be considerably weakened well as overshadowed by news of release three Americans.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1655. Official Use Only. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Lindbeck, Robertson, and Sebal.

**377. Telegram 1203 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 18, 1955, 4 p.m.

1203. From Johnson.

1. It will be noted Wang's prepared statement at yesterday's meeting was very hard and until last sentence I had feeling he was preparing ground for break. However, should also be noted he has not yet accepted my invitation at November 3 meeting to give their views on trade. They have impolitely [*implicity?*] accepted our position renunciation force first and most important item although they of course continue link it with FonMin meeting.

2. While they have dropped immediate demand for withdrawal US forces from Taiwan they are of course trying to maneuver us into position of issuing statement which would provide strong basis for demanding our withdrawal. At same time they have interpreted reference to "individual and collective self-defense" in juxtaposition to Taiwan area in operative para our draft as requiring recognition by them, on one hand, of US right unilaterally to defend Taiwan, and, on other hand, validity of US defense treaty with GRC. From this it would follow that they are precluded from even raising question "withdrawal US forces from Taiwan" as well as abandoning their over-all position on GRC and Taiwan. Therefore, it is empty to speak of not prejudicing their policies. Stripped of polemics believe this is genuine position they were setting forth in paras 8 and 11 Wang's statement (Mytel 1200) and that from their standpoint it has considerable point.

3. Do not suggest any amendment our draft at this time but believe we should be considering how point might be met if it appears desirable attempt do so.

4. Also suggest we be considering whether and how our draft could be amended consistent with our over-all position so that it would make specific reference to intent both parties settle disputes by peaceful means. What I have in mind is possibility inclusion some general statement intent both sides peacefully negotiate disputes including possibly specific reference to Taiwan area which would serve as substitute their para on FonMin meeting without commitment as to any particular form of negotiation. Believe if something along this line could be formulated it would substantially strengthen present draft and might slightly increase its acceptability.

5. However, as Department is aware it is my considered view that we cannot now anticipate CHICOMS will publicly make such major

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1855. Secret; Priority.

shift in position as would be involved in issuance any satisfactory renunciation of force declaration in Taiwan area without receiving what they would consider satisfactory assurance substantial value in return.

6. Next meeting will be "my turn" speak first and it will be important I have carefully prepared and considered statement. Would appreciate Department's suggestions on additional points I might make or those made in past which Department believes would be most useful emphasize.

Gowen

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**378. Letter 26 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 26

Washington, November 18, 1955

Dear Alex:

You are not the forgotten man despite the rather long interval between letters recently. With our forces rather widely scattered, there has not been much that I could give you which would add to what you were getting in the official telegrams. That is still essentially the case. So this letter will be rather short. I have just checked with both Mr. Robertson and Bill Sebald. They have no special sidelights on messages to convey and suggest that I defer any long letter until early next week. We are meeting with Herman Phleger at noon today. By Monday we should be able to take his views and the latest thinking of the Secretary into account.

We have a feeling that we may be getting into a fairly tight corner on the renunciation of force item although basically our position is unquestionably sound. It seems to us in FE that we are suffering from our inability to state our precise position fully and frankly to key friendly governments; from the need to pull our verbal punches to some extent at Geneva in order to insure the continuation of the talks; from the increasingly serious misgivings of the Chinese Government (see Taipei's 463 of Nov. 17 transmitting the note of Foreign Minister Yeh to the Secretary); from the clever way in which the Chinese Communists are attempting to seize the initiative on the renunciation of force item and masquerade as the real sponsors of the renunciation of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.



force concept. We are getting an increasing number of queries as to where we expect to go if the Chinese Communists should unexpectedly agree to sign some form of textually acceptable renunciation of force declaration? Taipei clearly believes that the Communists might be willing to sign some such form of declaration with no intention of observing it longer than it served their purposes. Taipei knows that no such declaration can be self-enforcing and they believe the Chinese Communists would not hesitate to try to rationalize a violation of any wording which might be proposed. Taipei is asking with increasing insistence, "Where would you go after you got an agreed announcement on renunciation of force?" We are drafting a message to Rankin which spells out to some extent the rationale behind the Geneva Ambassadorial talks. There may be some tendency on the part of our people out there to look at the problem almost exclusively in military terms. More of all this next week.

On the repatriation question, I am enclosing a copy of an Aide Memoire we are giving the British which answers some of their questions on the stand we would like for O'Neill to take in regard to letters and visits to prisoners, the obstruction issue, and the special responsibility resting on the Chinese Communists to establish contact between O'Neill and the prisoners in view of the inability of the prisoners to take any initiative without the consent and assistance of Chinese Communist authorities. We are enclosing a copy of the report of the interview with Downey on November 15. We are also sending you separately a copy of the memo of conversation between Indian Ambassador Mehta and Mr. Robertson which took place yesterday.

We are working on a revision of the draft public statement (your 1141). Presumably there will be no occasion to use this right away but we hope to have some concrete suggestions for you before the next meeting. It seems to me that there are various little straws indicating that the Chinese Communists may be laying the ground work for a resort to the public forum later. The casual suggestion of Tuesday for the next meeting is one such straw.

I hope you will find our proposal to substitute Dave Osborn for Doug Forman acceptable. Doug's family situation seems to call for his early return. Dave is outstanding and will bring considerable originality, resourcefulness and fertility of mind as well as a good basic knowledge, both general and particular. His report of current thinking here, such as Doug brought you in mid-August, will also be valuable to you.

We are working hard on the Ekvall case and hope to have a solution although it is too early for you to take this for granted. The bureaucratic hurdles encountered on such a seemingly simple problem are well-nigh incredible. I was glad to get your letter No. 17 of Nov. 4 (which took 10

days in transit). Bill Sebald appreciated your letter of Nov. 11 and asked me to acknowledge it in his behalf.

Regards and good wishes,

Walter P. McConaughy

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**379. Telegram 1281 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 19, 1955, 2:51 p.m.

1281. For Johnson.

Guidance for November 23 meeting.

1. Implementation. Acknowledge release three American prisoners, but emphasize 14 remain and we continue to be concerned over PRC's failure carry out commitment permit them expeditiously return. Inform Wang we also concerned over fact British Charge still unable perform his functions with respect these prisoners. Thirteen of fourteen still have not written Charge and since PRC has special responsibility provide facilities for prisoners' communication, if they have not written can only be assumed they prevented from writing. It is obviously absurd to imagine any person confined in prison would not seek to take full advantage Charge's efforts to remove impediments to freedom if given opportunity. (We believe this point should be made for the record.)

Requirement that Charge interview Americans only in accordance rules for relatives is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is obvious attempt defeat purpose of Agreed Announcement. No restrictions whatsoever on freedom of Chinese in US to communicate with Indians nor freedom of Indians to interview Chinese who appeal to them accordance Agreed Announcement. US cannot accept contention of PRC Vice Minister that question of encountering obstruction in leaving country does not arise in case imprisoned Americans. (Deptel 1248) Imprisonment is self-evident and incontrovertible form of obstruction to departure. Since more than two months have passed since PRC pledged Americans could expeditiously return, it is apparent they encountering obstruction in leaving.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1955. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Sebald, Phleger in substance, and McConaughy.

FYI O'Neill being asked make above points in Peiping. Use of preceding paragraph subject to British concurrence which we hope to have not later than November 22. END FYI.

2. Renunciation of Force. Continue emphasize, as in paragraphs 39 and 40 your 1200, that Wang has agreed with you that differences in policy should not lead to war and that statement should be made by both sides renouncing use of force. Department considers argumentation your 1200 admirable and believes you should hold to same general line.

3. Department puzzled by Wang's failure to bring up embargo last meeting. Would like your views as to reason.

4. Important keep meetings at least week apart.

Dulles

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### 380. Telegram 1210 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 21, 1955, 6 p.m.

1210. From Johnson. Re para 3 Deptel 1281.

1. I have no very firm thoughts on why Wang has not yet further brought up embargo.

2. However, it is possible they suspect trick of some kind lies behind our invitation present their views which obviously caught them by surprise. They may have been confused by our linking of renunciation of force with embargo and have not decided how it can best be handled. They may also suspect our mention CHICOM [*CHINCOM*] and UN resolution was solely to give basis for rejection any discussion these items as outside scope these talks.

3. Related to foregoing is possibility that having linked renunciation of force to their immediate major objective of FonMin meeting they do not wish to give us any basis for delay in bringing FonMin meeting to decision by diversionary discussion on secondary item of embargo.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–2155. Secret; Limited Distribution.

4. They may also have been awaiting outcome trade discussion in Big Four FonMin meeting before making up mind whether press or how to handle embargo. Lack results Big Four meeting may discourage them from pressing at least for time being.

Gowen

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381. Telegram 1289 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 21, 1955, 7:21 p.m.

1289. For Johnson.

Chinese Communist propaganda during past week contained only one direct reference to Ambassadorial talks, and comment on Taiwan remained at low ebb. Major attention devoted Big Four talks and other issues.

*Ambassadorial talks.* Commentary by "Observer" in *People's Daily*, November 18 charged that US is continuing delay progress of talks. Cited UP report November 9 quoting US officials in Washington to effect US would not be party to agreements until all Americans released from China; contrasted problem of remaining 14 Americans with situation Chinese nationals in US "long prevented from returning" to China. Concluded by saying talks at ambassadorial level cannot "be prolonged indefinitely," and called on US to stop fabricating "pretexts" and "honestly sit down and negotiate."

*Taiwan.* NCNA November 13 commented briefly on Far Eastern trip Air Force General Twining, alleging his discussions with Nationalist leaders concerned strengthening air defenses in Taiwan Strait. Special article *People's Daily* November 12 commented on "aggressive maneuvering" US Seventh Fleet in Taiwan area. Broadcasts to Taiwan featured speech by ex-Nationalist official Li Ming-yang addressed to government leaders on Taiwan.

*Big Four Conference.* NCNA commentary on closing of Foreign Ministers' Conference sought to place blame for failure on Western powers. Accused US of "torpedoing European peace and poisoning international atmosphere." Concluded "great deterrents still exist to relaxation

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-2155. Official Use Only. Drafted by Dawson; cleared in IAD and CA.

of tensions,” but took position that failure Big Four Conference reach agreement did not rule out possibility of more fruitful talks in future.

*East-West Contacts.* Issue of enlarging East-West contacts continued receive considerable Peiping attention. NCNA November 17 stated main question is problem of developing normal economic relations, and cited “growing demand” for abolition trade controls. Alleged “certain circles” in West were unwilling give up Cold War policies, and viewed expansion cultural ties as opportunity for pursuing Cold War further.

*Korea.* *People’s Daily* November 18 endorsed Nam Il’s October 31 statement demanding North Korean representation UN GA discussions of Korean Question, and advocated general Far Eastern conference on Korean issue with “wide representation” for Asian countries. Editorial also raised issue of Chinese POWs, stating US had never given proper accounting.

*Japan.* Katayama mission to Peiping continued receive considerable attention. Joint Sino-Japanese communique issued November 16, based on interview between Chou and Katayama November 15, called for restoration diplomatic relations, and settlement all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. Meanwhile, Peiping continued berate Japanese Government for deportation Chinese nationals to Taiwan.

*Indonesia.* Peiping radio November 17 commented favorably on Sukarno speeches of November 10 and 13, in which he charged connections between the Darul Islam movement and “foreign imperialism,” and called for vigilance against danger of “imperialist” efforts to subvert Indonesian Republic. NCNA pledged Chinese support for Indonesians in their struggle against imperialism, with specific reference to West Irian.

Dulles

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### 382. Telegram 1212 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 23, 1955, 2 p.m.

1212. From Johnson.

1. Two hour and fifty minute meeting this morning. No progress whatever.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–2355. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

2. Towards end of meeting Wang pressed me very hard with some obvious but unknown purpose in mind to commit myself to discussion his draft at next meeting while flatly and categorically rejecting our draft as any basis for further discussion. Although purpose unknown I was quite clear that he had some specific move in mind if I had given flat negative reply. I of course avoided any commitment, repeatedly replying in response to his demands for flat yes or no that I had been and would continue striving for agreement on a text while expressing disappointment lack his concrete responses to specific questions concerning wording to which they objected in our draft.

3. I opened meeting with statement on implementation accordance para one Deptel 1281 to which he made brief reply along usual lines.

4. I followed with long prepared statement on renunciation. Only somewhat new point I made was that these talks were normal and natural way discussing and settling differences. I said that if his government is as desirous of peaceful settlement disputes as my government, it will enable him make full and honest efforts negotiate and discuss differences here before raising question terminating these talks and substituting another method of negotiation. "When we have succeeded in resolving questions we are called upon to deal with here, then our governments will naturally be in better position consider what further steps might be taken."

5. Wang replied with long prepared statement repeating former arguments rejecting our draft, adding nothing new. However he included statement with respect to trade embargo rejecting "US proposal for lifting trade embargo in exchange for PRC agreement US draft announcement on renunciation of force."

6. In my reply and during much give and take I attempted keep discussion focussed upon concrete discussion our draft but he avoided all discussion our draft beyond that contained his original prepared statement and insisted on coming back his draft.

7. Next meeting Thursday, December 1.

8. Departing for Prague this evening, returning Tuesday, November 29.

**Gowen**

**383. Telegram 1214 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 23, 1955, 10 p.m.

1214. From Johnson.

Although it is hard for me to believe PRC would be willing to break talks or without breaking talks go to public on their present position, Wang's performance at end today's meeting nevertheless left me with feeling that they may well have one or other in mind. Briefly, I am not confident continuation of talks can be assured beyond next meeting unless some new element is introduced.

My present thinking with respect next meeting would be to open with very strong attack on ultimatum aspects his present tactics, brief but strong attack on his draft and then introduce new draft which would be essentially same as our present draft but give appearance of something new. I am also inclined to include implication willingness see respective positions made public but without express threat to do so.

With respect to his draft my principal point would be that while giving appearance of renouncing force, what it in fact does is maintain threat of hostilities in Taiwan area unless there is Foreign Minister meeting and such meeting results in settlement satisfactory to them.

Believe it would be useful if new draft could meet points raised in paragraphs 2 and 4 my telegram 1203 and consider paragraph 5 that telegram still valid.

I will transmit views on text new draft in subsequent telegram.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell (FE) notified 11/23/55 5:55 PM (EH).

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–2355. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

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**384. Telegram 1215 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 23, 1955, midnight

1215. From Johnson.

1. I opened 27th meeting today with prepared statement on implementation as follows:

A. Since our last meeting my government has received news that three of Americans held by your government are to be released; in fact, two of them have already left. Gratifying as this news is, fourteen Americans still remain in prison in your country.

B. Not only have these fourteen Americans not yet been permitted to exercise their right to return, but British Charge d'Affaires has not been able to carry out his functions under agreed announcement with respect to them. Thirteen of remaining fourteen have not yet been able to communicate with British Charge. Since your government bears responsibility for providing facilities for prisoners' communication with British Charge, my government can only conclude that they are being prevented from communicating with him. It is obvious that any person confined to prison would seek to take full advantage of Charge's efforts to remove impediments to freedom, if given opportunity.

C. To best of my knowledge the office of British Charge has been able to visit only one of Americans. My government considers that requirement that Charge interview Americans only in accordance with rules for relatives is arbitrary and unreasonable, since Charge is an official carrying out his duties and not relative. Requirements for visits would appear to be attempt to defeat purpose of agreed announcement. There are no restrictions whatsoever on freedom of Chinese in US to communicate with Indian Embassy or on freedom of Indian Embassy to interview Chinese who appeal to it in accordance with agreed announcement.

D. My government cannot accept contention of your Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in his interview with UK Charge on November 14 that question of encountering obstructions in leaving country does not arise in cases of imprisoned Americans. Imprisonment is of itself incontrovertible evidence of obstructions to departure. Since more than two months have passed since your government pledged that Americans would be expeditiously permitted return, it apparent they are encountering obstructions in leaving.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-2355. Confidential; Limited Distribution.



E. Tomorrow is my country's holiday of Thanksgiving; it is tragic that on this day, two and a half months after we issued our agreed announcement fourteen Americans covered by that announcement remain in prison, separated from their families. I can only urge that your government, in interests of improving relations between our governments and furthering prospects for success in these talks, complete implementation of its commitments without further delay.

2. I continued with prepared statement on renunciatuon of force as follows:

A. I have since our last meeting carefully reviewed our discussion thus far with respect renunciation of force. I have particularly reviewed statements which you have made in this regard including your statement at our last meeting.

B. In doing this I have been seeking to find basis upon which it would be possible make progress in our search for agreement on text for public statement. I am encouraged by progress we have thus far made with respect to principles, but our difficulties now seem revolve in large part around words with which express those principles. I have tried, and will continue try, make my best constructive efforts toward this end and I hope you will also do so. I am satisfied that, if we both do this, our agreement in principle is wide enough permit us reach agreement on words.

C. Mr. Ambassador, I am sorry have to say that I do not feel that your statement at our last meeting constituted such constructive effort. As I said at time, it was confined to generalizations, most of which were of very controversial character and of little pertinence our immediate task. I have tried at previous meetings explain why I felt your draft of October 27 did not best meet situation. I also made effort in my draft of November 10 meet both points of view. In spite of these efforts you simply rejected my draft and demanded that I accept your draft. It is hard for me to reconcile this with genuine desire make progress.

D. In your statement at our last meeting you entirely ignored statement made in my November 10 draft clearly setting forth that announcement was without prejudice to pursuit by each side of its policies by peaceful means. You entirely ignored clear wording of draft and alleged that it constituted requirement on your government renounce its views and policies. I want make it absolutely clear that draft constitutes no such requirement with respect to views and peaceful policies of your government. Draft provides that your government will simply state it will not initiate use of armed force to implement those policies. US Government at same time will renew its often repeated statements in this regard. I cannot see how any reasonable person can possibly misinterpret this proposal on part of my government and say that it

calls into question desire of my government seek just and peaceful settlements of disputes between us, including those in Taiwan area and therefore I do not believe arguments which you gave as alleged basis for rejecting my November 10 draft have a basis in fact.

E. At our last meeting you also again spoke of meeting of our Foreign Ministers, as if that was only means of peacefully settling disputes. You appear continue confuse basic difference between fundamental principle of unconditionally agreeing peacefully settle disputes and procedural question of what form of negotiation shall be used implement that principle. My government proposed these talks as normal and natural way of discussing and settling our differences. We are both Ambassadors fully authorized speak for our respective governments to extent that our governments are willing enable us do so. That is why my government proposed that these talks be at Ambassadorial level. If your government is as desirous of peaceful settlement of disputes between us as is my government, it will enable you to make full and honest efforts negotiate and discuss our differences here before raising question of terminating these talks and substituting another method of negotiation. When we have succeeded in resolving questions which we are called upon deal with here, then our governments will naturally be in better position consider what further steps might be taken.

[F.] At our last meeting you also particularly spoke of inclusion in my draft of phrase concerning right of individual and collective self-defense. I am very surprised at your apparent rejection of inclusion of such phrase as I would have thought that you would have considered it very important. Your interpretation of phrase was very distorted and, read in context of my draft declaration as whole, I do not consider that your interpretation is correct. What phrase simply says is, while we will not initiate hostilities, each of us wish to make clear that, if there is an attack in Taiwan area or elsewhere, we will defend ourselves individually or in concert with others. You have spoken much of principles of United Nations Charter. This principle of right of self-defense is certainly age old, natural principle which is again restated in United Nations Charter, and it is difficult for me see on what basis there can be objection thereto.

G. We have both agreed that our differences of view and disputes between us should not lead to war, and that it is intent of both of us that we will not permit this happen. Thus draft I have proposed simply says this in as straightforward and simple language as I am able contrive.

H. We both agree that region in which our differing policies and views confront each other most seriously is in area of Taiwan. This is also obvious to world. Therefore, in making such general statement it is important to make clear to world that neither of us has any hidden

reservations or qualifications concerning applicability of that general principle to area of Taiwan. My draft thus proposes that we specifically and clearly state this as fact.

I. We also are agreed that in whatever we say neither of us wants sacrifice or prejudice our position with respect to matters at issue between ourselves or others, that is, we do not desire to say something that would prevent us from maintaining our views and pursuing our policies by means other than use of military force. We want to be free pursue our policies by peaceful means. My draft also says this in just as clear and simple terms as I can.

J. We also agreed on principle that peaceful means should be used for just settlement of disputes between us. It was in accordance with this principle United States proposed these talks and it was hoped that reason your government accepted this proposal was that it also agrees with this principle. United States has done everything possible and will continue do all it can make these talks succeed. My government's purpose in suggesting declaration renouncing use of force as a fundamental first principle was intended contribute this objective. And it will continue be our policy, based on principles of United Nations Charter, strive for just settlement of disputes by peaceful means.

K. I have taken this time carefully explain and amplify my draft of November 10, since, from your remarks at our last meeting, it appeared that your government apparently did not have a full understanding of it. I hope that these remarks will serve clarify any misunderstanding that may have existed and enable us make progress in agreeing upon text.

3. Wang replied first with comments my implementation statement. He said during course of talks 41 American civilians or law-offenders had returned to US. Number of Americans who left China since talks began far exceeded two-thirds of number in China at time talks started. This fact shows PRC has made greatest effort in solution problem of returning American civilians.

4. Wang said Americans still remaining being treated accordance agreed announcement and PRC legal procedures. His side could not accept remarks alleging obstructions in regard to Americans who committed offenses. Proof of this in fact I had mentioned that one American remaining in prison was able communicate with British Charge without factual basis.

5. Wang said he had in past spoken of principle under which American law offenders will be dealt with. He could not accept contention that imprisonment itself constitutes evidence of obstruction against return. These people not able return simply because they have breached Chinese law.

6. Wang said his side desirous improving relations our two countries through present talks, but such improvement must be without sacrifice sovereign rights either party. Cases American law offenders being dealt with in accordance agreed announcement; at same time handling must be in accordance Chinese legal procedures.

7. Wang then replied to my renunciation of force statement. He said his side fully shared desire I had spoken of that these talks succeed and lead to peaceful settlement disputes between us.

8. Wang said question presently under discussion is renunciation of force. The basic points in this discussion. First, it is essential we both have common understanding nature of conflict of policies between us. Second, we should strive settle question on basis of such common understanding.

9. Wang said we both agreed desirability making public statement on renunciation of force. Question now is what is to be said in such statement. His side has made careful study of US draft of November 10. At last meeting he had again set forth his views. In my statement this morning, I had again amplified and explained draft I had proposed. Consequently it is necessary prior side also renew clarification its point of view this regard.

10. Wang continued with a prepared statement. He said that he had put forth October 27 draft agreed announcement after having considered my renunciation of force proposal and my desire that both sides make a public statement. His draft embraced points of view acceptable to both sides. His side was not seeking to impose its views on our side.

11. Wang said his draft quoted articles of UN Charter pertaining to renunciation of force. I had said that as member of UN, US willing abide by Charter. If this case, how could it be construed, as I had tried to do at last meeting, that specific provisions UN Charter were being imposed upon US or that they were points which were unacceptable to US.

12. Wang said third paragraph his draft stated PRC and US agree settle disputes by peaceful means without threat or use force. This concrete application of UN Chapter in Sino-US relations. He could not see how US side could possibly raise objections.

13. Wang said obvious difference of principle existed between PRC draft and first paragraph US draft. Latter simply states differences two sides shall not lead to armed conflict but makes no provisions whatever settle disputes between two countries. Such wording in no way acceptable under circumstances in which US side has already used force Taiwan area. Since we both recognized grave differences especially in Taiwan area, PRC side obliged stipulate concrete provision for peaceably settling differences.

14. Wang said paragraph 4 PRC draft provided for Foreign Ministers' conference. If US side sincerely desirous peaceful settlement disputes particularly in Taiwan area, he failed to see how I could object to that paragraph on any grounds.

15. Wang said PRC draft embraced points of view acceptable both sides, and was by no means intended impose views one side on other.

16. Wang said paragraph two of US draft, concerning renunciation of force to achieve national objectives, was not consistent with UN Charter, which provided force should not be used settle disputes or prejudice territorial integrity or political independence any state. No clause in UN Charter permitting interference internal affairs any state; on contrary, specific provisions barring this. Such terms as "national objectives" obvious attempt include Chinese internal matters.

17. Wang said Chinese people unshakably determined liberate all territory of country. By whatever means this accomplished, it cannot be distorted as violation of principles and purposes Charter. Our wording that force not be used to achieve national objectives goes beyond scope of Sino-American talks and is tantamount calling upon PRC side surrender exercise sovereign rights over Taiwan, which is what PRC side absolutely cannot accept.

18. Wang said fourth paragraph US draft purports that peaceful policies either side will not be prejudiced. However, policy pursued by US in Taiwan area is encroachment China's territory and intervention Chinese internal affairs. UN Charter explicitly rules out prejudice to territorial integrity and political independence of any state by any means. PRC side would never agree that US side entitled pursue such policies by whatever means.

19. Wang said paragraph 6 US draft even claims right individual and collective right of self-defense in Taiwan area. UN Charter contains no clause entitling state encroaching on territory and interfering internal affairs of another state to individual and collective self-defense on territory of state aggressed against. US presentation this principle evidently designed permit US prolonged occupation Taiwan and entire China through Chiang Kai-shek.

20. Wang said when US encroaches Chinese territory it is alleged this done for sake of self-defense. When China undertakes action in exercise of sovereign rights it assailed by US as aggression. He could not believe that I could be unaware that such a false argument was trying to pass black for white.

21. Wang said US draft failed provide concrete arrangements settle differences two sides. I had stated present talks constituted such arrangements. However, he had repeatedly asked whether I was willing discuss question withdrawal US armed forces from Taiwan area

and had never received any reply. This bears out fact present talks incapable settling question tense situation Taiwan area. Essential hold conference of Foreign Ministers to discuss and settle that question.

22. Wang said in light foregoing, it was not PRC side but US side that was attempting impose its views on the other. US draft demands PRC side surrender sovereign rights regarding Taiwan and recognize status quo of US encroachment of Taiwan and US interference Chinese internal affairs.

23. Wang said if his side agreed US draft and recognized status quo of US encroachment Taiwan and US interference Chinese internal affairs, then what would remain to be negotiated? Could it be that US side takes his government to be so naive and so easily led around by the nose?

24. Wang said I had indicated willingness discuss lifting embargo in exchange for agreement US draft. This out of the question. Policy of embargo is of itself unjustifiable. Embargo should be lifted. This is point he had made repeatedly.

25. Wang said US side had not succeeded in intimidating his side into submission by threat and use of force against Taiwan. Nor had US succeeded by these means in forcing PRC side into recognition status quo of US encroachment China's territory. US will now fail in trying to condition embargo on recognition US encroachment on Taiwan.

26. Wang said nearly two months have elapsed since discussion on renunciation of force initiated, and nearly one month since introduction PRC draft. He had made clear position his side. Substance US draft is demand PRC side recognize status quo of encroachment by US on China's territory. This absolutely unacceptable.

27. Wang said his draft embraces points of view acceptable both sides. If I still considered it essential we issue a statement, then PRC draft is only reasonable and feasible one. He hoped we would be able find agreement on basis PRC draft.

28. I replied Wang had misunderstood our position on question of embargo. In inviting his views, I had pointed out fact that measures he termed embargo taken by US in light of security interests. Measures US takes in regard to trade must take into consideration what we consider to be security interests. If US considers that danger of hostilities is lessened or removed, this naturally influences US point of view on trade. However, I certainly did not mean to imply that US willing trade lifting embargo for statement on renunciation of force.

29. I said Wang had properly pointed out that it is two months since renunciation of force discussion initiated. Although I am disappointed we not yet able reach full agreement, I am gratified at progress

I thought we had made. Agreement in principle should be sufficient to reach agreement on words.

30. I said we did have clash of views on nature of dispute in Taiwan area, but I had taken position from beginning of talks important first task is not to reach agreement on nature dispute, but to agree we will not go to war about it. I had not tried impose our views on him in regard to dispute or nature of dispute. I had simply tried state in straightforward terms that clash of views should not cause war between us. I did not believe that Wang's draft clearly set forth that intent. I did not want to repeat my previous statement, which in large part covered points he had made. I did think most important question we face is whether or not we each clearly and unambiguously state we do not intend let differences between us in Taiwan area lead us into hostilities.

31. I said last paragraph of Wang's draft stated Foreign Ministers should discuss and settle question of eliminating tension Taiwan area. If he felt he could say that without sacrificing his position, I could not see why he could not also say he was determined differences in Taiwan area should not lead to war. It was important this be said clearly. In saying it, I did not see why or in what way it prejudiced his position.

32. I said that I had several times in the past pointed out that following issuance of agreed announcement on renunciation of force, if he wished to raise other matters within scope of talks, I would be prepared discuss them.

33. I said I was disturbed we have not gotten further ahead on agreeing on a text. Regarding my draft, as I understood his position, he had no objection in principle with respect first paragraph but felt that it did not go far enough in establishing concrete measures for settling disputes. Was that correct?

34. I said he had specifically objected to paragraph two of my draft. I wondered what words he might want changed.

35. I said he had made no mention of paragraph 3 of my draft. Could I take it therefore that he had no objection to that?

36. I said in regard to my fourth paragraph, could I take it he did not object but felt it was prejudiced by following paragraphs?

37. I said in regard to last two substantive paragraphs, could I take it that there should be a specific reference to Taiwan area, such as he had made in last paragraph his draft, so as to make clear Taiwan was covered?

38. I said I still was not clear why he objected to individual and collective self-defense. I thought we both would want to include statement on that. I would appreciate any comments Wang might want to make.



39. Wang replied I had said US had taken embargo measures out of security considerations. However in actual situation in relations between China and US, it is precisely China's security that is threatened. Thus it can be seen measures of embargo are unreasonable and without basis. Disputes between us should be settled by peaceful means and for this end favorable atmosphere should be created. If embargo can be lifted at present time, it would contribute to such peaceful atmosphere.

40. Wang said we are in agreement on principle of advisability of making public statement. It should be possible agree on text. However, any discussion of text must be based on points of view acceptable to both of us. Draft proposed by his side October 27 has precisely met this spirit. He believed points enunciated that draft acceptable both sides.

41. Wang said, could it be that US objects to provisions UN Charter? Or that US opposes peaceful settlement international disputes? Again, could US object to making concrete arrangements for peaceful settlement existing disputes between our two countries?

42. Wang said as to US draft, he had already expressed his views on every paragraph. He had explained that he could not accept US draft as basis for discussion because it involved Chinese internal matters. Chinese people will not give up determination liberate Taiwan. That is within scope China's internal affairs and is unshakable determination Chinese people. Chinese people convinced they will achieve this end.

43. Wang said PRC side not opposed principle of individual and collective self-defense. That is inherent right of every state. However, with respect to Taiwan area side which is on defensive is Chinese side. In Taiwan area China is entitled to this right exclusively, US can of course claim right of self-defense but only after it has withdrawn from Taiwan area. Under present circumstances in which US occupies Taiwan China cannot accept what I had termed self-defense by US in this area. This another reason why US draft unacceptable his side.

44. Wang said he again requested and hoped I would agree adopt his draft proposal as basis for discussion.

45. I said last paragraph his draft mentioned Taiwan area. I took it that he did not consider this to prejudice his position concerning nature of dispute there. I did not understand why if he willing say that, he not willing say Taiwan area situation should not be cause war between us. I did not see how that would prejudice his position any more than mention of Taiwan in PRC draft.

46. Wang said I should be reminded there are actually two points in question that must not be confused. First, in Taiwan area there exists matter of China's internal affairs—that is, question of China's exercise of sovereign rights in liberty of Taiwan. This falls within scope Chinese internal affairs.



47. Wang said on other hand there exists in Taiwan area conflict of policy between China and US. We are agreed position in issues between two countries should be settled in accordance purposes and principles UN Charter, we are agreed conflicting policies should not lead to war between us, in international matter between China and US.

48. Wang said clear distinction should be made between these two points. It is second point our talks should strive to settle rather than first. He would appreciate further comments on PRC draft.

49. I replied I was still trying get to heart of matter. If Wang can express willingness negotiate concerning Taiwan area, why could he not say that before negotiations threat of force in area be removed?

50. Wang replied that third paragraph his draft is best answer.

51. I said I had nothing further for today's meeting. I had tried get into concrete discussion of wording and was sorry there had not been more progress.

52. Wang replied he believed he had answered all questions. He also hoped progress would be made. We had already used up a great deal of time. He would appreciate it if at next meeting I would put forth concrete opinion on PRC draft. Did I find this agreeable?

53. I replied way to make progress is to get down to specific wording. I set forth in great detail my views concerning Wang's draft. I had produced draft that I thought came close to meeting two points of view. I had not demanded he accept my draft. I had carefully tried determine points to which there was objection in order bring agreement closer. I would continue strive for agreement as I hoped he would.

54. Wang said could he take it then that I was willing make further progress on basis PRC draft?

55. I said I had nothing more to say.

56. Wang said could he take it that at next meeting we would continue discuss his draft?

57. I said I was willing continue discussion in attempt reach agreement on a draft. Question was not my draft or his draft. Question is to try to reach agreement. I would approach problem in that spirit and hoped he would do the same.

58. Wang said was I willing continue strive for agreement on basis his draft. Question was yes or no.

59. I said question was not yes or no. I had answered question.

60. Wang said he was not clear what I had answered. He hoped we would be able make concrete progress on this question.

61. I said I certainly hoped so. I would try my best.

62. Wang said he hoped I would put forth concrete views on his draft.

63. I said I hoped he would put forth concrete views on my draft as well.

64. Wang said he had made it clear he could not accept my draft. If he did so, he would be surrendering sovereign rights. Draft not acceptable his side.

65. I said we should see at next meeting whether we could not make progress on common text. I was willing continue strive to do so and hoped he was likewise willing. This fencing "my draft—your draft" does not get us very far.

66. Wang said he hoped I would give further views on his draft at next meeting. He would welcome any progress in this direction.

67. I proposed we meet on our regular schedule next Thursday. Wang agreed.

Gowen

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### 385. Telegram 1216 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 23, 1955, 10 p.m.

1216. From Johnson.

A. Following is suggestion for counterdraft for introduction next meeting which I believe somewhat meets points made my 1203 while still preserving our position.

B. It will be noted second paragraph is taken from article 33 UN Charter and that paragraph four picks up some language from Wang's draft.

C. Have no reason believe PRC would accept this draft, but believe it meets present situation which seems require new draft and should provide room for considerable discussion.

"Agreed announcement

"1. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan of the People's Republic of China and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson of the United States of America

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-2355. Secret; Priority.

during the course of their discussions of practical matters at issue between the two sides make the following declarations:

“2. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, declares that the PRC will refrain from the threat or use of force except in self-defense; and

“3. In accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and generally accepted standards of international conduct, the PRC will always seek the solution by peaceful means of any dispute to which it is a party and the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; and

“4. Recognizing the particular importance of relaxing and eliminating tension in the Taiwan area, the PRC declares that the foregoing general principles are specifically applicable to that area.

“5. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf etc.”

D. While foregoing is drafted as PRC section, we would of course put our section in identical terms first.

Gowen

Note: Mr. Waddell (FE) notified 11/23/55, 5:55 pm, EH.

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### 386. Letter 18 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 18

Geneva, November 23, 1955

Dear Walter:

This is just a very brief note as I have said just about everything I have to say in the telegrams I am sending off today.

Thanks for your letter of November 18. As you can see from my report of today’s meeting, the corner on renunciation of force is, as you foresaw, getting tighter and some decisions are going to be required before my next meeting.

What I am principally writing about is the entire question of what I suppose might be termed my administrative support. I am very disturbed at the amount of time and energy it is necessary for both of us to devote to this. If these talks are in fact as important as we believe

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. The original is signed “Alex” in an unknown hand. A handwritten note in the same hand reads: “Amb Johnson just had time to dictate this but not to sign it before catching his train to Zurich.”

them to be, the Department should surely be able to find some way of making available the extremely modest funds required so that there is not this continuous wrangle over whether I am to receive the minimum support I must have in the administrative field. I have no car or driver here and use a Consulate Chevrolet only for the purpose of getting to and from meetings, while Wang parades around in his big Zim with chauffeur. I have no secretary of my own, a single secretary loaned by the Consulate serving all three of us. Etc., etc. I am not saying this in any sense as a complaint but simply to point up what I believe to be the fact that no operation of comparable importance to the United States has ever been handled with less cost to the Government. Therefore, it seems inexplicable to me that there has to be this continuous wrangle about the few things for which there is unquestioned need.

First on my list is the question of a stenographer mentioned in the last paragraph of mytel 1201. When the Consulate agreed to loan me a stenographer, it had no idea that it was going to be for anything like the period that has already passed. However, they have been extremely good about it and have cheerfully given me the best they have. However, the Consulate has now lost several girls and is really up against it, and I do not feel it is fair to ask them to continue the present arrangement.

When I sent my 1201, I understood that the question of code room personnel had been resolved following the Foreign Ministers' meeting and therefore did not raise that. However, this now turns out to have been wrong and Deptel 1277 to the Consulate terminates the present extra clerk December 2, although it states a further period will be considered if required. The Consulate replied by its 1211 asking that the clerk be continued for the duration of my talks, but no reply has yet been received.

I am as sorry to have to bother you with all this as I am annoyed at continually being bothered with it myself. My suggestion is to see whether or not a decision cannot be obtained at whatever level is required to allocate the few thousand dollars that would be required to be used for purposes such as this. The Department knows me well enough to know that I will not ask for anything I do not need.

I should not be writing to you in this tone, Walter, as I full well realize it is certainly least of all any fault of yours, or any other individual for that matter. I well know it's "the system" and I only hope that what I have had to say will help in getting what is needed. It can also be blamed on bad humor arising from a Geneva cold I've been fighting the last few days.

As I mentioned in my telegram, I'm leaving tonight by train to Zurich and taking the plane to Prague tomorrow morning in the hope of having Thanksgiving with the family as well as getting some work done up there. We have had to send home one of my best officers, leaving only

three officers in the entire Embassy including the Consular Officer and Charge, so they are in a bad way and I want to do what I can to help.

I hope that before the next meeting there will be opportunity fully to go over the situation with Herman and the Secretary and will await my instructions with much interest. If it seems advisable, I could come back here on Sunday, but I will take some material with me to Prague so as to be able to respond from there on anything that might appear desirable.

I was very disturbed to hear from Herman that you have not been feeling well. Do take care of yourself—there is a point beyond which it does not pay to try to work.

My best to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**387. Telegram 1326 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 29, 1955, 7:35 p.m.

1326. For Johnson.

Chinese Communist propaganda during past week devoted somewhat more attention to subject of Taiwan and ambassadorial talks than in previous weeks. General attitude toward US continued hostile, with repetition of familiar themes that US obstructing progress of talks, quote intensifying unquote military efforts in Taiwan area, and seeking to revive Cold War.

Major Chinese Communist pronouncement of week on Taiwan issue and talks was statement appearing in East German youth daily, JUNGE WELT, November 24, based on interview given by Ch'en Yi November 7 to German youth group in Peiping. Ch'en reiterated usual CCP line on Taiwan issue, noting two possible solutions, voluntary withdrawal of US forces from area, or failing that, CCP quote liberation unquote of Taiwan by quote force of arms unquote. Peiping government, said Ch'en favored peaceful solution but quote many people unquote on mainland growing quote impatient unquote over Taiwan question. Ch'en saw no immediate need for resort to force, but China must be prepared. Hence, quote active preparations unquote being

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–2955. Official Use Only. Drafted by Dawson; cleared in IAD and CA.

carried out along coast, including construction of airfields, railroads, and ships. Lengthy negotiations at Geneva had produced no concrete results except release of Americans, but advantage of informing world opinion as to quote truth about Taiwan unquote.

Article in TA KUNG PAO November 24 alleged that US is protracting ambassadorial talks in order to quote perpetuate domination unquote over Taiwan. US quote intensification of war preparations unquote in Taiwan area said to violate international principles against use of force. Article noted visits of top-ranking US military leaders to Taiwan since October, cited reports US increasing supply of Sabrejets, and quoted Gen. Twining to effect that US Far East air force and Nat. air force being welded into force quote capable of advance unquote. NCNA commented briefly on visit of Admiral Stump to Taiwan. Other comment largely of Psychological Warfare nature, concerning food shortages on offshore islands, and quote factionalism unquote among Nationalist leaders.

Peiping comment on ambassadorial talks November 19 and November 24 reiterated previous charge that US obstructing progress of talks and detaining Chinese nationals desiring return to mainland. *People's Daily* November 19 alleged that lists Chinese nationals presented by US at Geneva were incomplete and charged that less than one fifth of Chinese who had requested return to China had been permitted to leave. Demanded that US take immediate steps to facilitate return, and stated that question of quote lawbreaking unquote Americans still held in China and that of quote guiltless unquote Chinese nationals in US entirely different matters. TA KUNG PAO November 24 urged that US quote get down to serious negotiation and reach necessary agreement on practical matters at issue unquote.

ChiCom commentary on Ministers Conference continued to echo Soviet line. Relaxation of tensions will continue, despite US efforts revive Cold War, but struggle for peace will be long and hard. Peiping hailed Bulganin trip as quote important milestone in strengthening peaceful cooperation between USSR and Asian countries unquote.

NCNA denounced Bagdad pact as quote concrete step by the US to aggravate tension in the Middle East unquote and hailed refusal of Egypt and Arab states to join as quote serious blow to US policy unquote.

Peiping during week continued to give considerable attention to question of trade restrictions, alleging that US embargo and quote trade monopolies unquote had seriously impaired expansion of trade among Asian countries. ChiCom overtures to Japan for normalization of trade relations continued. At same time, Peiping continued to berate Japanese government for its treatment of Chinese nationals seeking return to mainland.

**388. Telegram 1329 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 29, 1955, 7:34 p.m.

1329. For Johnson.

Guidance for December 1 meeting.

1. Implementation. If consonant with situation at time of meeting, impress on Wang there has been no progress this respect since last meeting. No additional Americans released, no more letters received by British Charge from imprisoned Americans. US Government takes serious view of PRC's unjustifiable delay in implementing its clear commitment under Agreed Announcement. Cite Bradshaw case as evidence personal hardship individuals suffering through PRC's delay.

2. Renunciation of Force. While Wang's hard line at last meeting may presage break in talks or resort to publicity, we believe it may also be deliberate pressure tactic to determine whether we will give any on our draft. PRC would seem not to be in strong position either break off talks or go to public at this moment. Believe we should hold firm on our draft for at least one more meeting. Wang's only criticism our draft has been on ground that it would preclude PRC use of force in Taiwan area, which would be true of any draft we presented.

You should follow tactics suggested your 1214 (omitting introduction revised draft), with strong attack on ultimatum aspects his position. Without acceding to his insistence that you negotiate on basis his draft, it might be useful probe vigorously to see whether he has any negotiating latitude with respect to it. Press hard on basic defect his draft which is failure apply renunciation force principle to Taiwan area. Argumentation you used last meeting was excellent and you should continue along this general line.

You may wish to point out that Wang has endeavored separate issue in Taiwan area into two parts (paragraphs 46 to 48 your 1215). The first part he claims is a domestic issue which concerns only the Communists and the Nationalists and in which he retains complete freedom to use force in that area. The second part he defines as an international question involving issues between the Communists and United States. As to this the Communists are willing to renounce the use of force. By this formulation, the Communists seek to deprive the United States of its right to use force in collective self defense, an inherent right recognized by the Charter, while preserving to the Communists entire freedom to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–2955. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Sebald and in draft by Robertson, Dulles, and Phleger.

use force to take Taiwan any time they wish. This Communist tactic appears designed to handcuff the United States by pious expressions of the renunciation of force to settle disputes while reserving to itself complete freedom to use force to take Taiwan whenever it wishes. This entirely defeats object of seeking declaration on renunciation of force in the Taiwan area which was designed not as a verbal exercise but to remove in fact threat of armed conflict there and thus permit progress in discussion on other practical issues.

Re your 1216, Department considering advisability introduction revised draft at later meeting if deemed essential to forestall break. In any event any changed formulation should not affect our basic position that both sides must renounce force in Taiwan area, and do this before there can be fruitful discussions other issues.

**Dulles**

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### **389. Telegram 1330 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 29, 1955, 7:34 p.m.

1330. For Johnson.

UNC called meeting of MAC November 26 at which US representative referred to Wang statement Geneva that MAC was proper channel for accounting for missing US military personnel and said US concurred this view. He presented revised list 2720 UN personnel including 450 US servicemen and offered individual accounting for 98,739 personnel of Communist side whenever Communists presented accounting for UN personnel. Communist side accepted lists but stated (1) individuals held outside Korea do not come under authority MAC and therefore irrelevant to discuss in MAC; (2) MAC has no connection with POW's disposed of by PRC. Also noted UNC offer to account for Communist side personnel and stated it unnecessary comment on UNC list at this time.

In view above MAC action you need not raise this subject again with Wang until further instructed. However, Communist statements

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-2955. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Clough; cleared in substance by Norred (NA) and by McConaughy.



1 and 2 above provide opening resume negotiation with Wang if Communists give no satisfaction in MAC within reasonable time.

Dulles

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**390. Circular Airgram 4199<sup>1</sup>**

CA-4199

Washington, November 30, 1955

SUBJECT

Background Information on United States-Chinese Communist Ambassadorial  
Talks at Geneva

TO

All American Diplomatic Posts

The following background information on the United States-Chinese Communist Ambassadorial talks at Geneva should be used as appropriate on a confidential basis in conversations with key officials of the government to which you are accredited and diplomatic colleagues. The Department particularly desires to scotch speculation that the talks presage recognition of the Chinese Communist regime by the United States.

The original agreement was that the talks would deal first with the return of civilians to their respective countries, then go on to “other practical matters at issue”. On September 10 the two Ambassadors issued an Agreed Announcement in which the Chinese Communists declared that Americans in the Peoples Republic of China who desired to return to the United States were entitled to do so and pledged itself to adopt “further appropriate measures” so that they could “expeditiously exercise their right to return”. The Agreed Announcement also provided that Americans in the Peoples Republic of China who believed they were encountering obstruction in departure might request representations by the British Charge d’affaires on their behalf. The United States made a parallel declaration with respect to the right of Chinese in the United States to return to the Peoples Republic of China if they desired which provided for Chinese to appeal to the Indian Embassy if they believed their departure was being obstructed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-3055. Secret. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy, Sebald, Phleger, and Dulles.

Of the nineteen Americans still held in prison in Communist China following the issuance of the Agreed Announcement, only five have been released to date. The United States is continuing to press at Geneva and through the British Charge d'affaires at Peiping for early release of the remainder. The failure of the Chinese Communists to fulfill their commitment to allow Americans to return "expeditiously" is causing the United States Government serious concern.

The United States places no restrictions on the departure of Chinese from the United States. The Department knows of no Chinese who claims his departure is being obstructed and the Indian Embassy has so far made no representations concerning any such case.

Under the second item of the agenda, the Chinese Communists asked for the removal of the United States economic embargo and agreement to talks at the Foreign Minister level. The United States asked for a Chinese Communist declaration renouncing force, and an accounting for 450 military personnel missing from the Korean War, and concerning whose fate we have evidence that the Chinese Communists might have knowledge.

Discussion has centered around the renunciation of force item. The United States has proposed that both parties make similar declarations renouncing the use of force generally, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area. The purpose is to remove the threat of war in the Taiwan area. The Chinese Communists have indicated a willingness to make a general renunciation of the use of force, but so far have adamantly resisted our efforts to get them to apply this to the Taiwan area. They insist that the Taiwan question is domestic and refuse to consider any curtailment of their freedom to use military force if necessary to impose their control over Taiwan. They have demanded the withdrawal of United States forces from the Taiwan area. The United States is continuing its effort to bring them to modify this attitude.

With reference to the proposal for a conference at a higher level, the United States view is that the ambassadorial level is the appropriate one. No proposal for higher level talks could even be considered until the Chinese Communists have permitted all United States citizens to leave, have renounced force in the Taiwan area, and all other practical matters at issue have been disposed of.

The questions of economic embargo and missing military personnel have received little discussion up to the present.

The United States has assured the Government of the Republic of China that it will not discuss at Geneva anything involving the rights, claims and essential interests of the Government of the Republic of China. There has been no discussion of recognition or admission of Communist China to the United Nations, as rumored in the press.

Discussion has been strictly limited to subjects mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

A similar instruction is being sent to the following consular posts: Algiers, Auckland, Bombay, Calcutta, Chiangmai, Dacca, Dhahran, Frankfort on the Main, Geneva for Johnson, Genoa, Hamburg, Hong Kong, Istanbul, Jerusalem, Kobe, Kuala Lumpur, Lahore, Madras, Medan, Melbourne, Milan, Montreal, Munich, Naples, Nagoya, Naha, Palermo, Penang, Sao Paulo, Singapore, Stuttgart, Surabaya, Sydney, Toronto, Tunis, Vancouver, Yokohama, Zagreb

**Dulles**

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### 391. Circular Airgram 4200<sup>1</sup>

CA-4200

Washington, November 30, 1955

#### SUBJECT

Background Information on United States-Chinese Communist Ambassadorial Talks at Geneva

#### TO

Algiers, Auckland, Bombay, Calcutta, Chiangmai, Dacca, Dhahran, Frankfort on the Main, Geneva for Johnson, Genoa, Hamburg, Hong Kong, Istanbul, Jerusalem, Kobe, Kuala Lumpur, Lahore, Madras, Medan, Melbourne, Milan, Montreal, Munich, Naples, Nagoya, Naha, Palermo, Sao Paulo, Singapore, Stuttgart, Surabaya, Sydney, Toronto, Tunis, Vancouver, Yokohama, Zagreb, Penang

The following background information on the United States-Chinese Communist Ambassadorial talks at Geneva should be used as appropriate on a confidential basis in conversations with key officials and colleagues. The Department particularly desires to scotch speculation that the talks presage recognition of the Chinese Communist regime by the United States.

The original agreement was that the talks would deal first with the return of civilians to their respective countries, then go on to “other practical matters at issue”. On September 10 the two Ambassadors issued an Agreed Announcement in which the Chinese Communists declared that Americans in the Peoples Republic of China who desired to return

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-3055. Secret. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy, Sebald, Phleger, and Dulles.

to the United States were entitled to do so and pledged itself to adopt "further appropriate measures" so that they could "expeditiously exercise their right to return". The Agreed Announcement also provided that Americans in the Peoples Republic of China who believed they were encountering obstruction in departure might request representations by the British Charge d'affaires on their behalf. The United States made a parallel declaration with respect to the right of Chinese in the United States to return to the Peoples Republic of China if they desired which provided for Chinese to appeal to the Indian Embassy if they believed their departure was being obstructed.

Of the nineteen Americans still held in prison in Communist China following the issuance of the Agreed Announcement, only five have been released to date. The United States is continuing to press at Geneva and through the British Charge d'affaires at Peiping for early release of the remainder. The failure of the Chinese Communists to fulfill their commitment to allow Americans to return "expeditiously" is causing the United States Government serious concern.

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The questions of economic embargo and missing military personnel have received little discussion up to the present.

The United States has assured the Government of the Republic of China that it will not discuss at Geneva anything involving the rights, claims and essential interests of the Government of the Republic of China. There has been no discussion of recognition or admission of Communist China to the United Nations, as rumored in the press. Discussion has been strictly limited to subjects mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

A similar instruction is being sent to all diplomatic posts.

**Dulles**

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### **392. Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 30, 1955

#### **SUBJECT**

Draft Declarations on Renunciation of Force

There are attached three draft declarations on renunciation of force. The first (Tab A) is the Chinese Communist draft introduced at Geneva on October 27; the second (Tab B) is the United States draft introduced November 8; the third (Tab C) is a revision of the United States draft which Ambassador Johnson has proposed introducing on December 1.

I consider the draft we submitted on November 8 to be tightly drawn and difficult to improve on. I also believe that the Chinese Communists are in a weak position from which to break off the talks and that they are unlikely to do so at this time when matters related to their entry into the United Nations have reached such a critical stage. Therefore, it is proposed to instruct Ambassador Johnson not to introduce a revised draft on December 1. However, it may become desirable at a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–3055. Secret. Drafted by Clough.

future meeting to introduce a revised draft in order to keep the talks going. Ambassador Johnson's draft is consequently being submitted for your comments.

**Tab A**

**Chinese Draft<sup>2</sup>**

Geneva, October 27, 1955

**PRC DRAFT DECLARATION ON RENUNCIATION OF FORCE**

(Introduced October 27)

1. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on behalf of the Government of the United States of America jointly declare that,

2. In accordance with Article 2, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, "All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered"; and

3. In accordance with Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations";

4. The People's Republic of China and the United States of America are agreed that they should settle disputes between their two countries by peaceful means without resorting to the threat or use of force.

5. In order to realize their common desire, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America decide to hold a conference of Foreign Ministers to settle through negotiations the question of relaxing and eliminating the tension in Taiwan area.

**Tab B**

**U.S. Draft<sup>3</sup>**

Geneva, November 8, 1955

**US DRAFT DECLARATION ON RENUNCIATION OF FORCE**

(Introduced November 8)

1. The Ambassador of the United States of America and the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China during the course of the

<sup>2</sup>Confidential.

<sup>3</sup>Secret.

discussions of practical matters at issue have expressed the determination that the differences between the two sides shall not lead to armed conflict.

2. They recognize that the use of force to achieve national objectives does not accord with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter or with generally accepted standards of international conduct.

3. They furthermore recognize that the renunciation of the threat or use of force is essential to the just settlement of disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

4. Therefore, without prejudice to the pursuit by each side of its policies by peaceful means they have agreed to announce the following declarations:

5. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan informed Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson that:

6. In general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, the People's Republic of China renounces the use of force, except in individual and collective self defense.

7. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson informed Ambassador Wang Ping-nan that:

8. In general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, the United States renounces the use of force, except in individual and collective self defense.

#### **Tab C**

#### **Johnson's Proposed Draft<sup>4</sup>**

Geneva, undated

#### **AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S REVISED DRAFT**

(Proposed for Introduction Dec. 1)

1. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan of the People's Republic of China and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson of the United States of America during the course of their discussions of practical matters at issue between the two sides make the following declarations:

2. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, declares that the PRC will refrain from the threat or use of force except in self-defense; and

3. In accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and generally accepted standards of international conduct, the PRC will always seek the solution by peaceful means of any dispute to which it is

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<sup>4</sup> Secret.

a party and the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; and

4. Recognizing the particular importance of relaxing and eliminating tension in the Taiwan area, the PRC declares that the foregoing general principles are specifically applicable to that area.

5. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf, etc.

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### 393. Telegram 1235 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 1, 1955, 1 p.m.

1235. From Johnson.

1. At one hour forty-five minute meeting this morning Wang opened with prepared statement which was very mild and conciliatory in tone, in very marked contrast to tone prepared statements past few meetings, and closed with presentation new draft agreed announcement which reads as follows:

A) Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and Ambassador Alexis Johnson on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree to announce:

B) The People's Republic of China and the United States of America are determined that they should settle disputes between their two countries through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force;

C) The two Ambassadors should continue their talks to seek practical and feasible means for the realization of this common desire.

2. In reply I welcomed his statement and characterized it as advance in our negotiations. I then spent about an hour probing on applicability statement to Taiwan area. Best answer I obtained from him was that although Taiwan internal matter beyond scope present talks, willing settle that question by peaceful means. He omitted usual qualification "conditions permitting". During give and take he spoke of "step by step" resolution US-PRC disputes and said if during course our talks here I wanted discuss ways and means relaxing tensions Taiwan area or other questions, he willing discuss. There was no renewal

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-155. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.



demand for withdrawal US forces but reply my question as to whether subsequent negotiations would be conducted under continued threat his side would resort to force Taiwan area if desires not met he replied with somewhat pro forma statement that PRC is one which feels itself threatened in area.

E. I made detailed statement on Bradshaw along lines Deptel 1297 and brief statement on implementation along lines para one Deptel 1329.

4. In reply Wang discussed at length Indian implementation in US and our failure assist them communicate with Chinese in US while we were asking UK Charge take initiative communicate Americans in China. I of course pointed out contrast Americans imprisoned in China with freedom any announcement, for Indians taking initiative.

5. Next meeting Thursday, December 8.

6. Departing for Prague Friday evening, returning Tuesday.

**Gowen**

Note: No paragraph D.

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#### **394. Telegram 1240 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 1, 1955, 10 p.m.

1240. From Johnson.

1. Twenty-eighth meeting today opened by Wang Ping-nan with prepared statement on renunciation of force. Wang said it now two months since discussion this subject began. Draft statement put forward by CPR side October 27 and by US side November 10. He has carefully studied drafts and statements made by both sides.

2. Wang said if both sides agreed in principle, it should be possible agree on text announcement. Chinese side always stood for peaceful settlement international disputes without resort to threat or use of force, in conformity UN Charter.

I had repeatedly indicated US as member UN also willing abide by UN Charter. At last meeting I had indicated US agreed to principle finding just settlement international disputes by peaceful means. On this principle there should be agreement both sides. Whether draft

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–355. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

announcement incorporated pertinent provisions UN Charter is technical question and must not constitute obstacle in way of agreement.

3. Wang said in view of agreement this fundamental principle, there should be no difficulty making agreed announcement to effect PRC and USA will settle disputes between them without resort to threat or use of force. Both recognize existence international disputes and agree practical, feasible way should be sought arrive at peaceful settlement. In order realize this CPR side has proposed conference Foreign Ministers. However, I and other responsible members US Government had indicated that present talks should be fully utilized. In order that talks may progress step by step he considered principles agreeable both sides should be confirmed by agreed announcement and talks continued in order find practicable and feasible way peacefully settle disputes between our two countries.

4. Wang said in line with above he was presenting new draft agreed announcement, pledging not to use force in international relations (Mytel 1235).

5. Wang said for presenting draft CPR side was not abandoning proposal convene Foreign Ministers' conference in order relax and eliminate tension Taiwan area. However he would amplify his stand in talks following issuance announcement. Draft announcement embraced all points on which both sides agree and contained nothing disagreeable to either side. He believed we should be able reach agreement on this new draft.

6. I replied I welcomed Wang's statement and felt it represented considerable advance our discussions. I would give draft the detailed and careful consideration I knew it deserved.

7. I said I had one question. Major point of difference between us so far has been whether or not there should be specific mention Taiwan area. I wanted make clear our suggestions in regard specific mention Taiwan area not motivated desire embarrass or trick Wang's Government into abandoning its well known position in regard Taiwan area. Desire for specific mention Taiwan area motivated by desire make clear whatever is said on renunciation of force applies also to Taiwan area.

8. I said on basis original draft and Wang's remarks in course of meetings, there has been doubt in my mind in this regard. I originally raised this question when October 27 draft presented. I asked at that time whether fourth paragraph applicable disputes between us in Taiwan area. I recalled Wang's answer had been yes. However, in subsequently amplifying his position, it seemed to me his government was reserving right to consider situation Taiwan area as domestic matter beyond scope of international matters between our two countries. I understood his position in this regard and did not desire engage in controversy this point. I simply desired know what effect draft announcement would

have our dispute in Taiwan area. As I understood his remarks, effect is that his government reserved right at any time interpret situation as domestic matter in which it entitled take offensive military action.

9. I said stated in another way his proposal appeared to me to have been that although we would seem to have agreed renounce force between us, his government would maintain threat at any time of its choosing to initiate hostilities that area. We consider it important that whatever is said on renunciation of force, it be made clear that even though there may be differences in interpretation of situation in Taiwan area, announcement also apply that area.

10. I said this was somewhat long introduction my question, but I wanted make clear our line of thinking. Questions whether or not Wang willing consider mention in some specific way of Taiwan area in order make clear we both consider announcement applies Taiwan area. Said I might add I perfectly willing this be done in manner not to prejudice his government's position and pursuit by peaceful means of its policies.

11. Wang said we had already spent long period of time discussing this question. Purpose discussions was overcome obstacles in way of settlement between us. Proposal for both of us make announcement originated with myself. Now we have before us two drafts for announcement. Each of us has points which he cannot accept in draft of other one.

12. Wang said however at last meeting I had indicated we agreed on principle making announcement and also agreed on need for peaceful settlement disputes but differed on text of agreement. At last meeting I had also repeatedly indicated that so long as we agreed in principle, there should be no difficulty in agreeing on text. So long as we both serious and sincere in search of agreement, there should be no difficulty.

13. Wang said his side had now made new effort in that spirit. I would note that new proposal did not contain anything to which we not able agree between us at present time. He considered that issues between PRC and US must necessarily be solved step by step. His idea was first to agree on points in common between us. So long as we employed peaceful means for settling disputes, he saw no reason for not reaching agreement.

14. Wang said in regard to mention of Taiwan area, he wished to renew his statements made in past meetings. We must not confuse international with domestic issues. Internal conflict naturally not within scope of present talks. In explaining fourth paragraph October 27 draft and also in presenting present draft, he had made clear disputes between two countries include dispute between us in Taiwan

area. It was precisely desire of PRC side that disputes between us in Taiwan area be settled peacefully.

15. Wang said he wished point out that proposal made this morning was very important and put forward only after serious and careful consideration. He was glad to hear my preliminary views and comments this draft. He hoped our side would give careful consideration to this latest offer. He hoped we would be able reach agreement on this draft. Adoption this draft would demonstrate that although we spent great deal of time in discussion, we able make progress and find text agreeable both of us.

16. I said I was still trying to get at heart of matter. I too hoped we can show progress to world. Important thing is we make sure it is genuine progress. Our problem is not give appearance of progress by agreeing to form of words that means one thing to one side and another to other. Problems we face are too fundamental importance for that. I felt we would be doing disservice to both our people and cause of peace if we attempted agree on basis words which had different meanings. That is why I may be appearing so persistent. Purpose is not debate but to try to arrive at understanding. I agreed that problems should be discussed step-by-step. We both agreed the area in which policies confront each other most seriously is Taiwan area.

17. I said what I was trying to get at was this. In making statement such as he had proposed, US would be renewing what I had termed renunciation of force in international relations; Wang's government would give appearance of doing same thing. However, in light of his remarks and fully expressed policy his government, would not his government in fact be saying it considered question of Taiwan area domestic matter and hence reserved right initiate use of force any time it did?

18. I said perhaps I had not made myself clear. I would state my point in another way. While his side was willing make declaration of renunciation of force with US, did it still insist on right interpret situation Taiwan area to permit it to apply force at any time its desires not met? That is, would US have renounced force whereas Wang's government would not have done so because of its reservations in regard to nature of dispute in Taiwan area? Would any further negotiation between us be subject to continuing threat of initiation of force by his government that area?

19. I said I hoped I was not right in this. What I had expressed frankly was my understanding of position Wang's government. I wished he would tell me frankly if I was wrong.

20. Wang said he thought it important to note we were dealing with matters between China and US. If he were to raise matters or policies within scope internal affairs US or if he were to cause apprehensions concerning US policy of internal affairs, he would be guilty of going

beyond scope present talks. This would complicate problem between us and would amount to creating difficulties in talks.

21. Wang said draft he had presented can in no way be described as an “apparent” form. He agreed anything we declared should have practical bearing. Difference of policies our two countries in Taiwan area has led to extremely tense situation over which people of world most concerned. Demonstrating our desire settle disputes by peaceful means without resort to use of force meets with desire people of world. This action in interests both sides.

22. I said I would put my question very bluntly, if this or similar statement were issued tomorrow, would his government have said anything that would prevent it on next day from saying that it considered situation Taiwan area domestic matter and was therefore initiating hostilities there?

23. Wang said my question went precisely beyond scope of talks. As he had repeatedly stated, question of Taiwan is an internal matter of China, which his side also willing settle by peaceful means. To follow line I had taken, if we were to issue announcement tomorrow, then our discussions have created same result. That, is, two countries henceforth willing settle any dispute by peaceful means. That would certainly be welcomed by all. It would demonstrate to world that China and US have made contribution to relaxing tension Taiwan area.

24. Wang said following issuance of announcement, we would continue discussion to find settlement disputes, such as question embargoes and higher level conference between two countries. Then if I wanted discuss further ways and means relax tension Taiwan area, his side prepared join me and continue discussion in this direction. I said would this mean discussions would not be held under threat that one side would reserve right initiate hostilities if its desires not fully met?

26. Wang said it has always been stand his side that negotiations should be carried on in peaceful atmosphere. If one were to mention threats, it is his side that felt itself being threatened.

27. I said I had nothing further on this subject. I would study draft and reply more fully at next meeting. Before passing to another matter, did he have anything further?

28. Wang said we had talked a great deal on this subject and new effort his side was being made on basis of what I had said at last meeting. He believed draft is within interest of both of us, and hoped we would progress smoothly on this subject.

29. I said I agreed, and felt our discussion this morning had been most useful. I hoped he would meanwhile consider question I had raised this morning. Amplification of his answers would be most helpful.

30. I said I wished bring up humanitarian matter in regard to implementation agreed announcement on release civilians that hoped he would present to his government. On November 17, his government had announced Mrs. Bradshaw being released from custody and free to depart. Mrs. Lau who had been caring for her asked that Mrs. Bradshaw be permitted depart with her. Permission not granted in time.

31. I said we understood from Mrs. Lau that Mrs. Bradshaw's health was very bad. She is extremely weak and we understand she has to be fed artificially at times. She is unable move or travel without assistance. Mental state also unstable apparently attempted commit suicide several times. I was sure Wang agreed with me it would be most unfortunate if she did not promptly and safely arrive in US.

32. I said it seemed to me best answer to problem would be for Mrs. Bradshaw's, husband, Dr. Bradshaw, who is physician to be promptly released so he could travel with her and take her out. Would be in interest of both of us. I hoped he would present suggestion to his government.

33. I said I also noted that no further Americans had returned since November 17 and that British Charge had not seen additional Americans or received further communications beyond one he received some time ago.

34. Wang said he had noted my statement. Regarding question of British Charge being unable communicate with imprisoned people as believed by me, he had already expressed his position. His side has all along been lenient in treatment imprisoned Americans in accordance agreed announcement, so that they should be able effect their return smoothly. Of course Americans who have committed offenses must necessarily undergo and complete legal procedure in China. Their cases must be examined and dealt with in accordance Chinese legal procedures. Before these are completed, question of return was not possible.

35. Wang said there was even less point in alleging delay or obstruction. If any American who has committed offenses has any communication to British Charge to make, PRC all along has helped them do so. If it were so, I asked that British Charge should have ability of communicating with Americans in question on own initiative, then Indian Embassy should enjoy same right in US of communicating with Chinese residents on its own initiative. PRC has learned from Indian Embassy that US not assisting Indian Embassy communicate with Chinese. Moreover, US has failed provide lists of Chinese in US. Indian Embassy thus has encountered difficulty in communicating with Chinese residents in US on initiative of Indian Embassy. PRC side not satisfied with failure US Government assist Indian Embassy communicate with Chinese residents in accordance agreed announcement.

36. I said I was sure UK Charge had not raised question communicating with Americans in China in general. Question involved only imprisoned Americans. Wang's government certainly had special responsibility in regard imprisoned Americans. Difficult to understand why of fourteen Americans remaining in prison only one had communicated with UK Charge.

37. I said as far as Indian Embassy functions in US concerned, I had previously given assurances every assistance being given carry out functions under agreed announcement, and no restrictions being imposed in this regard. Agreed announcement concerned people who desire return. Any Chinese in US who desires return and desires communicate Indian Embassy entirely free do so. I said I hoped he would transmit suggestion regarding Bradshaw to his government. There is no one to care for her. Her husband certainly best equipped do so.

38. Wang said he also hoped improvement would be made regarding Indian Embassy functions.

39. I said I knew of no complaint from Indian Embassy.

40. Wang said Indian Embassy had raised question of communicating with Chinese residents and US had stated it could not do so.

41. I asked what there was in agreed announcement concerning initiation of communications by Indian Embassy with Chinese residents. Announcement concerned only Chinese who wish to return.

42. Wang said governments concerned had duty grant facilities to third state. It was only because I had raised question that he had referred to matter. He had only stated that two third states should enjoy same rights.

43. Meeting closed with confirmation next meeting Thursday December 8. Same press statement.

**Gowen**

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**395. Telegram 1241 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 2, 1955, 4 p.m.

1241. From Johnson.

1. Believe yesterday's developments reflect major tactical shift in Peiping which will require corresponding decisions on our part. Whatever their motives their draft almost completely meets position I have been taking.

2. Their acceptance renunciation force concept, and agreement to apparently indefinite extension these talks probably stems in part from Peiping estimate repercussions these developments on Taiwan as well as on our allies. Postponement demand for FonMin conference probably influenced by our firm rejection this proposal at present stage, by failure obtain support of Molotov (as well as Macmillan and Nehru) and realization their public position of pistol-to-head demand on this issue was not good. Believe Secretary's communications to U Nu, substance of which undoubtedly passed on, also played important part.

3. At any rate PRC has now presented draft which very closely follows line of argument I have been taking in meetings. They therefore have grounds for anticipating its acceptance with little modification. If not accepted they are in very strong negotiating as well as public position and will probably not hesitate quickly to go to public if they consider it desirable bring pressure on us.

4. One question is whether in context negotiations thus far there would be commitment by U.S. to discuss in some form "relaxation and elimination of tension in Taiwan area". Refusal in any way to admit to discussion these talks would be difficult to defend publicly and would support their demand for FonMin meeting. Acceptance will increase strains our relations with GRC but possibly to lesser extent than FonMin meeting. Possibly we can find some subject we can introduce or some unilateral action we can take that would give us at least temporary initiative in this general field.

5. Another question is what other subjects could be introduced or discussed in effort keep talks going so as postpone coming to grips with thorny Taiwan area questions. Trade is now only remaining question and particularly if I must continue indicate complete firmness on U.S. embargo this offers little scope for meetings. While lowering CHINCOM levels fairly promptly following issuance any declaration

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-255. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.



renunciation force would be useful move, it cannot provide much in way of subject for discussion in meetings.

6. In light of above I will need as well as much background guidance as it is now possible to give me on what we desire concerning future course of talks.

7. With respect Wang's draft believe situation precludes my introduction new counter draft or return my first draft. On other hand I should have clear idea whether we willing accept his draft with or without such amendments we might suggest. I need not necessarily give final approval at next meeting but will desire avoid taking any positions from which I might later be required to retreat.

8. With respect his draft it seems to me principal question is whether I should press for specific mention of Taiwan. It seems to me from standpoint our relations with GRC and degree to which we are committed to discussion Taiwan area questions with PRC there is much to be said for omission any specific reference to Taiwan in declaration. This also related to whether we are to regard any such declaration as primarily legal or political statement. While statement as presently drafted may contain legal loopholes with respect Taiwan area, regarded as political statement it seems to me it would be extremely difficult for Peiping issue this statement and then turn around and attempt justify attack in Taiwan area on grounds unexpressed fine print. In eyes of world both friendly and enemy, major dispute between U.S. and PRC is in Taiwan area.

9. With respect second para Wang's draft, important note re accurate and literal translation of Chinese original would be "PRC and U.S. are determined that they should settle disputes between their two countries through peaceful negotiations and also will not resort to any (and all) threat (intimidation) of military force". (Chinese text operative portion this para and last para being transmitted by separate tel.) This of course much stronger and preferable from our standpoint to English translation given me by Wang, there not being any conditional relationship between negotiations and renunciation of force.

10. Therefore believe that, subject to whatever views Department may have with respect to specific reference to Taiwan, I can and should at next meeting probe on substitution of "and also" for "without" in English text. Wang will probably not commit himself but question will inevitably arise as to whether we prepared accept if they agree our English version.

Gowen

**396. Telegram 1243 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 2, 1955, 5 p.m.

1243. From Johnson.

Re para 9 Mytel 1241 there follows Chinese text in Matthews numbers of substantive portion second para beginning with "are determined" and all last para Wang's draft:

5187 5788 1697 2735 6439 4419 7477 3191 6638 3730 2115 - 5303 - 6078 - 4893 - 626 - 1697 - 6439 - 4419 - 3953 - 3738 - 935 - 835 - 6213 - 365 - 6541 - 1756 - 5379 - 5494 - 1362 - 7051 - 2641 - 2402 - 7195 - 3920 - 3953 - 3738 - 5943 - 5770 - 7477 - 3191 - 452 - 2865 - 2345 - 6078 - 2744 - 1217 - 5821 - 2684 - 265 - 3016 - 3709 - 6615 - 7729 - 7043 - 6213 - 811 - 5821 - 3381 - 2754 - 6213 - 6527 - 1120.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-255. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

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**397. Telegram 1244 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 2, 1955, 5 p.m.

1244. From Johnson.

Haguiwara (Japanese Ambassador) as well as Leroy (Belgian) have under instructions called on me in last few days to inquire our attitude on reduction CHINCOM controls.

Haguiwara particularly talked about indirect West European sales CHINCOM items to CHICOMS through SovBloc countries while practically Japan excluded from such trade. Specifically mentioned galvanized sheets.

Leroy said Belgian trade delegation headed by member Parliament recently returned from trip to Communist China and is strongly pressing government for relaxation CHINCOM level.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-255. Confidential. Repeated to Paris for Topol as telegram 279 and to Brussels unnumbered.

I took strong line with both along lines merchant letters to De Margerie and Kirkpatrick, personally emphasizing high value I placed on trade weapon and importance my renunciation force negotiations to other countries. However said my talks here only one aspect our attitude on CHINCOM level and further discussion subject should be in Washington or Paris.

Gowen

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**398. Telegram 1339 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 2, 1955, 6:54 p.m.

1339. For Johnson.

In view pertinent Peiping broadcasts transmitted Geneva in full by FBIS, Department believes it unnecessary continue weekly telegrams summarizing ChiCom propaganda. Therefore unless you request continuation no further weekly summary will be issued.

Dulles

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–255. Confidential. Drafted by Jacobson; cleared in IAD and CA.

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**399. Telegram 1354 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 6, 1955, 8:07 p.m.

1354. For Johnson. Reference Deptel 1352.

Following is Wang's December 1 draft on renunciation of force as amended by Department.

BEGIN TEXT.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–655. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Sebald, Phleger in draft, and McConaughy.

A. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree to announce:

B. The People's Republic of China and the United States of America are determined that they should settle disputes between them through peaceful negotiations without resort to the threat or use of force; and they renounce the use of force in general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, except in individual and collective self defense.

C. The two Ambassadors should continue their talks to seek practical and feasible means for the realization of this common desire. END TEXT

Department has decided not to object to form of joint announcement at this time rather than insist on separate, unilateral announcement so that if Communists should break off talks they could not utilize dispute over form of announcement to obscure real issue.

**Dulles**

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#### 400. Telegram 1260 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 7, 1955, 3 p.m.

1260. From Johnson.

1. Have just received Deptels 1348 and 1352 through 1354.

2. While we do not know what was in Bradshaw's two previous letters fact remains letter from him was transmitted containing information two previous letters refused transmission, and asking for visit "in order he and Mrs. Bradshaw might be released earliest possible moment". While failure transmit two previous letters grounds for protest, it seems to me difficult to make this basis for presentation outlined paragraph 3 Deptel 1352 particularly as a letter from Bradshaw has now been received.

3. I strongly question desirability of placing so much emphasis upon secondary "welfare" aspect of September 10 announcement. Believe we would be on much stronger grounds to base presentation

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-755. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution.

paragraph 3 Deptel 1352 on failure release Americans “expeditiously” under September 10 announcement.

4. Huan’s reply to O’Neill’s request for release Bradshaw (paragraph 8 Deptel 1348) would seem indicate Wang had probably transmitted my similar appeal at December 1 meeting and as things now stand we have some ground to hope for early release Bradshaw.

5. With respect Bradshaw and tomorrow’s meeting I would be in an awkward position if Bradshaw were to be released about simultaneously with meeting. While it is unlikely I must also be prepared for possibility Wang would exceptionally inform me of release at meeting. If Bradshaw not released by tomorrow’s meeting I do not see how in light all circumstances our tactic will persuade Chinese Communists expedite his release and believe may in fact be counterproductive.

6. Therefore I urgently request authority at tomorrow’s meeting to:

A. Make protest on failure deliver Bradshaw’s first two letters and reiterate hope for his early release.

B. Make statement along lines paragraph 3 Deptel 1352 but for most part based on failure “expeditiously” release Americans under September 10 announcement as set forth last sentence paragraph 3 rather than on Bradshaw’s letters as implied second sentence paragraph 3.

C. With respect renunciation force, ask him for more complete replies questions I asked last meeting (at close last meeting it was indicated to him I expected such replies), and make some general comments as would appear appropriate on his draft, picking up pertinent material from Deptel 1353 and in general paving way for introduction at subsequent meeting of our amendments his draft.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Waddell (FE) 12/7/55, 10:50 a.m. MG.

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**401. Telegram 1355 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 7, 1955, 3:39 p.m.

1355. For Johnson. Your 1260.

1. Department did not intend that you place primary emphasis on "welfare" aspect Agreed Announcement. You should continue as in past placing primary emphasis on Communist failure release Americans expeditiously using Bradshaw case as glaring example not only failure release, but refusal to transmit letters, pointing out this forces conclusion that remainder imprisoned Americans are receiving same treatment as Bradshaw.

2. Secretary believes time has come to demonstrate stiffer attitude on failure Communists live up to commitments. Three months passed since Agreed Announcement and only five of nineteen released. Wang has come to regard our weekly protests this subject as routine. Best way of convincing him we take this seriously is concentrate exclusively this subject for one meeting, basing your protest on fact you have been instructed by your Government do so.

3. Bradshaw release before or simultaneous with meeting does not change situation. This would not prove that Communists are carrying out declaration but only that in this case had done so because facts were fortuitously revealed. Bradshaw case is merely example of course of conduct by Communists which is continuing as to remainder still imprisoned. You can point out that Washington felt so strongly on this subject that your instructions were to deal exclusively with it for this meeting and that future progress on renunciation force is of necessity dependent on showing good faith in implementing Agreed Announcement already made.

4. While above tactics may not immediately assist Bradshaw, our conclusion is that from overall standpoint, bearing in mind that ninety days have now elapsed, time has come to take stronger line than heretofore.

5. It is important to show relationship between Communist performance under first Agreed Announcement and question participation by US in second one. This point should receive strong emphasis in your presentation.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-755. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy, Clough, Sebald, and Phleger; cleared in draft by Robertson.

**402. Telegram 1263 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 8, 1955, 2 p.m.

1263. From Johnson.

1. One hour fifty minute meeting this morning devoted entirely to implementation except for prepared statement by Wang amplifying his replies my questions last meeting on his renunciation of force draft.

2. I opened with long prepared statement fully bringing out all points contained Deptels 1352 and 1355.

3. After “regretting” I had nothing to say today on his draft Wang made prepared statement amplifying his answers my questions at last meeting particularly regarding applicability draft Taiwan area. He was more specific than previously in saying Taiwan area is heart US–PRC dispute and as such is international matter going beyond domestic matter of PRC’s dealings with Chiang clique. New draft is integral whole. PRC still considers removal and reduction tensions in Taiwan area proper subject Foreign Ministers’ meeting but willing discuss these talks if US desires. However refusal discuss and settle this problem would be tantamount to demanding PRC recognize status quo which it will never do. Somewhat more stress than last few meetings on withdrawal US forces as only way remove present threat to PRC.

4. Wang then made already prepared statement on implementation which he tied to my previous statement. Largely reiterated former positions on not discussing matter here but through third parties, vague complaints of US violation agreement during which he mentioned alleged new immigration regulations requiring Chinese students obtain entry permits to Taiwan before given date, with regard which they are asking India make presentation. Would not answer many questions from me with respect to implementation until I answer:

A) Whether US prepared provide India with complete list names and addresses all Chinese in US.

B) Assist India in finding out status of Chinese in US.

C) Rescind all measures violating “spirit” of the agreed announcement.

There was then long give and take during which I stressed not single known case any Chinese obstructed from a departure from US contrasted with situation 14 Americans remaining in prison. Also contrasted freedom Chinese US communicate not only with Indian

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–855. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

Embassy but with persons in PRC with known facts in Bradshaw letters and failure receive communications from other 12 Americans.

6. Next meeting Thursday, December 15.

Gowen

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**403. Telegram 1269 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 8, 1955, 11 p.m.

1269. From Johnson.

1. I opened 29th meeting today with prepared statement on implementation as follows:

A. I have been greatly encouraged in progress I feel we have been making in our discussions. It has seemed to me that we have been successful in gradually enlarging area of agreement in our search for basis upon which announcement would be issued which would assure world of our determination that our clash of views and policies, including those in Taiwan area, would not lead to war.

B. In this connection I have often spoken of vital necessity in discussing this fundamental subject, of making certain that there is not only full and complete understanding between us of exact meaning and implications of any form of words upon which we may agree, but also confidence that agreements reached will be fully carried out. In this regard I have most earnestly and frankly spoken of my government's dissatisfaction with way in which your government is carrying out obligations it assumed under our agreed announcement of September 10. That was first agreement reached between us and, in spite of very explicit words of that statement, it now appears there was either not an understanding of its terms, or its terms are being violated. My government considers latter is case. This does not create atmosphere conducive to discussion and agreement on second public announcement. My government and world public had every reason to expect that clear words of our statement of September 10 would be fully and effectively carried out. Words of first substantive paragraph of your portion of that statement are as clear as words can be: "PRC recognizes that Americans

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-855. Confidential; Limited Distribution.



in PRC who desire to return to U.S. are entitled to do so, and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return.” That statement which was freely made by your government contains no conditions, exceptions, or qualifications such as are now being used to justify your government’s continued detention of American citizens imprisoned in your country. At time we were discussing this subject in detail you asked such terms as “quickly”, “very quickly”, etc., and I pointed out to you that word “expeditiously”, which you suggested for English text, meant just that, and my government and people would so understand it. However, almost three months have now passed since the issuance of that announcement and 14 Americans still remain in prison.

C. It is not realistic to expect progress in reaching another agreement unless there is clear evidence that there is good faith in proceeding to carry out agreements already reached. I have been instructed to make absolutely clear that my government does not feel that there has been good faith with regard to expeditious return of Americans detained in your country, as well as in carrying out other aspects of agreed announcement.

D. Not only are Americans not being expeditiously released, but those detained are not able freely to communicate with U.K. Charge as is also clearly provided in agreed announcement. Of 14 Americans still detained UK Charge has received communications from only two. Yet your government has not, and I am sure that it will not, allege that reason these imprisoned Americans have not communicated with UK Charge is that they do not desire to return. You told me at our last meeting that if these Americans desired to communicate with UK Charge, they were being assisted in doing so. I believe that you must not have had all facts at time you made that statement.

E. For example, on December 2, UK Charge finally received letter from Dr. Bradshaw which had been written on November 19 and post-marked November 28. In this letter Dr. Bradshaw stated that prison authorities had refused to forward to UK Charge two previous letters he had written, one on October 26 and another on November 10. It is understood that transmission of these previous letters was refused on grounds that such letters must be limited to request for interview with UK Charge. There is certainly nothing in our agreed announcement of September 10 that contains any such limitation, and on December 5 representative of UK Charge properly protested to your authorities suppression of Dr. Bradshaw’s earlier letters. Representative of UK Charge additionally pointed out that your authorities had never in any way indicated this. That communications to him originated by Americans had to be limited to mere request for interview.

F. Your authorities did not attempt deny fact that Dr. Bradshaw's freedom of communication with Charge had been restricted but refused to accept protest on grounds that it went beyond the duties of UK Charge under agreed announcement. I thus assume that your authorities consider that this is only proper place for discussion of such matter. I do not agree that it cannot also be discussed by UK Charge in Peking, but am entirely willing discuss matter here.

G. This is clear evidence that your government has, in violation of terms of the September 10 agreed announcement, obstructed free communication of Americans with UK Charge. My government expects that any similar obstructions to free communication of other remaining Americans with UK Charge and other obstacles to full performance of his duties will be promptly removed.

However, I was encouraged to note statement by your authorities to UK Charge on December 6 that consideration was being given to request for early release of Dr. Bradshaw so that he could accompany his wife, and wish again to express hope that this matter can be promptly handled.

I. I will have further comments to make on your proposed draft at a subsequent meeting. I have nothing further to say today.

2. Wang replied that it was in interests of progress our discussions that his side presented new draft last meeting. Was regrettable I had not been able this meeting put forward concrete views U.S. side on that draft. Certainly hoped, as I had stated, would be able put forward latest views on draft at later meeting.

3. Turning to prepared statement Wang continued that in view of fact I had raised number questions regarding his draft at last meeting, he was willing make few amplifications on that draft. As I had specifically raised at last meeting question whether draft covered Taiwan area, he willing again amplify statement in explicit manner. It is specified in new draft that China and U.S. should settle disputes between them peacefully without resort to threat of use of force.

4. Wang said as heart of Sino-American dispute is precisely centered on Taiwan so it goes without saying that new draft covers this question. That I had said describing Taiwan as area where interests and policies China and U.S. clash seriously shows that tension Taiwan area is international matter and not simply domestic matter how to deal with Chiang clique.

5. Wang said in 1946 Chiang Kai-shek launched large-scale civil war and Chinese people forced to resort to war to overthrow Chiang and establish PRC. Notwithstanding fact some people been adopting hostile attitude towards victory Chinese people, nobody could deny fact liberation of mainland and large number coastal islands by PRC

has never created international conflict or danger war. Quite to contrary has greatly benefited stability Far East and has contributed to world peace and security.

6. Wang said in line with consistent stand, PRC willing strive for peaceful settlement disputes when circumstances permit. This includes such domestic matters as Chiang clique. However, this being matter of Chinese domestic affairs must not be made subject these talks.

7. Wang said present situation in Taiwan area is that U.S. side has initiated use of force and is threatening use force in interfering with liberation Taiwan and coastal islands. Is this situation which creates danger to peace? I had chosen skip over this fact, however it cannot be evaded.

8. Wang said each day U.S. armed forces remain in Taiwan area is a day of threat to PRC. According to UN Charter, PRC entitled demand U.S. side remove its forces from Taiwan area in order preserve its territorial integrity. In interest of relaxing tensions, China proposed as it did at Bandung conference that China and U.S. enter into negotiations to ease and eliminate tension Taiwan area.

9. Wang said party which now using force and threat force is none other than U.S. side. However China is not afraid of American force and threats. China not afraid of proposing enter into negotiations precisely because it determined not to yield to American force and threats. I had indicated that U.S. unwilling enter into negotiations under threat Chinese might use force at any time. Fact is contrary. It is Chinese side being threatened and U.S. side which already initiated use force.

10. Wang said nonetheless, China still desires settle disputes including dispute in Taiwan area through peaceful negotiations. Such negotiations aimed at removing force and threat of force which U.S. already applying against China. PRC side has consistently advocated negotiations, however I must not think PRC side thereby recognizing status quo of U.S. seizure Taiwan and interference PRC internal affairs, which is last thing PRC side will ever do.

11. Wang said new draft envisages two steps. Expresses determination to settle disputes through peaceful means without threat or use force. U.S. side has also indicated it would subscribe this principle. PRC side has taken account of view of U.S. side and draft adds Ambassadors should continue these talks to seek practical means for realization this desire.

12. Wang said PRC side considers that relaxation tension in Taiwan area is too serious to be lightly disposed of in Ambassadorial talks. Settlement these questions should be left to conference Foreign Ministers China and U.S. In presenting latest draft PRC side preserved its proposal for conference between Foreign Ministers China and U.S.

for purpose eliminating tension Taiwan area. However, if U.S. side desires discuss and settle this question in these talks PRC side will not object to making such attempt.

13. Wang said he must stress that new draft is integral whole. Question tension in Taiwan area must be discussed and settled. Refusal discuss would be tantamount to requiring that PRC recognize status quo in Taiwan area and surrender its sovereign rights, which is what PRC side absolutely cannot do.

14. Wang said new draft has already incorporated common ground in our views. If U.S. really sincere in expressing desire for settlement Sino-American disputes, U.S. side should adopt new draft and then continue discussions between us in order seek settlements.

15. Wang hoped these remarks he had made might help me fully consider questions before us.

16. Wang said I had again this morning raised question implementation agreed announcement. He could not accept allegation PRC side has violated announcement. Since I had repeatedly raised implementation question at every meeting he would like make few comments.

17. Reading from second prepared statement Wang said PRC side considers that since we reached agreement on first item our agenda these talks and since each side has entrusted implementation agreement to third state, questions regarding implementation should be referred to respective third states. There is no ground for repeatedly raising questions these meetings. Entanglement first and second items preventing further progress in discussions.

18. Wang said moreover facts have borne out that PRC side has been faithfully implementing agreement. Party failing implement is U.S. side.

PRC side has provided U.S. side with complete list Americans in PRC. This was done as early as last year and again at opening present talks. U.S. side because it has been provided with these lists can correspond with Americans in China.

19. He said U.S. side also maintains liaison station Hong Kong and can make use this station in checking list.

20. Wang said thus far U.S. side has not provided PRC with complete list Chinese in U.S. PRC side can only learn status remaining Chinese in U.S. from few Chinese who return from U.S. PRC side has every reason request Indian Embassy find out situation. However U.S. Government has made known it cannot assist Indian Embassy this regard.

21. Wang said I had stated there is no restriction on Indian Embassy performing functions assist Chinese return but this does not correspond with the facts.

22. He said moreover, even in case those Chinese who I had admitted being prevented from departing, so far many of them still unable effect return. Not only has India no means offer assistance on its own to these people, but according to recent information U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has of late made regulation requiring all Chinese students get entry permit Taiwan before given date. This intimidation Chinese students designed forestall return. This gross violation agreement.

23. Wang said it is intention PRC side make representations U.S. Government through Indian Embassy. However still felt such questions should not be brought up here so as hinder progress in present talks.

24. Wang said if U.S. side nevertheless insists raising these questions PRC side bound raise following questions:

A) Is U.S. side prepared provide complete list names and addresses Chinese in U.S.?

B) Will U.S. side aid Indians determine status Chinese in U.S.?

C) Is U.S. side prepared rescind measures violating spirit of agreement?

Before these questions are satisfactorily answered PRC side could not answer question U.S. side might raise.

25. Wang said he considered if both sides sincere in desiring progress should concentrate on second item and adopt reasonable proposal of PRC side under this item.

26. I replied that when present talks began, first question on agenda was return of civilians. I had hoped that September 10 agreed announcement would resolve that question. So far as U.S. concerned, question resolved even before September 10 because U.S. had rescinded all measures preventing return of Chinese in U.S. I had informed Wang of that at outset of talks. Nevertheless to show good faith U.S. had entered into arrangement that India could assist any Chinese in U.S. who felt prevented from returning.

27. I said many vague and general statements had been made here and by Wang's government concerning supposed measures by U.S. Government preventing return of Chinese. It is well known in U.S. and well known to Indian Embassy that there is nothing to prevent any Chinese in U.S. from communicating with Indian Embassy if he feels obstructed in departure.

28. I said under agreed announcement, U.S. agreed accept any representations by Indian Embassy on behalf of Chinese who felt there was obstruction to departure from U.S. It is important to look at facts. From outset of talks to present moment, not one single specific case called to attention U.S. Government in which departure prevented.

29. I said insofar as Americans in Wang's country concerned, in spite of terms of agreed announcement and arrangements made for UK carry out functions, 14 Americans still detained.

30. I said insofar as lists are concerned, Wang would recall that at first meeting I gave him list all Americans we had grounds for believing were prevented from leaving. That list compiled with great effort by my government.

31. I said insofar as efforts his government or Indian Embassy determine status Chinese in U.S., Wang would recall announcement referred only to those who desired return. I would repeat my statement that any Chinese in U.S. who feels obstructed from returning is free communicate any way he desires with Indian Embassy. This in addition freedom communicate with Wang's country.

32. I said after agreed announcement was issued, I had carefully outlined measures taken assure every person covered fully informed of its terms. In addition 70,000 copies agreed announcement were being posted in post offices throughout U.S. Thus not slightest possibility any Chinese in U.S. not fully informed his rights under announcement. Any Chinese has full freedom exercise those rights. In spite of all this, no single case called to attention U.S. Government of obstruction to departure for Wang's country or any country of his choice.

33. I said this contrasts sharply with situation Americans in Wang's country. Wang had spoken of not entangling item one and item two of agenda. I had no desire entangle these subjects, but to my regret desire Wang's government fully and promptly carry out agreement has inevitably entangled subjects.

34. I said it was difficult consider another announcement or public statement except in light of how previous statement carried out. Before agreeing on further statements there must be full confidence between us that any agreement will be carried out. For this purpose I made statement this morning. If we were to make progress there must be this understanding and confidence between us. My government is anxious there be progress and in interest of progress has instructed me make clear our feeling concerning implementation our first agreement.

35. Wang replied he agreed progress in regard further statement will depend on manner in which previous agreement carried out. He wanted point out, however, that proposal for second statement originated with U.S. side. He felt there was no ground for making implementation previous agreement prerequisite for further statement. We had reached agreement item one concerning return civilians and so far as his side concerned agreement all along faithfully carried out. Since beginning talks, 41 Americans left China, including American civilians and number of Americans released as result of lenient measures

adopted his side. This figure exceeded two thirds of Americans in China at time of announcement.

36. Wang said insofar as Americans in general category concerned, they will be able depart promptly upon application. They will not encounter difficulties or obstruction. This in conformity agreement reached September 10. In light of this, what grounds are there to allege his side not faithfully carrying out agreement?

37. Wang said as for Americans who have committed crimes he recalled he had clearly and repeatedly explained stand his side in course of discussions item one. He had never stated Americans who had committed crimes would be able return upon issuance agreed announcement. Question their return must be handled accordance Chinese legal procedures. Every sovereign state entitled this right. Would I imagine case of Chinese in U.S. who had committed murder. Would he be permitted return promptly? It was therefore groundless accuse his side of detaining Americans.

38. Wang said I had stated Chinese in U.S. free depart from U.S. According recent information U.S. Immigration Service is requiring Chinese students U.S. obtain entry permits Taiwan before given date. Is this not attempted persecution Chinese students? Can it be said this measure is in conformity September 10 agreement? Party which has failed carry out and has violated agreements is U.S. His side intended make representations with U.S. through Indian Embassy. However, he had no desire bring up this question at present talks, lest it hinder progress of talks.

39. I said I wanted ask only one question. Did Wang know of single case, or had he been informed of single case, or had Indian Embassy called attention to single case of Chinese in U.S. whose departure prevented by U.S. Government?

40. Wang replied U.S. had not provided lists Chinese in U.S. Consequently it was difficult ascertain this. Even in cases of Chinese on list I had given him many not yet able return. Only small number have returned. Without mentioning further cases, requirement of U.S. Immigration Service for students obtain entry permits Taiwan constitutes obstruction on part of U.S. Government.

41. I said I did not know what this alleged requirement of Immigration Service was. Even if it were fact, I did not see how it would prevent Chinese who wanted to leave from doing so.

42. Wang said by what right was U.S. entitled change status these people. He considered U.S. Government had no right adopt such coercive measures. Measure constituted persecution of Chinese and is designed prevent return to China.



43. I said I failed to see this. Question appeared to relate to students desiring remain in U.S.

44. Wang said he considered U.S. action illegal in principle. Chinese residents in U.S. should be free decide to go anywhere and should not be subject unreasonable coercion.

45. I said I would repeat that any Chinese who feels subject to coercion is free communicate Indian Embassy.

46. Wang said that is what he was going to do. His government was requesting Indian Embassy make representations.

47. I said I had said any individual in U.S. who felt prevented from returning was free to communicate. Indian Embassy was free investigate facts any such case. We had agreed accept the representations from Indian Embassy any such case. I did not know of single case where there have been such representations.

48. Wang said September 10 announcement specified both governments would take further measures facilitate return civilians. However measures of U.S. Immigration Service cannot be construed constitute measures envisaged agreed announcement. If dissatisfaction with implementation agreed announcement was to be revised [*raised*], it was Chinese side that feels entitled raise such dissatisfaction.

49. I said agreed announcement certainly did say just that. Discussion had centered on Americans in prison. It was our understanding his government would take further measures permit their return. His government presumably had in mind before it made announcement what measures it would take that regard. What I had pointed out was that those measures not so far taken regard 14 of Americans who were subject our discussion. I had pointed out in addition that there is evidence freedom 14 Americans communicate with UK Charge under agreement announcement has been obstructed. That certainly is not carrying out of agreed announcement.

50. Wang replied he had nothing further.

51. Next meeting Thursday December 15. Same release to press.

**Gowen**



**404. Telegram 1270 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 9, 1955, 10 a.m.

1270. From Johnson.

1. Wang's "three questions" at last meeting and his allegation concerning INS requirement for Taiwan entry permits give me excellent basis for following up on implementation at next meeting.

2. Would appreciate information on probable factual basis if any of allegation concerning INS requirement and suggestions concerning any further reply I might make this regard.

3. With regard three questions I would promise reply:

A) No provision in agreed announcement for furnishing list Chinese in US and has no relation to obligations under agreed announcement which relates only to those who desire return. Would refer discussion this subject when agreed announcement being negotiated. Test of performance under agreed announcement is whether in fact any obstruction to those who desire to return, freedom communicate with representative third state, freedom representative third state investigate facts any such case, and willingness receive and promptly act on representations from representative third state concerning specific cases. Facts in CHICOM and US performance speak for themselves.

B) There is nothing in agreed announcement concerning investigation of "status" all Chinese in US. Sole question this regard between US and PRC under agreed agenda as well as agreed announcement is freedom Chinese in US who desire do so return PRC.

C) At opening these talks US had already completed all necessary measures remove all obstructions to departure Chinese who desire return PRC. This continues in effect. There is in addition arrangement for Indian Embassy functions. Chinese who do not desire return PRC are in no way matter between US and PRC. If one were to speak of measures violating "spirit" of agreed announcement PRC should in addition to releasing imprisoned Americans repeal exit permit requirement so that Americans in PRC and Chinese in US would be on same basis.

4. In addition foregoing, subject to views UK I could raise Miner case (Mytel 1202).

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-955. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

5. It will be Wang's "turn" speak first next time and foregoing somewhat subject to what he may say on implementation in his opening statement.

6. Believe at next meeting I should also make counterproposal on renunciation force concerning which am submitting my views by following tel.

7. Have arranged with UN address letters Wang and myself stating fact services curtailed in UN Palais during week between Christmas and New Years and asking whether we expect meet that week and will therefore require special arrangements for servicing meeting room. I will at next meeting use letter as basis attempt obtain Wang's agreement to omitting meeting during that week.

Gowen

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#### 405. Telegram 1271 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 9, 1955, 1 p.m.

1271. From Johnson.

1. As substitute for para B amended renunciation force draft contained Deptel 1354 I submit following for consideration: "The PRC and USA are determined that they will settle disputes between them through peaceful negotiations, and that, without prejudice to the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, they will not resort to the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere."

2. In general this seems to me somewhat preferable to draft suggested in Deptel 1354 while still incorporating all its elements. I think that it also somewhat meets point made para 2 Mytel 1203 while still fully preserving our position.

3. It also incorporates translation point made in para 9 Mytel 1241 and eliminates what I felt was undesirable conditional relationship between two clauses by substituting "and" for "without".

4. While it does not incorporate word "renounce" it is unconditional in stating force will not be used in Taiwan area or elsewhere. It seems to me it is therefore a full "renunciation" of force but by avoiding use of word "renounce" in statement in which we are joined avoids

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-955. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

undesirable and incorrect implication that we are “renouncing” something we have heretofore used while in fact accomplishing this purpose with respect CHICOMS.

5. It seems to me this draft also avoiding somewhat confusing juxtaposition in Department’s draft of very similar phrases of “without resort to the threat or use of force” and “they renounce the use of force”.

6. While I have no reason believe Wang will accept foregoing draft I feel I can advocate and defend it in negotiations much more effectively than draft suggested Deptel 1354.

**Gowen**

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#### 406. Telegram 1272 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 9, 1955, 5 p.m.

1272. From Johnson.

1. Particularly in light Wang’s clear acknowledgement at last meeting international character our dispute in Taiwan area I still believe that as political document Wang’s December 1 draft would have approximately same effect as any more closely drawn document in deterring CHICOM attack against Taiwan or offshore islands. However, believe I can and should thoroughly test Wang’s position during next few meetings by presentation and discussion draft contained Mytel 1271.

2. With respect Deptel 1353 as defensive reaction in compliance treaty with GRC mentioned second sentence para 1 would presumably follow initiation use force by CHICOMS against GRC, do not perceive how CHICOMS could use to justify such initiation use force. In short do not perceive how Wang’s draft in any way ties our hands defensively.

3. Seems to me important point is that so long as any declaration carries express or implied commitment seek peaceful settlement CHICOMS might claim US failure seek such settlement vitiated declaration and untied their hands. Wang’s statement at yesterday’s meeting carried this implication clearer than at any previous meeting. This is one reason I believe it desirable substitute “and” for “without” in second para draft as again suggested preceding tel.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–955. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

4. Another important point is that so long as any declaration incorporates word "threat" CHICOMS are going attempt establish position that by renouncing "threat" we are obliged remove "threat" presence our forces on Taiwan. Of course they will also continue maintain similar position with respect "force". That is, by stationing forces on Taiwan U.S. has used "force" against PRC territory. However, seems me this can be much more readily handled than point in para 3 above.

5. With respect first sentence para 4 Deptel 1353 I do not see that there is necessarily clear choice between declaration some kind and "continued participation in negotiations along present lines". [garble—Granted] CHICOMS appear desire continue present negotiations for at least time being, do not see how we can assume they will indefinitely maintain this desire if they do not feel they are obtaining any substantial return. One practical difficulty is that present trend these talks is to reach point in near future at which there will be nothing left to negotiate about.

6. Of course similar question also arises as soon as any declaration might be issued as suggested in paras 4 and 5 Mytel 1241.

7. I thoroughly understand general principles set forth para 3 Deptel 1353 and will state as appropriate. However problem arises with respect practical application. If for example, does Department consider that any discussion presence our forces in Taiwan area is admissible within scope those general principles or that it would be useful subject? Of course I would not enter into any commitments discuss additional subjects without specific Department approval but background guidance in this general field would be very helpful.

8. With respect para 5 Deptel 1353 I question strength such public position particularly abroad and whether there would be general acceptance rationale especially next to last sentence.

**Gowen**

**407. Telegram 1372 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 10, 1955, 12:51 p.m.

1372. For David Osborn.

Examine carefully entire record of talks and telegraph Department earliest whether Chinese Communists ever told explicitly US would not negotiate subjects involving rights and interests GRC without their presence.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1055. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Clough.

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**408. Telegram 1276 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 12, 1955, noon

1276. From Johnson. Department's 1372.

No record Chinese Communists ever told this in talks. They been told repeatedly acceptance U.S. renunciation force proposal not to involve third parties. For example my October 8 statement introducing item and paragraph 15 my 872, paragraph 13 my 1056.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1255. Confidential; Limited Distribution.

**409. Telegram 1376 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 12, 1955, 3:48 p.m.

1376. For Johnson.

Urtel 1262. Failure receive significant flow FBIS due paucity pertinent items. Requirements under review however to ensure coverage your interest.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-855. Official Use Only. Drafted by Smigel (IAD); cleared by Strother (FBIS) and in substance by Stanley (DRF).

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**410. Telegram 1377 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 12, 1955, 4:09 p.m.

1377. For Johnson.

Guidance for December 15 meeting.

1. In view failure Communists to take any further action implement Agreed Announcement since last meeting, you should again limit your presentation to this subject, emphasizing that progress made on renunciation force declaration is encouraging, but further progress being hamstrung by Communist failure carry out earlier commitment. US Government and people do not understand why Communists should require more than three months to take "further appropriate measures" permit Americans "expeditiously" return. Your presentation last meeting was excellent and can serve as basis further representations.

2. Department concurs in your proposed replies Wang's three questions (Your 1270). Will consult with British on Miner case and advise.

3. Propose recess until Thursday, January 5 (or 12, if possible) because of Christmas and New Year's holidays which fall on Sundays with following Mondays also holidays.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-955. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy and in draft by Dulles, Phleger, and Sebald.

4. FYI Decision use above tactics based upon following considerations: a) as time passes and Communists evasion of commitments under Agreed Announcement becomes more flagrant, we should increase pressure on this issue in order obtain release US citizens and avoid giving impression weakness; b) we consider Communists probably will not break on this issue for their position on it is weak. They have neither made good on their first commitment nor have they been willing agree specifically renounce force in Taiwan area. Furthermore, UN situation developing so they would probably hesitate rock boat by breaking now; c) renunciation force issue has been dramatized sufficiently through these talks so as to make resort to force more difficult for them than it was. END FYI

5. Agree with your suggestion for text amendment Wang's draft transmitted your 1271. You should not submit it at next meeting unless you believe this absolutely necessary to prevent break.

Dulles

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#### 411. Telegram 1378 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 12, 1955, 6:13 p.m.

1378. For Johnson. Your 1269 Paragraph 38.

With reference Communist charge US requiring Chinese obtain Taiwan entry permits by given date, facts as follows:

Generally accepted international practice is that temporary visitors to a country must have document admitting them to some other country, their own or third, on expiration their permitted stay. Passports ordinarily suffice, but number of Chinese temporarily in US hold old GRC passports which not now valid entry Taiwan unless accompanied by Taiwan entry permit granted solely by Taipei authorities. When such Chinese applies extension his stay, Immigration and Naturalization Service must see proof he admissible to another country after expiration proposed extension. Chinese intending go eventually Taiwan may satisfy requirement by obtaining Taiwan permit or visa other country. For those Chinese intending go PRC, US will not, except in emergency,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-855. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Nagoski and Clough; cleared in substance by Suddath (INS).

grant extensions particularly in view Communist claim we obstructing their departure.

Thus, Communist charge that entry permit procedure not in conformity with Agreed Announcement is groundless. It required only for those who desire to prolong stay in US, not those who desire depart.

Dulles

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#### 412. Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 12, 1955

SUBJECT

Guidance for Geneva Talks with Chinese Communists

1. It is proposed to instruct Johnson at the next meeting to limit his presentation again to insistence on Chinese Communist implementation of the Agreed Announcement and to request a recess in the talks until January 5 or 12. Our reasons are given in paragraph 4 of the draft telegram to Johnson. (Tab A)

2. Johnson has suggested a revision of Wang's renunciation of force draft so that it will make specific reference to the Taiwan area and allow for individual and collective self defense. (Tab B) This draft appears acceptable to us, but it contains the commitment first introduced by Wang, that both sides will settle disputes between them by peaceful negotiation. If agreement should be reached on this draft, the Communists would immediately seek to push us into negotiations on the Taiwan issue, particularly the presence of our forces in the Taiwan area. Refusal by us to negotiate at all would give them plausible ground to claim they had been tricked.

*Recommendation:*

(1) That we avoid final agreement on an announcement on renunciation of force until the Communists have released the fourteen Americans they hold or we are confident they will be released; (2) that if agreement is reached on an announcement and the Communists then propose discussing withdrawal of U.S. forces that we take the position

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1255. Secret. Drafted by Clough.



that we cannot make agreements on this, but that the disposition of our forces would naturally depend on the military situation there and when the threat of use of force is removed, we would take this into consideration in our deployment of forces. If the Communists press further for discussion of the status of Taiwan and related matters we must insist on the position that these affect the interests of the Government of the Republic of China and we cannot discuss them without the presence of this Government. (Attached as Tab C is a compilation of statements made publicly and to the GRC to this effect.)

Attachments:

1. Draft telegram to Ambassador Johnson (Tab A).
2. Revision of renunciation of force draft (Tab B).
3. Compilation of statements (Tab C).

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**413. Telegram 1283 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 13, 1955, 5 p.m.

1283. From Johnson. Reference: Paragraph 3 Department's 1377.

It is my understanding proposed recess to begin after meeting December 22.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1355. Secret; Limited Distribution.

**414. Telegram 1393 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 14, 1955, 1:12 p.m.

1393. For Johnson. Your 1283.

Department's intention is that proposed recess begin after December 15 meeting. Re Our 1366 Colm may leave immediately after next meeting assuming recess agreed to.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1355. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Sebald and in substance by Yager.

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**415. Telegram 1286 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 15, 1955, 3 p.m.

1286. From Johnson.

1. Four hour meeting this morning devoted entirely to implementation.

2. Wang stated PRC is going to issue statement, presumably from Peiping, on implementation in rebuttal of alleged official U.S. Government as well as press statements charging PRC violation agreed announcement. Specific reference made to Secretary's December 6 press statement. In spite my pointing out deliberate effort made in Secretary's statements reduce and allay rising public concern in U.S. over failure PRC implement agreed announcement and our continued efforts keep PRC failures from propaganda forum, it was evident Wang was under instructions and had no discretion on whether statement would be issued. As additional effort discourage statement, I tied request for recess until January 12 to this serious and disappointing action on their part which would reduce hope progress our talks. This obviously gave Wang considerable pause but he remained firm on issuance of statement while rejecting any linking request for recess to such grounds. However willing consider recess based on holiday period.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1555. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Paris for the Secretary only as telegram 286.

I did not press question of linkage and finally made straight proposal for recess until January 12. Wang agreed consider and inform me later. I urged decision before tomorrow evening. In meanwhile we agreed inform press simply next meeting would be held December 22.

Gowen

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#### 416. Telegram 1288 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 15, 1955, 6 p.m.

1288. From Johnson.

1. We do not know what contents will be of CHICOM statement referred to by Wang today and how much impact it may have. Fact is of course Peiping propaganda has by interviews with returning students etc. been maintaining steady line of vague charges U.S. non-compliance with announcement, and dependent on content and context, new statement may not attract much notice. I avoided getting into their previous propaganda line with Wang today in order not get led down side road of statements made by returning Americans and to accentuate seriousness with which we viewed present action. I of course made it clear that, while we regretted their step, we did not shrink from propaganda battle if that was their purpose and that we would probably issue statement in reply although I did not commit ourselves to doing so.

2. If CHICOMS actually issue statement from Peiping and reply is considered desirable, believe it should be issued by Department.

3. Believe Wang's statements last few meetings give clue to probable content of statement, and amount of attention it attracts will be dependent on whether and to what degree it reiterates charges U.S. deliberately "stalling and entangling". I did not receive impression statement would contain text their last draft proposal on renunciation of force and therefore made no effort to introduce our amendments for which the negotiating situation in the meeting was in any event by that time entirely unsuitable.

4. Statement will at least probably reiterate vague charges of "fears" Chinese students "apply" to return, contrast our refusal give list Chinese in U.S. including those who may be in jail to Indians with

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1555. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Paris for the Secretary only as telegram 288.

list Americans given us by CHICOMS, proportionately small number of Chinese in U.S. who have "returned" compared with proportion Americans who have returned from China, INS "intimidation" Chinese to apply for Taiwan entry permits, etc.

5. I have no suggestions concerning public reply except to reiterate as appropriate positions that have been taken in meetings while avoiding specific reference to contents of meetings. With respect numbers who have returned, suggest use one line in opening statement today, that is, in 6 weeks between August 1 and September 10 thirty-three of 52 previously detained given permission depart and in 14 weeks since September 10 only 5. Thus results of agreed announcement largely negative with respect Americans and certainly not "expeditious" either in absolute numbers or proportion.

6. In considering any statement we make in reply, I desire reiterate my conviction that whatever points we may be able score in propaganda battle this subject will not be reflected, at least at any time soon, in increased releases of imprisoned Americans. To accomplish this objective our efforts should be directed to maximum extent consistent with our public position to restoring former basis of negotiation.

7. Going Prague Friday evening returning Tuesday if there is meeting December 22.

Gowen

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#### 417. Telegram 1289 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 15, 1955, 11 p.m.

1289. From Johnson.

1. I opened 30th meeting today with prepared statement on implementation as follows:

A. At our last meeting, I think we were in agreement in expressing our common desire avoid what you have termed entangling question of return of civilians to their respective countries with other questions before us. I have pointed out that only sure way of avoiding such entanglement was promptly and faithfully carry out terms of agreed announcement September 10. I have all along maintained that two of us

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1555. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

here should be prepared discuss and do everything possible eliminate any differences of opinion with respect to this first agreement between us and thereby establish sound basis which would give us best hope of making further progress in dealing with other vitally important matters confronting us.

B. You will recall that following issuance of our announcement of September 10 I pointed out favorable atmosphere which its prompt and full implementation could create for progress in discussion of second part our agenda. I pointed out advantage of promptly putting into effect appropriate measures for implementation of our announcement, which would dispose of problem we were called upon to deal with under agenda item one, before attempting resolve complicated and difficult problems under second item our agenda.

C. Although I did not feel that your government had in fact initiated all appropriate measures called for under announcement, on strength of your assurances in this regard I undertook discussion with you of questions under item two. I had hopes that entanglement of our two agenda items in our talks could thus be avoided. I am deeply disappointed and disturbed that my hopes have not thus far been realized. In fact in some ways results appear to have been negative when compared with situation prior to issuance of our agreed announcement.

D. When we arrived here to begin our discussions on August 1, there were to our knowledge 52 Americans whose departure from your country was being prevented in one way or another and whose names I gave to you. On August 1 you informed me that of that number 11 were being permitted return to U.S. On September 6 you informed me of 12 additional persons of that group who would be permitted depart. On September 10 you informed me of another 10 who would be permitted to return. Thus, in approximately 6 weeks between August 1 and September 10 action was taken permit 33 out of 52 persons depart. In approximately 14 weeks since September 10, of that group only 5 additional persons have been given permission depart. Thus, however results are regarded, that is by absolute numbers or by proportion, results in this regard since September 10 have been extremely disappointing and out of keeping with my government's understanding and expectation of what was reasonably to be expected under agreed announcement.

E. At our last meeting I also spoke of restrictions imposed by your authorities on freedom of Americans communicate with UK Charge, as provided for in agreed announcement, and other restrictions on ability of UK Charge carry out his functions.

F. I have also spoken several times in particular of cases of Dr. and Mrs. Bradshaw. You have often spoken of lenient and humanitarian

consideration by your authorities of cases of imprisoned Americans. There is certainly no better case in which there is opportunity now demonstrate this than case of these two persons.

G. UK Charge who visited Mrs. Bradshaw on December 10 fully confirms our previous understanding that this unfortunate woman is now mentally and physically in entirely helpless condition. She is eating practically nothing and could well pass away at any time unless prompt steps are taken. She is physically and mentally entirely incapable of making arrangements for her departure and travelling from country. Apparently one of her few touches with reality is knowledge that her husband remains in prison and desire be reunited with him in departing from country. Apart from agreed announcement these humanitarian considerations alone should dictate prompt release of Dr. Bradshaw.

H. It is our understanding that even full sentence of Dr. Bradshaw expires in March. He is understandably extremely concerned over condition of his wife and desires immediately return with her. I should think that policy of lenience, particularly in light of agreed announcement, should make possible shortening of his five-year sentence by mere matter of ten weeks.

I. It is understandable that known facts with regard to Dr. and Mrs. Bradshaw greatly increase concern of my government for fate of imprisoned Americans with regard to whom we have no information and accentuates need for their expeditious release so that they can exercise right of return recognized in agreed announcement.

J. At our last meeting you raised several questions with respect to carrying out by my government of obligations it assumed under agreed announcement. I am entirely prepared and willing fully answer those questions, even though they do not appear relate to factual information concerning any specific case nor to terms of agreed announcement.

K. Your first question related to whether my government was prepared provide Indian Embassy with complete list of names and addresses of all Chinese in U.S.

L. You will recall that we very fully discussed this question at time we were discussing text of our agreed announcement, and I am surprised that you again raise matter. Next, I desire point out again that statement made by our two governments on July 25 with respect to holding of these talks, as well as our agreed first agenda item, relates solely to persons who desire return. I also want point out that agreed announcement of September 10 very specifically refers only to persons who desire return

M. At very outset of our talks I gave you list of Americans in your country who my government had reason believe desired return. I have

not discussed or raised question of other Americans who may be in your country.

N. There is nothing in agreed announcement which in any way places any obligation on my government supply, either to Indian Embassy or to your government, list of all Chinese in U.S. Even if it would be possible to compile such list it could have no relation to ability of Chinese in U.S. return to your country. Tests of performance of obligations assumed under agreed announcement are very simple.

O. First test is whether there is in fact any obstruction to return of individuals who decide to do so, and whether individuals are therefore able expeditiously exercise their right to return. As I have continually pointed out since beginning of these talks, my government has removed all measures which would obstruct any Chinese in U.S. who desires return from doing so.

P. The second test is whether any individual who believes that, contrary to this declared policy, he is encountering obstruction in departure, can freely communicate with representative of third country. I have repeatedly and unconditionally stated that any Chinese in U.S. is entirely free to communicate with Indian Embassy in this regard. Indian Embassy is in position to fully confirm this to your government.

Q. Next test is whether representative of third country is able to investigate facts in any such case. Again I have fully and unconditionally assured you that Indian Embassy is able to do this. And, again, Indian Embassy is in position to confirm this to your government.

R. Next test is willingness of government concerned to receive and promptly act upon representations from representative of third country concerning any specific case. I have repeatedly assured you here and Indian Embassy has been assured of willingness of my government to act in this manner. However, as I have pointed out, I do not have knowledge of single case in which Indian Embassy has felt it necessary to make representations, nor do I know of any complaint of any kind from Indian Embassy regarding willingness of my government to fully assist and cooperate with it in carrying out its functions.

S. Without spending further time on this, I believe that facts with regard to manner and extent to which our respective governments have met these tests of performance under agreed announcement speak for themselves.

T. Your second question related to assistance to Indian Embassy in determining what you termed status of all Chinese in U.S. This is a very vague term and I am not sure exactly what you may mean by it. There is certainly nothing in our agreed announcement with regard to investigation of status of all Chinese in U.S. Sole question between our two governments with regard to Chinese in U.S. under terms of July 25 statement by our governments, agreed agenda, as well as our agreed announcement,

is that of freedom of Chinese in U.S., who desire do so, return to your country. I, therefore, assume that by investigation of status you mean whether individuals do desire return to your country. This is, of course, something that can be determined only by each individual for himself, and any so-called "investigation of status" has no relation thereto. Our agreed announcement and steps taken by my government implement it fully and comprehensively deal with all aspects of this question. As I have many times pointed out, any Chinese in United States who desires return to your country is under no compulsion or requirement obtain permission from anyone or inform anyone. Neither is he prevented from informing or communicating with anyone. For example, if he feels that there is any obstruction to his departure, he is entirely free communicate with Indian Embassy. He does not have to submit such communication through anyone else, nor does anyone have right in any way interfere with his freedom of such communication. There is thus complete and firm guarantee that any Chinese in the U.S., who in fact desires to return to your country, is able do so, and no general investigation of status of Chinese in United States is required.

U. Your third question related to rescinding by U.S. of any measures which you term would violate spirit of agreed announcement. I am not aware of any such measures, and it is rather your government which should rescind and correct measures which not only violate spirit but letter of our agreed announcement. There continues to be no obstruction to departure of any Chinese from U.S. for your country. As I have many times pointed out, there is not even any requirement for Chinese departing from U.S. obtain exit permit. Requirement of exit permit in itself entails delay and obstruction no matter how promptly it may be acted upon. Requirement of obtaining exit permit also presupposes ability of the agency to which application is made to deny permit. Therefore if one were to speak of rescinding of measures violating spirit of agreed announcement, reference would have to be made to exit permit requirements of your government. Only repeal of such requirement with respect to Americans in your country would place our two countries in position of equality and reciprocity in this regard.

V. At our last meeting you referred to supposed requirement that Chinese in U.S. obtain entry permits into Taiwan. I have investigated this matter and preliminary statement, which I made to you at our last meeting, I find to be entirely correct. This relates only to general requirements under our immigration laws that aliens, admitted to the U.S. temporarily, desiring to extend their stay must present valid evidence that upon expiration of their temporary stay, they will be able to proceed to another country. Thus matter relates entirely to Chinese desiring remain in U.S., rather than Chinese desiring return to your country, and in no way interferes with or hinders ability of Chinese in



U.S. return to your country. Thus matter has no relation either to letter or spirit of our agreed announcement.

W. I have spoken thus frankly with regard to this matter as I hope you continue share my feeling that it is important that in privacy of this room two of us not attempt dissimulate and conceal differences but openly discuss them with view of finding solutions.

X. I have spoken in some detail concerning our agreed announcement on September 10 in hope that our differences with regard to this matter could once and for all be resolved and that, fully understanding our point of view, your government would take the necessary steps remove this impediment to understanding between us and to progress in our discussions of other matters. I feel that encouraging progress we have been able make toward finding acceptable form of words to express our determination that our differences should not lead to war makes it doubly urgent that this other matter be quickly resolved. It is in this spirit I have made this statement this morning and it is in this spirit I hope it will be most carefully considered by you and your government.

End prepared statement.

2. Wang replied he had already made known position PRC side on questions relating to first item on agenda which I had raised at last meeting.

3. Turning to prepared statement Wang continued during meeting this morning I had again raised questions in this respect. Though he had already made his reply on same questions I had raised nevertheless he willing once again express position his side.

4. Wang said at last meeting and again this morning I had raised question on first item and without grounds accused PRC side violating agreed announcement. At same time U.S. side kept stalling discussion of second item. PRC side considered this attitude could in no way be reconciled with the statements and the gestures I had made regarding my desire see progress in talks.

5. Wang said our first item concerned return civilians. It was none other than U.S. side which violating terms agreement. In first place as he had previously pointed out PRC side had provided us complete list of Americans in China at outset our talks whereas U.S. side failed do same by providing complete list all Chinese in U.S. so that Indian Embassy in U.S. had no means of fully carrying out functions specified in agreed announcement.

6. Wang said he could not agree to my statement that this question bears no relation to discussion of return civilians.

7. Wang said his side has every reason to request Indian Embassy look into status Chinese in U.S. and investigate facts concerning

obstructions their departure, as well as offer assistance in effecting return. Yet U.S. has made known it cannot give any assistance to Indian Embassy that regard.

8. Wang said U.S. side claims Indian Embassy can only communicate with Chinese nationals after individuals have put in request.

9. Wang said though PRC side does not agree this interpretation, in circumstances since U.S. side adopting such interpretation PRC side can only treat British Charge on parallel footing.

10. Wang said and now U.S. side expresses dissatisfaction with situation which has been created solely by U.S. side. This is nothing but making a nonsensical fuss.

11. Wang said it only PRC side which entitled raise protest. If U.S. side wishes alter this situation it must first provide complete list names addresses Chinese in U.S.

12. Wang said in second place American prisoners held in Chinese prisons are those who have breached law. During period they are serving sentences they not entitled to request return. To speak of obstruction to departure is even more out of question.

13. Wang said however as PRC side has stated Chinese Government reviewing these cases accordance Chinese legal procedures as well as taking behavior individual into account and will then decide measures to be taken towards them.

14. Wang said it is matter of fact that China has in accordance its own statement already taken concrete steps and is carrying on reviewing work.

15. Wang said China has even made available to the prisoners full text agreed announcement and has lent hand to British Charge in distributing notices these people concerning agreed announcement.

16. Wang said in the event of individuals making request British Charge is also assisted to communicate with and interview them.

17. Wang said I could not deny that letters from these people asking British Charge for assistance have all been permitted to be forwarded.

18. Wang said during term of their sentences American prisoners' outgoing communications of course must be handled according to regulations laid down by competent Chinese authorities.

19. Wang said however other side this matter is that U.S. side never informed PRC side as to exactly how many Chinese imprisoned in U.S. nor has Indian Embassy been given list, so it has no means of making check. Indian Embassy also finds no way extending assistance to such persons. Such situation is unequitable.

20. Wang said now that U.S. side has raised question of Americans who have breached laws PRC side demands U.S. should first submit list of Chinese imprisoned in United States.

21. Wang said in third place U.S. side has also kept raising question of rate at which PRC side has been releasing law breaking Americans. As he had specifically stated, this would not advance implementation of agreed announcement. Americans who had broken law must be handled in accordance Chinese legal procedures and this could by no means be hastened by setting deadline. Such is a matter Chinese sovereign rights.

22. Wang said I had also time and again made reference to respecting Chinese legal procedures and avoiding actions prejudicing Chinese sovereign rights.

23. Wang said thus U.S. side has no justification whatever to raise demand for effecting release by a deadline or otherwise making such a demand under different cloak.

24. Wang said PRC side has been releasing Americans who have breached a law. From beginning these talks on August 1 already 26 among 40 Americans who had breached laws have been released. This is fact which I cannot but recognize. Already two-thirds of Americans have been released.

25. Wang said however no corresponding measures being taken with respect Chinese being held in prison in U.S.

26. Wang said in fourth place insofar as ordinary Americans in PRC concerned they have never encountered any difficulty in departing. Since beginning these talks China been extending assistance to expedite handling their pending affairs in order they may effect their return at early date.

27. Wang said 16 who applied to return were all permitted return. 3 of 16 have not yet departed from China. That is due their having unsettled affairs. However, China giving them all assistance.

28. Wang said the remaining American nationals who may later desire depart will also be able make their departure and can also count on being given similar assistance.

29. Wang said insofar as Chinese in U.S. concerned, even in case of 103 Chinese whom U.S. side admitted had long wanted depart but whose departure been prevented, 38 of them not yet returned up to present.

30. Wang said U.S. side stated that they were permitted to depart. However U.S. side never submitted their addresses nor accounted for failure to effect their return. Moreover U.S. side has refused assist Indian Embassy look into their status.

31. Wang said in fifth place PRC side particularly wants lodge protest in connection with measure of Immigration Naturalization Service which requires Chinese students remaining in U.S. to obtain entry permits for Taiwan.

32. Wang said I had said at last meeting that even if this was case it was not violation agreement. I had again this morning made reference to my previous statement. However that statement is sheer sophistry.

33. Wang said this requirement of Immigration Naturalization Service has nothing in common with arrangements generally required of foreign nationals before they effect their departure.

34. Wang said it entirely understandable that Chinese students may not be able make their return for time being whether because they not yet completed studies or because they might be delayed by other personal affairs.

35. Wang said by requiring these Chinese students proceed Taiwan U.S. obviously subjecting them further threat so that in future they will not dare demand return mainland of China.

36. Wang said as far back as last April State Department had admitted that "some Chinese students may refrain from applying to Immigration Naturalization Service for permission return to mainland for fear of being refused". And now U.S. not only failed take measure eliminate apprehension created during long period in which they been subject obstruction and threat but has further adopted threats against them. This is entirely in violation letter and spirit agreed announcement. PRC side demands that U.S. side promptly remove such regulations which violate agreed announcement.

37. Wang said it is U.S. side which has violated agreement reached on first item. Yet U.S. side has been making accusations against PRC side without any grounds. U.S. Secretary of State and other spokesmen have reversed the merits of this case by accusing PRC side of alleged failure implement. In view of this Chinese Government has decided make statement on this question.

38. Wang said he must point out from series of statement made by US on first item of agenda it appears U.S. side has regarded agreement as purely unilateral requirement PRC side assume obligations while US side not bound. U.S. side not only failed provide PRC side and Indians with facilities but laid down regulations in violation of the agreement. He urged U.S. side implement agreement and still considered we should proceed item two discussion.

39. Wang said in course discussion of second item it is U.S. side which suggested renunciation force in international relations. It was also U.S. side which demanded that two sides make statement this respect. PRC side has not only put forward reasonable draft but again submitted new draft drawn on basis points that have been agreed or may be agreed.

40. Wang said at previous meeting I had stated as result of effort PRC side there had been considerable progress in talks. At last meeting

had indicated it would be unrealistic enter into another agreement before previous agreement fully implemented.

41. Wang said it would appear that it is chance of agreement that has made U.S. side hastily revert to same self-contradictory position which U.S. side had taken couple of months ago when U.S. side insisted on final implementation agreed announcement before entering into discussion of second item.

42. Wang said this situation could not but pose once more question of whether U.S. side has sincere desire for progress when it insists on the condition of final implementation before there will be another agreement. Did I mean that there could be an agreement only after all Chinese in U.S. desiring to return had done so? If that were what I meant it would not be a matter of few months but a matter of years for the return of Chinese in U.S. who number tens of thousands.

43. Wang said U.S. side must see that if it attempts by this method to drag out or break up the talks it will get nothing good out of it.

44. Wang said he wished to point out that if U.S. side was sincere there is no justification for entangling talks with question of item one. Agreement should be reached on new draft of PRC side. Then talks could proceed to negotiation on problems at issue between both sides.

45. I replied that either Wang had misunderstood me, in which case I was sorry I had not made myself clear, or he had chosen distort what I had said concerning relationship of agreed announcement of September 10 and possible future agreements. Wang had quoted me as saying it would be unrealistic to enter into another agreement before first was fully implemented. I did not recall having said that and felt sure I hadn't. What I had said, was that I felt it would be unrealistic enter into another agreement unless full confidence was established that first was being carried out. I had many times referred to importance of confidence and full understanding between us, without which it would be unrealistic enter into other agreements. I had understood at last meeting he agreed with that.

46. I said I had for these reasons discussed agreed announcement in such detail. Far from desiring to retard progress I was hoping by this to expedite progress. In that spirit I had frankly discussed matter. If I did not desire make progress, I certainly would not take time and effort discuss this first matter as seriously as I had. I would be doing disservice to both of us if I attempted conceal or gloss over my government's feeling concerning operation of first announcement.

47. I said we should be completely frank. At time Wang and I had discussed agreed announcement, it was clear between us that largest group of Americans in his country under discussion was those in prison. I had made it clear at that time I had no intent interfere with method his government chose handle problem.

48. I said at time we issued agreed announcement, only Americans remaining Wang's country concerning whom U.S. had no assurances in regard to departure were those in prison. Our long discussion of draft agreed announcement had revolved almost entirely about this group. I had at first suggested problem be resolved by permitting their return prior to any statement. When Wang not willing, I had suggested release be simultaneous with issuance agreed announcement. When Wang did not accept that proposal, I suggested at least private understanding concerning length of time that would be needed. Wang unable accept that position. However, Wang had told me many times, time required would be very short. I would not review entire discussion that led up to suggestion by Wang and acceptance by US of word "expeditiously".

49. I said it was certainly clear in using that word concerning release of Americans in PRC we were talking about Americans in prison. It was also clear that phrase "further appropriate measures" pertained to measures within PRC sovereignty that would be taken to bring about release these Americans.

50. I said sometime before we issued announcement, Wang had indicated review of number of cases had been completed. On September 10, he informed me of these 10 names whose review completed. I did not know how long review of 10 had taken, but presumably review started after August 1. As I had pointed out this morning, this made total of 33 persons assured release in six week period between August 1 and September 10, including 12 names given me September 6 and 11 names August 1. In fourteen weeks since that time, only 5 additional released. As I had said, it appeared issuance agreed announcement has in fact slowed up resolution this problem.

51. I said I had not raised question of complete implementation of September 10 announcement. I thought it could and should have been completely implemented before this, insofar as this group of Americans is concerned. If it could have been, this certainly would have had beneficial effects. Nevertheless, what I have been raising is only question whether statement has any real substance or meaning insofar as this group is concerned.

52. I said on basis of facts it is certainly understandable that my government has doubts concerning how much meaning statement really has. Apparently PRC had reservations with respect to meaning and substance of statement. Those reservations not apparent to my government when it agreed to enter into statement. What I was asking in all earnestness was that some action be taken by PRC which would remove doubts on part my government.

53. I said turning again to questions he had raised, I honestly did not see how they bore any relationship to question of implementation. As I had pointed out there are simple tests of manner in which

announcement is being implemented. I would not take the time to repeat. However, basic test is whether or not there is obstruction to any Chinese departing U.S. for PRC or any other country. In spite of all discussion revolving about this question, there is still to be produced as single case of any kind of official obstruction by U.S. since my assurances to Wang this regard on August 2.

54. I said on one hand he had raised question of 38 Chinese who had not returned, out of group of 103. On other hand he had made statement acknowledging some Chinese in U.S. may not desire return for time being. In regard to 103, he apparently still not clear what that group consisted of. I had never said that all of group desired return and prevented from doing so. I did not want to go again over issuance of restraining orders. I wanted to make clear, however, that issuance those orders not necessarily related to whether person desired return. Orders issued, as I had pointed out, in absence of exit permit system to prevent departure of persons we did not desire go PRC at that time. Some persons that group may not at any time have in fact desired return. Others may have subsequently changed their mind. I had no way of knowing.

55. I said facts in individual cases not important. Important thing is whether persons now know that they free to go if they so desire and that if they feel obstructed they free communicate with Indian Embassy. Each person individually informed restraining order his case lifted. Each person aware of his right to get on boat and leave if he desired do so. Each person perfectly aware of ability and right to communicate with Indian Embassy if he feels obstructed. That applies to all Chinese in U.S.

56. I said Wang had again spoken of alleged fear of some Chinese in U.S. to apply for departure lest they be refused. I had stated over and over again that no Chinese desiring depart U.S. need apply to anyone for permission to do so. No exit permits of any kind required to departure. As I had pointed out this morning, if our nationals were to be placed on equal basis, PRC would have to repeal its exit permit requirements. However, I had not and did not intend to make such demand, since I did not want get bogged down in discussion of subject.

57. I said Wang had referred to cases Chinese in prison in U.S. I did not know of any such case. Certainly if there were a Chinese in prison who desired return, he free communicate with Indian Embassy and Indian Embassy free investigate his case.

58. I said Wang had also again raised question of INS requirement concerning entry permits to Taiwan. I would repeat again that there is no general requirement Chinese in U.S. obtain entry permits to Taiwan. What there is, is normal and regular requirement of any country that person entering country temporarily must show that at end of stay he able go somewhere else. This not applicable to Chinese alone but to all



aliens entering country. This normal requirement by consular officers issuing visas and has been done as long as I can remember. When person in country under temporary status desires extend period of stay, he must show this still holds good.

59. I said this arose regularly in regard to Chinese admitted temporarily as it does in regard any other nationality. Requirement can be satisfied in number of ways. Does not change fact when alien desires depart he free to do so and go any place of his choice. This need not be place he indicated at time of application. We do not control destination of aliens. They free depart any time for any destination of their choice.

60. I said Wang had spoken of his government making statement on September 10 announcement. It was not clear whether he referring to his statement here this morning or to public statement. I hoped it would not be latter. I was willing see facts made public, as I was sure facts would speak for themselves, but I did not see how it would help progress talks to engage in public propaganda. Such course would certainly entangle discussions.

61. I said I was sure he had noted that in spite of great public concern in U.S. over subject, statements by Secretary of State restrained in tone and confined to expression expectation announcement will be fully implemented. Secretary thus attempting discourage public debate. I thought he had been quite successful in this effort.

62. I said I had talked privately and frankly with Wang about subject. I had carefully and honestly answered all questions he had raised, and frankly given views of my government. I failed to see how bringing all this into public propaganda debate could contribute to progress.

63. Wang replied that he was very disappointed and wished express regret that discussion last meeting and again today had gone beyond item two of agenda. PRC side has no intent or desire go back to disputes and discussion that took place before issuance of September 10 agreement. It was because I had engaged discussion item one, PRC side forced do same.

64. Wang said his side always rejected any accusations by myself or by U.S. officials alleging his side violating agreement on return civilians. It has been position PRC side all along that either we would not reach agreement or, if agreement reached, it would be faithfully carried out so far as PRC side concerned. PRC has not altered this position. It can be seen PRC side is exactly performing agreement. From figures I had produced this morning, cannot be denied majority of Americans including those who committed offenses have departed.

65. Wang said we had had long argument over handling of group of Americans who breached law in China. PRC side did not enter into agreement that this group would be released by given date. This very clear. As he had indicated before, two factors will count concerning



handling these Americans. One factor is behavior of individual and nature of case. Other is manner in which relations between our two countries improve. He might ask whether there has been any significant improvement in relations between two countries since issuance of September 10 announcement.

66. Wang said as to question whether there are Chinese held in US prisons, I had answered I did not know of such cases. This did not mean that there is no such case. I had said even if there were such cases, Chinese held in U.S. prisons would be free communicate with Indian Embassy and request latter make investigation in such cases. This was answer I had provided. He wanted to point out that investigation into facts such cases and ability these persons effect return are two separate matters. He wished assure me Chinese Government handling cases Americans who breach law in China in exactly this manner.

67. Wang said concerning 38 of 103 Chinese who had been prevented from returning and have not yet effected return, I had suggested these persons may have changed their mind. He considered there was no ground for such conclusion. It incredible that individuals who had dared demand return under circumstances of being subjected to threats would not wish to return after issuance agreed announcement.

68. Wang said in regard to INS requirement Chinese students obtain entry permit Taiwan within given time limit, my explanation was not convincing. He might cite case of American nationals in China to explain his point. As I was aware, Mrs. Huizer was holding Dutch passport and as rule would be considered Dutch national. However, I had requested she be returned as American national. It was good will on PRC side that case was handled as that of American national. In explaining my point I had stated every alien national should be allowed proceed destination of his choice. How would I explain matter concerning Chinese nationals in U.S.? Why did U.S. side not take steps so Chinese would obtain entry permits to China instead of insisting they obtain entry permits Taiwan. By contrasting manner in which PRC side handled case of Mrs. Huzer and manner in which U.S. side handled requirement Chinese students obtain entry permits Taiwan, clear picture emerges of unfriendly attitude U.S. side. This also open violation September 10 agreement.

69. Wang said I had spoken of necessity ensuring understanding and confidence both sides in solution problems before us. On this he was in full agreement. He regarded present talks as concrete step toward promotion understanding and confidence our two sides. After forty days discussion, we able agree on September 10 agreement, the first between us. This represented further increase confidence and understanding between our two sides.

70. Wang said if since September 10 side issues had not been raised in discussion, he was sure we would have been able on basis September 10 agreement make steady progress in settlement other matters at issue in sincere spirit. However, stalling by U.S. side in discussion item 2 and entangling over question of first item of agenda, even with accusation PRC has violated agreement, will not help obtain better understanding

71. Wang said during course discussion PRC side has firmly followed understanding between both sides to discuss matters in frank and open spirit without engaging in propaganda. However repeated distortions appearing in press originated by U.S. official quarters alleging PRC side violating agreement have compelled PRC Government make its position clear.

72. I asked whether Wang's government had already or was going to issue statement.

73. Wang replied he had not said his government had already made statement.

74. I asked whether it was going to do so.

75. Wang said that was correct.

76. I said that he must realize that my government would have to consider making statement in reply.

77. Wang said to his knowledge U.S. Government had already made public statements on numerous occasions.

78. I asked what statements he was referring to.

79. Wang said without enumerating all instances, he could cite Secretary Dulles' press conference of December 6.

80. I said I did not wish to argue the point. Secretary was asked question in press conference and carefully refrained from making this public issue. As I had pointed out, American people expected imprisoned Americans would be permitted expeditiously return. By any standard they not returning expeditiously. Inevitably Secretary of State is being asked questions this regard. His answers entirely directed at reducing public controversy this point. He has consistently taken stand he hoped and expected agreement would be carried out. I did not see how exception could be taken to such statements, which in fact directed at attempting improve atmosphere surrounding talks and allaying public speculation in U.S. If PRC Government now determined bring matter into public propaganda field, difficult for me but to conclude that PRC does not share our desires for progress in talks. This cannot but adversely influence whole atmosphere that has been created.

81. I said Wang had spoken of September 10 announcement as furthering understanding and confidence between us. That had been exactly my hope. However, it is not words of announcement and

appearance of agreement that further understanding, but carrying out of announcement. It was only because of my tremendous interest in furthering progress that I had discussed matters the way I had. I regretted that matter was going to enter propaganda field, which could not but inhibit discussion of subject here.

82. I said I regretted that Wang had again spoken of state of our relations as factor in determining release of Americans. I had previously given my views on this and the inevitable interpretation that must be placed upon it. Improvement of relations is two way street. I had tried since beginning of talks point out as clearly as I could relationship between improvement of relations and views of American people concerning continued imprisonment of Americans. This not subject to arbitrary control of U.S. Government or anyone in U.S. Government. But is basic fact that must be taken into consideration in discussing our relations. I would not be honest and would not be doing service to our relations if I did not point this out frankly.

83. I said there were only two other small items. I had previously tried to make clear that group of 103 Chinese he had referred to were not persons who had demanded return, but were people who may or may not have desired to return against whom restraining orders were issued.

84. I said I failed to see any relationship between Mrs. Huizer and my explanation of immigration laws concerning temporary visitors. I was sure he did not mean to imply that if she had been Dutch subject she would not have been permitted leave.

85. I said concerning requirement of immigration law regarding temporary visitors, his country and every other country must have similar regulations. PRC certainly did not admit foreigners on temporary visits unless they able go somewhere else at end of visit. Various countries may administer such measures in various ways. As I had pointed out, U.S. requirement can be satisfied in various ways. Certainly it did not interfere with ability Chinese in U.S. proceed PRC if they decided to do so. Therefore, requirement had no relation to implementation agreed announcement.

86. Wang said he still did not agree to my explanation of INS requirement for Chinese in U.S. obtain entry permits Taiwan. Chinese students in U.S. all came from mainland of China. What right did U.S. Government have compel these students proceed to Taiwan? He had referred to case of Mrs. Huizer because PRC had regarded her as Dutch subject. I had regarded her as American national. Citation of Mrs. Huizer was designed show how Chinese Government has been handling problems in friendly spirit. Whereas U.S. side handling problems of Chinese in U.S. in unfriendly spirit.

87. Wang said I had said if Mrs. Huizer was Dutch, would PRC have prevented her departure. He could only conclude that it is a deliberate distortion for U.S. side to state matter in this manner.

88. Wang said as to need for establishing friendly atmosphere around talks, this was always objective of PRC side. But in order establish friendly atmosphere both sides must make common effort. It would be illusion for one side to insist on making charges while it wants other side keep silent. Statement PRC side is going to make has been compelled by U.S. propaganda.

89. I asked whether Wang could give me copy of statement.

90. Wang replied he did not now have a copy.

91. I said I wished again to deny emphatically that any Chinese in U.S. are being required to proceed to Taiwan.

92. Wang said this denial would have practical effect only after INS repealed its requirement on Chinese students.

93. I said there was no INS requirement that any Chinese student go to Taiwan.

94. Wang said requirement compelling students make such application is nothing but forcing them to proceed to Taiwan.

95. I said students could satisfy requirement in any number of ways. Wang must be aware that all Chinese who entered U.S. in recent years entered under Government of Republic of China passports. If those passports have expired, it is perfectly natural for these people to obtain renewal of their passports. However, whether they fulfill requirement that way or not, nothing compels them go to Taiwan.

96. Wang said as he had pointed out he could not regard this measure as justifiable.

97. I said I had nothing further on this subject. However, I was seriously disturbed over PRC side placing our talks on this subject into propaganda field. In view of action his government and in view of approaching holiday season for both of us, I wondered whether it would be preferable have few weeks interval before next meeting. Action of his government is inevitably going to entangle two items our agenda and our discussion. Perhaps if we were not to meet for a short period it might reduce public speculation and get us back to situation where we could make progress. I was throwing this suggestion out as sincere effort try reduce impact action his government and in hope it will enable us make further progress. Would appreciate his views.

98. Wang said what period of time did I have in mind in proposing a short recess.

99. I said we might meet again either on 5th or 12th January.

100. Wang said there are two aspects to question. According to what I had said, I desired recess and I was trying justify this recess by

alleged effect of action his government was going to take. If this was case, he could not agree to recess because it would not reconcile with spirit of making efforts find common ground between us. However, if recess proposal was motivated merely by consideration of holidays, he would consider suggestion and reply later.

101. I said I did not feel move his government will be helpful finding common ground between us. It was one of reasons leading me to suggest recess. However I did not desire to press point.

102. Wang said as I had stated, he would not agree to recess on first grounds, relating to action his government. If I insisted on recess on those grounds his side compelled make further statement to clarify its position. However, if second reason were in mind, if motive were purely the approaching holidays, then he would consider matter and give reply later.

103. I said my specific suggestion was for recess until January 12. If he preferred some other period I would consider it. I was not trying to be arbitrary.

104. Wang said he would reply after consideration. I asked when that would be and whether before December 22. He replied he couldn't say but would make it as soon as possible. In reply to my query as to what we would say to press he suggested we inform press next meeting would be December 22, the usual date. In case of change we would announce it later to press.

105. I pointed out I was leaving for Prague Friday and would appreciate if possible an answer before I left. He said he would try but could not promise.

Gowen

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#### 418. Telegram 1294 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 16, 1955, 4 a.m.

1294. From Johnson.

1. Text of press statement PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry was made available to correspondents here by Chinese Consulate General. Wang refused correspondents request for interview, and officer handing out

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1655. Official Use Only; Priority. Repeated to Paris for the Secretary only as telegram 291.

statement refused answer any questions on grounds had just been received from Peiping had no time yet to read. Assume full text available from FBIS. Statement of more than thousand words covered only following points:

A) U.S. failure supply list Chinese in U.S. to Indian Embassy.

B) While since August first 26 out of 40 American law breakers have been released, U.S. has refused inform PRC how many Chinese imprisoned in U.S. or list of their names.

C) No time limit can be set for release remaining Americans whose cases being reviewed individually and therefore "no justification for Americans to ask, or ask in disguised form for setting time limit to release American criminals" who are being released expeditiously.

D) Departure "ordinary" Americans not obstructed and in fact assisted where required while of 103 Chinese who U.S. admitted long prevented from departing 38 still not returned.

E) INS regulation requiring Chinese in U.S. obtain entry permit for Taiwan is threat against Chinese students unable for time being return which is violation letter and spirit September 10 agreement.

2. Statement closes with "The charge of the American side that China has not fully complied with the agreement is completely untenable. The Chinese Government firmly asks that the American side put a stop to all its acts in violation of the agreement and fully comply with the agreement between both sides".

3. I am informing press for attribution my spokesman that PRC ascertain in statement that it has fully complied with agreed announcement of September 10 and allegation that U.S. has not are completely contrary to fact. Any further comment would have to come from Washington. For background I have pointed out to correspondents here lack of relation charges against U.S. to obligations under agreed announcement and apparent attempt to obscure CHICOM failure comply with September 10 announcement in cases 14 imprisoned Americans. Have also expressed for attribution spokesman puzzlement at reference demand for time limit release Americans pointing out know of no public statements this regard.

**Gowen**

**419. Telegram 1295 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 16, 1955, 1 p.m.

1295. From Johnson. Re Mytel 1289.

Paragraph 21 second sentence to end should read: "As he had specifically stated in advance reaching agreement on return civilians, Americans who had broken law must be handled in accordance Chinese legal procedures and this could by no means be hastened by setting deadline. Such is matter Chinese sovereign rights."

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1655. Confidential.

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**420. Telegram 1296 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 16, 1955, 5 p.m.

1296. From Johnson.

1. In event meeting is held December 22 I find some difficulty in formulating any views on best course of action. However, following are some factors I believe should be considered in formulating tactics for next meeting and future strategy. Unless there is some new and unexpected development from CHICOM side before meeting such as release some prisoners it seems to me it would be difficult in present position to undertake any intensive discussion renunciation force. At same time further extended discussion implementation can only rake over already thoroughly plowed ground. (Incidentally situation with respect who speaks first also not clear. At this last meeting it was Wang's "turn" but he deferred to my request open meeting.)

2. Though both of us have preserved some freedom of maneuver and have left some leeway for enlarging area of maneuver, we are very close to deadlock. Position I have set forth is substantially that refusing further discussion under agenda item two until at least some further CHICOM steps on implementation. CHICOM position is virtually that

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1655. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

of no further releases prisoners until "relations improved" by at least resumption discussion under agenda item two.

3. It therefore seems to me one question we face is whether on one hand we attempt enlarge area of maneuver or respond any attempt by Wang do so, or on other hand whether we desire push them further into corner even at risk full deadlock. Full repetition my line last meeting with emphasis on their failure implement will push them further into corner. On other hand it may be possible maintain and enlarge area of maneuver by putting emphasis my regret on damage atmosphere talks their public statement and impediment to confidence created by their hidden reservations on September 10 announcement.

4. I am inclined think that if meeting held December 22 Wang may attempt force my hand on discussion renunciation force draft in effort better establish basis for public position of charging us with "stalling". In response I could follow either foregoing lines but believe latter line would be more productive.

Gowen

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#### 421. Letter 19 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 19

Geneva, December 16, 1955

Dear Walter:

I have neglected writing you the past few weeks, on the one hand, because I felt that I have covered matters very thoroughly in my telegrams, and, on the other, since the necessity of my returning to Prague each week because of the negotiations I have going on up there has left me little time after getting out my telegrams.

I know that in some of my messages I posed some really hard and possibly unanswerable questions at this time, but I, nevertheless, wanted you all to know what was worrying me and that I did appreciate answers to the extent that they could be made.

As I have indicated in my telegrams, I have had serious doubts about the efficacy of the course I have been asked to pursue the past two meetings, but I have, nevertheless, tried to do my best in carrying out the instructions I have received. Very frankly, while we have been

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."



able to establish what will undoubtedly appear as a good position “on the record”, I think that it has, if anything, set back the release of further Americans, and I am at the moment not at all clear as to where we go from here. Yesterday’s session was a very trying one, and towards the end of the meeting I tried to balance myself on the knife’s edge in testing their reaction to the continuation of these talks. It was quite clear to me that they certainly did not want a break, at least at this time, but, as I have said in a telegram last week, I do not think that we can safely assume that this is going to continue indefinitely.

I hope that the Department appreciates that in practice it would be extremely difficult for me to carry out an instruction, such as that for the last meeting, to introduce our amendments on their renunciation of force draft if necessary to prevent a break. It would probably only be absolutely clear that a break was coming if Wang were to make an ultimatum type statement of some kind to the effect that there would be no point in continuing the meetings unless I negotiated on their renunciation of force statement. This would, of course, be in effect an ultimatum, and if I were at that point suddenly to respond to his ultimatum, I would entirely destroy my future negotiating position.

I greatly appreciated the telegram authorizing Helenka’s employment and she is going to go to work right away. I had thought of this possibility but had not yet got around to talking with her when your telegram arrived.

Give my regards to all and an especially Merry Christmas to you and Dorothy from Pat and myself.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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#### 422. Letter 27 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 27

Washington, December 16, 1955

Dear Alex:

I am sure you must have been concerned at the last two meetings as to whether the tactics being adopted might not lead to an early break

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal.

in the talks. This problem has been given very serious consideration here. The consensus is that on the one hand the time has come when we must adopt a more forceful position with respect to Chinese Communist failure to implement the Agreed Announcement and on the other the Communists are not in a favorable position to break off the talks. These are the considerations which led to the decision to undertake tactics possibly involving greater risk of a break. The matter was discussed with the Secretary himself and he agreed that the time had come to take a stiffer attitude. I know that you have felt in the past that your basic instructions to keep the talks going frequently prevented you from taking as strong a line as you would have liked. The feeling here now is that we have in the talks accomplished a good deal up to this point toward our objective of making it more difficult for the Chinese Communists to resort to force and that we can now take greater risks than heretofore.

How useful to you are the FLDNP and ALDLP figures sent each week? I notice that you have not used them recently in the meetings, and that in any case, the Chinese do not pay much attention to them. Their compilation requires a considerable investment in time by I&NS and CA. Unless you feel otherwise we plan to discontinue this work.

With regard to the details in the cases of missing US military personnel, we have tracked down some of the Chinese newspapers in which there are probably references to some of the 450 men on your list. It will require a lot of work to go through the papers and find the names. Therefore, we do not plan to undertake it until such time as it appears you may be called upon to take up this matter again in Geneva.

I am enclosing a copy of a speech made by Nehru September 6 which you may wish to refer to next time you discuss renunciation of force with Wang. You will note on page I-2 that Nehru has explicitly renounced force with regard to Goa.

We have received a request for the original Chinese version of Wang's letter of September 16. If any of your staff has the time we should appreciate your sending us copies both of this letter and of the Chinese draft Agreed Announcement on the renunciation of the use of force in Chinese.

Mr. Hoover and Mr. Robertson believe that we have been sitting on the story of the mistreated Americans about long enough. The time may have come for us to release some accounts of the outrageous treatment experienced by these people. We are now working on an account of the experiences of a number of people. It is still an open question how we will use this material. The main objective would be to show foreign countries which may have some influence in Peiping what we are confronting. No final decision to use this material immediately has been made. The

compilation of the material is on a contingency basis, but the tendency is to think that we should use it fairly soon unless there is an early favorable development in regard to the 14. The most impressive account we have is the ghastly story of Bersohn, which he has written in full. Being an intelligent and articulate person, his story is effective, all the more so because it is written in an objective, matter of fact way without emotion, sermonizing or generalization. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum from John Henderson to Mr. Robertson embodying his ideas of how an information campaign should be conducted. If you have any thoughts on this, I would suggest that you get them in immediately.

I am engrossed now in drafting a Departmental statement in reply to the Chinese Communist press release of last night. It is a rush effort since we must issue it this afternoon.

I am planning to take a little leave next week if we get the recess. Otherwise, I expect to continue on the job.

The long lapse in my letters is explained by the fact that there just has not been any background or long-term guidance I could give you which was not embodied in the official telegrams. I hope that it will be different from now on.

I trust your administrative problems that you mentioned in your letter No. 18 are pretty well solved with the employment of Helena Osborn as your secretary and the assignment of Ekvall to Paris.

It was good to hear your voice on the telephone last night. Congratulations on your continued good handling of your trying assignment, and holiday greetings and good wishes to both you and Pat.

Sincerely yours,

**Walter P. McCaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Three British notes.
2. Nehru speech.
3. Memorandum from Mr. Henderson.

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**423. Telegram 1300 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 19, 1955, noon

1300. From Osborn.

Following just received from Wang:

"Since our side proposed the new draft for an agreed announcement at our December 1 meeting and although you have repeatedly referred to it as an encouraging progress in the talks, however, your side has, for three consecutive meetings, not expressed its attitude towards our new draft so that we have not been able to carry on discussions on the basis of this new draft in order to reach agreement. Our side considers that our new draft is entirely capable of leading to an agreement between the two sides and as such there should be no (repeat no) further delay. Our next meeting should be held on December 22, without alteration, as was agreed between us and publicly announced."

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1955. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated Niact to Prague for the Ambassador only as telegram 17.

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**424. Telegram 218 from Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, December 19, 1955, 4 p.m.

218. Reference: Geneva's 1300 repeated Prague 17.

Will depart Prague tomorrow morning so as meet with Wang December 22.

Believe that at meeting I should strongly reject effort in Wang's message use withholding agreement on recess force lines discussion.

Nevertheless if radio report I have just heard both Bradshaws released confirmed believe basing presentation on this I could usefully undertake some discussion renunciation force draft at December 22 meeting, in addition to presentation on implementation suggested my December 16 telegram from Geneva. Believe we might even give consideration

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1955. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated Priority to Geneva for Osborn as telegram 23.

introduction our amendments which while certainly not palatable other side might be useful in encouraging further releases and would place me in more advantageous position to propose recess until January 12.

In any event at December 22 meeting I would propose recess until January 12 and insist strongly on minimum of recess until January 5. However, would appreciate Department's instructions on how far it desires me to go in insisting on recess. That is, does it desire I go to extent of simply telling him I am not prepared meet regardless his desires. This would of course result in hereafter tending make timing of meetings substantive issue which both of us have thus far avoided.

**Johnson**

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#### **425. Telegram 1410 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 20, 1955, 6:03 p.m.

1410. For Johnson.

Guidance for December 22 meeting.

1. You should point out undesirability public exchanges like last week's as they impede real progress in talks. Remind Wang you urged Communists not make statement, but since they insisted US compelled reply. Suggest place for discussions is in meeting not in public and express hope this will be followed in future.

2. Express satisfaction at Bradshaw release, adding hope this portends early release thirteen remaining Americans. Inform Wang US position on implementation Agreed Announcement has been stated in Department's press release December 16 and no further statement required at this time. Add betterment in relations can only be expected as prisoners are released.

3. Propose recess until January 12 on basis Christmas and New Year holidays. If Wang resists point out he said at last meeting he willing consider on this basis and remind him of importance these holidays in US. Issue should not be pressed to point of refusing meet regardless his insistence although you could go so far as to state that in absence

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-2055. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Clough and Phleger; cleared in draft by Dulles and McConaughy.

any major development you will be in Prague and unavailable to meet on December 29.

4. Department considers that odds against Communists breaking off talks at this time in light developments at UN which they probably would think make it unwise from their viewpoint to break. Therefore, we can press further on implementation without serious risk and with hope of some results. Release of Dr. Bradshaw would seem bear this out. Bradshaw release justifies temporary relaxation pressure on implementation, but it is desirable avoid discussion other topics at next meeting, particularly in view hard tone Wang's note refusing recess proposal. However if you believe introduction revised US draft essential to forestall break you authorized to do so.

5. You may inform Wang in any case that on January 12 you will have comments to make on his draft and will have some changes to propose.

6. If Wang should accuse US of misrepresentation in stating you had protested "cruel and inhuman treatment" of Americans, you should tell him we referring to Bradshaw case.

**Dulles**

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#### 426. Telegram 1308 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 22, 1955, 2 p.m.

1308. From Johnson.

1. One and one-half hour meeting this morning.

2. Wang insisted on opening making strongest charges to date of US stalling, "insincerity" and renewing line of last meeting on implementation. Made special reference to cruel and inhuman treatment portion Dept release. Statement constituted strong invitation to me to rehash implementation discussion last few meetings.

3. In light subsequent developments at meeting, believe Wang was attempting lay basis for immediate issuance by them of public statement on agenda item two discussions and US failure respond their December 1 draft on renunciation of force. However, believe this was forestalled

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-2255. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

by my subsequent statement along lines Deptel 1410, particularly para 5 which, however, I stated in somewhat less categorical fashion.

4. In reply he reiterated points his opening statement and in noting my statement re discussion his draft proposed January 12 meeting said: "I should say that that would be the last opportunity for us to reach an agreement on basis our new draft. We can permit no further delay. Otherwise we will be compelled to make public the proceedings of our discussions on the second item of our agenda and leave it to public opinion for judgment. We cannot afford to endure definite delay in this respect."

5. Although foregoing statement carries some implication of break-off, I interpret it only to be threat to go to public. Believe, however, introduction our amendments next meeting would probably forestall this.

6. I challenged ultimatum aspect this statement characterizing as threat. In reply he did not withdraw statement but denied it was threat. He proposed and during subsequent give and take strongly insisted on next meeting January 6. I indicated I could not give any assurances would be in position discuss his December 1 draft before January 12. He finally accepted my suggestion. We announced next meeting for January 12 and if in meanwhile any developments either considered to make meeting desirable would get in touch with other. Agreed press announcement would state simply that in view of Christmas and New Year holidays next meeting January 12. Word recess was not used.

Departing for Prague this evening.

Gowen

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#### 427. Telegram 1311 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 22, 1955, 10 p.m.

1311. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 31st meeting today with prepared statement: It three months since September 14, when our side put forward question of embargo and question of making preparations for Sino-American negotiations on higher level, as second item for agenda.

2. Wang said if both sides share sincere desire for peaceful settlement Sino-American disputes there should not be any difficulty in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-2255. Confidential; Limited Distribution.

speedily reaching agreement on these subjects. However, US side on October 8 proposed both sides first make announcement renouncing use force. Our side submitted on Oct. 27 draft stating that in accordance provisions UN Charter we agree settle disputes by peaceful means without resort threat or use force.

3. Wang said, in order realize this common desire, his draft stated two countries decided hold Foreign Ministers conference to settle question relaxing and eliminating tension in Taiwan area.

4. Wang said this draft should certainly have been acceptable to both sides. Nevertheless, US side rejected it and was not ready to accept concrete step provided in this draft which foresaw imminent holding Foreign Ministers meeting.

5. Wang said, again in order expedite progress, PRC side has made another effort. On December 1 put forward new draft on agreed announcement. It provided that PRC and US are determined that they should settle disputes through peaceful negotiations without resort threat or use force, and added that two Ambassadors should continue talks to seek practical and feasible means for realizing this common desire.

6. Wang said his new draft had taken views US side into account and incorporated all points which already agreed on or might be agreeable. I had admitted I recognized this as encouraging progress. Hence it evident both sides should speedily reach agreement based on his new draft.

7. Wang said, however, for last three meetings US side has thus far failed make known any concrete views on this draft. As result we have not been able carry on discussions and reach agreement on his new draft.

8. Wang said, in last few meetings not only not been discussion his draft but also have been no preparations for Foreign Ministers meeting nor any progress in making bilateral statement which was first pressed for by US. US side must shoulder full responsibility for such unsatisfactory situation.

9. Wang said since talks entered into second phase of agenda, US side has been dragging out talks. At first meeting following conclusion agreement on civilians item, US side announced that before implementation of first announcement complete it would be premature to enter into discussion other matters. It precisely that unreasonable attitude which has deferred progress in talks.

10. Wang said subsequently when US unable avoid getting along into item two, it again continually kept thrusting implementation of first agreed announcement into discussions, in deliberate attempt to entangle talks and obstruct progress.

11. Wang said lately US side went step further by making groundless charges that PRC side has not fully implemented agreed announcement,



while at same time refusing implement. That is deliberate attempt defeat any concrete outcome talks. At our last meeting he had already brought out that PRC side has all along been faithfully implementing, and it was none other than US side which not only not implementing, but had acted in deliberate violation agreed announcement.

12. Wang said thus far US side not yet furnished PRC with names and information on all Chinese in US, while of those Chinese who US admitted had desired return but had long been prevented from returning [garble] there still many who not been permitted return.

13. Wang said US has never given PRC side any accounting of Chinese imprisoned in US nor adopted any appropriate measures in regard them.

14. Wang said I had stated that Indian Embassy had made no representations concerning the disability of any Chinese to depart, however, actual fact is that US side has completely refused offer any assistance to Indian Embassy permitting it take initiative to learn about Chinese in US and take measures help them. Result is that Indian Embassy not been in position to fully carry out its functions.

15. Wang said moreover US side is posing further threats to Chinese students in US by requiring them obtain entry permits Taiwan as condition their temporary stay in US, so that in future they will not dare ask return mainland. Such is outright contradiction to undertakings of US side by which it announced "US recognizes that Chinese in US who desire return PRC are entitled do so, and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so they can expeditiously exercise their right to return."

16. Wang said this action by US side has grave consequences. He asked that US side give consideration point he had raised, make satisfactory answer to it.

17. Wang said December 16 statement by State Dept. while attempting deny this gross violation agreed announcement even made allegation about Americans in China being subject cruel and inhuman treatment. He could only express indignation at such charges. Such charges do not have shred of factual basis since Americans who been imprisoned in China have repudiated these charges. If one to talk about cruel and inhuman treatment, it none other than American side which guilty of this, by preventing for long period return of Chinese to homeland and their reunion with their families.

18. Wang said it none but US which guilty cruel inhuman treatment for, after persecuting threatening Chinese in US it has now come out in outright breach of agreed announcement by adopting measures against them. There many cases of Chinese whose mental state put out of order as result protracted threats and persecution against them by

US Government. There are such cases among Chinese who returned to China recently.

19. Wang said it is distortion of agreement to allege that there is no distinction between ordinary Americans in China and those who have committed offenses in China.

20. Wang said he would like frankly point out it is not possible for PRC side or for anyone who sincerely concerned with Sino-American talks to tolerate charges which reverse merits of matter and drag out talks. Wang said PRC side asks that talks should without further delay get down to discussion of making announcement on basis their new draft so as to reach agreement thereon.

21. I then presented prepared statement as follows:

A. Before taking up any other matters this morning, I desire express my satisfaction at release of Dr. Bradshaw and news that both he and Mrs. Bradshaw have now arrived Hong Kong. I would hope that this action your government portends early release fourteen Americans still remaining in prison your country, thus removing not only this source dispute and controversy between us here but also removing continuing impediment to improvement relations between our two countries.

B. I regret note that in spite of fact that at our last meeting I most earnestly urged your government not issue public statement concerning substance our discussions here regarding our agreed announcement September 10, your government, nevertheless, issued such statement. As I pointed out at our last meeting, it is difficult for me understand how your government can consider that such statements contribute to real progress in our talks here. Such public debate can only exacerbate our differences and in no way can contribute to their solution. I have in past, and hope in future fully and openly discuss our differences here with intent do my best resolve them or arrive at greatest possible degree common understanding. I still hold view that place for these discussions is in our meetings here rather than by our two governments exchanging public statements. Action of your government making such statement of course compelled my government make reply. Position my government with respect to carrying out of agreed announcement of September 10 set forth in that reply which was issued by Department of State December 16.

C. I then said as far as cruel and inhuman treatment concerned, facts in case Mrs. Bradshaw speak for themselves. In December 1950 this woman along with her husband applied for exit permits. These refused and in February 1951 she and her husband arrested. At time she entered prison, she in normal health. Three and half years later she released completely broken in body and mind. In spite this, more than another [omission in the original] passed before authority given her leave.

D. I said Wang statement this morning again raised question concerning agreed announcement he had raised at previous meetings. These questions bear no relationship to carrying out of September 10 agreement. Unlike questions I had raised which bear directly on agreed announcement, his questions are extraneous thereto. I had thoroughly covered this ground in last few meetings. In spite of Wang's apparent desire lead us down side road in discussing these extraneous issues, I have no desire go over ground already covered. Particularly in last few meetings I had carefully and in detail gone into these questions. Statement appeared entirely ignore what I said previously. I had no intention pursue this subject this morning.

E. I said that as for other aspects Wang's statement, I had tried point out relationship between carrying out agreed announcement and confidence that must be established in regard to our other subjects. I had said many times that my discussion this subject not motivated by desire delay talks but by desire expedite them.

F. I said in regard to question of embargo I had still not received answers to questions I asked many weeks ago.

G. I said in view of imminent Christmas and New Year holidays and common practice with respect international meeting during that period, I suggest that we hold our next meeting January 12. I would hope at that meeting it will be possible to renew our progress toward reaching agreement on joint statement with respect renunciation force. I would expect at that meeting to be in position make further comments in regard to your December 1 draft, as well as to make definite proposals concerning amendments thereto that we would consider desirable.

22. Wang replied that on Monday he had sent letter stating at today's meeting we should give emphasis discussion on agreed announcement on renunciation of force. He regretted that in my statement this morning I had again failed put forward concrete opinions concerning new draft of December 1 of PRC side. He could not consider this satisfactory.

23. Wang said this fact shed light on attitude of US, which aimed at dragging out talks. Purpose of present talks is try resolve conflicts of policy between two countries. Existing conflicts of policy as well as tension Taiwan area are posing serious threat international peace. That is why world public focussing attention on developments Sino-American talks.

24. Wang said he had to point out that after forty days of discussion of item one, we finally reached successful agreement that item. But 100 days have passed since entering into discussion of more important questions, yet we still find ourselves no closer to progress. Cause for lack progress this respect entirely due to delaying attitude on part of US concerning item 2.

25. Wang said he believed this state of affairs will surely disappoint world public opinion and also American opinion. What American people want is friendly relations between Chinese and American people advantageous both people.

26. Wang said proposal for renunciation of force statement originated with US side. New draft put forward by PRC side December 1 fully meets points of view and requirements both sides. It seemed to him issuance of such announcement would be first step for relaxing tension between our two countries. He is surprised to find we have been delayed such a protracted time over this question. Although his side has plenty of patience, such waiting would naturally have a limit.

27. Wang said he noted my statement that I would be able present concrete views at next meeting on this question. He also noted that I had expressed hope that it would be possible for us make progress at that meeting.

28. Wang said "I should say that that would be the last opportunity for us to reach an agreement on basis our new draft. We can permit no further delay. Otherwise we will be compelled to make public the proceedings of our discussions on the second item of our agenda and leave it to public opinion for judgment. We cannot afford to endure indefinite delay in this respect."

[29.] Wang said I had expressed hope that discussion between us would not be made public but would be confined to conference room. Since beginning of series of talks, PRC side has maintained that spirit. However, two points must be taken into consideration. First, neither side should be allowed to make public statements outside of meetings. Second, unreserved and frank exchange of opinion at meetings should be directed toward resolving questions and making progress rather than dragging on indefinitely.

30. Wang said as far as last public statement his side concerned, he had pointed out at last meeting it was necessitated by fact US official quarters, including Secretary of State Dulles, openly made charges alleging PRC side not implementing agreed announcement. These charges and accusations had no factual basis, hence his side compelled set forth truth of matter to public in formal statement. From this truth world public can see which side is carrying out agreement and which is purposely violating it. All this has been set forth clearly in last public statement PRC side and again in his statement this morning. He had already set forth explicitly views his side in this regard and had nothing further to add.

31. Wang said in regard to my proposal to hold next meeting January 12, he wondered if I would be agreeable to make it January 6.

32. I replied I was disturbed at his use of such phrases as "last chance" and "last opportunity" concerning our talks here. I could only interpret his remarks as a threat and was certain that negotiations were

not helped by threats of that kind. I hoped he did not mean it the way it sounded. I was perfectly willing for public to judge on basis of facts concerning our discussions. However I did not see how exchange of public statements would help progress.

33. I said I was also surprised he would purport to speak for American people. I believed I was in position to do that. However, I did agree that American people desired improve relations between our two countries. I had tried to point out during meetings effect on our relations and talks of Americans still imprisoned his country.

34. I said I thought part of difficulty of present situation is lack of complete understanding concerning meaning of first agreement reached between us. At time that agreement reached, I had tried my very best obtain common understanding of words in agreement, particularly word “expeditiously.” However, Wang not willing reach such understanding with me. This points up and emphasises need of full understanding in any other agreements we may reach. In that spirit I have been trying to discuss matters with Wang.

35. I said that as I had stated this morning, I proposed next meeting be January 12. At that meeting I would expect to be in position to make further comments concerning Wang’s December 1 draft and make suggestions concerning amendments we would consider desirable. My government was continuing its study of draft and of entire matter. I did not expect to be in position to give our views until January 12 because of interposition of Christmas and New Years holidays.

36. I said magnitude and delicacy of question is such I did not see what could be gained by forcing pace of discussion. Wang himself had said question under discussion is most serious. World and our own peoples are more interested in solidity of agreement than in speed. We should certainly not attempt sacrifice solidity and satisfactoriness of agreements to speed. I felt it would be more satisfactory if Wang would agree to January 12 for our next meeting.

37. Wang replied we were now seeking ways and means for settlement of conflicts between our two countries. If both sides sincere, 100 days would certainly have been enough to get something out of discussions. It cannot be claimed we did not have enough time. I would be able to see how patient PRC side has been.

38. Wang said I had referred to terms such as threats. He could not accept such terms. PRC side has no intent of threats against US. In fact PRC side feels all along it is being threatened. Also it would not agree to let discussions be dragged out when sufficient time exists to achieve results.

39. Wang said as I had stated, he did not have least intent speak on behalf of American people. He was only expressing view that interests of people of whole world were identical and American people of course

are included. That is to say, friendly relations between China and US conform to interests of Chinese people and also of American people.

40. Wang said I had said American people still concerned over 13 Americans imprisoned in China. But he must point out also that Chinese people in same way are not only concerned over tens of thousands of Chinese residents in US but also over eight million Chinese people in Taiwan. This is something which must be taken into consideration in discussing problems between us.

41. Wang said he noted my explanation of proposal to meet January 12. He wondered whether it would be agreeable to set next meeting tentatively for January 6 and then to consider whether it would be desirable to extend recess. After consideration, if there should be an alteration in tentative schedule, he would inform us in written form.

42. I replied that I could not give assurances that I would be able discuss December 1 draft until January 12.

43. Wang said it appeared two weeks recess is still not sufficient time for me.

44. I said I could not give assurances I would be able discuss December 1 draft before January 12. If Wang thought it would be useful to meet before that date, I would certainly consider it. I suggested we announce next meeting for January 12. If prior to that time, developments made it desirable to meet, either side could get in touch with other.

45. Wang agreed to this proposal.

46. I suggested and Wang agreed we announce to the press that next meeting will be January 12 in view of Christmas and New Year's holidays.

**Gowen**

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**428. Letter 20 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 20

Geneva, December 22, 1955

Dear Walter:

Thanks very much for your letter of December 16. I have just come back from and finished dictating the summary of our meeting today

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Johnson who signed the original "Alex."

and as you will see, things got fairly tight and sticky. However, the most excellent instructions contained in the Dept.'s 1410 I think exactly fitted the situation and enabled me to finish up with no serious losses. (Incidentally, the Dept.'s. 1410 was a model of drafting fully covering the situation and I was completely clear in all the points contained.) It will be noted that at today's meeting I deliberately avoided attempting to pick up and answer all his points and being drawn into discussion of other topics. It left me with a somewhat unsatisfactory feeling at the meeting to do this but I feel that overall it worked out well.

As I said in my summary telegram, I do not believe that his threat at today's meeting was to break the talks but rather to go to the public. However, I am not absolutely positive on this and thought it well for you to immediately have his exact words. I naturally did not want to show too much worry or concern by attempting to get him to clarify at today's meeting. Fortunately I had made my statement on discussion of his December 1 draft prior to his making this statement. Otherwise I feel that it would have been impossible for me to make my statement. I have difficulty in interpreting the reason he made his statement after my statement except in the light of an assumption that they were prepared to go to the public today if I had said nothing on their draft and that my statement left him in a somewhat half-way position which he felt that his instructions required him to make the statement. They were all somewhat nervous at the beginning of today's meeting and at the close of his opening prepared statement and I had a feeling that they were building up to something.

However, we now have a respite until January 12 and I know that good use will be made of the time back there to think through our future course. As you can appreciate it would be most helpful for me to have all the background guidance possible.

I think it likely that their present estimate of the situation is that our only interest is in obtaining the release of all of the Americans and that if and when this is accomplished we will be quick to cut off any further negotiations. I feel that our future moves should take account of this probable estimate on their part.

Thanks for the quote from Nehru which I am sure I will be able to put to good use.

Dave is now making and will send you a copy of the original Chinese text of Wang's letter of September 16 and all of his December 1 draft Agreed Announcement. I sent you all of the substantive portion of his draft by telegraph.

With respect to the proposed information campaign my principal thought is that the decision as to whether or not such a campaign should be carried on officially by the U.S. Government must be carefully related to our overall objectives with regard to these talks and



our relations with Communist China. I think we have to carefully distinguish between a campaign bearing the official imprimatur of the Government and articles and stories appearing in private publications. An official campaign will probably be interpreted by our own people as well as other countries, and the Chinese Communists, as a prelude to a break in these talks. If such is the intent, a campaign of this nature would of course be well suited to the purpose. With regard to Henderson's memo to Mr. Robertson, I think it would be completely idle to believe that such a campaign would result in expediting the release of imprisoned Americans. It would certainly counter any impression that we are, as the memo phrases it, softening our attitude towards Communist China, and correspondingly reduce whatever capital I believe we have gained by our strong position in proposing these talks and our renunciation of force position. As far as U.S. public opinion is concerned, my own feeling is that it is fully willing without any stimulation to follow and support whatever policies the administration believes best. It is only necessary for the administration clearly to enunciate its policies.

I want to make clear that the foregoing applies to an identified official program, and does not imply that I think that we should sit on naturally generated news stories and articles. If Bersohn, for example, has a good story and some magazine desires to publish it, I certainly would not discourage it. In fact I am inclined to think that it would be useful all around. However, I believe entirely different considerations are involved in an official program and that before starting such a program we should be absolutely clear as to our purposes and whether the means will accomplish the purpose.

If the situation in Prague permits, I want to take Pat and Jenifer down to Garmisch for a few days at the New Year and will let you know by telegram from Prague whether I am doing so. Someone will at all times be on watch here in Geneva and will be able to get in touch with me in a matter of hours at the most. It will also be possible for me to get from Garmisch down here by car in six or seven hours. I hope that you will, as in the past, send me at Prague anything you think I should see or have a chance to think about before the next meeting.

I hope that you are able to have a real vacation as you have certainly earned it.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*



**429. Telegram 1320 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 28, 1955, 6 p.m.

1320. From Gowen.

US-Chinese talks.

Representative Chinese Communist ConGen Geneva called today and handed me letter from Wang saying I might open it in absence Johnson as matter "very urgent." English text which accompanied Chinese text reads "Geneva December 28. Ambassador Johnson: Liu Yung-ming was Chinese student of bridge construction engineering Missouri University. He arrived in USA in 1947 and passed M.A. in 1949. In May 1949 he applied for return to China but he was not only prevented from leaving USA but also was regarded (sic) in mental disorder and sent to state hospital no. 4, Farmington, Missouri. From hospital he wrote his wife saying 'no freedom at all. No freedom for writing letters, separated from outside, nobody comes see me. Eagerly hope get out of this hell and return to arms my mother country as early as possible'. Since latter part of 1950 his family has never heard anything from him. His wife has once and again written and inquired of the hospital. Hospital merely replied occasionally that he would leave hospital as soon as he recovered. Since 1951 even replies from hospital were cut off. Recently I received letter from his family in which above situation mentioned. You are requested to make investigation into this serious matter and give me satisfactory answer. Signed Wang Ping-nan."

Understand Johnson will return Geneva on or about January 10.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–2855. Confidential; Priority.

**430. Telegram 194 to Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 30, 1955, 3:26 p.m.

194. For Ambassador.

(Code Room: Please repeat Geneva's 1320, December 28; control 13398)

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-2855. Confidential. Drafted by Nagoski; cleared by Johnson (EE).

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**431. Telegram 1338 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 5, 1956, 5 p.m.

1338. From Osborn.

Following is English text letter addressed Johnson delivered by representative CHICOM Consulate General to Consul General Gowen 3:25 today. As in case December 28 letter (Geneva's 1320) neither English nor Chinese text bears Wang's autograph. Signature is typed. Dated Geneva January 5.

BEGIN QUOTE

I have asked you, in letter of December 28, to investigate serious matter regarding Chinese student [*name not declassified*] who is prevented from returning to China, and give me satisfactory reply. I still wait your reply.

I have received 7 more letters from families of Chinese students in USA. It is mentioned in these letters that 7 Chinese students are prevented from returning to China as follows:

[*text not declassified*]

END QUOTE.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-556. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Prague Priority for the Ambassador as telegram 21.

**432. Telegram 1465 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 9, 1956, 7:04 p.m.

1465. For Johnson.

Guidance for January 12 meeting.

1. We believe at next meeting you should review at length course of discussions on renunciation of force issue. Such review will serve to summarize our position for record and refute Wang's accusations past several meetings that US has been stalling.

2. In opening, you should state that you are dealing with this subject now, only because at last meeting you agreed to comment on Communist counterproposal. Otherwise because of Communist public statements since last meeting, you would have devoted this meeting solely to presenting protest to Communist misrepresentation of Agreed Announcement and its failure to implement it. This you will deal with later.

3. You should emphasize that US first introduced subject of renunciation of force, and repeat your introductory statement October 8. Point out that Communists waited three weeks, then on October 27 introduced draft which not only fell far short of meeting US proposal, but introduced extraneous elements. Point out that on November 10, two weeks later, US presented draft which incorporated all points made when you introduced subject and also legitimate portions of Communist draft and should have been acceptable. Read draft. However, this not accepted by Communists, who after another three-week interval, on December 1 presented counterdraft which represented some improvement over their first proposal, but failed to meet essential requirements including that announcement apply to Taiwan area and provide for legitimate self-defense.

4. You should avoid linking your presentation directly to Wang's accusations that US stalling. You should not be on the defensive, but rather take the offensive, taxing Communists with undeniable fact that for three months they have refused to agree to reasonable proposal made by US and intended to prevent hostilities in Taiwan area.

5. Conclude your presentation with statement that US willing to make further effort to reach agreement on this issue and to this end introduces revision of Communist counterproposal repeat counterproposal of December 1. Then present draft Deptel 1466. This identical with that previously approved for your use, except word "means"

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–956. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and Phleger; cleared by McConaughy and in draft by Dulles and Sebald.

substituted for word "negotiations" in paragraph D in order broaden meaning and give more flexibility. This phrasing in line with language in Communist December 1 draft paragraph C.

6. You should then proceed to statement on implementation, stressing that you protest in strongest terms Communists attempt to claim that Agreed Announcement does not apply to imprisoned Americans, pointing out that their names were actually before parties and were being discussed when unequivocal statement regarding their expeditious repatriation was drafted and made public. These imprisoned Americans were ones about whom we had for previous weeks been actually making representations. Also protest failure of Communists to live up to their announcement and point out that this cannot but have serious effect on success of discussions. Obvious that progress depends upon good faith performance of agreements already reached.

7. FYI Deptel 1455 contains substance O'Neill's report on receipt of communications from five imprisoned Americans since last meeting.

8. Material for use in replying Communist charges Liu Yung-ming case and others telegraphed separately.

9. Do not agree on earlier date for next meeting than January 19.

**Dulles**

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#### 433. Telegram 1466 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 9, 1956, 7:04 p.m.

1466. For Johnson. Deptel 1465.

Following is U.S. revision of Chinese Communist counterproposal of December 1 to be introduced January 12 meeting:

BEGIN QUOTE

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, agree to announce:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-956. Secret, Priority, Limit Distribution. Drafted by Phleger and Clough; cleared in draft by Dulles and Sebald and by McConaughy.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China are determined that they will settle disputes between them through peaceful means and that, without prejudice to the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, they will not resort to the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere.

The two Ambassadors should continue their talks to seek practical and feasible means for the realization of this common desire.

END QUOTE

Dulles

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**434. Telegram 1467 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 9, 1956, 7:06 p.m.

1467. For Johnson. Your 1320.

You may inform Wang at next meeting that immediately upon receipt text his letter Department undertook investigation situation Liu Yung-ming. Hospital stated that although Liu not repeat not completely recovered, he now able to travel. US immigration authorities obtained transit visa for Hong Kong and have arranged his return. He sailed for Hong Kong on President Wilson January 8.

American Red Cross has also been investigating case in response to request from Madame Li Te-chuan and is in communication with her concerning case.

Indian Embassy, in response to Peiping request, took up Liu case with Department. On being informed of action taken to effect Liu's repatriation, Embassy expressed satisfaction and stated no action their part appeared necessary.

Dulles

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–2855. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared in draft by Dulles, Sebald, and Phleger and by McConaughy.

**435. Telegram 1468 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 9, 1956, 7:07 p.m.

1468. For Johnson. Your 1338.

You should inform Wang at next meeting that none repeat none of persons mentioned his letter is being prevented from leaving U.S. As you have repeatedly told him, there are no obstructions to Chinese leaving U.S. Furthermore, any Chinese who wants to go to China mainland and feels he is being obstructed is free to communicate with Indian Embassy. So far, Indian Embassy has not brought to attention of Department any such case.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-556. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy and in draft by Dulles, Phleger, and Sebald.

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**436. Letter 28 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 28

Washington, January 9, 1956

Dear Alex:

During the recess period we received a number of communications from the British concerning O'Neill's activities in Peiping. I am enclosing copies of those which I think you have not yet seen. Unfortunately they are not numbered in any way so there may be one or two missing. However, I believe you have received all important documents.

We are in the process of numbering all documents received from the British concerning O'Neill's work and we hope to maintain this file on a more systematic basis henceforth.

Sincerely yours,

**Ralph N. Clough**  
*Deputy Director for Chinese Affairs*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

Enclosures:

Memoranda dated 12/22, 12/29, 12/30, 12/31, and 1/5/56 from British Embassy.

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**437. Telegram 1351 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 11, 1956, 11 a.m.

1351. From Johnson. Re Deptel 1467.

Would appreciate prior tomorrow's meeting text any statement by INS re Liu and substance American Red Cross reply to Madame Li.

Would also appreciate any info that would assist me in answering probable question as to why nothing happened re Liu's case between attempted deportation 11951 when he presumably able travel and date Wang's letter.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1156. Confidential; Priority.

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**438. Telegram 1353 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 11, 1956, 2 p.m.

1353. From Johnson.

Would appreciate prior to tomorrow's meeting text any public reply that may have been made by then to Peiping Allegation of US overflight Manchuria carried FBIS item 1949 1/10 or any instructions on reply if Wang should raise subject.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1156. Confidential; Priority.

**439. Telegram 1475 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 11, 1956, 7:01 p.m.

1475. For Johnson. Your 1353.

No public reply made to Peiping allegation.

If Wang should raise subject you should reply this is irresponsible charge similar to others made in past and you do not intend to engage in discussion of it.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1156. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Clough.

**440. Telegram 1476 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 11, 1956, 7:02 p.m.

1476. For Johnson. Your 1351.

1. INS has issued no repeat no statement regarding Liu case.

2. American Red Cross telegraphed Madame Li January 6 that Liu scheduled depart San Francisco by boat January 8; that US Immigration handling arrangements in accordance with deportation proceedings instituted earlier; that Red Cross representative in Hong Kong would meet Liu and escort to border; and inquired whether Chinese Communist Red Cross would meet at border.

3. Red Cross representative saw Liu in San Francisco and provided him with toilet articles and cash for trip. Red Cross representatives in Honolulu, Yokohama and Manila also instructed lend any necessary assistance.

4. During period 1950 to 1954 hospital was in communication with Liu's father who asked that hospital continue to care for Liu. Hospital

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1156. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Clough.



has no record of correspondence from Liu's wife. Department's first information concerning her existence and interest in Liu's return contained in Wang's letter.

Dulles

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#### 441. Telegram 1362 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, January 12, 1956, 4 p.m.

1362. From Johnson.

1. I opened 32nd meeting today with prepared statement as follows:

A. You will recall that at our last meeting I said I would hope to be in position at this meeting to make further comments with regard to your counterproposal of December 1 for declaration by our two governments concerning renunciation of force.

B. However, I regret to note that your government has during interval since our last meeting undertaken most violent and unfounded propaganda campaign instead of taking any constructive action with regard to our agreement September 10 which would genuinely contribute to understanding between us. These unfounded propaganda attacks against my government appear to indicate an intention on part of your government to misuse agreement of September 10 to foster misunderstanding rather than to contribute to understanding between us. In view of this, I would think it well to devote this meeting solely to purpose of clarifying this situation and pointing out facts with regard to which side has thus far really failed to carry out September 10 agreement. Nevertheless, in light statements which I made at our last meeting, I will first discuss this morning your December 1 counterproposal with regard to renunciation of force.

C. I think it well to recall it was my government which initiated suggestion for clear understanding between us and public announcement on basic and fundamental question of whether our differences would be permitted to lead to war. You will recall I introduced this question first at September 28 meeting and again at meeting of October 5. Then more than three months ago at meeting of October 8 I made very carefully drawn statement fully setting forth position of my government in this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1256. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.

regard. I think it well to recall exactly what I said at that time. (I then repeated my introductory statement October 8 on renunciation of force and continued with prepared statement as follows:)

D. That statement took full account of issues between us and positions of your government with regard thereto. I was hopeful we would be able promptly to reach full understanding on substance thereof which would permit us to draft and issue suggested declarations. It was only three weeks later on October 27 you introduced draft which not only fell far short of specific proposal I had made October 8 but also introduced extraneous elements. I discussed this matter in detail with you at subsequent meetings and only two weeks later at meeting November 10 introduced draft which incorporated essential points which I had hoped in light of our discussions we were agreed upon. (I then went over my November 10 draft point by point.)

If there were genuine substantive agreement on part of your government with views of my government concerning vital importance of not permitting differences between us, including those in Taiwan area, to lead to war, I cannot understand why my draft Nov. 10 should not have been acceptable. However, your side not only refused to agree to this draft but took extreme position of rejecting it even as basis for discussion.

E. After another three week interval, on Dec. 1, you presented your counterdraft. As I indicated at the time, I felt this counterdraft represented some improvement over first proposal of your side. However, as I also pointed out at the time, your counterproposal failed to make it clear that announcement applied to Taiwan area as well as elsewhere. In light of statements you had made here, as well as public position of your government, it thus appeared your counterdraft might carry concealed reservation with respect to Taiwan area under which your government could, if it later so chose to do, initiate hostilities in Taiwan area on grounds situation there was purely domestic matter. Your draft also failed to provide for legitimate self-defense.

F. However, in further effort to reach agreement on this fundamental subject, (*see attached*) agreement we are willing to accept your counterproposal December 1 as basis for discussion. Subject to slight amendment to bring English text of second paragraph more fully into conformity with our understanding of Chinese text and an addition to cover question of self-defense, as well as question of whether declaration is considered to be applicable to Taiwan area, we are also prepared to accept all of language as well as form your December 1 counterdraft. In order make our suggestions clear I have prepared draft incorporating our amendments and additions to second paragraph. You will note that first and third paragraphs are identical with your December 1 counterdraft.

G. In making these suggested amendments I have taken full account of our discussion and believe I have entirely met your objections to my November 10 draft. (I then handed draft Deptel 1466 to Wang.)

H. As soon as you have had opportunity to study it, I will be glad to explain any points that may not be clear or discuss with you in greater detail changes we have suggested.

I. I desire subsequently to discuss with you today questions raised in your letters December 28 and January 5, as well as other matters related to September 10 announcement.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copies to FE & SS 1/12/56, 12:55 pm FMH (CWO)

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#### **442. Telegram 1363 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 12, 1956, 4 p.m.

1363. From Johnson.

1. Three hour twenty-five minute meeting this morning.

2. I opened with long statement on renunciation of force closely following outline Deptel 1465. After relatively cursory study my draft Wang rejected it, renewed charges US occupation Taiwan, and particularly centered attacks my amendments as renewed effort by US obtain PRC recognition validity US collective defense arrangements Taiwan area. He ended with prepared statement renewing charges US stalling and proposing this and subsequent meetings be "open". (Later in response questions he indicated that by "open" he meant release of communique giving full substance following each meeting).

There followed long give and take during which I stressed apparent significance failure their side during three months since my Oct. 8 proposal to agree to specific inclusion Taiwan in any statement, as well as pressed him on willingness include in statement recognition as general principle right individual and collective defense. There was long give and take toward end of which apparently recognizing weakness their public position on inclusion specific mention Taiwan, he stated would consider our amended draft if reference individual collective

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1256. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution.

self-defense removed. I expressed willingness consider any alternative formulation for inclusion this principle and emphasized weakness their position in refusing include it in public statement while admitting to validity during our discussion. However, was unable to shake him on this.

I then made statement on implementation accordance para 6 Deptel 1465, brief statement on Liu, and statement accordance Deptel 1468.

At close of meeting after I repeated my refusal to agree to open meetings he said "would leave this question open for time being" and referred to his statement at last meeting on issuance unilateral public statement on discussion agenda item 2, indicating that would probably make such a statement. In reply my questions as to where, when and text, he said "this matter has not been decided so far". I, of course, indicated that if they issued statement we would feel free make reply.

Suggest that if they do issue statement, text my opening statement at today's meeting would be good reply and am telegraphing full text separately "Niact".

Next meeting Jan. 19.

Gowen

Note: Advance copies to SS and FE 11:55 am, 1/12/56 (DES)

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#### 443. Telegram 1364 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, January 12, 1956, 8 p.m.

1364. From Johnson.

1. Wang responded my prepared statement (Mytel 1362) at opening 32d meeting January 12 by saying he had listened my statement this morning in which I had reviewed course discussion on item two. He had listened very carefully but could not hear anything new or constructive in statement.

2. Wang said this applies in particular to my remarks which discussed his draft of December 1. He recalled that when he introduced December 1 draft, I had expressed welcome and had said it represented

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1256. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

considerable advance in discussions. We have had prolonged discussion this matter of issuing announcement on this question.

3. Wang said he had glanced over amended draft I had presented this morning and while leaving aside details of wording and language, he noted that question of principle still remains. He noted I was again claiming alleged right of so-called individual and collective self-defense in Taiwan area.

4. Wang said US is today occupying island of Taiwan which Chinese territory. Under these circumstances US has absolutely no right speak of any self-defense in Taiwan area.

5. Wang said in my statement this morning I had made reference to fact US is member of UN and also made reference to number international treaties and pacts, but all this could not defend position of US in occupying territory of other countries. If US could claim right to self-defense in Taiwan area, Wang could say there is no more justice in world.

6. Wang said his side has long expressed itself un mistakeably on this matter, that it would never accept this position. Therefore he said that amendments presented by me at today's meeting unreasonable and unacceptable to his side. Such amendments as had been put forward this morning would not help in any way in settlement of matter before us. Nor would they help bring closer views of two sides.

7. Wang said I might recall that during discussion of second item it was US which initiated proposal of making announcement on renunciation force. PRC side has repeatedly met views of US side and put forward new draft of December 1. Thus it could be said PRC side has moved several steps forward on this matter.

8. Wang said in this draft of PRC side it clearly stated that on basis of UN Charter, both sides should settle disputes between them by peaceful means without resorting to threat or use force. This not only conforms with desire of people of our two countries but also conforms with the desires of peace-loving peoples of world.

9. Wang said however for three meetings in succession US side has failed make any comments on his draft and fact that after long recess US side should suggest such terms and wording as had long been categorically rejected by PRC side could not but cause doubt as to whether US side has sincere desire arrive at agreement.

10. Wang said at same time he wanted point out that recently American military aircraft have been making encroachment on their territorial air and American "top brass" have gone to Taiwan to step up military preparations. All this conclusively proves that US bent on increasing tension in Taiwan area.

11. Wang said further, according press reports, US Air Force Secretary Quarles has gone so far as to indicate that outlying islands around Taiwan

are American bases in Far East. Thus it apparent that it intention of US side to require PRC side to recognize status quo of American occupation Taiwan as well as coastal islands controlled by Chiang Kai-shek clique. This position of US side can never be tolerated by PRC side.

12. Wang said all these events cannot but alarm PRC side and create doubts among Chinese as to whether US side is genuinely sincere in stated desire settle disputes between two countries.

13. Wang said, in view of fact that US is creating tension and in view of attitude of US side in deliberately stalling talks, all of which not in conformity with purpose and aims these talks, therefore PRC side demands that these meetings be public so that issues may be judged by world opinion. Also PRC side is obliged give account to Chinese people of proceedings these talks. That was PRC side's opinion on question we had just discussed.

14. I said in reply that first I didn't believe they'd had sufficient time fully consider my suggested changes and that I hoped they would do so. I thought probably first question between us, often discussed here, is question of whether we considered statement applied to Taiwan area. My suggestion from beginning on October 8 was that we make this specifically clear.

15. I said my understanding of their position had always been that they would consider such statement as applicable to Taiwan area. However, they had objected to form in which it was previously made on grounds this would prejudice their position on Taiwan area.

16. I said that I had stated in as many ways as I possibly could that our intention was not to get them to say anything that would prejudice pursuit of their policies by peaceful means, that this was made clear in our October eight statement and our November 10 draft, but that they had objected to form in which it was set forth in that draft.

17. I said we were both agreed that most serious problem facing our two sides was precisely in Taiwan area, and that question therefore appeared to me to be not whether any agreement applied to Taiwan area but whether it clearly stated this.

18. I said that they had talked previously, and at great length this morning, of sincerity. I said my government had over and over proposed and I again proposed this morning that both sides sincerity be demonstrated by specifically relating our agreement to Taiwan area. This would assure world which as he had rightly said had longed for peace, that neither side had any concealed reservations in this regard.

19. I said I had over and over pointed out problem wasn't one of form of words which either side variously interprets, but lay in reaching genuine agreement which could be put into words. To do otherwise certainly could not contribute to peace. I was reluctant to place

interpretation that might well be placed on their adamant refusal to permit any mention of Taiwan area.

20. I then said in regard to second point—mention of individual and collective self-defense—I would have considered they would have regarded it as important as we did. It was my understanding their government did not deny right of individual and collective self-defense to itself or to any other country. My understanding had been that their side objected to form of our November 10 draft because they felt it prejudiced their position on Taiwan area. Again, in honest effort to meet their point on this, in this draft we had tried to introduce this idea in form that would not do so.

21. I suggested that we go over exactly what that second para said. What it said was we were determined to settle our disputes by peaceful means and that certainly neither of us objected to that. Then it said we would not resort to force in Taiwan area or elsewhere. This was certainly clear and specific and I could not see why there could be any objection to that language. It then said that in stating this principle both sides wished to make it clear it was without prejudice to right of individual and collective self-defense. This was stated as general principle and I could not see what possible objection there could be to its inclusion in draft.

22. I said this second para as presently drafted would go as far as words could to show there was understanding between us. That if there was objection as to wording that revealed understanding between us was not as clear as I had thought.

23. I said they again this morning had discussed our dispute in Taiwan area and certainly our first task was to make certain this dispute did not lead to hostilities. If threat of force was clearly removed from that dispute, there was hope questions between us could, in that atmosphere, be discussed and resolved. I said draft I had proposed this morning should accomplish this purpose and I had hoped they would give it further study in light of my remarks.

24. I said I was not exactly clear about what they meant by their proposal to make our meetings open. I understood that in normal international usage, “open” meant public would attend our meetings. Or was their proposal that at close of each meeting press would be given full account of meeting by each of us.

25. I said in either event it was difficult for me to see how this could contribute to progress of our discussions. It seemed to me in either of these events, it would tend to make our meetings platforms from which each would speak to his public, rather than place for our negotiating and reaching understanding.

26. I said I was certainly willing that our respective positions be laid before public. I was certainly willing that public be informed of

their categorical and sweeping rejection of any mention of Taiwan area in any statement of agreement growing out of our discussions. I was sure public would have difficulty in understanding that in three months which had passed since we had made our proposal, their government was still unwilling to make it clear it did not have concealed reservations on Taiwan area in any statement on renunciation of force.

27. I said that however, I didn't see how all of this would contribute to our making further progress in our discussion and if this was attitude of their government, I wondered whether it really desired that we make progress. As I as well as my government was interested in making progress, I was unable to agree that we abrogate our agreement that nature of these meetings be private, and I was unable to agree either that meetings be open to public or press be informed substance each meeting.

28. I said I still felt interests and relations between two of us and cause of peace could best be served by keeping our discussions on frank open level that was possible under present arrangement and by informing general public of our agreements when we had reached them, rather than by informing the world of our disagreements as they came up here.

29. Wang said that other side had just asserted that Chinese side had not had sufficient time to study draft presented by US side. As to ideas US side has brought up, Chinese side had always been willing to give full consideration to those which were constructive, but he had to say that draft presented today did not contain anything new or constructive. All those amendments US side had presented that morning had been subject to long and tedious discussions, and during course of these Chinese side had on many occasions expressed its firm opposition.

30. Wang said he was sure US Ambassador was fully acquainted with course of discussions, in which it could be seen clearly how far Chinese side had moved and how the US side still stuck to its original position without making any progress. Views presented by US side had repeatedly been rejected by Chinese side, yet they have again been advanced, and Chinese side could not give consideration to them.

31. Wang said that in particular, he noted that US side had again advanced point concerning individual and collective self-defense. Naturally, it was a matter of principle that every state was entitled to right of self-defense and Chinese were prepared to recognize this. However, question was as to where it was to be applied, because there can be no objection if US exercises this right on its own territory.

32. Wang said that if, on other hand, it were on territory of another country, then certainly it could lay no claims to self-defense. When Japan in 1937 began its aggression against China, she also claimed this action was in self-defense. However, no people in world then recognized that



as such and none could be persuaded that Japan's action was taken in self defense. Therefore, there should be a clear definition and understanding as to this word self-defense and this word must not be arbitrarily abused.

33. Wang said that as to question US side had raised regarding whether peaceful solution of disputes between our two countries applied to Taiwan area, as he had repeatedly declared this did concern Taiwan area. The peaceful solution of disputes between two countries also applied to Taiwan area.

34. Wang said as to openness of meetings: it was not meant that public would be admitted to this conference room. But he meant the content of our discussion be released to press. Hence, as US side clearly recalled, at outset of talks he had followed US suggestion that these talks should be held private and this arrangement have no set time limit. The Chinese side throughout has observed these two rules in hope that it would permit full exchange of views, frankly, and would settle issues between us, and finally reach agreements.

35. Wang said Chinese side felt these rules had been useful to our discussion in initial stages. And facts showed that after forty days discussion we did reach our first agreement on the return of civilians. That also showed there was common desire between two sides to arrive at agreement and Chinese had expressed their welcome to such a spirit. Thus it showed that provided both sides shared a common desire to solve their common issues, these issues would be capable of resolution. For example, last September between Soviet Union and German Federal Republic. As we knew, relations were rather tense; however, after one week's discussion they did arrive at an agreement simply because of their common desire to reach an agreement, and hence there were favorable results.

36. Wang said that since last September 14 we had begun to discuss item two. It was now four months. This was not a short time. If there did exist common desire between two sides to settle issues between them, he should say that the two would have been able to reach many agreements instead of only one agreement. However, after four months both still found themselves deadlocked in the same place, and found themselves incapable of agreeing on simple announcement after all this time.

37. Wang said questions between us not only concern peoples of our two countries but also concern people of whole world. They, however, are not informed about our talks and of what has taken place. Now people ask why after such long time discussion, you people have obtained no result. As to Chinese side, they have always wanted an agreement to be reached between two so that Chinese Government could make account to its people as to what had happened. We have

wasted lots of time. Chinese side considers there has been deliberate stalling in talks. This is why Chinese side suggested we make meetings open: so that people will realize what issues between us are. That is what Chinese side considers responsible attitude toward people.

38. I said he had said that if we shared common desire to reach agreement we should be able to do so. I most thoroughly agreed. That is what I had been trying to find out.

39. I said clear back on October eight I had said that US was willing to make declaration that we were determined our differences should not lead to war. I made it clear that US was desirous and willing, in order that there be no misunderstanding between us or in world, that this would specifically apply to area in which our most serious dispute existed, that is area of Taiwan. I made it clear this did not involve in any way and it was not intention US in these talks involve rights and interests third parties. Nor was there any intention to prejudice peaceful pursuit of our several national policies. Yet after three months their government still unwilling publicly to make such statement. It was difficult to understand why, if Chinese considered that such statement applied to Taiwan area, as he had stated, why he would be unwilling to do so.

40. I said I did not agree that we had not made progress—I believed we had made some. I believed discussions had been useful. Insofar as responsibility for failure thus far to agree on text of announcement on renunciation of force—it is very clear.

41. Wang said US side had remarked that our exchange views had been useful, but he did not see how it had been useful. If it were really useful, it should have been demonstrated in progress toward solution of issues between us.

42. Wang said as to wording of text, if phrase concerning right to individual and collective self-defense could be removed, then Chinese side could give consideration to mention of Taiwan area. However, if we fail reach agreement on text of declaration, responsibility squarely on US side.

43. I asked if he objected to principle of individual and collective self-defense.

44. Wang said that principle was all right but could not apply to Taiwan area. US attempting to exercise this right in Taiwan area would be abuse.

45. I asked if he intended to tell United States in what countries it could have arrangements for individual and collective self-defense. As I understood it, their country had individual and collective self-defense arrangements with other countries but I had never raised question here.

46. Wang said they had such arrangements but they had them on their own territory and they had never gone thousands of miles across

sea to US. Suppose Chinese had military strength to occupy San Francisco and then clamored about self-defense. Could US consent to this?

47. I asked whether I could understand that they had no objection to principle but felt its mention in this context prejudiced their position in dispute between us in Taiwan area.

48. Wang said it was not thus. Chinese agree that every country has this right of self defense, but question is not that this prejudices their position but that US has no right to claim self-defense in Taiwan area. And in exactly same manner China has no right to set foot on San Francisco and claim self-defense.

49. I said that I did not believe he had gotten point of my question. Question of validity of our defense arrangements in Taiwan area was matter of dispute between us. Chinese Govt had one view, my government had another. I did not propose to discuss or try to resolve this problem with him. That was element in differences of views we had respecting Taiwan area. As I had told him, I had no intention demanding any statement from them that would prejudice their view in that regard. What I was saying was it was desirable we both make it clear we weren't thereby renouncing our respective rights of self-defense. I had tried to accomplish both purposes in this draft. If Chinese have suggestions as to another method of reaching this, I was willing listen.

50. Wang said in whatever way I might put this matter, present US occupation Taiwan was flagrant violation of international law. No matter how US was trying to defend itself, history would pass final judgment. US had asked whether Chinese side had any other views on draft announcement. He said his side had made its greatest effort and could not go further. As Wang had said, if US would accept their proposal to remove individual and collective self-defense from text, then Chinese would give consideration to draft. Otherwise, they could only consider that US was deliberately obstructing issuance of such announcement.

51. I said how he could call inclusion of statement of what I thought was universally recognized principle of individual and collective self defense obstruction, I could not understand. I had thought they would have considered it of equal importance. As I had made clear, I would be glad to consider any other formula they would like to propose. I wanted to be clear: was it that under no circumstances whatever and under no conditions that they would consider inclusion of any such phrases in any statement we might make?

52. Wang said that dispute between us in Taiwan area was what was under discussion and in this respect they could not acknowledge US right to individual and collective self-defense. It was matter of principle. This was not acceptable. Question was not that there should be any further suggestions from Chinese side but from the US side. And new suggestions should come from US side.

53. I said that I entirely disagreed and that unless we both here were willing together to work things out, I did not see how it was possible to reach agreement. Negotiation was not a matter of unilateral concessions, it was a matter of attempts to reach common agreements. I had, with these few minor changes, accepted form and words of their draft. This contrasted strongly with their refusal to accept my November 10 draft even as basis of discussion. As I saw it, principal question between us was whether there should be any mention of individual and collective self defense in any agreement. I had tried to do so in manner agreeable to them. I had expressed willingness to consider any other formula that they considered would better fit their position. It was hard for me to see how I could go further.

54. Wang said his points had also been made clear. He could go no further than that.

55. I said that it did not seem that any further discussion today was useful. I had nothing further on this if he had not.

56. Wang said he had made his position very clear on this matter.

57. I then said if agreeable to Wang I would turn to other subject. I read prepared statement on implementation as follows:

In previous meetings, I have frequently stated my belief that two of us here ought to be prepared to bring up and discuss frankly any questions which may arise as to implementation agreed announcement September 10. I held this opinion because of my conviction that by so doing we could best iron out differences of opinion, and contribute to speedy and faithful implementation our agreement. This, I felt, would aid progress talks with respect other items as well.

A. It was, of course, not my intention that two of us should attempt to go beyond provisions agreed announcement, nor to reopen issues which were discussed and settled before issuance September 10 announcement. I have, for example, avoided bringing up for discussion here cases of Americans in your country where there was no evidence desire return. I have carefully confined my remarks to those cases covered by agreed announcement, that is, Americans who clearly desire return and who have not yet been permitted to do so in accordance with terms September 10 announcement, and to those cases where UK repeat UK Charge has encountered difficulty or obstruction in carrying out his clearly defined functions.

B. Recently I have noted your official organs again appear publicly and otherwise to be attempting through an involved process of reasoning to create false impression Americans remaining in prison your country are not covered by agreed announcement. We have here discussed this subject at great length and I had hoped had arrived at understanding in this regard. I simply want again to repeat my government most emphatically cannot agree with statements of your government in this

regard. Our September 10 agreed announcement draws no distinction whatever between those Americans in prison and those denied exit permits for one reason or another. We both well know that at time we issued September 10 announcement only Americans in your country of whom we had knowledge desiring return and being prevented from doing so were those in prison. It was in this context our statement drafted, agreed upon and released. Unless unequivocal words of that statement and our discussions leading up to it are entirely without meaning with respect to this group Americans, they most definitely are covered by September 10 agreed announcement, and my government absolutely rejects any efforts now to allege this is not case.

C. I again must most seriously call to your attention fact that by no stretch of imagination or interpretation of plain meaning of words can it be considered Americans imprisoned your country are being permitted exercise their right expeditious return US in accordance terms that announcement. I have repeatedly pointed out failure fully implement this agreement during increasing passage of time cannot but have increasingly serious effect on success our discussions of other subjects here.

D. I now refer to questions raised your letters December 28 and January 5 concerning implementation by my government of agreed announcement.

E. Immediately upon receipt your December 28 letter my authorities looked into situation of Liu Yung-ming. Liu has been hospitalized at public expense since 1949 with serious case chronic schizophrenia. Although he was not yet completely recovered, it was determined he was able to travel and arrangements were made by my authorities for him depart January 8 for Hong Kong by steamer President Wilson.

F. With respect to persons mentioned your letter January 5, I can assure you none of them are being prevented from leaving US. In addition, I again assure you there are no obstructions to Chinese leaving US. Furthermore, any Chinese who feels he is being obstructed in proceeding your country is entirely free communicate with Indian Embassy. Thus far Indian Embassy has not brought to attention of my government any such case.

58. Wang replied in extemporaneous statement that he glad learn Liu Yung-ming on way home. However he must note that from this case it could be seen US has not been carrying out agreed announcement very well.

59. Wang said next as to question of American nationals residing in China and Americans in prison for offenses in China, PRC side expressed its position definitely and clearly in course our discussions. Any ordinary American resident in China free leave country any time upon application. Even in cases Americans who have violated law in

China, he noted that two-thirds of total have already been permitted leave.

60. Wang said if we view this matter in light of terms of American offenders in China he might well cite case of Father Rigney who had been sentenced to ten years. However, he only served five years and was granted release. Rigney was released five years in advance expiration of term. Was this not case of expeditious return? Wang would say it was very expeditious indeed.

61. Wang said however, PRC nationals residing in US find selves in very different situation. US Government has thus far not furnished PRC side with name list of all Chinese nationals in US nor has it given assistance Indian Embassy to carry out its functions. Nor has US Government given any account of Chinese imprisoned in US. Yet US Government been coercing Chinese students in US to secure entry permits Taiwan.

62. Wang said recently many exposures been made in cases of Chinese students in US who being obstructed from returning China. Chinese could not feel satisfied with this state affairs. All this violation of agreed announcement. They demanded that US faithfully implement provisions agreed announcement and withdraw any requirements that run counter to agreement.

63. In reply I said I not clear what Wang's allegation was. Agreed announcement says no obstruction will be offered to departure civilians. I had told Wang in detail of steps we had taken implement that. Agreed announcement says anyone who desires return but feels he encountering obstruction will be free communicate Indian Embassy. I had assured Wang that any Chinese in US free do so. I knew of no allegation or evidence that anyone been prevented from communicating with Indian Embassy.

64. I said I not clear therefore as to whether his statement referred to freedom communicate with Indian Embassy. Indian Embassy entirely free investigate any such case. I knew of no case in which Indian Embassy has stated it being obstructed in carrying out this function. Agreed announcement says that US will accept representations from Indian Embassy when it feels there has been any obstruction contrary to agreed announcement. As I had already stated this morning, thus far US had not received any communication from Indian Embassy with respect any such case. If we did, Wang could be sure it would be promptly acted upon.

65. Wang said as far as Chinese in US concerned they had learned that some of them have not been informed of agreed announcement, others find their freedom communicate obstructed. This state affairs must be improved by US. Compulsion of Chinese students in US to

secure entry permits Taiwan was matter of mental torture towards these Chinese students.

66. Wang said he had list of three persons in US and he was requesting me make investigation about them. (He then handed me list, telegraphed separately, containing names Tan Yu-min, Teng Hsien-jung, Yuan Jui-hsiang). In this list they had detailed information known to PRC side including place residence, profession, as well as time since they last heard of.

67. I said, of course I had no way of forcing Chinese in US to write to people in China. They free do so if they wanted to. However, in speaking of obstruction, I wanted be clear, was allegation that Chinese in US not free communicate with Indian Embassy?

68. Wang said his statement included cases in which freedom of communication with Indian Embassy been obstructed.

69. I asked whether that applied these three on list.

70. Wang said that was different matter. These three were missing, no information from them. Their families have lost contact with them.

71. I said, to get back to my question, is the allegation that people being prevented from communicating with Indian Embassy?

72. Wang said there had been cases in which freedom of communication been obstructed.

73. I asked if Wang could give me any details on these cases.

74. Wang said they would give me such details whenever he found it necessary.

75. I said it is all very simple. If Chinese want to return, they free do so. I knew of no such case in which any person has been in any way prevented from communicating with Indian Embassy.

76. I said then our next meeting would be next Thursday.

77. Wang said he had suggested that as from today our meetings be made open and he had given his reasons. He didn't know how I felt on this.

78. I said I had told him I did not agree.

79. Wang said if I unable agree, then should we leave question open for time being. However I would recall that at last meeting during discussion second item of agenda, he had told me his side going to make public statement on that matter which was discussed between us.

80. I asked him if he was going to do that.

81. Wang said they were going to make public statement.

82. I said that was entirely matter their choice, but US would have to consider making reply.

83. Wang said that was matter of our freedom.

84. I asked if I could get copy of text.



85. Wang said when text been received he would send it to me.  
86. I asked when and where would be released. Here or Peiping?  
87. Wang said this matter not been decided so far.  
88. We then agreed next meeting would be Thursday January 19.

**Gowen**

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**444. Telegram 1365 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 13, 1956, 10 a.m.

1365. From Johnson.

Fol list handed me by Wang January 12 meeting (para 66 Mytel 1364):

*[text not declassified]*

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1356. Confidential; Limited Distribution.

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**445. Telegram 1366 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 13, 1956, noon

1366. From Johnson.

Comments on yesterday's meeting.

Believe Wang was under firm instructions make proposal on open meetings as well as, in event we did not substantially accept their December 1 draft, to implement December 22 threat on unilateral statement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1356. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.



Believe our strong review history negotiations on renunciation force, and form in which we introduced our amendments their draft, well anticipated their tactic and created some confusion and doubt as to strength their public position even on agenda item two. Until very close of meeting was hopeful I had succeeded in dissuading them from persisting in threat to open meetings or going to public.

However, believe substantial gain accomplished in their tentative acceptance inclusion specific mention Taiwan in a statement which regardless of its exact wording would as political document commit CHICOMS in public mind to renunciation of use force in attempting upset status quo.

Negotiating position with respect next meeting was left somewhat confused, this portion January 12 meeting closing on note Wang's adamant refusal consider any mention individual and collective self-defense and I not giving any indication willingness consider any formula which did not include this principle.

Possible implication Wang's position could be willingness carry his position at close Jan 12 meeting to point of threatening actual or virtual break at next meeting unless we yield on self-defense clause. It possible this could be done as negotiating tactic, with intention yielding at meeting after next, or that by next meeting CHICOMS will perceive weakness their position on this and shift ground. However, I should also be prepared for contingency threat would be genuine.

Therefore, would appreciate my instructions for next meeting covering whether if necessary it is desired maintain my present position on inclusion self-defense clause up to point of actual or virtual break. Only by doing so could I completely test strength position he may adopt this regard. At same time would not want to be placed in position of appearing yield on this point in response threat of break by Wang.

With respect implementation Wang showed no enthusiasm for discussion (it was almost 1 p.m. when this introduced) and his replies were perfunctory and along familiar lines. With respect first sentence para 6 Deptel 1465 believe it important, particularly in any public output, to note their position and particularly Wang's position with me since our early exchanges on subject is more subtle than just asserting that agreed announcement does not apply to imprisoned Americans. Position is that there is "distinction" between those "who have committed crimes" and those who have not. With regard to those "who have committed crimes" PRC is taking "further measures" accordance agreed announcement and "expeditious" must be read in relation to "seriousness their crimes" etc. This also brought

out in Jan 6 Peiping Foreign Office spokesman statement and again in my exchange with Wang Jan 12.

Seems to me our best negotiating and public position is to reiterate simple and publicly understandable charge of failure release "expeditiously" accordance clear Sept 10 commitment rather than give currency any doubt imprisoned Americans covered by agreed announcement.

As sidelight Wang introduced two new assistants yesterday, Lai Ya-li and Wang Pao-liu replacing Lin and Li. (Am transmitting separate tel asking for available bio). On Tuesday met Wang together with Wang Pao-liu in Prague airport they apparently having come from Warsaw. Prague we traveled by same plane to Zurich. Wang used all of his very limited English in taking initiative congenially greet me, introduce Wang Pao-liu and some innocuous conversation while we were waiting board plane.

**Gowen**

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**446. Telegram 1369 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 13, 1956, 2 p.m.

1369. From Johnson.

Lai Ya-Li (Matthews 3776, 7225, 3920) and Wang Pao-Liu (7037, 4946, 4080) respectively, replaced Li and Lin on CHICOM Ambassadorial delegation yesterday. Request biographic information.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1356. Confidential.

**447. Telegram 1496 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 16, 1956, 7:02 p.m.

1496. For Johnson.

Guidance for January 19 meeting.

1. Point out that at last meeting in attempt to meet all legitimate Communist points, you had introduced amendment to their counter proposal of December 1. This amendment did not change essential features of Communist proposal, but for purpose of preventing future misunderstanding of scope and meaning, had introduced two clarifying insertions a) making clear it applied to Taiwan area, and b) that it was not intended to deny inherent right of two sides to individual and collective self-defense.

2. Refer to Wang's statement last meeting that Communists would be willing consider inclusion specific mention Taiwan area in renunciation of force declaration. This represents step forward and leaves only self-defense issue standing in way of agreement.

3. Insist on necessity to include provision for individual and collective self-defense for protection of rights of both sides. This cannot possibly be objectionable to either side since it is right long recognized by international law. It is expressly provided for in Article 51 of UN Charter. Having raised point, if US were now to agree to remove this provision from declaration on renunciation of force, it could be construed as a waiver by both sides of this inherent right and US cannot agree to this. You should point out that this is not designed in any way to commit Communists to renounce pursuit of their policies by peaceful means with respect to Taiwan, as was stated in your November 10 draft.

4. FYI. You should hold firm on this point. Department considers Communists unlikely break over this, for they would find their position difficult to defend publicly. However, even if Communists should break on this, Department considers it impossible to yield to Communist demand since this could be claimed by Communists to be relinquishment US right to enter collective defense arrangements in Taiwan area, and indeed its right to defend its ships and forces, and to participate in defense of offshore islands, if it decides to do so should they be attacked by Communists. END FYI

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1656. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Phleger and Clough; cleared in draft by Dulles and by McConaughy and Sebald.

5. You should repeat arguments used last meeting, again reviewing course of negotiations and emphasizing US initiative on renunciation of force issue, and its having met every legitimate Communist proposal.

6. Make strong statement on implementation, concentrating on Communist failure fulfill Agreed Announcement expeditiously. Expose absurdity of Communist allegations that US obstructing departure Chinese by citing Baltimore Sun article on Liu An-hua. Avoid implying that US has obligation or intention to investigate individuals named by Wang in absence any evidence that individuals in question being obstructed from going to Communist China. Wang's inability produce such evidence proves hollowness his charges. Weakness of Wang's position provides you opportunity take offensive as you did last meeting.

7. If Wang should renew demand that substance of discussions be made public, you should state that progress to date made possible by private character of discussions and detailing them to public would only hinder success. US has nothing to hide but has no desire transform talks from serious discussion into propaganda contest.

8. FYI British learned on good authority in Peiping that Wang was there December 31.

**Dulles**

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#### 448. Airgram 173 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

A-173

Washington, January 16, 1956

For Johnson.

Your 1369. No data on Wang Pao-liu.

Lai Ya-li has been Deputy Director of General Office of CHICOM Fonmin since October 1949, office headed by Wang Ping-nan until 1955. Lai apparently social scientist, reportedly once was secretary to General Feng Yu-hsiang. CHICOMS publicly identify Lai as member Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, but intelligence reports he Communist. In February 1949, reportedly arrived in Peiping as member delegation "democratic personages" from Manchuria. Same year, participated in first All-China Youth Conference, elected to National Committee All-China Federation Democratic Youth. Apparently relinquished connection

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1356. Confidential. Drafted by Nagoski.

youth organizations before 1953. In 1949, joined preparatory committee Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, became Executive Committee member and Deputy Secretary General Association. Relieved of these assignments by late 1954.

As Fonmin official, accompanied Chou to Moscow January 1950 for Sino-Soviet negotiations. Only other known trip outside China: In 1952 headed Sino-Soviet Friendship Association delegation to Mongolian-Soviet cultural conference in Ulan Bator.

Was delegate from Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee to Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and has been one of directors Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.

**Dulles**

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#### **449. Letter 29 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 29

Washington, January 16, 1956

Dear Alex:

We are trying to be more forehanded in getting out the guidance for your meetings. We are now having our preliminary session on Saturday preceding the Thursday meeting. This enables us to get out the first draft of the telegram by Monday morning. If all goes well we can get the Secretary's approval on Monday and dispatch the telegram before the close of business on that day. I believe you will agree that the extra day's margin is a good thing. We met with the Secretary last Monday, the 9th for about 45 minutes. He personally approved your instructions after making slight changes. I believe you will be interested in knowing that he continues to follow the talks closely notwithstanding the ever-mounting pressures on him. He gave no indication at the last meeting that he felt any change of tack on our part was needed. So there is no reason to expect any new departure in your guidance in the absence of agreement on the renunciation of force item and satisfactory implementation of the agreed announcement, or some other major move by the Chinese Communists.

I am enclosing a copy of the Shepley article on the Secretary from the January 16 issue of Life Magazine. In view of the flurry this article

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

has caused here we are taking no chances of your not having it. It is possible that it will either be mentioned by Wang or will influence the Chinese Communist tactics in some way. In any event it would be well for you to know what it says. Judge Phleger remarked on Saturday undoubtedly the article would receive close study in Peiping. He felt that it would probably have an influence on Peiping moves although it could not be predicted what the influence would be. It might well have something of a restraining and sobering effect, although the possibility of a different reaction could not be ruled out.

Mr. Robertson, Judge Phleger, Bill Sebald and I all agree that we cannot agree to any deletion of the provision for individual and collective self defense from a renunciation of force declaration. Your instructions as now drafted reflect this position. It seems clear to us that Wang's strategy is to tie our hands in the Taiwan area by getting us to renounce the right of self defense there. Then, by Chinese Communist reasoning, there would be no occasion for them to exercise any right of self defense in an "international" dispute and they could deal with the Chinese Nationalists as a domestic insurrectionary element the same as they would with an insurrection in Fukien Province.

My reaction to Wang's request that the talks be opened up, is that it indicates something of a turning point. I take it as a major decision probably growing out of Wang's reported consultation in Peiping. While it may have been something of a bluff, they had to be prepared for the possibility that we would call the bluff. It could mean that despite our not calling them they are prepared to make a unilateral move, although it may be significant that today, four days after Wang made the threat, there is still no public statement out of Peiping. At the least, Wang's move would seem to indicate that the Chinese Communists no longer have any real hope of getting what they want out of these talks. They undoubtedly expect to get a relaxation of the trade controls but figure that it will fall in their laps without their having to negotiate for it at Geneva. I dislike our being put in a position of seeming to want secret negotiations and seeming to fear publicity as to what is going on in the talks. It is the supposed secrecy that has led to the misunderstanding of the talks which has hurt us, especially in the Far East. Our public position at a later stage could be harmed by an insistence now on preserving the private nature of the talks. However I concede that no further progress would be possible if we abandon the private nature of the talks. The opposing positions would be instantly frozen. However, it is a question whether any further progress will be made anyhow. The clincher argument for trying to continue the private character of the talks is that the chance of protracting the talks for a while longer is certainly better if neither side goes to the public.

I was sorry to be away on the day of your meeting. I was up at the Naval War College making a speech on “U.S. Security Arrangements in the Far East”.

I hope Wang will not bring up anything on alleged Chinese prisoners in American penitentiaries. We are continuing to make preliminary investigation against that contingency.

Regards to all four of you, commendations from all of us here, and continued good luck to you,

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Article from Life Magazine
2. Article from Baltimore Sun

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#### **450. Telegram 1387 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 17, 1956, 5 p.m.

1387. From Johnson.

1. Appreciate and entirely concur guidance Deptel 1496 re renunciation force.

2. Believe CHICOM failure thus far make public statement in spite Wang's statement last meeting indicates they appreciate weakness their public position and greatly strengthens my hand.

3. In view their failure make public statement, believe I should be prepared for unlikely but possible contingency Wang may attempt force my hand at next meeting by eventually agreeing to our amended draft and pressing for prompt issuance. I would, of course, utilize every possibility of delaying any decision to at least next following meeting including necessity referring to Dept any changes whatever in text. However, if he should fully accept my text would appreciate Department's instructions regarding issuance statement. Would suggest that same pattern be followed as with September 10 agreed announcement, that is, would agree with Wang on release time by

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1756. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

both us here, text to be made available press by Department shortly thereafter, together with such further comment as Department considered desirable.

4. For following reasons question suggested reply on Liu An-hua: (A) I have in past consistently deprecated Wang's attempts use US or other press sources as reliable foundation for discussion in our talks. If I cite press source as official answer his inquiry re Liu An-hua I open door for him throw back at me my previous statements this regard and confront me with press stories that may in whole or part be favorable CHICOM position. (B) If I reply concerning Liu An-hua even by reference news story difficult avoid implication acceptance obligation reply other cases. Failure do so might then carry implication facts other cases not favorable to us.

5. Wang has thus far carefully avoided specifically charging any individuals named are being denied rights under agreed announcement and is cleverly couching request more on whereabouts and welfare grounds. As by-product to major objective of offsetting weakness their public position arising from failure release imprisoned Americans they hope thereby also lay "humanitarian" basis for justifying enlargement Indian Embassy functions into this field. Another by-product would be utilize our failure reply in meetings to expand precedent of Red Cross channel established Liu Yung-ming's case.

6. This exercise also partially fishing expedition in hope finding case some Chinese who is imprisoned with which belabor us for another Liu Yung-ming case.

7. Believe position we adopt should be consistent with position we have thus far taken with respect O'Neill taking initiative in visiting imprisoned Americans as well as whereabouts and welfare inquiries concerning Americans we may in future desire to make either directly here or through UK repeat UK.

8. Therefore, with respect this aspect for next meeting suggest I avoid direct reply concerning any individuals named by Wang keeping discussion as at last meeting strictly to US performance under agreed announcement and CHICOM failure produce any specific evidence of failure fully implement announcement. Believe I can make more effective presentation exposing hollowness Wang's charges and cynical nature CHICOM attempt throw up smokescreen without specifically mentioning Liu An-hua case. Would, of course, continue avoid any implication US has obligation investigate individual cases in absence such evidence.



9. In meanwhile suggest VOA make full world-wide use excellent material on Liu An-hua contained Baltimore Sun article as refutation Peiping broadcasts.

Gowen

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**451. Telegram 1507 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 17, 1956, 4:44 p.m.

1507. For Johnson.

According Dutch Embassy, Dutch Mission Peiping learned from diplomatic colleague who had spoken to Wang Ping-nan that latter was in Peiping January 1. Wang reportedly remarked to informant Chinese Communists were concerned at lack progress in Geneva talks.

Dutch Mission reports general view among diplomatic corps Peiping is that Communists do not desire break off talks but are seeking means exert greater pressure on U.S.

Dulles

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1756. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Lancaster (WE).

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**452. Telegram 1512 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 17, 1956, 8:19 p.m.

1512. For Johnson. Your 1387.

1. If Wang should accept our amended draft without change and press for immediate announcement, you should inform him question of

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1756. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Sebald, Phleger in draft, and McConaughy.

timing announcement must be referred Washington and propose special meeting mutually satisfactory date during week beginning January 23 to make final arrangements for release day following such meeting. Department would agree to release first in Geneva and by Department shortly thereafter.

2. You given full discretion as to whether to refer to newspaper article Liu An-hua. FYI VOA broadcasting Liu An-hua case worldwide and seeking similar stories on other individuals mentioned by Wang.

**Dulles**

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**453. Telegram 1388 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 18, 1956, 11 a.m.

1388. From Johnson.

Wang met Krishna Menon at airport yesterday evening and they conferred in airport for one hour during stopover Menon's plane. In response correspondent's questions following meeting, Menon said they had discussed subjects of these talks, United Nations and China. Wang refused make any statement.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1856. Official Use Only. Repeated to New Delhi as telegram 28.

**454. Telegram 1398 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 19, 1956, 5 p.m.

1398. From Johnson.

1. Three hour ten minute meeting this morning.

2. Wang opened meeting with long prepared statement reiterating position of objection to individual and collective security clause on grounds it would require them recognize "U.S. occupation Taiwan", referred my previous statements declaration did not involve third parties but said attempt incorporate individual and collective self-defense clause in Taiwan area automatically involves "Chiang clique". Then referring my statements these talks must be free from threat of force, launched into long and strong attack on alleged statements by Secretary which constituted "clamor for atomic war against China", "Chinese cannot be intimidated", "blackmail doomed to failure", "condemned by peace-loving people" etc., "this cannot benefit our talks", "cannot but raise question whether U.S. had genuine sincerity peacefully settle questions between China and U.S."

I replied with long extemporaneous statement first picking up his statements concerning Secretary which I characterized as "entirely uncalled for and gross libel". Record of U.S. had more than demonstrated lack aggressive intent toward other countries including China, cited unparalleled U.S. restraint in Korea in face provocation Chinese attack which gave every moral and legal justification for defending U.N. forces attack Chinese bases. Consistent U.S. record of fostering and protecting freedom and independence other peoples. Purely defensive nature all U.S. collective defense arrangements with other countries. President and Secretary have repeatedly expressed overwhelming sentiment American people never to initiate attack. There is nothing Secretary has ever said in any way that could possibly be interpreted in terms employed by Wang. During subsequent give and take this subject in response my direct question Wang cited "Life" article as basis for his statements. If had been said by "Knowland or McCarthy" would have been ignored but could not be ignored when made by Secretary. I said I had read article and find no statement by Secretary therein which could remotely support Wang's allegations. Said he should not confuse official and authorized statements with expressions of opinion made on own responsibility by writer magazine article. During course discussion he stated "hard to understand why U.S. on one hand invites PRC

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1956. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

make declaration renouncing force while on other hand Secretary State reveals that on three occasions U.S. was "on verge unleashing atomic war against China". I replied that I knew of no such revelation by Secretary but did know of statements of determination by U.S. to resist by war if necessary aggression unleashed by others.

Long discussion individual and collective self-defense for most part reiterated former positions. We each took increasingly adamant lines, I following line Department telegram 1496. I stated and reiterated "U.S. cannot and will not under any circumstances agree" in negotiating this declaration to PRC demand that U.S. renounce its legitimate right to individual and collective self-defense. Wang avoided meeting me directly on general principle, gave no reply to my interpretation of negotiations and yesterday's public statement as denouncing U.S. renounce individual and collective self-defense but carefully limited presentation his adamant position to PRC recognition U.S. claim applicability this principle Taiwan area. Adamancy this position best reflected by Wang's statement "if U.S. insists on including clause individual and collective self-defense in Taiwan area, I do not see how we can reach any agreement."

While he did not challenge neither did he confirm my reference to his statement last meeting concerning willingness consider specific mention Taiwan in declaration.

He then initiated discussion implementation with relatively mild statement giving me additional list of four names. Discussion for most part followed general lines last meeting.

At close of meeting I made statement referring their public statement expressing disappointment, concern over effects on talks and made somewhat double barreled query whether this indicated they did not desire to continue these talks upon basis which I had suggested at beginning of talks and which I had tried very hard to maintain. In reply Wang stressed their statement only "one time operation" reasons for which he had given in two prior meetings. Reaffirmed desire continue talks without suggesting modification present procedures on publicity. He said "it my hope and desire that talks will reach positive, constructive, honest outcome."

He took initiative suggesting next meeting, asking as special accommodation be held Wednesday January 25. When I asked whether this for just one meeting he replied hope next following meeting could be held Friday February 3. But in response my suggestion February 2 instead of February 3 next following meeting we agreed leave question open until next meeting. (For Department's information "Porgy and Bess" company arriving Prague February 4 and I planning hold large reception for them February 4 or 5.)

**455. Telegram 1402 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 19, 1956, 8 p.m.

1402. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 33d meeting today with visibly hastily drawn prepared statement saying that at our last meeting he already made some remarks on my proposed amendments to draft announcement. This morning he going make further comments.

2. Wang said at last meeting I stated that China and US confront each other with policies that in conflict but it need not lead to hostilities. If so, solution to disputes should be brought about through negotiation and that exactly specified in their draft. If however it intention US side in making announcement to maintain status quo of occupation Taiwan then as he had long ago pointed out his side would absolutely not agree.

3. He said I had repeatedly stated China not required to renounce policies she has laid down. However, policy of China is exactly to liberate Taiwan. My draft requires them to recognize right of US to individual collective self defense in Taiwan area. That aims to require his side recognize US-Chiang treaty as well as recognize US occupation Taiwan.

4. Wang said furthermore my draft attempted confuse exclusively internal issue of China with international disputes between China US. This would require his side give up legal sovereign right over Taiwan. As he had long pointed out this what his side absolutely will not do.

5. Wang said I had stated use of force does not accord with accepted standards of international conduct. However it exactly US which using force and threat against China in Taiwan area.

6. Wang said, in spite this his side still maintains that disputes between China US be settled through negotiations. As to question in which manner China will settle internal issues, as he had pointed out long ago, that exclusively matter Chinese internal affairs and permits no foreign country's interference.

7. Wang said again I had stated that issuance agreed announcement does not involve any third parties. However in draft put forward by me I raised question of so-called individual collective self defense in Taiwan area. That exactly an attempt to bring Chiang clique into matter.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1956. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

8. Wang said thus it evident that amended draft put forward by me Jan 12 and my original draft Nov 10 contain practically no difference and therefore it not acceptable.

9. Wang said my side on one hand suggested inside conference room that announcement on renunciation force be issued. However on other hand over an extended period US side not willing arrive at agreement this question. This cannot but raise question as to sincerity of professed desire settle issues between China US.

10. Wang said furthermore he would like point out in our previous meetings I stated that talks between us must not be held under threat of force. Yet US Secretary State Mr. Dulles had been clamoring recently for atomic war against China. Was this not outright threat?

11. Wang said if Mr. Dulles thinks Chinese people can be intimidated by threats and that Chinese people can be forced give up their sovereign rights this entirely wishful thinking.

12. Wang said it is well to recall that Korean armistice, restoration peace in Indochina as well as withdrawal from Tachen Islands, all these events have sufficiently demonstrated fact that forces of world people for peace and justice cannot be stopped, whereas policy of position of strength and atomic blackmail doomed failure.

13. Wang said recent warlike utterances of Secretary not only provoked greatest indignation on part Chinese people but also condemned by people of other countries including peace loving people in US. Could these utterances be reconciled with purposes present talks? Could these utterances be reconciled with further desire for progress?

14. Wang said all these events cannot but raise question as to whether U.S. has genuine sincerity to settle peacefully issues and disputes between China and U.S.

15. I replied extemporaneously saying Wang had again this morning spoken of sincerity. He had made remarks concerning Secretary of State which entirely uncalled for. I believed that record of U.S. in world affairs as well as record in these talks speaks for itself.

16. I said U.S. has demonstrated not just in words but in actions its devotion to cause of peace. It has also demonstrated not just in words but in actions its devotion to supporting freedom and independence of all peoples.

17. I said U.S. has demonstrated not only by words but by actions its complete lack any aggressive intent whatsoever not only towards other countries but also towards Wang's country.

18. I said Wang had mentioned Korea. I was sure there is not in history of world any greater example of self-restraint and lack aggressive intention towards other people than that demonstrated by U.S. in Korean hostilities. Actions of forces under control of Wang's government

crossing into Korea and attacking U.S. and other forces there operating under authority U.N. gave every moral and legal justification for those U.N. forces defend themselves by attacking bases in his country from which Chinese forces were supported.

19. I said U.N. forces restrained themselves from taking that action because of great desire, in spite actions Wang's government, not to spread war. For month upon weary month Chinese representatives refused agree any reasonable armistice that would stop hostilities. Eventually during period that Mr. Dulles was Secretary State, armistice was finally concluded.

20. I said every agreement or collective defense arrangement U.S. has entered into around world including Far East very specifically and clearly limited to self defense, self defense not only of selves but collective self-defense with other like-minded countries which fear aggression.

21. I said President of U.S. and Secretary State have time and again expressed overwhelming sentiment of American people in stating U.S. will never attack anyone. To state that Secretary is "clamoring for atomic war" is gross libel which I most strongly resented.

22. I said I well aware of public statements of Secretary. There was nothing Secretary had ever said in any way that could possibly be interpreted in that fashion. To do so was grossest type misrepresentation.

23. I said as far as devotion to peace and desire avoid war is concerned and with respect these talks I was satisfied facts are equally clear. As I had reviewed with him at last meeting and as he had again recognized in his statement this morning, it was U.S. which proposed we make it clear we were determined settle disputes through peaceful means and not resort war.

24. I said there is vast difference between proposing negotiate with overhanging threat of attack in background and proposal definitively to remove threat of war and then seek peaceful means resolving our disputes.

25. I said Wang had consistently in these talks and his government had in its public statement issued yesterday ignored plain statement I made in my original proposal October 8. I had made it clear in that statement, had made it clear in all statements I ever made in these meetings, had made it clear in draft November 10, that it was not suggested that Wang's government renounce in any way peaceful pursuit policy objectives which it believed it legitimately entitled achieve. Those not just idle words. I had attempted already carry out that intent. It was stated very specifically in November 10 draft, but in order meet Wang's objections to that draft, I tried another formula in amendments which I suggested to his draft of December 1.

26. I said at our last meeting I had offered consider any alternative formulation he might have in mind. I certainly didn't see how it possible for me be any more reasonable this regard.

27. I said there are two things that I had considered essential. One is that we make it clear that there no concealed reservations with regard Taiwan area. I had welcomed his statement last meeting that he willing consider inclusion of words that would make it clear Taiwan area included in scope any declaration we made. This seemed to me be very encouraging step towards final agreement.

28. I said that seemed to me leave only one obstacle. That obstacle did not seem be matter of substance but rather matter of finding words express substance. I had reference to matter of individual collective self defense.

29. I said we had both in these meetings expressed concurrence with this as principle. I had clearly expressed to Wang my intent that in stating principle, it should not prejudice his position with re nature our dispute in Taiwan area. I honestly felt I had accomplished that purpose in suggested amendments I proposed at last meeting. However I had said if he felt differently I was willing consider other suggestions he might have that regard.

30. I said having agreed on substance it certainly seemed to me not unreasonable and not beyond ingenuity of two of us to find words express that substance.

31. I said it had never occurred to me that this principle so long recognized in international law, embodied in U.N. Charter and generally accepted throughout world could be objectionable anyone. It never occurred me that any country which genuinely concerned with own sovereignty and willing respect that of other countries would be opposed to it.

32. I said it hard to see how any country would desire go on public record as admitting its policies were inconsistent with legitimate exercise by other countries of right self defense.

33. I said I repeated that in stating this it never had been and still was not my intention demand that his government abandon any of its claims or its views or its right to peaceful pursuit its policies, no matter how strongly I might disagree with some of those policies.

34. I said however as our negotiations upon this subject had developed, and particularly in light of public statement made by Wang's government yesterday, it appeared that intent of his government was to demand that in negotiating this statement my government renounce its legitimate right of individual collective self defense. I wanted make it perfectly plain that my government cannot and will not under any circumstances agree to do this.



35. At this point, 11 a.m., Wang consulted at some length with his interpreter. Also messenger brought in three-page Chinese letter which Wang glanced at briefly before proceeding.

36. Wang said this morning he had specifically pointed out negotiations between us should be aimed at bringing about peaceful solution of dispute between us in Taiwan area and relaxation tension in Far East. Therefore, he held negotiations should not be held under overhanging threat of force. As he had pointed out this morning, statement by Secretary contained flagrant threats against his side, and it seemed to him that such threatening utterances on part of Secretary of State of US would not rpt not bring people of US any good. Nor would these statements raise prestige of American people.

37. Wang said I had spoken much about US peaceful intentions in world. However, if US genuinely willing, not by words but by action, to demonstrate its peaceful intent, it was capable making great contribution to world peace. Today, people of world capable making own judgements, which made not on basis words but actions demonstrated. From development of events in field of disarmament, from establishment of military bases around world, from open intervention in internal affairs Korea, and armed intervention in Taiwan, people of world able judge by whom peace being breached, and that all these events run against international law and justice.

38. Wang said, in mentioning these past events he had no interest go into debate with me, for I well knew we could hold long debates without coming to any useful conclusion. He wished only make specific mention events in Korea and Taiwan. He convinced history would pass judgement as to which side had engaged in intervention in domestic affairs of others, as well as which engaged in armed aggression. People of world will make own judgements.

39. Wang said that I had referred to drafting of announcement renouncing use force and setting forth principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. He was sure I well aware their efforts this direction, that is, that they were striving in this direction to bring about agreement. On question of an agreed announcement on renunciation of force, their side had repeatedly made concessions. If both sides followed principles international law and both shared same desire for peace, hard for him see why latest draft Chinese side unacceptable.

40. Wang said this morning I had again stated US had no intent demand Chinese side renounce its legitimate rights, or abandon its views, or renounce pursuit its policies. However, in next instant I had again raised question of US right of self defense in Taiwan area and had stated US would not renounce its claims to individual and collective self-defense in Taiwan area. This latest statement practically refutes all my other statements and renders them meaningless.

41. Wang said it was their view that both sides must make equal efforts come to agreement. Chinese side has made such efforts but US has not. Therefore, difference between two of us not one of specific formulation or of choice of words, but one of substance. If US insisted on including phrase concerning individual and collective self defense in draft agreed announcement, he did not see how we could reach any agreement. This outcome was not Chinese desire or hope.

42. I responded that, first, Wang insisting on belaboring supposed question of statements by Secretary of State. I would like specifically ask what statement or statements?

43. Wang said this was statement now known everywhere and he referring to statement appeared *Life* magazine.

44. I said I wondered whether or not Wang along with many others might not be confusing official and authorized statements of Secretary of State with opinions and views issued on own responsibility by writer of magazine articles. I might add that I had read article in entirety and could find no statement therein by Secretary of State that could remotely support statements Wang made here this morning.

45. Wang said talks between two of us should be aimed at settling peacefully dispute between our two countries instead of at creating tensions. Peaceful settlement of dispute between two countries would not only bring about relaxation tensions in world but would contribute to cause of peace in world. Hard for them understand why US on one hand invited them discuss making joint announcement on renunciation force, while on other hand US SecState revealed that on three occasions US had been on verge of unleashing atomic war against China. Suppose these disclosures had been made by someone else—Senator Knowland or Mr. McCarthy—Chinese could omit ref to them in these talks. However, they noted these statements being made by personality in charge and guidance of US foreign policy, and those statements certainly caused alarm part of Chinese. They could not help raising question as to whether US foreign policy, under guidance Mr. Dulles, advocated negotiations between two sides or advocated use of atomic bombs against China. He only wanted make it plain and clear Chinese people were not to be frightened by this sort of talk.

46. Wang said, in particular they thought that at time while Sino-American talks were in progress, these utterances would serve no useful purpose. And he wanted to point out also that he who plays with fire is one who gets burnt in the end.

47. I said I had seen no statement by Secretary in *Life* article or elsewhere, or ever under any circumstances anywhere, speaking of unleashing an atomic war on China or on any other country. I had however seen statements referring to determination of US to resist, by war if necessary, aggression unleashed by others.

48. Wang said he had made clear his views on this situation and had nothing further to add.

49. I said, turning to his remarks concerning our draft, he had apparently slightly misunderstood or misinterpreted statement I had made this morning. What I was speaking of concerning embodiment in any declaration or statement on individual and collective self defense, was that it be clearly embodied as a principle. What I had said was that in light of history these negotiations and particularly public statement issued by Chinese Govt yesterday, they were in effect demanding that US renounce this principle. I had said this was what we would not do. In this, they were asking us to do something that we had not asked them to do.

50. Wang said he had made their position crystal clear in previous meetings as well as today on question of draft announcement. As he had said, he would welcome any constructive proposal or amendment which I willing present.

51. I said I had also made my position clear. Amendments which I had suggested to their Dec 1 draft, in spite of their importance, did not change draft's essential nature. I had incorporated them in form such that it was difficult for me to see why they should not have been entirely acceptable. I had offered consider any alternative formulations that would accomplish same purpose. I was disappointed that this morning he persisted in rejecting what I had offered without making any constructive suggestions of his own. I did not see how I could go any further.

52. Wang said I could see that they had already made repeated efforts on question of draft announcement. I would recall that in their original proposal they proposed to include certain specific stipulations of UN Charter as well as para concerning holding conference Foreign Ministers. However, in view our reluctance accept that draft and in spite fact stipulations UN Charter could be in no way objected to, subsequently in interest formulating draft meeting views both sides, Chinese side put forward Dec 1 draft, in which paras concerning UN Charter and convening Foreign Minister conference were withdrawn.

53. Wang said, however withdrawal of two paras did not mean paras themselves were objectionable or that they not proper for inclusion in draft. Withdrawal two paras from original draft did not mean they were not qualified for inclusion, but represented effort their part formulate an acceptable form and effort their part to work for making such an announcement and not for its hindrance. Therefore, hard for him see why I not willing accept concrete proposal he put forth last meeting: to withdraw phrase concerning individual and collective self defense from amendment to draft I had put forward at last meeting.

54. I said it should be clear to him and his government that, from manner in which this question of individual and collective self defense had been handled by him in these meetings as well as in public statement made by govt., any failure to mention this in any draft we might issue would inevitably be represented as renunciation on part of US of its legitimate rights of self defense. It should be equally clear that this was demand which it entirely impossible for US accept.

55. Wang said wanted make clear position his government this regard. That was, they would not accept any draft which included phrase dealing with so called right to individual and collective self defense in Taiwan area. If they did accept such phrase, would be tantamount recognition on their part of occupation of Taiwan by US. This why this (rpt this) phrase absolutely unacceptable to them.

56. I said I had nothing further on this. Did he have anything else?

57. Wang said, with reference to seven Chinese mentioned his previous letter to me, as well as list of three handed me last meeting, wondered if I had any information? He had further list of four Chinese in US who want return and who either been prevented or who have not been heard from for long time by families. Would like to hand me list (names in fol tel) and requested my govt investigate. Should note that in list had entered full details concerning them. He only wanted say that Chinese not satisfied with situation encountered these persons and fact they not able return.

58. I asked what was his allegation concerning these persons? Was it that they wanted return but were being prevented?

59. Wang said families of some have not heard from them for long period, others desire return but unable do so.

60. I asked if allegation was they obstructed?

61. Wang said yes.

62. I said if they felt they encountering obstruction they could freely contact Indian Embassy. Is allegation that they being prevented communicate Indian Embassy?

63. Wang said there were various circumstances. Some these people not informed concerning agreed announcement and therefore not informed of specific measures in agreed announcement and had no knowledge about communication with Indian Embassy.

64. I said it not credible to me that any Chinese in US who decided return had not heard of agreed announcement. I had outlined to him at time issuance of agreed announcement exceptional measures taken to bring it to attention of every Chinese in US. Since that time, as I had mentioned previous meeting, 70,000 copies full text posted in each of 36,000 post offices in US. Inevitable that it would be brought their attention some manner. Also like mention, if he had not noticed, press

release by Dept. of Dec 18 (I later corrected date to 17th) which stated: "If anyone knows of any Chinese who wishes to leave or who claims he is being prevented, he should communicate at once with the Dept of State or the Indian Embassy in Washington, which the US has agreed may render assistance". If there were in fact any obstruction departure any these people, reasonable that at least one case would have been brought attention Indian Embassy. He often here and statement his government yesterday continually referred to applying permission depart. I had over and over again explained him, and it was confirmable by Indian Embassy and any one else, that Chinese wishing depart need not apply to anyone.

65. I said if we were going bog discussions down here with case every Chinese in US who for one reason or another does not exercise his right to write person his country, did not seem to me we could get anywhere.

66. I said it should be most reassuring him that thus far Indian Embassy has brought no case to attention Dept concerning obstruction to departure of Chinese. I would be very happy and people my country would be much gratified if that were situation regarding US citizens in China.

67. I said I perfectly aware number Americans in his country with no desire return US. This entirely matter decision and right of individuals. I had not made any issue these cases. My government nor I here had not stated these pressured, terrorized, or in any other way prevented leaving, although this might be case. However, I making no such charge. I had tried keep discussions within terms agreed announcement of Sept 10. If I had evidence any these people being prevented in their desire depart, I would take it up here. However, my govt and I myself have no desire create hypothetical issues for sake propaganda or make exaggerated charges for public consumption. I carefully trying avoid place this type obstacle in way improvement relations and progress peaceful settlement our disputes.

68. I said my govt continues increasingly concerned fate thirteen Americans in prison who indisputably fall within category specifically covered agreed announcement. This not propaganda issue with us in any sense. It question validity and usefulness of any agreements between us. These thirteen certainly desire return. They clearly being prevented from doing so. Their freedom communicate UK Charge definitely been placed under limitations. They should be promptly expeditiously allowed exercise right return.

69. Wang said after announcement our agreement although US claimed it made wide publication concerning agreement, there still many people who not informed about agreement. Furthermore, in view

fact that US had failed submit list of Chinese in US, Indian Embassy had no means inform these people.

70. Wang said in addition many Chinese students in US have written home their families complaining of many difficulties and obstacles they encountering.

71. Wang said most conspicuous case is that of Liu Yung-ming. Liu innocent person who never committed any offenses against US yet he had been confined in mental hospital long time. Even after agreed announcement Sept 10 US Govt failed take any measures regarding him. It only after Wang had written letter to me that Liu allowed return.

72. Wang said as he stated at last meeting although he welcomed measures taken effect Liu's return, he entirely dissatisfied with treatment Liu subjected to for such long time.

73. Wang said furthermore I had failed give them precise information concerning any Chinese in US prisons. They had seen no measures taken by US Govt to remove requirement for Chinese in US secure entry permits for Taiwan. All these things indicated hindrances in way of return of Chinese in US.

74. Wang said he hoped I would make investigation into situation these people whose names he gave me in his letters as well as lists he gave me at last meeting and at today's meeting. He hoped measures would be taken assisting them return.

75. Wang said he would like point out names these people were not included in list I gave them of Chinese who desire return. He wished express his dissatisfaction over this fact.

76. I replied that with regard Liu, I simply wanted point out no action ever taken by US Govt prevent his departure. Liu was and still is sick man. He hospitalized many years at public expense in US. Only member of family who apparently ever took trouble correspond with hospital was Liu's father.

77. I said if Wang would refer to full record correspondence between father and hospital he would note that father asked that Liu's treatment be continued.

78. I said soon as word received that Liu's wife did not desire have treatment continued but wanted him return, and that he was willing return, although Liu not fully recovered arrangements made for him depart. There certainly no legitimate grounds for complaint regarding his treatment. In fact it would seem to me quite opposite.

79. Wang said superintendent of hospital in which Liu kept wrote letter which fully proved that Liu could have left hospital long ago. Liu also wanted return. His family always wanted him return. However, he not able do so for long time. Question of Liu and his situation quite clear.

80. I said neither Wang nor myself were psychiatrists, but there certainly difference between ability to travel, which apparently was Liu's condition in 1950, and being cured of illness. Certainly neither hospital or any other official agency in US would have any interest in treatment of person mentally ill other than pure humanitarian.

81. Wang said he thought doctor in this hospital was one who capable making just statement regarding condition Liu.

82. I said I would think so too and doctor says Liu still not cured.

83. Wang said but they had letter written by superintendent hospital stating Liu was fit to leave hospital long ago.

84. I said, that is, fit to travel.

85. Wang said yes.

86. I said I only wanted to say before leaving that I was very disappointed to note that in spite discussion last meeting Wang's govt saw fit issue statement with regard talks. It difficult for me see how this could help us make progress. As I said at last meeting, I did not see how public airing our differences helped towards solution problems. It only aggravates them.

87. I said I wondered if this indicated whether his government still intrested in continuing these talks upon basis which I suggested at beginning and which I had tried very hard maintain.

88. I said exceedingly heavy responsibility rests upon two of us here. I had tried for my part to discharge talks we face here with deep sense that responsibility. I willing continue do so. I hoped Wang shared my feeling this regard.

89. Wang said he could not accept charges I had leveled against their action in making public statement. He had at previous two meetings explained his position and reason tthat led for this one time to making public statement on their part.

90. Wang said I asked whether they interested in continuing these talks in previous manner. He wanted point out that in past his side had consistently been adhering to form of talks. However, form in which talks being carried on should be aimed at facilitating development of our talks.

91. Wang said he agreed with me that we had exceedingly heavy responsibility in talks. Public opinion in world had given our talks great attention as well as great hope. Public desires to see improvement in relations between our two countries as well as relaxing tension in Far East in world. However, public does not want see our talks remaining in old position without making progress forward.

92. Wang said they have always advocated means of negotiation to find way to settle statutes [*disputes*] peacefully. PRC side will fully and



certainly discharge task which we shoulder. It his desire and hope that our talks make positive, constructive and honest-to-goodness progress.

93. Wang said he would like advance next meeting from 26 to 25 January instead of usual Thursday.

94. I asked whether this just for this one meeting.

95. Wang said they would possibly want to delay the next following meeting one day to Feb 3, Friday, instead of Feb 2.

96. I indicated I agreed to 25 Jan meeting but indicated I might have some difficulty agreeing to latter change.

97. Wang suggested we leave that question open until next meeting.

**Gowen**

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#### 456. Telegram 1403 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, January 19, 1956, 1 a.m.

1403. From Johnson.

Comment on today's meeting:

With respect renunciation force, position concerning self defense clause froze very tight at today's meeting with only slight opening left by Wang. Their yesterday's public statement of course also tends rigidify their position at least for time being.

Wang's persistent relation of PRC objection on self-defense clause to its linkage with Taiwan area suggests that way to agreement might be by rephrasing and or repositioning clause. Question is who takes initiative in suggesting change.

I do not see any immediate possibility breaking this deadlock and would propose at next meeting only to carefully review and reiterate our position.

Although not explicitly confirmed at today's meeting, I feel that they have accepted inclusion specific mention Taiwan, as well as "means" in place of "negotiations". Much of Wang's comments on self-defense clause were based on implicit assumption Taiwan was included in paragraph.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1956. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.



I purposely refrained from my usual tactic of initiating implementation discussion and he was quick to take initiative. In contrast to acrimonious discussion of "Life" article and renunciation force, his manner and language in introducing implementation and particularly when presenting additional list of names was very mild and polite.

I also went some length in testing their desire continue meetings and it is clear they desire to do so for immediate future. However, would be rash to hazard any guess how long this may continue if no new element is introduced.

In considering future course I am continuing consider effects on remaining 13 Americans. I have no doubt if it were possible reach agreement on renunciation force statement, particularly if initiative came from US, additional releases would take place. In absence some such development or additional indirect pressure that could be applied difficult to foresee CHICOMS fully carrying out this commitment in near future. In this connection from conversations with correspondents and private individuals here am impressed with success of CHICOM smoke screen on situation of Chinese in US. Most seem impressed by CHICOM citation specific names and feel must be some fire where so much smoke. Also are confused by Liu Yung-ming case. Have found most effective rebuttal is citation fact not single representation yet received from Indians. We need get our story across better this regard, and repeat on all possible occasions.

**Message unsigned**

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**457. Telegram 1405 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 10, 1956, 1 a.m.

1405. From Johnson.

Fol is list handed me by Wang at board [33rd?] meeting:

[*text not declassified*]

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1056. Official Use Only.

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**458. Telegram 1524 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 20, 1956, 6:44 p.m.

1524. For Johnson.

Following statement being released by Department 11 a.m.  
January 21:

**QUOTE**

The Chinese Communists issued a misleading statement on January 18 regarding the Geneva discussions which have been taking place between United States Ambassador Johnson and Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang. It is thus necessary that the record be set straight.

These conferences were started last August to discuss the repatriation of civilians and other "practical matters at issue".

*AGREEMENT TO REPATRIATION OF CIVILIANS*

On September 10, 1955 the representatives of both sides, by agreement, issued statements that civilians were entitled to return to their own countries (Annex A).

The Communist declaration stated:

"The Peoples Republic of China recognizes that Americans in the Peoples Republic of China who desire to return to the United States are entitled to do so, and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return."

As of today, four months after this declaration was made, only six out of the nineteen for whom representations were being made on September 10 have been released. Thirteen Americans are still in Communist prisons.

As for the United States, any Chinese is free to leave the United States for any destination of his choosing, and not a single one has been refused exit. The Indian Embassy which was designated to assist any Chinese who wished to leave, has not brought to the attention of this Government any case of a Chinese who claims he is being prevented from leaving, nor has it stated that it is impeded in any way in carrying out its functions under the terms of the September 10 Agreed Announcement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-2056. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Sebald and White (ND).

*DISCUSSION OF RENUNCIATION OF FORCE*

After this Agreed Announcement was made, the two sides proceeded to discuss “other practical matters at issue between them”.

The Communists suggested the topics of the termination of the trade embargo against Communist China and the holding of a meeting by the Foreign Ministers of both sides.

Ambassador Johnson at the October 8, 1955 meeting, pointed out that progress in further discussions could not be expected in the face of continuing Communist threats to take Taiwan by military force, and suggested that both sides agree to announce that they renounced the use of force generally and particularly in the Taiwan Area and agree to settle their differences by peaceful means. The United States representative made clear that this renunciation of the use of force was not designed to commit the Communists to renounce pursuit of their policies by peaceful means with respect to Taiwan. These proposals were in the terms shown as Annex B.

Three weeks after the United States proposal to renounce the use of force, the Communists on October 27 proposed a draft, a copy of which is shown on Annex C. In this proposal, the Communists pointedly omitted any reference to the Taiwan Area, or to the recognition of the right of self-defense, and inserted a provision for an immediate meeting of Foreign Ministers.

This proposal was unacceptable because it would have made it possible for the Communists to claim that the proposal did not apply to the Taiwan Area, which is the very place against which the Communist threats are directed, and to claim further that the United States had renounced the right to use force in self-defense. Ambassador Johnson further pointed out that consideration of higher level meetings was neither appropriate nor acceptable under existing circumstances.

On November 10, 1955, Ambassador Johnson, in an attempt to reach an acceptable form of declaration, submitted a new draft declaration (Annex D). This made clear that the renunciation of the use of force was without prejudice to the peaceful pursuit of its policies by either side; that it had general application, but applied particularly to the Taiwan Area; and that it did not deprive either side of the right of self-defense.

The United States proposal was rejected by the Communists, who, on December 1, 1955, made a counter-proposal (Annex E). This represented an advance over their previous proposal in that it dropped the provision for talks on the Foreign Minister level in favor of the continuance of Ambassadorial talks, but still pointedly omitted any reference to the Taiwan area and to recognition of the right of self-defense.

In a further effort to reach agreement, Ambassador Johnson, at the January 12 meeting, suggested two simple amendments to the Communist counter-proposal. These were the insertion of the words "without prejudice to the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense" and of the words "in the Taiwan Area or elsewhere". This United States revision of the Chinese counter-proposal is shown in Annex F.

#### *THE COMMUNIST PUBLIC STATEMENT*

This was the status of the discussions when the Communists released their public statement of January 18.

The Communist statement apparently rejects the United States proposal. It states "Taiwan is Chinese territory: there can be no question of defense, as far as the United States is concerned. . . . Yet the United States has demanded the right of defense of the Taiwan Area. Is this not precisely a demand that China accept continued occupation of Taiwan and that the tension in the Taiwan Area be maintained forever." And further, it states: "The American side continues to demand that our side accept that the United States has 'the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense' in China's Taiwan Area. This is what our side absolutely cannot accept."

#### *THE UNITED STATES POSITION*

Two points must be made clear. First, the United States is not occupying Taiwan, and Taiwan has never been a part of Communist China. The claims of Communist China and the contentions of the United States with respect to this area are well known and constitute a major dispute between them. It is specifically with respect to this dispute that the United States has proposed the principle of renunciation of force and the settlement of differences by peaceful means. This is the principle which the Communists say they have accepted.

In this connection the United States has made completely clear that in renouncing the use of force neither side is relinquishing its objectives and policies, but only the use of force to attain them.

Secondly, the United States has rights and responsibilities in the Taiwan Area; also it has a Mutual Defense Treaty. Accordingly, it is present in the Taiwan Area. The Communist refusal to state that the renunciation of force is without prejudice to the right of self-defense against armed attack can only be interpreted as an attempt to induce the United States to agree that if attacked it will forego the right to defend its lawful presence in this area.

The right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack is inherent; it is recognized in International Law: it is specifically affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations. No country can

be expected to forego this right. Indeed the Communists should be as anxious to preserve this right as is the United States.

#### CONCLUSION

The present exchange makes clear that:

1. Four months after the Communists announced that they would adopt measures to permit Americans in China to return to the United States, 13 Americans are still held in Communist prisons.

2. The United States proposed that the parties renounce the use of force without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack, in order that the discussions might take place free from the threat of war.

3. The United States made clear that this renunciation would not prejudice either side in the pursuit of its objectives and policies by peaceful means.

4. The Communists, while stating that they accept the principle of the renunciation of force, have deprived such acceptance of its value by refusing to agree that it is without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack and that it is applicable to the Taiwan Area.

In short, the Communists so far seem willing to renounce force only if they are first conceded the goals for which they would use force.

The United States for its part, intends to persist in the way of peace. We seek the now overdue fulfillment by the Chinese Communists of their undertaking that the Americans now in China should be allowed expeditiously to return. We seek this not only for humanitarian reasons but because respect for international undertakings lies at the foundation of a stable international order. We shall also seek with perseverance a meaningful renunciation of force, particularly in the Taiwan Area.

END QUOTE

Dulles

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459. Letter 21 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 21

Geneva, January 20, 1956

Dear Walter:

Thank you very much for your letter of January 16 and especially for your forethought in sending me a copy of the Shepley article. As you will see the subject came up in a very major way at yesterday's meeting and I was able to handle it against the background of full knowledge of the contents of the article.

I do not think there can be any question but that the article stung Peiping and that at the minimum they felt they had to react at least verbally. I have tried to kill much speculation among the correspondents here that the article called forth the Chicom statement on the talks, letting it be known that Weng had informed me at last meeting before the furor concerning the Shepley article had started, that they were going to issue the statement. Whether or not the Shepley article in fact had any effect on their final decision, it gave them a convenient peg on which to hang their release.

I had to handle my reply to Wang entirely off the cuff but believe I made the major points. I had not anticipated quite this kind of presentation from him and thought it would more likely be a passing reference such as his reference to Quarles' statement the preceding meeting which I could, if I chose, ignore. However, his presentation with regard to the Shepley article was such I felt it incumbent to reply at some length.

I have tried fully and frankly to cover my views with regard to the situation in my telegrams and have little to add.

You can be sure that I more than share your concern over the possibility, and I think even probability, that eventually some Chinese in jail that desires to return will turn up. I am a little concerned over being too specific in my statements each of the persons mentioned in his lists is free to return, just on the chance one of them might turn out to be imprisoned, deceased, or some other such thing.

I agreed with him yesterday on changing the date of meeting after I had verified that it was not an attempt to step-up the frequency of the meetings. Knowing your schedule on getting my instructions to me, as well as the likelihood that little new would be needed for the next meeting, it should not present any problem to you back there. By agreeing to it of course enabled me somewhat to balance off his agreeing to my

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

Christmas recess and puts me back in the position of being able to ask for any change that we might desire in the future.

As a sidelight, as promised, Wang promptly furnished me copies of their January 18 statement and his interpreter just called Ekvall and asked that I furnish them copies of any statement that the Department may issue, which I agreed to do.

I stayed here last week-end in order to be on hand if and when they issued their public statement and I am staying here this week-end because of the meeting on Wednesday. However, I hope to leave Wednesday night so that I can get back to Prague on Thursday as things are piling up back there.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**460. Telegram 1410 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 21, 1956, 5 p.m.

1410. From Johnson. Department's telegram 1524.

Statement is excellent and from my standpoint strikes exactly right note. Yesterday Wang asked for copy of any statement made by Department and I am sending copies to him as soon as press reports Department release has been made. Will also make copies available to correspondents here in response inquiries.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Haring (FE–DO) notified, 1/21/56, 2:40 p.m., CWO/FED

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–2156. Official Use Only.

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**461. Telegram 1530 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 23, 1956, 7:33 p.m.

1530. For Johnson.

Chinese Communist Vice Minister made following reply to letter sent by O'Neill make representations on behalf McCarthy:

**QUOTE**

American criminal McCarthy offended against Chinese law and has been sentenced by competent Chinese Authorities. During period of his sentence McCarthy has no right demand repatriation and accordingly question of his encountering obstruction in departure does not arise. According to statement agreed to during Sino-American Ambassadorial talks, American criminals in China are basically different from law abiding Americans in China. American criminals in China cannot exercise their right of repatriation until Chinese Government has adopted measures. As to what sort of measures China adopts in accordance with its own legal procedure, and when it adopts these measures in respect of these persons, this is a matter of [group undeciphered. China's] sovereignty and will be decided by China herself.

**UNQUOTE**

You should register emphatic protest this gross misrepresentation and violation of agreed announcement in your presentation under paragraph 3 guidance telegram.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-2356. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Phleger in substance and Sebald. Brackets are in the original.



**462. Telegram 1531 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 23, 1956, 6:51 p.m.

1531. For Johnson.

In response to request from Miner UK Charge made representations his behalf and received reply dated January 18 stating Shanghai authorities have been taking active measures to help Miner settle his affairs and some progress made. However, Miner had intentionally delayed liquidation some his firms. Reply added authorities continuing help him but he himself responsible for his inability leave China quickly and his statement that he was being obstructed was not true.

Local representative Starr Interests says Miner reported recently he had completely transferred one firm to Chinese Communists and about to complete second. He appeared optimistic as result progress being made. Consequently, Department not requesting further British representations this time.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–2356. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Clough.

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**463. Telegram 1533 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 23, 1956, 7:33 p.m.

1533. For Johnson.

Guidance for January 25 meeting.

1. Concur your proposal only to review and reiterate U.S. position on renunciation of force. Department's press release January 21 (Deptel 1524) affords guide line for your presentation.

2. You should not take any initiative to rephrase or reposition self-defense clause so as to set it apart from reference to Taiwan area but you can make clear that its location is not designed to estop the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–2356. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy; cleared by Dulles, Phleger, and Sebald.

Chinese Communists from pursuit of their policies by peaceful means with respect to Taiwan.

3. Renew demand that Communists make good on their undertaking to release Americans expeditiously. Reiterate no Chinese being prevented from leaving U.S., no case of Chinese claiming he being obstructed has been brought to Department's attention by Indian Embassy, no response received to Department's public statement December 16 asking anyone who knew of Chinese being obstructed to communicate at once with Department or Indian Embassy. Chinese in U.S. completely free to write to relatives on mainland China if they wish. No U.S. responsibility for fact that some fail to write. FYI Department investigating case of Yuan Jui-hsiang (Your 1365), alleged by Wang to have been taken into custody by U.S. Immigration Service. Will take some time since Immigration does not maintain central files individual cases and must query each immigration district office. May be impossible trace if name given by Wang differs radically from spelling used by individual himself. END FYI.

4. Contrast U.S. performance with Communist refusal so far fulfill their commitment and emphasize Communist non-fulfillment would cast doubt on dependability of their pledged word.

5. Point out that responsibility for dragging out of talks lies with Communists, who not only fail to carry out their pledge of September 10 but also refuse to accept reasonable U.S. proposal for renunciation of force by both sides which would remove threat of war in Taiwan area and permit constructive discussion other practical matters at issue.

**Dulles**

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#### 464. Telegram 1416 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, January 24, 1956, 5 p.m.

1416. From Johnson.

Wang sent me 3:30 p.m. today copies long Foreign Ministry statement January 24 replying Dept's Jan 21 statement. Presume Dept receiving via FBIS.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-2456. Official Use Only; Priority.

Statement contains little new apart from slight hardening and amplification of line:

“Situation in which one side faithfully executes agreement while other side unscrupulously violates it is not permitted continue for long”.

“China has consistently stood for respecting right of each country to individual and collective self-defense . . . However, on Chinese territory of Taiwan, can be no question of self-defense so far as US concerned.”

“Ambassadorial talks have proved incapable of settling such major substantive question as relaxation and elimination tension in Taiwan area. Chinese side holds that Sino-American conference of Foreign Ministers must be held, as this is practical and feasible means for settling this question”.

Statement ends: “Should US persist in such unreasonable demand and drag out talks without any settlement, US must bear responsibility for all consequences”.

I making no comment here.

Gowen

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#### 465. Telegram 1419 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, January 25, 1956, 4 p.m.

1419. From Johnson.

Three hour twenty minute meeting this morning.

I opened with prepared statement on renunciation force. Stressed proposed declaration was essential preliminary other discussions, fact it did not require acceptance by either side of views of other. Pointed out his attempt force US into renouncing self-defense right was distortion original proposal and was “effort obtain US capitulation to PRC demands with respect our controversy Taiwan area”. Cannot expect this to succeed.

Wang replied with strong attack on US record Korea, bitter repetition charge of US “occupation” Taiwan and assertion US building base

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-2556. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

there for mainland invasion. Said Foreign Ministers conference must be held to settle question relaxation tension, realize principle non-use force. Demanded withdrawal US forces from Taiwan.

I reiterated facts on restraint of US and UN action Korea, refuted his charge of US "occupation" Taiwan by statement purely defensive and limited character our collective defense arrangements with GRC, which UN member and recognized by majority of world governments. Again assured Wang we not asking they accept our views, contrasting this with his attempt force US capitulate to views PRC regarding Taiwan controversy. I made this statement as pointed as possible and reiterated it in give and take in order test whether Wang would deny they attempting demand US capitulation. He refused all openings to deny it, reaffirmed that "liberation" Taiwan is exercise of Chinese peoples' inherent right self-defense, finally stated flatly "it not sufficient merely to state that either side may not accept views of other. Some views must be opposed".

On implementation I took initiative with my most forceful refutation to date their attempt claim distinction between "ordinary" and "law-breaking" Americans, referring to PRC Vice Minister's letter to O'Neill (Deptel 1530). Wang reaffirmed their position supporting distinction, reiterated standard charges, demanded revocation alleged Taiwan entry permit requirement and other pressures on Chinese in US, demanded "accounting" persons on his previous lists. Handed me new list 4 unheard from Chinese in US.

In give and take I stressed lack representations from Indians to which Wang had no rebuttal.

At close, Wang suggested instead of postponing next meeting to February 3 it be moved to January 28. I declined, saying had made arrangements for February 3 meeting accordance his proposal last meeting, but said I willing meet on February 2 as per regular schedule. Wang shifted back to February 3 date to which I agreed.

Leaving for Prague Thursday. Returning Tuesday.

**Gowen**

**466. Telegram 1422 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 25, 1956, 11 p.m.

1422. From Johnson.

1. I opened 34th meeting today with prepared statement as follows:

A. I have given considerable thought since our last meeting to nature and origin of difficulty which confronts us in present stage our talks. I do not mean to minimize significance of issues involved in our area of disagreement, but I am encouraged to believe if we are sincerely determined to seek with perseverance meaningful renunciation force, which will also unmistakably be applicable to Taiwan area, we can find way out this difficulty.

B. I believe to some extent our difficulty lies in fact that we may have gotten away from underlying principles and purposes of proposed declaration. In my Oct. 8 statement to you, proposed declaration was clearly identified as preliminary step towards peaceful settlement our disputes. It was to be—and I quote—“an essential foundation and preliminary to success of discussions under item two”. This I regard fundamental principle. As I plainly said there should be no question of attempting to settle or prejudge, in this declaration, issues in dispute between us.

C. I can honestly say I have carefully endeavored to be guided by this principle. My draft Nov. 10, I believe, was completely consistent with my statement Oct. 8, in that it was not suggested either of us should renounce any policy objectives which we considered we were legitimately entitled to achieve, but only that we renounce use of force to implement these policies. I have since on many occasions given you similar assurances.

D. Another fundamental requirement of proposed declaration was necessity it be clearly applicable Taiwan area. If declaration was to be useful preliminary to free discussion of our differences and their fair and equitable solution, it obviously had to apply Taiwan area, precisely area in which our differences are most acute, and where danger of hostilities is greatest. I believe my drafts and statements in these meetings have all recognized this requirement that our declaration be fully responsive to situation in which confrontation of policies of our two countries is most immediate.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-2556. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

3. Despite fundamental and even obvious character these two requirements, you for long time persisted in your objection to their retention in our declaration. You have also claimed my amendments Jan. 12 to your draft Dec. 1 required your govt. renounce its policies or abandon its well-known position with respect Taiwan area. I have given you repeated assurances that was not my intention. I again assure you it would not be in keeping with what I regard as fundamental character and high purposes of declaration for me to attempt to trick you into form of words that could be represented as renunciation by your government of its claims and peaceful pursuit its policies with respect Taiwan area. First, I have too much respect for your intelligence and that of your Prime Minister to think such an effort would be successful. Secondly, it would not be intelligent on my part even if I were successful in doing so. We would be entering into agreement that would mean one thing to one party, and something else to other party. While we would thereby be able momentarily to present to world surface appearance of agreement, in fact we would simply be creating further cause controversy and [garble] between our two countries. This would serve interests of no one honestly interested in reducing causes of our controversies.

F. I renew my plea you approach this matter in the same spirit. You certainly cannot reasonably expect my government can in any manner be forced in such declaration either explicitly or implicitly to renounce its view with respect Taiwan area or its legitimate rights. You certainly cannot expect US to say if American vessel on lawful mission is fired upon it foregoes right to defend itself. You certainly cannot expect US in effect to say it renounces right of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack—probably oldest, most fundamental and generally recognized right in law of nations.

G. Apparent attempt your govt. accomplish this purpose distorts simple and straightforward objective my Oct. 8 proposal. It can only be interpreted as effort on part your govt. attain in our negotiation of this declaration capitulation by US to demarche your govt with respect our controversy in Taiwan area. Your govt. cannot seriously expect it will be successful in this.

H. Effort to persist in this as well as continued failure your govt. fully to carry out agreement Sept. 10 with respect Americans imprisoned your country can only continue to delay time when it will be possible for us to enter into constructive discussion other practical matters at issue between us. For my part, I continue to hope it will be possible for us to enter into such discussions without further unnecessary delay.

2. Wang replied from notes taken during my statement that he had listened to my statement this morning, but failed note any new constructive remarks in it. He very much regretted that arguments which he had repeatedly refuted in course of talks had again been raised.

3. Wang said on his part it had always been their stand that talks should make positive steady progress. He didn't see how points raised by me, which unacceptable their side, could lead talks forward. He did not see any difference between points advanced this morning and those presented at last meeting. He had already given his comments on points raised last meeting. He would like make further comments now.

4. Turning to prepared statement, Wang said at last meeting I had lauded allegedly good record of US in world affairs and stated that in Korea US demonstrated restraint and lack aggressive intention. He had already indicated their views on this at that time. He would again point out that version given me grossly at variance with facts.

5. Wang said US performance in Korea and on Chinese territory as witnessed by Chinese people in past and at present time points entirely different record. US started war of aggression against Korea in June 1950 and ordered its armed forces to push towards Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Security of Chinese nation was greatly threatened and Chinese people could not stand idly by. Chinese people could not but rise in self-defense.

6. Wang said US at same time as its aggression against Korea also used threat and force against China in Taiwan area. Since intrusion US Seventh Fleet into Taiwan Strait, Chinese province of Taiwan fallen prey to direct aggression of US.

7. Wang said US has established naval and air force bases on Taiwan and stepped up equipping of Chiang Kai-shek clique, turning Taiwan into base of contemplated invasion of mainland. Such is matter of fact well known to all. Is there slightest grain in this performance which could be presented as restraint and lack aggressive intent?

8. Wang said Taiwan Chinese territory. Even US had assumed solemn pledge this effect. It matter of fact that Taiwan and Penghu turned over to then Chinese Govt. on Oct 25, 1945. This fact also acknowledged by US in White Paper published by State Dept. It indisputable matter of fact that new China has succeeded to China's entire territory and sovereignty.

9. Wang said as US has used force and threat against China in Taiwan area China has every justification to repel such aggression in exercise right of self-defense in its own territory. Nevertheless, China still willing seek for settlement this dispute between China and US by peaceful negotiations without resorting force.

10. Wang said it would not be difficult for me see that it PRC side which genuinely demonstrated self restraint and control. They always stood for peaceful settlement of dispute in Taiwan area between China and US by means of negotiation. In course our talks PRC side has repeatedly made major efforts and presented reasonable drafts for announcement renouncing use force by both sides.

11. Wang said their reason for holding of FonMin conference, which they still hold, exactly demonstrates their stand in this regard. However, confronted with circumstances in which US already using force against Chinese territory Taiwan, proposition of non-employment of force cannot be used to induce China to accept US occupation Taiwan.

12. Wang said, in order realize principle of non-use force in relations between China US, conference between ForMins two countries must be held to settle question of eliminating and relaxing tension between two countries.

13. Wang said we now spent four months on discussion second item agenda. If US genuinely willing renounce force and accept peaceful settlement dispute it should withdraw forces from Taiwan area. Unfortunately they had not yet seen any actions on part US to withdraw forces and stop posing threats in Taiwan area, nor had they heard any remarks from me ponting towards that end.

14. Wang said, as if to add to this, Mr. Dulles who leading figure of US foreign policy recently declared that America had thrice gone to brink of launching atomic war, recently stepping up military activities in Taiwan area which aimed at creating tension. In recent months American military aircraft made repeated intrusions into China's territorial air.

15. Wang said US refuses touch on question of withdrawing its forces and ending threat, yet persists in demanding China accept its right self-defense on Chinese territory Taiwan. Was this not resort to perversion of facts and turning argument upside down?

16. Wang said to respect right of state to individual collective self-defense in conformity with UN Charter one thing; to whitewash oneself with false claim to self-defense is quite another. Was this not clear enough? Could there be found any stipulation in UN Charter which could possibly be interpreted as granting aggressor state right of self-defense on territory of state which is victim of aggression?

17. Wang said I had stated that question of self-defense is not substantive issue. This sheer sophistry. If US attempts carry out so-called right individual collective self-defense on China's territory Taiwan, this is what Chinese people would determinedly oppose. If Chinese people were to accept such action of seizure as legal, what more remains between China and US which necessitates negotiations?



18. Turning again to pencilled notes, Wang continued that in statement I had made this morning I had remarked that talks have now encountered difficulty. I had acknowledged necessity for us to find way out of this. However, it might be asked wherein lies root of this present difficulty and how we should try to get out of it.

19. Wang said solution to present difficulty should be directed towards effective relaxation of tension in Taiwan area rather than in reverse direction. However, he did not see anything which leads this direction in my remarks this morning.

20. Wang said he could not refrain from pointing out that crux of issues between us is one of substance and principle.

21. Wang said we had agreed to make declaration in conformity UN Charter of fact we agreed disputes between two countries in Taiwan area should be settled peacefully. That is preliminary step. Next step would be for two of us seek practical and feasible ways to realize above objectives. That precisely point of view their side.

22. Wang said US on other hand proposes make declaration in which so-called right self defense of US in Taiwan area to be recognized. Instead of ending its occupation Taiwan, US by such declaration contemplates legalizing its occupation. That is controversy of principle with which we confronted.

23. Wang said Chinese people will never accept any terms in declaration which recognize so-called right of self-defense of US in Taiwan area. If US refuses give up so-called right self-defense in Taiwan area, can only create doubts as to whether US sincerely desirous of peaceful settlement of disputes between two countries.

24. I said I had just few preliminary comments make on statement he had just made. I had no desire enter into debate on matters past history, which cannot contribute to progress in our discussions here.

25. I said I found it impossible, however, pass by his statement that US started war of aggression in Korea in June 1950 and that security of China was threatened by US. I simply wanted point out fact that, with exception of those associated with that aggression against ROK, virtually every member UN agreed on who true aggressor was.

26. I said his statement regarding use force and threat to his country in Taiwan area at time Korean hostilities so entirely ignored action taken that time just to prevent spread of hostilities to that area.

27. I said his statement regarding US as attempting turn Taiwan into base for aggression against his country also entirely ignored facts. Purely defensive character and strictly limited arrangements of collective self-defense in Taiwan area by US has been published too and is well known by entire world.

28. I said tension Taiwan area had been caused not by any action taken by US. Tension been caused by long repeated, often reiterated, and still continued threats his country initiate hostilities that area.

29. I said it was US had proposed it be made clear that there is determination not initiate hostilities in area but seek solution to disputes existing between us in area by peaceful means. Not conditionally by peaceful means—that is not to say that if solution not found entirely satisfactory to one side or other that force will be resorted to, but unconditionally that solution be found by peaceful means.

30. I said he also persisted this morning in speaking of US occupation Taiwan. US is not occupying Taiwan. Presence US forces in Taiwan area in accord with collective defense arrangements with a government that is member UN and is recognized by great majority world governments. No amount words can twist this fact into supporting statement that US is in occupation Taiwan.

31. I said, however I recognized these were matters on which we have different views. I have not asked him accept my views in regard these matters. What I had asked was that we unconditionally and without reservations make it entirely clear we will not permit these differences lead us to war. Once this done, we could in that atmosphere discuss our differences and other outstanding practical matters between us with better hope coming to mutually agreeable and mutually satisfactory solutions.

32. I said I had made it very clear in proposing and discussing this declaration that it not my intent they sacrifice their views or renounce their policies. I regretted their not being willing adopt same attitude.

33. I said I regretted this morning that he had made it very explicit that his govt's purpose in these negotiations for declaration was to require US give up its right collective self defense. This entirely distorts proposal I had made.

34. I said what he seemed be saying was in making this declaration US Govt should entirely capitulate to views his govt with respect dispute Taiwan area. I had made no such demand on his govt and in negotiating this declaration did not believe it proper do so. That, it seemed me, got us completely away from proposition that we first make clear we not going to war and discuss our problems in that atmosphere and moved us to proposition that we discuss our differences under threat our side might resort to hostilities. That exactly situation I had been trying get ourselves out of.

35. I said I regretted that his govt gone so far in distorting this very simple straightforward and fundamental proposal.

36. Wang said he found hard accept views presented by me in my statement. Certainly not his intent initiate debate past history. Was

because I raised some historical events at last meeting that compelled him make their views clear.

37. Wang said I had again asserted that no intent part US threaten security China when Korean hostilities started. However, Chinese people could never forget historical lesson given in path taken by Japanese imperialists when seized Korea in order attack China in long run. I had alluded to UN resolution on question of who was aggressor but he might point out that resolution adopted under entire manipulation of US and therefore completely illegal.

38. Wang said, again on question of spread of Korean war which had been prevented: he might point out that was due to strength Chinese and Korean people that expansion Korean war prevented.

39. Wang said, then turning my denial US has occupied Taiwan and turned it into base for attack against China, he might point out US has made no gestures withdraw Taiwan area but is steadily reinforcing strength that area. Could only raise question whether US is not trying strengthen forces in order launch attack against China.

40. Wang said my claim tension Taiwan area not caused by US but rather by China was glaring distortion facts. It matter fact that liberation by Chinese people entire mainland China had never posed threat against anybody else. If there no presence American forces this area there would be no tension this area.

41. Wang said, as to proposal for relaxation tension between China and US in Taiwan area, proposal first advanced by Chinese Premier at Bandung conference in which he proposed China and US enter negotiations resolve disputes between them by peaceful means.

42. Wang said in order eliminate conflicts in Taiwan area and tensions that area, necessary take practical actions rather than merely render lip service.

43. Wang said I had proposed that disputes in Taiwan area be settled unconditionally, yet in draft presented by US, US claims right of self-defense in Taiwan area. This is exactly a condition imposed by US.

44. Wang said it was this condition that prevented our talks from making progress. Chinese people will never accept my denial that US has ever occupied Taiwan, nor my statement regarding relations between my government and Chiang Kai-shek. It well known fact entire world that corrupt regime Chiang Kai-shek long been veil worn by Chinese people. Without support of US, this Chiang Kai-shek clique can never exist for single day. Action US in supporting Chiang clique and occupying Taiwan is outright violation sovereignty China and interference with China's internal affairs.

45. Wang said if US continues persist claiming right to self defense in Taiwan area then all my remarks concerning not requiring Chinese

renounce pursuit policies or views toward dispute are no more than empty words.

46. Wang said I had given example that if American vessel fired upon it would respond in self-defense. He might ask what sort vessel meant. If merchant vessel carrying on peaceful mission would be one thing. If military vessel intruding into territorial waters China, it could not claim any self-defense. That action would be outright provocation and act aggression against Chinese people and Chinese people would not hesitate respond that aggression.

47. Wang said turning now to question of declaration on renunciation force. If US refuses withdraw its untenable claim to right self-defense in Taiwan area, it then proves US not willing make any progress on this question.

48. Wang said if US should in any way assume Chinese would accept my proposal, that, he might say, would be an illusion which could only be realized when sun rises in west.

49. I said, in other words his proposition was that, instead of being renunciation of force and agreement settle differences peaceful means, that instead would be renunciation of US of its views, rights, and interests in Taiwan area.

50. Wang said if they were to make declaration renouncing use force and at same time declaration recognized American right self-defense in Taiwan area, what meaning would there be to such a declaration? Probably I was proposing making of statement in which their side would accept continuing armed occupation Taiwan by US.

51. I said I had told him over and over again that it not my intent, and I did not think amendments I had suggested, in any way prejudice their views and policies on area. I still believed I had accomplished that purpose and I had said if they do not agree, willing listen any suggestions they cared make on this query.

52. I said, however in statements he had made here previously in public statements by his government, and again very explicitly this morning, he had stated his purpose in negotiating this declaration was to have US renounce its views and its rights in area. That was something different. He could not expect US do that, either explicitly or implicitly.

53. Wang said, I had said I did not demand China give up its views or position. However, position of China is exactly to liberate Taiwan. This liberation of Taiwan is inherent right of self-defense of Chinese people.

54. Wang said this reasonable position of China was accepted throughout world. He had repeatedly pointed out that US has absolutely no right self-defense Taiwan area. For US to insist on its views or rights in Taiwan area was to interfere in domestic affairs of another country and to seize territory of another country in violation international law.

This view of rights of US cannot be accepted by Chinese people. These are unequal rights or views.

55. I said I not asking him accept my views. What I asking was that he take same attitude regarding my position. However, he not doing so. What he was doing, and he had again explicitly stated it this morning, was demand that my govt accept his govt's views and renounce right of self-defense.

56. I said I believed I had fairly accurately stated my understanding of situation. If I had not stated it correctly, willing to hear in what way I was wrong.

57. Wang said, first, it would be well for me to recognize that purpose present talks was to try settle issues Taiwan area. Present fact was US had occupied Chinese territory of Taiwan and violated sovereignty of China. Fell upon us two to correct this unreasonable situation. In order to resolve this issue, it not sufficient merely to state that either side need not accept views of other. Some views must be opposed.

58. Wang said today it US which violates Chinese territory; it not China which violates American territory. If US would withdraw armed forces from Taiwan area and stop its threats in Taiwan area, no further issues would exist in this area between us.

59. I said I had nothing more on this this morning but had another matter I would like to take up. Made full prepared statement on implementation:

A. I had occasion on Jan 12 to call your attention to efforts your govt create false impression that in some way Americans imprisoned your country, only Americans we were discussing at time of our announcement Sept. 10 last year, were not entitled expeditiously return in accordance with commitment your govt made in that announcement. I had continued to hope this did not represent considered views your govt.

B. However, I particularly regret to note since our last meeting your government has in communication with UK Charge again attempted to justify this entirely indefensible position. In reply to communication with regard Father McCarthy your government has made such extreme assertions as Father McCarthy has no right even ask for repatriation during period his imprisonment and question of his encountering obstruction in departing does not arise during his imprisonment. Your government has even stated that under our agreed announcement of Sept 10 it was agreed cases of imprisoned Americans are basically different from those not imprisoned.

C. It is hard for me to believe your govt seriously thinks such contentions can be supported, and I am surprised that it continues its attempt to do so.

D. In first place you know, I know and world knows that was precisely these imprisoned Americans we were discussing at time our

agreed announcement issued. We were not discussing theories, imaginary or hypothetical Americans, we were discussing specific Americans in prison your country. What did your government say with respect those Americans? It first said it recognizes Americans in your country desiring return are entitled do so. It did not say only some selected Americans, it did not say only Americans who have managed to stay out of your prisons, it did not say only Americans released from prison, it did not say Americans in prison basically different from those not in prison, it said Americans desiring return, Americans we were talking about at the time, were entitled to do so. Words cannot be more plain.

E. What did your government next say with respect these Americans? It first said it has adopted and then that it will further adopt appropriate measures.

F. It did not say these further measures will be adopted with regard to Americans already in process of returning, it did not say these measures would be adopted with regard to those who did not desire return, it did not say these measures would be adopted with regard to any theoretical group Americans, it said these measures would be adopted with regard to Americans desiring return, precisely this group imprisoned Americans we were discussing Sept 10.

G. What was next thing said with respect these Americans? Your government said these measures would be adopted so these Americans could expeditiously exercise their right return. It did not say measures would be adopted so they could return when they had completed whatever sentences your authorities chose to inflict upon them, it did not say measures would be adopted so they could return when your authorities decided release them from prison, it said measures would be adopted so they could return expeditiously—not expeditiously from some future date, not expeditiously after they had been released from prison, not expeditiously after lifetime in prison, but expeditiously as of Sept 10, 1955 more than four long months ago.

H. That was statement freely made and freely entered into by your government. Your government could have had no misunderstanding of what statement meant.

I. What is record—thirteen these Americans still in prison. Thirteen Americans falsely given impression that all this has no relation to them. Not only have these Americans not been given their rights under agreed announcement, but your authorities seem to be attempting further to put off day when commitment with regard to them will be carried out.

J. Just with regard to case Reverend McCarthy—after over two years in prison without even trial, and six weeks after this commitment on part of your govt. what happens? Are obstructions to his departure removed so that he can expeditiously return? On contrary, apparent

new obstructions are set up and he is finally tried and sentenced four years imprisonment.

K. I fail to see what your govt hopes or expects to gain by this continued delay and evasion in carrying out its freely entered into commitment, and why it adopts course of action which if continued cannot but continue to cast increasing doubt on dependability of its pledged word.

L. It cannot hope conceal these facts or obscure issue by repetition vague and unfounded charges of hypothetical nature against my government.

M. Simple fact is my govt is not preventing any Chinese from leaving US for your country or any other destination of his choice. Third power who you designated to confirm this assurance has not called to attention my govt single case to contrary. There has not to our knowledge been single response to public statement made by Dept of State to which I referred at our last meeting inviting even anyone who knew of any Chinese being obstructed in departing to communicate either with Dept or Indian Embassy.

N. No amount propaganda nor reiteration vague charges can obscure contrast between my government's record and that of yours in this regard.

60. Wang said, in first place he wanted say he entirely could not accept false and unfounded charges against his govt on its carrying out agreed announcement Sept 10. Statement made by me was another attempt at distorting agreed announcement Sept 10.

61. Wang said he sure I would recall that, in discussions on first item agenda, clear distinction was made between those ordinary Americans in China and those who had committed crimes.

62. Wang said that as to ordinary American residents in China, passages of announcement of Sept 10 quoted by me were entirely correct. His govt has explicitly assumed commitment toward these ordinary American citizens. Along this line their side been consistently carrying out agreement concerning American residents in China.

63. Wang said that once any American civilian in China applied for departure, his govt never in any instance offered any obstruction to him. Even in cases those American civilians who had not yet settled personal affairs in China, policy his govt was assist them to enable them quickly depart. In this respect, no charges against his govt justified.

64. Wang said, as to those Americans who had committed offenses against laws China, they were precisely carrying out agreed announcement as well as principles indicated in our discussions over their handling of them. We had for very long time discussed question of those Americans who have committed offenses. Neither in conversations in course of discussions, nor in text agreement have they stated all those



Americans who have committed offenses should be released at given time. It simply said his govt would review each these cases, and would handle their cases with leniency, taking into consideration nature cases as well as their behaviour. As matter fact, their lenient policy towards these Americans has been demonstrated.

65. Wang said among 40 Americans who had committed offenses against Chinese laws at beginning of discussions, 27 been released. Could this action his govt be misrepresented as not lenient? Some of the Americans had been sentenced 10 years imprisonment yet after only five years imprisonment had been released. Was not this example lenient treatment by his govt?

66. Wang said it true 13 Americans still remain prison for their offenses. However, cases these people could in no way be used to charge Chinese Govt not carrying out agreed announcement. It was these 13 Americans themselves who were to blame for their not abiding by law in China and committing offenses against Chinese law.

67. Wang said I had stated that any Chinese in US was free to leave and that Indian Embassy had so far not raised any cases of obstruction departure Chinese. All this at variance with facts. If anyone to be accused of failure carry out agreed announcement, it was US which should be accused.

68. Wang said it precisely because my side continued exert pressure on Chinese in US in violation of agreement that many Chinese dared not attempt return or even communicate with Indian Embassy. Moreover, it because my refusal submit list all Chinese in US and furnish info about Chinese in US prisons that makes it difficult for Indian Embassy carry out its duties. Even after conclusion agreement agenda item one, my govt saw fit to adopt measures further threatening Chinese in US by requiring them secure entry permits Taiwan, thereby depriving them their freedom apply for return in future.

69. Wang said, although his side had repeatedly protested our gross violations agreement, so far had seen no actions by my govt to revoke these measures and improve situation. Might he ask whether US willing implement terms agreement after all.

70. Wang said he would appreciate receiving specific reply from me concerning withdrawal by US Govt of requirement for Taiwan entry permits.

71. Wang said he would also ask me to look into situation of 14 Chinese who were missing in US or whose departures prevented, as given in previous three separate lists. I had not yet given an account of them. Again I had stated in last meeting that I could see no point in their side raising question of Chinese who for one or other reason do not desire return for time being. He considers such attempt at generalization as entirely unjustifiable. For all these have desire return but



prevented doing so by US Govt my side has obligation give account on each of these. These represent only fraction those Chinese prevented from returning but does show plight of broad masses of Chinese in US.

72. Wang said this morning he had further list of four Chinese in US (names in fol tel) and requested me make investigation and give accounting on these as well as others. Full details had been given in list he handed me.

73. I said, first, in discussing Americans in China, he had spoken of lenient treatment, we had different views as to what was lenient and what was not, and I would not go into that.

74. I said he had also said his govt had not agreed that imprisoned Americans would be freed at any particular time. I did not think I needed take time review our discussion on this, but both of us well aware of significance of word "expeditiously" in this agreement. We had accepted word in good faith.

75. I said what I had said, and was repeating, was that these Americans were not being released expeditiously. No amount of explanation or rationalization could change that fact.

76. I said I had previously gone into question of what he called Taiwan entry permits at great length. If his govt going to disregard those explanations, I saw little purpose in repeating them.

77. I said, I had said in past and was again saying that I always willing discuss with him and immediately take up case where there appears evidence my govt might not be fully carrying out terms agreed announcement. I continued to be willing do this.

78. I said, however at same time I could not take or accept responsibility for those among tens thousands Chinese in US who do not write letters. As far as communication by Chinese in US with Indian Embassy concerned, anyone knowing anything about US and its postal system would know it perfectly absurd say that any Chinese afraid drop letter addressed Indian Embassy in mail box.

79. Wang said he had already stated their position towards Americans in China and their policy in handling of their cases. He had stated that his govt would continue faithfully to carry out terms agreed announcement.

80. Wang said he also asked US Govt do same in faithfully carrying out agreed announcement and refraining from any actions in violation of it.

81. Wang said situation of Americans in China was quite clear to everybody. And this situation was that their side has assisted these Americans in China. But they still not able get list Chinese in America from our side. They not even been furnished by US Govt with list indicating number Chinese who are in prisons.

82. Wang said I had just stated it hard understand why nobody among the great number of Chinese nationals in US had written Indian Embassy. This situation quite understandable to them. Situation is result of series of harassments and pressures taken by US Govt toward these people in past. Many people been detained prison, punished with fines, intercepted on way home by US Govt. All this has left deep impression minds Chinese in US. Particularly, after conclusion agreement return civilians, US Govt went so far as to require Chinese civilians residing US to procure entry permits Taiwan. This serious pressure on Chinese residents in US.

83. Wang said I had repeatedly advanced claims concerning 13 American prisoners China. These, as I knew, had committed offenses against Chinese laws. And cases known everybody.

84. Wang said the eighteen Chinese whose names given me previous meetings and this morning represent only fraction Chinese in US who have long wanted return but unable do so. These cases of eighteen show plight Chinese in US find themselves in.

85. Wang said, they ask US expeditiously make an account and give specific reply these cases of Chinese whose names he has given me.

86. Wang said and they ask US Govt should cease threats and pressures against Chinese students. US should adopt measures according with agreed announcement so as to enable these Chinese return expeditiously.

87. I said I did not say no Chinese in US had communicated with Indian Embassy. I did not know whether he familiar with press release of Indian Embassy Dec 20 which said that it been receiving enquiries and applications from Chinese in US. That press release said that some these had raised technical matters which Embassy was taking up with Indian Govt, and some had financial questions.

88. I said I did not know what these technical issues were. My only point was that Indian Embassy clearly was in touch with many Chinese in US. At least thus far, not in single case has Embassy of India, in spite fact in touch many Chinese in US, called attention my govt to any respect in which it violated agreed announcement or where Indian Embassy feels US obstructing departure of any these Chinese.

89. Wang said, as he had said if US Govt would not revoke those unreasonable measures against Chinese, the pressures against their free choice would always be present. They continued ask that US adopt measures in accordance with agreed announcement. He specifically had raised number cases with me, and he awaits my answer to these representations.

90. I said I had nothing more.

91. Wang said he also had nothing more.

92. I asked if he still wished meet next Friday.

93. Wang said perhaps we could advance next meeting—say Saturday 28th.

94. I said in view his suggestion last time I had arranged my schedule to fit and was agreeable his proposal of next Friday or as regularly scheduled on Thursday.

95. Wang switched to agree to next Friday, Feb. 3.

Gowen

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**467. Telegram 1425 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 26, 1956, 10 a.m.

1425. From Johnson.

Following list handed me by Wang 34th meeting January 25:

[*text not declassified*]

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–2656. Official Use Only.

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**468. Telegram 1426 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 26, 1956, 2 p.m.

1426. From Johnson.

Comments on yesterday's meeting:

Extreme position adopted by CHICOM with respect self-defense clause which they full well recognize would never be accepted by US, together with their public statements, may represent new policy

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–2656. Secret; Limit Distribution.

decision make no further efforts arrive at agreement with US on renunciation force declaration. Their tactic now appears be thereby utilize demonstrated inability these talks make progress to support public campaign and political pressures for FonMin meeting and in general try establish posture of their repeated efforts negotiate "reduction tensions in Taiwan area" being rebuffed or frustated by US. They may feel that if they are successful in this it would tend free their hands military action against offshore islands. To support this they may desire these talks be continued pro forma for time being or at least not be willing accept onus for breaking them off. In this regard Wang made no threats at yesterday's meeting to break off talks or otherwise and from this standpoint his statements were somewhat milder than Jan. 24 Peiping statement.

2. As far as next meeting is concerned it will be Wang's "turn" to open. It seems to me he has four possible courses of action which I list in order my estimate probability: (A) maintain focus on impasse perhaps putting more stress on threat aspect; (B) propose that as we have now spent more than four months on our item renunciation force without agreement we drop it and move to their item of FonMin meetings and trade embargo; (C) make new proposal on renunciation force declaration and (D) make move to break off talks. Believe I should be prepared handle any of foregoing possibilities.

3. If he follows first course or depending on nature his proposal even third course, believe in addition points I have already made, I might point out contradiction between accepting applicability renunciation force to Taiwan and demand US renounce self-defense right there. If PRC sincere in renouncing force Taiwan area question US exercising right self-defense there does not arise.

4. If he proposes break off of talks I would propose reiterate my willingness and desire continue efforts reach agreement and make clear they would have to bear entire onus.

5. While I could reiterate our position on renunciation force and FonMin meeting if he adopts second course, he may adopt attitude of flat refusal further discuss renunciation force declaration.

Gowen

**469. Telegram 1429 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 27, 1956, 4 p.m.

1429. From Osborn.

Wang's interpreter called to request postponement next meeting to Saturday February 4. Emphasized request purely for administrative reasons. He requested press be told merely it been agreed hold next meeting February 4 instead February 3, without saying at whose initiative. On instruction Ambassador Johnson, I agreed both requests.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–2756. Official Use Only; Priority. Repeated to Prague as telegram 24.

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**470. Circular Telegram 500<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 27, 1956, 6:09 p.m.

500. Joint State–USIA.

Department and Agency request telegraphic report reaction to Chinese Communist foreign office statement January 18 concerning Ambassadorial talks at Geneva, Department's reply January 21 and rebuttal by Chinese Communist foreign office January 24. Report should cover same points listed circular 426 December 23.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–2756. Confidential. Drafted by Henderson; cleared in USIA, NEA/P, EUR/P, and by Clough. Sent to Bangkok, Bern, Bombay, Brussels, Bonn, Calcutta, Colombo, Djakarta, Hong Kong, London, Madras, Manila, New Delhi, Paris, Rangoon, Rome, Saigon, Singapore, Stockholm, Taipei, and Tokyo.

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**471. Telegram 1559 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 30, 1956, 6:13 p.m.

1559. For Johnson.

Guidance for February 4 meeting.

1. Concur in your estimate (Your 1426) that most likely Communist tactic next meeting is renewed attack on US position regarding renunciation of force. You should respond along lines your presentation last meeting.

2. Reiterate demand for expeditious release Americans. Note that flagrancy Chinese Communist breach of Agreed Announcement cumulative with each added week of non-performance. Again reject in vigorous terms Communist attempt exclude imprisoned Americans from application Agreed Announcement. Point out that imprisoned Americans were very persons about whom we were making representations when Agreed Announcement was drafted and issued. Also point out that instead of fulfilling commitment to take appropriate measures expedite Americans return, in at least two cases some six weeks after issuance Agreed Announcement, Americans who had been held in prison several years were tried for first time and sentenced to long prison terms. This is callous violation their pledge. Longer they unjustifiably continue hold Americans, more apparent it becomes to people of world that they using human beings as political hostages. Such action is repugnant to all civilized nations. FYI During coming meetings you should continue build strong case against Communists aimed particularly at their failure to honor commitments and demonstrated use individuals as political pawns. END FYI

3. Inform Wang US is investigating case of Yuan Jui-hsiang, alleged to have been taken into custody by US Immigration Service, but does not intend to investigate other names previously submitted by Wang in absence specific showing claiming that US Government obstructing departure these persons. Refuse to accept any more names unless Wang makes such showing. Failure of Chinese in this country to write letters to Communist China is no evidence either that they wish to go to Communist China or that they have encountered obstruction.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-3056. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Phleger, Clough, and McConaughy; cleared by Sebald and in draft by Dulles.

4. Your argumentation at last meeting was excellent throughout and theme can be repeated next meeting with suitable variations.

5. FYI We do not wish talks broken off and under no circumstances should break come from us. Break, if inevitable, should come from other side. If Communist press for discussion of trade embargo or higher level meetings you should maintain position that fruitless to discuss other issues until both sides renounce use of force.

6. FYI. It would be possible by rearranging draft announcement of renunciation of force to eliminate any basis for claim that juxtaposition of reservation of self-defense and mention of Taiwan would represent Communist concession that Taiwan not part of China, and we could also insert statement that neither party gives up right to achieve objectives by peaceful means. However, because of categorical Communist statements which make clear their plan to contend that US renunciation of force would in effect give up US rights in Taiwan area and in implementation of Defense Treaty with GRC, we do not ourselves suggest any change in formulation of announcement, as it would be misinterpreted.

**Dulles**

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#### 472. Telegram 1440 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, February 1, 1956, 11 a.m.

1440. From Johnson. Paragraph 3 Department telegram 1559.

Appreciate reasons against appearing accept even by implication obligation investigate names submitted by Wang in absence any showing of current desire return and current obstruction departure. Will continue make clear not accepting any such obligation.

However, believe refusal accept further lists would be inconsistent with acceptance previous lists and my stand regarding his refusal accept list 450 military personnel which we may again desire raise.

Also as matter has thus far been handled by him in meetings it is only after receiving and reading lists that I can determine exact

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–156. Secret; Limit Distribution.

allegation concerning persons named and it would be awkward then attempt return list or tear off some names from list and retain others. Believe I can effectively make point in paragraph 3 reference telegram without refusing accept lists.

**Gowen**

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**473. Telegram 1568 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 1, 1956, 6:24 p.m.

1568. For Johnson. Our 1567.

Both British Embassy and American Red Cross have received telegrams from Hong Kong confirming Liu stated he did not wish to proceed Communist China. He is being cared for by Hong Kong authorities who are investigating whether Liu has any relatives in colony. American Red Cross has requested British Red Cross undertake any humanitarian assistance required by Liu and British Red Cross has agreed. American Red Cross telegraphing Chinese Communist Red Cross that Liu unwilling proceed Communist China and that British Red Cross will render assistance.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-156. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Clough.



**474. Telegram 1573 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 2, 1956, 10:23 a.m.

1573. For Johnson.

Your 1440. You are authorized your discretion handle Chinese names as you suggest provided Wang afforded no grounds for misinterpretation.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–156. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Sebald.

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**475. Telegram 1453 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 4, 1956, 4 p.m.

1453. From Johnson.

1. Five-hour meeting this morning, three hours of which on renunciation, two hours on implementation. No perceptible progress on renunciation and attempt in implementation lay groundwork for renunciation September 10 agreement on basis US failure implement. Should anticipate heavy propaganda play by Peiping radio this regard with particular emphasis Liu Yung-Ming case fantastically charging our objection to his departure 1949 drove him to insanity, and while subsequently cured, his confinement on ship and “pressure” brought on him has caused recurrence insanity.

2. With respect renunciation, threat break off meetings unless we withdraw self-defense clause clearly made coupled with demand Foreign Ministers meeting.

3. Next meeting Thursday February 9. Am departing Prague tonight returning Tuesday.

**Gowen**

FE Message Center notified 2/4/ 11:20 a.m. EMB (CWO)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–456. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

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**476. Telegram 1454 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 4, 1956, 7 p.m.

1454. From Johnson.

Comments on today's meeting:

1. From full record of meeting Department will note I went long way, particularly in latter portions give and take, to sharpen and clarify issue on self-defense clause in renunciation force draft. I am sure there can now be no possibility of their misunderstanding our position. I did not feel I could go any further without danger of erroneously implying willingness eventually negotiate away our position with respect Taiwan. However, would appreciate any specific comments or suggestions Department may have with respect my statements this regard at today's meeting, or what it feels I could usefully stress or minimize at next meeting.

2. There was no slightest indication at today's meeting any willingness their part reformulate self-defense clause, although he gave impression he might be expected to offer reformulation. Of course, I gave no indication intent offer any such reformulation. Thus situation with respect next meeting is very tight.

3. Their performance at today's meeting with respect implementation was probably for purpose attempting demonstrate strength their public position to denounce September 10 agreed announcement in event talks broken off and thereby use 13 remaining Americans as additional pressure on US. I tried expose weakness their position with respect Chinese in my replies today and at next meeting building on basis I laid today can well more clearly expose foregoing tactic. Would appreciate Department's suggestions as to any further replies I might make with respect his demand for list imprisoned Chinese, and whether there is any concrete basis for his charges concerning Chinese being required present passports to him. His statements with regard Liu Yung ming were so absurd and designed as desperate attempt build propaganda case explain his failure return, I considered useless attempt reply in further detail and indicated ridicule by ironically smiling when he made statements,

4. As far as overall situation is concerned Department will appreciate that it may be very difficult for me to keep talks going much if any beyond next meeting unless CHICOMS for own purposes desire

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-456. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

to have talks continued for their own sake, or their present tactics are bluff. There can be no sure answer except that which will be given by the course of events.

5. Would also appreciate instructions as to whether in event of break if situation permits Department desires me take any initiative toward or agree to maintenance any continuing contact between Wang and myself through Consulate here.

Gowen

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**477. Telegram 1455 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 4, 1956, 8 p.m.

1455. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 35th meeting today by reading prepared statement on renunciation force saying we now holding 16th meeting devoted discussion on making statement renouncing use force in relations China US. This subject first submitted by US side. After 16 sessions views both sides been set out clearly. Responsibility for failure reach agreement up to this time obviously not that of PRC side.

2. Wang said in line their consistent stand for peaceful solution international disputes their side proposed that China and US should jointly announce their intention settle their disputes peacefully. As US was already using force in regard Taiwan, there had to be some way in which this desire could be realized, hence their side proposed Foreign Ministers meeting.

3. Wang said, in order promote peaceful settlement disputes between two countries their side has refrained from advancing any prerequisites for renunciation force. However, US side has put forward and persists in requiring their side recognize US right self-defense on China's territory Taiwan. Obviously this represents attempt block way to peaceful settlement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-456. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

4. Wang said at last meeting I had claimed that action by US in forcibly seizing Taiwan June 1950 taken to prevent spread of Korean hostilities. Such actions can in no sense be taken as intended prevent aggression. Facts have proven to contrary. After US launched aggression against Korea, at same time it extended its aggression and attempted spread its aggression to China's northeast section.

5. Wang said now Korean War long ceased, yet US stepping up aggressive military activities in Taiwan area. This serves confirm point that US attempting use pretext of Korean War to whitewash its acts of war in seizure of Taiwan. However this simply vain attempt.

6. Wang said I had also claimed that tension in Taiwan area not created by American acts of aggression; that instead it created by China's desire exercise sovereign rights over Taiwan. This again is turning everything upside down.

7. Wang said exercise by state of sovereign right over own territory could in no way cause tension. Had it not been for outright intervention US, Taiwan would be liberated long ago, and there would have been no tension in Taiwan area whatsoever. No amount of sophistry could deny fact that American seizure Taiwan by force and intervention in Taiwan by threat of force caused tension in Taiwan area.

8. Wang said I had next claimed that US in Taiwan purely for self-defense and that presence American forces on Taiwan in accordance with collective defense arrangements with Chiang Kai-shek clique. Fact is Taiwan is China's territory and US had no right at all to traverse Pacific all way to Taiwan and put up defenses on that territory.

9. Wang said Chiang Kai-shek rule over Chinese people long been overthrown by Chinese people. Chiang could not represent anyone. Any treaties signed by his clique null void and could not legalize American aggression.

10. Wang said however my assertion that US on Taiwan purely in self-defense and that presence in accordance with self-defense arrangements fully proves my draft proposal for renunciation force amounts to requiring PRC side recognize occupation of Taiwan as well as recognize treaty between US-Chiang Kai-shek clique so as to legalize American occupation.

11. Wang said I had repeatedly stated US side does not demand PRC accept its views. In fact it not only demands they accept US position but also demands PRC recognize US actions of aggression as legal. He wanted say again that this could by no means be accepted.

12. Wang said it American occupation Taiwan which created tension Taiwan area. Their side proposes that conference Foreign Ministers be held by two countries, whereas US proposes that US must be given prior recognition status quo Taiwan so as to legalize occupation. As to

just which side has sincerity towards settlement our problems, it plain to everybody.

13. Wang said if US side desirous peaceful settlement it must therefore withdraw its unreasonable demands. If US side should continue persist in its unreasonable demands, Wang saw no point in continuing these dragged out talks.

14. In partly extemporaneous partly prepared reply I said he had given his views on how he saw situation in which we find ourselves and had renewed charges against my government and discussed matters which I couldn't see would help us advance in reaching agreement on problem directly in front of us. I, too, was seriously concerned with situation with which we confronted in our talks which could and still can have such favorable potentialities not only for our two peoples but for world. I would like to discuss that situation with him with utmost candor. I did not want to make charges or engage in fruitless debate but would like him understand how situation appeared to me at present moment.

15. I said I came here on August 1 last year with hope that his government fully shared spirit which led my government propose these talks and with hope real progress could be achieved by exercise of good will and understanding of each others point view, and would continue carry this out to best my ability.

16. I said it was not through accident, or lightly, that in its specific proposal for these talks my government placed matter of return civilians first, and had hoped that acceptance of that by his government proved that it also appreciated great importance of promptly resolving that matter. At very outset our conversations I carefully tried explain to him not only official attitude my government with regard this matter but also exactly how American people felt about it and relationship it had to atmosphere in which we might seek resolution of other matters facing us.

17. I said action his government had taken July 31 in freeing 11 American airmen led me to hope that his government also fully appreciated importance this matter and was desirous of promptly and completely resolving it. In order show its goodwill with regard matter and in hope it would facilitate prompt resolution of problem of Americans in his country, my government unilaterally rescinded all measures under which some few Chinese had been prevented from returning his country. I had informed him of this at very outset our talks.

18. I said no attempt was made to hold these people to extract political or other concessions from them nor was action in any way conditioned on taking of action by his government with respect Americans in his country. As I had pointed out to him at time, taking of similar

action by his government with respect Americans in his country could have promptly and quickly settled whole problem of return of civilians.

19. I said, however, he stated that his government not willing take simple steps necessary to match action taken by my government which would have disposed of problem, but insisted on third power arrangement. Although it clear that only action by his government could remove impediments to departure of Americans from his country, in order meet his point of view I agreed with such third power arrangement. I even accepted his position there be no specific time limit set within which action to permit all Americans return would be completed, and agreed to his suggestion that simply term "expeditiously" be used in this regard. Thus agreement was finally reached on our announcement September 10 last year, first agreement between us.

20. I said as I pointed out to him at time, people of my country would interpret agreement to mean just what it said and would expect expeditious return from his country of all Americans who desired return. Agreement was received with much satisfaction my country and there was general hope that it portended opening of new phase in peaceful resolution of other questions between us. Additional announcement of release 10 Americans on day of agreement greatly encouraged belief that remaining 19 Americans would in fact quickly be released in accordance pledge made by his govt in announcement. Thereby this problem and irritant in our relations would quickly be removed.

21. I said, thus, if his govt genuinely desired establish conditions for improvement our relations and atmosphere which would permit fruitful discussion questions it desired raise, it had it entirely in its power and ability do so by simply carrying out promptly and in good faith clear commitment into which it had freely entered.

22. I said, however, his govt appeared deliberately to be dissipating these possibilities. Instead of carrying out its commitment in prompt and straightforward manner that would command respect and confidence, it brings forward all kinds excuses and involved rationalizations for not doing what it full well knows it said it would do. Longer it delays in carrying out its pledged word, more inevitable is conclusion by American people, as well as people of world, that purpose is to continue hold these unfortunate human beings as political hostages. I was reluctant to come to conclusion his govt adopting such abhorrent policy but from statements made by his govt and continued failure release these people it increasingly difficult for me avoid doing so.

23. I said I also concerned with increasingly obdurate attitude his govt adopting concerning our simple and straightforward proposal Oct 8 and its persistent attempts misrepresent that proposal. I had at

one time thought we were in general agreement as to principle that without prejudice to our respective views and peaceful pursuit our policies we would make it clear we would not threaten or initiate war in attempt solve those differences.

24. I said once this had been done, we could in such atmosphere calmly and rationally discuss our differences with real hope that mutually satisfactory solutions could be found. If we were to be successful in such high purpose it essential we refrain from attempting anticipate settlement those disputes or prejudice position of either side with respect our differences. It seemed to me this proposition so self-evident there could be no objection to it and until recently I had assumed it also accepted by his govt, and our only remaining difficulties were those of words by which it would be expressed.

25. I said in my opening statement Oct 8 I very specifically set forth it was not suggested that either of us should renounce any policy objectives which we felt we were legitimately entitled achieve, but only renounce force in implementing those policies. This was also explicitly set forth in draft I presented Nov 10. I felt satisfied amendments suggested to his draft Dec 1 also carried out same intent. I still feel that is case. I said I thought he and his govt had mistakenly interpreted amendments which suggested there was no intent whatever to prejudice his views regarding peaceful pursuit his policies. I did not think there was any better way accomplishing common purpose than in amendments I presented. I still haven't thought of any better way but again repeat my willingness hear any suggestions he had.

26. I said, however, it has become increasingly clear intent of his govt, apparently from beginning our discussion this matter, was vastly and fundamentally different. It has become clear that purpose his govt is utterly to reverse whole spirit and intent of any such declaration into document which on one hand would explicitly or implicitly constitute unilateral renunciation by my govt its solemn international undertakings as well as its views and policies. On the other hand the intent appears to be to reserve to his govt. right to initiate war to oppose views of my govt. I said I do not believe I was unfairly misrepresenting situation if I stated it in simple terms as an attempt to get my govt to say it recognizes his govts right to start war in Taiwan area if it desires to do so, and if it does so my govt renounces its right to defend itself or its allies. This is not declaration of renunciation force, but rather declaration intent of one side use force. Proposition is so absurd, I do not see how some could seriously attempt support it, and if one is to speak of unreasonable demands this is certainly most unreasonable of all.

27. I said I did not question his right to hold his views with regard our dispute Taiwan area, or elsewhere for that matter, no matter how opposed to them I might be. Nor did I dispute right his govt

peacefully oppose views my govt. All I have asked, and continue to ask, is that he accord same respect my views, and two of us assure world of determination our govts that mutual opposition our policies will not lead to war. I do not see how any proposition could be more simple or universally accepted as just, reasonable and in accord with accepted standards international conduct. Can we not again approach this matter from this standpoint?

28. Wang said I had just given a general outline and review of our talks from the start last August up to present. He would like point out he found himself unable accept some of my standpoints in relation past events and in relation problems encountered in our talks.

29. Wang said in particular they could not accept unfounded and unreasonable charges against his govt regarding its implementation of agreed announcement.

30. Wang said he would set aside for time being until later fuller discussion of return of civilians and other such matters referring to item one of agenda.

31. Wang said, in first place he would make some comments on my statements concerning our discussion second agenda item, that is, on matter of issuing statement renouncing use force. There are two points in approach this problem which must be set clear between two sides.

32. Wang said first point is in connection objective in making such declaration between us. Second point is what exactly is nature of difference between our two sides. If we could set these two essential points in proper light, then remaining matters in connection with them could be easily settled.

33. Wang said, now concerning first point: it been their consistent view and stand that any such declaration or statement should be aimed at relaxing existing tension between two sides in Taiwan area, and that any such statement or declaration must provide effective and peaceful measures by which disputes between China and US could be concretely settled.

34. Wang said, hence it been their constant effort and attempt to incorporate in such declaration or statement, as much as they could, those points and views which acceptable by either side, while setting to one side matters on which we do not agree, so as to promote chance of peaceful settlement disputes between two of us. They have tried accomplish this purpose of peaceful settlement without involving any compulsion on other side.

35. Wang said, however US in its various proposals, including amendment it last put forward, there was always attempt include so-called right self-defense in Taiwan area by US. This attitude of US amounts to compelling their side accept position which it finds



absolutely unacceptable. This precisely is greatest obstacle in way making such statement by both sides.

36. Wang said I had properly said that we hold different objectives in matter making statements. He agreed with this view.

37. Wang said if proposed text of my draft accepted it would really be what I had termed it—a declaration of intent to use force instead of statement renouncing use force. Such declaration [he] noted, runs counter to objective in peaceful settlement of disputes.

38. Wang said, next point is what exactly is nature dispute Taiwan area? I had asserted we should not anticipate settlement of differences. He found it hard agree any such statement.

39. Wang said as he had repeatedly declared utterly unjust and unreasonable situation, then this situation is exactly armed seizure Taiwan by US. That is international issue between China and US which we confronted with. This exactly situation which required solution and which they hoped could be peacefully resolved between two countries.

41. Wang said in approaching settlement this dispute, if we do not have clear understanding this situation then it would be very difficult find out correct means for finding settlement.

42. Wang said now he proposed enter into discussion some concrete facts I had mentioned my statement this morning. I had stated that we agreed on desirability for making of statement renouncing force, and that only remaining difficulty was find form words agreeable both which could express this idea. I also had stated and again repeated this morning that I did not demand their side renounce its views or its policies. I had denied I demanded any prerequisites from their side in making any such statement, and I had asked their side to respect views of US.

43. Wang said however their side has always respected any views US which could facilitate relaxation tension Taiwan area, which conducive cement relations two countries, and which could help in smooth resolution differences between us. All these views respected by them. But he must point out most views presented by US on question making declaration renounce use force were unreasonable and unacceptable their side.

44. Wang said for instance, I stated there already existed common view on question of making declaration and only remaining difference one of choice words expressing that idea. But he could not accept this view my side because it tends ignore substance our differences over declaration.

45. Wang said orally I had stated I did not require of their side any prerequisites, but in statement I included demand right self-defense. This nothing but prerequisite.

46. Wang said it always been their view that each state in accordance UN Charter had right self-defense—self-defense its own territory. But US has absolutely no right claim self-defense on territory of another country and they strongly and firmly opposed to this view of US.

48. Wang said to claim right self-defense on territory of another country would tend remind people of events leading to Hitler annexation Austria and Sudeten area Czech. No matter how Hitler at time tried explain his action as exercise self-defense, history has recorded to contrary.

48. Wang said I had also repeatedly stated I did not intend prejudice their rights, policies, or position—these words sounded rather attractive and nice to hear. But these words also tend remind Chinese people of days before Japanese war when Japanese Prime Minister Hirota declared his ignoramus policy toward China. This gentleman Hirota also tried expound so-called policy of coexistence and coprosperity between China and Japan. But this Japanese gentleman in fact harbored only motive of creating puppet regimes in China, such as Pu Yi state in northeast and traitor Wang Ching-wei state in Nanking. Therefore this so-called coprosperity-coexistence policy only resulted unilateral prosperity Japan.

49. Wang said turning now present situation, while I asserting I not requiring their side renounce position, views, or policies that matter, yet at same time I demanding right self-defense Taiwan area by US—this last proposal had turned nice words into empty statements.

50. Wang said at last meeting I also stated that renunciation so-called right self-defense in Taiwan area by US would amount to requirement submission on part US, stated this what US absolutely could not agree to. They could not accept this presentation of this statement. Submission means country or state is forced renounce its sovereign rights in its own territory. If US persists in demanding so-called right self-defense Taiwan area by US, it amounts to demanding submission by China rather than by US.

51. Wang said if US should withdraw demand for so-called right self-defense in Taiwan area, would not be submission but observance UN Charter and in no way could be viewed as submission on part US.

52. Wang said they also share view we now encountering difficulties in conduct our talks. I had asked how we should approach present situation. As he has stated if I would only withdraw demands for untenable self-defense in Taiwan area, it would seem him then that our talks would be able advance and I probably could see their side had made repeated efforts in making their drafts meet points of our side.

53. I said I would ignore his remarks implicitly comparing my country and its policies to those of German Nazis and Japanese militarist aggressors. I did not understand how he felt such remarks could

contribute to our making progress here. I simply wanted remind him of expenditure of blood and treasure by American people to free world of scourge of their aggression including freeing of China from Japanese militarists.

54. I said next wanted correct two apparent misunderstandings he appeared have concerning my previous remarks.

55. I said first he quoted me saying this morning we should not anticipate any settlement our differences. I might not have made myself clear my original statement. Sense my statement was that we should not in this declaration anticipate what settlement or any particular settlement of our differences. That is, what settlement would be. I would not be sitting here with him unless my government hopeful have settlement with them.

56. I said what I do say is that we should not, in this initial step of agreeing that our differences would not lead to war, confuse that with the next steps.

57. I said next misunderstanding he apparently might have concerning my remarks that I wanted clear up was his statement he understood me as saying we agreed on principle but only disagreed on words express this. What I in fact said was that until recently I had thought that to be case. I had then said that it had however become increasingly clear that apparently purpose their government from beginning was require my government explicitly or implicitly to renounce its solemnly undertaken international agreements as well as its views and policies. This not something which in these discussions this declaration I asking his government to do, and is something which my government is correspondingly not willing do.

58. I said again I say, let us not confuse this essential first step of agreeing that differences would not lead war, with differences of our views themselves. As he said this morning, and I agree we should in discussing this declaration put to one side things on which we do not agree.

59. I said I would like make as clear as possibly can and see if I could not cut through this difficulty of understanding that seems exist between us.

60. Said he holds certain views with respect Taiwan area and relationship my country that area. As I said this morning in discussing this declaration, I trying respect their right hold those views no matter how opposed to them I may be.

61. I said my government holds its views regard that area. I respect his right peacefully to oppose those views. These are matters of dispute between us.

62. I said I did not feel any proposals I had made sacrificed or prejudiced their views with regard this dispute. I thought for his government to read such meaning into proposals I had made gave it meaning not there at all and not intended be there.

63. I said on other hand, as negotiations have developed on this and in light statements he made here and again made this morning and public statements made by his government, seems very clear that what his government attempting do is demand that in this declaration US renounce its views on our dispute.

64. I said he perfectly free oppose those views. I not asking him agree to them. He free oppose them in any peaceful way.

65. I said what I saying was that it would be complete perversion original purpose this declaration and something to which US could and would not agree—to renounce in this declaration its views.

66. I said seemed very clear me they thus asking US do something that entirely unreasonable, something we not asking them do.

67. I said that was putting situation as I saw it just as clearly and plainly as I could.

68. Wang said he had given number of illustrations this morning in order help understanding situation we now facing. Of course nobody would deny fact US participated in struggle against Naziism. Nobody would deny fact US also suffered attack by Japanese and was thus compelled join in battle against Japan. People have recognized contributions made US in struggle both in East and West and Chinese people have been in very good cooperation in operations against aggressors with US. And blood shed by Chinese people during eight-year war resistance cannot be measured. They finally achieved victory.

69. Wang said it always been their wish US would follow policy laid down by former President Roosevelt. And it not desire Chinese people that US should follow path former Japanese militarists and German Nazis.

70. Wang said Chinese people have suffered tremendously under aggression imperialists very long time. But his people would never be forced into submission before any external power. This compares also with American people who did not submit before event forced on them by Pearl Harbor incident.

71. Wang said in view Taiwan is under occupation of US, they cannot find better way illustrating this situation.

72. Wang said I had stated he had misunderstood my statements and that we should not confuse what I called two steps in settlement our disputes. He did not know how he had misunderstood.

73. Wang said it also their opinion we should approach settlement our disputes step by step and after first step go on to next step and finally try achieve complete settlement dispute.

74. Wang said on their part, they had no prejudice or what I had called anticipation of settlement. On contrary they found selves unrec-oncilable to position of US in making such a prejudice or anticipation by demanding right self-defense in Taiwan area.

75. Wang said if US persisted demanding in declaration right to so-called self-defense in Taiwan area, it would seem this declaration tantamount requiring China recognize occupation by US of Taiwan as being legal.

76. Wang said if US should insist in demanding so-called right self-defense in Taiwan area, it would exactly confuse what I called two essential steps toward settlement our disputes. I stated first step should be both sides make clear disputes not lead war and second to resolve disputes themselves. But my demand self-defense in Taiwan area exactly confuses these two steps.

77. Wang said if US would withdraw this unreasonable demand, then would enable two of us advance orderly fashion to settlement our disputes. This made necessary in view fact US has already resorted force in Taiwan area, which gives rise to tension there. That why he had asked my side withdraw such unreasonable demand, so as show world common desire peaceful settlement disputes. If US genuinely desires such settlement, did not see why it should insist this unreasonable stand.

78. I said he had asked me withdraw demand I had never made.

79. Wang said did I mean I had never demanded right self-defense in Taiwan area?

80. I said that I had never demanded they prejudice their position with regard that or any other aspect our dispute. What I had said was they demanding that US in this declaration renounce its position. I found it impossible interpret his remarks on this in recent weeks in any other way. Public record also clear on that.

81. I said most recently in his Prime Minister's speech January 30, in discussing question of our declaration, he specifically stated, "an announcement on renunciation force by both sides must lead to removal of force already used by US". It impossible for me interpret and, in view public record, impossible world interpret withdrawal of amendment I proposed concerning self-defense as other than renunciation by US of its position. I could not see that amendment which we suggested in this regard was requiring them recognize anything they did not choose recognize, or that they thereby prejudicing their position. However, if they believed it did that, as I had said, I willing

listen any suggestion they had as to how the purpose might be accomplished in any other way, and which would at same time meet problem that would be produced concerning position my government if phrase were withdrawn.

82. Wang said I had just stated I not requiring their side accept or recognize what their side would not accept or recognize, and that I not asking them prejudice their position. But if US should insist in right self-defense in Taiwan area, that nothing else but requiring their side recognize US occupation Taiwan. And this exactly prejudicing position Chinese people in exercising sovereign rights over Taiwan.

83. Wang said I had said if US should withdraw defense clause in draft it would be interpreted by world as renunciation by US of its right. Speaking of rights, there are rights in conformity with UN Charter and therefore proper rights, but there are also so-called rights which against spirit UN Charter and which interfere internal affairs other states. If it position US in Taiwan area to claim this co-called right as natural right, it not only would be opposed by Chinese people but also be opposed by people whole world.

84. Wang said he not see how position US would be prejudiced by withdrawing this clause from amendment. Just to contrary, absence that clause in statement will demonstrate that two countries China and US genuinely desirous seeking peaceful solution disputes and renouncing war between them. If, however, I should insist on this unreasonable clause, he did not see how this could lead further progress in talks.

85. I said what he just said seemed me simply confirm what I just saying, that their purpose in this declaration was obtain renunciation by US of its position. That seemed me be real difficulty.

86. Wang said it quite obvious that such declaration provided for peaceful settlement disputes and also at same time provided for parties to declaration to undertake not interfere in internal affairs of others. Chinese people strongly and firmly will oppose to end right of US to self-defense in Taiwan area, which no more than intervention Chinese affairs.

87. Wang said they already made great efforts in discussion declaration and remained for US to make corresponding efforts and take further steps to relieve us from present position. If I had any further constructive suggestion make, they also looking forward to them.

88. I said my constructive suggestion was they withdraw from position which requiring US in this declaration to withdraw from its position.

89. Wang said they could not on their part renounce their position that US should renounce its position. Position of US is one which insists in occupying territory of China. This position indefensible. They had

never asked US accept any position their side which meant internal intervention affairs US or occupation US territory.

90. Wang said if I had nothing further he would like bring up another matter.

91. I said all right.

92. Wang then rapidly read long prepared statement on implementation. Said he would now make observations concerning my opening statement regarding implementation first agenda item. As for their side, they always been faithfully carrying out agreement.

93. Wang said however number incidents occurring of late compelled him raise this subject. On many occasions I had tried cover up fact US Government violating agreement by continuing obstruct return Chinese students. But no amount sophistic statements could hide inhuman treatment accorded Liu Yung-ming. Liu's presence now in Hong Kong showed up my sophistic statements. Must be pointed out that my side, without justification, prevented return Liu with result that he lost his mind.

94. Wang said it only recently, after their side had made representations concerning Liu, that our side compelled release him. However, Liu never violated any US law but yet US expelled him under deportation procedures.

95. Wang said furthermore, on his return passage our side kept him apart from other Chinese, stepped up use of threats against him, and made him mentally unbalanced again. Moreover, he not yet able return. In name Chinese Govt. Wang protesting such inhuman acts in persecution Chinese students. US side must bear responsibility this.

96. Wang said furthermore he had itemized various things in four lists containing names eighteen Chinese and had asked me for accounting why they not returned. As he had pointed out, all desired return, all prevented from doing so. They unable return thus far, and unable communicate with families on account obstructions my government. Chinese people demanded rectification this situation.

97. Wang said had further list seven Chinese in US whose return being prevented (names in fol tel). He raising this with me and asking for accounting along with others. Experience these people showed US side not only failed observe agreement September 10 but also deliberately has broken agreement.

98. Wang said experience Chinese student Liao in present list provided example whereby not difficult see how US Govt. continuing offer obstruction return even after issuance agreed announcement return civilians. Mr. Liao went US end 1948, studied Univ. Chicago. Was on staff teaching mathematics at Agriculture and Mechanics College Stillwater, Oklahoma. Already on way home in 1952 when intercepted by



US Government at San Francisco. Later, he formally requested from US Government permission return September 1955, however so far unable return.

99. Wang said he had merely cited single case, there many more. Asked that US take note, immediately stop obstruction, and give report on situation these Chinese students.

100. Wang said on other hand, he had many occasions inquired as to innocent Chinese kept US prisons, but I had submitted no lists. This contrasted strongly cooperative attitude Chinese side which submitted complete lists of Americans in China. He once again asked US side submit complete list these prisoners. If my side sincerely interested implementation it should immediately submit such list. (Here Wang handed me list, saying it full list of seven students, giving full particulars.)

101. I said, first with reference Mr. Liu, I astounded at statements he made about him. According statements in Wang's letter concerning him, he became mentally ill May 1949. What relation that could have to fact that several years afterwards US imposed restrictions on some few Chinese regarding their departure, I could not understand.

102. I said Mr. Liu simply a very ill man, who been cared for at public expense over long period years. He not only cared for at US public expense, he returned Hong Kong at US public expense. Far from indicating any violation agreed announcement, I thought action US Government his regard spoke for itself. I wished might be possible have same prompt action concerning cases I had raised with him.

103. I said not quite clear me what their charge concerning Mr. Liu was. He had arrived Hong Kong. My understanding he being cared for by British authorities there. Could not believe Wang could be alleging British authorities preventing his return China if he so desired. This really carrying charge that US obstructing people from returning to absurd degree.

104. I said next these vague statements he continuing make concerning US breaking agreement simply unable stand in light facts. I did not ask him accept my word on it. I sure he had available from Indian Embassy in Washington full and real facts. He well knew that in spite free communication Chinese in US enjoy with Indian Embassy, there not been any case in which Indian Embassy felt facts justified any representations to US Govt. that it obstructing departure any Chinese.

105. I said for most part, names and information concerning persons in US allegedly being obstructed departing seem to come down to simple question their writing to people his country. I did not see how he could possibly interpret failure some individuals in US to write letters his country either as evidence they want go his country or that they encountering obstruction in return. As indicated to him in past, my government did not undertake in agreed announcement nor could



it undertake any obligation investigate case somebody who does not write letter his country. Nor could it force him do so.

106. I said obligations under agreed announcement very clear. Obligations are not to obstruct departure of any Chinese in US who desires return his country. Obligation is also that people who desire return and feel they encountering obstruction may freely communicate Indian Embassy. Obligation is to permit Indian Embassy investigate facts and if it finds obstruction allow it make representations. Obligation my government receive such representations. My government has in past and will continue fully carry out its obligations. I willing discuss with him here and take up with my govt. any case where there appears any possibility we not carrying out those obligations.

107. I said however my government did not intend investigate cases in which there no showing US Government obstructing departure.

108. I said my authorities investigating case Mr. Yuan Jui-hsiang, in which there claim he being detained by INS. I would inform him results as quickly as available.

109. I said I simply did not understand his persistent reference to persons in US applying for return and being prevented. For example, case Mr. Liao he mentioned this morning—Wang stated he formally requested return from US Government in September 1955. Wang's information that regard simply could not be correct. As I had said over and over again, there no exit permit, no exit visas, no procedures of any such kind which required of any alien in US. They do not have to apply anyone. All have to do is go.

110. I said I again repeated statement that I entirely satisfied my government not obstructing any way any Chinese who desires do so from departing country. I wished same was situation regarding Americans his country. Repetition these vague charges concerning Chinese in US does not conceal fact this not case with Americans in China.

111. Wang said American Government cannot evade responsibility in case Liu Yung-ming. I had just said Wang recognized in his letter that Liu in mental disorder. This not correct. In his letter, Wang had made quite clear Liu when went US not mentally ill. Far from being ill, he attended university and obtained masters degree. This proof enough he well and not ill at all. Only because desired return and prevented doing so that drove him mental disorder. Very inhuman act, and US Government should bear responsibility.

112. Wang said he would read me letter written by Dr. Hocter, supervisor hospital Missouri. In letter to friend of Liu, Hocter wrote, "your friend continues get along very well. However, we have had no recent word from immigration officials about his departure." This was written December 1950. In February 1951, Hocter again wrote that Liu

improved sufficiently that I think no need further delay in arranging return Hong Kong.

These letters of Dr. Hoctor exactly refuted statement made by me previous meeting that Liu although recovered yet not fit for travel. Then, after authorities hospital stated Mr. Liu improved sufficiently that could make departure, US Government kept him there. For this US must also bear responsibility. After PRC side made representations concerning Mr. Liu and US took steps enable his departure, although Liu had committed no offenses against US law, yet evicted from country under punishment deportation. This another action US Government responsible for.

113. Wang said when Liu on board ship sailing for home, he very delighted finally permitted return, but US authorities kept him in isolation from other Chinese on ship and sent personnel to talk with him and exert pressure on him while ship sailing China. This caused Liu another mental attack. US Government must bear responsibility this also. From this case of Mr. Liu, inhuman acts of US authorities in persecuting and obstructing Chinese in US are fully confirmed.

114. Wang said after his side had made representations with me concerning these 25 Chinese, whose names given me in various meetings, I again tried defend my position by arguing US Government did not require permit for return, that Indian Embassy free communicate with Chinese, and that Chinese in US not being obstructed departure. But facts turn out contrary to what I had alleged on question of Taiwan entry permit requirement, Indian Embassy had made representation US Government and Indian Embassy desired make public announcement on this question. However prevented doing so by US Government. These 25 persons he had so far raised with me were all desirous returning but were actually prevented doing so.

115. Wang said there had been cases Chinese already departed US and on way home but intercepted by agents INS halfway. Also of Chinese who had submitted passport to INS for visas, but no action taken permit departure. Therefore question arises as to which side's information not correct. I stated information by Wang not correct. On other hand, many occasions he had asked me as to exactly how many Chinese kept in American prisons but I had failed make reply up to present moment.

116. Wang said therefore if US not willing promptly stop its obstructions and carry out agreement between both sides, it should bear responsibility for breaking of agreement.

117. I said I not going take time today attempt answer in detail these statements which I could only term for most part as fantastic and not supported by single shred fact. For example, he had said Indian

Embassy been prevented making public announcement. US Government has no way, even if it would, of preventing Indian Embassy stating anything publicly it desired state. He had talked about Chinese being intercepted by immigration authorities. What Chinese? When? Where? I positive there been and is no such case. He had certainly brought up no such case.

118. I said there were such cases of Chinese attempting evade preventive departure order, but that long in past. I had told him over and over again that preventive departure order—which only measure ever taken by my government to prevent departure any Chinese—long ago rescinded.

119. I said he continuing speak of Chinese presenting passports to INS for visas. I did not know how many times I had to tell him that Chinese need obtain no visas from INS or anyone else for departure from US. He aware as well as I that Chinese continually departing freely from US. I had no way knowing whether or not they intend to or do proceed his country—as far as we know, they free do so. Press reports, including press reports his country, indicate some them going his country. With exception small group against whom preventive departure orders issued, that always been case. It now the case without exception.

120. I said if it intent his government to denounce our agreed announcement September 10, it should be clear to him that there were no facts with regard US performance under that announcement that could remotely justify such action. I satisfied that this would be recognized by all honest and disinterested persons everywhere. That was all.

121. Wang said I trying hard defend US failure carry out agreed announcement relating return Chinese from US. No amount argument could achieve that purpose. What I said orally not necessarily represents what actually being carried out. Fact is their attention continually been called to cases Chinese, not having committed any offenses in US, yet unable return homeland. This is situation we now facing.

122. Wang said I had enquired as to what Chinese been intercepted by INS and which Chinese presented passports to INS. He might merely refer to case of Liao, who named in list he gave me. This Liao one of Chinese intercepted half way on way home mainland.

123. I asked was this in 1952? If so, probably correct.

124. Wang said I correct on interception 1952, but what took place in 1952 also influenced things in 1955. Therefore, might remind me to investigate all these cases first before I asked questions as to which intercepted or which presented passports to INS.

125. Wang said if US authorities have in fact refrained from obstructing departure these Chinese, he did not see why their attention repeatedly been called to Chinese who desire return but unable do so.

And he also awaiting accounting as to Chinese in US prisons. Point is, since two sides already have reached agreement, duty both is to faithfully implement agreement.

126. I said exactly. I still had to see single case in which US has not done so.

127. Wang said but fact is people desire return but have not yet returned.

128. I said fact is thirteen Americans in his country unable return. This undisputed fact.

129. Wang said this was open to all and quite clear. He meant cases these 13 Americans. Outside these thirteen, most of rest have returned. But as far as known his side, more than thirteen Chinese to date being prevented departure US. Latest number he had given me 25. And their attention would be further called to more such cases. This also serves demonstrate respective manner in which both sides implementing agreed announcement.

130. I said neither these 25 or any other Chinese being prevented from leaving. If they thought they were, entirely free communicate with Indian Embassy.

131. Wang said if only they could freely express their opinions in the US. However, did not see that they could freely express their desire; freedom express desire in US was restricted.

132. I asked if he meant say they afraid write or telephone Indian Embassy.

133. Wang said it seemed even such freedom extremely restricted. And one might ask why US refuses rescind requirement entry permits Taiwan. Unhappy experience Mr. Liu showed how Chinese desiring return driven to mental disorder. All these cases show there been pressure and mental threat against people who desire return their country.

134. I said these cases show nothing except apparent desire Wang's government, I did not know why, to build case against US on this question which facts simply would not support. Anybody who knows anything at all about US knows facts would not support such allegation.

135. Wang said fact is people desiring return not able do so. Agreement is bilateral so cannot unilaterally ask Chinese implement agreement while no action other country permit departures of Chinese. US concerned with its thirteen men in China. Why cannot Chinese people show their concern for their 25 Chinese in US, or perhaps 250, 2500 Chinese in US? Fact he felt it necessary raise these cases with me was because Chinese people will not tolerate existing situation.

136. I said I had no more to say.

137. Wang said he had no more also.

138. I asked was he agreeable meet next Thursday, February 9?  
139. Wang said all right.

Gowen

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**478. Telegram 3173 from Saigon<sup>1</sup>**

Saigon, February 4, 1956, 4 p.m.

3173. Reference: Depcirtel 500.

1. Coverage limited to factual stories and editorials local Chinese-language newspapers based primarily on US statement; no specific attention to CHICOM January 24 reply. No radio coverage known. Definitely no newsreel coverage. Vietnamese press coverage of all foreign news now reportedly restricted by official censors who order concentration on domestic politics (approaching elections).

2. Editorial comment, following general pattern of criticizing Geneva Ambassadorial talks, stepped up demand for breaking off negotiations, pointed to CHICOM "lack good faith" as evidence CHINAT warnings against negotiations had been right all along. Must be kept in mind in this connection that Chinese Legation here now reportedly exercises virtual joint censorship powers with Vietnamese Government over local Chinese press.

3. No public comment by Vietnamese officials. Only available private comment that of FonOff Political Affairs Director Lam, who said after CHICOM January 18 statement he found action not surprising, supposed it might well mean end of Geneva talks. Chinese officials here follow "told you so" line, but some businessmen (possibly in hope being assured to contrary) have expressed view Dulles-Chou talks inevitable.

Reinhardt

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–456. Confidential.

**479. Telegram 1457 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 6, 1956, 2 p.m.

1457. From Johnson.

Fol list handed me by Wang 35th meeting Feb. 4:

[*text not declassified*]

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-656. Official Use Only.

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**480. Telegram 1591 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 7, 1956, 7:52 p.m.

1591. For Johnson.

Guidance for February 9 meeting.

1. Refer to return of Liu Tung-ming to mainland (Hong Kong's 114). Point out no restriction was imposed his return to Communist China and clear US carried out agreed announcement. Use information contained Hong Kong's 112 to Geneva showing 35 Chinese arrived Hong Kong January 31 en route Communist China. Mention cumulative figure of 189 in this category since Jan. 1955.

2. Continue stress failure implement Agreed Announcement. Regarding our own implementation reiterate there are no restrictions on departure of any Chinese; full circulation and publicity of announcement has been made, and no report from Indian Embassy of any Chinese in US appealing to it that they prevented from leaving. Regarding prisoners, would not discuss them specifically.

3. With respect to renunciation of force continue along lines of your last presentation and also of our last public announcement. Point out that Communist argument really adds up to demand that US concede to Communists all points in dispute instead of leaving them subject

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-756. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Phleger; cleared by Sebal, McConaughy, and Dulles.

for discussion after renunciation of force has been agreed to. Particularly point out that Communists continue to insist that US concede that Taiwan and off-shore islands are Communist territory when fact is that US position is that they have never been Communist territory and particularly that Taiwan ceded to Japan by China was captured from Japan by forces under US orders and now lawfully administered and held by sovereign GRC.

4. FYI It seems evident from Wang statement that Communists are not willing to agree to an announcement that would reserve right of US self-defense in area. Whether Communists will break off talks because they now realize that US will not concede to their position, cannot be predicted but if they are determined to break on this point we cannot make concession of US rights to prevent break. However you are under no circumstances to break off talks but continue to argue our position with firmness.

5. If break by Communists comes you should give out statement at once that Communists have broken off talks because they cannot have their way in insisting US give up right of self-defense against armed attack in area. State we hold Communists to Agreed Announcement on prisoners and hope they will be promptly released. Remark to Wang and publicly state that further communications between Communists and US can be transmitted through Consulates in Geneva. Any further statement will come from Washington.

**Dulles**

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**481. Telegram 1467 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 8, 1956, 11 a.m.

1467. From Johnson.

Re last sentence paragraph 3 Department telegram 1591.

My recollection is that surrender by Japanese Forces on Taiwan to Chinese was accomplished under general order No. 1 issued by MacArthur as SCAP rather than as U.S. Commander. Would appreciate

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–856. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

confirmation that our position is that this constituted "capture" but that action was carried out by "forces under U.S. orders".

**Gowen**

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**482. Telegram 1592 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 8, 1956, 12:51 p.m.

1592. For Johnson.

Your 1467. Latter portion last sentence paragraph 3 Deptel 1591 amended to read as follows:

"And particularly that Taiwan ceded to Japan by China was surrendered by Japan in 1945 under SCAP orders and now lawfully administered and held by sovereign GRC".

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-856. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Sebald and Phleger.

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**483. Telegram 1474 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 9, 1956, 4 p.m.

1474. From Johnson.

1. Four hour fifty minute meeting this morning. No progress whatsoever. Only unusual development Wang took twenty minute recess immediately following my opening statement. Although I received impression this was for purpose conferring on whether my opening statement fitted in with some contingent action they had planned,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-956. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.



subsequent developments in meeting gave no indication as to what it might have been.

2. General impression is that while no sign whatever any shift their position, threat of break on renunciation force has somewhat receded.

3. He was prepared omit any discussion implementation today but in response my initiative again took strong line on Liu Yung-ming, Taiwan entry permits, lists of Chinese US prisons, alleged US attempt force application for permanent residence, etc.

4. Because of Spring Festival he asked for next meeting Feb. 20 and when I hesitated, suggested Feb. 18 which I accepted.

5. Departing for Prague tomorrow morning.

Gowen

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#### 484. Telegram 1476 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, February 9, 1956, 7 p.m.

1476. From Johnson.

As situation has developed, believe there is possibility Wang might agree some formula stating US–PRC disputes to be settled “only” by peaceful means and preserving right of “self-defense” between US and PRC if declaration broken, including Taiwan area. Just possible they may offer some amendment this regard. Clear they feel that any acceptance by them our right “collective self-defense” in Taiwan area extends measure of recognition by them to legitimacy GRC which they not willing accord. Do not see any possibility their receding beyond this position.

Would appreciate Department’s instructions on attitude I should adopt if they should offer any amendment along lines first sentence or degree to which I might direct discussion in that direction.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–956. Secret; Limit Distribution.

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485. Telegram 1479 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, February 9, 1956, 11 p.m.

1479. From Johnson.

1. I opened 36th meeting with following prepared statement on renunciation force:

A. In announcements made by our governments last year on July 25, purpose of our talks was set forth very clearly. That purpose was two-fold: to aid in settling matter of repatriation civilians who desired return, and to facilitate further discussions and settlement certain other practical matters at issue between both sides.

B. What were these practical matters? We each recognized most important and urgent matter under this category was situation Taiwan area. However, our respective approaches to problem were very different. Against background of continued threats by your government to initiate hostilities in area, you proposed we immediately abandon these talks and there be meeting of FonMins our two countries to discuss question. In other words you were suggesting US undertake negotiations with you at that level under continued overhanging threat you would resort to hostilities if agreement entirely satisfactory to you was not promptly reached. Stated another way, you were asking such negotiations be conducted under what was in effect [garble] ultimatum.

C. US for its part suggested approach to problem should be first to remove this aspect by making clear neither side intended resort to war enforce its point view, and in that atmosphere undertake discussion our differences only by peaceful means and only to seek their fair and equitable solution.

D. This was proposal I made October 8 last year. So grave was overhanging threat by one side resort to force, particularly in Taiwan area, as to make peaceful and constructive discussion impossible, unless this overhanging threat were removed. In circumstances, to have rejected this proposition would have been admission of lack of real desire or intent settle our disputes peacefully.

E. I proposed whatever was said this regard be fully reciprocal; that it apply with equal force both parties, not asking of one party any more than of other, and only requiring of both parties they declare their

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-956. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

intention settle their disputes peacefully and refrain from threat resort to force attain their policy objectives.

F. I proposed this be expressly applicable to Taiwan area, as well as elsewhere. I felt then, as now, if threat resort to force were removed elsewhere but allowed remain Taiwan area, such declaration would be of no real purpose.

G. Finally, I proposed declaration make clear neither side was, by subscribing to it, prejudicing its inherent right self-defense. Since January 12 we have been considering emended draft, which like my previous drafts, was consistent with all these propositions. At our last meeting you indicated you were prepared accept this draft, with exception of last of my propositions, reference to self-defense.

H. You have stated in our recent meetings, and your government has declared publicly, it does not object to principle self-defense, either individual or collective. I will pass over without comment grudging manner in which this admission made, reluctance particularly surprising in country which is party to collective defense arrangements its own, and which even now has troops on foreign territory in defiance United Nations in what it claims to have been exercise of this very right.

I. You have stated, and your government has declared publicly, your only objection is to exercise of this right by US in Taiwan area. I should like to ask you for moment to consider self-defense clause in its proper context. That is, in its relationship to other propositions embodied in our declaration. This relationship is, I think, perfectly clear in my amended draft January 12.

J. Taken in context, implication of self-defense clause is clearly contingent. What it says in effect, is this: if either party should, in violation of this declaration initiate hostilities, or if either party should be attacked by any other party, then party which has been attacked may defend itself.

K. Thus placed in context, which is only way in which I have asked you accept it, self-defense clause not only does not conflict with other propositions embodied in proposed declaration [garble] corollary and supplement to these other propositions. It is completely reciprocal. It is applicable, with complete reciprocity, to Taiwan area.

L. Frankly, Mr. Ambassador, if we take self-defense clause in its proper context, I see only one thing which could render it objectionable. It would be objectionable, certainly, if one side were entering into declaration with false intention of nevertheless initiating use hostilities. It would be objectionable, certainly, from point view of whichever side was insincere renouncing use force to settle our differences.

M. I am reluctant believe all during four long months we have spent discussing this proposition there has not been any real intent on

part your government to take this first and essential step toward finding genuinely peaceful solution our differences. I am reluctant believe you have all along been contemplating declaration that would not have been reunification force at all, but rather only pious repetition in bilateral form of hope that our two countries might settle their differences peacefully. Was that hope not already implicit in agreement both sides to hold these talks? Was it not our purpose in these talks progress from hope to realization of hope?

N. As I say, Mr. Ambassador, I am truly reluctant believe your objective in these discussions has been, not to carry us forward, but to take us back to July 25 last year or even prior that time.

O. I am left, however, with just two alternative conclusions. First is, as I have previously pointed out, your position constitutes demand that in negotiating this declaration, US concede to you all points in dispute in Taiwan area, rather than properly leaving them for discussion following agreement between us to declare we will not resort force settle those disputes. Second, is that your objection to self-defense clause arises from fact that you view it in different context from one in which it was intended to be seen. I have tried make it clear, in its intended context, self-defense clause implies no more nor less than this utterly reasonable proposition: if either party should in violation of declaration initiate hostilities, then other party may defend itself. I am unable suggest any [garble] in which that can be set forth than in my amended draft January 12. If you have other suggestions I shall be glad hear them.

2. Wang said he had difficulty understanding my statement and its interpretation, would like retire with assistants to another room to check notes. I agreed. Wang and assistants were out of room from 10:36 to 10:55.

3. On his return, Wang said he had spent few minutes checking notes with interpretation of statement I had made this morning. He agreed that we holding these talks in order settle more important and urgent dispute now existing between China and US.

4. Wang said they had always held hope dispute between two countries might be settled peacefully without use force. At same time they had hoped that Ambassadorial level talks might achieve results they called upon to achieve. However, with reluctance he had to say they disappointed every time.

5. Wang said this been caused by rigid attitude on part US Government which delaying progress and success talks. We find selves at moment still confronted with most urgent and grave dispute unsettled between our two countries. For instance, situation exactly so with regard to negotiations on declaration between both sides, as

result continued US persistence in what it terms US right self-defense in Taiwan area, which greatest obstacle in talks.

6. Wang said, as he had said over and over again US has no right at all claim right self-defense Taiwan area. He noted that in my statement this morning I again trying justify position US with regard self-defense Taiwan area. I had again tried defend that position with all sorts arguments. I was alleging that so-called self-defense clause was corollary and supplement to statement.

7. Wang said actually US is trying to make China accept, by means this self-defense clause, US occupation Taiwan as legal and compel China accept US prerequisite.

8. Wang said I had also stated that this clause on self-defense applied equally both sides. However, self-defense clause, instead being applicable both parties equally only applies in favor US.

9. Wang asked whether US could possibly claim right self-defense on foreign territory. Present situation could not be interpreted as Chinese forces being sent American territory to claim self-defense there. Therefore they could not accept my statement this clause applicable both parties.

10. Wang said it no one else but China which had proper right claim self-defense on own territory. Any other foreign country has absolutely no right speak of self-defense on Chinese territory.

11. Wang said furthermore I had made various charges which reversed right and wrong, such as my use term “warlike ultimatum” and my attribution this to China, and such words as “overhanging threat of force”.

12. Wang said it no one else but US which threatening other countries by occupying their territory. Remarks made by Mr. Dulles recently actually such threats as I had described. Chinese people never going be frightened by such threat and would never be brought into submission by threats. Chinese people want exercise own sovereign right and want remove all threats against them.

13. Wang said he also noted that I said Chinese forces in foreign land in defiance UN. Actually Chinese people were rising in opposition to aggressive forces headed by US in gross abuse name of UN, forces which threatening security China.

14. Wang asked whose forces first gone to Korea. If had not been for US armed aggression in attempt threaten security China, Chinese people would not have exercised right self-defense.

15. Wang said next he noted I had said that draft he presented on December one represented retrogression. He could not accept my statement this regard. His draft of Dec one exactly great contribution

towards making declaration. His December one draft did not contain anything which not acceptable to either of two sides.

16. Reading now from prepared statement, Wang continued that as US already used force in Taiwan area, any announcement by both sides on non-employment force must necessarily lead to solution of next step. It exactly with this in mind that his draft provided for continuation of talks to seek practical and feasible means for settlement disputes between two countries.

17. Wang said his side firmly of opinion conference of Foreign Ministers should be held settle by negotiation question of tension in Taiwan area. This not what I had said this morning, that they wanted stop present talks in favor of holding FonMin conference. They had never advanced any suggestion along that line or made any suggestion of stopping present talks, and immediately holding Foreign Ministers conference. They had only said that holding conference at Foreign Ministers level is natural outcome of Ambassadorial talks.

18. Wang said however their side had not advanced in their draft announcement any prerequisite, nor had it in draft announcement demanded that my side accept any views which not acceptable. On contrary, it US side which demanded PRC side accept in draft announcement so-called right self-defense on Chinas territory Taiwan.

19. Wang said on number occasions in previous meetings I even repeatedly alleged that US holding on to Taiwan purely for self-defense and that holding US forces in Taiwan entirely in conformity with arrangements of collective self-defense. These remarks serve confirm that what I had wanted with insertion so called right self-defense was that PRC side recognize status quo of American seizure Taiwan as well as US-Chiang treaty. How could this be explained away as not requiring PRC side renounce its position?

20. Wang said at last meeting I had stated and again had made similar statement this morning, that I willing listen any suggestions that would meet problem that would be produced for my govt if clause on self-defense were simply withdrawn.

21. Wang said if US position indeed as I had put it, as not desiring prejudice position or views either side, then their draft exactly on that line, as it does not contain any prerequisite nor does it require submission of either side. If, however, position is to require their side accord recognition to American seizure Taiwan as well as US-Chiang treaty and accept American aggressive acts as legal, then US must give up this position, as it would require submission their side, and would deprive continuation of talks of all meaning.

22. Wang said I had repeatedly stated that I willing listen any suggestion their side might have; their suggestion very simple and

straightforward: their draft announcement of December one last year is proposal acceptable to either side. If there real intent make such announcement, he failed see any reason why we could not reach agreement on draft of their side of December one.

23. I replied it seemed me that we faced somewhat same problem which I had often discussed and did not intend belabor this morning. That is, whether our objective here is to momentarily give world surface appearance of agreement, but in fact, because lack of meeting of minds, there would be no agreement. I did not conceive this to be real purpose and did not believe it would really contribute anything to situation to follow such course. In fact, seemed me that in end it could only be counterproductive.

24. I said question between us of most fundamental nature was whether either side intends initiate hostilities in Taiwan area in attempt settle our dispute there in that manner. We really renounce all appeal to force settle that dispute.

25. I said I had carefully attempted avoid discussion substance this dispute itself at this stage. Wang had in past and again this morning, and his govt had in its public statements, it seemed to me, continued confuse this question of substance our dispute and question of agreeing simply that we would not use force settle this dispute. Neither one of us questioned fact there is dispute there.

26. I said Wang had often set forth his position re substance that dispute. As I had said last meeting, I did not dispute his right hold those views and advocate them by all peaceful means. He well knew I opposed those views but I not trying force my opinions on him at this stage.

27. I said Wang well knew it position my govt that Taiwan and off-shore islands we had just been discussing not their territory and never been their territory. I was not asking Wang accept that view. However, appeared to me, at this stage in discussing this declaration, Wang was continuing insist my govt concede to their view on that matter.

28. I said view my govt is Taiwan, which ceded to Japan by China, was surrendered by Japan 1945 under orders SCAP and that it now lawfully administered and held by GRC which sovereign govt. It is with that govt that US has treaty relationships and obligations. However, this all concerns substance our dispute.

29. I said position he taking seemed me required US in effect to say it has no rights in Taiwan area and to abandon its position with regard to our dispute. As he had again said this morning, he looked upon declaration we discussing as of necessity leading to, if I understood correctly, abandonment by US of its position. I think it entirely wrong to regard this declaration as "leading to" abandonment its position by either side.

30. I said what it should lead to is establishment of conditions under which solution of these difficulties by peaceful means can be achieved. It not proper to regard this declaration as of itself effective solution of these disputes.

31. I said as I pointed out this morning, it hard for me to reconcile his objection to self-defense clause with genuine intent not to use force to settle our disputes. If both sides say they will not use force to settle their disputes and genuinely carry that out, there would be no need to call into operation by either side of the self-defense clause. It would only be if one party did not carry out statement it had made regarding not using force that self-defense clause would become operative. Therefore, if his govt really intends to declare that only peaceful means will be used in settlement of our dispute, it can have no objection to self-defense clause.

32. I said I shared his concern over time we had spent still without settling these problems between us. I certainly have not taken any rigid attitude on this question. I simply trying make certain that we thoroughly understand each other. If there could be real understanding and agreement regard to this question of use of force without reservations, we could have long ago have said so and proceeded to discussion those other matters. I continue hope that it will be possible for us do so.

33. I said, however seemed be that we still faced with lack real agreement between us on this subject. I still in doubt whether his govt agrees that only peaceful means will be used in settlement disputes between us. If I wrong, hope he will correct me.

34. Wang said they had always held that we should employ peaceful means and by means negotiations should settle Sino-US disputes in Taiwan area. If not been for purpose peacefully settling these disputes, he would not have been sitting with me and engaging in these talks.

35. Wang said position his side on settlement of disputes in Taiwan area has been made clear repeatedly. Their position is liberation of Taiwan and exercise of their own sovereign rights.

36. Wang said I had set forth views of US Govt in this respect. He shocked by my statement, which seemed extremely absurd and which entirely distorts history on question of Taiwan. I had stated that Taiwan and offshore islands have never been part of Chinese territory. This entirely a self contradictory statement.

37. Wang said he understands that in US there are two parties in politics. But existence of different parties in any state does not represent existence different governments within that state. What been done by Republican or Democratic parties cannot be argued away as not done by US.



38. Wang said as matter history, Taiwan and offshore islands belonged China and been part Chinese territory long before US emerged as a state. Chinese island of Taiwan has been subjected number times in history to occupation by foreign imperialists. However, all those imperialist occupations Chinese island of Taiwan have always ended eventually in downfall imperialist rule and Taiwan always returned to arms of China. It highly insulting to Chinese people to claim that Taiwan and offshore islands not belong China.

39. Wang said it served no purpose in this conference room to reiterate such claims. On their part, they never had asserted New York not part US territory. Nor asserted US of today still British colony. They not think any such assertions would serve any useful purpose.

40. Wang said I had also set forth position US as having so-called treaty relations with Chiang Kai-shek regime. As he repeatedly had pointed out, regime Chiang Kai-shek long been overthrown by Chinese people, long been discarded by Chinese people, and it had no right sign any treaty with any foreign country. All such excuses with regard treaty obligations toward regime Chiang Kai-shek were no more than vain attempts argue away untenable position of occupation by US of Taiwan, which Chinese territory. This situation which now facing reminds them of what Japanese imperialists had done in asserting they had treaty relations with puppet regime in Manchukuo and with puppet regime Wang Ching-wei.

41. Wang said such treaty relationships have never been recognized by Chinese people and to insist in such recognition is greatest farce in eyes people world. Neither puppet Pu Yi or traitor Wang Ching-wei in past, nor Chiang Kai-shek regime of today, can ever be considered as a state. US attempt to justify occupation of Taiwan by excuses of having treaty relations with Chiang Kai-shek regime is something like drowning man grasping at straws.

42. Wang said I had stated that making of declaration would lead to abandonment of US position. As he had indicated above, such position of US cannot be considered as proper position at all. Wang asked if we could find any clause in UN Charter as justifying one country's seizing territory of another country?

43. Wang said their position as he had said had always been that we, in atmosphere of calm and peaceful discussion, and without hostilities, and with conciliatory attitude, should both sides together try reach solution. If we should demonstrate ill feeling these talks, did not see how we could succeed.

44. Wang said I might recall that proposal for making such declaration made by US, not by their side. And they accepted this proposal of US and agreed with necessity for making such declaration. They also recognized that making of such declaration would be useful. It would

be useful in that it would demonstrate to world that two of us, China and US, determined settle disputes peacefully without resort hostilities; such declaration not only conforms to interests both peoples but also meets aspirations of people world.

45. Wang said we however faced with tremendous difficulties on our way to making such declaration. This is fact we have both recognized. Might be asked, wherein lie our difficulties?

46. Wang said now difficulty we facing is that of US persistence insisting inclusion clause US called right self-defense in Taiwan area in agreed announcement. His views regard this matter set forth over and over again and he not able enumerate how often he had set forth such views. Might be asked if we should not try overcome this difficulty. On their part, they always maintained position we should overcome this difficulty we facing and make progress in talks. We should not give up efforts advance talks in face difficulty we facing. Question remains is how shall we overcome this difficulty?

47. Wang said in his opinion, two essential points will help us in our efforts. First, each of us should show spirit conciliation; that is, make joint efforts. Without spirit mutual conclusion and mutual conciliation, no agreement can be reached.

48. Wang said I would recall that Oct 27 original draft their side contained three paras, first two quoting clauses UN Charter and last clause dealing with FonMin conference by two countries. Afterwards, I had advanced objections to certain respects this draft. After I expressed objections, their side made tremendous efforts and concessions and finally put forward amended draft of Dec. 1, which amended some of wording their original draft. This effort was made to meet my points. However, all US proposals—whether our proposal Oct 8, or draft Nov 10, or Jan 2 draft amendments—have persisted in inclusion so-called self-defense clause.

49. Wang said by comparing our respective drafts, can be seen which side making concessions and which side not making concessions. That why he said we should make mutual concessions. If only one side required make concessions, we cannot make progress talks.

50. Wang said second point he wanted make, in order overcome our difficulty, was that both sides should first try find those points in common and thereby then overcome points of difference. It true on this matter that there some points common both sides and some points difference between us.

51. Wang said for instance, desirability making declaration renunciation force is point common both us. Then both agreed that in making such declaration no prerequisite should be advanced for either side. Then it agreed we should not confuse step of making declaration with substance our disputes. We also agreed that making of such declaration

would create favorable atmosphere between us. We have no disputes between us on points mentioned above.

52. Wang said if we agreed that two steps should not be confused, he really found difficult see why US should insist inclusion self-defense clause which exactly confusing making of declaration with substance of dispute.

53. Wang said as he viewed situation we now confronting, we have many difficulties confronting us, but we should try settle differences one by one. If we do share this common understanding of trying settle problem step by step then and only then can there be better hope our settling our disputes.

54. I said he had listed four points on which he had stated we were in agreement. I agreed with him that if we were in genuine agreement on those four points, plus one more point I about to mention, we should be able arrive at agreement on announcement.

55. I said additional point I would add would be whether we were in agreement that only peaceful means will be used settle our disputes. Not that peaceful means will be, as he previously termed it, used "if possible". "If possible" would be by whose standards? Or who would judge "if possible"? Settlement of disputes by peaceful means can be meaningful only if both sides unconditionally subscribe to this doctrine.

56. I said he had also said that we agreed that there be no prerequisites. However, I wanted ask how it possible me interpret position he taken here and his government taken publicly with regard withdrawal self-defense clause, other than conceding to them by US of most fundamental points our dispute in Taiwan area.

57. I said other question I wanted ask, to see if we could advance understanding between us, was what he thought should happen if, in violation of declaration, one side should initiate hostilities.

58. Wang said he might point out there two aspects what I said in my statement: One, relationship between China and US, and other relationship between China and Chiang Kai-shek regime. Seemed him we should not confuse these two aspects with each other.

59. Wang said regarding relationship with Chiang Kai-shek clique, as had stated previously, they will try to bring about peaceful settlement if circumstances allow. They not changed this position right up to now.

60. Wang said, however regarding disputes with US, they always stated that they should settle disputes with US peacefully without use force between two countries.

61. Wang said as he had often said, Chinese people and American people friendly to each other and these two countries should try settle disputes by peaceful means without any fighting between two of them.

62. Wang also said this intent was clearly included in their draft of statement December 1, in which they stated two countries should settle disputes peacefully without resort to force and they want make this determination known whole world. This really declaration of peace.

63. Wang said then they had said they would continue to seek necessary practical means for realization settlement of disputes. That idea also accepted by myself. He thought this statement which both sides should agree to and did not see how it could be objected to.

64. Wang said on other hand, by withdrawing self-defense clause by US from proposal, US would sustain no loss or harm their drafts, in addition to declaration determination peaceful settlement disputes between two countries, provided for further research into peaceful means for settlement disputes between two.

65. I said this not very directly answering questions I asked, and which I asked in honest effort see whether we could not get ahead on this. I hoped if I could not have my answers today, that he would consider them and answer me at next meeting.

66. Wang said their views been set forth very clearly, could not be any clearer than he had stated it. Their view is we should strive for making statement. He hoped I would give further consideration Dec 1 draft and be in position to state my views at next meeting.

67. I said I had nothing further but would like turn to another question.

68. Wang said good. (At this point they started gather up papers then, noting I still seated, Wang continued:) Oh, you have another matter to take up?

69. I said if it were all right with him. I then read following prepared statement on implementation:

A. At our last meeting you made series charges against my govt concerning case unfortunate Mr. Liu Yung-ming, these charges were so exaggerated and so at variance with plain facts I found it hard to credit you were serious in stating them.

B. Facts with regard Mr. Liu are perfectly plain. In May 1949, Mr. Liu, then student in US, became ill. His sickness was of mind: type sickness against which, unfortunately, scholastic degree is no magic amulet.

C. Mr. Lius illness is fact. It is also fact had Mr. Liu not been incapacitated by illness and had he desired return China, he would have been able do so. There were no restrictions on departure of any Chinese, students or otherwise, from US at that time. To contrary, it is fact that approximately 1,000 Chinese students returned your country in 1949 and 1950. This number not only returned but 637 of them had their passages paid by US Govt.

D. Mr. Lius need for continued treatment beyond his initial period in hospital is also fact. Between 1950 and 1951, Mr. Liu had apparently reached stage at which travel would have been possible. Hospital authorities, desiring return Mr. Liu his home if possible, communicated with Mr. Lius father in Hong Kong, only one Mr. Lius relatives who had taken trouble correspond with hospital about him. They did not say Mr. Liu had no further need treatment. On contrary, that was clearly communicated to Mr. Lius father, and father expressly requested hospital continue its treatment.

E. Hospitals treatment Mr. Liu was in fact continued at public expense so long, and only so long, as there appeared be no responsible relative Mr. Lius ready and able assume responsibility providing him care he needed. As soon as my govt. was informed, and was able pass info on to hospital that Mr. Lius wife had expressed wish to have him return, arrangements were made and carried out for Mr. Lius prompt departure. Mr. Liu sailed from San Francisco Jan 8 on ship President Wilson, and arrived Hong Kong Feb 1.

F. These arrangements Mr. Lius departure were communicated to Indian Embassy, which expressed its entire satisfaction. Arrangements were also made known to Red Cross Society your country. Arrangements were made known you here. Your govt thus knew Mr. Liu was arriving Hong Kong Feb 1. Your govt also knew, as I made it clear to you here, Mr. Liu was not fully recovered, and still required care and attention.

G. Why, if your govt was genuinely concerned about Mr. Lius welfare, were no arrangements made by your authorities for his reception and care? Why did Mr. Lius wife not arrive Hong Kong until Feb 5, four days after Mr. Lius arrival?

H. I am afraid, Mr. Ambassador, and I say this with reluctance, these facts point to conclusion as inescapable as it is repugnant. Quite deliberately, your govt chose exploit for propaganda purposes Mr. Lius unfortunate mental condition.

I. This conclusion, repugnant as it is, is completely consistent with the recent efforts erect propaganda smoke screen behind which conceal stark failure your govt carry out provisions our agreed announcement Sept 10 with respect return Americans your country.

J. You stated at our last meeting you expected to have your attention called to names of additional Chinese in U.S., to 250, or to 2,500. And why not? Unhampered by any regard for facts or evidence, and without any consideration for desires individuals or their families, why could not your govt multiply these numbers endlessly?

K. Mr. Ambassador, there are 13 Americans in prison your country. You know they are there, I know it, and world knows it. We all know

they want to come home. We all know they are being prevented from doing so, in spite of clear promise made on Sept 10 last year.

L. Mr. Ambassador, 250, 2,500, or 5,000 empty and fanciful charges unsupported by facts, unsupported by any evidence, unsupported by Indian Embassy, cannot balance off these thirteen Americans. Nor can any number hypothetical cases obscure or justify attempt your govt use these 13 Americans extract political concessions.

M. If your govt is really interested improving our relations, it will no longer delay in carrying out its obligation with respect these 13 Americans.

70. Wang replied with prepared statement amplified by ref penciled notes saying that previously in course about dozen meetings he had been repeatedly and concretely calling my attention to series of acts testifying to US violation Sept 10 agreement between both sides and had asked me to promptly stop those unjust acts. However, so far they had not witnessed any steps improve situation.

71. Wang said, instead their attention repeatedly been called to fact my govt obstructing departure Chinese from US. He did not see how our persistence in ignoring agreement could possibly help in further progress our talks.

72. Wang said inhuman treatment received by Chinese national Liu Yung-ming sufficed demonstrate how cruel US Govt been in its ill treatment Chinese nationals in US who desire come back China. He would make further observations concerning case Liu in few minutes.

73. Wang said next he would call my attention concrete fact that US Govt compelling Chinese students obtain entrance permits Taiwan and apply for permanent residence. Chinese student, Mr. Tseng Kuang-chih, wrote family 1952 that he would be coming home after graduation in US. However, recently New Years card reached family in which he wrote that he been obstructed from returning by US Govt many years and not been able return up to present, and that US Govt was trying induce him apply permanent residence.

74. Wang said another Chinese student, Mr. Chao Chung-yun previously often wrote to family and he also indicated he would come back after completion studies. However letter from him mid-August 1955 stated US Govt insisting on keeping Chinese nationals in US and that US Govt was annoyed with those Chinese who insist on returning home, and US Govt giving them lot of trouble and trying to compel Chinese students who did not apply permanent residence in US to apply Taiwan entry permits instead.

75. Wang asked were not difficult plights encountered by these two Chinese to whose cases our attention been called, were not these cases clear evidence of US violation of agreed announcement?

Could above tactics employed by US Govt be explained away as not intended deprive Chinese forever of ability return to homeland?

76. Wang said I should look into situation these two Chinese students and give accounting of them and immediately stop those unjust acts, or else bear all responsibility for breaking agreed announcement. (Here Wang handed me list two names, transmitted in separate tel).

77. Wang said so far US has failed give accounting of Chinese prevented from returning and whose names he gave me in five separate lists with request that I give accounting.

78. Wang said moreover, even in cases those 103 Chinese students whom US admitted it had prevented from returning, so far 32 them not yet returned. These people all been subjected obstruction by US and return was prevented. He wanted say most emphatically once again that US has all responsibility to give accounting for every one these people.

79. Wang said I had asserted that Indian Embassy so far not made representations with US Govt concerning any obstruction in departure Chinese and that Indian Embassy so far had not indicated its ability perform its functions under agreed announcement been interfered with. He must point out that US so far failed submit list Chinese nationals in US so that Indian Embassy finds it difficult perform its functions. US had even refused permit Indian Embassy make announcement accordance with agreed announcement setting forth information that all Chinese in US including those who been compelled apply permanent residence or been compelled secure entry permits Taiwan are all entitled return. Was this not grave act in violation agreed announcement?

80. Wang said he wanted raise question Chinese in prison in US in all seriousness. Although he had made repeated ref regarding Chinese in prison, my side had so far not taken any measures regarding Chinese in prison US. This situation not satisfactory.

81. Wang said I had once asserted that in my knowledge there no Chinese in US prisons. Fact is, in accordance with reports from Chinese who returned recently there many innocent Chinese in prison US. As to exactly how many Chinese nationals being imprisoned by US and exactly what their status and condition, US side must speedily give accounting for all of them.

82. Wang said there many points in my statement re Liu Yung-ming which at variance with facts. As matter fact, Liu sent US to further his studies and when he went he was in normal health. He even completed his studies and obtained degree, which also indicates that during that period he enjoying normal health.



83. Wang said Liu suffered illness of mind simply because US prevented his return which caused his nervous breakdown. Wang must strongly protest to US against such acts of persecution Liu.

84. Wang said in bringing up case Liu US Govt has made many false and dishonest statements about Liu. First, it was stated Liu in hospital and not fit travel. Then US stated Liu could not obtain transit visas Hong Kong. All this false. All this at variance with facts, and fabrications.

85. Wang said when Liu began journey home, state of mind was normal. However, on way home and while he on board ship, Americans often came to talk with him and terrorize him. This resulted in fresh nervous breakdown on part Liu. Even when ship anchored Yokohama, somebody came aboard with fake letters from family with which they tried deceive Liu and change his mind. Similar incidents also took place while Liu in refugee camp in Hong Kong.

86. Wang said US authorities and US Red Cross originally informed PRC side that Liu would be escorted or sent to border town of Shumchun on Feb 1. Chinese Red Cross specially sent doctor to accompany Mrs. Liu and other members family to proceed to border and receive Liu.

87. Wang said however soon as Liu arrived Hong Kong, fresh fabrication again made to effect Liu did not desire return China and attempts made keep him in Hong Kong. Attempts were thus made detain Liu again. If one to speak about repugnant or inhuman acts this most repugnant and inhuman act of all. Man has already been terrorized into becoming crazy man and still attempts being made persecute this unfortunate person.

88. Wang said experience Liu suffices show how Chinese who desire return subjected to that sort of treatment. This could not fail to add all more to increasing concern of Chinese people over vast number Chinese remaining in US.

89. Wang said Chinese had not yet seen any action taken by US to withdraw requirement for Chinese in US to secure Taiwan entry permits. As indicated on list he had given me, fresh attempts been made cause Chinese in US apply for permanent residence in US. This unheard of in history international affairs, violates human rights and violates agreement between both sides.

90. Wang said from stories given by Chinese who recently returned from US, picture can be drawn of how USINS authorities gone wild in their treatment of Chinese. In eyes of Chinese nationals, INS become symbol of hell.

91. Wang said Chinese nationals have full lawful right ask for return their country. This been made provision in agreed announcement of Sept 10 last year. What right had US compel these unfortunate



people obtain American citizenship and stay in US for so long? If US thought its population not big enough, even in that case it could not resort to this means of increasing its population.

92. Wang said this contrasts strongly with treatment of Americans in China by Chinese authorities. Even in case American who refused to return to US for moment and even if it happened that in future he changes mind and desires return to US, Chinese Govt would not attempt detain him. This attitude of Chinese Govt beyond comparison with action of US Govt in forcibly detaining Chinese in US.

93. Wang said I had said that number of Chinese who desire return as given me by him were what I termed empty, fanciful, unsupported by facts. Might he ask about 103 Chinese students who US admitted had been prevented from returning, was it not fact that 32 of them still not been able return? Was it not fact that 27 persons including those named on today's list not yet returned?

94. Wang said it quite true there are still 13 Americans in Chinese prisons. But how many Chinese are locked up behind bars in US prisons and whose names US has failed submit to Wang's side?

95. Wang said if US refuses take measures improve treatment Chinese who desire return in accordance with agreed announcement between two sides, and if US refuses make accounting of Chinese of whom he had asked accounting, then US has no right ask about these 13 Americans.

96. Wang said agreement must be carried out by both sides. It is impermissible, while one side carrying out agreement, for other side to be violating it.

97. I said I had only few simple things say. First is, he stated people writing to his country alleging they being obstructed in returning. I not seen any case yet in which there any definite facts they being obstructed.

98. I said however over and beyond that I not see how he could allege that people feel free to and are writing his country and if genuinely desire return his country and feel obstructed, why they do not communicate with Indian Embassy. On very fact of it, this incredible.

99. I said next let me say his allegations here on one hand seem to relate to Chinese who desire return and on other hand to those who desire remain US or do not desire return his country. I wanted point out agreed announcement concerned only those who wanted return his country. Those who desire stay US or go other destinations are not proper subject our discussions here.

100. I said however with regard persons who do desire stay US, I wanted point out few simple facts. I mentioned these before, but apparently he not understood.

101. I said under US immigration laws, person coming US for temporary visit is admitted for certain definite period time. If admitted as student—in student status, with what we call student visa—his stay there dependent on maintaining student status. In any event, when he applies for visa, must be able show that at end temporary stay he able proceed another destination. If temporary visitor, and end approaches of time for which he originally admitted and he desires extend stay, he must be able proceed another destination at end his extended stay. If he desires change status from that of temporary visitor or that of student and wishes remain US to accept employment, he must change status to that of permanent resident.

102. I said this all matter perfectly free choice of individual. In general, these laws been in effect US over long period years. Apply equally all non-Americans.

103. I said as far as becoming American citizen concerned, process is long and surrounded many safeguards both for individual and country. US never has, and I satisfied never will, force anyone become US citizen. Such policy would obviously be against our self interest. Our interest is that persons who do become citizens be attached to principles our govt. We certainly do not want any reluctant citizens.

104. I said to return to subject aliens. Regardless status under immigration laws—whether temporary visitor, student, permanent resident, or whatever status—he at all times free depart US for any destination his choice. This applies all aliens in US, Chinese as well as others.

105. I said he also continued speak of supposed 32 Chinese out of the 103, who still not returned. As said many times before, and seems necessary say again: I never said those 103 against whom preventive departure orders issued, desired return his country. Some may have, as shown fact they returned; some may not have. Those preventive departure orders, as I had explained, were issued without regard whether individual desired return. Issuance preventive departure order was no evidence one way or other individual wanted depart or not. Each person concerned this order individually informed when order withdrawn. Thus, apart from question their knowledge agreed announcement, each knows he entirely free depart. If does not do so, it matter own choice. If feels being obstructed, can communicate freely Indian Embassy at any time.

106. I said I would not take our time further discuss case Mr. Liu. He and I both been at universities. Illness Liu suffered from, as we both know, is unhappily not absent any group students. My experience, expect in his also, it often most brilliant students who often susceptible this illness. Liu evidently very brilliant person of this type.

107. I said Liu very unfortunate young man and we had done our best care for him and cure him. Regretted he not fully recovered before

he returned his country. Hoped that recovery which he has started will be completed and he will be entirely restored his faculties.

108. Wang said in any case, could not find acceptable explanation regarding Liu by explaining illness as frequent occurrence among brilliant students. All this is device intended obscure true responsibility.

109. Wang said I had asked why, if persons desire return, they not communicating Indian Embassy. Answer is because these students and nationals now residing in US. Confronted by measures taken by US Govt, difficult for these people express own free will. Fact that Indian Embassy, as foreign mission in US, is prevented from making public statement it asked to make—this helps make them understand situation Chinese students.

110. Wang said I had enumerated laws of INS. I had said some laws and regulations INS of long standing. But such immigration laws and regulations must not prejudice agreement between us. If any such immigration laws can be used to prejudice agreement, what is use of such an agreement between our two sides?

111. Wang I said had repeated statement that Chinese in US free depart. However as far as their information concerned, 27 Chinese in addition to 32 who desired return are still unable do so. Unless these 32 and 27 return, they cannot bring themselves believe assertion they free return.

112. Wang said I had stated US does not force anyone acquire US citizenship. However cases two students whose names given me this morning show to contrary that people being forced remain in US. Until these two persons accounted for, they cannot believe US not forcing people acquire US citizenship.

113. Wang said as he already suggested, it necessary both sides faithfully implement agreement between us. He again asked US Govt change and improve treatment Chinese desiring return.

114. Wang said until requirement for Taiwan entry permits withdrawn, until requirement forced permanent residence withdrawn, until all Chinese desiring it are returned, until accounting Chinese in US prisons is given, they cannot say US is faithfully implementing agreement.

115. I said he seemed be talking about Chinese who wish remain US, not those desiring return.

116. Wang said he given me names 27 persons, all desiring return. He requires me look into situation these people. Could I say all these did not desire return?

117. I said I did not understand him. He seemed be saying in some mysterious way, I did not know how, US was selecting people, permitting some return some not. I did not understand. To best my

knowledge, no way know exactly where they go after leaving US. At least 189 travelled his country since Jan last year.

118. I said it my understanding that 35, or about 35, of persons who arrived Feb 1, on Pres Wilson at Hong Kong had proceeded his country. I did not know how many others may have gone by other routes.

119. Wang said what he had said quite clear: US was obstructing return. He asked that US change situation. What he saying to me concerns those desiring return who not yet returned. Did I mean say 32 of 103 whose names he had given me, after I had made investigation I able establish all 25 did not desire return now? Have they decided they do not want return?

120. I said I had never I said 103 wanted return. They may have, they may not have. Only test is whether they do return. All free return.

121. Wang said what about 25? Did I say they free.

122. I said I did.

123. Wang asked did I carry out investigation?

124. I said I said they free return.

125. Wang said was this formal reply after investigations.

126. I said I had nothing add.

127. Wang said it cannot be established these able return. He recalled I had stated I would account for one of the Chinese, but he had seen no accounting.

128. I said I had no report as yet but would give it him when available. Wanted point out agreed announcement provided there be no obstruction departure people. Did not say there would be screening all nationals to determine what they wanted to do. I said they free decide what wanted do. Every Chinese national is free decide.

129. Wang said as matter fact, in spite words of US saying they free go, on other hand there are obstructions. I had indicated I not yet obtained information regarding Yuan Jui-hsiang and not able today give any accounting. Yet how could I have information that all these 25 free return?

130. I said I knew that under laws and regulations my country there no obstructions departure.

131. Wang said I said there no obstructions, but he had list here 25 been obstructed and not yet able return. He asked US cease all obstructions. Before return these Chinese, cannot realize US has ceased obstruction. Said had nothing more.

132. I said I had nothing more, and suggested meeting on Thursday, Feb 16.

133. Wang referred to next week being a Chinese holiday and suggested following Monday, February 12. On my hesitating and consulting calender, Wang suggested alternate of next Saturday, Feb 18.

Gowen

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**486. Memorandum from McConaughy to Robertson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 9, 1956

SUBJECT

Recent Reactions to Continuance of the Johnson-Wang Talks in Geneva

*Summary*

Adverse reaction to continuation of the talks has been noted in

1. Thailand
2. Hong Kong
3. Taiwan
4. Japan
5. Viet Nam
6. Republic of Korea

No reaction was noted in

- |              |                |
|--------------|----------------|
| 1. Australia | 6. Italy       |
| 2. Austria   | 7. Laos        |
| 3. Belgium   | 8. New Zealand |
| 4. Cambodia  | 9. Philippines |
| 5. France    |                |

No survey of reactions was taken in countries that have recognized Communist China.

*Thailand*

Quoted from Bangkok's telegram of January 12, 1956.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-956. Secret. Drafted by Kahmann (FE/CA). A copy was sent to Lockhart (FE/P) and Phleger.

"In recent conversation acting Foreign Minister Ran (repeat Ran) told me Thai Government concerned over fact that Thailand Chinese becoming increasingly pro-Chinese communist. He attributed this shift primarily to impact U.S.-Chinese Communist Geneva talks, suggested U.S. use all (repeat all) means possible counteract.

"Comment: Chinese Communist star has been rising here as result of Geneva talks as well as other developments of which Department is aware . . . It is highly unlikely that our explanations can offset impact of fact that U.S. is talking with Chinese Communists. Even if talks should collapse, it would be most difficult erase effects of developments last six months on attitude local Chinese. So long as Chinese Communists continue play their propaganda cards as cleverly as they have been doing, they stand to hold if not increase gains already made."

*Hong Kong*

Letter dated January 23, 1956 from Consul General Everett F. Drumright.

". . . Already the tide is running against us, partly because of our own hobnobbing with the Chinese Communists at Geneva and partly because of the weak-kneed attitudes being shown by our allies out here. I am afraid the trend of drift to the other side is likely to continue and even to be accelerated unless we and our allies dig in and truly convince the uncommitted people out here that we are not seeking accommodations with the Communists and that we really mean business in pushing back Communist expansionism which has become much more dangerous, subtle and varied during the past year."

Letter dated January 30, 1956 from Consul General Everett F. Drumright.

". . . So long as we continue negotiations with the Chinese Communists, it is going to be impossible to convince people out here that we are not seeking some accommodation which will be at their expense. In such a climate, no matter how good our information program may be, it cannot be expected to achieve any measurable success among those we want to influence."

*Taiwan*

Aide Memoire transmitted by Taipei's telegram of January 26, 1956. The Chinese Foreign Minister said in part:

"The Chinese Government views with particular concern the offer made by the U.S. to enter into a bilateral declaration with the Chinese Communist regime concerning the renunciation of the use of force. Such a declaration would be tantamount to an admission by the U.S. to equal responsibility for the existing situation in the Taiwan Strait, for which the Chinese Communists should and must be held solely responsible.

In the form now proposed by the U.S. it might be understood to imply a tacit de facto recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. It would be construed by the free peoples in Asia and elsewhere as a further retreat of the U.S. position and would consequently weaken their determination of resisting Communist inducement . . .

“It has been the consistent view of the Chinese Government that the Geneva talks, once permitted to go beyond the practical question of civilian repatriation, would inevitably degenerate into a favorable platform for Communist propaganda and provide opportunities for neutralist countries to further exert pressure on the U.S. toward appeasement. This view has unfortunately been borne out by recent events.

“It is the considered opinion of the Chinese Government that, in the interests of the U.S. and the Republic of China as well as the free world as a whole, the Geneva talks on the renunciation of the use of force should be brought to an end as soon as possible.”

The point of view stated in this aide memoire was also expressed by several Taipei newspaper editorials and articles as reported in January Weekas from Taiwan.

#### *Japan*

Quoted from Tokyo's telegram of January 31, 1956.

“. . . In spite of all which has been said publicly by the Secretary and others, there is still a large body of opinion in Japan which believes that American policy towards Red China is changing and there is considerable concern lest an abrupt change be made without Japan knowing in advance so that she can adjust her own policy accordingly.

“I assured Mr. Kishi that I had seen no evidence of any coming change in our policy toward Red China and while obviously no one could say what would be the situation after passage of several years, nevertheless I could assure him that our policy in fact was the same that it has been stated to be time after time by our public leaders. I emphasized that the Ambassadorial level talks in Geneva were purely for the purpose of obtaining release of Americans imprisoned in Red China and for the purpose of obtaining if at all possible a commitment on the part of Red China not to use force in the Formosa area but that these talks in no way implied any recognition of Red China or any intention to recognize Red China in the future.”

#### *Viet Nam*

Newspaper editorial comment in Viet Nam has consistently criticized the Geneva talks and has recently stepped up demands for breaking off the negotiations. (Saigon's telegram of February 4, 1956.)

*Republic of Korea*

Light newspaper editorial comment in the Republic of Korea has been skeptical of the value of the Geneva talks.

*Austria, France, Belgium, Italy, Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Australia, and New Zealand*

No comment indicating concern by these governments over continuance of the Geneva talks has been received recently by the respective desk officers.

In countries that have recognized Communist China no survey has been made of reactions to continuance of the Geneva talks.

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**487. Telegram 1619 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 13, 1956, 7:10 p.m.

1619. For Johnson.

Guidance for February 18 meeting.

1. Refer to your statement at October 27 meeting, repeating reasons US believes Communists have information concerning 450 missing servicemen. Wang stated at November 3 meeting he did not consider this proper subject for discussion at Geneva. He said such information should be sought from MAC in Korea. US accepted this suggestion in good faith and presented list again at Panmunjom on November 26. Communist representative declared that individuals held outside Korea do not come under authority of MAC and therefore irrelevant to discuss them in MAC. Also declared MAC has no connection with POW's disposed of by PRC. Communist representative accepted list but to date has provided no information. US is entitled to reply either from MAC or from Wang, for this is one of practical matters at issue which Ambassadorial talks were convened to consider.

2. Inform Wang that in reviewing record of past several meetings, we still do not understand Chinese Communist position on renunciation of force. They agree neither side should go to war over its differences with other. But it appears that if hostilities should break out, Chinese Communists would expect deprive US of natural right of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-1356. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Phleger and McConaughy; cleared by Dulles in draft and by Sebal.



self-defense. Would not Chinese Communists exercise their right of self-defense if US should go to war in violation its commitment? Then how can Chinese Communists seek deny US identical right? Would not Chinese Communists consider that their forces stationed outside their borders had right to defend themselves if attacked?

3. Point out that Wang does not seem to understand US draft does not require either party to give up its position with respect to merits of its claims. Any draft declaration must be couched in such terms as not to discredit or prejudice claims of other side. Therefore Wang's tirade at last meeting about alleged US occupation of Taiwan and lack of any US right defend itself individually or collectively in Taiwan area has no relevance to proper substance Agreed Announcement about renunciation of force. Wang's tirade deals with merits of respective positions. It is premature to take up this issue of merits of respective positions before Agreed Announcement on renunciation force is issued. A discussion of merits of issues can only come after renunciation force by both sides.

4. FYI. Our present draft is product of long and careful consideration and we are not disposed to alter it. If, however, Wang proposes amend renunciation force draft along lines suggested your 1476, state only that you will receive his proposed amendment, give it careful and serious study, and state US view of it later. Make certain Wang submits his formulation in precise and specific terms indicating where in draft his revised language would appear, so we will have complete text in form Communists would be willing sign. END FYI.

5. Again protest vigorously continued Chinese Communist failure to live up to their obligations under Agreed Announcement. If Chinese Communists should release any of imprisoned Americans on occasion of Chinese New Year moderation of tone might be desirable.

6. Inform Wang that Immigration Service has now received replies from all its field offices and none is able to identify Yuan Jui-hsiang. Request additional information from Wang to assist further investigation, including date and place Yuan allegedly taken into custody by Immigration and alternate spellings Yuan's name.

**Hoover**

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488. Letter 30 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 30

Washington, February 13, 1956

Dear Alex:

We expect to be forehanded with your guidance for the February 18 meeting. We had a meeting with the Secretary on your instructions at his home on Saturday the 11th on the eve of his departure for his vacation in the Bahamas. Early in the week we had a meeting with the Secretary on the guidance for your February 9 meeting. Judge Phleger expedited his return from a visit to Puerto Rico in order to participate in drafting the guidance for the February 9 meeting.

You have received some very fine bouquets all along the line for your superior handling of the meetings. Gratification has been expressed by all who are in on this subject at the way you have handled both your prepared presentations and the give and take of the impromptu exchanges. Your tactics have been superb and your approach precisely in line with the prevailing thinking here.

We believe that you have Wang on a pretty weak wicket now. He is close to being on the prongs of a dilemma if we hold steady. His choices are (1) to accept our formulation; (2) to continue the talks indefinitely with all the inhibitions which that places on aggressive action by them; or (3) assume the responsibility for breaking off the talks, which would be a considerable onus and one which they presumably are reluctant to assume. The danger which the Secretary feels that we must avoid is the appearance of extreme inflexibility. If we appeared to adopt an absolutely rigid stance, the Communists after a break off might be able to transfer a good part of the onus to us arguing that our unyielding attitude on phraseology was deliberately designed to provoke a break. We want to avoid giving any plausibility to this sort of allegation. I would characterize the Secretary's attitude toward the stance you should take as "firmness without rigidity". He does not feel that it is necessary or desirable for you to propose any amendment or transposition in our proposal, but you do not close the door to serious consideration of any amendments proposed by Wang which do not do violence to the basic principles on which we stand.

You will be interested in a view which was expressed in the Saturday meeting and which did not encounter any challenge. This was to the effect that a renunciation of force declaration by the Chinese

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

Communists which specifically included the general area of Taiwan would tend to compound the seriousness of the implication of any subsequent attack by them on Kinmon or Matsu.

You probably have been impressed with the paucity of information in our telegrams on the issue of Chinese prisoners in Federal and State penitentiaries in this country. As you have probably gathered the sparse guidance reflects not a lack of awareness or concern, but a feeling that if we get into this subject we “open a can of worms”. We have explored the problem in a cautious way with the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the I. & N.S. We know there are at least 30 Chinese aliens in Federal penitentiaries. There is no estimate of the number in State institutions, although Judge Phleger is sure there are a lot of Chinese in San Quentin for murder and other felonies. If we enter into correspondence on this subject with all the wardens and State Governors, there is no telling where we will come out. A few of the prisoners might want to go to the Mainland, or claim that they did. It is by no means certain that pardons or paroles for deportation could readily be obtained in all cases. It could be argued that any Chinese Communist agent in this country would in effect be given immunity if he could be sure of immediate deportation to his home base after the commission of a crime in this country. The Indian Embassy would probably get into the act in a big way once we started polling Chinese prisoners. We fear that the issues would become confused, our compliance with the Agreed Announcement might become clouded, the right of the GRC to represent Chinese in this country might appear compromised, and a propaganda field day might be afforded the Communists. So all in all it seems better to play our cards close to our chest on this, relying on the fact that probably all Chinese inmates of jails have heard about the Agreed Announcement and could write to the Indian Embassy if they wanted to. We know that some prisoners on their own initiative stated they would prefer remaining in prison to being sent to Communist China. If the Indians receive a request from a prisoner, we will cross that bridge when we get to it. In the meantime we are not pressing any further inquiries into the subject. We hear there are 50 known Chinese aliens in mental institutions in this country. We are keeping our fingers crossed on that.

We will give you any interesting information we may receive in the course of our private checks with the I. & N.S. on the names handed you by Wang. So far the information is mostly negative. Of course in cases where there is no allegation of obstruction, we are not going beyond the information already on hand in Washington on these cases and the check is only for our own background illumination.

We are enclosing a number of documents which may be of interest to you as follows:

1. Full record of O'Neill's conversation of Jan. 11 with Chang Han-fu.

2. Round up of reports from our Far Eastern Posts on the effects of the talks.

3. Exchange of correspondence with the Indian Embassy on the Taiwan entry question.

Doug Forman has sent Dave a copy of the study by Spielman of the Historical Division on the course of the talks to date. I wish you would tell Dave that we would like for him to check this over during his spare time, if any. We feel he is unusually well qualified to do it. This work of course is on a contingency basis and is not intended for any current declassification unless there should be a break off.

We hear that DRF has funds to keep Stanley in Geneva until the end of March when he is slated to go to Taipei. This is no immediate problem but I wanted you to be alerted to the fact that the question will arise in about five weeks as to whether we should try to extend his detail with you, send another specialist or try to make do with the part time services of a Geneva Vice Consul. I hope you have no stenographic problem with the unfortunate departure of Helenka Osborn. Let us know if you are in a jam.

I was glad to get your letter No. 21. It was passed around as usual and was read with interest.

Congratulations on that successful Porgy and Bess party in Prague Saturday night. It was played up in the New York Times this morning as something pretty special and just about without precedent in Prague. You are juggling two pretty tricky balls with phenomenal success.

Regards and good wishes,  
Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

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**489. Letter from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, February 16, 1956

Dear Walter:

I am writing this from Prague as it looks as if my plane is going to be very late today. I do not know if I will get a chance to write to you this week end from Geneva.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Personal-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

I would hope that before the Secretary departs for his SEATO and Far Eastern trip you will raise the question and let me know what I should do to keep him informed concerning Geneva developments. I also presume that Phleger and Robertson will be accompanying him and that this may complicate the problem of instructions for a meeting or two. I would think it might be wise for me directly to repeat to them a fairly full summary of whatever meetings take place during their trip. The problem will be how I could best and most quickly reach them.

I have had almost a full week here in Prague which has been most helpful and useful and enabled me to handle the Porgy and Bess visit to the best advantage.

It later occurred to me that it may not have been clear from my messages concerning the last meeting as to why I hesitated about agreeing to the Monday meeting. However as he put the question it was clear to me that what he had in mind was a Monday meeting as a substitute for this week's meeting and then another meeting during the week. This of course I did not want to accept or get in to an argument about and I therefore took his suggestion of a Saturday meeting. I hope that I can now get us back on the regular Thursday schedule.

All the best, I remain

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*Ambassador*

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#### 490. Letter 31 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 31

Washington, February 17, 1956

Dear Alex:

This letter is mainly to transmit a number of documents for your background illumination, some of which I believe you will find of more than ordinary interest. If you don't go back to Prague after the February 18 meeting (assuming there will be no break-off), you may

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

have time to study these at some length before the following meeting. They are listed with brief identification below:

1. *Paper on Chinese Communist Treatment of Imprisoned American Civilians.*

This is the projected "white paper" on maltreatment of jailed Americans by the Chinese Communists from 1949 to date. It has been prepared on a contingency basis for possible release to the press in the event of a break-off at Geneva. The study is mainly the work of John Lindbeck of FE/P who has been working on it almost full time for several weeks. The individual case summaries which are to be attached as a sort of appendix are not completed yet and they are not being sent to you. There will be over a hundred of these. We would like the frank reaction of yourself and Dave Osborn to the general approach and the contingent of the study as it now stands. It is not firmed up yet and there is still time for amendments, either broad or of the nit-picking variety. As you will see Lindbeck has taken a fairly restrained line while still seeking to get considerable impact. I believe it is objective and on a sound factual basis. Frank Harris the American from Hong Kong who used to run Rediffusion there and who has made himself quite an authority on the subject of imprisoned Americans, is reading over the material and making some helpful suggestions from the standpoint of an informed private American citizen. His comments are all the more helpful because he has recently talked to Harriett Mills and Malcolm Bersohn and other ex-prisoners. We will welcome criticism of either the constructive or the destructive variety, from you and Dave.

2. *DRF Intelligence Report entitled "Communist China's Interest in a Foreign Ministers' Conference with the United States".*

This study by DRF is based on their full access to the Geneva reports and the presence of one of their men on your staff. Herman thinks it is a good job. He mentioned it to the Secretary at the meeting on the 11th. If you have any comments on this, both FE and R will be glad to have them.

3. *Report of Secretary's discussion with Selwyn Lloyd on China matters on Jan. 31 during Eden visit.*

This is the record of the China portion of the discussion with the British at the Foreign Minister level on the morning of Jan. 31. It is an excerpt from the full record of the Eden visit to Washington. It has not been officially cleared by the Secretary yet. I had to get special permission to send this to you and of course it should be very closely held by you. This meeting took place in the Department and practically all the chief participants on both sides were present except the President and the Prime Minister. You will be particularly interested in the Secretary's

discussion of the Geneva conversations on the first two pages, and in the Secretary's exposition of the reasoning behind our China policy, stated in very broad terms, from page eight through the middle of page eleven. The discussions of trade controls against Communist China and the off-shore islands issue were also of more than ordinary interest.

*4. Contingent Press Release in the Event of a Break-Off.*

Early last week we decided that we should have a carefully drafted press release ready for instant use if Wang should break off the Geneva talks. Our early draft was considerably revised by the Secretary. The enclosed statement which was approved by the Secretary on February 9, is substantially his original draft with some very slight amendments which he accepted. This statement represents an effort to strike a just balance of strength and restraint. You will see the various touches designed to show up the weaknesses in the Communist position without burning all the bridges. If you have any suggestions on this, it will not be too late to consider them, again assuming that the talks will continue.

*5. Robertson-Koo Conversation of February 1.*

You will be interested in reading the record of the long conversation of February 1 between Amb. Koo and Mr. Robertson. Koo had returned the day before from consultations in Taipei and, stimulated by the strength of the sentiment he had encountered in Taiwan, he gave the most vigorous presentation of the GRC objections to the Geneva talks that we have yet had from him. I believe you will find much of interest in the tact that Mr. Robertson took in answering Koo's arguments and questions.

In connection with the foregoing you will also want to study the reassurances which we gave to the Chinese Government in our Aide Memoire of Feb. 13 in answer to their Aide Memoire of Jan. 25. The Chinese Aide Memoire was repeated to you from Taipei as their 159 to Geneva. Our Aide Memoire went to Taipei as the Department's 481 and has been repeated to you by pouch. It should arrive at the same time as this letter. Our Aide Memoire was personally approved by the Secretary on Feb. 11.

We are working on a talking paper on the Geneva conversations to be used by our representative at a forthcoming session of the NATO Deputies sometime early in March. It seems that Amb. Perkins will have to make this presentation. Livy Merchant feels that it is important to give our NATO allies a fairly full confidential briefing on the current situation in the talks right away. He feels it cannot wait until the next ministerial level NATO session in April which will be attended by the Secretary. It is unfortunate that the presentation to the Deputies will have to be made by a representative who has had no opportunity to

acquire any particular background on the talks, especially since there will be a discussion period during which some fairly tricky questions will be asked. We will arm Amb. Perkins as well as possible, but this may not be sufficient. It is possible that you will be asked to go to Paris to brief Amb. Perkins some time before the Deputies meeting. We feel this would be invaluable to our spokesman. We are assuming that you could work this short trip into your schedule without too much difficulty unless the Prague demands on you are unusually heavy. No orders have been issued yet and there might be a change in the thinking. This is merely to alert you to the possibility and give you a chance to react in advance if you want to.

I will be standing by for your first report of the meeting on Saturday afternoon and earnestly hoping that all goes well.

Regards and good wishes,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

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**491. Letter from Lindbeck to Osborn<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 17, 1956

Dear Dave:

I enclose copies of a number of memoranda dealing with the paper I have been working on relative to Chinese Communist treatment of imprisoned American civilians. Walter McConaughy is transmitting a copy of this paper to Alexis Johnson today. I was too tardy to get this material included in the packet so I am sending it on to you for his information and yours.

Sincerely,

**John M.H. Lindbeck**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal.



**492. Telegram 1509 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 18, 1956, 3 p.m.

1509. From Johnson.

1. Three hour forty five minute meeting today. No progress whatever.

2. I developed theme of paragraphs two, three, Department's 1619, taking increasingly explicit position that proper interpretation self-defense clause is simply that each side is, on own behalf, making clear that declaration is made without prejudice to what it considers its inherent right individual collective self-defense, and does not in any way require other side recognize or accept merits of claims.

3. Wang entirely failed meet my point this regard, confined self to reiterating previous positions, however with intimation of plea we offer reformulation self-defense clause.

4. Wang took initiative on implementation, confining self to and pressing hard on Chinese in United States prisons, their alleged lack information about agreed announcement, et cetera. Alleged we had refused Indian request transmit text announcement to imprisoned Chinese.

5. I replied by reiterating previous position on no Chinese being obstructed in return and contrasted situation 13 Americans.

**Shillock**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–1856. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

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**493. Telegram 1512 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 18, 1956, 8 p.m.

1512. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting.

1. Nothing particularly noteworthy to add about today's meeting except that atmosphere even easier than last meeting. From full record

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–1856. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

Department will note that Wang gave no signs of impatience and that I did my best to contribute to business like attitude and keep discussion to text declaration. However, there was no sign of any change whatever in their attitude toward self defense clause.

2. With respect implementation he senses he may have struck soft spot with regard imprisoned Chinese and is pressing it to maximum. Would appreciate Department's instructions as to what if anything further it believes I could usefully say this regard next meeting.

3. Department will also note details our exchange re Liu Yung-ming medical records. Would appreciate instructions this regard for next meeting. Spite their attitude on this case I feel we have nothing lose something gain by making response their request to extent hospital able and willing.

4. His response on missing military personnel was as expected but I hope our exchange will expedite some reply in MAC. His thought that I was linking this with Chinese prisoners in US was understandable in context meeting and I thought it well immediately correct any implication we prepared give them list imprisoned Chinese in exchange their accounting for missing military personnel.

**Shillock**

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#### 494. Telegram 1513 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, February 18, 1956, 9 p.m.

1513. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 37 meeting with prepared statement saying he would like make further observations regarding statement I made at last meeting. First, it was US use force against China in Taiwan area which created serious dispute between China and US. Nevertheless during Afro-Asian Conference China proposed China and US sit down and enter into negotiations about dispute. That proposal gave expression to China's desire for peaceful settlement dispute between two countries.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-1856. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

2. Wang said in course these talks US side asked that both sides make announcement renouncing use force and threats. PRC side agreed to this idea of making announcement and took initiative in presenting draft announcement, which PRC side later amended after considering US views.

3. Wang said thus problem confronting us evidently nothing else but how desire for peaceful settlement disputes, as specified in proposed announcement, can be realized. As US already used force and threats against China, desire for peaceful settlement disputes cannot be realized unless practical feasible means are sought for.

4. Wang said if US side genuinely sincere in desiring peaceful settlement disputes between two countries, should make honest effort follow announcement of declaration by seeking practical feasible means realize this. Foreign Ministers conference is precisely such practical and feasible means.

5. Wang said secondly it out of question for US to talk about any sort of self-defense rights on China's territory Taiwan and coastal islands. No amount of arguments such as put forward at last meeting, alleging Taiwan and coastal islands never been their territory could alter facts.

6. Wang said aggressive acts of US in seizure of Taiwan and intervention in internal affairs of China could in no way be turned into self-defensive acts by treaties between US and Chiang clique, which long been overthrown by Chinese people. China absolutely would not renounce its sovereign right over Taiwan and coastal islands. To require their side in making this announcement to give recognition to US right self-defense on China's territory, to give recognition to Chiang treaty, to give recognition to American seizure Taiwan, is asking impossible.

7. Wang said thirdly as to by what means China would accomplish liberation Taiwan, that entirely internal matter of China in which US has no right whatsoever interfere. Desire expressed by China to strive for peaceful liberation Taiwan if circumstances permit has nothing to do with US.

8. Wang said at last meeting US side asked that China undertake to use peaceful means for liberating Taiwan. Such is unscrupulous intervention in China's internal affairs which China absolutely will not tolerate.

9. Wang said I had repeatedly indicated that US had no intention prejudicing position PRC side regarding our disputes. As matter fact ever since discussion on making this announcement began US side all along has clung to demand that China renounce its claims. US side has never indicated slightest change in its position. US side has even demanded PRC recognition seizure Taiwan by US. How could I explain this as other than demanding their side renounce its position?

10. Wang said, outside conference room, moreover, US continuously stepping up military activities in Taiwan area. Recently US openly declared it would stage large scale military maneuvers with Chiang forces in Taiwan area. Obviously this further act of provocation.

11. Wang said he asked that US make explicit answer as to whether it intent of US, after announcement of declaration, to maintain status quo of its seizure Taiwan and intervention China's internal affairs, and its interference in China's liberation Taiwan and coastal islands, meanwhile refusing hold Foreign Ministers conference.

12. Wang said if that is intent of US, then is it not lot of empty words to talk about "not prejudicing position and rights" of PRC? Would this not be making it impossible to realize desire for peaceful settlement disputes between two countries?

13. I replied that it didn't seem me statement Wang had made helped advance us in task we facing in attempt reach agreement on declaration on renunciation of force. It seemed me his statement tended again lead us down side road of discussing substance our disputes.

14. I said in attempt to see whether or not we could not advance understanding between us, I had asked him at last meeting two simple questions which I thought would help clarify situation. As I recalled it, first question was whether we were in agreement that only peaceful means would be used settle our disputes.

15. I said other question was what he thought should happen if in violation declaration one side should initiate hostilities.

16. I said he had again referred this morning to his interpretation of draft we discussing as requiring him to renounce his position and recognize positions which he did not desire recognize. I had tried to deal with this question at last meeting, just as plainly as I could. I had hoped I made myself clear, but apparently I had not.

17. I said I had tried make clear draft we discussing including self defense clause did not require either side give up position with respect merits any disputes. What I had been trying do was place self-defense clause in that declaration, to which Wang objected, in its true relationship to remainder of declaration and show that it meant only this: proposition I set forth was that if either side should violate declaration and initiate hostilities as means of attempting make its views prevail over other, or if either side should be attacked from any other quarter, it would be clear that side attacked would not by declaration have renounced its right self defense.

18. I said I had given much thought to this, and had tried think of some way in which I could make this perfectly clear. Therefore, it not with any intent of getting into substance our disputes, or saying things that would lead us down byroads, but with intent of making our

interpretation and understanding of this just as explicit as possible that I want try again explain my position.

19. I said let me put it this way. Wang disputed position of US with regard to Taiwan area, and did not recognize merits, nor did he wish to say anything that gave appearance we recognizing merits of position of US in that regard.

20. I continued from prepared statement that Wang said he did not dispute merits of assertion by US of right of individual and collective self-defense at some places but that he did dispute merits of US claims this regard with regard Taiwan area. He said US must abandon its claim with respect right self-defense with respect Taiwan area. I believed that this was honest summary his position, as I understood it.

21. I said on other hand they had claimed and still claimed for themselves right individual and collective self-defense in areas admittedly beyond borders their country and where US considers they have utterly no basis for claiming that right. I did not and would not say anything in this declaration that would recognize or give appearance of recognizing merits their claims this regard, and I did not believe draft we considering did this.

22. I said surely he did not wish issue a declaration in a form that would imply that if their forces attacked they would not defend selves. Surely if after making declaration US should in violation its commitment initiate hostilities, their forces would exercise what they would consider their right individual collective self-defense and defend selves. It was difficult me to understand how then he could attempt to deny to forces of my country very same right.

23. I said Wang had said he would not deny our forces that right in some places but did deny them that right in Taiwan area. My point was that draft we discussing did not in any way and should not attempt deny other's views or embody agreement between us as to merits respective claims. Confrontation our respective claims does not belong in present stage of discussion.

24. I said all I had suggested was that in making this declaration not to employ force to settle our disputes each of us simply state that in doing so we were neither of us renouncing what we considered to be our inherent right of individual and collective self defense. In agreeing join with Wang in making such statement I did not consider I was in any way sacrificing or prejudicing my views with respect to merits their claims with regard to places at which they asserted that right.

25. I said, similarly, I did not think that it sacrificed their views with regard to merits of claims of my government concerning that right.

26. I said I thought this entirely proper and in accordance with original purpose of not attempting in this declaration to discredit or

prejudice views of either. Discussion of merits of respective claims and working out by peaceful means of solutions to those problems where our policies confront each other can only be accomplished after we have made clear that only peaceful means will be used in finding those solutions.

27. I said question Wang had asked this morning was one I could only term as prejudging solutions to problems facing our two countries. As such, I didn't believe it proper or constructive question to ask at this stage our discussions.

28. I said the US earnestly hopes for and will do everything its power to bring about peaceful solution these questions. The US had no reservations in its determination that only peaceful means would be used in their solution.

29. I said if Wang agreed to issuance of draft we discussing, US would have no reservations in its determination that we seek together, as set forth in draft, "practical and feasible means realizing this common desire." US continues hope we can reach that stage. US continues hope we will not be longer delayed in reaching that stage by useless attempts get US agree that if its forces attacked they would not defend selves.

30. Wang said he noted that I had expressed hope we would be able to reach agreement on issuance of announcement quickly so that we could enter into discussion other matters. He shared this concern that we had spent much time in discussion this announcement without reaching an agreement on this up to present moment.

31. Wang said that in his opening statement this morning he had pointed out repeated efforts their side to reach agreement by putting forth various drafts which embodied points of view common to both sides and which acceptable to both sides. If indeed my view that we should quickly reach agreement on an announcement, it hard for him to see why US still continues not to accept their draft announcement so that we can advance to discussion other matters.

32. Wang said he had repeatedly made clear that our draft unacceptable to their side because our draft only serves view of US side. Because US draft only gives consideration to US interests and prejudices position their side, therefore it unacceptable to their side. This view of their side had been made clear repeatedly in previous meetings.

33. Wang said it entirely unjustifiable for us to include clause on self-defense of US in Taiwan, which was what their side would not accept. Observations I had made this morning, it seemed to him, in main continued to defend position of US regarding US self-defense in Taiwan area. That, as he had said, was principal obstacle in way of reaching agreement on issuance of announcement. He did not see how

this repetition of this position could advance in any way discussion by both sides on issuance of announcement.

34. Wang said with regard to statement I made this morning, there seemed to be three points on which we must be clear. In first place, my statement tended to confuse aggression with self-defense.

35. Wang said it quite true that they endorse and do not dispute right every country, in accordance United Nations Charter, to individual and collective self-defense, and that this includes United States. However, such right of self-defense can only be used in protecting and defending territory of own country against external aggression and attack. This right of self-defense has nothing in common with armed aggression against other countries. So these two things must not be confused with each other.

36. Wang said I had pointed out that they had self-defense arrangements beyond their borders. It true that they have exercised that right of self-defense. If there had not been foreign forces threatening their border and foreign military aircraft violating their airspace, they would not have exercised that right. Chinese exercised that right of self-defense simply in order protect their territory from being violated by foreign powers. However, action of foreign forces in starting aggressive acts on foreign territory cannot be termed exercise of self-defense.

37. Wang said let him put it more concretely and with respect disputes between China and US in Taiwan area. Present grave hostilities between China and US in Taiwan area chiefly result of US action in forcible seizure Taiwan, which Chinese territory. No amount talk, argument, or sophistry can turn Taiwan into state or territory of America. Therefore action of US in forcible seizure of Taiwan can only be termed aggressive action and can never be termed act of self-defense. Same is true other way around—Chinese forces would have no right speak about self-defense if they should forcibly occupy American territory of San Francisco.

38. Wang said I had stated this morning that if American forces were attacked they would not forego right to self-defense. However, present situation is not one in which US forces being attacked, but is one in which US forces have used force against Taiwan and have attacked China. [garble] logic seemed to be equally absurd as that of man who beats up another and while beating him still claims it is self-defense. How can this action be termed self-defense?

39. Wang said from this it should be clear that we should not try confuse aggressive acts with self-defense. These two acts should be clearly separated from each other. By this he meant we should not try explain aggressive action as action of self-defense.

40. Wang said as he had said, they have full right to expel present occupation of Taiwan by US forces. Nevertheless, they still propose

settle this question by means peaceful negotiations. This demonstrates peaceful intention of Chinese regarding settlement international disputes.

41. Wang said second point he wanted make was that we should not attempt confuse international dispute with internal matter. This question has always remained before us.

42. Wang said I had asked whether or not China would only use peaceful means in settlement Taiwan problem. It seemed him this question went beyond terms of reference present talks. It entirely matter for Chinese people themselves as to by what means they would accomplish liberation Taiwan. This matter in which US has no right interfere. They would oppose any attempt interfere this matter. Same is true in other respect: that is, China has no right interfere in internal matter of disputes between political parties in US. They had made clear in previous meetings this point of view: that such matters, which essentially internal matters of China, beyond scope these talks.

43. Wang said what we should discuss in these talks is question of grave tension created Taiwan area as result US occupation Chinese area of Taiwan, and we should attempt find solution to this situation.

44. Wang said thirdly he wanted deal with question of relationship between issuance announcement and substance of our disputes. They had always proposed that these two questions should be separated in their order of solution, and this is given expression in draft put forward by their side. It is a practical way—to try to solve disputes between our two countries step by step.

45. Wang said that was why they did not in their draft announcement raise any prerequisites or raise any matter which US could not find acceptable. Whereas in US proposal, US has attempted confuse these two steps and raise self-defense clause, which tantamount to prerequisite. That is where obstacle in way progress our talks lies.

46. Wang said therefore problem confronting two of us seemed to him very clear. It quite clear also why we not reached agreement issuance announcement up to present moment. Present fact is that we have not reached agreement on a proposed announcement. This not what their side desired. Question of what would follow issuance announcement was not one I had asked—what would happen if declaration were violated—but the problem was rather that both sides would attempt find ways and means for realization of provisions which stated in declaration.

47. I said I was sorry we just did not seem able arrive at meeting of minds on this. We seemed be arguing somewhat at cross purposes here. I been trying very hard keep simply to substance of our draft announcement. Whereas he said he agreed with my view that we had to keep our separate steps apart from each other, yet he continually attempting



bring us back to merits our disputes. He kept referring to his views regarding our dispute in Taiwan area terming it continuously a matter of US occupation of Taiwan. I had in past and continue resolutely to reject validity any such characterization of question. However, I did not intend repeat that this morning. Because that, I felt, again gets us down unproductive side road of discussion merits our respective positions.

48. I said however whatever term is used characterize our dispute that area, seemed me that position he taking was that solution of that should precede or accompany issuance our declaration.

49. I said he spoke again this morning of what he termed their right expel American forces from Taiwan area. His government has in its public statements also often spoken along same line. This is, and can be interpreted as, nothing else than a threat to initiate hostilities in order to resolve questions at dispute in Taiwan area in their favor. This is principal reason we are here discussing whether or not his government willing give up threat or use of force to resolve our differences.

50. I said this one of reasons I asked him at last meeting and again asked this morning the question as to whether in issuing this declaration they considered that only peaceful means were to be used to settle our disputes.

51. I said there no confusion my mind in this regard. I relating my question exactly to text our declaration. In spite my explanations this morning, he still insists in interpreting amendments I had suggested as attempt by US to trick him into prejudicing their position. That neither my intent nor is it in plain language of draft we discussing. Let me read that. "The USA and the PRC are determined that they will settle disputes between them through peaceful means—and if I may here leave out the self-defense clause—and that they will not resort to the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere." However in saying this, each of us is also saying in own behalf simply that we doing this and saying this without prejudicing what each of us considers his inherent rights to individual collective self-defense. As I said my statement this morning, neither us by saying that is recognizing or giving appearance recognizing merits position of other in this regard. (At this point Lai had whispered conference with Wang over Chinese December 1 draft.) Both us are simply making clear fact that if either us is attacked we intend defend ourselves. It simply says, when we in declaration say we not going use force, that we not carrying it to point of saying we not intend defend ourselves if attacked. It applies equally to both of us and, as previously pointed out, I would think they would consider it of equal importance.

52. I said it just didn't seem to me that their objections to it had any validity; and that their demand that it be withdrawn constituted,

in effect, demand that US say that if its forces are attacked they will not defend themselves. That of course is absurd on face of it.

53. I said I earnestly hoped that he could reconsider his position on this in light our discussions and my explanations this morning so that we could see whether it possible for us to reach agreement on this at our next meeting. I sincerely hoped we could do so.

54. Wang said they could not but want make clear their point view regarding issuance of agreement. They could not but explain their views regarding what they consider to be incorrect views concerning announcement.

55. Wang said they say US is occupying Chinese territory of Taiwan today. Only after American forces in Taiwan area—such as Seventh Fleet and so on—are withdrawn could I argue that US not occupying Taiwan. That would be matter which everybody would welcome and be glad see carried out.

56. Wang said I had talked much about alleged threats. As long as US forces not withdrawn from Taiwan area, American threat will always exist in that area. This not threat on part Chinese against US, but on contrary is US threat against China. This plain fact.

57. Wang said in spite all this their side still willing negotiate with US in peaceful manner in attempt arrive at solution this dispute. Is not this attitude Chinese side very conciliatory attitude? Certainly we are still in present stage of discussing issuance of agreed announcement.

58. Wang said I had stated that we should confine our discussion at present stage to issuance of the announcement. In course of discussion we should continuously overcome obstacles in our way and keep advancing. If as I had said we should confine discussion strictly to question of announcement itself, was I willing accept their December 1 draft, which he considered very reasonable? His draft says that “PRC and USA are determined that they should settle disputes between their two countries through peaceful negotiations without resorting to threat or use of force.” This says both should use peaceful means, rather than means of war, to settle disputes between them.

59. Wang said certainly he would be prepared listen to any suggestions or opinions I might have regard to this draft.

60. Wang said he had noted that when I read from my January 12 draft I had left out phrase regarding “without prejudice to inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.” He wondered if I meant that I would omit this clause from draft announcement. He would appreciate it if I would clarify these two points he had just raised.

61. I said first I would not take our time to review my previous comments regarding his December 1 draft. I had previously set forth reasons I felt it was defective as meaningful declaration.

62. I said in reading paragraph I had referred to this morning, I had not left out clause on self defense. I was simply trying to read it in context so as to make exactly clear meaning and interpretation that appears there.

63. I said what I was saying was that in making declaration each of us was saying on own behalf simply that we were doing this and saying this without prejudice to what each of us considered to be our inherent rights of individual and collective self defense. By that means I was attempting to make just as clear as I could what this in fact says, at least insofar as English is concerned.

64. I said I was doing this in order try clear up apparent confusion that still existed as to exact meaning and our intention in including it. I hoped that Wang would reconsider it in this light, because I felt Wang might not have fully understood it.

65. Wang said (after consultation with Lai) I had stated that I did not consider their December 1 draft meaningful declaration. However, I would recall that on December 1, when he put forth that draft, I had stated that I welcomed their action in putting that draft forward, and said that it represented progress in talks. My remarks on that occasion served to prove that December 1 draft of their side was meaningful declaration.

66. Wang said if I did consider their December 1 draft a considerable advance in our discussion on issuance of announcement, he did not see why we could not continue our progress along that line.

67. Wang said with regard January 12 draft of US side, he had made it clear at previous meetings that as regards self defense clause included in that draft, it not question of what sort of words to use to express that idea. He had said that it was substantive question with which we must deal.

68. Wang said if I genuinely hoped that we should make further progress in talks, then he would hope I would be able set forth more concrete opinions on basis their December 1 draft at next meeting.

69. Wang said if it my intention to insist on this clause regarding self defense in Taiwan area, and keep heckling about this clause in our discussions, he just didn't see how we could make any progress in our discussions.

70. I replied that I had only two brief things. First, I did say that I welcomed their draft of December 1 and did consider it advance over position Wang had previously been maintaining.

71. I said I not only said this, but I had shown that I thought this was case by my taking his draft as basis for negotiation and by agreeing accept it as declaration with two small amendments that we had

suggested. It frankly just had not occurred to me that Wang would find this self defense clause objectionable or that he would make issue of it.

72. I said I certainly had no intention or desire to build it up into issue, but Wang had insisted on doing so. Again, Wang had just said he considered this matter of substance. How else could I interpret his statements than as substantive demand on his part that US renounce its views regarding merits of our disputes. I had nothing more to say.

73. Wang replied that I had termed my amendments to his draft as very small changes, but he did not think they were very small changes. He considered them to be still insisting on my original position. He did not consider them amendments in true sense of word. They were rather a form of insistence on my original position.

74. Wang said I had stated that in making these changes I did not intend build up issue over self-defense clause. If, as I stated, it not my intent to build up into issue, then he didn't see why I had insisted on this issue.

75. Wang said I had also said that it not my intent demand or require prerequisite. In view of fact that self defense clause had become issue between us and constitutes prerequisite on US part, this self defense clause had become obstacle to progress of talks.

76. Wang said it was to be hoped that at next meeting I would be able put forth suggestions and opinions that would help progress of talks.

77. Wang said if I had nothing else, he would like bring up another matter. On my assent, he read prepared statement saying that Chinese side had at very start these talks submitted complete list of all Americans in prison in China. They had all along been concerned with status of Chinese in prison in US. In spite of repeated requests that we submit list Chinese in US prisons, US side not only failed submit such list but declared it had no knowledge of Chinese in prison.

78. Wang said he had long ago pointed out that that assertion did not tally with facts. According information offered by returned Chinese there actually many Chinese unjustifiably kept US prisons. He would again call my attention to question of Chinese in US prisons and would appreciate explicit answer from me.

79. Wang said he failed see why my side had thus far not taken any appropriate measures in regard to these imprisoned Chinese, nor could he understand why US so far refused provide either their side or Indian Embassy with information about these people, or why US would not permit Indian Embassy advise these imprisoned people of contents of agreement between China and US of September 10, 1955. Under such circumstances, how could Indian Embassy be expected fully carry out

functions provided in agreement. This was situation highly dissatisfactory their side.

80. Wang said Chinese Government and people very concerned about situation of 27 Chinese whose names he gave me in six separate lists with request that I look into cases and give accounting for them. Last meeting, without making any investigation, I had made casual remark that they all free depart. That remark not made with sense of responsibility. All these people being subjected obstruction, not able return. US side had every responsibility look into their cases in earnest, and give accounting for each individual.

81. Wang said this morning he would again hand me list of four Chinese whose return being prevented and request me look into their cases and give accounting of them. Particulars about their situation were set forth in papers he handing me. (Handed over list, transmitted by separate telegram).

82. I said I thought it was necessary to recall that we came here to discuss civilians who desired return. Wang would recall that we discussed subject of lists, and that when we began talks I had given him list of Americans who we had positive evidence desired return and were being prevented from doing so, including those imprisoned in Wang's country.

83. I said it no part of terms of reference for these talks or of agreed announcement to investigate status all Chinese in United States. There was only one question between us, one question that is concern of Indian Embassy in US. That is, US has unequivocally and unconditionally stated that Chinese in US who desire return PRC entitled do so. Sole question is whether US has and is carrying out that obligation.

84. I said I here and my government also had categorically without condition stated that we have carried out obligation. In event that any Chinese in US desiring return feels he being obstructed, our agreed announcement sets up definite clear and simple procedure. US had even gone beyond terms of that announcement and invited anyone who even knew of any Chinese being obstructed in his desire depart, or who felt he being obstructed to communicate with Indian Embassy or State Department.

85. I said thus far, in more than 5 months that had passed since announcement issued neither these procedures nor any other source had given any specific evidence of any kind that any Chinese in US who desired return being obstructed from doing so.

86. I said raising demands and making requests entirely outside terms reference talks and agreed announcement did not obscure this fact. None of this could excuse continued failure Wang's government carry out its commitments with regard precise Americans we were discussing at time this announcement issued. There nothing hypothetical

or theoretical about those Americans. There nothing hypothetical or theoretical about who is interfering with their return.

87. I said in only one case that he had thus far brought my attention did there appear be any substantial allegation that US could be obstructing his return. That was case of Mr. Yuan Jui-hsiang, which I had told him I was looking into, and whose name he had given me January 12. Wang's statement regarding him was to effect he been summoned by immigration authorities, interrogated in July 1954, and taken into custody.

88. I said I had had very thorough check made of all our immigration offices and had not been able confirm he been taken into custody at any time, nor been able positively identify that he had had any business with immigration authorities. However, I would be glad try to go further into this if Wang would furnish me further details. Wang's statement said he summoned in July 1954. If Wang could give me exact date it would be helpful. It would also be particularly helpful if Wang could give me particular place where this took place. I should presume this information should be available from sources Wang had used. It would also be helpful if Wang could give me any information on how he spelled his name in English letters. We had looked into possible alternate spellings under various dialects that might be given to his Chinese characters, but had been unable to identify him. As Wang also knew, it entirely possible he might have adopted a personalized spelling of name—a spelling of his own for his name. Or he might have partially anglicized his name. Any information Wang could give me in this regard would be helpful in looking into this matter.

90. Wang said I had said I came here to discuss and resolve question of civilians both sides who desire return. I had referred to declaration by US that all those Chinese who desire return free do so. I had said there no obstruction whatever on part US against their return. It one thing to say this in announcement, but it important to look into facts. They had always welcomed any news given him regarding return of certain batch Chinese and whenever they also had knowledge any return Chinese they always expressed welcome.

91. Wang said however on other hand, their attention repeatedly been called to fact many Chinese desire return but in fact unable do so. That concerns names those people he had given me and request I look into those cases.

92. Wang said with regard Yuan, their hope was US authorities would continue look into this matter. When his side received further information, he would certainly be glad inform me.

93. Wang said he next wanted call my attention to question of Chinese in US prisons. These people who desire return have not been informed of agreed announcement between US and their side very

concerned regard welfare these people. Now question of those Chinese in US prisons is not question of whether or not there are Chinese in US prisons, but is question of how many them in US prisons. I had repeatedly referred to imprisoned Americans in China. He sure I able understand similar concern their part regarding Chinese in prison in US. They would like learn about information on their situation.

94. I said I had nothing more on that subject but did have another brief subject.

95. I said he would recall that at our 23rd meeting on October 27 I had raised with him and discussed at that meeting as well as at 24th meeting October 3, the question of American personnel missing during Korean hostilities for whom no accounting been made from his side. I would not review reasons set forth that time regarding reasons why we thought his side had information concerning them.

96. I said he would recall that he had said he felt that MAC in Korea was proper place for discussion this question and I had asked whether he would recommend his authorities that they agree discuss this question there. My government accepted this suggestion in good faith and in meeting of MAC November 26th raised this question. Although representatives his side made some statements regarding individuals held outside Korea as not coming under authority of MAC, I pleased note that they did accept list. I wanted point out that although almost three months had passed since lists received and discussed in MAC, no information yet received and no indication of intent his side provide information. I simply wanted state at this time that my government considered itself entitled to reply whether in MAC or here, because my government considers this still to be one of practical matters between us which these talks were convened to consider.

97. Wang said I did not seem to have replied to questions he had put to me.

98. Wang said as to US military personnel missing in Korea, he had at beginning pointed out this not matter to be discussed these meetings. It was proper for US to raise question at MAC in Korea. It should expect any reply in same place—that is, in Korea.

99. Wang said he would like remind me not to confuse those matters in Korea with present talks between China and US. He did not consider it proper or wise raise this matter at this conference.

100. Wang said as he had said, if US was concerned over imprisoned Americans in China, his side also entitled know about situation of Chinese being imprisoned in US. Their request for information regarding imprisoned Chinese in US was exactly within scope our talks and was matter which concerned implementation of agreed announcement.

101. I said it not necessary raise matter here if his representatives in Korea would be instructed give reply. I hoped this would be done.



102. Wang said he did not see how issues in Korean War could have connection with Chinese in prison in US.

103. I said I had never said there was.

104. Wang said if I not making such a connection, then why did I not reply his questions regarding imprisoned Chinese in US?

105. I said I did not intend connect two problems.

106. Wang said he had no such intention, but he had raised question imprisoned Chinese in US but I in reply was trying excuse myself by bringing up matter missing persons in Korea. Could only give impression I was trying confuse these two matters. He had no intention doing this.

107. I said I recognized that both questions separate.

108. Wang said he agreed with me that they separate.

109. I said we were agreed.

110. Wang said but question of Chinese imprisoned US still remains.

111. I said I had nothing more.

112. Wang said if I had no answer for him on this question he would hope I would do so next meeting. He had still another matter take up.

113. Wang said this concerns Mr. Liu Yung-ming. After his return China and after diagnosis, it confirmed Liu a victim of schizophrenia and this had something do with ill treatment received hands US. His government now has decided cure him so he will be restored his health at early date. Liu was in American hospital for six years, however when returned hospital did not give him records and information regarding his disease—the diagnosis and etiological information concerning his disease. In order give Liu effective treatment, necessary for hospital their side get and refer to such information. He would hope our side would render assistance and give necessary materials so Liu could be cured early date.

114. I said I be glad look into matter. Had request been made through other channels?

115. Wang said no.

116. I asked if doctor had written hospital?

117. Wang said no.

118. I asked where he wanted information sent, to doctor or to hospital?

119. Wang said perhaps we could make further arrangements in due course.

120. I suggested we return to regular schedule for next meeting.

121. Wang suggested that in order maintain an interval it be Friday, February 24th. I agreed.



**495. Letter 22 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

No. 22

Geneva, February 19, 1956

Dear Walter:

A very cold Sunday afternoon and a chance to write you as it was not practical for me to go back to Prague this week. With the plane schedules and all it would have meant I would only have had Monday there. I hope I can get back onto the Thursday meeting schedule which works out best for me. However, I must confess I do not have much stomach for flying the kind of weather we have been having here. Last week I went up in the teeth of what can only be described as a real howling blizzard and it took us three hours for the Zurich-Prague leg which is normally about 1¾ hours flying time. There is no GCA at the Prague airport, and while I have lots of faith in Swissair I just do not enjoy this roaming around in a snowstorm feeling for the airport between the hills.

As you can see, I am writing this myself, so please excuse the typing. We have heard nothing concerning Miss Howard's arrival except for the Department's message to Canberra, but I very much hope that she will show up next week. Fortunately both Dave and John type so that between them they managed to turn out yesterday's meeting.

Thanks very much for your helpful and I fear all too generous letter of February 13. Frankly, I am finding it increasingly difficult to think up any new approaches, and I find it constitutionally repellent to just say the same old things. Tactically I also think it is not good. As you have also noted the less that is done the longer the meeting, and these straight five hour sessions are really wearing. Yesterday, I tried to keep it down to a reasonable length, and keep it to the point. There is a great temptation to try to answer everything every time, but it seems to me that it serves little purpose. At times I have feared I was somewhat ahead of the Department, but was particularly glad to note that your 1619 fully confirmed the line I have been building toward and which I fully developed yesterday.

I presume that everyone is very aware that we have now gone a long ways towards agreeing to talk with them about "tension in the Taiwan area" and much related thereto at such time as agreement may be reached on a declaration. It will be very difficult later to say that we cannot talk about it because it involves third parties. You will recall I raised this in para 4 of my 1241 back in December. It worries me a great

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret.

deal as I just do not see what we say or do when, or perhaps, if we reach that stage.

I was a little puzzled by your remark concerning the effect of any renunciation of force on the offshore islands. I have always assumed that when we said "Taiwan area" we were including the offshore islands and I believe that Wang thinks we do. It never occurred to me that we thought otherwise, and I do not believe I have ever given Wang any grounds for any other interpretation.

As you can see from yesterday's meeting I fear the "can of worms" of Chinese prisoners in the U.S. is finally opening up. I sure hope you have some good answers to suggest to me for the next meeting.

As a few minor matters. They are obviously keeping Wang very well informed here, and he has often been ahead of me in such matters as the details of the correspondence from the hospital concerning Liu Yung-ming, your conversations back there with the Indians etc. I certainly do not want to load the wires with any more telegraph traffic, but I believe on some of these matters it would be better to give me fairly complete summaries by telegram rather than rely on the pouch which is again very slow. On Liu Yung-Ming for example I had to build much of my argument around inference and deduction, and at the preceding meeting he knew all about Robertson's exchange with Mehta when I had no information at the time of the meeting. Nothing serious in the way of harm has happened thus far, but I would be in a much better position in such exchanges if I was sure I knew everything there was to be known on the subject, and there is always the chance I may some day stub my toe very badly, if I do not have fully current information.

I have been thinking about the question of Stanley's detail and have discussed it with him also. First, he is entirely willing to do anything the Department desires, although he is naturally loath to stay here for a prolonged period separated from his family. Next, I would, of course, be loath to lose him, but if I can be assured of keeping Dave would be willing to make a change. Next, the Consulate here is very hard pressed and I doubt very much they could spare a man for the approximately two full days a week that he would be occupied with the meetings. Stanley's knowledge of Chinese is also a very valuable asset and as an FSO he should get started in his career. All this brings me to a thought I throw out for you to work on. Why not assign him here to the Consulate over-complement? This would mean that he could start learning the consular ropes three days a week while working for me two days a week. He could bring over his family. Whatever happens to my talks there is likely to be some continuing contact here and it would be very useful to have some one stationed here with his background and knowledge of Chinese. It seems to me that it has much to recommend it. He could take his FSI training whenever the situation here permitted. I have *not* talked to Gowen about this.

Regards to all

Alex

P.S. Is there any basis for my theory that shift in Wang's attitude toward continuation of the meetings has resulted from something passed from New Delhi to Peiping, and Nehru anticipating his talks with the Secretary next month? That is, Nehru has told Peiping that if they do not upset the applecart by breaking off these talks, he will bring pressure on the Secretary when he sees him to agree to the Fomin meeting.

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**496. Telegram 1526 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 21, 1956, noon

1526. From Johnson.

Following list four names handed me by Wang 37th meeting February 18 (my telegram 1513, paragraph 81):

*[text not declassified]*

Gowen

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Waddell (FE) 11 a.m. 2/21/CWO–JRL.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–2156. Official Use Only.

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**497. Telegram 1663 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 21, 1956, 7:11 p.m.

1663. For Johnson.

Guidance for February 24 meeting.

1. Continue to affirm established US position both on renunciation force and implementation Agreed Announcement of September 10.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–2156. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy; cleared in draft by Phleger.

Further repetition is necessary in present situation and you need not hesitate employ it. It is incumbent upon Chinese Communists to act both on our draft proposal on renunciation of force and on implementation Agreed Announcement. In absence new move by Wang, we must continue press our strong case for immediate affirmative action by Chinese Communists in both fields.

2. Draw attention to frequent Communist statements last meeting which dealt with substance disagreement between US and Communists in Taiwan area, such as "US has used force against Taiwan and has attacked China," and Communists "have full right to expel present occupation of Taiwan by US forces." Point out all these are one-sided Communist contentions which demonstrably false and involve the very points at issue between us. Problem at this stage is not to debate these contentions, but simply for each side to declare that it will not use force to impose its will.

3. Remind Communists that latest revision renunciation of force declaration was presented by US in effort arrive at acceptable formulation.

4. Remind Communists that we presented list detained Americans at outset of talks and that thirteen these Americans still held in Communist jails, despite Communist pledge September 10 take appropriate measures so they could return expeditiously. We did not demand or use any Chinese Communist list of Americans nor did we at any time agree to provide any list Chinese in US. Such demands are beyond scope Agreed Announcement. Latter provided that civilians both sides entitled return and that individual who believed he was being obstructed might appeal to representative of third power. US has scrupulously carried out all its commitments contained in Agreed Announcement including provision for wide publicity in US. No case of individual claiming obstruction has been brought to US Government's attention by Indian Embassy or anyone else, despite publicity given Announcement. Specific US obstruction alleged by Wang regarding only one of thirty-one Chinese named in recent Communist lists and information given this case so meager that US government unable trace or identify. Other names obviously supplied as part of propaganda effort to gloss over Communist failure carry out their part Agreed Announcement and to hide from world unpalatable fact that most Chinese in US do not wish to return Communist China. (FYI Believe position outlined above will be sufficient reply to Communist pressure for information regarding Chinese in prisons and names Wang has submitted. No Chinese alien in prison has applied for repatriation and we do not wish to open up any hypothetical question in this regard. Discussion could prejudice release imprisoned Americans, even though latter held on political

rather than ordinary felony charges and their desire for repatriation not disputed. END FYI)

5. Inform Communists US Government will inquire whether Liu Yung-ming hospital records available and supply if possible. Request Communists supply similar records for Wilma Bradshaw and Dilmus Kanady who both suffering from mental illness at time release.

6. This guidance not yet seen by Secretary who returns to Washington 22nd. In absence supplementary instructions on 23rd you may assume his concurrence.

**Hoover**

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#### 498. Letter 23 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 23

Geneva, February 22, 1956

Dear Walter:

I tremendously appreciated your letter No. 31 transmitting various documents which I have found most useful and helpful, and this letter is primarily for the purpose of replying thereto.

I was greatly disappointed to receive a telegram from Bonn this morning, saying that Miss King could not arrive here until next Monday, so that means we will go through another meeting session without a secretary. Miss Ferguson, who formerly worked for me and is now Mr. Gowen's secretary, has most generously volunteered to forego her holiday today in order that I could get this reply off to you.

1. We all feel that Lindbeck's *Paper on Treatment of Imprisoned American Civilians* is a most admirable piece of work. It strikes an excellent note and, except for the last page where I have fairly substantial suggestions for rewriting conclusions, we only have nit picks. For your convenience in handling, I am enclosing a separate sheet giving our suggestions and I am retaining here the copy of the Paper which you transmitted to us.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

2. *The DRF Intelligence Report on the Foreign Ministers' Conference.* This is also an excellent piece of work and except for the following I concur with it.

In the abstract and again on page 3 the paper gives the impression that the United States supports the GRC "legal" closure of the mainland ports. I had always understood, and Dave confirms that it was also his understanding up to the time he left the Department, that we had never taken a position in support of this port closure. In fact it is my recollection that we protested it at the time it was imposed and I do not recall that we have ever withdrawn our protest. In any event I feel certain that Chou would never raise with us the question of GRC termination of this measure which he would regard as a "domestic", that is GRC-PRC matter. He might raise the question of U.S. material aid to the GRC in maintaining this policy and, thus, the U.S. "interference" in a Chinese "domestic" matter.

With respect to the general thesis of Section IV, particularly the bottom of page 7 and page 8, it seems to me most unlikely that the Chinese Communists would attempt an invasion of Taiwan (as opposed to the Offshore Islands) as a means of coercing the United States into a Foreign Ministers' conference. If the Chicoms had reached the point of being able to mount such an invasion, they would be shooting for the complete elimination of the GRC and the possession of Taiwan. They would certainly not be prepared to suspend any such invasion for a Foreign Ministers' conference or have any interest in such a conference until the battle had been decided.

While not disagreeing with any of the listed motives under Section III of the Chinese Communists pressing for a Foreign Ministers' conference, it seems that this Section slights a very major element. One of the reasons Chou made his bid for negotiations at Bandung was his appreciation of the strong world and neutralist sentiment for peaceful negotiations and the avoidance of war. On the positive side, the Chicoms want to enlist this sentiment behind their claims and policies. On the negative side, the Chicoms appreciate that it would be politically most unwise for them to initiate military action, even against the Offshores, without first having established the impression that they had exhausted all avenues of peaceful negotiation. By pressing for a Foreign Ministers' meeting they are able to capitalize on this sentiment whether or not we agree to such a meeting. If we do not agree, they consider they will be able to reinforce their pose of willingness to negotiate being rebuffed by the United States. If we do agree to such a meeting and no "reduction of tensions in the Taiwan area" is accomplished, they will similarly hope to reinforce their pose of "reasonableness" being frustrated by U.S. "unreasonableness". In each of these situations they will hope to capitalize on the almost general absence of international support for the GRC position

on the Offshore Islands and the deteriorating international position of the GRC as the de jure government of China, further to isolate the United States in its position with respect to the GRC.

3. *Contingent Press Release in Event of Break-Off*. I think that the Department's statement is excellent and it well avoids the danger of slamming doors and accentuating any crisis atmosphere that may be created. I have no suggestions.

In this regard I am enclosing a copy of the contingent break-off statement which I drafted prior to the February 9 meeting on the basis of the Department's 1591. I am keeping this in the brief case for use, if necessary, and would appreciate any comments or suggestions the Department may have. Of course, both of these statements may require some modification to fit them to the situation. As far as my statement is concerned, for maximum effectiveness, it would have to be given out as I left the meeting room and would have to appear largely extemporaneous. In any event I suggest that you keep the text handy on meeting days so that if a break does unexpectedly come, it can be used as a basis for a telephone call from me letting you know exactly what I have said.

4. *White Paper Summarizing Talks*. Both Dave and I have carefully gone over the Historical Division's draft paper summarizing the talks to date. Our intention was to transmit our detailed suggestions as with Lindbeck's paper. However, we both found that this was not practical as, frankly, we feel the paper is in need of complete rewriting. I do not feel that it effectively presents our case, and its shifting back and forth between the chronological and subject approach can only leave the reader very confused. I certainly would not want it to represent the official summary of our talks. Dave is starting to work on an entirely new draft which we will go over together and try to get to you as quickly as possible.

I particularly appreciated the memorandum on the China portion of the discussions with the British as well as Robertson's conversation with Koo. I especially felt that Robertson's comments to Koo on Chiang's recent statements were very well taken and I was glad to see this said.

I will, of course, be glad to go over to Paris if it is thought that it would be useful and I would hope to hear one way or another as soon as possible in order that I may make my plans. I have made an engagement in Prague for Sunday, March 4, which I would be loath to break but could fit in almost any other time.

I should have previously called your attention to the "question" Wang asked me at the last meeting (paragraph 11 mytel 1513). This is the best and frankest thumbnail summary of their position that he has given to date.

I expect to go back to Prague Saturday morning and return here on Tuesday.

All the best to everyone.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

**Enclosure**

**Comments on Draft<sup>2</sup>**

Undated

COMMENTS ON DRAFT (1/30/56) WHITE PAPER  
"AMERICAN CIVILIANS IMPRISONED BY CHINESE  
COMMUNISTS 1949-1956"

*Page 1—Introduction*

The following is suggested as possibly somewhat preferable wording for paragraph 5: "The two purposes of this policy that have emerged most clearly are: first, to utilize these defenseless Americans as hostages to attempt to obtain political concessions from the United States; and, secondly, to force these Americans to make spurious confessions designed to discredit the United States."

*Page 8*

Omit "apparently on the contention that he was a prisoner of war" in penultimate sentence of first full paragraph. I am not clear that this was in fact Chicom's contention and its inclusion tends to give an impression of some justification for Buol's detention when in fact there was none.

*Page 9*

Typographical error in footnote—should be spelled Shih instead of Chih.

*Page 14*

Delete "civilians" in last line of paragraph ending at top of page. My talks at that time actually also dealt with military personnel.

Suggest that last sentence beginning at bottom of page would read clearer if worded "They were, in other words, expected to build a case

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<sup>2</sup> Confidential.



against their own country out of their own lives and actions in support of Communist charges, etc.”

*Page 22*

Suggest second sentence, second paragraph, would be somewhat strengthened by insertion “public” preceding “information on local political and economic conditions, etc.”

*Page 25*

Suggest last sentence, penultimate paragraph, be reworded so as to make it clear it refers to rights of communication with U.K. Charge, etc., covered by Agreed Announcement and not right of release which is not “trivial”. Suggest some wording along following lines: “Most of them have even been denied the meager privilege of communicating with the United Kingdom Charge at Peiping and receiving visits from him pending their release as was provided for in the Communist pledge of September 10, 1955.”

*Page 30*

It seems to me we need to find some better conclusion than giving currency to the ostensibly plausible Communist proposition that there is a difference between those who have “committed offences against the law and those who have abided by the law”. As it stands I do not think that we make a convincing case for the valid conclusion of the last paragraph. My suggestion would be something along the following lines as a substitution for the last three paragraphs:

“This commitment clearly applies to all Americans, and particularly to those in prison. As the Chinese Communists had finally on September 6, 1955 agreed to grant exit permits to those Americans who, although not in prison, had up to that time also been denied permission to leave the country, only the cases of Americans in prison were under discussion at the time the Chinese Communists made this public commitment. It will be noted that the Announcement states and it was clearly understood that the Chinese Communists had committed themselves ‘further to adopt appropriate measures’ so that these remaining imprisoned Americans could ‘expeditiously’ return.

“Nevertheless the pattern of continued Chinese Communist efforts to use these innocent and unfortunate victims of Chinese Communist ‘justice’ for political purposes is clear. On the date of the Announcement, September 10, 1955, and four days before making their demand for a meeting with the Secretary of State, the Chinese Communists announced the release of ten of these imprisoned Americans. On October 27, 1955, the date of the opening of the 4-Power Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Geneva, and also the date the Chinese Communists embodied their demand for a meeting with the Secretary of State in a formal document, the Chinese Communists announced the release of two more imprisoned Americans. On November 17, 1955, the day following the close of the 4-Power

Foreign Ministers' meeting, the release of three imprisoned Americans was announced by Peiping. Since that time only one American, Dr. Homer Bradshaw, has been released, it being clear even to Peiping that in his case Mrs. Bradshaw would shortly pass away in China as a result of the treatment she had received in prison unless Dr. Bradshaw, who is a physician, could accompany her from the country.

"In the meanwhile the Chinese Communists have tried hard to assert that the remaining thirteen Americans imprisoned, equally covered by their September 10 commitment, are somehow not entitled to return because they have 'committed offences against the law', and, on the other hand, to intimate that their return depends on 'improvement in relations', that is, the granting to Communist China of political concessions by the United States.

"Thus the Chinese Communist failure to honor its pledge of September 10, 1955 to release all imprisoned Americans, and its pattern of action with regard to those prisoners who have been released, again conclusively establish the continued efforts of Peiping to use innocent Americans as political hostages and propaganda pawns."

#### **Enclosure**

#### **Draft Press Release<sup>3</sup>**

Undated

#### *PRESS RELEASE*

I regret to announce that Ambassador Wang has rebuffed my efforts to continue to seek with him agreement on a declaration which would renounce the threat or use of force generally and particularly in the Taiwan area, and which would unqualifiedly provide that differences between the United States and Communist China be settled only by peaceful means.

Ambassador Wang made it clear that his refusal further to meet with me was based upon the Chinese Communists' unwillingness to drop the demand that the U.S. give up its right to self-defense against armed attack in the Taiwan area, and in fact concede to them the very goals for which they would use armed force.

<sup>4</sup>Ambassador Wang also informed me of the Chinese Communists' intent to denounce our Agreed Announcement of September 10 with respect to the return of civilians. Such unilateral action cannot relieve

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<sup>3</sup> No classification marking.

<sup>4</sup> This paragraph to be used and penultimate paragraph deleted if Wang denounces Agreed Announcement. [Footnote in the original.]

the Chinese Communists from the obligation which they assumed in that Agreement expeditiously to release all detained Americans, and the U.S. continues to expect them to fulfill that obligation and promptly to release the thirteen Americans still detained in Communist Chinese prisons.

Chinese in the United States continue to be entirely free to return to mainland China and the U.S. offers no obstruction whatever to their departure. The Indian Embassy in the U.S. has not brought to the attention of my Government any case of a Chinese who claims he is being prevented from leaving, nor has Ambassador Wang here presented any factual evidence of obstruction.

<sup>5</sup>In spite of the Chinese Communist commitment of September 10 last year expeditiously to release all detained Americans, thirteen Americans still remain in Chinese Communist prisons. The US continues to expect the Chinese Communists to fulfill that commitment and promptly release those unfortunate people.

I have informed Ambassador Wang that any further communications between the two sides can be transmitted through our respective consular offices here in Geneva.

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<sup>5</sup>This paragraph to be used and second paragraph deleted unless Wang denounces Agreed Announcement. [Footnote in the original.]

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#### **499. Telegram 1547 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 24, 1956, 4 p.m.

1547. From Johnson.

Four and one half hour meeting this morning. No progress whatsoever.

Renunciation took familiar lines for three and half hours with discussion becoming very diffuse Wang reiterating usual lines of foreign versus domestic nature dispute Taiwan area. Also tried hard to sound me out 1) on U.S. willingness hold FonMin meeting as “practicable and feasible means” mentioned in declaration and 2) on linked question whether any flexibility our position re status quo Taiwan. Context this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-2456. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

line carried implication they concerned our intent is to regard declaration end in itself in maintaining status quo and relieving US any obligation continue seek "relaxation tensions Taiwan area".

I replied along lines our firm intent fully carry out all terms declaration and that under last para draft did not exclude any "means" but at same time entirely unwilling agree FonMin meeting only such means. In any event such discussion was premature and CHICOM attempt establish unacceptable condition precedent to declaration.

Did not meet my reiterated characterization self-defense clause as unilateral reservation by each right self-defense along lines it took at last meeting. He also refused my repeatedly proffered opportunities deny their intent in demanding withdrawal self-defense clause was motivated by desire represent this as renunciation by US its position with respect Taiwan, sticking to line this required them recognize our position there. Characterized our insistence on self-defense clause as raising question whether U.S. really wanted any declaration. Some suggestion they now unwilling include specific reference to Taiwan.

He led off on implementation with brief statement giving me three more names and I replied with long statement along usual lines stressing not single fact or solid evidence showing any Chinese obstructed in departure from U.S. He again pushed prisoner question implying knowledge "more than hundred" Chinese in U.S. prisons.

Next meeting Thursday March 1.

Departing for Prague Saturday morning, returning Tuesday.

Gowen

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#### 500. Telegram 1554 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, February 24, 1956, 9 p.m.

1554. From Johnson.

1. I opened 38 meeting with following prepared statement on renunciation force:

A. Mr. Ambassador, we have now spent much time in discussing and attempting to arrive at an agreement to a declaration on the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-2456. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

renunciation of force that would enable us to proceed to the next stage of our talks in an atmosphere free from the threat of war. As I understand the situation the only objection you have had to the draft we have been discussing was to the clause relating to self-defense. Your stated objections to this clause have been based on the assertion that it prejudiced the views of your government with regard to the merits of our dispute in the Taiwan area, requiring your government to recognize the validity of the U.S. position there and thus preventing your government from peacefully maintaining and asserting its position in this regard. If this were a fact your objections would certainly have validity and I would be entirely prepared to recognize them.

B. However, as I have repeatedly pointed out, I have no such intent, and the plain language of at least the English text has no such meaning or connotation. I have repeatedly pointed out that all that the text says is that in making this declaration each of us states that he is doing so without prejudice to what each of us consider our inherent rights of individual and collective self-defense. As I pointed out at our last meeting, this does not mean that your government is recognizing the merits of any and all U.S. claims in this regard any more than my government is recognizing the merits of any and all claims of your government in this regard. I have tried to make this just as clear as I could and particularly at our last meeting explained it in very simple terms. Therefore, if this was in fact the basis of the objection of your government to this clause, I hope that it has reconsidered its position in the light of my explanations.

C. I hope that it is not the intention of your government to demand as prior or concomitant condition for the issuance of our declaration that my government agree to a resolution on your terms of any of the disputes between us. If this is not the intent of your government I see no reason you cannot promptly agree to the text of the draft declaration we have been discussing and pass on to the discussion of other matters in accordance with the terms of reference for these talks and the text of that declaration.

2. Wang, reading from his notes, said I had properly stated that we indeed have spent so much time on discussion of declaration renouncing use of force. It all the more unsatisfactory that in spending so much time we have not yet been able reach agreement.

3. Chief reason for this delay has been fact that there still exists difference of principle between two of us on this question. It now for both us try overcome and resolve differences existing between us. It also necessary for us to clarify some of points we encountering in discussion such a declaration.

4. Wang, turning to prepared statement, said I had repeatedly stated at last meeting that in making declaration it not the intention to

dispute or prejudice views of either side nor to abandon either's position in any our disputes. I had again made statement along that line to effect declaration does not require any side to prejudice its position or to give up its views in regard our disputes. At last meeting I had also stated that my side already had accepted December 1 draft his side as basis for discussion with only two small amendments.

5. Wang said however the two amendments suggested by me actually contained the entire demands of my side without any modification, which requires his side to abandon its position and which my side had insisted upon all along since beginning talks. As his side has long ago categorically stated, that was what his side absolutely can never accept.

6. Wang said in first place, my January 12 draft requires his side to recognize U.S. claim to right individual collective self-defense in Taiwan area. I had stated that U.S. is in Taiwan area purely for self-defense and that presence of U.S. forces on Taiwan allegedly was in accordance with collective self-defense arrangements. In other words, intention my side in including self-defense clause in draft was to require his side to recognize validity of continued U.S. seizure Taiwan and to recognize U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek treaty. How can this be explained as other than demand that their side abandon its position on our dispute?

7. Wang said secondly, my draft announcement proposed and he would quote "they will not resort to threat or use force in Taiwan area or elsewhere". That is attempt to confuse international dispute of China and U.S. with a Chinese internal matter. As his side had long pointed out, it was entirely matter China's internal affair as to whatever means China used to liberate Taiwan, a matter in which U.S. had no right interfere. I had once and again indicated that declaration between us should not involve any third parties, yet every draft announcement put forward my side precisely tried involve internal matter of China and Chiang Kai-shek clique. How can this be explained as other than demanding his side abandon its position?

8. Wang said his side held that purpose for making declaration could only be one of giving expression to desire both sides for peaceful settlement disputes of China and U.S., as well as to give expression to determination both sides seek means realization this desire. It was precisely with this purpose that his side's December 1 draft was presented. It contained no prerequisites nor did it contain any points which might not be acceptable. His side did not intend to make use of declaration to accomplish any ulterior ends which cannot stand public scrutiny.

9. Wang said his side had proposed and will continue to stand for holding Foreign Ministers' conference between China and U.S. in order to discuss and settle question of easing and eliminating tension Taiwan area, because this is practical and feasible means for

realization desire for peaceful settlement disputes between China and U.S. in Taiwan area.

10. Wang said at last meeting he had asked me whether it intention my side following making of our declaration to preserve status quo our occupation Taiwan and our interference China's internal affairs while refusing a Foreign Ministers' conference. He had not yet received clear-cut reply this regard. His side considers this question very important to present stage our talks. For if it should turn out that my intention was indeed so, then his side sees no point in continuing these talks. If however this not my intention then my side has no justification whatsoever to keep insisting his side abandon its position, thus preventing us from making progress.

11. Wang, turning back to his notes, said in statement I had made this morning I had stated that if their objections to self-defense clause were based on belief that this self-defense clause prejudiced their position and their views with respect to disputes and if this the fact, then their objections could certainly have validity and I would be entirely prepared recognize them. In other words, did I mean that in recognizing validity their objections that I prepared withdraw self-defense clause from draft announcement?

12. I said his statement this morning here, including his question which he had asked at last meeting and again repeated this morning, seemed to me to be still confusing the situation. I had tried at previous meetings and had tried again this morning to keep very strictly to immediate and first task in front of us. He had said I had not changed my position with respect to our declaration. That was true, insofar as principles which I had enunciated first here on October 8, were concerned. That principle was sound and could not be changed. I had thought and he had often stated here, that he had accepted that principle. That principle was that we each make clear that we renounced use force to make policies of either prevail over other. I had characterized that as an essential foundation and preliminary of success in discussion other items.

13. I said we both recognized that area in which our policies confronted each other most seriously was the Taiwan area. I had also made it clear that the enunciation this principle did not mean either us were giving up what we considered to be our legitimate rights self-defense. That is, if we were attacked we would defend ourselves. All this comes down to simply saying in a clear and unequivocal form that we were determined to use only peaceful means in settlement our disputes.

14. I said recognizing that there was a difference between us regarding character of dispute between us in Taiwan area, and recognizing the interpretation placed by his government on character that

dispute, in order to leave no possibility doubt concerning that area, it was considered essential that we both make clear that such declaration would apply that area. As I had often pointed out, question is not one of obtaining some form of words that would give impression of agreement between us, but one of genuine understanding and agreement between us.

15. I said his December 1 draft, the explanations with which he accompanied it, and public statements issued by his government did not make clear that there was full understanding between us that he would not, by interpreting situation in Taiwan area in manner that he did, subsequently allege that declaration did not apply there and that he free use force. However the dispute there was characterized, a declaration which did not clearly cover that situation was certainly of little value. If we genuinely renounce force in settlement our disputes, that renunciation certainly must cover the principal and most urgent dispute between us. Saying that force would not be used certainly did not require abandonment by either side its view regarding character dispute.

16. I said he had said that purpose his draft December 1 was to set forth desire both sides for peaceful settlement of disputes. Point I been trying make was that there was vast difference between, on one hand, setting forth pious hope for peaceful settlement and saying that if settlement is not satisfactory force would be employed, and on other hand unequivocally saying that force will not be used as means settlement and only peaceful means will be used. Amendments which I had suggested to his draft December 1, I believed, were essential to make this clear.

17. I said he had again said this morning that intent my government in including clause regarding self-defense was to require his government recognize U.S. claims regard our dispute that area. He had stated this in face my repeated and very categorical statements this not our intent. I had stated this not only in meetings here, I had stated so in my original statement this subject October 8, and I stated it very clearly my draft November 10, which he had rejected.

18. I said question was who was to be master in this situation? Did plain words have some hidden intent of their own? Were words to be master in situation? Or did words simply say what we said that they say?

19. I said I had said this morning that if his objections to words had validity I would certainly be prepared recognize his objections. However I did not feel that his objections did have validity. I entirely failed understand why his government insisted on putting this distorted interpretation on these words, if in fact it the intent his government unconditionally to renounce force in settlement our disputes.



20. I said question he had asked again this morning seemed to me in effect to be whether, when we came to discussion other matters between us, my government intended to capitulate to position his government with regard points in dispute between us. If I understood him rightly, he saying that in effect there no point in continuing these talks unless I would assure him here and now that when we came to discussion these other matters I would entirely concede to his position. This was hardly in the spirit of negotiation and seeking peaceful means for settlement our disputes, seemed to me it came very close saying that he not willing renounce use force in settlement our disputes unless he first assured that other side would capitulate to his views in settlement of dispute.

21. I said this was again jumping over question of our declaration to question of merits of our disputes. As such I did not consider question to be a proper one. If he had asked me the question in relation to our declaration whether it my intent in issuance this declaration that he abandon his views with regard status Taiwan, or respective merits our positions with regard thereto, and his views with regard to meeting of Foreign Ministers, my answer would have certainly been a categorical “no.”

22. Wang said statements he had made this morning were intended to clarify our respective points view on question issuance declaration between us. As he had previously stated repeatedly, in making such declaration it necessary both sides indicate willingness make mutual concessions. As he had often pointed out, amendments put forward my side to December 1 draft turned out to be merely further persisting in my original point or without displaying any desire make further progress our talks. Statement I had just made had confirmed that this one case—that is, amendments put forward by my side did not indicate any modification principles my side put forward and this showed U.S. side had not made any concessions with regard to declaration. If one side should hold its own views while insisting incessantly that other side should give way on own views, then no agreement could possibly be reached between two sides.

23. Wang said he would point out particularly that it not true as I alleged that his side had accepted what I termed principles my October 8 statement. Could there have been any occasion in which it could be claimed his side had given recognition to U.S. right self-defense in Taiwan area? Was it not fact that point on self-defense clause in Taiwan area had always been point of controversy and point of opposition in course talks?

24. Wang said from opening these discussions he repeatedly had tried make clear that international disputes between two countries China and U.S. must be separated from internal issues of China.

Was it not outright interference in internal affairs of sovereign country in trying to make his side do something or to refrain from doing something in regard to Taiwan? Was it not fact his side had always resolutely rejected such a proposition?

25. Wang said question we now discussing was question of making declaration renouncing use force. In making such a declaration, we should make clear that issuance such declaration and actual solution of practical matters between two countries China and U.S. were two separate matters. It did not seem to him practical for us to think that issuance declaration itself resolved practical matters between us. He believed I also in agreement with him this point. Such being case, we should attempt resolve issues between us step by step.

26. Wang said such declaration between us must not contain any prerequisites. Such declaration must not involve domestic matters either side. And points set forth in such declaration must be such as are acceptable both sides. If we had such a common understanding then we would be able settle this question of issuance of declaration. It especially important that we should recognize that issuance such a declaration merely gave expression desire two of us to resolve disputes between two countries in peaceful manner and declaration did not prejudice outcome of settlement of issues between our two countries or how it finally would be accomplished.

27. Wang said if as I had said such declaration should include the most important dispute between our two sides it would tend give impression of confusing expression of the desire with the result of the final settlement. If my point view adopted, it difficult avoid situation in which one side would attempt make its policies prevail over that of other or, in other words, impose its views on other. It did not seem to him that if we put matter in this manner it would help bring us closer to solution this matter. Therefore, as he had said, purpose in making such declaration must be one of merely giving expression desire both sides for peaceful settlement international disputes between China and U.S. in Taiwan area. At same time, such declaration should give expression determination of two sides to relax the crisis in Taiwan area.

28. Wang said I had categorically stated that it not intention my side require them abandon their position regarding disputes Taiwan area, or to give up their views respect respective merits positions both sides thereto, and had categorically stated it not my intention demand they give up or abandon their views regarding holding Foreign Ministers' conference. By making such categorical statement, did I mean say I prepared withdraw self-defense clause from draft announcement? Could this statement be interpreted as saying I would not require his side, following issuance declaration, to prejudice their right of liberating Taiwan in exercise their sovereignty in this internal affair of China?

Could this statement be interpreted as agreement on my part to seeking of what they termed practical and feasible means for settlement of issues between our two states—that is, to seek holding of Foreign Ministers' conference?

29. I said first, if I understood him rightly, he had said if we were to include in our declaration the most important matter between us it would give impression of prejudging results any settlement. Should I interpret that as meaning that he not willing make clear that our declaration did cover the most important dispute between us—that is, the dispute in Taiwan area?

30. I said next he said that our declaration should not involve domestic matters. Of course we both recognized, I believed, that question of whether our dispute in Taiwan area did involve a domestic matter from standpoint his government or an international matter did go to very heart our dispute there.

31. I said I had told him that it not my intent to prejudice or pre-judge his view regard that matter. However if it his intent that in this declaration the U.S. recognize and accept his view of its being solely a domestic matter, was that not again jumping ahead of ourselves and asking U.S. to concede to his views on this matter at this stage?

32. I said with regard self-defense clause, I had again pointed out this morning that all it said was that, in making this declaration, each of us was doing so without prejudice to what each us considers inherent right self-defense.

33. I said now for my own government to state that in context this declaration did not, as I pointed out this morning, mean that he was accepting merits any and all my claims in this regard any more than it meant my government accepting merits any and all his claims that regard. I thought that was keeping very strictly to principle of not prejudging merits of any our disputes in issuing this declaration.

34. I said however in light his statements here as well as public statements made by his government I could only interpret his demand for withdrawal that clause to mean recognition by U.S. that its claims this regard in Taiwan area did not have merit. That was prejudging question. It was something it obvious my government could not accept.

35. I said he had quoted me as saying that it not my intent require him abandon his views with regard disputes in Taiwan area, regarding holding of Foreign Ministers' conference, et cetera. What I had said, and I repeating, was that it not my intent in this declaration to require him abandon his views or to prejudice them in any way in these regards.

36. I said it not my intent interpret declaration, or use it as pretext for interpreting it, that he had abandoned his views in any these regards. I was sure that nobody would so interpret it. Declaration

would be interpreted by us, and I sure by world, to mean only exactly what it said. And what it said did not prejudice his views. I therefore still found it extremely difficult see why he not able agree to it unless his intent was that U.S. in this declaration abandon its views.

37. Wang said first thing he would like say was that we still in stage of discussing proposed declaration. Today he had made effort try make clear purpose making such declaration, and that in making such declaration does not mean that issuance declaration itself will resolve our disputes, nor will issuance declaration itself constitute final settlement disputes.

38. Wang said it might be recalled that joint communique between our two governments on July 25 last year only set forth that we would discuss such other matters at issue between two sides. It did not single out exact matters to be discussed.

39. Wang said what we discussing today is question of making declaration in view of existence of confrontation of policies two countries in Taiwan area. Dispute between us very grave indeed. This dispute caused solely by U.S. occupation Taiwan. Problem we facing is to indicate by what means this dispute might be resolved.

40. Wang said declaration we now discussing just such a declaration in order to indicate desire of two sides for peaceful settlement of disputes between two countries. Such desire very important thing. Important though it is, yet it not final solution. With regard outcome dispute, we had set forth in declaration determination of two sides to strive seek means for realizing solution.

41. Wang said practical and feasible means they had in mind was exactly meeting of Foreign Ministers U.S. and China.

42. Wang said he believed by separating these two matters, could greatly facilitate carrying out of task before us.

43. Wang said international disputes between China, U.S. must be separated from domestic issues between China and Chiang. These two matters which distinctly different can be separated. Could it be said that U.S. intends discuss China's domestic affairs in talks between China U.S.? They had categorically stated in past and repeated over and over again that they would resolutely oppose such proposition.

44. Wang said turning now to question of self-defense, he had stated that every country entitled to right self-defense in accordance with spirit of U.N. Charter. But he had also pointed out at same time U.S. not justified in claiming right self-defense in Taiwan area.

45. Wang said I had also stated in past that they did not object in principle to right self-defense. Should he interpret this as agreement on my part, instead of this clause, to rewrite draft in accordance with U.N. Charter in same manner as their first draft of October 27?

46. Wang said situation confronting us one in which U.S. force already being used in Taiwan area. I had said that in making such declaration it did not prejudice their views or require their side abandon its views. However, by continued insistence my side on self-defense clause, was it not our intent to require them abandon their position with regard dispute in Taiwan area?

47. I asked Wang to let me immediately answer his last question. To let me say again what I had said over and over again, that it not our intent require him abandon his position regarding merits our disputes there.

48. I asked Wang let me turn question around and ask if it not his intent in requiring abandonment this clause to obtain acknowledgment from U.S. that it does not have right individual collective self-defense in Taiwan area, and thereby to accept in this declaration his one-sided contentions with regard our dispute there, which involve very points at issue between us.

49. I said only other point I wanted make was that he had said this declaration should indicate desire of two sides for peaceful settlement. My contention from beginning had been and still continued to be that if that desire honest and unequivocal it must go beyond that and say that we determined settle disputes only (repeat only) by peaceful means. It should not be possible for either of us by giving one interpretation or another to situation with respect those disputes in fact to resort to force to settle them.

50. I said I thoroughly agreed that this declaration was not the final result. It in itself settled nothing, except that we determined our disputes should not lead to war, and in that atmosphere to seek their peaceful settlement. From very beginning I had characterized declaration as preliminary to discussion our disputes.

51. I said as I had said at last meeting and again this morning, once declaration issued, it was intent U.S. to carry it out in full and in good faith. We said in declaration that we determined we will settle disputes between us through peaceful means. We said that two of us should continue our talks to seek feasible and practical means for realization that desire. Wang could be certain that U.S. would carry this out to full. He could also be certain when U.S. said in declaration it would not resort to threat use force in Taiwan area or elsewhere, it meant exactly what it said and that we would not by some twisted interpretation of situation attempt to get around it.

52. Wang said if there is willingness to make such declaration and to indicate that neither side would be required abandon its position then they failed see why U.S. would not withdraw its demand with respect self-defense clause.

53. Wang said I had indicated I accepted principle that declaration should be one which acceptable both sides. How could I expect them to accept clause in declaration which only in one-sided interests of U.S.? Did this continued insistence on unreasonable clause mean that U.S. unwilling put out this declaration at all?

54. Wang said if in fact I had such a willingness make such declaration giving expression to desire for peaceful settlement and giving expression determination of two sides seek practical and feasible means for solution tension in Taiwan area, (and by this last paragraph of draft they had in mind holding of Foreign Ministers' conference)—if I had this willingness, did it mean also I had same willingness with regard to practical and feasible means specified in draft, as they understood it?

55. I replied I thought we again getting ahead selves. If he by his question meant did I agree here and now before declaration issued that only practical and feasible means for settlement disputes by peaceful means was through Foreign Ministers meeting, my answer would have to be no. When I said practical and feasible means I was not excluding any means, nor was I agreeing that there only one means.

56. I said it seemed me at present stage question is fundamentally different. Question was whether we really, honestly and unconditionally in this declaration say we will use only peaceful means in settling disputes and that we will not resort threat or use force and in that atmosphere seek, as declaration says, practical feasible means realize that desire. I had to confess I still not clear as to whether or not he really did unconditionally renounce threat or use force in seeking this settlement.

57. I said as far as prejudicing his position concerned, he would recall that back in my draft of November 10 it was my suggestion we make specific and categorical statement to effect we not prejudicing our positions. If this still genuinely his concern, I did not see why he rejected that draft.

58. I said as I had said I still could only interpret his position as demanding my government not only prejudice but in fact renounce its position with respect our dispute. That still my interpretation.

59. Wang said my remarks did not seem to have given reply his question. I had stated that he had asked me to agree before declaration issued that only practical and feasible means was Foreign Ministers conference, and I had said I would answer no. But he had not asked me to say so before declaration issued. He was talking about what should happen after declaration.

60. Wang asked if by replying no I meant that I was not agreeing that holding of Foreign Ministers conference is practical and feasible means.

61. Wang said his next point was that I had asked whether in making declaration it meant we would only use peaceful means settle

disputes between us. Text of his December 1 draft had given me very precise and clear answer to this question.

62. Wang said I had stated I still not clear about his intent this regard. In turn, he would like say he still not clear whether it intent U.S. following issuance declaration continue its seizure Taiwan.

63. I replied it seemed me Wang still getting us down byroad of discussing what happens with regard settlement our disputes after declaration issued. I did not see that there would be much purpose in repeating answers I had consistently given this regard. I wished we could get agreement on declaration and then we could carry on in accordance its specific terms. I had nothing more say on this this morning.

64. Wang said it was because he had some questions in doubt that he had put them forward to me. Before these points made clear, issuance declaration would be of no meaning.

65. Wang asked whether I meant, as I had just stated, I would not agree to holding Foreign Ministers conference following declaration? Did I have this in mind, or perhaps his understanding not correct.

66. I said if his questions were whether U.S. would, following issuance declaration, concede to all his views, there could only be one answer. I could only characterize this as most remarkable prerequisite for issuance of declaration. I had said with regard to his specific question on Foreign Ministers meeting that I did not exclude any feasible means for realization our common desire for peaceful settlement our disputes, nor did I agree that there only one means for realization this desire. I did not and would not go beyond words of declaration itself, words which he had suggested.

67. Wang asked if we then were agreed that we could accept this draft they had proposed.

68. I said I had already accepted language of last paragraph their draft.

69. Wang said by that paragraph they precisely had reference to Foreign Ministers conference. Did I also accept that? Did I mean we had same understanding with regard that paragraph?

70. I said I couldn't see how I could go beyond what I had already said. I fully understood that Wang had in past and probably would in future contend that there should be Foreign Ministers meeting. I did not see that anything he said in declaration prejudiced his position that regard.

71. I said Wang perfectly aware of my position that I consider such discussion premature at this time. I did not see that anything said in declaration prejudiced position.

72. Wang said reason why he had forward that question was because they considered declaration they discussing closely related to



practical and feasible means specified in declaration. They had never said Foreign Ministers conference should take place before issuance declaration nor had they contended that we should not discuss declaration at this time but rather discuss Foreign Ministers conference at this time. He had only said that issuance declaration should be connected with holding Foreign Ministers conference. Only in this way could we express desire stated in declaration and at same time have practical means for peaceful solution our disputes.

73. Wang said of course at present stage most important question is issuing of declaration. They had made perfectly clear their views this regard. They had also pointed out what they considered unacceptable. They would hope that I would reconsider this whole matter in light of what Wang had said this morning and they would hope we would be able get closer in this regard next meeting.

74. Wang said if I had nothing further this morning, he wanted raise another matter. He wanted discuss with me question of Chinese nationals in U.S. who desired return but being prevented. He recalled that in previous meetings he handed me names 31 Chinese in this category. Their attention again been called to fact there three more Chinese this category who desire return but not able do so. He would hand me list of names and other information. (Did so)

75. Wang said next thing was he would appreciate if I had anything to say or any information give him regarding 31 whose names he gave me and who desire return but unable do so, as well as situation those Chinese who imprisoned by U.S.

76. Wang said with regard question of medical information about disease of Liu Yung-ming which he discussed with me last meeting, he would appreciate it if I would kindly inform hospital send such material to Chinese Red Cross in Peking.

77. I said let us be very clear about this matter. Neither in agreed announcement nor elsewhere had U.S. accepted any responsibility for investigating every individual Chinese in U.S. U.S. said it had not and would not offer any obstruction to departure any Chinese from U.S. to Wang's country. Very simple, clear and definite procedures to which Wang agreed had been set up to insure this was case. U.S. has fully and faithfully carried out all its obligations under agreed announcement. I had said over and over again no Chinese who desires return Wang's country being obstructed in his departure.

78. I said I had explained to Wang procedures for assuring that this is case. If Chinese have not left U.S. for his country, it purely because they do not desire do so. I could not accept any obligation to poll or screen each Chinese to determine why he didn't want return. Neither would I be party to bringing any pressure on Chinese to do so. He entirely free do whatever he wants. If he feels he in any way



obstructed from leaving he entirely free communicate with Indian Embassy.

79. I said anybody who at all familiar with situation in U.S. knows that there is such freedom of communication. There are no exceptions.

80. I said I had previously indicated and still would indicate to Wang my willingness to take up here, if it not taken up through proper channel of Indian Embassy in Washington cases of anybody who in fact being obstructed. Almost without exception, cases that Wang had brought up here appeared to be simply those of persons who had not written home for some time or might have changed minds about returning, if they ever had genuine desire return.

81. I said vague statements such as those contained in list Wang had given me today, for example “continues desire come back but unable do so due U.S. obstruction”, constitute not slightest shred of evidence that there any obstruction departure.

82. I said it truly remarkable that if all those whose names Wang given me desired come back and were in fact being obstructed, not even one of them, or even a friend of any of them, had brought case to attention Indian Embassy, or that, if Indian Embassy had thought there any merit to their complaints, that it had not brought them to attention my government.

83. I said I could only characterize all this as very transparent and desperate attempt find some justification for not permitting return of Americans still held by Wang’s government.

84. I said there nothing vague about desire these Americans return, or about what is preventing them.

85. I said I had very deeply and sincerely hoped agreed announcement would be carried out by his government. If it had been, it could have contributed much to our relations. No matter how it regarded, by no stretch of imagination could it be said that that agreement has been carried out.

86. I said Wang would recall that when we were discussing this matter he had said there would be no comparison between time it had taken to return Americans let out earlier and time it would take to return this group.

87. I said insofar as prisoners concerned, Wang had talked about time required to review cases and other such matters. Apparently in six weeks from beginning talks until announcement September 10, his authorities able complete reviews and release 10 these people. Twenty three weeks now passed today since we made that agreement and Wang entered into that commitment. In those 23 weeks, six persons been enabled to return. I thought facts spoke for selves.

88. I said I was, as I had promised at last meeting, looking into availability hospital records on Liu Yung-ming and would supply them

if possible. I had taken note and would transmit to my government Wang's request that they be transmitted to Red Cross in Peking. I presumed that no further address than that was needed.

89. Wang said that correct; only "Chinese Red Cross Society, Peking."

90. I said doctors who attending Mrs. Bradshaw and Kanady, who both suffering mental illness at time departure Wang's country would appreciate receiving similar medical records with regard illness and treatment. Records could be delivered here to me and I would see they forwarded to proper people.

91. Wang said I had not yet given clear reply to questions he put regarding Chinese whose departure prevented and with respect Chinese who imprisoned by U.S. He could not accept my explanations and remarks regarding situation Chinese in U.S. as satisfactory.

92. Wang said they had not asked me make investigation of all Chinese in U.S. They had only raised question of those who have definite names and definite facts and where departure being prevented.

93. Wang said I claimed U.S. carrying out agreed announcement and carrying out obligation under it. This only one aspect of question. Other aspect this matter shown by measures taken by U.S. in forcing Chinese obtain entry permits Taiwan and apply for permanent residence in U.S., and such other measures which prevent Chinese who desire return from doing so. I had asked whether it intent their side for U.S. exert pressure on Chinese force them return home. They not asking that pressure be put on these people. Only asking that such pressures which preventing them from leaving be removed.

94. Wang said my argument seemed to be stating that U.S. on one hand granting Chinese freedom return while on other hand suppressing freedom return and obstructing return.

95. Wang said I had made reference to communications with Indian Embassy. He had made views this regard clear previously.

96. Wang said I had made remarks to effect PRC side trying use as pretext bringing up of this question of Chinese who prevented from returning, trying use that as pretext to prevent Americans from returning. He considered that distortion of facts.

97. Wang asked if I viewed agreed announcement as agreement solely relating to matter of Americans in China rather than agreement on return of nationals of both countries.

98. Wang asked if agreed announcement intended require only Chinese carry out agreement while US exempted from obligation of carrying it out.

99. Wang said I had made comparison with respect time already elapsed after issuance agreed announcement and stated that in 23 weeks

after issuance announcement only 6 Americans have returned. If we for moment followed my logic, then it was fact that six persons had returned to America after announcement issued. However, in 23 weeks after issuance announcement, despite fact their side repeatedly brought up question of imprisoned Chinese in US, their side still not been given any information regarding these people.

100. Wang said to continue the comparison between Chinese and thirteen Americans who now serving their prison terms, today their attention been called to fact that up to now 34 Chinese who have definite names and surnames, who desire return still being prevented doing so. And there additional 32 people who not been able return.

101. Wang said they had no information from me as to how many Chinese imprisoned in US. They believed this not matter running to few score, but probably running to over hundred. These people not informed of agreed announcement. These people desired return but being prevented from doing so. Yet Wang's side not allowed even to know about their situation. This contrasts sharply with attitude of Chinese Government in supplying me with information respect to Americans in Chinese prisons. Manner of carrying out agreed announcement as between Chinese Government and US contrasts sharply with each other.

102. I said all I could say was I still have to see single fact or evidence that any Chinese in US been obstructed, prevented or hindered in returning to Wang's country if he desired return. That was all.

103. Wang said until all these people whose names he had given me, and until Chinese in US prisons accounted for, and until they actually able return, he could not consider US carrying out agreed announcement. They could not consider valid contention that Chinese free return. They still awaiting reply regarding these people.

104. Wang said, (consulting note passed him by Lai, who got information from printed booklet entitled *Mei-ch'iao Fen-lei Ts'ai-liao*—material on overseas Americans by category) regarding my request for medical records on Bradshaw and Kanady, his information indicated that they not been hospitalized in China, and as far as his information concerned, Bradshaw been cared for by her friend Mrs. Laura Lau, who American. He not sure if medical records available. Of course, he would look into this matter and if they available, he would be glad comply with my request.

105. I asked if it agreeable to Wang to meet next Thursday, March 1. He agreed.

Note: I have no comments on today's meeting beyond those contained my preceding summary telegram.

**Gowen**

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501. Letter 32 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 32

Washington, February 24, 1956

Dear Alex:

The guidance situation won't be quite as bad here during the month of March as you surmised it might be when you wrote your letter of February 16. While the Secretary and Robertson will be away most of the month, Phleger will be here. He is not making any part of the trip to the Middle and Far East with the Secretary. Of course Bill Sebald and I will be on the job here. The Department of course will continue to be the central clearing house for your instructions. However it will be a good idea to keep both the Secretary and Robertson currently informed on any important developments. You should use your judgment as to which messages you will repeat for the information of the Secretary and Robertson. We will repeat the guidance telegram to them, and any others which we feel they should know about. We will also repeat as we consider necessary telegrams or extracts of telegrams from you which you have not repeated. We understand that ordinarily they will wire any comments they may have to the Department. If they should wire you direct they will repeat the messages to the Department. In this way we should have good coordination although at some additional expense. You will of course not be necessary to repeat the full reports of the meetings to either of the travelers. We will try to keep the traffic on the Geneva talks at a minimum both for reasons of economy and because their time will be so fully occupied. The schedules of both are enclosed.

2. We have had some tentative second thoughts on the subject of Chinese prisoners in U.S. jails. When the Secretary got back from his vacation he expressed the thought that maybe we could get some dividends out of offering to deport some Chinese dope traffickers and murderers to Mainland China at Chinese Communist expense. It was his thought that it would be good riddance, would impose a burden on the Chinese Communists, take some wind out of their propaganda sails, and maybe improve the prospects of our imprisoned citizens. Of course it was understood that deportability under our laws would have to be established first, and presumably the prisoners would have to express a desire to return to the Mainland. We are making some very cautious and tentative efforts to explore the situation further. We are asking

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Top Secret; Official-Informal.

the Attorney General to use the resources of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to find out just what aliens are in Federal and State penitentiaries, what their offenses are, and the length of their terms. This is being done in a very discreet way under an injunction of complete secrecy. There will be no consultation with the prisoners, at least at this stage. We are aware of the fact that if the Communists got the names of Chinese aliens in prisons it would be quite a windfall to them which they could exploit actively. Undoubtedly they are making great efforts to come up with the names of some Chinese aliens in prison in this country. Unless we are able to establish in advance that all could be paroled for deportation, it would probably be better not to stir the waters on this at all. We have made no decision beyond the very limited one to have this list compiled. We will decide what if anything we do with the information after we have studied it. If you have any thoughts on this, we would welcome them. We can not be sure from your messages just how effective Wang's complaints on this subject have been. Enclosure No. 2 is a contingency statement we have drafted for possible use in the event of a breakdown of the talks if we decide not to do anything about Chinese imprisoned in this country, and if the Chinese Communists try to make a major propaganda point about it. Bear in mind that it is not yet certain we would take this public position in any event. It is all tentative. Again we would like your reaction to it. I consider the thesis somewhat vulnerable in some respects, in view of our unqualified position on American prisoners, and our contention that nothing in the oral give and take of the discussions affects the literal wording of the Agreed Announcement. This statement was drafted before the Secretary's return, and our thinking on this subject has changed somewhat since it was drafted.

3. We wired you yesterday about the formation of a Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to investigate the mistreatment of American civilians in Communist China. We gather that this was done on fairly short notice and without any very definite ideas as to what the scope of the investigation would be, or how it would be conducted. So far the Subcommittee has only asked us for the names of all American civilians imprisoned at any time by the Chinese Communists, and their present addresses. Apparently the thought is to invite (not subpoena) a number of them to come to Washington to testify before the Committee. We do not know whether public or closed hearings are contemplated. We would guess that the former is more likely. It would seem that there is no thought of censuring the Department in connection with this investigation. The attitude is one of cooperation. However we would be concerned if the investigation should adversely affect the Geneva talks or the prospects of the imprisoned Americans. If we should give them the Lindbeck study (which is now undergoing a final revision), they might well publish it at any

time and we would lose control of the timing of the release. We would like to have your assessment of the effects on your talks and American prisoners of a well publicized Congressional Investigation, with several victims telling their stories before the cameras and microphones.

4. We are not sure now that the proposed NATO briefing by Amb. Perkins will come off. There is really not much that he could say beyond what was contained in the January press release. There might be a feeling of disappointment on the part of the NATO representatives and an unfounded but nevertheless real suspicion that we were holding out on them. So it might be counterproductive. At the moment Phleger and FE are inclining to the view that it might be better to avoid the subject at NATO until the Secretary gets there for the Ministerial Meeting in April. But the subject is still under consideration.

The instructions for today's meeting were pretty stereotyped but it seems necessary to play the same old record. We are devoting considerable speculation to the reasons for the rather abrupt disappearance of Wang's impatience.

Good luck at today's meeting and renewed congratulations on the more than satisfactory way you are handling the rugged assignment.

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Press Release No. 62 (Secretary's schedule)
2. Mr. Robertson's schedule
3. Draft Contingency Statement

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**502. Telegram 1558 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 27, 1956, 7 p.m.

1558. From Johnson.

Fol list names handed me by Wang 38th meeting February 24:

[*text not declassified*]

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-2756. Official Use Only.

**503. Telegram 1693 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 28, 1956, 7:39 p.m.

1693. For Johnson.

Guidance for March 1 Meeting.

1. Implementation Agreed Announcement.

Lay particular stress on long time lapse since last American, Dr. Bradshaw, released Dec. 20. Contrast this record of complete non-performance for over two months with steady flow of voluntary departures Chinese from this country to Mainland China. At least 114 such Chinese arrived Communist China since August 1, 1955, 35 of these since December 20. You should again draw attention to these sizeable figures. Note that current Chinese Communist record on fulfillment of its obligations under Agreed Announcement, far from improving, is even worse than unsatisfactory standard established Autumn 1955. Record can only be construed as evidence of Chinese Communists contempt for their publicly pledged word and that they do not expect achieve anything constructive on other topics. Wang must be aware constructive achievement unlikely in atmosphere engendered by open flouting of Chinese Communist undertaking.

2. FYI We are requesting on confidential basis solely for our own guidance a survey by Attorney General of identity, status and eligibility for voluntary deportation all alien Chinese prisoners in Federal and State penitentiaries. Would like your own views as to whether Wang has gotten or can be gotten into position where if we were to deport such prisoners PRC would feel bound to release and deport US prisoners in China.

3. FYI We are telegraphing separately summary of conversation with Indian Embassy officer in which he requested our assistance in ascertaining current addresses of Chinese whose name submitted to you by Wang. Indian Embassy wishes to mail copies Agreed Announcement to all these individuals. END FYI

4. Renunciation of Force.

Adhere to and restate as necessary principles already fully enunciated. You should again take no repeat no initiative to reposition either of controversial clauses.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-2856. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Phleger in draft.

**504. Telegram 1694 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 28, 1956, 7:50 p.m.

1694. For Johnson.

FYI Indian Embassy officer said February 28 that Embassy had sent copies Agreed Announcement to some of individuals on lists given you by Wang and asked whether Department could provide addresses of remainder. He was told we felt adequate publicity had already been given Agreed Announcement and did not consider it necessary send copies to individuals named in these lists. We had told Wang in Geneva we did not intend investigate names he gave us unless he showed these persons obstructed from leaving. He had made such specific allegation in only one case which we had investigated but had been unable locate individual and had asked Wang for additional facts to enable us to investigate further.

In response inquiry regarding publicity given Agreed Announcement in prisons, Embassy officer was told we had investigated and satisfied ourselves information about Agreed Announcement was available to prisoners through newspaper and radio facilities provided in prisons.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-2856. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough.

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**505. Letter 24 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 24

Geneva, February 28, 1956

Dear Walter:

I have just come in from Prague this afternoon and have read your very interesting and helpful letter No. 32.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."



I have noted and will carry out your suggestions with regard to keeping the Secretary and Robertson informed while they are on their trip.

The following are my thoughts with regard to the subject of Chinese prisoners in the United States:

The *quid pro quo* for the release of the 13 are not Chinese in United States prisons (they have no real interest other than propaganda in them) but the agreed announcement of the Renunciation of Force and the Foreign Ministers' meeting. We would get a few more releases if and when agreement is reached on the agreed announcement, particularly if we made some concession that would permit agreement to be reached. We would then probably get the remainder of the 13 if and when they saw agreement in sight on a Foreign Ministers' meeting. They would probably be willing to make some deal whereby announcement of the completion of the release of the remainder of the 13 would be made prior to the announcement of the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

Do not misunderstand that I am necessarily advocating any of the foregoing which is only what I consider a realistic and cold-blooded assessment of their position.

They have seized on the issue of Chinese in United States prisons only as a convenient and somewhat telling counterattack against our stress on the 13. They have been somewhat feeling their way and are becoming increasingly convinced that they have an effective point. However, for us now to come forward with some release of Chinese in United States prisons would only serve to strengthen their point by demonstrating that after all these months since the agreed announcement the United States is belatedly and partially admitting to the validity of their complaints and its failure "expeditiously" to carry out the Agreement. I do not think that this would result in any additional release of Americans and would only serve to give Peiping an additional propaganda weapon. Only a full and impartially confirmed release of all Chinese in prison desiring to or willing to return when they heard about this could serve to bring any real pressure to release the remaining Americans. I frankly do not see how such an operation would be practical, even if desirable, and there is no assurance that it would result in the release of all Americans.

As you know, I was very doubtful of the wisdom after our September 10 announcement of belaboring the question of implementation the way we did. Not with any intent of recrimination and only for the purpose of attempting to analyze the present situation, I feel that the belaboring of implementation during that period caused them to search frantically for a counter and finally strike on this issue of Chinese prisoners. However, since we have reached the situation, I see little choice but to continue to pursue our same tactics. However, we should

not be under any illusions that they will produce any significant release of Americans, as they now feel that they have struck a sufficiently good propaganda counterpressure on us with the issue of Chinese in United States prisons. And they will continue to belabor that issue as long as we belabor the 13. I think it possible that if I were to let up on the 13 he might well let up on the Chinese in United States prisons, but I do not know whether this would be a good idea at this time. It would only be good in the sense that I have always thought that the more we make an issue of the 13 the harder it becomes for them to release them, the more they become convinced that our only interest in the talks is getting the release of all the Americans, and the more valuable they estimate the 13 may be to them in extracting political concessions from us.

What worries me is the inevitable day he comes along with the name of a Chinese in prison. I thoroughly agree with you that they must be making every effort in this direction. A thorough search of their files of United States newspapers should alone produce some names. I frankly do not know what we do at that point except to do our best to persuade the man that prison in the United States is preferable to returning to Communist China and when we are sure that he will say this, let the Indians see him and have him tell it to them.

I do not think much of the contingency press release upon prisoners but I am not holding up this letter to make a redraft. I will send my ideas along as quickly as possible.

After seeing Lindbeck's study and reconsidering the matter from the standpoint of the situation at which we have now arrived, I am inclined to think that its publication now could do little harm as far as its effect on subsequent releases of the 13, and it might be a useful counter to Chinese charges on Chinese in United States prisons. Its sober, carefully balanced tone eliminates some of the objections I previously had to the publication of a White Paper on this subject and, in any event, I feel the situation is somewhat changed. I, therefore, offer no objection to its publication if the Department considers it would otherwise be a good idea to put it out now. It occurs to me that it might also help in handling the Foreign Affairs Sub-committee hearings.

As far as those hearings are concerned, I can only say that I cannot see how a publicized and inevitably sensationalized camera and microphone show can help at this time in obtaining any releases of any additional Americans, and I feel it may well hurt whatever slim chances they may now have. I would, therefore, suggest from my standpoint that the Department attempt to discourage this type of hearing, using my views if you think it would be useful, but not take any strong position of opposition. I do not think that the Department should open itself to any possibility of charges that it is attempting to suppress such information.

As of this writing, I have not received instructions for Thursday's meeting. I assume that you are working on them today and that they will be in tomorrow morning.

Kind regards.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S.

Feb. 29 a.m.

Have received the instructions for the March 1 meeting this morning since writing the above. My views on Chinese prisoners asked for in Para. 2 of the instructions are largely incorporated in this letter. However, I want to think about it some more and will reply by telegraph.

I am somewhat disturbed by the answer given the Indians in the second sentence of your 1694, although I am not sure I would have been able to suggest a good alternative. If we felt giving the Indians the addresses would establish an undesirable precedent, I feel we should have found some grounds for refusing other than we "did not feel it necessary" to send copies to the individuals named. The Agreed Announcement provides the Indian Embassy may also give publicity thereto and I do not feel we should be in a position that could be interpreted as preventing them from doing something that comes within the strict terms of the announcement and which they consider desirable. There is also the question of consistency with the position we have taken with respect to O'Neill's functions.

However, as a broader matter, I would be inclined to go a long way in keeping the Indian Embassy completely satisfied and well informed. We "invited" them to undertake their functions and our position is so strong with regard to the freedom of the general run of Chinese in the United States to depart if they desire to do so that we can well afford to let the Indians fully satisfy themselves on this. They can be our most useful ally in establishing the strength of our position and I feel we should make every possible effort to cultivate their support. Nothing could so effectively further spike the Communist charges as the Indians sending the text of the announcement to some individuals and getting back replies that they did not desire to leave. Let us hope they get such replies in those cases where they have transmitted the announcement.

I wonder, for example, if it might be a good idea to read them some of Wang's milder charges. I know you have all of this very much in mind, but I wanted to express my feeling that on the basis of what I have seen of our exchanges with the Indian Embassy we could in some cases with advantage to ourselves be somewhat more forthcoming than it seems to me we have been.

UAJ

**506. Telegram 1695 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 29, 1956

1695. For Johnson.

Communists returned to UNCMAC February 25 list of 2720 missing UNC personnel handed them by UNCMAC November 26. Notation in Korean after each name indicates individual disposition. Notations presently being translated and UNCMAC expects transmit Washington with comments and analysis March 3.

FYI Message from CINCUNC indicates 1084 still carried on list as "no data available". We are not repeat not sanguine that any useful new information provided, although can not be certain until translation completed. END FYI

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-2956. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Clough. The time of transmission is illegible.

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**507. Telegram 1697 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 29, 1956

1697. For Johnson.

Our 1693 first paragraph.

In citing arrivals Chinese in Communist China from US you may make further itemization. Our records show minimum 67 arrivals between September 10 and December 20 and 35 since December 20.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-2956. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of transmission is illegible.

**508. Telegram 1569 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 1, 1956, 9 a.m.

1569. From Johnson.

Padmanabhan, recently arrived Indian rep here, whom I had not previously met, paid "courtesy call" on me yesterday evening. During course conversation he gave me understand he had been instructed talk with me and report to New Delhi prior Secretarys arrival there. Not clear how much was New Delhi's initiative and how much Krishna Menons.

I talked to him at length along lines Depts Jan 21 statement pointing out no change since that time. I strongly stressed CHICOM failure carry out commitment release imprisoned Americans, influence this having on American opinion and with increased passage time increasingly serious effects. Faithful carrying out commitment immediately following Sept 10 could have had very favorable effects, less favorable now, and more time permitted pass less favorable any effects will be. U.S. will not trade political concessions for release. CHICOM attempt create smokescreen with unfounded charges concerning Chinese in U.S. etc. Also explained issues on renunciation force stressing Wang's lack denial attempt obtain in declaration renunciation our position with respect Taiwan, absence rigidity our approach exact wording declaration but Wangs refusal reciprocate, my suspicion their exact position etc.

He said Indians had expected prompt release all Americans following announcement and were at loss explain why it had not taken place.

In reply his statement Krishna Menon had asked him tell me he would be glad to see me any time I thought he could be helpful. I said I would always be glad see Krishna Menon whenever he wanted see me. I made it clear did not welcome Krishna Menons suggestion Padmanabhan have Wang and me to meal. However, I let him know I had taken initiative in having Wang to meal shortly after opening our talks.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-156. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

## 509. Telegram 1571 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, March 1, 1956, 3 p.m.

1571. From Johnson.

1. At three hour 25 min meeting this morning no progress whatever, even some retrogression Wang's part.

2. Essence of his position this morning was if we insist on specific mention Taiwan in declaration must be coupled with agreement on Foreign Ministers' meeting as set forth their October 27 draft. If we not willing now agree Foreign Ministers' meeting only acceptable form declaration is their December 1 draft. "Ambiguous" U.S. attitude on Foreign Ministers' conference and insistence on U.S. amendments to December 1 draft show U.S. purpose is to "procrastinate" Foreign Ministers' conference in order maintain status quo "its seizure Taiwan and interference in liberation offshore islands". Four successive times during meeting he carefully coupled "liberation" with offshore islands and not with Taiwan as formerly.

3. U.S. insistence on both amendments to December 1 draft is for purpose obstructing issuance declaration.

4. After my reiteration our position he said there was "no point in continuing this sort of discussion" and that PRC was "considering" issuance of public statement. I regretted and deplored their again going to public as indication real lack desire on their part make progress and asked for reconsideration, but expressed willingness let public judge side preventing agreement on meaningful declaration. Could get no indication when and where statement will be made but presume if made will follow same pattern as previously that is, issuance by Peiping with copies made available here.

5. Implementation took familiar lines with my including points contained para 1 Deptel 1693.

6. Next meeting Thursday March 8.

7. Am going Prague tomorrow morning, returning here Tuesday.

**Gowen**

NOTE: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 3/1/56 10:45 a.m. EMB (CWO)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-156. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

**510. Telegram 1572 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 1, 1956, 4 p.m.

1572. From Johnson.

Re para 2 Deptel 1693. My answer to last sentence is negative. Believe their principal interest in Chinese prisoners in U.S. is as counterweight to our emphasis on their failure release 13. Their quid pro quo for 13 remains political concessions. Agreement on renunciation force declaration would result some additional releases and assurance agreement on FoMin conference would probably result in release remainder.

Deportation some rpt some Chinese prisoners after present lapse of time since agreed announcement would only be used by them as lending substance their charge we have heretofore been violating agreement. If practicable deportation all rpt all Chinese prisoners able and willing go confirmed by Indians would undoubtedly serve as some pressure on PRC release additional Americans but doubt whether actual result would be release of all.

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Waddell (FE) 3/1/56 1:10 p.m. MG

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–156. Confidential; Priority.

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**511. Telegram 1574 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 1, 1956, 7 p.m.

1574. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting.

1. Department will note from full record today's meeting Wang no longer making even any pretense of meeting or responding to my arguments.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–156. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

2. My analysis their actual present position is that they willing "renounce force" with specific reference Taiwan if we agree Foreign Ministers meeting but they would not consider any such renunciation valid beyond point Foreign Ministers had met and failed achieve peaceful settlement on substantially their terms of "problem of reduction tensions Taiwan area." It possible they would consider even such a limited renunciation not applicable offshore islands. I do not consider this necessarily implies any immediate intention attack offshores but only that they not willing even in this limited sense bind themselves with respect to them.

3. Foregoing is of course poles removed from our position on renunciation of force and unless further outside influences are brought to bear on them makes possibility of any agreement on declaration on our terms very remote. Difficult to see how any further progress can be achieved solely on basis discussion in meetings.

Gowen

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## 512. Telegram 1577 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, March 1, 1956, 10 p.m.

1577. From Johnson.

1. In view Wang's evident reluctance open, I opened 39th meeting by saying that in thinking over our discussion at last meeting, it seemed to me we were still tending to get away from principal and immediate task before us, that is question of declaration. Details of our respective substantive positions with regard our various disputes seemed to be obscuring real object at this stage in our talks. To use a vernacular English phrase, we seemed to be getting into position of not seeing forest for trees.

A. I continued from prepared statement, what we ought to be trying to do is to agree on declaration renouncing use of force. That is where agreement is essential at this stage. It would be fine if would agree on everything else too, but past weeks have shown that we have difficulty enough without borrowing more. Can we not at this stage

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.



seek agreement where it is essential to task at hand and leave our other differences for settlement when we reach that stage?

B. Here is an example of what I regard as an area where agreement is essential at this stage. Purpose of proposed declaration is to facilitate peaceful settlement of our disputes by first renouncing use of force in regard to those disputes. Declaration can have this effect only if renunciation of force is unconditionally binding with respect to all our disputes. Neither of us should be able, following issuance of declaration, to claim that peaceful settlement portion applies to a certain dispute but renunciation of force portion does not apply to that same dispute.

C. I hope you follow me thus far. Unless words of our declaration have this meaning for both of us, it seems to me that we can only talk in circles.

D. However, with respect to this same part of declaration, there is an area where disagreement at this stage is not only permissible but inevitable. With respect to nature and origin of our disputes, you have your views, and I have mine. You have your views as to what kind of a settlement of each these disputes would be acceptable. I have mine. Differences as to merits of our respective views need not, however, prevent our agreement as to unconditional and binding nature of our commitment not to use force against one another in support of these views.

E. Similarly, with respect to last paragraph of my January 12 draft, which is identical with that of your December 1 draft, there are both an area where agreement is necessary and an area where disagreement at this stage is permissible. We must be in agreement in our determination without reservation to seek practical and feasible means of realizing common desire set forth in preceding clauses. We must be in agreement as to desirability of continuing these talks in search for such practical and feasible means. However, we do not at this stage have to determine just what the practical and feasible means are. Must we find what we are going to seek before we begin our search?

F. Situation with respect to self-defense clause is parallel. Should both be able to agree that in conformity with UN Charter and with international law, each of us is entitled to make clear in this declaration that we are not renouncing our right of self-defense. It is only essential that we agree at this stage that neither of us is renouncing that right. However, here too, as with other clauses, a distinction can be drawn between area where agreement is necessary at this stage and area in which some disagreement is not only permissible but inevitable.

G. You have your views as to places and circumstances in which US would, in case of necessity exercise that right. I have my views, which differ from yours, regarding places and circumstances in which your country has claimed exercise of that right. To attempt at this stage to iron out all such differences, past, present, and future, actual and

potential, would be futile and can only have purpose if intent is to block rather than reach agreement on our declaration.

H. I have outlined my views point by point and in concrete fashion, concerning areas in which I consider agreement is essential to reach an understanding in our declaration. If you are in agreement with me on these points, let us proceed with issuance of declaration. If we are in agreement in these essential areas, may we not leave our disagreements in other areas to be ironed out in later stage of seeking practical and feasible means for settlement of our disputes?

2. Wang said, reading from notes, I recall it is 20th meeting today since we started our discussion on issuance of a declaration. We had hoped it would be possible for us to reach an agreement on this question.

3. Wang said, such an agreement as I have previously pointed out, must not be taken as capable of resolving all questions between us. Such an agreement would only indicate a common desire of US to settle issues between us. Such a desire should be one that is acceptable to either of us. How can we be expected reach an agreement if one side tries to impose its views on other?

4. Wang said, at last meeting he said to me that he hoped I would be able to put forth further concrete opinions at this meeting. However after listening carefully to statements made at this meeting he found we still remain in same place as we found selves previously. We have now spent so much time discussing declaration renouncing use of force that respective positions and views of our two sides have now become quite clear. He didn't see any point in letting conferences proceed in this manner. It seemed to him that we turning in circles and always finding ourselves in same place in discussion of such a declaration. Such manner of discussion is not what they originally expected it to be. Wang said I said this morning we should not turn round in circles in discussion. He is willing to explore ground with me in all frankness to see if there is any hope reach agreement in this respect.

5. Wang turned to prepared statement and said he would like to point out once again that clause on self-defense right advanced by my side in draft declaration was absolutely unacceptable to their side. For, as his side repeatedly explained, it was intent my side by self-defense clause to get them into recognizing in effect status quo US seizure Taiwan and US interference in China's internal affairs in offshore islands. Statements I had made at last few meetings indicated that my side itself has been aware that self-defense clause can be removed from declaration. Therefore, no point arguing. Should my side insist on self-defense clause his side can only come to conclusion that my side not desiring reach agreement.

6. Wang said, as regards my other amendment to his Dec 1 draft, "they will not resort to force in Taiwan area or elsewhere", his side has

pointed out that this is attempt to confuse international issue between US and China in Taiwan area with internal affair of China in exercising right of sovereignty over Taiwan and offshore islands.

7. Wang said I stated at last meeting that US did not acknowledge exercise by China of sovereignty rights over Taiwan and offshore islands as internal matter of China. This has all more exposed my attempt confuse international dispute with China's internal affairs. Thus, if declaration were to include ambiguous terms of my amendments, even if self-defense clause were removed from declaration, US could still accomplish its ends of seizure of Taiwan and its interference in liberation of offshore islands.

8. Wang said, furthermore in light of ambiguous attitude which my side has so far taken regarding holding of Sino-US FonMin conferences, it threw more light on my attempt calculated at obtaining by trickery a vague declaration which would enable US to interpret China's internal matter as allegedly being covered by scope of Sino-US declaration and thus justifying continued seizure and obstruction of China's exercise of sovereign right of Taiwan and offshore islands while on other hand US would procrastinate over a long period and refuse hold FonMin conference in order maintain status quo US seizure Taiwan and interference liberation offshore islands. He must say frankly that his side has seen through such design and his side would not be easily duped.

9. Wang said his side must restate: that China's exercise sovereignty over Taiwan and offshore islands, which is internal matter, and international dispute between China and US in Taiwan area must be separated. It entirely matter China sovereign right and internal matter as to whatever means will be used for liberation Taiwan and offshore islands and US has no right whatsoever interfere. His side would never permit to see China's internal affairs involved in Sino-American declaration or to make it subject of negotiations with US.

10. Wang said as regards international dispute between US and China, issuance Sino-American declaration is only first step towards settlement and earnest efforts must be made to seek practical and feasible means to achieve final settlement. His side considers FonMin conference is exactly such practical and feasible means. In view fact, that US has already resorted use of force and threat in Taiwan area, if after issuance declaration US fails take actual action to give evidence of desire expressed in declaration, then declaration itself would become scrap of paper.

11. Wang said I had said at last meeting that Dec 1 draft of his side did not cover Taiwan area. He would like remind me that during April 1954 when Chou En-lai at Bandung made proposal that China and US enter negotiations, he specifically stated that purpose was to settle through negotiations question of easing and eliminating tensions

in Taiwan area. In first draft which he had put forward Oct 27, it also clearly provided that China and US should hold FonMin conference to settle through negotiation question of relaxation and eliminating tensions in Taiwan area.

12. Wang said it could thus be seen that his side was not evading disputes between it and US in Taiwan area though disputes additionally included Korean question, implementation of Geneva agreement on Indochina and especially South Vietnam, and US creation of Manila Treaty which aimed against China, and such other questions. However, it was obvious dispute between China and US in Taiwan area is main issue of all. That dispute arose solely as result US occupation Taiwan and interference liberation offshore islands.

13. Wang said his side held that FonMin conference between China and US must be held to settle this grave dispute. His draft of Oct 27 specifically provided for this last point. It merely because my side only willing make declaration of principle and would not agree to declarations specifically mentioning Sino-American conference of FonMin. Thus his Dec 1 draft did not concretely mention Sino-US dispute in Taiwan area. However, just in same way as my side asserted that practical and feasible means did not exclude Sino-American disputes in Taiwan area. If my side desired dispute Taiwan area be specifically mentioned, then my side must agree to declarations specifically mentioning FonMin conference, without which his side would be left with no assurance whatsoever.

14. Wang said question now before us quite clear and simple: if it desired that declaration mention specifically holding FonMin conference as well as dispute in Taiwan area, their Oct 27 draft is there. If however it not desirous to mention FonMin conference and Sino-American dispute in Taiwan area, but that concrete problems mentioned above should be left as next step, then their Dec 1 draft stands. As to which of two drafts will be adopted, they not insistent. I might make my choice between either of two. He only wanted state here that in neither these two drafts did his side demand prior commitments nor that I accept his position. This fair and equitable. That was precisely fundamental distinction between his drafts and mine. If my side still desirous of making renunciation of force declaration, he saw no possibility outside two drafts which his side had presented.

15. Wang said in interest of arriving at agreement without further delay he had exhausted all clear words available in stating his views and he hoped my side would make careful consideration.

16. I said in early part his statement I thought he struck at heart of one of differences and apparent lack of understanding between us. He referred to this declaration, which we discussed, as only indicating common desire to settle issues between us. Later on he had referred to

declaration as a renunciation of force in settlement of dispute between us. It seemed that he had tended to approach matter from former standpoint.

17. I said I thought therefore that part of our problem was whether this declaration was to be only pious repetition of desire to settle disputes or whether it was to genuine renunciation of appeal to force to settle our disputes and then in that atmosphere to seek means peacefully to settle them—this was heart of differences in approach between us. As I had said this morning, question seemed to be whether we were in this declaration unconditionally renouncing appeal to force with regard to all our disputes or whether we only piously saying that we desire to settle disputes peacefully but that renunciation of force applies only to some of them.

18. I said statement he had made this morning with regard to inclusion of specific reference to Taiwan in our declaration, seemed to me to bear out this view of mine. I must say that I find myself entirely unable to follow logic his position this regard.

19. I said what it seemed to me he had said was that he was willing make specific mention Taiwan only in context of FonMin conference. That is, he was willing make statement expressing hope for peaceful settlement of dispute between us in Taiwan area if US agreed in advance that only means of discussing such settlement was FonMin conference.

20. I said on other hand his position seemed to come down to an unwillingness to make clear that renunciation of force also applied our dispute in Taiwan area. It seemed me he suggesting that, however our dispute in Taiwan area might be characterized, they were free to use force in that area.

21. I said it hard for me believe he could seriously consider that it would contribute to peaceful discussion and settlement of our disputes if they were to resort to war in very area where he himself agreed our policies were in greatest conflict. He himself had said this morning that our principal dispute lay in Taiwan area. He had said this morning that his Dec 1 draft specifically covered Taiwan area. If this case, it entirely incomprehensible to me why he unwilling accept mention of Taiwan area in form suggested in my Jan 12 amendment if he were in fact willing renounce force in settlement our dispute in that area and seek peaceful means for its solution.

22. I said he had again repeated this morning that he found clause on self-defense as suggested my Jan 12 amendment as absolutely unacceptable on grounds it was intention my side by that clause to obtain recognition by his side of US position with regard that area. It hard for me to recall number of times I had here said that there was no such intent and that this did not require him to recognize any particular state of affairs contrary to his views, any more than it requires US to recognize

any particular state of affairs contrary its views. I could assure him US was not submitting to his government for its approval or ratification any of our treaties or agreements with other countries.

23. I said in its proper relationship to other parts of declaration, self-defense clause only stated fact that if one side violated declaration by using force other side would not have renounced what it considered its legitimate right to self-defense.

24. I said opposition to self-defense clause could be based on only two possible grounds. That is, that intent of one side in issuing this declaration is not consistent with exercise of self-defense in case of necessity by other side. Only other alternative was that one side was attempting to get other side to renounce its views with regard to character our dispute in Taiwan area. This I wanted make clear was absolutely unacceptable my government.

25. I said however I continued my willingness to strive reach with him agreement upon this tremendously important subject. I felt way to reaching agreement was not giving of what were in fact ultimatums, or of take it or leave it positions, but to continue to strive to see whether or not agreement could be reached.

26. I said it was in this sense that I had made my opening statement this morning. I had tried very hard in it to avoid introducing extraneous issues not germane to our immediate task. It was utter nonsense to say that because US not willing in this declaration unilaterally to renounce its views with respect Taiwan area and concede to his views, that it did not desire declaration.

27. I said he had spoken this morning of ambiguous terms of our Jan 12 draft. It seemed me that shoe was on other foot. His objections to that draft appeared be based precisely upon grounds that it removed ambiguities of his Dec 1 draft. If declaration was to have any real meaning rather than just appearance of agreement where no agreement existed, those ambiguities must be clarified in his Dec 1 draft. I had indicated essential points upon which we considered ambiguities must be removed.

28. I said I had indicated way, in the declaration, that I felt those thoughts might be expressed. I still thought that language which I had suggested was best way of doing it, and if there was genuine agreement on these essentials, there should be no objection to that language. However, I have never put this forward on any ultimatum or take it or leave it basis. I had repeatedly indicated that if he had any thoughts on how it could be better expressed I was willing listen his suggestions and give them careful consideration. It not possible for me see how I could be any more reasonable than that.

29. Wang said in his opening statement this morning he had again made attempt frankly express thoughts his side in order explain more

fully their views regarding declaration. He failed see any portion my long argument I had just made which could contribute progress our discussions.

30. Wang said I had stated that he had first made proposal that declaration we were discussing should simply express desire for peaceful settlement, and then that he had referred to declaration as renunciation of force declaration. He did not think that there were any two declarations that he had been referring to, and there were no points of contradiction in his statement. When he said declaration should express desire for peaceful settlement, he did not mean desire that two sides should go to war to effect settlement. Instead it was declaration of desire for peaceful settlement and they regarded declaration we discussing as something which would help peaceful settlement disputes between us and they regarded declaration as first step toward such a settlement. He recalled that I had also said in previous meetings that declaration in itself settled nothing.

31. Wang said I had also repeatedly referred to his opinion that issuance of declaration must be separated from actual settlement of practical issues between us. These were two separate things. However, views advanced by me at previous meeting and again this morning tend to confuse these two things.

32. Wang said text their December 1 draft was quite clear and no distortion any portion it was possible. He would read portion of December 1 draft. It stated: "PRC and USA determined they should settle disputes between their two countries through peaceful negotiations without resorting to threat or use of force." Let him also read last paragraph their October 27 draft: "In order realize their common desire PRC and USA decide to hold a conference of Foreign Ministers to settle through negotiations question relaxing and eliminating tension Taiwan area."

33. Wang said thus texts these two drafts have clearly expressed desire for settlement disputes between two sides. Also give expression to our determination to seek practical and feasible means settlement our disputes. How can it be said that such views as expressed in these drafts had any disadvantageous effect against U.S.? Could there be found anything in these drafts which tended to require that U.S. abandon its view.

34. Wang said however U.S. did not accept even these drafts and instead U.S. alleged groundlessly that his side insisted on using force to settle disputes. Was not that utter nonsense? First I had referred to position of U.S. as one of absolute unwillingness to accept views stated above. However I had followed up that statement by saying I willing strive for agreement. Was not that self-contradictory statement?



35. Wang said he had repeated many times that unjustifiable amendments of U.S. regarding his December 1 draft were absolutely unacceptable his side. These were unacceptable precisely because of U.S. attempts to use these amendments to interfere in China's internal affairs and exercise of its sovereign rights. Must China ask for approval and ratification by any other government of its actions taken in order to exercise its sovereign right in liberation of its own territory? Was not this again utter nonsense? Therefore views of both sides on this issue were quite clear.

36. Wang said they had made repeated efforts on this question of issuance of declaration. They had no intention in this declaration to impose their views on U.S. They considered their views to be acceptable to both sides.

37. Wang said these views were intended to facilitate issuance of declaration. However U.S. is doing to contrary, it had all along been insisting on these unreasonable clauses. U.S. had been insisting on its unreasonable stand for considerable period of time. I, on behalf of U.S., had stated that these reasonable suggestions of his side were unacceptable to U.S. How could we expect to arrive at agreement in this situation?

38. Wang said after such a long time of discussion if I and my side still so adamant its position, how could one not arrive at conclusion that U.S. not willing agree on declaration and was obstructing issuance of such declaration? He saw no point continuing this sort of discussion.

39. Wang said if we still unable to make declaration at present time responsibility did not lie on his side. In view fact we not been able to arrive at agreement for such long time his side considering to make public views of his side on this question, so that public might be able make own judgment.

40. I said I would like try to get down to some fundamentals with him. I had tried in my opening statement this morning but did not seem successful in doing so.

41. I said he had again in his last statement spoken of this declaration as "help" in settlement our disputes. He had also spoken of it as first step toward settlement our disputes. As he knew I entirely agreed with him on latter part—it is only first step and I had always so characterized it.

42. I said however question still seemed to exist between us, as to what this step consisted of. I considered this step to be unconditional and unequivocal statement that we will not in any manner or under any pretext initiate hostilities against each other in attempt to settle these disputes. I would like to ask clear question as to whether he so considered it.



43. I said having said that and in conjunction with that, we each say we will settle disputes through peaceful means. One without other did not give real meaning to our expression of desire to settle disputes by peaceful means.

44. I said having said that, how could he say that it was unreasonable on my part to suggest that we say that both of these aspects apply to dispute that we both agree is most serious between us? How could he say that it was unreasonable for each of us in stating that, that if either is attacked in violation this declaration or by others we will defend ourselves? Objection to either of these simple and fundamental principles I found hard to interpret as other than desire avoid issuing of meaningful declaration that would genuinely be real first step toward settlement our differences.

45. I said if he thought that this position on his part would appear reasonable to public, it certainly his choice as to whether or not he desired again to initiate public exchanges between us. I reiterated view that I had expressed previously that I genuinely did not see how such public exchanges advanced agreement between us or could be reconciled with real desire for agreement. I therefore regretted and deplored issuance of a public statement by his side and hoped that they would reconsider it.

46. I said however if it was their decision to issue such statement I was perfectly willing that public judge as to which of us was genuinely willing to renounce force and willing to seek peaceful settlement. I entirely willing let public judge which side was in fact obstructing issuance of meaningful statement between us.

47. Wang said he felt all these points I just raised had been concretely answered by December 1 draft their side. They had given much discussion to these points in our previous meetings. Therefore he did not think it necessary for him to repeat all views he had advanced previously.

48. Wang said their intent and attitude is quite clear and definite. They had accepted proposal I had put forward to effect that we make declaration between us as first step in actual settlement. This first step, as we have characterized it, is expression of determination of two sides to settle disputes peacefully without resort to force. And merits of practical disputes might be left for settlement at next step. There was nothing ambiguous in it and there was nothing hidden which could not be brought out for public scrutiny.

49. Wang said I had questioned public airing of discussion and I had termed it as not advancing our talks. However if discussion was to go on in same manner as we were, how could anyone expect to make any advances in talks? They believe public would be able make fair

judgment between positions of two sides. He had nothing further and if I had nothing further he had another matter to bring up.

50. Wang said their attention had again been called to fact that Chinese nationals being prevented from returning. At last meeting aggregate number Chinese nationals being prevented returning was 34 persons. Today he would like to raise cases three more persons.

51. Wang said case of Mr. Tan Wen, which he would later present to me, could serve as example to illustrate Chinese in U.S. Mr. Tan applied permission to return ever since 1950 but U.S. had refused permission. In August 1955, that is when our talks got underway, Tan again applied return and wrote his family after application that he expected permission to be granted end last year. However, wrote again last January that unable return in February and had to wait another two months. Mr. Tan said in letter that he was among first to apply to return and also handed in his applications most frequently, however he was unable to return up to present time. This specific case of Mr. Tan has increased their concern over Chinese in U.S. who find selves in same situation.

52. Wang said during talks I had repeatedly assured him that Chinese in U.S. free to return and that U.S. was not offering obstructions to their departure and that no procedures of whatever sort have been set up to prevent their departure. However case of Tan Wen and latest facts about his failure to return had revealed situation that U.S. was not consistent in its actions and its words. From treatment of Tan, how could it be said that U.S. was carrying out its obligations under agreement?

53. Wang said it was clearly stated in agreement that parties to agreement would facilitate return of nationals and that no obstructions should be offered to their departure. Mr. Tan never violated any law of U.S. and what was reason he encountering repeated obstructions against his return?

54. Wang said in addition to case of Tan, and they had raised many similar cases recently, it was evident Chinese still encounter obstruction in their return. This situation necessitated that I give accounting in each these individual cases.

55. Wang said in addition to this category he had raised repeatedly question of Chinese who were in prison in U.S. and they were still awaiting reply from my side. (Handed over list, given in following telegram).

56. I said he seemed to have considerable detailed information on Mr. Tan. Wang's statement here said that Tan again put in application in August 1955 and expected receive permission return at end of year. I would like to ask for details from his correspondence with Wang—to whom did he make application? I would also like ask what his correspondence indicated he applied for—that is, he applied for what? I

would also like ask whether Wang's correspondence with him indicated whether Tan communicated with Indian Embassy and if not, why not, if he felt he being obstructed in leaving?

57. Wang said it was stated clearly in list that Tan had applied with INS. From statement in his letters, could be seen that Tan made repeated applications and had not given up hope. He first indicated that he expected permission would be granted by end last year, but wrote again he expected permission in February and then his departure further delayed by two months. Although he still hopeful that he will one day be granted permission to return, he has been delayed so long. This is situation, so far as they knew, regarding Tan to which their attention has been called. It precisely because they cannot understand nature obstruction against his return that Wang has requested me make inquiry.

58. I said I was trying to get some facts on this, these statements that he gave me here were utterly inexplicable. He does not need apply to anybody for return, I had said that over and over again, neither he nor any other alien in U.S. Wang did not have to accept my word on that. Indian Embassy or anyone familiar with U.S. could confirm it.

59. Wang said this was not individual case of Tan. Tan was only one example. I had requested facts about Tan. If I required any facts about Americans in China then they had these facts. But Tan was now in U.S. and how could they give me facts about his being obstructed?

60. Wang said I had stated that it not necessary for Tan apply INS, however as he had told me Tan precisely refused permission by INS. If I myself unaware this situation, how could I expect him to understand it.

61. I said U.S. INS does not deny or grant permission any alien leave U.S. He was one who was alleging this not correct and that Tan being obstructed. I was asking for some facts—he evidently had close communication with Tan—on how he being obstructed. Statements made here made no sense whatsoever in light of what everybody knows about departure aliens from U.S. This was similar to allegations made in many these other cases.

62. I said I could not consider it as slightest evidence U.S. was obstructing departure any of these. Because I knew facts quite to contrary. I also asked why, if Tan did think he being obstructed, he had not communicated with Indian Embassy in accordance with procedures we had established. If he communicated with Wang and Wang's authorities, it clear he able freely communicate with Indian Embassy if he desired do so.

63. Wang said he wanted clarify that Tan's correspondence was between him and family and not between him and Wang's authorities. It because they did not know actual facts about his being obstructed

in U.S. that they had asked me inquire and look into his case. If statement given by me were true that any aliens in U.S. including Chinese were free to leave or enter the U.S. without application INS or any other U.S. authority; if it true INS does not set up any procedures controlling exit of foreign nationals, if this true then action taken by INS against Chinese in U.S. defy reason and that is something they request me to investigate and correct this state of affairs. I have to tell INS to stop all such illegal acts because such illegal and wild acts taken by INS are in violation of agreement between us on return of civilians.

64. I said first let me say I did not say that U.S. INS does not exercise control over entry of aliens to U.S. I have continued to refer only to departure of aliens from U.S.

65. Wang said case of Tan not one of entry U.S. but one of departure U.S.

66. I said that was right and I was discussing it in those terms. In case of Tan and these other cases he had continued to make vague statements regarding their being prevented from departure. It utterly incredible me, if there were any factual basis any these cases that at least one person would not have called attention his case to Indian Embassy in accordance procedures we established for handling this. I simply could not give credence to these charges in view lack any factual evidence. I satisfied there was no factual basis.

67. I said facts show that not single case been called to attention my government in accordance agreed announcement but that Chinese have steadily and regularly been traveling from my country to his country. According best information available to me, at least 114 Chinese had arrived in his country since beginning talks. 67 arrived between September 10, date our announcement and December 20. Since December 20, a period during which not single American had been released from his country, my information was that at least 35 Chinese had arrived his country. I had no way knowing how many others might have arrived.

68. I said as for situation regarding Americans his country, I could only conclude we were going backwards. Subsequent to September 10 his authorities on October 27 announced release of two American prisoners. Three weeks later on November 17 his authorities announced release of three Americans. About one month later on December 20 his authorities announced release of one American. This was average of about one every two weeks. More than ten weeks have passed since December 20 and in that time no American been released. I had extremely difficult time reconciling this with agreement September 10 which specifically covered these Americans and reconciling this with a desire to bring about improvement in our relations or with a desire to obtain genuinely constructive achievements in these talks. It certainly

bore no relationship to facts with regard to free return of Chinese to his country.

69. Wang said I had made comparison between number of Americans who departed China and number of Chinese who departed U.S. and had stated that during period since our announcement made on September 10 that 102 Chinese had left U.S. Although this number of Chinese had come out from U.S. even this number very unsatisfactory to them. If we made calculation of proportion of people released he could show me that of Americans in category of criminals alone 27 of 41 been released. Number of released comprises two-thirds of number of people who were in prison and in addition this number criminal offenders released, there are Americans in other categories who have left China. These are 16 in number. And it can be seen that almost overwhelming majority of American criminal offenders have been released. If we take Chinese students alone, putting aside question other Chinese nationals in U.S., we may take figure of 5,000 for these Chinese students. What would number of 102 students who have come out of U.S. compare with total of 5,000—what ratio would it make? From this proportion it is quite clear as to whether more Americans left China or more Chinese left U.S. Is not this clear indeed?

70. I said proportion proper to talk about is that of those desiring to return. There was still not slightest evidence any Chinese desiring return was being prevented from doing so. Now, almost six months since September 10 announcement, both know there are 13 desiring return who are still being prevented from doing so although it was said that they could do so expeditiously.

71. Wang said I had talked of proportion of people who desired return. The 37 whose cases he had raised with me in these meetings were exactly people who desired return. They have not as yet gotten any reply from me concerning those who desire return but are in prison in U.S. He still awaiting my answer concerning situation Chinese imprisoned U.S.

72. I said I had told him again and again any Chinese in U.S. who feels obstructed was entirely free communicate Indian Embassy.

73. Wang said this was only one aspect of question, the other was U.S. obligation give accounting these Chinese in prison.

74. I said U.S. Government has obligation faithfully and fully carry out provisions agreed announcement. This U.S. has done and will continue do.

75. Wang said if those people who desire return still prevented doing so and unable return, he could not consider U.S. Government carrying out fully obligation under announcement.

76. I asked whether next Thursday March 8 was satisfactory for next meeting. Wang agreed.

77. After we stood up to leave, I asked if he would send me copy of their public statement. Wang said that if it were made he would do so. I asked if he could give any indication as to time. Wang said he had none.

Gowen

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**513. Telegram 1578 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 2, 1956, 11 a.m.

1578. From Johnson.

Following list three names handed me by Wang 39th meeting March 1:

*[text not declassified]*

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-256. Official Use Only.

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**514. Letter 33 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 33

Washington, March 2, 1956

Dear Alex:

I will be going to the airport shortly after noon today to see the Secretary and WSR off for Karachi. We did not anticipate any special administrative problem in handling the correspondence with you while they are away, although if a crisis should develop with time a crucial

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. The enclosures are not printed.

factor in connection with some important decision, obviously we will have something of an added problem.

We met with the Secretary yesterday afternoon. No particular decision was made except to hold firm on the position we have clearly staked out. We believe it is a good and eminently defensible position. If Wang should precipitate a break, we believe we can more than hold our own in a public exchange. The Secretary feels that we may be able to do something with the Chinese prisoners question which could be helpful to our cause, at least from a public information standpoint later on. We have already sent you a copy of the letter dated Feb. 28 to the Attorney General requesting a survey. We are not quite as inclined as you apparently are to discount entirely the possible utility of seeking to arrange the voluntary deportation of some Chinese aliens in prison.

While it is probably an academic question, the Secretary did express the view that if Wang should request a recess of the talks during the next few weeks, we should raise no objection. It was the consensus that we should not propose any recess for the period of the Secretary's absence from Washington. No new tack of any sort is planned for you to take during this period, but it was felt that it would be a mistake for us to propose a recess. We understand your distaste for having to repeat *ad nauseam* the same old things, but it seems necessary under the circumstances. While it is naturally repellent and frustrating, we doubt whether it is harmful from the tactical standpoint in the given situation.

Everyone agrees with your surmise that the Secretary may be presented with some sort of package proposal when he gets to Delhi. All the signs point this way. We anticipate that the Indians and the Chinese Communists may have sought to enlist at least the moral support of several of the SEATO powers for some sort of scheme which would involve the off-shore islands and a higher level meeting. The Secretary anticipates that the pressure on the off-shore islands question is going to be greatly stepped up in connection with the campaign for a higher level meeting. He expects to have a very full and frank review of this whole problem with the Generalissimo in Taipei on March 16. The disposition here is to adhere to the position already stated on the higher level conference question. In this connection the letter which Senator George wrote to the Secretary last October was recalled yesterday. This is an important statement which is still believed to accurately represent the position of the majority of Congress in both parties. I don't believe you were ever sent a copy of this letter. It is now enclosed. Moreover we are very mindful of our pledge to the GRC not to discuss matters involving its rights, claims or essential interests without its presence or concurrence. We find it difficult to visualize Chou En-lai sitting down at the same conference table with George Yeh and the Secretary. (You



will be interested in the enclosed article by Chalmers Roberts which appeared in today's Washington Post.)

Your good letters Nos. 22 and 23 of February 19 and 22 came together on February 27. They have been read with great interest by the usual inner circle. I am sorry that I was so guarded in my reference to the off-shore islands in my letter No. 30 of February 13, that you missed my meaning. Of course I had something more in mind than the obvious truism that the off-shore islands are in the Taiwan area and would be included in our renunciation of force draft. What I was trying to get over was an intimation that Public Law No. 4 would be more likely to come into the picture in the event of Communist action limited to the off-shores after a renunciation of force declaration.

Enclosed is a copy of Ralph Clough's conversation with Munsiff of the Indian Embassy on February 28. What Clough said is now somewhat outdated, since we have subsequently decided to send copies of the Agreed Announcement by registered mail, with return receipt requested, to each of the Chinese named by Wang at Geneva whom we can identify and locate. We will be prepared to exhibit to the Indians as appropriate and desirable the signature of the Chinese on the return receipt. But we will be careful not to let the Indians see the U.S. address of the individuals concerned. It will be a matter of principle with us to protect these Chinese from possible Communist pressure, by not divulging their whereabouts.

Also enclosed is a copy of a telegram from Mort Rosse, the American Asiatic Underwriters' representative here, to their representative in Hong Kong regarding the Charles Miner case. It now looks as if Miner may be able to get out fairly soon after a payment of an additional \$6,000 of extortion money. We anticipate that Treasury will probably license this added sum. We have informed the British Embassy and they will ask O'Neill to hold off on any additional representation in Miner's behalf for the time being in view of the more favorable prospect.

It looks as if we may be heading for a turning point of some kind in the talks. Our intuition to this effect is confirmed by your 1574 of March 1, which unfortunately was not distributed in the Department until after we met with the Secretary yesterday afternoon. But it has been called to his attention since then.

I hope the flying weather between Geneva and Prague is better than it has been. Good luck, and be assured that we are all with you.

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy



**515. Telegram 1585 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 3, 1956, 11 a.m.

1585. From Osborn.

According information from reporters, statement being released at (repeat at) Chinese Communist Consulate General 3:30 p.m. local time today.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–356. Official Use Only; Priority. Originally received as telegram 1538 but corrected to 1585. Repeated for information Priority to Prague for Ambassador Johnson as telegram 26.

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**516. Telegram 1586 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 3, 1956, 3 p.m.

1586. From Osborn. My telegram sent Department 1585 repeated information Prague 26.

Reporters say Chinese Communist Consulate General has announced postponement release, no indication until then.

**Gowen**

Note: FE Duty Officer notified 3/3/1:15 p.m. LWH

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–356. Official Use Only; Priority. Repeated for information Priority to Prague for the Ambassador as telegram 26.

**517. Telegram 1587 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 4, 1956, 4 p.m.

1587. From Osborn.

3:30 p.m. today Chinese Communist CONGEN released 1,500-word statement Ministry Foreign Affairs PRC. Copies addressed Ambassador Johnson delivered half-hour ahead. Presume Department receiving by ticker as release made simultaneously Peiping.

Statement parallels Wang's prepared statement last meeting. Reiterates demand for Foreign Ministers' conference, says "One cannot but deem that purpose of American side is to trick statement out of Chinese side, then put off indefinitely Foreign Ministers' conference so as to maintain present status US occupation Taiwan, interference with China's liberation coastal islands." Gives US two choices: If it is desired declaration specifically mention Taiwan dispute, must choose Chinese October 27 draft; if it desired statement not (repeat not) mention Foreign Ministers' meeting, must choose December 1 draft.

Final sentence: "Chinese side cannot agree to talks being dragged out as it is, nor can it allow talks be used by US as tool to prevent China from exercising sovereign rights."

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Carwell (FE D.O.) notified 3/4/1:55 p.m. EMB

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-456. Official Use Only; Niact. Repeated Niact to Prague for Ambassador Johnson as telegram 28.

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**518. Telegram Tosec 3 to Karachi<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 4, 1956, 5:54 p.m.

Tosec 3. DCT please repeat Geneva's 1587 Mar 4, 4 pm Control 2083 to Karachi captioned

For the Secretary and Robertson.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-456. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Sherwood (S/S).

**519. Telegram Tosec 7 to Karachi<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 5, 1956, 1:56 p.m.

Tosec 7. (Code room: Please repeat Geneva's 1574, March 1, Control No. 540.)

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–156. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy.

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**520. Telegram Tosec 10 to Karachi<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 5, 1956, 5:21 p.m.

Tosec 10. For Secretary and Robertson.

1. Re Tosec 3. We believe our reply to Communist statement March 4 should be prompt and should consist merely of statement to press by Lincoln White as follows:

QUOTE

The Chinese Communist statement of March 4 contains nothing new. Its failure, however, even to mention that the Chinese Communists still hold 13 Americans in prison, despite their agreement of last September that these Americans would be permitted "expeditiously" to exercise their right to return to the United States, cannot be overlooked. This only reemphasizes that these Americans are being held as political hostages.

The reply which the United States made on January 21 to a similar Chinese Communist statement of January 18 is equally applicable to the Communist statement of March 4. The concluding paragraphs of that reply read as follows:

INNERQUOTE

1. Four months after the Communists announced that they would adopt measures to permit Americans in China to return to the United States, 13 Americans are still held in Communist prisons.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–556. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in substance by Phleger and Sebald.

2. The United States proposed that the parties renounce the use of force without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack, in order that the discussions might take place free from the threat of war.

3. The United States made clear that this renunciation would not prejudice either side in the pursuit of its objectives and policies by peaceful means.

4. The Communists, while stating that they accept the principle of the renunciation of force, have deprived such acceptance of its value by refusing to agree that it is without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack and that it is applicable to the Taiwan area.

In short, the Communists so far seem willing to renounce force only if they are first conceded the goals for which they would use force.

The United States, for its part, intends to persist in the way of peace. We seek the now overdue fulfillment by the Chinese Communists of their undertaking that the Americans now in China should be allowed expeditiously to return. We seek this not only for humanitarian reasons but because respect for international undertakings lies at the foundation of a stable international order. We shall also seek with perseverance a meaningful renunciation of force, particularly in the Taiwan area.

END INNERQUOTE QUOTE

2. We have requested Johnson to comment from Prague, repeating to Karachi. Request your views on above proposed reply.

3. We have repeated to you as Tosec 7 Johnson's March 1 analysis situation following last meeting. We believe he correctly states situation now confronting us.

4. Proposed guidance to Johnson for March 8 meeting being sent separately.

**Hoover**

**521. Telegram 1718 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 5, 1956, 7:24 p.m.

1718. For Johnson.

Guidance for March 8 meeting.

1. Although Chinese Communist statement of March 4 may indicate approach turning point in Geneva talks, we wish to proceed along established lines as if break not anticipated. Your basic tactic should be to keep onus for any prospective rupture squarely on Wang while maintaining integrity our position. You should pitch your discussion in moderate key at same time avoiding defensive posture and maintaining continuous pressure on Wang on both repatriation and renunciation issues.

2. Restate US view that public statements, particularly those couched in terms approaching ultimatum such as March 4 statement, can only hinder progress of talks. Read US reply for record and note that US will continue to set public record straight whenever need for such action created by Chinese Communist misrepresentations.

3. Take up Communist March 4 statement item by item, answering it with same type argumentation you have effectively used past meetings.

4. Press for Communist release of 13 Americans, emphasizing increasingly obvious Communist use of them as political hostages.

5. Continue to reject Communist demands for investigation status individual Chinese in US in absence specific allegation of obstruction. Since Wang has specifically alleged that Tan Wen refused permission depart by INS, Department is investigating this case. FYI Department has requested INS discreetly obtain pertinent information on all Chinese named by Wang. This will not be turned over to Communists but will be useful in event Wang alleges specific obstruction to departure or individual should become center of public attention. END FYI

6. Inform Wang that Department will send copies Agreed Announcement by registered mail to 37 Chinese named by him if current addresses can be found. Remind him that no case of Chinese claiming obstruction in departure has been brought to Department by Indian Embassy.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–556. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy; cleared in draft by Phleger and Sebald. Repeated Priority to Karachi for Robertson as telegram Tedal 13.

**522. Telegram 1603 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 7, 1956, 3 p.m.

1603. From Johnson.

Would appreciate information soonest on when Department plans release reply to CHICOM March 4 statement and confirmation of text.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 3/7/12:15 p.m. LWH

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-756. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

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**523. Telegram 1730 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 7, 1956, 6:25 p.m.

1730. For Johnson.

Medical case history Liu Yung-ming received from Missouri State Hospital No. 4. It is being forwarded promptly to American Red Cross for transmittal to Red Cross in Peiping. You may inform Wang to this effect at tomorrow's meeting.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-756. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy.

**524. Telegram 1611 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 8, 1956, 5 p.m.

1611. From Johnson.

1. Two-hour 25 minute meeting this morning with no (repeat no) change.

2. Wang was obviously marking time and refused to respond to or be drawn into discussion on renunciation.

3. In context making points Deptel 1718 repeated Karachi Tosec 13, I also characterized his position at last meeting and CHICOM March 4 statement as constituting retrogression from apparent previous position and stated my understanding their present position was they refused to renounce force even temporarily with respect Taiwan area unless US first agrees to Foreign Minister meeting and that this logically leads question what new conditions and prerequisites would be presented in connection with Foreign Minister meeting, that is, would they consider renunciation binding only up to and during such meeting and if meeting did not result complete concession their views would they then consider themselves free use force? Such position is complete perversion renunciation force principle and glaring reversion to war-like ultimatums and holding negotiations under threat by one party of initiating hostilities in absence peaceful surrender by other party. Contrasted with US position particularly as set forth in January 21 and March 6 statements stressing last paragraph both statements.

3. Wang completely failed respond these points stating respective positions fully developed last 20 meetings and their views set forth their March 4 statement to which he had nothing to add. Hoped next meeting I would make choice between their two drafts. I hoped he would correct me if my foregoing statement their position in error.

4. I made very strong statement on implementation, characterizing situation in this field also as retrogression with CHICOM receding to same positions they held before agreed announcement both with respect Americans in China and Chinese in US. During course of give and take I said, "insofar as desires your government with respect to our talks here are concerned, policy continuing to hold 13 as political hostages can only be counterproductive".

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–856. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information Priority to Karachi for the Secretary and Robertson as telegram 7. An additional transmittal note reads: "Also request confirmation receipt and delivery Geneva's 1611 to Secretary. If not (repeat not) delivered retransmit immediately to New Delhi."

5. He renewed usual charges concerning US "obstruction", repeated demand for accounting for names he had given me, and Chinese in US, and alleged interception mail from families to Chinese in US, and alleged requirement Chinese apply permanent residence or obtain Taiwan entry permits. In latter connection made and reiterated charge US interfered in Indian Embassy desire make public statement. When I replied US does not have to agree or disagree to Indian Embassy making any public statement it desires within proper sphere its activities diplomatic mission, he said "atmosphere here appears to be somewhat different that in Washington".

6. In rebuttal my continued stress on 13 he said if they covered by agreed announcement Chinese US prisons were covered and renewed his demand for "accounting".

7. Next meeting Thursday March 15.

8. Proceeding Prague tomorrow morning returning Tuesday.

**Gowen**

NOTE: Advance copy to FE—Mr. Waddell 5: 10 p.m., 3/8/56 CWO/FED

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## 525. Telegram 1614 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, March 8, 1956, 7 p.m.

1614. From Johnson.

1. Wang's performance today's meeting confirmed my previous feeling they awaiting assessment success their efforts influence us through January 18 and March 4 statements and probably more importantly through GOI during Secretary's visit.

2. Before deciding next move they may only await reports they receive on any discussion this subject during Secretary's visit New Delhi or possibly they may wait to see if any new moves our part following completion Secretary's FE trip.

3. They are retaining flexibility of action with regard continuation talks but have left selves very little flexibility on text any renunciation force declaration in absence United States concession on Foreign Minister's meeting. However, dependent on what reports they receive

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-856. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated Priority to New Delhi for the Secretary and Robertson as telegram 29.



from New Delhi they may well make move towards break or even carry out break at next meeting.

4. Would appreciate being informed any developments at New Delhi that would assist me in anticipating or assessing situation here.

Gowen

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**526. Telegram 1615 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 8, 1956, 8 p.m.

1615. From Johnson.

1. I opened 40th meeting by telling Wang I had given very careful study to position of his government as outlined in his statements at our last meeting and his government's public statement of March 4. I continued from prepared statement:

A. I have searched hard for some evidence that your government is genuinely willing to respond to proposal of my government for renunciation of force—proposal that meets aspirations of peoples of all political persuasions throughout world, who seek an end to discredited and outmoded means of attempting settle disputes by an appeal to force.

B. Essential purpose of my proposal was to remove overhanging threat of appeal to force by one side and thus make possible free discussion differences and search for their fair and equitable solution by peaceful means. I had felt that in spite our difficulties we were largely in agreement in principle and that with sincere desire both sides make progress there was real hope of narrowing and finally eliminating our area of disagreement. I have been doing my best to approach matter from this standpoint and to spend whatever time was required in patient effort to clear up misunderstandings and to remove doubts.

C. However, I find your statement at our last meeting and action of your government in releasing its statement of March 4 very disturbing. I cannot but feel that your position is intentionally or unintentionally dragging our talks on this subject backwards.

D. I hope that this trend can be promptly reversed and that we can again move forward. I do not believe that way to progress lies in issuance

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–856. Confidential; Limit Distribution. The telegram is unsigned.

of ultimatata, and in particular I do not believe that public statements such as that issued by your government on March 4 can contribute to progress we seek.

E. As I understand position you set forth at our last meeting you categorically assert that only means of peacefully discussing and settling our disputes in Taiwan area is by meeting of our respective Foreign Ministers.

F. Also, as I understand your position, you refuse to renounce force, even temporarily, with respect to our dispute in the Taiwan area, unless my government first agrees with your government's contention that only means of discussing and settling this dispute is by meeting of our Foreign Ministers.

G. Establishment of this prerequisite and condition with respect to renunciation of force in Taiwan area logically leads to question of what new conditions and prerequisites would be presented in connection with such meeting. For example, would you consider such a renunciation of force binding only up to and during holding of such meeting? If meeting did not result in complete concession to your views would your government then consider itself free to use force? Any such position would, of course, be complete perversion of principle of renunciation of force and settlement of disputes by peaceful means. It would be most glaring reversion to practice of war-like ultimatata and holding of negotiations under threat by one party of initiating hostilities in absence of peaceful surrender by other party.

H. I thus find your present position difficult to reconcile with your previous apparent acceptance of at least some of principles of my proposal of October 8. I also find it hard to reconcile your present position even with your December 1 draft as I had understood it. I thought that you had assured me that your December 1 draft did cover situation in Taiwan area. I did not recall your having stated it covered our dispute there only on condition that we agreed to Foreign Minister's meeting. In fact, as I recall it, you often said that you were establishing no conditions or prerequisites. Now, in statement issued by your authorities on March 4, I find demand for Foreign Minister's meeting stated not only as condition, but in terms approaching an ultimatum.

I. You will note that in necessary statement of reply made by my government it carefully avoided any such aspect, and I have and will continue to avoid such aspects here for I am convinced that they cannot contribute to that peaceful settlement of our disputes which we continue to seek.

J. Position of my government was carefully and soberly set forth in its statement of January 21 and in its response your government's statement of March 4 copies of which you have. I want particularly to stress closing words of both of these statements. "United States for its part,

intends to persist in way of peace. We seek now overdue fulfillment by your government of your undertaking that Americans in your country should be allowed expeditiously to return. We seek this not only for humanitarian reasons but because respect for international undertakings lies at foundation of stable international order. We shall also seek with perseverance a meaningful renunciation of force, particularly in Taiwan area.”

2. Wang said we have spent much time in our discussions for reaching agreement on issuance of declaration on renunciation of force. They have made very clear views of their side in all our previous meetings. His government had recently issued public statement in which position his side also very clearly set forth. This allowed no misunderstanding or deliberate misinterpretation by anyone.

3. Wang said at last meeting he had indicated that if there were genuine desire for agreement on declaration their two drafts were there—that is, their October 27 and December 1 drafts—and he had indicated any these would have served for agreement between us, and he asked that I make careful choice either these two drafts. Their December 1 and October 27 drafts were consistent and there was nothing which could be termed inconsistent between those two drafts. Their draft did not in itself set forth any prerequisite conditions.

4. Wang said therefore as he saw it if we were to make declaration at all we would have to be clear on three points. First, such a declaration must be on equal footing and be reciprocal. Second, such declaration must not prejudice the sovereign rights of any of parties. Finally, such a declaration must be acceptable both sides. Their objections my previous drafts had all been based on grounds my drafts did not conform with three points mentioned above.

5. Wang said he had carefully studied statement issued by Department on March 7 and examined that statement in accordance with three principles above but fail find in that statement any reply their questions mentioned above. In same way they found selves disappointed with my opening statement this morning because he did not find anything in it which could lead us forward or which could contribute our progress.

6. Wang said we have now come to stage our discussions in which not a question of setting forth respective views because these views been made clear in course discussion. It would be very difficult for discussions get forward if at every meeting we should repeatedly set forth views which been set forth before. We had in front us task of resolving question regarding declaration.

7. Wang said he noted I had stated desire for our disputes being settled peaceful means and for narrowing down area disagreement. If this case, then should we not make genuine effort and get on to agreement

on basis drafts he had advanced? If one should, on one hand, claim desire for solution but on other hand refuse touch on subject of declaration itself, how could we make any progress? They consider there no point in going on in this way by repeating all our previous ground.

8. I said I had tried this morning not to repeat previous ground. Had tried during these weeks obtain real understanding his position in order we could make progress. As he here and as his government in its statement of March 4 again persisted in confusing discussion of merits our disputes, which belongs at later stage, with our immediate task of declaration renouncing use force, I found very difficult get at his exact position this latter and essential question. Way to understanding between us was, in these talks and in privacy this room, to try meet and understand each others points view.

9. I said I had in my opening statement this morning set forth just as simply and clearly as I capable my very frank understanding his position. I asked some simple and straightforward questions, not with desire engaging in controversy but with very honest desire of attempting understand fully his position.

10. I said I disappointed he had not answered these questions. He had spoken of misinterpretation his position. If in fact I had misinterpreted it I would appreciate his telling me where.

11. Wang said if at present stage we still talking about understanding each others position in order help in progress he would say we had adequate understanding because we had held 20 meetings our discussions already and these 20 meetings spent solely in explaining each others positions. If anyone wanted genuinely seek understand points view other side it would not take 20 meetings do so.

12. Wang said as far as position his side concerned, their position been always clear. And their position embodied in two drafts which they had presented. All questions raised by me been answered these two drafts. I entirely free make choice between these two.

13. Wang said again statement he made last meeting also sufficiently clarified and set forth their views. There nothing unclear in it. There nothing concealed in it. If I considered we ought make declaration at all, then I should make choice either of two drafts they had presented.

14. I said I inclined agree his statements were fairly clear. And I had set forth this morning what I thought they clearly said. I hoping I was wrong or that I had possibly not understood them. For they seemed me to be long ways from clear renunciation force and peaceful settlement our disputes.

15. I said I hoped he would study interpretation I had placed on it this morning and if I wrong any respect that he would clarify at next

meeting. If he nothing more on this this morning, I had another matter would like bring up.

16. Wang said he had stated his views regarding opening statement I made this morning. In my opening statement this morning I had again repeated previous old tune. All arguments advanced by me in opening statement been refuted our previous meetings.

17. Wang said as he had stated, if I still thought we should make declaration at all then there were two drafts of their side and I entirely free determine on either them. Both these drafts contained reasonable principles for settlement our disputes.

18. Wang said if I not in position determine on one these drafts we would better leave it until next meeting when he hoped I would do so. If I had anything else bring up, he prepared listen.

19. I then read prepared statement on implementation: I have spoken this morning of what appeared to me to be something like reverse trend in our discussions under second item of our agenda. It is hard to avoid drawing parallel between that situation and situation with respect to our first item, return of civilians desiring to do so.

A. In order to dispose of matter of return of civilians, we worked out an agreed announcement recognizing right to civilians desiring to do so to return to their respective countries. It specified that measures would be or had been adopted to permit our respective civilians expeditiously to exercise that right. We worked out third party arrangement, in order fully to meet your point of view, as an assurance in implementation of agreement.

B. Our agreed announcement not only expressed subjective intent of our two governments to allow civilians to return freely and expeditiously when they desired to do so; it also provided third party arrangement as means of making objective test of whether this intent was in fact being carried out. For while, our agreement seemed to be producing some results. Apparent intent of your government to allow Americans to depart seemed to be evidenced by announcement of release of numbers of Americans formerly detained.

C. Then, gradually, your country started to behave as though your agreed announcement had never been issued. First, as regards Americans in your country, you began to ignore plain fact that you were responsible, under agreed announcement, to adopt measures permitting them expeditiously to exercise their right to return. You ignored, or turned aside with flimsy excuses, objective and reasonable statements of U.K. Charge when he pointed out that return of these Americans was being obstructed.

D. Then as regards Chinese in United States, you started to revert to same position you held in our early meetings in August. You alleged

that United States had instituted measures to prevent Chinese who desired to return from doing so. You made these allegations partly on basis of certain entirely normal and proper requirements of my government applicable, not to Chinese who desired to return, but to Chinese—or to any other alien—who desired to stay in U.S. Partly, your allegations seem to have been based on no more than supposition that all Chinese in U.S. desire to return, and that therefore failure of any Chinese to return is of itself evidence of obstruction.

E. More seriously, you made these allegations in apparent disregard of third party arrangement, to which we both agreed in making our agreed announcement. This arrangement provides an objective test of whether in fact Chinese feel they are being prevented from leaving my country. By this objective test, I think it is evident that Chinese in U.S. do not consider that they are being prevented from leaving.

F. You nevertheless allege that some Chinese are being prevented from leaving, and you have given me names of 37 persons who you say fall into that category. My country has already fully complied with terms of agreed announcement as regards these 37 persons, as well as all other Chinese in U.S. Most important and essential thing is that any of these 37, or any other Chinese in my country, if they desire to return, can exercise their right return your country whenever they choose and expeditiously as they choose. Next most important and essential thing is that any these persons who feels he being obstructed from departing can communicate with Indian Embassy. I have informed you repeatedly and in detail of wide publicity given agreed announcement my country in accordance terms announcement. However, in view your allegations these 37 persons, my government willing go beyond matter of agreed announcement and ensure that each them, insofar as can be positively identified, has copy of full text announcement. Also desire inform you medical case history Liu Yung-ming is, accordance your request, being transmitted by American Red Cross to your Red Cross Society.

G. I would like ask you just how far you prepared go in complying terms our agreement with regard Americans your country. Can you assure me each of 13 Americans whose names I given you and who do indisputably desire return can now expeditiously exercise right return?

20. Wang said statement by Department State of March 7 as well as my statement this morning had again raised question 13 Americans. They thought such manner of raising question not in conformity truth and intended stir up argument.

21. Wang said it precisely attempt use this question as pretext cover up fact obstruction against return Chinese in U.S. It precisely Chinese side instead U.S. side which feels highly dissatisfied with situation return its civilians.

22. Wang said it true we had agreement on return civilians and this agreement provided for expeditious return those civilians who desired do so. It also true we had agreed on third nation arrangement in order insure smooth return civilians and implementation provisions this agreement. All these arrangements been made with view expediting adoption measures permitting civilians return.

23. Wang said however ever since announcement agreement they not seen adoption by U.S. Government of measures to expedite return his civilians. Instead U.S. had adopted measures which forcibly required Chinese obtain entry permits Taiwan in order obstruct return these civilians his side. And what is more U.S. had further adopted measures to forcibly require Chinese in U.S. apply permanent residence.

24. Wang said India as third nation had not been in position distribute texts agreed announcement their civilians in U.S. and had not been allowed even make announcement regarding forcible requirement of obtaining entry permits Taiwan imposed by U.S. on Chinese civilians.

25. Wang said furthermore in spite fact I had made assurances all along in previous meetings that Chinese in U.S. have freedom communicate, they found in case Mr. Lu Cho [illegible in the original] son Lu Chih Wei former President Yenching, his family had written 20 letters him but he received only two, remainder been intercepted by U.S. In U.S. terms, can this be called freedom of communication?

26. Wang said and then of 103 Chinese students they had discussed previously, 32 them still not returned.

27. Wang said as regards 37 persons whose names he had given me previous meetings, I had not been able up to now give accounting them as to whether U.S. Government will no longer obstruct them. I had stated U.S. Government would be willing furnish each of 37 with copy text agreed announcement. However failure of return those 37 was not just question their lack information agreed announcement but because of deliberate obstruction offered by concerned U.S. agencies which preventing their return. Therefore no matter how U.S. tried to excuse self on question return Chinese in U.S., if no definite accounting forthcoming with regard questions he had raised, how could possibly believe U.S. was in fact implementing agreement?

28. Wang said question before us was whether U.S. had already adopted measures to remove forcible requirement for Chinese in U.S. to obtain Taiwan entry permits? Question was whether U.S. would adopt measures to remove such requirements as forcibly requiring Chinese in U.S. obtain permit for long-term residence U.S. Question was whether U.S. would no longer obstruct Indian Embassy in U.S. from making announcement this regard. Question was whether U.S. would stop intercepting mail of Chinese in U.S., which was against practice of



civilized nations. This was practice of secret police. Question was also whether U.S. would be willing make inquiry into cases he had raised in order remove all excuses for obstructing return these cases.

29. Wang said I had again this morning raised charge regarding 13 Americans imprisoned China and statement American Department State also raised this matter. Now they exactly would like ask U.S. as to how many Chinese imprisoned in U.S. These people being kept in prison. How could they express their desire for return?

30. Wang said if U.S. felt self entitled express concern for imprisoned Americans, then why did U.S. refuse make accounting situation innumerable Chinese being kept imprisoned U.S.? Responsibility of my side could not be avoided by evasive means.

31. Wang said implementation our agreement was equally binding both parties. It not proper ask one party abide by agreement strictly while other party could break it. From series actions taken by U.S. in violation of agreement, it raised question of whether U.S. actually going to rescind agreement.

32. Wang said in addition 37 names he had given me previously, this morning he had five more names he would like give me, whose return being prevented by U.S. (handed over list; names in following telegram). It stated in this list that all these persons want return but being prevented doing so.

33. Wang said in case Mr. Mai, he was among 32 of 103 who not yet returned and he stated his failure return was due deliberate obstruction offered by U.S. agencies. There not slightest indication that failure return of these 32 persons was due to change of their minds. Failure their return due to obstructions.

34. Wang said he continued to await accounting by my side of all these questions he had raised.

35. I said he had rightly said that it was question who was in fact carrying out our agreed announcement. As I had pointed out this morning this was not question of opinion or vague charges but very fortunately was question of fact. It question of facts that can be determined by objective impartial test. Third country arrangement which established by our agreed announcement was established exactly as such test.

36. I said facts were, and he as well aware of them as I, that out of many thousands Chinese in U.S. there not yet been one case in which Indian Embassy had called attention my government any obstruction in departure any Chinese. This a record that was clear and for all world to see. This fully confirmed statements which I had repeatedly made here ever since August 1 last year, that no Chinese was being obstructed in returning his country.



37. I said facts were also that Chinese were steadily returning his country. Not only since August 1 last year but also prior August 1 last year. Questions his government continually raised and which he raised again this morning, as I repeatedly had pointed out, had no relation to Chinese who desire return his country. It absurd on face of it to say U.S. forcibly requiring people do this or do that in order require them stay in our country. We had no interest whatsoever in requiring Chinese or any other aliens to remain in U.S. who did not want remain there.

38. I said he knew and I knew that as far as Americans in his country concerned our discussion concerning agreed announcement revolved around those specific Americans whose names I had given him and who he knew and I knew desired to return. I had from very beginning our discussions here, in most earnest desire of removing these impediments to improvement our relations, explained to him exact relation these detained Americans that situation. I had very frankly explained that our attitude regarding these persons was not one arbitrarily taken by my government but one about which American people feel very strongly. I had most earnestly hoped this problem could be and would be removed when we made our agreed announcement.

39. I said I simply was at loss understand why if his government genuinely desirous improve our relations, it had not taken advantage this opportunity remove this irritant. As I had said here many times and as we had said our public statement, I just could not avoid conclusion these Americans continue be held for political purposes. I did not know how I could make clear to him that, insofar as desires his government with respect our talks here were concerned, such policy had been and could only continue to be counterproductive.

40. I said I had spoken very frankly about this and in what one might call this personal vein because its tremendous importance and my very deep feelings regard to it. I hoped he would accept it in that spirit.

41. Wang said I had spoken about desirability of removing causes misunderstanding between peoples our two countries on question return our two nationals. It exactly in this spirit that his side been carrying out agreement respecting Americans in China.

42. Wang said it hard him to reconcile this with actions adopted by U.S. with respect Chinese, which were unfriendly and completely contrary what they had done. Attitude adopted by U.S. Government toward Chinese nationals did not contribute improvement our relations but rather worsened relations between us. He might frankly inform me that Chinese people very indignant over steps U.S. Government had taken which inconsistent with its words.

43. Wang said I had spoken about failure Indian Embassy bring up single case with my government. He wanted ask why U.S. Government

should interfere with Indian Embassy to prevent it making public statement this respect. Did U.S. think this action its part would help Indian Embassy in performance its functions? He wanted ask whether I willing remove such obstructions against Indian Embassy's making announcement on question of so-called exit permits Taiwan.

44. Wang said since I had raised question 13 Americans in prison, then he wanted know whether I was going to make accounting of Chinese imprisoned U.S. All these problems were covered by agreed announcement between us. Therefore they fully entitled raise this matter. And U.S. in same way has obligation give accounting.

45. Wang said that why they had mentioned both sides should make reciprocal effort improve state affairs on question return civilians. First of all must be made very clear in our thinking that both Chinese and Americans were human beings and were equal. Their personal rights must be respected equally. It not proper be concerned with one's own civilians while adopting unfriendly and contrary attitude towards civilians other side. If such inconsistent attitude be adopted, how could relations between two countries be improved?

46. I said U.S. under agreed announcement had no obligation give what he called accounting Chinese in U.S. U.S. had obligation not obstruct return any Chinese who desires return his country. We willing receive and promptly act upon any facts which indicate we not carrying out that obligation. We willing do that for Indian Embassy in U.S. or I willing do that for him here. I still have not seen any facts on any obstruction. We in past and will continue fully cooperate with Indian Embassy in carrying out functions it assumed under agreed announcement.

47. Wang interrupted to ask did this mean I willing agree to Indian Embassy making public announcement?

48. I said U.S. did not agree or disagree to Indian Embassy's stating anything publicly it desired state. Press in U.S. entirely free and Indian Embassy could say anytime anything it desired say and it would be published. I recalled I brought up here some weeks ago statement made by Indian Embassy being published in U.S. I thought it was last December.

49. Wang asked did I say that U.S. Government had never interfered with Indian Embassy's making any public statement? Could it be said if there should have been anybody who interfered with Indian Embassy's making public statement it entirely action his own responsibility?

50. I said I did not know what he talking about. U.S. Government was in no way keeping Indian Embassy from saying anything it desired within proper sphere its activities as diplomatic mission.

51. Wang said they had noted this question and had noticed atmosphere in Washington somewhat different from what he had experienced here. (Wang asked whether I had finished before continuing).

52. Wang said I had spoken about U.S. having no obligation under agreed announcement to make accounting Chinese in U.S.

53. I said I did not follow his point.

54. Wang said I stated I had no obligation give accounting for Chinese. If they followed my logic, would they ask if 13 now in prison had no relation with agreement between us?

55. I said I just did not follow point. We had obligation not obstruct return Chinese, to permit them expeditiously return. He had exactly same obligation regarding Americans his country, including as we both knew specifically those 13 as they were ones we talking about when we made announcement. Their return indisputably still being obstructed.

56. Wang said I had claimed U.S. did not obstruct return Chinese. Now regarding failure return 32 plus 42 persons, could I explain it as no obstructions being offered them; if these 13 Americans were related to agreed announcement between us then Chinese in U.S. prisons were also related to agreement. They wish be informed situation them, and this also within scope agreed announcement. Could not be said this beyond scope agreed announcement.

57. I suggested next meeting be Thursday March 15. Wang agreed.

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**527. Telegram 1617 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 9, 1956, 4 p.m.

1617. From Johnson.

Following list five names handed me by Wang 40th meeting March 8.  
[*text not declassified*]

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–956. Official Use Only.

528. Letter 34 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 34

Washington, March 9, 1956

Dear Alex:

We have received your 1614 analyzing the March 8 meeting, and two out of seven sections of your 1615 giving the record of the meeting. We don't see how we can give you any variant to freshen the atmosphere at the next meeting. It is vexing to have to waltz around the floor to the same old music for the umpteenth time. We understand and share your antipathy for this business but our strategy requires us to stand fast and to do nothing to precipitate a walkout. Your pertinacity will put an extra star in your crown.

One of the 37 Chinese named by Wang came in to see us yesterday in a state of great agitation. He is [*text not declassified*]. A senior member of the University faculty accompanied him. The occasion of the visit was his receipt of a letter from Wang, enclosing a copy of the Agreed Announcement. It was posted in Geneva February 28. An informal English translation of the letter is enclosed. We do not know how many of these letters Wang has mailed, but the presumption is that he has sent the letter to all the Chinese whose addresses are known to the PRC. [*text not declassified*] suspects that his name and address were obtained from one of the students who recently returned to the Mainland. There is a printed list of the members of the Chinese Students Club at the University of Illinois, and this list was probably taken back to China by one of the recent travelers. [*text not declassified*] thinks that the letter to him signifies that his wife and two children will be pressured in some way if he does not return. Of course he does not want to go back. He is completely adjusted and committed to life in this country, and has already taken out his first citizenship papers. He would like to bring his family over. But he is not willing to intimate in any way either in a letter to the Mainland or in conversation here outside of the Department that he wants to stay here, or that he has not been prevented from returning to the Mainland. He is scared to death, so much so that he insisted that we blank out his name and all other identifying data from the letter sent him before we photostated it. The letter apparently is a circular form, with blanks to be filled in as appropriate. This man will not talk to the Indian Embassy or do anything to disillusion the Chinese Communists or otherwise set the record straight, so long as his close relatives are at the mercy of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

Chinese Communists. This case is probably typical of what we are up against.

Hubert Graves told me at lunch on the 5th that he had just received an informal note from O'Neill stating that Chou En-lai or Chang Han-fu—I forget which, had recently mentioned to a diplomat in Peiping that the PRC has a list of 200 Chinese who are in American prisons, which the Chinese Communists are holding in reserve for possible future use. We surmise that the PRC does not intend to produce this list at Geneva, at least for the present, but is keeping it as an ace in the hole for exploitation when the recriminations start, if there is a break off. My guess is that if there is a list of 200, the great majority are American citizens of Chinese race, but this would not necessarily prevent the PRC from getting some propaganda mileage out of the list.

The Chinese Embassy here, and the large Chinese community in San Francisco and New York, are greatly upset over the extensive Federal Grand Jury investigation of the Chinese passport fraud racket. A very energetic Assistant District Attorney in San Francisco is pushing an unusually vigorous investigation there, with the officers of many Chinese benevolent, fraternal and family societies, being subpoenaed to appear before the Grand Jury with all their records. Many ill-informed Chinese apparently think that the information sought is eventually to be turned over to the Chinese Communists as part of some deal growing out of the Geneva talks. It is a far fetched apprehension, but apparently is real and widespread. The Chinese Embassy claims that many Chinese are in a state of near panic. We are sending you a copy of a memorandum of conversation on this subject.

In reference to the unaccounted for military personnel, Col. Monroe says Defense is working on the list of 450 and expects to have a revision ready about the middle of next week. There will be a reduction in the total number of names resulting from the identification of some additional bodies. There will also be some new information on many of the names. Also the list will show what the recent Communist "accounting" at Panmunjom was with respect to each name. (Incidentally, Defense will be sending a message to the MAC shortly stating we consider the accounting inadequate and spelling out why.) A copy of the above list will be sent to us and to you.

I think nothing further need be said about this at Geneva for the time being.

We spent last Sunday afternoon at the Department studying the Chinese Communist statement and deciding how we would handle it. I gather you agreed with our decision not to be hasty in our reply, and to itch it in a restrained key. Neither the Chinese Communist statement

nor our reply got any appreciable play from the press. We think it was just as well no great attention was paid to the exchange. I apologize for the slip which resulted in your not getting our reply until 24 hours after it was issued. We had been assured through FE/P that you would get it promptly through the USIA bulletin. For some unaccountable reason USIA did not carry it in its European Service, although it was carried in the Far East and Middle Eastern Service. I had a copy telegraphed you early on the morning of March 7, just on a hunch that you might have missed it. It was on its way before you telephoned. But you should have had it immediately and in the future we will see that anything of comparable interest is telegraphed especially to you at once. We will not rely on USIA for this service.

A few short miscellaneous items. There was an error in my last letter in the amount of Miner's account. The total amount for which the C.V. Starr Company is requesting a license from Treasury is approximately \$88,000. Prospects seem to be pretty good that Treasury will license the full amount requested, and that the local authorities will accept the settlement and give Miner his exit permit.

We have sent the Liu Yung-ming dossier to the American Red Cross for transmittal to the Red Cross in Peiping.

We are working on the possibility of temporarily detailing John Holdridge to Geneva in place of Stanley. Holdridge is here on home leave from Hong Kong and could return to Hong Kong by way of Europe with very little extra travel expense. Hong Kong has been anxious to play a somewhat more active part in the Geneva talks, and this would give them their chance. The experience would be good for Holdridge and his observations would be useful to all our political reporting people in Hong Kong when he returns there. He is a China language officer with a good record although he is young. This is all tentative but I wanted you to know the way the wind is blowing. Presumably he could not stay in Geneva indefinitely, but it is questionable if the talks will continue indefinitely.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee is very fully occupied with the Foreign Aid Bill, and for this reason has postponed the hearings on Chinese Communist mistreatment of Americans prisoners until May. Lindbeck has finished his work. He has winnowed out the 50 most significant cases of mistreatment and has included case summaries of only these 50 with his report. He took into account your very constructive suggestions when he revised his first draft.

Your letter of February 28 (No. 24) came on March 5 and was warmly welcomed.

We ought to be hearing something from New Delhi over the weekend. Regards and good luck,

Sincerely,

Walter P. McCaughy

Enclosures:

1. Copy of letter to [*text not declassified*]
2. Despatch No. 484 from Taipei

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**529. Telegram 1621 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 11, 1956, 5 p.m.

1621. From Osborn.

Chinese Communist Consulate General 3:30 p.m. today issued copies 700-word "Statement Ministry Foreign Affairs PRC" dated March 11. Sent usual two copies addressed Ambassador Johnson.

First two-thirds statement devoted implementation. Charges U.S. with failure take any measures in regard Chinese imprisoned U.S. Says U.S. has "forbidden" Indian Embassy issue announcements. Cites other familiar "facts" which "serve to expose beyond dispute distortion made by Department of State" in its March 6 statement.

On renunciation, statement contains one-paragraph summary their current version of U.S. position: "Has refused express definite attitude on (Foreign Ministers meeting) and even demanded so-called right individual and collective self defense on China's territory Taiwan. One cannot but consider aim is require China accept U.S. occupation Taiwan, interference liberation coastal islands." Does not repeat not contain line of March 4 statement, that U.S. must choose either October 27 or December 1 draft.

Concluding paragraph: "U.S. not only violated agreement already reached and obstructed further progress of talks, but is stepping up military activities Taiwan area. Chinese Ministry Foreign Affairs deems necessary point out United States must bear full responsibility for all consequences resulting from this state affairs."

Of course not commenting here. However, local Reuters man, noting this first public charge US holding Chinese in prison, inquired

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-1156. Official Use Only; Niact; Limit Distribution.

of Garnish whether anything to charge. Garnish unattributedly discounted charge as unfounded Chinese Communist effort cover up own failure implement, suggested [garble] read too much significance into it.

Gowen

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**530. Telegram Secto 43 from Colombo<sup>1</sup>**

Colombo, March 11, 1956, 10 p.m.

Secto 43. Reference Secto 41.

Following is summary of Chou En-lai memorandum to Nehru, dated March 2 for discussions with Secretary. Johnson-Wang talks concern two principal questions, one implementation of agreement on Nationals, two declaration on peaceful settlement disputes. As regards American Nationals out of 40 prisoners only 13 remain. Cases of remaining are under review. No difficulty exists in case of prisoners. However, as regards Chinese Nationals in US many difficulties have arisen. Out of 5042 students only 156 have so far returned. PRC have list of 3477 names of which 628 wish to come back. US however, have told them permission to return has been given to only 103 students. Of these 31 have still not returned and 3 are missing. Names and addresses of all have been given to Indian Embassy. Chou En-lai mentioned following specific US obstructions: (a) US has taken no action communicating text agreed announcement to Chinese prisoners; (b) have refused to give list of prisoners; (c) Indian Embassy has no facility for communicating agreed announcement to Chinese prisoners; (d) Formosa entry permits and permanent resident permits.

As re declaration on peaceful settlement of disputes the text of the four drafts have been made available to Indians. Last American draft raised two fundamental questions: (a) right of self-defense; (b) specific mention of Formosa area. Under no circumstances could PRC agree to any statement regarding US so-called right of self-defense in Formosa area. Chou En-lai intimated that US might withdraw clause re self-defense in order to insist that Formosa area be specifically mentioned in text. PRC would not object to Formosa being specifically mentioned in draft as one of existing disputes provided Foreign Ministers' conference also mentioned as agreed method of settling these disputes. Unless US willing accept this compromise declaration should be in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-1156. Confidential.



general terms as suggested by PRC draft of December 1. Chou En-lai listed three reasons why US insists upon mentioning Formosa while avoiding reference to Foreign Ministers' conference: (a) they wish to show superficially to world that declaration has softened tension in Formosa area while actually it would freeze situation there; (b) they wish to tide over election year and have no (repeat no) intention of agreeing on Foreign Ministers' conference; (c) they wish to increase their armed strength in Formosa area under pretext of helping Chiang Kai-shek. Chou En-lai said present American tactics hidden conspiracy to cheat and deceive China. PRC have seen through plot and would not agree to "their designs." PRC position is that US can accept either of two Chinese drafts: (a) draft of last October or, (b) draft of December 1. In case of US continuing obstructive tactics PRC intends releasing entire proceedings of discussions of second item of agenda.

Following is memorandum given to Cooper for delivery to Nehru re release Nationals: "At time the Johnson-Wang negotiations began in Geneva on August 1, 1955 there were 41 American civilians being detained in China, 29 in prison or under house arrest, and 12 being denied exit permits.

"On September 16 Chinese announced release of the 12 exit-permit cases. Therefore only the 29 prison and house arrest cases were under discussion between Wang and Johnson at the time the agreed announcement was made on September 10. On that day the Reds announced the release of 10 of these imprisoned Americans. This left 19 (18 in prison and one under house arrest) subject to the terms of the agreed announcement.

"Today exactly 6 months after this public commitment was made to expedite the departure of these Americans only 6 of the 19 have been released. The British Charge in Peiping has been able to see only one of the 13 still held and has received letters from only 5 others. He has been unable to establish contact with the remaining 7. In his discussions at Geneva, Wang Ping-nan has virtually admitted that these Americans are being held as political hostages, stating that "review of cases" will be governed by "state of relations" between US and Communist China.

"Our records show that 114 Chinese have returned to the Mainland from the US since our negotiations began on August 1. 102 of this number have returned since the agreed announcement of September 10.

"With reference to Chinese Nationals in the US the Chinese Communists first demands concerned only students. They later asked for list of all Chinese in US thus seeking to establish position of being lawful representative of all Chinese in America.

"All of the approximately 5,000 students in US at time of Communist takeover of Mainland in 1949 held National Government

of China passports. The overwhelming majority of these students were and are adherents of the National Government. No exit restrictions were ever imposed except on a small number (approximately 175) during a period beginning with the Red Chinese entry into the Korean War. All restrictions were rescinded in the spring of 1955. At that time the restrictions covered 103. Chou En-lai's statement that 'the Chinese Government have ascertained that 628 wish to come back' and that 'US Government have, however, told them that permission to return has been given to only 103 students' is pure fabrication.

"The US Department of State in press release December 16, 1955 publicly invited any person who knows of any Chinese who claims he is being prevented from returning to China Mainland to communicate at once with the State Department or the Indian Embassy. The Indian Embassy has not (repeat not) questioned US compliance with the terms of the agreed announcement and has made no (repeat no) allegations of interference with the departure of any Chinese. Not a single case of a Chinese claiming obstruction has been reported. The so-called 'Formosa entry-permits' and permanent resident permits obstructions are nonexistent".

Attachments: one, agreed announcement September 10, 1955 one copy; two, Department of State press release December 16, 1955.

With regard to 5,000 students it would be helpful to give cooperative breakdown of how many have returned to Mainland over past years insofar as our records cover, indicating how many had returned at US expense.

Please repeat reply to Secretary for attention Robertson.

**Dulles**

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**531. Telegram Tosec 54 to Djakarta<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 11, 1956, 5:51 p.m.

Tosec 54. For Secretary and Robertson.

(Code room: Repeat text Geneva's 1621 control 6674.)

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-1156. Official Use Only. Drafted by McConaughy and an officer in DCT. Also sent to Prague for Johnson as telegram 289.

**532. Telegram Tosec 60 to Bangkok<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 12, 1956, 6:43 p.m.

Tosec 60. Tosec 54 Djakarta, Prague 289.

Chinese Communist blast March 11 appears to have evoked little or no public interest in this country. Correspondents asked no repeat no questions regarding it or any other phase of Geneva talks at regular press briefing today. Department intends make no repeat no official reply this statement. In unlikely event subject raised later by press, spokesman will characterize it as mere rehash of previous Communist statements. If he is queried about reference to Indian Embassy he will affirm that US Government has never forbidden Indian Embassy to issue announcements. Spokesman will refrain from saying anything explicit on Chinese in US prisons.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–1256. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy. Repeated Priority to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 1749.

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**533. Telegram 1750 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 12, 1956, 6:47 p.m.

1750. For Johnson.

Code Room: Please repeat Colombo's Secto 43, Control 6696, March 11, 1956.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–1256. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Clough.

**534. Telegram 1751 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 12, 1956, 6:47 p.m.

1751. For Johnson.

Guidance for March 15 meeting.

1. Although Chinese Communist public statement of March 11 and Chou En-lai's memorandum to Nehru (Secto 43 repeated Geneva 1750) afford little ground for optimism regarding progress talks, they do not appear to threaten early break. Maintain steady pressure on Wang on both renunciation force and implementation issues by earnest re-exposition United States position.

2. Note issuance Chinese Communist March 11 statement without prior notice contrary understanding regarding public statements. Call attention false allegations in Communist statement, specifically setting forth that US has never forbidden Indian Embassy issue any announcement it wished.

3. Refer to assertion in Communist statement that all Americans can contact office British Charge and ask for report failure seven of Americans in jail to communicate with British Charge.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-1256. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy and Phleger. Also sent Priority to Bangkok as telegram Tosec 61.

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**535. Telegram 1631 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 13, 1956, 10 p.m.

1636. From Johnson.

In response to request from Wang who said it necessary he leave here March 14 for Warsaw "on urgent business" I agreed next meeting

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-1356. Confidential; Priority. Repeated for information Priority to Saigon for the Secretary and Robertson as telegram 15.

be postponed to Thursday March 22. Also agreed his suggestion press announcement only state this “agreed upon by both sides for administrative reasons.”

Gowen

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**536. Telegram 4 from Geneva to Warsaw<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 13, 1956, 10 p.m.

4. From Johnson.

Wang called tonight asking postpone our next meeting to March 22 stating it necessary he leave here March 14 for Warsaw “on urgent business”.

In order assist in assessing this move would appreciate any information you can discreetly obtain as to what if any “urgent business” might require his presence there.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–1356. Secret. Repeated for information to the Department of State as telegram 1632.

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**537. Telegram 1754 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 13, 1956, 6:55 p.m.

1754. For Johnson.

National Catholic Welfare Conference has learned from letters sent by Father Houle to his mother that he was tried October 30, 1955 and sentenced 4 years retroactive to date of arrest June 1953.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–1356. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Phleger and McConaughy. Repeated Priority to Saigon for Robertson as Tosec 70.

Without citing Father Houle's letters as source inform Wang you have learned of his sentencing and protest in strongest terms this further flagrant violation Agreed Announcement.

Hoover

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**538. Telegram 2293 to New Delhi<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 15, 1956, 3:43 p.m.

2293. Reference Secto 43 and memorandum given to Cooper for delivery to Nehru. From 1949 to 1955, U.S. at public expense assisted 3641 Chinese to pursue studies in U.S. and, among this group, provided travel funds to 771 who needed money to return to mainland. Slightly over 80 percent of this travel assistance was provided in 1949-50. Official totals on all Chinese definable as students who have returned to mainland since 1949 not available.

Hoover

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-1556. Confidential. Drafted by Nagoski; cleared by Sebald and in substance by German (USINS), Nelson (IES), and Withers (SOA). Repeated to Taipei for Robertson as telegram Tosec 78 and to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 1759.

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**539. Letter 25 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 25

Geneva, March 15, 1956

Dear Walter:

I received your letter No. 34 of March 9 which I appreciated very much.

Your account of Wang's letter to Chou confirms the feeling that I have had that many of the Chinese in the United States, who while

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." The enclosure is not printed.

not desiring to return, are being careful to play both sides of the fence, sometimes to protect relatives, and probably sometimes to not slam any doors if later they change their minds. I agree that this is a very difficult situation to handle and for the moment have no thoughts on what we may be able to do. I have been trying to think of some way that I could casually make the point to Wang during the give and take for what it might be worth. I think it entirely possible that apart from their obvious desire to use this for their propaganda play, they are, in fact, also being somewhat misled by the situation.

I sent your office a telegram last night on Wang's request to postpone this week's meeting. It was as welcome to me as I am sure it was to you. You will see that Warsaw suggests he may be going back to attend the funeral of Bierut. I had not thought of this and think it may well be correct. At the same time, I think it entirely likely that they may be planning some new move for the next meeting. While, as you see from my telegrams, I feel that we are pretty near the end of the road, we nevertheless cannot forget the Communist ability to ignore everything that has happened in the past and radically shift positions. I agree that Chou's memorandum to Nehru does not appear to threaten an early break but do not understand how they feel that publication of the "entire proceedings" on the second agenda item constitutes any pressure on us. The entire substance has certainly been made public in our respective statements and it does not seem to me that there is anything substantial that can be added thereto.

Incidentally, while I greatly appreciate the copies of the memorandums contained in your 1750 I am left a little puzzled as to whether Nehru simply handed the Memorandum over without discussion, or whether there was some discussion between himself and the Secretary, and if so what its nature might have been. I hope that I know at least as much about what may have taken place in this regard as Wang may know. I would also be interested in knowing whether or not there was any discussion of Indian functions under the Agreed Announcement and Implementation beyond that indicated in our Memorandum for Cooper to give to Nehru. That is, I would be very much interested in knowing to what degree the Indians may have expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction, as this would assist me in governing the statements I make here to Wang in this regard.

In the absence of any instructions to the contrary, I will assume that your 1751 will still be applicable to the March 22 meeting. I am not very impressed with the point in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of those instructions and in this regard will plan to confine myself to expressing disappointment over their making the March 11 statement rather than the violation of our understanding with regard to making statements. He had told me at the previous meeting that they were going to make a statement on renunciation and I only implied that we might make

a reply and did not say our reply would cover implementation. Our March 6 statement did very properly, I believe, include implementation and their statement of March 11 was a reply thereto. I therefore do not believe that any exchange based upon technicalities of our understanding with regard to public statements can be very useful or fruitful but we should rather keep to the substance.

If he pursues his tactics of the last meeting of simply not meeting my arguments and chanting his refrain on accepting either their two drafts, the situation may get fairly sticky. If their purpose is to bring about a break they will, of course, try to maneuver me into a position where it would appear the initiative had come from me. However, I will be alert for all such situations and do my best to avoid them. I think that my best line will continue to be a willingness and desire to continue to strive for an agreement with them and a willingness to listen to any alternative formulations they may have with respect to the substance of our January 12 draft.

I will also make the point contained in your 1754 with regard to Father Houle. Although this point has never seemed very impressive to me as the usual pattern in the past has been "trial and sentencing" just prior to release. My position has always been that I am not interested in their legal mumbo-jumbo but only the fact of the release of the Americans.

I am enclosing an original and two copies of our draft of a White Paper summarizing the talks. This, of course, contains blanks that require filling in as time passes. However it embodies my thoughts on how this whole complicated and in many ways esoteric subject can most clearly be presented in White Paper form. Dave Osborn has done the writing and deserves whatever credit the paper may merit. I have approved it and, therefore, deserve the full share of whatever blame may be attached to it for errors. In any event, I hope that the Department may find it acceptable as a basis from which the final product can be produced.

Kindest regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. In looking over the postscript to my letter No. 24 I note that there is a typographical error in the first sentence of the last paragraph which completely reverses the meaning. It should have read "wilder charges" rather than "milder charges".

Is there any conceivable factual basis for this continued repetition in Chinese students' letters to "applying for permission to INS" to return? In the absence of word to the contrary I am assuming I am still on absolutely solid ground in saying they do not apply to anybody for



anything. I have in mind the income tax clearance but that has never been raised.

If the assignment of Stanley here, which I still think is the best plan, cannot be worked out I would agree that the detail of Holdridge would be useful.

UAJ

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**540. Telegram 1474 from The Hague<sup>1</sup>**

The Hague, March 16, 1956, 6 p.m.

1474. Foreign Office official has informed Embassy representative that Chiao Kwang-hua, Chinese Communist Deputy Minister Foreign Affairs, discussed with Zeeman, Netherlands Charge Peking March 4 communique which Chinese Communists issued re Geneva talks. Chiao pointed out that, although communique threatened US with rupture talks unless either October 27 or December 1 proposals accepted, Chinese Communists had deliberately fixed no time limit for such acceptance.

Zeeman reported that he feels this observation was made to him for specific purpose of relay to US Government. It was his impression that Chinese Communists were willing, despite tenor of communique, to continue talks in Geneva.

**Matthews**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–1656. Confidential. Repeated for information to Geneva as telegram 17 and to Taipei as telegram 1.

**541. Telegram 1769 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 19, 1956, 6:21 p.m.

1769. For Johnson.

1. At March 22 meeting follow guidance given Department's 1751.
2. Telegraphing separately for your background reports Secretary's conversations in New Delhi Taipei and Tokyo.
3. Also telegraphing separately for your background report on Grand Jury investigations New York and San Francisco into passport frauds among persons Chinese race since Wang might seize this as pre-text charge persecution Chinese in US.
4. Return soon Spielman history of talks to date with your suggested revisions as this might be required on short notice if Communists broke off or carried out threat publish complete record.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-1956. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Phleger in substance and by McConaughy.

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**542. Telegram 1770 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 19, 1956, 6:22 p.m.

1770. For Johnson. Our 1769 Paragraph 3.

During past several years investigations by Consulate General Hong Kong have revealed extremely high incidence of fraud among Chinese claimants to American citizenship. Many such fraudulent claimants to American citizenship on being denied passport Hong Kong took advantage of provision of law which permits claimant to institute civil action against Secretary of State in Federal Court to prove citizenship. Some 1350 such cases now pending including 700 in San Francisco.

In February 1956 Grand Juries were empaneled in New York and San Francisco investigate passport fraud cases. In San Francisco Grand

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-1956. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Clough.

Jury subpoenaed officers of large number Chinese associations, directing them submit records of membership, financial contributions and photographs in order obtain independent, accurate records Chinese family relationships in this country.

Chinese communities in US were alarmed by Grand Jury action and appealed to Chinese Government which made representations to US. Alarm reportedly due in part to rumor that Grand Jury compiling roster of names Chinese in US to turn over to Chinese Communists. Department assured Chinese Embassy no truth in rumor and emphasized that legal rights of all Chinese residents US fully protected. Department pointed out investigation directed solely at fraudulent claimants to American citizenship and those who aid and abet them.

**Hoover**

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**543. Telegram 1771 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 19, 1956, 6:51 p.m.

1771. For Johnson.

(Code room: Please repeat Taipei's 848, March 18, Control 10953.) Re: Summary of Conferences with President Chiang.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–1956. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.

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**544. Telegram 1652 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 20, 1956, 5 p.m.

1652. From Johnson. Re Deptel 1769.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–2056. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

Reports conversations New Delhi not (repeat not) yet received other than summaries of memos contained Deptel 1750. Tokyo conversation also not received.

Draft history talks transmitted by letter March 17.

**Gowen**

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**545. Telegram 1772 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 20, 1956, 3:44 p.m.

1772. For Johnson.

(Code room: Please repeat Colombo Dulte 22, March 11, Control 6737)

**Hoover**

Re: Summary of views Nehru expressed to Secretary.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-2056. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy.

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**546. Telegram 1776 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 20, 1956, 8:25 p.m.

1776. For Johnson.

Following is text Tokyo's 2237:

(Code Rm. please repeat Tokyo's 2237, Control 12066 and 12065)

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-2056. Confidential. Drafted by Clough.

**547. Telegram 1658 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 21, 1956, 7 p.m.

1658. From Johnson.

Concur Clough's memo to McConaughy March 12 that not rpt not desirable ARC attempt by letter seek assistance CHICOM Red Cross release 13. Nicholson should however utilize all possibilities at May meeting to impress on CHICOM Red Cross American concern continued detention 13.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–2156. Confidential.

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**548. Telegram 1661 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 22, 1956, 3 p.m.

1661. From Johnson.

1. One hour forty minute meeting this morning. No change whatever.

2. Wang's opening statement was devoid of any new content and closed with reiteration I choose between their two drafts. In response my last meetings characterization his position as war-like ultimata he made this charge against US citing alleged statement by Air Force Major General Hunter Harris to effect in event outbreak fighting Matsus would be no question but that there would be joint air support. I reiterated our position including willingness listen any reformulation essential points our January 12 amendments contrasting with their ultimatum and take it or leave it attitude. Renunciation closed with each of us hoping other would meet position of other at next meeting.

3. I attacked their March 11 statement as not helpful to negotiations and as containing gross distortions and misstatements of fact including charge we had prevented Indians making statement, I had admitted

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–2256. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

32 Chinese detained, etc. Also made statement on Father Houles sentencing statement "protesting outrage" US authorities causing death of Daniel Pao (Pao Che-en) (See FBIS March 15 daily report) who placed under surveillance in 1950 after trying return and in 1952 "forcibly" sent to sanatorium "on pretense" he had TB and where he "mysteriously" died two months later obviously as result of US "persecution". I made vigorous reply characterizing charges regarding Pao as desperate and absurd attempt cover up failure release 13 and characterized CHICOM treatment imprisoned Americans and other foreigners as "barbarous".

5. Meeting closed on this acid and acrimonious note.

6. Next meeting Thursday March 29.

7. Departing for Prague tomorrow morning; returning Tuesday.

**Gowen**

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**549. Telegram 1663 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 22, 1956, 3 p.m.

1663. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting.

While there was some indication Wang might be attempting goad me into saying I saw no point in continuing talks given their present position, he did not push hard and made no attempt move further toward break. In accordance pattern last few meetings he did not make any attempt meet my points and rebuffed my efforts draw him into substantive discussion. In general might characterize his attitude today as willingness continue endurance contest and continued unwillingness make slightest move to break deadlock.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-2256. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

**550. Telegram 1668 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 22, 1956, 10 p.m.

1668. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 41st meeting saying statement I made last meeting entirely unsatisfactory. He gave only points to lack sincerity my side to reach agreement proposed declaration. One would not fail see it was attempt my part by distorting statement he made March 1 to evade reply his question as to which of two drafts his side I prepared accept.

2. Wang said at that meeting I even termed his proposal for FonMins conference a prerequisite and war-like ultimatum, such assertion entirely unfounded. Exactly contrary my allegation, FonMin conference has been accepted throughout world as proven means resolving international disputes. Their insistence FonMins conference is manifestation their sincere desire peaceful settlement disputes. However, in light my unjustified insistence confusing international disputes and matters China's internal affairs as well as US intent continue seizure Taiwan and offshore islands, it clear it exactly my side which making threats and ultimatums.

3. Wang said recently for instance Chief Operations FEAF Maj General Hunter Harris known to have declared that in event outbreak fighting Matsus, joint air support would be out of question (apparent intent of Wang was to say, "would be unquestioned"). His revelation amounts to declaration to Chinese people that US prepared use force against China. That is another flagrant example of war clamoring. Against this he must lodge serious protest. If my side will not promptly stop such provocative actions, situation could only be interpreted attempt disrupt talks and grave consequences must be borne entirely my side.

4. Wang said I had also said at March 1 meeting I found hard reconcile his statement that meeting with his previous position. This again distortion fact. After 21 sessions between us could it be possible position their side this regard not been amply clear? Was it not consistent stand their side to insist removal self-defense clause and to categorically reject any attempt interject China's internal affairs into negotiations or make them subject negotiations between us? It consistent also with their insistence on FonMins conference. As regards their proposal FonMins conference, he been stressing on more than one occasion that without such conference no way to carry out declaration and declaration would consequently become scrap paper.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–2256. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

5. Wang said in order reach agreement speedily on declaration, two drafts which been put forward by their side were exclusively fair and reasonable proposals. Which of these two drafts was I willing accept? This was the one question to which their side continued seek answer from me.

6. In response, I said as I told him at last meeting, I felt position embodied his govt's statement of March 4 and which he had set forth our meetings before and again set forth today, was only resulting dragging our talks backwards. Since Oct last year, I been trying find basis for agreement with him on declaration use force.

7. I said US had, in its obligation under UN and in its arrangements for collective self-defense in Far East as well elsewhere in world, made clear beyond question or doubt it would never initiate use force in settlement international disputes. These not only words, but been fully established by actions US. US has in past and has many times reiterated however that it will never supinely surrender to aggression or initiation of use force by others, and if other nations do use force US is determined defend itself and its allies. No statement made by any responsible spokesman US Govt has ever been contrary to this and I satisfied none ever will be.

8. I said when we came here it well known to world that one side in these discussions was threatening to initiate use force to resolve situation with which it was dissatisfied. Purpose of proposals which I had made this regard was remove overhanging threat force and make possible peaceful discussion and settlement disputes between our two countries. I thought he shared this purpose. I thought he agreed me as to general character declaration we sought. Obviously such declaration must apply unequivocally to all situations where danger resort force by one side existed. Yet he still persisted in refusing embody in such declaration statement that made clear it did apply all such situations. He refused make it clear that declaration applied precisely to that situation where threat use force been most explicit.

9. I said such declaration I thought we both agreed must not embody any prerequisite conditions. Yet their position, that they had set forth publicly and set forth our meetings here, with respect FonMins meeting I could only interpret as effort establish pre-conditions. His evasion at our last meeting and again this morning of reasonable and logical questions which I asked him in this regard only further demonstrated that this the case. I raised these questions he would recall, in order demonstrate that declaration on conditions he laid down would be entirely lacking in any meaningful content as a renunciation force.

10. I said as I pointed out our last meeting his govt seems be proposing these terms almost as ultimata. He had presented two drafts here which met his position. He said that US could choose between



his two drafts. It hard to call that serious or sincere negotiation. Way to negotiation did not lie in issuance such take-it-or-leave-it positions.

11. I said in contrast his position, I withdrew previous draft of Nov 10 my side to which he objected and adopted his draft Dec 1 as basis our negotiations. At our Jan 12 meeting I embodied amendments to his draft which I considered essential to make it meaningful. He had continued to misinterpret and misrepresent intent in plain words that Jan 12 draft.

12. I said I had often said here I thought that his position was not well taken. However, if he had other thoughts on way concepts therein could be stated I would be glad listen them. I had issued no ultimatum, I had taken no take-it-or-leave it positions. I had and would continue try do my utmost to reach real agreement with him on basis honest negotiations. I did not see how he could feel that issuance ultimata such as he had again issued this morning helped in progress our talks here and in resolution tremendously important problems we called upon to deal with here.

13. I said I did not see how his govt felt that statements such as it again made March 11 were helpful to us. For example, in his govt's March 11 statement it says my govt had forbidden Indian Embassy make announcements. I could only characterize this as willful and complete misstatement of fact. I had told him here that even if it desired do so my govt had no way prevent Indian Embassy from making announcements and had not sought do so. Anyone having slightest familiarity my country would immediately recognize absurdity this, and other such statements in March 11 statement his govt. I honestly did not see how it helped these talks. I did not believe it even accorded with genuine interests his own side. I might mention another distortion fact his March 11 statement, attempt made there to give impression I had admitted my govt's restriction departure 32 Chinese. What purpose was served by this sort juggling of words? Again why did his govt declare that all Americans his country free to contact office UK Charge d'Affaires when we knew as matter fact then only 6 of 13 remaining persons desiring return had been permitted do so?

14. I said I had hoped it not intention his govt in issuing statements this kind to face my govt with what amounted to ultimata, to force my govt to agree his demands. I could assure him that no tactic could be more mistaken or more certain of failure. I had hoped that if this was intention his govt it had been abandoned. However, his statement this morning gave me no grounds for feeling it had done so. I would hope that by next meeting his govt would have abandoned his intention and we would be able proceed in orderly manner to discussion of declaration unequivocally and unconditionally renouncing use force. I would hope that it would enable us resume progress we seemed for time to

be making, rather than be dragging us backwards where we were last October.

15. Wang said it seemed I had not made any attempt my statement this morning to answer questions he had raised previously. We knew our discussions had been dragging on quite long time, in spite fact that their side had submitted concrete proposals and in spite my statement that I had accepted their December 1 draft as basis discussions. If basis for our negotiations already existed, he saw no reason why two sides should not advance on this basis.

16. Wang said he recalled that drafts he put forward had been submitted after his side had given due consideration my views. And their drafts had undergone amendment. Their drafts also embodied views my side. Since their drafts had taken into consideration views both sides they were therefore capable of being accepted by both sides.

17. Wang said if amendments put forward by my side did not involve internal affairs of China and did not raise any prerequisite conditions, such amendments would be certainly considered by his side if reasonable and equitable. Therefore it seemed him fact we not been able so far reach agreement on declaration and even that there had been retrogression in our discussions was not fault their side but was responsibility US side.

18. Wang said I had declared that US had never intended to initiate use force in settlement international disputes and that US had not only demonstrated this intent by words but also by deeds. He might ask questions as to whether declaration made by Maj Gen Harris in an official utterance, as he had mentioned this morning, was not representative of position of US? If Maj Gen Harris did not make his declaration as spokesman of US Govt, then his revelation entirely exposed groundlessness my statement. We now in this room discussing declaration for renouncing use force. Could such war-clamoring declaration of Gen Harris help our discussions here?

19. Wang said I had referred to some points in March 11 statement by his govt. These points in their statement were not advanced without bias. They were by no means juggling of words. US could only live up to its words by taking actual actions to correct what it had done. Two drafts they had proposed could by no means be termed as any ultimatum.

20. Wang said he sure I also felt we had spent enough time this question. Discussions we been conducting on question of declaration were not discussions for sake of discussions. They must be aimed at genuine effort to reach reasonable and peaceful solution of problem. This a hope which their side continued maintain.

21. Wang said they continued hope that I would make my attitude clear about these two drafts, so that we might in long run come

to agreement on this question of renunciation force. If we would work along this line we would be helping our talks forward rather than preventing any progress.

22. I said our difficulties with regard to draft—and let me say not only with regard to words of draft, but with regard understanding between us—seemed to revolve around two points primarily. First, was specific mention of Taiwan area and other was self-defense clause. He had said many times these meetings, that any declaration would cover Taiwan area. I found it completely inexplicable that he unwilling accept specific mention Taiwan area in his December 1 draft, if that were correct.

23. I said the other point—with regard self-defense clause—was that neither us would in this declaration be renouncing what we each considered to be our legitimate right of individual and collective self-defense. These were two simple and fundamental propositions.

24. I said I had given him my thought over and over again about how I thought they should be embodied in declaration. If he continued to disagree to form of words I had suggested for embodying these two thoughts I would hope that at our next meeting he would be able suggest form he would consider more desirable. I felt both thoughts were fundamental to meaningful declaration. But I had not taken hard and fast position on exactly how they should be stated. I not able think of any better way of stating them than what we had already suggested. If he had other thoughts, as I had said, I would certainly be glad listen them. I did not see how my position could be any more reasonable or show any greater desire to get ahead with this.

25. Wang said with regard two points I had mentioned, namely specific mention Taiwan area and self-defense clause, he had already made his position adequately clear and did not think necessary him to repeat his previous statements. He must however remind me that our discussions which we been conducting should be directed to seeking reasonable and peaceful solution disputes between our two countries. There would be entirely no meaning for conducting these talks if they were to allow US to achieve design of continuing seizure of Taiwan by any formula or any way. If US should in any way still cling to illusion that his side might in any way concede or capitulate to this position my side it would be futile.

26. Wang said as regards mentioning of Taiwan in our declaration he should say that this was precisely what they had done in their draft of October 27. They had asked me to choose from two drafts of their side. If I were really concerned with mentioning Taiwan area, then why not accept their draft October 27.

27. Wang said I had said I would be ready listen and consider any thoughts he might have. His thoughts were very simple. As he had said they have two drafts. I might choose either these two. He also hoped at

our next meeting I would be able make choice from these two drafts so that our talks would move forward. If I had no other matters at hand he would like raise another matter with me.

28. Reading from prepared but handwritten statement Wang continued. He must lodge serious protest against my side over outrage of my authorities in causing death of Chinese student Mr. Daniel Pao. Pao went to US in 1948 study civil engineering at University of Florida. He applied return after receiving master's degree 1950. However my authorities refused him permission and put him under surveillance. This was an overwhelming pressure on his mind. In May 1952 in order strengthen surveillance over him my authorities forcibly sent him sanatorium on pretense his contracting TB. Two months later he mysteriously died obviously he died as result persecution of him by my authorities.

29. Wang said I had often repeated in our meetings pledge that my side had never persecuted Chinese nationals. But no amount sophistry could cover up fact such persecution. He must again demand my side promptly stop such wanton persecution against Chinese nationals and give responsible account death Mr. Pao.

30. Wang said next he would also appreciate any information about these Chinese students and nationals he had asked me to make investigation of and if there any information available he would be ready listen to it. Also he continued await reply from me about status Chinese in US prisons.

31. I said I wondered what extent his government was willing go in attempt make these absurd allegations regarding Chinese in US in order attempt confuse people regarding their failure release people they said they would release on September 10 last year. His statement regarding Mr. Pao apparently came down allegation that US maintains institutions called sanatoriums where we liquidate people for reasons which are not clear. I had heard many allegations concerning my country over years but I must say this was new one. Liquidation of people or their execution without public and due process of law was something that happily not known my country, contrary situation in other countries with other forms government.

32. I said simply on basis information he had given regarding Pao it appeared very simple case of somebody who contracted TB, was sent to one of sanatoriums which maintained throughout US for treatment this disease, and unfortunately he did not recover. To jump from that to statement that he obviously died of persecution was conclusion that even most gullible person knowing anything about my country could not accept.

33. I said I had not brought into our conversations here what I could only call the barbarous treatment that Americans imprisoned

his country had undergone. People who had died in his prisons and who we had only heard of years later, people who had emerged from his prisons broken in mind and body, people who will never forget the terror, the physical treatment they received—I had not discussed them here, but if it his desire do so I could certainly well do so. These not been isolated experiences but been common experiences not only Americans but of people other nationalities. However, when we came here to begin these discussions I said I did not want engage recriminations with regard past but would look to future and I continue do so.

34. I said one of best and most recent examples I knew of way his authorities carrying out commitment they made was that exemplified in case Father Houle. He would recall I specifically mentioned his case October 20. We had now learned that on October 30, just ten days later, this man who had been under arrest since 1953 was finally tried and sentenced long term imprisonment. It hard call this permitting his expeditious return to US. Over three months have now passed without single one Americans, who subjects our September 10 announcement being permitted return. It dismal record.

35. Wang said he must say I had again failed give proper answer to what he raised. Allegations made regarding Americans in China entirely without factual basis. Even in these unjustified allegations my side I had not been able cite single instance in which measures against law-abiding Americans his country had been taken. I not been able cite any instance in which people different skin color had been put to death without any legal procedures. Such barbarous act against humanity could never happen his country.

36. Wang said yet cases unhappy Mr. Liu mentioned previously and Mr. Pao whose name told me this morning were examples how people could be turned into madmen or dead men. I had said this was something new me. He would not say it anything new, but would say it frightening revelation. It extremely inhuman act. It most barbarous act. It immense insult against civilized people. They shocked when heard this incident. Pao did not die any disease, but died result obstructions and persecution against him. It be unconceivable if U.S. did not correct this act.

37. I said I willing let world judge. I had nothing more this morning.

38. Wang said world will know in whose country most barbarous outrages have taken place.

39. I asked if he had anything more. He said no. I suggested next meeting Thursday March 29. He agreed.

Gowen

**550A. Letter 35 to Johnson**

Washington, March 23, 1956

[Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Letter text missing in the file.]

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**551. Telegram 1804 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 27, 1956, 7:51 p.m.

1804. For Johnson.

Guidance for March 29 meeting.

1. Review course discussions on return of civilians. Remind Wang this was first item for discussion and its early and satisfactory settlement would have provided solid basis for further progress. Early optimism engendered this country by release some Americans and issuance Agreed Announcement long ago replaced by disillusionment. US Government and people cannot understand why Chinese Communists deliberately choose flout their pledged word if they have serious desire improve relations with US. Failure carry out their public commitment September 10 and attempt obscure this failure by vague unfounded charges concerning treatment Chinese in US can only be interpreted as intended place pressure on US for political concessions. This maneuver cannot succeed. If Chinese Communists seriously intend reach understanding with US on outstanding issues between us they must start by fulfilling their pledge release Americans.

2. On renunciation force maintain posture of being willing consider any Chinese Communist amendments which would not do violence basic principles our January 12 draft. Criticize their "take it or leave it" attitude regarding their two drafts.

3. We understand how difficult it is for you carry on these discussions and continue repeat arguments and restate positions made many times before. The skill, ingenuity and good temper which you have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-2756. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and Phleger; cleared by McConaughy and Sebald.

shown in face of Wang's provocative and belligerent conduct is admirable. It is desirable that these talks continue and extremely important that any break should be on Wang's initiative and in such a way as to be clearly demonstrable to public. We know you have in mind that you must furnish no basis for any claim that you caused break.

**Hoover**

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**552. Telegram 1809 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 28, 1956, 5:49 p.m.

1809. For Johnson.

Following for your background.

1. Re Wang's reference last meeting to General Harris statement, Taipei Weeka 12 states local press erroneously quoted Harris as saying US would give air support if Communists attacked Matsuo. US public information officer following day denied that General Harris had made statement attributed to him. Consider your best tactic avoid any comment this subject as you did last meeting.

2. Re your letter March 15 only discussion between Secretary and Nehru on China problem summarized Dulles 22 rptd Geneva 1772. There was no repeat no discussion of Indian functions under Agreed Announcement. Indians have never expressed dissatisfaction at cooperation afforded them by Department in carrying out their functions, although in certain respects they have indicated sympathy with broader interpretation of their functions under Agreed Announcement favored by Chinese Communists.

3. INS has assured us Chinese students do not repeat not have to "apply to return". They are, of course, required to show they have discharged income tax obligations.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-2856. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Phleger, Sebald, McConaughy, and in SOA.

553. Letter 26 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 26

Geneva, March 28, 1956

Dear Walter:

I came back last night from Prague and found your most interesting letter No. 35. I am not particularly surprised at the news it contained nor with the PRC proposal which I am inclined to think is genuine and not just a brainchild of Krishna's. As you know, I have thought all along that they want to do business with us, on their terms of course, but they find our terms on renunciation of force too hard for them. I think that they are substantially right in saying that accepting our formulation would in fact be an acceptance by them of the *status quo*. And at present they feel entirely too self-confident and sure of themselves to feel under any compulsion to accept the *status quo*, particularly with respect to the offshore islands.

It is apparent that they feel that they can get easier terms from us if they can find some way to by-pass the Department. Hence their stipulation that our man be a direct representative of the President and not a career Foreign Service officer. This may also indicate that they are having some second thoughts about a Foreign Ministers' meeting.

As far as my talks here are concerned, while on the one hand they may be reluctant to break this contact as long as they feel there is any chance of it developing into something further, and are reluctant to accept the onus for breaking them, on the other hand they may shortly come to the point where they estimate that only by bringing about a break (possibly accompanied by increased actual or threatened stepping up of military activity in the Taiwan area) can they bring maximum pressure on us. In any event, I reluctantly come to the conclusion that these talks are going to be sterile of further results, and the length of time they will continue very problematical unless I am able to introduce some new element. I feel I have gone to the very outer limits of my instructions in holding out a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow to them and in trying to get across the thoughts contained in Senator George's letter to the Secretary. I also feel that I have gone as far as I can in the other direction without getting so far down the slippery slope which would lead up to a break that I would not be able to draw back. I know that the Department appreciates that this leaves fairly narrow limits within which I can operate.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Top Secret; Official-Informal; Eyes Only. Johnson signed the original "Alex."



In connection with the Department's recent guidances, including the guidance for tomorrow's meeting, you can be sure that unless clearly and specifically instructed I am never going to bring about a break and will do my maximum to avoid giving him any basis for claiming I have caused a break. Perhaps my telegrams have at times indicated a greater degree of frustration and exasperation than I have intended and possibly given rise to a little concern I might sometime go too far in a meeting, but you can be sure that I will do my best not to do so. I full well realize that this is a situation which completely transcends in importance any personal feelings I may have and I will not give way to them. I do appreciate the kind and generous words in paragraph 3 of the Department's 1804. I assure you that they give me a big lift. I assume the Department approves of my tactics at a few of the recent meetings of not attempting to drag out the meeting in the face of Wang's unwillingness to enter into any real discussion but close it off after I have made my points.

Thanks very much for the new Defense material on prisoners. I do not clearly understand whether it is supposed to include all of whatever "accounting" the Communists rendered at Panmunjom in February of this year. I have not yet found any specific mention of this "accounting" under any of the individual names in the new book and the only information I have received on this was Deptel 1695. That telegram indicated that of the 2,720 missing UNC personnel 1,084 were carried on the list as "no data available." I am curious as to what information was given as regard to the others and whether it covered any Americans. I am also interested in information on how to reconcile this new list with the previous list. From a cursory examination of the new list it indicates that it now contains a total of 438 names (243 Army, 5 Navy, 3 Marine and 187 Air Force) which represents a reduction of 67 (55 Army, 10 Marine, 4 Air Force, plus 2 additional Navy) over the August 1, 1955 list. This comes out to a total of 505 whereas the August 1 list was 450. Perhaps a further detailed study which I hope to make will explain this, but I would appreciate any readily available information on how these figures are to be reconciled. I am immediately sending back by surface pouch rather than burdening Stanley's baggage with them the briefing book for Hammarskjold and the previous roster from Defense of missing American personnel which I presume you mean by "prisoner book." I am not clear as to what else you mean by the latter and if this is not correct, please let me know.

I will be looking forward to the arrival of Holdridge.

To break the monotony, Pat and Jennifer are coming down here Thursday and we plan to drive up to Paris on Friday to spend the Easter

weekend. I have only been through on rush trips with the Secretary and Pat had never seen it so this seems like a good opportunity, and I hope that neither Wang nor the Czechs spoil my plans.

My very best to all,

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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#### 554. Telegram 1706 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, March 29, 1956, 9 p.m.

1706. From Johnson.

1. Calm and mild one and a half hour meeting this morning with Wang soliciting and even urging new draft by U.S. and I tossing ball back to his court.

2. I opened meeting with prepared statement incorporating paragraphs 1 and 2, Department telegram 1804. Wang made no attempt to meet, but receding from take it-or-leave-it attitude on their October 27 and December 1 drafts, stated "If U.S. still found those drafts unacceptable, U.S. should put forward new constructive proposal and submit new draft". I, of course, countered pointing out by all logic and normal negotiating procedures it was their turn put forward draft if they genuinely shared our desire for declaration. Much inconclusive fencing during remainder of meeting on point of who should submit new draft.

3. His reply my statement on implementation was very brief, reiterating in low key charges U.S. not carrying out agreed announcement and stating if U.S. has in mind only Americans in China and does not give due consideration problem Chinese in U.S., "this problem can never be resolved". Again raised failure account Chinese in prison and on lists given me and asked for information on Pao's "mysterious" death.

4. He proposed and I agreed to next meeting Monday April 9. In order I could make plans I asked whether he would agree next

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-2956. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

following meeting Thursday April 19. He asked decision be deferred until next meeting and I told him I expected make proposal April 19 meeting that time.

Gowen

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**555. Telegram 1707 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 29, 1956, 4 p.m.

1707. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting:

Believe Wang considers that his shift today from former take it or leave it attitude with respect his October 27 and December 1 drafts was move on their part to get talks off dead center, and that next move is up to us. Do not believe he will submit any new draft next meeting. However I feel his move today gives us opportunity present new draft without same disadvantages as heretofore, if we desire do so.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–2956. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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**556. Telegram 1709 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 29, 1956, 5 p.m.

1709. From Johnson.

1. I opened 42nd meeting with prepared statement saying I was very disturbed at course of last few meetings, as well as at apparent

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–2956. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

absence of intent Wang's government take those simple and fundamental steps that could lead to improvement our relations.

2. I said I had come here last year with high hopes that two of us could, notwithstanding obvious difficulties, find solutions to more pressing practical problems existing between our two countries and thus open road to mutually satisfactory resolution other matters. Success in this could mean much to our two peoples as well as to all other peoples. My hopes had not yet been realized but I felt that issues were too important to permit discouragement or impatience.

3. I said my government proposed and his government agreed first item to be resolved was return of civilians. It was well known when we came here this fundamentally involved from US standpoint question Americans imprisoned in his country or denied exit permits.

4. I said his government had professed concern over question restrictions imposed during Korean war by my government on departure of some few Chinese students with militarily useful technical training. It was well known that all other Chinese have at all times been free to depart if they desired to do so. As I had told him at outset of these talks removal these restrictions had been completed by that time. No amount vague and unfounded charges concerning Chinese in US or introduction extraneous issues could obscure fact. Third party arrangement he had suggested to confirm Chinese in US desiring return his country were free to do so had in fact confirmed it.

5. I said at very outset these talks I had spoken of importance satisfactory resolution problem of Americans in his country. I had pointed out then, and have continued to point out in every way which I am capable, that early and satisfactory settlement this problem would have provided solid basis for further progress. At time we issued agreed announcement I had pointed out very favorable effects its prompt and faithful execution by his government could have on our relations. I had often pointed out to him here optimism over future our relations that was engendered in my country by issuance announcement and release some Americans effected by his government at that time. These releases were understandably taken as grounds for hoping that there would in fact be full implementation agreement and that this unnecessary irritant our relations thereby removed. However, as long months had passed since then, this optimism had, I greatly regretted to say, naturally been replaced by a sense of disillusionment. It simply impossible for my government and people understand why his authorities chose continue flout their pledged word in our agreed announcement of last September 10, if there is serious desire really to improve relations with my country. They could only interpret attempt obscure this failure by resort to vague charges concerning treatment Chinese in my country, charges which every American and every person familiar

with my country immediately recognized as unfounded, as attempt to place pressure my country for political concessions. I said I had consistently pointed out that such policy could only be counterproductive. I could not stress too often or too strongly that if his authorities seriously intended to reach understanding with my government on issues outstanding between us there must be fulfillment of first agreement reached between us, our agreed announcement of September 10 last year, that is, Americans still detained in his country must be released. I did not know how I could make words any plainer, or how I could better persuade him of overriding importance this matter. And if I had again spoken at some length on it, it was because of my desire to stress its importance and implications for future of our relations.

6. I said we both agreed that next important practical problem confronting us was situation existing in Taiwan area. In this regard first and most urgent task was to assure that our differences with regard to this problem would not lead to war. I said my proposition was and is very simple—it is just that while we disagree about issues there, we agree we will not plunge our peoples or world into war about them but will discuss them as rational human beings. In putting forward a method of stating this proposition I had tried to respect his views and even offered specifically to agree to his saying that it would be clearly understood that whatever was said was without prejudice to peaceful pursuit of his policies.

7. I said yet he was unwilling to accept this simple proposition. He saw tricks where there were no tricks. He split hairs about what he termed international and domestic matters in an apparent attempt to obtain declaration which would sanction use of force by his country whenever it felt its desires with regard to Taiwan area were not being met. He said he would not agree peacefully to discuss matter unless I first agreed with him that meeting between our two Foreign Ministers was only way it could be discussed. He said his ears were closed to further negotiations on text of any declaration and only choice open to us was between two drafts which he had submitted embodying his points of view. In short his position seemed to be one of renewing his threat to resort to force unless I surrendered to his demand that there be prior agreement to immediate holding of meeting our Foreign Ministers.

8. I said I continued to hope this not his real position and that if he continued to object to form in which I incorporated my amendments to his December 1 draft in my January 12 draft, he would this morning offer alternative language that would enable us proceed to negotiation of meaningful declaration that would honestly assure world that we do not intend to go to war about our differences but would strive to seek their settlement in spirit of peace and goodwill.

9. Wang replied (speaking only from notes) he must say he disappointed after listening my statement and surprised I had again indulged in unfounded charges concerning Americans in China. He noted I had failed give concrete opinion on question of making declaration between us. I did not seem to have put forward any fresh or constructive opinion which would enable further progress our talks. When we now meeting 42nd time between us he did not see how I thought it would help talks to renew old contentions they had repeatedly refuted in course talks.

10. Wang said when he came these talks last year he also had goodwill and desire resolve differences between us and thus open road to practical settlement differences and improvement relations between us. They also well aware present talks between us not only concerned our two peoples but also have important bearing on peace in whole Far East. If we genuinely desirous settling outstanding issues between us and thus improving relations between us we should accordingly make effort resolve disputes between two countries Taiwan area by peaceful negotiations instead of going to war to resolve them.

11. Wang said if we have these desires it not matter words but of deeds. Even on question of issuance of declaration between us which we now discussing he could hardly find such a desire on part of US. Proposal for making such declaration between us was initiated by my side. They went along with this idea. Two drafts presented by their side and which we had often discussed lately had actually been put forward after due consideration been given my opinions as well as their opinions. These two drafts should therefore be acceptable both us.

12. Wang said in regard these two drafts there no element of coercion in least. As he repeatedly been making clear amendments submitted by me were not acceptable his side. After so much discussion situation confronting us, seemed to him, if I could not find drafts his side acceptable to US (repeat US) then I should put forward constructive new proposals and submit new drafts which I deemed reasonable. Only in this way could spirit of negotiation be demonstrated.

13. Wang said if I refuse accept their proposals and their drafts on one hand while refusing produce new drafts of my own he did not see how could proceed any farther. Therefore if I had genuine desire make progress in talks and eventually reach agreement on question of declaration in talks, he would hope I would be able submit new and concrete proposal and draft on behalf US.

14. Wang said next he wanted discuss question return civilians. I had in my statement made many unfounded charges against his side. All these charges he must reject. I had not fair attitude when I discussed this problem. It must be clear that agreement last September 10 between us was agreement on question civilians both sides. If I only

had in mind 13 Americans in China while neglecting fact there innumerable Chinese in US who have not been able return—in view this situation how could relations between us be improved on this question of civilians? In dealing with this problem if one only has in mind one side, without due consideration other side he would say this problem could never be resolved.

15. Wang said he might bluntly inform me that Chinese Government and people have every day been asking this question: Why US so far been refusing implement agreement and still obstructing return and still refusing give accounting Chinese imprisoned US? He had here in these meetings requested we look into situation 42 Chinese and he not yet received any information from me.

16. Wang said today he would like bring up question four more Chinese in US who not able return his country. Information about them contained this paper which he handing me (names in following telegram). He again requested I make investigation these four individuals.

17. Wang said about case Mr. Pao, which he raised last meeting—mysterious death Mr. Pao cannot be explained Chinese people and Chinese Government. They request account by me as to cause his death and actually how he died in US. He would say this question humanitarianism.

18. I said first regarding question our declaration I must say I not entirely able follow his logic. He would recall history our negotiations on this. As he mentioned I made proposal for declaration first on October 8. He presented draft on October 27. I explained reasons why US did not consider draft satisfactory and presented new draft November 10. He did not find that acceptable and on December 1 he presented draft. I carefully explained why, although I thought December 1 draft represented some advance over his previous position, I felt it defective some respects and, withdrawing my November 10 draft, I presented draft on January 12 in which I incorporated amendments which I considered essential to make his December 1 draft meaningful declaration.

19. I said if his statements regarding his desire issue such declaration and to find point at which our views could be reconciled have any meaning, it certainly by all laws logic and normal negotiating procedures up to him at this time to submit alternative suggestions if he still did not agree my January 12 draft.

20. I said I tried my best in January 12 draft to produce something which I felt met both our points of view and which I felt he would find acceptable. That draft fully incorporated our views regarding his December 1 draft. If we going get ahead on this and if he really desired get ahead on this it clearly up to his side produce alternative that meets essential points contained my January 12 draft.

21. I said I had not taken any arbitrary positions on this and I had in past and continued to express willingness give consideration any thoughts he might have on how thoughts expressed my January 12 draft might be better stated. I had hoped that this morning he would have such suggestions which would enable us get on it. I, of course, disappointed that he had not. I hoped he would have at our next meeting so we could again resume progress on this.

22. I said with regard to civilians I had little to add to what I already said. What I said was very carefully considered and as I pointed out, very important. I only wanted add that statements here, statements on radio, press, vaguely charging that Chinese in US desiring return his country were not able do so, did not constitute facts or evidence that such is case.

23. I said very clear objective test was set up to determine whether or not our agreement regarding civilians was being carried out both sides. This test was third-power arrangement. That test had provided very clear and irrefutable evidence as to who was and who was not carrying out our September 10 agreed announcement.

24. I said in list he gave me this morning I noticed in case Mr. Chen and Dr. Wang he referred to their having made application for permission return. His information this regard, I could only say, simply could not be correct. I had said over and over again here, and I categorically repeating, that any alien in US including any Chinese alien who desired depart US makes no application to US Government or any authorities for permission leave.

25. I said we had no exit visa, exit permit, or any other such requirement regarding departure from US by alien. He simply goes down, buys ticket on boat or airplane and goes. I did not ask him accept my word on this. Anyone familiar with US, including Indian Embassy, knows this to be fact and can confirm this to him.

26. Wang said again on question of declaration in statement I had just made I had spoken about this question in such way as to say that "if Chinese side desires make such declaration Chinese side should do thus and so". Now he must ask me whether this indicated US not willing make such declaration.

27. I said I did not quite follow his point.

28. Wang said he might quote actual words. I had said if his statements regarding desire issue declaration and find point on which our views can be reconciled—"et cetera". It appeared from my statement that I said if his side desired make such statement his side should undertake produce what I had termed alternative suggestions. In view this statement he might ask me if this indicated there no such desire make such declaration on my part. I referred to declaration as desire on their part.



29. I said I did not follow his point. I had submitted draft which I had hoped met his point view as well as our point view and upon which we could find agreement. He had not so far found that acceptable and had said that only choice we had was to choose between his two previous drafts. Last draft before us was one incorporating my amendments his December 1 draft.

30. I said my point simply was that by all laws logic and normal negotiating procedures, if his desire was to find draft on which agreement could be reached, it clearly up to his side to submit alternatives that they would find acceptable and would incorporate thoughts it contained, I had expressed willingness consider any thoughts he might have this regard. I did not know how I could be any more reasonable or show any greater desire to push ahead with essential task of issuing such declaration. My assumption had been that there had been an equal desire to reach such declaration.

31. Wang said if as I said both sides desire to reach agreement then, of course, I could not ask one of two sides arbitrarily to do what I had said.

32. I asked what was there arbitrary about normal, natural and logical procedure of doing such things?

33. Wang said problem was way I had put things in my statement which created impression that it only Chinese side which had been so desirous make such declaration. That why he felt necessary to clarify this matter. If we put things as if one side had desire and other side was without such desire, then pattern our discussions would be quite different.

34. Wang said if matter confronting us was, as I put it, that both us had desire reach agreement then his position regarding making declaration has been quite clear and he had repeatedly indicated January 12 draft presented by me unacceptable his side. And again I had not been able state definitely whether I could accept two drafts submitted by him. I had failed accept two drafts his side despite fact these drafts incorporated points view both us.

35. Wang said so that we could get ahead on this matter it was hoped I would produce new reasonable and constructive formula. And so he looked forward to any new proposals and opinions which I would put forward our next meeting. He desired know if I was going make such new and reasonable proposal next meeting.

36. I said I had already said if there were equal desire get ahead on this certainly all logic and normal negotiating procedures would require him to present some constructive suggestion our next meeting that would meet points view I had expressed here regarding his December 1 draft and I would hope at next meeting he would have such suggestions.

37. Wang said if issuance this declaration was equal desire both us the effort to make progress should be forthcoming from both sides. If I on one hand would not accept their drafts but on other hand would not put forward new proposals it hard him call this attitude of reasonable negotiating.

38. Wang said on matter return civilians if return Chinese in US so simple and straightforward that they need only go to buy ticket on boat or plane for passage home and there been no requirements whatever to do with US authorities, then it would seem be entirely to no purpose his bringing up cases 46 Chinese in US these meetings. It would be highly desirable on their part if rosy picture I painted were actually true in case Chinese.

39. I said I had nothing more this morning.

40. Wang said he looked forward to new proposals forthcoming from me next meeting.

41. I said it up to him. I presented last draft.

42. Wang quipped these meetings are negotiations—we not playing football.

43. I suggested next meeting Thursday April 5. Wang suggested Monday, April 9.

44. I said that was all right. What was his thought regarding meeting after that so I could make plans.

I would suggest meeting Thursday following week, 19th. Wang said we might discuss that matter next meeting. I said I would probably so propose at next meeting.

**Gowen**

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**557. Telegram 1713 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 29, 1956, 10 p.m.

1713. From Johnson.

Following list four names handed me by Wang 42nd meeting:

*[text not declassified]*

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-2956. Official Use Only.

**558. Letter 36 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 36

Washington, April 2, 1956

Dear Alex:

With reference to my last letter No. 35, of March 23, 1956, I am now enclosing copies of the two highly classified memoranda of Krishna Menon's recent conversations in Washington, with Sherman Adams and [*text not declassified*]. I am sending you the text of these two documents since the flavor is somewhat different from that described in my last letter. My description was based on an oral briefing given me by [*text not declassified*]. My last letter was written before I had seen the memo of conversation with [*text not declassified*]. My oral briefing was based on a conversation of [*text not declassified*] and may more accurately convey the tenor of the conversation than the written memo. I have no way of judging that, but in any event we think that you should have the written summary of the conversation.

We discussed this latest Krishna Menon move with the Secretary shortly after I wrote you last. His reaction was that the move was probably an effort by the Chinese Communists to take an intermediate step in the direction of an eventual Foreign Ministers' Meeting. His off-hand reaction was that we had nothing to gain by assenting to Krishna Menon's suggestion, and that we would be walking into a trap if we did.

We all anticipate that Nehru may follow up on Krishna Menon's initiative when he comes to Washington in July. This looks as if it is preparatory to a more active espousal of this proposal on the part of the Indians.

Wang's more flexible and moderate attitude at the last meeting on March 29 amply confirms our feeling that the Chinese Communists are not contemplating an immediate break. Mr. Robertson is in Richmond today but we will have a meeting in ample time to consider the latest developments and get your instructions to you before the next meeting a week from today.

Drumwright rather objects to giving up Holdridge for any extended period. He points out that the important reporting on Mainland China developments from Hong Kong will suffer. With the pattern of the talks now getting pretty set, and with the big job of revision

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Eyes Only; Official-Informal.

of the possible White Paper now finished, we may have to consider cutting you down to one advisor in the near future. Do you feel that you could get along reasonably well with just one man in addition to Col. Ekvall?

Regards and good wishes,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McCaughy**

**Enclosure**

**Memorandum from Hoover to Dulles<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, March 21, 1956

Enclosed is a memo of conversation between Gov. Adams, Krishna Menon and Ambassador Mehta. The meeting was at the suggestion of the Indians.

We supplied Gov. Adams with appropriate briefing memoranda prior to the meeting.

**Herbert Hoover, Jr.**

**Enclosure**

**Memorandum from Adams to Hoover<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, March 19, 1956

SUBJECT

Meeting with Krishna Menon and Ambassador Mehta on March 19, 1956

The purpose of the meeting seemed to center upon the suggestion made by Krishna Menon that overtures should now be made toward a meeting between the Communist Chinese Government and the Americans. The rationale of the suggestion was based on the desirability of exploratory discussions toward the resumption of diplomatic and trade relations.

Prompted by a reference to the possibility of the Formosan question being raised, it was readily admitted that the matter would unquestionably come up, but that the inclusion of Chiang Kai-shek in any such meeting was an obstacle which ought not to be permitted to intervene.

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<sup>2</sup> Confidential. Copies were sent to Murphy, Robertson, and Allen.

<sup>3</sup> Personal and Confidential.

In answer to my emphasis upon the showing by the Chou En-lai Government of good faith and the willingness and ability to support and maintain guaranties and commitments respecting Far Eastern territorial integrities and like questions, Menon made the statement that those were precisely the points that the Chinese themselves raised in their discussion of possible negotiations. The purpose of any such conference in Menon's mind was designed principally to show that a meeting could develop both solutions and good will. In answer to my questions he suggested such a meeting could be held in Vienna, and would be attended by Chou En-lai and a Presidential designee. He thought the Secretary of State would doubtless be too much engaged.

The Indian Ambassador spoke of the Nehru visit. Apparently he wished to convey that the change in Nehru's plans had been brought about only with considerable effort.

No mention of nuclear tests or disarmament was made, and German reunification came up only with perfunctory reference, mainly by Menon's reference to the fact that he had never believed that the Soviets should oppose free discussions between the peoples of divided Germany.

SA

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**559. Telegram 1836 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 3, 1956, 7:13 p.m.

1836. Verbatim text. For Johnson.

We are considering having you introduce following reformulation renunciation force announcement at April 19 repeat April 19 meeting:

**QUOTE**

1. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and Ambassador Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree to announce without prejudice to the pursuit by each side of its policies

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-356. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy and in substance by Phleger.

by peaceful means or its inherent right of individual or collective self-defense:

2. The People's Republic of China and the United States of America are determined that they should settle disputes between their two countries through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere;

3. The two Ambassadors should continue their talks to seek practical and feasible means for the realization of this common desire. UNQUOTE

We believe above reformulation, while not dropping any elements we consider essential, provides opportunity for Chinese Communists to abandon previous adamant position without loss of face, should they be inclined do so. From US point of view it has advantage constituting further effort on our part find suitable formula and thus permit us maintain strong public position. If this reformulation is adopted we are thinking of having you tell Wang at next meeting that US giving further study to renunciation of force announcement and might have proposal make at following meeting.

Reformulation has not yet been considered by Secretary. Would appreciate your comments.

Dulles

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## 560. Telegram 426 from Prague<sup>1</sup>

Prague, April 5, 1956, 7 p.m.

426.

1. Following are my comments on text re formulation contained Deptel 1836. A. Do not see any advantage from our standpoint of inclusion at this stage phrase "to the pursuit by each side of its policies by peaceful means." Also do not believe it makes paragraph any more palatable for CHICOMS who have already rejected it as part of November 10 draft. If Department concurs in its inclusion I would in any event prefer to leave it out of initial draft and be authorized offer its inclusion during course of debate if appeared be useful tactic.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-556. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Geneva as telegram 36.

B. In light foregoing as well as from standpoint style suggest following for phrasing latter portion first paragraph “Agree, without prejudice to the inherent right of each side to individual or collective self-defense, to announce:” (if phrase mentioned subparagraph “A” above included suggest same order of words, that is “agree” at beginning of clause and “to announce” at end.)

C. With respect paragraph 2 suggest substitution of “means” for “negotiations” and “and that” for “without” as in our January 12 draft for reasons considered that time. If Department willing accept wording this paragraph set forth Deptel 1836 would still prefer adhere formulation as in our January 12 draft and be authorized offer accept form this portion December 1 draft during course debate if appeared be useful tactic.

2. Do not believe there much likelihood that CHICOMS will accept any of the foregoing formulations as “individual and collective self-defense” has now become such a red flag to them. Therefore likely issue will again become crystallized around those words in spite of their repositioning. However believe introduction such reformulation provides useful material for several subsequent meetings, gives CHICOMS opportunity to move if they are looking for way to do so, and greatly improves our public position.

3. However, dependent on our immediate objectives suggest consideration could alternatively be given to inclusion some general phrase in first paragraph such as “without prejudice inherent rights either side” which would preserve our position, make draft much harder for CHICOMS to reject and should give us even better public position if they do so. However, anything of this nature would have to be done in initial new draft as reintroduction of self-defense clause may again face us with situation where its acceptance by Wang or alteration by us could appear as yielding on substance Taiwan area dispute.

4. Am returning Geneva Saturday.

**Johnson**

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**561. Telegram 1841 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 5, 1956, 1:43 p.m.

1841. For Johnson.

Guidance for April 9 meeting.

1. Maintain strong position that Chinese Communists must implement their commitment release imprisoned Americans. Tell Wang that Chinese Communists should discard any illusion that their continued failure live up to their agreement will gain them political advantages. Also that failure carry out in good faith agreement already made is unpropitious basis for attempt make further agreements.

2. FYI We have asked General Swing ascertain from appropriate authorities whether all fifty Chinese aliens now known to be in Federal and State prisons can be released for deportation. If this can be done, we can consider whether their deportation would be advantageous move in securing release of Americans. Our reasoning is that this might improve our public position vis-a-vis Chinese Communists and Indians, increase pressure on Chinese Communists release Americans, and provide face-saving pretext for them do so. Decision not repeat not taken as yet, but under consideration. Request your comment. Bearing this in mind, it appears desirable for Wang continue advance claim that Chinese in prison are covered by Agreed Announcement and entitled exercise right return to China, thus laying further basis for our claim regarding imprisoned Americans, and placing Communists in difficult position if Chinese in US prisons are deported. You should not of course intimate in any way we are considering extending our interpretation Agreed Announcement cover Chinese prisoners, but at same time avoid giving Wang opening to claim American prisoners not covered. END FYI

3. On renunciation force restate US position, but tell Wang positions both sides being restudied and intimate that new US draft may be forthcoming April 19.

4. Propose next meeting April 19.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-556. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and Phleger; cleared in substance by Dulles and by McConaughy and Sebald.



**562. Memorandum of Conversation, Robertson and Koo<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1956

SUBJECT

Geneva Talks

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador

Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE

Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Amb. Koo asked about the progress of the Geneva talks. Mr. Robertson said the situation was the same. There was no progress. The two sides at Geneva were repeating the same arguments over and over. It was about as if each side were playing a phonograph record.

In response to a question, Mr. Robertson confirmed that the Secretary was keeping in close touch with the Geneva talks. Our position on renunciation of force and the Chinese Communist obligation to release the American prisoners remained firm.

(See separate memoranda of conversation entitled, "Recent Asian Trip of Secretary Dulles", "Situation in Cambodia and Viet Nam", "Canadian Position on China Policy Questions".)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–656. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.

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**563. Letter 37 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 37

Washington, April 6, 1956

Dear Alex:

You were probably in Paris when we sent you the wire inviting your comments on the prospective rearrangement of our renunciation of force formula. We still want your comments, although since we sent you the initial telegram, the Secretary has approved the idea and your

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal.

guidance telegram for the next meeting has been dispatched. Since you will not submit the reformulation at the next meeting on April 9 but merely intimate there will be a new draft later, there is still time for us to consider your reaction.

Our thought is that the reformulation will provide a further test of Chinese Communist attitudes and will afford another token of our desire to reconcile the opposing positions. We have changed the reference to the Taiwan area so that it is no longer contiguous to the reference to the right of individual and collective self defense. We have adhered to the wording of their draft at every place where we could, and we have given them a peg on which they can gracefully hang a modification of their position, if they have any desire to come to an agreement. We doubt that they will accept the new formula but we at least have something to gain tactically by introducing it, and we do not depart from our essential position. The redraft is the work of Judge Phleger. It was approved by the Secretary on the afternoon of April 4 when he reviewed the entire course of recent developments at Geneva.

While there may not be much material for new discussions in this revision, it does at least give you a little something to chew on and should take care of the meetings through the 26th of April, which is the earliest date on which Wang could give a Peiping reply to a revised draft introduced on April 19.

We told you in the guidance telegram yesterday about our decision to have I & N. S. actually ascertain if deportation would be possible in each of the 50 cases of Chinese aliens in the U.S. penitentiaries. This is quite a project, but the preliminary survey seems worth while. Enclosed is a copy of our letter requesting the survey which gives our background thinking. We are aware of your view expressed in a recent letter that deportation of Chinese prisoners would not bring about the release of the American prisoners since the detention of the Americans is linked to political demands. We agree with you that the Chinese Communists are using the American prisoners to try to extort political concessions, including a Foreign Minister's Conference. But some of the people working on the matter at this end believe that the release of Chinese prisoners would at least give us a better club with which to hammer the Chinese Communists on the prisoner issue and might well put the Chinese Communists in dutch with even their neutralist friends if they fail to release the Americans following release of Chinese prisoners. Although you have commented at length on this matter in a recent letter to me we invited your reaction to this proposal so that we will be sure that we have your latest view on this, and also that we may have it in the official record.

I am not surprised that you discovered discrepancies in the figures given in the new Defense Department list of missing military personnel. NA discovered the same discrepancies in reviewing the figures and called them to the attention of Defense. Corrected sheets have been prepared by Defense for your book and are forwarded herewith. There is also enclosed an additional sheet with detailed information on Captain Malcolm Edens which should be filed under Tab 2 in your book.

There is enclosed a copy of the "accounting" given by the Chinese Communists in UNCMAC last February. We delayed sending it to you expecting a more detailed report from UNCMAC, but it later turned out that this was all they had. As you will see it is far from satisfactory. We have been working with Defense on an instruction to UNCMAC asking further specific questions about the accounting. This has not yet gone out due to clearance problems in Defense, but we expect it to go shortly and we will see that you get a copy. The feeling here in Panmunjom before we ask you to bring the matter up again in Geneva.

The Prisoner Book which we would like back if you do not need it is a gray loose leaf binder containing miscellaneous memoranda and other documents collected by Ed Martin when he was Prisoner Officer here. Please send it by air pouch. Dave Osborn should be familiar with it. With the increasing Congressional interest in the problem of Americans detained in Communist China, and queries as to what the Department has done about this problem in the past, we felt this book would be needed more here than in Geneva.

Mr. Robertson is having a little stomach trouble again and is supposed to be taking a rest in bed. However he is insisting on staying on the job for at least a couple of weeks. He is planning to take two weeks rest in bed around the end of this month.

It was good to get your letter No. 26. Messrs. Phleger, Robertson and Sebald read it too and we all found it of particular interest. We hope you and Pat had a good relaxing Easter weekend in Paris.

Regards and good luck,

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Additional Sheet for Tab 2 of Defense Book.
2. Copy of the "accounting" by Chinese Communists in UNCMAC.
3. Army Telegram No. FE 800650 from CINUNC Tokyo.
4. Copy of letter to General Swing.

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**564. Telegram 1735 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, April 8, 1956, 7 p.m.

1735. From Johnson.

Re paragraph 2 Department telegram 1841.

1. Am still of same opinion set forth Mytel 1572. Important note Wang has thus far not specifically advanced claim that Chinese in prison are covered (perhaps because he has considered it unnecessary in light my claim concerning coverage imprisoned Americans) but by agreed announcement for most part has rather attempted to maneuver me into position of admitting "distinction" between prisoners and "ordinary" civilians and that prisoners can only be released accordance our legal processes thus accepting justice his position with respect imprisoned Americans.

2. While deportation all rpt all imprisoned Chinese aliens, or deportation those willing to go with confirmation by Indians of those unwilling to go, would improve our position with public and Indians and constitute some pressure on CHICOMS for additional releases it would not assure release all rpt all Americans. CHICOMS could resist such pressure as this might constitute by continuing their major theme of U.S. "obstruction" to departure students and others. Unfortunately experience with Victor Chou and others indicates we cannot count on much help from students in demonstrating falsity CHICOM charges either to public or Peiping.

3. Political concessions will remain price for release all Americans. CHICOMS still estimate our primary objective these talks is release Americans, and once this accomplished we will cease any further movement toward adjustment relations.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-856. Secret; Limit Distribution.

**565. Telegram 1736 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, April 8, 1956, 7 p.m.

1736. From Johnson.

Stanley's orders expire April 13. If Holdridge or replacement will not arrive prior to April 19 meeting request extension Stanley's orders. Consider it absolutely essential someone be available during meetings with sole duty maintaining accurate notes so that Osborn can be free to advise and assist me as necessary. Have to anticipate this might well become more important in future than during recent meetings. It is not possible for Osborn to do both jobs and also believe any reduction my staff present at meetings, to only officer and interpreter would tend give impression we downgrading talks. Stanley's Chinese-language ability has also proven be very valuable and useful and would be desirable replacement also have language qualifications.

Therefore if Holdridge or other similar replacement cannot be detailed strongly renew my suggestion for over-complement assignment Stanley to ConGen Geneva as most efficient and economical use personnel.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–856. Official Use Only.

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**566. Letter 27 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 27

Geneva, April 8, 1956

Dear Walter:

I returned last night from Prague and was very interested in reading your letter No. 36 giving further details on Krishna Menon's recent conversations. I greatly appreciate your keeping me so fully and completely informed on this. It would seem from the written Memorandum

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Eyes Only; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." The enclosure is printed as Document 567.

of Conversation that Menon's approach carries more of the flavor of his own ideas than that of a message from Peiping. I would certainly agree that we should not at this time give any consideration to assenting to his suggestion. In fact, it seems to me that in some ways the meeting with someone designated as the President's personal and special envoy carries with it from our standpoint even greater disadvantages than a meeting of the Foreign Ministers. It is also quite obvious that it would tend to give the impression, which Peiping would probaly be quick to exploit, that there is a divergence of view between the President and the Department with respect to the Chinese Communists.

I am enclosing a separate letter on more general subjects.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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#### 567. Letter 28 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 28

Geneva, April 8, 1956

Dear Walter:

I was remiss in not letting you know that I had left Geneva and returned to Prague last week, my plans for a trip to Paris Easter having fallen through [*text not declassified*].

[*text not declassified*]

I was very disappointed to hear about Holdridge and today sent a telegram which summarizes my views. Obviously the man in Stanley's job is fully occupied only on meeting days and I am concerned that something can be worked out that will usefully occupy the person in that job the rest of the time. As I said in my telegram, I still think that Stanley's assignment to Geneva for consular training is a logical and efficient answer from every point of view. The pace of the meetings is of course not my choice and obviously my staff here is not heavily pressed. However, when I need people, I need them and it seems to me the issues are important enough to meet my very modest requirements. Dave has assisted Stanley in keeping notes and they provide a very

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

useful cross-check with each other. However, if Dave were to have full responsibility for the notes he would have to concentrate entirely on this and would be unable to offer me any advice or assistance. Even during the recent meetings I have found his advice very useful, he feeding me ideas that occur to him, providing some one with whom I can crosscheck my impressions of often very fine nuances, and searching through folders for materials that I may unexpectedly need. Wang has two men doing nothing but feeding him ideas and materials (his interpreter keeps their notes). It seems to me that I would be placed at a considerable disadvantage unless I am able to continue something comparable. All of this has, of course, not been of vital importance during recent meetings as issues have been very cut and dried. However, no one can predict when things might become more complicated and active and I cannot honestly feel I can do my best without something comparable to my present setup. Incidentally, as I mentioned in my telegram, although Ekvall is a splendid interpreter it is still very useful to have someone in the room with Stanley's knowledge of Chinese and by comparing impressions and discussing the matter he and Ekvall are often able to clarify subtle and obscure points often made by Wang and which come out only very imperfectly from his interpreter. Also, incidentally, it is entirely out of the question for Ekvall to keep full notes of the meeting.

In this regard, Ekvall's time will be up in June and we may well be having to persuade Defense for a new extension. I hope that you can pave the way on this so that there will not be too much trouble, as he is, of course, absolutely essential.

Also, Miss King's time will be up May 27. I will be very happy to have her stay and she is entirely willing to do so, although she naturally hopes to and should have her home leave before too much more time has passed. If she cannot be extended I would, of course, very much hope that some way could be worked out to send Helenka back here. This would be ideal from the standpoint of both Dave and myself. Incidentally, Dave is making very good use of his time studying Russian at his own expense. I have told him to write to the Department and see whether something could not be worked out that would pay for his lessons and give him credit for the work.

Spring is as slow in coming here as the Chinese Communists are in thawing with regard to the release of Americans. It is still very cold here in Geneva and we were having a really heavy snowstorm in Prague as I was leaving.

All the best to everyone.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**568. Telegram 1737 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, April 9, 1956, noon

1737. From Johnson.

1. Very mild one hour 10 minute meeting this morning.

2. Wang opened with statement hoping I would have constructive suggestions that would enable us to make progress. I replied with expression disappointment he had no concrete suggestions; unreasonable expect me offer suggestions meet his objections which I did not consider well-founded; willing cooperate find language meet both points of view and listen any suggestions he had consistent with principles I consider essential. I hoped that he would at this morning's meeting "at least have some thoughts that would enable me to give further detailed consideration this matter prior to our next meeting". He cut off any further discussion, moving to implementation.

3. Implementation was along familiar lines, he giving me three more names, I making points contained para one Deptel 1841. Although I gave him many openings to do so he seemed deliberately to avoid any mention whatever of Chinese prisoners in US, concentrating on "almost 50 names" he had given me for which I had not accounted. In my rebuttal I cited his failure give me any additional info on Yuan Jui-hsiang or reply to my request for medical records on Bradshaw and Kanady as well as focusing discussion on fact Indian Embassy has not yet brought to our attention single allegation of obstruction.

4. He demurred my suggestion next meeting April 19 pressing for Monday April 16 but finally yielded to Thursday April 19.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-956. Confidential; Limit Distribution.



**569. Telegram 1742 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, April 9, 1956, 7 p.m.

1742. From Johnson.

Departing for Prague morning April 10 returning Geneva April 17.

Have no comments on today's meeting other than those contained my telegram 1737.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–956. Official Use Only.

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**570. Telegram 1746 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, April 10, 1956, 10 p.m.

1746. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 43rd meeting, consulting notes to say he recalled at last meeting having said in order advance our talks he had hoped I would at present meeting be in position make new suggestions on subject issuance declaration and so he ready listen anything I had to say this subject.

2. I replied from prepared statement that it was I that hoped that he would have some new suggestions this morning. At our last meeting he took position that it up to me to offer suggestions meet objections he had voiced to amendments I offered January 12 to his draft December 1. As I explained him at time I found his position inexplicable if he really shared my desire arrive at agreement this subject. It obviously unreasonable expect me offer suggestions meet objections which I did not consider well-founded. As I had consistently stated I entirely willing cooperate finding language that would meet both our points view. I had consistently stated I would be willing listen any suggestions he had that were consistent those principles which I considered essential. I had long hoped careful detailed explanations

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–1056. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

I had made of our January 12 amendments would lead him perceive his objections thereto did not have real validity. Failing that I had hoped he would offer concrete suggestions for alternative language. If he did not have such concrete suggestions this morning I hoped he would at least this morning have some thoughts that would enable me give further detailed consideration this matter prior our next meeting.

3. Wang said he believed he had already made his points very clear at our last meeting. Therefore, he rather disappointed I had failed again offer fresh suggestions this morning this subject. It sincere hope his part that at next meeting I would be able do so by offering new suggestions. If I had no new suggestions put forth this morning he would like bring up another matter.

4. Wang said their attention been again called cases three Chinese in U.S. whose return being obstructed. He would now hand me names these three persons and would appreciate if I would make investigation their cases. Particularly case of Chou, even after agreement on civilians which reached last year between us was announced his return still been obstructed.

(Handed list—names following telegram). This seemed inexplicable his side.

5. Wang said to date he had made representations on nearly 50 persons, including names three persons he given me today. Almost three months had passed since he handed me first batch persons in his letter January 5 to me. So far I had not given any account or information regarding these persons nor had any one these come back China.

6. Wang said his side very dissatisfied with obstructions offered them in their return. Fact these people had not yet been able come back could hardly be reconciled with pledge for expeditious return in our agreement. All these people have desired return their motherland, but been prevented doing so up to now. Fact they been prevented from returning cannot be disputed. My side cannot escape or evade responsibility for unjustified obstructions against their return. His side will keep pressing this matter as long these people not being permitted return.

7. I said in this list names he given me this morning here I noticed that under name Chou statement made that after our agreement September 10 last year Mr. Chou "again applied return". I did not know upon what information he based these continued references these persons applying to return but I satisfied it not correct.

8. I said I had told him in past he need not accept my word that there no such thing in U.S. as aliens applying leave country. Indian Embassy or anyone else familiar my country could confirm this fact for him. I just did not know how make this clear him.

9. I said situation regarding aliens departing my country was just as clear, straightforward and simple as it is with regard aliens here in Switzerland, with which we both familiar. Or for that matter in any other country here in Western Europe, with which I sure he also familiar. He and I both knew that ourselves or any other foreigner here in Switzerland if he wants leave gets in his auto and drives to Annemasse or anywhere else without any exit permit, exit visa or any other procedures. Or he goes down to airport, buys ticket, gets on plane and goes anywhere he wants go. Situation very similar in U.S.

10. I said these people did not apply anybody to leave. They free go any time they desire. I just could not be any clearer or any more categorical in saying that they certainly not been obstructed by any authority in U.S.

11. I said it incredible that, in more than six months that had now passed since we made agreed announcement, if in fact any them being obstructed that at least one case would not have been brought our attention by third power arrangement established for just this purpose. To say that just because somebody does not return his country he being obstructed by my government simply does not bear light of facts.

12. I said in only one of cases he mentioned me here was there specific allegation of obstruction—that was case Yuan Jui-hsiang. I went into that case but information he gave me was not sufficient, as I told him sometime ago, enable me identify him. Some weeks ago I asked him for further information that would enable me go into case further. But I not yet received such information.

13. I said I might also mention that some weeks ago he asked me for medical records on Mr. Liu and I was pleased be able very promptly reply his request. I had also asked him for similar information and records regarding Mrs. Bradshaw and Kanady but had not received his reply.

14. I said facts were clearly that Chinese desiring return his country free do so. They steadily arriving his country from U.S.

15. I said situation regarding Americans still remains vastly different. It now approaching four months since last American released from his country to return U.S. I had pointed out many times here and would not go into details this morning that my people and my government increasingly feel these specific Americans who were clearly subject our agreed announcement were being held in expectation and hope of extracting political concessions from my government in exchange their return.

16. I said I had said over and over again and I again said this morning that no policy could be more mistaken. I found it very difficult understand why his government did not even in its own interest carry

out agreement with regard these specific Americans. Whole situation certainly does not establish very sound or hopeful basis to consider entering into new agreements.

17. I said facts of matter were that neither my government nor anyone else could consider that our agreement September 10 was really being carried out by his authorities with respect these specific Americans. I again renewed my request that this agreement be implemented and these Americans be permitted return.

18. Wang said my statement with regard ability of foreign nationals to depart freely sounded very good. He would very much like take my words here for granted. However, fact that nearly 50 persons, whose names given me, had not been able make departure and still under obstructions from doing so made it very hard accept my statement.

19. Wang said he entirely prepared accept information given by me regarding exit procedures currently being practiced in European countries including Switzerland. However, in Switzerland their Chinese nationals had never been subject obstructions their departure by Swiss authorities and he had never heard of such setup as immigration service in Switzerland. If situation was indeed similar to practice in Switzerland in which foreign nationals including Chinese nationals could freely make their departure, then it would have been entirely superfluous for both us to make agreement which we did last September.

20. Wang said specific persons whose names he had given me and whose number about 50 persons had in fact encountered obstructions and difficulties in departure. It a matter for steps to be taken to look into cases all these nearly 50 people and is not matter of one or two persons encountering obstructions.

21. Wang said in speaking about implementation our agreement last September, first of all they expect American side to implement or carry out agreement between us. For since agreement reached between us U.S. Government not known to have taken any necessary measures to help Chinese in U.S. make free departure. U.S. Government also has not taken measures to permit expeditious return of Chinese nationals. Any excuses with regard this matter cannot explain matter of return of Chinese. I had said I found it very difficult make this matter clear to them. Best method in which I could make this clear them was to allow these Chinese return.

22. I said if these people he had mentioned or any others really desire return and really felt they being obstructed, why was it that at least one them has not brought his case to attention Indian Embassy and if Indian Embassy felt there any substance his allegations it has not brought case attention my government?

23. Wang said he had told me reasons in this regard many times in past. Chinese nationals in U.S. were constantly under unreasonable oppression of U.S. INS and fact was that many people were not able make known their free will. This quite sufficient explain existing situation with regard Chinese.

24. I said I recalled as long ago as last December seeing public statement by Indian Embassy to effect it in communication with many Chinese in U.S. Certainly if any them alleging any obstructions by my government and Indian Embassy felt there any foundation for it, it would have said something us about it.

25. Wang said I had said Indian Embassy in communication with many Chinese in U.S. Did I mean that U.S. Government has already handed Indian Embassy lists Chinese in U.S.?

26. I said I only referring what Indian Embassy said. On December 20 Indian Embassy issued statement first paragraph of which reads: "Since Embassy India announced details repatriation procedure for Chinese in U.S. wishing return Chinese mainland, Embassy at Washington, D.C. and Consulates General of India New York and San Francisco have received inquiries and applications from Chinese seeking advice and assistance." Only citing this shows that as long ago as last December Indian Embassy said it in communication Chinese in U.S. Certainly if any real obstruction any these people, Indian Embassy would certainly called it our attention.

27. Wang said his information indicates Indian Embassy willing inform Chinese in U.S. of agreed announcement between us last year but Indian Embassy had found this job be very difficult because failure U.S. Government provide list Chinese in U.S. They continue hope U.S. Government would cooperate this matter by submitting such lists Indian Embassy so as help Embassy in fact communicate with Chinese. However all that only one aspect of solving this matter.

28. Wang said essential thing was what attitude U.S. Government was adopting with regard expeditious return Chinese. If U.S. Government would not openly abolish such unreasonable requirements as entry permits Taiwan and requirement application permanent residence U.S.—if U.S. Government fails take these steps, pressure hitherto exerted minds Chinese would not be relieved.

29. I said essential thing was whether U.S. in fact obstructing departure any Chinese in U.S. who in fact desires return his country. Fact was that not single fact showing any obstruction in any case has yet been demonstrated and I satisfied none would be. I wished it were same situation with regard 213 Americans his country.

30. Wang said greatest fact was that about 50 specific persons had not been able return. I had not yet given account about these about

50 persons. So long as every last one these people had not yet been able return, they would continue press this matter these meetings. They would continue do so until these people had in fact returned.

31. I said if he had nothing more I proposed next meeting Thursday April 19. Wang inquired whether I would consider April 16 Monday? I said that would be very difficult for me, and would much prefer Thursday April 19. Wang said he would not insist.

**Gowen**

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**571. Telegram 1856 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 10, 1956, 6:32 p.m.

1856. For Johnson. Your 1736.

Holdridge departing Paris for Geneva April 13 flight 738 Air France. Stanley to depart as planned.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-856. Official Use Only. Drafted by Serey (FE/EX); cleared in substance by Clough and Manning (R).

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**572. Telegram 1860 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 11, 1956, 7:05 p.m.

1860. For Johnson. Your 426 from Prague.

1. We believe restoration of phrase "to the pursuit by each side of its policies by peaceful means" in paragraph one strengthens our public position and provides you firmer stance from which rebut Wang's

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-1156. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy; cleared by Sebald and Phleger.

argument US trying trick Chinese Communists into recognizing status quo. Inclusion this phrase makes it unmistakably clear that in draft declaration we seeking only debar use force to alter status quo. Statement in fact reiterates what you have stated in discussions on numerous occasions.

2. We do not envisage use minor changes in wording as negotiating tactic unless at later stage it would appear that such minor textual changes would lead to final agreement. We prefer table text which will give us strongest public position in event break and thereafter avoid proposing minor changes for bargaining purposes.

3. Concur your suggestion place “agree” at beginning clause and “to announce” at end.

4. Your suggestions for revising paragraph 2 are good and would improve it somewhat from our point of view. However, we think this consideration is outweighed by psychological desirability of retaining unchanged as much as possible from Chinese Communist December 1 draft.

5. Re paragraph 3 Urtel, Dept not repeat not prepared authorize deletion reference to “individual and collective self-defense.” Broadness proposed substitute wording would permit Communists interpret so as to nullify their renunciation force pledge. Furthermore deletion of self-defense reference after we have insisted on its retention could be readily misrepresented by Communist side as implying that we have receded from our original position.

6. On basis above considerations, reformulation to be introduced April 19 should be that contained Deptel 1836 with change approved by (3) above.

7. Reformulation will be referred to as “Second US Revision of Chinese Communist December 1 Counterproposal.”

**Dulles**

**573. Telegram 324 to Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 12, 1956, 4:24 p.m.

324. For Amb Johnson.

Following is text Department's 1860 to Geneva:

QUOTE

(Code Room: Please repeat Department's 1860, Control 04671, April 11, 1956)

UNQUOTE

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-1256. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough.

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**574. Telegram 327 to Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 12, 1956, 9:22 p.m.

327. For Johnson.

Geneva's 1739. Close check through Department shows that no repeat no change in Department's position on passports valid for Communist China has taken place. Policy not to reexamine question prior to release of imprisoned Americans remains unaltered. Department unable to find any indication of recent approach by Catledge or any other New York Times representative on this subject.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-956. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Sebald, Robertson, Phleger, Donovan (EE), Chase (SCA), McIlvaine (P) and Macomber (S).



**575. Telegram 1874 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 13, 1956, 1:40 p.m.

1874. For Johnson.

(Code Room: Please repeat Department's telegram to Prague 327, Control 05588, April 12.)

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–1356. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy.

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**576. Letter 38 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 38

Washington, April 13, 1956

Dear Alex:

We are glad that you were able to get the 10 day interval between the last meeting and the next one. Everyone back here is aware that your life is a hard one while you must bear the heavy dual responsibility. The extra breathing space must be welcome.

You may have been somewhat disappointed with the Department's 1860, since the reasoning departed somewhat from yours. We went to some lengths in our telegram to spell out our rationalization so that you would not think your ideas had been summarily dismissed. I believe you will recognize the Department's position as tenable regardless whether you see completely eye to eye with us.

Judge Phleger in particular believes it is important to leave in the reference to the right of pursuit of policies by peaceful means, in order to undermine Wang's argument that we would trick him into accepting the status quo. Judge Phleger also thinks that it is very important from a psychological standpoint to adhere as closely as possible to the wording of the Communist draft. This will give more substance to our contention that we are going a long way to meet Wang's proposition

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal.

and that our limited amendments of his draft should not make the document unacceptable to him. We are willing to accept slightly less desirable wording in paragraph two in order to preserve this position. Mr. Robertson concurred strongly with Judge Phleger on these points.

The feeling was unanimous that we could not possibly consider doing away with the specific reference to the right of individual and collective self defense. This seems to us a cardinal point, and the cession of the point could undermine the foundations of the protective commitment we seek. Our misgivings on this score assume redoubled force in the light of the importance we have attached to this provision in the discussions to date. If we abandon this phrase now after an issue has been made of it, great significance would inevitably be read into our action, with possibly dangerous consequences.

We are sending you separately a communication delivered to the British in Peiping, by the Chinese Communist Foreign Office proposing a general conference on the NNSC and on a political settlement in Korea. This was delivered to us by the British only 24 hours ago and is still under preliminary consideration here. If you have any thoughts on how this ties in with Communist strategy as observed by you at Geneva we would like to have them.

Mr. Robertson saw Congressmen Richards and Dodd yesterday on the matter of the proposed House investigation of the maltreatment of Americans in Communist China. He explained our request to the Senate Subcommittee to postpone a similar investigation, and expressed the hope that the House Committee would do likewise. He stressed that the timing of such an investigation might be wrong at this moment although it could well be useful later on. He felt that we should not dissipate the impact of a forcible campaign by letting the story of the outrages come out in dribblets. If and when we start a campaign it should be well organized and we should get the benefit of the full impact of the whole story. We understand that Father Rigney is testifying before the Senate Subcommittee next week. This is isolated testimony in connection with the book he has written on his experiences which is to be published in a few weeks. We have not objected to his appearances before the Committee.

We have not yet had a reply from Justice to our request for the survey of the deportability of Chinese prisoners. It is undoubtedly a tedious and delicate project. We are continuing to give I & N.S. the data provided by Wang on the Chinese alleged to be encountering difficulty in returning to Mainland China. I hope Nagoski will have some of the information from I & N.S. soon. Of course it is intended only for our own confidential background illumination.

We are running into a real budgetary and personnel problem in keeping you supplied with officer manpower. Hong Kong feels that its

reporting on Communist China is going to suffer through Holdridge's absence. FE/EX feels that it is a regrettable waste of scarce officer manpower to have two good men there with little or nothing to do between the sessions. FE/EX has suggested that I inquire of you whether a deal might not be worked out with the Consulate General in Geneva whereby Osborn's services could be made available to the Consulate General a couple of days a week in return for the loan to you of the services of a Geneva Vice Consul on meeting days. This would make it possible for us to release Holdridge fairly soon, and it would give Osborn something to do between meetings. It should also benefit the overworked Geneva staff since they would receive more help than they would be giving. FE/EX thinks that this arrangement, while rather unconventional, should be workable. Please let me have your reaction in your next letter.

Regards, and the best from us all,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosure:

Text of Note received by the British in Peiping.

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**577. Telegram 1892 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 16, 1956, 7 p.m.

1892. For Johnson.

Guidance for April 19 meeting.

1. Go over usual ground once more on implementation Agreed Announcement. Deplore long drawn out Communist flouting September 10 obligation. Observe that absence any developments whatever for 4 months affords clear evidence Communists have willfully ceased any pretense of compliance. State that effect on American public opinion, US Government's estimate of dependability Chinese Communist pledged word and on US assessment of character Chinese Communist motives can only be adverse to progress in reaching further agreements. Place on record that 9 Chinese from US known to have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-1656. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in draft by Phleger and by Clough.

crossed Hong Kong border March 18 and 7 more April 7, making total of at least 130 Chinese who have traveled from US to mainland China by ship via Hong Kong since talks began.

2. You granted full discretion as to introduction reformulation renunciation force draft at this meeting. If tactical situation seems to indicate desirability new move along this line on your part, you should introduce it. If you believe circumstances not propitious this meeting, you may refrain from introducing new draft. If draft not introduced meeting, you should in your discretion either lay groundwork for introduction at next meeting or continue urge merits last US proposal and give Wang full opportunity propose counter draft. If you do introduce revised US draft you should lay stress on lengths to which we have gone in effort to retain as much as possible Wang's draft both in substance and form. You should point out new location self defense clause in preamble and express your belief Wang can find no reasonable grounds for objection to draft in this form. State you assume reference to right self-defense is as important from Wang's standpoint as from ours. Recall that Wang has already implied he would be agreeable to inclusion reference to general area Taiwan in proper context. We believe new formulation affords context he should be able accept.

3. In order insure there will be no misunderstanding full text reformulation as approved by Department quoted verbatim below:

QUOTE

Second US Revision of Chinese Communist December 1 Counterproposal

1. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree, without prejudice to the pursuit by each side of its policies by peaceful means or its inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, to announce:

2. The People's Republic of China and the United States of America are determined that they should settle disputes between their two countries through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere;

3. The two Ambassadors should continue their talks to seek practical and feasible means for the realization of this common desire.

UNQUOTE

Dulles

**578. Memorandum of Conversation, Hill, Robertson, and Members of Congress<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 16, 1956

SUBJECT

Proposed Investigation by Dodd Subcommittee of Mistreatment of Americans in China

PARTICIPANTS

Robert C. Hill, Assistant Secretary, H  
Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE  
Rep. Thomas J. Dodd (D-Connecticut)  
Rep. Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wisconsin)  
Rep. Lawrence H. Smith (R-Wisconsin)  
Rep. John Jarman (D-Oklahoma)  
Rep. Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia)  
Rep. J. L. Pilcher (D-Georgia)  
Ralph N. Clough, Deputy Director, CA

Mr. Robertson expressed his complete agreement with the objectives of the Subcommittee in desiring to investigate mistreatment of American citizens in Communist China. It was purely a question of tactics and timing that he wished to discuss with them. He reviewed the past negotiations with the Chinese Communists for the release of Americans, beginning in June 1954 pointing out that 52 Americans had been released as a result. However, 13 Americans remained in jail in Communist China and we were still engaged in protracted and tedious negotiations to bring about their release. It was obvious that the Chinese Communists hoped to obtain political concessions in exchange for release of these persons, but we had made no concessions and were determined not to do so. We saw no other way to bring about the release of our citizens than to continue to negotiate. We believed that an investigation by the Subcommittee at this time might be counterproductive and therefore hoped that the Subcommittee would delay its investigation. Furthermore, we considered it highly desirable to employ all available material on mistreatment of Americans in Communist China at the psychological moment when it would have the greatest effect. We had a carefully prepared report on this subject, covering 157 cases of Americans who had been imprisoned as well as other material but we did not intend to release this now. It should be released as part of a carefully planned campaign with a clearly defined objective rather than dissipated little by little in an uncoordinated manner.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-1656. Confidential. Drafted by Clough.

Members of the Subcommittee said that their primary concern was the increasing tendency toward accommodation with Communist China which they had noted both in the US and abroad. They were worried that Communist China might be admitted to the UN. They regarded the proposed Subcommittee investigation as a useful means of reminding the American people of the true nature of the Communist regime in China. The question was raised as to whether there would ever be a time when we would not have some American behind the Iron Curtain for whose release we were negotiating. Members of the Subcommittee emphasized the need for constant repetition of Communist China's misdeeds since people had a tendency to forget. They did, however, express great respect for Mr. Robertson's views and promised to give them most careful consideration. They asked for an estimate as to when the Americans might be released and the investigation carried on without any adverse effects.

Mr. Robertson stated emphatically that he knew of no softening towards the Chinese Communists among responsible officials of this Government or within Congress. He repeated the statements which the President had made to Prime Minister Eden. With respect to the question of timing, he said it was impossible to judge how soon the Communists might move on releasing the prisoners.

The members of the Subcommittee expressed their appreciation for Mr. Robertson's presentation. They indicated that they all shared his strong opposition toward any softening of our policy towards Communist China. Chairman Dodd said that as soon as Mrs. Church and Mr. Jackson returned, in the next day or two, the Subcommittee would meet and decide what action to take concerning the investigation.

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#### 579. Letter 29 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 29

Geneva, April 18, 1956

Dear Walter:

I returned to Geneva yesterday evening and appreciated receiving your Letters No. 37 and 38 as well as the guidance for tomorrow's meeting. As far as the new draft is concerned I do not say that I was disappointed as it is largely what I expected and believe it is entirely

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

defensible. I am just very doubtful that agreement can be reached thereon and made my comments in order that all possible points of view would receive consideration. I particularly appreciated your spelling out the rationalization for the draft and it is much help to me in formulating the arguments in its defense. While I entirely see the Department's point of view with regard to the self-defense clause, I frankly continue to have some difficulty in convincing myself of its real importance as an issue. To whatever extent any Chinese Communist statement of renunciation of force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere has value, the question of our exercising the right of self-defense against them does not arise. If they violate the declaration and attack I do not see how even the most unfriendly critic could allege that the United States would still be bound by the declaration and forestalled from exercising its right of individual and collective self-defense. However, I agree that in the context of negotiations as they have developed it is difficult to drop the clause, and I felt that now that we were presenting a new draft it would be our only opportunity of doing so and the possibility should at least be considered. Of course the difficulties that we will face if and when agreement is reached on a renunciation declaration are such that there is much to be said for stretching things out along the present line as long as possible. I think that the new draft has merit viewed in this light. Of course I do not exclude the possibility of the Chinese Communists realizing this and therefore looking for a way to shift their position and getting a declaration issued, substantially accepting our new draft. However, at the moment, this does not seem likely.

I have carefully studied the second paragraph of the Department's 1892 with a view to determining whether there was any way at tomorrow's meeting I could usefully further sound out the situation before deciding whether to present my draft. I have just not been able to think of any way this could be done except that I plan to try to get him to speak first, which I expect he will refuse, and I then plan to make an opening statement which will present the draft. I am entirely sure that he fully understood my hint at the last meeting with respect to the possibility of new draft, and if I am coy about bringing it forward it can only be counterproductive. The only thing I might do would be to restate his positions in a form designed to pave the way for the introduction of my draft and wait for his reaction. However, this has the danger of eliciting responses from him which would make it difficult then to introduce the draft. I have, therefore, decided that if he refuses to speak first (it is actually my turn to speak first tomorrow) I will try to avoid accepting any summary rejection on his part by not getting into too much detailed discussion and urging that he take it home and study it. Anyway, you will know how things have come out before you receive this letter, but I wanted you to know my present thinking.

I have interpreted your titling of the draft as "the second United States revision of Chinese Communists December 1 counterproposal" as a title that would be used if and when there were a public unilateral release by us of the text. In my opening statement I am therefore, although I find it somewhat awkward, laying the groundwork for that terminology. However, in the piece of paper that I am actually handing him I am sticking to the former form of simply showing the date of the draft and entitling it as previously, "Agreed Announcement of the Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China", and as he has always laid considerable store upon such niceties, reversing the order of the names from that which appears in your 1892 so that my name appears first.

Thanks for the corrected information from Defense on the list of missing military personnel. It is certainly a complicated situation when one gets down to the details and you can be sure that I will be happy as long as they continue to handle it at Panmunjom. We have located the "Prisoner Book" and I am sending it to you by air pouch. Sorry for the delay.

As far as the note from the Chinese Communists to the British on the NNSC is concerned, I have no special light to shed on it from this end. It appears to me to be largely an effort to enlist the interest of Sweden and Switzerland in reducing the NNSC as an additional factor in support of the long-standing Chinese Communist position on a Korean conference. A renewal of this at this time of course also fits in well with the whole Communist Bloc peace strategy, to the extent that they are pursuing that strategy probably inhibits them from taking military action against the offshores.

I am hoping that we will shortly get from INS some of the background data we have asked for on the names given me by Wang, as it will certainly help me in knowing how best to handle the matter better in the future here.

I am very pleased at Holdridge's arrival. I have talked to Frank Gowen with regard to your thought of their loaning me a man one day a week to keep the record of the meetings in exchange for Osborn doing some work for the Consulate. With the GATT meeting here now winding up, Gowen says that he would be able to carry it out and is agreeable to such an arrangement. I am, therefore, suggesting that Holdridge stay through the meeting next week which will give him a good cross section of the situation here to carry back to Hong Kong with him, and the arrangement with the Consulate will then go into effect with the first meeting in May. I very much feel with such an arrangement some way should be found of sending Helenka back here and I hope that this can be done. This would enable Miss King to get away for her home leave and on her way to her next assignment where she is undoubtedly



needed, while at the same time entirely filling my needs for a secretary at no more cost to the Department than any other arrangement.

Tell Walter to take good care of himself and that I will do my best to sit on the lid while he takes a rest. Regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

April 19

P.S. Have just returned from meeting which went about as expected. Expect it may be a fairly rough session next time. If they want to keep things going they might present a new draft. Will appreciate all ideas anyone may have.

UAJ

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**580. Telegram 1797 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, April 19, 1956, 2 p.m.

1797. From Johnson.

1. One hour 40 minute meeting this morning. After Wang refused my invitation to open, I opened with prepared statement making points contained paragraph 2 Department telegram 1892 and at end presenting second revision December 21 counter-proposal.

2. After 15 minute recess requested by Wang he made “preliminary” remarks characterizing draft as changed in form but content same. Did not feel that it represented any new progress. Made three points:

(A) Their position self-defense clause should be deleted not re-positioned.

(B) Taiwan area reference not in context Foreign Ministers meeting as per October 27 draft.

(C) Present Taiwan area reference confuses international and domestic issues to which they are “persistently opposed”. However, will “study draft as a whole” and comment detail next meeting. In

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–1956. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

order avoid freezing positions I refrained from extensive rebuttal and urged careful study of draft which I felt fully met both points of view.

3. I then made statement on implementation in accordance paragraph 1 Department telegram 1892. He replied along similar lines. In meeting today slight reference our failure account for Chinese prisoners, and asserting announcement covered all nationals both countries and not just Chinese students, he gave me no new names. Kanady medical records being transmitted through Red Cross but records on Bradshaw not available as she obtained medical care on own outside of prison. Charged we using alleged insufficiency information on Yuan Jui'Hsiang as "pretext" to avoid accounting on all 49 his names.

4. Next meeting Thursday April 26.

5. Proceeding Prague tomorrow morning, returning Tuesday.

Gowen

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**581. Telegram 1799 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, April 19, 1956, 6 p.m.

1799. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting.

Wang's reactions to our second revision draft about as expected and probably will forecast line he will take at next meeting.

If at next meeting he flatly rejects our revision would propose, in addition repeating as necessary arguments already made, stress his responsibility offer alternative language which would meet our minimum criteria of: (a) obviating possibility distortion declaration into renunciation by United States its position re self-defense and (b) make explicit renunciation of force applicable Taiwan area as well as elsewhere.

Would appreciate Department's comments.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-1956. Secret.

**582. Telegram 1800 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, April 19, 1956, 4 p.m.

1800. From Johnson.

1. After Wang failed agree my suggestion he open meeting, I opened by reading prepared statement:

A. I have at our recent meetings been attempting obtain your cooperation in formulating language acceptable to both us to embody meaningful agreement in renunciation use of force to settle our disputes. I have patiently pointed out in great detail lack any real foundation your stated objections to revisions which I suggested January 12 your draft of December 1. I have also pointed out that if you nevertheless maintained your objections those revisions, and if your government genuinely shared desire my government for meaningful declaration this regard, it now clearly obligation your side make suggestions that would assist us in finding mutually acceptable language. I been expecting you would offer such suggestions and have repeatedly declared willingness listen and carefully consider anything helpful you might offer this regard. At last meeting I particularly solicited your cooperation in finding mutually acceptable language and asked for any thoughts you had that would help in giving further consideration this matter, yet you offered no such suggestion simply insisting you had made your position clear at previous meetings. Because this insistence, and in spite of difficulties occasioned by your unwillingness cooperate with me in search for acceptable alternatives, I have carefully restudied your statements our previous meetings concerning revisions which I suggested January 12 remove ambiguities your December 1 counter-draft. I have done this in further effort my part see if some way could not be found resume progress our discussions.

B. In connection my first amendment concerning right self-defense, as I often said, I always assumed you considered this as important from your standpoint as we did from ours.

In fact you have repeatedly declared here and your government has stated publicly there no objection to object [*subject*] in view your governments past assertions that very right.

C. In connection my second amendment making clear declaration considered be applicable by both sides to Taiwan area as well as elsewhere, you repeatedly agreed gravest our disputes was that with respect Taiwan area, and have said any declaration intent discuss and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–1956. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

settle our disputes peacefully must cover our dispute there. In fact, if my recollection correct, you have said failure include that dispute would be tantamount to requiring your government recognize status quo there and surrender its sovereign rights.

D. Thus, as I understand your position, your objections to my January 12 revisions are to neither them as such but to some special connection which you seem see between them. Apparently you saw in juxtaposition these two amendments attempt to trick you into saying something which might be interpreted as renunciation your position with regard to merits our dispute in Taiwan area and recognition of status quo. I have repeatedly assured you there was neither such intention my part nor was language open that interpretation. I have repeatedly tried make clear my only purpose has been and remains to obtain agreement on declaration that will make it unmistakably clear between ourselves and to world that neither us will initiate use of force in attempt enforce our views, and in that atmosphere will seek resolution our differences. Therefore, in further effort reach agreement I have restudied my January 12 revision your December 1 counterproposal.

E. In order completely remove any possible basis for misunderstanding which apparently gave rise your objections, I have entirely separated my amendments by placing amendment self-defense in preamble of declaration. In order make this point even clearer I have also included specific statement in preamble to effect entire declaration made without prejudice pursuit by each side its policies by peaceful means.

F. Reference Taiwan area is made only at end second paragraph which otherwise retains exact language your draft December 1. In order meet your point view I have also dropped two minor language changes which I had proposed for that paragraph. Draft thus otherwise conforms exactly language and form your December 1 draft. My second revision your December 1 counterproposal thus reads: (I then read substantive portion 2nd revision per paragraph 3 Deptel 1892).

G. Am confident this draft entirely conforms relevant views both sides, without prejudicing views of either side on merits our disputes. Would hope prompt agreement can be reached this draft in order we can proceed these talks in accordance with its terms.

2. Wang requested 15 minute recess study draft.

3. Following recess, Wang said he had just studied draft I gave him this morning, could only say he disappointed with it. Just as I had said this morning, we had discussed subject making joint declaration for long time already, he very dissatisfied we so far unable arrive at agreement for draft proposed declaration. In my statement this morning I had made remark necessary both sides push forward

discuss difficulties between us with spirit cooperation, but draft submitted this morning did not seem to him offer any new progress on subject. As I had stated, hitherto central point of dispute between us concerned with US claim right of self-defense in Taiwan area. In this morning's draft I had made change in location clause concerning so-called self-defense right, but as stated in Chinese proverb, although form changed content still all the same. Therefore, it seemed to him all my drafts—those of November 10, January 12, and this morning—were identical in substance.

4. Wang said he then noted reference Taiwan area in new draft not in context FonMin meeting as contained his Oct 27 draft. Such reference Taiwan area as I had made this morning's draft had caused their persistent opposition because such reference would mix up international disputes with an internal issue. They had been asserting their opposition such a reference to Taiwan area in same way as they had been opposed so-called self-defense right in our drafts. Furthermore it necessary give further study drafts wording. Of course, he would give further study this draft, reserve further comment for next meeting.

5. I said I had just couple small comments on his reference to other minor changes in draft. I had pointed out in statement there were no other minor changes and that my previous suggestion changes had been deleted and I had gone back precisely to his Dec 1 draft. As far as English text concerned, it otherwise followed exactly English text he had given Dec 1. Had he noted any changes?

6. Wang said he would give further study to whole thing.

7. I said that as I had pointed out my statement this morning, I felt this draft did answer objections previously raised, did give us text upon which we could both agree. It was offered in that spirit and I hoped would be studied in that spirit. I looked forward to his remarks next meeting, because I thought if he did study draft in same spirit as authors he would find it as something meeting position both sides. Nothing more on that this morning and unless he had more I had something else I would like to talk about.

8. Wang said he would give further study and make further comment next meeting. However, as he had pointed out this morning, could not agree with my statement present draft being offered in spirit of cooperation in discussion, because they had asserted opposition inclusion self-defense clause from very beginning. They believed self-defense clause should be deleted altogether from draft and not repositioned. Nevertheless would make further comment next meeting. He would listen anything else I had to say on other matters.

9. I said it now four months since any development whatsoever with regard return to US of Americans subject our Sept 10 announcement. There no longer seemed to be even a pretense by their

authorities carry out that agreement. I had many times spoken here in all seriousness and earnestness of effect this having on public opinion in my country and on my government's estimate of pledged word his government. I had pointed out before and wished again point out adverse effects their failure permit these Americans expeditiously return is having and effect it will continue have in future discussions here find solutions to problems between our two countries. Certainly release of only six individuals in these 7 long months that have passed since September 10 cannot be interpreted as permitting these people expeditiously to return to own country. This still continued contrast very much with situation concerning Chinese in US, who returning steadily to his country. According our best information, nine Chinese from US were known to have crossed border into his country March 16, seven more April 7, making total at least 130 definitely known to have returned since our talks began. How many more might have returned by other routes I had of course no way of knowing. However, what was undisputable was that Chinese were allowed to return and were returning whenever they wished to do so. For any those who had not returned, had been entirely their personal decision. I hoped in interest our talks here, with their potentialities for future relations between our two countries his authorities would correct the bad situation existing in spite our announcement September 10.

10. Wang said situation respecting return nationals each country directly related to improvement our relations. I had stated that since talks began 130 Chinese had returned to his country. Bearing in mind existence some 5,000 Chinese students in US, what proportion would the 130 Chinese who have returned make to this integral number?

Might point out, however, since talks began number American nationals in China having returned my country exceeds two-thirds total number. From these two proportions it is quite clear as to whether more Americans or more Chinese have returned to their countries since talks began. As such, from point of view September 10 agreement between us situation concerning nationals not satisfactory his side. Had already called my attention names 49 Chinese in US, however, I had not yet given accounting for any of them. At last meeting I had remarked information he gave me concerning case Yuan Jui-hsiang not sufficient find out about him and identify him. I seemed to have found some pretext by which I was refusing make inquiry and give accounting of all 49 Chinese who have been prevented returning.

They had provided such information as name, profession, and circumstances obstructions received. No one could ever believe country as large as US having such huge and extensive investigating setup as FBI cannot find and identify Mr. Yuan. Therefore, hoped my authorities would promptly correct treatment and attitude toward Chinese

in US whose return being prevented, and give clear accounting all these persons. My authorities must not only keep an eye on American offenders in China who have been sentenced according to law and who now serving prison sentences in China, while altogether ignoring fact Chinese in US still being prevented from returning. Such an attitude this problem entirely not conducive progress our discussions. My authorities so far had not given slightest accounting Chinese in US prisons.

11. Wang said as regards medical records Mr. Kanady and Mrs. Bradshaw, he had told me his authorities would make inquiry about availability their medical records. Now informed me Chinese Red Cross had investigated. Medical records Kanady available and will be forwarded ARC through Chinese Red Cross. However, Mrs. Bradshaw had been receiving medical care on own outside prison; therefore, his authorities did not have medical record.

12. I said he had again spoken this morning of proportion between total number Chinese students in US and number who have returned to their country, and related this to proportion of number Americans in his country who had returned. He had related that to our Sept 10 announcement and stated situation not satisfactory his government. I had previously pointed out this type proportioning entirely false. Our agreed announcement did not say that if two-thirds of Americans in China returned to US, US then will force two-thirds of Chinese in America return his country. It did say all those who desire return will be permitted do so. It does not say one-half, two-thirds, or nine-tenths of those who desire return, it says all who desire return. Says not only they be permitted return, but return expeditiously as of Sept 10 last year. Test of performance therefore whether in fact in each country all who desire return permitted do so and no obstruction offered their return. We both knew that of Americans we talking about before and at time our agreed announcement, 13 still not returned. They indisputably people who desire return. We also knew prior to and at time issuance our announcement, his interest was with respect Chinese students in US. We both knew that up to time talks began some of those—very small number—were forbidden by my government return his country. Also knew that at time talks began, measures against these students entirely withdrawn, so that any of them who desire return can. In spite all statements made here and made publicly by his government, we both knew that third power arrangements, established at his request, confirm situation. Thus far in the more than 7 months passed there has not been brought to our attention a single case in which US has not fully carried out terms of agreed announcement. No amount of words or charges can obscure these facts.

13. Wang said references he had made to proportion people returning made only because in my earlier statement I had dwelt on number returnees. Of course, would not be necessary for us make references these proportions if Chinese in America were in fact not being obstructed from returning. However, he had repeatedly noted that Chinese in US had been subjected all sorts obstructions and this situation not changed even after our agreed announcement last September. Therefore, these proportions helped explain and demonstrate performance our respective sides regarding return our nationals and carrying out of agreement. Although at beginning our discussions they made references Chinese students in US, however agreement between us concerned nationals of both sides, and students only a portion of nationals who were subject to agreement. Those 49 whose names he had given me were persons who desire return but who have been unable do so. I had made repeated references to 13 American offenders serving prison sentences in China but had never given reply as to how many Chinese actually in prison in US. He still awaited reply from me this subject.

14. I said I cited number of Chinese known returning his country from US to show they are steadily returning and as evidence no obstructions being offered their return. If in fact there were obstructions offered Chinese living in US, then these people would not steadily be leaving. As I had pointed out, proportions those returned to those in either country has no relation whatsoever to carrying out our agreement. Question is one of fact—whether those desiring return are being obstructed from doing so. He had again said Chinese in US being subjected to “all sorts” of obstructions. There had not been slightest evidence here any kind of obstructions, nor had third power ever presented any evidence of obstructions. There had been no evidence any obstructions whatsoever of student or anyone else being prevented from returning. Those were facts not allegations.

15. Wang said they had called my attention cases 49 people who had not returned and such was precisely evidence of obstructions. If, however, after I made an investigation I could say poor people were free to return he would of course welcome such a statement. Would like remind me agreement calls for all nationals, and not just of nationals only facts could make a reasonable reply this regard.

16. I said that if he had nothing else I would like to suggest next Thursday as date our next meeting. Wang agreed.

Gowen



**583. Letter 39 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 39

Washington, April 20, 1956

Dear Alex:

There is not much pass on to you this time. I am enclosing a copy of Defense's instruction to the MAC on the missing servicemen. This instruction gives the Defense analysis of the shortcomings in the Communist so-called accounting of March 1. This was drafted about three weeks ago in Defense and has just been cleared.

Your prediction as to the likely reaction of Wang to our second revision of the renunciation of force draft was accurate. I should be surprised if his considered reaction at the next meeting is any different from his off the cuff response at the meeting yesterday. However he will be somewhat more on the defensive following this initiative of ours. You will be able to press him very hard to come up with some revision of his own which would take into account our minimum requirements. We have just received your 1799 and will have some comments on Monday or Tuesday.

We are about ready to mail copies of the Agreed Announcement to the individuals named by Wang whose addresses we have been able to find. We have decided to send out a mere one sentence transmitting letter. It will be in mimeograph form on State Department letterhead but without signature. It will be a circular and the names and addresses will appear only on the envelope. In this way we hope to avoid causing any particular uneasiness on the part of the recipient. The letters will be sent by registered mail and the Indian Embassy will be informed. However, we will not give the addresses to the Indian Embassy. At this stage we of course want nothing said about this project to anyone. A copy of the proposed form letter is enclosed along with the printed copy of the Agreed Announcement which we are using. This is the same printed form which was placed on Post Office Bulletin Boards all over the country. You will note it mentions the Indian Embassy in Washington and gives the address.

We are in rather a bad situation with the COCOM and CHINCOM countries because of the delay in the formulation of a U.S. position on the proposed relaxation of the trade controls. We are between the frying pan and the fire on this because of strong congressional sentiment against any concessions at this time. The Foreign Aid Bill may be jeopardized if any concessions are made. Yet the British, the Japanese and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

the French feel compelled to move rapidly and are urging an early CG meeting. I fear the Chinese Communists are well aware of the awkward situation that has developed. They apparently recognize that they do not need to make any move in the Geneva talks or elsewhere. So I do not anticipate that you will be troubled with the trade issue in your talks.

We are doing a brief talking paper on the Geneva talks for the Secretary for possible use at this forthcoming NATO meeting. We are not going very deeply into the subject in the talking paper. We will send you a copy even though it is pretty cut and dried.

I was glad to get your letters No. 27 and 28 of April 8. I sympathize with your position on a number two adviser and hope we can take care of your needs. If you feel strongly that the number two man must have a knowledge of Chinese, the suggestion of an arrangement with the CONGEN at Geneva will not work out. For the present anyway we can keep Holdridge there.

We were very sorry to hear of Pat's illness. I hope she is fully recovered now and that better fortune will be yours. Regards and all the best.

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosure:

1. Telegram to CINCUNC Tokyo DA 900776
2. Proposed letter to individuals named by Wang with copy of Agreed Announcement.

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#### 584. Telegram 1912 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 24, 1956, 1:03 p.m.

1912. For Johnson.

Guidance for April 26 meeting.

1. You should continue to press Wang to accept our latest revision of renunciation of force declaration. Record our conviction that it meets

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-2456. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Clough; cleared in draft by Phleger and Sebald.

every objection raised by Wang which has any plausibility. It fulfills every essential requirement of the situation for each side. It is cast in appropriate terms. It represents serious attempt on US part to arrive at a formulation which would take into account the views of Wang's side concerning form as well as substance. You should strike the recurrent note that we have done our utmost to produce a draft that both sides can accept unqualifiedly and that Communists should accept it, if they are really interested in arriving at solution. We feel that the essential requirements of both sides have been thoroughly aired and that this formulation is the best solution which can be arrived at.

2. We differ from the line of reasoning advanced in your 1799 only in that we would have you urge the merits of our latest revision more insistently and put less emphasis on a challenge or an invitation to Wang to produce a new alternative of his own, if he does not like ours. While of course must remain prepared to consider any new draft which Wang might table, we do not wish to give the impression that we expect him to reject our new draft. Emphasis should be on our firm conviction that our draft is the best that can be done to meet the valid points of each side, rather than on expectation that Wang will now produce revision of his own. We are in better position with Wang rejecting our reasonable draft, than with US rejecting new Chinese Communist draft that is unacceptable, but capable of being misunderstood and misinterpreted.

3. Theme which you should enunciate repeatedly at this meeting is that any conceivable objection to our draft can only be based on unwillingness to accept fully principle of non-resort to force. If Chinese Communists are genuinely willing to make complete renunciation of force without mental reservation or purpose of evasion they can raise no valid objection to this draft. If they have not made this decision then no formulation will achieve the objective. Indispensable requirement is that Chinese Communists make unqualified resolve to give up use of force in pursuit of their objectives.

4. Your statement on detained Americans should follow established lines, but we would suggest a heightened note of insistence in your presentation. You may mention growing sense of outrage in both Houses of US Congress at continued Chinese Communist maltreatment of American citizens and premeditated and malicious failure of Chinese Communists to keep their pledge of September 10.

5. Reject emphatically Wang's allegations that Chinese being obstructed from leaving US. Steady flow of Chinese to China mainland and fact that Indian Embassy has not cited single case of Chinese claiming obstruction is incontrovertible evidence. Wang's assertions that Chinese unable communicate with Indian Embassy patently untrue. Embassy has announced publicly it has received inquiries from

Chinese and it has paid transportation for number of Chinese returning to mainland China. If Peiping had been informed by individuals in US that their departure being obstructed this would mean Peiping was in communication with individuals, directly or indirectly, and could advise them to communicate with Indians. Absence of complaints confirms obvious fact that no obstruction exists, either in communication facilities or in departure.

6. FYI ONLY. Department mailing by registered letter copies of Agreed Announcement to all Chinese named by Wang whose addresses have been ascertained.

**Dulles**

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**585. Telegram 2617 to New Delhi<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 24, 1956, 6:51 p.m.

2617. Your 2301.

Authorization extend US official invitation to Chinese Communist delegation or accept official invitation from Chinese Communists can not repeat not be granted. Apart from diplomatic impropriety, such action would be widely misconstrued with consequences harmful our interests. No reason why US delegation should be apologetic or evasive about avoidance host-guest relationship with Chinese Communists. This is in accordance with standard protocol practice where recognition has not been granted. No explanation required other than fact of absence diplomatic relations.

US delegation will of course encounter Chinese Communists at functions given by Nepalese Government and other delegations. This need cause no concern.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-2556. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Simmons (Protocol), Allen (NEA), and in SOA.

**586. Letter 30 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 30

Geneva, April 25, 1956

Dear Walter:

I received your letter No. 39 when I returned yesterday evening and this morning the guidance for tomorrow's meeting came in. I greatly appreciate the many thoughts incorporated into the guidance which are of great help to me in formulating my presentation which I will have to play entirely by ear tomorrow. I realized after I had sent my 1799 that I may well have erroneously given the impression that I did not intend to vigorously push our draft, as I had not made it clear the last paragraph referred only to a contingent position. Therefore, I think that the comments in paragraph 2 of your 1912 are very well taken and are actually entirely in accordance with my own intent.

Thanks very much for the Defense instructions to MAC on the missing servicemen. I was particularly happy to see that MAC would be asked to refer their proposed statement to Washington which will give you a chance to frame it in more effective terms and keep it consistent with what has been done here.

I can well see the difficulty we are in with regard to the COCOM and CHINCOM position, and entirely agree the Chinese Communists will probably realize the situation. I have not seen anything recently in the press on the progress of the Foreign Aid Bill and wonder what the outlook actually is.

With respect to Holdridge, in my letter No. 29 which you will now have received, I said that I had been able to work out an arrangement with Gowen for the loan of a reporting officer from the Consulate General and was therefore willing to release Holdridge. He is planning to leave here on Friday for Hong Kong. I put the necessity of having a second officer to keep the record in the essential category, and a knowledge of Chinese on his part in the desirable category. The arrangement which I suggested with regard to Stanley not having worked out, I find it hard to justify keeping Holdridge sitting here from week to week with nothing really substantive to do between meetings and, therefore, acquiesced to his departure and the arrangement with the Consulate General. It is not the best arrangement from my standpoint, but I can get along. In this connection, it seems to me that the Department ought really to be doing something about training a Chinese interpreter. As you well know, just a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Printed from a copy that Johnson signed "Alex."

knowledge of the language, no matter how good, is not enough. I do not know what we would do if Ekvall were not available, and looking to the future we certainly cannot depend on his always being available. In any event, it is anomalous for us as the Department of State to have to depend on Defense in this regard. Good as he is with the language, I know that Stanley felt he would not be up to doing the type of interpreting required in these meetings. However, I should think that he or someone with comparable facility in the language could with intensive training become qualified in this field. Of course, it is not too attractive a field for an FSO but it seems to me that it is a problem that the Department will have to resolve.

Incidentally, I noted in Prague just before I left that the Czech May Day slogans which have just come out, this year dropped any mention of support for Chinese Communist liberation of Formosa. I think that this would be particularly significant if the same pattern is followed elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc and suggest that it would be of interest to have DRF make a check into it.

We have received Part II of the White Paper on prisoners, giving a summary of the experiences of individual Americans. Although my comments were not asked for I cannot refrain from saying that it by no means seems to me to be up to the standard of the White Paper itself. To me at least, it simply does not make as effective and convincing a case as the facts justify. My own feeling is that this appendix will be most effective on supporting the White Paper if it sticks to a plain, cold recital of facts avoiding color words and simply letting the facts speak for themselves. I also feel that there is simply too much carelessly and poorly written English in it to be issued as a public document by the Department.

Just as a few examples of what I have in mind: the last paragraph on page 2 under Bersohn, the last sentence beginning at the bottom of the page seems to me to be open to misinterpretation by non-Americans and simply not as effective as quoting some statement of Bersohn's following his return. On page 7 under Buol, the statement is made that, "in August 1951 he was removed to a private home and placed in confinement alone with a Communist-provided companion". In the first place, as a matter of English, if he had a companion he was not alone. However, the use of the word "companion" in the sentence without any explanation does not, it seems to me, make any point. It is only when one gets to the end of the section that it is stated that his "companion" was subjecting him to propaganda. On page 8 under Cline, the statement is made that "according to medical reports" he died from being denied needed medicine. The question immediately arises as to whose medical reports? If they are independent reports, we certainly should say so. On page 9 under Dillon, the statement is made "he kept

the document until March 27, 1951 when he was searched . . ." and at the bottom of the section it states his expulsion from China began March 25, 1951. On page 12 under Ford, it seems to me that the logical place for the last sentence is up above following the detailing of his torture. On page 14 under Giffin, the first sentence is a masterpiece of confused writing. As a detail, it also seems to me that where American-sounding names of non-Americans are mentioned, their nationality should be specified. Otherwise, the question immediately arises as to why their accounts are not included in this compilation. On page 17 under Greene, the statement is made, not even in quotes, "his judge decided that since he was only a small cog in the American spy wheel . . .". Standing the way it does this can certainly be easily distorted and twisted into an admission by us that he was a "cog in the American spy wheel". On page 20 under Kanady, a sentence reads, "after four and a half years of imprisonment he was deported from China in a state of shocking physical and mental damage". This is just poor writing. On page 39 under Rigney, it seems to me that a sentence such as "any visible manifestations of religious devotion were promptly suppressed by cellmates with whom he was undergoing 're-education'", is entirely lacking in "punch". I do not know what the actual facts were but a straightforward statement such as "when he kneeled to pray he was cuffed and spat on by his cellmates", would be much more effective. It seems to me the next following sentence would be much clearer simply stated as "although his treatment subsequently improved, at the time of his release he still weighted only 100 pounds, compared with 180 pounds at the time he entered prison". Also, it seems to me to be much more effective to relate the nine times he "confessed" directly to the account of the torture he underwent. For example, to say that "during one period of interrogation he was denied sleep for 11 successive days and nights" is not very effective stated in that way and standing by itself. It would be much more effective to say that he was interrogated without any respite for 11 days and nights and that each time he collapsed from fatigue he was beaten into wakefulness until, utterly physically and mentally broken, he signed a "confession". It also seems to me absurd to end the Rigney story with the statement that he became a "model worker in the production of match boxes". The whole account, as many of the other accounts, shifts back and forth between chronological and subject approach in a very confusing manner. Certainly in reading it one is not left with any clear picture of exactly what happened and, as told, the story simply does not have the impact the facts justify. I feel that this is a common fault of most of the accounts.

I have viewed this from the standpoint of our foreign audiences in particular who are the ones that need convincing. I feel that for this purpose the stories can be told much more effectively than they have been. It seems to me that by far the most effective telling would be

to have someone simply take the facts as they are known to us and set them down in chronological order in short, simple and factual sentences. I have gratuitously given my opinion very bluntly and without any knowledge of whose feelings may be involved. However, I am sure that is what you would want and will treat whatever I have said accordingly. I urge that you have someone else sit down with the basic material to see whether something better cannot be produced.

I wonder whether consideration has also been given to the possible reactions of some of the individuals involved where their experiences have been obtained from private interviews and have not thus far been published. I raise the question with respect to the exact content of what is said with respect to them in this publication as well as with respect to giving any detailed account of their experiences. I assume this has been considered, and only mention it to make sure it is not overlooked, as the Communists would be able to make much of even a single adverse reaction which became public or a public denial of a fact by an individual concerned.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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## 587. Telegram 1818 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, April 26, 1956, 3 p.m.

1818. From Johnson.

1. One hour 45 minute meeting this morning. Wang opened with a bare and flat complete rejection April 19 draft. Gave no sign whatever any willingness compromise language nor of intent offer alternative formulation.

2. Made following points in presentation:

(A) Requires PRC recognize status quo Taiwan area and GRC treaty;

(B) If peaceful pursuit policy by both sides to be countenanced, including "US policy occupation Taiwan" what purpose served by peaceful negotiations?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-2656. Confidential; Priority.



- (C) Mixes international dispute and domestic matter; and
- (D) Failure couple Taiwan with FMC.

3. In rebuttal I made points contained paras 1 and 3 Deptel 1912, avoiding any invitation to Wang to produce new alternative. At close of considerable give and take in reply his statement our draft had not met their objections I stated their objections appeared to have two aspects. First was whether draft prejudiced their position and second whether declaration was to constitute unqualified renunciation of force all our disputes including dispute Taiwan area. Satisfied my draft fully met all objections based on first aspect. However, with regard second aspect, if PRC purpose is to retain ability use threat initiate force Taiwan area I agreed draft does not meet PRC position and US never would meet that position. To do so would be complete perversion of whole purpose of declaration. Wang made no direct reply.

4. I made very strong statement on implementation along lines para 4 Deptel 1912. Wang replied along usual lines stressing “growing dissatisfaction Chinese people” with US implementation and during the exchange, in which I made points contained para 5 Deptel 1912 stressing Indian Embassy has not brought our attention single case obstruction. He challenged me formally to state that “not single Chinese now imprisoned in US”.

5. Agreed Wang’s proposal next meeting Saturday May 5. Departing for Prague Friday morning.

**Gowen**

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#### 588. Telegram 1825 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, April 26, 1956, 6 p.m.

1825. Comments on today’s meeting.

Would characterize Wang’s presentation today as tending more toward unwillingness under any circumstances (even including agreement our part to FMC) unconditionally renounce force in Taiwan area, that is, also vis-a-vis GRC. However, one statement (para 10 Mytel 1823) could possibly be interpreted as reaffirmation of position toward which he sometimes in past appeared to be tending, that is, willingness

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–2656. Confidential.

agree renunciation force specifically applicable Taiwan area if assurances FMC also included. Of course, either position is far removed from ours.

Although I do not exclude possibility his presenting new draft it seems unlikely for next meeting. I see no choice for next meeting except to reiterate our position and sharply attack his making clear that if there is to be new move it will not come from us. Only if in context of meeting it clearly appeared useful would I imply any invitation to Wang to produce new alternative.

Dept will note Wang today again carefully used new formula on Taiwan and offshore islands (paras 3, 4, 8 etc.) in use since Mar 1 meeting. Suggest possibility this formula may have been adopted with Public Law 4 in mind.

Gowen

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#### 589. Telegram 1823 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, April 27, 1956, 1 a.m.

1823. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 45th meeting today with prepared statement saying he has carefully studied draft I presented 26th meeting and was bound state this draft still contained points their side had long declared categorically unacceptable. Indeed, as he had pointed out at last meeting, this draft did not differ in substance from ones I had submitted on Nov 10, 1955 and Jan 10, 1956.

2. Wang said his side could not but consider that at a time when our discussions on this subject of announcement had entered eighth month, my submission of such draft was entirely at variance with my expression of expectation early agreement at last meeting.

3. Wang said as his side had consistently pointed out, US already used force and threat of force. Had seized Taiwan and was trying interfere in China's liberation offshore islands. Under such circumstances, announcement which embodied our claim so-called right self-defense could only be interpreted as requiring PRC side to recognize status quo

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-2756. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

in Taiwan area as well as US treaty with Chiang Kai-shek clique. Obviously that was what his side could not accept. Yet my draft still contained clause on so-called right self-defense.

4. Wang said, moreover, I had also made references to what I termed “pursuit by each side of policies by peaceful means”. Insofar as US concerned, US policy towards China has so far been interference in China’s exercise sovereign rights over Taiwan, and in its liberation offshore islands. Statements I had made in course our discussions only bore this out. Such policy is inadmissible by whatever means it might be pursued.

5. Wang said if pursuit such policies by US to be countenanced, what purpose would then be left for any peaceful negotiations between China and US?

6. Wang said insofar as China concerned, its policy had been liberation open territory Taiwan and offshore islands. This matter of China’s internal affairs and admits no interference by any other country, which-ever means China chooses use.

7. Wang said my draft also retained reference to what I termed “without resorting use force Taiwan area or elsewhere”. Here again as their side had long pointed out, announcement which mixes up international dispute with internal affairs is impermissible and therefore is something their side could not accept.

8. Wang said particularly serious aspect of matter is that while my draft makes specific reference Taiwan area, it entirely omits any reference holding Foreign Ministers conference. This only indicates that US still intending obtain declaration which would freeze situation Taiwan area and then to procrastinate and refuse take practical step for solution dispute there, in order to maintain status quo of US seizure Taiwan and interference liberation offshore islands.

9. Wang asked, such being case how could it be alleged that my draft meets points view both sides. As they had categorically stated, if it desired make specific reference Taiwan area, then same announcement must also provide for holding Sino-American conference Foreign Ministers. Moreover, no specific reference to Foreign Ministers conference made, there would be no justification for demanding reference to Taiwan area in such announcement.

10. Wang said any agreed announcement between us must give assurance both sides. Any agreed announcement putting a restraint on one side without other side offering any assurance could not be made basis for reaching agreement.

11. Wang said as he had pointed out, fundamental difference between respective drafts our two sides was that their drafts embodied points acceptable both sides and did not contain anything unacceptable

either side, whereas my drafts require their side surrender rights and accept demands which their side cannot accept. Same comment applies fully my April 19 draft.

12. Wang said he must state in all seriousness that to reach agreement on matter issuance announcement, such announcement must be fair and reasonable, on basis equality for both sides. My draft, however, fell short of this mark.

13. I said in these discussions I thought it important we keep in sight fundamental involved this matter. As I often said, problem we face not the issuing announcement for sake of announcement, simply saying some words that may mean one thing to him another thing to me, so we can give superficial agreement to world. This was not point. Whole objective much deeper and more fundamental than that. My basic suggestion from very beginning our discussions very simply stated: is that recognizing these differences between us, never [*very*] serious difficulties and particularly with respect Taiwan area that we very simply and straightforwardly say we are not going to go to war about them. At same time, we would not say anything that would prejudice views either side with respect these disputes. I had suggested his government make such statement, and if it did so, my government would make similar statement reiterating its position. He had suggested form and content such statement, to which I had very closely adhered in incorporating views my government with regard those points which it considers essential to a meaningful statement.

However, question much more fundamental than those just of form and exact words of statement; question is, is there really agreement between us on renunciation use of force in settling disputes, including dispute in Taiwan area. That is, was his government, in accordance accepted standards international conduct, willing renounce force as instrument national policy?

14. I said if his government had made decision in fact to renounce force as instrument national policy, there could be no real objection to text of draft which I gave him April 21. If that decision had not been made by his government, I could see no formulation of a meaningful declaration would be acceptable to him. Only if that principle were accepted without mental reservation or purpose of evasion would agreement on meaningful agreement for declaration be arrived at between us.

15. I said he had previously stated that his objections my other drafts based on connections he saw between self-defense clause and mention Taiwan area. Revisions which I suggested April 19 removed any plausible possibility such argument. I respected his right to hold whatever views he desired with regard to nature, origin, any other

aspect our dispute in Taiwan area. This draft provided no basis for alleging it required his side recognize anything it did not want recognize or in any way prejudice his position. What this draft did do was require his side say unequivocally and clearly it will not use force to impose its views. Apparently it was that to which he objected, in fact, rather than to any other aspect of draft. We had done our utmost to produce draft which both sides could unqualifiedly accept and which should be accepted if [omission in the original] arriving at solution.

16. I was puzzled by and could hardly believe that he really meant his statement asking what purpose of peaceful negotiations would be if each side were free pursue its policies by peaceful means. If what he appeared be saying was that he saw no prospect of a solution to questions in Taiwan area unless they be able maintain their threat use force in that area. There was great difference between that and a renunciation of force that would genuinely make possible real negotiations. It seemed to me that this strikes to very root of question between us and represents not the slightest change from announced policy with respect use of force which his government had long maintained. Fundamental question was whether his government was willing without reservation or purpose of evasion renounce force so that there would be genuine peaceful negotiations. Central thought behind my original proposal had been and remained that genuine peaceful negotiations between us on these complicated and complex problems were not possible under overhanging threat that one side on one pretext or another would resort to use of force. Renunciation of force and peaceful negotiations were not separate and unrelated items. If one was really determined discuss problem peacefully, one could not at same time threaten use of force with regard that problem. Unless he accepted that principle, I could come no conclusion other than that there was not genuine sharing desire my government for peaceful solution.

17. I said I never had and did not now ask him abandon his views with respect our disputes in Taiwan area, but I did ask him accept applicability declaration as a whole to our disputes in Taiwan area. Not just that portion declaration relating peaceful negotiations but that indispensable concomitant thereto, of renunciation of force. The two went together and could not be separated. I could not escape conclusion that in his insistence on linking any mention Taiwan area to Foreign Ministers meeting he was, in fact, separating those two fundamental concepts.

18. I said I also could not escape conclusion that objection to self-defense clause in its present position was based upon an attempt to obtain a document which he would interpret as renunciation by US of its position. I was not asking him recognize in any way US position

with regard to merits of our dispute. I was only asking him accord to me same respect for our views as I accorded to his. If there were agreement on his part with me on genuinely renouncing force as first essential preliminary to seeking means of peacefully settling our disputes, there could be no valid objection to this draft. If there were not such agreement, difficulties between us were indeed deep and disturbing.

19. Wang said he had given me his views with regard to my draft of April 19, both at last meeting and this morning. In his statements he had specifically pointed out reasons why they objected to and could not accept my draft. Their efforts at trying find agreement on issuance renunciation of force declaration must be carried out on basis of fair and reasonable proposal. Their drafts of October 27 and December 1 were just such drafts and fulfilled principle of reasonableness and fairness. If US had genuine desire settle and resolve grave disputes between our two countries, there could be no reason for not accepting these drafts of their side. He regretted find that so far we not able arrive agreement on basis their drafts.

20. Wang said he obliged note that new opinion submitted by me did not change my former position and did not advance our meeting a step further. This morning I had again made statements to effect that I respected their views and rights in Taiwan area and would not prejudice those views and rights. However my draft of April 19 in its text precisely prejudiced their lawful views in that respect. He noted in my statement this morning I had made repeated references to what I said had been use of force and threat of use of force by his side. Such references in fact were made in attempt cover up use of force by US in Taiwan area and attempt by US use threat of force against PRC. His side had constantly made clear that FonMins conference was the most effective means for settling grave disputes between PRC and US in Taiwan area, and so if it were desired make specific reference Taiwan area in agreement, same announcement must make provision for holding FonMins conference.

21. Wang said I had said my draft of April 19 had met their views and had removed reasons for their objections, but actually this draft, like all others, retained those features toward which they voiced their objections. As such, how could I say it had met and removed their objections? As he had said in his statement this morning, his side trying to find announcement capable of being accepted by both sides. My side had repeatedly proposed drafts which their side long ago made clear it objected to and could not accept. This would not help resolve problems between us.

22. I said there were two aspects to his objections. One aspect was whether anything that was said prejudiced his position with respect to our disputes. The other aspect was whether or not our declaration was

to constitute an unqualified renunciation of force with respect to all our disputes including our dispute in Taiwan area. My draft of April 19 was second successive attempt I had made arrive formulation which took account his views. With regard to aspect prejudicing his position, I was satisfied it met every essential requirement both sides in this regard. However, if his purpose in this declaration was retain his ability use threat of initiating use of force in Taiwan area, I agreed it did not meet his position and I never could meet his position in that regard. To do so would be complete perversion of entire purpose this declaration.

23. Wang said I had said I had made so much effort in order meet their views; however, my draft actually did not make such provisions as I had said. On contrary, my draft of April 19 still retained those points to which they objected and which they could not accept. If one could be credited with making genuine effort achieve a declaration it was his side which had made such an effort, as manifested in his December 1 draft. To speak about the threat of armed force, he could say actual problem we now facing [garble] US threat of force against his side and not his armed forces occupying US territory. Nothing could obscure this fact.

24. I said if had nothing further I would like speak again about our September 10 announcement on civilians. I wished tell him very plainly, very bluntly, that sense of outrage in my country over what I could only term the premeditated and malicious failure of his government release remaining Americans as agreed in our announcement of September 10 was growing. His government should know this was particularly true of all members of both parties of both Houses of our Congress. This was an urgent and serious situation. I would be doing a disservice if I minimized or attempted gloss over the growing feeling in my country with respect to what everyone regarded as a very straightforward case of failing carry out the pledged word of his government. It was going on eight months since we made that announcement of September 10 and it was over four months since any Americans had been released. I asked he impress upon his authorities urgent importance of immediately doing something about this matter.

25. Wang said if we were to speak about dissatisfaction concerning the civilian question, it was his side which was dissatisfied about the situation. He had made so many representations concerning the return of Chinese from the US. But so far had not received any reasonable reply from me. Just how many Chinese were there in prison in US—he had raised this question many months ago and I had not bothered reply this simple question as to how many Chinese were in prison in US. Could I say this attitude my side conformed with September 10 announcement? He had given me names 49 Chinese whose departure being obstructed in spite of fact these people innocent and had not committed

any crime. However, I had not complied his request make investigation and give accounting of them. So far I had not given any constructive reply this question. Chinese people were very dissatisfied with obstructions received by Chinese nationals in US. Therefore, he hoped I would impress this feeling of Chinese people on US Government. And see that these obstructions against Chinese residents in US were corrected.

26. I said facts showed there had not been a single case of any obstruction and he well aware of that fact. Fact that Indian Embassy had not called our attention to single case in which obstruction had been alleged was incontrovertible evidence that cannot be denied.

27. Wang asked did I mean to say that not a single Chinese was locked up in US prisons?

28. I said there had not been a single case of Chinese desiring return Wang's country who had alleged obstruction of any kind. I make no exceptions. If there were such case it certainly would have been called to our attention by Indian Embassy.

29. Wang said fact was that 49 Chinese desire return but have not been able do so. Such was a fact. He would appreciate my making formal statement hereto that there not now single Chinese in prison in US.

30. I said if any of those 49 Chinese really desired return and felt really being obstructed they certainly would have contacted Indian Embassy, and if Indian Embassy felt had there been any factual basis it certainly would have carried out its functions under agreed announcement.

31. Wang said he could only impress on me, here, great dissatisfaction of Chinese people with regard failure to return these 49 Chinese. They would not cease raising this matter here as long as these people had not returned.

32. Wang proposed Saturday May 5 for next meeting. I agreed.

**Gowen**



**590. Letter 40 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 40

Washington, April 30, 1956

Dear Alex:

I went to Charlottesville on Friday to make a speech before the Committee on Foreign Relations there. I have just returned and have not yet had much opportunity to digest your reports on the meeting of April 26. There was no meeting on Geneva over the weekend, either with the Secretary or with Judge Phleger. The Secretary leaves on Wednesday for the NATO session. I doubt if we will see him before then. It may not be necessary since we seem to be locked tight in the present position. There is general agreement that we must stand firm. Hence, no high-level pow-wow seems to be called for at the moment. We agree that you can only reiterate your position at the next meeting, emphasizing the firmness of our stance on this position and picking away at the chinks in Wang's armour. I believe you very effectively exploited the point that his objections are all related to the fact that he envisages a PRC resort to use of offensive force in certain contingencies.

We have finally received a preliminary acknowledgment from Immigration to our letter of April 5 requesting a survey of all the Chinese in US prisons. A copy of this acknowledgment, dated April 24 is enclosed. You will note that 8 of the prisoners claim American citizenship and another one is a mental patient rather than a convict. This leaves 42 known Chinese aliens in penitentiaries.

Enclosed are 42 sheets giving the INS reports on each of the names of Chinese mentioned by Wang as encountering interference with departure. We have not yet received INS reports on the remaining 7.

I also enclose as of background interest a good example of the kind of propaganda drive Peiping has been conducting to bring about defections on Taiwan. Such broadcasts by former officials of the GRC, now with the Communists, addressed to their ex-colleagues on Taiwan are an almost daily occurrence. So far they have had no perceptible effect. This particular broadcast is interesting in that it expressly links "peaceful liberation" of Taiwan with the world-wide Communist drive for "relaxation of tensions". This suggests that the Chinese Communists are well aware of the damage military action in the Taiwan area would cause to their general political posture. You will note that the broadcast speaks not only of the "peaceful liberation" of Taiwan (which the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.

Communists are not presently capable of taking with military force) but also of Minmen, capture of which might be within their capabilities. All of this leads to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists are unlikely to launch any large-scale offensive in the near future and that our estimate is probably correct that continued talks with them make it more difficult for them to resort to military action. I also enclose a copy of our briefing paper on the Geneva talks, prepared for the NATO Ministerial Meeting. You will see that this is much less detailed and less sensitive than what we originally contemplated.

[*text not declassified*] You were very cooperative to release Holdridge to Hong Kong so promptly. I hope the new arrangement will work out and that neither you nor Dave will suffer unduly, as a result. It seems to us that you should be given the best young officer at Geneva to assist you at the meetings. Your letter No. 29 of April 18 came on the 24th and was read with great interest by Judge Phleger, and Bill Sebald as well as myself. Walter Robertson will continue on sick leave until May 14. He got out of bed to give a major speech at Staunton, Virginia, on April 27 as part of the Woodrow Wilson Centennial Celebration.

Al Westphal, on the staff of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, told me last week that the Dodd Subcommittee probably will not give any further consideration to the question of investigating treatment of Americans in Communist China at least until the end of May. The Committee Chairman has given instructions that no Subcommittee work be done until the Committee as a whole has finished work on the Foreign Aid Bill.

Regards from us all here and congratulations on doing the job precisely the way that is desired here.

Sincerely yours,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Letter April 25, 1956 from Immigration.
2. List of 42 Chinese.
3. Excerpt from FBIS, April 24, 1956.
4. Nato Briefing Paper, "Geneva Talks".

**591. Telegram 1943 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 2, 1956, 12:27 p.m.

1943. For Johnson.

Guidance for May 5 meeting.

1. We concur in view expressed your 1825 that, in absence new move on part Chinese Communists, you should confine your remarks on renunciation force to attack on their position and reiteration ours. Heart of your presentation should be repetition theme which you expressed last meeting: that if Communists genuinely willing renounce force Taiwan area they cannot validly object to our April 21 draft. If their intention is to reserve to themselves option of resorting force there, then any form of words that they accepted purporting to bind them to renounce force in Taiwan area would be fraud on world.

2. Wang appears interpret phrase “without prejudice to pursuit by each side of policies by peaceful means” as meaning acquiescence by Communists in policies pursued by US. (Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 your 1823.) Point out to him that our draft does not require Chinese Communists acquiesce in US policies. Neither does it require US acquiesce in or agree to Communist policies. Purpose of phrase is simply to make clear that neither side is renouncing anything except prosecution its policies by armed force. This is action which has been taken by all members UN, including US, as well as other countries. There is no sound reason why Chinese Communists should not take similar action.

3. Inform Wang that eighteen more Chinese from US crossed border into Communist China April 30, making total of at least 148 since August 1, 1955. FYI This figure includes only those proceeding US to Hong Kong by ship in direct transit to Communist China. END FYI This uninterrupted flow Chinese from US to mainland China contrasts sharply with complete cessation in release Americans since December last year, despite September 10 pledge that latter would be allowed expeditiously return. Ask Wang how Chinese Communists expect world believe they are carrying out Agreed Announcement when facts so clearly speak otherwise? US intends faithfully continue carrying out its September 10 pledge, but expects Chinese Communists to do likewise. Their failure to do so makes impossible improved atmosphere they profess to be seeking in these talks.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–256. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy and in draft by Phleger.

**592. Telegram 1840 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 3, 1956, midnight

1840. From Johnson.

Wang's interpreter called tonight requesting that next meeting be postponed until Thursday May 10. I suggested Friday May 11 in view of Swiss holiday May 10 to which he agreed. I agreed his suggestion that each only announce to press postponement was by mutual agreement for administrative reasons.

**Gowen**


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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-356. Official Use Only. Repeated to Paris for the Secretary as telegram 434.

**593. Letter 31 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 31

Geneva, May 3, 1956

Dear Walter:

A few hours after my return from Prague last night, Ekvall received a call from Wang's interpreter asking to postpone the next meeting. I have sent you a telegram on what I think it means if anything and I am making a check with Warsaw which I am repeating to you. Ekvall received the impression from Wang's interpreter that Wang was in town, but I am having inquiries made to find out for sure whether this is the case. He was not on the plane yesterday from Prague and, therefore, if he has returned from Warsaw he must have done so on Wednesday. He went up on the same plane as I last Friday. We met in the airport in Zurich, he having come up the evening before by train while I had come up on the morning plane from Geneva. He had a very attractive lady with him whom he introduced as his wife. As always he was very affable but a lack of a common language inhibits very much any conversation.

*[text not declassified]*


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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

I have received your letter No. 40 and greatly appreciate the information it contained.

I do not want to continue to labor the point, but I cannot help noting that in the enclosed sheets giving the INS reports on the names given me by Wang there is frequent reference to "requesting permission to return". Most of these references appear to be referring to the period prior to August 1 last year, but in some cases this is not entirely clear. In one case (No. 19 Liao, S.D.), it states that on January 12, 1956 he "requested permission to return to his home in Hunan (mainland) China," and that on March 9, 1956, "Philadelphia advise Service has no objection to his return". I have difficulty in reconciling this with the "Agreed Announcement" and the categorical statements I have been making here based on the INS assertions to the Department. There is undoubtedly a reasonable explanation but it would relieve my mind if I knew what it was. As other somewhat less clear examples see No. 1 (Shen), No. 4. (Kao), No. 15 (Chang), No. 16 (Tao), and No. 26 (Tseng).

*[text not declassified]*

Regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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#### 594. Telegram 1841 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, May 4, 1956, 10 a.m.

1841. From Johnson.

Have no explanation for Wang's request postpone next meeting. It appears he probably in Geneva but am attempting confirm. If they required more time coordinate some new move would seem that he could have just marked time at May 5 meeting. Therefore am inclined think reason for postponement is probably extraneous to these talks and that it does not presage any new move on their part. However cannot exclude latter possibility. As one possibility suggest that if there is any factual basis for CHICOM statements mentioned Deptel 1941

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-456. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

they might be planning face us with release of some prisoners accompanied by new draft partially meeting our position but with provision for FMC.

Would appreciate Department's estimate or any factual info that might assist me in anticipating possible moves they might make at May 11 meeting.

**Gowen**

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**595. Telegram 6 from Geneva to Warsaw<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 5, 1956, 4 p.m.

1849. From Johnson.

Wang asked for postponement our May 5 meeting to May 11. Do you know of any development that would require his presence in Warsaw during that period? He traveled to Warsaw April 27 presumably attend May 1 celebration but I have not (repeat not) been able to determine whether or when he returned Geneva.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-556. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 1849.

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**596. Letter 41 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 41

Washington, May 7, 1956

Dear Alex:

We were mildly surprised at the postponement of last Saturday's meeting. We agree with you that some developments unrelated to

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

the Geneva talks probably prompted the postponement request. The only development we can think of which might have a relationship is the Chinese Communist request for a Conference on Korea. Peiping undoubtedly is closely watching the reaction to its note of April 9. It is just possible that their tactics in pressing for a high level conference at Geneva are related to the reaction to their request for the multilateral conference on Korea. However they could hardly expect to get a reply from the 16 before the next meeting and I doubt that this is the real explanation for the delay. Incidentally Bob Murphy met with representatives of the 16 last Friday the 4th. At that time he gave them a copy of our draft note and asked for the reactions of their Governments. It was agreed that the British should present a concerted reply on behalf of the 16. The next meeting of the representatives of the 16 is to take place on Wednesday the 9th. We hope to have reactions of the Governments then. There is general agreement that no new conference should be agreed to in the present circumstances. But there is less certainty about how the handling of the NNSC problem will come out. We are sending you a copy of our draft note.

We have a single copy of the William L. White report on the treatment of American POW's. We are trying to get another copy which we can send to you. What we have received seems rather fragmentary. It deals almost exclusively with the contrast in physical treatment of POW's by the UN Command and by the Communists. There is little or no examination of germ warfare confessions brain washing in the Communist POW camps or the Communist subversive organization in the UN POW camps. Nor is there any adequate treatment of the exchange of prisoners following the Armistice Agreement or the illegal detention by the Communists of UNC personnel inside China after the prisoner exchange.

It is our feeling that your instructions for the meeting of last week which was never held will still be good for the meeting of May 11, barring unforeseen developments. However we will consider today and tomorrow whether any slight revision is called for.

There is enclosed a copy of a letter received by [text not declassified] the well known Chinese foreign trader and expert on tungsten, from [text not declassified] lives in New York and is now a naturalized American citizen. [text not declassified] wrote the letter from Stockholm where he was attending a Communist "International Peace Conference". [text not declassified] is a leading industrial engineering specialist in alkalies especially caustic soda. [text not declassified] says he is not a Communist and he is satisfied that the letter was written under duress. This is a part of the general Communist campaign to induce the return of nationals, especially those who have something to contribute to the industrial and technological development plans.

Of the registered letters which we sent to Chinese mentioned by Wang, we have return receipts from 23. Four letters have been returned as undeliverable—addressee unknown. The remaining 6 have not yet been heard from. (Attached is a breakdown of the registered letters.)

Considerable pressure is being brought to bear on the Secretary at Paris by the British and others for immediate relaxation of the CHINCOM controls. Under the recent NSC decision any relaxation is to be handled on a “exceptions” basis rather than through deletions from the control lists. The problem still poses a dilemma for us.

The Hua Chiao Jih Pao in Hong Kong recently published a report that the Bureau of Civil Affairs of the Kwangtung Provincial Government was requiring families of students in the U.S. “or in other capitalistic countries” to register. We mentioned this report to the British, who queried Peiping about it and were informed by O’Neill that he had not heard of my such registration. Although we have no confirmation of the report and Hong Kong newspapers are not noted for their reliability, this would be a likely step for the Chinese Communists to take. It may foreshadow a flood of additional names from Wang Ping-nan. A copy of the report is enclosed.

I am writing you a separate letter on the proposed replacement of Osborn with Comiskey. Although the telegram tells you the whole story in essence, I will fill out the details as soon as I have a little time. The pouch is closing now.

Regards and good wishes,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Letter to I & N. S. dated 5/1/56
2. Draft reply to Chinese Communist Note, April 9, 1956.
3. Breakdown of registered letters to Chinese in U. S.
4. Letter to [text not declassified] dated April 11, 1956 (English and Chinese)
5. Report published by the Hua Chiao Jih Pao in Hong Kong.



**597. Telegram 41 from Geneva to Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 8, 1956, 4 p.m.

41. From Osborn.

Warsaw's 20 to Geneva repeated information Department 797 notes new Polish Foreign Minister reception May 8. Believe this adequately explains postponement. No record here Wangs having arrived by air past week.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–856. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 1855 and to Warsaw as telegram 7.

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**598. Telegram 1967 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 9, 1956, 6:01 p.m.

1967. For Johnson.

Guidance for May 11 meeting.

1. Instructions Deptel 1943 intended for last week considered still valid. You should be governed by them at May 11 meeting.

2. Your 1841. Department has no intelligence which would shed light on reason for Wang postponement request. Appears likely request related his Warsaw duties. We doubt the Foreign Office reception May 8 would have required him cancel Geneva meeting May 5 but presence Chinese Communist Economic Mission in Warsaw headed by Nan Han-ch'en may afford explanation. As Chairman Committee on International Trade and member Standing Committee National People's Congress Nan is figure of considerable importance although not of top hierarchy. If group is actually purchasing complete industrial installations in Poland as reported its negotiations may assume fairly high priority.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–956. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Phleger and Hemmendinger (NA).

3. If postponement request related to tactics at Geneva (which considered unlikely) only known current development which would seem relevant is pending Chinese Communist request of April 9 for multi-lateral conference on Korea. It is just conceivable that Peiping's tactics in pressing at Geneva for high level conference may be conditioned by what Peiping can learn of initial reaction of 16 UN nations to Chinese Communist note of April 9. Meetings of representatives 16 countries held in Department May 4 and May 9.

For your background, reaction of 16 to conference proposal strongly negative. This information highly classified at this stage but with so many countries involved immediate leak to Chinese Communists must be considered as probable. Hence Chinese Communist tactics for future Geneva meetings presumably can be devised in light of this knowledge.

**Dulles**

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**599. Letter 32 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 32

Geneva, May 10, 1956

Dear Walter:

I arrived down here at noon today by Air Force plane which the Czechs had permitted to come in and pick me up. I told the Czechs that only in this way could I attend the Foreign Minister's National Day reception last night.

Incidentally, at the reception I met the Brazilian Parliamentary Delegation, led by a Miss Vargas, which had just arrived and is beginning a tour of all the Bloc as well as Communist China. They will spend some time in the United States on their return but will not be coming through Prague. I did the best I could in the hurly-burly of the big reception to brief them on Americans in China in the hope that they might do a little missionary work and at least be prepared for whatever they hear from the Chinese about it. It seemed to be a quite intelligent and very sympathetic group on the whole and I would think that it might be worthwhile for FE to keep in touch with the Brazilian Desk so

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." A marginal note by McConaughy next to the paragraph concerning Colonel Ekvall's status reads: "Request for extension made by phone to [illegible in the original] of Defense on 5/27. He promised to check with [illegible in the original] G-2!"

as to have an opportunity to talk with them when they come through the United States.

Also at last night's reception the Prime Minister (Siroky) took the initiative in asking about my negotiations here. I did a heavy missionary job on him saying I was discouraged and pessimistic because of the failure of the Chinese to carry out their promise to release the Americans, the increasingly serious adverse effects this was having in the United States, and my concern over their unwillingness to renounce force in the Taiwan area. He made no counter argument or defense on their position, and for whatever it is worth, I believe was somewhat impressed with the reasonableness of our position. He commented that it was good that we were at least talking and implied the hope that the talks would not stop. When I raised the economic negotiations we are having with the Czechs in Prague he dismissed them as not really too important or difficult and not at all on the same scale of importance with our negotiations with the Chinese.

Thanks for your Letter No. 41 as well as for the very interesting enclosures.

Incidentally, with regard to the report that you mentioned was in the Hong Kong press on registration of families having students studying abroad, this report originally appeared in the Ta Kung Pao under Canton dateline of March 23 giving the full text of the proclamation by the Kwangtung government (see Hong Kong's China Mainland Press Survey No. 1259 of April 3, page 5). I had assumed that you had seen this.

I desire to thank you most sincerely for the arrangement with regard to Dave remaining here and the family being sent over. I feel that it is the ideal arrangement from every standpoint and I am most happy that the Department has been able to work it out. Needless to say, Dave is also delighted. I know that you will understand that my somewhat sharp note concerning administrative difficulties in my telegram from Prague was introduced only with the thought that it would help you in shaking loose the administrative end.

I hope that you will be equally successful in getting Ekvall's status extended so that we will not be faced with any last minute crisis concerning him. Incidentally, he went to Paris over the weekend and saw Gen. Moorman, the Army Attache there, and reports that he is completely cooperative. He says Moorman fully appreciates the importance of his assignment here and says that he will not raise any question whatever concerning its extension. However, the initiative and additional orders for the extension of his detail must come from the Department of Defense and Moorman can do nothing without authorization from higher authority.

I am afraid it is going to be more of the same old thing at tomorrow's meeting but you will, of course, know the story before receiving this letter which I want to get off in tomorrow's pouch. Regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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#### 600. Telegram 1866 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, May 11, 1956, noon

1866. From Johnson.

Following is text new draft handed me by Wang at today's meeting:

"Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree, without prejudice to the principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, to announce:

"The People's Republic of China and the United States of America are determined that they should settle disputes between their two countries in the Taiwan area through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force against each other;

"The two Ambassadors should continue their talks to seek and to ascertain within two months practical and feasible means for the realization of this common desire, including the holding of a Sino-American conference of the Foreign Ministers, and to make specific arrangements."

**Gowen**

Note: Advance copy to FE 8:45 a.m. 5/11/56 CWO/FED

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files. 611.93/5-1156. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

**601. Telegram 1870 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 11, 1956, 2 p.m.

1870. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened this morning's meeting by presentation draft previously transmitted Dept together with relatively brief statement which did nothing to clarify its obvious ambiguities.

2. I avoided any specific comment and asked series of questions designed to clarify its ambiguities. I specifically asked in what way draft avoided prejudicing U.S. position; whether second para. intentionally excluded disputes other than those Taiwan area; whether "two months" in last para. was intended limit validity declaration to that period; whether last para. as whole meant that FonMin conference was "only practical and feasible means"; and whether "to make specific arrangements" referred to "practical and feasible means" or to FonMin conference.

3. He avoided any direct response my first question, saying that mutual respect clause was not only "common sense" but—"also" to be found in UN Charter. In reply to second question he indicated that limiting to Taiwan area dispute was deliberate because my emphasis on Taiwan area and since if settlement that most critical dispute could be effected without war other disputes would present no problem. His replies to my questions on last para. were completely evasive. However "very willing hear any ideas or suggestions" I may have.

4. At close of this phase referring to his statements on "procrastination" and our seeking "freeze" situation in Taiwan area, I pointed out talks had not made further progress because of their ambiguous position thus far on renouncing force.

5. I made statement on implementation along lines para. 3 Deptel 1943 to which I replied along usual lines stressing that last December they had asked for accounting Chinese in U.S. prisons, who, I could not deny, desired return China, and we had no right inquire concerning Americans in Chinese prisons until we made such accounting.

6. Next meeting Thursday May 17.

7. Proceeding Prague Saturday returning Geneva Tuesday.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–1156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

602. Telegram 1871 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, May 11, 1956, 5 p.m.

1871. From Johnson.

Comments on today's meeting.

"Mutual respect" clause in first para their draft is adroit counter to self-defense clause. He expects I will counter with reinsertion self-defense clause upon which he may propose both clauses be included or both be omitted. In this connection he may argue dropping self-defense clause does not prejudice our position any more than does dropping "mutual respect" clause prejudice their position.

With respect second para believe they probably open to an addition of "or elsewhere", but of course entire para must be read in relation last para.

Third para is, apart from substance, very loosely drafted. On one hand appears attempt pick up my previous remarks on not excluding FMC as a "practical and feasible means" and on other hand to be commitment to FMC. PRC would, of course, insist on latter interpretation. (They hope we will bargain on "two months" period.) Thus in essence draft is simple reiteration their position on FMC concerning Taiwan area and is further removed from our position than their Dec 1 draft. Incidentally best English translation of Chinese term rendered as "ascertain" in third para is "determine upon" or "decide upon". (Matthews 1181-6393)

Believe that at next meeting I should attack draft from this standpoint, also pointing out weaknesses suggested by my questions this morning. Would particularly appreciate Depts suggestions on best tactic and arguments on "mutual respect" clause.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddel (FE) notified 5:40 p.m., 5/11/56 FMH

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-1156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

**603. Telegram 1875 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 11, 1956, 7 p.m.

1875. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 46th today with prepared statement: As he had specifically pointed out at last meeting, US in draft submitted on April 19 still required their side give up sovereignty and agree to freezing status quo Taiwan area with intention long procrastination without opening FonMins conference so as to permit US continue its policy seizure Taiwan and interference liberation offshore islands. This was what his side absolutely could not accept.

2. Wang said however taking into consideration my repeated request proposed declaration explicitly apply Taiwan area, his side willing make another effort by offering following amendment. (Here Wang read text new draft previously transmitted Mytel 1866.)

3. Wang said I would certainly notice his new draft specifically applied to Taiwan area principle of settling disputes between two countries by peaceful negotiations without resorting threat or use of force. He considered this draft had fully accommodated all reasonable portions my draft.

4. Wang said however he must very frankly point out Sino-American dispute Taiwan area must be separated from China's internal affairs. Any attempt to interfere China's internal affairs through ambiguous words absolutely not to be permitted.

5. Wang said since I had repeatedly indicated at last meeting US did not harbor any such intent their side therefore considered new draft should be acceptable both sides.

6. Wang said since proposed declaration now made specifically applicable Taiwan area in accordance my request, it therefore followed that seeking and ascertaining (Chinese word had sense of "determining upon") means for solving tensions in Taiwan area must also be specified. In order forestall any possible long procrastination talks following announcement declaration without making concrete arrangements settle disputes their draft specified we should seek and ascertain practical feasible means for realization this desire including making arrangements for holding Sino-American conference FonMins within two months. He believed that if both sides shared sincere desire for settlement two months should be sufficient.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–1156. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

7. Wang said their draft also provides in preamble announcement declaration should not be taken as precluding principle mutual respect territorial integrity sovereignty non-interference each other's internal affairs. This self-evident.

8. Wang said we now approaching ninth month since starting discussions second item agenda. If US really desires as repeatedly stated respect their views without requiring them abandon sovereignty or position then they considered both sides should agree new draft without delay.

9. I replied I would comment subsequently in detail on new draft. However few questions I would like ask in clarification to assist in consideration it. First, he had spoken of respect for views each other concerning nature origin our dispute Taiwan area. I would appreciate any amplification he could give on how he perceived this draft respected views US.

10. I said next I noticed that second para. as I read English translation appealed limit entire declaration to dispute between two countries Taiwan area. Instead being declaration general applicability also having specific applicability Taiwan area it seemed be now drafted in form that had applicability only Taiwan area. I would appreciate any amplification that regard, was declaration not to have applicability any dispute between us elsewhere.

11. I said I would also appreciate amplification last para. Without expressing opinion on substance—he well knew my opinion that regard—it seemed me language ambiguous. Ambiguous two respects, from my first cursory reading. With inclusion words “within two months” did it mean that whole declaration had effectiveness only two months? If agreement on practical feasible means not arrived at within two months period, did he consider remainder declaration no longer valid?

12. I said second ambiguous point, it seemed me was phrase concerning holding FonMin conf. It not clear me as this read whether this saying only practical feasible means realization common desire is holding conf Fon Mins or whether it meant to say holding of conf Fon Mins one of practical feasible means to be considered.

13. I said these were questions that immediately struck me on reading draft and I asked them not in sense of making comments on draft. It seemed me that they questions which clearly arose in interpreting and considering his draft. As clear and specific answers as he could give would be of assistance in consideration his draft. It in that sense I asked them.

14. Wang replied he considered draft submitted this morning quite clear in text. He had also made explanations various paragraphs this draft during statement this morning. He had pointed out this morning draft had taken into consideration and included those portions my opinion



which reasonable. This draft represented another effort their part help our talks and arrive at agreement.

15. Wang said according to first para this text they would accord respect to sovereignty, territorial integrity US and would not attempt impair or interfere in internal affairs US. In same way they expected my country respect their rights their territorial integrity and also not to try interfere and [garble—prejudice] their internal affairs.

16. Wang said to them this para matter common sense concerning rights sovereign states. Principles this para also to be found in UN Charter specifically provided for in Charter.

17. Wang said if two countries could adopt and agree on these principles stated in first para then he should say we would thereby lay foundation for improvement relations between two countries. However such question general in extent.

18. Wang said next we come to second para. This para specifically dealt with dispute China-US Taiwan area. Today most critical issue between China-US placing them acute oppositon each other is that in Taiwan area and not any other place.

19. Wang said they believed if Taiwan question could be settled peacefully between two countries without going war then all other issues between two countries would be settled same way.

20. Wang said as to practical feasible means for realization common desire as specified last para., they believed should specify time limit for seeking these means so that any possible procrastination following announcement can be prevented. As he said in opening statement if we shared sincere desire for success discussions following announcement, would not be any delay or procrastination that regard.

21. Wang said as he repeatedly stated in course talks practical feasible means they had in mind precisely FonMin conf. between two countries. He also noted I had never in previous discussions excluded such conference from consideration. For making specific arrangements this practical feasible means, two months time certainly sufficient.

22. I replied I still not clear whether it intended that second para would have any applicability to disputes other than those Taiwan area. It seemed me as para now read there was implication with respect disputes other than those Taiwan area principle of renunciation force and settlement by peaceful negotiation might not be applicable.

23. I said I also still not clear as to interpretation applicability of declaration—whatever rest of it meant—if at end two months agreement not been reached. If agreement not reached in two-month period or if settlement entirely satisfactory them not reached in FonMins meeting or this meeting or any other meeting did his declaration say they would again be free at that time resume threat resort force?

24. I said I also not clear and did not think language clear on whether declaration was stating it already been determined between us FonMins conf only practical feasible means. For example last part sentence "to make specific arrangements"—specific arrangements for what? For FonMins conf? For seeking and ascertaining means for realization common desire? Without expressing opinion at moment, it seemed me language very ambiguous as to what it actually did mean. If I had difficulty understanding it, certainly others would have much more difficulty.

25. Wang replied as he saw it my question concerning second para draft already been answered. As I had previously repeatedly asked question whether peaceful settlement disputes between two countries included dispute Taiwan area therefore present draft had precisely answered my question. In his opening statement he had said I would notice new draft specifically applied to Taiwan area principle of settling disputes by peaceful negotiation without resorting threat use force. He thought this sufficiently clear.

26. Wang said with regard third para on attainment practical feasible means, if we agreed on principle settling disputes Taiwan area without resort threat use force against each other then it followed practical feasible means realizing this principle must be sought. If we failed seek find such practical feasible means as specified declaration what would be use making declaration at all?

27. Wang said this para clearly says we should seek practical feasible means and these means included holding Sino-American FonMins. Text this para quite clear. As to specific arrangements referred to this para they meant arrangements for such conference—time, place, how it would be arranged. This was position their side which they made clear over over again in course deliberations. That was their understanding of practical feasible means referred to here.

28. Wang said nevertheless he would also be ready listen me if I had other better practical feasible means in mind.

29. I replied I just wanted make one more comment on his statement. He had often in past and again this morning talked of procrastination and necessity avoiding procrastination and attempt at freezing situation Taiwan area.

30. I said I just wanted note it US which last October proposed there be renunciation force specifically applicable Taiwan area as elsewhere so genuine peaceful negotiations could be undertaken. It ambiguous attitude Wang's govt. had thus far taken with respect really renouncing use force Taiwan area that had prevented undertaking such discussions.

31. I said I would study his draft and comment in detail next meeting.

32. Wang replied he could not agree with remarks I made just now. It matter fact their side at session October 21 offered concrete

draft proposed declaration on renunciation force, it not US which took this first initiative. If US had genuinely shared desire their side make this declaration it would been made long ago, it would been made last year, instead of carrying discussion over to present. Present draft another important effort their part to make discussions success and he did not want see any further delay. They hoped we able adopt this draft and reach agreement speedily.

33. Wang said however he very willing listen any positive constructive remarks had to make next meeting with regard this draft.

34. I said if Wang had nothing further that matter I would like note 18 more Chinese arrived Hong Kong April 30 enroute Wang's country. This made total 148 we know of that arrived by ship Hong Kong enroute his country since August 1 last year. It been almost five months now since [garble] American been released his country. It hard me see how his authorities could expect world believe they carrying out commitment Sept 10 last year, regarding Americans when facts so clearly spoke otherwise.

35. I said my govt intends faithfully carry out pledge made our agreed announcement. At same time we expected his govt do likewise. It clearly not doing so.

36. I said I had spoken many times effects this having my country. If his authorities really seeking improve atmosphere surrounding talks and relations between two countries situation must be corrected.

37. Wang replied I had said number Chinese now returned his country but these Chinese should been permitted return long ago. Of 49 Chinese whose names he given me except one who already returned they had no information on remaining 48.

38. Wang said he able tell me any ordinary American civilian now China can return my country any time he desires. If they not now returned it simply because they not have desire return now. They could not force them leave country or deport them because they not breached Chinese law. As to question persons in prison during discussions last December he requested me make investigation Chinese imprisoned US. However nearly half year passed without my giving him any information on them which he regretted very much. Certainly I could not tell him that persons imprisoned US did not desire return his country.

39. Wang said if I concerned about Americans imprisoned in China then must first all give them such information as actually how many Chinese now imprisoned by my govt US. He could tell me very frankly if US refused give accounting Chinese imprisoned US, US had no right mention question Americans in prison his country.

40. Wang said he had said my govt not satisfied with situation Americans imprisoned in China. He could tell me his govt, his country, his people even more dissatisfied with situation his compatriots imprisoned in US.

41. I asked what Americans we were talking about last September if not about those Americans detained their prisons. We were not talking about Americans in abstract, we talking about specific Americans and both us knew it. There was certainly no doubt between us that his authorities were committing selves permit those (repeat those) Americans return expeditiously US. This they had not done.

42. Wang said question we discussed was question return civilians both countries and this dealt with in very clear terms and words our agreement. Agreement did not speak about particular category civilians agreement covered all civilians. They expected US implement agreement accordance its terms.

43. I said I had nothing further and asked if next Thursday 17th satisfactory. Wang agreed.

Gowen

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#### 604. Letter 42 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 42

Washington, May 11, 1956

Dear Alex:

We went all out to meet your request to keep Dave Osborn. We took the matter to Mr. Carpenter in order to get it resolved [*text not declassified*].

[*text not declassified*]

We had the new Indian Minister Hareshwar Dayal in. He called on Mr. Sebald on May 8 for a discussion of the application of the Agreed Announcement. As you will see from the enclosed memo of conversation, the Indian Embassy is a little bit fussy on some aspects of the matter.

[*text not declassified*] informed me in confidence the other day that the Indian Charge in Peiping had told the [*text not declassified*] Charge there that the Indian Embassy here "assisted about 330 Chinese to return to China". I do not know where he got the figure. There is no evidence here that the Indians have been in contact with any such movement of Chinese. They have undoubtedly assisted a few financially. They did not volunteer any information on this and we of course have not pressed them.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal.

We will send you a report on the meeting of the representatives of the 16 countries which was held on May 9 with Bob Murphy on the Chinese Communist note. (See Circular 777 May 10) You will recall that we referred to this in our guidance telegram of May 9, No. 1967.

Your letter No. 31 dated May 3 was received on May 8, 1956.

I have asked Nagoski to check the unfortunate language of the Immigration people in reference to “applications for permission to depart”. He tells me that the Immigration Service confirms categorically that Chinese do not need “permission” to return and do not have to inform the Immigration Service when they leave the United States. However, some foreigners (and this not confined to Chinese) in the U.S. apparently do not realize this. They may feel that it is necessary, or at least the polite thing, to touch base with U.S. I&N.S. before leaving. Also, some of the prospective Chinese repatriates are under the illusion that the US I&N.S. can help them with tickets and travel reservations. Perhaps some of the U.S. I&N.S. field officers have not always made sufficiently plain to the inquirers that a positive response does not imply that the inquiry was necessary in the first place or that a negative answer could have been given. The one case in which the inquiry was referred from one office to another appears to have been an instance of pure bureaucratic timidity. We have asked I&N.S. to reexamine its circular instructions to the field offices on this subject to make sure that it is sufficiently emphasized that Chinese need have no dealings with the Immigration Offices in their arrangements for departure.

I agree with your observation in your letter No. 30 about the deficiency in the case histories attached to the Lindbeck report. I have shown Lindbeck your comments and he is working on the matter. We will have some information on this shortly.

*[text not declassified]*

I hope there are no unpleasant surprises in the meeting tomorrow.

*[text not declassified]*

Regards and every good wish,

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Copy of Memorandum dated May 9.
2. Copy of Memo of Conversation with Indian Minister

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**605. Memorandum from Clough to Robertson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1956

**SUBJECT**

Developments in Geneva Talks Since April 21

There have been only two meetings in Geneva during your absence, one on April 26 and one on May 11. A meeting was originally scheduled for May 5, but was postponed at Wang's request. We don't know why he requested the postponement, but suspect it might have been connected with the presence of a Chinese Communist trade mission in Warsaw.

The meeting on April 26 was relatively short (1 hour and 45 minutes). Wang flatly rejected our April 19 draft and showed no sign of willingness to compromise nor intent to offer an alternative formulation.

On May 11 Wang opened by presenting a new draft. (Tab A) It cuts out our self-defense phrase, replacing it with the phrase "without prejudice to the principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs." It also cuts out the phrase "or elsewhere" in the second paragraph, thus limiting renunciation of force to the Taiwan area alone, and makes the pledge not to use force apply only to the US and the Chinese Communists by adding the words "against each other." It also specifies the holding of a foreign minister's conference and sets a time limit of two months for making arrangements for it.

At both meetings Wang demanded an accounting of Chinese imprisoned in the US.

Attachment: (Tab A)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-1456. Confidential. Drafted by Clough.

**606. Letter from Osborn to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 14, 1956

Dear Ralph:

Reading Walter's latest letter, which came this morning, I feel bad about all the trouble you in CA and FE have had to go to on my account. Believe me I appreciate it from the bottom of my heart, and if there had been any alternative I would gladly have taken it. [*text not declassified*]

If I can take advantage of this extremely informal context, I'd like to broach an idea or two on the talks, mainly so that if the ideas reflect too much of a drift away from FE's, you can write back and tell me they're all wet. They are not official suggestions, not endorsed by the Ambassador (to whom I haven't shown—but will show—this letter) and don't even reflect any hard-and-fast opinions on my part.

1. Duration of Talks—We will presumably continue unwilling to force a break, so that duration is up to CHICOMS. Their position with respect to continuation of talks will reflect not only their appreciation of the value of the talks per se, as an instrument for promoting the trend towards accommodation and hurting the GRC, but also their estimate of the prospects for a FMC.

2. CHICOM Estimate of FMC Prospects—CHICOMS will presumably not want to force the issue of a FMC before Nehru's U.S. visit in July. Question is whether they will want to try to force the issue during Nehru's visit, or whether they may not have another crucial date in mind, the presidential elections in November. They must be aware that we are not going to volunteer any movement towards a FMC, at least before November. They might be content to wait out November. On the other hand, they might try to put the Administration in a pre-election dilemma, by threatening hostilities against the offshores unless we agree to a FMC. Either choice would be very painful, particularly just before election time, but the CHICOMS might figure that with the GOP campaign slogan "Peace and Prosperity" the Administration would choose the FMC as the lesser of two evils.

3. The Worth of a FMC—The thing that bothers me about a FMC, apart from the general damage that a FMC would do to the anti-communist forces in the FE, is what would there be to talk about? Paradoxically, about the safest topic I can think of would be a meaningful renunciation of force. Still, in Europe especially, one senses how much the U.S. needs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal.

some evidence to point to to show it is not being “unreasonable” in its opposition to Communist China.

4. Our Tactics Vis-a-vis New Draft—Wang’s new draft has a lot of bargaining room built in. We can exploit this for two or three months, at least. Here, however, is a point: in order to get the most mileage out of the new draft, it would be a tremendous help to have some idea of the Department’s thinking on strategy. One approach on the new draft, designed to get mileage, would be to go through the thing paragraph by paragraph. The first paragraph alone, for example, would be good for three or four meetings. However, in planning this kind of approach, it would be helpful to know more about our objectives. If we are going to be really adamant on the first paragraph as per our April 19 draft, for example, we should save discussion of the paragraph until the last, since once we start insisting on ICSD without “mutual respect” we have put a term to the mileage we can get out of the new draft. What would enable us to get the most mileage would be if we had a “minimum position” draft towards which we could work point by point and paragraph by paragraph—such a draft would, of course, not be tabled until all possible mileage had been squeezed out of Wang’s new draft.

5. A “Minimum-Position” Draft—In the enclosure, I have tried my hand at such a draft. This does not represent my opinion of what would be desirable in the way of a declaration if we had *carte blanche*. It is merely a sample of the kind of thing that would be a very useful guide for us in getting mileage out of Wang’s draft.

In drafting the enclosure, I have tried to protect our position on three points: (a) no sacrifice of self-defense right; (b) renunciation of force applicable to Taiwan; and, (c) U.S. control over whether and when FMC to be held, with implication in any event not until Americans released. The last paragraph in particular is rather treacherous ground, but in any case, the whole enclosure is purely illustrative and not intended as a concrete suggestion.

As to whether Wang would “buy” the enclosed, I have my doubts, but I think it is at least conceivable. He would certainly look darn unreasonable if he turned it down. Whether or not he would buy it, such a draft would at least help us get mileage out of Wang’s draft.

Hope I haven’t presumed too much on your time. Regards to Doug, Steve, Joe, Allene, Irene, Elaine. Regards and sincere thanks to Walter and Mr. Sebald—and Cappy.

Sincerely yours,

David L. Osborn



**Enclosure****Draft Agreed Announcement<sup>2</sup>**

AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE AMBASSADORS  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, agree, without prejudice to the views of either side with respect to the merits of any of their disputes, [or, alternatively, "to the inherent rights of either party"] to announce:

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China are determined that they should settle disputes between their two countries in the Taiwan area or elsewhere by peaceful means only, and are determined they will not resort to the threat or use of force;

The two Ambassadors should continue their talks to settle the practical matters at issue between them and should expeditiously seek such additional practical and feasible means for the realization of the common determination expressed above, [including the holding of negotiations at a higher level]<sup>3</sup> as may be ascertained to be appropriate and necessary.

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<sup>2</sup> Confidential. Brackets are in the original.

<sup>3</sup> Bracketed clause to be inserted as ultimate "concession" if necessary. [Footnote in the original.]

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**607. Telegram 1994 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 15, 1956, 6:55 p.m.

1994. For Johnson.

1. Communist May 11 counterproposal represents sharp retrogression from their December 1 counterproposal and is entirely unacceptable for following reasons among others:

- a. It contains no reservation of right of self-defense.
- b. Paragraph 1 amounts to recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Communist China.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–1556. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Phleger; cleared by Dulles in draft, Sebald, and Clough.

c. It is not an agreement to renounce force, but an agreement to settle disputes without using force.

d. It is limited to disputes in Taiwan area.

e. It is limited to renunciation of use of force against each other, and does not renounce use of force by Communists against GRC.

f. It apparently places two months' limit on ambassadors talks, requires holding of Foreign Ministers' conference, and may limit effect of announcement to two months.

2. Our analysis is that Communist proposal is by all odds shrewdest and most dangerous move to date. In effect it would amount to our recognition Communist sovereignty and territorial integrity, leave Communists free to attack GRC whenever they wished with US barred from use of force to assist defense and would obligate us to agree within two months to hold Foreign Ministers' conference.

3. Tactics in handling this proposal should be directed toward indicating that draft unacceptable and long step backward from their December 1 draft. You should try and lead back to our April 19, second revision as basis for discussion, pointing out that it covers all legitimate requirements of situation, preserving rights of two sides, renouncing use of force, and providing for discussions to settle outstanding differences. Every effort must be made to prevent Wang's proposal from being used as basis for discussion.

4. We should be careful that while rejecting Communist proposal we do so in such a way as not to furnish grounds for break, and your manner of use of material in first paragraph should be dictated by this requirement. We think best tactic if possible is to get back to discussion US April 19 revision and why no grounds exist for Communists refusal accept.

5. From discussion last meetings it would appear that Wang has taken position all prisoners both US and Chinese are covered by Agreed Announcement, but that Communists are not living up to their agreement because US not releasing Chinese prisoners. Attempt to get Wang to reiterate this position. FYI We have ascertained that only 42 Chinese aliens in all US prisons, and while we have no final word as yet, it may be possible in relatively short time to make arrangements for deportation of Chinese prisoners if release US prisoners can be thereby obtained or facilitated. END FYI

6. You should again call for release of US prisoners and Communist implementation Agreed Announcement pointing out their failure thus far has made it difficult to make further progress in talks.

**Dulles**

**608. Letter 33 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 33

Geneva, May 16, 1956

Dear Walter:

With reference to my letter No. 32 concerning the visit of the Brazilian Parliamentary Delegation to Communist China, I am not clear as to exactly what may have happened. However, on the following evening they denied to Vedeler that they were going to Communist China and I now assume that this must be the fact. There was no possibility of misunderstanding between us at the time I had my conversation with them as several of them with whom I was speaking spoke good English and we talked about it in some detail. However, you can now I think disregard it.

I have received the instructions for tomorrow's meeting and will try to carry them out to the best of my ability. In thinking it through, I have decided that my best tactic for tomorrow is to avoid specifics and simply attack his draft as a whole, then try to steer the discussion to our April 19 draft. I doubt if I am going to be very successful on the latter point but we will have to see how it works out. I figure that if I get into specifics, particularly with respect to the self-defense clause, I will open the door for him to suggest its inclusion along with their mutual respect clause and will find myself mired down in an unproductive morass.

Thanks very much for your letter No. 42. It seems to me that Sebald's discussion with Dayal was an excellent idea and should be very helpful in influencing Indian attitudes.

I am very glad to note the action you have taken with INS on the "application for permission to depart" problem.

Regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

## 609. Telegram 1895 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, May 17, 1956, noon

1895. From Johnson.

1. Two hour meeting this morning which I opened with prepared statement making generalized attack on his May 11 draft. I pointed to complete lack "accommodation" our position and characterized draft as retrogression from not only our draft of April 19 but also his draft Dec 1. Closed by urging consideration April 19 draft making points contained para 3 Deptel 1994.

2. In give and take he repeated points made last meeting and made concerted effort to draw me into specific discussion particularly on first para May 11 draft, closing by hope I would have detailed comments next meeting. In course this discussion Wang in referring to "peaceful aspirations" PRC stated "will not tolerate present situation (in Taiwan area) for long without applying solution" and if US sincere can it "desire these talks drag on indefinitely"?

3. During give and take I avoided specific discussion details May 11 draft focusing on their unwillingness renounce FMC Taiwan area and continually urging April 19 draft as unobjectionable statement if they accepted this principle. Characterized May 11 draft as nothing more than their original position FMC on Taiwan area while they preserved option use force there. Said US never would accept this position.

Urged they reconsider their position by next meeting.

4. Reply my statement again calling for release 13 he said hoped I would be able give him information on Chinese prisoners in US, "this was undertaken by US in agreed announcement".

5. Next meeting Thursday May 24.

6. Proceeding Prague Friday morning, returning Tuesday or Wednesday.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 5/17/3:25 p.m. EMB (CWO)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-1756. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

**610. Telegram 1902 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 17, 1956, 6 p.m.

1902. From Johnson.

Comments on today's meeting:

At today's meeting I deliberately avoided specific comment on details his draft and did not as such mention either self-defense or mutual respect clauses in effort avoid traps May 11 draft and keep issue focused on major point their unwillingness renounce force in Taiwan area as set forth our April 19 draft. This served well today and probably can profitably be continued for another meeting or two. However, by thus sharpening basic issue between us I may be correspondingly reducing our freedom of maneuver to keep talks going.

However this is also issue upon which public position CHICOMS is weakest and upon which they will be more reluctant go to public or break talks. Suggest this aspect would be much clearer if Communists were not able publicly confuse basic issue with either self-defense or mutual respect clauses. Therefore suggest Dept may desire give consideration to method whereby this might be accomplished.

While at today's meeting Wang permitted himself some extent be led back to discussion April 19 draft at subsequent meetings he will probably limit himself to flat rejection that draft.

As additional points Dept will note from full record that today he went further than in past, sharpening distinction between offshore islands and Taiwan by specifically mentioning Penghus with Taiwan and stating we had no international disputes "elsewhere". Just possible additional motive for their deletion "elsewhere" might be hope I would, in arguing for its retention, and other disputes such as Korea, thus appearing support their proposal for Korea conference.

Wang's statement para 244 Longtel, that "situation where country already used force", carried implication comite preparing use force. Relevance this statement to context of FMC in which Wang made it not entirely clear, but in any case carries connotation of threat and as such may provide useful point to attack next meeting.

Dept will also note he avoided any take it or leave it attitude with respect May 11 draft and seemed to be inviting amendments. Seemed particularly desirous getting me into detailed discussion first para,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-1756. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

repeatedly challenging me to oppose mutual respect clause (10-4-37 Longtel).

Believe I was successful today in getting him to go about as far as he is going to go in linking prisoners and paving way for our deportation Chinese alien prisoners as pressure on them release remaining Americans.

Gowen

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**611. Telegram 1903 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 17, 1956, 8 p.m.

1903. From Johnson.

1. I opened 47th today with prepared statement: QTE I carefully studied draft you submitted last meeting, in light comments you made that time. In general, must say struck by discrepancy between your comments and draft itself.

2. First place, you said last meeting draft fully accommodated reasonable portions my draft. Presume you were speaking of my April 19 revision your draft December 1. As I pointed out in presenting that revision, had carefully adhered your draft in preparing it. Fact, it very exactly includes all language your December 1 draft.

3. Must ask just what portions my amendments been, as you say, "fully" accommodated in new draft? First such portion, so far as been able discover in English text consists solely of three words "without prejudice to". Not by any stretch imagination could anyone call this accommodation my amendment that paragraph.

4. Second portion my amendments which apparently included in new draft consists four words "in the Taiwan area". Shall [return] this point later, for moment let me say context in which phrase included new draft vastly departs from sense my amendment December 1 draft.

5. That is all of so-called "accommodation" my amendments. Cannot find any other example "accommodation" my revisions or point view anywhere in new draft. Accordingly, I left with supposition when you spoke of fully accommodating portions my draft, you really talking

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-1756. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

about portions your own draft of Dec 1, claiming credit for accommodation your own point view.

6. Unfortunately, as I compare Dec 1 draft with your draft May 11, seems you done only slightly less damage to it than to my amendments. Dec 1 draft, on surface at least, seemed genuine step towards renunciation force, and at time I so interpreted it. My primary concern, when you submitted that draft, was with certain ambiguities it contained. By what it failed say, rather than what it said, Dec 1 draft appeared capable meaning one thing one side another to other side. Did not then occur me you trying trick me. I did not jump to conclusion ambiguities deliberate. On contrary, I felt you would welcome suggestions to remove ambiguities; on two successive occasions, made such suggestions. Still seems me if ambiguities Dec 1 draft not deliberate, and if your government were genuinely willing join in declaration renouncing force Taiwan area, can be no valid reasons for your objections my revisions. Still seems me if your government not willing renounce force Taiwan area as well as elsewhere, then all its talk about desiring peaceful negotiations idle and without sincerity of purpose.

7. It now begins appear, in light May 11 draft, that perhaps ambiguities Dec 1 draft were deliberate. In new draft, and particularly in third paragraph, you deliberately introduced new ambiguities. You have used language which apparently places arbitrary time limit our efforts here. Have used language which apparently means your government threatens resort force unless resolution disputes fully meeting its unilateral position reached within two months. Other hand, paragraph might be interpreted mean even without waiting two months, two of us should immediately drop all other business and start preparing FonMins meeting. Simply not clear. What is clear is it represents no slightest concession from basic position this regard you took at very outset talks under second agenda item.

8. Respect to Taiwan area reference, situation also very ambiguous. In your statements previous meetings and again last meeting, you not attempted deny existence other disputes between our countries, although we both agree dispute in Taiwan area most immediate. Indeed, last March, when you began insist on Dec 1 draft or Oct 27 draft as only choices being given us, you appeared take position your Dec 1 draft covered all our disputes including that in Taiwan area. Last meeting you again took cognizance existence other disputes, said your government hoped our other disputes also be settled without resort force.

If that really desire your government, why fear say so? Why have you, in second para new draft, explicitly excluded any and all disputes other than that Taiwan area?

9. These are some of reasons, why I feel new draft constitutes retrogression not only from my draft April 19 but even from your own

draft because if we going go forward, then let us do so, beginning with serious consideration April 19 draft. That draft covers all legitimate requirements of situation fully preserves rights both sides. Is unambiguous renunciation use force in settlement our disputes. It makes provision for discussions settle outstanding differences.

End quote.

10. Wang (from handwritten notes) said he already made some explanation most points covered my statement. Last meeting he made quite clear that he submitted new draft representing another important effort on Chinese part these talks. Since I had asked how new draft accommodated my views he would like amplify. They made quite clear new draft accommodated views US and by this he meant it had accommodated all reasonable views US.

11. (Turning to one of several short horizontally typed statements) Wang said issue between us very plain. It US which first made proposal two sides make declaration. Their side accepted that proposal and had repeatedly taken initiative offering draft. Recently after consideration US views they submitted declaration making principle peaceful settlement disputes between two countries without resort use force specifically apply Taiwan area.

12. Wang said however as their side often pointed out in circumstances where US occupying Taiwan trying interfere liberation offshore islands it absolutely impossible make China recognize US-Chiang Kai Shek treaty or recognize US claim self-defense Taiwan area or acquiesce in continued carrying out by US such policy. That why he repeatedly stated China could and could only accommodate reasonable portions my views and could not accommodate unreasonable views US. If US intended include in draft or conceal in declaration unreasonable views, that impossible. This point should be quite clear between us.

13. Wang said second place regarding specific implication Taiwan area principle peaceful settlement disputes between two countries without resort threat use force this so stated because there exists international dispute between China-US over Taiwan Penghu islands.

14. Wang said elsewhere do not exist any international disputes in practical sense term where China as one party confronts US as other party so he did not see any reason mention "elsewhere".

15. Wang said next I had referred to time limit in draft and had said their side trying hike up this time limit to threaten use force. However fact quite contrary. It their view that given equal sincerity both sides it entirely possible in two months ascertain practical feasible means and make specific arrangements settle disputes two sides Taiwan area.

16. Wang said fact confronting us today is that US already applied force and threat against China seizing Taiwan. China nevertheless still



willing settle this dispute by peaceful negotiations fully demonstrating peaceful aspirations on part China. However they could not tolerate present state of employing threat and force against China to continue long without solution. That why they believe essential set time limit for seeking ascertaining practical feasible means. If we sincere in desiring peaceful settlement disputes two countries did we want go on talking forever?

17. Wang said therefore May 11 draft their side demonstrated sincere desire part China arrive at resolution dispute between us. This draft as he said included all reasonable portions drafts both sides.

18. Wang said as to April 19 draft he had already stated it maintained our old unreasonable position and as he stated very categorically it not acceptable them.

19. I replied he had again said US made proposal for declaration. Seemed necessary reiterate what I often previously said, US proposal not for declaration for declaration's sake. US proposal was for clear definite renunciation use force to settle disputes including dispute Taiwan area.

20. I said this would as US pointed out in its proposal open way for peaceful discussion settlement differences. Fundamental issue still seemed be that first fundamental step renouncing use force as instrument national policy.

21. I said question was whether any declaration we issued would in fact constitute such renunciation force. Or whether it would give surface appearance doing so while reserving Wang's govt option initiating use force especially Taiwan area any time it desired. Such declaration would be fraud and could only in future aggravate differences between us. Other hand declaration clearly unambiguously renouncing use force could open way genuinely peaceful discussions.

22. I said he had again this morning spoken of requiring them acquiesce or agree policies US particularly Taiwan area. He long maintained my Jan 12 draft required them acquiesce those policies. Order meet fully his point view this regard, I had submitted April 19 draft which very specifically by exact terms stated it without prejudice pursuit by his side its policies by peaceful means and said same thing so far US concerned.

23. I said that draft most clearly did not require him acquiesce or agree policies US. It made very clear they not renouncing anything except pursuit policies by use force. Did not require them acquiesce US policies any more than required US acquiesce their policies views. Fully preserved positions both us that regard.

24. I said had some difficulty following his reasoning on inclusion all disputes as well as specifically dispute Taiwan area. In past we both

agreed we had other disputes. There other areas where we confronted each other with conflicting policies. If principle renunciation force peaceful settlement disputes had validity one area certainly had validity other areas.

25. I said thus April 19 draft certainly met positions both sides if there willingness part his government really renounce force.

26. I said that draft also specifically provided in language suggested by him we continue our efforts discuss settle outstanding differences. Way get ahead in discussion settlement differences is no longer delay unambiguously renouncing force then proceed discuss those differences. That exactly what provided by April 19 draft. He had spoken of sincerity and desire get ahead with talks. If there real sincere desire part his government get ahead it could certainly do so by agreeing draft April 19 then two us immediately proceeding accordance last paragraph that draft. I most earnestly continued hope we would do this.

27. Wang said he had already stated they could not give consideration April 19 draft which I mentioned in statement. They had dealt this question many times and had stated why they considered it unacceptable because it unreasonable.

28. Wang said first we must make it clear between us as to purpose issuing declaration. Purpose was respect rights and internal affairs each other. Purpose such declaration should be settle disputes two countries peaceful means without use force threat. This purpose in accordance accepted general principles international relations between countries.

29. Wang said I just stated primary issue between two countries renunciation use force as instrument national policy. However in point fact situation we faced today not rpt not one where China seizing territory any other country. Actual fact was US already used force pursuit its policy and had seized territory China. If proposed declaration should contain implication freezing present situation Taiwan area, such declaration could not be described as renunciation force but on contrary it declaration recognition and acceptance established facts aggression.

30. Wang said China always pursued peaceful foreign policy.

This point fully proven over years in statements China made together other countries. Fact China now engaged talks with us to work toward peaceful settlement disputes two countries even more proof this peaceful foreign policy China. China willing settle disputes with US by peaceful negotiations instead by use force or going war. Principle this foreign policy specifically applied Taiwan area. If US shared this peaceful desire of China they saw no valid reason not accepting principle this paragraph.

31. I said Wang had again made allegation concerning policy my government which without foundation and entered into merits our disputes Taiwan area.

32. I said in effect Wang impugned good faith my government regard carrying out terms declaration as it appeared in April 19 draft, what had appeared in effect be saying was my government would be entering into declaration without intent carrying out terms last paragraph. I surprised disappointed Wang would make such implication.

33. I said when we came here last year, situation with respect matters at issue between two countries particularly Taiwan area embodies grave threat peace. Had my government wanted perpetuate that situation certainly would not have made its proposal these talks. Had my government desired perpetuate danger inherent situation Taiwan area I certainly not have made my proposal October 8 last year.

34. I said if anyone has shown intent perpetuating that situation it certainly not been US. It US which proposed clear unambiguous renunciation force Taiwan area just so that situation would not be perpetuated.

35. I said question between us still seems be whether his government desires perpetuate situation where it holds self free initiate use force that area with consequent dangers peace and difficulties finding peaceful solutions under such conditions.

36. Wang said in attending these talks they had always held hope reaching definite results. Since we now discussing declaration we should try find way out in respect declaration itself. He had many times explained terms and clauses May 11 draft acceptable both sides.

37. Wang said there three paragraphs his draft. First dealt mainly with mutual respect rights both sides. How could there be any opposition this paragraph? This paragraph not spur-of-the-moment creation it dealt with fundamental principle on which rest international relations of states. These principles now being widely applied between states with different systems. He could not imagine any opposition this paragraph. Nor could they include this paragraph principles which contrary to that of May 11 draft.

38. Wang said second paragraph dealt with question we had discussed very long time. This paragraph they had endeavored particularly accommodate my requirement by stating we should settle disputes two countries Taiwan area through peaceful negotiations. Was this not precisely request I had made repeatedly? Outside Taiwan area was there other dispute between two countries which even graver than that Taiwan area? Did I say specific reference Taiwan area they made in May 11 draft did not accommodate US request?

39. Wang said I had alleged May 11 draft constituted retrogression. Does US desire reference Taiwan area draft May 11 be removed from paragraph?

40. Wang said third paragraph dealt with practical feasible means realization desire expressed previous paragraphs for peaceful resolution disputes two countries. Dealt with question seeking ascertaining within given time practical feasible means in spirit declaration. Was this not very reasonable paragraph? Did we intend deliberately drag on talks without resolving issues?

41. Wang said it in this sense he again expressed hope I would make further study his draft so we able bring about identity views and said agreement this basis to enable us get ahead these talks.

42. I said I had explained why I felt this draft was retrogression rather than advance in talks. It appeared be in substance only reiteration Wang's position from beginning these talks that there be held Foreign Ministers meeting respect Taiwan, while at same time reserving his govt option using force that area. That was position which could not and never would be accepted my govt. My govt would not negotiate under threat force. Once force clearly unambiguously been renounced my govt would negotiate good faith. April 19 draft accomplished that purpose. I hoped at next meeting Wang could reconsider matter from this standpoint. I had nothing further on this.

43. Wang said I had stated draft May 11 contained ambiguities and that they had ulterior intentions or motives in that draft and that there discrepancy between draft and its meaning. Other hand I also stated their side from beginning talks had maintained position for holding FonMins conference for settlement disputes two countries.

44. Wang said situation where country already used force against another and situation where country preparing use force—these two quite different matters.

45. Wang said it quite true they always maintained principle set forth third paragraph May 11. That is we should seek practical feasible means settlement disputes and this included holding FonMin conference. Thus draft May 11 and intent and position their side consistent each other and quite clear. Thus consistent foreign Wang's country—actions and words identical and consistent each other. There nothing hidden between lines these paragraphs. Respect holding FonMin conference he understood from my previous statements I never refused or rejected this position their side.

46. Wang said he also hoped would be able reconsider draft and do something at next meeting to get ahead in talks. That all he had on this.

47. I said I had nothing further on that, however, I did want note it now lacking three days of five months since any Americans released by his country. If there to be improvement relations, 13 Americans remaining prison must be released, as undertaken by his government September 10 announcement.

48. I said I would move [*hope?*] he would be able do more than been done in past in impressing his authorities overriding importance this. I would say no more on this this morning.

49. Wang said he also hoped I would be able give him information about Chinese imprisoned US so as improve relations between us. They hoped US Government would give serious attention this question. This also undertaken by US in our agreement.

50. I asked if next Thursday, May 4 satisfactory. Wang agreed.

Gowen

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## 612. Letter 43 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 43

Washington, May 21, 1956

Dear Alex:

As we stated in our telegram to you, we consider Wang's new draft a retrogression from his December 1 draft and extremely dangerous. Judge Phleger is of the opinion that the Communists now realize that they came within an ace of agreeing to a formula that would have tied their hands. They are now taking care to protect themselves more fully.

It is noteworthy that the Communists worked into the first paragraph of their new draft two of their five "principles of peaceful coexistence" which have formed the basis of joint declarations with India, Burma and other states. Judging from Wang's efforts at the last meeting to get you to comment on this paragraph, they are hoping to demonstrate that we reject these principles and thus harbor the intention of interfering in their internal affairs and encroaching on their territorial integrity. This would strengthen their position vis-a-vis the neutralist states. Of course, we cannot accept paragraph one without, in effect, recognizing the PRC. It was for this reason that we asked you to try to get back to our April 19 draft as a basis for discussion, rather than comment in detail on the Communist draft.

It may be significant that the Communists selected two months as the period during which arrangements for a foreign ministers' conference should be completed. Allowing a few weeks to reach agreement

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy.

on their draft, the two months would carry the meetings through the completion of a full year and beyond the time of Nehru's visit here. It is possible that they are looking toward a break-off around that time if no progress is made.

We have been debating whether to ask O'Neill to make new representations in Peiping. We had a copy of a despatch from him last Friday in which he discusses the advisability of such a move. The principal reason we have hesitated to go ahead is that we believe Clifford and Phillips both have three-year sentences which will be up about mid-June if the Communists follow their usual procedure of making them retroactive to the date of arrest. If we should present a strong note to the Communists via O'Neill just at this time it might cause them to delay the release of these two so that it wouldn't appear that the release came about as a result of "pressure". We would appreciate having your views on this.

We have still been unable to reach complete agreement with the representatives of the sixteen regarding action to be taken on the NNSC. Some progress has been made. All agree that the conference on Korea should be rejected, in the absence of any evidence that the Communists have changed their attitude. All have now accepted, in principle, the necessity of unilateral action to remove the NNSC to the demilitarized zone. Difference of opinion now revolves around the timing and form of this action. The Commonwealth countries and France are holding out for an interval between announcing our proposed action in the MAC and carrying it out. The interval proposed ranges from six or seven days to five weeks. We have been trying to get agreement on reducing the interval or, better still, eliminating it, as we fear that we will just be providing the Communists with an opportunity to make propaganda and work on the neutralists during the interval. Also, there is the constant danger of incidents in Korea during such a period. There will probably be another meeting of the sixteen this week to reach final agreement.

We have now received the second section of the W. L. White report on Communist treatment of POW's. There is more to come. If we can get more copies we will send you one—so far Defense has furnished only one copy for all interested offices in the Department. Mr. Hoover asked for an evaluation of the project to date and there is enclosed a memorandum from Bill Sebald to him giving our views.

We have sent you a copy of a memorandum prepared for Mr. Robertson reporting on the latest developments in Congress relating to imprisoned Americans. Interest in this subject appears to be mounting and it may not be possible much longer to discourage the interested committees from holding public hearings.

I have just returned from a weeks' leave, which I took to spend with my Father in Alabama on the occasion of his birthday. I have not yet had a chance to bring myself fully abreast of developments since I left Washington on May 10. The foregoing was drafted entirely by Ralph Clough, who was in charge of CA while I was away. He kept in close touch with Robertson, Phleger and Sebald, and participated in a meeting with the Secretary on May 15. What he has written above has my full concurrence. The Secretary personally approved the instructions for the meeting of May 17.

I suppose Helenka Osborn will be in Geneva before this letter arrives. I trust her arrival will improve matters for you as well as for Dave.

Regards and good wishes,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Memo from Mr. Sebald to Mr. Hoover
2. Meetings of 16 (May 7 and 14)
3. Despatch from O'Neill
4. Copy of memo from WPM to Sebald 3/21/56 (Americans in C.C.)

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### 613. Telegram 2023 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 22, 1956, 4:37 p.m.

2023. For Johnson.

Guidance for May 24 meeting.

1. We consider best counter to Communist May 11 draft to be restatement our position. Go back to our original October 8 proposal and restate reasons why US seeks renunciation force. Again place on record our purpose to remove threat military force, not to require either party acquiesce in policies of other. Point out our April 19 revision Wang's draft carefully drawn accomplish this purpose and no other.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2256. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Clough; cleared by Phleger and Sebald.



2. While you should avoid being drawn into specific comment on Communist draft, particularly paragraph 1, you should probe further into meaning of two-month limitation paragraph three, along lines you took May 11. As we understand Communist position they are offering renunciation force only for period of negotiations. If negotiations fail within two months achieve solution satisfactory to Communists or agreement on Foreign Ministers Conference or if Foreign Ministers Conference fails reach settlement on Communist terms, renunciation force would lapse. This is not a renunciation force. Renunciation force is pledge such as that taken by UN members not to use force except in self-defense. Pledge has no time limit. Present Communist proposal appears to be agreement to refrain from using force for limited period only unless dispute in which they have threatened force is resolved in their favor.

3. If Wang continues base his argumentation on allegations US has used force against Taiwan and seized it you should take appropriate opportunity repudiate these falsehoods in addition to pointing out Wang is going beyond question renunciation force into substance dispute.

4. FYI Department commends your adroit drawing out of Wang on applicability Agreed Announcement to prisoners. Investigations of INS indicate high probability responsible Federal and State authorities agreeable release all Chinese alien prisoners for immediate deportation. If deportation decided upon, procedure desired which would bring maximum leverage on Chinese Communists to release imprisoned Americans and bring us tactical benefits Geneva. We intend avoid any compromise of principle, but are mindful convicted felons not entitled same civil rights as law abiding alien residents.

Following courses appear to be available:

A. Deport compulsorily to Mainland China all Chinese alien criminals who came from there.

B. Inform Chinese alien prisoners individually of Agreed Announcement and tell them they may apply for parole and immediate voluntary deportation Mainland China if they wish. If this course followed, we would have to decide whether Indian Embassy representatives would be allowed interview prisoners to verify prisoners' decision and satisfy themselves it freely arrived at. In order obtain maximum bargaining and public relations benefit, we would clearly have to permit Indians interview all prisoners, although not desirable in some respects to allow representatives of Chinese Communist interests to interview Chinese prisoners who have not expressed any interest in returning to mainland. (It may be that most if not virtually all would reject voluntary deportation.)



C. Take no action on prisoners except possibly in cases where they appeal to Indian Embassy of their own volition for return to Communist China.

D. Refuse to take any action on prisoners in any event on thesis that Agreed Announcement does not apply to common criminals convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude.

If we should take action in regard to these criminals, question whether to demand reciprocity for our imprisoned nationals would arise. Should we endeavor to obtain balancing quid pro quo from Chinese Communists for every action taken by us? We could make offer to deport all Chinese prisoners contingent upon simultaneous deportation of all imprisoned Americans. Also could equate visits by Indian Embassy representatives to Chinese prisoners with visits by British Embassy representatives to American prisoners. Or we could refuse to descend to trading tactics, seeking place added moral pressure on Communists by keeping our action on higher plane independent of Chinese Communist transgressions.

Your detailed evaluation these courses and any variants which you may wish comment on, with your recommendations, are invited in time for formulation your instructions for next meeting. While effect each proposal on prospects of American prisoners and on future course of negotiations should be carefully assessed, also bear in mind effect on our public position in event of break off.

Dulles

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**614. Telegram 1925 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 24, 1956, 3 p.m.

1925. From Johnson.

1. Two hour 25 minute meeting this morning. Wang opened with prepared statement again rejecting April 19 draft and advocating May 11 draft para by para. Said "mutual respect" clause replaces "self-defense clause which embodies ulterior motive" to justify continued US seizure Taiwan and interference in liberation offshore islands. Second para was "more conspicuous" accommodation to our views by

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-2456. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

making it specific that peaceful settlement of disputes without threat of force applies to Taiwan area. With respect to "elsewhere" are there any "real and not imaginary other disputes which find China and US facing each other as parties international dispute?" With respect third para should be acceptable as I had not opposed holding FonMin conference and I had said that US not desirous perpetuate danger in Taiwan area. "Must two of us sit here and go on talking without an end? PRC cannot be left without assurance FonMin meeting if Taiwan area to be mentioned."

2. In reply I impliedly characterized their May 11 draft as willingness renounce force for two months; as willingness renounce force only on condition FonMin meeting; as willingness renounce force only on condition disputes settled entirely on their terms on failure which they held selves free renew threat of force. Also referred back his statement at last meeting on preparations by PRC for use of force characterizing it as shocking and disturbing and not only no advance from PRC position prior these talks but even retrogression from position taken by Chou at Bandung. Concentrating on last para said mention two months there contained definite implication resort to force if no agreement reached in that period and this contradictory with profession desire for peaceful negotiations. Expressed regret he had not this morning or previously clarified this contradiction.

3. There was then long and diffuse give-and-take during which I characterized fundamental issue as their unwillingness unconditionally and without time limit renounce force and he characterized fundamental issue as US use of force in occupation Taiwan. I refuted latter allegation with strong restatement our position. Also came back to our April 19 draft as clearest expression renunciation force in form meeting both points view. He attempted interpret my concentration on "two months" last para as indicating acceptance other two paras and repeatedly tried needle me into specifically commenting on first para. In context inviting me make amendments May 11 draft he implied my continued flat rejection that draft as basis discussion would "force them consider" making it public.

4. At close meeting I noted Miner's release five years after he made original application for exit and nine months after Wang told me he would be released in two or three months. Nevertheless gratified he finally released and hoped this portended early release other Americans still detained. Wang replied entirely defensively simply saying was not "entirely" PRC fault and made no mention whatever Chinese in US.

5. Next meeting Thursday May 31.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 5/24/56

**615. Telegram 1928 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 24, 1956, 5 p.m.

1928. From Johnson.

Re para 4 and following Deptel 2023.

1. Strongly favor course B with Indian Embassy representatives permitted to interview all prisoners or at least those now electing return to mainland. Suggest this action be taken without prior demand on CHICOMS for quid pro quo but subsequently use to maximum advantage this undermining of their public position on imprisoned Americans.

2. Fear course A would probably involve US in serious problems both domestically and with GRC. Might give rise to court actions and would in end prove to be very difficult if not impossible to carry through.

3. Course C appears be only continuation our present course of action.

4. Course D cannot but tend support CHICOM public position with respect imprisoned Americans.

5. Believe that advantages under course B of permitting Indians interview all prisoners far outweigh disadvantages. Believe we can maintain valid distinction between our taking initiative permit Indians interview prisoners and Indians taking initiative interview free persons who have not asked for their assistance. First it does maximum forestall possibility CHICOM allegation some American prisoners do not desire return and not permitting verification by UK. This would be particularly important if as suggested in Deptel most if not virtually all Chinese prisoners might reject voluntary deportation. In this event without advantages Indian verification course B could well be actually counterproductive. Indian verification would of course also markedly improve our public position. In this connection believe it important note CHICOMS will respond this move on our part by release additional Americans only because considerations their public position.

6. Suggest best tactic would be simultaneously inform Wang here and Indians that all prisoners have at all times been free communicate with Indian Embassy if they felt agreed announcement applicable to them and they desired return. We have thus fulfilled our obligations under agreed announcement. We understand thus far none have in fact

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2556. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

communicated with Indian Embassy. Nevertheless in view Wangs statements we have carried out careful investigation all prisons to identify Chinese imprisoned. This necessary because no Chinese imprisoned on political type charges because his race, nationality or political beliefs but only for common crimes. In order remove any vestige question our performance under agreed announcement, each of these persons has not only individually been informed of agreed announcement but has now specifically been informed that if he desires to do so he may apply for parole and voluntary deportation to mainland. Prompt action will be taken upon any such application. Indians will be informed of any such deportees and if Indians desire arrangements will be made for them to interview such persons. Arrangements will also be made for Indians interview prisoners of Chinese nationality who do not apply for such parole and deportation.

7. Suggest that at same time we inform GRC of action being taken but do not give action any publicity at this time, treating it as only further routine step with respect agreed announcement. Also suggest I inform Wang in straight manner without coupling action with demands respecting imprisoned Americans. CHICOMS will be quick to realize how much this will undercut their public position and will be quicker to correct that position by additional releases Americans if presented in this manner than if coupled with demands or public pressures.

Gowen

Note: Mr. Waddell's office (FE) notified 3:40 p.m. 5/25/56 CWO/EMB

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## 616. Telegram 1929 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, May 24, 1956, 5 p.m.

1929. From Johnson.

Comments todays meeting.

No particularly noteworthy development or change in todays meeting except somewhat strengthened renewal of "stalling" theme by Wang.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-2456. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

His statement para 41 Longtel might contain some implication (particularly arising from choice exact Chinese words used) that all Americans would be released on successful completion two months negotiations mentioned May 11 draft. Felt best tactic today was ignore threat go to public rather than indicate any concern by taking note of it.

Gowen

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**617. Telegram 1930 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 24, 1956, 8 p.m.

1930. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 48th today prepared statement: Their side made many efforts since beginning talks on issuance declaration. However it clear US side still bent requiring abandonment China sovereign rights freezing status quo Taiwan area. This what they could never accept. My draft April 19 apparently designed induce them acquiesce unreasonable demand. As he repeatedly told me they absolutely could not accept draft.

2. Wang said their May 11 met common requirements both sides. Entirely reasonable and represented further important effort their side make progress. No amount terms used by me such as ambiguous retrogression could degrade that draft their side.

3. Wang said first para introduces principle mutual respect territorial integrity sovereignty non-interference internal affairs, which recognized by all peace-loving states. This replaced self-defense clause my draft which embodied ulterior motive justifying continued seizure Taiwan interference, liberation offshore islands. This amendment undoubtedly puts draft on firmer basis. Would have thought US could not stand against that amendment for if so we would make people suspect our aim precisely to seek continued seizure Taiwan interference liberation offshore islands. How could we expect this position accepted their side?

4. Wang said 2nd para it even more conspicuous their side accommodating US views in making principle peaceful settlement disputes without resort threat use force specifically apply Taiwan area. This specific

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-2456. Confidential; Limited Distribution.

provision new draft accommodation my repeated requests. However I ambiguously raised so-called question "elsewhere". He found it hard follow my logic. Perhaps I could suggest some real not imaginary dispute where China US faced each other as parties international dispute, which even graver than Taiwan area dispute.

5. Wang said 3rd para specified practical feasible means settlement disputes two countries Taiwan area should be decided within two months, and specific arrangements this para should be acceptable both sides. He had all along understood I never opposed holding FMC for settlement disputes.

6. Wang said at last meeting I indicated did not desire perpetuate dangerous situation Taiwan area. If so why oppose time limit? Must two of us sit here go on talking without end?

7. Wang said at last meeting I also alleged new draft constituted retrogression from Dec 1 draft. He failed see basis that allegation. I would certainly recall his remarks 39th meeting. What he said was if we desired have reference Taiwan must also agree specific reference FMC. Otherwise their side left without assurance. Reference FMC in May 11 could not be obscured.

8. Wang said he sure he made thoroughly clear only new draft reasonable accommodation position both sides. Would hope I could reach agreement with him on May 11 draft. Now let us stall no longer.

9. I replied as had said in past mtgs fundamental issue now facing us was whether his government willing renounce use force Taiwan area as well as elsewhere as first step toward peaceful discussion.

10. I said this did not mean renounce use force for limited period such as two months, but without time limit. Not to renounce use force only on condition there be some particular single form negotiations agreed on such as FMC but rather seek peaceful settlement disputes. Not renounce use force only on condition disputes invariably settled entirely on ones own terms, on failure which one held self free renew threat force. Rather as had all responsible govts, agree abide by processes and results peaceful settlement. To do so did not require one acquiesce or agree policies or views of others any more than when others had done so they had acquiesced or agreed with policies of other party with which they did not agree.

11. I said I had hoped his govt accepted those principles. Since last October had been seeking his agreement statement clearly saying nothing more less than this. I been making every effort go far as possibly could meeting his point view without violating this fundamental universal principle. I accepted his Dec 1 as basis negotiation and offered successive suggestions to accomplish purpose.

12. I said it been and will remain my consistent unalterable objective obtain agreement between us on unconditional renunciation force unambiguously applicable Taiwan area as well as elsewhere. Been doing this not from standpoint vague theory but standpoint stark fact that one party these discussions asserting right use and even threatening initiate use force that area. Neither his statements here this morning nor previous statement nor draft May 11 reassured me this did not continue be case.

13. I said near close last meeting it my recollection that in discussing Taiwan area he referred what he called preparations his country for use force. Hoped he would correct me if had drawn wrong inference from statement. However, if understood his position correctly, his govt not only asserted in principle it free use force in order obtain solution meeting unilateral desires but it in fact preparing use force accomplish this purpose.

14. I said such assertion shocking any context but in context new draft even more disturbing representing no slightest advance from position his govt taken prior talks. In fact seemed rather be retrogression from position his Prime Minister Bandung conference.

15. I said I regretted in his remarks morning he done nothing clarify implication this effect contained even his May 11. It difficult not to read into last para his May 11 implication threat in insisting therein two month's time limit on talks. He seemed be saying that draft that if within two month's time limit no agreement completely satisfactory him reached these talks he free resort force. He seemed be saying if no resolution our disputes his terms reached in negotiations mentioned therein he held self free renew threat force. It certainly self-contradictory for him say desired peaceful negotiation settlement and at same time thus maintain threat force.

16. He said question between us therefore whether his govt willing unambiguously unconditionally renounce force settlement disputes or whether it still reserving self right threaten use force. Taken in context his May 11 could not but read into last para that draft particularly time limit set forth therein meaning that his govt reserving self threat use force. Most earnestly hope this not case and that he could morning clear up this point. Did not feel his previous statement done so.

17. Wang said could not agree points I just raised. Stark fact between China-US which also fundamental issue between them was US already used force against China occupied territory Taiwan. That indisputable fact not imaginary. It solely this issue between two countries that hindered normal relations.

18. Wang said in dealing this issue there might be various methods. It their Prime Minister who at Bandung proposed holding talks China US. There he proposed our two countries sit down hold

negotiations reach peaceful settlement. Today they joined with US in peaceful discussions. This precisely demonstrated peaceful intentions their part.

19. Wang said in course talks I incessantly alleged China planning use force against US. Doing so I disregarded fact US already used force against China thus using imaginary argument defense my position.

20. Wang said Chinese people would never permit or agree to action US using force against China occupying its territory. Fact was today it not question China's forces occupying territory US. If Chinese forces occupied US territory US would equally not tolerate such action. No country would tolerate use force against sovereign state.

21. Wang said peaceful settlement disputes China US specifically demonstrated in question issuance declaration. It their side which successively made offers accommodating joint desires both sides. They had specified principle mutual respect sovereignty territorial integrity. They proposed principle peaceful settlement disputes China US specifically apply Taiwan area. Even more concretely they suggested seek practical feasible means settlement disputes two countries within definite time in order not allow long stalling.

22. Wang said if both sides have common desire peaceful settlement should not be difficult reach agreement this basis. Today we should direct main efforts to try make such declaration thus showing sincerity. Should not engage in discussion irrelevant questions which outside text itself. This essential feature their May 11 draft.

23. I replied had continued hope he would not introduce matters irrelevant immediate issue before us which was declaration renunciation force. I had consistently avoided doing so. As had often said question this stage not discuss merits disputes. That could come after we unambiguously and unconditionally agreed we not going war about them.

24. I said as we both recognized we had different views regarding nature [garble] disputes particularly Taiwan area. He persistently made such unfounded statements as that US already used force against them and US occupying Taiwan. Here and in his drafts he seemed persistent intention have me accept that point view. It false and world knew it false.

25. I said facts are Taiwan lawfully held by government with which US long relations and which recognized by majority governments world. US had solemn treaty arrangements that government arrangements which registered with UN and which free and open for all world see.

26. I said however question at present stage not one of reconciling our points view. Question was whether our difference views be permitted lead war. US determined should not do so, had continued



hope his government would share that determination. I said he had often spoken here and his govt often spoken of peaceful negotiations and desire peaceful settlement. Genuine desire peaceful settlement not demonstrated by numbers drafts one submitted in negotiation but demonstrated by whether one really abandons threat use force settlement disputes. It one thing make statement one desires peaceful settlement or peaceful negotiations and another thing say one will not use force settlement disputes. First empty without second.

27. I said he said could not agree with points I raised morning. Most fundamental point I raised was that in last paragraph his draft he reserving self ability again threaten use force. If he could not agree that assertion my part would appreciate his telling me in what respect I wrong.

28. Wang replied he already stated their fundamental point view nature origin dispute between two countries. Had repeatedly pointed out present issue between us was US already used force against his country and used its forces occupy Chinese territory. I had said this unfounded allegation. Might he ask whether US forces now Taiwan dropped from sky or rose from sea?

29. Wang said I had made reference Chiang Kai-shek clique Taiwan however I could not use this defend position I holding. In similar case when during Sino-Japanese War Japan created puppet regime Wang Ching-wei but Japanese could not justify their stand either. These were facts which could not be distorted in eyes people world.

30. Wang said I had also remarked I did not desire go war settle disputes between two countries. He felt this very reason why we now meeting here discussing issuance declaration this effect. If both us willing settle disputes peaceful means without going war or threat war should demonstrate desire by concrete deeds and rapidly reach agreement on joint declaration.

31. Wang said I had made repeated references last para their draft. In light this, might he understand we agreed on first second paras their draft and only part remaining in question was last para? He would hope I able enlighten him this respect so we could proceed speedily with declaration.

32. I replied he had said if we both willing settle disputes without going war or threat war should demonstrate desire by concrete deeds. That precisely been my point ever since last October. That precisely step his government continued avoid taking.

33. I said first fundamental concrete deed was unequivocal unconditional unambiguous statement we not going war. Other words, renunciation force. That what his govt continued avoid doing in May 11 draft.

34. I said had spoken of last para that draft because that where this intent appeared most glaring. It appeared to be renunciation force for two month period. That like saying "I will not shoot at you for two months but if at end two months you not agreed with me I will shoot you." Such position I could only describe as grotesque if presented as renunciation force. It rather made it threat force. As I had pointed out appeared me in complete contradiction with assertion desire peaceful negotiation settlement. Still hoped he could clear up contradiction.

35. Wang said if both us had sincerity in adopting May 11 draft would be important step accelerating settlement disputes two countries. Would then be able show world talks we been conducting not idle but had concrete content. Would be able show world two countries genuinely sincere in desire settle disputes between them peaceful means.

36. Wang said world would certainly welcome gesture two countries expressing resolve settle grave disputes between them peaceful means. World would see our two countries not only expressed desire settle disputes but also adopted concrete steps toward this end. Announcement this declaration would only have these good effects. Would not raise doubt in connection other issues. People would welcome time limit, would not have doubts about it.

37. Wang said we had talked nearly year. Setting time limit in declaration would all more demonstrate to US genuinely sincere desire settle problem. Only those who willing express desire settle peacefully disputes but without intention taking concrete step would oppose such specification. He therefore felt inclusion time limit would only help resolve problem, would not prevent from doing so.

38. I replied desirable though might be public gesture without real content could exacerbate rather than assist settlement differences. US interested in genuine peaceful settlement differences. It exactly because this I sent here. Exactly because this I proposed as first step we make clear going settle those differences without war. I still waited for his govt take that first step. That step and only it could demonstrate world who genuinely seeking peaceful settlement.

39. I said regretted he continued avoid specific reply questions I raised—questions regarding time limit on declaration set forth his May 11.

40. Wang recalled it his country at Bandung last year made proposal peaceful settlement disputes two countries. It his country which voiced this peaceful intention as early as Bandung last year.

41. Wang said it nearly one year since two us began discussion peaceful settlement disputes between two sides. This fact demonstrated their side been amply patient in search for settlement. By this time we

should be able embody efforts toward peaceful settlement in declaration. Provided there sincere intention for peaceful settlement two month's time limit quite sufficient for our endeavors. This would prevent further delay settlement our practical issues. He felt US equally interested in and in need of expeditious settlement disputes two countries Taiwan area and avoidance further stalling.

42. Wang recalled I had told him my side did not desire perpetuate present situation Taiwan area. Therefore inclusion time limit in interests both sides.

43. I asked what was effect declaration if at end two months period agreement not been reached between us. Did he consider self at end that period again free threaten use force? Or actually to use force?

44. Wang did not feel question I raised was thing to discuss at present stage. We now discussing declaration, seeking of practical feasible means following announcement declaration. What we now discussing was peaceful settlement disputes two countries. These were things should now seek. If even prior announcement declaration and even before seeking practical feasible means we began discuss question I had raised would be idle and diffuse.

45. Wang said at present we could not predict whether after two months US still would continue threaten use force against China forces occupation Taiwan. At this stage he did not intend raise this question.

46. I replied it US that proposed unconditional unlimited renunciation use force. US not proposed it be qualified by time limit or any other way. He had spoken of "expeditious" settlement. I thought we both would recall last Sept we discussing time limits and "expeditious" in other connection. Still seems our understanding that term vastly differs.

47. I said US did not desire perpetuate situation Taiwan area where threat force by one side could plunge two countries and world into conflict. This precisely been point my proposal and discussion, that we first make clear we not permit this happen. Once that done could undertake search for peaceful methods resolving dispute that area. I still awaited and had awaited almost nine months genuine indication his govt willing take that first step. I continued hope not only for sake negotiations here but for sake two countries and peoples it would take that step. Hoped it would do so without reservation purpose evasion, as my govt willing do.

48. Wang said if we had desire peaceful settlement should concretely demonstrate by reaching agreement and making declaration. I had said my side also had same desire peaceful settlement. If so, why not get together on common desire and try reach agreement on language express this common desire?

49. Wang said would not assist discussions in any way to engage idle talk or depart from question-making declaration. Would appreciate my telling him whether had any other opinions on May 11 draft.

50. I said if he willing unequivocally unconditionally renounce force in settlement dispute and also same time express determination seek peaceful settlement I not able think any clearer way this could be done, in form meets both points view than that contained my April 19 revision his December 1.

51. I said for reasons I had set forth did not believe that purpose in any sense accomplished by May 11 draft. I still believed that draft step backwards from what I thought we been able accomplish. Would hope at next meeting he would realize this and we be able take steps marking progress.

52. I regretted to say I did not feel position he had taken today enabled us make progress. If he willing unconditionally renounce force settlement disputes I satisfied progress could be made.

53. Wang said he also, in reference remark I just made, disappointed. My remarks did not seem help in progress on declaration. If I still clung April 19 draft he could only consider deliberate hindrance in discussions. He continued hope I would change my stand. He continued hope I would be able offer constructive opinions basis May 11 draft. By doing so would enable us speedily reach agreement on declaration. Should not stall on this matter. Otherwise they would consider making draft open to public and letting public judge whether draft reasonable. He hoped we be able rapidly progress this question.

54. I said if he nothing further would like note, although it five years from time he made original application for exit Wang's country, and although it almost nine months since Wang told me here would be able leave in period two-three months, Charles Miner arrived Hong Kong May 19. However, I nevertheless gratified he finally able leave. Would hope this indicates remaining Americans detained his country shortly be following.

55. Wang said as he told me soon as unsettled affairs Miner settled he able leave country, his exit now proved this was so. Miner had settled unsettled affairs and now left country. Time taken in departure not entirely fault Chinese authorities.

56. I said had nothing more, suggested next Thursday May 31. Wang agreed.

**Gowen**

**618. Telegram 1937 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 25, 1956, 7 p.m.

1937. From Johnson.

Unless able make some new move with respect May 1 draft next meeting believe we should be prepared for possibility CHICOMS may make public statement. However likelihood their doing this would be considerably reduced if I am able make proposed statement on Chinese prisoners in US. In event they make statement I would propose immediately make available correspondents here April 19 and May 11 drafts together with brief statement to effect when Wang informed me at previous meeting of intention issue public statement I found it difficult believe they willing expose May 11 draft public scrutiny, as it even more ambiguous and lacking in elements of unconditional renunciation of force than their Dec 1 draft. Although Amb. Wang has indicated he still shares my desire to reach agreement meaningful renunciation force he has rejected my successive efforts to make simple revisions Dec 1 draft that would accomplish this purpose. My April 19 draft incorporated those revisions in form that took full account both points of view. Despite Amb Wang's rejection this further effort my part I shall continue seek agreement with him on statement that will make genuine contribution to establishment peace in Far East. Any further comments will emanate Washington.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2656. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

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619. Letter 34 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 34

Geneva, May 25, 1956

Dear Walter:

As I told you, I am staying down over this weekend until the next meeting to get some dental work done, so that I also have an opportunity to write you at a little leisure today.

I have received your Letter No. 43 and entirely agree that the first two paragraphs of the May 11 draft are very clever and adroit. However, I think that they are much more vulnerable in the last paragraph both from the negotiating and public position, particularly as we had previously accepted their December 1 version of that paragraph. As I indicated in my 1902, it seems to me we are faced with two broad courses of action. We can continue to take our previous broad position that the Communists have in effect agreed to renounce force and that the problem revolves around the self-defense clause, or we can take the position they refuse unconditionally and unambiguously to renounce force with respect to the Taiwan area. The latter is, of course, the actual fact and you will note that in the last two meetings I have been concentrating heavily upon that aspect. The former course has some obvious advantages but it is open to a great deal of public confusion over the actual issue and does not give us as clean and clear a public position as the latter course. A good example of this is the lead editorial in the London Times of May 24 which states that the Chinese Communists are willing to make a general declaration of renunciation of force, but that the issue revolves around its application to Formosa with the added American proviso that Taiwan and its government must have a right to collective self-defense. I think that we should regard the whole matter from the standpoint of the public position we will desire to take when the matter next becomes public. There is, of course, much to be said for maintaining the public position that the Chinese Communists have in effect renounced force and leaving up to them the onus of denying it. While it leaves us in the disadvantageous position of not being able to present a clean-cut and simple issue, it does serve the purpose of reducing public impression of "tension" in the Taiwan area. These are just some random thoughts on which I would appreciate the trend of the Department's thinking.

While it would be very useful to get back to our April 19 draft as a basis of discussion, it is easier said than done and I fear I have not thus

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

far been too successful. Nor do I expect to be successful. The only real way that I can be successful in forestalling their going to the public and keeping things rolling along here would be to counter their drafts with drafts of our own or being given some flexibility in impliedly or specifically discussing changes in their drafts and thus keep the situation fluid and confused. My flatly rejecting his drafts and he flatly rejecting my drafts does not give me very much room for manuevering.

I greatly appreciate being consulted on our proposed action in regard to Chinese prisoners and yesterday sent off my thoughts in my 1928. I should perhaps have made it clear in there that my thought with regard to not giving publicity to the matter applies only to the initial stage and a suitable period to see what response it brings from the Communists. I also think that we ought to wait and see what the actual results are in terms of numbers, etc. before giving it any public buildup. If the results are justified and response from the Communists is not satisfactory, we could then profitably pull out the stops on publicity.

With regard to the fourth paragraph of your Letter No. 43, I should think it would be preferable to have O'Neill wait on any note not only till we see if Clifford and Phillips are released and until we see what results our action with regard to the Chinese prisoners seems to be producing. I would hope that at the minimum it would produce fairly prompt action on the part of the Communists to tell O'Neill that he can see the remaining American prisoners. If it does not, then I believe O'Neill should by all means follow up with a full representation which would point up the disparity between the United States and Communist actions.

*[text not declassified]*

As I wrote Bill Sebald from Prague, I have for many reasons accepted an invitation to give the commencement address at the Nurnberg Army High School on Thursday, June 14. If you are agreeable back there I am thinking of skipping the meeting for that week unless, of course, there are developments which would make this clearly undesirable. In view of Wang's previous requests to which I have agreed, I think that I could do this without any special implications being read into it by them. I have not decided whether I would do it by canceling the meeting by telephone as he has done or by putting it to him straight at the previous meeting. Let me know if you have any thoughts or views on this.

Regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**620. Letter 44 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 44

Washington, May 25, 1956

Dear Alex:

Walter is away for two days in Omaha and Colorado Springs where a group of senior Departmental officers are being briefed by the Strategic Air Command and the Continental Defense Command on their current capabilities and problems.

We have the preliminary report on your meeting of yesterday. Wang's concentration on the first paragraph of their latest draft and his implied threat to make it public reinforces the suspicion that the Chinese Communists are seeking to build a strong propaganda position. I have not yet had a chance to discuss the meeting with anyone. There will probably be a meeting on Monday to consider tactics for your next meeting.

The behaviour of the Brazilian Parliamentary delegation is very puzzling. We certainly understood here that they were scheduled to visit Communist China.

Thank you for calling our attention to the "Ta Kung Pao" proclamation on registration of families with students abroad. I do not know why this was not brought to our attention earlier by Hong Kong or DRF. We now have a copy of the text of the Peiping proclamation which I am enclosing. There are also enclosed two memoranda showing how the drive to gather information on Chinese in this country is developing. The attempt to utilize the American Red Cross is a particularly clever move. The Red Cross may wish to make some gesture toward providing information in order to preserve their relationship with the Chinese Communist Red Cross which is helpful to our prisoners but it would be most unfortunate if they began to supply the very names and addresses which we have refused, for good reasons, to give the Chinese Communists.

Regarding Bob Ekvall's situation, Walter called a Mr. Zander, who is temporarily in Bill Godel's place, and he agreed to take the matter up with G-2. We will follow up on this and hope that there will be no difficulty in obtaining the necessary extension of detail.

There is enclosed a memorandum giving the latest developments in arranging deportation of Chinese prisoners in this country. We expect today the final report on this from General Swing. We are awaiting with interest your suggestions, in response to our last guidance telegram, as to how the matter can best be handled to gain the greatest advantage.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Drafted by Clough.



We are agreed that the Chinese Communists are not really interested in getting these prisoners back and that they will therefore not constitute a strong bargaining counter. However, we feel it is possible to place the Chinese Communists in an awkward public position on this issue and thus create some pressure for them to release Americans.

I have just seen Maggie Higgins' lengthy article in today's "New York Herald Tribune" revealing publicly that the Chinese Communists have demanded that all Chinese in American jails be let out. I have no idea who the "high administration source" who revealed this is. Questions are already coming in from the press. What the results of this will be on our plans is anybody's guess.

Sincerely yours,

**Ralph N. Clough**

*Deputy Director for Chinese Affairs*

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum re "Chinese Communist Pressure on Chinese in the US."
2. Memorandum re "Latest Developments on Deportation of Chinese Prisoners"
3. Two memoranda re Chinese Communist Red Cross Inquiries.
4. "Peking Daily" proclamation re registration of families of students in US.
5. Korean Briefing Meeting, May 16, 1956.
6. Article by Marguerite Higgins.

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**621. Letter from Osborn to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 26, 1956

Dear Ralph:

*[text not declassified]*

Some more random thoughts that have been batting around here, but which have not taken a firm enough shape to put any kind of imprimatur on:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Osborn signed the original "Dave."

*Turning the Tables on "Mutual Respect":* We all realize "mutual respect" is a hard one to handle, but some of Wang's statements have indicated possible flexibility on his part. Presumably he would like to work towards a "compromise" in which both ICSD and "mutual respect" were left in the first paragraph. This would, of course, be no compromise at all from our standpoint, and I don't see how we could ever accept it.

If we are going to proceed on the basis of the May 11 draft, accordingly, one problem is how to make Wang agree to dropping "mutual respect" in exchange for some briefed-down, innocuous clause like "without prejudice to inherent rights of either side", or etc. A frontal attack on "mutual respect" would probably not do the trick, as the Chicoms could make us appear to be opposing virtue (see Para 3 our 1930). I have been toying with a somewhat devious, anything, but frontal, attack designed to alarm Wang about the implications of his own clause. It rests on a syllogism something like this:

(a) If the "mutual respect" clause is really mutual and reciprocal, as Wang asserts, then the implication is there that the Chicoms are acknowledging a legitimate US concern in matters of sovereignty and territorial integrity related to the Taiwan area. They are also apparently acknowledging that the US has some "internal affairs" in that area.

(b) If Wang denies this implication, then he is either denying the applicability of the first paragraph to Taiwan, or he is denying its mutuality.

Although this might be the rationale of our line on this point, we should not present the line from this angle. Too sophistic. It would be more alarming (not to say infuriating) to Peiping if we introduced it something like this:

"Mr Ambassador, one of the unfortunate aspects of your first para is that, intentionally or not, it gives the impression that matters of sovereignty and territory in the Taiwan area are entirely and exclusively mutual between us. It gives the impression that only the two of us are concerned with internal matters in that area.

"It is true that my country, which had a major part in defeating Japan and thus liberating Taiwan, has a legitimate concern in questions of sovereignty in that area. It is possible also to speak of such matters as the control and disposition of American forces in the MAAG on Taiwan as an internal matter of my country. However, in the first place, my country is not willing to give the appearance of disregarding the role of the other great powers allied with the United States in the war against Japan—among them the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.

"In the second place, as I have repeatedly emphasized here, I do not think we should render our present task, of agreeing on a renunciation of force, even more complex and difficult than it already is by introducing matters of substance relating to the merits of our disputes. This, it seems to me, your first paragraph indisputably does."

It seems to me, if this line could be presented with a straight enough face, it might give Peiping some food for thought. I don't necessarily urge this approach, which *is* devious; but I can't at the moment think of a better way of alarming Wang about "mutual respect."

I am also toying with the possibility of a new US draft, based on their December 1 draft, but approaching the amendments from a different angle. I'll send it along in a later letter.

Best to all in CA—

Sincerely,

David L Osborn

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**622. Letter from Osborn to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 28, 1956

Dear Ralph:

If we are *not* inclined to talk on the basis of Wang's May 11 draft, I think the best way of avoiding it is to submit a new draft. I don't think the April 19 revision is adequate for this purpose. It is too close to our January 12 revision, for one thing, and is not the kind of dramatic "effort" to reach agreement that would really look good in the record. For another thing, in point of timing we need something that postdates their May 11 draft.

A second reason for submitting a new draft (the first being our possible reluctance to talk on the basis of their May 11 draft) is that this would keep Peiping off balance with respect to a break-off, and possibly even with respect to a resort to the public. They would want to have the last word—as usual—and might be reluctant to face the public on the basis of a record showing the United States had made the last concrete effort to reach agreement. The effectiveness of our new draft in accomplishing this purpose would, of course, depend on how good our "effort" would look in the record.

*Possible New Draft—December 1 with a Codicil:*

We have preserved a position in the talks from which we can consistently say that we have, from the time of its submission, considered

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Osborn signed the postscript "Dave."

Wang's December 1 draft an acceptable form and framework for a declaration renouncing the use of force; but we have, also from the time of its submission, been concerned about certain ambiguities therein which make it possible for the December 1 draft to mean one thing to one side and another to the other side.

Our successive efforts since January 12 have been directed at removing the ambiguities of the December 1 draft. We could argue that Wang, by his submission of his May 11 draft, has in effect acknowledged his own concern about the ambiguities of his December 1 draft.

Wang's May 11 draft (we could argue), in trying to overcome the ambiguities of his December 1 draft, unfortunately sacrifices too much of what was good in the December 1 draft. Wang has thrown out the baby with the bathwater.

What we ought to do is to concentrate on the essential task of turning the December 1 draft into a meaningful declaration by removing its ambiguities while preserving this mutually acceptable form and framework.

How to do this? In regard to what points do both Ambassadors agree the December 1 draft requires amplification or specification? First, both Ambassadors seem to be in agreement that it is desirable to make it clear that the declaration does not prejudice the rights, or the positions and views of one side or the other. Various ways, none of them completely satisfactory to both sides, have been suggested. And yet, in answer to the direct question "should the proposed declaration be interpreted as in any way prejudicing the rights of either side, or the position of either side with respect to the merits of this dispute?" both Ambassadors would certainly say it should not.

Secondly, both Ambassadors have suggested ways in which the declaration should be related to the Taiwan area. There has been much discussion on this point, but surely both Ambassadors would agree that the Taiwan area dispute should be included in the disputes referred to in the proposed declaration.

Our suggestion in presenting the enclosed draft would be that the way to agreement on a declaration acceptable to both sides is to take the acceptable form and framework of the December 1 draft and let it stand, with the addition of an "Agreed Understanding" (or some other name for Codicil) on the two points mentioned above.

I would presume that our initial draft "Agreed Understanding" would contain only the two paragraphs. If Wang insisted on a third paragraph relating to a FMC, we might be prepared to move towards something like the bracketed third paragraph of the enclosure.

On the whole, I am inclined to think this approach might be better—safer and more under our control, also less defensive—than the approach outlined in paragraph four of my May 14 letter.

Regards to all. Hope Walter is not too tired from his trip West.  
Sincerely,

David L. Osborn

P.S. It looks as though I may at last get some substantive work to do—writing up some reports, attending some conferences—in the Delegation's Economic Section. Hope so.

DLO

**Enclosure**

**Draft Agreed Announcement With Codicil<sup>2</sup>**

AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT  
ETC.

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the Peoples' Republic of China, agree to announce:

The United States of America and the Peoples' Republic of China are determined that they should settle disputes between their two countries through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force;

The two Ambassadors should continue their talks to seek practical and feasible means for the realization of this common desire.

AGREED UNDERSTANDING OF THE  
TWO AMBASSADORS:

1. Neither this Announcement nor any of its provisions is to be construed as in any way prejudicing the rights of either side or the position of either side with respect to the merits of their disputes;

2. This Announcement applies to all disputes between our two countries, including that in the Taiwan area.

[3. With reference to the last paragraph of the Announcement, the two of us shall not only continue to discuss and strive to settle the practical matters at issue between us, but shall expeditiously consider and arrange for such other practical and feasible means, including the holding of negotiations at a higher level, as may be ascertained to be appropriate and necessary.]<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Confidential.

<sup>3</sup> Bracketed paragraph would not be part of initial draft. [Footnote and brackets in the original.]

**623. Letter from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 28, 1956

Dear Walter:

Bob Ekvall has received a letter from Ted Liu who was principal Chinese interpreter at Panmunjom. He is finishing up his M.A. degree at Columbia in June and will be looking for a job. At present he says he is being considered by USIA and the National Security Agency and has asked Bob for his advice on any other places that he might look. Bob says that he is absolutely tops as an interpreter as well as a person.

With reference to my previously expressed thought, that the Department should be looking toward obtaining a first class Chinese interpreter, this seems to me like an excellent opportunity. At my suggestion, Bob is therefore writing to him suggesting that he see Ralph Clough. I am enclosing the Curriculum Vita that he sent to Bob.

I Just received Ralph's letter enclosing Marguerite Higgins article on prisoners. This is, of course, most unfortunate and disturbing after the success we have had in recent months in keeping out of the press. I have not yet seen the article in the Paris edition of the Herald Tribune but presume that whether or not it appears there it will certainly fall into the hands of the Chinese. If I receive any inquiries on it here I plan to say nothing whatever.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

Enc.

Curriculum Vita of Theodore M. Liu

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Official Use Only; Official-Informal.

**624. Telegram 1949 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 29, 1956

1949. From Johnson.

Daily Radio Bulletin 1261 of May 26 Items 117 and 124.

Would appreciate text White's remarks re Geneva talks also guidance for us answering possible local inquiries. No inquiries so far but several correspondents have indicated interest doing round-up stories in connection fiftieth meeting and I anticipate question Chinese prisoners will be raised.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2956. Official Use Only; Limit Distribution.

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**625. Telegram 2059 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 29, 1956, 3:48 p.m.

2059. For Johnson.

FYI.

1. Mrs. Robert McCann has received letter from Chinese Communist Red Cross dated May 7 in answer letter from her dated Feb. 6, stating her husband sentenced 15 years imprisonment starting from date of his arrest "owing to violation of Chinese law". Sympathy extended and statement made that Court may order an early release "if he behaves well in his imprisonment". States decision of authorities alleviate suffering of separation by granting special permission for families of convicts come to China and visit them is still in force. Chinese Communist Red Cross offers "make arrangements" if she would like come to China visit her husband.

2. Lawrence Buol died suddenly in France May 27.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2956. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy.

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**626. Telegram 2066 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 29, 1956, 8:12 p.m.

2066. For Johnson.

1. Your 1928 re optional return to Mainland China of Chinese alien criminals imprisoned in this country. Department has decided proceed promptly with course B Deptel 2023. May 28 letter from Justice states that parole for deportation of all State prisoners can be arranged. Some Federal cases more difficult where minimum time for parole eligibility not yet served but release for deportation possible through Presidential action which we believe obtainable.

2. Plan is for concerted action be taken May 31 by you with Wang and by Department with Indian Embassy. We will point out that Agreed Announcement does not require us take any action regarding Chinese common criminals serving sentences in this country but that we are nevertheless affording such criminals opportunity of immediate voluntary return Mainland China, thus removing any semblance of basis for Chinese Communist allegation of US non-compliance with Agreed Announcement. We have decided permit Indian Embassy representatives to interview all 34 Chinese alien criminals and ascertain for themselves which ones desire return Communist China. Decision of each prisoner must be confirmed by him to responsible American authorities. Necessary machinery for release and voluntary deportation will be put into motion in each case only after we are satisfied that prisoner has freely made decision to return. Appropriate communication quoting Agreed Announcement and informing prisoners of choice before then and prospective visit of Indian Representative, will be delivered in near future.

3. Department contemplates no repeat no follow-up approach by O'Neill in Peiping for time being. We believe chances of favorable action by Chinese Communists on American prisoners will be improved if we refrain from applying pressure for a time. Our action is in part predicated on assumption that Chinese Communists will require a face saving procedure for belated compliance with Agreed Announcement and immediate pressure tactics would not be consistent with this theory.

4. Chinese and British Embassies here will be informed in confidence of our decision morning 31st. No present publicity contemplated and no decision will be made as to future publicity awaiting further developments. Your comments on publicity question requested.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-2556. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in draft by Phleger and by Rountree (NEA) and Jones (SOA).



Your instructions for next meeting will outline presentation to be made on this subject to Wang.

Hoover

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627. Telegram 2067 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 29, 1956, 8:13 p.m.

2067. For Johnson.

Guidance for May 31 meeting.

1. Inform Wang that in order remove any vestige basis for Wang's claim that US has not performed under Agreed Announcement because Chinese prisoners not free leave US each Chinese alien criminal in Federal or State penitentiary in US being informed of Agreed Announcement and is specifically being told that if he desires do so he may apply for immediate voluntary deportation to mainland. Indian Embassy being informed that arrangements being made for its representatives interview each imprisoned criminal of Chinese nationality to ascertain to Embassy's satisfaction whether individual desires release for immediate return mainland China. US will take prompt action upon any application by such Chinese criminals for immediate deportation.

2. Inform Wang that while Chinese alien criminals in US prisons were not included in Agreed Announcement September 10 or in discussions leading up to that Announcement and none so far as we know have expressed any wish return to Communist China, nevertheless in view of Wang's statements we have carried out careful investigation in all Federal and State prisons to identify alien Chinese imprisoned there. Extensive investigation necessary because no Chinese imprisoned on political type charges or because his race, nationality or political beliefs. They are all imprisoned for common crimes such as murder and narcotic traffic. Names and addresses all Chinese alien criminals who have been identified will be given Indian Embassy here. You may inform Wang that Indian Embassy will be informed morning May 31 Washington time but that no publicity now being given to decision.

3. FYI You may expand your presentation along indicated lines as you consider appropriate in order obtain maximum tactical and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2956. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in draft by Phleger.

psychological impact from it. We hope by this strategy actually to obtain release imprisoned Americans or else make Chinese Communist public position in continuing to hold them completely indefensible. Compulsion on Chinese Communists to act must at this stage be indirect rather than in form outright pressure. END FYI

4. We anticipate that this new move on prisoners will and should occupy major portion meeting. We leave it to your judgment whether you introduce this item or renunciation force first. On renunciation force reiterate reasons why Wang's May 11 draft is a retrograde step and unacceptable. Probe Wang's motivation in moving away from agreement instead of toward agreement. Indicate US distaste for threats inherent in Wang's position. Repulse allegation US is side that is guilty of stalling tactics. Continue take non-committal attitude towards possibility Chinese Communist publication Wang's latest draft, making it clear while we disapprove publicity at this stage in accordance with understanding at time talks were initiated we have nothing to fear from publicity.

5. If Wang should make public statement as suggested your 1937 you should make statement along lines you recite there but make no mention that further comments will emanate Washington as we may not wish make further statement here.

**Hoover**

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**628. Telegram 2068 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 30, 1956, 3:50 p.m.

2068. For Johnson.

Your 1949. Department believes transmittal text May 25 news conference unnecessary. In light Deptels 2066 and 2067 you will understand why Department prefers you endeavor avoid comment on Chinese prisoner matter.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-2956. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy.

**629. Telegram 1958 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 31, 1956, 1 p.m.

1958. From Johnson.

1. Two hour 20 min meeting this morning. Balancing all considerations decided best to open on renunciation which I did, making points para 4 Deptel 2067, mentioning however that I had information for him on first item and therefore would make my discussion renunciation brief.

2. Give-and-take generally followed previous lines except that he pressed harder for specific detailed comments and invited textual amendments. "If two months period not enough time what period would be enough?" While he avoided explicit threat go public he renewed stalling charge in context world opinion being disappointed by failure these talks produce results.

3. I made statement on Chinese prisoners along lines paras one and two Deptel 2067 except that I did not explicitly inform him no publicity was being given to decision. In context meeting I felt it probably more productive leave him guess on this. In any event probably more effective if they learn this through Indians.

4. Wang had prepared statement obviously based on Higgins article and other press reports reflecting instructions to "demand" that we release all Chinese prisoners and specifically asserting they included in September 10 announcement. Although my previous presentation undercut basis for his prepared statement he nevertheless used some of it, making foregoing points. In reply to his question as to how many, I said did not have exact figure but was between 30 and 40, to which he replied this was "quite big number". I ignored his request for list of names. He renewed charge on coercing Chinese apply for permanent residence and Taiwan entry permits, adding charge that US born children Chinese students being denied exit. I immediately and categorically denied latter charge pointing out that even though American citizens children were being permitted accompany parents.

5. My statement on Chinese prisoners obviously took him by complete surprise, he had no instructions to cover possibility, and therefore confined himself to prepared material despite incongruities.

6. At Wang's suggestion next meeting Friday June 8.

7. Proceeding Prague tomorrow returning Geneva Wednesday June 6.

**Shillock**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–3156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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**630. Telegram 1964 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 31, 1956, 6 p.m.

1964. From Johnson.

1. I opened 49th today with prepared statement:

A. Shall make remarks on second item brief as possible this morning as have some information give you concerning first item.

B. Do not, however, want to make so brief as to leave you in doubt as to my position regard our search for agreement on renunciation force at present stage discussions. My government considers this search task of fundamental importance, and for its part is determined make every effort find common ground for agreement on meaningful renunciation force. My country will continue seek this as essential first step toward peaceful resolution differences.

C. It because this attitude my government that, when you submitted last Dec 1, I did not reject it simply because it came from your side. On contrary, as you will recall, welcomed it as advance over your previous position. Felt it had possibility being made into acceptable form framework meaningful renunciation force. As told you at time, was concerned about certain ambiguities your Dec 1 draft. As indicated your Dec 1, your draft, because these ambiguities appeared capable meaning one thing one side another to other. As indicated you that time, there was danger you might be taking draft to mean US abandoning its position respect merits dispute Taiwan area. As also indicated, I felt relation of draft to Taiwan area was another point of ambiguity.

D. However, despite these dangers which, as noted at time seemed inherent your draft, I was most careful in suggesting revisions to avoid rejecting what was constructive in draft. Limited revisions to what thought was minimum necessary to remove ambiguities I had pointed out. You persisted rejecting my amendments, but for five months refused submit alternative suggestions. April 19, I again suggested certain minimum revisions designed meet your stated objections my January 12 amendments. Again, most careful preserve intact form and exact language your Dec 1 draft, limiting changes to necessary minimum.

E. Finally, on May 11, you came forward with new revision on your own. You have objected my terming your May 11 draft "retrogression". Have not used this term hastily. Really do not see how it possible regard that draft as other than retrograde step. Let me make this entirely clear.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-3156. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

F. First, consider question in terms of drafts, of concrete documents. Stated at time, your December 1 draft constituted advance over previous position. Surely effort both us ought be preserve elements of advance in draft and concentrate solely on improving it. My successive efforts followed this principle, in true spirit reciprocity and desire for progress. Do not believe you can point to any respect in which my revision April 19 sacrificed any part your Dec 1 draft. Unfortunately, your draft May 11 does sacrifice much of earlier draft. Revisions which it suggests either depart completely from spirit reciprocity and mutuality, or limit validity of declaration, or introduce new and extraneous elements ambiguity. Even excludes those portions of your own Dec 1 draft I had accepted. Rather than moving direction of agreement, moves away from agreement.

G. Second, consider question in terms of relations between my country yours, and of situation Taiwan area. Does not set time limit—and short one, at that—on validity of proposed declaration automatically heighten [not] decrease, dangers of that situation? Does it not automatically raise question of what your side intends do at end two-month period? Your December 1 draft constituted apparent advance towards basis for agreement on meaningful renunciation force. That is, I felt and still feel if its ambiguities removed, as was done in my April 19 draft the Dec 1 draft could lead to removal dangers inherent in present situation in Taiwan area. It could thus open road toward genuine peaceful discussion and resolution differences. I felt and still feel this is direction which we should try move. Must insist your May 11 draft is step in opposite direction. Do not see how anyone could consider it as other than reversal of course, and hope you will understand my reluctance join you in backward step.

2. Wang replied (from notes and from prepared statement) he noted my statement this morning dealt general terms their previous drafts. Could not agree my assertion terming May 11 draft retrogression. It presented exactly because their previous draft Dec 1 been submitted for long time and did not achieve any result in discussions. View that situation they submitted new draft May 11. May 11 draft common points been included. In light expressed attitude US last few meetings in discussion May 11 draft, particularly in light my statement this morning as well as opposition to time limit in declaration it become quite clear my intention this discussion is try get declaration freezing status quo Taiwan area, then resort prolonged procrastination without following up with FMC in order maintain ability my country continue seizure Taiwan intervene China's internal affairs. That position what their side would under no circumstances agree to.

3. Wang said as been repeatedly pointed out US already used force threat force in seizing China's territory Taiwan intervening China's

liberation offshore islands. That fact which can no way be negated by resort sophistry.

4. Wang said I had made repeated statements calling for unconditional renunciation force Taiwan area. If so US should first of all remove own forces and threat force already used against China Taiwan area. China upheld peaceful settlement Sino-American disputes Taiwan area. However would never remain onlooker allowing US continue perpetuate seizure Taiwan interference China's internal affairs.

5. Wang said any declaration renouncing use force China US Taiwan area must not under any circumstance be something freezing status quo Taiwan area. Must specify means by which Taiwan area dispute might be resolved. Their draft specified such practical feasible means should be sought ascertained within two months from announcement declaration. This proves sincerity their part for peaceful resolution disputes between us.

6. Wang said it now more than eight months since began discussions this second item. As result procrastination part US we still not able reach agreement. If US even lacked intention reaching agreement on means settling Sino-American dispute Taiwan area, to what year and to what month would I want drag on talks when we came to discussion substance disputes?

7. Wang said they always held provided there equal sincerity two months time should be entirely sufficient for two sides agree practical feasible means solution disputes Taiwan area.

8. I replied he had spoken of supposed US desire freeze status quo Taiwan area. Seemed me as sometimes said in English shoe on other foot. What was status quo Taiwan area? Status quo was there dispute regarding that area involving both us. One side for long in past and still is threatening use force resolve that dispute to its satisfaction.

9. I asked what was first step to peacefully resolve that dispute? First step was clearly say force would not be used in attempt solve it. Next step was peacefully and in that atmosphere discuss disputes. It eight long months ago I put forward this simple proposition. Might even say elementary proposition. Proposition designed verily clearly to change present status quo under which force being threatened and there danger hostilities long as it continued.

10. I said it not US but rather his country that apparently desired maintain status quo. It not US that prevented us from coming grips other substantive problems confronting us. It unwillingness his government thus far accept simple elementary proposition that prevented us thus far moving on any further these talks. I thought it important we keep clear on what actual situation was.

11. Wang said I had just now indicated desired present status quo Taiwan area not be maintained and something must be done about it. That exactly what they maintained. Status quo Taiwan area abnormal and false. That why something must be done change that situation. However, order change that status quo Taiwan area empty words not sufficient. One must show concrete deeds that direction. It exactly for this purpose settling disputes two countries Taiwan area we started discussions here. For eight months we not been able make progress this subject. This not to their satisfaction.

12. Wang said first step settlement Taiwan area dispute two countries lay in announcing declaration. However, I had failed give him any help that direction. In discussing subject making declaration must concentrate on how make progress in discussion. May 11 draft designed exactly for purpose advancing talks not producing deadlock or dragging talks backward.

13. Wang said he had repeatedly explained his draft. It contained three substantive paras. First para they proposed two countries accord mutual respect sovereignty territorial integrity each other. That would be normal fundamental principle on which relations two countries could be established; he could not imagine any other principle departing from this principle on which relations could be established. He could not imagine how this principle mutual respect could be replaced by mutual disdain and hostility.

14. Wang said second para proposed peaceful resolution Taiwan area dispute two countries. That para reasonable and expressed their peaceful intentions in that they determined try settle disputes peacefully without going war.

15. Wang said next about time limit in declaration. This expressed mutual determination seek means settlement disputes. Fact that no agreement been achieved eight long months in Sino-American negotiations had exerted unfavorable influence international opinion. Public says two us meeting for sake meeting, and do not have desire settle concrete problem. On their part they dissatisfied with delay. If we set two months time limit would help greatly our endeavors for settlement. That in interests both sides.

16. Wang said in discussion declaration should not and cannot try depart from these things. Issue could not be settled by making empty charges such allegation their draft retrogression. I alleged their May 11 constituted step backwards. Told me would appreciate if I could enlighten him in what points their draft made what I termed retrogression.

17. I said Wang had characterized his May 11 draft, in reference its second para as expression intention on part two us try settle disputes peacefully without going war. I inclined agree that characterization his

draft. I felt this pointed up really fundamental difference between us. Would declaration we discussing be merely pious ambiguous expression of desire try repeat try settle disputes peacefully without going war? Or would it be declaration saying we would not go war over disputes but would discuss them and seek settlement only by peaceful means? It in this regard in particular I must consider his May 11 draft as retrogression from Dec 1 draft.

18. Wang interjected it seemed we better keep discussion in terms exact text draft. Their draft in this para said two countries determined should settle disputes between two countries Taiwan area peaceful negotiation without resorting threat use force against each other. We better keep strictly to text draft. What he wanted discuss was exactly text draft.

19. I told Wang I still felt taken as whole effect of May 11 draft was as I had said. As I had said this morning taking last para his May 11 in relation whole it even introduced element of threat at end period mentioned therein. However it explained or rationalized that simply inherent in language it used. I had pointed out also in that para he had dropped language on which we previously agreed. I had accepted his language exactly as expressed in his draft Dec 1 for that last para. By now dropping language on which agreement already reached certainly had gone backwards.

20. Wang said we would both recall prior agreement first announcement we both worked earnestly in terms language of announcement. As result our efforts we finally reached agreement precise text announcement.

21. Wang said he had asked me this morning point out exactly which places in three paras his draft constituted retrogression. However I had first mentioned second para. He could hardly follow logic that respect. I would recall their previous draft Dec 1 in which second para. said PRC and USA determined should settle disputes two countries through peaceful negotiation without resorting threat use force. That was statement in general terms regarding settlement disputes two countries. As they understood public statements made by US Department State we desired specific mention Taiwan area this para. In meeting I had repeatedly advanced point of including Taiwan this para. Their May 11 did include reference Taiwan area. Therefore it met requirements US. That why it hard for him understand how such inclusion constituted retrogression. He must say he not able follow me this respect. My position seemed be in their previous drafts they did not have reference Taiwan area second para and that not satisfactory me. Now in second para they added reference yet I said this retrogression. Could this be regarded as demonstration sincerity in talks?



22. Wang said I had next spoken about third paragraph and about time limit. They maintained time limit essential necessary and useful both sides. For several meetings in succession I had expressed different opinions on time limit. I had done so in spite repeated explanations. If I considered two months insufficient then how much time would be sufficient? He would like hear my ideas that regard period.

23. I said had just two brief things. First in discussing first agreement last September we did not make progress by dropping from declaration mid-way during negotiations, language on which had already reached agreement. Parenthetically I might note in spite care I attempted exercise discussing that agreement we came out with something which did not mean same thing both us. Issues here too important for that again happen.

24. I said next far as his question concerning time limit did not feel any time limit could be placed on renunciation force settlement our disputes. We certainly would not say we agreed not go war each other two months two years twenty years. It worse say that really than say nothing at all.

25. Wang said he found me in self-contradiction with previous statement this morning. This morning I said did not desire maintain status quo Taiwan area and desired present situation Taiwan area be changed. By omitting time limit did I feel present status quo Taiwan area should be maintained two years twenty years? If one should view Taiwan problem from that standpoint it would show he not willing have settlement at all. If I thought he mistaken in that he hoped I would clear it up for him.

26. I thought I had already made position amply clear on that. He had twisted my clear statement into arguing something I did not say. However I was satisfied my position clear. Had nothing further on this this morning. As told him at beginning meeting had information for him in regard first item which would take little time present and if it agreeable him would now do so.

27. Wang said although I had said my position clear they still not clear regarding it. He regretted I had in my statement not helped progress our discussion on declaration. If there no desire for deliberate stalling talks and if there genuine desire for reaching agreement would hope I able at next meeting put forward concrete opinions. Rather than saying abstract things would hope I able express concrete opinion.

28. He [*I*] then read prepared statement:

A. Since last December you with increasing frequency brought matter Chinese in prisons my country. At 47th meeting May 17 even asserted my government had under agreed announcement September 10 undertaken commitments this regard.

B. While not my purpose again enter controversy this matter, you well recall from time two years ago when two of us undertook discussion respective nationals in country of other I indicated from my standpoint this involving question all Americans your country prevented departing by denial exit permits or imprisonment. So there be no question concerning exactly what discussing, I gave you list their names. You indicated interest was in question removal restrictions imposed by government on departure Chinese students. Your request I gave concrete information this regard. Were of course, no Chinese my country in category corresponding Americans your country imprisoned charges political nature.

C. These continued be respective concerns and subjects discussion throughout period contact through consulates general here well as through negotiations from August 1 leading agreed announcement September 10 which issued this context. Clearly understood between us and I made abundantly clear insofar my statement that announcement concerned, it confirmed fact, which I informed you outset our talks August, as of that time removal completed all restrictions on departure for your country Chinese my country.

D. That my country fully faithfully carried out with regard Chinese in US all terms agreed announcement demonstrated beyond doubt not only by fact Chinese continued freely proceed from US your country but also by fact in almost nine months since agreed announcement Indian Embassy has not brought attention my government single case where even alleged obstruction been offered to departure Chinese who desire proceed your country.

E. Nevertheless you in recent months raised question Chinese my country serving prison sentences. Your obvious purpose been falsely impugn faith performance my country all commitments under agreed announcement. Despite demonstrable falsity impression you seek create, my country's authorities, view your statements this regard, carried out full careful investigation identify alien Chinese who might be serving prison terms. This investigation included all federal and state prisons. Necessary because no Chinese imprisoned my country on charges political nature or because race, nationality, political beliefs. He subject to imprisonment for common crimes as murder narcotics traffic only after prompt, fair public trial before impartial courts where has same legal safeguards as every other resident my country including counsel of own choice. Those convicted under such procedures not singled out by reasons race nationality, nor records concerning them maintained that basis.

F. As far as I able determine no alien Chinese in prison my country has expressed desire return your country. However, in order remove any vestige basis your claim my government not fully carrying

out agreed announcement, each these prisoners being individually informed agreed announcement and specifically told if desires do so may apply for deportation your country. Prompt action will be taken any such application.

G. In addition, Indian Embassy my country being informed arrangements being made its representatives interview each such common criminal so can ascertain to its satisfaction whether not he desires be released for immediate return your country. Indian Embassy will be given names and location all such criminals. Indian Embassy today also being informed these measures.

29. Wang said he could not agree remarks concerning Chinese nationals US. Nor could he agree my assertion September 10 agreement did not include Chinese US prisons. He did not deny in beginning our contact on return civilians they first raised question Chinese students US. That time, Chinese students had suffered extremely unreasonable restrictions in US. However during last negotiations on return civilians beginning last August until we reached agreement on September 10 they never on their part stated that problems Chinese civilians only restricted Chinese students. Chinese students only portion Chinese nationals US. Same as in case US lawbreakers in China which included military personnel as well as civilians other categories.

30. Turning to prepared statement Wang continued he recalled I made statement during previous discussion to effect I did not know of any Chinese in prison US. I now formally informed him there were Chinese prisoners US.

31. Wang said he had also noted statement by spokesman US Department State to effect Chinese imprisoned US not going to be released. He must say this very serious question.

32. Wang said since I informed him I had made investigation Chinese in US prisons he would appreciate my telling him exact number such prisoners. Hoped I would be able give him list. These Chinese nationals imprisoned in US. That was fact. Fact was they subjected unequal treatment in US and being persecuted under various charges. Wang had right demand US release these people so they could return native land. They quite dissatisfied since agreement reached on civilians US so far not fully carried out agreement. He had made many representations concerning Chinese and Chinese students who being obstructed but, except in case Liu Yung-ming I not made any accounting these people.

33. Wang said US not yet removed requirements coercing Chinese US apply permanent residence and entry permits Taiwan.

34. Wang said according their information US recently taken measures deny exit children born Chinese students in US to depart

with parents. That constituted violation agreement on civilians. They demanded US promptly remove such measures in violation agreement.

35. I said I did not know whether he clearly understood exactly what I told him. His remarks appeared indicate he did not. I had said far as I been able determine no Chinese prisoner thus far expressed desire return his country. I said however that it going be made specifically clear each them that if he desired do so he could apply deportation Wang's country.

36. I said I did not even ask him accept my word on this. Arrangements made Indian Embassy see each these persons determine for self whether desired be released for immediate return. I had also told Wang Indian Embassy would be given names and locations each these persons.

37. I said as far as numbers concerned did not have exact figures which being given Indian Embassy but understood in neighborhood 30–40 persons who involved.

38. I said purpose this morning not enter controversy over ground covered many times in past but I found difficult accept his statement Chinese US who committed murder other common crimes being persecuted because put in prison for it.

39. I said only new thing Wang had mentioned was assertion children born US to Chinese student parents being denied exit. Could categorically tell him this not correct. Though such children American citizens they being permitted accompany parents. Because they American citizens procedures for departure somewhat different from case aliens and might in some cases require short period time. However even though they American citizens they being permitted accompany parents.

40. Wang said first place he might say number given by me for Chinese in prison US—I had said 30–40—quite big number. Essential question re these people was for US Govt release them so could return their homeland soon as possible. Regarding Chinese that category who in prison US he hoped I able give him list.

41. Wang said as regards children born to Chinese parents it case of obstruction departure. I had just now stated they not obstructed, but same time stated they received different treatment in regard departure from that accorded parents. That precisely case of obstruction for it quite apparent if children subject obstruction would also hinder departure parents. He hoped prompt action would be taken by US authorities correct that situation.

42. I said had nothing more. Wang proposed next meeting Friday June 8. I agreed.

**Shillock**

**631. Telegram 1965 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 31, 1956, midnight

1965. From Johnson.

To carry out tactic outlined para 3 Deptel 2066 believe I should not take any initiative with respect implementation next meeting. At best may take several weeks assess effect on them this unexpected move. Regardless of what action they may ultimately take respective release of Americans he will probably make some statement at next meeting attempting redress record from his standpoint to which I would propose reply as necessary without laboring release Americans aspect. Would appreciate instructions covering possibility he renews request I give him here list of prisoners. Would attempt as today avoid issue but if he presses I may be required indicate some position. On one hand no requirement under agreed announcement they be given any such list but on other hand they will of course receive list from Indians and flat refusal give him same list here tends somewhat adversely reflection his status here and be inconsistent with my previous position on all implementation matters being proper subject for discussion here. In any event if appears useful desire be able state will inform him when any prisoner departs.

**Shillock**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–3156. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

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**632. Telegram 730 to Taipei<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 31, 1956, 8:29 p.m.

730. (CODE ROOM: Please repeat Department's 2066 to Geneva, Control 13989, May 29.)

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–3156. Secret. Drafted by McCaughy; cleared in SOA. Also sent to London as telegram 7256 and New Delhi as telegram 2925.

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633. Letter from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, May 31, 1956

Dear Walter:

Thought you would be interested in knowing that the Indian Consul General here just called me saying that he recalled that I had asked him to let me know whenever Krishna Menon came through town and that he was passing through here on Monday, intimating that he would like to see me but not directly saying so. Of course, I had never said any such thing to the Consul General and he perfectly well knows so, my last statement to him being that I would be very glad to see Krishna Menon any time he wanted to see me.

I replied that I was very sorry that I was leaving for Prague tomorrow morning and would not be returning until Wednesday and asked that he give Mr. Menon my regards.

I suppose that he will, of course, be seeing Wang. I have no idea what this means, if anything, but wanted to pass it on to you.

I have nothing on today's meeting except what I have already transmitted in my telegrams. I was delighted to be able to make the statement on Chinese prisoners and so thoroughly to throw him into a spin at today's meeting. It was fortunate that I had at the very outset in my statement of renunciation mentioned my desire later to talk on Item one, because it was quite obvious that he was preparing to jump in with his "demands" on us to release the Chinese prisoners, and if he had gotten his statement in first, it would have made it very difficult for me to make mine. However, it all worked out well and I think that we have handled the matter so as to obtain the maximum advantage.

Regards.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

**634. Letter from Osborn to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 1, 1956

Dear Ralph:

After talking the last meeting over with Bob Ekvall, I had worked up a paragraph or two on renunciation for possible inclusion in the Ambassador's "comment" telegram. When I showed the draft to the Ambassador, his reaction was, while agreeing with the analysis, to doubt the utility of putting it in the telegram. He suggested I send it to you in a letter, and so I am enclosing it.

I would certainly agree with the Ambassador that the Department appears to face the possibility of a resort to the public by Wang with equanimity. It is also true that if in fact the CHICOMS do go to the public on the basis of the May 11 draft, they will not be in too strong a position. Even Wang seems to realize this, and that is probably why he has been making such determined efforts to lure us into making textual criticisms. His tactic would possibly be to then table a new draft apparently meeting our objections without really doing so. This would put Peiping in a stronger public position than the May 11 draft alone.

Possibly Wang may have another try or two at getting us to talk textually. If this fails, Peiping may decide to go to the public anyway. If Peiping takes the issue to the public solely on the basis of the May 11 draft, the CHICOMS are going to have a hard time convincing people this draft represents a really sincere effort to reach agreement on a meaningful renunciation of force. Accordingly they might stress, rather than the draft itself, Wang's repeated offers to consider alternative suggestions, and our "obstinate" refusal to offer any. They might even, as a minor gambit, play Wang's trick of "assuming", since we concentrated our objections on the time limit clause, that the United States had no objections to other parts of the draft. This would not fool most intelligent observers, but it might injure feelings on Taiwan.

Alternatively, Peiping might decide that the May 11 draft is completely unsuitable as a basis for a public position, and Wang might be instructed to table a new draft, even in the absence of textual comments from our side. Our failure to take this new draft as the basis for discussion would bring on a threat to go to the public, and this time it would be genuine.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Osborn signed the original "Dave."

These various possibilities have probably occurred to you in CA, and are probably being taken account of in planning our strategy in the talks, insofar as they are worth taking account of at all. This might be a good place to say again that in writing you these letters I am not attempting to force the pace of things, request answers to questions, or urge any particular direction of policy with regard to the talks.

Since we have been relying on the services of one of the ConGen officers for the note-taking spot, we have been working up the long telegrams on the basis of my shorthand notes, thoroughly cross-checked with the long-hand notes and Bob Ekvall's notes of what Wang *really* said in Chinese, as well as approved by the Ambassador. In dictating off the telegrams to the secretary I have tried to comply with a recent instruction from the Department calling attention to excess verbiage in our previous traffic. I hope I have not been condensing to the detriment of intelligibility. If so, don't hesitate to tell me.

Regards to Walter and all in CA.

Sincerely,

David L. Osborn

## Enclosure

### Draft Comments by Osborn<sup>2</sup>

#### COMMENTS ON RENUNCIATION FORCE SITUATION

In absence new move from me on renunciation next meeting anticipate Wang will heighten threat resort public, justifying step along lines para. 15 long telegram (i.e., saying international opinion already deploring worthlessness these talks, and asserting it CHICOM right and duty inform public who is responsible for lack progress). Wang's original hope may have been elicit my objections his May 21 draft, then submit another new draft allegedly meeting my objections, with plan of going to public following my rejection his "second successive effort reach agreement". Plausibility this supposition supported by extensive bargaining room in his May 11 draft and by his determined efforts elicit my specific comments or suggested amendments.

Accordingly it possible Wang may continue recent tactics one or two more meetings. However as and if Wang convinced I intend avoid specific comment text his draft, Peiping may feel self forced go to public on basis that draft.

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<sup>2</sup>Confidential.



**635. Letter 45 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 45

Washington, June 1, 1956

Dear Alex:

I plan to wait until Monday the 4th to write the regular weekly letter. That letter should reach you well before the next meeting on June 8. This is merely a short note to transmit a copy of the Aide-memoire we delivered to the Indian Embassy yesterday, together with the full list of Chinese alien prisoners. We have just received your 1965 and we feel you should have this list in any event. If it should be decided that you should transmit this list to Wang at the next meeting (and this question will probably be decided on Monday), you should have this list in advance in order to be prepared. It would be difficult and expensive to transmit this list by cable, and the incidence of garbles would probably be high. Unless this pouch is delayed you will be all set for whatever course may be decided upon next week.

Indian Ambassador Mehta seemed highly pleased at our decision. He told Dudley Withers after he left Mr. Robertson's office that he felt this was a constructive move which should lead to some progress. He seemed to feel definitely optimistic. He obviously thinks it will be up to the Chinese Communists to make a reciprocating move now. I believe we have at least the local Indian representatives on our side on the prisoner question now, and we have high hopes that they will exert whatever influence they may have in the right direction. We will send you a memorandum of the Robertson-Mehta conversation on Monday. The Indians intend to arrange the interviews with the prisoners as soon as they receive word that we have delivered notifications and copies of the Agreed Announcement to the prisoners. We hope to get the draft circular letter to the prisoners cleared today. You will also get a copy of this.

Minister Tan was quite unhappy when I gave him the news half an hour before Mehta came in. He feels that both the propriety and the consistency of our action are questionable. Obviously he feels that the position of the GRC as the sole representative and protector of Chinese interests in this country is somewhat compromised. He wants a list of the prisoners, and Mr. Robertson and I both feel that we should give it to him. However, it has not been done yet. Tan believes the Indians will try to bring pressure to bear on the prisoners to elect return to the mainland. He thought we might have the same sort of tug-of-war

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by McConaughy.

on these criminals which was experienced with the Chinese POW's in Korea. He also feels that if and when the news leaks out the effect on the peace of mind of law-abiding Chinese residents of the US will be adverse. He thinks it might be construed by them as the thin edge of a wedge.

FE/P is worried about the publicity angle. They feel if the news leaks out or is released by the Chinese Communists we will be at a serious disadvantage. They wonder if we should not put the news out first so that we can retain control, insure that a garbled version does not gain currency, and avoid being placed on the defensive. We are awaiting your comments on the publicity problem. So far there has been no leak that we know of.

Congratulations on the way you handled the presentation of our decision yesterday. You really took Wang by surprise. Wang was caught off balance most conspicuously and you handled his predicament very well indeed.

The British Embassy here has informed O'Neill in detail of our move and our reasoning in showing restraint at this stage. O'Neill will, of course, make no move until we ask him to. We have invited his suggestions as to the best way to play our cards if we get no prompt, favorable reaction from the Chinese Communists.

Congratulations on the fine commendation which the Secretary wrote you. No commendation could have been more merited in our view.

Judge Phleger has been away most of this week on two speech-making trips. Of course, the Secretary has been away too, taking a short rest at Duck Island. Bill Sebald left on Tuesday for a six-weeks tour of the entire FE area.

Regards and every good wish to you, Dave and Helenka and Colonel Ekvall,

Sincerely yours,

**Walter P. McConaughy**  
*Director for Chinese Affairs*

Enclosure:

Aide-memoire to Indian Embassy.

**636. Telegram 1985 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 4, 1956, 3 p.m.

1985. From Johnson.  
Geneva's 1909 [1949].  
Advise.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–456. Official Use Only.

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**637. Letter 46 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 46

Washington, June 4, 1956

Dear Alex:

There have been no Geneva developments since I wrote you on Friday except a constant battle to keep down publicity on our prisoner decision. Judge Phleger has been away until now. I expect that we will have a Geneva meeting in the course of the day although your instructions may not go out until tomorrow since the meeting is on Friday this week.

Unfortunately Kuh of the Chicago Sun Times got hold of almost the entire story on our prisoners move, either late Thursday or early Friday. His story appeared in the Chicago Sun Times Friday afternoon, June 1. It was almost a miracle that the wire services did not pick up the story immediately and carry it on their tickers.<sup>2</sup> For some reason we did not get the pressure until Saturday morning. John Hightower of AP got on to the Chicago Sun Times story at that time and immediately went all out to elicit something from Mr. Robertson, John Lindbeck and myself. So far he has been staved off, largely by the efforts of Mr. Robertson, who told him frankly that we could not confirm his surmises. Any story

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal.

<sup>2</sup> Since dictating this I have discovered an AP item on this did appear in various papers yesterday. It did not receive very prominent play, being carried on inside pages. Copy attached. [Footnote in the original.]

he might write would be based on pure conjecture. Such conjecture would be prejudicial to the interest of the 13 imprisoned Americans. Mr. Robertson thought he would want to think twice before he would write an uncorroborated story which might have the effect of worsening the plight of his fellow countrymen who were already in dire straits. Don Gonzales of UP also got wind of the story yesterday, but so far has been held off by the use of tactics similar to those employed with Hightower.

We understand from Hightower that the New York Times Washington Bureau and other correspondents are working on the story. They all sense that a news story is present. But they are loathe to move until they can get some official confirmation. Kuh's poor reputation with many of his colleagues is helping us here, although his account is so circumstantial that the other correspondents are convinced there must be some fire where there is that much smoke. As usual we have no idea where the leak occurred, although we suspect the Indian Embassy may be the source. It is interesting that Gonzales said he understood that 36 names were on the list of Chinese criminals. This is a figure which was never given the Indian Embassy. It is the figure originally received from I & N. S. Two names were later deleted from this list because they appear to have a claim to American citizenship. This would make it seem that Gonzales' source was someone who saw the list either in Justice or in State at an early stage.

Obviously the story is going to come out eventually although we hope to stave off general circulation of acceptance of the story for a while longer. It seems to us that official confirmation of the story at this time would be totally inconsistent with our tactics of giving the Chinese Communists as much room as possible for a graceful change in policy on the imprisoned Americans. We will most certainly get bogged down with an exchange of recriminations with the Chinese Communists on the application of the Agreed Announcement, if we let anything out prematurely. The chances of the 13 would likely be lost in the heat of the controversy. Although you have given us some intimation of your general attitude of the publicity question, we would welcome a more explicit recommendation and analysis. We have tried our hands at three drafts of a contingency press release if we are forced into the position of putting out a confirmation. We do not like any of these drafts. It is an extremely difficult subject to press succinctly and cogently with the right shades of emphasis throughout.

There is enclosed a copy of the letter which is being sent to each prisoner. It has been cleared in the Department and by I & N. S. and

the Bureau of Prisons and we expect to send it out in English and Chinese today.

I am sorry I won't be able to get another letter to you before the next meeting to report on our meeting with Judge Phleger today. Anything real significant will of course be included in our telegrams to you.

Regards and good luck,

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

Enclosure:

Copy of letter to be sent to Chinese aliens in prison.

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#### 638. Telegram 2090 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 5, 1956, 8:22 p.m.

2090. For Johnson.

Following is draft text letter we propose sending Chinese prisoners. Draft not finally approved here but would appreciate your comments. We are considering having you give Wang copy at June 8 meeting.

QUOTE

There is enclosed a copy of the Agreed Announcement issued at Geneva on September 10, 1955.

The responsible United States authorities have decided that the provisions of the Agreed Announcement will be applied to your case. In the near future, you will be given an opportunity to state formally whether you elect to continue serving your sentence in the United States subject to prevailing regulations, or whether you prefer to be discharged expeditiously from prison for the sole purpose of immediate and direct travel to China. If you apply for parole or commutation of sentence for this purpose, the American authorities concerned will give prompt consideration to your application.

You will later be visited to verify that you have been informed of this opportunity to be deported, and to ascertain whether you elect to be deported, so that the necessary arrangements can be made. The

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–556. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough.

warden of the prison where you are confined will notify you in advance of the arrangements for the visit. UNQUOTE

**Dulles**

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**639. Telegram 551 from Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, June 6, 1956, 6 p.m.

551. Re Deptel 2090 to Geneva.

Suggest Wang not be given copy letter unless he asks for it or it otherwise appears would be useful in context of meeting.

Suggest first sentence second paragraph reference letter be deleted. Do not see necessity raising in this letter, particularly if copy to be given Wang, controversial question of whether and by whose decision prisoners covered by agreed announcement. It seems to me omission of sentence would not jeopardize our position which has been made clear to Wang and avoids thus formally committing ourselves to carrying out release under agreed announcement rather than by our own unilateral action.

**Johnson**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-656. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Geneva for Osborn as telegram 47.

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**640. Telegram 2099 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 6, 1956, 6:45 p.m.

2099. For Johnson.

Following Chinese note dated June 3 transmitted for your confidential background:

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-656. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy.

**641. Telegram 2100 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 6, 1956, 6:57 p.m.

2100. For Johnson.

Guidance for June 8 Meeting.

1. You are authorized inform Wang of delivery Indian Embassy May 31 of US Aide Memoire enclosing list Chinese alien prisoners. Do not repeat not give document to Wang. While we realize Chinese Communists can obtain list from Indians, we wish avoid undesirable implications of formally turning over to Chinese Communists, in apparent response demand by them, information regarding Chinese nationals in US who have not indicated desire proceed Communist China.

2. We hope by our action make it difficult if not virtually impossible for Chinese Communists refuse British access American prisoners held in Communist China, and release of Americans. All our actions related this latest tactic are geared to overriding objective of placing maximum indirect pressure on Chinese Communists.

3. You are authorized your discretion tell Wang that US has refrained from giving any publicity to its decision give criminals option of return Communist China. FYI Leaks have not been officially inspired and are from sources we have not been able to identify. We have carefully avoided giving any official confirmation to rumors in this regard. END FYI.

4. You should not mention prospective letter to Chinese prisoners (Deptel 2090) at this meeting.

5. Reject as unfounded Wang's allegation US obstructing departure children of Chinese going Communist China. On contrary US waives passport requirement for accompanying American-born children of Chinese aliens travelling mainland China. Indian Embassy informed of this arrangement and has not alleged obstruction any such case.

6. You are authorized your discretion refrain from taking any other initiative regarding implementation at this meeting or from linking our action with action expected of Communists on American prisoners. Use your judgment in answering any statement Wang may make in reply US proposal.

7. Concerning renunciation of force, no new proposal or argumentation by you contemplated. Adhere to defined position, pointing out futility of tabling proposals such as Wang's May 11 draft, which Wang

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–656. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Phleger.

well knows is retrograde move which cannot succeed. Urge Wang reconsider merits our April 19 draft from Chinese Communist point of view. Call attention lack of any indication willingness on part of Peiping to recede from its "all or nothing" position and remark on contrast this attitude with public posture reasonableness and conciliation which Chinese Communists apparently endeavoring assume.

8. Department considers it tactically inadvisable for us propose omission meeting next week. Various unwarranted and possibly hurtful inferences might be read into such request. Accordingly you should suggest Friday June 15 for next meeting if you can return from your engagement in Nuremburg by then. Otherwise request nesting for Saturday, June 16.

**Dulles**

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#### **642. Telegram 741 to Taipei<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 6, 1956, 7:05 p.m.

741.

1. Department believes your 1080 manifests degree of perturbation at Chinese prisoner decision which is not warranted by circumstances.

2. Chinese June 3 note of protest will be answered shortly making essentially same points enumerated below.

3. Indian Embassy will not act on behalf Chinese Communist regime or as protector interests Chinese prisoners when it interviews prisoners. It will function in collaboration with US Government merely to verify facts as to expressed wishes of prisoners regarding return to Communist China. Indian representative will be accompanied by US official. Indians will not be allowed to influence decision of prisoners and will have no repeat no function in regard to prisoners who do not voluntarily elect travel Communist China.

4. Prisoners by their confinement are protected from Chinese Communist influence and intimidation. Indian visits will not endanger them nor do visits constitute any significant extension of Indian role under Agreed Announcement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-456. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Phleger and in substance by Dulles. Repeated Priority to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 2101.



5. Under the normal operation of our Immigration laws, Chinese criminals have been deported to Communist China before and travel of criminals to Communist China, if any elect to go there, will not constitute any new departure.

6. Chinese Government has regularly resisted deportation Chinese to Taiwan. In view GRC lack cooperation with INS this matter, we had assumed they would not be interested in taking these criminals. However, GRC is at liberty to receive any of them who may elect to go there, and prisoners will be given opportunity express this preference.

7. GRC was given complete list of criminals with description of sentences and addresses prisons where confined. They will of course be given access to these prisoners. US continues recognize GRC as sole protector of rights Chinese aliens including criminals. There is no change in this Government's China policy, express or implied, actual or prospective represented in prisoner decision.

8. GRC has regularly been kept informed all significant Geneva developments. Consultation on Geneva moves has never been practiced or promised. We cannot undertake consult with GRC on moves which we are satisfied do not impair its rights and interests. We can see no reason for such marked concern on part of GRC at action of basically minor significance to its real interests as voluntary deportation of a few dozen undesirables. We are not aware any Geneva move which has prejudiced GRC rights or claims.

9. Contrary to your assumption, Department has not repeat not given any publicity to prisoner decision. Leaks from unidentified sources have reached press but Department has carefully refrained from confirming rumors or lending them any credence directly or indirectly. Chinese Embassy was placed under injunction of secrecy when it was informed in advance US decision. Public comment attributed by press to Chinese Foreign Office appears to be in violation of this injunction.

10. We have obligation leave no stone unturned in our efforts obtain release our 13 imprisoned nationals. This is only promising remaining step open to us. We feel these prisoners cannot help Chinese Communist cause regardless whether they elect return or stay in prison. They are burden to any country which has them. We feel we cannot lose by confronting Chinese Communists with this act which either will result in release our maltreated nationals or further expose Chinese Communist inhumanity and failure to live up to their commitments. This we are satisfied is being accomplished without any injury to position GRC as only Chinese Government recognized by US.

Dulles

**643. Telegram 2102 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 6, 1956, 7:15 p.m.

2102. For Johnson.

(CODE ROOM: Please repeat Taipei's 1080, June 4, Control 1662)

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-656. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy.

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**644. Telegram 2008 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 7, 1956, 4 p.m.

2008. From Johnson.

Regret delay in specifically commenting accordance last sentence para 4 Deptel 2066. As stated para 7 Mytel 1928 felt action should have had no publicity at this time with thought discussion on publicity could be deferred until effect action tested. However in view leaks am inclined favor Department or preferably INS spokesman responding to press inquiry by confirming Chinese prisoners being given opportunity deportation mainland China. This merely broader application deportation policy which has in past been applied individual cases. None of criminals affected by this step will be forced go to Communist China against his will. I do not believe such release would adversely affect CHICOM action on 13 nor would it prevent its later exploitation to bring public pressure on CHICOMS if and when this appears desirable.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-756. Secret; Limit Distribution.

**645. Telegram 2104 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 7, 1956, 12:37 p.m.

2104. For Johnson.

1. New York Times June 6 reported Chairman of Communist Party of Connecticut addressed letter June 5 to Mao Tse-tung stating "We sincerely believe that release of John Downey and twelve other Americans will contribute towards better relations between United States and Peoples Republic of China".

2. Recent letter from Father Wagner to his brother stated "On March 17 we prisoners were all taken on three thousand mile trip lasting 25 days". He mentioned visiting Hankow, Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking and Hangchow and being taken to see factories, hospitals, universities, farms and temples. This seems to corroborate report in Deptel 1941. Letter did not indicate which prisoners made trip.

3. Letter from Representative Dodd to Secretary June 5 states Dodd Subcommittee plans to start within next few days "investigation and study of facts and circumstances surrounding detention of United States citizens in Communist China". He requests list of American businessmen who have been detained or otherwise prevented from leaving Communist China. Would appreciate your comments on possible effect such investigation at this time on prospects imprisoned Americans, particularly if investigation involves public hearings and considerable publicity.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-756. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Phleger.

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**646. Telegram 2105 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 7, 1956, 1:02 p.m.

2105. For Johnson.

Your 551. Revised draft proposed letter to prisoners quoted below. Comment soonest. You will note we have deleted first sentence

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-756. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy.

paragraph former draft as you recommended. We have also amended latter portion same paragraph. Reasons for these changes will be evident to you from our 2099 and 2101.

QUOTE There is enclosed a copy of the Agreed Announcement issued at Geneva on September 10, 1955.

In the near future, you will be given an opportunity to state formally whether you elect to continue serving your sentence in the United States subject to prevailing regulations, or whether you prefer to be discharged expeditiously from prison for the purpose of immediate and direct deportation to Mainland China. The Government of the United States also gives you the option of immediate and direct deportation to Taiwan if the Government of the Republic of China will receive you. If you apply for parole or commutation of sentence for the purpose of being deported, the American authorities concerned will give prompt consideration to your application.

You will later be visited to verify that you have been informed of this opportunity to be deported, and to ascertain whether you elect to be deported, so that the necessary arrangements can be made. The warden of the prison where you are confined will notify you in advance of the arrangements for the visit. END QUOTE

Dulles

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**647. Telegram 2009 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 8, 1956, 10 a.m.

2009. From Johnson. ReDeptel 2105.

While I understand reasons for revision latter portion second para will of course reduce effectiveness of action in obtaining release Americans when letter inevitably comes to attention CHICOMS through Indians. Would, therefore, hope some method could be found whereby position relating Taiwan could be deleted and possibly included subsequent letter or handled orally. While we have made statement to GRC contained para 6 Deptel 2101, we have made no commitment as to form in which this would be done and in any event GRC has not yet

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-856. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

withdrawn statement last sentence para 7 Deptel 2099. Until they have modified or withdrawn that statement, giving prisoner impression he has option of Taiwan would be misleading.

Gowen

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**648. Telegram 2013 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 8, 1956, 4 p.m.

2013. From Johnson.

1. Two and half hour this morning, two hours of which were on implementation.

2. Wang opened with brief statement on renunciation asking for “concrete and constructive opinion” on their May 11 draft and then directly moved to long statement on implementation. Pleased we had informed Indians no obstruction would be offered to accompanied children, and had given Indians list names those imprisoned. Noted we still had failed give list all Chinese U.S. and although list given Indians was called “list all known alien Chinese prisoners” covered only 30 or 40 persons. This was far smaller than number imprisoned according their information. “Cannot agree” to attempt “screening” few selected Chinese” so as “cover up obstruction offered return large numbers Chinese in U.S.” With respect Chinese in prison US should take steps similarly taken by PRC with regard Americans. First release them from prison and then refrain from obstructing departure if they desire return. U.S. also thus far failed account for names given me here, and gave me list additional five names also Taiwan entry permit question.

3. Throughout subsequent long give and take I focused on fol weaknesses his position: (a) he in effect objected to us going beyond terms agreed announcement (b) he objected to measure he had previously demanded (c) questioning reliability verification by third party of his choice (d) false implication that had already freed all Americans (e) his attempt dictate U.S. should free all alien Chinese prisoners

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–856. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

regardless whether they desire return PRC—this entirely beyond terms of reference talks.

4. In his replies he generally side-stepped my attacks attempting to switch subject by rehashing charges on name lists, Taiwan entry permits, etc. However, when pressed, position he took in essence appeared to be that out of many Chinese in U.S. prisons, 30 or 40 special cases had been selected who did not desire return, these would be subject to sham screening process by Indians and results would be used by U.S. to cover up continued violation agreed announcement. Also made determined effort to get me to acknowledge that we had first to “review cases” as PRC had done before releasing. I, of course, avoided this.

5. Toward end give and take I gave categorical negative replies to his renewed questions on list of Chinese in U.S., revocation requirements temporary visitors desiring prolong stay present evidence ability enter another country, release all alien Chinese prisoners without regard their desire proceed PRC, basing these upon being entirely outside terms ref our talks and provisions agreed announcement. With regard name list given me I said that all free return if they desire do so.

6. After repeated and strong attempts by him to cut-off further discussion implementation, I made statement on renunciation again characterizing May 11 draft as intensification threat to use force rather than renunciation of force, as retrogression from Dec. 1 draft on which agreement already reached, setting time limit not only implies threat but places arbitrary time limit on these talks, U.S. does not feel time limitation should be placed either upon period which country will not resort to war nor upon period during which peaceful settlement of disputes will be sought, April 19 draft was attempt to move forward preserving areas agreement already established, and still desired move forward if he would cooperate.

7. In reply he made brief statement expressing disappointment renewing charges U.S. threatening PRC in Taiwan area, PRC “will not allow problem to last forever without arriving at settlement”, and will not agree to U.S. attempt to freeze status quo. PRC felt obligation make public statement.

8. I regretted decision make public statement but willing let world judge relative merits.

9. I proposed meeting Saturday, June 16 in reply to which he asked for next meeting Thursday, June 21 “for administrative reasons”.

10. If and when they issue public statement I will have promptly issued here statement along lines recited Mytel 1937 without mention any further statement from Washington. As their statement also includes implementation, I would propose not make any mention thereof my statement here but leave it to Dept make any statement this

regard it would consider necessary or desirable. In general believe we should, if possible, avoid any statement on implementation at this time.

Gowen

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649. Telegram 2022 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, June 8, 1956, 8 p.m.

2022. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting:

1. Believe extreme position Wang took indicates propaganda line they anticipate having to take if and when matter becomes public issue. Keeping in mind propaganda defeat they suffered with Korean POWs they of course see plot on our part demonstrate to world that Chinese prefer American prisons (or perhaps Taiwan) to Communist China. (This increases delicacy of how we handle GRC aspects.) If any considerable number of prisoners elect deportation to mainland this might alter CHICOM assessment our intentions, and further weaken Wang's position in talks, though publicly they might merely play it up as evidence "failure" our "plot". If none or very few elect deportation it will confirm it in their suspicions.

2. Maximum effect action on release Americans may come if and when some Chinese deported. In this regard today's meeting tends confirm O'Neill's observation in last sentence para 4 Deptel 2109. Therefore important action such cases be expedited much as possible. Best time vigorously renew attack if they fail release Americans will come after we have completed action on Chinese prisoners.

3. His statement today indicates they will probably attempt discourage Indians from accepting our offer see prisoners. Doubt if this and other extreme portions their position will receive any support from India but it may nevertheless be reluctant interview prisoners in face CHICOM objections. If question is raised by Indians we simply point out that it is of course their choice but public record will show we made offer which refused. Believe our effort should be directed toward keeping any controversy over this centered between CHICOMS and Indians.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–856. Secret; Limit Distribution.

4. Line to be taken at next meeting must be somewhat dependent on what takes place during interval, including content their public statement but in any event propose carefully analyze or record today's meeting and to prepare statement further pointing out absurdity his position.

5. Am encouraged by development reported para 2 Deptel 2104 to believe they were planning shortly release at least some additional prisoners and our action particularly if it results any deportations mainland, will serve to expedite.

6. Ref para 3 Deptel 2104 in my opinion next few weeks would be very first [*worst*] time initiate public hearing on Americans detained Communist China and could only jeopardize possible success obtaining release Americans by tactic we now urging. Such hearings could be useful this regard if after present tactic has been given full trial it has not been successful.

7. Suggest that soon after Indians have undertaken first visits O'Neill ask to visit Americans if CHICOMS have not in meanwhile taken initiative. If Indians refuse offer make visit believe O'Neill should then make request visit Americans.

Proceeding Prague Saturday morning.

Gowen

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#### 650. Telegram 2023 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, June 8, 1956, 8 p.m.

2023. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 50th with short handwritten prepared statement: With view pushing talks forward he had at last meeting patiently, repeatedly explained reasonableness their May 11. That draft provided for seeking, ascertaining practical feasible means in 2 months of announcement declaration thus showing sincerity desire settlement disputes. It entirely acceptable both sides and he did not feel it necessary again go over ground already covered so many times.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-856. Confidential; Limit Distribution.



2. Wang said at last meeting he asked me this morning put forward concrete constructive opinions on their May 11. Hollow expressions or ulterior designs would never help us settle problems. He now ready listen my concrete opinions this regard.

3. Turning to typescript statement Wang continued next would like deal with question under first item agenda. He glad learn US had indicated to Indian Embassy it would not offer obstruction departure children born Chinese students accompanying parents.

4. Wang also glad learn US Government given Indian Embassy list names Chinese imprisoned US. However, would like note their side at very outset talks had given me list comprising names all Americans China including prisoners, whereas we thus far failed give them list Chinese US. My government had long delayed giving accounting this matter even after Indian Embassy made representations, and it not until June 1 this year that what we claimed was list all known alien Chinese prisoners US was handed over. He must express his regret over this.

5. Wang said I had indicated last meeting this list only covered 30–40 persons. This figure by far smaller than number Chinese known be in prison US. Must also emphatically state thus far US not yet given complete list all Chinese US. They therefore highly dissatisfied.

6. Wang said they also could [not] agree my unreasonably characterizing Chinese prisoners my country as criminals and Americans imprisoned his country as political prisoners.

7. Wang said last meeting I indicated my government would permit representatives Indian Embassy interview each Chinese prisoner determine whether he desired return. Must frankly tell me this move nothing other than attempt “screen” Chinese prisoners US. Must tell me could not agree this. Apparently US intended use entirely impermissible means such as screening few selected cases of Chinese prisoners in order cover up obstruction offered to return large numbers Chinese.

8. Wang said question return Chinese prisoners my country could only arise after US undertaken appropriate measures let them out of prison. As to question whether they desired return, after they released should be left decide this selves. If my side had real intention abiding by terms agreed announcement, should undertake such measures, similar what PRC already re Americans, done to settle cases Chinese prisoners my country, then refrain from obstructing their return, once they out of prison.

9. Wang said finally he must remind me US thus far failed account persons named lists he given me past meetings, nor had US removed such obstructive measures as entry permit Taiwan requirement designed prevent return Chinese.

10. Wang again urged US give accounting without further delay. Had here this morning list five Chinese prevented from returning and requested me look into cases well as all previous cases and give accounting.

11. I replied did not know whether I understood his statement correctly regarding prisoners. It my understanding purport his statement was that under agreed announcement there obligation each side let each person in prison out of prison regardless reason his being there. Then once they out prison they free decide whether or not they desire return respective countries, and this what PRC already done. Without expressing opinion at moment would appreciate his enlarging on that. Did he mean all Americans imprisoned his country now been released and now free decide whether they want return?

12. Wang was sure made self quite clear. Had dealt in his statement with question I raised. Had said he glad learn my govt had handed Indian Emb list names Chinese imprisoned my country. Had pointed out this list only covered portion Chinese residing US. Whereas what they requested was complete list all Chinese residing my country. My side long delayed without replying this request.

13. Wang said he had declared even list handed Indian Emb appeared unsatisfactory because number Chinese known their side be imprisoned US far exceeded figure given them that list.

14. Wang said they could not agree this move my govt of asking Indian Emb interview these few Chinese. This move nothing but "screening" Chinese US prisons. What they asking my govt do was take necessary measures regard these Chinese in prison so as let them free again. Once these prisoners been restored freedom US Govt should not offer further obstructions their return. What they ask of US Govt similar what his govt already done respect Americans China. Their side had carried out individual review cases Americans and adopted lenient policies and released numbers these prisoners in advance fulfillment sentences. He sure what they had done well known me.

15. I said as understood his position it was that US should release all Chinese US prisons regardless crime committed and regardless whether not they desired return. Was that correct?

16. Wang said had made point quite clear opening statement. What they asked was for my govt review cases Chinese prisoners just as his govt done in past and for my govt take appropriate measures settle cases. That what his govt did respect Americans. As to return these Chinese prisoners once they out prison it matter for prisoners selves determine. They asked US not offer obstruction their return.

17. I asked was he objecting to measures outlined to him last meeting to permit these people return.

18. Wang said he could not accept measures my govt in asking representatives Indian Emb interview these people.

19. I was utterly unable fol him. He was one who first suggested third party arrangement and suggested Govt India act that capacity in US. We had gone beyond requirement under agreed announcement. Sole question under terms reference on which we first met here and also under agreed announcement was whether any these people desired return his country. We had gone beyond anything required in agreed announcement to permit third party suggested by him to determine its satisfaction whether not any these people did desire return. Never occurred me he would object third party doing more than required agreed announcement, particularly light our previous discussions.

20. Wang said no question arose regarding capacity Indian Embassy represent interests their nationals US on behalf his govt. Now problem this portion Chinese nationals US was that they had lost freedom. Question of return these people depended first place on what measures US going take that regard. Their side did not advance excessive demands. They only asked my govt do similarly what his govt already done. I well knew because of measures undertaken his govt many formerly imprisoned American criminals had their cases reviewed and settled. After cases been settled they released in advance and already returned US. What asked of US Govt exactly same.

21. I utterly failed fol this. What I informed him last time was that any Chinese in prison who desired return Wang's country would promptly be enabled regardless length sentence, or crime committed. I took it what he now asking was we not do this.

He asking US take measures similar what they already done. Did he want US permit some Chinese go and continue hold others?

22. Wang said of course their side concerned with interests every national their country. That why he repeatedly requested US furnish him complete list Chinese nationals my country. They also asked that if any Chinese national my country desired return PRC be allowed do so without obstruction. As to question of return Chinese now prison my country it essentially matter for US undertake on own initiative measures to settle their cases. If US Govt does not take initiative settling cases how can they come out prison and return.

23. I said any prisoner who desires return will promptly be enabled do so.

24. Wang said that depended measures taken US Govt in review-cases. They would welcome my govt's adoption such measures.

25. I said essence his position seemed be he objecting our going beyond terms agreed announcement and what required of US under

agreed announcement. Seemed me ridiculous position and never occurred me he would adopt such position this matter.

26. Wang could not accept that. Return nationals depended on concrete acts. He gave me names more than 50 Chinese including morning's list. These people all desired return prevented doing so. As to prisoners, if my govt not willing settle their cases and only made empty statement when they desired return they could do so, such statement completely hollow. If my govt would undertake measures settle cases restore freedom these people so they able return his country of course would welcome.

27. I said in other words he was without ref to whether not any individual desired return attempting dictate my govt steps it should take re all alien Chinese criminals my country.

28. Wang said these people residing US under control my govt. If I only stated we would permit them go home but at same time would not take actual measures, he not prepared believe it. He asked me whether my govt prepared remove obstructive measures to return Chinese such as entry permit Taiwan requirement, and whether my govt willing undertake measures settle cases Chinese prisoners.

29. I asked Wang if he prepared believe representatives Indian Govt as to whether or not any individual imprisoned my country desired return.

30. Wang complained I had not yet replied his questions.

31. I said there two pertinent facts re carrying out agreed announcement. First was whether not person desired return. Second was whether not he prevented returning. Both counts facts re US performance spoke for selves. Facts re Americans PRC also spoke for selves. There never been any question but that Americans whose name I gave him at outset talks desired return. There never been any question they not been permitted return expeditiously as promised in agreed announcement, by whatever name this called or however it rationalized. Far as Chinese US concerned, never been any facts to contradict my categorical statements they free return. Not single case any specific complaint any specific obstruction been brought our attention by Indian Embassy.

32. I said Chinese steadily returning freely his country. According best info I had, at least 160 had returned since Aug 1. There not been any evidence thus far any of criminals desired return. They not included original discussions here and I did not consider they covered agreed announcement. Nevertheless we gone beyond its terms. Even permitting third party suggested by him see them in order determine whether not they desire return. If did desire prompt action would be taken permit them do so.

33. I was sure he would realize there no possible basis for objections he made or his demands on my govt. World would be able readily recognize who—not only in past but future—carried out agreed announcement and even went beyond provisions. If it his desire my govt withdraw measures outlined him regarding Chinese prisoners going beyond terms agreed announcement, would appreciate his clearly saying.

34. Wang could not agree my contention imprisoned Chinese not covered agreed announcement. To engage empty talk without taking concrete measures not only failed go beyond terms agreed announcement but was actually failure carry out terms.

35. Wang said up to present they not received complete list Chinese residents US and had no means verify whether Chinese in question desired return. He asked whether US prepared give list. There were number of persons they knew definitely desired return but because obstruction my govt not able do so, so far there still 34 persons on list I handed him previously who not yet returned. In addition there further 53 persons whose names given me previous meetings including morning's who they knew definitely desired return but unable do so. They requested me conduct inquiry this regard and give them accounting. They awaited concrete act my govt re these people and Wang would like know if my govt prepared take any.

36. Wang said requirements for Chinese residents US obtain entry permit Taiwan violation agreement. They had repeatedly requested withdrawal, but requirement still remained and still prevented Chinese US exercising right return his country. He would like know whether US Govt prepared remove this obstruction. As to Chinese prisoners, prior any measures undertaken settle their cases how could anyone talk about freedom return his country?

37. Wang said I had just asked whether these people desired return and whether they prevented. These persons exactly such cases in which they desired return and prevented. Simply stating that if these persons desired return they able do so would not actually enable them return.

38. I said he had spoken of verification. Steps I outlined to him regard prisoners would enable independent verification by third party as to whether person desired return. If I understood his statement morning correctly he objecting that verification.

39. Wang said if my intent to carry out so-called screening these people, they would strongly object. That action would not be demonstration sincerity in settlement question. If my govt had sincerity why not take concrete steps?

40. I asked what further measures could possibly be taken than, it they desired go home, permitting them.

41. Wang said that hollow remark. If his govt had adopted such measures he believed Americans formerly imprisoned China would still be there. In settling cases Americans his govt did not engage hollow talk but took concrete measures. Would like ask whether my govt prepared take initiative adopt concrete measures re Chinese prisoners.

42. I asked if I understood him rightly then was his govt prepared promptly free all Americans now prisoners?

43. Wang complained I had not yet answered his questions. Before they answered he did not think it necessary delve further that question. He still awaited my concrete opinions re second item agenda.

44. I said he and I had had long discussions about whole question respective nationals over long period time. I had always done best understand and respect his point view. Must confess morning I found it impossible. He raised entire question Chinese imprisoned US many times recent months. Now I had told him of steps to permit prisoners promptly return if desire do so regardless length sentence, seriousness crimes. I had with great deal effort and difficulty gone far beyond anything in discussions leading up agreed announcement. Now he appeared—not only appeared, did object my having done so. Found his position utterly inexplicable.

45. Wang said it quite right they always been concerned about Chinese imprisoned US and they still concerned. He had stated he glad learn my govt now given Indian Embassy list persons imprisoned. Had however pointed out they not satisfied with list because did not tally with information they had. Essential concern their side was what concrete measure US going take settle cases prisoners. If US would not undertake measures settle cases, to say when they desire return could do so would not settle question. This was all he had on this question morning.

46. I took it that he willing have US determine without verification by Indians whether these persons desired return or not.

47. Wang said it not question of desire to return it matter for my govt to settle cases.

48. I said question was whether they desired return. If not it not proper question for us discuss here.

49. Wang said without settling cases how could one say whether they desired return or not. Hard for persons in prison express free will. Question whether they desire return could only arise after cases been settled.

50. I asked how he reconciled that with at least several cases of Americans that been released or sentenced his country on understanding they be immediately deported. I referred cases Americans in which sentence been immediate deportation.

51. Wang did not understand.

52. I explained that as I understood his position all Chinese prisoners US should be released from prison then they could express desire as to whether not they desired return. Question I asking was how he reconciled this with fact at least many Americans who left his country did so under circumstances of being sentenced immediate deportation.

53. Wang said had already dealt at length with policies his govt and ways it settled cases Americans prisoned China. Essential thing was they given lenient treatment taking into consideration behavior gravity offenses. Lenient policy his govt shown by fact many American prisoners released advance their sentences. As result lenient policy large number former American prisoners regained freedom.

54. Wang said they did not ask anything else from us. Only asked we adopt similar measures to those his govt re American prisoners. If US did that they would be satisfied.

55. Wang said we had discussed this problem much morning and I had not yet answered questions he put. Did not think necessary US stall more morning.

56. I said as I understood his outstanding questions they were: First whether US prepared give list all tens thousands Chinese US. Next question as I understood was whether US prepared rescind requirement that alien in US on temporary visit who desires extend stay must present evidence can proceed another country at end stay. That in effect was question posed by what he called Taiwan entry permit question. Next question was whether US prepared free all alien Chinese serving prison terms for crimes.

Was I correct that these were questions?

57. Wang said there also question concerning persons whose names given me desiring return but unable.

58. I said re first question on list Chinese US we previously discussed at length. Answer no. Had previously outlined reasons to him. Re second question on requirements our immigration laws for persons desiring remain US, answer no. Had no relation whatever to those desiring return. Did not prevent them now or in future from returning his country unless he chose so make it. As far as names persons he given me, told him in past and have continued tell him they free return whenever desire. Far as prisoners concerned, answer no. US not prepared free alien prisoners if they to remain in US, except in accordance existing US procedures. If they desired return, answer is yes, they would promptly be able.

59. Wang was dissatisfied with answers I had given. Would not help in settlement question return nationals. In fact it preventing and obstructing return Chinese nationals. Therefore not in conformity spirit agreed announcement. He therefore reserved right further comment



this question next meeting. Re question declaration had already made self clear last meeting and today and now prepared listen my concrete opinions.

60. I replied in opening statement he had made two statements with one which I could not agree and one with which did. First statement with which could not agree was his May 11 acceptable both sides. Second statement with which agreed was hollow expressions ulterior designs would not help settle problems we faced. I had at previous meetings outlined exactly reasons I felt his May 11 even more filled with hollow expressions than his previous drafts. It not meaningful renunciation force we been seeking. Draft as whole went against very purpose renunciation force. What draft did was intensify very threat we should be trying remove. Changing word here or comma there not going change that fact. I perfectly ready as always consider any suggestion that led toward declaration constituting really meaningful renunciation force. I not ready consider suggestions leading opposite direction. Found it hard reconcile his May 11th with desire expressed reach agreement declaration.

61. I said way realize desire for agreement was build on basis agreement already reached until we achieved something fully satisfactory both. Way to agreement not throw out what already agreed on substitute language which self raises new questions. Whereas I been careful in my suggestions to preserve area agreement avoid raising new controversial questions and endeavored respect principal reciprocity, could not consider his May 11 did so.

62. I pointed out setting time limit May 11 draft not only carried clear implication threat his govt intended use force at end two month period, also appeared place arbitrary time limit efforts two us here find resolutions problems confronting us. My govt had not did not propose approach question confronting us this spirit. Did not feel time limitations should be placed either on period country says will not resort war nor on period peaceful settlement disputes will be sought. His Dec 1 appeared affirm principle renunciation force peaceful settlement disputes without initiating it by time limitations. That one of aspects his Dec 11 welcomed and been careful preserve in each of revisions I offered.

63. I said did not think we discharged duties here or contributed to reaching agreement by making threats, deliberately throwing away agreements already reached. Thought way discharge duty own people—his well as mine—and world was work constructively preserving enlarging area agreement already established. This what I attempted do in my April 19. This what I still determined do if he would give me even slightest cooperation.



64. Wang expressed disappointment my statement. Every time he came meeting hoped achieve rapprochement our positions and succeed in reaching agreement. He regretted my statement did not lead rapprochement.

65. Wang said his statement that May 11 draft acceptable both made on basis assumption both shared desire reach agreement. As he repeatedly explained time limit advantageous both sides. Without time limit would imply deliberate intent drag out talks without settling disputes.

66. Wang said as he had told me many times country which threatened was US which threatening his country. They would not allow problem between two countries last forever without arriving settlement. Would not accept anything resulting freezing status quo Taiwan area.

67. Wang said I had again mentioned my April 19. As he had stated so often it entirely unacceptable. By again mentioning my April 19 I showed lack respect points view both sides and lack sincerity in discussions.

68. Wang agreed with my ref to discharging duties toward people of world. They, including people my country his country did not desire see talks dragging out without achieving settlement. Therefore felt obligation to make public statement so world people able judge matter.

69. I said he had found my April 19 entirely unacceptable. Did he find last para that draft now unacceptable?

70. Wang said I would recall his having stated previously if it desired mention Taiwan area second para must also mention holding FMC third para as well as time limit.

71. I asked did second para his Dec. 1, then, not apply Taiwan area?

72. Wang said must not take single para, must look at integral draft as whole.

73. I said if it Wang's desire make public statement that of course his choice. Could not but regret such decision. However entirely satisfied public readily able judge who been doing maximum preserve area agreement already reached and expedite reaching understanding on meaningful declaration and who has dropped areas agreement already reached and introduced new extraneous controversial elements. I thought comparison two drafts would enable public readily judge who willing unambiguously renounce war settlement differences and who thus far not.

74. Wang said public would be able judge who desired settle questions, reach agreement declaration and who offering obstruction.

75. Saying had nothing more I proposed next meeting Saturday June 16. Wang proposed instead next meeting be Thursday June 21 for administrative reasons. I agreed.

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**651. Letter 37 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 37

Geneva, June 8, 1956

Dear Walter:

It is after 9:00 p.m., we have just finished up all the loose ends of today's meeting, and I have a 6:00 a.m. departure tomorrow morning hence only a very short note.

However I did want to let you know how much I appreciated the full information in your letters Nos. 45 and 46 as well as the info telegrams. They have all been a big help.

I have fully covered my thoughts in my telegrams, but as you can see I was really taken aback today at the violence and extremes of Wang's reaction. However, do not believe we should yet be discouraged at the possibility of our tactics having some success. At least we can now really put them on the spot.

Wouldn't blame you if you thought I had cooked up the next meeting date with Wang. Only wish I could maneuver him that well.

Am arranging to keep in touch with Dave re reply to their public statement. He has a full draft which he will immediately release on my behalf if he considers it fits. If not he will get in touch with both myself and the Department.

Hope we can shortly have some word on Ekvall whose orders expire June 30.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

**652. Telegram 557 from Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, June 11, 1956, noon

557. 1. On further consideration believe we should in my statement replying any CHICOM statement say something on implementation if raised in CHICOM statement.

2. Therefore subject to Department's views suggest addition following if implementation included CHICOM statement: "All Chinese in United States continue be entirely free leave United States for any destination their choice and not (repeat not) single one has been refused exit. Neither Ambassador Wang nor Indian Embassy has brought to our attention single fact to contrary. I shall continue seek release 13 Americans still held in CHICOM prisons more than nine months after commitment permit their expeditious return to United States".

3. Still believe any specific comment or background information on Chinese in United States prisons should come only from Washington. However, if question specifically raised in CHICOM statement and correspondents make inquiry believe Geneva could point out to correspondents use of "all" in foregoing. Because inability Chinese in prisons enter countries other than PRC or possibly GRC believe statement as worded valid even with respect imprisoned Chinese.

**Johnson**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–1156. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Geneva for Osborn as telegram 48.

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**653. Telegram 561 from Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, June 11, 1956, 6 p.m.

561. For Department's information following is text my draft statement to be issued at Geneva if and when Chinese Communists issue public statement.

"As I informed Ambassador Wang when he told me of intention issue new statement, I am surprised his government is willing expose

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–1156. Confidential.

its latest proposal public scrutiny. Ambassador Wang's draft declaration May 11 is even more ambiguous and lacking in elements of genuine renunciation force than was his draft on December 1. It shows not (repeat not) slightest advance over Chinese Communist attitude of last year when Department of State was obliged comment, 'the Communists so far seem willing to renounce force only if they are first conceded the goals for which they would use force'.

"Although Ambassador Wang has indicated he still shares my desire reach agreement on meaningful renunciation force, he has rejected my successive suggestions for simple revisions in his own draft December 1 which would accomplish this purpose. On April 19, I proposed draft which incorporated those revisions in form which took full account both points of view.

"Despite Ambassador Wang's rejection this further effort my part, I shall continue seek agreement with him on statement that will make genuine contribution to establishment of secure peace in Far East".

If necessary will add thereto statement on implementation accordance my telegram 557.

Johnson

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#### 654. Telegram 50 from Geneva to Prague<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, June 12, 1956, noon

50. From Osborn. Prague's 557 Department repeated Geneva 48.

1. Suggest following wording for implementation paragraph: "All Chinese in United States desiring return PRC continue be entirely free go. Not single Chinese has encountered any obstruction departure. Neither Ambassador Wang nor Indian Embassy brought attention single fact contrary. Shall continue seek release Americans still held CHICOM prisons more than nine months after CHICOMS assumed commitment permit expeditious return United States".

2. View wide range possible CHICOM lines attack on implementation well as possible coincidental release some Americans, request

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-1256. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 2030.

discretion do whichever of following appears appropriate: (1) Issue statement with or without implementation paragraph; (2) hold up release statement pending consultation with you and Department.

Gowen

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**655. Telegram 2033 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 12, 1956, noon

2033. From Osborn. CHICOMS have just announced press conference for 3:30 our time.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–1256. Official Use Only; Priority. Repeated to Prague as telegram 51.

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**656. Telegram 2039 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 12, 1956, 4 p.m.

2039. From Osborn.

1. Statement mild, relatively factual. No (repeat no) mention implementation. Datelined Foreign Ministry PRC June 12. Presume full text being carried FBIS. Summary follows:

2. (A) Chinese side, to realize aim relaxing, eliminating tension Taiwan area, repeatedly demanded FMC. American side persists in demanding China accept present state “US interference China’s internal affairs occupation Taiwan and has refused take positive stand” on FMC.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–1256. Official Use Only; Priority. Repeated Priority to Prague as telegram 52.

(B) Full text April 19 draft cited.

(C) Draft characterized as US demand China accept "US occupation China's territory Taiwan by use threat force and intervention in liberation by China of coastal island", recognize so-called right ICSD, fails mention FMC. This exposes US attempt freeze status quo et cetera. This is "announcement requiring China acquiesce US aggression. Is of course what Chinese side cannot accept."

(D) Chinese side, taking consideration repeated US request announcement be applicable Taiwan area, submitted May 11 draft (quoted in full).

(E) Since US already occupying Taiwan, if declaration made applicable Taiwan area, must also explicitly provide for FMC. Therefore May 11 draft stipulates that within two months should seek and ascertain et cetera.

(F) If US sincerely desires peaceful settlement, there no justification for further dragging out. People throughout world worried about "inevitable consequences" prolonged failure talks reach agreement. "Chinese side therefore deems it necessary make above facts known world."

3. Releasing our statement four o'clock today without (repeat without) mention implementation. Text as transmitted by Prague to Department. Delivering copy CHICOM ConGen addressed Wang.

Gowen

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#### 657. Telegram 389 to Prague<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 12, 1956, 7:35 p.m.

389. We have given most careful consideration to suggestion your 2009. After weighing all factors involved we have concluded balance of advantage lies with inclusion Taiwan reference in letter. Our reasoning as follows:

1. Our public position would be indefensible both domestically and with respect to GRC if we did not at some stage give Chinese

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-856. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Phleger in substance and by McConaughy. Repeated to Geneva for Johnson as telegram 2128.

convicts option going Taiwan. If this done prior to Indian visit, either by letter or orally, Indians almost certain learn of it when interviewing prisoners and would inform Communists. If done subsequent to Indian visit, this would open possibility of prisoner originally opting for Chinese mainland changing his mind. Effect of this would be far worse than if Indians learned prisoner had been offered free choice of two destinations in beginning. Since it is unlikely we can keep knowledge of Taiwan option from Indians, even if communicated to prisoner by means other than original letter, we consider best course is to keep record clear by presenting both choices in that letter.

2. If we were confident Chinese prisoner move would bring about release of Americans we would be willing run greater risk having our position misunderstood in US and on Taiwan. Wang's attitude last meeting inspires little confidence that this move will succeed. Therefore omitting Taiwan reference from letter would not only not ensure Communists remaining ignorant of this option as pointed out above but even if they did, it now appears they unlikely respond favorably to Chinese prisoner move.

3. Wang's adamant opposition to Indian interviewing of prisoners may make whole question academic. If Indians should refuse conduct interviews it could do little harm to include Taiwan reference in letter.

**Dulles**

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**658. Telegram 53 from Geneva to Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 13, 1956, noon

53. From Osborn. Sending Wang copies Department's release number 315.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–1356. Official Use Only. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 2041.

659. Letter from Osborn to Clough<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, June 14, 1956

Dear Ralph:

The failure of the Chicom statement to hit implementation may be a reflection of Peiping's tactical dilemma. Wang's line of counterattack on the prisoner release was planned on the assumption that the prisoner move is a US plot to repeat the Korea screening operation. Wang wouldn't want to compromise this line by assuming a different position in public; yet he is aware of the many vulnerabilities of this line, and of how foolish he would look if our move on prisoners turns out not to be a plot. Accordingly Peiping may have felt it wiser to say nothing more on implementation until some initial results of the screening are in.

If no results are in by June 21, we ourselves have a choice to make. Should we really try to reassure Wang that the operation is "straight", or should we let Wang continue to entangle himself in his ridiculous line of last meeting? So long as we don't know what the prisoners' choice is going to be, the last course would be safer as well as easier.

What Wang might do on implementation, if his dilemma is not resolved by June 21 by the appearance of the initial results of the screening, is to shift increasing emphasis to the "obstructed" students. We can of course counter this by our old standbys:—no representations from Indians, Chinese steadily returning Wang's country (including Dr S.D. Liao, who was on Wang's February 6 list, and who is now back in China). Might it not so be a good idea to start dropping a few low-keyed remarks about Chicom pressures on students' families in China? We could do so without violating the confidence of Victor Chou et al, as we now have the Chinese news reports on the registration of student families. The Chicoms are vulnerable on this point and it might not hurt for them to know it.

On renunciation, I have no new thoughts—a lack which no doubt distresses you—but still feel that it would be in keeping with Wang's tactics if he were to submit a new draft soon. He likes to keep the initiative, both in the talks and publicly, and Peiping is probably fully aware, now that we have publicly confessed our deadlock, that both the initiative and the public advantage will now accrue to whichever side first makes a strong and apparently "reasonable" effort to break the deadlock.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Osborn signed the original "Dave."



As you know, our estimate here of Wang's tactics is that he has been trying so determinedly to elicit our specific objections to his May 11 draft precisely in order that he may proceed to "meet" them in a new proposal.

A possibility that occurs to me is that Wang may seize upon the Department's press release—*faute de mieux*—as providing the specific objections he has been seeking.

If I were Wang, I think I could work up a prepared statement for next meeting or the one after making the following points:

1. US statement charged PRC side had rejected own draft of December 1. This not so. PRC side still willing agree on that draft.

2. US can either accept December 1 draft as is, or it can insist on amendments. If it insists on amendments, they must not be one-sided. If US insists on ICSD, PRC will be entitled to insist on "mutual respect". If US insists on Taiwan reference, FMC entitled insist on FMC, preferably with time limit agreeable both sides, if necessary without time limit.

3. How there can be any objection to words which PRC proposes to add is not understandable unless US is determined either to violate principle of "mutual respect" by freezing up status quo while postponing indefinitely the practical step of a FMC, which necessary to resolve Taiwan area dispute.

Of course, an alternative to Wang's making this pitch in a meeting would be for Peiping to make them in a public statement, but for tactical reasons it would be more likely for them to be made in the meetings, before taking the position to the public.

This is, of course, entirely speculative, and we'll see what actually happens.

I'm enclosing Wang's latest list. Did not feel these lists now warrant telegraphic handling. If I'm wrong, please tell me.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

David L Osborn

Enclosure

List Presented by Wang<sup>2</sup>

Geneva, June 8, 1956

Mr. [text not declassified]

Mr. [text not declassified] went to the United States in 1948 and studied medicine at the Pennsylvania University, Philadelphia. He

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<sup>2</sup> No classification marking. The Chinese text of the list is also enclosed but not printed.

was already on his way home in September 1951 but was intercepted at Hawaii by the U.S. Immigration Service and escorted back to the United States. He is still unable to return.

Mr. [text not declassified]

Mr. [text not declassified] went to the U.S. in 1949 and studied microbiology at the University of California. He had planned to return the next year but his successive applications for departure were turned down and is still unable to return.

Mr. [text not declassified]

Mr. [text not declassified] went to the U.S. in 1949 and studied civil engineering at the Purdue University, Indiana, where he received a master's degree in 1950. In 1951 Mr. [text not declassified] entered the Columbia University in New York for post-graduate study. He is still being obstructed from having his departure for home.

Mr. [text not declassified] and wife Mrs. [text not declassified]

Mr. and Mrs. [text not declassified] went to the U.S. in 1946 and 1948 respectively. Mr. [text not declassified] was a post-graduate at the University of Chicago where he received a doctor's degree in Physics in 1952 and is now engaged at an Observatory. Mrs. [text not declassified] also received a doctor's degree in Mathematics at the University of Chicago. Their return is being obstructed by the U.S. Immigration Service and last year the U.S. Government even prevented Mr. [text not declassified] from attending a gathering of the International Astronomical Union in Ireland where he had been invited to present his thesis.

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## 660. Telegram 2183 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 19, 1956, 8:06 p.m.

2183. For Johnson.

Guidance for June 21 meeting.

1. Continue your efforts obtain maximum psychological advantage from our pending initiative on offer to Chinese prisoners of repatriation

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-1956. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in draft by Phleger.

and on Indian visits to verify this and freedom of choice. You are given discretion in determining how you will exploit absurd position Wang took at last meeting in objecting Indian Embassy performance its role, and in demanding unconditional release of Chinese criminals. Although we believe it is psychologically too early apply renewed high pressure to Chinese Communists on implementation, especially in view release Clifford and Phillips last week, we do not believe we can afford fail take note ridiculous situation in which Wang has placed himself. It may be possible to capitalize on it at least to limited extent without forcing Communists into more rigid position on American prisoners. Also point out 17 additional Chinese from US have returned to mainland since May 23. Total 177 since August 1.

2. FYI Indian Embassy has informed Department by letter today it will have to await instructions from New Delhi before it can accept our invitation visit prisoners. This possibly foreshadows Indian refusal make visits, resulting from Chinese Communist request Indians abstain. Rejection our invitation would be embarrassing for Ambassador Mehta, who expressed gratification when we made decision. Department officer will probably call on prisoners alone, if Indians refuse participate. This would seem best expedient open to us but from public relations standpoint it would not be as good as Indian visits.

3. If you consider it advisable, you may inform Wang two of Chinese prisoners named in list which we gave to Indian Embassy (FYI Nos. 15 and 27 on list) have recently been released from prison on expiration of terms, and that Indian Embassy informed. Coincidental that these two men were released about same time Clifford and Phillips released. Endeavor avoid any implication relationship. FYI Five more Chinese prisoners will become eligible for parole next two months.

4. FYI Chinese Embassy here pressing us hard for permission its consuls visit Chinese prisoners immediately. We have informed Embassy we acknowledge its right visit prisoners for legitimate purposes and we will assist if satisfactory reason shown. In light GRC refusal accept prisoners on release, obvious GRC intention pressure prisoners not to depart hardly seems sound grounds for visit. Prisoners already aware from our circular letter June 13 they need not depart for either destination if they do not want to. END FYI

5. Hold your ground on renunciation question. You may invite Wang reply in meeting to points made in our press release. We particularly would like have his explanation of reasons why he can not accept the slight additions to his December 1 draft.

**Dulles**

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**661. Telegram 2103 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 20, 1956, 7 p.m.

2103. From Johnson.

1. I opened 51st today with prepared statement:

A. Before do anything else morning, think we have misunderstanding clear up. View your surprising statements last meeting, feel necessary explain once more, as clearly can, action my government intends take regard alien Chinese prison my country.

B. Let me start with situation any individual Chinese prisoner before my government decided apply such cases provisions agreed announcement. Like any other convicted criminal my country, he serving sentence fairly openly handed down in court of law. Like any other criminal, he received fair lenient treatment as matter course. Like any other criminal, he could normally look forward being released, or paroled, well advance full term sentence; this being accordance standard practice my country paroling prisoners good behavior. As far as return your country concerned, any such Chinese prisoner was entirely free do so, after release. This was situation alien Chinese prisoner my country before agreed announcement even thought of.

C. About December last year, you began make issue Chinese prisoners my country. Without citing specific cases, you alleged my country violating provisions announcement respect such prisoners. In March, your government even went far as make implication in public statement. In subsequent meetings you became more and more explicit asserting Chinese prisoners my country covered by announcement.

D. I recalled your previous meetings reasons why announcement, light our discussions last August September leading up its issuance, obviously was not intended apply ordinary criminals serving sentences my country. However, controversy this question now beside point. Point is you demanded application announcement Chinese prisoners my country. Point is, you were using this demand basis charging US violation announcement. Order remove any possible basis such charges, my government decided apply provisions announcement every alien Chinese prisoner US. My government, that is to say, decided take measures, firstly, making it possible each such prisoner desiring do so return his country expeditiously.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-2056. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

E. At last meeting you appeared object my government's taking these measures, insisting instead each prisoner be required finish term prison, and only after finishing term or being paroled, be allowed return his homeland. As have said, this always been policy my country respect Chinese—or for that matter any alien prisoners. If words announcement are have any meaning at all as applied prisoners, they should obviously mean any prisoner desiring return can do so promptly, without waiting expiration sentence or completion normal parole procedures.

F. Secondly my government decided take measures accordance with and even going beyond letter announcement respect third party arrangement. Order should be no question by anyone but that each alien Chinese prisoner US had been fully informed his opportunity choose prompt deportation your country, my government's authorities not only informed each prisoner individually this opportunity; it also offered let representatives Indian Embassy interview each prisoner order confirm his free choice.

G. At last meeting your rejection this proposition particularly vehement and especially difficult for me understand. Third party arrangement not only part announcement, but originally suggested by you. Indian Embassy not only designated in announcement perform functions mentioned therein in US but this designation originally suggested by you.

H. In fact, if didn't utterly fail comprehend your remarks last meeting, left with conclusion you objecting my government's application any or all provisions announcement Chinese prisoners my country. You object measures designed permit their expeditious return your country; you object their being assured access third party. In short, you apparently want my government continue treat them exactly as it treated them even before announcement ever thought of.

I. Find great difficulty reconciling this apparent position with your previous demands announcement be applied prisoners my country. Hope you can clear this up for me this morning.

2. Wang noted my remarks on Chinese nationals prison US contained several deliberate distortions well as number outright sophistries. He could not agree these remarks. They had always considered announcement covered return Chinese students, other Chinese nationals, well as Chinese imprisoned US. My claim agreement only covered part nationals not conformity actual fact.

3. Wang said we had very clear understanding on question how nationals would exercise right return respective countries. What they asked was both sides carry out agreement faithfully and not offer any obstruction. Their side has precisely carried out agreement. It their consistent policy adopt measures on their own in accordance their law in settling question return American nationals China. Matter fact since

talks began, of 40 American offenders 29 already exercised right return. As result measures adopted government, majority American prisoners China already exercised right return.

4. Wang said on their hand they always been concerned with Chinese imprisoned my country. They raised question Chinese prisoners far back as last December but I for long time gave no accounting. That was in past cause great dissatisfaction their part. Nevertheless, Wang had expressed appreciation last meeting on learning of action my government handing over names Chinese prisoners Indian Embassy. Although in making remark he pointed out list not complete, and also stated he could not agree with arbitrary characterization by my side of American prisoners China as political prisoners while Chinese imprisoned US common criminals.

5. Wang could only consider as arbitrary my assertion he had agreed prisoners should not be expeditiously returned but should finish terms sentences. He strongly rejected this remark.

6. Wang said what they objected to was means adopted my government bring Indian Embassy into screening Chinese prisoners. Chinese imprisoned my country had great difficulty expressing free will while in our jails. Could express free will only after my government taken measures on own leading to release from prison. That why he requested at last meeting my government adopt measures on own regard Chinese prisoners in order these prisoners may be set free and after release that no obstruction be placed in way their return. However, in my opening Wang found no indication my government prepared take such measures. I had only repeated empty remarks that if some person desired do so he able return, if we going be satisfied with empty remarks that either Chinese nationals who not committed offenses, or Chinese who had committed offenses could return if they desired, and my government not prepared adopt measures on its own create conditions so these people could actually return he could only consider all my promises and remarks empty.

7. Wang said it quite true Indian Embassy been entrusted by Wang's government take care interests their nationals my country. Indian Embassy asked my government provide complete list Chinese nationals my country to enable Embassy check whether those Chinese desired return. However, my government refused.

Indian Embassy requested my government make public statement clarifying question Taiwan entry. My government did not comply this request. Present question is whether US Government will accord every facility Indian Embassy to expedite performance its functions. However, they could not agree to Indian Embassy's being led into damaging trap.

8. Wang said they still as always concerned over situation Chinese nationals my country including imprisoned. However, question their return depended on my government's adopting measures enabling them. They could not consider satisfactory my government's simply making remarks that somebody could return without adopting measures on own enable them.

9. Wang said thanks to measures taken his government on its own majority American nationals their country returned.

What corresponding measures was my government prepared adopt?

10. I said Wang had spoken of Indian Embassy being led into what he termed damaging trap. I sure, I didn't understand what Wang had in mind. Had tried explain honestly and straightforwardly as could exactly what we doing. Certainly no trap or trick our part intended or even possible. Our whole thought in inviting Indian Embassy participate in measures was to give them every assurance these measures being honestly carried out.

11. I said we had confidence integrity good faith Indian Embassy and its representatives. As he suggested they assume third power role in US, I had assumed his government also felt same way about them.

12. I asked Wang let me make this simple as could. As pointed out this morning Chinese alien prison my country, same any other alien or American for that matter, could always expect lenient considerate treatment and in normal course events could expect release prior expiration sentence. When he completed sentence could, same any other alien, leave US for any destination his choice. That perfectly normal situation Chinese aliens even before announcement. Announcement states respective nationals desiring return shall be enabled expeditiously do so. If that to have meaning for prisoners certainly could not leave them in same situation existing prior its issuance, else what point issuing?

13. I said had explained we now applied our interpretation announcement alien Chinese prisoners US. We applied plain words announcement. Under announcement there two factors involved. First was whether or not person desired return. Second whether not he able expeditiously. Far as Chinese US concerned who not prison measures long ago taken permit any all them return who desire. As I many times explained here they did not have to express desire. Did not have to apply anyone. All had to do was go. They thus able freely indicate desire by acts.

14. I said situation prisoners admittedly little different. How could prisoner definitively express desire? We had had no evidence or indication any them did desire. However, in order there be no possible doubt



prisoner understood choices freely open him I had explained Wang measures we taking inform prisoners those choices. Prisoner's choice was to look forward early release prior finishing sentence in normal course events on commutation sentence, parole, time off good behavior.

15. I said as matter fact might incidentally mention since list prisoners given Indian Embassy two prisoners mentioned therein already thus been released normal course events.

16. I continued if on other hand prisoner desired rather return immediately Wang's country he also free do so. Choice was did prisoner desire await release normal course events or did he desire immediately return Wang's country? It very simple straightforward choice. We could independently put choice each prisoner ourselves and act accordance what he told us. However, to give Wang further assurances our good faith, we invited Indian Embassy participate in order it could determine for self wishes of prisoner.

17. I said Wang had spoken of screening. Did not know exactly what he meant or had in mind this regard. I never thought of it these terms at all. I thought of it only in terms Indian Embassy being able satisfy self each prisoner freely made own choice.

18. I said Wang had spoken great difficulty of prisoners expressing free will. Frankly didn't see what difficulty prisoner had very simple decision. Able state decision presence representative third power. Thus first question as I pointed out was whether man desired return. These were measures we had taken determine and confirm that desire. Had previously told Wang if prisoner did desire return action would promptly be taken permit him. Further action this matter awaited reply Indian Embassy our invitation.

19. I said Wang also asserted list prisoners given Indian Embassy not complete. Did not know on what he based assertion, but could assure him not correct.

20. Wang was sure had made points quite clear both last meeting and morning and did not think necessary make further explanations. As he had said although list handed over by my government incomplete they still appreciated that action my government. Would not agree US inviting Indian Government participate screening Chinese prisoners. If my government had true desire fully carry out agreement and assist Indian Embassy performance its functions regarding return Chinese why was it my government so far refused give complete list Chinese nationals US so could make check determine whether nationals desired return?

21. Wang said it matter common sense nobody liked staying in jail. It also matter course every person in prison desired early release. If Chinese prisoners allowed early release and freely return, he would



be only too glad receive that information. However, whether prisoners could do so depended on measures adopted by my government in their cases. Wang had nothing further on this matter to say.

22. I continued to be puzzled by Wang's attitude. He continued to speak of all Chinese in the US being given a list by the Indian Embassy so they could check their desire to return. Regarding those not in prison no such check necessary. All they had to do was return. We gave the Indian Embassy a list of those in prison so they could check on whether they desired to return. Yet Wang said he did not want the Indian Embassy to make such a check. Found this impossible to understand.

23. Wang said this was very simple. Obstructive measures by my government in the past had left a feeling of terror in the minds of Chinese in the US. They asked for a complete list of Chinese nationals simply because many Chinese still not informed about the announcement. That made a check necessary and desirable.

24. I said it was certainly strange if any Chinese in the US felt what Wang called terror about departing the US, that at least one such case not come to the attention of the Indian Embassy and that the Indian Embassy not call it to our attention.

25. I said not only had there not been a single such case but Chinese continued to freely depart the US to return to their country. Since the last information at this point I knew definitely of 17 additional who returned to Wang's country making a total of 177 definitely known since August 1 last year. All this certainly did not indicate any obstruction or so-called terror part of Chinese in my country returning to Wang's country if they desired to do so. According to public statements made by the Indian Embassy some Chinese in my country had communicated with it concerning various matters. To the best of my knowledge none of these communications had involved alleged obstruction.

26. Wang said the fact the Indian Embassy had not yet raised an instance of obstruction did not mean actually no obstruction part of my government. He had given me names of 55 persons who obstructed. Fifty-three of them not yet returned. Among 103 persons whose names I gave him previously 28 still not returned. Such were facts.

27. It seemed to me even Wang's own statements simply substantiated the fact Chinese steadily returning. If any of them felt obstructed they were entirely free to communicate with the Indian Embassy.

28. Wang said if I had no further remarks on this problem he would like to speak on another question.

29. Wang continued from his prepared statement that my government's statement of June 12 called for the following comments. In his statement my government stated that my side had adopted a draft proposed by Wang on December 1 except for two revisions and Wang's side not only rejected our draft but advanced new conditions. Must be pointed out although in outward appearance we

made only two revisions these two revisions caused qualitative change in draft. This again proved so far there not been slightest change in stubborn persistence my side calculated freeze present status quo Taiwan area and refuse negotiate to improve situation.

30. Wang said second paragraph my April 19 still retained ambiguous words about not resorting threat use force Taiwan area elsewhere, while failing make specific provision on holding Sino-American conference Foreign Ministers. Apparent aim my side doing so was require them accept present state my country's occupation Taiwan intervention liberation by China its coastal islands while indefinitely protracting talks.

31. Wang said in previous meetings he already made quite clear position their side was either we agree general statement on peaceful settlement disputes China-US without resorting use force or if it desired mention Taiwan area specifically statement must also provide holding Sino-American conference Foreign Ministers. Their May 11 provided for seeking ascertaining practical feasible means including holding Sino-American conference Foreign Ministers within prescribed time for settlement Sino-American disputes. It thus took full account views my side and did so with view reaching agreement acceptable both. This represented step forward and could not be called retrogression, however distorted.

32. Wang said addition of phrase "without prejudice pursuit, etc. or inherent right, etc." to preamble my April 19 would mean that on China's territory Taiwan well as any other area where US intended carry out its aggression US could continue its policy aggression and would have so-called right self-defense while doing so. He must seriously state on China's territory there no room talk about so-called American right self-defense nor could right self-defense be permitted in any way justify policy aggression. Their May 11 set forth principle mutual respect territorial integrity sovereignty non-interference internal affairs, which reasonable and conformity Charter UN. There no possible basis for US object them. Hence he considered if we desired reach agreement on announcement US should not try distort May 11.

33. I said he had spoken of what he termed my "stubborn persistence". Would freely admit it stubborn persistence in attempting assure our differences not lead war but settled only by peaceful negotiations. Would admit to stubborn persistence in attempting reach agreement on declaration saying this unambiguously without qualification or time limit. Would admit stubborn persistence in insisting such declaration clearly apply to what we both agreed was most serious dispute Taiwan area.

34. I said Wang's statement morning well as previous statements made clear he apparently did not consider his Dec 1 applied dispute Taiwan area. This one of very ambiguities that draft I attempted clear up in my April 19. If there agreement with me on unambiguous unqualified untime-limited declaration on renunciation force including Taiwan area well as elsewhere, would be no grounds for rejecting my April 19. I regretted he not yet willing accept this simple straightforward proposal so we could resume progress talks.

35. Wang said on his part already made large progress. Progress will depend on attitude US Government towards this entire problem. Wang hoped at next meeting I would be able make remarks furthering progress.

36. I replied I had nothing more morning. Wang suggested we meet Thursday 28. I agreed.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Waddell's office(FE) notified 6/22/56 12:20PM. EMB (CWO)

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## **662. Letter 38 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 38

Geneva, June 20, 1956

Dear Walter:

First, Ekvall has not heard anything concerning extension of his orders and his time is up on June 30. It is putting him in a difficult position with regard to extending the lease on his house, etc.

Next, I received the guidance for tomorrow's meeting this morning and appreciate it very much. I plan to open with implementation, attacking his position at the last meeting but in a fairly low key and see where it leads. Incidentally, with respect to renunciation I find that the correspondents here really do not understand what the fuss is all about. The American correspondents accept what we say on faith but really do not understand it and the foreign correspondents are more skeptical. One of the difficulties I find is that by emphasizing the "slightness" of our April 19 changes to their December 1 draft the question is raised as to why then their December 1 draft, if not ideal, is nevertheless not

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." The two postscripts are handwritten.

acceptable. They follow our explanations but one can see that they are not really very convinced.

Yesterday I encountered Wang at the airport in Prague on our way down, he having come in from Warsaw. I missed seeing him when I first came in the waiting room as he was sitting in the corner all alone but he came across the room to speak to me. He made a point of asking me about the President's health, expressed gratification that he was getting along well. Incidentally, as in the past Czech officials made a point of taking me out to the plane ahead of the other passengers, leaving him to fend for himself.

In Zurich while waiting to change planes we talked at some length in English at which he is obviously improving. I commented on the new horizontal, left to right style of the magazine he was reading which led us to some discussion of the language simplification program. He said they planned definitely to reorganize the language using an alphabet of twenty-seven letters which will be Roman and not Cyrillic. He volunteered that he had asked to postpone the next meeting because he wanted to be in Warsaw for the visit of the Indian Vice President and the opening of a trade fair in Poland in which they had a large exhibit. He commented that there was also a large exhibit of American books at the trade fair. He said his wife spends most of her time in Warsaw and that they have four children. We engaged in a little mutual commiseration on the problems of educating children in the diplomatic service. The usual afternoon rush at the Zurich airport led him to comment on the opening of the tourist season in Europe. I told him that it was expected 550,000 Americans would visit Europe this summer, to which he commented that was a very fine thing as such visits would lead to increased understanding of other people. He said that he had difficulty in getting back to Warsaw between our meetings as on the return trip there was a six-hour layover at Prague and the weather was often bad on the Warsaw-Prague leg. He was as usual outside the meeting room very affable and friendly. None of this has any particular significance, I know, but I thought you would be interested.

Incidentally, while I was gone the UN here called David and said that their space situation was going to be very tight during the ECOSOC meetings from July 9 through August 15 and wondered whether Wang and I had any plans for a vacation. David told them we had not and that he did not anticipate there would be any recess. There would not in any event be any recess of such a length although there was always the possibility of a week's recess as in the past. They said that in that event they hoped we might find it possible to avoid meeting during the week of July 9. David said of course he could make no commitment but that he had no objection to their saying something to the Chinese if they wished to do so and they indicated they were going to call the Chinese. There is, of course, also the problem of our meeting during the week of

July 4. I am planning a major reception in Prague for the Fourth therefore would not want to meet here until the 6th or 7th. If we do that we might well skip the meeting of July 9 and meet next the week of July 16. I would appreciate any thoughts you may have on this.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**

*American Ambassador*

P. S. For your info I am submitting an efficiency report from here on Dave's work with me. I assume you will do one from your end on his work in CA.

UAJ

P.P.S. I just saw in the paper the news of Jimmy [illegible in the original] accident. Such a tragedy. Would appreciate anything you learn on how they are getting along and where I could write to them.

UAJ

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**663. Telegram 2100 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 21, 1956, 3 p.m.

2100. From Johnson.

One hour 55 minute meeting this morning, 1½ hours of which in implementation. I opened with statement pointing out absurdity his position last meeting on Chinese prisoners which in effect is demand we not apply agreed announcement such prisoners. His replies along same lines last meeting referring to "Indian Embassy being led into damaging trap" and PRC would "not agree to India participating in screening prisoners".

We cut short implementation discussion saying we wanted take up "proper" question of draft declaration. His mild prepared statement referred to Department's June 12 press release. Our so-called minor changes their December 1 draft actually brought about "qualitative change" showing continued US stubborn persistence "freezing present

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-2156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

status quo Taiwan and refusing negotiation" on subject. Apparent US aim is requiring PRC accept present state US occupation Taiwan interference liberation off-shore islands while indefinitely protracting these talks. PRC position continued be declaration could consist either of general statement on peaceful settlement disputes without resorting threat use force, or if Taiwan area specifically mentioned FMC for specific settlement must also be proposed. If US desires agreement on announcement should not distort their May 11 draft.

I replied admitting to "stubborn persistence" in seeking unambiguous, unqualified, unlimited in time renunciation of force specifically applicable Taiwan area as well as elsewhere and stating their failure accept our April 19 revisions indicated they unwilling accept this simple straightforward proposition. His remarks this morning as well as previously indicated they did not consider their December 1 draft applicable Taiwan area. This one of points ambiguity my April 19 draft intended clarify.

Next meeting Thursday June 8. Proceeding Prague Friday morning returning Geneva Tuesday.

**Gowen**

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**664. Letter 47 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 47

Washington, June 22, 1956

Dear Alex:

In reply to that portion of your letter of May 28 relating to employment of Ted Liu as a Chinese interpreter, there has been no definite decision yet to set up a position for a Chinese interpreter in the State Department. However, in view of Mr. Liu's qualifications, PER is looking into possibilities for placing him. Any decision may have to await approval of the FY 1957 budget, but Ralph Clough will be glad to see Mr. Liu if he decides to visit Washington.

With reference to the extension of Ekvall's assignment mentioned in your letter No. 37, Defense assured me this morning that they will see to it that Ekvall's assignment to you is continued. They have already set aside the funds and established the allotment and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

authorization for the new fiscal year, in the budget of the Army Attache at Paris. Defense says that the Army Attache at Paris is squawking at the long duration of Ekvall's detail to Geneva. The Paris Attache apparently was led to believe that he would get more benefit out of Ekvall's assignment to Paris (especially as to North African matters) than has proved possible. I don't know why the attache at Paris should be allowed to rock the boat when it was clearly understood last year that the assignment to Paris was merely a device to get around some administrative problems, and that Ekvall's real responsibility was to you. Defense said it may be necessary to inquire again into the possibility of assigning Ekvall to Berne. In that event they want FE to try to get the active assistance of EUR in inducing the Swiss Government to agree to this. I told Defense I felt it would be preferable not to meddle with the existing arrangement. In any event the continued presence of Ekvall on your staff is assured and you should not lose any sleep over the administrative problem.

Enclosed is a copy of our letter to the Indian Embassy of June 18 and the Indian Embassy reply. You will see that the Indians are blowing very cool all of a sudden. I fear they have received the word from the Chinese Communists and do not intend to make any protest.

I doubt if we will make any reply to the "Observer" article in the "Peoples Daily" of June 21 replying to our press release of June 12. I suppose you have the full text of the "Observer" article. In case you don't, a copy is enclosed.

I will be writing you a short letter on substantive matters Monday morning, which should reach you in time for Thursday's meeting.

Regards and good wishes,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

PS: Krishna Menon had lunch privately at the Indian Embassy with Sherman Adams on June 19, but did not raise any topic connected with the Geneva talks or any other Chinese Communist question.

Enclosures:

1. Copy of letter from British Consulate General Peiping re Bishop Walsh
2. Letter to Amb. Mehta from Mr. Robertson dated June 18, 1956.
3. Letter to Mr. Robertson from Amb. Mehta dated June 19, 1956.
4. Copy of "Observer" article in "Peoples Daily" of June 21, 1956.

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**665. Letter 48 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 48

Washington, June 25, 1956

Dear Alex:

We have decided to put some pressure on the Indian Ambassador here to proceed with the prisoner interviews. We are calling him in some time today. We plan to hand him a letter signed by Mr. Robertson emphasizing the urgency of the matter in view of the fact that the prisoners were informed some time ago that they would shortly receive a visit. We shall also remind Mehta of the repeatedly expressed Indian interest in the question of Chinese prisoners in this country, and the gratification which Mehta expressed on May 31 when he was informed of our decision. We intend to indicate our belief that the Indians should proceed with the interviews regardless of any inexplicable shift which may have occurred in the attitude of the Chinese Communists. We will let him see that in our view the Indians have an obligation to us and to their own conscience, and that they should not unquestioningly play the Chinese Communist game in this matter against their better judgment. We have an added reason for moving rapidly on this, in that we find that we are on weak grounds in stalling off the GRC on its insistent request to interview the prisoners. Article VI of the Treaty of January 11, 1943 on the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China (copy attached) gives the Chinese this right specifically with no conditions attached as to the purpose of the visit. The Chinese are really aroused over this whole question. It has posed some very acute problems for the new Ambassador Hollington Tong. He has done his best to placate Taipei but he feels that the rise of this issue just at the beginning of his Mission, has given him a bad start in Washington. In a letter of June 23 (copy attached) the Chinese indicate that they will take any of the prisoners who wish to go to Taiwan if no Indian representative, or representative of another third country is present, when the wishes of the criminals are ascertained. You will see that there are some possibilities of our getting some good out of the situation even if the Indians let us down. We will do all we can to exploit the position in any event. It has occurred to me that if we cannot use the Indians we might have a representative of the International Red Cross, or the American Red Cross to accompany our representative when the prisoners are interviewed. The International Red Cross would of course be preferable.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.



We expect to send Ralph Clough to interview all the prisoners as the Department's representative.

You will be interested in a short item in Drew Pearson's column of June 24:

"Amb. Alex Johnson in Geneva has been instructed to keep talking to the Chinese Communists for another year if necessary, to give the Far East crisis a chance to cool off. Johnson has been talking for almost a year already and he's now a bit impatient, wondering how much longer he had to listen to Red insults and demands for a meeting with Secretary Dulles. Back came a cable from the State Department last week, telling him to keep talking indefinitely, making no concessions."

While this does not fully reflect your instructions of last week, it looks to me as if somebody who saw our guidance telegram talked to Pearson. In any event there is a basic leak somewhere and this sort of thing is highly mischievous. It is certain to come to the attention of the Chinese Communists and will probably be given a certain amount of credence by them.

The British Embassy informed us on Saturday that Fathers Clifford and Phillips have received orders from their superiors to leave. They are to take the SS Hamburg from Shanghai to Hong Kong sailing June 29. We are glad that they are leaving.

We have not been able to get anything from General Erskine's office this morning on Ekvall's orders. We believe that local interests of the Army Attache in Paris are the only stumbling block since he has all the necessary authorization and the money for Ekvall. It may have been cleared up already. We gave them a copy of your telegram of June 22. We shall continue to press the Pentagon on this until it is completely resolved.

There is no present disposition here for us to take the initiative on tabling any new formulation of the renunciation of force draft. Any change which might recommend itself to Wang would necessarily involve something of a substantive backdown and would imply even more than it literally conveyed. The disposition here is to stand on the April 19 draft.

There is nothing new on the Nehru visit. We have done a short briefing paper on the Geneva talks for the Nehru visit. Copy will be forwarded.

We are pretty hard pressed with Ralph away on two weeks leave. He returns on Wednesday. Regards and good wishes.

Sincerely,

Walter P. McCaughy

Enclosures:

1. Copy of letter from Amb. Tong to Mr. Robertson dated June 23, 1956.
  2. Copy of Article VI of the Treaty of Jan. 11, 1943.
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**666. Telegram 2217 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 26, 1956, 8:44 p.m.

2217. For Johnson.

Guidance for June 28 meeting.

1. FYI Indian Ambassador wrote Department June 25 as follows:

QUOTE Under the terms of the Agreed Announcement made at Geneva on September 10, 1955, this Embassy may make representations to the United States Government only if requested to do so by a Chinese who believes that he is encountering obstruction in departure to the People's Republic of China. Further, we are competent to investigate the facts in any such case, only if desired to do so by the People's Republic of China. This Embassy has received no authority from the People's Republic of China to interview the Chinese prisoners named in the list attached to your aide memoire of May 31. I regret, therefore, that we are unable to act in the manner requested in your two communications referred to above. I trust you will appreciate the position. UNQUOTE.

You will note Indian Embassy letter carefully avoids any implication that Embassy will not act if requested do so by a Chinese. Department's tentative plan, if Indian Embassy will not visit prisons, is to offer each prisoner opportunity express decision as to whether he desires be deported to Communist China, or Taiwan or remain in prison and also, if he wishes to communicate with Indian Embassy. END FYI

2. You should seek exploit Wang's abrupt reversal of position on Chinese prisoners, but avoid giving Wang any clue as to action we propose take in light of Indian letter. Inquire of Wang how he proposes reconcile his sudden loss of interest in Chinese prisoners with his former insistence that Agreed Announcement applied to prisoners,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-2656. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in substance by Phleger.

that information be supplied concerning them and that they be given benefit provisions Agreed Announcement. Place on record your conclusion that his newly discovered objections to performance of any Indian Embassy function as to prisoners is totally at variance with his frequently reiterated previous position, and is inexplicable.

3. Results we seek from prisoner move remain the same: (1) put maximum psychological pressure on Chinese Communists make good on their Agreed Announcement and release imprisoned Americans, and (2) make Chinese Communist position untenable if they refuse to act. Hence we do not wish to provoke them to a point where reaction inimical to prospects imprisoned Americans would occur. At same time we cannot fail expose complete inconsistency of their position on prisoners. We note that last meeting Wang continued assert that Chinese prisoners covered by Agreed Announcement.

4. We have nothing new to add on renunciation of force and you should continue reiterate our position, stressing our attempts arrive at meaningful declaration by adopting their proposed language with clarifying additions.

5. FYI Would be interested in any reaction by Wang postponement of Nehru's scheduled July visit.

6. Re your letter 38, no objection July 6 or 7 for next meeting. If UN space demands make meeting impracticable week of July 9, we would prefer responsibility for postponement until week of July 16 be shared with Wang.

Dulles

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#### 667. Telegram 2219 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 27, 1956, 2:31 p.m.

2219. Verbatim text. For Johnson.

Following reply to Indian Ambassador's letter June 25 being sent today:

QUOTE I acknowledge your letter of June 25 stating that your Government has instructed you that under the Agreed Announcement

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–2756. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Clough.

of September 10, 1955 the Embassy of India can act only in cases of Chinese who request it to do so and only if the Chinese Communists so desire. You further state that since you have no authorization from the Chinese Communists to visit the Chinese prisoners in this country you are unable to do so.

While the United States was of the view that the announcement did not apply to Chinese criminals in U.S. prisons, nevertheless in order not to furnish any basis for the further refusal of the Chinese Communists to permit Americans in China to return to the United States, it determined to make the necessary arrangement to permit such Chinese prisoners to return if they so desired.

The United States decision was made in the light of the insistent representations of Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang Ping-nan at Geneva, that the Agreed Announcement was applicable to Chinese prisoners and strongly criticizing the U.S. for not permitting them expeditiously to leave the U.S.

The decision of this Government was also taken in the light of inquiries from your Embassy as to whether Chinese prisoners had been informed of the Agreed Announcement, and in the light of informal requests from your Embassy for a list of Chinese prisoners.

Following a survey by the U.S. Government to identify all prisoners of Chinese nationality in U.S. Federal or State prisons and after advising your Embassy on May 31 of our plans, this Department on June 13 sent a letter to all the Chinese prisoners informing them that they would be visited for the purpose of ascertaining whether they elected to return to China. A copy of this letter was sent you on June 18. The prisoners now expect a visit pursuant to this statement.

We have assured the prisoners that we will give them free choice between the courses which have been presented to them. In order for this choice to be universally accepted as a free one, we believe it is important that the representatives stipulated in the Agreed Announcement, namely the Indian Government representative, visit the prisoners. This action would be in compliance with Section 2A of the Agreed Announcement.

It is earnestly hoped that you will seek on a priority basis a reconsideration of the decision of your Government.

I appreciate all that you have done to assist us with this difficult question. UNQUOTE

**Dulles**

**668. Telegram 2129 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, June 28, 1956, 1 p.m.

2129. From Johnson.

1. Two hours 35 minutes meeting this morning, two hours of which on renunciation. Wang made brief opening statement to effect May 11 draft was major effort meet our point view and if US sincere will give up attempts obtain PRC agreement freezing status quo Taiwan area.

2. I made long extemporaneous reply point out real problem was lack willingness PRC take first fundamental step renouncing force including Taiwan area, contrasting this with US position. Characterized their position as asking my government agree to negotiations under very clear and continued threat their part resort force if necessary. This anachronistic position would never be accepted by my government or any other self-respecting government. Their equating renunciation force with agreeing to maintenance status quo Taiwan area was doctrine of despair and pessimism in effect saying some disputes could not be settled peacefully. From this led back to urging acceptance April 19 draft.

3. In reply Wang renewed familiar charges US occupation Taiwan distinction between international and domestic matters, and particularly urging “five principles” first paragraph May 11 draft, PRC will not agree to anything that will perpetuate situation Taiwan area. Our task is to push forward peaceful resolution Taiwan area dispute.

4. Renunciation ended on this inconclusive note with no slightest indication any shift position by Wang and I also avoided any indication possible change.

5. He obviously not desiring any implementation discussion. I made prepared statement along lines paragraph two Deptel 2217. I introduced subject referring my remark last meeting further action was awaiting reply Indian Embassy and reply now received to effect PRC has not agreed to Indian Embassy interviewing prisoners. Made no other statement regard Indian Embassy letter and avoided any statement that Indian Embassy had refused act. Wang denied they had reversed their position and avoided any direct reply retreating to previous complaints our not furnishing list Chinese US, accounting for names he had given me, Taiwan entry permits etc., also repeating list those in prison “not complete”. In rebuttal I stuck to prisoners asking him direct question whether it their position that if prisoner desired return he should not be able promptly do so but rather await completion

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-2856. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

sentence or normal parole procedures, and whether they willing accept our word on whether desires return. Noting his statement on full confidence in Indian Embassy I expressed gratification and said my government could take much satisfaction that considering number Chinese in US and long period since issuance agreed announcement Indians have made no complaint lack full cooperation my government nor had alleged single case any obstruction. Wang avoided any reply referring to his previous statement as "fully setting forth their position".

6. I proposed next meeting July 6 and Wang countered with proposal for Tuesday, July 10 "because of previous engagement" to which I agreed. Departing Prague Friday morning.

Gowen

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#### 669. Telegram 2135 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, June 28, 1956, 7 p.m.

2135. From Johnson.

1. Direct discourse report 52nd meeting follows:
2. Wang (prepared statement):

Last meeting you indicated desire make progress talks. Told you I welcomed indication. However since we began second item agenda month after another slipped away while thus far not able arrive agreement declaration because your side persists unjustifiable position. That unsatisfactory situation.

3. May 11 our side represents major effort meet your point view; therefore entirely acceptable. In spite clear words this draft you insist without basis asserting it contains ambiguities and constitutes retrogression, and you object stipulation time limit. Regret you persisted such unjustifiable attitude. If sincerity your side make declaration second item, should give up attempts freeze unjustifiable situation Taiwan area and intervene internal affairs my country. If desire your side settle disputes no reason object seeking ascertaining practical feasible means including Sino-American FMC within two months declaration. If you have constructive opinions this regard ready hear.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-2856. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

4. I said: Seems me we still confronted same difference approach question second item. You still seem regard this from stand point making declaration for own sake is primary purpose. If that were purpose would be easy. We could make all kinds declarations, joint statements, which one us could interpret one way other. Other way could easily temporarily give surface appearance agreement. However, I regard issues problems between us too important handle such manner.

5. I: Been striving reach agreement fundamental proposition. Proposition which our view and view host countries world is first step and fundamental to peaceful settlement disputes. Do not want take time morning repeat review my point view, but think vital we keep these fundamentals mind.

6. I: Speaking very frankly would again like have you understand exactly how we view situation. You profess desire find peaceful solution problems between us including problems existing Taiwan area. Same time, before talks began and during talks, you been and your government continued enunciate policy using force resolve situation Taiwan area its satisfaction if other means not result solving to its satisfaction. Thus, however phrased or whatever words used express it, you asking my government agree negotiate under clear continued expression threat your government resort use force if necessary obtain desires. Should think possible your government appreciate this is condition and situation neither my nor other self-respecting government possibly accept in world today. World I hope progressed beyond that point.

7. I: My government seeks with you as elsewhere peaceful settlement disputes. Impossible in this, well as many other disputes, for frail human minds look into future determine exactly what means or what way particular disputes can be settled, not necessary we do so even not desirable. What necessary or even essential is we determined only use peaceful means. Once that determination made, may open peaceful settlement. My proposal October 8, my position since been we take this first, simple, fundamental step. You purpose still appears be attempt force US into negotiations under continued threat resort force unless negotiations entirely your satisfaction.

8. I: Far as attempts make progress resolving situation concerned, I made most earnest attempts do so. I welcomed your December 1 as it seemed step towards agreement. Although it quite different from what I had mind when made original proposals October 8, I was willing accept it as framework basis for negotiations order make progress. You yourself characterized that draft general statement principle renunciation force peaceful settlement disputes between us. That precisely what I took it be when you submitted. My only quarrel was it too general and subject misunderstanding. This gave rise two questions. First, was draft intended make it impossible my side defend self if attacked? Second,

was this general statement applicable all disputes two countries including Taiwan area?

9. I: January 12 I put forward draft incorporating simple clear answers these questions. In response my January 12 you denied had any intention prejudicing position my side. You acknowledged of all disputes Taiwan area most important. You stated intended principle peaceful settlement disputes apply also Taiwan area. However rejected my simple amendments clearly embodying these points. You asked and again this morning whether it intention my side prejudice position your side which you claim inherently peaceful. To cover point I inserted clear amendment my April 19. Questions I thus asked about your December 1 might be phrased: whether intended prevent my side defending self if attacked? Did it not apply also Taiwan area? Was it intended prejudice right either side peaceful pursuit policies? These perfectly natural questions, directly applicable pertinent this first step renunciation force. Do not introduce extraneous ambiguous elements. Have tried be careful preserve area agreement your December 1 indicated already reached. However, if you any suggestions how answers can be expressed more effectively more acceptably to you I glad hear them. As previously explained, I not feel they answered by your May 11.

10. I: Have talked some length morning this subject not with desire engaging polemics, rather see whether some way two of us with heavy responsibility cannot reach greater measure understanding than we thus far succeeded. Seems me proposition I set forth in past and again morning so simple normal fundamental it must be accepted by anyone sincerely desiring peaceful settlement disputes. Wish you most earnestly consider what I have said because it been said all sincerity earnest desire see whether cannot reach agreement clearly unambiguously eliminating danger hostilities our two great peoples and open broad road genuinely [garble—resolve?] peaceful resolution differences.

11. Wang said: You spoken some length morning large collection views subjects you previously stated. Although you stated more than once you have sincerity in desire resolve problems, however, fail find any such sincerity from study speech as whole.

12. W: Issue confronting our countries clearly evidently case US armed occupation territory my country and US threat force against my country. However, you by sophistry trying turn situation into opposite and allege my country threaten yours. Issue is US armed occupation my country's territory. However you reverse this and claim unreasonable right self defense as often stated in past.

13. W: In past I repeatedly enunciated position my side on peaceful settlement dispute Taiwan area: there exist 2 aspects Taiwan area. On one hand, international dispute between China US, which we now



discussing and trying find solution. On other hand, problem Taiwan area essentially internal matter therefore allows no intervention foreign power. In your statement morning you again tried deliberately distort this position respect settlement international disputes two countries Taiwan area and our peaceful intentions.

14. W: You again mentioned morning relations between states. First para May 11 precisely sets forth normal [garble] principles regulating and establishing relations between states. However, US armed occupation our territory Taiwan not only matter Chinese people will not long tolerate but is a matter no sovereign state can tolerate. You stated will strive for resolution our disputes Taiwan area peaceful means. However, fact is your side continues try freeze present status Taiwan area, so your side can perpetrate occupation Taiwan. You mentioned morning your proposal October 8 and your April 19. All these proposals fully supported views I just stated. I cannot consider these indication sincerity resolution by peaceful means our disputes. That reason my repeated objections these unacceptable propositions. Thus US propositions cannot help resolve issues.

15. W: Purpose these talks precisely seek peaceful means settlement our disputes. Not purpose these talks engage empty discussion without settling any questions. I agree we not discussing making declaration for sake declaration. But my side cannot agree make declaration which would do nothing change present unjustified situation Taiwan area, but would instead perpetuate such situation. Declaration should set forth common desire settle issues. Declaration should advance peaceful resolution dispute Taiwan area. If both sides have common sincerity desire find peaceful resolution disputes believe we able make progress. Might frankly say my country has sincerity and peaceful intent. This intent demonstrated all drafts we presented. Hope US also same desire and demonstrate desire by action. In interest both our peoples for us make speedy progress arrive at agreement.

16. I said: Have just few short remarks. First, you persist in these talks and drafts in attempting get US accept your interpretation nature dispute Taiwan area. I carefully tried in draft and remarks avoid discussion nature origin our disputes in interest making progress. As have said many times, consider this premature and not germane immediate task. Only possible make progress, and understood you agree, if we take very complicated situation existing between two countries step by step. If we confuse steps can only hopelessly confuse, bog selves down. I always and still take view first step renunciation use force settlement disputes. You appear still take position that for your government renounce force respect dispute Taiwan area means your government agrees status quo and sacrifices position this dispute there.

17. I. However dispute regarded, this seems remarkable doctrine: doctrine of despair, pessimism. It in effect says some disputes not capable settlement peaceful means. If other governments in world adopted this doctrine outlook indeed bleak. However, at least most governments reject this doctrine. My government rejects doctrine there are disputes cannot be settled peaceful means. Given goodwill determination find settlements only peaceful means there no dispute not capable resolution peaceful means. All I asked and continue ask is you join me saying this unequivocally regard all disputes including Taiwan area.

18. Wang said: Cannot accept assertion May 11 contains what you call ambiguities. Don't think assertion correct. Recall when I proposed December 1 you asserted draft ambiguous because didn't insert Taiwan area. Then in May 11 draft inserted Taiwan area thus making principle peaceful settlement disputes specifically Taiwan area. You still say May 11 ambiguous. I can only regard this as deliberate distortion. My latest and previous drafts, all take account actual situation disputes two countries. No intent these drafts try resolve by single stroke all disputes. As intention these drafts adoption and agreement on declaration constitute first step solution disputes.

19. Wang: Abnormal situation Taiwan area urgently calls for settlement. However, our side has not slightest despair or pessimism with regard settlement. Our side firmly opposed present situation Taiwan area. However, always had faith this abnormal situation Taiwan area can of necessity be resolved.

20. Wang: You spoke great length settlement disputes peaceful means. It exactly policy my government pursue such means in resolution disputes between two countries. My government joined with others proclaiming well known Five Principles. If these Five Principles accepted by all countries am sure all disputes can be resolved. May 11 exactly proposition accomplishing basis peaceful settlement disputes countries. If your government genuinely desires settle international disputes peaceful means has no basis oppose May 11 and no ground object seeking ascertain practical feasible means settlement disputes including convocation FMC repeat FMC within two months announcement declaration. Decisions set forth my draft are in accord general principle peaceful resolution international disputes. Provisions set forth feasible practical. If one side professed desire settlement disputes peaceful means while refusing take peaceful feasible steps this direction, how can peaceful resolution be achieved.

21. I said: All want say still find it impossible understand why if your side really wants reach agreement it rejects areas agreement already reached and in your May 11 introduces new extraneous elements.

My April 19 preserved all your December 1.

22. Wang said: Although your April 19 retains some of text my previous draft, in substance your side not in any way changed position. That why I said could not accept it.

23. I said: Nothing further that subject, but like take up another matter. (From prepared statement) Continue be puzzled attitude you taken regard steps I informed you my government taking concerning alien Chinese prisoners. As informed you last meeting, further action awaiting reply Indian Embassy to our invitation to determine which prisoners desire return your country. We now received reply from Indian Embassy to effect your government has not agreed its interviewing.

24. I: Find this position your government now taken regard these persons utterly inexplicable and totally at variance positions you previously taking.

25. I: First, you previously insisting provisions agreed announcement be applied these common criminals. I have agreed this. As pointed out last meeting if provisions announcement to have any meaning respect these persons, it means that, same any other Chinese US, they can promptly proceed your country if so desire. Therefore, first question is do they desire return your country? This connection you previously asking for list such prisoners. Assumed your interest in such list could only be satisfy self such persons been informed announcement, whether they desired return your country and if so able do so. Such list has been given Indian Embassy. You been insisting Indian Embassy be permitted make check determine whether Chinese my country desire return. In order further meet point view you expressed this regard, we took initiative inviting Indian Embassy make such check with regard these prisoners though went beyond terms announcement. Just never occurred me you would subsequently reverse position and object our permitting Indian Embassy carry out with respect this group persons exactly what been requesting.

26. I: Can only assume your present objections to performance Indian Embassy this function with respect these prisoners means you reversing previous position respect applicability announcement these persons. If so this of course entirely your choice.

27. Wang said: Our position respect Chinese US including those in prison always very clear. Cannot accept allegation my side reversed previous position. Can only regard this allegation as unjustifiable entirely unsupported. We invited India act as third power taking care interests our nationals US including question their return. Indian Embassy requested your government give it complete list all Chinese US as my government did at very beginning these talks giving you list all Americans my country. Indian Embassy requested these lists facilitate performance functions. However, your government so far not

given lists. We requested your government give us information and make accounting Chinese prisoners your country but never requested Indian Embassy question them. We do not agree Indian Embassy questioning these Chinese in prison, because they cannot fully express free will in prison.

28. Wang: I just cannot understand why if your government genuinely interested carrying out announcement, it not willing take initiative settling cases these imprisoned Chinese when set free not offering obstruction their return my country. This request my side cannot be called excessive because only requesting you do same as my country in cases American prisoners, taking initiative settle cases enabling return. Just cannot understand why if your government desires carry out announcement faithfully hasn't given Indian Embassy complete list Chinese in US; why has not given any accounting 28 persons in list 103 not yet returned nor for 53 of 55 names given you who not returned, even list imprisoned Chinese you gave Indian Embassy not complete therefore unsatisfactory.

29. Wang: Again your government not taken steps remove Taiwan entry permit requirement well as so-called permanent resident requirement. In past we often made complaints this regard. If your government really willing facilitate Indian Embassy help Chinese returning my country why should it permit continuation situation I spoke of. Position my government always clear. We have full confidence Indian Embassy performing functions your country representing interest our nationals. Always concerned with interests every national US and desire see they can freely return without obstruction. Hope your government able give satisfactory reply all these questions I raised.

30. I said: Let me ask two questions. First with respect Chinese in prison. If understand correctly your position is if they desire return your country it is not your desire they be permitted promptly but rather they await completion sentences or normal procedures parole good behavior. That is they in exactly same position as before announcement issued. Next question is as you not agreeable Indian Embassy interviewing prisoners are you willing accept whatever prisoners may tell of regarding desire return.

31. I said: Glad note your affirmation full confidence Indian Embassy carrying out functions. Embassy never any respect indicated slightest dissatisfaction full cooperation my government consistently extended it in carrying out functions. Neither has Embassy brought our attention any case any obstruction whatsoever being offered departure any Chinese US desiring return. Considering tens thousands Chinese US and length time announcement in effect, think that truly remarkable record one in which my government can take much satisfaction.

32. Wang said: Our position with regard Chinese in prison and reason why object Indian Embassy questioning been given previously and again morning. Don't think necessary repeat. Don't think claim Indian Embassy has no dissatisfaction in carrying out functions tells whole story. Indian Embassy asked your government for list all Chinese US. Your government so far refused. This not demonstration willingness offer help Embassy. Calling this situation satisfactory at variance with fact.

33. I said: Suggest if agreeable Friday July 6. This exceptional in view July 4 national holiday have to be Prague. Wang said: Previous engagement Friday suggest Tuesday July 10. I agreed.

Gowen

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**670. Letter 39 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 39

Geneva, June 28, 1956

Dear Walter:

I am not sending any comment telegram this week as I do not have much to add to my summary message, and, in any event you will receive this long before you have to get out the guidance for the next meeting.

Things went about as expected this morning. I had not intended to say much on renunciation but listening to his opening statement the mood seized me and I let myself go. It is the type of act that loses its usefulness if put on too often, but after arriving there this morning it seemed to me a good idea. It is also, I feel, much more effective when I do it obviously extemporaneous rather than reading a prepared statement. I tried again to go as far as I felt I could in holding out the "pot of gold" if they would behave themselves. It seems to me this is now and again necessary if I am to do everything possible to assume that we keep going along the present lines. However, it is hard to find new ways to say the same old thing. My present feeling is that with careful handling we can expect to be able to plow this same furrow until November but, depending on what happens then not much beyond

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. A handwritten note indicates the letter was received on July 5. The last page of the letter is missing.

that. It is not too early to consider how we will handle the various contingencies that might be expected at about that time, but I leave that in your good hands.

There is no question but that we really have them on the ropes with regard to the prisoners. I am still hoping it will accomplish something other than giving me some fun in the meetings. However, as I said previously, I think the greatest pressure on them will come if and when some prisoners actually leave. Until then they will try to dismiss it as a stunt on our part. I do hope that some prisoners can be gotten on their way shortly and then I can really turn on the heat here. Tell Ralph that I have much confidence in him. It does not affect my conscience in the slightest to have a few dope peddlers and murderers go back, and I am surprised the GRC is still making such a point over competing with Peiping for the affections of such persons. If the Indians continue to turn us down I would not be inclined to try to bring in the ICRC but believe the ARC has considerable merit. As you can sense my main interest is in getting some under way as quickly as that is possible. Incidentally, I thought your reply to the Indian letter was excellent. It said exactly the right things in the right way. You will note that in this morning's meeting I avoided saying that the Indians had refused to act so as to leave the door open for them to change their minds but sought to leave an impression that the PRC attitude was holding up everything. I thought it better not to press him today beyond the point that I did.

With respect to para 5 of Deptel 2217, I could not think of any way to obtain a reaction to the postponement of Nehru's visit. However, if I happen to run into him again on the plane I may be able to turn the conversation in that direction and see what reaction I get. I regret that such conversations are so very limited in their possible scope by the language problem.

Incidentally his failure in any way to mention the matter this morning leads me to believe that, as I hoped, the Indians have not passed on to them the text of our letter to the prisoners.

With respect to the last para of Deptel 2217 I had, of course, intended that Wang would share the responsibility for any postponement, and that was the reason for our suggestion that the UN call Wang and simply say the same thing to him that they had said to us. This would then have provided a basis for my raising the matter with him. However, it subsequently developed that the UN did not do so but scrambled around and decided they could with some difficulty accommodate us even during the week of July 9. However, they thereafter called Wang saying that there would be some difficulties in accommodating us through the ECOSOC session and did he have in mind any vacation in the talks during July or August. His reply was that he did not. I pass

this on as an added indication of the lack of any present intention to break off. Thus, my carefully laid plans for a week's vacation have again gone astray. Because of the work in Prague and my Nurenberg speech my plans for the week of June 11 fell through, and this next week I, of course, have the big July 4 show in Prague. Am expecting about 500 this year and am giving them a buffet and a dance. Do not misunderstand that I am complaining, but just letting you know what I have been trying to do in a personal way.

Thanks for the Drew Pearson item which I have not seen here. I certainly agree that it is not very helpful.

Thanks for taking care of Ekvall's orders. He has now received them and is set for another six months. I think Erskine's office was giving you a little line on Paris being the block. Everything I know is to the contrary, but in any event it is cleared up.

I think it significant Menon did not raise the Chicoms with Sherman Adams. I have a general feeling that the Indians have somewhat cooled on Peiping and are not tooting their horn as vigorously as they once were. I hope this prisoner business assists in the process.

They have just brought in the FBIS on Chou's June 28 speech renewing the offer to negotiate with Taiwan. There was some excitement among the correspondents at the Palais this morning about it but they did not have the full text and I have of course refused to make any comment. While it is a repetition of what has been the theme for some time there is a difference in emphasis and I believe for the first time it is couched in formal terms. It is a much more adroit piece of work than their previous statements on the subject and undoubtedly sets the tone for their future propaganda line. However USIA really ought to be able to get in some real licks on the last paragraph.

We have experimented in today's full report of meeting with putting it into direct discourse. Let us know how you like it compared with former indirect discourse form. Neither of them read too well after being put into "telegraphese" but we get bawled out by someone back there (I believe it was the telegraph people) for using unnecessary words so we are complying. However, with something like this it seems to me to make very hard reading.

**671. Telegram 11 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 6, 1956, 7:25 p.m.

11. For Johnson.

Guidance July 10 meeting.

1. *Agreed Announcement.*

Recall to Wang our decision to extend Agreed Announcement to Chinese alien criminals was reached after Wang had dwelt on this question for many weeks. Express surprise that PRC now placing obstacles in way of Indian Government performance its function and register hope PRC will refrain from further interference. FYI We are still awaiting Indian reply our second letter June 27 asking reconsideration Indian refusal visit prisoners. We feel we should allow short additional time for Indian reply before we proceed with prisoner visits independently of Indians. Believe it preferable not reveal Wang precise Indian attitude or our probable course of action in face Indian position. END FYI

2. *Renunciation of Force.*

Go over usual ground.

3. While you should be prepared meet on July 19 there would be no objection here to postponement next meeting until July 26 if Wang suggests it. FYI Unlikely there will be any visits to prisoners before week of July 23. END FYI

**Hoover**


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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-656. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in substance by Robertson.

**672. Letter 49 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 49

Washington, July 6, 1956

Dear Alex:

We all liked the way you handled the June 28 meeting. The extemporaneous review of the position on renunciation was fine. You further exposed the illogic of Wang's position on the prisoner question while

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.



keeping him guessing as to what the Indian Embassy has told us and how we will proceed with the interviews. While your new format for your full report of the meeting was quite intelligible, I do not believe we get the full flavor of the exchanges as well as with the customary form. Maybe it is just that we are accustomed to the indirect rather than the direct discourse. But in any case the “telegraphese” destroys some of the shadings which convey the overtones of the dialogue. Who ever called you down for excess verbiage should not have done so. We ran into the same problem here with our guidance telegrams. An employee of DC/T complained about our failure to economize on words. I took the matter to Stufflebeam, the Chief of the office, pointing out that the administrative subordinate should not even see these limit distribution telegrams much less quibble about the number of words in them. Stufflebeam agreed fully and stated he would issue orders that in view of the importance of the talks and the need for conveying exact inflections, no questions would be raised as to unnecessary words. The same principle would apply to you. I would suggest that you go back to the old form and abandon the “telegraphese”. Of course we endeavor to cut out any completely unnecessary articles and prepositions but we do not consider ourselves as constricted as in the case of routine messages.

The Indian Embassy on June 28 acknowledged our letter of June 27 saying they had again referred the matter to Delhi. I suppose there is a remote chance of some sort of reconsideration but we cannot rely on it. Our plans are to proceed with the visits ourselves, probably in company with an American Red Cross representative, after giving the Indians a reasonable time for reply to our June 27 letter. We have no evidence that any of the prisoners are interested in returning to Mainland China. A number have already voluntarily indicated that they have no interest in going to Communist China. There is some possibility that one or two may apply to go. We recognize that you would be helped if we could move fairly rapidly on the interviews with the prisoners. We hope to get going just as soon as we have given the Indians a fair period of time to reconsider.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter we have received from Purdue University regarding another insane Chinese student who is held in an Indiana State Asylum at Logansport. We are trying to get the facts on this with the help of the I & N.S. and the Indiana authorities. We are informing Purdue that of course the student is free to return to Mainland China if he wants to do so, provided the responsible authorities consider that he is mentally competent to make a decision, and feel that he can safely be released from the hospital where he is undergoing treatment. This looks like the Liu case all over again.

We received your letter No. 39 of June 29 on July 5, which contained much of interest. The indication that Wang expects to carry right on through the summer is significant. We agree that it is not too early to start thinking about the various possibilities that may develop in the Autumn. The disposition here is not to try to develop anything new on renunciation. You will have to continue using your ingenuity to play the same theme. There will be a chance to introduce new material on implementation as we go forward with the prisoner question.

I sympathize with your no-vacation dilemma. I wonder if something could not be maneuvered around the Swiss National Holiday on August 1. It falls on Wednesday but maybe a meeting could be skipped that week without your taking all the initiative since the usual Thursday meeting date is so close to the holiday. Even a vacation of one week would certainly help.

*[text not declassified]*

Ralph Clough's father died suddenly last Sunday. He has been out all week. Judge Phleger is away for several days, but participated in a Geneva meeting with WSR and me on Tuesday, just before he left. Bill Sebald is due back from his grand tour of the entire Far Eastern area on July 22.

Please ask Helenka to include a carbon copy of your letters in the future.

Regards and good wishes to all of you,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Carbon copy of letter to Secretary Dulles from A.H. Tichenor re  
*[text not declassified]*
2. Article from The Times—Thursday May 24, 1956

**673. Telegram 16 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 9, 1956, 3:56 p.m.

16. For Johnson.

1. Letter from Mackensen to his father dated April 30 indicates he has been brainwashed to attack our position on implementation and to elect to remain in Communist China after his term completed. Letter describes in glowing terms his trip around China with other prisoners. Says he is receiving QUOTE first-class treatment UNQUOTE in prison and is completely satisfied that Chinese side carrying out its part of Geneva Agreement on return civilians. He declares QUOTE I am somewhat disturbed that Chinese in U.S. aren't faring so well. Though our ambassador at Geneva and British Charge d'Affaires in Peking have had complete reports on Americans in China, so far as I know, so far there have been no comparable reports from our side on Chinese in America to Ambassador Wang or to Indian Embassy. It seems to me if we are to carry on negotiations in good faith, then we must do so on basis of complete equality and mutual benefit. How else can negotiations be successful? At same time I have read letters from Chinese who have relatives in America (particularly students), whose whereabouts and disposition have become a question. Whatever you may have heard concerning this matter, it is evident that there have been all kinds of intimidation, restrictions, and other unsavory methods used against patriotic Chinese in our country—and their families at home have all suffered because of this. They are innocent victims of unwarranted discrimination. UNQUOTE

Goes on to say his detention completely different from QUOTE what Chinese in US are facing UNQUOTE. He was detained for QUOTE open hostility to trends in Chinese domestic affairs and for aiding those who would turn back the course of Chinese history. UNQUOTE. Declares he intends to resign from Board of Foreign Missions and request permission to remain and work in China when his term up in ten months. Full text by letter.

2. Indian Government requested and received our permission July 7 to inform Chinese Communists text our circular letter to Chinese prisoners. You should anticipate possible Chinese Communist reaction tomorrow's meeting.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-956. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Phleger.

**674. Letter 50 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 50

Washington, July 9, 1956

Dear Alex:

Enclosed is a copy of a disturbing letter from [*text not declassified*] to his parents dated April 30. You will see from this that the Chinese Communists have done a most thorough job on him. It is significant that they have indoctrinated him with false information on the Geneva talks and on the status of the Chinese in this country.

It would seem that the Chinese Communists are determined to prevail on some of our Nationals to “elect” to remain in Communist China after their terms are completed, as a counter to the lack of interest of most Chinese in this country in returning to Communist China.

[*text not declassified*] father, [*text not declassified*] naturally is quite upset over this letter and wants all publicity avoided, at least for the present.

We are debating whether you should make any reference to this letter in the meeting tomorrow. We will probably send a summary of it by telegram later today. In the meanwhile, we want to get the full text off to you before the pouch closes a few minutes hence.

Regards and good wishes,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Copy of letter from [*text not declassified*] / dated April 30.
2. Copy of letter from [*text not declassified*] / dated June 29.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal.

**675. Telegram 20 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, July 10, 1956, noon

20. From Johnson.

1. One hour fifteen minutes meeting today. I opened with prepared statement emphasizing mutuality my April 19 draft and charging him with “haggling and bargaining” over Taiwan area reference by establishing preconditions for its inclusion. Ended with hope that we could at least move in direction April 19 draft.

2. He replied with prepared statement along lines Chou En Lai’s remarks on talks in People’s Congress speech with emphasis on stalling charges. “Any announcement must be capable relaxation and elimination tension Taiwan area instead of perpetuating status quo US occupation.” Aim of US has always been secure announcement advantageous solely to US and failing such attempt indefinitely drag out these talks. Cannot agree these talks being used as “tool” by one party, continuation must be advantageous both sides.

3. During give and take I kept coming back to April 19 draft, pointing out mutual advantage as first step peaceful resolution and renewing charge they unwilling make unconditional renunciation force as first step.

4. Wang replied that it did not appear positions two sides likely come closer together on renunciation declaration, and therefore unless at next meeting I had new constructive proposal he suggested talks take up discussion other agenda two item, that is trade embargo.

5. I made no direct reply to his suggestion but pointed out inference his government was rejecting unconditional renunciation of force and while I discouraged at their attitude felt issues too important for despair and still hopeful his government would adopt this generally acceptable principle international conduct. If it persists in maintaining its threat initiate force Taiwan area hard be optimistic peaceful settlement our disputes.

6. He attempted avoid any discussion implementation, and I took initiative making brief statement noting Fathers Clifford and Phillips permitted leave only after completion full term sentences and making points para one Deptel 11. Wang closed off subject by general statement was US rather than PRC interfering with Indian Embassy.

7. He proposed next meeting July 24 but readily accepted my counterproposal for Thursday July 26.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–1056. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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**676. Telegram 22 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, July 10, 1956, 5 p.m.

22. From Johnson.

1. I opened 53rd today with following prepared statement:

A. You and I have disagreed about many things during course our discussion on renunciation use force. However, there is no question but that we do agree both your country and mine are dissatisfied with and concerned about certain aspects of existing situation in Taiwan area. Although we approach matter from greatly differing premises I believe we are agreed it would be in our mutual self-interest peacefully resolve our disputes.

B. Yet you have rejected, at past meetings, steps I have proposed to this end. If you accept peaceful resolution our difference as being something equally desirable for both of us, I cannot understand why you reject steps necessary realize this principle.

C. I have proposed as first step two of us declare unequivocally on behalf our governments we are not rpt not going to go to war over any our disputes. Surely you agree this step essential to truly peaceful negotiations. What is alternative? To declare we are going to war over our disputes? Or that we may do so, if our desires are not met within specific period of time? Could any negotiations be peaceful if held in shadow such pronouncement?

D. I have proposed that two of us make it clear declaration cannot be distorted into abandonment by either side its inherent right pursue its policies by peaceful means. Is it not rpt not to our mutual advantage have it perfectly clear that declaration is not designed prevent either our countries from defending itself if attacked?

E. I have also proposed declaration be made expressly applicable to Taiwan area as well as elsewhere. Again, I find it hard undersand how this could be regarded as "one sided" provision. Is it not rpt not desire your country as it is of mine, make possible peaceful resolution our differences? If your government does share desire my government in this regard, it is difficult for me understand how it persists in its attempt to haggle and bargain over Taiwan area reference? Since Taiwan area reference clearly to our mutual advantage, how can your government continue establish preconditions for its inclusion?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1056. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

F. None of proposals I have made are unilateral or designed serve interests of one side more than other. All them are designed solely make possible realization of desire my government and people, that differences our two countries should not lead to war, but should be settled peacefully. Your government professes share this desire. If it really has this desire, it should no longer persist in establishing preconditions for its realization. It should be willing for two of us to reach agreement on declaration based upon your own draft December 1, with necessary and reasonable revisions thereof contained my draft April 19. I hope you have also considered remarks I made in this regard at last meeting and this morning we can at least move in this direction.

2. Wang replied from prepared statement he had carefully listened remarks I made this morning but failed detect any new elements. In statement this morning I had merely repeated old tune of arguments he had long before repeatedly refuted. I had again referred to April 19 draft. This draft as he had clearly stated in previous meetings, their side could not (repeat not) accept. He did not (repeat not) consider it would contribute to progress talks to advance these old arguments even going so far as to put forward draft which had been rejected.

3. Wang said he would like remind me once again our discussions on second item now been going on nearly ten months. Out of desire resolve outstanding issues their side had shown great patience in talks. Had repeatedly exerted tremendous efforts for making agreed announcement on renunciation force originally proposed by my side. Draft which they last put forward May 11 after stating determination both sides settle disputes Taiwan area through peaceful negotiations without resorting threat use force against each other added that two sides should within two months of issuance declaration seek ascertain practical feasible means including holding FMC between China–US. In spite fact this draft obviously took view US into account and therefore entirely acceptable my side nevertheless continued under various pretexts refuse reach agreement speedily on that draft.

4. Wang said at previous meetings well as last meeting my side repeatedly made allegation their proposed draft ambiguous and that their side approached this question from standpoint making declaration for sake declaration. My side even turned facts upside down asserting their side threatening US in Taiwan area. It simply because US occupying China's territory Taiwan by force which created tension Taiwan area. My side still continued its activities Taiwan area aggravating existing tension and threatening security his country. Hence, their side firmly held any announcement renouncing force must be capable leading relaxation and elimination that tension rather than perpetuating status quo US occupation Taiwan. This position their side so clear as to preclude ambiguity.

5. Wang said on other hand aim US these talks always been attempt secure announcement solely advantageous US so as to enable US maintain present state occupation Taiwan while continuing interference his country's liberation Taiwan. Failing obtain such announcement US would then continue drag out talks indefinitely in order obtain same object of freezing status quo Taiwan area.

6. Wang would like frankly point out their side could not agree to make announcement which in favor one side alone nor could their side allow talks be used as tool by one party to achieve unilateral aims. Their side maintained any joint declaration must be advantageous both sides. In same way continuance talks possible only under condition it advantageous both sides.

7. Wang said with reference statement I made this morning, if US truly desirous reaching agreement on proposed announcement renouncing force and willing move this direction he would hope I able seriously consider their May 11 draft and put forth concrete opinion about it.

8. I replied I completely unable follow his statement this morning that draft I put forward April 19 solely advantageous my side. As had said this morning thought we agreed it would be to mutual advantage both our countries peacefully resolve disputes.

9. I said Wang put forward his December 1 draft presumably with thought it at least acceptable his own side. To say now that my April 19 draft which incorporated all his draft of December 1 solely advantageous my side something I not able follow. April 19 draft simply stated very clearly unequivocally we not going war over disputes including those Taiwan area. It also fully incorporated last paragraph his December 1 draft. In other words it clear unequivocal statement of renunciation force I had always maintained and still did that this was first task before us. As said this morning only alternative I saw was to say we were going war settle disputes or we might do so unless desires met within certain period time.

10. I said certainly if purpose my government not to seek peaceful settlement or, as he termed it, intent drag out talks I would never have made proposal last October nor would I have gone to lengths I had in incorporating his draft in our proposals. I had every hope and expectation based on previous discussions that he would find April 19 draft acceptable. Never thought he would discard degree agreement that draft indicated had been reached and, by introducing other elements in his May 11 draft, really accomplish purpose of dragging out talks and preventing agreement.

11. I said April 19 draft could not be interpreted by any reasonable person as in any way sacrificing Wang's position. I was still disappointed he persisted in seeing purposes and difficulties that simply not



there. Still hopeful he would find that draft acceptable and if he did not that he would put forward reasonable suggestions to meet both points view. Could not so consider his May 11 draft.

12. Wang replied in talking about peaceful settlement disputes, fact their side participated these talks had precisely shown desire for such settlement. However this purpose could not be fulfilled by mere lip service, or mere profession of desire while in actual deeds we continued pursuing other purposes. Since we began discussions on renunciation force they had so far not detected any sign of correspondence between professed desire of US for peaceful settlement and our actual deeds. Accordingly although US continued speak about peaceful settlement disputes renunciation force this remained mere lip service and was hard to believe.

13. Wang said with desire to push forward talks and reach agreement on announcement their side had since beginning talks this question proposed three drafts—October 27, December 1, May 11. Every time he put forward draft it was in hope we able reach agreement on it. However none these drafts been accepted. Therefore when I said we already had agreement in certain respects, it not correct. Although each his drafts took into consideration point view my side and capable reading agreement I persisted in turning down these drafts and prevented us from reaching agreement. It true my April 19 draft made some revisions in his previous draft however revisions had actually caused change of nature of draft and that why it not acceptable them.

14. Wang said remarks I had made this morning showed we would not be able make further progress in talks advancing talks and making announcement. He did not see any indication I would change my previous views. We had to recognize after prolonged discussion this question points view both sides been made very clear.

15. Wang said views both sides on making renunciation force declaration not likely come closer. Hence at next meeting unless I came forth with new constructive proposal, he would suggest talks should then take up other subject under second item, that is question of trade embargo.

16. I replied what he was saying, then, in other words was his side rejected unconditional clear-cut statement renouncing force.

17. I said Wang had said my April 19 changed nature his December 1 draft. He himself had said when we discussing his December 1 draft that it covered dispute Taiwan area as well as elsewhere. If it did not, had no meaning whatsoever. My April 19 draft simply made this clear, as well as taking into full account his views with regard location clause on self-defense. If he considered it changed nature his December 1 draft that simply meant his December 1 draft never was renunciation force and never intended to be.

18. I said my government still sought such renunciation force as first step. I was discouraged at continued evasion by his government on one pretext or another of making such renunciation force. Nevertheless I still hopeful it would adopt this generally accepted principle international conduct and thus as I said at last meeting open road for peaceful resolution differences. If it persisted in refusing do so and persisted in maintaining its threat initiate use force Taiwan area, it hard be optimistic over peaceful settlement our disputes. Neither my government nor any other self-respecting government could negotiate under such conditions. I hoped he could reconsider this prior next meeting. Believed issues too important for two of us despair of reaching understanding.

19. Wang agreed with thesis that once we begin discussing certain problem we should try settle problem. On question of making announcement, during past ten months their side made repeated effort and fact that no agreement been reached not (repeat not) their responsibility.

20. Wang said if US actually desired and not (repeat not) merely giving lip service to renunciation force in settlement disputes should do so by actual actions. He had always hoped we would put forth new constructive proposals based on spirit mutual advantage both sides. If we talk about refusing make announcement, it US which refused joining in making announcement advantage both sides.

21. Wang said he had nothing more on this question this morning. He proposed we meet next July 24.

22. I indicated I had not (repeat not) agreed to ending meeting although had nothing more on subject renunciation force this morning. I simply wanted say I pleased note Fathers Phillips Clifford after completing prison sentences in full had been permitted leave and arrived Hong Kong July 7.

23. I said disappointed now his authorities apparently still attempting interfere and prevent Indian Embassy from carrying out functions with respect Chinese prisoners US which I had outlined at previous meetings. Found this difficult understand if he still interested in return these people.

24. Wang could not (repeat not) accept my statement their side interfering with Indian Embassy in carrying out functions. If Indian Embassy had difficulty carrying out functions in US so simply because US Government failed cooperate effectively in carrying outfits functions.

25. Wang said he was not (repeat not) going to say anything more on this this morning and suggested that the next meeting be held Tuesday July 24. I indicated I was agreeable to meeting that week but would prefer Thursday July 26 as Tuesday would be inconvenient. Wang agreed.

**677. Telegram 23 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, July 10, 1956, 6 p.m.

23. From Johnson.

1. Comments today's meeting:

Do not believe Wang's "suggestion" we turn to trade embargo presages any early break but is rather renewed attempt bring pressure on us. Also, their thought may well be that in absence any success this will demonstrate lack any advantage to them from talks and thus prepare ground if they eventually decide carry out break. They may also estimate that now is propitious time focus public attention on trade and will in talks here attempt lay basis for public position which will accelerate present trends other countries lower restrictions on trade with them and weaken international position US this question. In view of current dearth of public interest in renunciation topic, CHICOMS may also feel further concentration on this would be less productive of embarrassment to US and GRC than shifting focus to trade, with attendant possibility of exploiting US support of GRC "piracy." This was hinted at in Chou's NPC speech.

2. At next meeting he will undoubtedly query as to whether I have any "new constructive proposal" with respect renunciation and in absence any new draft my part renew "suggestion" move to trade embargo. Suggest my best tactic at that point would be refer my November 3 statement (para 75 Mytel 1056), copy of which was given him, on interrelation two items but in accordance that statement express willingness listen to what he has to say. I would avoid any direct reply at that meeting and restate position on renunciation as appropriate asking they reconsider their position that regard.

3. Reference June 29 letter from Purdue to Department note Tseng Kuang Chih's name was included list Wang gave me February 9 or two months before he placed under observation. Must expect Wang will eventually learn of this case from returning students or other means. If authorities determine Tseng not competent make decision on return suggest desirability Indians being informed facts.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1056. Secret; Limit Distribution.

**678. Telegram 25 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, July 11, 1956, 11 a.m.

25. From Johnson.

At 53rd meeting Ambassador Wang introduced new adviser, Wang Ning (Matthews 7037, 4724) who takes place of Wang Pao Liu.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1156. Official Use Only.

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**679. Letter 40 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 40

Geneva, July 11, 1956

Dear Walter:

Thank you very much for your letter of July 6 which I received on the 9th. Also thanks for the telegram with regard to MacKensen and the Indians having asked to give the prisoner letter to the Chinese. As you will have seen I had no reaction from Wang on this probably not having had time to have reached him. I expect I will get some reaction at the next meeting. I would very much hope that by the next meeting there may be some news with regard to the Chinese prisoners so that we will know where that is going. Also, is it not about time that O'Neill ask to see the Americans?

I have not much to add to what I have said in my comments telegram. There is one point though that I would like to mention. It is whether I now, but more particularly in the future, if there is a break, play the note that they have by their December 1 draft to a large extent renounced force, or whether I play the note of implicit threat in their position. This is more important in regard to our public position than the position that I take in the meetings but the two are, of course, closely related. I could, for example at yesterday's meeting, have taken the position that a virtual refusal to further discuss renunciation of force carried with it the implication of intent to attack in the Taiwan area. However, I refrained

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

from doing so and also deliberately refrained from saying anything with regard to their position threatening peace in the Far East as I felt that the latter might carry with it the implication of a threat on our part. From the standpoint of both the talks here and our public position, it seems to me that it would be wise to soft-pedal threat aspects so as not in these talks or publicly to build-up any crisis atmosphere even if they were to be broken off, but rather to emphasize the degree to which they have, particularly in their December 1 draft, accepted the principle of renunciation of force, leaving it to them to deny it.

I am driving back to Prague, arriving there tomorrow night. Because of engagements I had already made and cannot be broken, I will be remaining there until the next meeting. Therefore, If you have anything to send me, you can send it there. I will probably come down on Tuesday, July 24.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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#### 680. Memorandum from Colm to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 18, 1956

##### SUBJECT

Comments on Peking Radio regarding the Geneva talks

The following comments were reported on Peking Radio regarding the Geneva talks, in connection with the Anniversary of the Geneva Summit Conference. Quoting from, various newspapers, Radio Peking stated:

"No further gains were made at their (Johnson–Wang) talks in Geneva, because the United States lacks sincerity and tries to continue intensified tension in the Taiwan area".

"The paper describes Ambassador Johnson's obstinate persistence and unreasonable principles at the Sino-American Ambassadorial talks as 'amazing'. This is also a reflection of the U.S. dilemma. It dares not break off the talks outright, nor does it dare to reach agreement".

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–1856. No classification marking. Drafted by Forman and sent through him.

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**681. Telegram 60 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 19, 1956, 7:11 p.m.

60. For Johnson.

Guidance for July 26 meeting.

1. We believe it is important at the coming meeting to protest the prolonged failure of Communists to implement the agreed announcement on return of Americans. Point out agreement made more than 10 months ago, return was to be expeditious, and that 90 days had even been discussed as a limit of time. Point out our full compliance in letter and spirit with announcement, and our recent action in arranging for deportation of Chinese in prison, although they not covered by announcement. Point out that this U.S. decision made in light Communist repeated claims that they included so that there could be no possible basis for Communist continued refusal to release U.S. prisoners. Point out difficulty in making arrangements for exercise by prisoners of choice of repatriation and for participation by Indian Embassy; incomprehensible failure of Indian Embassy to cooperate due to request by Communist that it do not do so. Point out difficulty of making progress toward further agreements when those already made are not lived up to.

2. You should also point out inability understand failure of Communists to agree to meaningful renunciation of force, particularly when U.S. had accepted Communist formulation of December 1 with only slight additions to make clear its meaning.

3. With respect to topic of trade controls, we must maintain our fundamental position that there can be no fruitful discussion of this item under the over-hanging threat of use of force; that there must be a meaningful agreed announcement by parties renouncing force before trade embargoes can be usefully discussed. However it is hoped that without prejudicing in any way this position, you can lead Wang to disclose just what he has in mind as to the item of trade embargo and what changes the Communists propose in existing situation.

4. You may wish point out that unrealistic to think any country would help to strengthen economically another which threatens to use force if its demands are not met, by trading with it, where goods received in that trade could be used to support use of force. All this should lead back to discussion of necessity for meaningful renunciation of force in order permit progress in talks.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1956. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Phleger and McConaughy; approved in draft by Dulles.

5. FYI Indian Embassy has not replied our letter of June 27 requesting reconsideration its adverse decision on visits to prisoners. Embassy has intimated we may get reply from Communists at Geneva before it receives reply from New Delhi. As it is clear Indians will be guided by Chinese Communist wishes in this matter we are not sanguine of reversal of decision. However will allow few more days for Indian reply before we arrange for visits to prisoners by American officials, probably with Red Cross observers.

6. FYI we are asking British Chargé Peiping to renew his request for permission visit all American prisoners. In view invitation we have extended to Indians, he is in favorable position press Chinese Communists insistently on this issue.

7. One more Chinese criminal Moy Lum No. 11 on list has been released from prison. Total of 3 released since survey made. You may inform Wang if you consider it desirable do so.

8. FYI Chinese Ambassador at our request has agreed instruct Chinese Consuls in this country to defer their visits to Chinese prisoners until we have had opportunity present alternatives to prisoners. END FYI.

Dulles

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**682. Letter 51 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 51

Washington, July 20, 1956

Dear Alex:

1. We were glad to get your letter No. 40 of July 11. Messrs. Robertson and Phleger have read it. It would not seem necessary to decide finally at this stage how we will eventually construe the Chinese Communist position on renunciation of force—whether we would publicly stress its threatening aspects or its ostensible partial acceptance of the concept of renunciation of force. We shall be giving some thought to this on a contingency basis although our assessment is that an early break-off is unlikely.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

2. We have been quite forehanded with your guidance telegram, No. 60 of July 19th which went off last night. I believe it is the first time we have dispatched your guidance a full week before the meeting. The reason is that the Secretary is leaving today for Panama and Judge Phleger for a week in San Francisco.

3. You will see that we are taking a strong line in refusing to discuss trade controls in the absence of a renunciation of force. It is substantially the position you took last November, and the position you recommended in your comments on the last meeting. We debated for some time whether we should also state that discussion of trade or any other practical matter would additionally be contingent on full Chinese Communist compliance with the agreed announcement. We somewhat reluctantly decided not to put this in, for tactical reasons. At the same time you will understand that this second condition, although not to be expressed by you at this time, still stands. If they should agree to renounce force, we would then point out that they would have to make good on their commitment of September 10 before we could go on to any other practical matter at issue.

4. Enclosed is a translation of a circular letter to Chinese students in this country, mailed from mainland China. We got this through Intelligence sources.

5. We have heard of one additional Chinese student who has gone insane. His name is [text not declassified] from the University of Minnesota. He has been in the mental ward of the University of Minnesota Hospital since February. The doctors think his condition is attributable to letters he has received from his family in China. He received letters through the open mail from his family which praised the Communist regime and urged him to return. Later he received smuggled letters which told him the former letters had been written under pressure and that he should disregard them. Although [text not declassified] is an aero-engineer, apparently he was never on the list of technically trained Chinese who were temporarily restrained from leaving the U. S. Apparently he is not the [text not declassified]. We received this report from the FBI. We have heard nothing from the Minnesota authorities or from [text not declassified] himself. We intend to take no action unless we receive something from those quarters.

6. We are enclosing the latest tabulation of information on Americans in prison in Communist China. While you may have all this information it is more accessible in this tabular form.

7. We have just heard from [text not declassified] that her husband, [text not declassified] has apparently been pretty extensively influenced by the Chinese Communist brainwashing efforts. He has been taken on a tour of a number of Chinese cities. He wrote his wife a long letter containing all sorts of panegyrics on the Chinese Communist



accomplishments. She mailed us typed excerpts but apparently left out important parts, possibly because she is embarrassed at the evidence that he has broken to some extent under Communist pressure. We are trying to get a complete copy of the letter. We will let you have what is available in any event.

8. We still have no reply from the Indian Embassy to our appeal for a reconsideration. The Indian Embassy gave us the amazing information the other day that we would probably get the reply from the Chinese Communists at Geneva before the Indian Embassy here had anything. That does not sound encouraging, but we are allowing a few more days before we make plans to proceed independently with the prisoner interviews. From this Indian reply you should probably expect a new attack by Wang at the next meeting on our prisoner initiative.

9. The British are about to jump entirely off the reservation on trade controls. They are exporting 151 "land rovers" (jeeps) to Communist China in defiance of the multilateral control and consultation procedure. We fear they will follow up with a number of tractors. Other countries of course will feel that they are no longer inhibited. The whole system is in jeopardy and we still have no firm position here on how we will deal with the crisis. The Communist Chinese are probably aware of the trend and it may make Wang less insistent on the trade issue at Geneva.

10. We have heard from FE/P that the NBC wants to have a filmed TV interview with you on the first anniversary of the beginning of the talks August 1. We have heard nothing from you on this and it may be a garbled report. In any event we have told FE/P that we think an interview along the anticipated lines would be a mistake and should be discouraged. We do not want to play up your success in keeping the talks going at this time. Judge Phleger in particular feels it would be a serious mistake.

11. SCA feels that it would be a good idea for Ambassador Lodge to make a speech on the question of the 450 servicemen. The State Department is coming in for a lot of unwarranted criticism from many Americans who are writing in. A speech might help to clear the atmosphere and FE is not opposed, assuming of course the content is right.

Regards and good wishes,

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McCaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Translation of circular letter to Chinese Students dated May 29, 1956.

2. Copy of Tabulation of Information on Americans in Prison in Communist China

3. House Resolution of July 18.
  4. Washington News Editorial of July 12—"It's Just Ransom Talk".
  5. Chinese Communist Comments on Geneva Talks, Carried on Radio Peiping.
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**683. Telegram 70 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 23, 1956, 4:02 p.m.

70. For Johnson.

Chinese convict Lu Ping Yeou No. 25 on list released from prison July 20. Four released 30 remain.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2356. Confidential. Drafted by Clough.

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**684. Telegram 72 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 23, 1956

72. Deptel 60.

British Embassy July 20 transmitted to British Chargé O'Neill Peiping our request that he renew immediately and insistently to Chinese Communist authorities request that he be allowed to visit all American prisoners.

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2356. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy. Pouched to Hong Kong, London, and Taipei. The time of transmission is illegible.

**685. Telegram 71 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, July 26, 1956, 2 p.m.

71. From Johnson.

Three-hour five minute meeting this morning mostly on renunciation. While Wang renewed his proposal move to trade and made few general remarks thereon, he didn't press hard and discussion revolved around renunciation along familiar lines. This phase meeting closed on inconclusive note with Wang stating progress depended on US putting forward constructive opinion and my characterizing obstacle as lack willingness PRC give up threat use force Taiwan area.

After I made opening statement on renunciation Wang made fairly extensive reply ending with proposal move to "discussion concrete measures lifting trade embargo." I replied thereto with renewal discussion on renunciation but weaving in points para 3 and 4 Deptel 60. While Wang made few general remarks on lack justification for embargo which "outstanding issue which hinders normal development relations" permitted himself to be led back into discussion renunciation and remainder phase this meeting kept that subject.

I made long statement on implementation covering points contained para one Deptel 60 tying it back to his previous statements on necessity talks be advantageous both sides and characterizing results agreed announcement as one-sided disadvantage to US. Wang replied along usual lines, only thing new being reference to "recent move by US try to send Chinese in US in prison to Taiwan" but without directly referring to letter to prisoners.

I proposed next meeting Tuesday August 2. Wang countered with suggestion Thursday August 9 to which I agreed.

Departing Prague Friday morning.

**Johnson**

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Waddell (FE) 7/26/56, 3:15 p.m. LWH.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2656. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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**686. Telegram 75 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, July 26, 1956, 11 p.m.

75. From Johnson.

1. After Wang refused my invitation to open I opened the meeting with prepared statement:

A. At our last meeting and several previous meetings you have been making reference to what you term attempt of US in discussing question arriving at agreement on renunciation force to take prejudiced viewpoint and obtain one-sided advantage. Frankly, when I proposed last October that two us issue declaration announcing use force, I did so because of conviction my government it would be advantageous to us if we could create atmosphere in which our two countries could resolve their differences without resorting force. I say this quite frankly and openly, because I feel there is nothing wrong or shameful in my having made this proposition. It is my responsibility as representative my country, seek promote advantage of US. That does not mean I seek promote disadvantage other countries. I assume you feel same way about seeking advance interests your country.

B. In making my proposal last October it was not my intent, or intent my government, seek unfair or one-sided advantage. It was not—and is not—my feeling that meaningful renunciation force in settlement our disputes would be adverse to real interests your country. In fact it my conviction this would be genuinely also to advantage your country as well. It my belief that resort of force over any our disputes would in long run injure real interests your country as well as mine. I am well aware of position your country with respect our dispute in Taiwan area. I am also well aware of reluctance on part your country's authorities abandon what they consider "right" use force if they choose do so. It is not my purpose to enter into philosophical argument over abstract question whether such "right" can exist nor to argue concept rights consistency with what has become a generally accepted principle modern international conduct. It been my hope your government would come to realization that just as practical matter of its own self-interest, interest of its people, and interest of rest of world, it ought to accept principle of renunciation force.

C. I continue hope your government will eventually accept this principle. Matter boils down to this: does your government still

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2656. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

consider it is entitled to use force in respect our dispute Taiwan area? Does it still reject unqualified renunciation use force?

D. To state question in terms concrete content our discussions over last half year, was December 1 draft your side really intended as general statement of principle fully accepted by your side? If so, how can your government insist on withholding application of principle from very area where need for it is greatest? Or how can your government haggle and bargain over its application to that area, establishing pre-conditions and setting time limits?

E. If your governments principle which appears be stated in draft December 1, how can it object to clarification this statement on principle? Surely it obvious my country could not accept declaration which prejudiced its right self-defense. Surely your own government would not want prejudice its own right this regard. What possible objection can there be to making this clear in declaration itself.

F. I wish to record my most earnest hope your government will accept principle of renunciation force without qualification, and it will be possible for two us, on basis of area of agreement already reached, to go on to issuance of declaration clearly and unequivocally embodying that principle.

2. Wang, speaking from prepared statement, said would soon be one year since began talks. Most urgent, important task talk his achievement relaxation and eliminations tension Taiwan area, whereby fundamental adjustment abnormal relations existing between China and U.S. might be brought about and cause peace in Far East and world may be benefited. It in this spirit their side been conducting negotiations with our side on making renunciation force declaration.

3. Continuing from notes taken during my statement Wang said at outset these discussions their side hoped we be able resolve question relaxing and eliminating tension Taiwan area by peaceful means. However, such peaceful settlement must be in conformity generally accepted international principles and also in conformity fundamental interests of sovereign states. Central issue between two countries which requires resolution is that of Taiwan area dispute. Taiwan is territory of China. Chinese people can in no circumstances renounce right sovereignty over Taiwan. Taiwan within framework Chinese territory therefore Chinese people never permit any foreign country interfere in this question. Exercise of sovereign rights over Taiwan by Chinese Government is exactly in conformity with generally accepted principle international conduct.

4. Wang said I had stated in discussing question dispute Taiwan area, US would not prejudice right self-defense that area. He could only say these remarks aggressive. This US position precisely what their

side consistently, firmly rejected in talks. If one country tried impose right self-defense on territory other country, could this be called observance generally accepted principle international conduct? His government always respected rights interests every other country, in return requested all other countries respect their sovereignty rights as well.

5. Wang said I had stated this morning it my responsibility advance interest US, however, in doing so US must not violate, infringe on rights his country. Chinese people firmly oppose conduct talks which while promoting US interest prejudiced interests his country. Discussion on peaceful settlement disputes between two countries can never and must not be conducted in manner whereby US advancing own interests at expense interest of his country.

6. Returning to prepared statement Wang said I had again made repeated reference to making declaration renounce force. He would say it precisely because desire his side issue fair, just, equal declaration with US on renunciation force that in discussions his side repeatedly made great efforts and more than once offered drafts meeting views both sides, particularly one proposed May 11. No reason why both sides could not entirely reach agreement that draft. However, my side at outset discussions unveiled intent securing declaration of unilateral advantage US, enabling US maintain status quo seizure Taiwan and continue intervention Chinese internal affairs by preventing Chinese people from liberating own territory Taiwan. All drafts presented by US been imbued with this intent. His side absolutely rejects such attempts. He could only regret intransigence our side over its unjustified position.

7. Wang said we now had to admit so far failed reach agreement question making renunciation force declaration instead had met obstacle. As he said at last meeting he welcomed any move my part putting forth constructive opinions to advance talks this regard. Otherwise, we should change subject our discussion. He noted in my remarks this morning I merely played over old tune and failed put forward any new constructive opinions. He regretted this was case.

8. Wang said they had made clear in talks that holding FMC between China and US absolutely indispensable to solve question relaxation and elimination tension Taiwan area. Nonetheless, two of us as Ambassadors of respective countries should be able go ahead tackle settle certain outstanding matters which hinder improvement relations between two countries. He recalled that when his side Sept 14 last year proposed subject embargo under item two, US indicated readiness discuss subject in talks, thus agreed include this subject in our agenda. He therefore proposed we now start discussing concrete measures for lifting embargo.

9. I replied he had spoken of obstacles met in reaching agreement on question of renunciation force declaration. He had also referred to situation in Taiwan area being most urgent and important question confronting us. I thought we should be clear as to exact nature obstacle now confronting us. While he continued speak of renunciation force declaration, he had continued avoid agreement on statement which would in fact constitute such declaration. Proposition I had put forward here very simple. I had repeated it many times. It was simply that while we disagree about many things and particularly about origin, nature, possible settlement dispute Taiwan area we simply say first we not going go war about those things. Obstacle we faced and continued face was unwillingness his government say this in clear unequivocal language. While he continued speak of renunciation force declaration and we had discussed various drafts embodying that principle it was clear from our discussion here, public statement made by his government and drafts he put forward that while he desired on one hand give appearance having accepted principle, on other hand he attempted retain freedom use force. He had in particular attempted retain for his side freedom use force with regard dispute which we both agreed most urgent and important facing us. To characterize any such declaration as renunciation force would be fraud upon world and could only result increased misunderstanding and increased tension between us. This was obstacle which continued confront us. No playing with words could resolve this. This obstacle could be removed only by decision his government. I had over past months and continue earnestly hope his government would remove that obstacle. If that obstacle removed words could readily be found embody principle. I had in past and still continue feel this first and most urgent task confronting us.

10. I continued from prepared statement:

A. As I told you at meeting November 3 and also subsequently mentioned, I consider there is an inherent relationship between question of renunciation force and what you have termed the trade embargo. My views this regard have not changed. That is, from my standpoint discussion of what you term trade embargo cannot be divorced from continued overhanging threat your government will resort use force in attempt resolve to its satisfaction dispute in Taiwan area. It unrealistic to think my country or any country sensible of its own interests would desire economically to strengthen a country which threatens to resort hostilities if its demands not met. That is, my country does not consider there can be any advantage to it in trade, where goods received in that trade can support use of force against it. This should be self-evident. It thus clear there is an inseparable relationship between renunciation force and subject of trade and that first had an inherent priority over second.

B. I therefore cannot and do not agree that subject renunciation force be dropped. It is and will continue be first and fundamental question in future our relations. I continue seek unconditional and unequivocal agreement your government to this fundamental principle. However, as I said on November 3, in interest of expediting our discussions, while your government continues give consideration to question renunciation force, I am entirely willing hear any views you desire put forward with respect to trade.

11. Wang replied both us made respective points view already clear on question declaration. Repeated effort his side on question making declaration could not be denied or obscured. He had on three successive occasions proposed clear-cut propositions on this question. They could not be distorted. Three drafts put forward by his side testified to sincerity his government this respect and world recognized it as such. I had stated question making declaration is most fundamental task confronting us. Fact was however as experience in talks showed, US always remained on same spot without making progress. He considered this very clear. As far as encountering difficulties in way making declaration, his side always making efforts overcome difficulties. While US always created difficulties with result impossible two sides actually make declaration.

12. Wang continued declaration which they been striving make was one which would resolve unreasonable situation in Taiwan area. Result such declaration should in no way be maintenance of unreasonable situation in Taiwan area or freezing that situation. If they should agree make declaration with US which recognized US occupation their territory Taiwan, then he wondered why should they be here negotiating with US.

He might point out that to harbor any such desire was fantastic and wishful thinking. US Government must realize and be aware this situation. US Government must face realities of historical development. Era in which country can seize territory another country long past. This action inconsistent with modern concept international relations. From my remarks and statements it could be concluded it not sincere in desire overcome difficulties in way making progress. He could only term continuing of discussions this fashion waste of time without constructive meaning. That was reason why he must propose change subject discussions.

13. Wang continued, we must also recognize question of embargo also one of outstanding issues between two countries which hinder development of normal relations. He considered proper settlement question embargo would certainly help improve relations between two countries. As he told me previously policy of embargo imposed on his country by US actually didn't bring any great harm to his country. However, they opposed this policy embargo because unreasonable



of itself. Similar to that of man who injures his own toes by dropping stone (cuts off nose to spite face). Policy embargo unbalances normal international situation and has caused opposition and hostility from countries of world. Remarks I made this morning in effort justify that policy embargo could only be termed without justification. I had made charges with regard Chinese making threats of force. He could only say this is putting shoe on wrong foot. It merely lame argument trying justify US threat force against China. I could never succeed in making embargo policy appear reasonable.

14. Wang could not agree to my remarks on what I termed relation between question embargo and renunciation force. US embargo policy first most unfriendly and hostile act of US against China. If there really desire improve relationship between two great powers, this policy embargo mustn't be allowed remain. That policy not in interests either people. That why he proposed we discuss this question. I had also said we mustn't abandon subject renunciation force declaration. As he had repeatedly said this is up to US and depends on whether US willing put forward constructive opinion this regard. Obstacle now in way of agreement on renunciation force declaration can only be removed by giving up one-sided and unilateral interest and adopting principle meeting interests both sides.

15. I replied, I had already this morning covered my view obstacle which confronts us with regard declaration. I thought his last remarks though again tended point up difference between us. That is, he spoke of declaration we been discussing as resolving difficulties in dispute in Taiwan area. That is resolving it on his terms. That is, he continued first to confuse question origin, nature, possible resolution on situation Taiwan area with first step of simply saying both of us determined it would not be cause of war between us. No amount of words or rationalization could obscure fact he intended in one way or another to preserve freedom use force in that area. No suggestion for any declaration and no draft I had ever proposed required him recognize anything in that or any other area which his government did not want recognize. US interest has been and remains that of assuring that situation did not lead to war. Every proposal I made solely had purpose saying this clearly. This was what he referred to as one-sided, unilateral interest. If that be correct I could only conclude his government considered it to its interest to maintain ability threaten utilities in area. He had spoken of my position having remained same spot with regard principle of agreeing between us that our differences would not lead to hostilities and saying so clearly. I still hoped by agreeing with this principle his government would remove this obstacle to agreement between us and thus permit us to make real meaningful declaration and open way for fruitful discussion other subjects he desired raise. This would permit

these talks result genuine mutual advantage both countries. Still hope they could have that result.

16. Wang agreed there existed difference of principle between two us on question declaration. However difference was between genuine desire settle our disputes and desire continue armed occupation Chinese territory, although this being camouflaged by protestation peaceful intentions. Chinese Government always expressed readiness settle disputes with US by peaceful negotiations. His government always strove aid settlement disputes between two countries by war-like means. However this did not mean his government would accept its territory being forcefully divided and grabbed or in any way agree to its sovereign right being infringed. Next question was under what condition could disputes between two countries in Taiwan area be settled. As they saw it, condition was that neither side try advance own selfish interest at expense others. This condition fundamental condition which any state must follow. This condition they had followed was to be found UN Charter, nothing concealed in this respect and no one could deny its justification. Therefore, in trying overcome difficulties we should follow correct principles international relations instead following selfish interests one side at expense other. This government always desired respect territorial integrity and sovereign right of US. At same time expected US do same respecting sovereign rights territorial integrity his country. If we could reach common understanding this regard, then difference could be readily resolved. Our talks could only progress in this spirit.

17. I asked if he thought it harming interests his country simply to say clearly, unequivocally we not going go war over disputes between us including those Taiwan area. How would that harm his country?

18. Wang replied he had made it clear many times as long as Taiwan under occupation foreign forces, whether there were war or not, interests his country were always being harmed.

19. I asked if he was therefore maintaining threat use force to resolve that situation to satisfaction his country?

20. Wang replied this entirely reversing rights and wrongs of situation. This way saying things entirely unreasonable. The actual threat existing in Taiwan area at this moment in fact came from US occupation Taiwan by force. One might ask whether US would cling to occupation Chinese territory by force.

21. I charged Wang with avoiding question. I had many times given facts with regard situation there. US not occupying Taiwan. However my purpose from beginning been try avoid discussion at this stage all rights and wrongs situation there. I had not attempted force on him any views with regard situation there and had tried keep them our

discussion this stage. What I had tried do was simply arrive agreement with him this stage that both of us agree we do not go war over it. That is all. If his government would adopt same attitude we could very readily reach agreement.

22. Wang challanged my statement US not occupying Taiwan. Nobody could be deceived by this remark. If US had not used force occupy Taiwan then Taiwan would long ago been rejoined to motherland. Any such remark could in no way succeed whitewash and defend aggression of US. He did not think any arguments or remarks along this line could contribute to our discussions.

23. I said it did not contribute to our discussions to characterize the relations between the US and government occupying Taiwan as US occupation of Taiwan or US aggression. Two of us could very easily get selves in long acrimonious discussion all these questions. I had tried my best this stage avoid such unprofitable discussion. I hoped we could get back to first and fundamental principle of simply saying we not going go war about it. That was all I had that subject.

24. Wang said he had merely pointed out real facts situation. They would not put up with incorrect and absurd arguments. He had nothing more say this regard this morning.

25. I said he had often spoken here of these talks as well as specific subjects we been discussing being benefit both our countries. He had spoken of necessity their not being one-sided. I entirely agreed with that. I wanted point out briefly that as far as first subject we came here discuss, return civilians, results appear very one-sided to my country. After weeks of discussion, he and I arrived at agreement on issuing agreed announcement September 10 with regard civilians. During that discussion I had pointed out we had unilaterally and without demanding concessions entirely removed all restrictions which had previously been imposed on departure any Chinese from my country. I agreed to arrangements which he proposed with regard third power functions. My government had fully complied with both letter and spirit of announcement we issued at that time. Chinese continuing depart freely my country and arriving his country. In more than ten months now past since issuance that announcement, not single case any obstruction of Chinese wishing depart from my country has been brought to our attention.

26. Although not included in original discussions and I did not consider they covered in agreed announcement, we even gone to extent making it possible for any Chinese in prison my country to leave for his country. This done in response to representations this regard he subsequently made to me here. Its full implementation thus far been delayed only because inexplicable objections his government

to participation by Indian Embassy in determining whether and which of these prisoners desire return his country. Thus results agreed announcement from standpoint his country been very substantial.

25. Regretted results from standpoint my country had been very meager. When began discussions here I hoped we be able equalize situation nationals our respective countries by his country taking action to permit all those Americans who desire return to do so. Our discussions in regard Americans revolved primarily around those imprisoned his country. Wang and his government well aware our strong interest in this group Americans. In fact at time we issued our agreed announcement these were only Americans we knew of who desired to return and being prevented do so. Two of us had long discussion on the subject when these persons would be able leave return US. He would recall I was very insistent on some statement time so no misunderstanding between us. He refused agree any statement of time. He told me however their cases would be handled very quickly. In effect said they would be handled much more quickly than in past and issuance of announcement would greatly expedite their release. Although I was dissatisfied with lack explicitness his statements in order not prolong discussions, get ahead. I finally agreed to his suggestion use word "expeditiously" this connection. I told him my country would interpret that word mean exactly what it said. Neither my country nor anyone else could by any stretch imagination consider these people were being permitted return expeditiously. In fact difficult for me see there had been any substantial improvement in situation that existed even before our agreed announcement. In spite use word "expeditious" in agreed announcement his assurances that release Americans would be markedly expedited in comparison with situation before issuance announcement, I could see little or no change in situation.

26. I did not desire get into complicated question numbers, proportion or that type of thing with him, I simply wanted to point out that at 6th meeting August 13 he made statement 38 Americans left China during year since June 1954 as result review their cases. Of those who remained prison, after ten of whose release he informed me September 10, only 8 Americans have been released permitted return to US in approximately 11 months since we issued that announcement. I not only considered this performance grossly at variance specific terms our agreed announcement but also considered results our agreed announcement to have been very much one-sided. I had often as earnestly as could spoken to him of relationship this whole question to improvement our relations. I come here most earnestly seeking that improvement and I still sought it. I again appealed to him to impress upon his authorities tremendous importance with which we view this question.

27. Wang said very dissatisfied with my last statement. Chinese Government had indeed handled cases American law breakers China with most lenient policy. Among 40 such American lawbreakers serving sentences his country there remain only 11 prisoners. That is majority these 40 now returned US as result lenient policy his government. How could I say this figure not substantial or little. Perhaps I was dissatisfied with fact they had released too many. Otherwise he could only term this deliberate reversal facts. US failed faithfully carry out agreement between two sides. I had stated Chinese in US free make departure. These merely empty words. As matter fact of 55 persons regarding whose return I had made representation, 53 still had not returned. Among 103 persons who desired return his country, 28 still failed return. As to these persons not yet returned his country, I could not say Chinese in US free depart. In addition, even after issuance agreed announcement, US made requirement Chinese in US must apply permanent residence US. In addition to that, requirement by my authorities Chinese in US apply entry permits Taiwan. All these requirements he could only say very bad—in violation our agreement.

28. Wang continued they had learned recently there had been moves by my authorities try send Chinese in our prisons to Taiwan. As said many times Chinese in our prisons have no freedom at all to state their will. And recent moves our authorities send Chinese in our prisons to Taiwan was yet another threat to these persons in prison. Also these at variance with agreement between us. These are violations agreement. If US really has interest and desire settle question civilians between two countries it should honestly observe agreement instead violating it. He also asked me impress upon US Govt that Chinese people and Government extremely dissatisfied with action US Govt in violation agreement.

29. I replied he had spoken of majority of Americans in their prisons having returned. I simply wanted point out agreed announcement didn't cover some or majority Americans their prisons; it covered all of them. Only release all of them would be compliance with our announcement not their return six months after agreed announcement, a year or 5 years, but their expeditious return as of date issuance announcement. As far as Chinese in US concerned, even since before issuance agreed announcement not just one-third or one-half or majority of those desiring return able return, but any of them who desire return able return. Best and indisputable test whether or not this is fact is third power arrangement established to confirm it. Thus far not a single one has alleged any obstruction. I previously discussed and would not take time this morning to discuss his persistent reference to what he termed requiring people to obtain permanent resident

and Taiwan entry permits. However I would be glad discuss that again in detail any time if he desired.

30. I asked him with regard his statement this morning to let me simply say as far as Chinese in prison concerned no one going be sent against his will any place. It was in order assure him this was case that suggestion made by my government with regard participation Indian Embassy. As far as freedom persons in prison express will concerned, he can certainly reach decision as to whether desires remain prison, subject same commutation of sentence and parole procedures as other prisoners or whether desires immediately leave prison for another country. Each man knowing own situation can certainly decide this for self. I might mention that since I last discussed this with him, two additional Chinese prisoners had been released under normal parole procedures.

31. Wang had no more comments to make on this question. His government failed faithfully carry out announcement it should not at same time make false charges against other. Unfounded charges would not in any way help resolve matter.

32. I thought facts very clear.

33. Wang felt facts I have in mind incorrect and everybody aware of that.

34. I had nothing more and proposed next Thursday if agreeable to Wang.

35. He proposed making it Thursday August 9 and I agreed.

**Gowen**

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**687. Letter 41 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 41

Geneva, July 26, 1956

Dear Walter:

Just a few brief notes. First thanks for your letters 50 and 51. Incidentally in your No. 50 you mentioned some excerpts from a letter of Bob McCann's, but they were not enclosed. Very sorry to hear about

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. The signature is handwritten.

him, but knowing him would be very reluctant to reach any conclusions on the basis of a letter in which he may have had some particular purpose in mind. However, I entirely agree that on the basis of this and Mackensen's letter they may very well be attempting to prevail on some Americans to remain as a counter to the reluctance of Chinese to return.

Incidentally I had heard nothing here about a NBC filmed interview and, of course, would do nothing about it in any event. However, all of the correspondents here have been pushing me hard for "anniversary stories", and in reply I have been stressing that I simply do not look at it in that light, it having been just another meeting. I have, of course, seen them individually and explained there is nothing new, everything having been very thoroughly covered in the press releases. They have also pressed me hard for "private and personal" opinions on the relationship with our elections but I have strictly refused any discussion of this pointing out that there was no reason to believe that on the fundamental questions of release of American prisoners or renunciation of force there was or could be any differences of opinion among Americans. You can thus expect a spate of "birthday stories" from here which they have all been instructed to write but I wanted to let you know I have done my best to minimize them. The only thing I have done is to give AP a list of the remaining 11 taken from the Dept's. lists giving their occupation and home towns.

Wang's performance today together with his proposal for another two week's gap to the next meeting confirms me in my belief that they intend to mark time until November. Depending on how they read our domestic political situation we must expect some new move on their part shortly before or very shortly after the election. I do not think that we should exclude the possibility that they may estimate that if the "peace" issue figures heavily in the campaign the administration would be responsive to pressures just before the election that would threaten hostilities in the offshore islands.

I certainly have no objection to a speech by Lodge on the missing servicemen issue. I presume it would be in the GA and tied to the still outstanding UN resolution.

One aspect of my guidance for today's meeting on which I would appreciate a little more background amplification is how far I can go if I think it useful in stating the converse of the proposition that there can be no fruitful discussion of trade in the absence of a renunciation of force. You will note that today I carefully kept away from this converse and will try to continue this line. However, if necessary, how it is suggested that I handle the implied converse, that is, could I hold out any hope for a "fruitful discussion" of trade in the event of a satisfactory agreement on renunciation of force, and, of course, release of the



prisoners? I hope that by the next meeting we will know what is going to happen with respect to the Chinese prisoners. You will note that today I made a really "big speech" on the Americans, which I tried to make as fervent as I am capable. Incidentally it is only when we get on the subject of implementation that Wang gets really emotional. It does not stand out too clearly in the translation but it is obvious he is putting real personal feeling into this subject. I suppose that whatever personal convictions he may have on this are fed by the equivocal letters they probably receive from Chinese in the U.S. who are still sitting on the fence for personal reasons or to protect their families.

I do not yet know what I will do with this two week's gap and will have to wait until I see how things are when I get back to Prague. In absence of word to the contrary you can assume I am there. If you do not get distribution on my Prague arrival and departure telegrams you might check with EE.

Regards to all,  
Sincerely,

Alex

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**688. Telegram 76 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, July 27, 1956, 1 a.m.

76. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting.

Dept will note Wang's performance today seemed to be a "marking time" operation, and he did not object to leaving situation with respect to discussion renunciation and embargo in somewhat vague state. However believe his tactic may well be attempt build up for eventual use public position along lines Chou's Peoples Congress speech, that is US purpose is indefinite prolongation talks so as avoid discussion of and maintain status quo Taiwan area, and unless PRC gets something out of prolongation no point continuing. Therefore while making our points with respect embargo discussion attempted at today's meeting avoid giving him any firm handle which he could grab as flat refusal even discuss embargo.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2756. Secret; Limit Distribution.



Do not now have any recommendations with respect next meeting other than to follow our tactics at today's meeting reiterating positions as appropriate. Position with respect implementation will of course be somewhat dependent on results O'Neill's efforts see Americans and developments with respect Chinese prisoners in US.

Gowen

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**689. Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 31, 1956

SUBJECT

Letter of Commendation from President to Ambassador Johnson

There is attached (Tab A), a memorandum from you to the President recommending that he sign the enclosed draft of a letter of commendation to Ambassador Johnson (Tab B) on the occasion of the anniversary of the Geneva talks. This letter was prepared in accordance with your oral request of July 20.

**Tab A**

**Memorandum for the President<sup>2</sup>**

Undated

SUBJECT

Letter of Commendation for Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson

On August 1 one year will have passed since Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson began his talks with the Chinese Communist representative at Geneva. This assignment has been particularly trying not only because of the inherent difficulty of negotiating with the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–3156. Official Use Only. Drafted by Clough; concurred in by Raymond (L).

<sup>2</sup> Official Use Only. Drafted by Clough. A handwritten note indicates the memorandum was signed on August 2.

Chinese Communists but also because Ambassador Johnson has continued to perform his duties as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. He has displayed unusual qualities of perseverance and resourcefulness in the [illegible in the original] of the talks at Geneva and I believe it would be appropriate if, on the occasion of the anniversary of those talks, you would send him a letter of commendation.

I recommend that you sign the attached letter of commendation to Ambassador Johnson.

**Enclosure**

**Draft letter from President Eisenhower to Johnson<sup>3</sup>**

Undated

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Johnson:

It has come to my attention that one year ago today you began the talks with the Chinese Communist representative at Geneva. I do not want this occasion to pass without commending you for the good judgment, resourcefulness and patience you have consistently displayed as the United States representative in this difficult negotiation. It is to your credit that you have been able to carry out this mission while continuing to perform your regular duties as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

Your efforts have undoubtedly accounted in large measure for the release in the last year of a number of our citizens wrongfully held by the Chinese Communists. Your efforts have also helped to preserve the peace in the troubled area of the Taiwan Strait.

You are entitled to take satisfaction in the able performance of an exacting task.

Sincerely yours,

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<sup>3</sup> Official Use Only. Drafted by Clough.

**690. Memorandum of Conversation, Bunker and Robertson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 1, 1956

SUBJECT

Visits to Chinese Criminals in American Prisons

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Ellsworth Bunker, President of American Red Cross

Mr. Elsy, American Red Cross

Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE

Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Mr. Robertson reviewed for Mr. Bunker in some detail the history of the negotiations with the Chinese Communists at Geneva for the return of American citizens. He pointed out the breach by the Chinese Communists of their undertaking of September 10, 1955, to take measures to enable Americans expeditiously to exercise their right to return to the U. S. He explained why the American Government had decided at the end of May to extend the provisions of the Agreed Announcement to Chinese criminals in American prisons, although such criminals had not been discussed in the negotiations leading up to the Agreed Announcement and in our view were not necessarily covered by it. Mr. Robertson then described the devious course of the Chinese Communist position on Chinese criminals in American prisons. He mentioned the abrupt Chinese Communist loss of interest in the prisoners after we announced our intention to give the Chinese criminals the option of taking advantage of the Agreed Announcement. Mr. Robertson explained that the Indian Government, as a result of the reversal of the Chinese Communist position on the prisoners, felt unable to comply with our request that its representatives visit the Chinese prisoners and ascertain their wishes as to return to Mainland China or to Taiwan.

Mr. Robertson then explained why it would be desirable for the American Red Cross to undertake to interview the prisoners. He stated that the American Red Cross as a respected non-political organization with humanitarian objectives would be everywhere recognized as impartial and its word would be accepted. If the Red Cross interviewed the prisoners and attested to the fact that they had all been given a free choice between return to the Mainland, return to Taiwan, and remaining in prison to complete their sentence, no one could

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–156. Confidential. Drafted by McConaughy.

say that the prisoners had been coerced or influenced by the American Government in reaching their decision. We had already promised the prisoners that they would be visited and given an opportunity to express their choice. We were morally obligated to carry out this promise.

We hoped that the implementation of the offer to the prisoners would put moral pressure on the Chinese Communists to belatedly carry out their commitment to permit the imprisoned Americans to return to the United States.

Mr. Robertson said that the Department felt it was very much in the interest of the imprisoned Americans in Communist China that this undertaking be carried out.

Mr. Bunker expressed sympathetic appreciation of the problem and said he foresaw no difficulty in Red Cross compliance with Mr. Robertson's request. He said that he would want to consult his Board before he formally agreed. However he did not anticipate any difficulty and he thought Mr. Robertson could safely assume that the reply would be favorable. He said that the project was a humanitarian one and therefore consonant with Red Cross objectives. He considered the proposed role to be non-political and therefore not improper for the Red Cross to undertake.

Mr. Robertson showed Mr. Bunker a list of the names and addresses of the prisoners.

Mr. Bunker thought that Red Cross regional representatives in various parts of the United States could make the visits without undue difficulty.

Mr. Robertson expressed appreciation for the sympathetic reception given by Mr. Bunker to the proposal. Mr. Robertson said that the Department would confirm its request by letter on August 2, which would set forth the proposal in detail.

Mr. Bunker said he would be glad to have such a letter and would give the matter immediate attention.

A copy of the confirmatory letter to Mr. Bunker of August 2 is attached.

**Attachment****Letter from Robertson to Bunker<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, August 2, 1956

Dear Ellsworth:

You will recall that by the terms of the Agreed Announcement issued at Geneva on September 10 by the American and Chinese Communist Ambassadors (Tab A), the Chinese Communists were committed to take measures to enable American nationals expeditiously to exercise their right to return to this country. After nearly eleven months, the Chinese Communists still hold eleven American nationals in Chinese prisons in violation of this commitment.

The Chinese Communists in the course of the Geneva talks, have offered various pretexts for violation of their pledge. Some time after the Agreed Announcement was issued, they raised for the first time the matter of Chinese prisoners who are serving terms in American penitentiaries. These Chinese criminals were not mentioned by the Chinese Communists in the course of the negotiations leading up to the Agreed Announcement. In our view the Agreed Announcement did not apply to them. However, in view of the belated attempt of the Chinese Communists to cite the imprisonment of these criminals as an excuse for their non-performance of their obligations under the Agreed Announcement, the U.S. Government decided that it would afford the Chinese criminals an opportunity to avail themselves of the provisions of the Agreed Announcement if they so desired. A comprehensive survey was made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the entire prison population, Federal and state, of the United States. On June 13, the prisoners were informed by a circular letter that they would be given an opportunity to make a choice between obtaining a discharge from prison for the purpose of proceeding to mainland China, or to Taiwan, and remaining in jail until the completion of their sentences. A copy of the letter to the prisoners is attached as Tab B.

The United States decision was responsive to the strong and repeated representations of the Chinese Communists. However, the Chinese Communists have now abruptly informed us at Geneva that our release offer is a device to embarrass them and is not bona fide. They allege that the prisoners have been “screened”. They have requested the Indian Government, which represents the Chinese Communists in matters pertaining to the Agreed Announcement, not to interview the prisoners and to have nothing to do with our proposal.

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<sup>2</sup> Confidential. Drafted by McConaughy.

We have told the prisoners that they will be given a free choice and that they will receive a visit in order that their choice may be ascertained. We are morally committed to implement our offer, regardless of this non-cooperation.

With the Indian Embassy unable to discharge this function as described in our Aide Memoire of May 31 (Tab C), the best choice for this responsibility appears to be the American Red Cross. The Red Cross, upon making the visits, could vouch for the fact that the prisoners were given a free choice and made their decision without coercion or influence from any official source. No one could effectively challenge the motives, the veracity or the impartiality of the American Red Cross. The certification of the Red Cross that the prisoners had been allowed to make their own decision would be generally accepted throughout the world.

Accordingly, I confirm the oral request which I made of you yesterday that the American Red Cross undertake to interview the 30 remaining Chinese prisoners (four of the original 34 have been released from prison under normal procedures in recent weeks), and ascertain their wishes. A list of these prisoners and their whereabouts is enclosed as Tab D. A copy of a letter and form of designation of choice which we propose to send to the prisoners is enclosed as Tab E. The letter would be sent before the visits of the Red Cross representatives, and the original of the form would be signed in the presence of the Red Cross representative and delivered to him.

In the undertaking of this mission you can be assured of every cooperation from this Department, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the State prison officials, the wardens of the various penitentiaries, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. It is believed that it would be desirable to proceed without any avoidable delay, and that the particulars can best be worked out through consultations between your officials and Mr. Clough of the Office of Chinese Affairs. His telephone extension is 3482.

We are deeply grateful for your expressed willingness to give sympathetic consideration to this matter.

Sincerely yours,

**Walter S. Robertson**  
*Assistant Secretary*

Enclosures:

Tab A—Copy of Agreed Announcement of September 10, 1955.

Tab B—Copy of Letter to Prisoners.

Tab C—Aide Memoire of May 31.

Tab D—List of Prisoners and Tabulation of Prisons Involved.

Tab E—Copy of Proposed Letter and Form to be Sent to Prisoners.

**691. Letter 52 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 52

Washington, August 3, 1956

Dear Alex:

We hope to get the interviews with the Chinese prisoners under way soon through the medium of the American Red Cross. Following the definitive Indian refusal to participate on July 25 (copy of Amb. Mehta's letter is enclosed for your files) we got to work on an alternative procedure. There was general agreement that the American Red Cross was the best organization to do the job following the Indian default.

Mr. Robertson had Ellsworth Bunker in on August 1 to put the proposition to him. Mr. Robertson reviewed the history of our decision to extend the provisions of the Agreed Announcement to the Chinese prisoners, the abrupt reversal of the Chinese Communist position on the Chinese prisoners, and the resultant Indian Embassy inability to act. He pointed out the obligation which rested on us to follow through on our initiative and outlined the reasons why he thought the Red Cross was the logical agency to conduct the interviews.

Mr. Bunker's reaction was most favorable. He showed a sympathetic understanding of the problem and foresaw no difficulties in Red Cross assumption of the role. He characterized the function as appropriate to the Red Cross in that it had a humanitarian purpose and was non-political. He said that he would want to consult his Board as a matter of procedure but he felt confident that no objections would be raised. He felt that Mr. Robertson could safely assume that official Red Cross response would be affirmative.

We confirmed our request to the Red Cross by a letter dated August 2, a copy of which is enclosed.

I hope we can get the Red Cross under way on the interviews by the week of August 13. There are quite a few details to be worked out with the Federal and State officials. Appointments will have to be made through the Wardens and we will have to look into the problem of interpreters in the cases of the prisoners who speak no English. Some of them may speak only Cantonese or Toishan dialect.

Ralph Clough has sent Dave a massive document compiled in Defense concerning the unaccounted for 450. It is supposed to be a compilation of all the recently discovered evidence. We are not very hopeful that it has much that is new or useful to us. But it should be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

gone through carefully and we believe Dave is the man for this job. We are still very hard pressed here. We will be interested in getting Dave's analysis of the document. Col. Monroe is in Korea where he is supposed to needle our people on the MAC to renewed action on the issue of the missing military personnel. We are not sanguine that anything significant will come out of the MAC on this but the further effort needs to be made.

We have not yet had any reply from the British on our request of July 20 that O'Neill renew insistently his request to see all the American prisoners. I intend to ask Arthur de la Mare, the new Counselor of the British Embassy for Far Eastern matters, to send out a tickler on this to O'Neill today. We would like to have some news on this for you before the August 9 meeting.

We have received word from the British that the Foreign Office in Peiping informed them that Bishop Henry Pinger is to be released "tomorrow" (presumably August 4) upon expiration of his sentence. This will reduce the number of American prisoners to 10. But the last 3 to be released have been compelled to serve their full sentences. Wang cannot claim that they were released "expeditiously" or that the so-called "policy of leniency" has been applied in their cases. In our next guidance telegram we may suggest that you make an observation on this at the next meeting. Also we may suggest that you raise the matter of the violation of the Agreed Announcement in the case of Father Clifford. You will recall from Hong Kong telegram that his request for permission to write O'Neill was refused by the Chinese Communists. The British Charge still has not heard from half of the imprisoned Americans. It is highly probable that the request of others have also been denied.

An amusing footnote to the petition of the American Communist Party of the State of Connecticut to Mao Tse-tung for the release of Downey and the other imprisoned Americans, is a report we have received that the National Communist Party headquarters in the U.S. reprimanded the head of the Connecticut Party organization for his temerity in forwarding this request to Peiping. Apparently it was considered a breach of Party discipline.

Tell Dave we are glad to hear that he will remain in the Foreign Service Class 4 rather than going to the new Class 5. We have just heard that he is on the list of those who were recommended for promotion by the last Selection Board, and therefore will be placed in the new Class 4.

I suppose you have seen the Departmental Circular No. 185 which implements the new Foreign Service Act which the President signed July 28.

Things are a little bit disrupted with Herman Phleger in London with the Secretary, and Walter Robertson away on leave until August 20.



The Judge should be back today so the ranks will not be dangerously thin.

Regards to all,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Copy of letter from Amb. Mehta dated July 25, 1956.
2. Copy of letter to Mr. Bunker dated August 2, 1956, with Tab E.

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**692. Telegram 124 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 6, 1956, 7:33 p.m.

124. For Johnson.

Guidance for August 9 meeting.

1. Belated release Bishop Pinger provides good opportunity to underscore again US view that Chinese Communists have failed to carry out commitment in Agreed Announcement to release Americans expeditiously. Nearly one year has passed since Communists made their pledge and ten Americans remain in jail. No reasonable man could describe Communist performance as expeditious.

2. Take Communists to task for refusing prisoners permission to communicate with British Chargé. This is outright violation of Agreed Announcement. Inform Wang we know Clifford was specifically refused permission to write O'Neill (Hong Kong's 108 to Department repeated Geneva 4) and we presume others also turned down since half of those still in prison have not written. Contrast this with our offer to allow Indian Embassy to visit any prisoner whether or not he has written.

3. FYI In view of recent Communist invitations to American students and journalists to visit Communist China (Deptel 123) we consider it timely to remind Communists again how strongly we feel about their continued detention of our citizens. You should not mention

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–656. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy and Phleger.

invitations in your presentation but allow Communists to draw their own conclusions. END FYI

4. FYI We have not yet heard from O'Neill regarding request to visit American prisoners that he was instructed to make. Neither have we been informed by Red Cross whether they will undertake interviews with Chinese prisoners here. Consequently you should defer any comment on these subjects until next meeting. END FYI

5. Press for Communist acceptance US April 16 renunciation of force draft using same arguments as last meeting and previously. Avoid specific comment on embargo question by linking it to renunciation of force declaration in same manner as last meeting.

**Dulles**

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### 693. Telegram 135 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 8, 1956

135. For Johnson.

1. You will note clear implication in Department's press release (Deptel 134) that Americans would be allowed travel Communist China once all America prisoners released. Without making this implication explicit, you should exploit it in August 9 meeting so that meaning will be clear to Communists and maximum leverage will be exerted on them to release Americans.

2. FYI American Red Cross has agreed to interview Chinese prisoners in US. Communists should not be informed of this at meeting.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-856. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Phleger and McConaughy and in substance by Sebald. The time of transmission is illegible.

**694. Telegram 129 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 9, 1956, 3 p.m.

129. From Johnson.

1. Two hour twenty minute meeting today. Wang opened with statement that ten months have been spent on discussion renunciation of force suggested by US and in spite three PRC drafts submitted US still “stubbornly clinging unacceptable demands.” While I had indicated willingness hear PRC views on trade, my statements had indicated I did not intend to carry on businesslike discussion and settle this matter. This was “unfair and unequal” and hoped this was not my intent. Therefore formally proposed we agree discuss question embargo seek practical settlement.

2. In reply I made long statement reiterating renunciation as first essential step in seeking peaceful settlement disputes, therefore could not agree we abandon efforts reach agreement on this subject. Reviewed history negotiations on this stressing retrogression May 11 draft PRC attempt confuse with other issues and establish preconditions for renunciation. Also reasserted inseparable relationship between renunciation and trade but reminded him I had previously agreed inclusion subject trade our discussions therefore willing to hear his views. Also reiterated invitation amplify aspects they had in mind in accordance questions asked my Nov 3 statement as well as reiterated statement made last meeting that no advantage to US in trade where goods received can be used support use of force.

3. In reply he agreed renunciation force declaration “is at the heart of the disputes between us” as attested by their patience ten months negotiations on this and three successive drafts. I still failed put forward any views which eliminate obstacles to agreement and no progress could be made by repeating old arguments. He then made statement we should strive step by step to resolve disputes, embargo was against interest both countries, violated accepted international principles trade, prejudiced interests other countries and provoked extreme dissatisfaction people other countries, lifting would be first step in improvement of relations as well as in interest American people, etc., etc. Wanted to hear my views with regard to first steps for lifting embargo. Should not entangle with other subjects or establish preconditions.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–956. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

4. I replied with statement charging they seeking unilateral advantage from talks as demonstrated by their position with respect renunciation and trade and then led directly into implementation pointing out contrast between advantages resulting agreed announcement to PRC and US. With respect Americans in prison retrogression not only in rate of release as compared with situation prior agreed announcement but PRC pattern now apparently requiring remaining Americans serve full terms as shown cases Phillips, Clifford and Pinger whereas prior agreed announcement at least some Americans being released before completion unjust sentences. Also half remaining Americans have not communicated with UK Charge evidence they being prevented obtained from Phillips and Clifford. Contrasted our offer permit Indians visit all prisoners, then referred to Dept's Aug 7 press statement, giving him copy and particularly calling attention to last sentence.

5. He replied rejecting argument abolishment trade embargo solely in interest PRC stating even among US authorities "some people recognize necessity abolishing." They were continually receiving applications from American journalists for permission visit China and they had now agreed in order correct false stories and let them see construction of new and industrialized China. Also to refute slanders about iron curtain or bamboo curtain. Pointing out PRC had approved applications without asking reciprocity, he wondered if US would have been able give reciprocity. Charged US was actually iron curtain country and was absurd for US to attempt exploit their approval these applications for "blackmail" and demands extraneous preconditions. World and even American press would blame US. As far as Chinese in US concerned many who had returned told of efforts by INS persuade them go to Taiwan or not return and when insisted on returning such unreasonable time limits imposed as prevent them bringing personal belongings. This violates spirit agreed announcement and at variance my statements freedom Chinese to depart.

6. I refuted his charges with usual arguments not single case obstruction brought attention Indian Embassy, etc., and pointed out only action by his government could remove impediments if they desired Americans visit PRC. In view their record with respect Americans in China my government would be delinquent its responsibility protection American citizens if it took any other attitude.

7. He proposed I agreed next meeting Tuesday Aug 21. Departing Prague Friday morning.

Gowen

**695. Telegram 134 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 9, 1956, 7 p.m.

134. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting:

Department will note that at today's meeting I more fully developed and turned back on him theme of relative advantage of talks and results thus far. Propose develop this further at next meeting pointing up their demands on FMC and trade in effect constitute demand full satisfaction all their stated desires from talks with no satisfaction US desires. Believe this best counter to what still appears be his tactic of building up for eventual public use position along lines Chou's People's Congress speech as set forth Mytel 76. While doing this, his attitude at today's meeting and proposals at this and recent meetings on timing subsequent meetings also appears indicate they intend continue "making time" operation for next two months or so. While any new move their part not likely until after our elections, depending on their interpretation any pertinent campaign developments, cannot exclude possibility some move by them shortly before elections.

It was clear he immediately caught implication Dept's Aug 7 press statement and can expect propaganda campaign by them along lines his reply.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–956. Secret; Limit Distribution.

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**696. Telegram 135 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 9, 1956, 9 p.m.

135. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 55th meeting with prepared statement: Since opening second item we spent ten months discussing renunciation force suggested by my side their side already put forward three

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–956. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

reasonable drafts for declaration that regard. Only because my side stubbornly clinging to demands unacceptable their side that no agreement reached. To prevent these talks from developing into meaningless stalling situation their side proposed we discuss subject of embargo raised by their side under second item. At last meeting I had indicated willingness hear their views on question embargo but remarks I made then seemed show my side doesn't intend carry on businesslike discussion of subject and seek solution. If that is position he could only regard it as unreasonable. Their side had joined in discussing subject proposed by my side. If my side refused discuss subject proposed their side it would indeed turn these talks into unfair unequal negotiation; he hoped this not intent my side.

2. Wang now specifically suggested we first reach agreement on following lines: "In order that subject raised by Chinese side under second item agenda may be handled, both sides of these talks agree to proceed to subject of embargo and seek practical settlement." He would now like to hear my views.

3. I replied assumption he made was apparently that there no longer any way open to us continue seek agreement on question renunciation force. While true this subject proposed by me, it subject which felt we both agreed went to very heart of basic disputes between us. It was suggested by my side as first essential step in seeking peaceful settlement those disputes. I could not but continue consider it this light. I therefore could not agree that we abandon efforts reach agreement renunciation force. If his govt were to abandon obstacles it had placed in way of reaching agreement on renunciation force declaration I was satisfied we could very readily reach agreement thereon. In our discussion up to May 11, two of us had been proceeding—very slowly, it is true—in way which could lead to agreement. He responded to my proposal of last October with draft that indicated at least partial acceptance fundamental principles proposal which I had made. This was in sense step forward, although it was largely canceled out by his attempt introduce into that draft separate matter Foreign Ministers conference as precondition for agreement on renunciation force.

4. I said with introduction my draft Nov 10, which expressed very concretely principle of renunciation force without entangling it with extraneous topics, our discussions had progressed to new stage. Three weeks later on Dec 1, he had submitted new draft. Without sacrificing his views as to desirability eventual meeting Foreign Ministers, had in his Dec 1 draft at least tacitly accepted idea our immediate task, of reaching agreement on renunciation force, should not be complicated by introduction extraneous matters. I had welcomed this draft of his side, and called it advance over previous position. In my subsequent successive efforts continue our progress towards meaningful renunciation force, I had been very careful preserve, in entirety, area agreement

which his Dec 1 draft indicated had been reached between us. As he knew, my draft April 19 retained not only form but also every single word of his Dec 1 draft.

5. I continued in contrast to efforts I made to preserve area of agreement between us, his efforts since May 11 been devoted eliminating basis for progress towards meaningful declaration. He had done this by reverting to position of last October. He had attempted establish first one precondition and then another for issuance of declaration. I continue hope his govt will reconsider its present position and change its attitude so we could issue really meaningful declaration renunciation force as first and fundamental step to settlement disputes between us.

6. I said had agreed to inclusion in our discussion of what he termed trade embargo. I had no intention of going back on this agreement. My attitude toward discussion this not based on narrow procedural consideration but rather on fundamental substantive relationship of this matter to renunciation force. As I told him on November 3 and again at last meeting I entirely willing hear any views he might desire put forward with respect trade. When he did so I hoped he would amplify exactly what aspects this matter he had in mind. Last Nov 3 I had asked specific questions this regard to which he had still made no replies. I did not believe it would serve any useful purpose to make as he had in past, vague and unfounded charges against my govt in exercising its unquestioned sovereign right to control and regulate trade in whatever manner it deems in best interest of US. Let me say again very bluntly as I had at last meeting, my country did not consider there could be any advantage to it in trade where goods received in that trade could be used support use force against it. It would thus be obvious if discussion trade matters between us to be fruitful it must be clear that such use would not be made of goods received in that trade. I had stated our position on this very bluntly and very frankly not with intent of giving any offense or of engaging in fruitless argument, but rather so that he would clearly understand our position this regard and thereby contribute to constructive results our discussion. I therefore hoped he would carefully consider matter of both renunciation and trade in this light.

7. Wang agreed question issuance renunciation force declaration at heart disputes between two sides. Their patience in discussion this topic attested by ten months in which they joined with us in this discussion. His side had thus forwarded three successive drafts for making such declaration. Thus clear their sincerity in reaching such agreement couldn't be questioned. This morning I had stated I didn't abandon, or give up subject renunciation force. But I failed put forward any views which could eliminate obstacles in way of discussion this subject. He

didn't think it would contribute to progress to reiterate old arguments which had been put forward in our discussions. Blame of failure reach agreement after ten months discussion on renunciation force couldn't be put on their side.

8. Wang asked in light my statement on subject embargo this morning, could he take it had no objection to opening discussion on this subject and that I would agree do so? He recalled statement I made Nov 3 last year on subject embargo. He recalled he had already made clear reply to that statement. He said then question embargo is one of matters at issue between two sides. It purpose these talks to gradually resolve, step by step all disputes between two countries. He had told me repeatedly policy embargo in itself unreasonable and hurts both sides, and violates international principle peaceful trade. That why his side resolutely opposed policy embargo. They always maintained this policy embargo should be abolished. Abolition this policy embargo in accordance interest both our two countries and peoples. Abolition this policy embargo must not be forcibly entangled with any other question or qualified with preconditions in this regard. He therefore would like hear my views in regard first steps for abolishing eliminating this embargo.

9. I assumed he did not question sovereign right my govt control trade in whatever manner it deems best interest my country. Also assumed he not questioning ability my govt, cting in accordance lawful processes, to determine what it considers in best interests my country. Policies my govt adopts with respect trade not capricious or arbitrary but determined by what it considers best interest my country. He said this question must not be forcibly entangled with other questions. I had not attempted establish any forced—but rather very natural—relationship between that and question renunciation force. I had carefully and frankly explained again this morning inevitable relationship between these two matters. I believed what I said was entirely clear and would not take time repeat it. Nevertheless as I had said am entirely prepared hear whatever views he desired put forward on subject. I again repeated that when he did so I hoped he would be specific and particularly that he would clarify exactly what aspects he had in mind. Several aspects to it as brought out in statement I made Nov 3. It not clear yet which of those various aspects it his desire discuss.

11. Wang replied deemed it necessary make clear no statements he ever made carried any intent interfere in internal affairs my country. If policies pursued by my govt had no relation whatsoever his country he'd never raise any matter this regard. His understanding trade between countries always naturally advantageous to two parties or at least this trade must not prejudice interest of one party. However, policies pursued by US Govt do not fit in



generally accepted principles international trade—rather my country carrying on policy international blockade and embargo in order pursue national political objective. Implementation these policies has prejudiced interests other countries. In fact these policies prejudicial to everybody concerned. That reason why he stated this policy of embargo unreasonable, should therefore be abolished. Matter of fact this policy already provoked extreme dissatisfaction of peoples every country. That made it all more necessary discuss this subject. That was reason why this subject one of matters at issue between two countries. In raising this subject it was their demand that policy of embargo be lifted. Lifting of embargo would help in improvement of relations between China and US. Lifting embargo not only in interests Chinese people but also in interest American people. He had stated he hoped I'd put forward my concrete views with regard lifting embargo but my last statement still had not contained reply to statement he had made. He continued hope I'd consider this matter and if I found not able do so this morning, do so next meeting.

12. I replied he had often spoken of necessity these talks being mutually advantageous. Negotiations between two countries such as ours could not be one sided. However seemed to me thus far in these talks results and efforts of his [garble—side] had been directed toward solely unilateral advantage. He had presumably raised question of what he termed “trade embargo” because he considered it advantageous his side. I had explained to him reasons US didn't consider it advantageous under present conditions. On other hand renunciation force something that clearly mutual and advantageous to both of us. If threat of force could, as I had so often proposed, be removed it could open door to fruitful discussion of other subjects. Trade policies of my country were not cause but rather effect of threat force that continues exists. If that threat could be removed by unequivocal renunciation force, it would remove one of causes this policy. His govt had it within its power remove that cause.

13. I continued at outset these discussions I pointed out another cause seriously affecting our relations was detention of American citizens in his country. I pointed out at time this also could only be removed by action his country. This another case in which his side had sought unilateral advantage. I'd thought last Sept. we'd agreed upon course action that would be of mutual advantage. Yet things appeared be going backward as far as any advantage to US concerned. Not only had Americans been released from his country at what is apparently rate considerably slower than even before we entered into agreement but any policy of what he had termed leniency appeared even been dropped. Pattern now apparently being established persons in prison being required serve full sentence. I noted that of last three persons

released from prison, all had served full term sentences. I had also been disturbed note that in spite his statements here and public statements his govt, one half of persons in prison never communicated with UK Charge. That this not entirely matter of their choice confirmed by fact Father Clifford told us he had specifically been refused permission write UK Charge or to see British ConGen. Father Phillips stated he specifically told agreed announcement issued Sept 10 not applicable him. Apart from all other considerations this stands in strong contrast to offer of which I had informed him to Indian Embassy to visit any Chinese in prison in US whether had written or not.

14. I continued whole situation is case in which his govt even yet had in its power bring about improvement in relations between us. My govt noted fact his authorities invited certain US newspaper correspondents radio commentators visit his country. My govt welcomed free exchange information between different countries irrespective of whatever political or social differences might exist between them. Impediment to such exchanges between our two countries was one which had been set up by his country and could only be removed by his country. Dept State issued public statement in this regard. In order that he might have exact text, I giving him copy. I particularly drew his attention to last sentence that statement.

15. Wang said had always held view we should base our discussion issues between on basis principle mutual benefit. We should not base discussion on unilateral or one-sided benefit of one side. Problems could only be readily resolved if we based our discussion on former principle. No problem could be considered it we only considered ones own unilateral benefit. We all talk about the principle and we all agree with it. However, great contrast between two sides in practical carrying out this principle.

16. Wang asked permission cite few instances in relationship between China and US. What US had in fact maintained was to pursue its own unilateral benefit at expense other side. It was as matter of fact US which occupying territory China rather than China occupying territory US. It was US which carrying on economic embargo against China and not China which carrying on such policy. It quite obvious that what US doing today was to pursue its unilateral benefit at expense China. Facts being so how could my govt still cling to policy of own benefit while prejudicing benefit this country. How could such policy one-sided benefit contribute to improvement relationship between two countries.

17. Wang could only term absurd all charges against his country which without regard to actual facts. I seemed to him to have said their side proposed policy embargo be abolished solely because abolition would be in interest of China alone. He must point out such categorization wrong. Original objective of US in imposing such policy embargo

was try create difficulties for China. Objective of US was pursue own selfish interest. However things had not turned out exactly in accordance reasoning my govt. Reason either side proposed abolition policy trade embargo was not one which could be explained by saying this policy had caused tremendous difficulty to his govt. The policy embargo had actually not created any great amount difficulty to his country; fact turns out to be new and industrialized China being built up. This fact already been recognized by the world. Because policy embargo unreasonable and violates interest all peoples of world including Americans that they propose its abolition. Fact that even among US authorities there also some people who recognized necessity abolishing trade embargo proved that this policy damaging to interest of all concerned. Number of people in US didn't understand construction of new and industrialized China. These people deliberately creating false stories this regard. Now very good opportunity afforded to American correspondents and newsmen to report on this regard personally.

18. Wang charged US had consistently made propaganda saying his country iron curtain country or what we have termed bamboo curtain country—and that his country didn't offer access to people of other countries to visit it. They had continually been receiving many requests from American newspapermen to come China report news. General principle to deal with this matter now being adopted by most countries that visiting by newspapermen be reciprocal. This principle which should be followed is that same time American newspapermen being admitted to China, Chinese newspapermen should also be admitted to US. Might ask if US such a free country as we term it, would it have been able admit Chinese newspapermen. His government had not asked such question. His govt had acceded request newspapermen to visit his country. Might say this particularly lenient step his govt. would offer opportunity for correspondents of those American newspapers which in past had constantly slandered his country to be able visit his country themselves. This visit would also serve to promote mutual understanding and friendship between peoples these two countries.

19. Wang said now that his govt accepted request various journalists and commentators to visit his country, any attempt offer obstruction to these newsmen or to raise absolutely unreasonable demand in this regard he could only consider improper. This would amount to deliberate obstruction on part my govt against those American correspondents to make personal tour his country and have facts. This would amount to deliberate attempt on part US Govt to continue refuse face facts on China. All this would make US by its own volition what it always calls an iron curtain country. This would show US Govt deliberately creating further obstructions rather than removing existing obstructions between China and US. Action taken by US Govt that regard would inevitably invite condemnation of all people including

American press. International opinion would have its proper say on merits this matter—as to which side merits on. Any attempt try seize this opportunity when Chinese Govt accepting request American correspondents visit China for blackmail or to demand any extraneous precondition, he could only term extremely absurd.

20. Wang continued far as question return civilians concerned, they also see that what US Govt said grossly at variance with what actually carried out. I not yet given any accounting those people whose names he had given me in course discussion. Number Chinese who recently returned from US have told of various obstructions related to their return offered by US Govt. Many these people who returned had expressed desire return his country but IN and S my country made repeated attempts force or induce them go Taiwan. IN and S objected to their return on grounds China what we call Communist country. Some of them given unreasonable time limit to departure so could not bring along personal possessions—even clothing. All those actions of my country violate spirit agreed announcement. This picture grossly at variance either what US said regard so-called free departure Chinese from my country.

21. I replied fact remained in spite these vague charges Chinese, even in accordance his own statement, steadily returning his country whenever desire do so. Fact remained if any them felt were being obstructed could communicate with Indian Embassy. Fact remained Indian Embassy had not called our attention single case such obstruction. Fact remained from very outset talks I made it clear our interest was in obtaining release all Americans detained his country. I thought, my people thought, my govt thought, this had been agreed to by his authorities in our agreed announcement Sept 10. Fact remained in spite agreement between us Americans still being detained in his country, and of those who remained, their situation appeared to be even more unfavorable than prior issuance agreed announcement; whereas even before agreed announcement some of them being released prior to full term sentences that had unjustly been served upon them, now appears be pattern name those that remain serve full sentence.

22. I thus found it difficult see what advantage there been to my country in issuance agreed announcement. In view this situation and treatment accorded these Americans who already in his country it certainly cannot be expected US Govt would approve more Americans placing themselves within jurisdiction his authorities. This just plain common sense, and my govt would be delinquent of its responsibility toward its citizens if it took any other attitude. If he desired have Americans visit his country it entirely within power his authorities remove this present impediment to their doing so; I earnestly hoped they do so.

23. Wang said this explanation and reply regarding question civilians, especially regarding Chinese civilians in US, do not appear satisfactory to him. He considered my charge [illegible in the original] his

country regarding American civilians in China unreasonable. They did not accord with fact. He therefore could not accept them. With regard question American correspondents who request go China, fact was US Govt did not want them go—is preventing them from doing so. He could only say this against plain common sense and entirely policy directed to duping people. Such policy would not bring any good to US Govt.

24. On my indicating I had nothing further, Wang suggested next meeting Aug 21. I agreed.

Gowen

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**697. Letter 42 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 42

Geneva, August 9, 1956

Dear Walter:

Thanks very much for getting the Department's August 7 press statement to me before the meeting. It was an excellent statement, saying the right things in the right way and I was able to make good use of it. However, I don't think we should believe that it will in fact accelerate the release of the remaining prisoners. The Chinese Communists full well knew we would take this position before they approved the applications and they did so first as a propaganda gesture in an attempt to put us on the spot, and secondly in the belief that our position will be undermined by some of the correspondents going regardless of what we say. It is going to be very hard for them to go in face of the Department's statement, but I fear this may not deter some of them. Also they hope to set up controversy between the Department and the news agencies so that it will not be an issue between ourselves and the Chinese, but between the Department and the news agencies. It is a very clever move on their part and I am surprised they haven't done so before now. You will note that in discussing it today I carefully avoided saying anything about our "for-bidding" correspondents to go or making any flat statements that none would go. I very much had in mind our discussion with Hermann before I came over here on the whole legal position in this regard. I suppose if they do go and get away with it we will be faced with the problem of some of the relatives of prisoners wanting to go.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Personal-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." The postscript is handwritten.

I haven't much to add to my comment telegram. The whole thing has become so abstract and the same things have been said so often that I find it difficult to keep my grip on it or think of any new way of saying it.

Strange we have not heard anything from O'Neill. Hope we have something from him as well as the interviews with the Chinese prisoners before next meeting. However, with regard to the latter even if some want to go I do not think it would be wise to say anything to Wang or the Indians until they have actually left. If we do and any of them change their minds or there are other slip-ups it would have been better to have said nothing.

Thanks for your letter of August 3. Dave is going over the material on the missing POWs. Incidentally you should know that between meetings he is working the Economic Section here and getting some good experience in ECE sub-committee meetings, etc. Vreeland, who the consulate has made available for reporting the meetings is an excellent man and the whole arrangement is now working out very well.

Incidentally could you have someone send us two copies of the recent Yale University publication on "Chinese Language Reform" on which there was an article in the August 5 New York Times. We can make use of one of them and I have in mind using the other to give Wang if and when a suitable opportunity develops.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. The Geneva contingent send their regards to you Doug, Ralph, John & Pete for the supplement to the entertainment allowance and said it will be used as per instructions. A full report will be submitted.

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**698. Letter 53 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 53

Washington, August 13, 1956

Dear Alex:

There has been quite a stir throughout the past week over the issue of the proposed visits of American correspondents to Communist

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

China. Peiping timed their decision to authorize visas for the newsmen pretty shrewdly. The knowledge that entry would be granted by the Chinese Communists was just enough of a catalyst to set the pot to boiling very vigorously. As long as there was some doubt whether the newsmen could actually obtain entry into Communist China, the issue was more or less academic and pressure was accordingly moderate. Now it has increased to a point where it can be contained only with great difficulty.

Linc White in his first round with the newsmen after word was received that visas were obtainable, put the emphasis almost completely on non-recognition as the reason for the non-validation of passports. This came under considerable fire since its vulnerability was pretty obvious in the existing situation. Very influential publishing figures including Sulzberger of the New York Times intervened quite actively in favor of the granting of authorization for the visits. They got in touch with the White House as well as with the Department.

The Secretary felt that we would have to rely on the issue of the imprisoned Americans as the reason for holding the line. This was something tangible that everybody could understand. It is difficult to refute. Of course it has the drawback that it overlooks the other cogent reasons which exist or might exist for continuing the policy after the possible release of the 10 Americans. Also it does not give us a complete basis for excluding visits to North Korea and North Vietnam, which are included in the passport ban. However it is the basis which has been selected to stand on. If all the Americans are released and if there is no new element in the situation, presumably we would have to authorize visits. And it is doubtful if we could discriminate in favor of newsmen as a class and against others with strong practical reasons for visiting Mainland China.

The press reaction, except for David Lawrence's column has been quite critical of the Department's policy. I am enclosing a large batch of clippings assembled by John Lindbeck. These need not be returned.

As you were informed in the Department's 135, the American Red Cross has agreed to undertake the visits to the Chinese convicts to ascertain their wishes. The Red Cross showed no hesitation in undertaking the task and is going about it in a business-like manner. We decided not to send a Departmental officer along with them. It would have meant the loss to CA of Ralph Clough for two weeks or both Ralph and Joe Nagoski for one week and a considerable slice out of FE's travel funds. If we had thought that it would improve our position, we wouldn't have hesitated to make the sacrifice. However, we do not think that sending a Departmental officer along would have the slightest effect on the attitude of either the Chinese Communists or the Indians, except perhaps to strengthen the Chinese Communist



argument that we were arranging to release a selected fraction of the large number of Chinese in prison for propaganda purposes. As far as the public in general is concerned, we are satisfied that the Red Cross visits will be adequate proof that each individual was given an impartial hearing and a free choice.

A Red Cross representative came in on August 10 to work out the details. They have named two of their senior men to do the job, one taking the prisons in the West and the other those in the East. They will come to Washington on the 15th to be briefed and will begin their visits on Monday, August 20. We estimate that they will be able to complete the job within that week. Enclosed is the letter we propose sending to the prisoners advising them of the impending Red Cross visits.

If all goes as planned, we should know by the meeting following that of August 21 how many convicts wish to go to Mainland China, go to Taiwan or stay where they are. We should appreciate your thoughts on how to get the greatest advantage from the operation from that point on. We are tentatively thinking of having any who wished to go to Mainland China write to the Indian Embassy. This would bring the Indians back into the act; they could hardly refuse to assume responsibility when an individual prisoner had written to them. We would expect also to shift the cost of deportation to the Chinese Communists, by having the convict request financial assistance for his return.

We may wish to make the whole story public at some point. It does not seem likely that public pressure of this sort would cause the Chinese Communists to shift the position they have so firmly taken—apparently in order not to be compelled to let all the Americans go immediately. However, we have a good case and if we place it before the world before the Chinese Communists do, it will put them on the defensive and demonstrate to any reasonable person why the United States has reason to be distrustful of Chinese Communist promises. Please give us your views.

Your letter No. 41 of July 26 came August 7. Thanks for it and for the news and for the comments it contained. We had already sent out your guidance for the August 9 meeting when your letter arrived. Before the next meeting, we will consider the question of what you might be able to imply regarding the trade discussions in the event of a satisfactory agreement on renunciation of force and the release of the prisoners.

Certainly nothing new is in prospect on the horizon as grist for your mill in the next few meetings. It looks as if it will be the same old wine and it will be difficult to put it in any new bottles.

I am sorry that we still don't have the complete text of the letter from Bob McCann. Even the excerpt which I mentioned has been misplaced temporarily. We hope to have it for the next pouch.



You may be interested in the language used by “Observer” in the People’s Daily on August 8 commenting on the Egyptian crisis. In supporting the Egyptian position, “Observer” says: “The time has long passed when one could settle questions by the threat of force or armed intervention.” Further on he declares: “No problem can be solved by the threat of force or armed intervention.” Of course in the Egyptian crisis as in the case of Taiwan the Chinese Communists hold that the threat of force is entirely from the outside and that there is no such threat from themselves with respect to Taiwan or from the Egyptians with respect to the Suez Canal.

Congratulations from us all on the well merited commendation from the President, a copy of which has come to us. This is indeed a signal and well deserved honor. I will see to it that a copy of the letter goes to your personnel file.

Tuesday is an awkward day for your meeting from the Washington standpoint. We will need to get your guidance off Thursday or Friday. However it should be easy to shape it up since nothing new is contemplated. The Secretary leaves on Wednesday for the Suez Conference and Mr. Robertson is due back from leave next Monday the 20th.

Regards and all the best from everyone here.

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Newspaper clippings
2. Draft of proposed letter to Chinese prisoners.

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#### **699. Telegram 176 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 17, 1956, 2:56 p.m.

176. For Johnson.

Guidance for August 21 meeting.

1. Maintain position that you willing listen to Wang’s views on embargo but that it is unrealistic expect discuss fruitfully this collateral

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1756. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy; cleared in draft by Phleger.

problem until principle renunciation of force has been accepted. So long as Chinese Communists threaten to settle disputes by force threatened party cannot be expected contribute directly or indirectly through trade to build-up of that force. Urge Communists give further consideration US April 16 revision of Wang draft as acceptable formula for mutually advantageous renunciation of force in Taiwan area.

2. Reiterate US dissatisfaction with continued detention ten Americans. Do not volunteer further reference to US refusal of passports to journalists desiring visit Communist China, as overemphasis probably self-defeating. However if Wang mentions subject, possibly citing US editorials in support his view, reaffirm position taken in press release of August 7. Observe that US Government justified in withholding its approval of travel its nationals in country where American citizens are still subjected to deprivation of basic human rights. Point out that US Government has responsibility for welfare of citizens abroad and when any are wrongfully detained by foreign government not conforming accepted international standards serious international problem created.

3. FYI American Red Cross will commence interviewing Chinese prisoners August 20. Expect know results prior your next meeting. Still no word from O'Neill on results his approach Peiping.

**Hoover**

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## **700. Letter 43 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 43

Geneva, August 20, 1956

Dear Walter:

I am starting this letter to you Monday evening to deal with some of the matters raised in your letter of August 13, and will finish it after the meeting tomorrow.

First, let me say that I was startled and distressed at this week's TIME story directly quoting me on the talks, particularly on my alleged remarks concerning reduction of dangers of war in the Taiwan area. While from a domestic point of view the story is favorable, and TIME'S intentions were the best, it is not of any help to the talks. I saw the story immediately on my arrival here last night and today got hold of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Personal-  
Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

correspondent to whom I talked last week. I told him first that it was my clear understanding that our conversation was, as in the past, entirely background, and secondly, I had a very clear recollection that when he had asked me concerning the effects in the Taiwan area I had refused to discuss it even for background, saying only that he could speculate on that as well as I could. When I raised this with him today he admitted, as confirmed by the PAO here, that when arrangements were made for him to see me it was understood that it was not an interview but that during the course of our conversation I had at a couple of points said “don’t quote me on this” and therefore he assumed that it was alright to quote me on other points! This is pretty thin and I told him so. With regard to the alleged remarks concerning Taiwan, he agrees that I did not say this in our conversation but that I had said something to that effect some five or six months ago which he had quoted to TIME at that time and that based on my statements to him that there had been no substantive change with respect to the negotiations during recent months TIME had now picked up and used the quote. This is even thinner and I have asked him to let TIME know in very definite terms that I am very perturbed over it. I am sorry that it happened as I have thus far been fairly successful in my relations with newsmen here and dislike having this mar the record.

I certainly agree that the issue of American correspondents traveling to Communist China has created a real stir. They timed this very cleverly and the results have probably exceeded their rosier expectations. As I indicated in my telegram from Prague, I think the damages to us and their purposes are already largely accomplished and the issue of whether newsmen now go or not is now substantially secondary. I would hope we could find some way of recovering from the situation, but the only thoughts I had in this regard were contained in my telegram. I know that it must be terribly difficult to handle, particularly with the Secretary away, and you have my full sympathy. I suspect that Wang will find it difficult to resist the temptation to throw it at me tomorrow, and my present inclination is to counter by noting the virtual unanimity of the press on the importance of imprisoned Americans being released and thus try to get back to implementation. I feel this might be somewhat more profitable than confining myself to the line suggested in the guidance for tomorrow’s meeting, although I will of course also use that as necessary.

With regard to the Chinese in prison, I agree that considering all the circumstances it is probably better for the Red Cross alone to see them. I am glad to know that visits are now getting underway. My thoughts with regard to handling it from thereon are as follows:

If any desire to go to Communist China I doubt the wisdom of having them write to the Indian Embassy to obtain passage money. While I am thoroughly sympathetic with the idea of the Chicoms being made

to pay their way if possible, I am fearful that they would use this in every way possible to sabotage the program. I can think of several ways in which they could do this and their imagination is even more fertile than ours. By in effect making it dependent upon Peiping's agreement to furnish passage money, we give them an opening that we can be sure they will use to the maximum in every way to embarrass us. I therefore wonder whether it would not be worth the difference in cost to us to pay the additional expense to transport them to Hong Kong.

With respect to publicity, I think that we should make a public announcement at the time the men are embarked which would contain: (a) a few brief sentences on the belated Peiping interest in these men and their effort to use them as a justification for continuing to hold Americans (b) the Red Cross interviews (c) the action taken to permit their return, names, and any other such pertinent details. I would entirely omit any mention of our invitation to the Indians, Chinese Communist's refusal to permit the Indians to act, etc. First this would bog down the whole press release in involved explanations, the inevitable necessity of trying to explain the Chicoms' attitude, why we have gone ahead in spite of that attitude, etc., etc. I would also think that from the standpoint of both the Indians and Taipei its omission would be best, and would suggest that before putting out the press release we call in the Indians and tell them what we are doing. I would think that it would gain only appreciation from the Indian side. If the Chinese later desire to come out with an expression of their attitude and attempt to explain it, let them do so as no rational person will be able to follow them.

I would say nothing to Wang here until the men are actually embarked. This would in all probability mean that I would not be able to say anything to him until after the press release had been issued although I see no great harm in this. On the other hand I would call in the Indians shortly before the issuance of the press release, give them the text, and if not included in the release, the names of the persons being released.

With regard to the timing of meetings, I have been proceeding on the assumption that the Department continued to desire that I suggest no interval longer than a week and leave it up to him to push it beyond that time if he desires. Therefore, I agreed to a Tuesday meeting this week rather than push it up longer to Thursday. However, I will bear in mind that you prefer a Thursday meeting, as do I.

In thinking about the possibility of a break, it has occurred to me that we have perhaps been oversimplifying the way they may attempt to bring it about. It seems to me that he might well attempt to take the attitude that it is no use having further meetings until I have something "new and constructive" to present and when I do he will be glad

to meet with me at any time I designate. In such an event I would of course refuse to accept any such condition, point up its ultimatum aspects, and making a definite proposal for the date of the next meeting strive to obtain a definite acceptance or rejection from him. However, it is possible that the situation might become somewhat confused.

August 21

Well, things livened up a bit at today's meeting and his performance confirmed my feeling they are continuing to build up their case along the lines of Chou's People's Congress speech. He placed me in a dilemma which I was able to avoid today and was able to counter-attack. However, the situation is going to be much more difficult next meeting and harder for me to maintain the objectives of assuring continuation of the talks and also carrying out my other instructions with regard discussion of renunciation of force and trade. I know you will consider all this in my guidance for the next meeting. Whereas I would not expect any clean break at the next meeting it is possible that he might try a gambit along the lines of the first paragraph at the top of this page, or set the stage to pull it later on. Of course, once I have taken a flat stand against discussion of trade until renunciation of force is resolved it would be very difficult for me to recede from it and this can well start us on the road to an actual or de facto break. On the other hand I recognize the almost insuperable difficulties of giving me any basis on which I could discuss trade in a positive sense even contingent on a satisfactory renunciation of force. You will note I have carefully avoided thus far even stating the converse of my present instructions, that is trade discussions might be "fruitful" if renunciation of force was agreed upon. They could, of course, well exploit just the fact of discussion of trade even on a contingent basis. I do not know what the answers can be but hope you will give me the maximum of straws with which to build my bricks. (I have written this before writing my "comment telegram" just in the way of doing some "thinking out loud" with you.)

*[text not declassified]*

All the best to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. I was tremendously surprised and naturally most pleased at the President's letter which I received at Prague through EE last Friday. I have transmitted an acknowledgment through EE which I asked they show FE before sending on.

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701. Telegram 167 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 21, 1956, 2 p.m.

167. From Johnson.

One hour fifty minute meeting today. I opened with statement along lines para one Deptel 176. Wang replied stating "did not deny declaration force one of central issues" failure reach agreement due US persistence "unreasonable demands" and "deliberately creating obstacles." Merely saying should not abandon search for declaration and "not offering concrete changes" did not contribute progress. Should not entangle ourselves any longer this regard. Pleased note that I willing listen to his concrete opinions on trade and proposed draft agreed announcement (text by separate telegram).

In reply I rebutted his statements on responsibility lack progress renunciation force and reiterated inherent relationship to subject trade avoiding any direct comment on his proposal. During considerable give and take he then tried hard tie me down to either flat refusal or commitment discuss his proposal. I avoided both. From amount conferring his assistants over my replies and other signs, gained definite impression his intent was to set stage for at least public statement if I flatly refused, or in event could obtain commitment discuss to propose so informing press.

During subsequent give and take I picked up his statement that "reasonable resolution" trade problem "would contribute to resolution other disputes" as occasion for reviewing questions US had thus far presented here, that is, detained Americans, renunciation force, and missing UNC personnel, asking him whether implication his statement these problems would be resolved if US agreed with them on trade matters. He avoided trap. In reply my review concessions we had made in agreed announcement to obtain resolution problem detained Americans and our disappointment at results he replied that if US had "faithfully abided by announcement situation would be much more satisfactory." I of course rejected this. In reply my review concessions we had made on renunciation force he said if US had accepted principle of mutual respect in May 11 draft agreement could have been reached. He rejected missing personnel as not in terms of reference. Agreed his proposal next meeting Thursday Sept 6. Returning Prague Wednesday morning.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

**702. Telegram 168 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 21, 1956, 3 p.m.

168. From Johnson. Reference Mytel 167.

Following text draft agreed announcement Wang presented today:

“In order to bring about a gradual improvement of Sino-American relations and relaxation of international tension, Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree to announce: The People’s Republic of China and the United States of America hold that they should adopt measures respectively on their own initiative to eliminate the existing barriers which interfere with trade between their two countries.”

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2156. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

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**703. Telegram 172 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 21, 1956, 6 p.m.

172. From Johnson.

Comments today’s meeting:

Believe Wang’s tactics today directed toward facing us with dilemma of whether to refuse any discussion trade and thereby build up their position on continuation talks along lines Chou’s Peoples Congress speech, or to agree to discussion, when any agreement our part discuss trade, however tentative or contingent, would be exploited by them to accelerate undermining our international position on trade controls. Can anticipate he will sharpen dilemma and intensify attempt

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2156. Secret; Limit Distribution.

bring pressure this regard next meeting. If we take position flat refusal discuss anticipate their action will first be public statement then attempt bring further pressure on us by proposing recess until US has "some new and concrete proposal" when they willing meet at US request. This would also enable them maintain posture of "reasonableness" and avoid onus of definitive break.

Dept will also note at today's meeting his renewed invitation submit new draft on renunciation and my pointing out we had submitted two successive drafts. Dept will also note I have thus far avoided stating converse my present instructions on trade, that is any statement trade discussion could be "fruitful" if renunciation force agreed. While recognize difficulty authorizing me state converse, if it is possible do so may enable me develop line that would be useful next meeting. Will appreciate maximum guidance and suggestions Dept able give me meet probable situation at next meeting.

**Gowen**

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#### **704. Telegram 173 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 21, 1956, 7 p.m.

173. From Johnson.

1. I opened 56th today with following prepared statement:

A. For past few meetings you been attempting get me agree with you abandon search for meaningful renunciation force and go on to discussion topic you proposed last September, what you call question of embargo. You been trying do this, as you say, because you consider our search for agreement on renunciation force is in one-sided interest of US whereas, presumably, you expect discussion trade would be to advantage your country.

B. I not willing abandon search for agreement on renunciation force. I cannot agree renunciation force would only benefit my country. I believe it would serve real interests not only our two peoples, but of world at large. Nor can I accept your contention it is "one-sided" on my part prefer seek agreement on basis your Dec 1 draft, as amplified

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-2156. Confidential; Limit Distribution.



clarified by my amendments, other than switching over to new and unsatisfactory basis your May 11 draft.

C. Nevertheless, I have not refused exchange views with you on what you term embargo. On contrary. I have consistently expressed willingness take note of whatever views you may wish put forward this regard, while at same time expressing our attitude toward matter. Such attitude my part is not inconsistent with my position our first immediate task should be that of reaching agreement on renunciation force. In fact, believe any rational and dispassionate consideration of matter of trade would only reinforce point have so often made here: —that trade problem stands in collateral relation to problem we dealing with in our discussions renunciation force. That is, so long as threat and possibility exist that goods received in trade would be used support hostile action against forces my country, it not realistic expect my country look with favor on such trade.

D. Another reason why I should be glad hear your views on topic trade is that in your remarks so far you given no indication what advantage you expect or demand from discussion that topic. You have talked in vague general terms of what you call policy international blockade and embargo, and demanded its abolition. I not aware any blockade by my country. As for what you term “embargo” you have repeatedly avoided my questions as to just what aspect or aspects this matter you had in mind. You have denied your country has experienced any difficulty as result trade policies my country. You have acknowledged principle trade should take place only on terms mutual benefit; yet that precisely purpose trade policies my country. Where trade can or may have effect supporting use force against one of parties to exchange, how can it be considered mutually beneficial?

E. So far your remarks on subject trade seem be utterly out of keeping with your position in introducing topic, when you seemed have in mind some specific advantage your country. You say what you call policy embargo should be abolished, not for good your country, but for good of my country and other countries. Inasmuch as measures with regard trade with your country which are in effect my country and other countries have been effected accordance their respective sovereign decisions and interests, I find this position yours hard understand.

F. You also say what you seek in demanding abolition these measures is general improvement relations between our two countries. As have often pointed out you here, in addition carrying out our agreed announcement Sept 10 last year first essential step to improvement relations between two countries is agreement on meaningful renunciation force. Only by so doing can we approach peaceful resolution our differences—whatever their nature—in atmosphere free from overhanging

threat force. Yet practical effect your present insistence on prior discussion trade is to delay agreement on renunciation force, thus put off, rather than hasten, improvement relations. Would welcome any concrete views you can put forward this morning that will clarify these points.

2. Speaking from notes, Wang replied he did not deny declaration on renunciation force one of central issues in dispute between two countries. As matter fact this patient attitude their side was fully proved by fact they put forward three drafts for such declaration and joined in discussion this topic for as long as ten months. However failure so far reach agreement or make progress in discussion this topic making declaration renouncing use force has been due to persistence my side in unreasonable demands we put forward and our failure also been due to fact my side deliberately created obstacles in way reaching agreement that regard.

3. Wang continued if there genuine desire make meaningful declaration on renunciation force there no reason why their reasonable proposals should not be accepted. It would not in any way contribute to progress in discussion of declaration to merely repeat desire not to abandon efforts on this topic, while at same time there is failure offer concrete changes. Since we had found difficulty on question making declaration renunciation force, we should try not entangle ourselves any longer in this respect, because there are other problems and disputes between two countries which awaiting solution. That was why he had been insisting on our discussion of question of embargo.

4. Wang said in discussing this problem of embargo their side already made clear their position on question. He was pleased note I had expressed willingness discuss this problem with him and had been willing hear concrete opinion their side would put forward this respect. (Turning to prepared statement, Wang continued.) He would now put forward draft agreed announcement to be adopted by two sides this matter. He proposed two sides adopt and announce this draft agreed announcement as means of settling disputes between China and US on trade.

5. Wang read draft agreed announcement on trade (Geneva's telegram 168). Handed me copies.

6. Wang continued he sure if I carefully study draft will find it entirely fair reasonable advantageous to both sides. Adoption and announcement of this agreed announcement would not only resolve one of outstanding problems between our two countries thereby bringng about gradual improvement Sino-American relations, but will certainly contribute to relaxation international tensions. Goes without saying practical problems will not be resolved by mere adoption this

agreed announcement; thus following issuance announcement parties expected actually to take measures on own initiative to ensure its implementation.

7. I replied was glad note he still agreed with me question meaningful renunciation force central issue between us. However, entirely unable agree failure thus far reach agreement due what he termed unreasonable demands my side. I entirely unable agree my side deliberately created obstacles to our reaching such agreement. In fact situation very much other way around. I carefully took his draft of Dec 1 which seemed to offer prospect of agreement and made only few essential amendments thereto that would make clear it would cover our most serious disagreement and neither of us sacrificing inherent right self defense. Twice in succession I had offered suggestions in attempt meet his point view, entirely preserving language his proposal. This could hardly be characterized as unreasonable or deliberately creating obstacles. However, his action abandoning even that portion in which we had already reached agreement, reverting back to old positions and conditions, even adding new conditions, had been real obstacle to agreement. Despite time admittedly spent discussing this, extremely difficult me interpret this as genuine desire reach agreement. Way reach agreement was preserve areas agreement already reached and advance from there. This what I had attempted do and if his side would adopt same attitude I satisfied agreement could be reached between us. My April 19 draft did this and if we could proceed from that—which based on his Dec 1 draft—it seemed to me progress could be resumed.

8. I reiterated with respect his proposal this morning principal barrier improvement relations was continued threat his side initiate use force to resolve dispute in Taiwan area. All my suggestions with regard declaration renunciation force directed toward resolving that problem on mutually beneficial basis, thus really opening door toward resolution other problems between us. As I pointed out last meeting and again this morning, question trade relations was effect of that situation, rather than cause. Would appreciate any thoughts he might have on how this cause might be removed.

9. Wang replied from proposal he made this morning for agreed announcement designed remove embargo, their efforts in gradually improving relations between two countries could be noted. We faced with great number issues which require resolving one by one. As regards allegation made by me few moments ago that China threatened use force Taiwan area, could only consider allegation slanderous without basis. One which used force in Taiwan area not China but US itself. Their side always maintained removal embargo was one of ways

improving relations between two countries. If we should attempt put together all issues and entangle them, we would find we not able settle any one them. Therefore, he considered in discussing question trade and embargo nobody should impose any precondition. This morning he would appreciate any views I might have with regard draft agreed announcement he just put forward.

10. I said thought I had expressed views very clearly. I had not and would not create artificial entanglement of issues. I thought inherent relationship between questions renunciation and trade very clear. If trade between our two countries to be of benefit my country, should be clear goods received in that trade would not be used support use force. This inevitably led us back to question renunciation force. Hard to see how discussion of item trade could be fruitful until question renunciation force resolved. This not artificial but perfectly natural and logical relationship. Hoped by next meeting he would have considered matter from this standpoint. I would welcome any concrete thoughts he had for its resolution.

11. Wang could not feel satisfied with my remarks this respect. During long months passed in discussion previous topic renunciation force US consistently created obstacles preventing us reaching agreement. However I also indicated willing discuss question embargo and suggested he put forward concrete views on question trade. Now that he had put forward concrete views and concrete proposals this morning, I again tried evade positive reply while at same time putting forward preconditions. In view this situation, could he take it I not willing discuss question embargo and not willing seek practical settlement this problem? At same time could he take it my side not willing consider reasonable proposal he put forward this morning. He would appreciate clarification by me to problems he raised.

12. I denied ever saying not willing consider any proposal he put forward. I many times offered receive his views on trade. At same time always pointed out inherent relationship between this and renunciaton force and asked that he at same time reconsider his positon with regard renunciation force. In that way I had hoped time could be conserved and progress resumed. I would make any further comments in this regard at our next meeting.

13. Wang asked if I meant I would make further comments on proposal he made this morning.

14. I replied was not going to be tied down to what I would say next meeting or make advance commitments.

15. Wang said thought we must realize we have very important responsibilities in these talks. Our responsibility is seek by every means

at our disposal, to bring about improvement in relations between China and US. We must endeavor by every means within our ability to remove existing obstacles in relations between two countries. This he considered highly important necessity for both our sides. It precisely based on this approach to these talks that his side entered talks. All proposals he made were made in this spirit. We both recognized that existing embargo was one of obstacles in relations between our two countries.

If we could succeed in reaching reasonable solution to this dispute it would certainly contribute to resolution of other disputes. He believed this approach reasonable and realistic. He had not tried reverse order of things. In view my willingness consider proposal he made this morning, he hoped at next meeting I would have carefully studied it and make concrete reply.

16. I replied he had said removal of what he called embargo between two countries would contribute to resolution of other disputes between us. There were three problems between us which my side had thus far raised. First question was that of Americans detained in his country at opening these talks and ten of whom still detained in spite of what I thought was resolution of that problem last September. Other two as we well know were: question of renunciation force specifically applicable to Taiwan area; I also previously raised here with him question of accounting for military personnel still missing from Korean hostilities. These were questions I had thus far raised in these talks. Could I interpret his remark, therefore, to imply that if question of embargo satisfactorily resolved from this standpoint, it would contribute to resolution of these problems I had raised.

17. Wang said obliged point out question of what I called missing Americans which I had just mentioned, not within terms reference these talks. As regards other questions I raised he might say his side also not satisfied. For instance, on question of returning civilians if US had faithfully abided by agreement we reached here last year, he sure situation would be much more satisfactory than now. Situation equally true on question making declaration renunciation force. If my side had accepted his proposal making declaration without prejudice to sovereign rights and territorial integrity of parties and without prejudice to domestic matters of parties—he satisfied we able make progress that regard. If my side had accepted that principle he satisfied we would long ago have made declaration. I had repeatedly made allegation of existence threat force but why had my side not made declaration on renouncing force on basis principles contained his proposals—that is without prejudice sovereign rights and territorial integrity and without interfering internal affairs other side. It could thus be seen which

side always ready resolve issues and which side not willing do same. As pointed out, question embargo is obstacle in relations between two countries. Also wanted point out if I would only accept proposal he made this morning he satisfied it would certainly contribute to resolution other problems as well. Agreement in this regard would certainly create favorable atmosphere and provide us with favorable basis for settlement issues between two countries. Could anyone deny this is what both our two peoples desire?

18. I said when we were discussing agreed announcement on civilians, I completely met his point view on third power arrangements in US, on removing all barriers to return Chinese students who desired return his country, on form of announcement he desired make in this regard, and on his desire make no specific statement of exact time limit within which Americans permitted return, with understanding this would resolve first problem I had raised in these talks, return of Americans. Fact that US completely abided by this agreement incontrovertibly sustained by fact third power arrangement even after passage almost year, has not brought to our attention single case obstruction. Yet in spite this, it has not resolved problem of return of Americans. As I previously pointed out we seem to be going backwards in this regard. With regard announcement on renunciation force, I accepted in full all language of his Dec 1 draft, making only minimal amendments required to make it really meaningful with regard to our most serious dispute. When he said acceptance of proposal with regard trade would contribute to solution of other problems between us and provide basis for settlement issues it certainly understandable if I asked what concrete content such a statement had.

19. Wang said was sure he had already clearly answered in several remarks this morning, questions I asked. Agreement on removal embargo would demonstrate two of us here really engaged in settling questions rather than stalling and were really working to get rid of obstacles rather than creating obstacles in our relations. Success in this regard would indicate even though we met difficulties on other issues, yet we have scored progress in this present problem. For both of us solving problems better than not solving.

20. I had nothing more. Wang asked if I agreeable meeting Thursday Sept 6. I was.

Gowen

**705. Letter 54 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 54

Washington, August 31, 1956

Dear Alex:

Your letter of August 20 reached us after Walter McConaughy had departed August 24 for a week's leave in Alabama. However copies have been sent to Messrs. Robertson, Phleger and Sebald. We had a brief meeting before Walter left to consider developments at the last meeting. While we recognize the problem created by Wang's efforts to push you into a corner on whether or not we will discuss trade, we consider it unlikely that the Chinese Communists will endeavor to bring about a break or a prolonged suspension of the talks over this issue. It seems more likely that they will go to the public again in an endeavor to make propaganda capital out of their proposed agreed announcement on trade. We are satisfied that we are still in a strong public position so long as Peiping still holds Americans and refuses to announce the use of force. We will meet on Sept. 4 after Walter's return to prepare your instructions for the next meeting which we hope will give you the kind of guidance requested.

It is unfortunate that Time Magazine distorted your remarks. However the story does not appear to have been picked up by any other news source in the United States nor have we seen it used on Communist broadcasts.

The Red Cross is still engaged in the process of interviewing prisoners. It has taken somewhat longer than they estimated but it seems to be proceeding smoothly enough. We do not know how the interviews are resulting because it was arranged for them to report only after all interviews were completed. However, we know that there is at least one prisoner who desires to go to Mainland China, as he has written us direct. However he is one who we thought had claimed American citizenship and therefore was not included on the original list. The final decision has not been made here as to whether or not we will bring the Indian Embassy in on the return of prisoners to Communist China. We will discuss your views at our next meeting.

The most important recent event in our relations with Communist China was the shooting down of a patrol plane last week. Enclosed is a copy of the Note delivered to Peiping by the British at our request and the Chinese Communist reply. On the basis of the facts we have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.



been able to gather about the incident, there is little question but that the plane was shot down by Chinese Communist fighters. However it appears that the plane may have been off course and over Chinese Communist territory or territorial waters when attacked. Whether it was forced there by Communist fighters is unknown. The Secretary has drafted a public statement giving the facts so far as we know them and characterizing the attack as unprovoked and unjustified. It will also state that we will demand reparations. The finishing touches are being put on the statement in consultation with the Pentagon today and it will probably be issued before you receive this letter. We will see that you receive the text of the statement promptly.

The results of O'Neill's renewed request to visit American prisoners were as expected. We shall await a reasonable time to see what reply the Chinese Communists will make to his approach. We intend to have him keep pressing Peiping on this point emphasizing the fact that American prisoners have been prevented from communicating with him and contrasting this with our offer to permit the Indians to see Chinese prisoners here even when the latter had not communicated with the Indian Embassy.

We were glad to have Dave's letter enclosing his careful study of the new material on the missing servicemen. Col. Monroe who has just returned from a trip to Korea is coming over today to discuss the next move. A recent communication from UNCMAC gives their view that the matter should not be taken up again in UNCMAC but rather shifted to Geneva. We do not understand clearly the reasons for this and hope that Col. Monroe will be able to clarify this.

The Chinese student in the mental institution at Logansport, Indiana to whom we sent a copy of the Agreed Announcement has indicated he wishes to communicate with the Indian Embassy. We have told him he may do so. And we have also informed the Indian Embassy of the case and our readiness to allow him to go to Mainland China so that they could not put it to us as a case of an individual claiming obstruction and thus mar the perfect record to date of having received no such representation.

The Chinese Communists are engaged in an all out campaign to have Americans come to Communist China. In addition to the visas approved for the news men, invitations have been issued to the U.S. National Students Association, to some of the relatives of American prisoners and we recently heard from an American missionary that he had been invited to make a trip to Communist China.

We are trying to get a hold of two copies of the Yale University publication on Chinese language reform which you requested and will send them to you as soon as we can get them.



I hope you have a fine vacation and return renewed to the fray  
September 7.

Sincerely,

Ralph N. Clough

Enclosures:

1. Excerpts from Letter of April 22, 1956 from Mr. McCann
2. Article by David Lawrence "On Rejecting Reds' New Lure"
3. FBIS article re comment of Chinese Communist Mission visiting Jordan.
4. Copy of text of letter sent to Peiping by British Aug. 25, 1956 re shooting down of patrol plane.
5. Copy of text of telegram from British Charge in Peiping, Aug. 25, re shooting down of patrol plane.

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**706. Telegram 248 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 5, 1956, 6:56 p.m.

248. For Johnson.

Guidance for September 7 meeting.

1. Trade Controls. You should decline discuss Wang's draft agreed announcement on trade (your 168), or discuss either CHINCOM multilateral trade control system or U.S. unilateral total embargo on trade with Communist China. Base your refusal to discuss on following grounds: (a) persistent Chinese Communist refusal to renounce force and continued threat use force which makes it unthinkable on national security basis for U.S. to contribute through trade to Communist China industrial and economic build up; and (b) Chinese Communist breach of Agreed Announcement of September 10 which casts serious doubt on Chinese Communist good faith in implementation of any commitment Chinese Communist representatives may enter into. In making this point you should continue leave open question of our attitude in event prisoners are released and Chinese Communists agree to pending renunciation of force declaration. We do not wish indicate whether we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–556. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Clough; cleared by Dulles in draft and by Sebald.

would or would not lower our economic guard as a result of Chinese Communist assent to renunciation of force principle. Although you will continue use all your resources keep talks going, you should not be deterred from explicitly refusing discuss trade by any fear Wang may use it as a pretext for breaking off or recessing talks. Even if Chinese Communists have made firm decision suspend talks unless we make concessions on trade, we do not intend to yield to pressure on trade issue.

We do not see that you are impaled on horns of any dilemma in taking this position. So long as Chinese Communists have not given us satisfaction on renunciation of force and implementation Agreed Announcement, propaganda position Chinese Communists in resort to public press, would be vulnerable. We consider our public position strong and are prepared defend it positively if Chinese Communists again resort to publicity. Foregoing not intended prevent you from offering to listen anything further Wang may want to offer on trade question, so long as you do not participate in trade discussion with him.

2. Renunciation of Force. If it seems necessary in order provide material for discussion you may inform Wang we are exploring possibility of formulating new revision his Dec. 1 draft. We hope be able inform him at next meeting results our study. FYI, we believe our April 16 revision of Wang's draft probably best that can be done. END FYI

3. Return of Nationals. Seize occasion of approaching first anniversary issuance Agreed Announcement to reiterate our protest at continued imprisonment 10 American citizens in violation long standing Chinese Communist commitment and obligation to release them expeditiously. You should take Wang to task with more than ordinary vigor in view lapse of full year.

4. Give Wang text our press release of August 31 characterizing Aug. 23 attack on Navy patrol plane in East China Sea as unjustified. Tell Wang this tragic occurrence demonstrates anew need for genuine Chinese Communist renunciation of force. So long as present posture Chinese Communist regime continues, danger of attacks such as this ever present. State our conviction present Chinese Communist attitude of hostility makes impossible attainment of stable and secure situation in Far East.

FYI Your talks should not become forum for discussion merits this case. It is to be used as illustration of need for renunciation of force and as demonstration of dangers of unjustifiable destruction of life and property resulting from trigger-happy attitude on Communist side. Parenthetically, markings on all US planes including this Navy Mercator, of course entirely different from markings on GRC planes and clearly distinguishable therefrom. END FYI

Dulles

**707. Telegram 230 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 7, 1956, 2 p.m.

230. From Johnson.

One hour fifty minute meeting this morning. I opened with statement along lines paragraphs 1 and 4 Deptel 248, handing him copy Aug 31 press release. He replied with statement on renunciation force and trade reiterating old points and then made fairly extensive prepared statement on plane incident during which he refused pick up Aug 31 press release, as “only PRC has right make protest this incident” and handed me copy Sept 2 PRC press release. In reply I pointed out that in my original statement I said I did not intend enter into discussion plane incident here and was giving him copy press release as matter of courtesy in order that his authorities would have full and accurate text. Noted we had already received through UK copy Sept 2 PRC release but glad take copy he had handed me. Then made fairly extensive statement on trade and renunciation force making it more explicitly clear than in opening statement that I was not willing discuss trade until they had accepted principle of renunciation force and agreement reached on text declaration. In course this statement emphasized our record flexibility on language renunciation force statement and willingness to consider and reconsider any language that preserved essential principles. Hoped he would be in position next meeting abandon May 11 draft and seriously negotiate with me on text which would preserve area of agreement shown our April 19 draft. Avoided any expressed or implied commitment we would present new draft. In reply Wang accused me merely repetition old positions and stated PRC “would have to consider making its position public”. With respect to plane incident picked-up copy August 31 press release as “informal document for their information only.” I expressed regret they intended again resort publicity and propaganda and said that if they made statement US would, of course, have to consider making reply.

I then made strong and extensive statement on implementation in reply to which he asked whether US willing to release all Chinese in prison US “so they could return.” I of course immediately reiterated our position on Chinese prisoners and pointed out PRC bears full responsibility any delay in return any who might desire do so.

I agreed his suggestion next meeting Thursday Sept 20. Returning Prague tomorrow, arriving Sunday evening.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–756. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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708. Telegram 231 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 7, 1956, 4 p.m.

231. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting:

Although Wang said only they were "considering" public statement assume in accordance previous pattern they will in fact issue one from Peiping sometime prior to next meeting. Although Osborn will remain here to handle anything that might develop, am not planning any reply from here as assume Dept will issue whatever reply considered desirable.

Although I have now made entirely clear no "discussion" trade in absence renunciation force and also linked this to implementation Sept 10 agreement, should anticipate they may attempt exploit my willingness "listen" to what they have said on trade to give impression to third countries there has been some substantive discussion this subject, or at least commitment our part to consider lowering trade controls in exchange for abandonment their position with respect Taiwan. Might also anticipate their statement will follow Wang's line at today's meeting in attempting like US renunciation force proposal with "violation their airspace and territorial waters" by downed Navy patrol plane and search craft. In this regard Dept will note Wang anticipated and attempted enter into substantive discussion plane incident which I avoided by refusing reply his charges except by reference Dept's Aug 31 statement.

Dept will also note at today's meeting he more clearly than ever in past invited new draft on renunciation force. While we can reach decision on tactics for next meeting only after seeing their public statement, believe it probably would contribute to our objective if at next meeting I was able introduce another draft on renunciation that would give appearance of something new.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-756. Secret; Limit Distribution.

**709. Telegram 232 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 7, 1956, 6 p.m.

232. From Johnson.

1. I opened 57th with prepared statement:

A. Hope you have reconsidered remarks made at last few meetings, and particularly at last meeting, on inescapable priority of question of agreement by your govt to genuine renunciation force.

B. As pointed out fruitful discussion trade cannot be expected under conditions in which your govt persistently refuses agreement and attempts evade clearly renouncing use force in disputes involving two countries, and in fact even continues openly threaten use force. Just common prudence dictates my country not contribute to increasing economic industrial potential of country which maintains such posture toward my country.

C. Tragic event of night of Aug 22–23 in which lives of number my countrymen unjustifiably taken again demonstrates need for your govt genuinely renounce use force. So long as your govt maintains present attitude this subject danger of attacks such as this will always be present. Most solemnly must state conviction that continuation of this attitude of hostility and readiness destroy lives property of others makes impossible that attainment of stable secure situation in Far East which my govt continues seek. Cite this merely by way example and not for purpose of here discussing unhappy incident. However in order your authorities may have full accurate text, I am giving you copy joint statement Departments State and Defense of August 31 with regard this incident. (Pointed copy on table.)

D. Also related to this is question of good faith in carrying out agreements. All too clear and continued failure your authorities permit return detained Americans accordance our agreement of year ago cannot but give rise to increasingly serious doubts this regard.

E. This then is situation which two of us confronted. Question is what we do resolve it. It clear it cannot be resolved by discussion subsidiary subjects, but only by progress on fundamentals, that is, unconditional renunciation force as I have proposed and by carrying out in full our agreement Sept 10 last year.

F. Very much look forward to hearing from you this morning anything that will assist us in making progress on these fundamentals.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–756PA. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

2. Wang replied from prepared statement: Two of us had spent long time on discussion issuance renunciation force declaration. In course this discussion his side had repeatedly put forward reasonable proposals for making such declaration. Failure so far, after 11 months, to arrive at agreement due to persistent demand my side to encroach upon sovereign rights his country. If my side desired make progress on this, then must give up unreasonable demands before we could succeed.

3. Wang continued, was with aim pushing talks forward and making talks yield fruitful progress that his side proposed subject removal embargo. As he consistently had pointed out embargo one of obstacles in relations between two countries, is unjustifiable in itself, should therefore be removed. Again, as he observed at last meeting, agreement between both sides on removal embargo would create favorable atmosphere in talks and contribute toward resolution other problems. He must however frankly point out my side must not expect his side accept demands that encroach on sovereign rights their side in exchange for removal embargo because this simply could not be accepted.

4. Wang continued, as regards plane incident Aug 23 I had mentioned, he must point out this incident another case serious provocation by US military aircraft against his country. Incident involved US military aircraft making intrusion into territorial air his country. This established as indisputable fact which US Govt itself could not but acknowledge in statement. Hostile military aircraft intruding into territorial air of sovereign state is something no sovereign country could tolerate and remain idle. Intruded area, as known, is combat zone and therefore all consequences intrusion by US aircraft must be responsibility US itself. Following this violation territorial air of China by said military aircraft, US Naval vessels and aircraft again Aug 23–24 intruded in force their territorial sea and air in planned manner. Instead accepting serious protest his govt, my govt had even made unreasonable demands on his govt—this entirely unjustifiable.

He might put question, suppose military aircraft his country intruded in territorial air US, what did I think consequences be. Could US remain idle without taking any action against this aircraft? In this incident his govt alone had right make protest therefore could not accept copy this document I handed him this morning. Incident Aug 23 only one of many incidents of provocative nature on part US against territory his country.

5. Wang continued, such incidents clearly at variance with objectives renunciation force, subject which I had suggested. They considered success in making declaration renunciation force must not remain in words but must be carried out in action. We now confronted situation in which US side not only failed put forward constructive proposals for making renunciation force declaration but US also not

stopped continuous provocative acts against this country. This performance US could not contribute improvement relations between two countries. In order I might clearly understand position his govt he would hereby give me copy English translation statement made by his Ministry Foreign Affairs Sept 2. Next he would appreciate my making comments on reasonable draft he put forward last meeting on question removal embargo.

6. I replied was not sure he understood me regarding copy statement I offered him. We had previously received through Office UK Charge Peiping copy statement issued his Foreign Office Sept 2. However, was glad accept additional copy he made available this morning. Statement I had offered him was only copy public statement which had already been issued. I simply making it available him for information so he would have full and accurate text. Doing this as matter of courtesy. Of course if he did not desire accept it, it was his choice entirely. Point of view US very clearly and carefully set forth in that statement. Had no intent taking time here recapitulate what already contained that statement. As said, not my purpose enter into discussion here.

7. I continued, with regard present stage negotiation on declaration renunciation force he stated he put forward repeatedly what he termed reasonable proposals this regard. Could not agree this was case. As previously pointed out, he had since Dec 1 gone backwards in this respect. I in turn had consistently attempted preserve area of agreement we had reached and go forward. I not taken any hard fast attitude on exactly how such declaration should be expressed. I had been insistent only on principles it should contain if it is to have real meaning. Even accepted in his draft Dec 1 form and words contained therein. In attempt fully meet his point view I offered on two successive occasions amendments to that draft Dec 1 adding only minimum necessary make it really meaningful. I had made no unreasonable demands on his govt. My suggestions had been fully reciprocal and had not required his govt sacrifice or prejudice its views in any way. Had only been insistent declaration be really meaningful and there be full understanding between us as to its meaning. That is, it not be empty words devoid of real content and understanding between us. Have considered in past and willing reconsider in future question of how principles can be expressed in form acceptable to both sides. I did not have closed mind on subject but consider way to make progress was move ahead from points of agreement already reached and not try establish new conditions and revert to old positons as he had done in May 11 draft. Had kept hoping he would approach matter with same attitude.

8. I said my position regard discussion trade at this stage not based upon any arbitrary attempt establish relationship between this item and renunciation force but only on inescapable substantive

relationship between these two things. My views on this fully set forth. As previously said, I fully prepared listen his views on trade while he considering question renunciation force. Once his govt had accepted principle renunciation force, and agreement reached on declaration that regard, then could be discussion of item regard trade he proposed. However, did not think useful or productive for me comment on proposal he had made until that time.

9. I said would hope he would be able abandon position taken May 11 draft and that preserving area agreement shown my April 19 (note: 19) draft we could really get ahead on question making declaration renunciation force. If he not position do so this morning, hoped he would at next meeting so we could sit down and really accomplish something this regard.

10. Wang replied, had fully set forth this morning position his side on question making renunciation force, that is, if we were to make progress on this, my side must either accept their proposal or produce some new proposal acceptable to both sides. However, I had just now made mere repetition my position and he did not think this resetting forth old positions would help us in this discussion. He must point out however it was simply stalling tactics my side and insistence my side on unjustifiable demands that caused failure reach agreement on this so far.

11. Wang said it was in view this that his side proposed we discuss question removing embargo. I had again said willing listen views his side on question removing embargo and would be willing take under consideration that question. Yet his side already made concrete proposal this regard and I had again evaded definite reply. I had even further put forward unjustifiable precondition to this discussion. As said this morning, any attempt my part make his side accept unreasonable demands in exchange for removal embargo will prove illusion and will prove be something cannot accept at all. His side strongly and continuously opposed any such attempt. Attitude adopted my side on question embargo could not but compel his side consider making public its position on question embargo.

12. Wang said with regard Aug 23 plane incident and statement my govt I mentioned this morning, he already made clear protest his govt this incident. Since I had explained it not my purpose discuss matter here and since I stated this statement only informal document for information, he would be ready accept this document.

13. Wang picked document off table.

14. I said thought we ought be clear as to what had prevented agreement thus far on renunciation force declaration. There were two things. One has been unwillingness his govt make it clear such declaration covers what we both agree is most serious dispute between us:



that is Taiwan area. Second has been his insistence my govt abandon right self defense. World readily able judge which these positions reasonable, which unreasonable. World also be able readily judge whether reasonable that this fundamental question of whether there is to be resort to force in these disputes be resolved before there is discussion of such matters as trade. Regretted his decision again resort to public statements and propaganda with regard these talks. However perfectly willing if he desired that our respective positions be made public. If his govt did make public statement, of course my govt must consider matter of making reply thereto.

15. I said thought world also able judge whether our agreement of almost exactly one year ago been carried out by his side. Impossible me understand what his authorities think they gaining by avoiding carrying out that agreement. That was first question in terms of reference for these talks. Over year later still outstanding question. Ten Americans still remained in prisons his country in spite of clear commitment they be permitted expeditiously return. As I had pointed out they had even gone backwards as far as people and govt my country could see. Apparently policy now was require prisoners serve full term their sentences no matter how unreasonable or unjustified sentence might have been. From standpoint my govt there seems be no advantage—in fact disadvantage from this agreement. I must most strongly emphasize our dissatisfaction, disappointment this agreement not being carried out and this source friction between our two countries not being removed as I proposed at very outset these talks.

16. Wang said could not agree with remarks I just made. Purpose these talks try seek solution of issues between two countries. Not purpose make propaganda. He did not want leave questions under discussion for long without attaining results. He did not want let world be deprived of information on what had taken place in these talks. Sure public opinion in position judge which side reasonable and which not.

17. Wang noted as to question civilians, that most of persons whose names he had given me had not returned and no accounting been made. Moreover unreasonable requirement with regard Taiwan entry permits, requirement Chinese in US apply for permanent residence not been removed. He sure public opinion also able make fair judgment on this matter. World would readily and clearly see that since talks began greater part of Americans in China had returned to their country as result lenient policy his govt. These facts could not be disputed by anyone.

18. I replied our announcement of September 10 did not say greater part Americans in his country be able return within year after announcement—announcement said all would be able return expeditiously.

19. Wang said our agreement did not say all Americans in prison who committed crimes would be able return promptly disregarding Chinese law.

20. I said it did not say some Americans, it did not say except those in prison, it said all Americans would be able return.

21. Wang said but this agreement did not specify precise time. Or was my govt in position release all forty odd Chinese in prisons my country.

22. I said had told him previously, any who desired return would be able promptly return, whether in prison or not.

23. Wang asked if we in position release all those people from prison and let them decide whether or not they wish return his country.

24. I said did not get his point. Did he mean they should all be released, whether they wanted return or not? Our agreed announcement covered people who desired return.

25. Wang asked how could person in US prison express free will as to whether he desires return to his country. That was what he not ready believe. Even people out of prison in US had all sorts worries and apprehension on question returning. How could one expect people in prison decide freely?

26. I replied person in prison could certainly decide whether desires remain serve out term accordance normal processes justice or whether desires immediate return his country. That not hard decision make. I had set forth plan to enable them to assure themselves prisoners had freely made decision. It just had never occurred to me he could or would object to procedures we set forth. They went far beyond anything we required do under agreed announcement. It was attitude his govt that had prevented Indian Embassy from acting in accordance with procedures we set forth. Therefore any delay is solely and absolutely responsibility his govt.

27. Wang replied this serious remark not credible. Must try judge matter on merits actual facts instead on basis imagination. US authorities repeatedly tried prevent Chinese students return his country by telling them not return to what we call Communist China and by attempting influence them proceed Taiwan. If such acts could be applied people out of prisons one could readily imagine what would be done to people in prison. Chinese in prison could express desire return own country. But ability actually do so another question. These people have to take into account whether by expressing will return their country it would intensify punishment. Problem is whether US would carry out faithfully agreement permit Chinese in US return without applying pressure or offering obstacles to their doing so. He noted that I had taken no step to submit list all Chinese in US which he had repeatedly

requested. Such being case, side which extremely dissatisfied with outcome agreement precisely his side.

28. I said no obligation under agreed announcement submit any list Chinese in US. Obligation was permit Chinese in US who desire do so return his country. Let us keep to facts. Agency established for assuring whether or not this case had not among tens of thousands Chinese in US yet brought to our attention any single case alleged obstruction. This was fact which no amount vague statements, vague charges could controvert. Was also fact Chinese steadily returning his country. I knew of nine who had definitely done so since I last mentioned this subject. This made total 190 I definitely knew of since last Aug 1.

29. Wang said even this 190 did not represent all who desired return. He had given me names 50-odd persons, 52 of whom had not returned. I had stated no allegation been made to US as to obstruction return, but this did not mean there been no difficulties encountered by Chinese. He had repeatedly spoken on this situation. He had nothing further.

30. Wang proposed next meeting Thursday, Sept 20 and I agreed.

Gowen

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#### 710. Letter 44 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 44

Geneva, September 7, 1956

Dear Walter:

I have little to add to my "comment" telegram today. I felt satisfied that the meeting went as well as it did and particularly appreciated the very complete and clear guidance for today's meeting. You will see that I made full use of it. I especially appreciated its explicitness in instructing me not to be deterred in refusing to discuss trade by fear they would use it as a pretext to break off or recess the talks. It gave me just the guidance I was looking for on this subject. I hope you understand that my recent emphasis on the possibility of a break or recess has not been motivated by any change in my feeling they are probably not going to make any major new move until around election time, but simply a desire to anticipate and be prepared for the worst while hoping for the best.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

I felt it a little difficult to carry out the instructions with regard to giving him the copy of the press release on the plane incident and the comments with regard thereto and at the same time not letting these talks become a forum for the discussion of the merits. You will see that I tried to carry this out by weaving it in with renunciation in my opening statement rather than giving it any character of a separate item or waiting for him to initiate discussion of it. Incidentally I have been somewhat surprised at their willingness to fall in with the UK channel on this. Is this not unprecedented on a matter of this kind? Incidentally I also thought the Department's August 31 statement was a real masterpiece of balance and objectivity. It was a very refreshing change from the way similar cases have sometimes been handled in the past. It was also very refreshing not to have Defense and every Lieutenant in the Navy leaking views and news, and not to have Drew Pearson announcing the plane was on a dangerous and secret mission.

As I mentioned in my comment telegram Dave is staying here to be on hand if and when they come out with their public statement rather than going up to Prague with me as we had previously planned. If there is sufficient time after their statement before the next meeting he and Helenka may drive up themselves.

Thank Ralph very much for his letter of August 31 and all its news. I had three nice days in the sun down at Santa Margarita. The first time I have really been warm this summer. I know that is not a complaint you can make in Washington.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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#### 711. Letter from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Prague, September 12, 1956

Dear Walter:

I have just received a telegram from Geneva saying that Senator Mansfield wants to see me in Geneva on September 20 or 21. I have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

replied that I will, of course, be glad to see him, suggesting the 20th in order that I can return here the morning of the 21st.

I have not followed his views recently, and have only noted in *The New York Times* his open telegram to the Secretary suggesting that I take up the plane incident in Geneva. However, I presume he will be satisfied the way it was handled through the U.K.

The only purpose of this letter is if there are any special cautions or advice the Department feels I should have before talking with him, I would appreciate having a telegram sent me at Geneva.

As a responsible member of the Foreign Relations Committee I assume that he is fairly well briefed on our policy and that I can talk with him quite freely.

Incidentally, during Senator Long's recent visit here he did not raise and there was no discussion whatever of my Geneva talks.

Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson  
*Ambassador*

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## 712. Letter 55 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 55

Washington, September 13, 1956

Dear Alex:

The American Red Cross gave us on September 12 their report on the interviews with the Chinese prisoners. They did a very thorough job. They carried out their instructions precisely, presenting the three choices very fairly and explaining the matter fully and impartially. We can say with confidence that no pressure of any sort was exerted on the prisoners, and that they were afforded an opportunity to make up their own minds on the basis of full and exact information, without any interference. Three prisoners elected to go to mainland China, two to Taiwan, and nineteen preferred to remain in prison to serve out their sentences. The remainder had already been released under normal prison regulations. We are having the reports on each of the 24 cases reproduced for transmittal by pouch to you either today or Monday.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

We have not yet decided whether we will bring the Indian Embassy into the picture as to the three who wish to go to Mainland China. We are leaning in that direction mainly because we want to do everything possible to influence Peiping to give O'Neill more scope in his efforts to help our imprisoned nationals. At least we want to put them as much on the defensive as possible if they refuse to give O'Neill any better access. We also would like to present the Communists with the bill for the transportation of these people. Indian participation would make that possible. On the other hand Indian participation might slow up the procedure, when we are impatient to move the three out of here as fast as possible. No final decision has been made yet. But we already are working with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Bureau of Prisons on the preliminary steps looking in the parole of the three individuals for shipment out of the country. Immigration and Naturalization Service does not care whether they are deported or leave voluntarily with Indian assistance.

The GRC is committed in writing to take any prisoners who choose Taiwan so long as the Indians are not allowed to interview the prisoners. We intend to hold them to this commitment. We had Dr. Tan in yesterday and gave him the results of the interviews. We are sending you by pouch a copy of our telegram to Taipei reporting on the interview and explaining why we prefer that the GRC not insist on visiting the prisoners. Tan did not raise the matter yesterday and we are hopeful that they will not rock the boat. We have had a good and complete survey and any interference with the prisoners at this stage by the GRC representatives could only be harmful.

Enclosed are various press releases on the U.S. Navy plane incident of August 23, including our note of protest of September 8 which the British delivered in Peiping September 11; an announcement on the reported finding by the Chinese Communists of the body of a second member of the crew, Jack Curtis; and U.S. Navy statement of September 13 announcing the discontinuance of search operations and the planned shipment of the two bodies recovered by the Communists from Shanghai to Japan on September 22.

We are also enclosing a report by Col. Monroe on his recent visit to the MAC concerning the accounting for the missing servicemen.

We are having a meeting this afternoon to discuss the guidance for your meeting of September 20. The main topic will be the question of whether we will propose any changes in the draft on renunciation of force.

Mr. Phleger was away on leave for a while and since his return has been pretty much tied up because of the Suez crisis. We expect him at the session this afternoon.

For your background things are looking a little better on the trade controls question. By agreeing to give a little ground on the China list, we have brought the Japanese more or less into line. We have had high level meetings with the British, French, Germans and Italians at which we have presented quite strongly our case for preserving a substantial China differential, with some concessions on our part. We are hoping that with Japanese support, combined with the pressures we are putting on these countries, we can hold the line at least for the near future. A CG meeting is contemplated for December.

Everybody here likes the way you handled the last meeting. While we naturally do not invite any resort to publicity by the Chinese Communists, we are prepared to meet it and do not fear it.

Keep up the good work. Regards from us all to Dave, Helenka and Col. Ekvall as well as well as to you.

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

**ENCLOSURES:**

1. Interviews by Red Cross Representatives
  2. Press Release No. 480
  3. Note to British protesting shooting down of Navy plane.
  4. Report from Col. Monroe
  5. Letter to Mr. Youde from Mr. Clough dated September 11, 1956,
- D. Kelly
6. Letter to Cong. Lane
  7. Navy Statement of Sept. 13.

**Enclosure**

**U.S. Navy Statement<sup>2</sup>**

Undated

**Navy Release**

The Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet advises Adm. Stuart Ingersoll was directed today to discontinue the search operations for possible survivors of the Naval P4M Marcator shot down over international waters off the Chu Shan Archipelago on the night of 22–23 August. A constant search by ship and aircraft of the Seventh Fleet Patrol day and night since

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<sup>2</sup>No classification marking.

August 23 has exhausted all possibilities for rescue of any survivors. The bodies of Albert Perry Mattin, USN and Lt. Commander James Pansford, USN, were recovered by ship research group in the same area in which floating wreckage of the plane was located. The Chinese Communists have announced the recovery of William Frederick Haskins, USN and Jack Albert Curtis, USN. They further reported that the bodies of Haskins and Curtis were delivered by them to British Consul General, Shanghai on September 12. It is expected that the bodies will be returned to United States authorities in Yokahama, Japan via the S.S. Ouwerkatt leaving Shanghai about 22 September. Next of kin of those recovered have been previously notified by the Navy Department.

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**713. Telegram 300 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 17, 1956, 7:33 p.m.

300. For Johnson.

Following is excerpt relating to Taiwan from Liu Shao-chi speech September 15 Chinese Communist Party Congress:

QUOTE Furthermore in order to defend our country we must continue to strengthen our national defense, we must continue to strengthen our national defense army—the glorious Chinese people's liberation army. Our armed forces must strive to raise their fighting capacity to a higher level, guard our frontiers and coast lines vigilantly and defend our territorial integrity.

Our territory Taiwan is still under the occupation of the US imperialists. This is a most serious threat to the security of our country. The liberation of Taiwan is purely China's internal affair. We are willing to bring Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland through the peaceful means of negotiation and avoid the use of force. If force has to be used it would only be when all possibilities for peaceful negotiation have been exhausted or when peaceful negotiations have failed. Whatever means we adopt we are convinced that we will win the ultimate victory in the just cause of liberating Taiwan. END QUOTE

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1756. Official Use Only; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough.



**714. Telegram 301 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 17, 1956, 7:33 p.m.

301. For Johnson.

Guidance for September 20 meeting.

1. Renunciation of force. Again show how our April 19 revision introduces minimum changes Communist December 1 draft which provided reasonable starting point for negotiation although not in itself sufficiently explicit constitute acceptable formulation renunciation of force declaration. These changes were essential to demonstrate to world both sides sincerely willing renounce use of force Taiwan area and pursue objectives by peaceful means only. Characterize Communist May 11 draft as step backward. (FYI After thorough consideration possible reformulation our April 19 revision, we are satisfied our objectives best served by holding to present draft. We consider it strong position on which defend ourselves publicly against Communist propaganda effort. We do not repeat not contemplate any revision. END FYI)

Refer to passage from Liu Shao-chi speech before 8th Party Congress September 15 regarding Communist intention take Taiwan (Deptel 300).

Observe that apparent PRC determination bring Taiwan under Communist domination by any means necessary including use of force would seem to indicate further attempts to arrive at meaningful renunciation of force may be foredoomed to failure. Surmise that PRC high policy reflected in Liu's speech may afford explanation Wang's persistent refusal to agree to effective renunciation of force formula through more than 9 months fruitless discussion this subject at Geneva. Invite Wang to explain and interpret Liu statement in light professed Chinese Communist willingness make comprehensive renunciation of force.

(FYI While there is nothing new in Liu statement on Taiwan we think his high position as Chairman Standing Committee National Peoples Congress and as spokesman for Central Committee of Party and importance of 8th Party Congress before which he spoke justify this special attention. We wish speech used to draw out Wang more fully re Chinese Communist determination use force to extend their sway to Taiwan, if they cannot obtain this objective by less costly means. END FYI)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1756. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy; cleared by Sebald. Repeated to London Priority as telegram Tosec 2.

2. Trade controls. Refuse to discuss trade controls, framing your argument in same terms used last meeting.

3. U.S. Navy Plane. Subject need not be introduced this meeting. However if Wang brings up take same line as last meeting and continue avoid being drawn into discussion merits of case. (FYI Chinese Communists have not yet replied our protest. END FYI)

4. Implementation. In pressing for early release remaining Americans emphasize futility continuing hold these persons hostage as means bringing about improvement of relations. FYI We are proceeding deport promptly to China mainland three Chinese convicts who chose to go there. We are not bringing Indian Embassy into process since Agreed Announcement provides for their intervention only if Chinese wishing to go to mainland encounters obstruction, as we have told them they will be allowed leave and are expediting their departure. We do not propose to inform Wang or to make public announcement regarding Chinese convicts until latter have left US unless we are obliged to do so by Communist propaganda on subject or leak to press in US. END FYI

**Dulles**

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## 715. Telegram 279 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, September 19, 1956, 10 a.m.

279. From Johnson.

Wang (who was on same plane yesterday from Prague) called this morning asking next meeting be postponed to Saturday Sept 22. I implied that because previous engagements greatly preferred Friday, Sept 21. He replied Friday "impossible" for him whereupon I agreed to Saturday, Sept 22.

Do not know what this may presage but manner in which he has handled definitely indicates significant move being planned by Peiping of which he probably only informed after arrival here yesterday.

With reference third sub-paragraph beginning "observe that apparent" paragraph one Deptel 301, presume Dept recognizes that this will give Wang opportunity say that although our reasons differ we now

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1956. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London for Secretary Dulles as telegram 21.

apparently agree his repeated contention further discussion renunciation force declaration fruitless. Together with our refusal discuss trade this could give them better basis from which to move toward recess or termination talks if this their desire.

Gowen

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**716. Telegram 295 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 21, 1956, 6 p.m.

295. From Johnson.

Am making no press comment on CHICOM statement (my telegram 293). If Department issues reply would appreciate prompt transmittal here.

At tomorrow's meeting plan ignore CHICOM's statement unless raised by him and proceed along lines Deptel 301.

Popper

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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**717. Telegram 320 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 21, 1956, 5:59 p.m.

320. For Johnson.

Chinese Communist statement issued Peiping and Geneva September 21 contains nothing new. It does not alter line to be taken your September 22 presentation which should continue be guided by

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2156. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Robertson in substance and Sebald in draft.

Deptel 301. We are considering issuing brief reply Communist statement probably on September 24 which will stress unreasonableness Communist demand we discuss relaxation trade restrictions at time when they continue threaten use force against Taiwan and fail to carry out last year's Agreed Announcement.

We recognize that tone adopted in portion of guidance referred to third paragraph your 279 is somewhat harder than heretofore. However, we do not believe Communist decision to break or not to break will be significantly affected by relatively minor alterations in phraseology used by you in discussions. We feel harder line necessary this stage of talks to emphasize our opposition to their continued insistence on right to use force to achieve their aims.

Line adopted by speakers at Chinese Communist 8th Party Congress and September 21 statement itself do not suggest Peiping moving toward break-off in talks.

**Hoover**

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#### **718. Telegram 297 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 22, 1956, 11 a.m.

297. From Johnson.

Two hour and five minute meeting this morning. I opened with statement along lines para one Deptel 301. While reaffirming same line on means liberation Taiwan China's internal affair his replies were largely pro forma. He did not respond to my subsequent goading him on subject and I obtained nothing new with respect renunciation. He repeated any further moves renunciation must come from US.

After making brief reference to trade he introduced draft announcement on "mutual contacts and cultural exchange" attempting take strong offensive throughout remainder meeting this subject, citing US "obstruction" Porgy and Bess, Peiping Opera, journalists, Peiping Whitman attendance.

I cited their treatment Americans including officials from time Communist takeover mainland, failure implement agreed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2256. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

announcement, and kept coming back to renunciation force and policy hostility threat use force as block to improvement our relations which must be removed before any attempt made deal other problems.

Next meeting Oct. 4. Returning Prague Sunday morning.

**Cooper**

Note: Mr. Smith (FE) notified 1:45 p.m. 9/22/46 FMH

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**719. Telegram 301 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 22, 1956, 1 p.m.

301. From Johnson.

Following text draft announcement Wang presented today's meeting:

"In order promote mutual understanding between peoples China and U.S., in order resume traditional friendship between peoples China and U.S., Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf Government People's Republic of China, and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf Government of U.S. of America, agree announce: People's Republic of China and U.S. of America will adopt measures respectively on their own initiative to eliminate existing barriers interfering with freedom of mutual contacts and cultural exchange between peoples of their two countries."

**Popper**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2256. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

**720. Telegram 302 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 22, 1956, 3 p.m.

302. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting:

Wang's proposal on what he orally termed "human contacts" and cultural exchange today continues their pattern of attempting to build up public record of "sweet reasonableness" in talks being frustrated along lines Chou's People's Congress speech. Can presume they will in due course follow same pattern as with trade proposal, that is, make public release after we have refused discuss. However anticipate they may somewhat step up pace possibly making release following next meeting if they succeed in obtaining from me what they consider sufficiently clear-cut refusal discuss.

While refusing discuss believe it gives useful opportunity more fully develop theme I started at today's meeting on previous treatment of Americans leading up to pressure release those still imprisoned. Department will note I also linked it to renunciation. Would appreciate guidance for next meeting on degree to which I should expressly or impliedly link travel of Americans to mainland only to release those imprisoned as implied my original instructions and Department's August 7 press release.

**Popper**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2256. Secret; Limit Distribution.

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**721. Telegram 303 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 22, 1956, 4 p.m.

303. From Johnson.

1. I opened 58th with prepared statement:

A. At last meeting I said looking forward to your reversing backward trend in talks on central subject renunciation force exemplified

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-2256. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

by your May 11 draft and to moving ahead from area agreement and broad concession to your point view exemplified my April 19 draft. As I many times pointed out that draft accepted your December 1 draft as reasonable starting point for negotiation and introduced only minimum revisions essential to demonstrate to world both our countries sincerely willing renounce use force Taiwan area and pursue objectives by peaceful means only.

B. On basis your explanations here I had taken this be intent your December 1 draft and that your concern with respect my January 12 draft arose from fear it was intent U.S. trick your government into abandoning position respect merits dispute that area. It in order remove all possible basis for such claim I successively offered my revision April 19. Have continuously and carefully reviewed that draft in light your stated objections during these meetings but still feel if your side genuinely sincerely willing renounce use force in that as well as our other disputes there can be no valid objection that draft.

C. If your side not willing in fact renounce use force it of course obvious no form of words can be devised that will meet your objections as I not willing be party to perpetrating upon world fraud of form of words that attempts give appearance having renounced force while in fact failing do so.

D. This connection I been concerned note during last few days high government and party officials your country are reiterating threat resort war if necessary to achieve objective of bringing Taiwan under its domination. I particularly noted even such authoritative spokesman as Liu Shao-chi in speech September 15, as reported by your radio, reiterates intention use any means necessary, including force, to achieve objectives this area. This deeply disturbing and if continues be policy your government, of course cannot be reconciled with professions of desire use only peaceful means settle disputes. I find that policy particularly hard reconcile with explanations of intent of your December 1 draft. However, it again explains persistent rejection through months of discussion here of all formulae that my side has proposed to make clear that use of force being renounced. Continuation of such indefensible policy would of course mean further attempts arrive at agreement on meaningful renunciation force may be foredoomed failure. However, I reluctant arrive at such pessimistic conclusion for peace of Far East and world.

E. I welcomed your statements here on sharing my desire arrive at agreement on meaningful renunciation force and steps such as your December 1 draft that appeared be in that direction. However, cannot reconcile this with statements such as that of Liu September 15 that appear only reiteration of old position of threatening force. Would be

glad hear anything you able say this morning that would explain this apparent contradiction.

2. Wang replied after listening my statement on question renunciation force he could find nothing new. With regard April 19 draft which I had again referred to in statement, it already repeatedly been rejected by their side. They could not agree to unreasonable demand contained in April 19 draft. That precisely because they could not agree to any division their territory by foreign state or forces, and could not agree any intervention by any foreign power in their internal affairs. He presumed that if in his position I would also adopt same attitude this regard.

3. Wang said he very surprised to hear my references to statements of leading members his government with regard liberation Taiwan. As they had consistently announced in past it entirely matter China's internal affair as to means by which she liberated Taiwan. They would never allow any other people interfere as to by what means China achieved liberation Taiwan as they had all along made clear it entirely within framework China's internal affairs as to what means she used in liberating Taiwan and they had also made clear existing tension in Taiwan area was international issue between China and America. These were two entirely separate matters and there was substantive difference between them, as had consistently been made clear by them in past, and therefore confusion of two matters not permissible.

4. Wang pointed out as he had already in past, that my side had on one hand persisted in demanding an infringement of his country's sovereignty insofar as question renunciation force concerned and this been cause failure reach agreement. On other hand my side had evaded discussion question lifting embargo so no result been achieved regard their proposal on lifting embargo. In spite this their side still willing seek appropriate amelioration insofar as existing practical issues between two countries concerned.

5. Continuing from prepared statement Wang said, it belief his side that removal now of artificial barriers hindering human contacts and cultural exchanges would contribute to removal barriers and relaxation tensions, and was thus fully in accord desires two people. They considered that desire American journalists come to China for news coverage and desires Chinese and American theatrical companies was practical feasible and justified. He therefore proposed two of us make agreed announcement this respect. His specific proposal was as follows (here he read text draft announcement telegraphed separately). He was sure text made it quite clear announcement entirely reasonable. He was ready to listen to anything I had to say with regard this proposal. He handed me text.



6. I replied was disappointed he had not this morning been in position contribute anything that would enable us move forward on what I thought we both agreed was central issue—renunciation force. Use of such words as “internal affairs”, “liberation” and other such terms did not change facts of situation Taiwan area. I had not asked him accept my interpretation those facts but nevertheless they did exist.

7. I said facts were Taiwan lawfully administered by government with which US and majority countries world had long maintained diplomatic relations. It administered by government which member UN. It administered by government with which US had defensive treaty arrangements. A treaty which registered with UN. These were all facts which must be recognized in situation there. However, I had not asked him here and we had not asked him in any our drafts accept our interpretation those facts.

8. I said Wang’s government had long threatened use force to bring Taiwan under its control. He in effect seemed to have been saying and continued say if they could not do this by negotiations they intended use force. Fact that could not be overlooked was that use force to bring Taiwan under their control would involve solemn international treaty obligations of US.

9. I continued this was factual situation with which we confronted. In order make certain this did not lead to hostilities between us I had made my proposal last October that both of us without in any way prejudicing views on merits situation simply say we would not use force. This had been and must remain central issue. US had offered state this principle in unconditional and clear form. His government still unwilling do so. Until this resolved too difficult to see how other problems existing between us could be resolved. If this central issue resolved, other issues should be capable resolution. From beginning these discussions on second part our terms reference, I had striven to do utmost to resolve central issue. However, It difficult to see how could be resolved as long as his government threatened go war about it if it not otherwise able gain objectives.

10. I still earnestly hoped his government would see that its interests and interests peace could only be served by clearly and unequivocally saying it would not go war about this issue. For his government to state this in no way prejudiced its position with regard merits whole matter. I had never said that they do so and nothing I had said here nor any draft I had presented could be so interpreted. To attempt so to interpret it misrepresented situation and was attempt to obscure real responsibility for our not having reached agreement this subject.

11. I said as preliminary comment on proposal he had made this morning I first wanted to note did not see how it could be divorced from continued threat of hostilities. US had consistently throughout

its history welcomed free exchange information and peoples regardless any social and political differences. At time his government took control mainland China there were hundreds Americans including officials in those areas. Policies his government adopted at that time with respect those persons rendered continued presence there intolerable. They were subjected to indignities, expelled from Wang's country, subjected to imprisonment, and in general their position rendered impossible. Ten Americans still remained in prison.

12. I said it could be said these all matters of past. It was with hope they truly could be made matters of past that my government proposed as first item business between us its resolution, by permitting Americans who there and who not been able return, to do so. I had thought and my government had thought and my people had thought this issue, impediment to exchanges between our two people was resolved over year ago. Here year later it still not resolved. I had pointed out over year ago it could only be resolved by Wang's government. In interests our relations and suggestions he had made I hoped his government would no longer delay in removing this impediment, just as I hoped his government would no longer delay in unequivocally renouncing use force.

13. Wang could only regard my statement on question Taiwan as sheer sophistry. No matter how I presented this question could not make people of Taiwan into American subjects nor could I make Taiwan American territory. Had there been no American invasion of Taiwan there would have been no pressing situation in Taiwan. US aggression on Taiwan not only violated spirit UN Charter but also violated solemn international pledges entered into by US with respect Taiwan. Present armed occupation Taiwan by US was indisputable fact and was act which all people of world opposed. US treaty with Chiang Kai-shek was not worth single cent, was unlawful, and Chinese people never recognized it. Present situation was that no resolution Sino-American dispute Taiwan area could be achieved solely on basis US interests.

15. Wang said present obstacle in way our making renunciation force declaration caused unreasonable demand which US persistently clung to. Failure reach agreement this respect not their responsibility at all. Efforts promote progress on this must be forthcoming from US and not from their side. Our deliberation here should be directed at seeking all sorts of formulae for improvement relations between two countries. We must strive bring about gradual resolution existing disputes between us and he thought this purpose could be served by no other attitude. To condition resolution all other questions on resolution one particular question meant there no desire or intention resolve issues at all.

16. Wang said since we had now met roadblock in one of main issues we should without delay try find outlet as far as other issues concerned.

In this sense their proposal on lifting embargo was step towards betterment relations. He very much regretted we had as yet made no progress on that. In order that talks might not waste time meaninglessly he had again this morning put forward proposal on mutual contacts and cultural exchange between two countries.

17. Wang said it their consistent conviction that uninterrupted human contacts and cultural exchanges would contribute to better understanding between peoples and to relaxation international tensions. His government not only maintained this conviction but had actually carried out policy along these lines. In 1955 his country had received more than 4,000 visitors from some 66 countries of world. This represented increase of 60 percent over previous year. Number of visitors expected to double this year. Most foreign visitors who had come to their country during past year had come from countries which had as yet no diplomatic relations with his government. It their belief that presence or absence diplomatic relations should not be obstacle to human contacts with peoples these countries. Many people had prejudices and doubts before contact made but after such contacts such prejudices and doubts in most cases been eliminated or reduced.

18. Wang said his people entertained friendly feelings towards people US. People our two countries had traditional friendship. It consistent policy his country protect all foreign nationals—including Americans—residing in his country who abided by laws. There were still number American nationals who desired remain his country to carry on normal livelihood and work. They had never felt any prejudice or mistreatment on part of Chinese Government. However, any law-breaking foreign nationals, no matter what country they came from, would be dealt with in accordance Chinese law. This was normal practice any sovereign state.

19. Wang acknowledged at present relationship between China-US subject to interruption and broken. Nevertheless, any dispute between two countries should be settled peacefully. However, such disputes as exist between China US should not be made pretext for hindering free contacts and cultural exchanges between two peoples. Artificial barriers would not contribute any ordinary improvement relations between two countries. To put up artificial barriers was against interests both peoples and against desires. Today it up to US to remove artificial barriers in contacts of people. It US which now adopting extremely unfriendly policy towards Chinese people. This policy of US was in complete contrast to policy of China towards American people.

20. Wang said present situation was that US occupying portion Chinese territory and not China occupying part US territory. Present situation was US carrying on policy embargo against China and not China carrying on policy embargo against US. It US which putting

up artificial barriers preventing mutual contacts and not Chinese Government which doing so. They would look forward to removal by US of such barriers so that peoples our two countries could contact each other freely and benefit from such contacts by learning from each other, and thus finally promote relations between two countries.

21. I just wanted to say it difficult to persuade me or my government that experiences of hundreds Americans who had lived under jurisdiction his government were brought about by friendly feelings on part his government toward US or Americans or to persuade US these respectable Americans who never encountered difficulty elsewhere were criminals.

22. I said with regard resolving disputes between us it US that proposed as first step we make it clear there would be no hostilities between us. It US which proposed it be made unconditionally clear this covered most serious dispute between us. It his government that still refused this simple basic proposition. It his government which still threatened use force. These were facts that could not be obscured and which readily understandable by all.

23. Wang denied that they had in course these negotiations rejected any reasonable proposals I had made. They did not judge proposals on their appearance but on substance and content. They could not accept proposal such as I had made that seemed say what is mine is mine and what is yours is mine. Any such proposal could not be considered by his side. He hoped my side would give favorable consideration to proposal he had made this morning for removing barriers to mutual contact and cultural exchange—as well as to lifting of embargo—and he looked forward to any result of such consideration. At time when peoples of different countries were exchanging more and more visits for US arbitrarily to set up artificial barriers to such exchange simply not reasonable. They regretted that up to now peoples of China and US could not have normal uninterrupted exchanges.

24. Wang recalled some time ago commemorative conference held in Peking in honor American poet Whitman and they had extended invitation to number outstanding representatives American literature and arts but regrettably these persons had been denied passports to come China take part that conference. Despite opposition American Government against visits of American journalists to China there still great number journalists who desired come their country and who making every effort break through barriers. Wang recalled that Peking Opera Company had already signed contract with American theatrical company for exchange visits but due US Government intervention contract could not be realized. During performance Chinese acrobatical troupe here in Switzerland acrobatic company received inquiries from US and requests for tickets so that American tourists who came here

might have opportunity seeing their performance. All this indicated fervent desire among people for cultural exchange. As Wang knew we here had seen performances Peking Opera and acrobatic troupe. Could any of US gentlemen say these performances contained any political propaganda? They were sorry they had not had opportunity see American theater but were sure they would look forward to seeing American theater. This showed that feeling and desire of two people were same.

25. Wang understood Lt. Col. Ekvall very much interested in studies of Chinese national minorities and had actually written some works in that respect. They would welcome Lt. Col. Ekvall sometime visiting their country so he could continue work and achieve desires. Or could there be any harm done to US if Lt. Col. Ekvall were to come to China and complete work? As Wang had said such exchanges were in interest both countries and they would hope US would give favorable consideration their proposal this respect.

26. I said if Wang's country really interested in improving relations I could not too strongly stress that it fundamental it abandon its policy of hostility and threats of force involving US and agree our differences would be settled only by peaceful means, and demonstrate its willingness carry out first agreement we reached. I and my government continued hope this could come quickly.

27. Wang hoped I would be in position give favorable consideration to proposal they had made at next meeting.

28. Wang said he had nothing further and suggested next meeting be held Thursday, October 4. I agreed.

Popper

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## 722. Letter 45 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 45

Geneva, September 22, 1956

Dear Walter:

Well the 58th meeting is over. There is not much to add to what I have said in my telegrams. Their exchange proposal is obviously designed to produce something having more public appeal than trade.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

Based on the reaction to the correspondents' question they probably estimate it will even obtain considerable response in the U.S. I, therefore, look to their releasing it as quickly as they can complete the basis for doing so.

We have been speculating on what they might next try along this line. It has occurred to us that one possibility would be a proposal from them for a technical arrangement, understanding, or something else of this nature to avoid such incidents as the shooting down of the Naval patrol plane. This has many possible ramifications which would lend themselves to exploitation by them if we refused to consider it.

Wang's tone at today's meeting was that of injured innocence, trying to make it as hard as he could for me to take a tough line. You will see that he did not even mention Chinese in the U.S.

I suppose our telegrams crossed with regard to their press release yesterday, but I was happy to see we were in entire agreement. I was under considerable pressure to say something here on it, but decided not to do so as it did not contain anything new that required immediate correction, they fairly accurately representing the fact that we had refused to discuss trade. Also, I had previously told you I was not going to put out anything here. Although I had said this on the assumption I would be in Prague when the release was made, I feared I might cross wires with the Department. I also thought it was such a dud of a statement that it would only serve to build it up if I did say anything.

However, I still feel they are building toward a major move around election time, and that a continuation of the present trend will at least result in their terminating or suspending the talks shortly after the elections as a means of attempting to bring increased pressure on us.

Thanks very much for the full information on the prisoner interviews contained in your letter of Sept. 13. I thoroughly agree that the Red Cross seems to have done an excellent job and I have all the material necessary to exploit and defend the results.

I suppose it will be some time until we know the results of the efforts to send reading material to the remaining prisoners but will be interested in hearing when we know.

I thoroughly agree with para 8 of Col. Monroe's interesting memorandum on his talks with the MAC. As far as practical results are concerned we cannot expect to obtain anything more here than what I have already obtained, that is, renewal of discussion in the MAC. It seems to me the most promising line of action is the suggestion that a sub-group of the MAC fully armed with every available fact on every individual undertake a straight-forward case by case approach to each individual.

I have sent you the memo of my conversation with Senator Mansfield. As you will see nothing unusual or difficult developed.

As I feel confident there will not be any move on their part before the next meeting I am suggesting that Dave and Helenka make their trip to Prague during the interval, and they will probably do so.

*[text not declassified]*

Regards to all,

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**723. Memorandum from McConaughy to Robertson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 1, 1956

**SUBJECT**

Adverse Effects of Geneva Talks

**REFERENCE**

Your Oral Request of September 27

1. The talks create doubts throughout Asia concerning the steadfastness of American opposition to Communist China. They encourage the belief that the United States is seeking to negotiate privately a “deal” with Peiping which would leave in the lurch our Asian friends who have been following our lead on China policy. The secrecy and the long duration of the talks lend color to this suspicion. This plays into the hands of all of those throughout Asia who advocate policies of closer relationships for their countries with Communist China. (See Tab A for documentation).

2. The talks are no longer an effective means of bringing about the release of our imprisoned citizens. They may now have the opposite effect. If the Chinese Communists consider the talks of value to them (which they evidently do) they may continue to hold some Americans hostage to ensure that the talks continue. They may estimate that if all Americans were freed we would have attained our objective and immediately terminate the talks.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–156. Secret. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy. Attachment 3 is printed as Document 486.



3. It is damaging to American prestige, particularly in Asia, for the U.S. to go on talking with a regime which is brazenly violating the only commitment they have made to us in the course of the talks. It would be more in keeping with our national dignity and would be readily understood throughout the world if we were to refuse to talk any longer with a regime which has shown its contempt for us by flouting its word. The tactical advantages we have obtained at Geneva could be preserved by the right type of break-off statement, which would emphasize that we would welcome at any time a bona fide Chinese Communist renunciation of force declaration.

4. The talks are not a conclusive factor in preventing a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan or the offshore islands since the initiation of the Communist "smiles" campaign. The major deterrent is the presence of powerful American armed forces. The second important deterrent is the Chinese Communist desire to maintain a peaceful posture before the world. These two factors would continue to operate, even though the talks were terminated.

5. The talks are regarded with great antipathy and misgivings in Taiwan. We have made unusual efforts to reassure the GRC, without any success in allaying their apprehensions. Nothing would give a greater boost to morale on Taiwan than for the U.S. to break off the talks. As they see it, we have given the Communists a chance to undermine the whole anti-Communist position in Asia by merely releasing ten American citizens and signing an Announcement which would in fact be worthless.

6. The Chinese Communists are eager to establish a posture of desiring relations of every kind with the United States. Our policy is to deal with them only when we must. Under these circumstances, the Communists have the initiative in the talks, being in a position to make (and to publicize at the opportune moment for them) proposal after proposal of a seemingly praiseworthy character, such as those on trade and free travel and cultural exchanges which we must reject. This keeps us on the defensive and gives the Communists a great advantage.

Attachment: Tab A.

1. Telegram from Taipei, Jan. 26, 1956.
2. Memorandum from Mr. McConaughy to Mr. Robertson, Feb. 9, 1956.
3. Letter from Drumright to Mr. McConaughy, Mar. 6, 1956.
4. Bangkok's Telegram No. 841, Sept. 24, 1956.
5. Bangkok's Telegram No. 905, Oct. 1, 1956.
6. Letter from Ambassador Rankin to Mr. McConaughy, Aug. 3, 1956.



**724. Letter 56 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 56

Washington, October 1, 1956

Dear Alex:

We agree with you that the Agreed Announcement on increased human contacts which Wang proposed last meeting is designed for early public exploitation. You handled it very well and we will probably adopt a somewhat similar approach should we be called upon to make a public statement.

We were glad that you resisted the pressure to comment at Geneva on the last Chinese Communist press release. Your comment as you say would only serve to build up their statement.

While it is impossible to be certain in these matters, we consider it unlikely that the Communists are moving toward a break off or suspension of the talks. Ever since the beginning of the year they have periodically accused us of stalling and intimated that they might break off the talks. However they are still talking. We think, given the present world situation and the Chinese Communist "peaceful" posture, that it would not be easy for Peiping to terminate the talks.

We have succeeded in setting up a procedure for sending reading material to the remaining prisoners. MATS will carry the packages free of charge to Hong Kong where they will be forwarded by the Army Liaison Officer to Downey and Fecteau and by the Consulate to the others.

We have made preliminary inquiries about shifting Helenka to a daily contractual basis. There seems to be no insuperable obstacle to this so we are getting the paper work started today.

Regards and good wishes,

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official–Informal. Drafted by Clough.

**725. Telegram 374 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 2, 1956, 8:39 p.m.

374. For Johnson.

Guidance for October 4 meeting:

1. In connection with Communist proposal that there be announcement on cultural exchange US position is that there can be no such exchange while US citizens held in Communist jails and in violation Agreed Announcement. Point out how inconsistent with cultural relations is the refusal of Communists to make meaningful renunciation of force.

2. Refer to exchange of public statements on trade restrictions and read Department's September 24 statement into record.

3. If Wang should attempt open discussion on trade repeat reasons why we must decline to discuss.

4. FYI Results of last exchange of public statements confirm our view that US in strong position and should continue rest its case without any modification whatever on refusal Chinese Communists either renounce force or release Americans. Your argumentation on these points has been sound and effective. END FYI

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-256. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Phleger and Clough; cleared by Phleger, Sebald, Robertson and McConaughy.

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**726. Telegram 359 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 4, 1956, 2 p.m.

359. From Johnson.

Two hour ten minute meeting this morning. Wang opened with long prepared statement "reviewing ground" at beginning fifteenth month

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-456. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

going over familiar ground renewing charge US attempting obtain PRC abandonment territory and sovereignty and as result US intransigence “talks have become deadlocked,” “US purposefully procrastinating meetings.” It is up to US stop using force and threat of force against PRC. Charge of September 24 statement PRC holding Americans political hostages is “slander.” PRC list of 55, 52 Chinese not yet returned, and of US list of 103, 26 not yet returned. US still holding Chinese in prison and should “adopt measures on own initiative in same manner as PRC enable them exercise right to return.” US using charges on civilians as pretext to cover up procrastination in meetings. In order break deadlock PRC had made embargo and cultural exchange proposals. Failure make progress on main issue renunciation should not stop effort make progress on minor issues. In view President Eisenhower’s Geneva proposal on cultural exchange and contacts, no reason for US refuse PRC proposal this field.

I made long extemporaneous statement in reply incorporating first three paras Deptel 374 (as I had previously sent him copy September 24 statement and he referred to it in opening statement, I did not read out full text at meeting but wove in substantive language at appropriate points). Charged them with procrastinating on renunciation pointing out that whenever agreement seemed near they retreated to pleas of internal affairs sovereignty, etc. Made long charge on mistreatment Americans in China including numbers of those imprisoned, numbers those who died, etc., leading up to charge that PRC is one who had cut off cultural and human contacts, and coming back to fundamental importance implementation September 10 announcement. During course this statement I made it entirely clear no discussion trade or cultural exchange until renunciation force and release of Americans achieved.

In reply Wang charged me with trying to “poison” our negotiations and during course rebuttal referred to three groups Americans in China: those who continue reside freely; those who opposed Chinese people; and those “dropped from air carrying poison, pistols and bombs.” Did I expect them treat latter as distinguished guests? Cited long list alleged US wrongs against “Chinese people” bombings, occupation territory etc., etc., and for first time in talks mentioned UN membership, alleging US pressure on others deny PRC legitimate rights in international affairs including representation UN. PRC attempting by every means improve relations. If US intends use talks poison relations “what is good of continuing such talks.” PRC efforts shown by successive draft proposals. With respect cultural relations Americans are protesting against own government’s denial permission journalists visit China and appears American Government has lost confidence in own people as well as system. PRC made cultural exchange proposal “in friendly spirit.” Failure

US Govt favorable consideration this proposal would require PRC consider giving publicity thereto.

Meeting closed with my renewing charge PRC procrastinating on accepting simple and fundamental renunciation force proposal as well as on carrying out agreement on release Americans. I refuted his lack confidence charge and while regretting their threat again go to public, expressed confidence world could judge.

Next meeting Thursday, October 18. Departing Prague tomorrow morning.

**Gowen**

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## **727. Telegram 362 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 4, 1956, 4 p.m.

362. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting:

Wang took expected line which fits in with previous pattern and reaffirms my belief they are attempting put selves in position carry out break or indefinite recess within next few meetings.

His statement on public release cultural exchange proposal was somewhat more tentative than previous similar statements but nevertheless consider odds are they will make release before next meeting. Statement will probably follow lines his opening statment this morning and can especially be expected will attempt capitalize on Geneva summit conference exchange proposals. If statement issued plan make no comment here unless it contains new and gross misstatements fact which require immediate correction and I am in Geneva at time.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-456. Secret; Limit Distribution.

**728. Telegram 363 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 4, 1956, 6 p.m.

363. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 59th with prepared statement saying as talks entered fifteenth month would not be without purpose to review ground covered since last August so as to obtain better appreciation position where we found selves at moment. When discussions first item ended in agreement and talks shifted to second item, my side introduced renunciation force subject for discussion. In interest making progress and with desire reach practical feasible agreement this, their side successively made important efforts in form three drafts, whereas my side all along been holding on unjustifiable position of interfering in internal affairs and encroaching on sovereignty of China.

2. Wang continued after my original proposal been turned down my subsequent amendments had invariably retained same essence. As per Chinese saying, water in pot might be renewed but pot remained same. US was fond of saying it did not require their side abandon its position, yet in practice my side invariably demanded they abandon territorial integrity and sovereignty while holding on to our own unreasonable position. My side also very fond of saying we accepted December 1 draft with only what we called minimum changes, yet so-called minimum changes always turned out to be maximum changes in substance of their proposals.

3. Wang said as result intransigence my side in its demands interfering China's internal affairs, encroaching sovereignty his country, our talks had come to deadlock. Just where blame for failure thus far reach agreement should lie quite clear. However, my side repeatedly been trying within and without conference to distort true picture events, in attempt shirk responsibility. He particularly referred to statement issued by my government charging their side with continuing refuse renounce force Taiwan area. It might well be asked, after all, who was using force against whom in Taiwan area? Obviously there did not exist at present any situation in which China found using force against American territory. It entirely matter of China's internal affairs as to by what means China would liberate own sovereign territory. Crux of whole matter was rather for US Government stop interference China's internal affairs and renounce use force in Taiwan area. Could not be anything other than this.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-456. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

4. Wang said September 24 statement of US once again distorted facts by slandering their side with charge of holding Americans as political hostages. Ten Americans still held were persons lawfully sentenced for breaking China's laws. Insofar as law-abiding Americans his country concerned, they always free choose whether to return or reside China. Subsequent to agreement September 10, Wang's government had taken further measures of leniency in granting release of greater part Americans. Could thus be seen it his government which been faithfully carrying out agreement. In contrast, my government still failed fully carry out agreement. US still failed give them complete list Chinese US. Of 55 persons whose names he had given me, 52 still not returned, and my side still failed account them. Of 103 persons on list I gave him, 26 still not returned and we still failed give accounting them. US still held many Chinese in prison. However their side not making charge we holding them as political hostages. Their side only requested US on own initiative adopt measures similar to what they had done to enable these persons exercise right return. Distortions and slander freely resorted to by my side on question civilians were no more than attempt to cover up procrastination of talks without intent of seeking solution of problems. However, facts could not be so easily covered up.

5. Wang continued as result intransigence my side in unreasonable position, talks had come to prolonged deadlock. So that no possible means for solution of controversial issues between China-America would slip through fingers, their side had introduced practical feasible proposal for removing embargo. As Wang had said, if we could reach agreement this problem it would not only resolve that issue but would also exert favorable influence on settlement other issues. Thus far, however, US had not shown willingness give earnest consideration this fair and reasonable proposal. Position my side on this was untenable.

6. Wang said my side had on one hand continued persist in demand encroaching on sovereignty and interfering internal affairs China, so that both sides could not arrive at agreement on renunciation force, yet on other hand my side had made agreement on this prerequisite for discussion of embargo. Thus my side had once more blocked way to progress in talks.

In spite this attitude my side continued hold in these talks, which did not in any way contribute to progress, nevertheless, their side still, inspired by spirit of desire for progress, made yet another proposal to promote human contacts and cultural exchange between two peoples. Far as his country concerned it consistent policy his government encourage and promote friendly exchanges between people his country and other countries of world. That because they believed peaceful coexistence and cultural exchanges between people of world would contribute to their mutual understanding and remove doubts.

7. Wang said they had not changed their policy because US Government consistently carrying on policy of hostility against Wang's country. On contrary they considered there did exist long history friendship and contact between Chinese and American peoples. Earlier they had taken initiative in adopting measures facilitate American journalists making news coverage in China. Proposal they had made would serve to re-establish contact, for whose rupture their side bore no responsibility. It their belief that both Chinese and American people cherished strong desire this regard. It also their understanding that during conference heads state held here last year President Eisenhower made proposals for exchange of ideas and contact between peoples. In its official statements my government had also on many occasions declared itself in support this idea. It could therefore be assumed there would be no difficulty in reaching agreement on such matter, where we found such identity between views two governments.

8. Wang continued we now found selves in fifteenth month our negotiations. If we still fail achieve something at this juncture, we greatly disappoint people of world and of own countries. It seemed to him if we really desired make progress in solving problems we should conduct earnest negotiations; for to introduce prerequisites would not produce any results. He continued hope that this morning I would be able give favorable views on proposals their side had made for lifting embargo and for cultural exchange respectively.

9. I replied his view of negotiation still appears be all take and no give. I regretted this appears still be case as hard see how progress can be achieved under those circumstances. I agreed it important we be clear in minds why we at stage we are after fourteen months discussion. There were two simple straightforward, reasonable and mutually advantageous objectives which have been sought by my government at this stage. First these was that of release American citizens held in his country. Whose responsibility was it that after fourteen months this objective still not achieved; it certainly not responsibility my government. Who had failed release these people in spite our clear agreement on subject. It his government which after 14 months continued hold these people; I had pointed out at very outset these talks great importance this subject as far as future our relations concerned. He freely entered into agreement with me which clearly covered, and I had thought disposed of, this question. Failure carry out this agreement could not be excused by retreating into plea this involved international matters and domestic affairs. Every international agreement to greater or lesser extent involved sovereign and internal affairs. If after entering into such agreement government should plead that it could not perform them because involved sovereign and internal affairs, international agreement would have little meaning. In fact

international relations would deteriorate into chaos. This first agreement between us had tremendous importance and potentialities for future our relations. I had entered into it with much hope and optimism. Failure carry it out had sorely tried that hope and optimism as well as patience. I did not understand how he could term our pointing out clear fact of failure carry out this agreement as distortion and slander. Procrastination entirely part his authorities. They were ones that have it in their power stop their procrastination in carrying out this agreement. Did no good try confuse and obscure this issue by talking about lists Chinese in US. Both of us knew perfectly well under terms agreed announcement no obligation on part US to furnish any list Chinese in US. Both of us knew perfectly well such lists have no relation to ability Chinese in US return his country if desire do so. There only one question: are they able return if desire do so? Both of us knew perfectly well not been single case any obstruction to their return alleged through mechanism established that purpose.

10. I continued other immediate objective sought by my government was renunciation force which would specifically apply to most serious dispute between us. That objective also not been achieved. Whenever appeared we close to achieving it his side had retreated into pleas of domestic affairs, internal affairs, sovereignty, other such terms. Use of such terms did not obscure fact that his government still refused make clear-cut unqualified renunciation force. Here again procrastination entirely on his side. I had tried throughout discussion of this to point out first and immediate question not whether this internal affair or international affair or any other kind affair or otherwise to get into merits of this whole complicated issue.

11. I continued overwhelmingly most important and first aspect of it was whether we going to permit our differences—and certainly there are differences—to plunge our two peoples into cataclysm of war. This transcendental issue and cannot be concealed by distorting proposals I made by making them appear say things did not say or by making other proposals which avoid issue. He simply could not get around fact my proposals been simple and straightforward. Without prejudicing his position in any way—in fact I had specifically said so in my proposals—we simply make it clear that renunciation force did specifically apply to Taiwan, he simply could not get around fact it his side which continues threaten use force that area if could not otherwise attain ends. He could not get around fact it his side which thus far procrastinated and refused renounce use threat force that area.

12. I continued had hope he would give up insistence we digress from this fundamental issue to subordinate matters. Until this fundamental issue resolved, hard see how subordinate matters could be



resolved. In treating patient one deals with source and cause of disease rather than with symptoms. As had pointed out to him here and as pointed out in Department's statement September 24 to which he referred, it hardly reasonable expect US discuss relaxation its trade restrictions when trade that would result from such relaxation would strengthen regime which refuses renounce use force against US. As that release also pointed out and I pointed out to him previously here, my government also not prepared enter into such discussions at time when American citizens continue be held as political hostages despite pledge of September 10 last year to permit them expeditiously exercise their right return. That release uses term political hostages and I used term here advisedly. I done this because his statements here. As well as public statement his government made it all too clear it holds these people in hope extracting further political concessions from my government. This is type trading which I have and will continue refuse enter into. I find it hard understand why his authorities also appear now believe my government could consider entering into any understanding with respect cultural exchanges as long as these circumstances continue. A country does not enter into such relationships while its citizens continue be unjustly imprisoned in violation of solemn commitments that they will be released. Also while I entirely agree cultural relations between peoples are important, desirable and can do much remove misunderstanding, it hardly consistent to propose such relations with people while maintaining clear threat use armed force against same people.

13. I continued Wang had spoken again this morning of long history cultural exchange and contact between our two peoples. He had also spoken of strong desire cherished by both our people in this regard. Cutting off this contact was entirely at initiative his government and his government must bear entire responsibility for it. Because of strong desire American people maintain this contact, hundreds of Americans remained in territory which was brought under their control. These were Americans who had long and distinguished history of high-minded unselfish cultural relations with Chinese people. They were Americans who desired maintain these contacts. They were Americans who could have contributed much to understanding between our two peoples. What was history of this effort, this individual effort, on part these Americans? Organized demonstrations were fomented against them; everything possible done to foment hostility of population towards them. Money was extorted from them. Chinese who had any contact with them were placed in jeopardy. They were expelled from country. Above all, out of this small group of people we know of at least 155 who were arrested by his authorities. Stories of efforts by his authorities to extort confessions of all sorts fantastic crimes from them haven't done much to encourage American Government or people to

attempt reestablish cultural contacts between us. It not done much to encourage us to know that in addition those who were broken in body and mind when they finally left his country, at least five died while in prison or immediately following release from prison. This record not pretty nor pleasant, regretted necessity bringing it up here. However memories of those of us who associated with problem, memories of friends and relatives these people still very fresh.

14. I continued as said at last meeting, had hoped this could all be made matter of past. Had hoped bitterness in our hearts could disappear. Had hoped this entire problem could be liquidated. Had hope this could be done by release those that remained in prison so we could look forward to fresh start. Had hoped this with all my heart both personally and officially. My government had hoped for this same thing. I found it inexplicable that his authorities not appreciated importance this. Perhaps I in some way been deficient in not being able sufficiently clearly explain this to him. If so I regretted it but assured him it not been through any lack trying. If his authorities really desirous improving relations between two countries and really desirous obtaining peaceful settlement other outstanding problems, they continue have it in power do so. I assured him my government continued hope they will do so.

15. Wang replied it with regret disappointment he listened my remarks this morning as didn't find anything contribute advance these talks, but rather contrary. In these remarks I had made many unreasonable charges against Chinese people which he could not accept. If we discussed problem deterioration Sino-American relations, we inevitably arrived at conclusion it Americans done much wrong to Chinese people and not Chinese who wronged American people. If anyone to make accusation with regard relations between China America it evidently China which in right position make such accusation, instead of American Government.

16. Wang continued fact was American aircraft and bombers throwing bombs on Chinese territory killing Chinese people. No one could ever charge Chinese aircraft sent to American territory carrying out such inhuman destructive mission. Fact was American ground, sea and air forces occupied part Chinese territory. Could I ever charge Chinese forces ever occupied at any time American territory. It US which unreasonably carried out detention of Chinese by public government orders and American Government which persecuted and imprisoned Chinese in US and as result this persecution many victims suffered mental breakdown. I could not charge Chinese Government published decree to detain Americans resident in China. It US which carried out policy embargo against China not vice versa. It US which tried by every means to deprive China of legitimate rights in international affairs, including

efforts on part US try deprive China of legitimate representation in UN. And in doing so US has pressured other countries to follow lead. These aggressive and unfriendly records of US against China not only roused indignation all serious-minded people his country but also aroused all serious-minded people of world to oppose such policy.

17. Wang continued China never adopted any blanket policy against American citizens in China. There still many American citizens who continue after long years residence to reside in his country freely. These people so far have not indicated any desire return US. There another group Americans who opposed Chinese people. There yet another group Americans who sent by American Government and purposely air dropped into Chinese territory. Such people did not come to China out of any high-minded idea, but went to China with poison, pistols and bombs. Could anyone expect Chinese Government treat these people as distinguished guests. Despite these unfriendly activities consistently carried out by US, in spite this record, their side had been patiently sitting here and had continued to desire negotiate with America.

18. Wang continued I had remarked that they only wanted take not give. They simply wanted take those things which originally belonged them. What gift did we expect of them? In present circumstances America already occupying Chinese territory Taiwan. Did US expect China give more territory? Present difficulty is US merely thought of own interest without considering interest of others. This case of pursuing only ones selfish interest. In that manner how could problems between us be solved. We sitting here engaging in discussion and our objective should be resolve issues. If we could not now resolve big issues, we could still resolve small issues. This would still help a lot and it better to solve these small issues than not solve any at all. As we sitting here in negotiations we should seek means for improving relations instead poisoning them. If one has intention poisoning relations between two countries instead of trying solve outstanding issues, then what is good of continuing these talks? Record of these talks clearly showed they consistently working to resolve issues between us. Their record evidenced by successive drafts introduced on agreement making renunciation force declaration as well as by proposals they made designed remove embargo against China and designed promote human contacts cultural exchanges between two countries.

19. Wang continued American press always been fond of making charges against China alleging it not free country and existence iron or bamboo curtain and alleging his government did not offer freedom of travel for foreigners. Present fact is Americans desire visit China. American people interested in China. Deeds and words of American Government are quite inconsistent. Proposals Chinese Government

introduced on question contacts persons and cultural exchange capable of satisfying desire of American people. Present action of US Government runs counter to such desire of American people. This evidenced by fact American people not making protest against Chinese Government but rather against American Government on question contacts of people and cultural exchange. Policy pursued by American Government on question of contacts of peoples and cultural exchange can show whether this government has any confidence in own system. Refusal on part US Government to proposal of cultural exchange and contact of peoples shows American Government has lost confidence in own people as well as its own system. It out of friendly spirit his side proposed contact of people and cultural exchange. Refusal of US Government to give favorable consideration this proposal would make them consider it necessary make public their proposal so public could judge.

20. I replied as he had once well said here, these negotiations not football game. They could not be judged, neither would world judge them on basis of number balls tossed out on field. Could only be judged, and world would judge on basis substantive positions each side had taken. It US which proposed unconditionally we make it clear our differences be settled only by peaceful means. No amount proposals or words could obscure fact his side still rejects that simple proposition. No amount proposals or words could obscure fact his side still procrastinated in accepting that fundamental principle. No amount words can obscure fact his government still failing carry out its undertaking permit Americans return. I regretted that instead facing up to resolving these basic matters his government intended again resort to forum public statements. However I continued be entirely willing let world judge issues. I entirely willing let world judge whether it and American people had faith in our system which had endured for almost two centuries and brought to our people and world standards of material and spiritual well-being and freedom unparalleled in world's history.

21. Wang said he had presented his views this morning and had no more to add. He sure people able judge who trying solve issues and who obstructing.

22. I had no more and suggested Thursday, October 18 for next meeting. He agreed.

**Gowen**

**729. Letter 46 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 46

Geneva, October 4, 1956

Dear Walter:

I have little to add to my telegram on today's meeting. As you will see I still think they are working toward a position which they estimate will enable them to bring about at least an indefinite recess, most likely sometime after the elections and before the new year. I may well be wrong and you all may well be right, but I do not think it can be assumed because they have continued talking up to now they will continue to do so indefinitely. During past months I have been able to do a certain amount of stringing them along and dangling a certain amount of "pie in the sky", but I have now largely run out of that as I have never been in a position where I could say if you do so and so we will do so and so. I full well realize the reasons it has never been possible to enable me to take any such positions, but I know also that you realize the extremely narrow limits in which this has required I operate. As I did full well realize this at my last meeting I threw renunciation in the cultural exchange package and strengthened it today. My only point is that with the material now at hand, I do not feel confident that I will be able to keep things going much longer. Perhaps I feel low this afternoon after the verbal exercise of this morning and perhaps I am unduly pessimistic.

I had planned to make only a short speech this morning but he threw up so many balls I felt I had to field, that it turned out to be rather long. I could well have fielded some more but I thought I caught the most important ones.

At the moment I haven't got the slightest notion of what to say at the next meeting. However, I hope that by then the three prisoners will be on their way so I can make a little mileage out of that.

Regards to all,

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

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730. Letter 57 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 57

Washington, October 12, 1956

Dear Alex:

The principal event since your last meeting has been the Chinese Communist last-moment refusal to allow Addis, the British Counselor from Peiping, to see Father McCarthy in Ward Road Jail in Shanghai on October 5, after all arrangements had been made and after Addis arrived at the prison. Addis was met with the bland statement from the officials that McCarthy had changed his mind and did not want to see Addis. The officials added that they could not force McCarthy to have the interview. Addis was naturally taken aback, but did what he could by way of remonstrance. The British are of course as aware as we are that McCarthy did not voluntarily change his mind. The Communist claim was either an outright lie, or else they had broken McCarthy. We suspect that they want to demonstrate to the British that they are wasting their time in trying to see the prisoners. The Communist decision may have been made after they allowed Father McCarthy's letter to O'Neill to be delivered. We are enclosing a copy of the full text of this letter, which shows that Father McCarthy was alert and resolute when he wrote the letter. We have it from other sources that he probably is the most resourceful and durable of the remaining Shanghai prisoners, which makes it all the more unlikely that he would have voluntarily given up the fight. Since this represents a callous and completely indefensible hardening of the Chinese Communist position, Mr. Robertson believes that we should attack Wang very vigorously on it at the October 18 meeting. You will get full instructions on it in your guidance telegram. The British are awaiting guidance from us on how they should react in Peiping. We will counsel a strong reaction there too although our main reliance will be on you at Geneva.

2. [*text not declassified*] a Chinese mental case at Logansport, Indiana still demands to return to the Communist mainland but according to the foreign student adviser appears to be incompetent to take the initiative to get in touch with the Indian Embassy. Consequently we are considering asking the Immigration Service to deport him. The longer he remains the more chance there is that the Chinese Communists will exploit the case in their propaganda.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

3. One of the two Chinese convicts at the U.S. Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky, who opted for return to the China Mainland has now informed the parole officer that he has changed his mind. He claims that since he was formerly in the Nationalist Army he will be persecuted by the Communists should he go back. We are asking that commutation of sentence proceedings in his case be halted. Fortunately we had not told the Indians or the Chinese Communists of the results of our survey so that if this development can be kept confidential no harm will have been done.

4. *Missing U.S. Military Personnel*

We have thought a good deal about how we should renew our pressure on the Communists to account for our missing military personnel. This is a subject which the relatives of the missing persons keep very much alive here and numerous letters are written each month by the Department of State, the Department of Defense and USUN in New York in response to pleas from these relatives. Our official replies contain the assurance that the United States Government is leaving no stone unturned to try to obtain the facts from the Communists. We feel very keenly the need to take some action. However, we share the views expressed both by you and by General Guard, the Senior U.S. representative on UNCMAC, that we are unlikely to obtain any satisfactory accounting from the Communists either in Panmunjom or Geneva.

After weighing the pros and cons, we wonder if it would not be preferable for you to reopen the subject at Geneva. Enclosure A contains a summary of our reasons. These were originally prepared for inclusion in a memorandum recommending reintroduction of this subject at Geneva, but we wanted first to get your reaction. A further reason for selecting the Geneva forum, which, for obvious reasons, is mentioned neither in the enclosure nor in Col. Monroe's memorandum on his talks with the U.S. element of the MAC, is Col. Monroe's feeling that the personnel presently assigned to UNCMAC or those who might be assigned there in the future, have neither the experience nor the specialized skill required to negotiate effectively on this subject with the Communists.

Our tentative thinking is that you might introduce this item again, using as your springboard the statement by the Communist spokesman in the MAC that they had no responsibility for individuals held outside Korea. You could then proceed on a case by case basis to seek information from Wang. Presumably he would, at least in the beginning, refuse to discuss this issue and try to shift the responsibility back to the MAC. This would not be so easy for him to accomplish this time, in view of the statement made by the Communist spokesman in that body. Even if we fail to obtain any information from the Communists, we might at least succeed in throwing them off balance for a time, particularly if we should decide to exploit the issue publicly.



We should like to have your candid views as to the advantages and disadvantages of reintroducing this subject at this time, and also your estimate of the kind of support you would require from Defense should you undertake this task. Defense's capabilities to supply the kind of information you would want is, of course, limited. The enclosed copy of a memorandum from General Erskine to the Secretary of Defense indicates what Defense is undertaking to do to supply some of the deficiencies pointed out in Dave's letter of August 23.

5. Our feeling here based more on our appraisal of the general attitude of the Chinese Communists than the tactical situation in the Geneva talks is that the Communists are probably not moving toward a recess or break-off of the talks at least not until after the elections and the opening of the UNGA. It appears to us they have more to gain by holding on than by breaking off. The latter move seems contrary to their general posture in international affairs. We are concerned at the adverse effects that the continuation of these talks are reported to be having in some parts of the Far East. We are considering asking key posts for up to date reports on this matter.

6. You will be interested in the latest Chinese Communist gambits in the cultural field. A number of American publishers have received orders for American newspapers and magazines. The official Chinese Communist book and periodical agency the Gnozi Shudian has sent letters to a large number of American publishers requesting the contribution or sale at discount of large selections of scientific and technical books for a proposed exhibit in Peiping early in 1957. The Chinese Communists have also announced on the China Mainland that a wide range of American publications including *Time* and *Life* can now be subscribed to. Teaching of English is being introduced in the middle schools to the extent that teachers are available.

7. By way of general comment, don't expect any new tack to be authorized here on either of the two big issues. The emphatic conclusion here is that our position is unassailable on both questions and that any attempt to look for new wording on renunciation otherwise show any "give" would only weaken our position, both from a tactical standpoint and from the standpoint of our public position when the eventual public showdown comes. We are somewhat more skeptical than you apparently are as to the likelihood of a Chinese Communist suspension of the talks or other major move within the next few weeks. The Chinese Communists are exploiting the talks in various ways, as we have seen in connection with the 8th Party Congress, and in their talks with visiting delegations, such as the Malayan Chinese, and the Indonesian delegation headed by Sukarno. Their present tactics seem to envisage a continuation of the talks and further misrepresentation and exploitation of the fact that the talks are private and are continuing. We are making a new study in



FE of the whole question of the influence of the talks on Asian attitudes toward Communist China and toward our China policy. As a sidelight on the above, you will want to know that Mr. Robertson thinks that it is preferable for you to refrain from indicating any regret or disappointment at Chinese Communist publication, or threatened publication, of statements on the talks. Naturally, you will not encourage publicity by them, but we do not now like the connotations of deploring publicity or indicating that we fear it or find it distasteful.

8. We were glad to get your letter No. 45 of September 22. We have FE/EX working on your request that Helenka be placed on a daily contractual basis.

Regards and the best to each of you,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Copy of letter from Father McCarthy to Charge at Peiping, dated Sept. 1, 1956.
2. Memorandum on Missing Personnel
3. Gist of a telegram from Foreign Office commenting on O'Neill's telegram of Oct. 8.
4. Memo from General Erskine to Secretary of Defense dated Oct. 8

P.S. Apologies for the overlap between 5 and 7. You know how rushed we are. I had Ralph work with me on this, and we crossed our signals a bit.

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**731. Telegram 440 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 16, 1956, 9:39 p.m.

440. For Johnson.

Guidance for October 18 meeting.

1. Major portion your presentation should be devoted to attacking Communist failure carry out pledge made in Agreed Announcement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1656. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Clough; cleared by Dulles, Phleger, and Sebald.

Lead off with McCarthy case as typical example of Communist disregard of pledged word. First point out McCarthy and other nine Americans should have been released long ago if clear language of Agreed Announcement had any meaning. Now one of nine belatedly permitted write British Charge stating he is unjustly prevented from leaving and requesting representations his behalf. When Charge endeavored investigate case as provided in Agreed Announcement his representative prevented from seeing McCarthy, after Communists had authorized interview and made appointment. Statement by prison official that McCarthy did not wish interview is not credible. Note written evidence that McCarthy wanted interview and ask why prison official refused permit Charge's representative verify McCarthy's wishes.

In course of your presentation also press Communists for reply which they promised some time ago to British Charge's letter August 23 requesting permission visit all American prisoners. Communists have no valid reason refuse this. In connection with Chou En-lai's statement to British Charge December 9 that Communists could not permit visits all Americans because US would not permit Indians visit Chinese prisoners this country, point out US has offered permit Indians interview any Chinese prisoner this country, which Indians declined to do upon instructions from Peiping.

State that US Government has been extremely patient in face of inexplicable refusal Communists carry out their commitment release all Americans. U.S. Government seriously concerned at this latest attempt to evade obligations of Agreed Announcement, and is considering making public statement.

FYI We believe Communists can be put on defensive both in Geneva meetings and publicly by using McCarthy case to dramatize Communist violation public pledges. Their plea for closer cultural contacts with the US can be made to look ridiculous in light of their behavior in McCarthy case. We are requesting British Charge to (1) make representations requesting immediate release McCarthy on basis his letter stating he being unjustly prevented from leaving; (2) write McCarthy explaining circumstances last attempted interview and offering arrange another interview; (3) write Communist Foreign Office asking reply to his letter of August 23 requesting permission interview all jailed Americans. END FYI

2. Reject attempts to draw you into discussion of Communist cultural exchange or trade proposals, stressing resentment American government and people at continued detention American citizens and inability rely on public commitments made by Communists. Communist refusal agree to meaningful renunciation of force should also be cited. FYI In view Wang's statement last meeting we agree it would be consistent Chinese Communist previous practice for them to

issue statement on cultural exchange shortly before October 18 meeting. In this event we concur course proposed last sentence your 362. Department prepared make reply if deemed desirable. END FYI

3. In any discussion of renunciation of force hold to established position.

**Dulles**

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**732. Telegram 443 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 17, 1956. 7:09 p.m.

443. For Johnson.

Latest Chinese Communist statement on Geneva talks seems to have fallen flat. Not carried so far by any newspaper or wire service seen here. We plan ignore statement if press continues to do so.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1756. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Phleger and Sebald.

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**733. Letter 47 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 47

Geneva, October 17, 1956

Dear Walter:

1. I am starting this on Wednesday and will finish it tomorrow after the meeting.

2. I certainly have no objection to again bringing up the POW question here, but as Monroe said after his trip to Korea, I think the decision revolves around whether we believe there is any chance whatever of

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.”

obtaining any more information and, if not, whether we then intend to use the issue further publicly to indict the Chicoms. If it is solely the latter I believe Geneva to be the best forum. I do *not* agree with the statement in the draft memo enclosed with your letter (No. 56) that Geneva offers a slightly better chance than Panmunjon for obtaining an accounting for at least a few of the 450. I can build up a good public record on the subject here and can probably embarrass Wang to a certain degree, but he is never going to give me any accounting for individuals here, and we should not raise the subject here on the assumption that there is any possibility he will do so. He has frequently and strongly taken the position that the lists he gave me at the outset of the talks accounted for all Americans in China and it cannot be expected he will reverse that position.

3. As a minor point with respect to numbered para (2) of the draft memo, I did in fact allude to the POW question at our 56th meeting (para 16 mytel 173) and drew a response from him on it.

4. With regard to the less likelihood of their countering with our failure to account for communist prisoners if the subject is raised here, you will recall that when I first raised the subject here he fortunately countered only with the 14,000 sent to Taiwan which was not hard to handle, but he may now be better prepared to counter with others and I will have to be prepared immediately to reply if he does so. Of course, by raising the subject here we will probably avoid the more difficult subject of the Koreans released by Rhee.

5. In this connection it is my recollection that their list may be wholly or primarily based on the lists of notification of capture that we transmitted through the ICRC. It is also my recollection that a large discrepancy in these lists arose from the fact that a capture form would be made out at the time the man was taken with a copy to the ICRC. On arrival at Kojedo the man's tag would be missing and another would be made out with another copy to the ICRC. Because of the language problem, difficulties of transliteration, and sometimes through the POW giving a different name, the name would not appear as identical with the first report. Thus ICRC would receive and transmit to the Communists two names covering the capture of only one man. I do not recall whether this appears anywhere in the records, but I know it was explained to me when I made my "POW trip" to Korea with General Hull.

6. Also pertinent to all of this was an exchange of numbers of persons held in the early days of the armistice negotiations. My memory on this is dim but I believe we gave the Communists some definite numbers on those we held.

7. I do not recall what the circumstances are and when the communist list of missing personnel mentioned in the last sentence of the first

para of the draft memo was presented or of what it consisted. My only point is that before terming it “in large part fictitious” I would want to be sure that it is not in fact based upon names originating with the UNC.

8. My memory on our exchanges of lists of names of POWs with the Communists is also very hazy. Not that it is likely to come in any detail here, but to avoid possible mistakes I would appreciate a short summary of the facts in this regard. I have a feeling we gave them some list early in the armistice negotiations, and that they gave us one but I am just not sure whether this is correct or of what they consisted. Were there also not lists given the NNRC which were passed on to the Communists? I do not want anyone to go to any great trouble on this but perhaps there is a pertinent summary already made up. Perhaps HD would have it available or could readily make it up.

9. Whether the subject is raised here or Panmunjon it will be important that the information with respect to individuals reflect the “accounting” set forth in CINCUNC’s message of March 2, 1956. That is, in our best documented cases of their at one time being alive in Communist hands, the March accounting attempted to dispose of them by saying they had “escaped”. Thus in these “escaped” cases the issue is no longer whether they were at one time alive in Communist hands, by saying they “escaped” they have admitted this, but rather being able to demonstrate that such an accounting is false. This is very well set forth in detail in the memo enclosed with Dave’s letter of August 23. My reason for mentioning it is that while the Memo to the Service Secretaries enclosed with your letter encloses what I presume is the substance of Dave’s memo, the attached “Suggestions” do not appear to take account of this important point of which I would have to take account before again raising individual cases here. For our purposes here I would not need any large number of cases, a half dozen or so would probably serve my purposes, although, of course, the more I have in my pocket the better. My suggestion would be to have Ralph and Col. Monroe pick out a few of the most promising cases and exhaustively run them down with the services rather than spreading the effort too thin.

10. My 362 did not imply that I had changed my estimate that they are most likely to make a major move shortly after the elections and the opening of the UNGA. With two weeks between meetings, the “next few meetings” mentioned in my 362 brings us up to that point. What I have been and continue to say is that they are very obviously putting themselves in a position to carry out such a move at about that time. Whether they do so, of course, remains to be seen. I simply want to be sure that the Department understands and is prepared for the contingency and does not desire to take any further action to forestall it. Incidentally, while our position through the Suez crisis has been very

consistent with the position on renunciation of force I have taken here, the statements of the French and British have certainly not given too much support to the “universally accepted” nature of the principle.

11. I was very interested in your account of the Chinese Communist initiative in the publications field. Do our Treasury regulations operate so as to prevent any such shipments? (I have subsequently seen the CA notice which I am glad to note is encouraging the licensing for non-technical publications.)

12. I had been deploring publicity under my previous instructions but had also tried to make it clear we did not fear it. I entirely agree with Walter’s views and will act accordingly in the future.

13. The guidance for tomorrow has just come in. It is very complete and I certainly agree we are on a strong wicket in the disgraceful McCarthy affair. I just can’t understand why they have done it.

Thursday

14. Back from the meeting and have just sent off my summary to you. I do not think there can longer be much doubt as to the course of action they have laid out for themselves. The only question now is the timing—that is will they carry out their move at the next meeting just before the elections and the UNGA or will they wait until the following meeting just after the elections and the UNGA. In any event, there will in all probability be a public statement following the next meeting, which will make the threat to break, with the break carried out at the following meeting. One can never dismiss the possibility of a bland reversal but I just do not think it is likely as they have now gone almost out to the end of this limb. I hope that the Secretary will have time carefully to consider the situation and that my guidance will be as explicit as possible.

15. I deliberately did not try further today to develop the threat implicit in the last sentence of his prepared statement, leaving that for next time when I will want to make a very carefully considered and comprehensive statement in reply to his of today. I would hope that my guidance will also cover whether it is desired I try to steer things in the direction of an indefinite recess or a clean break, if the next meeting goes in that direction.

16. I should think it would be nice to get out our statement on implementation before the next meeting. I think it would place us in a much better position to meet their next move. (Incidentally, I hope you will get it to us here well before release time so that we know what has been said and I can get a copy over to Wang at approximately its release time.) I should also think that at our next meeting I should be prepared to say something on the missing POWs without getting into any details.

17. I am enclosing for comment a draft break statement which I would plan to issue immediately following any meeting at which a break would occur. It might, of course, be necessary somewhat to modify it to meet the exact situation but I would plan to stick fairly close to its general line. As this would ostensibly be an extemporaneous statement as I left the meeting room it must be short and simple.

18. In the quite likely event he does not break at our next meeting but very shortly thereafter and issues a statement along the lines of his prepared statement today I would propose to promptly comment along the lines of para 2, 3, and 4 of the enclosed break statement with such changes as the circumstances require.

Regards to all,

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**

*American Ambassador*

P.S. Just an afterthought. If they are planning something timed to our elections I might throw them off step and somewhat spike their guns by asking for a postponement of the next meeting to Monday November 5. I am in a good position to ask for it as I have never cashed in on the times I have agreed to his requests for postponement. I would, of course, do it at the last minute, that is on Wednesday or Thursday before the meeting and all I would have to do is send him word that it was “impossible” for me to meet until Nov. 5.

UAJ

**Enclosure<sup>2</sup>**

#### DRAFT STATEMENT

I regret to announce that at today’s meeting Ambassador Wang refused to agree to any date for our next meeting. (or refused to meet further with me).

In effect, he refuses to meet further unless the U.S. capitulates to their demand for a Foreign Ministers conference under the continued threat that the Chinese Communists will resort to force if they cannot otherwise achieve their ambitions in the Taiwan area. Ambassador Wang has also demanded that the U.S. remove its existing controls over trade and travel between the U.S. and China.

I have told Ambassador Wang that I hope he will reconsider this peremptory attitude and for my part I stand ready again to meet at any time to resume with him in a genuine negotiating spirit search

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<sup>2</sup>No classification marking.

for agreement on an unconditional declaration which would remove the existing threat of the Chinese Communists to resort to force in the Taiwan area and agree that our differences will be settled by peaceful means only.

The U.S. continues to expect the Chinese Communists to carry out their commitment of September 10, 1955 and promptly to release the 10 unfortunate Americans still held in their prisons in violation of that agreement.

I have informed Ambassador Wang that any communications can be transmitted through our respective consular offices here in Geneva.

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#### 734. Telegram 415 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 18, 1956, noon

415. From Johnson.

Two hour twenty minute meeting this morning. I opened with statement along lines para one Deptel 440 except that only stated prison authorities refused permit UK Charge representative see McCarthy, not mentioning prison official allegation McCarthy did not wish interview. (My thought was if Wang briefed on subject and made this statement would use it as point for counterattack. However during discussion it was obvious he not briefed on any details McCarthy case). He made no response my notification we were considering public statement and after extemporaneous rebuttal my opening statement along familiar lines, made prepared statement opening with sentence "talks have now come to stage where no progress can be made". Reviewed negotiations along familiar lines and then alleged US has revealed "it deliberately blocking progress in Ambassadorial talks and is fearful of any improvement in Sino-American relations". PRC has exerted "greatest efforts" which have not been rewarded and considers such "futile situation should not continue any longer". PRC therefore formally proposes the holding of a Foreign Ministers conference "to discuss the questions of relaxing and eliminating tensions Taiwan area, as well as questions mutual renunciation force by China and US, lifting embargo, peoples contacts and cultural exchange, etc." "What is at stake is the future of Sino-American relations and indeed peace of Far East and world".

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1856. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.



In reply I reviewed history their bad faith implementing first agreement and their refusal abandon use force Taiwan area as showing futility discussion at any other level. If they desired resolve these problems could be done between us as Ambassadors, if they did not desire resolve them changing level would make no difference. US would not negotiate under threat of force.

During subsequent give and take he did not attempt force any more specific reply, obviously content let matter rest here until next meeting, and subsequent discussion centered around implementation with my continuing come back to McCarthy case, PRC refusal permit third party arrangement operate absence representations Indian Embassy etc. Wang consistently took refuge in Taiwan entry permit charge.

Next meeting Friday, November 2. Returning Prague tomorrow.

**Gowen**

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### 735. Telegram 416 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 18, 1956, 6 p.m.

416. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting:

Wang clearly plotted their future course at today's meeting and barring unforeseen reversal only question is timing. Believe most likely course is release shortly after next meeting of public statement along lines his today's prepared statement. In this event or in event break next meeting propose immediately issue here public statement accordance draft being transmitted by letter.

Propose at next meeting make careful review our position noting implied threat last sentence his today's prepared statement and also again making mention missing POW issue. While will not go into details latter issue this meeting will appreciate most recent statistical summary that situation. Suggest release our implementation statement before next meeting.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1856. Secret; Limit Distribution.

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736. Telegram 417 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 18, 1956, 7 p.m.

417. From Johnson.

1. I opened 60th with prepared statement:

A. During recent meetings, and in your govt's current series bi-weekly press statements recurrent theme has been attempt create false impression responsibility for our failure make further progress these talks and specifically failure thus far reach agreement on fundamental question renunciation force rests with my side. Emphasis your side places on these unsupported allegations demonstrates uneasy awareness of glaring weakness its position. That is, in final analysis, it comes down to question of comparative good faith of two sides in carrying out presently existing or proposed agreements. Fortunately, people of world who being called upon form opinion on this subject have entirely concrete set facts by which they can judge this matter for selves. World well knows of commitment your side made Sept 10 1955, respect return Americans. World well knows in spite of that clear commitment ten Americans still languish in your prisons. Let us take as example the case just one these Americans, Fr. McCarthy.

B. On June 15 1953, Fr. McCarthy's long devotion to Chinese people and desire promote understanding between our two peoples was rewarded by sudden arrest. Without respect for legal norms of any social or political system he was kept in prison for month after month year after year without trial, without charges being proffered, without opportunity obtain defense counsel, without opportunity defend himself, without opportunity have his guilt or innocence determined by impartial tribunal. Finally on Sept 18 1955 Fr. McCarthy is shown by your authorities copy of agreed announcement which you and I issued here eight days previously. As would any reasonable man, Fr. McCarthy believed this solemn commitment applied him as well as all other imprisoned Americans. He could only have anticipated his expeditious release return to his country accordance with that announcement.

C. However, what happens? Instead of promised release, on October 22 1955 he finally given so-called trial and sentenced spend more years in prison.

D. In meanwhile Fr. McCarthy receives letter from UK Charge written and delivered within context of announcement and transmitting copy thereof to him. Again he must have dared hope. On

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1856. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

December 10 1955 he is permitted send letter to UK Charge properly pointing out he was being prevented from returning to US. UK Charge, again in absolute conformity with agreed announcement made representations to your govt on behalf Fr. McCarthy. What is result? In utter disregard of freely entered into commitment and provisions of announcement your govt curtly asserted it was entirely matter its sovereignty as to how it treated imprisoned Americans and refused act on UK Charge's representations. Thus in this one example there is laid out extraordinarily complete record of not only failure your authorities release Americans accordance with their commitment Sept 10 but even permit operation of third party arrangement which was established by that announcement.

E. However, even this is not end of record in this case. On Sept 1 this year Fr. McCarthy permitted again write UK Charge requesting interview with him, again within context announcement. Your authorities agreed permit interview and time was set for it. Acting in good faith representative UK Charge makes long journey to Shanghai, presents himself at prison at appointed time. Then, prison authorities refuse permit representative UK Charge even see Fr. McCarthy. He refused even meager privilege of interview. He refused very explicit authority set forth in announcement investigate facts in any such case. There cannot be any clearer evidence of deliberate refusal carry out every substantive provision of announcement.

F. It should not even have been necessary for Fr. McCarthy write asking for interview, for UK Charge should long ago have been enabled by your authorities see all Americans who continue be held in prison. As long ago as last December your Prime Minister told UK Charge that he was not permitted visit American prisoners on grounds that Indian Embassy in US not permitted visit Chinese prisoners my country. Although this matter had not been raised during our discussion announcement on May 31 1956 at 49th meeting, I formally informed you here, and Indian Embassy in US was informed, that its representatives could interview any Chinese prisoner in US whether in federal or state institutions. It solely because of inexplicable objections your govt that this was not done. On Aug 23 this year UK Charge again formally requested permission visit all American prisoners. Although there no longer even slightest basis for your authorities refuse this modest reasonable request, your govt has not even yet replied his letter.

G. My govt has been extremely patient in face this inexplicable continued refusal of your authorities carry out its clear commitment release all Americans. It is also seriously concerned at attempt of your authorities, as exemplified in case Fr. McCarthy, evade their obligations under announcement with respect third party functions. These

undisputable facts with regard public agreement between us and my govt is considering making public statement with regard to these facts.

H. It is in light of these facts as well as continued unwillingness of your govt enter into meaningful renunciation force that world will judge which side is willing carry out its public commitments, which side is willing unconditionally renounce recourse to use of force in settling our disputes, and thus, which side is truly demonstrating its good faith in attempting improve relations between us.

2. Wang replied, in my statement I referred to issue civilians as well as renunciation force declaration. He could only say I had only repeated old arguments in this respect and in doing so reversed facts. In discussing question civilians had never made any clear accounting in cases 52 people of 55 names he had given me and also failed give accounting with regard 26 persons whose cases brought up previously and whose names I had given him. I had not referred to any improvement in ability Chinese in US return their fatherland. I had not spoken of any action taken by my authorities eliminate obstruction offered Chinese returning their country. Thus it was their side which actually dissatisfied with present situation on civilians. Despite repeated representation of their side, situation had not yet improved. I had made reference to American nationals in China but not able state any case of ordinary American resident in China hindered or prevented from leaving. This fully proved it precisely Chinese side which carrying out agreement between us. Policy his govt any aliens residing his country without respect nationality, who are friendly to people and abide by their law, will be treated with even more friendliness and protected. To treat foreign friends as criminals is not practice of China and will never occur China. Such is only practice of American authorities with respect innocent Chinese residents in America. However, any aliens residing China who dared go against Chinese law would certainly be punished according to law.

3. Wang continued, with regard concrete example I had given this morning regard case Fr. McCarthy, if he had not engaged in intelligence activities against China and had not carried out subversive activities against China Govt, he would never been punished by law. Fr. McCarthy had himself made confession regard these criminal activities. In case any foreign nationals engaged in subversive activities against Chinese Govt, could anyone expect Chinese stand idly by without doing anything against him. Supposing such case occurred in US, he presumed my govt would also take similar measures against him. This is only natural.

4. Wang continued from prepared statement, at today's meeting he would like point out talks have now come to stage where no progress can be made. This could not but greatly disappoint them. At

last meeting my side used entirely unjustified pretext and once again rejected last proposal mutual contact and cultural relations between peoples. This could not but lead one to conclusion present talks at Ambassadorial level could not solve other practical matters at issue between China and US as stipulated in agenda. At very beginning our discussions on second point agenda my side deliberately and without any reason haggled procrastinated first point agenda. Then so-called renunciation force item introduced. However throughout full year negotiations on this, my side persisted in unjustifiable position encroaching sovereignty interfering internal affairs. My side never tried conceal this intention encroach sovereignty and interference internal affairs under renunciation force proposition. In this respect my remarks at last meeting on relations between international agreement and sovereign and internal affairs were startling. According my logic it seems any country which happens have dealing with US must accept encroachment sovereignty and interference internal affairs. Entirely contrary this attitude of my side, their side adopted spirit conciliation with view resolving Sino-American disputes and made three successive reasonable proposals this respect. It only due persistence my side in unreasonable demands, we thus far have not succeeded and talks developed into deadlock. Evidently until my side abandons attempt encroachment sovereignty and interference internal affairs no progress could be expected this question. In spite all this, his side had continued make important efforts with view breaking deadlock. Their side had introduced two proposals for lifting embargo and peoples contact and cultural relations. In making these proposals their side believed agreement these matters which easily resolved would not only dispose these two outstanding questions Sino-American relations, but also definitely facilitate improvement atmosphere these talks, thus contributing to solution other controversial issues. However my side had rejected both these reasonable propositions. It should be pointed out my side even refused conduct discussion these proposals. In addition to making acceptance of our terms on renunciation force issue, precondition also introduced pretext of handful Americans who offended law in China and serving sentences in China. These pretexts all been refuted long ago—we ourselves well aware such pretexts untenable. Everybody knows pretexts my side could in no sense justify obstruction lifting embargo and development personal contacts and cultural exchange.

5. Wang continued, in taking such position my side only reveals self as deliberately blocking any progress in Ambassadorial talks and fearful any improvement Sino-American relations. Talks between us at Ambassadorial level had taken such long time, during which so many trials made. Despite fact their side had made such efforts, these efforts not rewarded as deserved. They consider now such futile

situation should not continue any longer. They consider it is time Foreign Ministers our countries meet for direct talks. Hence he now formally proposed Foreign Ministers conference between China and US be held to discuss question relaxing and eliminating tension Taiwan area as well as questions mutual renunciation force by China and America, lifting embargo, personal contact and cultural exchange, etc. In making this proposal their side was fully conscious duty to people. What is at stake is future Sino-American relations and indeed peace in Far East and world. Therefore it his earnest hope my govt would give careful consideration to this proposal.

6. I replied when my govt made proposal for these talks he would well recall that it put as first item in terms reference question return civilians. His govt agreed here this was first item on agenda. His govt well aware what we referring to when used term return civilians. There had been various indirect exchanges between our govts on subject and in 1954 he and I here directly discussed matter. Had been discussion of subject here between our respective Consulates and when he and I first met here August last year, I had given him list of people with whom we concerned in discussion of subject. These were people who denied exit permits from his country and people in prison. Our discussions here prior issuance announcement Sept 10 last year, so far as Americans concerned, centered entirely around these people. Sept 6 last year he informed me cases those refused exit permits had been resolved and they being given such permits. Thus when we made announcement Sept 10 only cases remaining were those in prison. He would well recall our long discussions this subject and would well recall history of each of words appearing in that announcement, particularly word "expeditiously." Quite clear intent my govt this subject from very beginning not issuance some vague public statement which resolved nothing, but in resolution problem itself.

7. I continued, we given that problem to resolve and was on very clear understanding my part issuance of that statement would resolve problem that I had agreed to its issuance. I willing agree to wording therein, which not as explicit as would have liked to see, in deference to his views and on understanding it covered problem we given to resolve. I still considered that agreement did cover problem. As said at time we reached that agreement, however, agreement as such did not resolve problem, only carrying out agreement could resolve problem. This was first agreement reached between us. Its prompt faithful execution could have had great potentialities for future our relations. I and my govt had most earnestly hoped it would be promptly faithfully carried out. During past months here I had over and over again pointed out if not being carried out. This morning I pointed out fact regard just one case in which not carried out, not only respect commitment release

person involved but also with what we might term more minor matter of third party functions. Thus this not matter of any pretext involving any few American citizens, important though each them were. It transcended even their importance. It matter good faith carrying out agreement he and I, as Ambassadors representing our two govts, had solemnly entered into. If not good faith carrying out agreements reached between us as Ambassadors, it certainly futile consider negotiations at another level. Thus, progress blocked not by refusal my side engage in discussions other agreements, progress blocked by failure his side carry out agreement already reached. Progress measured not by number paper agreements we pour out to press of world but by what we actually do in solving problems. I been trying my best urge, in every way I capable, on his govt that it make progress in resolving this first problem between us. His govt, and only his govt, had it in its power permit us make progress this regard. Entirely choice his govt as to whether or not progress would be made.

8. I continued, we next both agreed most urgent problem facing us was that existing Taiwan area. I thought we both accepted obvious fact situation very complex and did not lend itself to any ready and easy solution. We disagreed very strongly about origins, causes, possible solutions and other aspects that situation. However, that did not mean we had to go to war about it. We could both agree only peaceful methods be used in pursuing our policies, and resolving that problem. That had been my proposition and very simple proposition from very beginning. On other hand from very beginning it had been their position they free use force and threat force in attempt resolve that situation. Making such charges as an attempt being made interfere in internal affairs, sovereignty, other such matters did not obscure fact he had not yet accepted simple proposition I had made that force would not be used resolve that situation.

9. I continued, when his govt reached decision it willing say would not employ force in that area or any other areas in which we found policies in conflict, agreement on renunciation force readily possible between us. If it had not reached that decision and willing state it in simple straightforward terms, no amount discussion this or any other level could hope reach agreement that subject. I had made it clear my govt not willing enter into any statement, particularly following our experience on statement first item agenda, which means one thing to one side and other thing to other side and gives appearance to world agreement renunciaton force has been reached when such agreement does not in fact exist. My govt and no self-respecting govt willing negotiate under threat force. That threat use force in Taiwan still publicly being stated by high officials his govt. When that threat removed we could discuss ways and means whereby other existing problems between us could be



resolved. I had continued hope he would enter into agreement with me which would renounce threat force, thus open up way settlement other problems. US was one who made this proposal—expressed willingness unconditionally renounce use threat force in settlement that dispute. I still hoped his govt could perceive that acceptance that simple and straightforward proposition as well as carrying out first agreement between us was in its own interest as well as in interest peace in Far East and world. If there was good faith this was something entirely capable resolution between us here. If not good faith certainly could not be resolved at other level discussion.

10. Wang replied he not going make more comments on course our talks here as record of more than year past has fully proved tremendous efforts put in these talks by their side. He recalled occasion on which I had indicated talks on this Ambassadorial level capable resolving issues between our two countries. At that time he had said disagreed with that view but added if US genuinely desirous do so, of course he glad go along. I had stated that for our talks to go ahead depends on resolution practical problems, to this he readily agreed. However record of past year demonstrated US Govt not produced authority for settling issues and had not shown willingness do so.

11. Wang continued, had just made statement covering question return civilians as well as what I called existence threat use force Taiwan. Both these questions demonstrated fundamentally erroneous approach my side to these questions. We must recognize principle of mutual benefit must be observed in any negotiations to resolve controversial issues. In my statement I had repeatedly said I expected his govt do thus and so. This approach to talks entirely reveals standpoint my side; that is my side only takes account of own interests. On question return civilians, if US not willing take any action or make gestures to improve situation of Chinese in US desiring return China and if US only made charges against his govt, how could such approach facilitate our resolving the question. With reference cases Chinese residents in US who long expressed desire return homeland and not able do so, can this situation indicate good faith on part US to carry out agreement? US authorities been trying coerce Chinese residents who desire return his country to apply for so-called Taiwan entry permits or even cause them proceed Taiwan itself and US authorities trying coerce Chinese obtain permanent residence US. Could all these cases be described as record American good faith. If we were to talk about good faith question involved US alone.

12. Wang continued, next, on question existence threat force Taiwan. Is it not situation US posing threat force against China? How can anyone say that in Taiwan it China posing threat force against US? Was it not fact precisely China which first proposed China and US



should enter into negotiations settle controversial issues Taiwan area. Was it not fact Chinese made untiring efforts these talks and repeatedly put forth proposals with view improving relations between two countries? Was it not fact US repeatedly refused any improvement in relations between two countries? To sum up facts very clear. Problem facing us not for China do thus and so but problem was for US to improve negotiations and contribute to solution of problems. They on their part always desired and always made efforts overcome difficulties so that problems might be resolved. They had made many efforts this direction. Now that in these talks whole series of question and even some minor ones had not been resolved, spite all their efforts, was it not time consider holding FMC rpt FMC to resolve all these questions? Could it be that US Govt determined continue present situation these talks without settling any issues and on other hand refused to raise level of negotiations? They hoped that in interest improved relations between China and US and in interest peace, US will not take that course of action. Hoped US Govt would give careful and favorable consideration to proposal he had made this morning concerning holding FMC.

13. I replied, he had spoken of mutual benefit in negotiations. I certainly agreed. We entered into this agreement on civilians on understanding it was to be of mutual benefit. Fortunately there was way of undisputable demonstrating to whose benefit it had operated. There were facts with regard to it that did not rest on unsupported assertions. Facts were that under third party arrangement with which we agreed, my govt had not received single allegation any obstruction offered to any of tens thousands Chinese in my country. Facts were as I cited this morning that in addition to Americans covered by agreement still remaining in prison his govt had rejected representation of third party made in accordance with that agreement and had prevented third party from operating even limited way set forth that agreement. I'd hope at our next meeting he would be in position assure me this situation been corrected.

14. Wang replied, also wanted point out fact many Chinese imprisoned in America. They had not seen any initiative taken by US improve their situation. As he had mentioned previously Chinese in US still subject to many unreasonable restrictions. Hoped US would improve lot. He meant such restrictions as so-called Taiwan entry permit.

15. I replied, no Chinese in US ever forced go Taiwan against his will. No Chinese who desired return his country had in any way been obstructed doing so. Only action of his govt prevented third party from determining in impartial manner desires of Chinese who imprisoned for common crimes. Might mention that since last informed him, to our knowledge, 222 Chinese have returned his country since Aug 1 last

year. Chinese continue freely depart for his country at any time they desire.

16. Wang said would be very happy to take my word regarding Chinese in US, but even happier see facts actually so.

17. I said fortunately he had Indian Embassy there which could assure him of facts.

18. Wang said but Indian Embassy not informed them US has already rescinded so-called requirement forcing Chinese obtain Taiwan entry permit. Very much hoped such proof could be given them.

19. I said that not issue, issue is does any Chinese in US feel he being obstructed from returning? Established third party arrangement to take care of that. Had Indian Embassy informed him of even single case Chinese who alleged he being obstructed? I had assured him we been and continue willing take action immediately any case brought our attention by Indian Embassy. This sharply contrasted with attitude taken by his govt with respect representations already made to his govt by UK Charge. Hardly any mutual benefit or reciprocity in situation from US standpoint.

20. Wang said fact Indian Embassy has not made representation did not mean cases do not exist. Past experience of Chinese in US still haunting them. Unless US Govt going to take positive effect measures to improve their situation, such influence could not be easily removed.

21. I said certainly did not seem prevent Chinese departing US whenever desire. US had and would continue faithfully carry out agreement into which we entered, in spite fact his authorities not only not carried out agreement in broad aspects but even in details. I knew of no way in which we could better show our good faith.

22. Wang could only say these remarks sounded very nice but coercion such as requirement secure Taiwan entry permit still existed. He hoped I would give careful consideration to proposal he made this morning.

23. Neither of us having any more to say, I asked if Nov 1 agreeable. He suggested Friday, Nov 2. I agreed.

**Gowen**

**737. Telegram 189 from Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, October 19, 1956, 5 p.m.

189. In order obtain maximum coverage and assist relations with press in Geneva suggest that press officer Geneva be authorized make simultaneous release proposed press statement on CHICOM implementation agreed announcement.

**Johnson**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1956. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Geneva for Osborn as telegram 9.

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**738. Telegram 137 to Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 24, 1956, 6:51 p.m.

137. Eyes only Johnson.

1. You should inform Wang on October 31 that for administrative reasons you request postponement next meeting from November 2 to Thursday, November 8.

2. In view your assessment that Chinese Communists may move toward suspension or termination of talks next meeting Osborn should urgently update historical review of talks and forward to Department, if possible prior next meeting, as it might be required on short notice. Also have Osborn prepare condensed summary of talks suitable for publishing in three or four pages Current Foreign Relations.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–2456. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared in substance by Phleger and Dulles and by Sebald.

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739. Letter from Osborn to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, October 25, 1956

Dear Walter:

From your note on the slip transmitting Fr. McCarthy's latest letter, I got the impression there may have been some misunderstanding back there about the nature of the proposed statement mentioned in the Ambassador's last comment telegram. As will have been made clear by the Ambassador's letter No. 47, this statement is proposed for release only in case Wang breaks or comes close to it, and was not intended as a recommended draft of the statement on implementation. I hope no delay has been occasioned in the release of the Department's statement.

As to why the Chinese Communists allowed the McCarthy incident to happen, it seems only to make sense (and even then not good sense) if it is remembered that the Chicoms have their own interpretation of the Agreed Announcement, which differs from ours—or from any rational man's. In the light of their distorted interpretation, the McCarthy correspondence documents, not a case of infraction of the Announcement, but a case of fulfillment of its terms. They maintain that the Announcement applies to imprisoned Americans, so far as the right to contact the UK Charge is concerned; however, they say the Americans' right of expeditious return can only be exercised after their cases have been "settled". Accordingly, the Chicoms maintain that there can be no question of "obstruction" until after settlement of a case. Further, they insist that neither the Announcement nor the third power arrangement has any relation to the sentences or the treatment of imprisoned Americans.

Another element in the picture is the fact that Wang was so obviously not briefed on the details of the McCarthy incident. If the whole thing had been carefully planned, Wang would surely have been briefed. Accordingly it seems reasonable to suppose the incident reflects neither a calculated maneuver nor a significant change of policy. It probably occurred as an unforeseen development in the carrying out of existing policies.

I would guess at a sequence of events something like this:

1. The Chicoms allowed McCarthy to send his September 1 letter because they did not want to have McCarthy, after his eventual release, charging them with having denied him this elementary right under the Agreed Announcement, a right which they have acknowledged, even under their strained interpretation of the Announcement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

2. The Chicoms permitted McCarthy to request an interview with the UK Charge, and they O.K.'d the UK arrangements for the interview, because they wanted to provide an illustration of Chicom compliance with the Agreed Announcement—as they interpret it.

3. In the meantime, spunky, outspoken Fr. McCarthy precipitates the contradictions inherent in the Chicom interpretation of the Announcement by telling his jailers what he plans to say to Addis. He makes it clear he is going to tell Addis just how unjust his imprisonment has been, and is going to ask that the UK Charge make representations, not merely asking for his, McCarthy's release, but also setting forth in full detail the injustice of the "obstruction" that has been offered in his case. The jailers pass these remarks on to Peiping and request instructions.

4. Peiping cannot accept McCarthy's right to request this kind of representation without by implication acknowledging: (a) that imprisonment constitutes obstruction, and (b) that the justice/injustice of charges, treatment of prisoners, etc., are legitimate subjects of concern under the Agreed Announcement. Therefore Peiping advises the Shanghai jailers that McCarthy has no right to ask for the kind of representations he wants. When this word is given to McCarthy, he takes everybody completely by surprise with his refusal to see Addis.

5. Given the above background, and the Chicom interpretation of the Agreed Announcement, their decision to let McCarthy's October 6 letter pass is not surprising. They realize how suspicious this affair has looked to Addis and will look to the world; they welcome this confirmation that McCarthy had indeed refused to see Addis. To the Chicoms, in the light of their interpretation of the Announcement, McCarthy's October 6 letter illustrates, not their infraction of the terms of the Announcement, but their consistency in abiding by these terms, as they have been construed in Peiping.

All this is mere guesswork, of course, but it seems to me the most probable explanation of what has happened. The one encouraging thing about the affair, to my mind, is that Peiping still feels constrained to maintain the pretense of compliance with the Announcement, and there is thus still some hope for further releases in the not-too-distant future.

Please excuse the hasty drafting, necessitated by the fact our weekly pouch is closing in about half an hour.

Hope to see you all one of these days. Regards to all, from the both of us

Sincerely,

**David L. Osborn**

P.S. I appreciated the September monthly notes very much. Hope to receive October's also. Thanks, Irene and Doug.

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740. Letter 48 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 48

Geneva, October 31, 1956

Dear Walter:

Just a very brief note late tonight in the hope that I will have a reply from Wang early tomorrow morning on the postponement of the meeting. (I have just drafted a telegram letting you know the status as of tonight.) I felt November 15 was as far as I could safely shoot for and it is evident that even this date has thrown them into something of a spin as I still have no reply. I take it that it is not the intent of the Department that I build this up into too big an issue, and, if he doesn't agree will have to play it by ear.

I had thought of trying to handle the whole matter of postponement from Prague, but as I was very anxious to go over the summary and history of the talks decided that I must come down here to do that if they were to be gotten off to you in this week's pouch which leaves tomorrow. I was and still am confident nothing dramatic is imminent there.

We have had to work very hurriedly on these today in the expectation I will be able to leave for Prague early tomorrow, and to connect with tomorrow's pouch. It was physically impossible to recopy all of the White Paper in its revised form in time for tomorrow's pouch. I am therefore enclosing with this letter only the major revisions with an indication as to where they are inserted and the full revised copy will be sent in Sunday's pouch.

I think that with a few minor changes it would be possible to use the article we have done for Current Foreign Relations as a substitute for the original summary section of the White Paper. Of course, this somewhat depends on the audience to whom we are primarily directing the White Paper. You will note that in our Foreign Relations article we have struck the note that in spite of their failures, the talks did accomplish something and it was therefore a good idea to hold them. This may be very good for some audiences but it inevitably tends to give the Chinese Communists something on the credit side of their ledger. One could make the approach that the talks were a complete failure because of Chinese Communist intransigence, but it seems to me this tends to impugn the wisdom of holding them. I have tried to preserve a balance between extremes here, but undoubtedly Walter and the Secretary will want carefully to consider particularly the note

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

struck in the opening paragraphs. In any event I know all of you back there will also have many suggestions for improvements. I think it would be well for you to have someone not too familiar with the talks to read the White Paper draft to test reactions. I realize that time may well not permit, but if possible I would appreciate an opportunity to comment on any major substantive changes. I will have a copy with me in Prague.

*Thursday morning.*

No word yet this morning. In order to give credence to necessity my being in Prague tomorrow am leaving this morning. Am returning by car as in any event would be impossible obtain plane until tomorrow morning.

Regards to all,  
Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

Encl.

Major revisions of draft White Paper on Talks.

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**741. Telegram 451 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 1, 1956, 8 a.m.

451. From Johnson.

Without giving Wang any indication whether I am in Geneva passed message to him early afternoon today (Oct 31) through interpreter that not rpt not possible for meet as scheduled Nov 2 as necessary be present post at that time and suggest next meeting Nov 15 "according customary schedule." Although I have determined he subsequently arrived Geneva late afternoon plane as of late tonight still have no reply. Assume this indicates he has felt it necessary consult Peiping.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–156. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

**742. Telegram 453 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 1, 1956, 10 a.m.

453. From Johnson.

No repeat no reply yet from Wang. Am departing for Prague this morning. Have arranged to keep in touch en route with Osborn who will keep Department informed of developments.

Drafts requested papers going forward today's pouch.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-156. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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**743. Telegram 456 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 1, 1956, 3 p.m.

456. From Osborn.

Wang agreed next meeting November 15. Usual announcement press, postponement "for administrative reasons".

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.



**744. Letter 58 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 58

Washington, November 9, 1956

Dear Alex:

The world shaking events in Hungary and Egypt have indeed crowded out our Geneva operation. It is just as well that we were able to take a back seat at this time.

You handled the postponement of last week's meeting precisely right. We agree that a two week postponement was all that could justifiably be requested in the circumstances. The confluence of the crises in Eastern Europe and Suez with the preoccupations of the pre-election week undoubtedly made the reasons for postponement quite understandable.

EUR is no doubt less uneasy about your leaving your post for the next meeting. They were quite apprehensive last week, but your assessment that no early eruption in Czechoslovakia should be anticipated, should remove any strong objection to your absence from Prague next week. However, EUR from a longer range standpoint is not happy with the double duty arrangement.

There has been no meeting yet on your instructions for the next session. With the Secretary in the hospital and with Herman Phleger deeply engrossed in the two major crises, the meeting will be largely a FE proposition. I do not anticipate anything new. We will consider the pros and cons of taking up the missing military personnel issue at Geneva again at the next meeting, but I would not be surprised if we postponed it for at least one more meeting.

The British still have no reply from the Chinese Communists, either to the Father McCarthy representation or to the general request of last August for permission to visit all American prisoners. Relations between the British Mission in Peiping and the Chinese Communist Foreign Office are more strained than they have been since the Korean Armistice, with the Egyptian crises added to the Hong Kong border violation incident and the nasty attitude the Chinese Communists have taken on the Hong Kong riots.

In reading over your letter of September 22, requesting a change in the method of payment for Helenka Osborn, we find your request somewhat ambiguous [*text not declassified*]. We would appreciate your

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

clarifying your proposal in your next letter and we will do the best we can to satisfy your needs.

We are enclosing a copy of a document spelling out Chinese Communist adherence to certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Walter Robertson is to leave Washington November 22 for Wellington, where he will head the U.S. Delegation at the Colombo Plan Meeting December 4–8. After that, he will visit Djakarta, Manila, Hong Kong and Tokyo from Dec. 11 to Dec. 18, arriving back in Washington about December 20. Mrs. Robertson and Howard Jones will accompany him.

We were glad to get your letters No. 47 and 48 on October 29 and November 5 respectively. You and Dave indeed did a good job on the summary and history of the talks. It is good to have this on hand, whether Wang makes any major move at the next meeting or not.

Regards and good wishes,

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Clipping from FBIS–Nov. 6, “NPC Committee Approves Geneva Accords”.

2. Clipping from FBIS–Nov. 7, “CPR Ratifies Four Geneva Conventions”.

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#### **745. Telegram 531 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 13, 1956, 6:50 p.m.

531. For Johnson.

Guidance for November 15 meeting.

1. Press further your attack of last meeting on Communist failure carry out Agreed Announcement. Using McCarthy case as illustration, point out how Communists have not only failed carry out basic

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–1356. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy; cleared in draft by Phleger and Sebald.

commitment release Americans expeditiously, but are balking at supplementary provisions of Agreed Announcement extending rights to third power. FYI We consider McCarthy case represents major weakness in Communist position which you should exploit to maximum. O'Neill could not get appointment with Peiping Vice Minister Foreign Affairs and therefore embodied in letter delivered last week points made our Aide Memoire October 22, with exception last sentence numbered subparagraph 2 which he is holding for later use. You need not restrict your presentation to points made by O'Neill and may include latter point also if you consider desirable. We have withheld for time being public statement on McCarthy case because developments in Egypt and Eastern Europe would cause such statement receive little attention from world press. END FYI

2. If Wang should press you on question Chinese prisoners in US, you may inform him of Red Cross survey and fact that James Lew, only Chinese convict choosing go to Communist China, sailed October 29. Do not mention unless Wang presses. FYI We do not contemplate public statement on prisoner survey until issue of 2 prisoners desiring deportation to Taiwan (Deptel 407 to Taipei repeated Geneva 529) is resolved, unless developments should make earlier statement desirable. END FYI

3. Reject Communist demand for Foreign Ministers Conference in same manner as last meeting, emphasizing Communist responsibility for failure make progress present talks. Hold to previous positions on renunciation of force, trade and cultural exchange.

4. Reserve missing military personnel item for presentation later meeting.

5. Contingency statement transmitted with your letter October 17 has been revised in Department. It is being telegraphed separately for your use in event Wang refuses meet again. Separate statement would be issued here.

**Hoover**

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**746. Telegram 532 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 13, 1956

532. Verbatim text. For Johnson.

Re Deptel 531, Paragraph 5, following is approved text for your use if Wang should suspend talks.

QUOTE At today's meeting Ambassador Wang advised me that the Chinese Communists were suspending further ambassadorial meetings.

In effect, he refused to meet further unless the US capitulates to the Communist demand for a Foreign Ministers conference. At the same time Wang made clear that the Communists would not agree to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan area. He also demanded that the U.S. remove its existing controls over trade and travel between the US and China.

I have told Ambassador Wang that for my part I stand ready to meet with him in an attempt to reach agreement on an unconditional declaration which would remove the existing threat of the Chinese Communists to resort to force in the Taiwan area and would assure that our differences will be settled by peaceful means only.

I am certain my government will not accept the unilateral breakoff of these talks as a pretext for the continued violation by the Chinese Communists of the terms of the agreed announcement of September 10, 1955. As a result of this violation ten unfortunate Americans are still held in Chinese Communist prisons.

I have informed Ambassador Wang that any communications can be transmitted through our respective consular offices here in Geneva  
END QUOTE

**Hoover**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1356. Confidential, Priority, Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy; cleared by Phleger in substance and by Sebald and Henderson in draft. The time of transmission is illegible.

**747. Telegram 508 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 15, 1956, 1 p.m.

508. From Johnson.

One hour fifty-five minute meeting today. I made opening statement pointing out progress thwarted by PRC unwillingness agree disputes would be settled by peaceful means only and PRC failure carry out agreed announcement, leading into McCarthy case including Charge UK has not even been permitted carry out clearly specified function investigation facts, and noting no reply UK Charge's August 23 letter requesting interview other prisoners.

Wang replied with somewhat perfunctory restatement their position last meeting on futility talks, deadlock and necessity for FMC then shifting over to implementation. Additional example US obstruction was FBI investigation into Chinese students' correspondence with families which "fresh threat against those wishing to return and violation agreed announcement". On McCarthy stated his sentence expires June 1957, familiar restatement question right return does not arise prior to release, UK permitted interview accordance prison regulations but McCarthy refused. Referring US proposal Indians interview prisoners in US said this only "screening in disguise" and list prisoners given Indians incomplete. "If US wants UK Charge be able contact US prisoners on own initiative US should give Indians list of all Chinese in US concerning all those in prison and agree Indian Embassy can contact Chinese in US on own initiative in unrestricted manner". Nevertheless if UK Charge receives request from US prisoner in PRC interview will be permitted if it takes place conformity regulations. During course subsequent discussion also referred "Walter Robertson's aide memoire" June 1 to Indian Embassy stating Chinese prisoners in US not covered by agreed announcement. Thus US position has been self-contradictory.

There was extended give and take on implementation during which I vigorously attacked all aspects their position on Americans in prison. He was clearly on defensive. During course his defense he charged not single Chinese prisoner had returned from US. During course reply I stated "was now in position assure him that not single alien Chinese desiring return remains in US prisons". He rejected this as fact but did not press me for details and I not amplify.

At close meeting when he made pro forma statement hoping US Government would have something say next meeting on FMC proposal,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1556. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

I said had already made our position clear and when he replied they "didn't feel it was satisfactory" I sharply retorted that I not satisfied with responses his government and would like to see some efforts their part carry out agreement already reached. Also added that in view retrogression situation Americans in China "it would have been better if we had never made agreement". Meeting ended on this sharp note. I proposed next meeting Thursday, November 29 but agreed his proposal Friday, November 30. Departing Prague tomorrow.

Gowen

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748. Telegram 514 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 15, 1956, 6 p.m.

514. From Johnson.

Comments today's meeting:

Whatever reason may be Wang's performance today's meeting was clearly marking time operation. Although I pressed him hard and sharply on implementation, particularly at end of meeting, his responses were defensive and relatively mild. While considerably less emphasis than last meeting on break aspects there was no shift his substantive position and they continue in position of having laid ground for break at time their choosing.

From observation papers from which he talked, etc., had impression that portion his opening statement on McCarthy and implementation was made up from draft public statement they had prepared for rebuttal of public statement they anticipated from us on subject.

I utilized point last sentence sub-para 2 October 22 aide memoire to British on theory that whatever technical aspects under agreed announcement previous British requests O'Neill's letter last week constituted formal request investigate facts which CHICOMS have not yet granted.

Gowen

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1556. Secret; Limit Distribution.

**749. Telegram 515 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 15, 1956, 6 p.m.

515. From Johnson.

1. I opened 61st meeting with prepared statement:

A. "At last meeting I again pointed out as clearly as know how progress in resolving our disputes continues be thwarted by unwillingness your government agree to fundamental proposition disputes will be settled by peaceful means only, as well as by failure your government carry out simple terms of first agreement between us.

B. Particularly reiterated my hope situation with regard implementation of that first agreement would be corrected so basis of confidence could be established. Am enormously disappointed during period since last meeting not even single step been taken in that direction.

C. At last meeting I particularly spoke of case Fr. McCarthy which exemplified not only failure your authorities carry out their basic commitment expeditiously release Americans but their failure honor even supplementary provisions of agreement September 10 last year which extended very specific rights to third parties designated therein.

D. In spite of renewed representations of UK Charge with respect Fr. McCarthy, he has not only not yet been released but UK Charge has not even been permitted carry out his clearly specified function of investigating facts in case. Neither has UK Charge been given even reply to his letter of almost three months ago renewing request interview other Americans still imprisoned, nor have any those persons been released return US.

E. If your government is sincerely desirous contribute to peace in Far East and world, it would remove its threat resort to force settle disputes. If your government sincerely desirous have improved relations, it would take prompt steps correct its record of performance with respect this first agreement."

2. Wang said I had just made reference to failure talks achieve progress so far; to this he agreed. However he could not agree to what I said was cause of lack progress our talks. Present state of affairs our talks very unsatisfactory so far as his side concerned; they disappointed with attitude adopted by my side which does not contribute progress. It could not but create doubts in their minds as to whether US still has sincere desire arrive any agreement on this second item agenda. In course of previous

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–1556. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

discussion although their side on three occasions put forward reasonable proposals for making renunciation force declaration, yet as result my side's insistence unreasonable demands, no progress made and talks come to deadlock. I would clearly recall that to break deadlock, his side then turned to matters which they supposed would yield more easily to solution and made two proposals for raising embargo and promoting peoples contacts and cultural exchanges. Again my side didn't enter genuine discussion these subjects. In these circumstances how could anyone feel there were still hopes for progress in talks. That why they said at 60th meeting it high time respective Foreign Ministers met in direct conversations. It their firm conviction only by holding FMC can any progress be made on subjects relaxation elimination tensions in Taiwan area, mutual renunciation force between China and US, lifting embargo, promoting peoples contacts and cultural exchanges and so forth. Unless my side promptly abandoned unreasonable demands and changed its attitude in discussions which lack sense earnestness, he saw no prospects for progress at present level discussions and it futile continue our discussions at this level. In complexity present international situation both Chinese and American people earnestly wish improvement relations between two countries. They again asked that my government seriously and carefully consider proposal his side put forward for holding FMC. In this connection he regretted note I not yet given reply in statement this morning. I had spoken about peaceful desire; such peaceful desire should only be demonstrated in concrete reply from US Govt on this proposal of his side.

3. Wang continued with respect improvement relations he could only point out this also depends on efforts both sides. On question civilians they also not satisfied with attitude adopted by US Government this regard. In previous meetings he had repeatedly pointed to obstructive measures taken by US Govt. with regard return Chinese nationals. He had pointed out such measures taken by US were in violation our agreement. So far he not seen any moves taken by US Govt. to correct this unsatisfactory situation. Moreover, their information indicated US FBI been making investigation into Chinese student correspondence with families. Obvious attempt obstruct freedom communications, prevent them returning and fresh threat against those wishing return.

This is instance further violation agreement. He asked that US Govt. promptly stop this threatening action which violates our agreement.

4. Wang continued, regarding case McCarthy which I made repeated reference, he wished make following statement: McCarthy lawfully sentenced 4 years imprisonment October 22, 1955 for offenses against Chinese law. Sentence takes effect from day taken into custody and will expire June 1957. Prior expiration sentence or before Chinese authorities decide grant him expeditious release, there does not arise



question his return. Any demand his immediate release goes beyond scope of agreement and unacceptable any self-respecting country.

5. Wang continued as regards question third party interviewing prisoners, my side asked representative British Charge be permitted interview Americans in China on own initiative while US would prevent representative Indian Embassy do same respect Chinese imprisoned in US. In asking representative Indian Embassy interview imprisoned Chinese it aim my side merely carry out screening in disguise. Their side long ago made clear would not agree to this. Besides, list given Indian Embassy by my side only lists part of Chinese imprisoned and did not cover all Chinese in prison in US, not to speak of all Chinese in US. If US wanted British Charge on his own initiative be able contact American prisoners in China then US should in first place furnish Indian Embassy a list Chinese in US, including all those in prison. My side should also agree Indian Embassy on own initiative may contact Chinese in US in unrestricted manner. Nevertheless if British Charge received personal request from American prisoner to this effect, and Charge requested interview, China had always granted such interview provided took place in accordance relevant prison regulations.

6. Wang continued, in this connection allegation I made last meeting their prison authorities refused permit representative British Charge visit Fr. McCarthy in accordance with previous arrangements was not in accordance with facts. Fact was McCarthy not willing comply with prison regulations governing such interviews and had voluntarily withdrawn request interview. Fact was McCarthy on that day refused interview. In proof this there is his signed statement. Yet I had alleged prison authorities refused McCarthy permission have interview. This obviously deliberate distortion fact. He considered it necessary clarify this point this morning.

7. I replied I thought statements he just made about prisoners, particularly regard Fr. McCarthy exemplify and illustrate better than anything I know apparent continued unwillingness his authorities even carry out agreements we already reached. It well illustrated what I had said in past about fact, if there no desire on part his government resolve issues and [illegible in the original] out agreements which we might reach at this level it certainly futile consider negotiations any other level. As pointed out last meeting and many times previously he perfectly well realized and his government perfectly well realized what Americans we talking about when we were suggested these talks take up as their first matter of business, the return of civilians, he and his govt perfectly well knew that at time we entered into agreement regard civilians these were only Americans that were subject of discussion. What he now appeared saying was all our discussion and plain words our agreement with regard these Americans utterly without any meaning or substance. It utterly beyond my comprehension how he could seriously make this assertion at this

time. Certainly no misunderstanding between us at time we were discussing this as to what we meant by words "obstruction" and "expeditious" and to whom they applied with regard Americans in China. If relations between us to be improved and international agreements have meaning, must be carried out in good faith by parties thereto. Attitude his govt taken regarding these prisoners after we entered into our agreement and attitude of his govt, as exemplified by his statement this morning, were at grossest variance with not only our understanding but the plain words of agreement. Not only does agreement specifically and clearly cover all Americans desiring return but he would well recall when we discussing this, question differentiating in some way between those in prison and those not was discussed and specifically eliminated from agreement. Not question of placing demands which as he termed it "unacceptable any self-respecting country," it question whether self-respecting country would carry out solemn commitments into which it entered. Agreement said any American who felt being obstructed—did not say any Americans not in prison—any American who felt being obstructed from returning might communicate with UK Charge.

8. I continued, agreement said his govt would receive representations from UK Charge in any such case. Agreement said if desired by US Govt UK Charge might also investigate facts in any such case. Fr. McCarthy rightly and properly felt he was being obstructed and he invoked, strictly in accordance with agreement, the assistance of UK Charge. No action taken by his govt in response to representation made by UK Charge. UK Charge, still strictly in accordance with agreement, attempted to investigate facts in Fr. McCarthy's case. Fr. McCarthy expected he would do so and Charge expected he be able to do so. Both certainly had every reason expect this could be carried out because it clearly embodied in our agreement. As Fr. McCarthy said in letter to UK Charge he certainly didnt ask to see him to carry on any social chat. He desired talk about his case in order that UK Charge could investigate facts. Fr. McCarthy was informed he would not be permitted in any way to discuss his case with UK Charge. Fr. McCarthy properly felt under those circumstances interview was pointless. This action by Wang's authorities clearly in violation of our agreement, and entirely frustrated whole purpose of our agreement. As I said I and my govt consider this whole act with regard to Fr. McCarthy not only in violation basic principles our agreement that all—and I repeat all—Americans who desire to do so be permitted return but also in grossest violation subsidiary provision of agreement concerning function of third party. As he had properly said improvement relations between us required efforts of both sides. Attitude which his govt adopting with regard prisoners did not indicate any effort—in fact quite contrary—to resolve this problem. It indicated willingness entirely to disregard and ignore solemn commitments.

9. Wang replied with regard first agenda item performance his govt always conformed with agreement that item. Regarding case McCarthy already clearly stated if his request in conformity with prescribed regulations, all his requests would have been granted. As result lenient policy his govt handling cases Americans great majority those imprisoned for offenses against Chinese law been deported. By contrast, with regard Chinese imprisoned US prisons, his side so far had not seen any move by US Govt with regard them. Up to now not single person of those imprisoned US had returned China, when I was referring Americans in China it seemed never aware still many Chinese in prison in US. Statements my side with regard imprisoned persons full of self-contradiction. For instance, in statement issued Dec 17 1955 Dept of State alleged in our agreement no distinction made between those in prison and those out of prison. But Asst Sec State Walter Robertson in aide memoire to Indian Embassy stated Chinese prisoners in US not covered by agreement. This self-contradictory statement. Can we be allowed give such unequal interpretation to agreement reached between us? He therefore advised me take note fact many Chinese in US obstructed and prevented from returning. US claims self be free country. What kind of free country is it if Chinese students correspondence with families being interfered with. If freedom of Chinese students to communicate with families being interfered with what else could one expect of freedom for Chinese to return from US.

10. Wang continued, question improving relations between two countries closely connected with how we proceed in these present talks. Since present state affairs these talks not satisfactory, question confronting us was how make these talks move forward and make progress. In order move these talks forward his side taken initiative in making whole series efforts this direction. Then at very end they put forward proposal for holding FMC our two countries. If US also shares desire improve relations and also shares desire solve issues by peaceful means, should take effective steps move talks forward. It their hope US would proceed this direction.

11. I replied he had raised question how we move talks forward. We move these talks forward if we resolve problems called upon to deal with. After more than fifteen months we have not resolved very first problem called upon to deal with. Why had we not resolved it? Because his govt had not taken action necessary to resolve it, even though it had committed self do so. He referred to efforts our respective govts resolve problems. Aide memoire June 1 of Dept of State to Indian Embassy he referred to was most excellent example of efforts my govt resolve problems. Memo correctly pointed out Chinese alien common criminals in US prisons not subject our discussion leading up to our agreed announcement and we did not consider them included therein. Nevertheless, in

view his representations here on that subject, we proposed take action on this question and that aide memoire very specifically set forth that "all Chinese alien criminals now serving sentences in federal or state penitentiaries in US are free to apply at once for parole or commutation sentence for purpose immediate voluntary return to" Wang's country. In spite his govt's inexplicable attitude toward proposal made in that aide memoire I was in position inform him that there not now in any of US prisons any alien Chinese who desire return to his country.

12. I continued, with respect Fr. McCarthy Wang had said if request were in accordance with prescribed regulations they would be granted. I utterly rejected concept that request must be in accordance with whatever regulations prison authorities might set forth when those regulations in conflict with clear provisions international commitment entered into by Wang's govt. Only test is whether they in accordance provisions our agreed announcement. Requests of McCarthy and UK Charge have been in strict accordance with that agreement. Rejection those requests by Wang's authorities in violation that announcement. I rejected concept release what he called "great majority" those Americans in his prisons was fulfillment terms agreed announcement. Detention any American who desired return was violation that announcement.

13. Wang replied, statement he made this morning had given very clear explanation this regard. He could not accept my allegation that his side violated agreement and considered it distortion of fact. During period in which serving prison term, American prisoners cannot claim right to return. This exactly in conformity with our agreement and not in violation of our agreement. It precisely Chinese side which taken effective measures in accordance with policy leniency. I repeatedly made arbitrary allegations Chinese Govt not carrying out agreement but it precisely as result Chinese Govt carrying out policy leniency that greater part American prisoners been able to exercise their right return. On US side so far not single Chinese imprisoned in US prison has returned. Under circumstances in which Chinese imprisoned in US not regained freedom, he rejected statement not single one among them desires return.

14. I replied I didnt see how on one hand he made statement that, fact that what he called "great majority" of prisoners in his country had returned showed his authorities had carried out the agreement, and on other hand he said they had no rights under agreement. Agreement did not speak of "great majority" of prisoners. Agreement spoke of all Americans who desired return.

15. Wang replied fact great majority American prisoners returned to US means Chinese Govt taken measures on own initiative in accordance with lenient policy and enabled them return. Chinese Govt not suspended such a policy with regard American prisoners. However, before

Chinese Govt adopted these measures, any demand for immediate release any prisoners whose sentences not yet expired went beyond our agreement. Nor had my govt agreed to any immediate release Chinese prisoners my country. He therefore advised me that in speaking about question of civilians, I should pay more attention to improving situation Chinese prisoners my country. Moreover, he hoped I'd give constructive consideration to proposal he made at last meeting and again this morning with regard holding FMC to break present deadlock.

16. I asked was it on his assertion that all our discussions leading up to our agreed announcement, and agreed announcement itself have no meaning with regard to Americans we were discussing.

17. Wang did not think this proper way posing such question. Chinese Govt either would not agree enter agreement at all or once it entered agreement it always carried it out faithfully. In the same spirit his side always carried out agreement we reached previously. It exactly Chinese side which extremely dissatisfied with violation and breach of our agreement. He had nothing more say today.

18. I had nothing either.

19. Wang repeated had nothing except hoped I be able at next meeting express opinion with regard proposal he had made.

20. I thought I had expressed it very clearly this morning.

21. Wang did not think it was satisfactory.

22. I did not think responses of his govt were satisfactory.

23. Wang said his side had made repeated efforts this regard. Of course if I had something better offer, should put it forward.

24. I said would like see some efforts carry out agreement we made. As I had said before, we seem to have gone backward in that regard. It would be better if we had never made that agreement.

25. Wang said had nothing more.

26. I proposed next meeting Nov 29. Wang preferred Friday, Nov 30, and I agreed.

Gowen

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750. Letter 49 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 49

Geneva, November 15, 1956

Dear Walter:

I do not have much more to say this time, I still feel that I was right about their intentions as of the end of the last meeting but they have postponed action for reasons about which we can only speculate. Certainly the dramatic events elsewhere have had their influence but it is hard to say what the influence may have been on them. Perhaps their reaction was much the same as ours with respect to our public statement on implementation, i.e. they felt so much was going on elsewhere that a public statement from them threatening a break or a break would not attract much attention or constitute much pressure on us. I do not even exclude the Secretary's illness as a possible additional factor.

I will plan to come down by air on November 28 for our next meeting, returning immediately on December 1, without any further notification to the Department unless there is some major change for the worse in the general situation or that in Czechoslovakia, in which case I will of course check by telegraph. Please tell EUR so that they understand. I sent a message this last time so there would be no misunderstanding and I am mentioning it now in view of what I thought was a somewhat odd reply. You can assure EUR that I do not come to Geneva for a "visit" but to do some work.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. Tell Walter I hope he has a good trip. Am so glad Mrs. Robertson can go with him. UAJ

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." The postscript is handwritten.

**751. Letter 59 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 59

Washington, November 23, 1956

Dear Alex:

We were pleased at the forceful manner in which you presented the case for Father McCarthy at the last meeting. Wang was very much on the defensive and his defense was weak. We have now received reports of O'Neill's last interview with the Chinese Communists which show that in Peiping also they are holding very firmly to a logically untenable position. Copies of these reports are enclosed.

Mr. Robertson left yesterday on a four weeks' trip to the New Zealand meeting of the Colombo powers and to several posts in the Far East. We will probably hold a meeting tomorrow to consider what line you should take at the next meeting. My present thinking is that we should continue to press them hard on the McCarthy case and implementation generally. I will try to get off a longer letter to you on Monday outlining more fully our views.

The Chinese Communists now appear to have worked themselves into the awkward position of having to either come up with a new gambit, suspend the talks or remain on the defensive.

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

Copies of Texts of 3 telegrams from British Charge.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Clough.

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752. Telegram 581 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 26, 1956, 7:22 p.m.

581. Verbatim text. For Johnson. Re Deptel 532

Your comments desired on following draft statement for issuance by Department should Communists break off talks. QUOTE Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang Ping-nan informed US Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on (blank) he would not meet with him again until US agreed meeting at Foreign Minister level. Ambassador Johnson told Ambassador Wang although US willing continue discussion of fundamental matters at issue, meeting at Foreign Minister level neither appropriate nor acceptable under present circumstances.

US in July 1955 agreed participate in Geneva talks in hope might bring about release American citizens imprisoned Communist China and open way to solution other matters at issue. At first appeared progress could be made.

September 10, 1955 Communists issued following agreed statement: INNERQUOTE The People's Republic of China recognizes Americans in People's Republic of China who desire return to US entitled to do so and declares it adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so they can expeditiously exercise their right to return. END INNERQUOTE At time statement issued still nineteen Americans in prison or under house arrest in Communist China. Soon clear Communists not intend carry out unqualified commitment and today more than fourteen months later still ten Americans in Communist jails.

To justify failure fulfill their pledge Peiping resorted accusations that US preventing Chinese from leaving. Such accusations completely unfounded. Since beginning Geneva talks no Chinese prevented leaving US. Indian Embassy which was designated assist any Chinese who wished to leave has not brought to attention of Government single case of Chinese who claims he is being prevented from leaving.

In addition seeking release imprisoned American citizens US proposed both US and Communist China agree to renounce use of force particularly Taiwan area, except in self defense. Ambassador Johnson pointed out progress in discussions could not be expected in face of continuing Communist threats to take Taiwan by military force. Once threat of force been removed other matters might be discussed. This proposal failed when Chinese Communists insisted Taiwan problem

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-2656. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy, Henderson, and Phleger in substance.



was domestic matter they entitled settle by any means they chose, including force.

In recent months Chinese Communists introduced proposals aimed promoting trade and INNERQUOTE cultural contacts END INNERQUOTE between US and mainland China. Ambassador Johnson pointed out US restrictions in these fields resulted from Chinese Communists' acts and threats of military aggression and mistreatment Americans. US sought assurance through Geneva talks such behavior would not continue. Until meaningful assurances in these respects been received US could not consider modifying these safeguards.

US dedicated to peaceful solution of differences. It is prepared resume discussions at ambassadorial level directed toward issuance by both sides meaningful declaration on renunciation of force and thereafter other practical matters at issue. UNQUOTE

**Hoover**

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**753. Letter 60 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 60

Washington, November 26, 1956

Dear Alex:

We are considering whether to release a public statement on the McCarthy case. We are also weighing the pros and cons of a public statement on the results of our offer of parole and deportation to Chinese convicts in U.S. prisons. The press attention to the Middle East and Hungary has abated sufficiently for us to be able to command a reasonable amount of press space for these matters if we decide that from other standpoints the time is ripe. The GRC has agreed to take the two prisoners who elected to go to Taiwan so there is no longer a problem on that score. If we decide to make a statement this week, it would probably come out on Thursday. We would, of course, give you the text in advance.

Your letter No. 49 of November 15 arrived on November 23. In the prevailing circumstances we consider that Wang is unlikely to suspend the talks at the next meeting. However, we have a contingency

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by McConaughy.

statement ready for use if a suspension does occur. With Chou's goodwill trip through parts of Southeast Asia and the Middle East in full swing, with Nehru's visit to the President in prospect, and with the Chinese Communists' public agitation over the Egyptian issue tapering off somewhat, an abrupt move of a defiant nature at this moment would not seem to be in the cards, notwithstanding the fact that they have lost the UN membership battle for this session of the GA.

We have delivered your message to EUR. There was considerable apprehension at absences of any of our chiefs of mission in certain countries following the political criticism of Jacobs and Wailles for not being at their post when the trouble started, but this is less evident now.

I agree with you that the EUR telegram authorizing your "visit" to Geneva was peculiarly worded. We did not see the text before it went out or we would have objected. They simply told us that they were okaying your travel to Geneva.

I was at the American Assembly at Harriman, New York, November 15 through November 18. The final Report was pretty favorable to our basic far Eastern policy, although there was criticism of our policy on travel of newsmen. You get so many reports of the harm which the talks are doing to us in the Far East, I'm glad I can tell you that the fact of the talks made it much easier for me to defend our China policy before the Conference. They are all for "flexibility and a reasonable conciliatory and moderate approach." They felt that the Geneva talks are a definite manifestation of such an attitude. I believe we would have been criticized for a negative and rigid posture toward the Chinese Communist problem, had we not had the Geneva conversations to point to. I will send you a copy of the revised Final Report as soon as I receive it. You no doubt have seen the references to the speech of Ernie Gross on the night of November 17 in which he rather minimized the Geneva talks as being "behind the barn" in character and as not being at a sufficiently high level.

I am enclosing a copy of an extremely confidential report made by [*text not declassified*] his recent trip to Communist China. I apologize that we have to send you a rather messy copy, but it is the only one we have. It is particularly sensitive and we had to get a special dispensation to send it to you.

Walter Robertson got away on Thanksgiving Day. I am enclosing a copy of his itinerary in case you would like to write him before he gets back on December 22nd.

I leave on Wednesday to make a speech in Mr. Robertson's stead at the Naval War College on November 29 on "The Power Struggle in the Far East." I'll have something to say about the talks in the course of that speech.

Sabe Chase has just reported for temporary duty with us until he retires next March. It is good to have him here.

Regards and good wishes to all of you,

Sincerely,

Walter P. McConaughy

Enclosures:

1. Copy of report by [*text not declassified*]
2. Copy of Mr. Robertson's itinerary

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**754. Telegram 587 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 27, 1956, 7:24 p.m.

587. For Johnson.

Guidance for November 30 meeting.

1. Continue press for Chinese Communist fulfillment their commitments in McCarthy case and those of other Americans. US Government rejects Chinese Communist contention that imprisoned Americans, the very persons on whose behalf we negotiated Agreed Announcement, can be excluded by Chinese Communists from provisions Agreed Announcement, which they are bound to observe. Neither can US Government accept Chinese Communist refusal permit British Charge exercise investigative functions prescribed under Agreed Announcement. Continued Chinese Communist violation of their pledged word can only force conclusion that their word cannot be relied on. (FYI In your presentation draw freely on exchange November 15 between British Charge and Peiping Foreign Office. Department has decided not repeat not issue press release on McCarthy case prior next meeting but you should hammer away on this flagrant case. END FYI)

2. You may refer as necessary to US action regarding Chinese prisoners in US. James Lew arrived Hongkong November 19 and presumably entered mainland along with group granted direct transit through Hongkong. (FYI GRC has agreed take two convicts opting for Taiwan and preparations their deportation under way. It would appear

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-2756. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy; cleared by Phleger in draft.

preferable make no mention these two as they might only becloud issue. We do not contemplate public statement at present on our offer to Chinese prisoners but will reply factually should press raise question. END FYI)

3. Hold to same positions on foreign ministers' meeting, renunciation of force, trade and cultural exchange.

4. Reserve missing military personnel for later meeting.

**Hoover**

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**755. Telegram 562 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 28, 1956, 6 p.m.

562. From Johnson.

ReDeptel 581 consider draft statement excellent and have no substantive changes to suggest.

As minor points offer following suggestions for alternative language:

(1) Substitute "unless" for "until" in first sentence so as conform text Deptel 532,

(2) Substitution following for second sentence:

"Ambassador Johnson told Ambassador Wang US ready and willing settle practical and fundamental matters at issue in Ambassadorial talks which had been accepted as appropriate forum by both sides; under present circumstances, of manifest unwillingness Chinese Communists to settle issues, meeting at Foreign Ministers level neither appropriate or acceptable". While I see no objection to Department's language foregoing revision conforms somewhat closer and amplifies rationale I have used in meetings.

(3) Deletion of "claims he" last sentence fourth paragraph. This might be somewhat safer way of making same point until we see what public comment Indians may make to show they have been active in performance agreed announcement functions.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-2856. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

**756. Telegram 570 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 30, 1956, 3 p.m.

570. From Johnson.

Three hour fifteen minute meeting this morning. Following brief opening statement by Wang restating their position on fact and causes deadlock in talks and necessity FMC, entire remainder meeting devoted implementation. During course meeting I made points para one Deptel 587 and informed him arrival James Lew stressing he deported even though had served only small part his sentence and was not rpt not eligible for parole or release under normal regulations. Also informed him of ARC interviews of prisoners but did not mention those opting for Taiwan and this question did not arise. When he responded with usual charge prisoners could not make free choice and US should "on its own initiative" follow PRC procedure and release prisoners after which they could choose where they desire go I countered by pointing out PRC had followed deportation procedure in releases Americans at time of and immediately following agreed announcement. Throughout long give and take I continuously came back to all aspects McCarthy case as prime illustration their failure carry out agreed announcement. Wang retreated entirely behind repetition previous charges re Chinese in US in obvious attempt close off discussion and meeting with last word. This I refused accept and during last hour and half repeatedly refuted each his charges and turned discussion repeatedly back to Americans particularly McCarthy until he finally desisted from repeating his charges.

Next meeting Thursday, December 13. Departing Prague tomorrow morning.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-3056. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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**757. Telegram 571 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 30, 1956, 5 p.m.

571. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 62nd meeting with prepared statement. My side has continued take procrastinating attitude on second item agenda culminating deadlock our talks. Ever since began second item his side been following spirit of resolving issues improving relations and repeatedly made constructive proposals this direction. His side made great efforts clear away difficulties resolve issues. By adoption his proposals for renunciation force in relations between China and US as well as for holding FMC, our two countries could have resolved outstanding issues and tensions in Far East would have been relaxed and Sino-American relations improved. However, my side apparently did not share desire. My side simply sticking to unreasonable demands for encroaching their sovereignty and interfering internal affairs—thus contributing nothing to resolution problems.

2. Wang continued under such circumstances his side again taken initiative in making proposal for lifting embargo and another for promoting mutual contacts and cultural exchange between Chinese and American people in expectation that resolving these two points might enable us make progress other issues as well. However, my attitude toward these proposals had been equally disappointing. My side had even gone so far as refuse negotiate, giving no consideration whatsoever to those proposals. Meanwhile my side continued intolerable acts provocation to increase tension Taiwan area. Such performance in dragging out talks on one hand and creating tensions other was not expression sincerity talks. It was their hope I would change this futile, harmful performance and get down to earnest negotiation so two us could discharge mission. He'd be glad hear any constructive views I might have push forward our talks.

3. I replied he had spoken of settling our problems here. He had spoken of constructive views or attitudes on settling our problems. This exactly point I been trying make here during recent months. I tried point out way settle problems was do something about them rather than just issue forms of words which appeared do something about them but in fact do nothing. Our governments both agreed and terms reference these talks clearly set forth that first problem we were to deal with was return civilians. As had pointed out at time we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-3056. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

issued our statement, statement itself solved nothing—only action his govt could solve matters insofar as Americans concerned. However his govt continued procrastinate and stall in settlement that matter. It entirely impossible for me understand what it hopes gain thereby.

4. Turning to prepared statement I continued:

A. Since last meeting, I received additional information with regard continued effort your govt procrastinate in carrying out announcement Sept 10 last year, and distort very clear meaning that announcement. On Nov 14, your authorities in Peking rejected representations made by UK Charge in case McCarthy, alleging that Charge's representations exceeded scope his functions under agreed announcement. Your authorities even refused permit UK Charge investigate facts in McCarthy's case.

B. For over year, your authorities have been steadily and systematically depriving that announcement of its meaning, so not shred of its original substance left with respect Americans.

C. At time that announcement issued, it covered, so far as Americans in China concerned, definite group 19 persons in prison. Our announcement contained very explicit provisions affecting these 19 persons. Their right return was recognized. Measures were to be taken by your authorities permitting them expeditiously exercise this right. If any of Americans felt his departure being prevented, he could communicate with UK Charge. UK Charge was to be able make representations on behalf any such person. Charge was also to be enabled investigate facts in any such case.

D. Now, after more than year, it impossible point to single provision our announcement which has not been systematically cynically violated by your authorities. Even limited ability of Americans communicate with UK Charge has been deprived of any meaning by prohibition any mention of facts with regard their cases. This would appear indicate even your authorities realize facts in these cases could not justify continued failure release these persons in accordance with commitment announcement.

E. While your authorities have been thus constricting scope of agreement, with eventual result its significance has been all but destroyed, my government has not only been faithfully carrying out every one of its provisions, it has even enlarged its scope beyond what was originally agreed upon. My government offered deport immediately your country any alien Chinese prisoner my country wishing go there. To assure you our good faith my government was prepared allow representatives of third party your choice to be present when prisoners stated their preferences. You rejected this offer, making it clear you preferred my government join your authorities in restricting, rather than enlarging, scope of agreed announcement. This, my government

of course could not and would not do. Since decision had been taken to extend provisions of agreed announcement to such prisoners, my government on own initiative took measures allow those wishing do so expeditiously exercise their right return. Prisoners were interviewed individually by representatives of American Red Cross in order entirely impartially determine their wishes. In keeping with your desires, no representative of Indian Embassy,—nor of any third country—was present these interviews.

F. I can now inform you, on October 29, as result these measures, a Chinese prisoner desiring return your country, Mr. James Lew, departed from my country. I understand he arrived Hong Kong November 19, and has now presumably crossed into your country. I might mention Mr. Lew was permitted proceed your country even though he had served only about one and one half years of 7 to 20 years sentence for manslaughter and would not for many years have even become eligible for our very lenient parole procedures or reduction sentence for good behavior.

As for balance of Chinese prisoners my country, they have freely and formally indicated to impartial representative ARC they have no desire return your country and are thus clearly outside terms reference our talks.

G. Have given you this information not in order demand your authorities enlarge, as my government has done, scope of announcement. My government asks no more than plain terms of our agreement be implemented, with respect to very Americans about whom you and I were talking when announcement was issued. My government is clearly entitled expect 10 remaining Americans will be allowed without further delay return their country.

H. I mention this matter in some detail this morning because think it important we be clear as to which side really been resolving issues between us. I mention it because of great importance fulfilling understandings and commitments already arrived at and great importance knowing whether pledged words have any value. This had importance which transcends even importance of these individual Americans and this issue. Importance relates to whole range of relations between our two countries. Basis of mutual confidence absolutely essential if there is to be possibility of negotiating resolution of our other disputes.

5. I continued, performance his government thus far with respect first agreement between us had not established that basis confidence. I had at each meeting here and continue to express my hope that his authorities would establish that basis of confidence by carrying out that agreement. This is not anything which any form of words or proposal from my side could possibly resolve. Neither could any form words or proposals from my side resolve problem of decision by his authorities



that our other disputes be solved by peaceful means only, either these problems could be resolved by changing level of these meetings. They could be resolved when his authorities reached decision to resolve them. When that done we could here go on to discussion other matters between us. I had hoped, still hope his government would take action essential enable us do so. I regretted that in his statement this morning I did not see any indication they had taken decision do so.

6. Wang replied after listening statement I just made he equally regretted no indication in statement any constructive views make progress these talks. I had spoken of establishing mutual confidence between us and also said settlement problems could only be resolved by taking action rather than putting forward empty words. In course talks his side repeatedly made proposals which could have helped us make progress. Yet my side refused take under consideration. How could we expect progress. If only one of two sides had desire make progress by taking action in these talks it very hard make any progress. For long time they had not seen any indication of intent on part US take effective steps make progress these talks. My side not only failed offer effective steps push these talks forward but at same time my side not willing consider acceptance their proposals which could have actually made progress our talks. Under such circumstances how could one expect any resolution of problems and how could mutual confidence be established this manner.

7. Wang continued insofar as problem return civilians it rather his side which felt dissatisfied. They had always extended welcome all Chinese nationals returning their country. However number persons who actually returned very much at variance with number those whose return they desired. These talks now in sixteenth month yet my side still, without justification refused furnish list all Chinese residing my country. My side still refused give any account 52 Chinese whose names he had given me with request accounting be made nor given any explanation of failure return 26 of 103 who my side long ago informed him desired return and whose return been obstructed. Even after conclusion solemn agreement my side seen fit pressure Chinese nationals secure Taiwan entry permit or apply for permanent residence US. In addition my authorities continue use all sort impossible methods try keep their nationals from returning homeland. Besides shocking case he brought up last meeting is how FBI, in attempt obstruct return, flagrantly interfering freedom Chinese nationals' correspondence, my immigration authorities also used pressure and threats in violation agreement and attempt convince departing Chinese proceed Taiwan or not leave US. Most Chinese who returned recently had had such experience, indicating such illegal practices being used systematically. Instead correcting this violation agreement my side resorting entanglement issue by making false charges that his country failed carry out

agreement. My side dared not face up to fact his govt long since carrying out agreement by enabling all Americans desiring do so return my country. My side cannot deny his side in accordance agreement takes measures on own initiative and been handling cases in lenient spirit even enabled greater part American prisoners return. At opening these talks this group Americans numbered 40, including 13 airmen (sic.). Now remained only 10 serving sentences in China. Now my side gone so far demand immediate release these persons prior expiration sentences and before justice authorities taken measures own initiative commute sentences. He couldnt but consider this flagrant case interference in internal affairs his country. Insofar case Charles McCarthy concerned already made comment at great length last meeting and not going make further comment today. Contrary lenient policy his country toward American prisoners, my side illegally carried out screening of imprisoned Chinese in attempt accomplish design retaining these persons. They would never recognize this illegal screening persons. They formally demand US carry out agreement by supplying list Chinese, by removing obstructions their departure and by stopping all acts which violate agreement. Improvement relations between us and progress our talks required concerted effort both sides. The demand only one side unilaterally to make progress will not help in the actual progress of our talks.

8. I replied he had spoken of false charges here. We had very good method in our announcement of determining who in fact making false charges. We had very good method determining who in fact carrying out announcement. It method he himself suggested. It is third party which had specific functions in each our countries under announcement. I did not know how it could be better demonstrated that my govt had carried out agreement than by fact it had not yet received from third party single representation alleging it had interfered with departure any Chinese from my country who desired return. This should demonstrate what I wanted emphasize is fact: my country had not slightest interest attempting keep in my country any Chinese who desires return his country. That should be, I thought, self-evident. We had no need for or desire have unwilling residents our country. Every Chinese my country who desired return continued free be able do so at time his choice. That they continued do so shown by fact that insofar our information extends 250 have done so since beginning our talks. Question not whether number who returned was, as he phrased it, number whose return they desired; question was whether those who wanted return able do so. This, in view his representations here even extended to prisoners who common criminals. Extended without regard gravity crimes, length sentences or eligibility for leniency. I had been making no demand on him here except that his govt equally carry out commitment it undertaken. That it had not done so shown by fact there 10 Americans

who undeniably desire return, not yet able do so. That it not even carried out subsidiary portions agreement proven by fact it even refused accept representations from third party with regard case clearly coming within terms announcement. It had refused permit third party even investigate facts case when request been made strictly in accordance terms announcement. These not vague, unsupported allegations my part, they undeniable facts. They acts involving third party under our agreement. No amount rationalization could dispose of these facts.

9. Wang replied had already made clear opinion on question civilians this morning. Nothing more add to those observations. Also made clear repeatedly his specific request on improvement status Chinese nationals in US, improvement their ability without obstruction return their country. He desired see this situation would in fact be improved. As he had repeatedly made clear in these talks, any additional demands going beyond scope agreement, insofar as Americans in China concerned, would not be accepted by his side. They had already taken measures enable greater part Americans in China exercise right return. As regards remaining 10 prisoners serving sentences he had never said China would cease applying to them lenient policy. If these persons show good behavior, they would continue, as they had repeatedly stated, to take lenient measures.

10. I replied it not question good behavior, not question lenient policy as he termed it. Not question of greater part of Americans being able return who desire do so. It question of whether first agreement between us was to be carried out and all of them be able do so. I had made no demands on him beyond scope agreement. My demands were that agreement be carried out. Thus far it had not been. He spoke of lenient policy. As I had previously pointed out, very hard even a part agreement, see that is being carried out. Policy now appeared be these people required serve full term their sentences. Contrasted sharply with action taken my authorities. As I pointed out this morning a Chinese prisoner in my country desiring return his country had been permitted do so entirely without regard normal policies parole and leniency. Permitted do so without regard his behavior or any time off good behavior. When impartially determined he desired return, he was permitted immediately—let me say expeditiously—do so.

11. Wang replied his govt had in past and would in future adopt lenient policy toward American prisoners. In view crimes and offenses committed by these individuals in China, not question of taking couple years off their sentences. Facts already demonstrated how extensive had been application lenient policy to Americans. To demand his govt disregard provisions of its law in dealing with Americans was interference with sovereign rights his country and would never achieve desired end. If all the Americans who committed offenses in

China be able return within prescribed time then, not necessary make that agreement. As matter of fact my govt actually kept greater number Chinese in our prisons. They had repeatedly stated and expressed strong opposition to screening these Chinese. There was significant discrepancy between my statement this morning and at last meeting. At last meeting I made statement not single Chinese indicated desire return his country. This morning I told him one these Chinese had desired do so. This conspicuous case self-contradiction. He repeatedly advised my govt adopt measures on own initiative just as his govt had in handling Chinese in my country. I had been making demands immediate release Americans serving sentences his country. If he were to follow my logic (he not speaking of immediate release all those imprisoned Chinese) he'd like to know whether my govt could agree allow all these imprisoned Chinese get out of prison and be in position to express will. As he had repeatedly pointed out in past, it essential in handling return civilians to adopt measures facilitate and enable persons to in fact return. Nothing in series actions taken my govt had been in direction resolving this problem. In such circumstances how could one speak of faithfully implementing our agreement.

12. I replied, first wanted clear up apparent misunderstanding. He quoted me as saying at last meeting not single Chinese in prison had indicated desire return his country. I did not recall making that statement—did not believe I had. What I recalled saying was that there not then any single Chinese in our prisons who did desire return, that statement entirely accurate and consistent with statement I had made this morning because as had stated this morning Mr. Lew departed from US October 29.

13. I continued frankly not able follow his line reasoning. On one hand he said my asking him release all American prisoners and permitting them return in accordance with agreement was interfering in internal affairs. On other hand he asked me to release all Chinese in prisons US and once released permit them make decision as to whether desired return. I not asking him release Americans from his prisons to remain his country. I was asking him to make it possible for all of them who undoubtedly wished return to do so. I might point out even his own practice did not conform to what he desire I do. He had informed me of at least eight or nine cases since talks began—some at time issuance agreement and some subsequent that—of Americans who being deported from his country. They not being released as free persons into his country to decide what they wanted do, they being deported. I had not objected this procedure. His authorities could naturally carry it out any way they desired. Two important elements are simply whether they desire return and whether able do so. In cases where his authorities carried out deportations these elements present. Not objecting, but

simply pointing out inconsistency with what he now seemed be saying with regard Chinese prisoners in US. Accepting his contention that they covered by agreement these two elements again arise. Did they desire return and were they able do so. In absence of his concurrence procedure we first suggested to determine their desires, we had adopted most incontrovertibly unprejudiced method we could find. That was agency of American Red Cross. That agency interviewed each prisoner to determine his desire. When that determined, prisoners who had expressed desire return his country enabled immediately and promptly do so.

14. Wang replied on question return civilians, I had spoken of two elements: whether persons desired return and whether able do so. Problem we now handling concerned transaction between two countries and should therefore follow usual international practice. Greater part Americans in China including those imprisoned for offenses had been handled by his govt in accordance with measures taken his govt. As far as Chinese imprisoned my country concerned, they had repeatedly pointed out fact imprisoned persons not in position indicate free will. That why he raised question with me as to whether my authorities could release them out of prison and when once released determine whether desired return my country. If US not in position do so, then easy understand why his govt could not act according to what I had demanded here.

15. I replied, had not asked him to release Americans in prison to remain in China and then decide whether or not they desire go. As had pointed out in past that had not even been his own practice in many these cases. Except where persons had served full term sentences, and therefore there no choice but release them, they appeared to have followed practice deportation. As had told him that is entirely acceptable to me and I did not believe it contrary to terms agreement. In fact I anticipated that he would probably carry out his obligations under agreement in that manner. However, this entirely matter for decision by his authorities. I had never attempted dictate manner in which they should carry out their obligations. Only asked international obligation assumed by his authorities be carried out.

16. Wang replied what I had spoken about exactly what his country doing now. As to what methods and ways employed, whether they be deported or whether be given early release, entirely matter decision by justice authorities his country. As had repeatedly stated here, if prisoners concerned showed good behavior, it would certainly help justice authorities take action to reach such decision.

17. I replied yet he asked justice authorities my country unconditionally release all Chinese prisoners my country, then let them decide if they desire return.

18. Wang replied they had not made such a demand on my govt. Only demanded it adopt measures on its own initiative. Wished stress imprisoned Chinese my country did not have ability express will while in prison. To try to state by any means that any Chinese in our prisons return or not could not be considered true.

18. I asked did he mean a man in prison could not decide whether he preferred to serve sentence in accordance with regulations of which aware, or desired immediately proceed his country—that is did he mean a man could not make a decision between those two things.

19. Wang replied as result years my govt's outrageous anti-China propaganda campaign and persecution Chinese my country, tremendous pressure and threats exerted these persons with regard desire return motherland. As result all this, (psychology of Chinese prisoners no longer normal and would believe if only mention desire return motherland, sentences might be doubled and in cases when people committed minor offense,) might be taken as major offenses and heavier sentences given. Under such circumstances difficult express wish and difficult make decision.

20. I said seemed to me pressure would all be in other direction. Certainly for prisoner who had long sentence ahead of him to be given choice between serving that sentence and being given immediate release return to his country, pressure would be all for seeking release. I was confident any Chinese in US perfectly aware of what been fundamental principle of our system justice from very beginning our country. Far from being worried about his sentence being doubled or increased, he would know perfectly well that utterly impossible under our system. First, it always been fundamental principle our justice, no man could be tried twice for same crime. That is if tried and found innocent he could not be tried again. If tried and found guilty and sentence imposed he could not be tried again and another sentence imposed. If tried and found guilty and appealed sentence to higher court, higher court could under no circumstances increase sentence. It could either decrease sentence or reaffirm sentence—or declare him innocent. These absolutely fundamental principles of our system justice which well known anyone living our country. I thus satisfied no prisoners could possibly have fear he mentioned. In any event I thought case Mr. Lew who has just returned his country ample proof this. Again ask him by whatever method he chose, permit Americans in his country expeditiously be permitted return my country. In other words simply ask that clear words agreement be carried out.

21. Wang said didn't want engage debate on legal procedure my country. Simply wanted point out no lack cases innocent Chinese nationals and Chinese students my country who subjected arrest and imprisonment my govt. For a person simply to desire return own

country had even been made sort of crime. Even those persons who already embarked on ships bound home and even those already Hong Kong had been subjected all sorts systematic obstruction. Such was treatment given by my agencies to persons who not even committed offenses my country. We could imagine what state of mind persons actually imprisoned my country are in. That reason he had pointed out persons imprisoned my country not able express free will.

22. I made two points. No Chinese imprisoned my country except for committing common crimes; survey of all Chinese prisoners my country showed they there for only two offenses—one was murder or manslaughter, other narcotics violation. Secondly, it truly remarkable that if any substance their allegations of obstruction, at least one case not called our attention by very agency established for that purpose. This fact taken with fact Chinese had steadily been returning his country showed lack substance such allegations.

23. Wang said already pointed out many examples how Chinese in America who desired return been obstructed. On other hand fact many Chinese students in America who desired return his country not able do so proved fact obstruction. Had expressed hope and continued hope this situation so far as Chinese in America concerned would be improved.

24. I asked did McCarthy desire return? Answer was he does. Did he feel he being obstructed? Answer was he does. He had said to designated third party that he did. Had third party made representation to his country on case? Answer was he had. Had his govt refused accept those representations in accordance obligations under agreement? Answer was it had. Had third party attempted investigate facts of case? It had; his govt refused permit it do so. There had been most explicit violation of every single aspect of letter our agreed announcement.

25. Wang could not accept this way of presenting problem. He could put matter this way. Asked whether Charles McCarthy committed offenses in China? Answer was yes. Asked if persons who committed offenses should be arrested? Answer was they should. Had Charles McCarthy been tried? Answer was yes. Had he himself admitted his offense? Yes he had. When would he be able get release from prison? There were two answers—one was as soon as sentence expired he would be released. Other was if Chinese justice authorities considered he had shown good behavior and was eligible to be granted earlier release under their legal procedures—then he would be granted release accordingly. Did agreement between us stipulate Charles McCarthy would be released before expiration his sentence? No such stipulation in agreement. Had Chinese Govt acted in conformity with agreement in case Charles McCarthy? Answer is Chinese Govt has.



26. I asked what meaning did agreement have with regard Mr. McCarthy? How was his situation any different from what was before we reached agreement.

27. Wang said difference lay in fact time not come in which his case might be resolved according to that agreement.

28. I just could not follow. It seemed to me he in exactly same position was before we reached that agreement according to Wang's statement.

29. Wang said blame not on Chinese Govt but on prisoner himself. Blame on prisoner who came China to oppose Chinese people and Govt under cloak missionary work.

30. I did not get point. Agreement did not say it did not apply to those whom Chinese Govt alleges came to China to oppose Chinese people and Govt under cloak missionary work, agreement said it would apply all Americans.

31. Wang said all Americans to whom agreement applied and should be able return under that agreement had already returned. Agreement did not provide all prisoners be able return within prescribed time. Agreement provided that all persons who desired do so should be allowed return their country; however, in my country great number Chinese who desired do so had not been able return. They had not only been unable return country but even their correspondence with families been subject interference by FBI my country. This interference violates fundamental principle of democratic state. This violated fundamental freedom of persons. This exactly violation and breach our agreement. It to be hoped my govt would speedily correct all these actions which in violation agreement all these obstructive activities.

32. I said Wang's last statement came down to two points. One that agreement applied only to those Americans to whom his govt chose apply it. Other point seemed be they had not applied it to other Americans remaining in their prisons because of what they alleged to be obstruction to Chinese in America desiring return. With regard first point, agreement did not state would be applied to those to whom his government chose apply it. Said applied all Americans. With regard second point, mechanism which Wang himself suggested to determine whether agreement carried out had as far as the US concerned not offered any evidence or even allegation of obstruction. As far as Americans in his country concerned same mechanism had alleged obstruction and had made representation on it which his govt refused accept.

33. Wang did not agree to explanation offered by me. There was difference between obstruction and law breaking. We could not make allegation Chinese Govt obstructed people who broke Chinese law. This not question his govt offering obstructions to those Americans but question



those Americans breaking their law. It these Americans who to blame for breaking Chinese law. People who committed offenses must be punished in accordance with law. On other hand he had pointed out many cases and examples obstruction to return of Chinese in America. Absence of representation to my govt did not mean obstructions did not exist.

34. I said seemed awfully good proof to me.

35. Wang replied if all obstructions had been removed then they could say this proof. Was my govt prepared remove requirement for Chinese nationals get Taiwan entry permit. This was long-standing question he had raised for long time and still unresolved. Was it alleged that my govt never made such requirement on Chinese nationals US.

36. I thought a little late to go over all the ground I had previously so carefully gone over with him in regard that matter. I had pointed out to him in any event requirements our immigration laws concerning applications by people who there on temporary status to show they able proceed another destination at end their temporary stay had nothing to do with ability Chinese in US who desire return to do so. However, important fact was no Chinese in US had alleged that in this or any other manner my govt had obstructed his departure from US if he desired do so through channel established that purpose. On other hand, Americans in his country, including most notably Mr. McCarthy, had alleged this. His govt not only refused accept but also refused act upon representations made through channels established in agreement.

37. Wang replied no matter how I explained this matter, so long as requirement for Taiwan entry permit not removed, we could not be regarded as acting in accordance agreement. Other hand no matter how I explained away this matter, I could not confuse question obstruction with question persons who committed crimes.

38. I asked who were we talking about when made agreement? He perfectly well knew then Fr. McCarthy in prison. In fact he formally informed me of that. Not said then agreement was not to apply to Fr. McCarthy. In those weeks of discussion I wasn't talking of abstract Americans. Both us talking about very specific Americans—those Americans in prisons.

39. Wang said we did not then discuss matter in terms of regarding holding of American offenders as obstruction their return. Had they not resolutely fought against and refused my demand for release these prisoners in definite time? When had he ever agreed persons in this category would be released within given time? Case Charles McCarthy included therein. Did he not make it quite clear at the time cases these persons would have to be dealt with in accordance with substance and nature offenses and also allowances for good behavior? Fact Charles McCarthy not yet released, indicates not yet fulfilled conditions for earlier release.

40. I asked did we not reject and did he not agree to elimination of any distinction in agreement between those he termed as having committed crimes and those who had not? Did not we say in agreement all would be permitted return expeditiously?

41. Wang said that was exactly what his govt doing in dealing with these cases. If his govt not acted this way how could one expect greater part Americans this category able return. He had not said all persons would be released at same time and all together and did not consent do so.

42. I replied we had said they would all be released expeditiously. I did not, my govt did not, and I did not think any reasonable person would think they had been released expeditiously. Question not if some or majority, question was if all released expeditiously.

43. Wang replied, talking about expeditious release, I would recall I given him names 103 Chinese students more than year ago, who desired return. After more than year 23 still not yet returned. Did I term this expeditious return? Another 52 persons who desired return and concerning whom request had been made to my side for inquiry; but these persons had not returned. Could anyone consider this expeditious return? In accordance with connotation word "expeditious" Chinese Govt enabled majority Americans to return—not case so far Chinese my country concerned.

44. I said had not given him list 103 persons desired return. Had never so termed it. Had given him list of 103 persons who had been ordered during limited period not depart from US. Those orders issued without regard whether they desired return or not. I had explained that quite clearly at time. Each these persons had been formally officially notified that these orders had been withdrawn and they were entirely free proceed Wang's country if wanted do so. If they had not done so it because they did not desire do so. If they desired do so and felt obstructed they entirely free contact Indian Embassy. Best my knowledge, none had alleged any obstruction.

45. Wang said any case in present circumstances ordinary Chinese subject to interference in his communication with family, wife and friends and in same way under great mental strain if he desires communicate with Indian Embassy. This one of questions on which he had made repeated representations and still hoped my govt would take effective measures to correct it.

46. I did not see that a man was under much mental strain in dropping letter in letter box or picking up phone to phone Indian Embassy.

47. Wang had nothing further.

48. I suggested Thursday, December 13. He agreed.

**758. Letter 50 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 50

Geneva, November 30, 1956

Dear Walter:

I have just returned from the meeting and dictated my summary telegram. As you can see it was a sterile performance with absolutely nothing new except my ability to introduce Lew's return and their reply to O'Neill. I debated also throwing in their refusal to let O'Neill take the initiative in seeing the other prisoners but decided to stick for today to the more basic points, particularly on the McCarthy case. My occasional stubborn streak came out in the last part of the meeting when I determined I was just not going to let him have the last word and kept it going until he cried uncle. I could hardly keep from smiling toward the end when he got himself wound-up in to the point he was just mixing up his words and at one point even stuttered. It was some emotional satisfaction and I hope might have some slight effect in demonstrating to them how weak their public case on implementation really is. Our release of Lew has immensely strengthened my hand. I also had debated refuting today their allegations on FBI interference with correspondence by counterattacking with their registration of families and "bringing of pressure" by their letter writing campaign. However, as the meeting went I feared this would sidetrack us from the main issue and saved it for possible use next time. I hope that Herman will concur in my little lecture on American jurisprudence.

After learning of Nehru's prospective visit to the States I entirely concurred in your estimate that they would mark time today. However, I am still of the opinion that they consider they have now placed themselves in a position to break at a time of their choosing. I hope I have been able somewhat to shake their confidence on this but am not too sanguine I have done so.

I know that you will inform me of anything of significance to me during Nehru's visit. I would be very surprised if with everything happening elsewhere he would do much carrying of the ball for Peking.

Thanks very much for your letters of November 23 and 26 which were both here when I arrived. I particularly appreciated the most interesting report of Suhrawardy's visit and am returning it to you. Don't you feel it would be a good idea pretty thoroughly to brief such persons on the prisoner issue before they talk with the Chinese, not with the objective of having them take it up, but so that when Chou comes back with his torturous position they would be somewhat forewarned and not lead Chou to feel they are impressed with his position?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." The postscript is handwritten.

I am not sending any comment telegram this time as I really have nothing but the obvious to say.

I presume the Department will be agreeable to arranging the longest Christmas recess that seems feasible. As I have to get Jennifer back to school in Lausanne about January 9, it would be of considerable personal help to me if I could make the subsequent meeting during that week. Ekvall's orders expire December 30. Would you please do the necessary to set the machinery for their renewal in motion.

Wang was with me on the plane from Prague on Wednesday. We had the roughest flying I have had since I was caught in a typhoon in the Pacific during the war. It looks as if it may be another long cold winter, literally and figuratively.

Regards to all,

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. If you have the opportunity tell the Secretary we are all delighted he has made such a marvellously quick recovery and is able to be back on the job.

UAJ

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**759. Letter 61 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 61

Washington, December 7, 1956

Dear Alex:

We are immersed in the preparation of briefing papers for Nehru's impending conversations with the President. We are doing a paper on the Geneva talks, as well as one on China policy in general. We are also doing one on Chinese Representation Issue in the UN. It is a problem to get everything that needs to be said within the one page that is allowed for each subject. We will send you a copy of each briefing paper as soon as they are multigraphed. Since the Secretary is leaving for Europe and will not be able to brief the President in advance, we understand the President himself may read these briefing papers.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

There is increasing evidence that the Chinese Communists are getting ready to release some or all of the 10 American prisoners as a part of the big play Nehru is expected to make for some modification of our China policy. We sent you the text of an AP dispatch out of New York yesterday which quoted Krishna Menon's speech. It is clear that Menon would not have made such a speech without something pretty definite to go on and probably some form of clearance from the Chinese Communists. We also have it from Kuh of the Chicago Sun Times that Indian Ambassador Mehta said the day before yesterday that he expected the prisoners to be released before Nehru's arrival in Washington. Nehru is due here on the 16th.

We are preparing ourselves for the eventuality of release of the prisoners. We expect to have a statement ready, and John Lindbeck's study of the maltreatment of Americans over the entire seven year period is being dusted off, although it might not be used immediately.

If the release of all the prisoners should take place just before your next meeting on the 13th, we would have something of a problem as to how the next meeting should be handled. I should think that after taking note of the action in proper fashion we would concentrate on renunciation of force. We certainly would not want to open up any new subjects, and I don't believe we will be ready to take up the missing servicemen again as early as December 13. However, the Department continues to receive numerous letters from Congressmen and relatives of missing military personnel pressing for further action with regard to them and we will probably want you to bring this matter up again soon, although we are not sanguine that it will produce any results. At least we would go on record as having pressed the Communists as far as we could on specific cases where there is evidence the Communists should have information. There are enclosed additional materials on nine Navy and two Army cases which may be useful to you. They have just reached us and we have not had time to study them. Defense is making the review of these cases a continuing project, requiring reports on a quarterly basis, so you can expect to receive additional material.

We anticipate that the matter of travel of newsmen to Communist China will come up immediately in acute form, if and when the prisoners are released. We are committed to reexamine the whole question at that time, and I don't imagine we can delay the reexamination very much.

I am enclosing the full text of the speech that Ernie Gross made before the American Assembly at Harriman, New York on November 17. Ernie was not very happy about the points in the speech which the New York Times chose to highlight, and wrote a letter to the Editor of the Times which was published on November 25. He argued that the report was unbalanced and conducive to misunderstanding of his point of view. You will note the reference to the Geneva talks in the speech.

I am also enclosing as of some background interest a copy of a recent letter from Karl Rankin to Joe Grew.

We have had no reply from you to the questions we raised in our letter No. 58 about Helenka's status. Don't you want that question pursued further?

Bill Sebald and I expect to arrange a Geneva meeting today or tomorrow and we count on getting your instructions out by the close of business on Monday.

It seems to me that unless some special reason for an earlier meeting develops, we should seek to pass up a meeting during Christmas and New Year weeks, and arrange to have the next meeting on January 10. There will be something on that in your guidance telegram.

Regards and the very best holiday greetings and good wishes to you, Dave, Helenka and Col. Ekvall from Bill, Ralph and Doug as well as myself,

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Dossiers on 11 Missing Military Personnel
2. Copy of Letter to Joseph Grew dated Nov. 28, 1956.
3. Copy of letter to Mr. Tichenor dated Nov. 21, 1956
4. Article from Wash. Post dated Dec. 4, 1956 by Sokolsky.
5. Speech by Ernest Gross at American Assembly.

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## 760. Telegram 638 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 10, 1956, 5:13 p.m.

638. For Johnson.

Guidance for December 13 meeting.

1. Continue your excellent attack of November 29 on Chinese Communist progressive nullification of terms of Agreed Announcement, drawing again on McCarthy case to illustrate your points.

FYI We are asking British to take up McCarthy case again in Peiping along lines suggested by O'Neill. There were some indications

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1056. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and McConaughy; cleared by Phleger.

last week that Communists might plan release some or all Americans coincidental with Nehru's visit December 16, but Chou's December 9 press interview Calcutta raises some doubt. In event of release we would expect you to alter presentation accordingly, but maintain emphasis on implementation Agreed Announcement unless all ten released. Supplementary instructions will be sent you if time permits. Contingency statement drafted for possible use here being wired separately. END FYI

2. Maintain previous position on other issues.
3. Propose next meeting January 10 because of holiday season.

**Hoover**

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**761. Telegram 640 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 10, 1956, 7:07 p.m.

640. Verbatim text. For Johnson.

Following draft text for release by Department if all ten Americans released:

QUOTE The Department of State is gratified to learn that the ten American citizens so long unjustly imprisoned by the Chinese Communists have finally been released. On September 10, 1955, more than a year ago, the Chinese Communists agreed that these Americans would be permitted expeditiously to return to their homes in the US. Only now have the Communists made good on their agreement. The American people are most appreciative of the good offices extended by the Indian Government and other governments in prevailing upon the Chinese Communists to honor their undertaking.

We hope that this long delayed action foreshadows a willingness on the part of the Chinese Communists to make a meaningful renunciation of force to include the Taiwan area. UNQUOTE

Following to be used in event only part of Americans released:

QUOTE We are glad that at long last these American citizens are again free. We have all been distressed by the sufferings which they and

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1056. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough, Lindbeck, and Phleger; cleared by Phleger in draft and Sebald.

others have unjustly endured under the Chinese Communists. If the Chinese Communists had honored their pledge of September 10, 1955, they should have been free long ago. The American people are most appreciative of the good offices extended by the Indian Government and other governments in prevailing upon the Chinese Communists to take this step toward carrying out their undertakings.

There still remain (blank) Americans in Communist jails. Despite the Chinese Communists' promise over 15 months ago to take measures to permit all Americans held in China "expeditiously" to exercise their right to return, they continue to hold (blank) Americans as political hostages.

Only full implementation of the Agreed Announcement can resolve the problem of the return of American civilians. Until the Chinese Communists honor their commitment, the United States will continue to press for the release of the remaining Americans UNQUOTE.

**Hoover**

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## **762. Telegram 643 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 11, 1956, 7:09 p.m.

643. Verbatim text. For Ambassador Johnson.

Following UP report yesterday's date from Washington transmitted for your information. Department has no independent confirmation of quoted statements:

QTE The Indian Embassy has helped some 20 Chinese nationals return to the Communist-held mainland, it was disclosed.

Indian Ambassador G.L. Mehta told reporters that he knew of no Chinese represented by the Embassy who had been barred from leaving the United States by the State Department.

In some instances he said difficulties arose because of the American-born wives or children of the Chinese nationals wanting to leave. But he said a majority of the score or so applicants already have returned to China.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1156. Official Use Only. Drafted by Henderson (FE/P); cleared by McConaughy and in NEA and SOA.



The Chinese Communists and the United States government agreed some time ago that India would represent any Chinese who claimed they wanted to leave this country and could not. The British perform the same function for Americans detained in China, ten of whom still are in jail there.

Mehta talked with reporters after visiting Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr. to discuss the forthcoming Washington visit of Indian Prime Minister Nehru.

His remarks were made when reporters questioned him about a statement in Calcutta by Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. Chou said the next move was up to the United States if it wants to get the rest of its nationals out of Red China. UNQTE.

**Hoover**

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### 763. Telegram 597 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 12, 1956, 8 a.m.

597. From Johnson.

It seems to me draft press release Deptel 640 unjustifiably tends give virtually entire share of credit for release to India and thus deprecates US Govt's efforts as well as UK role.

Accordingly suggest text first draft be revised along following lines:

"The Dept of State is gratified to learn that the ten American citizens so long unjustly imprisoned by the Chinese Communists have finally been released in belated fulfillment of their commitment of Sept 10 1955 at Geneva.

"Only now after fourteen months of repeated representations in the Ambassadorial talks in Geneva, of efforts by the UK representative in Peiping in accordance with the agreed announcement of Sept 10 1955 have the Communist Chinese permitted these Americans to return. The American people are most appreciative of the influence exerted by the Govt of India and other govts in prevailing upon the Chinese Communists to abide by this agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1256. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

"We hope that this long delayed action foreshadows a willingness on the part of the Chinese Communists to make and to abide by a meaningful renunciation of force to include the Taiwan area and thus contribute to the preservation of peace in the Far East."

Suggest text second draft be revised along following lines:

"We are glad that at long last these American citizens are free. We have all been distressed by the sufferings which they and others have unjustly endured under the Chinese Communists. If the Chinese Communists had honored their pledge of Sept 10 1955 they, and the (blank) others who still remain in Communist jails should have been free long ago.

"Only now after fourteen months of repeated representations in the Ambassadorial talks at Geneva and efforts by the UK representative in Peiping, in accordance with the agreed announcement of Sept 10 1955, have the Chinese Communists taken this step toward carrying out that agreement.

"The American people are most appreciative of the influence exerted by the Indian Govt and other govts in prevailing upon the Chinese Communists to permit these Americans to return." Last two paragraphs as in Dept's draft.

Gowen

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#### 764. Telegram 647 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 12, 1956, 7:25 p.m.

647. For Johnson.

Substance recommendations your 597 incorporated without change in contingency press releases.

Hoover

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1256. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy.

**765. Telegram 605 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 13, 1956, noon

605. From Johnson.

Two hour fifty minute meeting this morning almost entirely on implementation except for review by Wang of FMC, trade, and cultural proposals with emphasis on latter two. Cited Coleman statement on trade and American Assembly statements on trade and cultural relations and newsmen in support contention "American people" favor action on these subjects. If US genuinely desires settle problems it should express its views with regard to these specific proposals on questions whose resolution would be easy and in interest both peoples; implementation discussion followed familiar lines except that in reply he renewed charges US interfering with correspondence Chinese students, I made strong statement charging them with campaign bring pressure on students through organized letter-writing from families. He reiterated old position on imprisoned Americans and there was not slightest indication of any plans for early release.

In reply my suggestion January 10 next meeting he suggested January 12 and opposed January 17 and then finally agreed on Saturday, January 19. Returning Prague tomorrow.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1356. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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**766. Telegram 611 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 13, 1956, 5 p.m.

611. From Johnson.

1. I opened 63rd with prepared statement:

A. At last meeting I again referred manner in which your authorities seem steadily have nullified each of provisions announcement

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1356. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

until it has ceased have any substance with respect Americans your country who were and still are being prevented returning their country. I again point out unwillingness your authorities resolve this first simple straightforward question we were called upon deal with, as well as carry out first agreement reached between us, cannot but raise serious doubts concerning intent your government carry out its agreements and resolve other questions.

B. However, instead taking action remove these doubts I regret note since last meeting your authorities seem be continuing their attitude of not only ignoring this agreement but even ignoring fact you and I have been meeting here for past sixteen months with mutual agreement our first order business was return civilians.

C. In July last year on eve beginning our talks your Prime Minister made public statement which was widely interpreted as indicating desire and willingness quickly resolve question Americans detained your country permitting them return. He was quoted to effect that number Americans detained your country was small and speedy resolution problem their return should be possible. I was accordingly willing accept your proposal with regard announcement between us on understanding this would, as stated in announcement "expeditiously" resolve question as also stated in announcement, "Americans who desired return". However, it has not done so.

D. It seems me we have rather now almost come back in full circle from where we started as far as ten still detained Americans concerned.

E. Have noted recent statements your Prime Minister in which he again saying number Americans is small, is again making statements about possibilities their release as if we had never entered into agreement September 10 last year. He has also ignored fact my government has not only carried out agreement but even gone beyond its terms meet your point of view. However, it not my purpose here attempt edit or correct public statements your officials. Also, as have often said here, it never been my intention specify your authorities manner or procedures they should take implement their commitment under announcement. That something which only they can decide. However, it been and will remain my intent insist they do implement that agreement and permit those still detained return my country. I do this not only for sake these Americans but also for importance that respect for this agreement has in determining course our future relations.

F. I, therefore, hope this morning you in position make clear statement on intentions your authorities with respect this agreement and ten Americans still being detained.

2. Wang replied greatly regretted my statement this morning did not seem contain any new constructive views. I had made many unjustified charges against Chinese Government on question return civilians

which he could not possibly accept. At opening these talks last year Chinese Prime Minister did state number Americans in China small and problem could be resolved easily. During more than year of negotiations here his government exactly been settling problem in accordance spirit that statement made by Premier. As result great majority Americans in China already returned as Premier made clear in statement. If we examined record of handling question return civilians by Chinese and American Governments, facts clearly showed Chinese Government exactly worked in accordance spirit agreement and made many efforts this respect. On other hand, on question return civilians, side which should be reprimanded is entirely US Government instead Chinese Government. Therefore, it is up to US Government make further efforts on this question present moment. I had just observed we seem to have traveled in circle and come back to point when started these talks. But blame not his side. It my side which to blame because it had consistently chosen delaying tactics. Now that year 1956 coming to close he regretted say our talks not been able make any more progress than had year before.

3. Wang continued, question which side willing and ready resolve issues and which not should be determined by actual facts. No empty charges or words can determine this matter. At very beginning discussion on second item agenda his side put forward proposal for holding Sino-American FMC. It always been his view such conference would play decisive role in easing and settling tensions and disputes in Taiwan area. Regretted say, however, my govt up to now failed respond to or accept this reasonable proposal.

4. Wang continued (from prepared text) it also hard understand if my side genuinely desired settle disputes and improve relations, why my side still had not responded to simple and reasonable proposal put forward by his side Aug 21 this year proposing lifting embargo. However American people did not share this view of mine. They properly feel lifting embargo and restoration traditional trade relations between China and US advantageous to both sides. He did not pretend speak for American people but what had read in American press indicates American people want to do away with obstructions to trade. Mr John Coleman, President US Chamber Commerce at interview in November expressed self in favor lifting embargo and restoring Sino-American trade ties. Also noted tenth American Assembly held New York not long ago expressed same view. Such views proper expression desires American people. As he had previously told me, in imposing unreasonable embargo against China my govt did not succeed in causing China any formidable difficulties. This did not however absolve US of unrighteousness of embargo policy. Therefore it essential embargo must be lifted before minimum basis Sino-American relations could be established. They felt sooner my govt adopted such reasonable outlook, better.

5. Wang continued, neither had my side responded to proposal for promotion human contacts cultural exchange made by his side Sept 22. My side had thus shown lack willingness reach even limited agreement such as this. In taking such line preventing normal exchange my govt could not make self popular. Above mentioned American Assembly had also recommended my govt permit American newsmen scholars visit China also advocated increased interflow culture and information. Such were exactly ideas covered by his Sept 22 proposal and they felt these desires American people reasonable and proper.

6. Wang continued, if US had genuine desire resolve problems it should make progress in second item agenda. It made unfounded futile charges instead taking action in discussing those specific proposals which could be easily resolved and which in interest both our people—such manner conducting these talks futile. If US really wanted settle problems it should express views these proposals his side. They continued await response my govt these proposals.

7. I replied he seemed to have missed point I had tried make again this morning on relationship of first agreement between us on civilians and other proposals which he had made. He had also seemed ignore fundamental relationship to question renunciation force and agreement settle our differences by peaceful means only. Again wanted stress until these fundamental matters resolved, these subsidiary matters could not fall into place. I had all along and still expressed willingness discuss and do best resolve any other subsidiary matters which properly come within terms reference our talks, once fundamental matter resolved. Could not be denied it had been continued unwillingness his govt resolve these fundamental matters which had continued for all this time prevent us from going on to other matters. Even before he and I met here our govts agreed first matter to be settled was return civilians. I had made it very clear right from beginning these talks that my interest not in words and appearances of agreement—my interest was in resolving this question. My govt demonstrated its good faith and took action to resolve this question even before he and I met here by removing admitted restrictions which had theretofore been placed on departure from US some few Chinese students. He had indicated to me here in 1954 and his govt indicated through consular level talks here as well as through public statements that this was their primary interest. Thus rather than proposing formulae for public statements, my govt took concrete action resolve this question in which he had indicated interest.

8. I continued when he had raised question concerning Chinese alien criminals in American prisons, my govt also took concrete action resolve that. As had previously informed him there not now in prison any Chinese alien who desired return his country. We took all these actions without condition, without demanding concessions, as our

earnest desire quickly resolve this problem. We did this frankly in hope his govt would on own initiative take corresponding action to solve problem of Americans imprisoned his country. It could easily have done so if it had desired resolve this question and this whole matter which had continued be irritant in our relations could have been disposed of in first few days our talks. However, he had insisted on public agreement on this subject and third party arrangement which would be able determine facts. As had pointed out to him at time, that agreement in self solved nothing. Only implementation that agreement could solve question. Nevertheless I willing enter into that agreement with him on understanding it would be implemented and would resolve question. As I had noted this morning it had not done so. He had spoken of actual facts with regard implementation that agreement. It was his suggestion we establish third party arrangement so facts could be determined. I accepted that arrangement and it was that arrangement which best demonstrated facts. I had often cited fact here that in no case had we received any notification from third party that any obstacle had been placed in way any Chinese my country who desired return his country. In reply that he had at times intimated here that Chinese may fear communicate with Indian Embassy. As I had pointed out this utterly absurd. Absurd think person would fear put letter in mail box or pick up telephone to communicate with Indian Embassy if he felt he being obstructed from leaving US. His govt must be perfectly aware this fact and perfectly aware facts regard communications between Chinese in my country and Indian Embassy. In this connection I had noted press statement made this week by Indian Ambassador in US in which he quoted as saying Embassy had assisted some twenty Chinese in returning Wang's country. This established that Chinese able to and in fact were in communication with Indian Embassy. Indian Ambassador had gone on to say knew of no Chinese who had been barred from leaving US. I regretted UK Charge Peiping not able make similar statement. Regretted that facts with regard Americans his country would not justify or support such statement by Charge. UK Charge would have to say ten Americans who desired return US still held in prison. He would have to say Wang's authorities refused accept representations from him with respect these Americans even though this clearly set forth in agreement. He would have to say authorities prevented him even from investigating facts of case as clearly set forth in agreement. I did not know how I could better illustrate or establish who had been carrying out this agreement. These not what he termed unjustified charges or unsupported allegations. These were actual facts. These were actual facts established by arrangement which he himself suggested for establishing such facts. I had cited these facts not only because of importance in themselves but because of relationship of them to fundamental question whether agreements between us were to

have substance. It had yet to be demonstrated that this first agreement between us had substance. It had yet to be demonstrated whether his govt willing resolve first question we called upon to deal with.

9. Wang replied my statement on question civilians could not be regarded as in accordance facts. He could not see how settlement of our issues could be facilitated by repeating these statements. As matter fact even prior opening our talks here Americans in China who desired return my country had been able to because his govt never adopted any illegal restrictive measures against their departure. At present still were number of Americans who desired remain his country. At future if any these people desired return my country his side would continue enable them depart in accordance with agreement. In addition these ordinary American civilians, I must also know number former American prisoners from Korean War who refused repatriation and who had chosen reside China. Recently two of this group indicated desire return my country. His side had promptly assisted them do so. This showed they always ready assist those who desired return my country to do so. In future if any these former prisoners of war should desire return, his side would continue help them depart. At time these talks opened here there were 40 Americans in China who had committed various crimes. To show good will, his govt taken special measures of leniency by announcing release of 11 of them on very first day our talks. In course our talks, Chinese Govt had taken further measures in giving 19 prisoners opportunity exercise right return. All these 19 persons had returned. Therefore could be said China not only enabled all those American nationals who desired do so leave country, but also taken further measures enable great majority American prisoners exercise right return. Under such circumstances to charge China failure carry out or violate agreement was deliberate distortion facts.

[10.] Wang continued (from prepared statement) insofar as remaining ten American prisoners concerned, as he had always indicated if they displayed good behavior authorities would adopt lenient measures within framework their legal system give them early release. Their policy with regard American prisoners was entirely legal and lenient in every respect. No one could deny this fact. Let us examine record my government in handling question release civilians. Up to now my side had refused hand over list all Chinese imprisoned in America. Even list of Chinese prisoners in America we had produced not complete one. My authorities continued force Chinese go Taiwan. With regard this, he wanted point out my side not yet withdrawn requirement Taiwan entry permit which violated our agreement September 10 last year. They continued receive information on this matter. In case where Chinese nationals forced to Taiwan, my immigration authorities playing leading role. My side had not yet stopped interfering with correspondence of Chinese students with families. My side must stop



all these examples obstruction return in flagrant violation agreement. They continued press for accounting on group 26 persons and group 52 persons—exactly why these persons had not returned. Until such accounting given, people could only assume their return obstructed. Insofar as Chinese prisoners concerned my side not yet taken measures as China had done so could exercise right return. On other hand my side actually adopted illegal screening method so that these people left in same situation as before.

At one moment my side had alleged not single one these desired return. At next moment I said a single one did desire return. At one moment I said agreement not cover these persons at next moment said did cover them. How could such contradictory statements convince people my side trying settle this problem? Even so in whole course these talks my side permitted only single Chinese in prison return China. Sharp contrast to fact in same interval his side permitted 30 of 40 American prisoners, that is to say great majority return.

11. Wang continued there were tens of thousands Chinese nationals in US; at present only very few permitted return. Still many who desired return but could not as result all sorts obstructive measures my side in violation agreement. There were even cases in which persons forcibly sent to Taiwan against their will. If my side refused announce removal illegal requirement Taiwan entry permit and if my side refused stop interfering in correspondence Chinese nationals in US with families, situation could really be regarded as farcical. It evident, therefore, on question return civilians, up to my side make further efforts implement agreement. This was request and also hope his side.

12. I replied, let us be clear that we decided proper subjects our discussion here with regard civilians were those who desired return. I had said in past and I repeat again and my statements substantiated by third party he had designated in US—no Chinese national in US who desired return Wang's country was being obstructed doing so. Chinese nationals who had not returned have done so only because of own free choice. He had persisted in misunderstanding and misrepresenting what he called question Taiwan entry permits. First let me say I did not consider it proper subject of discussion here since it had no relationship to those who desired return his country. It had relationship only to those who desired extend temporary stay in US—that is remain in US. Nevertheless I had been willing explain matter here. I had explained in past nobody required obtain what he termed Taiwan entry permits. Persons desiring extend stay in US must be able show they can proceed to another destination at end of stay. This is not something that applied just to Chinese—it something that applied all aliens in US. Applied equally to Indian, Swiss or British subject.

13. I continued he had also again spoken of what he termed interference with correspondence. What he was doing was attempting put

blame on my government for situation which his own authorities created. I had refrained previously from talking on this matter because I hoped his authorities would realize absurdity such charge. We have learned that in spring this year his provincial authorities were enforcing mass registration of families of Chinese studying in US. Such registrations are known to have taken place in Canton between March 30 and April 30, and in other cities of that province between April 5 and May 5. Similar mass registrations are known to have taken place in other areas during same period. In succeeding months, purposes of this became all too clear. Chinese students my country began receiving letters from relatives—letters which were on whole quite different in content from those they had previously been receiving. These letters contained similarities of language and content that were beyond probabilities of chance; some of them hinted that unless student returned immediately to mainland his family there would suffer; still others contained warnings disclosure of correspondence would bring reprisal on families. Some students received letters mailed other than from mainland telling them to disregard earlier letters, as they had been written under pressure. Purpose of this pressure was all too clear. However, some students, in their anxiety for fate their families, had turned for advice to various Chinese welfare and religious organizations in my country. Some brought their cases to attention authorities my country. Eventually, as was inevitable, whole maneuver came to light in public press. I found it incredible attempt now being made lay blame for situation on authorities my country. If any pressure had been exerted on Chinese students my country, it had come from his country. My government has real sympathy for both students and families. My government had and would continue follow humane course of allowing each Chinese in US make up own mind whether remain or leave. It had not brought pressure bear on students; nor had it attempted through them exert pressures on families.

14. I continued, my govt had not alleged Americans in his country who desired remain there in fact desire return. It had never attempted bring pressure on these Americans to return. I had been very careful from beginning these talks not bring subject these Americans into talks. Had not attempted complicate our talks by making false allegations about these Americans. Had discussed only question of Americans who unquestionably did desire return. At very outset these talks had given him list these Americans. It those Americans I had been talking about. It those Americans who were subject of agreement. It was ten those Americans who still not given right return which they granted under agreement. It with regard these Americans UK Charge Peiping not even able carry out subsidiary provisions that agreement. It those Americans who subject terms reference these talks. Until all, not just majority, those Americans had returned, first item our discussion had not yet been resolved. I again urged it be resolved by his govt permitting them return.

15. Wang replied, I had stated our agreement Sept 10 related to persons who desired return their country; that was right. On other hand, I demand that ten Americans who had committed crimes and now serving out terms should immediately be released; that was wrong in error. Our agreement did not at any place state all Americans, including criminals, be able return. Such demands were illegal. Such interpretation of agreement was distorted one. On other hand, it was rather Chinese nationals in US who desired return and who being obstructed from doing so.

16. Wang continued, very surprised listen my statement with regard investigation correspondence Chinese. Well known China sent large number students abroad study in places including Europe, US, Japan. These students sent abroad either by govt or their families. Didn't go there stay but rather serve their motherland at conclusion study. Question whether these students desire return country does not arise in any civilized country. Yet they had seen this problem arise in US because US trying detain these students and prevent them return motherland. Not yet seen more striking instance in history civilized world. Only too natural Chinese Govt and families express concern these students. Nothing secret and entirely open that families of Chinese students have gathered in public meetings to put forward demand their kin in US be allowed return. His delegation had received large quantities mail from families Chinese students in US requesting assistance for student return rejoin families. This only too natural. It entirely matter Chinese internal affairs as to what advice offered by Chinese Govt to these relatives to help kin—these students—return motherland. Only too natural sentiment for these relatives advise and appeal for return their kin in US. Nobody can expect their relatives to advise their kin remain there. Information in my statements entirely proved fact US Govt investigating and interfering in correspondence Chinese students with families. This act could only be regarded as violation of personal rights and freedom Chinese in US. What was purpose this investigation correspondence? Purpose was bring pressure bear on minds Chinese students in US prevent their returning China. This investigation of people's correspondence reminiscent days KMT rule in China. In those days people's correspondence also investigated and we termed this activity work of special agents while in other democratic country this called police activity. They vigorously opposed to this action of US Govt which violation personal liberty and democratic spirit.

17. I replied information had given him [garble] what he termed investigation of correspondence. It resulted from voluntary acts of persons receiving correspondence calling it to attention our authorities and asking for advice. From his statements seemed quite clear he did agree there was campaign to bring pressure through families on these

Chinese students to return or [garble] might not desire return would naturally show some concern. Would naturally be especially concerned when, as some informed us, had received one letter from relative postmarked from Wang's country urging them to return and subsequently received another letter postmarked elsewhere telling them disregard first one. Fact of matter was not my govt attempting bring any pressure on these students. They were mature enough make own decisions. Fact of matter was all evidence showed not single Chinese been obstructed from leaving US if desired leave country. Evidence for this was not my unsupported statement. Evidence was third party which established to determine just this very fact. Fact of matter was, as best exemplified in case Fr. McCarthy, third party in Wang's country not even permitted investigate facts of case where person alleging obstruction return. Facts with regard performance our two govts on agreement all too plain.

18. Wang replied, I had spoken of campaign launched by his govt to urge Chinese students in America return motherland. Fact was relatives these students hold many public gatherings voice demand to his govt that govt should make reps my govt for return their kin in US. It was quite public matter. Such campaign made necessary simply because Chinese students my country prevented from returning. If not prevented from returning, such campaign would have been unnecessary. Relatives had written letters. No matter where mailed and no matter by what means mailed, purpose of letters was urge members family return motherland. This reasonable and expression entirely humane desire. But absurd, utterly absurd, for parents urge members families remain in US all their lives and die in US.

19. Wang continued, he would remind me terms reference these talks did not cover only question return civilians but covered wide range matters at issue between two countries. He referred second item agenda. In course these talks his side had made various proposals designed resolve other matters at issue between us. He regretted my side not in position join in discussion these matters and because of this attitude my govt, no progress made in discussion second item agenda. It to be hoped my govt would devote necessary attention second item agenda and join in reasonable discussion those items and proposals made by his side.

20. I replied hoped his govt would resolve first item agenda and thereby show desire resolve issues between us.

21. Wang replied had already made quite clear their opinion as to how first item agenda to be settled. On their part always acted in accordance with agreement. Their opinion was problems could only be resolved this way.

22. I asked did that mean Americans his country who desired return would be able expeditiously do so. If so I welcomed statement.

23. Wang said matters could only be resolved in accordance agreement. Impossible ask beyond scope agreement.

24. I said had asked for nothing beyond scope agreement. Agreement said Americans who desired return would be able expeditiously do so and that his govt would take necessary measures that regard. Agreement said anybody who felt obstructed from returning could communicate with UK Charge. Agreement said UK Charge could investigate facts in any such case. Agreement said his govt would accept representation from UK Charge. I could not see single aspect our agreement which being honored with regard those ten Americans still there.

25. Wang said with respect ten American prisoners serving prison terms China, his govt could not accept any unilateral demand of US Govt because such demands unreasonable and did not conform with agreement. People other than ten Americans serving sentences, other Americans in China including former prisoners of war who refused repatriation would be assisted by his side without any condition depart from his country if they desired so. They might ask how many Americans formerly in Chinese prisons allowed return and how many Chinese in US prisons allowed return.

26. I said all Chinese in US including those in prison who desired return been able do so. Ten Americans his country who desired return not been able do so.

27. Wang said these ten Americans not permitted return because had not served out terms given them for their offenses. This was accepted practice every sovereign govt.

28. I said in other words, our agreement had no meaning with respect these ten Americans.

29. Wang said agreement did not state all American prisoners should be released within specified time.

30. I replied agreement said Americans desiring return would be able expeditiously do so.

31. Wang said that only one aspect of problem.

32. I said however one termed it, it was agreement between us which not being carried out.

33. Wang rejoined it was US which not carrying out agreement.

34. I stated third party arrangement showed which side carrying it out.

35. Wang complained US had not assisted third party to perform functions.

36. I pointed out that not what third party said.

37. Wang asked since two items on agenda, why had US not presented views on second item.

38. I replied US had at great length presented views on second item agenda and US had also expressed views with regard first item. US expects agreement on first item be carried out and US expects fundamental items under second item be resolved. It still hoped—even after this passage of time—that his govt would make decisions resolve these matters.

39. Wang stated now up to US take such measures resolve question. Removing requirement for Taiwan entry permit would do more good than to sit here and engage in long empty statements. It was American people who demanded lifting embargo. Why had my govt not taken measures do so? It was American people who demanded American pressmen be allowed visit China. Why had not American Govt taken action permit do so? He hoped US would take concrete action which could be seen by everybody rather than by making empty statements or empty professions of desires.

40. I noted for 180 years my govt considered fully qualified speak for American people. I thought no less qualified do so today. This did not mean, happily, that no difference of opinion among American people. This did not mean, happily, that persons having different opinions not able publicly express them.

41. Wang commented we had not come here for history courses.

42. I suggested January ten for next meeting in view Christmas and New Years holidays.

43. Wang proposed January 18 which I found inconvenient and we agreed on Saturday, January 19.

Gowen

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**767. Letter 51 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 51

Geneva, December 13, 1956

Dear Walter:

I am again not sending any comment telegram as there is really nothing new to say and much can happen before the next meeting.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

I must confess that the news stories from India certainly make my prediction that Nehru would not talk much about Communist China look entirely wrong. It now looks as if he might do much talking about it, and may be carrying some messages. Therefore, I presume that what happens at the next meeting will to a considerable degree depend on what is or is not said during the Washington visit.

Do you see any significance in Wang's persistence on the January 18 date? I do not have Chou's schedule here and wonder if it could be related to the post-Washington meeting between Chou and Nehru and Chou's return to Peiping.

I pressed for the January 17 date as Swissair is no longer flying to Prague on Saturdays and Sundays and I have to go back by Czech Air on those days for which I have no stomach. (They have had too many crashes with their old Soviet planes and the week preceding my last return by Czech Air, killed a whole plane full taking off from Zurich.) I agreed to Saturday with the thought I could lay-over here Sunday and go back Swissair on Monday [*text not declassified*].

I am sorry I failed to reply to you about Helenka. However, as I had talked over with her the suggestion you made regarding leave without pay and as she was agreeable I had dismissed it from my mind as finished business. Nevertheless, I should have said something to you.

I presume you have by now received my letter about extending Ekvall beyond December 30. (My letters to you seem to take an extraordinary time in transit).

As a side light Wang was with me on the plane coming down Tuesday and while we were in the airport at Zurich I showed him two articles and pictures in the New York Times of Chou's Indian visit. In a little while he came over and gave me the Prague English news bulletin of NCNA giving the account of Chou's Calcutta interview. It was to that I was particularly referring this morning and he knew it as I had it on the table.

I didn't feel as pleased with today's meeting as I had with the last meeting in that I wasn't able to keep it as exclusively on the ten Americans as the last meeting. However, I felt it was time to call him on their tactics with respect to the Chinese students and this inevitably led us somewhat down that road. However, all in all, I think I was successful in continuing to keep him on the defensive.

I am very glad you accepted my suggestions on the contingency statements in the event of any releases. I just felt we were giving the Indians entirely too much credit.

I did not put too much stock in Menon's statement as indicating knowledge by him of an early release, but would be inclined to give



considerable credence to Mehta's remarks if Kuh was correctly quoting him. (Incidentally thanks very much for the press account of Mehta's statement on Chinese in the U.S. As you will have seen I made very good use of it.) I would be most surprised if they released all 10. If they are going to make any gesture I think it much more likely they will at the most let 8 go.

If and when I bring up the missing servicemen again I suggest I should also include some blanket inquiry that would cover not only the 11 Coast Guard and Navy personnel but the recent weather plane incident in the Japan Sea on which I forwarded you a reply to a letter from Mrs. McLaughlin. That is, without individually mentioning all such incidents an inquiry framed in such a way as to attempt to draw from him a disclaimer of knowledge of survivors of any such incidents so that we could assure inquirers we have done our best for them.

Holiday greetings and best wishes for all. May 1957 be more productive than 1955 and 1956.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**768. Letter from Clough to Osborn<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 19, 1956

Dear Dave:

The last batch of data on unaccounted for military personnel was sent to us by Defense in such haste that they failed to get to us the enclosed covering memorandum. I note from the memorandum that there should be data on twelve persons rather than eleven, as Walter stated in his letter of December 7 to Alex. Defense now tells us that in the rush they sent over extra copies of some of the dossiers which they would like you to send back, since one will presumably satisfy your needs. They have also told us that the Navy is declassifying the material on Naval personnel so that it can be used in negotiation.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential. Drafted by Clough.



We would be interested in your comments on the usefulness of this latest batch of material. The Department is under continued pressure to do something about the unaccounted for military personnel and we may want this subject brought up again at the next meeting.

With such long gaps between meetings you must be turning into a regular member of the Consulate General staff which we regret, since FE pays the bill and we could use you to much better advantage here. However, there seems to be no solution to this unsatisfactory situation.

Awana and I send best wishes to you and Helenka for the holiday season and hope to hear from you.

Sincerely,

**Ralph N. Clough**

Enclosure:

Memo from Defense dated December 6

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**769. Letter from Osborn to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 26, 1956

Dear Ralph:

I am returning the extra copies of the missing-personnel dossiers you mentioned in your letter of December 19. As you say, we did get data on twelve persons.

It should be possible to make a pretty good presentation on the basis of the material we now have, if we can have discretion as to the use of material from some of the classified dossiers. Although some of the new material is still utterly valueless in our context (e.g., Pvt Worley, Lt. Gleaves, Lt De Lacy, Lt Cochran, Lt Batson, Lt Nelson), I don't think this would necessarily hurt our presentation. We now have a few cases we could cite in some detail to cast doubt on the so-called "accounting" in both the "escaped" and the "no-data" categories (e.g., Pvt Walker, Lt Biesterveld, Capt Moreland—why have we no new data on him?—and several of the Air Force cases). Taking off from this, we could strongly renew the demand that this "practical matter" between the two sides be settled by the simple and feasible action on Peiping's part that we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential.

have asked for all along. It has seemed to us here we might also want to work in a blanket demand for information on any other US personnel, whether or not involved in the Korean conflict, of whose fate the Communists might have knowledge. In this connection, it might be useful for us to have whatever unclassified information is available on any US planes that have gone down near China since 1950—plane numbers, crew names, etc.

Probably Wang will not even give us a nibble this time. If he does respond, it will probably be with a counterattack. He can if he chooses attack the failure of the UN side to submit any accounting at all; but this line can be exploited by us against him, as it would at least be an acknowledgment that MAC business can be dealt with here. Wang could, if he chose, make a fairly good counterattack on the 14,000, even though these are not comparable to the unaccounted-for personnel. He could point out that the PRC has let those of the US non-patriots wishing to do so return; he could ask whether the 14,000 have the same right; he could point out that this is a practical matter between our two countries. Of course, he would be wrong, but it might prove uncomfortable having to argue the point. However, this line of counterattack somehow doesn't seem Wang's style in the present pattern.

I was glad to learn from your card that Joe Bennett is to be joining you. He is an excellent man. As to when I might rejoin you—the Ambassador has indicated a sympathetic understanding of my disinclination to stay on here if the talks assume—or retain—the character of an indefinite and sporadic maintenance of contact. We both feel that the next meeting ought to be somewhat more indicative than most in regard to the future of the talks.

I realize, of course, that this doesn't give you in CA much of a firm basis for planning ahead on personnel, which is another reason I'm glad Joe Bennett is coming.

Helenka and the children and I had a good Christmas, and hope all of you in CA did, too. We're taking advantage of the year-end holidays to spend a few days in Italy, which I've never seen.

Happy New Year to all.

Sincerely,

**David L. Osborn**

Enclosures: Extra dossiers of missing personnel for Defense

**770. Letter 62 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 62

Washington, January 4, 1957

Dear Alex:

I have checked with Bill Godel in General Erskine's office on the status of Col. Ekvall. Bill assures me that there will be no difficulty in extending his present assignment. Apparently the red tape that has vexed us previously will not have to be contended with again. However, Bill warned me that Ekvall is nearing the mandatory retirement age of 60. He wanted to give us due notice so that we would have ample time to make other arrangements. We have checked the Army register and find that Ekvall was born in February, 1898. Hence his compulsory retirement date should be February 28, 1958. That is far enough in the future so that we will not have to worry about the matter for the present. As you know, we now have a modest Foreign Service interpreter training program under the guidance of Howard Sollenberger of the Foreign Service Institute. The first trainee, John Dexter (already a Chinese language Officer) should complete the interpreter training by early next year.

We have received intimations from Dave and Helenka that he is very eager to return to his work in CA and that you might be willing to consider releasing him after the next meeting. Undoubtedly FE would get a much larger over-all return from Dave if he were working full-time for us here in the Department, rather than for brief and infrequent periods at Geneva. This would seem to be doubly true since the talks have entered a stereotyped phase where there is little for him or any other assistant to contribute. It has occurred to me that we might explore the possibility of bringing Dave back, and detailing Ed Martin to commute between London and Geneva for the meetings, if you are receptive to the idea. Probably it would have to be understood that there would be no more than two meetings a month in this event. We have not discussed the matter with EUR or Embassy, London, and will not do so until we got your reaction. We have ascertained that such an arrangement apparently would be feasible from the FE budgetary standpoint, although FE's travel expenses, plus the differential pay which Dave would receive when he is back in the Department, would come to a little more than we are now spending. I have to make this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Unclassified; Official-Informal. Drafted by McConaughy.

letter unclassified, since otherwise there would be a long pouch delay. However, I believe the essentials are spelled out.

We intend to see that you get all the support you feel you need, and if the proposed arrangement would not suit you we want you to say so. It would be clearly understood, of course, that if you do give up Dave, we would reassign him or someone of comparable qualifications for full-time service should the talks take a new turn involving the discussion of other major substantive matters.

Regards and good wishes to you and Pat for all of '57.

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

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**771. Letter from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, January 7, 1957

Dear Walter:

I have just received your unclassified letter of January 4 and hasten to reply in the same way mailing this by APO channels from Nuremberg when I go through there tomorrow.

It is reassuring to know that if I am still at this in 1958 a substitute is in the mill. You can be sure I most fervently hope that the contingency will not arise.

I had told Dave that if by the end of the next meeting it looks as if things are going to continue on the same course I would be willing to tell the Department I was willing to release him to return to the Department, subject, of course, to the arrival of a replacement. I had not thought of Ed Martin from London but am delighted at the prospect and believe that from my standpoint it would be entirely practicable if we continue at our present pace of not more than a meeting each two weeks. This would leave the problem of a secretary which I will discuss with Geneva when I arrive there. With Dave Popper at no. 2 there now I may be able to work out something more satisfactory than previously. I will let you know.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Unclassified; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." A handwritten note on the letter indicates it was received on January 14.

I hope you have lots of news waiting for me at Geneva, so that I know at least as much as the other fellow about what has happened, if anything.

All the best,

Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson

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**772. Letter 63 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 63

Washington, January 14, 1957

Dear Alex:

I hope you got my letter No. 62 of January 4, sent to you at Prague. I presume you did since we received no word that you would carry through the travel and leave plan which you were considering when you wrote your letter No. 51 of December 13 (received here December 21).

I am leaving on the 17th to participate in a panel discussion of Communist policy at the Air Command and Staff School at Maxwell Air Base, Alabama. I hope we can get our guidance telegram for the January 19 meeting on the wires not later than Wednesday, the 16th. I hope we can have a preliminary meeting today. There will be nothing really new to put in it unless we decide to have you bring up the missing servicemen again. I'm going to recommend that the subject be brought up at this week's meeting. I assume you will have enough time to prepare your presentation, and it needs to be done to satisfy Defense, and to back up many letters to the relatives in which we state that we are continuing to pursue the question actively. It is evident that we are not going to make any headway in the MAC. I agree with the suggestion in your last letter that some blanket inquiry be included which would cover other incidents where military personnel have disappeared in the general area of China and adjoining waters.

We do not feel that we have any good explanation for Wang's insistence on not having this week's meeting on January 17. Chou En-lai's current trip to Poland may have something to do with it, although it seems doubtful that Chou's present itinerary had been planned in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

detail as early as December 13. As you know, extensive changes in Chou's travel plans have been made, or at least announced, since then.

We have sent you what little we have on Nehru's conversations touching on China matters while he was recently in this country. We have no reason to think that anything took place in those talks which would influence our tactics with Wang. I gather that Nehru is not sanguine about the prospects for any immediate favorable action on the prisoners by Peiping.

We are in a rather difficult position in our efforts to hold the line on travel of Americans to Communist China. The unexpected entry of the 3 American newsmen into Communist China has complicated our problem. The present disposition here is to refrain from any sort of legal or administrative sanctions against these three. The "Look" Magazine people have already ordered Stevens and Harrington out and the "Afro-American" publisher has promised to advise Worthy to leave promptly, although Worthy is not actually an employee of the "Afro-American" and may not feel obligated to respect their wishes. Wiggin of the "Washington Post" is making a comprehensive study of the whole subject for the American Society of Newspaper Editors. While he is not entirely unsympathetic to our position his report may make it more difficult to hold the line 100 percent. There is a strong effort to break down our position to the extent of letting in a selected few newsmen. But we do not see how we can discriminate against people in other occupations who have plausible reasons for going in. We intend to continue to use all the moral suasion we can while avoiding tangles with the courts and with public opinion. It seems important to get out a better statement of our reasons for opposing travel to Red China than we have yet done. Such a statement is being worked on now.

Our difficulties have been compounded by the digging up of a 1952 press release (copy enclosed). This release announces that all passports will be stamped not valid for travel to various Communist countries including Communist China but explains that "this procedure in no way forbids American travel to those areas." None of us were here when this press release was issued. Do you recall any background on why it was stated that we would not object to travel in Communist China? That is hard to understand since it was issued at a time when the Korean War was still going on and more than 40 Americans were unjustly imprisoned in Communist China.

Our endeavor to keep the pressure on the Communists to release the American prisoners by refusing passports to mainland China until they are released has been further damaged by the action of the defense lawyer in the Powell sedition case, Abraham Lincoln Wirin. He has given the court a long list of witnesses in Communist China whose testimony he claims is essential to his clients' defense. The judge

has issued an order providing that the testimony of these witnesses be taken in the form of depositions before an American consular officer in Hong Kong. However, Wirin avers that in order to get the witnesses to come to Hong Kong he must go personally to Communist China and North Korea to interview the witnesses and others with information relating to the case (including Chou En-lai and Kim Il-sung.) Having been denied a passport valid for travel to Communist China and North Korea, Wirin appealed to the court and the judge issued an order (copy enclosed) to the effect that he was to go to these two areas as an officer of the court, at government expense, depositing his passport in Hong Kong, and the court would protect him from any criminal or administrative action against him by reason of this travel. L, which has primary responsibility in this situation, has decided not to contest the judge's action and Wirin has announced, according to the press, that he will depart for Hong Kong and Communist China on January 28. Thus, we have another precedent and another breach in the dike.

Regards and good wishes to all of you,  
Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Press Release No. 341 of May 1, 1952.
2. Copy of court order.
3. Two Nehru Briefing Papers:
  - (a) Chinese Prisoners in U.S. Penitentiaries.
  - (b) Background Paper on Father C.J. McCarthy.
4. Copy of Television Interview—Edward R. Murrow and Chou En-lai

P.S.

It would be useful if you could let us know right away if any breaching of the line at all on travel of Americans in Communist China would compromise your position in your talks with Wang. You will recall that you have mentioned several times to Wang that we could not change our policy while Americans are unjustly held. If you have any important observation on the effect in Geneva of any modification of the policy, it might be well for you to telegraph as well as write.

We are naturally interested in the interview which Worthy is to have with American prisoners in Shanghai today or tomorrow. But we have decided it would be inappropriate for us to transmit any questions for Worthy to put to the prisoners, as we have an opportunity to do. We do not wish to seem to be capitalizing in any way on Worthy's

visit when it has been termed contrary to official policy. Furthermore we do not believe any additional information would result from action on our part. The questions which might logically be asked are obvious and will occur to Worthy without any prompting from us.

It now seems as if we may put out a strong statement immediately on our handling of Chinese prisoners and students, in order to correct the harmful misrepresentations which Chou En-lai is making in the course of his current tour.

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**773. Telegram 736 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 15, 1957, 7:58 p.m.

736. For Johnson.

Guidance for January 19 meeting.

1. Express deep disappointment and concern of American people that new year has begun with terms of Agreed Announcement still unfulfilled by Chinese Communists. Many months have passed since last American released. It now appears Chinese Communists taking no repeat no measures permit Americans expeditiously return US as promised in Agreed Announcement, but instead compelling each prisoner serve out term of sentence prior release. Such action is flagrant violation of Agreed Announcement and contrary Wang's assurances that prompt action could be expected. It also in sharp contrast to US action regarding Chinese prisoners in US. Only Chinese prisoner choosing go mainland China released after serving only two and one-half years of seven to twenty year sentence. US has extended benefits of Agreed Announcement to all Chinese in US including common criminals in prison such as narcotics offenders and murderers. US even invited Indian Embassy interview all such prisoners. Chinese Communist refusal permit interviews cannot obscure fact US has done more than required by Agreed Announcement regarding Chinese in US, while Chinese Communists have failed carry out their commitment regarding Americans.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1557. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy, Sebald, and Phleger in draft.



2. Renew demand for accounting by Chinese Communists for missing military personnel. Frame demand in terms broad enough encompass both personnel missing from Korean War and other US military personnel missing from aircraft lost vicinity of China. Select from dossiers forwarded to you best-documented cases missing individuals reliably reported at one time in Chinese Communist hands and present in detail to Wang. (Material sent you McConaughy's letter December 7 all now declassified.) If Wang should refuse consider subject, refer statements of Communist side at Panmunjom at 67th Meeting of MAC on November 26, 1956 that personnel QUOTE detained by authorities outside Korea UNQUOTE or QUOTE disposed of UNQUOTE by Chinese Communist regime not repeat not subject discussion at Panmunjom. Point out this is obvious issue between us, one of great concern to American people, and therefore suitable subject for Geneva talks.

3. Maintain previous position other subjects.

4. Propose next meeting February 7. (FYI Lengthening interval between meetings will serve to emphasize to Communists our dissatisfaction their attitude in talks and make less frequent demands on your time.)

**Dulles**

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#### 774. Telegram 705 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, January 17, 1957, noon

705. From Johnson.

Re travel Communist China as indicated Mytel 67 Aug 16 from Prague felt fact issue largely turned into one between US press and USG had largely destroyed negotiating value position here and best course was find some way acquiesce and capitalize on situation rather than have correspondents travel in defiance USG policy. As some correspondents have now in fact travelled and further such travel must be anticipated if correspondents now there not prosecuted or courts refuse convict, and as Wirin's travel will probably give rise to question travel by others such as families prisoners who may well consider selves more deserving, feel negotiating value position thus far taken here has now been destroyed.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1757. Secret; Limit Distribution.

This, as CHICOMS feel serves well on way accomplishing immediate purpose this field with bonus of having created issue between US press and USG, in spite our position here, continuation that position will not constitute effective pressure on them expedite release remaining Americans.

Do not believe there is sufficient possibility modification US position would expedite releases to justify such modification solely on this ground but do not feel such modification would have adverse effects and in fact might have slightly favorable effects. However, such modification could not now be exploited here and if such decision were taken it could probably best be done by public statement pegged to appropriate appeal from Society Newspaper Editors or other such action.

[garble] fully recognizes extreme difficulty such modification at this time feel this action preferable to further erosion our position by developing events.

Re inquiry McConaughy Jan 14 letter cannot recall clearance with FE of press release 341 May 1 1952 and use word "China." Without further clarification would appear indicate language may not have been considered in FE. However, it possible language was cleared on basis we were at time also discouraging travel Taiwan in view possibility spread Korean hostilities that area. Taken in context and from my recollection practical application it seems clear intent first sentence second para was simply state endorsement did not constitute inflexible ban on such travel which however could be undertaken only after authorization accordance procedure second sentence second para.

Gowen

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**775. Letter 52 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 52

Geneva, January 17, 1957

Dear Walter:

I have just received your letter of January 14 and in accordance with your suggestion have this morning sent off a telegram giving my views on the present situation with respect to travel to Communist China. I well realize that it may not be exactly what you are expecting

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

but I cannot in all honesty say anything else. David and I both feel very much the same on this. I of course base myself primarily on our evident inability to hold the line and to obtain public support or support from the courts.

In my telegram I also answered your query in regard to the press release of May 1, 1952. In this connection we were not at the time preventing travel to Communist China on the grounds of their unjust imprisonment of American citizens but on the more general grounds of the Korean hostilities which made such travel unthinkable. We, of course, had American citizens unjustly imprisoned at the time in other Communist countries and while I recall that that was a factor in restricting Americans traveling to those areas, I do not believe that we have in any case other than China made it the sole factor. As a matter of fact while the Otis case was a factor in including Czechoslovakia in the ban we never entirely prevented all travel to Czechoslovakia, particularly of newspaper correspondents, and removed the restriction with regard to Czechoslovakia even though we had and still have at least one American unjustly in prison there.

I am surprised that you did not get word of my leaving Prague on January 8. I sent an OM well before Christmas confirming the plans I had mentioned in my previous letter to you. I also sent a telegram on the day I left. I fortunately received your letter of January 4 just before leaving and sent a reply by open air-mail from Nuernberg on January 8 which you should have received well before your letter of January 14. In that I had said that I was agreeable to Dave and Helenka going back after the next meeting if it looked as if things were simply going to continue to drag along, subject, of course, to obtaining an adequate replacement for Dave. I said that I was delighted at the prospect of having Ed Martin and thought that his commuting here would be entirely practical.

I do not understand your reference to having sent me material on the Nehru conversations as I have received nothing except background papers prepared in FE. Perhaps you have sent something to Prague which I missed.

I have to close this hurriedly in order to make the pouch.

Regards to all

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. *[text not declassified]*

**776. Telegram 710 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 19, 1957, 3 p.m.

710. From Johnson.

Desultory two hour forty minute meeting this morning with nothing new except my presentation missing military personnel item to which he responded along same lines as in 1955.

In prepared opening statement Wang reviewed course of talks along standard lines leading up to reiteration next move up to US. He stuck to this position throughout give and take. No implication intent their part break off.

When I proposed February 7 for next meeting, he suggested February 14 which I accepted.

In course implementation discussion, Wang handed me name address Chinese allegedly forced by US to Taiwan against will: Lee Li-chuen, (characters not received) 45 Ludlow Street, Apartment 2, New York 2, N.Y.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1957. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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**777. Telegram 712 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 19, 1957, 6 p.m.

712. From Johnson.

Minutes 64th meeting being pouched leaving Geneva January 20.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1-1957. Official Use Only; Limit Distribution.

**778. Telegram unnumbered from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 19, 1957

Unnumbered. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 64th with prepared statement: As talks between us enter third year would not be without purpose if we reviewed at this first session of new year ground talks so far covered. These talks owe origin to Asian African Conference Bandung April 1955, where premier of Wang's country first made proposal negotiations should be started between China America. Ensuing developments led to elevation on August 1, 1955 of Consular level contact to present talks on Ambassadorial level. Agreed agenda of talks included return civilians and other matters at issue between two sides. Attitude held by each side towards two items throughout entire course negotiations showed who been consistently working devotedly for negotiation and resolution problems and who been lacking in sincere desire for resolution issues and obstructing progress in talks. Sincere desire his side for settlement problems these talks displayed at first meeting, when his side took special measures of leniency, even before entering into discussion of substance, to grant early releases of 11 airmen who been convicted of intrusion into territorial air of China to carry out espionage activity.

2. Wang continued China had tens thousands its nationals in US including several thousand students. Since proclamation of PRC, when US Government began actively carrying out policy of hostility towards China, these Chinese nationals had lost freedom of returning to homeland. In violation international law and principles of humanity, US Government even issued orders prohibiting Chinese nationals returning motherland, while obstructing and unlawfully persecuting those who desired return. In discussing first item of agenda it was essential that such abnormal state affairs should be corrected. American nationals in China had always been able return their country freely and China had never tried obstruct them doing so. This was entirely in contrast attitude my side towards Chinese nationals. After Agreement September 10 was reached, Wang's side faithfully carried out, and in addition continuing offer assistance departure of those Americans desiring return, they had also taken further lenient measures in advancing release of greater part American criminals.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1957. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Johnson. Sent via pouch. Received on January 24.

3. Wang continued, US, however, not only failed give China names of all Chinese in US but also resorted to various means continue obstruct return Chinese in defiance agreement. In this respect there still 52 of 55 and 25 out of 103 who thus far not returned. Besides, US also failed take corresponding measures on own initiative settle cases imprisoned Chinese so as enable them return. My side not only refused submit complete list imprisoned Chinese but even adopted illegal screening operation. Under such circumstances, my side still sought disregard Chinese law by demanding immediate release ten remaining American criminals!

4. Wang said on second item, attitude my side even more unsatisfactory. Their side made, under second item, proposals to hold FMC and lift embargo. My side had raised proposal for making declaration on so-called renunciation force. Here it should be pointed out it was only after period unreasonable delay my side entered into second item. Intent this proposal of my side been clear from very start, that is, it designed interfere with internal affairs Wang's country, and obstruct his country from liberating its rightful territory Taiwan. With view reaching agreement acceptable both sides, Wang's side had put forward on October 27, 1955 reasonable draft declaration regarding proposal my side. Subsequently, in order meet point view my side, his side successively put forward amended drafts on December 1, 1955 and May 11, 1956, but my side not given up in slightest its attempt interfere internal his country, and obstruct liberation its own territory, and consequently obstructed ever since agreement on this problem.

5. Wang continued it not fortuitous my side should have adopted in these protracted talks such attitude and performance which had nothing in common with desire settle outstanding problems and improve relations. Ever since Chinese people overthrew reactionary rule Chiang Kai-shek which had been renounced and discarded by entire Chinese nation, US been hostile to Peoples' Republic and been attempting overthrow it by every means at its command. To achieve this end, US Government not hesitated resort to open warfare and covert subversion. US Government still at this moment occupying China's territory Taiwan by armed force.

6. Wang continued, on international plane, US Government repeatedly been obstructing restoration lawful rights PRC in UN. This policy of unscrupulous opposition to PRC could not win US prestige. On contrary, could only lead to moral bankruptcy and failure. No matter whether certain people like it or not, Peoples Republic stood in world and was ever making progress.

7. Wang said since opening these talks, his side already taken many steps. He would hope at this first session of new year, US would make new efforts and I would be in position put forward constructive opinions that would give us good start in new year.

8. I replied I too had hoped we could have gotten off to better start during this new year. If statements Wang had made here and statements of his government on desire for improving relations had real content his government would long ago have implemented first agreement between us. When he and I first came here in August 1955 I tried in every way I could impress upon him importance this question of Americans detained his country. I would not have done that if I had not hoped for quick substantial progress in these talks. His authorities appeared have recognized that fact by accepting this question of return civilians as first item agenda. They appeared indicate, in public statements at time, desire resolve this problem and appeared indicate it was capable of ready solution. I had told him at time we entered into Agreement September 10, 1955 of very favorable effects it would have on our discussions and future course our relations if it were faithfully implemented. I had told him of very favorable reception it received from public my country and their very great satisfaction that this problem apparently resolved. I had been encouraged by release ten these individuals at time we entered into this Agreement. This showed what his authorities could do if they wanted to resolve this issue. I had taken it as token of their intent speedily resolve this issue. I had taken it as token their intent carry out agreement we entered into that day. Wang's government had it within its power at that time, by carrying out this agreement, bring about I would say very marked improvement in atmosphere surrounding these talks and our relations. His government had it within its power demonstrate it prepared honor fully letter and spirit agreements into which he and I entered.

9. I continued, here we were at beginning 1957; this agreement we entered into 1955 still not fulfilled. This is source most keen disappointment to me, to my government, to my people. As I had often said here it could in all honesty be said we had gone backwards since we made this agreement. It been many months since even single American been released. Whereas prior to our agreement it appeared some Americans released prior to completion their sentences, it now appears his government adopted policy requiring them serve out full terms their sentences before being released. This not only direct violation commitment Wang's government entered into on September 10, 1955, but even step backward from position existing prior that time. This deeply discouraging; cannot be reconciled with genuine desire on part his government resolve outstanding problems between us.

10. I continued, Wang's failure resolve this problem cannot be obscured by repetition these vague unsubstantiated charges concerning Chinese in US. Action—or rather inaction of his authorities in this matter stood in very stark contrast to action which has been taken with regard Chinese in my country. He continued make here very vague unsubstantiated charges concerning US obstruction Chinese desiring

return his country. Even though his country still maintained exit permit procedure, he attempted characterize action US took prohibit departure some few Chinese students as violation international law and rules humanity. That surely extraordinary charge particularly in view procedure for exit aliens maintained his country. In any event as I had informed him August 2, 1955, all orders concerning those few persons had been removed. They withdrawn not because were violation of international law and rules humanity but in order fully resolve to his satisfaction question with regard these students. Any Chinese in US who desired return Wang's country did not need apply to anyone to do so. He simply did so. Under our Agreement if rightly or wrongly he felt in any way being obstructed he could communicate with Indian Embassy. We entered into this Agreement September 10, 1955; it now January 19, 1957. During that period, Indian Embassy had not brought to our attention single case in which Chinese desiring leave my country had been obstructed from doing so. We had even extended this right of return to common criminals.

11. I continued, Wang appeared charge my government with giving false information to Indian Embassy and not giving it list all Chinese alien nationals in our prisons. I resented this charge, which utterly false. Fact that his authorities refused agree to Indian Embassy interviewing these prisoners to determine their desires could not obscure fact we had done more than our agreement of September 10, 1955, whereas they failed carry it out. Even though they refused permit Indians carry out offer made them, we nevertheless went ahead and took steps return his country any imprisoned Chinese who desired return. As I had told him, the prisoner desiring return, as determined by impartial survey American Red Cross, was permitted do so promptly even though had served only two and half years seven to twenty year sentence. He permitted do so even though he committed common crime and even though under normal parole and commutation procedures under our law he not entitled release.

12. I continued, with regard second item agenda, my suggestion for first step between us to resolve peacefully our disputes was very simple and fundamental one that we simply say we going resolve them by peaceful means only. No amount misrepresentation proposals I had made here obscures fact his government still refused accept that first and fundamental proposition. No amount proposals on subsidiary items from his side could obscure fact his government still unwilling state unconditionally that our disputes could be settled only by peaceful means. Rather than my side refusing negotiation, question is one of his side refusing first fundamental step toward peaceful resolution disputes. Not question at this time discussing merits those disputes which he seemed continue try mix in with these discussions, but rather saying they will be settled only by peaceful means. No amount words



or charges could obscure fact his government still unwilling accept this simple proposition. If his government desired we make progress here; if his government willing give substance to, rather than just give appearance of, desire improve relations, way open to it is very clear and simple: resolve first issue between us by carrying out first agreement entered into between us and then agree that differences between us will be resolved only by peaceful means, including our differences in Taiwan area. Nothing unilateral in these two simple propositions. Acceptance of both propositions could be of tremendous benefit to his government and to peace of world. I still failed understand why his government delays acceptance these propositions.

13. Wang replied he had made statement this morning briefly reviewing ground covered our talks. He intended make it as reminder essential we strive go ahead with talks rather than remaining dead-locked without making progress. However, lengthy statement I had made not given him impression US Government now ready contribute progress these talks by putting forward constructive opinion. If any had been discouraged by these talks, as I said, it him who been discouraged and disappointed. If purpose these talks improve relations and solve existing problems, then purpose not achieved by repeating series empty statements but only by taking concrete action. It should be pointed out ever since talks started his side taken concrete steps toward settlement our problems in both first and second items agenda. This action his side had fully shown sincerity on their part in these talks. However he regretted point out success our talks could not be achieved by efforts only one side. During these talks US had not taken concrete constructive steps toward resolution our problems but merely content making unjustified unfounded charges against his country in many respects. Such approach these talks in no way contributed to success our talks. I had also remarked our talks going backward. He ready accept this observation, but this does not come from intent his side.

14. Wang continued my remarks with regard non-existence obstruction to return Chinese in US did not obscure fact US authorities do obstruct their return. In this connection he would here call attention to specific case in which deliberate obstruction on part US has been established. They had received information that a Chinese resident in New York, Mr. Lee Li-chuen (no Chinese characters) had received orders from American Immigration authorities during October last year telling him leave for Taiwan. He wanted point out this represented yet another serious violation of Agreement September 10. This case indicated how US Government consistently in defiance Agreement continually coercing Chinese nationals proceed destination to which they did not desire go. Wang's side demanded my government immediately stop these and other acts obstruction of return Chinese nationals and requested me

promptly make investigation and give accounting of this case. For my information he giving me name and address (he did so). From actual cases such as one just mentioned, fact clearly seen who faithfully carrying out agreement and who not. If anyone dissatisfied with state in which Agreement implemented it actually and exactly his side which dissatisfied.

15. I replied did not know exact circumstances case Mr. Lee Wang mentioned. However could categorically tell him even in case ordinary Chinese citizens who entered US illegally—that is not accordance our immigration laws, such as case seamen who jump ship or something that nature—he not forced go Taiwan or any other destination against his will. While he required leave US, he permitted go any place which would receive him. I knew many cases seamen for example subject deportation for illegal entry who had been deported to Wang's country in accordance their choice. Wang's authorities must be perfectly aware these cases. I also know if Mr. Lee wanted go Wang's country and felt he being obstructed do so, he entirely free communicate with Indian Embassy.

16. I continued he had spoken of improvement our relations and resolution our existing problems by concrete action rather than empty statements. That exactly point I was trying make here for all these many months. What I trying say was insofar as Americans detained Wang's country, empty statements would not resolve problem, but only concrete action permitting them return. There another concrete question in which my government was and is still extremely interested. Question which I raised earlier our discussion second item agenda and also still not resolved.

17. I continued from prepared statement:

a. On October 27, 1955, and again November 3 that year, raised with you question missing American military personnel. Pointed out this was practical matter unavoidably affecting relations between our two countries, one which clearly came within terms reference our talks.

b. Your position that time was this question should be dealt with through MAC in Korea. You will recall I replied it was immaterial whether accounting furnished here or in MAC. What was—and still is—important is this practical matter at issue between us be settled.

c. Over year has now gone by, matter still not been settled, either here or in MAC. It not my intention this morning enter controversy over question proper place for accounting requested by my government. What simply wanted do is underscore this question is real, vital, practical matter at issue between our two countries; this question arises not because I, or my Government, have chosen raise it but because your side not even after this long lapse years carried out its clearly expressed obligation this matter vital interest to American people

d. My government responsible to American people not just in abstract, but to them as individuals. It is responsible to Mrs. Vergie Walker. Mrs Walker's son, Army Private Archie Walker, reported missing in action in Korea August, 1950. On March 28, 1951, New China News Agency broadcast report by one its correspondents listing names addresses persons in US to whom American prisoners war in certain camp in Korea wished send greetings. One of persons named was Mrs. Vergie Walker. Since then she had no word whatever of her son. He not repatriated. His body not returned. No report his death received. Most careful questioning repatriated prisoners not resulted in any firm information concerning his fate. Mrs. Walker does not know whether he alive or dead. She naturally incredulous when your official news agency and radio at one time serves as channel for sending her greetings from her son and then subsequently your side says it knows nothing about her son. She cannot but have hope her son may still be alive. However, if he is dead she would naturally like know even that. She clearly entitled some definite information this regard and clearly entitled feel your side must have such information. She and my government find it impossible understand why it not made available.

e. My Government responsible to family and friends Army Captain Harry D. Moreland. Captain Moreland was captured in Korea October 27, 1952, following crash his plane. He reportedly lost left leg in that crash. According other Americans imprisoned with him, his right leg also amputated in November 1952. Some time during November, Captain Moreland taken from his room, not seen subsequently.

f. My Government responsible to relatives and friends Ensign Thomas Biesterveld. There no doubt about fact Ensign Biesterveld's capture April 29, 1951, following crash his plane. There uncertainty about what happened Ensign Biesterveld subsequently. When last seen by fellow prisoners, June 1951, he suffering from severe burns received in crash his plane. He also contracted pneumonia dysentery. On June 25, 1951, Ensign Biesterveld removed from prison camp. According later statement Chinese interpreter to one Biesterveld's fellow-prisoners, he died in prison hospital June 26, 1951. There never been any official confirmation this, however, nor has his body been returned.

g. Could mention many other similar cases, cases where man's family knows beyond any doubt he held prisoner by forces your side, but has no other information any kind. For these people, this issue overshadows all others between our two countries. Towards many hundreds persons thus directly and deeply concerned by your Government's refusal thus supply information it must have, my Government has responsibility it cannot shirk. This matter at issue between us cannot be resolved by simply ignoring it, or by arguments over proper forum, but only by action your authorities providing information which I have requested, and which I again formally request this morning.

h. Even apart from such solemn international commitments as Korean Armistice Agreement, it common international practice for country rescue survivors, recover remains, and inform country of origin in any case where aircraft or vessel of another country is lost in or near its territory.

i. Accordingly, in addition this accounting for US military personnel still missing from Korean hostilities, request any additional information which your authorities now have or may in future acquire concerning Americans surviving or killed in such accidents or incidents. This is another matter on which only concrete action by your authorities either here or in MAC in Korea, can resolve outstanding issues between us.

18. Wang replied, matter I had just brought up an old matter I had already raised in early part our talks. I would recall at that time his side had firmly rejected attempt bring up such matter in our discussion, because it not within terms reference our talks. This still held to present moment. His side not prepared enter into discussion any such matter.

19. I replied whether Wang rejected it or not, it still matter at issue between us. As I had said it immaterial to me where this matter resolved. When we raise matter in MAC, Wang's side there states that individuals held outside Korea do not come under authority MAC, and it therefore irrelevant discuss in MAC. His representative in MAC states MAC no connection with prisoners of war disposed of by Wang's government. Wang could not have it both ways. Either matter for discussion and resolution here or matter for discussion resolution in MAC. I had waited over year for this be resolved in MAC. It had not been resolved there. It was matter at issue between us.

20. Wang replied he had kept saying matter which taken place at given place must be resolved that place. The alleged matters concerned persons in Korea and should therefore be referred to organization in Korea itself. During Korean war US Government in gross violation of international agreements forcibly detained immense numbers prisoners war. Specifically, some 14,000 captured Chinese personnel sent to Chiang clique by force. Chinese Government received no accounting for this gross violation international agreements. Families these 14,000 captured Chinese prisoners will always remember kinsmen forcibly sent to Chiang clique by US Government. Such is matter which Chinese Government so far received no accounting—but they had not proposed raise this matter at this conference. Now that US deliberately brought up matters this nature, does US now intend account for 14,000? Who should be held responsible for so-and-so missing on Korean field? Responsibility lies on government which had sent those persons there. Who sent these young men to place thousands miles away from home to engage in war of aggression? It those who sent people there who

should be responsible. Such matters would not have arisen if governments concerned had not sent men go war in that place.

22. I replied in first place, as I had pointed out, no parallel between persons for whom we had asked accounting—who still missing—and persons from his side who voluntarily chose go Taiwan. I had not raised question here of those Americans who decided go his country. I raising with him here persons who clearly captured by his side; persons whom his own official channels of communication admitted holding at one time and with regard to whom his side now says there is no information. His representatives in MAC state they have no information regarding these men and at same time state have no connection with prisoners of war who may have been disposed of by Wang's government. Official information agencies of his government at one time admitted knowledge many these men. Seems incredible his government did not now have information regarding what happened to them. As said previously with regard this question, making no charges, merely asking for information which all evidences showed must be in possession his government. As had also said immaterial to me where furnished. If he felt proper place furnish it was MAC it entirely satisfactory to me. However, not been furnished through MAC and therefore still remained an issue. Also desired point out UN members MAC had told members his side fully prepared give detailed accounting all persons of whom his side has requested an accounting whenever his side prepared give accounting persons still missing. However, simply saying had no information regarding men of whom at one time they clearly did have information could not be regarded as satisfactory accounting.

23. Wang replied he had stated his attitude toward this matter. Did not consider it necessary repeat it all over again. However would be glad if I had any opinion put forward on second item, specifically concerning their proposals on lifting embargo and personal contacts and cultural exchange (Wang's interpreter also mentioned FMC).

24. I replied I previously clearly expressed our attitude on this and would not take time repeat this morning. I had hoped this morning he would have been able take more positive attitude regard saying unconditionally our disputes would be settled only by peaceful means, and thus clear way for our discussion subsidiary matters. Other questions between us could only fall into their proper place when his government willing say it willing settle these matters only by peaceful means. Continued overhanging threat his government resort force, if it could not otherwise obtain objectives, remains fundamental issue between us.

25. Wang replied if I wanted talk about threats, it US which threatens China. If one were to speak about resolution problems unconditionally by peaceful means, it US which should do so. In course talks his side already made many efforts. If talks going make any progress efforts of only one side of two could not achieve this end.

26. I asked who had proposed we unconditionally refuse to resort threat or use force resolve issues between us? Who is it thus far refused do this?

27. Wang pointed out American occupation Taiwan was one such condition and American insistence right self defense in Taiwan area another such condition.

28. I stated unconditionally means we unconditionally say we will not go war about these problems but will seek their peaceful solution.

29. Wang said there was more to "unconditional" than that. If US ready accept their draft US would thereby prove sincerity.

30. I answered that his proposals did not constitute unconditional renunciation force. I had been in past and remained willing consider any proposals which did accomplish this. Not willing consider proposals which gave appearance doing so but in fact avoided doing so. Not willing accept proposals which mean one thing one side and another thing to other side. Particularly not willing do so after our experience with agreement on civilians.

31. Wang insisted had dealt with all these problems in past and did not like my "new" opinion in this regard this morning.

32. I suggested next meeting Thursday, February 7. Wang preferred February 14. I agreed.

Gowen

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## 779. Letter 53 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 53

Geneva, January 19, 1957

Dear Walter:

Back from the 64th. As I implied in my summary it was a dreary affair. Today he seemed to be saying that he was willing to sit there just as many months as I was but I should not believe he was going to make any further moves and I said the same back to him. So there we are. It is not a cheerful prospect. As a footnote, if I did not seem too brilliant at the end it was because my mouth was hurting from a tooth I had to have pulled late yesterday evening which, together with other facts of nature, made me desperate to get out of there.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

Incidentally, I told the New York Times man here yesterday that, without any direct quotation, he could indicate I was very unhappy that some correspondents had traveled to Communist China in spite of the U.S. Government's position as it obviously had greatly weakened my position vis a vis Wang here. I hope this will be of help to the Department.

I also had USIS expand out their story from here on today's meeting to review the facts on the release of Americans and the fact no Chinese have been obstructed in leaving the U.S. I suggest you take a look at it. I thought it would be useful for the field to be reminded of some facts to counteract the line Chou has been putting out on his journeys.

The talks now seem in a complete cul de sac and look as if they could well continue indefinitely in that state. It now seems to me that while they would probably quickly fall into any move on our part which would place the onus for a break on us, they are not going to take the onus for breaking and only some major outside development or a move by one side or the other in the talks can resolve the impasse. It seems clear we cannot at the present stage expect the release of any Americans other than possibly slightly expedited releases of those whose terms will shortly expire.

I am, of course, entirely willing to go on as we are if it is still felt it is serving a useful purpose but I hope that that decision will be fully examined at a high level. I am not arguing that the exercise is not useful, I think it may well be, but I just want to be sure that the Secretary also still thinks so.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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## 780. Telegram 260 to Prague<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 23, 1957, 1 p.m.

260. Your 705 from Geneva.

Though effectiveness US ban on travel Communist China as pressure on Chinese Communists release imprisoned Americans may possibly have been somewhat weakened by fact three correspondents defied ban, we do not believe US Government can or should alter opposition to travel Americans in area where no repeat no protection

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–2357. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information to Geneva for Osborn as telegram 769. Drafted by Clough and Sebald; cleared in draft by Phleger and in FE/P and SCA.



can be provided, where regime continues hold Americans as political hostages, and where it desires promote cultural exchanges to break down US policy of non-recognition and non-seating in UN. For US to acquiesce in such travel would encourage Communists to redouble efforts to promote QUOTE cultural contacts UNQUOTE while taking no repeat no action to release imprisoned Americans.

Following considerations have bearing on Department's position:

1. Employers of Look correspondents ordered them out of Communist China after policy explained to them. Department believes moral suasion will still effectively keep most correspondents and other Americans from going.

2. Investigation under way to determine if three correspondents who defied ban misused passports preliminary to determining what further action will be taken.

3. Wirin travel to Communist China and North Korea is unique case of individual travelling as officer of Federal court pursuant to court order specifically authorizing such travel for purpose of offering opportunity to prepare defense of persons accused by our Government of crime of sedition. If Wirin's travel prevented, this might seriously prejudice Government's efforts prosecute case. Wirin's passport was not validated for Communist China or North Korea.

Under present circumstances Department will therefore continue adhere to policy of discouraging to greatest possible extent travel to Communist China by any Americans including correspondents and will refuse to acquiesce in requests for approval such travel either with or without passport.

**Dulles**

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**781. Letter from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, January 28, 1957

Dear Walter:

I received a copy of Taipei's despatch No. 240 of December 10 commenting on NIE 43-56 and copy No. 57 of the Department's instruction A-159 of January 15 on the same subject. Although I was not able to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."



check what envelope they came in I presume CA sent them to me for my information and I appreciate it very much. I found both most interesting. My only purpose in mentioning it is to be sure the copy of the Department's instruction was in fact intended for me and that a copy was also sent to Taipei.

Thanks very much for the word on the travel of the correspondents. I will of course be most interested in knowing before my next meeting whether anything developed between Chou and Nehru on the subject of the remaining prisoners.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson

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**782. Letter from Osborn to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, January 30, 1957

Dear Ralph:

I talked with Ed Martin by phone yesterday and he told me London is somewhat less than enthusiastic about having him fly here for the meetings. From the absence of direct word from CA, I expect you all are encountering a similar lack of enthusiasm on the part of FE/EX for incurring the additional travel expenses that would be involved in sending out a replacement from CA, particularly in the light of the uncertain future of the talks.

I don't know whether you have already considered and discarded the idea, but if the interval between talks is to stay at its current length, would it not be a possibility to have me or some other CA officer fly out for each meeting? On a thumbnail basis, I make it out to be less than \$200 a month more expensive than just keeping me here, if a reasonably cheap rate on tickets could be obtained from the airlines. Such an arrangement would have the additional advantages of not wasting an officer's time between meetings, and maintaining closer liaison with FE. I haven't talked this out fully with the Ambassador yet, but I did mention it to him briefly.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Official Use Only; Official-Informal.

Needless to say, Helenka and I both hope something can be worked out. Not only for various personal reasons—[*text not declassified*]<sup>1</sup>—but also for the official and principal reason, that there just isn't any work for me to do here between meetings.

However it works out, we appreciate the efforts we know you're making.

Sincerely,

David L. Osborn

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### 783. Letter 64 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 64

Washington, January 30, 1957

Dear Alex:

1. Your letter No. 53 of January 19 came January 24 and has been read by Messrs. Robertson, Phleger and Sebald. All of us sympathize with you in the frustrating and exasperating position in which you find yourself, with the talks apparently leading nowhere and dragging on indefinitely with the same tired points being reworked ad infinitum and ad nauseam at every meeting. Undoubtedly it is difficult for the man who is on the scene and who is carrying the chief burden to see the further utility of the exercise. However the talks are precisely fulfilling the primary purpose envisaged by the Secretary in 1955. Mr. Robertson told him yesterday about your letter including the question you had raised about the desirability of prolonging the talks. The Secretary smilingly recalled that when he was giving you your instructions he had mentioned to you that you should be prepared to carry on the talks for two years. The Secretary said that you were handling the talks exactly in accordance with his wishes, and that the talks were serving the purpose he had in mind. He appreciated the difficulties you confront but his views as to the importance of the talks and the desirability of continuing them had not changed. He said that when the Middle East pressures subsided somewhat, he would be glad to review the matter and give careful attention to any arguments against continuation of the talks which we might consider overriding. But as of now he felt the talks

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal.

should continue and that you should know that he approves the way in which you have conducted the talks.

Undoubtedly the talks continue to cause us some embarrassment, and lead to some misunderstanding of our posture vis-a-vis Communist China, especially in the Far East. Also the continuance of the talks makes it difficult for us to manifest the full extent of our dissatisfaction at Chinese Communist violation of the Agreed Announcement. On the other hand, we still have the Chinese Communists tied up in talks which may make it more difficult for them to start any hostilities in the Taiwan area. If they should initiate any such action while conversations are going on, the risk they would run of general world condemnation and possible multilateral sanctions against them would be appreciably increased. While the Chinese Communists obviously estimate at this stage that their interests are best served by continuing the talks, they are probably not happy over the negotiating situation in which they find themselves and would be delighted if we broke off the talks. An onus would attach to the side which took the initiative to break off the talks, and this the Chinese Communists want to avoid. We have them in a situation where they are on the defensive on both of the principal points at issue, and unable to improve their negotiating position. As one officer put it, if we broke off the talks now we would in a sense be letting the Chinese Communists off the hook and would be giving up just at a time when we for once are beating them at their own game by out-sitting and out-talking them. As Mr. Phleger put it, "Alex is doing fine, and should carry on along the lines that he has already developed so well". You don't need to worry about repetition, or lack of new topics. It may be a dreary, boring business but it is serving a purpose which is more apparent here than it can be in the front line. The talks undoubtedly are reducing the pressures from European quarters for other U.S. contacts with the Chinese Communists and they make it much easier to refute the arguments advanced for a Foreign Minister level meeting.

2. We were quite interested in the record of the last meeting. Wang's argumentation was of some significance, even though there was nothing new in it. It was all right to send the full report by pouch. It arrived in four days.

3. We were somewhat taken aback at the New York Times despatch of January 19 from Geneva quoting you as feeling that your negotiating position had been seriously weakened by the visits of the three newsmen to Communist China. While your negotiating position certainly was not helped by the visits, we do not see that it was helped by the public attribution of this feeling to you either.

4. We are sending you herewith a full report of O'Neill's interview with Huang Hua on December 28, 1956. In this conversation, Huang Hua explicitly denies that the Agreed Announcement applies

to American prisoners. We anticipate that this will give you plenty of material for the February 14 meeting.

5. We released our statement on Chinese Communist failure to release imprisoned Americans on January 29. A copy is enclosed for your files. We are also sending a copy to Osborn. We thought Chou En-lai's statement in Nepal about a possible "exchange of prisoners" gave us a good occasion to issue the statement. However it has not received as much play in the press as we hoped for.

6. There has been a new development in the Powell case. Having been authorized by the judge to travel to Communist China as an officer of the court, leaving his passport in Hong Kong, the defense attorney, Wirin, now claims to have received a cable from his contact in Peiping stating that he will not be admitted without a validated passport and that the United States Government should communicate with the Chinese Communist authorities concerning his travel. (Copies of the defense motions are enclosed.) Wirin is reported to have mentioned orally to the judge that the Geneva talks would be a suitable channel for communicating with the Communists concerning his travel. The Department of Justice attorney who is handling the Washington end of the case informed us that the judge categorically turned down Wirin's request for a court order that his passport be validated for travel to Communist China and North Korea. The judge said he had no authority to issue such an order. The judge is reportedly unsympathetic to Wirin's latest gambit. He has asked that appropriate government authorities provide him with an affidavit setting forth the United States Government's position with regard to the Chinese Communist and North Korean regimes, travel by Americans to those areas and the facts concerning the Geneva talks. We are preparing material on these subjects for Justice, which will then prepare the affidavit. A hearing is set for February 2, when the judge will consider this information.

It seems clear that the Chinese Communists are using the Powell case as another lever to compel a change in our policy regarding travel to Mainland China. They probably feel that they are in a strong position in this case, since if the U.S. Government blocks Wirin's travel to Communist China, there is a good chance that the case against the Powells will be dismissed. Thus, whichever way we move, the Communist movement would stand to gain. Peiping's tactics in this case strongly suggest that they are not interested in utilizing the Powell case to revive the germ warfare charges against the U.S. If they were, they would certainly be more inclined to facilitate Wirin's travel. Their propaganda, too, has supported this conclusion, since they have played up the Powell case as another attempt by the U.S. to persecute journalists who try to tell the truth about Communist China. Germ warfare has been barely mentioned. We are giving Justice the information we have on the various

efforts by Peiping to break down our passport policy, so that they can pass this background informally to the judge.

7. It now seems as if the passports of Stevens and Harrington of Look Magazine will be made valid only for return to the U.S. Action on Worthy will be withheld until we get a full report on his travel and the use he made of his passport.

8. It has been good to talk to Pat, and to get some further news of you and your children through her. I wish you could join her here.

Regards and good wishes,

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McCaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Press release No. 43
2. O'Neill interview with Huang Hua, Dec. 28, 1956
3. Defense motions on Powell Case

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**784. Letter from Johnson to McCaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, February 6, 1957

Dear Walter:

I have just received the Radio Bulletin containing your January 30 statement.

It is an excellent job and the most convincing statement we have put out. It should do much to dispel the doubts of those who have felt that there must be some fire behind the Chicom smoke screen.

I see in the *New York Times* we even got some grudging support out of New Delhi.

With respect to the next to the last paragraph of the statement, it is excellent from my and a public relation standpoint. However, are we not going to have to be careful not to get ourselves into the box of in effect making an open ended commitment to deport to Communist China any Chinese alien who desires to go there regardless of the crime he may hereafter commit. I have tried to skirt around this in the talks

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

by sticking to the 34. We can of course meet this problem if and when it arises. I do not believe the statement as drafted does commit us but it may carry that implication. In this connection do you have any information on arrests of Chinese aliens subsequent to the survey that turned up the 34?

I have heard from Dave that London refuses to release Ed. I know this must be very disappointing to you as it is to me. It seemed to be the ideal solution. I will be open to any other suggestion you may have.

Incidentally, I have written to Ed Freers about coming back on a couple of weeks consultation this spring—perhaps around April or May—if there continues to be a months gap between meetings. I told him to get in touch with you if he thought well of it. It will have then been close to two years since I was home and there is much I would like to talk over both on FE and EUR matters.

Regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson

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**785. Telegram 815 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 11, 1957, 6:55 p.m.

815. For Johnson.

Guidance for February 14 meeting.

1. Take issue with virtual repudiation Agreed Announcement by Huang Hua in interview with O'Neill December 28, when former stated that until American prisoner released from jail QUOTE question of encountering obstruction UNQUOTE did not arise. As Wang well knows, Americans imprisoned or under house arrest were the very ones that were subject of American representations and there would have been no purpose Chinese Communists declaring they would QUOTE further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return UNQUOTE if it were not to apply to Americans in jail. Furthermore, recall that even though Chinese

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/21157. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by McConaughy and Sebald and Phleger in draft.

criminals in US jails were not covered, when Communists suggested they were covered if Americans in Communist jails were, US while denying this interpretation, nevertheless so there could be no question proceeded to see that Chinese criminals in US jails were given opportunity to go to Communist China. If Wang counters with usual charges regarding QUOTE obstruction UNQUOTE Chinese departing US, refer categorical statement by spokesman of Foreign Ministry, New Delhi, February 1, that Government of India QUOTE unable find any obstruction being placed on their exit UNQUOTE.

2. Again press for accounting missing military personnel, presenting additional individual cases.

3. Maintain position other subjects.

4. If Wang endeavors exploit current controversy in US over travel newsmen Communist China, refer as necessary to Communist treatment Americans as reason for US policy, but avoid extended discussion.

5. If Wang refers press reports US plans station Matador unit Taiwan, avoid comment.

6. FYI Lee Li-chuen, who Wang alleged being forced go Taiwan, is seaman who entered US November 1, 1955 on GRC-registered ship Union Power. At one time deportation Taiwan planned. Immigration states Lee now under order deportation plans depart voluntarily own expense San Francisco February 23 for mainland China. Since Lee may fail depart as scheduled, believe preferable not repeat not inform Wang now. However, if he raises case, you may state categorically Lee never obstructed from leaving US for any destination. END FYI.

7. Propose next meeting March 14.

**Dulles**

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**786. Letter 65 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 65

Washington, February 11, 1957

Dear Alex:

1. Developments in the issue of travel of newspapermen to Communist China have not been very favorable for us. The press is giving strong support to Stevens and Worthy. Apparently they have been able to whip up a certain amount of public support for their position. Worthy appeared on Eric Sevareid's nation wide newscast Sunday afternoon February 10 and probably evoked quite a bit of sympathy for his position. Worthy left Moscow before the Embassy received our instructions, and he refused to submit his passport to the Legation in Budapest for restrictive endorsement. He also refused to say yes or no on the passport hearing which was offered him, placing his case in the hands of the Civil Liberties Union. When Worthy passed through Immigration at Boston his passport (by decision) was not taken up or restrictively endorsed. As I see it this will make it difficult for us to follow through in Stevens case. Look Magazine plans to fight the case of Stevens and Harrington. Presumably there will be a passport hearing in Washington when Stevens returns to this country. Stevens was given the choice of a hearing in Moscow or Washington before restrictive action was taken, and Look Magazine instructed him to choose a hearing in Washington, which will presumably take place a few weeks hence.

The decision to seek to restrict the passports was taken with some reluctance in view of the local uncertainty but our hand was more or less forced by the press release of December 28 in which it was stated flatly that the passports would be made valid for return to the U.S. only. We did soften the proposed action by making it clear to our Embassy in Moscow that we did not require Stevens to come home. The instruction was to endorse the passport "upon departure from the Soviet Union, valid for return to the U.S. only". This would enable Stevens to continue his assignment in the U.S.S.R. without interruption. However Look has elected to bring him home in late March in order to fight the case.

We are faced with a flat defiance of the Department by Worthy, and strong resistance short of defiance in the case of Look Magazine and Stevens.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.



The Secretary took a very strong position in his press conference of February 5. We have been looking through the Geneva records for the best documentation that we can find based on Wang's remarks. Of course we have the Wang statement about the handling of the prisoners being influenced by the state of relations between the two countries and the tie in between visits by American citizens and the "state of relations". We have found nothing along this line dated later than September 28, 1955. I presume neither you nor Dave recalls anything later or more specific than this. I understand you got a copy of the Secretary's press conference separately, but to make sure that you have it, a copy is enclosed herewith. We still hope to hold the line by voluntary action of the press, plus limited administrative action where necessary. No court action is being considered but we may run into difficulties even here with administrative passport action. The line up against us is pretty solid, especially since Senator Humphrey has entered the picture with a proposed Senate investigation, and since the American Society of Newspaper Editors has sent a resolution to the President.

2. We anticipate that your instructions for the February 14 meeting will follow the usual line. We expect you to hammer hard at Wang on the subject of the interview of December 28 between O'Neill and Huang Hua in which Huang Hua virtually repudiates the Agreed Announcement by saying it has no application to the Americans while they are imprisoned. I sent you a copy of O'Neill's report to Prague with my last letter of January 30. I hope you received it. As a precaution another copy of O'Neill's report is enclosed herewith.

3. Also enclosed is a working draft of a proposed new press release on travel to Communist China. It has been drafted largely with a view to clarifying the questions and ambiguities which seem to exist as a result of the events of last week. Bear in mind that this has not been approved and may undergo further changes if it is put out at all.

4. In answer to the question raised in your letter of January 28 from Prague, the Department did intend for you to have the copy of Instruction A-159 to Taipei as well as the NIE 43-56.

5. We are working hard on a replacement for Osborn. The Embassy in London is very shorthanded now in the sections which cover both FE and Middle Eastern Affairs. It would be difficult for them to spare Ed Martin at all till June. I believe we could get him then. We have your telegram 389 agreeing to Dave Popper as an interim measure if we can get him. We intend to sound out Geneva on this today and will probably authorize you to take it up with Gowen while you are in Geneva this week. We fear that Geneva will feel that they cannot spare Popper. We will work out some solution in any event.

6. Judge Goodman in San Francisco is still considering the Wirin request for a passport to go to Communist China. The Judge has requested Justice to submit briefs on two questions as follows:

1. Whether the Court possesses the power to compel the Secretary of State to validate Wirin's passport.

2. Whether the Court could compel the Government to elect either (a) to validate Wirin's passport or (b) the dismissal of the indictment.

We armed Justice with quite a bit of material for the meeting which the Judge held on February 1. We endeavored to show that the Communists were using the Powell-Schumann trial as a lever to force official accreditation of an officer of the Court for activities in Communist China.

7. We are wishing you well and hoping that at the very least you will not have dental trouble to plague you this time.

Regards,

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Secretary Dulles' News Conference Feb. 5, 1957

2. Interview with Huang Hua on December 28, 1956

3. Memorandum from [*text not declassified*] in Karachi dated December 28, 1956 re Chinese Communist Prime Minister's visit.

4. Working Draft of proposed new press release re travel to Communist China.

5. Article in N.Y. Times dated Feb. 7, 1957 re American Newspaper Publishers Assoc. Resolution sent to the President.

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**787. Telegram 784 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 14, 1957, 2 p.m.

784. Your 815.

Concur.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-1457. Confidential.

**788. Telegram 787 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 14, 1957, 4 p.m.

787. From Johnson.

Three hour meeting this morning devoted almost entirely implementation.

I opened with strong point by point refutation Huang Hua's December 28 statements to O'Neill along para one Deptel 815. While avoiding any detailed rebuttal Wang reiterated previous position on question return not arising while Americans in prison. Then led into long prepared statement in course of which referred to January 29 press statement, Secretary's February 5 press conference, Robertson's speech in Bloomington, and US press criticism of USG position on travel correspondents. Termed January 29 statement as "groundless charges" to cover up facts with regard to Chinese in US. With reference Secretary's February 5 statement PRC conditioning release Americans on visits correspondents "refutation superfluous as American press already done job for them in dismissing story as groundless fabrication". PRC approval applications American correspondents visit China was gesture goodwill and US attempt link with question release Americans was "outright insult to pressmen". "US alone attempting introduce link." Robertson's Bloomington "vituperation and slander" and "other unfriendly utterances he has made not even worth trouble refutation". US should be aware that "slander and threats could not help progress". Can only expect progress when I ready discuss his proposals FMC, cultural relations, and trade.

I made long extemporaneous statement reviewing course negotiations on prisoners and reminded him of his previous statements linking release Americans to "improvement relations". Could only interpret this as demand political concessions as price release. At other times he and PRC authorities appear base failure release Americans on alleged grounds imprisoned Americans not covered by agreed announcement and that at other times on alleged violation agreement by US with respect Chinese in US. Challenged him show single misstatement fact January 29 press statement. Cited GOI February 2 statement as confirmation our January 29 statement with respect Chinese in US and challenged him produce similar statement from UK on situation Americans in PRC.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-1457. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

Major portion his subsequent remarks devoted to themes: (1) "era long passed China could be brought into submission by threats or pressure" or aliens could break Chinese law with impunity; (2) PRC friendly gestures (release airmen and others, Chou's statements to American correspondents PRC desired friendship with US and American people, permission newsmen visit China, etc.) had been met only with hostility from US side. "If anybody going present relations between our two countries as only involving question of few criminals he could only say it is making game of these talks". US uses "pretext" few criminals prevent improvement relations.

I, of course, refuted along usual lines both governments had agreed civilians first order of business, major concessions US had made with respect Chinese in US, PRC implementation September 10 agreement test of good faith and fundamental first step in improvement relations, etc. Another fundamental step was renunciation force.

He made no reply whatever to my presentation on missing service men referring only his previous statements.

He proposed and I agreed next meeting March 14.

Gowen

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**789. Letter 54 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 54

Geneva, February 14, 1957

Dear Walter:

I received your letter sent to Prague enclosing the O'Neill-Huang Hua December 28 interview and the material on Wirin's travel before I left. Yesterday I also received your February 11 letter. (Fast service!) Thanks very much for both of them.

I talked with Gowen and he has agreed also to loan me Popper. He sent a telegram on this last night. I am sending you a telegram today on the contract employment of a secretary to replace Helenka. I had hoped I could use Popper's secretary who previously worked for me but she is going on leave shortly and I did not want to strain the office here by

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

asking them also to furnish a secretary. In any event, I think that the FE budget is now getting off very easily.

As you know, I know and respect Dave Popper tremendously, but he, of course, simply does not have the specialized FE experience that would be most useful to me. He also has more than a full time job here with not much time to devote to this and the office needs him badly in many ways. I therefore hope that we can shortly shake Ed Martin or someone else loose before long. Dave Osborn has some ideas he will discuss with you.

I have been hit hard here by the press, particularly the New York Times, on the Secretary's February 5 statement on the newsmen and the Americans, wanting to know exactly how and when the Chicoms made the proposition. I have, of course, said nothing except to point out our often reiterated statements that the Chicoms were holding the Americans as political hostages.

In this regard there is, of course, no specific statement in the record. The most specific statements are, as you have noted, those on the "state of relations" which he long ago dropped when he saw the box into which it had placed him.

Since his last "state of relations" statement on September 28, 1955 there are only a few relatively obscure statements bearing on this that I have been able to recall or Dave has been able to find. At the 56th meeting (para 16) I picked up his remark (para 15) that a "reasonable solution (on trade) would contribute to resolution other disputes", but he sidestepped. At the 63rd meeting (para 6) he said "if U.S. had genuine desire resolve problems it should make progress in second item agenda". Both of these are very tenuous and only have any meaning at all within context.

You will recall that in accordance with my original basic instructions, at our first dinner (Mytel 585 Aug. 23, 1955) I inferentially brought up the possibility of visitors after all Americans were released, and at our second dinner (Mytel 642 August 29, 1955) made this somewhat more specific with respect to correspondents. I cannot recall that the subject again came up until the Chicoms issued their invitations to correspondents last August and at the 55th meeting I gave him a copy of our August 7 press release emphasizing the last paragraph (para 14 Mytel 135 and Wang's reply in para 19). At the 58th meeting he introduced the cultural exchange proposal and I made preliminary comments (paras 11 and 12 Mytel 303) on which I expanded at the 59th meeting.

Thus, while he took the initiative in raising "state of relations" as a factor in the timing of the release of Americans I took the initiative in specifically relating the travel of correspondents to their release. He has always been very careful not to be specific as to exactly what he meant

by "state of relations" and although I have not the slightest doubt that they would have considered our permitting correspondents to travel to mainland China as a step toward "improvement of relations" I cannot point to any specific statement that says this. However, I have always felt that they would consider travel of correspondents as only one factor in "improving relations" sufficiently to release all of the Americans. That is, I have never felt that they had in mind releasing all of the Americans in exchange for the travel of correspondents, although, as you know, I felt it might produce the release of a few. I have not gone back over all my messages in this regard, but I regret if I misled you or the Secretary in any way on this.

While there was nothing new in today's meeting I think that you will find much of it very interesting reading. (Incidentally I am sending it by cable as there is no courier from here until Sunday which would mean almost a week until you received it.)

You will see that he more thoroughly developed the theme of U.S. "hostility", pressure, etc. than he ever has in the past. Throughout his presentation I could not but help think of Chou's remark to [*text not declassified*] that the release of the Americans would be regarded as a confession of weakness. I think that that remark and Wang's expansion on it today is the real key to their attitude. You know that I have long felt, and I continue to feel, that whatever other very useful and important purposes it may serve, the building up the issue of the release in fact works in the opposite direction. However, we are now so far down this road that I see no choice but to continue what we are doing. They have, of course, behaved very stupidly. The Agreed Announcement gave them a perfect back-drop against which to release them and they would, in fact, have gained enormously if they had done so. I am amazed that they did not have the intelligence to see it. It only goes to prove that they are not "eight feet tall". However, they have now got themselves in such a box on this that they could not do so even if they desired.

I greatly appreciated Walter having spoken to the Secretary and having obtained a re-confirmation of his desires. I am, of course, willing to go on as long as it is thought to be useful. I just wanted to make sure that this was the case. I do well see and appreciate the objectives, and will try to carry them out the best I can.

Incidentally, I have just realized that the material on missing Air Force personnel forwarded us in June has not, at least technically, been declassified. Paragraph 2 of Deptel 736 declassified the material sent me with your letter of December 7. However, as the Air Force material had been sent to us previously this does not cover that. Will you confirm to me whether I can also consider it declassified so that I can use it as occasion arises.

Pat arrived this morning just as I was leaving for the meeting. Haven't had a chance really to talk with her yet.

Regards to all.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**790. Telegram 790 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 15, 1957, 8 a.m.

790. From Johnson.

1. I opened 65th with prepared statement:

A. On Dec 28 1956 representative your Ministry Foreign Affairs told UK Charge Peking question of departure Fr McCarthy could not arise until his prison term expired or your govt advanced date his release. Should like call your attention paragraph our agreed announcement Sept 10 1955 which reads: "PRC recognizes Americans in PRC who desire return US entitled do so, and declares it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so they can expeditiously exercise their right return."

B. Does your govt deny Fr McCarthy is American? Does it deny he desires return US? If not, then question return Fr McCarthy to US has already arisen. It arose Sept 10 1955, under agreement into which you entered with me on that date. It had arisen even earlier in very specific manner in these talks, for I had given you list names, on Aug 2 1955, of Americans desiring return and being prevented from doing so, and Fr McCarthy's name was among them. We had been talking for six weeks about return of precisely this group Americans. Can you point to anything in our announcement which would withhold its application from Fr McCarrthy?

C. The representative also told UK Charge question Fr McCarthy's encountering obstruction could not arise while he was in prison. What does our announcement have to say about obstruction? "If any American in PRC believes contrary to declared policy of PRC he encountering

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-1557. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

obstruction in departure, he may so inform office of Charge d'Affaires UK." Under our announcement, it clear question obstruction arises, not when PRC wishes to raise it, but when "any American in PRC believes he encountering obstruction." Is Fr McCarthy American in PRC? Does he believe he is encountering obstruction? Then question of obstruction has arisen.

D. The representative also on Dec 28 told UK Charge his request for facilities investigate facts was not in accordance terms agreed announcement. What are those terms? Any American who believes he being obstructed, and again I quote from our announcement, "may so inform office of Charge d'Affaires UK in PRC and request it make representations on his behalf to Govt PRC. If desired by US, Govt of UK may also investigate facts any such case." Did Fr McCarthy inform office of UK Charge of his belief his departure being obstructed? Did he request UK Charge make representations on his behalf? Does US desire facts this case be investigated? Can you point to any other terms our announcement bearing on this question of investigation of facts? Can you cite any part announcement which can be used justify refusal your authorities permit this investigation?

E. Would like ask you in all seriousness this morning whether there any provision of announcement which your authorities intend apply to cases Fr McCarthy and nine other Americans whose departure still being obstructed by your govt. Or is it your intention utterly repudiate our agreement? This is question of most fundamental importance for if relations between our countries are to be placed on some other basis than that of profound distrust and mutual suspicion, it is up to two of us take first steps in that direction. It up to us show negotiations between our two countries can result in understandings and agreements which will be carried out in good faith. Impartial testimony shows my govt has and is continuing demonstrate its good faith in carrying out this first agreement between us. I continue seek evidence of intention your authorities do same.

2. Wang said attitude adopted by China in this conference has all along been relations between China and US should improve, disputes between us should achieve settlement. From statement I had made this morning he did not see display similar spirit.

3. Wang (turning to prepared statement) continued, might mention press statement of US Dept State Jan 29 again indulged total inversion right and wrong to confuse world. No amount such malicious arguments can establish point that making American criminals serve sentence which accordance law, China guilty violation accord Sept 1955.

4. Wang (from notes) continued, I had asked question whether agreement between us was to be repudiated. His answer was no amount groundless charges could distort facts this matter. Good faith his govt



carrying out that agreement beyond question. I had asked question about McCarthy. There no question as to his being American and he might desire return home. Had to point out while he serving sentence, question his return did not arise. In dealing with this and similar cases question violation agreement by his govt had not ever arisen. His govt welcomed third power representative investigating cases where obstruction departure Americans from China reported; but his govt in no case would accept interference on part third country to attempt investigate anything which properly within scope and terms reference authorities their Justice Dept. He wanted point out no obstruction had been offered to any American national in China who desired return US. In fact since liberation China already more than 1000 Americans in China had freely departed without encountering any obstruction. All Americans desiring return my country had done so and his govt so far not received single complaint obstruction to departure of any.

5. Wang (from prepared statement) continued, my side repeatedly making hostile propaganda and raising outcries against China in vain attempt hoodwink and mislead world. By now I should have come to realize era long past when China could be brought into submission or abandonment sovereignty by threats or pressure. Chinese people would never bow to threats. Era gone and will not come back, when American or any alien could break law and get away with it. Americans who broke law in China now must put up with jail in accordance sentences meted out by Chinese authorities. This natural for any sovereign country. Unless criminals displayed good conduct in prison they would have to serve out their sentences. However press statements of my side had not succeeded in covering up or obscuring violation agreement on part my side. On record, still remain two groups of 52 and 25 persons who had not been able come back as result all sorts obstruction by my country, and my side still refused account for them. Obstructive tactics of my authorities now developed to extent of encroaching on human rights to include examination of correspondence between Chinese and relatives. Already many relatives have reported correspondence with folks in US was breaking off. This apparent outcome threats and pressure applied by American authorities. Furthermore while representative US Govt conducting negotiations with representative PRC, American authorities had seen fit continue coerce Chinese residents and send them Taiwan. Such activities and other violation agreement call for strong condemnation. Press statements my side also attempted cover violation agreement of my side with regard question imprisoned Chinese. My side taken unilateral action in subjecting prisoners to illegal screening process. Intent this all too clear—it is to detain such people through this illegal screening process. Under no circumstances would they accept such process. They continued urge US take action

on own initiative enable these people return as had been done in case former American convicts.

6. Wang continued, during past weeks world had witnessed two leading members US Dept State trying in turn pass rash judgement on China. Mr Robertson's vituperations and slanderous statements from Bloomington rostrum and other such unfriendly utterances he has chosen to make not even worth trouble refutation. However people could not fail take note statement American SecState at press conference Feb 5. Mr Dulles reported to have declared China conditioning release American convicts on permission by US Govt for US correspondents go China. He did not know on what ground Secretary created this story. However, refutation from his side seemed superfluous as newspaper editors in US already seem to have done job for them in dismissing this as groundless fabrication. Anxiety of American correspondents visit China shows American people did not approve of policy American Govt in obstructing exchanges between peoples. American newsmen desired visit China. China had accepted applications. This gesture goodwill Chinese people toward American people. Establishment link between question American pressmen and release American prisoners constituted outright insult to American pressmen, by American authorities. My side alone attempting introduce link between these two distinct matters. Notice which caused my side attribute this piece of pure fabrication to his side is none other than desire hoodwink world and slander China and make pretext for barring American press visits to China. He and I been associated here long time. I must have become aware long ago slander and threats could in no way help progress in talks. Interests of talks could only be advanced when I abandoned this and ready discuss his proposals, namely FMC, relaxation trade embargo and cultural exchange, movement between our two countries. This always their hope.

7. I replied he and I had spent long time discussing these subjects. I had been and continue be willing take time do it because I feel issues are of such overwhelming importance. Question of American civilians in his country could not be disposed of as his authorities apparently felt it could by what we might call simply sweeping it under rug. I had in past and continued try do best to understand and appreciate his point view. Frankly and as one who had talked to him now for long time, this subject one I simply could not understand. Even before we came here for this series talks Wang's govt perfectly aware of importance we attached to question these civilians. In terms reference our talks it agreed this question would come first. However unjust we felt action taken by his authorities was, I had not demanded unilateral action with regard them. I had not had and did not now have any interest in attempting humiliate his govt or obtain any propaganda victory in this matter. This one of

reasons that right at outset these talks I had suggested they be private in character. My sole interest was finding method resolving this problem so that it could be removed as irritant our relations. I had known from talks we had 1954 attitude his govt with regard Chinese students in US. I had attempted before we ever came here to meet his point view in this regard. I had not raised with him any question US sovereignty, US jurisdiction, or other such theoretical questions. My govt had taken action to resolve this question to his satisfaction. My govt had taken action to entirely remove restraints which had been placed to departure of some few Chinese from my country. I had conceded to his point view on declaration by US. At same time, he knew perfectly well my primary interest was in these imprisoned Americans. It perfectly proper for us reach agreement which included not just Chinese in US but Americans in his country. His reaching such agreement was certainly not in any way derogation sovereignty but was an exercise his sovereignty.

8. I continued, insofar as discussions leading up to agreement concerned, he would recall that they concerned these imprisoned Americans. I would not take time review those discussions—he was as familiar with them as I. He would recall though that particularly in discussion leading up finally to use word “expeditiously” in that agreement, it related to time when these imprisoned Americans would be released. Fact he and his authorities at that time well recognized this agreement related to imprisoned Americans had been well demonstrated by their release ten imprisoned Americans on same day and in connection with issuance agreement. For his authorities now to go back and say the agreement has no relation to those imprisoned Americans—just persons we talking about at time we made the agreement—simply not logical, just, or defensible.

9. I continued, he spoke of threats, pressure, exercise sovereignty. Hard as I tried understand and follow him on this I just unable do so. I could not see how asking that agreement freely entered into be carried out constitutes threats or pressure. I could not understand how any govt able say carrying out by it of agreement, into which it has entered, is derogation of its sovereignty. In fact it seems me it is opposite—it is exercise of its sovereignty. If I or my govt wanted see continuation of type relations which had so unhappily heretofore existed between us—certainly never would have laid stress I had on importance resolving this question civilians.

10. I continued, for him to demand concessions and agreements from me on other subjects prior to resolving what our govts both agreed was first question between us and prior carrying out this first agreement between us, is taking completely unilateral point view. At times his authorities and he here seemed take position their failure carry out this agreement based upon allegation agreement did not cover these

imprisoned Americans. At other times he seemed have taken attitude this agreement would not be carried out and Americans released unless and until there were further political concessions by my govt on matters of interest to his govt. I could not but interpret in this sense statements he had made with regard improvement relations between us being a factor in timing of release those prisoneers. At other times he seemed take attitude because of alleged violation of agreement by US with respect Chinese in US, his authorites in retaliation were refusing implement agreement with regard Americans still in prison in his country.

Continued he had spoken of press release my govt Jan 29 and had termed it groundless charges. I would not take time go thru that press release—seemed to me be most sober, careful presentation facts this matter. Instead trying dismiss it as groundless charges I asked him show me single misstatement fact in release. This not just my opinion or opinion my govt. He would recall and had probably noted with respect Chinese in US, following that release, Feb 2 spokesman GOI stated Indian Embassy Washington had found no case of any proved obstruction any Chinese in US desiring return his country; that while few cases alleged obstruction been drawn attention Indian Embassy, in no case had it proved true.

12. I continued, he had said here this morning his govt had not received any complaint obstruction of departure of any American his country. He knew and I knew Govt UK had not and could not make statement supporting that allegation such as Indian Govt made supporting statement I had made here this morning. To go into any further detail would simply obscure these fundamental undeniable facts.

13. Wang replied, in my statement I had termed most fundamental issue between two sides question civilians. In this regard, greater part this problem already resolved as result efforts made by Chinese Govt. That was to say, most of Americans or practically all Americans desiring depart this country to return US had already been enabled freely do so. Number people who had done so not in neighborhood several scores or several hundred but more than 1000 done so. If I wanted say question civilians sole issue involved in improvement relations, it could be said good basis already established this respect. What US trying do was present this matter as only concerning few criminals—this what he could not agree with. They felt that problems existing between our two countries concerned kind of issues which arise between two great powers and are of great consequence to humanity. If we failed see problems from this point view, it would seem be what people call losing sight of forest when only seeing single tree. If anybody going present relations between two countries as only involving question of handful criminals, can only say it making game of these talks, with pretext of question few criminals. If we were to take that course he afraid people would have

pass judgment on those who had wasted so much time and failed carry out fervent desires entrusted to them by people.

14. Wang continued, he also found it hard follow my logic when I said in concluding international agreement sovereignty had to be derogated. They took different view. They thought in concluding international agreement it should not prejudice but safeguard sovereignty.

15. Wang continued, in discussing question return civilians, one must take note of fact Chinese Govt always been carrying out that agreement faithfully. They could never concede to any allegation Chinese Govt introduced any obstruction departure Americans from China. If such obstruction existed, how could one explain fact majority Americans in China had been able leave. Most convincing fact and practical matter was fact in cases number former American prisoners war who refused repatriation whenever any of these persons desired return my country his authorities had not obstructed and had always given all facilities enable them do so. In fact number these already returned my country. As he had told me if in future any other persons this category changed mind and desired return my country they would help him do so in same way. This showed that his authorities always carried out agreement in assisting departure any American who desired do so.

16. Wang continued there were number criminals in China and this involved another matter. They had saying in China debtors must pay debts and murderers undergo punishment. So they had taken position that question repatriation did not arise with respect persons serving prison terms. However they had repeatedly made it known if these persons in question had displayed good conduct they would also be enabled exercise that right. But if anybody tryng force issue upon Chinese Govt pressurize it into abandonment established procedure law—this something which simply not done in China. I would recall when we first met in this room 1954 I had told him restraints imposed my govt on Chinese students my country matter jurisdiction my govt and categorically declared I not going change that legal procedure my govt.

17. Wang continued with regard my allegation that his govt on question American criminals trying extract political concessions from my side. He could only regard this as inversion of fact. His govt in interest improving relations made number constructive proposals, but my govt so far refused take up these proposals—moreover my authorities repeatedly banned correspondents from visiting China. This could be termed attempt by my authorities by various means try extract political concessions from China. If there genuine desire improve relations, one would have to take into due consideraton views of both sides instead of sticking to ones own viewpoint. He sure I aware public conversation made by Premier Chou with number American correspondents. Premier

spoke about China's desire friendly terms with US and American people; specifically pointed out Chinese side taken many steps forward. In order really improve relations both sides must take steps forward simultaneously.

18. I replied, first let me correct apparent misunderstanding. I understood he thought I had said that concluding an international agreement is derogation of sovereignty. I did not say that nor at least did not intend to. What I said was exactly opposite—that concluding international agreement not derogation of sovereignty—in fact is exercise of sovereignty. Interesting though it might be my point was not enter into philosophical argument but my point was that his govt having entered into agreement Sept 1955, its carrying out that agreement would be exercise sovereignty rather than derogation sovereignty.

19. I continued, I did not believe I had said question civilians most fundamental question between us. What I had said was it a fundamental question between us and both our countries had agreed it first question between us. Demonstration our ability resolve what our govts considered first question between us certainly fundamental to resolving others. A fundamental question between us still remains question whether permit our misunderstanding in Taiwan area to lead war. Remains still for us say unconditionally unequivocally it will not. However to go back to what both agreed was first question it not question resolving it in part, for some Americans or most Americans—it question of resolving question.

20. I continued, when we issued statement Sept 10 we not talking of Americans who already left his country and returned US. We talking about 19 specific Americans still in prison that time. Not talking about American POW who voluntarily decided remain Wang's country. We talking about these 19 Americans. He had termed it matter of few criminals. I could not agree with him on that. We had in past and still considered imprisonment these Americans completely unjust. However I did not ask him agree me on that. I only asked that first problem we came here resolve be resolved and good faith be shown here in resolving it. As had pointed out here many times, not only did we consider good faith not been shown in resolving it, but seem to have gone backwards. Considerations Wang's country's sovereignty and judicial procedures had not prevented release eleven fliers day our meetings opened here. It had not prevented release 10 Americans Sept 10 at time we issued agreement. Since that time, seemed quite clear they had adopted policy requiring these unfortunate people serve whole term their sentence.

21. I continued, it perfectly natural in light this history of carrying out agreement and treatment afforded Americans his country, that my govt felt it would be delinquent in its responsibility protect Americans to approve their travel to his country.



22. Wang replied, on their part they had also many grievances in connection with treatment their nationals in US. I had described these meetings as going backward. He agreed with me, but pointed out they had nothing to do with it. If one of two partners trying go forward while other trying pull backward, of course it very difficult have results. I had referred release 11 member American Air Force on their own initiative and had referred to release number Americans on day agreement. These releases had been effected simply as result decision Chinese authorities in accordance judicial procedure. Also took these measures in expectation and hope such lenient measures given Americans would be example goodwill and eventually lead to improvement relations between two countries. What was reward of this gesture goodwill their part? US taken series unfriendly actions against Wang's country and had demanded Wang's country do that and that while my authorities doing unfriendly things toward Wang's country. For us demand that other side do something, and not do it ourselves would not improve relations. In last part statement I had referred to responsibility US protect Americans in China. They had just seen number American correspondents returning in safety to my country from visit China. Nothing wrong done to them. One could not fail note American press, including Association American Publishers, refuted allegation that protection and safety of correspondents was an issue. It was friendly thing for American correspondents to wish visit China, it was friendly for Chinese Govt to let them come, but US Govt forbidding them was unfriendly act; to say it was matter of safety was still more unfriendly act. It would bring no good to American Govt continue pose such unfriendly and hostile attitude and spreading unfriendly statements against China.

23. I replied, he had spoken of release 11 fliers, and of 10 civilians released Sept 10 as motivated by desire improve relations. I supposed then I could only interpret continued holding of 10 who still there in spite our agreement as motivated by opposite desire. Certainly hard for me believe behavior of 10 still here so much worse than behavior those released as to preclude release. Let us be clear about this. We given as first task question civilians. That been completely resolved on independent evidence of agency and govt which he designated to confirm this with respect Chinese in US. Even though did not enter into original discussions, it been resolved even for Chinese imprisoned for common crimes. I had not thrown off fog of arguments about jurisdiction, sovereignty, other such terms—we had gone ahead and resolved it. We still did not see evidence intent his authorities resolve it equally as far as Americans his country concerned. We resolved it without asking any political concessions. We resolved it completely in spirit and letter of agreement into which we entered. We still look for similar intent on part his authorities.

24. I continued, not only had they not resolved this, but not resolved question Americans still missing from Korean hostilities. Both are simple straight-forward questions resolvable not by talk or formulae but by action. Nothing complicated about them. They think things can be done simply. When I first raised question Americans still missing Korean hostilities he had said not properly within scope our talks here. As I had told him at time, I did not raise subject here in order raise controversy between us—I raised it solely get resolution. It made no difference to me where it was resolved. When after lapse of over year I raised it at last meeting he made remarkable allegation this responsibility my govt. He made this allegation in spite responsibility his side assumed under Korean armistice agreement and in spite clear evidence his govt at least at one time had info regarding these men. I had cited to him evidence this—reasons we and families these men felt they must have some info with regard their fate. I simply could not understand why that info could not be given to us. As said it makes no difference where, either here or Korea.

25. I continued, for example on June 22 1951, Peking Radio broadcast info regarding Mr Casimire T. Demoll indicating to his family he alive and well in prison camp at that time. On June 27 that year similar broadcast concerning William D. Schonder and on June 29 concerning Myron Johnson. It certainly not responsibility US that hopes families raised in regard these men. It certainly not responsibility US there no further info regarding them. These were just few of many many cases in which it clear Wang's authorities at one time had these in their hands and had info regard them. I again asked that info be made available US, whether here or in Military Armistice Commission Korea. Was making no allegations; if these men died, it was all the info we asked for. I could not understand, though, why info withheld.

26. Wang replied, advance release 11 airmen at opening these negotiations and release ten American criminals Sept 10 1955 all effected in accordance judicial procedure his country and had been made voluntarily on their part. Those releases indeed represented vital effort made his govt view improving relations between two countries. This recognized fact throughout world. World recognized Chinese Govt did not merely engage in talking but had actually taken concrete action improve relations. Deterioration relations between two countries not result unfriendly attitude to US but on contrary, had solely been result hostile, unfriendly attitude US toward China. Even after series friendly actions taken by his govt, US Govt had not in any single instance shown similar intent toward China. These actual facts speak for themselves. It US lacking desire improve relations with China, not any lack goodwill part China. Therefore he would like call attention to fact if relations between two countries to improve, it required equal simultaneous



effort both sides. If my govt kept demanding one thing from his govt one day and raising another the next, it is simply wishful thinking. He would refer to saying in his country that if person treats me well, I will go one better but if he treats me ill, let him beware of consequences. With respect other points I raised my statement he had at last meeting and also this morning expressed position and would not take time go over them.

27. I said I had not asked him take any action with regard those remaining Americans other than what he had taken with regard eleven airmen and ten civilians. Not asked to take any action other than what we had taken in regard Chinese in US.

28. Wang rejoined, he had made it clear time and again progress talks depend concerted efforts two sides.

29. Wang suggested next meeting March 14. I agreed.

Gowen

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#### 791. Letter 66 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 66

Washington, March 8, 1957

Dear Alex:

1. Dave Osborn returned on March 4 and received a warm welcome. His ringside report on recent developments has been illuminating and has given us a better feel of the atmosphere. He reported to Mr. Robertson briefly on March 5. Unfortunately Mr. Phleger could not attend that session. Mr. Robertson left with the Secretary March 6 for the SEATO meeting at Canberra. Mr. Robertson will visit several of our SEA and SPA posts after the Canberra meeting and will not return to Washington until March 25. A copy of his itinerary is enclosed.

2. The Secretary on March 5 personally authorized your home leave following the next meeting on March 14. He agreed that you should take your full home leave, passing up the April meeting as far as you are concerned. We will have something to say in our guidance telegram which is to go out on March 11 regarding the way you will handle the announcement of your home leave plans with Wang at the next

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.

meeting.<sup>2</sup> The instructions will also cover the action you should take if Wang should insist on a meeting at some level while you are away. EE feels in any event you should go back to Prague for two or three days after the next meeting because there may be some excitement on March 15 generated by the Hungarian issue, which might have some repercussions throughout the bloc. We assume you would not plan to come direct to the States from Geneva in any event. The foregoing is all based on the assumption that you would like to take your home leave immediately. If you would prefer to postpone it until late spring or early summer, there is no opposition on anybody's part. More on this in your guidance telegram, and possibly in a follow-up letter by Monday's pouch which should reach you on or before the next meeting.

3. We are sending you several enclosures on the issue of American travel to Communist China, including the Secretary's comments at his March 5 press conference and a memorandum of conversation he had with an executive of the UP at the Gridiron Club dinner last Saturday night March 2. Also enclosed is an excerpt from the President's Press Conference of yesterday. This whole question is probably being debated right now on the Secretary's plane enroute to Canberra. The Secretary, Robertson, and Andrew Berding, the new Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, were planning to review the matter at length aboard the plane. It looks as if there certainly will be no general relaxation and we in FE are hopeful that a strong line can be maintained.

4. You will have received news of Mackensen's reported release from prison upon expiration of his sentence. But we gather that he is so thoroughly brain washed that he is likely to elect to remain in Communist China at least for the present. No Departmental comment on Mackensen's release and his apparent decision to stay in China is now contemplated.

5. We are enclosing a copy of recent correspondence regarding the cases of prisoners Edwin Pon and John Woos. In regard to the Woos case, it is the confirmed U.S. Government position that dual nationals who are not dependents are not entitled to the benefits of the Agreed Announcement. For your background, we do not consider that we are bound to extend the benefits of the Agreed Announcement to alien Chinese criminals incarcerated after our offer to Chinese aliens of last summer. The benefits of the Agreement are being offered to Pon because it seems desirable to do so in view of the fact that he was sentenced about the time of the arrangement of last summer. But this does

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<sup>2</sup> The Secretary wants you to describe your home leave to Wang as being for the purpose of consultation and a needed rest, when the time comes to inform him. [Footnote is in the original.]

not constitute a binding precedent. Each case will be judged on its own merits.

6. We do not contemplate any new tack in your instructions for the next meeting. Mr. Robertson's last word was that you could and should be as tough as you wanted to be in dealing with Wang on the violation of the Agreed Announcement. He sees no reason to pull your punches on this issue.

7. I have just learned that I am slated to go to Bermuda March 20-24 for the talks with the UK.

Regards and good wishes and a hope that we shall have the pleasure of seeing you soon.

Sincerely,

**Walter P. McCaughy**

Enclosures:

1. Mr. Robertson's itinerary.
2. Correspondence on Edwin Pon Case
  - Letter to Pon 3/1/57
  - Letter to Senator Kennedy 2/20/57
  - Letter to Senator Kennedy from Edwin Pon 1/28/57
  - Memo from Department of Justice to CA 2/11/57
  - Memo from Warden-Lewisburg to Director 2/6/57
  - Letter from Edwin Pon to Warden Taylor 2/4/57
3. Letter to Mr. Munsiff re John Wood 3/6/57
4. Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary and Frank Bartholomew, UP, dated 3/5/57
5. FBIS March 6—Text of Chou En-lai's speech
6. Press Release No. 111—Secretary Dulles' News Conference 3/5/57
7. Text of President Eisenhower's News Conference March 7, 1957 (N.Y. Times 3-8-57)
8. Memo of Conversation 2/19/57 with Congressman Lane

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792. Telegram 895 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 11, 1957

895. For Johnson.

Guidance for March 14 meeting:

1. Keep discussion throughout meeting centered on growing sense outrage American people over failure Chinese Communists keep pledge of September 10, 1955. This evidence bad faith casts doubt on Chinese Communist protestations they desire improvement relations. US attitude throughout on issue been one of extreme forbearance. Chinese Communists have had ample time demonstrate good faith. However far from showing good faith by implementing announcement they have been increasingly demanding political advantage. Chinese Communists should realize no progress can be made these talks by repudiating agreements, making false charges, or holding hostages for political ransom.

2. If Wang threatens public statement you should point out such statements not conducive to progress, reserve right public reply and point out no amount false charges and distortions can substitute for performance. FYI We consider our case so strong this point that Communist statement can do little damage. END FYI.

3. On other subjects maintain position as required, leading discussion back to civilians by pointing out essential establish some mutual good faith before considering other agreements.

4. In your discretion, cite Mackensen case as example violation Agreed Announcement. He presumably would have been released at end of term even if Agreed Announcement non-existent. Challenge Wang to show any part Agreed Announcement was applied by Communists his case.

5. If you decide on consultation and home leave at this time, suggest you inform Wang you must return to US for extended period this purpose and propose next meeting late May.

Herter

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-1157. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and Osborn; cleared in draft by Phleger. The time of transmission is illegible.

**793. Letter 67 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 67

Washington, March 11, 1957

Dear Alex:

Walter McConaughy received a message yesterday that his 86-year old father was seriously ill following a heart attack, so he flew to Alabama. He hopes to be back on Wednesday but that will, of course, depend on his father's condition.

I have only one item to add at this time to Walter's letter of March 8. The Department of Defense "Prisoner Officer," Jim Kelleher, has told us that there is strong sentiment in Defense for an official "progress report" of same kind on actions taken by State and Defense regarding the missing 450. Both departments, but particularly Defense, are under continuous pressure from relatives and interested parties in Congress and elsewhere for action. Congressman Lane's proposed resolution that this be made the "primary objective of the foreign policy of the United States" (later toned down at our suggestion) is an indication of the feeling. Unfortunately, the only progress report we could make is one which said, in effect, "no progress," but it would serve to show that we have not been idle. We would appreciate any ideas you might have as to the kind of public statement that might be usefully made on this subject. We would, of course, have to decide whether we would stick to the 450 figure or use the new figure of 383, with a suitable explanation to account for the difference.

We will meet today to draft instructions for your next meeting. As Walter said, we do not expect to come up with anything new. We are all looking forward to seeing you when you come home on leave.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

**Ralph N. Clough**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Drafted by Clough.

**794. Telegram 874 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 13, 1957, 10 a.m.

874. From Johnson.

Would appreciate info whether Lee Li-chuen departed February 23 as mentioned para 6 Deptel 815.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-1357. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

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**795. Telegram 899 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 13, 1957, 4:52 p.m.

899. Your 874.

Lee Li-chuen departed February 23 President Wilson ETA Hong Kong March 18.

**Herter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-1357. Confidential; Priority; Drafted by Seward (FE/CA/RA).

**796. Telegram 881 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 14, 1957, 6 p.m.

881. From Johnson.

Two hour meeting this morning with no new developments. Wang opened with statement attacking “stepping up” of slanderous attacks and false charges by US spokesmen. Secretary’s Canberra statement was “particular evidence this campaign poison atmosphere and try slander China in order arrest improvement Sino-American relations”. This contrary attitude of even American people where even including “some occupying important positions were speaking out for change in US ostrich policy toward China”. USG “trying through renunciation force doctrine induce China recognize present status American control over Taiwan”. Military control over Taiwan being “incessantly intensified” extending military bases and planning install guided missiles. “Aggressive steps by US in Taiwan would only enable all Chinese patriots including those now on Taiwan recognize” US attempting enslave Chinese nation. Chinese people desire “be kindly terms” with American people. Referring to FMC, trade and cultural proposals “if there will and desire” by US improve relations should get down to serious discussion rather than entangling talks by introducing side issues.

I carried out theme paragraph 1 Deptel 895 pointing out PRC had agreed civilians first matter and by refusing to solve was one blocking progress. Agreed announcement was also test good faith and value of agreements but had operated only to advantage PRC. American spokesmen had and would continue express growing sense outrage of American people against PRC bad faith in carrying out that agreement. PRC failure resolve question American civilians belied their professions desire improve relations, et cetera. Also cited failure PRC agree renunciation force.

Give and take centered almost entirely around implementation with Wang reiterating familiar charges, and I reiterating theme only way to progress was carrying out agreed announcement, citing GOI and UK as proofs of who had demonstrated good faith with respect agreement. During course give and take informed him departure of Lee Li-chuen.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–1457. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Saigon unnumbered for Robertson.

Meeting closed on note my blunt reiteration release Americans and renunciation force essential.

He accepted my proposal next meeting Thursday April 11.

Full record by pouch leaving tonight.

Returning Prague tomorrow morning.

Owens

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**797. Telegram unnumbered from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 14, 1957

Unnumbered. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 66th with prepared statement. As result my side dragging out talks and persisting in unreasonable demands we have failed make progress. This state affairs could not but cause them doubt that my government had any sincere desire resolve problems. Even in U.S. itself, more and more people getting fed up this attitude my side. More and more people, even including some occupying important positions, were speaking out for change in U.S. ostrich policy toward China. These people take view removal trade barriers, cultural exchange, holding of Foreign Ministers Conference, might be carried out as concrete steps leading to improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations.

2. Wang continued instead of considering these ideas, however, spokesmen of U.S. Government stepping up slanderous attacks and false charges. Recent statement U.S. Secretary of State at Canberra meeting was particular evidence of this campaign poison atmosphere and try slander China, in order to arrest improvement Sino-American relations. In course these talks, my side trying incessantly through so-called Renunciation Force Doctrine induce China recognize present status American control over Taiwan. U.S. also incessantly intensifying military control over Taiwan, extending military bases and planning install guided missiles. Such maneuvers could hardly be reconciled with purposes we should pursue in these negotiations. Aggressive steps adopted by U.S. in Taiwan would only enable all Chinese patriots,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3-1457. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Sent via pouch. Received on March 19.



including those now on Taiwan, to recognize that steps now being taken by U.S. were attempt enslave Chinese nation.

3. Wang continued Chinese people desire be kindly terms with American people. Chinese people not to blame for failure bring about improvement Sino-American relations. In discussions here his side already contributed series efforts with aim improve relations between two countries. Proposals made by his side calling for meeting between Chinese and American Foreign Ministers, removal of trade barriers, and peoples contacts and cultural exchange are just such effective steps for improvement in relations between the two countries. If there still any desire on part my government for improvement relations as well as resolution questions between China and America he did not see why there should be further delay our getting down to serious discussions. Only by putting forward constructive opinions and display of good faith, rather than entangling talks by introducing side issues, can improvement in relations be effected. This what he had always tried achieve in these talks.

4. I replied he had spoken of what he alleged were attempts of U.S. entangle these talks with side issues. Impossible for me understand how he could make such statement in light history steps leading up to these talks and talks themselves. In fact I had been one who had been attempting keep us to resolution problems with which we given to deal. No amount such statements could change fact our governments gave us as first task question of return civilians.

5. I continued in Terms Reference setting up these talks his government had agreed that was first question. Even before meeting began his authorities stated this question would be easy to settle with respect Americans detained in his country, and my authorities, even before these meetings began, settled it with respect to Chinese in my country. When his authorities agreed to those Terms of Reference and made those statements, they well knew from the talks which he and I had had here in 1954, and the subsequent contacts between respective consular officers, that my country not interested theoretical concepts or abstract theories; that it was not then concerned about Americans who appeared to have chosen to remain in his country or other irrelevant questions—what we might term side issues. It interested solely ensuring that a specific group Americans should be able return their country—Americans who being denied their right return either through refusal exit permits or through imprisonment. If there any possibility doubt this regard, it would have been entirely dispelled by statements I had made at very opening our discussions here. Indeed our discussions respect Americans leading up to Agreement September 10, 1955 had to do entirely with that group Americans whose names I had given him. He had given me every reason believe agreement proposed by him would lead to “expeditious” resolution that problem, and on that basis I had entered into Agreed Announcement.

6. I continued, results however had been precisely contrary not only to our expectations but to clear words of pledge contained that Agreement. For more than year it been apparent policy his government require all remaining imprisoned Americans serve full terms their sentences even down to last day. There seemed be clear intent not resolve first question with which we called upon deal, even at price violating solemn public commitment. There seemed be clear intent perpetuate this acknowledged first obstacle to improvement relations between us. American people, American Government and myself find it entirely impossible reconcile statements he and his authorities had made with regard desire improve relations between our two peoples and continued failure carry out first agreement between us. At time we entered into that agreement I pointed out to him as earnestly and clearly as I could that if it were desire his government improve relations between us, the carrying out of that agreement was of utmost importance. I pointed out at time, agreement itself meant nothing. Only its implementation could have meaning. He was well aware at time we entered into that agreement of very favorable effects it had on public opinion my country. I pointed out to him at time that those effects would be dispelled unless it carried out. As had often pointed out here it would have been better never enter into agreement if it not to be carried out. What I had said at that time I believed had been amply borne out. Those effects had been dispelled.

7. I continued there was increasing sense outrage among American people and American Government not only over failure these Americans return, but over what we could only consider as bad faith which had thus far been demonstrated in carrying out this first agreement between us. Spokesmen for American Government could not, even if they would, conceal or ignore this feeling. They had and would continue express sentiments of American people this regard. If facts unpleasant to Wang's authorities, it was they who must blame themselves for creating this set of facts. They could not expect extract price political advantage for carrying out their already pledged word. This could not be obscured by introducing proposals on subsidiary matters. Progress could not be achieved by repudiating agreements which had been made, by making false charges or holding hostages for political advantage. It could not be concealed by charges that U.S. using these as pretext to prevent improvement relations.

8. I continued I had reiterated that his authorities had agreed that this question return civilians would be first question we should handle here. They could not conceal fact that their failure make progress this first question was what had prevented progress these talks. Attitude my government regarding this question had throughout these long months been one of greatest forbearance. Only his authorities could remove this continuing block to progress which they themselves

had established. Only his authorities could make decision that they willing renounce use armed force in achievement their objectives and accept simple and straightforward proposals we had made for renunciation force and settlement these issues only by peaceful means. If, as Wang said, atmosphere being poisoned, it not been by any action U.S. It been by failure his authorities carry out already pledged word and by failure his authorities renounce their threat use armed force achieve their ambitions. They and only they could correct this situation.

9. Wang replied every time he came here he had had determined hope my authorities would change present policy dragging out talks and preventing progress these deliberations. However, each time after he had finished listening to my words he had felt that attitude I maintained could not contribute to progress these talks. Their side had made clear in past that number American nationals in China small and resolution their problems could be made easy. If we examined course these talks from opening meeting to present with sober mind, we able readily see Chinese Government had always faithfully carried out agreement entered into with respect question civilians. All charges being poured upon his government in connection question civilians false and not true. Government which failed carry out concluded agreement on civilians none other than American Government itself.

10. Wang continued he had in past repeatedly called attention of my government to fact steps being adopted by my authorities in connection requirement Taiwan entry permit and permanent residence requirement entirely violated agreement between us. Action taken by my authorities in restricting and interfering with freedom of communication between Chinese residents in U.S. and families in China as well as action taken by my authorities in coercing Chinese residents in proceeding to Taiwan were all violations of agreement. U.S. failed up to now account for failure of return 53 Chinese in U.S. whose names he had given me and failed account for failure another group 22 persons return. Could this attitude taken by American authorities be reconciled with provisions our agreement. Although he had made repeated representations in these meetings, this failure carry out Agreed Announcement with respect Chinese in U.S. had not been corrected or improved.

11. Wang continued charges made by American Government in connection with question civilians could only be considered as tactic to cover American Government's own failure carry out agreement with regard Chinese in U.S. So far as improvement in relations between our two peoples concerned, of which I had spoken this morning, Wang's side aware there was such a desire among American people, in same way as Chinese people had desire improve relations between two countries. Statements made by American spokesmen entirely contrary to this desire of American people. I had spoken about what I called feeling of outrage against his country among American people; his side

could not discover any such feeling among American people. Rising sense of outrage seen my side was not outrage against China but rather outrage against American Government's repeated efforts try continue prevent reestablishment contact between Chinese and American peoples. If one was going to talk about improvement relations, lip service not sufficient, but rather adoption of concrete steps toward real improvement in relations between two countries. These concrete steps include putting forward concrete opinion and steps with view to really improving relations. A single action of advantage to both sides was a greater contribution to improving relations than much empty talk. The taking of such action would not only help progress our talks, but action itself in interest both peoples.

12. I replied I believed I probably in better position speak for and represent feelings American people. However, he entirely right when said American people desired better relations with people his country. They did this in spite hostility his government demonstrated toward U.S. and its allies. He made serious error if he interpreted these expressions of desire for better relations with his country as lack concern for, or absence resentment of, fact that his country had thus far failed either to release our fellow citizens whom Wang's country holds, or to carry out first agreement between us. American people did not enjoy living in attitude of hostility with anyone or toward anyone. No one would be quicker to respond to action by others indicating desire for such friendship. He had well said that lip service not sufficient, concrete steps are what counted. This precisely what I, my Government, and American people been seeking with regard to first item agenda. This precisely what his government had not done. As I had previously said, the question resolving first item agenda by action rather than words was something which transcended even importance of individual Americans concerned. It was test whether agreements between us were to have substance and whether they to be carried out. He had talked about necessity of agreements being advantageous to both sides. I would certainly not argue with that. What had happened with respect this first agreement between us was that it appeared be entirely to advantage his side, with no advantage my side. In fact as I had again pointed out this morning, it seemed to have worked to positive disadvantage our side. Whereas even prior our agreement, his authorities had on occasion released Americans prior expiration full term sentences imposed, now his side not only not permitted all return expeditiously in accordance agreement between us, but even required them serve full term sentences.

13. I continued, on other hand I had from beginning fully met all pertinent points his views regarding Chinese in U.S. In 1954 we had talked of Chinese students in U.S. who being prevented returning his country. By time we met here August 1955, all orders preventing return

such students had been withdrawn. Thus in that matter I had entirely met his point view. That I had done so and that any Chinese in U.S. desiring return his country could do so, was proven by official statements of very agency he himself had suggested for establishing facts.

14. I continued no amount of distorted efforts to attempt misrepresent various aspects U.S. immigration legislation could change fact, established by evidence of third power agency established for purpose, that no Chinese in U.S. desiring return to Wang's country had been or was being obstructed from doing so. Chinese steadily returning to his country whenever they desired do so. My latest information was that 277 had returned by direct route to Hong Kong since beginning our talks here. I had no way knowing how many returned other routes. He continued speak of 53 and 22 and demanded what he termed accounting for them. U.S. was under no obligation provide accounting for Chinese in U.S. What it was under obligation to do and would do was not obstruct departure of any Chinese in U.S. who desired depart. As far as 53 and 22 concerned I had told him in past and reiterated categorically that their return not being obstructed and if they had not returned it was because they did not desire do so. If they felt being obstructed, they, along with any other Chinese in U.S., entirely free communicate with Indian Embassy. They had not done so as far as I knew. Certainly no case alleged obstruction brought to attention my government by Indian Embassy. I certainly did not propose have them cross-examined as to reasons for whatever decisions they may have made.

15. I continued there was another example of continued freedom of Chinese in U.S. to proceed to Wang's country if they desired do so. I referred to case Lee Li-chuen, whom he mentioned 64th meeting here. This man at no time prevented from returning Wang's country if he desired do so. This true even though he was seaman on ship registered by Government Republic China and had overstayed period temporary admission to U.S. and was therefore subject to deportation. According my information he had departed from U.S. on February 23 en route to Hong Kong. It my understanding he expressed intention proceeding Wang's country at time he left. However, whether he did so was of course matter his own choice.

16. I continued again as matter meeting Wang's point of view and advantageous his side, after he had raised with me question imprisonment Chinese common criminals U.S. we took measures assure any Chinese desiring proceed Wang's country able do so. The one who desired do so was enabled do so—even though he far from having served term sentence or even eligible for parole.

17. I continued, thus situation regard Chinese in U.S. contrasted sharply with that of Americans imprisoned in Wang's country. Thus there appeared to have been what he would term no advantage to American side in this agreement. However what is even more serious

is that it calls into question whether agreements between us are to be mere forms and words or whether they to have concrete substance. It calls into question whether we to give appearance by form of words of having resolved questions between us—or whether we to resolve them. Thus first question we called on to deal with been resolved with respect Chinese in my country. It had not been resolved with respect Americans imprisoned in Wang's country; and it would not be resolved until they permitted to return in accordance agreement entered into 1955.

18. Wang replied I had quoted him as having said in past that whatever agreement we entered into should be advantageous to both sides. I had indicated having accepted this opinion. However when it came to concrete facts, I had always demonstrated attitude entirely ignoring interests his side, while simply seeking advantage my own side. This particularly conspicuous respect Chinese now in U.S. prisons for offenses. This group Chinese in prison in U.S. very big yet my side so far failed give his side complete full list their names. In dealing with question Chinese in U.S., my side only thus far released one of these people and allowed him return China. My side not taken steps with respect remaining prisoners. My authorities even conducted illegal screening process on them against their will. Wang's side could not believe anyone in prison could freely express his choice as to where he wished to go.

19. Wang continued he glad be informed by me concerning desire among American people improve relations between two countries. However American officials not only dared not openly make remarks expressing such desire but had deliberately insulted and made false charges against China. Wang's side agreed that improvement relations between two countries urgent task we called upon to serve. They acknowledged question civilians had been one part of differences between us. Insofar as question civilians concerned his side already entered into Agreed Announcement and up to two sides to carry out this agreement faithfully. Frankly he had to make it clear that while his government, his side, willing continue strive for improvement relations between two countries, his government could not be made to renounce its sovereignty. What was more, question civilians was far from being sole issue between us. In addition to this question there were other questions such as Foreign Ministers Conference, removal of embargo against his country and reestablishment of peoples contacts and cultural exchange between two countries. All these questions and maybe others urgently call for solution between us. If I were going to entangle these talks by sticking to question civilians while refusing take steps resolve other important questions, he could only interpret this as deliberate attempt prevent progress our talks by using question civilians as pretext. This certainly cannot result in any benefit to our talks.

20. I replied tangling had been done by his side. If his side wanted to resolve first question civilians, could have done so August 2, 1955 by

simply matching action my government already taken, that is permit civilians both sides who desire do so to return. Evidence of third parties designated under our agreement of September 10, 1955 showed who had permitted that take place and who had not. Difficult foresee value further agreements between us when first agreement not carried out and when his side refused unconditionally to say our disputes would be settled only by peaceful means.

21. After Wang indicated he had nothing more to say I proposed next meeting Thursday, April 11. Wang agreed.

Gowen

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**798. Letter 55 from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 55

Geneva, March 14, 1957

Dear Walter:

You will see that nothing remarkable developed at today's meeting. At the end I virtually dared him to make a move to break off if he wanted to but he didn't accept the challenge.

First, I enormously appreciated your letter and the authority from the Department to take home leave if I desired to do so. Please express my personal appreciation to the Secretary at a suitable opportunity. Frankly, when I wrote to EE I had no thought whatever of the possibility, and, as I told them, was thinking only of a quick trip between monthly meetings. However, I must confess that the prospect of some leave at home is most attractive, and opens up new vistas that I had not contemplated. [*text not declassified*] Therefore, to extract maximum advantage from the opportunity I took advantage of your generous offer to set my own time and did not ask for the postponement this time. My present thought is at the meeting May 9 or thereabouts to ask for the following meeting July 11. This would enable me to leave directly from Geneva following the May 9 meeting, spend the week of May 13 in the Department, start leave the week of May 20 taking about six weeks ending about June 30, and be back in Prague for the July 4 reception, and then come down here for the meeting the following week. This is, of course, always subject to any last minute developments either here or in Prague that would clearly make it undesirable. I would appreciate your letting EE know of this plan, and confirming

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Drafted by Johnson who signed the original "Alex."



that neither FE or EE have any objections. I do not know how Wang will take it, but the more I think about it I think that it might not be a bad idea from the standpoint of the talks themselves. In any event, I might come back with a somewhat more sprightly approach. Frankly, I feel run out of ideas at the moment.

Now for other business. Thanks very much for your letter of March 8, as well as for Ralph's of March 11. [*text not declassified*]

I see that Taipei came up with about the same idea as the Secretary's on the correspondents. It seems like a very good out to me and hope that it goes through.

I have gone over the ICRC list of Korean POW's (your transmittal slip 2/28/57). While I have not had a chance to check it against our list, I am struck by some very odd aspects that appear to indicate it is in itself very incomplete. You will note that it is arranged alphabetically starting off with "Chidester" an American and continues with Americans "no materials available" through "Smith" and then suddenly shifts to "Southworth" British through "Wylie" British "no materials available" and then again starts up with Americans running from "Adamo" through "Chavez". It then starts out with "Macnair-raga" an American escapee and runs alphabetically through "Zawacki" later starting with "Alcorn" as an American escapee and running through "Levitski". Subsequently it starts another alphabetical list of Americans "no materials available" with "Jensen" and running through "Ziemer", but there does not appear to be any place that the first part of that alphabetical series is given. In any event I would appreciate knowing what Defense makes of it, and whether it adds anything to what we were given at Panmunjon.

With respect to Ralph's inquiry on my views concerning a public "progress report" on this question, I certainly have no objection from my standpoint. I think that by all means we ought to use the new figure of 383 with an explanation of the difference. I have no particular thoughts on what form it might take, but perhaps a letter to a Congressional committee pegged to Lane's resolution might be the best. I have no objection, and, in fact think it ought to include what we have done here on the subject, keeping it entirely factual.

I notice that in the Secretary's statement at Canberra he spoke of the Chinese Communist refusal to renounce war "as an instrument of its policy in relation to Taiwan and Penghu", whereas we have previously been very careful to use the term "Taiwan area" so as to embrace the offshore islands. Does this have any significance? I am sure it will be noted in Peiping and Taipeh.

Has the "Wirin case" entirely subsided or is it going to raise its head again?

Tell Dave we have been moved out of our room because of the Hungarian hearings and are back where we were during the Foreign Ministers' Conference.



I hope you have a chance for a little relaxation at Bermuda. I do not suppose you are getting to make the slow cruiser trip, but it would be nice if you could.

All the best to everyone.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**

*American Ambassador*

P.S. Tell whoever handles it that they no longer need to send the Daily Summary extracts to me here. With the gap between meetings the copies I receive at Prague are entirely sufficient.

**Attachment**

**Note from McConaughy to Freers<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, March 20, 1957

Ed,

Please read the attached letter of March 14 from Alex Johnson. I presume EUR has no objection to his proposal to take leave from about May 10 to July 1, but I would like to have definite confirmation of that before I answer his letter. I am also attaching a copy of my letter to Alex of March 8.

**Walter P McConaughy**

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<sup>2</sup>No classification marking. McConaughy initialed the note "WPMcC."

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**799. Letter from Freers to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 21, 1957

Dear Alex:

Walter McConaughy has just informed me that your tentative plans for home leave call for leaving directly for the States from Geneva about May 10.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official–Informal.

I regret to have to bring up a complication but thought you should know that a meeting of the Eastern European Chiefs of Mission is now scheduled for May 10 through 13 in Vienna. Burke Elbrick will preside, and among others expecting to attend are Messrs. Henderson, Murphy, Perkins and Bill Clark from USIA. We feel it very important that you be there to present your views about the situation in Czechoslovakia at the meeting.

I hope the delay of a few days will not seriously disrupt your home leave plans. You will be receiving more specific information about the meeting very shortly.

Best regards,  
Sincerely,

Edward L. Freers

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**800. Telegram 487 from Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, April 5, 1957, 11 a.m.

487. Wang's interpreter called Ekvall this morning and asked for postponement next meeting to May 15 as Wang was in China in connection visit Polish Prime Minister. I have replied May 15 not possible for me and have suggested any time between May 6 and May 9. Will inform Department when reply received.

Johnson

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-557. Official Use Only; Priority.

**801. Telegram 491 from Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, April 8, 1957, noon

491. Mytel 487.

Wang has replied not possible meet before May 15. In view desirability my meeting with him after his return from Peiping and before my consultation with Department have agreed to May 15 meeting. Usual announcement postponement meeting will be made at Geneva but have authorized PAO there inform any press inquirers on background basis postponement at Wang's request.

At May 15 meeting will propose July 11 for next following meeting.

Plan depart Geneva evening May 15 arriving Washington afternoon May 16.

**Johnson**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–857. Official Use Only.

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**802. Letter 68 from McConaughy to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 68

Washington, April 17, 1957

Dear Alex:

The cancellation of the April meeting at Geneva has somewhat disrupted the normal exchange of letters with you there. CA has been sending to Geneva some of the material that would normally have been sent as enclosures to a letter, so as to keep down the bulk of the letter I will send you in time for the May 15 meeting. However, Defense has raised some questions with regard to the missing personnel issue, going beyond the immediate context of the Geneva meetings, and we would appreciate your preliminary thoughts on the matter, if possible before your arrival in Washington.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Drafted by Osborn.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter from Defense asking about the current status of your efforts at Geneva, and whether it would be desirable for the UNC again to raise the issue in the MAC. The Defense letter enclosed a copy of a statement prepared by the UNC for possible use in the latter eventuality, and asked for our approval or comments. We sent Defense an interim reply to the effect we were asking you for your comments and would reply more fully when we had heard from you.

On the desirability of taking the issue up in the MAC, it is our feeling here that we can build up a better public position if we maintain a posture of unremitting efforts in both forums to get an accounting, continuing to bring it up both at Geneva and in the MAC.

I think you will agree that the proposed UNC statement is not of the sort best calculated to build up a strong public position, and that it should be re-written to bring it more into line with the approach you have followed at Geneva. To be of maximum usefulness, a public position on the missing personnel question ought to be ready for disclosure by the fall, shortly before the opening of the UNGA. It would be good if, before that time, all the well-documented individual cases (i.e., those where the Communists obviously should have information, but have indicated "no data" in their accounting) could have been cited, either in your presentations at Geneva, or the MAC, or both. We also feel our position would be stronger if the UNC took more note of the Communist "accounting," calling attention to its falsifications and its inadequacies, but not simply ignoring it. For example, with regard to the "escaped" category, the UNC could ask the Communists to provide supplementary data on the time and place of escape. Naturally any presentation in the MAC should be cleared by such other of the 16 allies as have unaccounted for personnel on the list, but this ought not to prove too difficult.

If a general strategy along the above lines can be agreed upon, it would not cause much of a change from your past approach to the problem at Geneva. There would be individual presentations on perhaps four or five persons per meeting, drawing your material largely from the better documented cases in the Air Force roster (as the Air Force list was entirely in the "no data" category in the Communist "accounting"). We have sent on to Geneva material on 20 USAF personnel. However, you need not feel restricted to the use of this material, as Defense has informed us that all the information on the copy of the roster you have (Air Force included) may be used as though it were unclassified, *except* for actual citations of certain specific intelligence sources.

With regard to the selection of "well-documented" cases for individual citation, we believe after talking to Defense it would be better to let you choose on the basis of the material you have in Geneva, as you will in any case to work up the presentation. We will effect some

coordination with the effort in the MAC by keeping Defense informed of the cases you have cited.

I would hope that when you are here on consultation we will be able to arrange a meeting on the missing personnel question with Defense representatives. We would appreciate any comments you may be able to send us before your arrival in Washington, however, as they would help prepare the ground for our discussions.

Sincerely yours,

**Walter P. McConaughy**

Enclosure:

Copy of letter dated 3/11/57 from Gen. Erskine with attached copies of letter, and statement proposed by the UN Command.

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### **803. Letter from Johnson to McConaughy<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, April 24, 1957

Dear Walter:

I have received your letter of April 17 with regard to the next steps concerning the missing POWs.

I should have, perhaps, earlier expressed my thoughts on handling this. I have been thinking that the most useful, and also effective from the standpoint of public relations, procedure would be that of what might be termed a “whipsawing” operation somewhat in the past pattern. That is, take it up alternately in Panmunjon and Geneva along the pattern of our first exercise. That is, Panmunjon had not got any place on it, so I took it up in Geneva. Then Panmunjon took it up again and received some very small although entirely unsatisfactory results in that the other side did accept the lists and did make some small pretence of an additional accounting. I then, again took it up at Geneva, and it would now seem to me that it would be well for Panmunjon again to take it up before I make another move in Geneva on it. I am sorry that it has not been taken up again before now in Panmunjon. If and when they get no place at Panmunjon, I will again hit Wang with it in detail. In the meantime I will continue to take advantage of all

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.”

suitable opportunities to mention it as a still outstanding item of business. Perhaps it would be well for me to at least touch on it again at the May meeting.

I do not see any particular advantage in attempting to exhaust by individual presentations what might be termed the well-documented individual cases. They having accepted the list of names, we are always in position accurately to tell inquirers that the individual case in which they are interested has specifically been brought to the attention of the other side. You will note that the cases I have thus far used and I believe to be by far the strongest from the standpoint of such a presentation are those in which Peiping had itself admitted they were at one time being held. I am under the impression that I have already used the best cases in this category, although there may be a few more. Not having the lists here I am not sure, but Dave who did all the research for me on this will undoubtedly be able to recall. In any event I will look into it on my next trip. If my belief is correct, I am now or soon will be at the point of citing cases in which the evidence is primarily unilateral from our side. While, I do not, of course, question the validity of such evidence and its usefulness in other contexts it seems to me that for Geneva purposes it is much better that I continue to make my stand on those cases where Peiping itself had acknowledged the man was being held. I have left him now with the impression that I may well still have a large number of such cases in my pocket. If I pull out any considerable number of other types of cases he will undoubtedly heave a sigh of relief that I do not have him on as bad a spot as he is with those I first cited. Therefore, I would propose that the next time I take the matter up in detail I cite any additional cases I may have in the first category, or if necessary refer back to those previously cited rather than taper off on what may be weaker cases from a Geneva standpoint.

I cannot think of anything that would be better calculated to give them the impression our sole purpose is to make a propaganda play out of this issue rather than a serious quest for information than the draft statement submitted by the UNC. While I well realize the difference in tone between the Panmunjon and Geneva meetings I should think that it would be worthwhile for the UNC to at least try a somewhat different approach on this subject. It probably will not produce any more results, but it certainly stands a better chance of doing so than the approach in the draft. Also, it seems better to me from the standpoint of the 16 and public relations when the record is published. I also thoroughly agree that any such statement must take account of the Communist "accounting" calling attention to its falsifications and inadequacies rather than simply ignoring it. I should think that this would be much more effective than building the case almost entirely around the fact that some prisoners were taken to Mainland China as in the draft, the apparent presumption being that we think that the PRC is holding all or most of

those on our present list. Our primary interest is not whether prisoners were taken to China, but in information about them. From my examination of the present cases I would doubt that many of them involve their ever having been taken to China. While they may be holding back some information, my feeling is that in fact they probably just do not have the records, particularly in the cases of those who fell into the hands of the North Koreans. This does not mean that we should not keep pressing them, but I am not sanguine we will ever achieve any substantial results.

I also do not see the point in the draft of laboring the point on PRC belligerency and “volunteers” in Korea. They seem largely to have dropped this fiction and I do not think we should seem to be going out of our way to labor the point.

I would, therefore, suggest a complete rewriting of the draft and believe that Dave Osborn should be able to do so. He thoroughly knows the subject, knows my ideas on it, and I would be content with anything he produces.

I assume the UNC has now been informed of what I have last done at Geneva on the subject. I should think it would be well to arrange to keep it informed on a current basis and ask that they do the same. Because of the GA resolution I should also think it well to keep the record clear on keeping Hammarskjöld informed.

I will, of course, be very glad to discuss the subject when I am in Washington. My present plan is to spend the week beginning May 20 in the Department and I hope to be able to finish everything in that week. It will be a busy time and I hope that between you and EE you can schedule it in the most efficient way. I leave myself entirely in your hands so feel free to arrange anything you think useful. I hope that the Secretary, Walter and Herman will be there at some time during that week.

I am leaving here May 8 for the Vienna EE Chiefs of Mission meeting which begins May 10. (There are no planes on May 9, the national holiday here, and also for various reasons I would prefer to be out of town on that day.) I plan to leave Vienna the morning of May 13 and arrive in Geneva the same afternoon. I then plan to leave Geneva the evening of May 15 for New York, and if my car is ready drive down to Washington May 16. If you want to get in touch with me while I am in Vienna you can, of course, do so through the Embassy there.

Pat is leaving here directly May 10 and will arrive in Washington May 12.

Regards to all and looking forward to seeing you soon for a real good chat, I remain

Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson

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804. Letter 69 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 69

Washington, May 10, 1957

Dear Alex:

Walter McConaughy has gone off on a short trip to Alabama and expects to be back early next week. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after twice postponing his appearance before them to discuss his appointment as Ambassador to Burma, has indicated that they will call him late next week. Naturally he is anxious to complete this procedure and receive his confirmation.

Since you have not had a letter from CA for some time I will try to include here mention of the principal developments relating to your talks during the last month. We intend to begin preparation of instructions for your next meeting today and will probably meet with Mr. Robertson on Monday to put them in final form. We do not anticipate any new departure.

1. *Appearances of Department Officers on Hill on March 23*: Bill Sebald and Walter McConaughy appeared before the Far East Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to answer questions about the ban on correspondents travel to Communist China. The members of the Subcommittee were quite sympathetic to our position, with only two or three members appearing to question it seriously. The majority appeared to take the position that the central question was whether or not a distinction between newsmen and ordinary citizens for the purpose of travel was justified. We have sent you separately the record of the proceedings. On April 2, Mr. Murphy went before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. He made a very forceful presentation of the Department's policy, which was put out as a press release by the Department, and a copy of which has been sent you. The Senators were somewhat less sympathetic and understanding than the Representatives had been with Bill Sebald and Walter. Their questions were sharp and the hearing was rather lengthy. Following the hearing, Senator Fulbright sent over an additional list of some 35 questions to be answered by the Department. The questions were for the most part along the same lines as the ones asked in the hearing itself, but some of them were very trickily worded. One of them, for example, was the question whether the fact of non-recognition itself made it more difficult for the Department to extend protection to Americans traveling in Communist China. As you can imagine, it is

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal.



difficult to phrase an answer to this question without appearing either to offer an argument for recognition or, on the other hand, to discount the validity of the argument that we cannot offer protection as one of the reasons behind our policy. Another question which appeared to be somewhat loaded was the question of whether you at Geneva still felt that removing the travel ban would have an unfavorable effect on the prospects for release of the prisoners or whether you had come to believe, in the light of the propaganda advantage that Peiping had already gained from exploiting the issue, that the ban no longer had any value in your negotiations. Our answer to this one was in effect that your position at Geneva had always been along the lines of the Department's press release of August 7, that you felt the travel of certain reporters in defiance of the ban had weakened your position vis-a-vis the ban, and that you had stressed that the Communists would probably not release the Americans in exchange for a removal of the ban. The Department agreed with this analysis, and in any case did not intend to bargain for the release of Americans. (I am enclosing a copy of the FE portion of our reply).

2. *The Worthy Case*: William Worthy was given a hearing on April 29 in order to inform him officially of the tentative denial of his request for a new passport. The Department, at this stage, kept the focus on the issues as defined in the passport regulations. The next step will presumably be a hearing before the Board of Passport Appeals.

3. *Cases of Downey, Fecteau and Redmond*: We have already sent to Geneva a memorandum of conversation with Mrs. Downey, the mother of John Downey, in which Mr. Robertson discussed with her various possibilities growing out of a contact she had with Dag Hammarskjold. You will see that there is a possibility she might come to Geneva at the time of your next meeting for an interview with Wang. The Department did not attempt to discourage her from making the trip, although we, of course, could not give her any assurance that the interview would be granted, or that it would have any effect on the release of her son. We are attempting to find out more about Dag Hammarskjold's reported willingness to take up again the cases of Downey and Fecteau, on the grounds of their being civilians under the authority of the UNC in Korea, and therefore entitled to repatriation under the Armistice Agreement. You will recall that at the time of Hammarskjold's visit to Peiping in January 1955, although he went there primarily on behalf of the 11 airmen, we left the door open to the inclusion of the two civilians in the category of personnel who should be released under the Armistice Agreement. Also, in Wang's list of Americans in China which he gave you at the start of the talks, Downey and Fecteau are placed in a separate category from the other civilian prisoners. Of course, in anything that we might do or ask the Secretary General to do, we would

have to be careful not to appear to relax our demands that the Chinese Communists release forthwith all the prisoners without regard to their status or any other distinction.

In the above connection, William Worthy has been stirring up a good deal of trouble among the American relatives of the prisoners. He tried to lead Mrs. Fecteau on into saying that the Department had for two years failed to permit her to send parcels to her son. Fortunately, Mrs. Fecteau issued a refutation of this allegation through her Congressman, Mr. Lane, to whom CA also supplied a statement summarizing our efforts to get parcels to Fecteau and all the other prisoners and making the point that, almost as soon as we learned of the fact that Downey and Fecteau were alive and in prison in Communist China, we commenced efforts to make it possible for their families to send them parcels. Worthy has also been in touch with Mrs. Redmond trying to convince her that the Department has not done everything in its power to get her son's release, and advising her that she might speed up Redmond's release if she made a trip to Peiping.

A Yonkers citizens committee for the release of Redmond has also been very active lately, demanding an interview with the Secretary, and protesting the relaxation of CHINCOM controls as a sign the Department is "aiding Red China while our boys are rotting in prison." The committee claims to have been responsible for sending Mao Tse-tung over 300,000 "polite" letters on behalf of Redmond. It also appears to be under the misapprehension that the Department made some sort of "deal" with Red China whereby Father Rigney was put at the head of the list to be released. The committee apparently attributes the success of this "deal" to the efforts of Rigney's Congressman, Mr. MacCormack, and it appears they may use this allegation in attacking Congressman Gwinn, in whose district Yonkers is. Naturally, this adds to the complications of the matter.

4. *Case of Daniel Kelly*: We have had some correspondence lately with an American who is interested in assisting Daniel Kelly, the son of an American father and a Chinese mother, all now living in Peiping, to come to the States to complete his pre-medical training. It would appear that the boy has a valid claim to American citizenship, but the Chinese Communists probably consider him also Chinese. We have recommended that Daniel Kelly be advised to apply for an exit permit, and if it is refused, to notify the Office of the UK Chargé. We did not want to make an issue of this case at Geneva, as we would naturally prefer to have it settled without having to cite the Agreed Announcement. It would be out of line for us to insist upon the application of the Agreed Announcement to a dual national, unless he were trying to leave in order to accompany his parents. This is apparently not the case in this instance.

5. *Matador*: The first elements of a USAF unit equipped with Matador guided missiles arrived in Taiwan about May 6. A press release giving the bare facts, emphasizing the defensive nature of the action and the US control of the unit was issued May 7 by Embassy Taipei and the GRC Foreign Ministry. Comment by US officials is to be limited to a minimum. The Chinese Communist reaction has already appeared in an article in the "Peoples Daily" on May 8. Copies of this article and our announcement are enclosed. Wang may bring up the matter in the next meeting.

6. *Father Wagner's Condition*: A despatch from Hong Kong (No. 860), a copy of which was sent to Geneva, reports Father Gross as saying Wagner's asthma is quite serious, and that there were at one time "hints" he might be released in advance of his sentence (June 1958). Despite some feeling that pressure on the Communists might prevent Wagner's early release, we are considering having the British make up representations as well as the possibility of asking you to take it up at Geneva.

7. *Donald Blackwood Enters Communist China*: An American citizen, Donald Blackwood, with his Korean wife and son, went into Communist China from Macao April 27. He appears to have gone voluntarily but we are at a loss as to his motivation. Such information as we have on this mysterious development is contained in a summary attached. There is no reason at present to bring this matter up at Geneva but it is conceivable that it might become a subject of discussion there in the future.

Sincerely yours,

**Ralph N. Clough**

Enclosures:

1. Copy of Questions & Answers for Senate Subcommittee.
2. Copy of article in "Peoples Daily" on Matador.
3. Copy of announcement on Matador.
4. Copy of British Despatch on Fr. Gross.
5. Summary of Blackwood case.

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**805. Telegram 1181 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 11, 1957

1181. For Johnson.

Guidance for May 15 meeting.

1. Concentrate on continued failure Chinese Communists implement Agreed Announcement. There is no justification whatsoever for Communists to continue hold eight Americans twenty months after they promised to take measures permit them expeditiously exercise right to return. So long as promised action not taken, result can only be to deepen distrust Peiping's pledges and render sterile present talks.

2. As further instance Communist retrogression on implementation cite Communist abandonment any pretense considering humanitarian factor, as exemplified by continued imprisonment Father Wagner, who reported seriously ill.

3. If Wang attacks MATADOR, deployment, review entirely defensive nature our collective security arrangements with GRC and point out MATADOR being sent Taiwan by agreement with GRC as part these security arrangements. Defensive measures obviously required in situation where Communists continue pose threat of hostile action and continue reject meaningful renunciation of force.

4. Maintain position other issues.

5. Set July date for next meeting.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-1157. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and Osborn; cleared in draft by Jones (FE). The time of transmission is illegible.

**806. Telegram 1193 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 14, 1957, 5:55 p.m.

1193. For Johnson.

Supplementary guidance regarding paragraph 3 Department's telegram 1181.

Public policy on MATADOR deployment to Taiwan has been to emphasize defensive nature of move and treat weapon on same basis as any other piece standard US Air Force equipment. You should take same line, emphasizing need for US defensive arrangements in Taiwan area, but avoiding discussion of propriety this particular weapon if Wang should attempt draw you into discussing this.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–1457. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Clough and Henderson; cleared by McConaughy and Jones.

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**807. Telegram 1166 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 15, 1957, 1 p.m.

1166. From Johnson.

One hour and forty minute meeting this morning.

I opened meeting with statement on implementation along lines para one and two Deptel 1181. Wang replied along usual lines with detailed presentation case of Dr. Lin Lan Ying (spelling uncertain) who departed San Francisco President Wilson January 6, 1957. Was Sylvania Electric Employee. Alleged great pressure by FBI and INS, including at stop in Honolulu, persuading her not to return. On departure San Francisco thorough search including body search and taking from her all notebooks and \$6,800 in travelers checks. Protested "rough handling" and asked for return personal property including notebooks and travelers checks.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–1557. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

Wang also made strong statement re stationing guided missiles Taiwan. Spoke of guided missiles being atomic weapons. Statement included "strong protest in name of his government" at this "act of aggression", "hostile act and another serious provocation" proving falsity US professions peaceful intent. "US must be held responsible for all consequences this act aggression". If US purpose is to achieve peaceful settlement good faith should be demonstrated by acts, etc. If US were not in military occupation of Taiwan reunion would have been realized long ago. China will never tolerate and certainly will liberate, etc. etc.

I replied along lines para three Deptel 1181 and Deptel 1193 including reaffirmation lawful administration Taiwan by GRC, mutual defense treaty with GRC and that those who had no aggressive intent had nothing to fear.

With respect Dr. Lin pointed out she had, in fact, returned in contrast the eight Americans still in Chinese prisons and those who would never return because of death under mistreatment. Cited fact she had not contacted Indian Embassy if, in fact, she felt she was being obstructed. Also strongly made point agreed announcement thus far no advantage but rather disadvantage to US.

Interesting to note that in today's meeting for first time Wang consistently used terminology "Geneva agreement" in referring agreed announcement and to "Geneva talks".

Next meeting July 11.

Popper

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#### 808. Telegram unnumbered from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, May 15, 1957

Unnumbered. From Johnson.

1. After Wang declined open, I opened 67th. It had been 20 months since he and I first entered agreement here to resolve first question with which we called upon to deal. It had been 20 months during which the high hopes of myself, my government, my people, that this problem of civilians could be resolved, had been disappointed. It had been

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-1557. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Johnson, Popper, and Freeland. Sent via pouch. Received on May 20.

20 months during which failure his authorities carry out this agreement between us had blocked improvement relations between our two countries. So long as his authorities continued fail carry out this agreement between us, it could only have result increasing our distrust and increasing doubts concerning intent his authorities carry out agreements into which we entered. So long as this situation continued we could not expect anything other than the sterility which had thus far existed in resolving other problems in these talks. Apparently it was intent his authorities emphasize that none of persons whom we had been talking about in the Sept. 10 agreement would be released until expiration their sentences. Last two persons released, Reverend Mackensen and Father Gross apparently held until very last day their sentences, thus emphasizing this pattern.

2. I continued entirely apart from question of obligation of his authorities under Agreed Announcement, he had often spoken of his authorities humanitarian and lenient approach toward unfortunate victims of their oppression. It difficult for me not conclude even this had now been abandoned. For example, we know Father Wagner was in hospital and seriously ill. I would have thought any policy of leniency and humanitarianism would certainly have dictated release Father Wagner long before this. I wanted express hope Father Wagner could certainly be released at latest next month at time Father McCarthy and Father Houle due to be released so he could accompany them. I would have hoped he would have for me this morning some indication his intent, not only about Father Wagner, but about other imprisoned persons—and his intent concerning carrying out our agreement so that this block to progress in dealing with matters we called upon to consider could be removed.

3. Wang replied (from prepared statement) he also had feeling although more than twenty months had passed since we entered talks, yet problems we called upon consider remain as deadlocked as ever. People of our two countries held high hopes with regard talks between us; however they seem be disappointed in this hope. Must be made clear that he and I entered into this series talks for purpose achieving peaceful settlement problems between China and US. Therefore, good faith of each side must be demonstrated with regard reduction tensions and improvement relations between two countries.

4. Wang continued, however, for an extended period, aggressive acts of my side in Taiwan area entirely contrary this purpose. My government had recently taken new steps to aggravate tensions in Taiwan Area by flagrantly stationing guided missiles unit on territory of Taiwan, thus turning Taiwan into launching ground for attacks against China. This hostile act of US could only be regarded as another serious provocation against China. This act also served prove pronouncements

of our peaceful intent, which I had made repeatedly in past, were entirely false.

5. Wang continued, in name his government he lodged strong protest. My side must be held responsible for all consequences this act aggression. Inside Conference Room my side continued stalling tactics, refused discuss tensions Taiwan Area and refused discuss his proposal removal embargo and cultural exchanges, etc. Outside of Conference Room my side tightening grip on Taiwan in attempt obstruct efforts Chinese people liberate Taiwan and continuing war-like acts to increase tension. One could not but doubt serious good faith my side.

6. Wang continued, so far as question civilians concerned, charges I had made were unacceptable to him. Ever since we had entered into Sept. 10 agreement his government had always been dealing with question civilians in accordance that agreement. As contrast to this there still remain 33 Chinese civilians in US prisons. So far as other Chinese nationals in US concerned, they still encounter repeated obstruction on part US authorities. He had raised such matters with me repeatedly in previous meetings. This morning he wanted take up case Chinese student Dr. Lin lan ying (spelling uncertain) who returned early this year. Since this case involved performance of US authorities in carrying out agreement of Sept. 10 and this related to ability thousands Chinese students in US return China, he felt it necessary call my attention to her complaint.

7. Wang continued. Dr. Lin graduated University Pennsylvania in US and employed in Sylvania Electric Co. in Philadelphia till her return in January, 1957. She departed San Francisco Jan 6, 1957 on SS President Wilson. Succeeded return homeland only after going through series unreasonable obstructions by US authorities. Let us follow story of unhappy lady and see what American authorities were doing in so-called carrying out of our agreement. When Dr. Lin was known to desire return, agents of U.S. Immigration Service came early December, 1956 interrogate her, used every vicious slander in intent intimidate her and compel her change mind. This sort interrogation and intimidation repeated Dec. 20, 1956, this time by agents FBI, who intruded in her apartment to do this. When these FBI agents failed to intimidate her they tried induce her move her family out of China.

After these two attempts failed to shake her resolve return, US authorities resorted to rough handling. On Jan 6 1957 when Dr. Lin waiting for embarkation San Francisco FBI agents suddenly turned up, made search all her baggage. What was more insulting was forced body search. In disregard her protests, agents also took away all notebooks and private property of \$6,800 in travellers checks. When liner arrived Honolulu US authorities made last attempt by sending immigration agents aboard attempt influence her against continuing journey.



8. Wang continued, my authorities had remarkable record attempts hinder return Chinese students. Dr. Lin only one among many such unfortunate victims. That many more Chinese students so far unable return, due to our obstructions, was beyond question. Dr. Lin was Chinese student who had never offended our laws, yet subjected to rough handling by our authorities merely because she desired return and invoked Geneva accord to return. What was there to assure freedom of Chinese in US to return? He urged my government actually take necessary measures stop all violation of agreement to return Chinese from US. With view safeguarding legitimate interests of Chinese nationals, Wang also asked me request my authorities return to Dr. Lin her private property of \$6,800 and all notebooks taken from her and give assurances against all recurrences such incidents. In addition, if I had any information with regard 52 and 22 persons who failed return, as well as concerning Chinese confined in our prisons, he glad hear it.

9. I replied, with regard Dr. Lin, I noted two things. First by his own statement she had returned to his country. Eight Americans who covered by our Agreed Announcement had not returned. There were other Americans who would never return—who had died from treatment they received in his prisons. There were others who had returned broken in mind and body. Virtually without exception they tell stories of most violent mistreatment. Second point I noted with regard Dr. Lin: if in fact there was basis for statements which he said she had now made and if in fact she felt being obstructed from leaving, she was at all times free to communicate with Indian Embassy. Fact that she apparently did not do so, fact that Indian Embassy not yet called to our attention single substantiated case obstruction among thousands Chinese in US, was incontrovertible evidence of faithfulness with which my authorities been carrying out our agreement. This has been affirmed also by public statements issued by Government of India and Indian Embassy.

10. I continued, with regard first part his statement I must flatly reject his completely erroneous statements that US had, or had intent carry out any acts aggression. We had to start with recognition of fact, whatever the views and policies of his government might be, the territory of Taiwan was lawfully occupied and administered by a government with which US had long had diplomatic relations, by a government recognized as a lawful government by majority of nations of world, by a government also so recognized by UN. US had with that government a treaty of mutual defense which had been published and registered with UN. That treaty and all our arrangements and understandings with that government were publicly and irrevocably defensive in their nature. Very first article of that treaty very specifically sets forth the agreement of both parties to it to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means. This an element which common to all

our treaties with like-minded countries who entered into arrangements to pool defensive strength against aggression. US adherence to this principle without exception and without equivocation amply demonstrated to world in recent months. None who did not have aggressive intent, none willing accept principle peaceful settlement disputes had anything to fear from any defensive arrangements US might make with countries of like mind. No threat to use force being posed by US anywhere in world, including area Taiwan.

11. I continued, I wanted point out on October 8, 1955 I made proposal here that force be removed in settlement our disputes including dispute in Taiwan area. That was proposal which he thus far rejected. Threat hostile action Taiwan area thus still being maintained by his authorities. US would be deficient in carrying out international obligations and lacking in responsibility if it did not recognize this fact and take whatever defensive measures appeared be prudent. This posed no threat to his country or anyone of peaceful intent. I still hopeful he would accept proposal I had made for unconditional renunciation force in Taiwan area as well as elsewhere. No one of truly peaceful intent could object to that proposal.

12. Wang replied, cases Chinese civilians residing US who encountered unreasonable obstruction on part American authorities appearing every day. Experience of Dr. Lin to whom he referred this morning was only one of many similar such cases. Actions taken by American Immigration authorities in case Dr. Lin assumed such scale one could only term it plain robbery by taking away private property and confiscating all her notebooks. I had just now argued Dr. Lin returned Wang's country after all. He wanted point out she did not return freely as entitled to under Geneva Agreement. Succeeded returning only after encountered series unreasonable obstructions by American authorities. Fact that Dr. Lin succeeded returning did not absolve US authorities of responsibility for obstructing her return. As to allegations I made this morning regarding alleged ill-treatment Americans in China, he could only term them entirely unfounded and irresponsible allegations. There were facts to prove even persons released out of prison, desired remain in his country of their own free will. These facts would shatter all unfounded rumors and slander against his country.

13. Wang continued with regard protest he had lodged with our side this morning regarding act aggression by US government by stationing guided missiles atomic unit on Chinese territory Taiwan, he could not accept statement I had just made. It was entirely due to military occupation by US government that Taiwan still not united with Chinese mainland. Unreasonable stand taken by US government in supporting in Taiwan the KMT regime to oppose the Chinese government also met a disapprobation by all peace-loving peoples of the world. Underlying

factor in existing tension Far East entirely created by US in military occupation Taiwan. Had there not been American military occupation in Taiwan, reunion between Taiwan and Chinese mainland would have been realized long ago. Chinese people would never tolerate occupation of Taiwan by US. Chinese people certainly will liberate Taiwan. No force on earth could ever deter this determination on part Chinese people. No amount rationalization and argument offered by me could ever cover acts of aggression by US government demonstrated in their latest military threats, posed in the Taiwan area in form of stationing guided missiles unit on Taiwan.

14. Wang continued, had been common practice by aggressor governments in history always speak of aggressive arrangements as if these aggressive arrangements entirely for defensive purposes. The stark fact at present is that it is US government occupying Chinese territory and not Chinese government occupying any territory of US. Fact is at present US posing threats against China and not China posing threats against US. If one desires talk of renunciation of force he should make good his words by actual deeds. In face of latest tension created by US in Taiwan area, how could anyone believe any more in any peaceful promises by US. Chinese people would oppose to end such open aggression, provocation. If US had any peaceful intentions, it should demonstrate sincerity by concrete acts. This what he always looked forward to.

15. I replied, nothing he had said changed fact that it his government which still posed threat use force in Taiwan area. There was vast difference between saying willing settle disputes peacefully if other side surrenders to your point of view and saying unconditionally you willing settle disputes peacefully.

16. Wang replied, facts show who was advocating peaceful settlement dispute Taiwan area and who was willing use force that area. These facts could not be distorted. Today when people everywhere oppose policy of war threats, latest steps taken by US government in Taiwan area can never be explained as resulting from peaceful intent. Latest military threat posed by US government in Taiwan could never succeed in frightening people. On the contrary, they can only stir up indignation and hatred.

17. I replied, our problem not to reach agreement on situation in Taiwan area. Problem is to agree we will not use force to settle it. That and carrying out of first agreement between us are still the essential steps in bringing about that improvement in relations which we, on our side, seek.

18. Wang replied he had made clear his point of view that this series talks here in Geneva should have as purposes relaxation international tensions and improvement relations between our two countries.

In accordance this purpose he had made series proposals advantageous to both peoples, both governments. Believed these proposals advantageous to both sides. They continued hope there should be progress in these talks between us.

19. I replied I accepted first proposal he had made here. I accepted it with understanding it would be advantageous to both sides. I could not see that there had been any advantage—in fact, it seemed to have been disadvantageous.

20. Wang rejoined whether advantageous or disadvantageous, only the facts could prove.

21. Wang had nothing more to say, and I had nothing more. I suggested next meeting July 11. Wanted him know I planned return this evening to Washington for consultation and short rest with my family.

22. Wang agreed.

Popper

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**809. Letter from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 5, 1957

Dear Alex:

I haven't a great deal to add to our conversation last Tuesday. I have discussed the matter of your instructions for the next meeting with Dave Osborn and Howard Jones, and we have some ideas on how to meet the problem which you mentioned to the Secretary. We plan to discuss the draft instructions with Mr. Robertson either today or Monday and will also send them up to the Secretary.

The problem of travel of newsmen to Communist China remains unresolved and the Secretary is currently considering the latest proposal for some kind of pool arrangement. We still feel here that if newspaper men are permitted to go, it would be very difficult to hold the line on travel of others.

With respect to the missing military personnel, we are still thinking in terms of having the next move take place in Panmunjom. We have been urging Defense to move on this, but they have not yet

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret.

indicated when they will be ready to do so. I hope that it will be before your next meeting so that we could then shift the attack to Geneva if it seemed desirable. We are tentatively thinking that if new efforts at both Panmunjom and Geneva bring no results, it might be useful to publish a joint State-Defense report on this subject, going into some detail as to the criteria for placing names on the list, mentioning our various attempts to obtain an accounting from the Communists and giving examples to show how defective has been the accounting we have received.

Tseng Kuang-chih, the student from Purdue University who has been in the state mental hospital at Logansport, Indiana was deported June 13 aboard one of the President liners. Other cases of whom the Chinese Communists have or may have knowledge are:

Lin Lan-ying (memos attached)

Chang Chih-ye (memo attached)

John Woos (copy of letter attached)

Edwin Pon (copy of letter attached)

We have been informed by Immigration and Naturalization Service that Pon is leaving July 7.

We will try to cover in your instructions the various subjects which Wang might raise, and suggest appropriate lines of reply. We have sent to Geneva various items of background material which we thought might be useful to you and are attaching to this letter certain others. As a general practice, we send materials as soon as they come to hand rather than hold them to enclose with a letter, since letters have become too infrequent.

We will be watching with interest to see whether Wang presents anything new. We don't really expect him to, but many remarkable things have been happening in the Communist world of late and he may surprise us.

It was a great pleasure to see you the other day. You can count on us to support to the best of our ability your tedious but skillful endeavors at Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

**Ralph N. Clough**  
*Director for Chinese Affairs*

Enclosures:

1. Dept. of Defense Press Release re Aircraft Carrier Hornet
2. FBIS Item re "Armistice Meeting Request Backed" dated June 28, 1957.

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3. FBIS Item re Korean Ambassador's Statement re Korean Armistice Agreement.

4. Despatch No. 631 from Taipei re "Cause and motivations for riots of 5/24."

5. Chronology of mob attack on U.S. Embassy and USIS at Taipei.

6. Memo for files re "Increased Tempo of Hostilities around Offshore Islands"

7. Copy of letter to Edwin Pon dated 6/25/57.

8. Article from New York Times dated 6/13/57 re "U.S. Carrier Plane Hit by Red Chinese Gunfire".

9. Telegram from CINCUNC Tokyo No. FE 208197 re 76th meeting of the MAC.

10. Telegram from CINCUNC Tokyo No. FE 208123 re 75th meeting of MAC.

11. FBIS item dated June 13, 1957 entitled "US Chiang Planes Invade Kwangtung".

12. FBIS item dated June 13, 1957 entitled "U.S. Die-Hard Group Hostile to China".

13. Defense Department News Release dated June 21, 1957

14. Copy of Memo dated 12/11/56 from FBI re Lin Lan-ying with its enclosures.

15. Copy of memo dated July 3, 1957 from Mr. Aylward to Mr. Clough re "Dr. Lin Lan-ying—removal of \$6,800 in Travelers Checks at San Francisco".

16. Item from New York Times, June 24, 1957, re U.S. Missionary Dies in China.

17. Memo from Aylward to Osborn April 4 re Deportation of Chinese Aliens.

18. Memo from Aylward to Clough 6/15/57 re Chang Chin-ye

19. Paper entitled "Interim Assessment of Riots of May 24 in Taipei".

20. Communique re Kishi visit, dated June 21, 1957.

21. Copy of Letter from Father Rigney, dated June 21, 1957.

22. Statement by Mr. Robertson before the Foreign Operations Sub-Committee of the House Committee on Appropriations 6/27/57.

**810. Telegram 36 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 9, 1957, 4:40 p.m.

36. For Johnson.

Guidance for July 11 meeting:

1. Remind Wang one of basic obstacles progress in talks and peaceful discussion and settlement problems threat posed by Communist insistence on use force if necessary.

This also basic cause of tension Far East, which imposes heavy burden on peoples of area. Essential first step to remove threat and tension is reciprocal renunciation force. Step deserves serious discussion long as necessary to reach agreement. Responsibility cannot be evaded by submitting number of drafts which reflect no serious attempt meet US view, then attempting shift discussion to corollary problems as Wang did year ago.

2. Tell Wang your trip to US brought home depth concern American people for six prisoners. This ought to be short-run problem which need not require long discussion. Only requires measures promised by Communists in Agreed Announcement. American people cannot understand failure take such measures. FYI We hope that shifting usual order presentation foregoing subjects and emphasizing fundamental nature renunciation force problem and US willingness undertake prolonged discussion if necessary may help counter possible Communist belief that release remaining prisoners would result in prompt withdrawal US from talks END FYI.

3. Regarding Wang's inquiry on Lin Lan-ying, inform him search made accordance customary procedures and with customary safeguards. She was allowed take money required for trip and excess taken from her as required by long-standing regulations and placed in blocked account. Note that Chinese Communist regulations strictly limit funds Americans permitted take out of Communist China. If Wang inquires about Tseng Kuang-chih or Edwin Pon inform him they left US on June 13 and July 9 respectively for Communist China. If he mentions Woos, inform him Woos entered US 1922 as US citizen by birth and Agreed Announcement not applicable US citizens.

4. If Wang attacks UNC decision introduce modern weapons Korea or US despatch missile unit Taiwan point out actions taken only in response long-term Communist introduction modern weapons

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-957. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Osborn and Clough; cleared in draft by Jones and Robertson.

Korea in violation armistice agreement and in case Taiwan as reaction to continued build-up military facilities opposite Taiwan and refusal renounce force.

5. Wang may refer to Secretary's San Francisco speech, Taiwan riot or plane incident Swatow, probably as part generalized attack on US policies in Far East. Your response should demonstrate, using material from speech and elsewhere, that US policies of which Wang complains made necessary by threatening nature of Communist policies. It should not be necessary be drawn into discussion of either plane incident or riot which would place you in undesirably defensive position.

**Dulles**

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### 811. Telegram 30 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, July 11, 1957, 10 a.m.

30. From Johnson.

Hammaraskjold saw me this morning to say he wanted continue to coordinate with me on question missing military personnel and Downey and Fecteau. He said with respect missing military personnel someone suggested recently proposed congressional resolution makes it desirable take some new action. However, his view was that as matter now primarily in my hands here and at MAC best that he not cross wires and would do nothing additional unless we asked him. I said I agreed.

With respect Downey and Fecteau same consideration applies. In reply my query as to what he thought he could do he said that as Chou had taken initiative raising their cases with him he could readily go back to Chou with personal communication concerning them. He said argument some made against this was that it would single out Downey and Fecteau from other civilians still held. I said latter consideration did not seem too important to me as Downey and Fecteau were not only covered by agreed announcement but also by Korean armistice and thus within scope U.N. resolution under which he acting. I was therefore inclined to favor such approach by him at this time.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1157. Confidential; Limit Distribution.



I did not see it could do any harm and it might do good in indicating that U.N. interest in them still alive. Said I would inform Washington and Ambassador Lodge would be in further touch with him concerning matter.

Gowen

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## 812. Telegram 31 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, July 11, 1957, 3 p.m.

31. From Johnson.

Two hour ten minute meeting this morning.

Wang opened with generalized statement attacking “policy of hostility” and “aggressive policy” aimed at overthrowing PRC set forth in Secretary’s San Francisco speech as well as referring stationing guided missiles on Taiwan and plane incident. No rpt no mention Korea. Policy set forth by Secretary was meeting increasing opposition abroad and in US as well as meeting with defeat as exemplified by recent actions other Western countries concerning embargo. “Even in Taiwan patriotic people have risen in protests against this policy.” US proposal of renunciation of force was “deceptive and hypocritical excuse.” Then continued with statement on implementation referring previous inquiry on Dr. Lin and making statement Tseng Kuang-chih. Situation with regard to Chinese in US continues to be unsatisfactory.

I replied with long statement along lines paras one and two Deptel 36 as well as making strong counterattack on PRC record of hostility toward US, PRC attack on US in Korea, PRC attempts at subversion of and support of rebellion against Asian states friendly to US, etc. Made detailed reply on Dr. Lin pointing out that though she attempted take US funds in violation of US regulations she was permitted to proceed. Also made detailed reply on Tseng using material Deptel 40 which much appreciated and most useful. Characterized our handling both Dr. Lin and Tseng as most considerate for which we should receive appreciation rather than complaint. Wished problem imprisoned Americans would be handled with same consideration. Solution problem of imprisoned Americans “would permit us direct

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–1157. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

undivided attention to question reciprocal renunciation of force which remains fundamental to successful discussion other items under second part our terms reference."

Subsequent give and take largely restatement respective position on renunciation of force. PRC will never agree to any formula which violates its sovereign rights. Many PRC proposals for improvement relations have not raised "response or echo" from US.

No surprises or new developments, line taken by Wang being very much along lines anticipated by Deptel 36. His presentation, though, was largely pro forma and carried no intimation any intention break talks or make new move. At one point when I used term "new departure" in referring to renunciation of force he eagerly picked it up and used it as take-off point for urging new departure by US in talks. He also pointed out both sides agreed Taiwan area tension is fundamental problem. Gave no indication whether he caught my point on willingness continue talks even if all Americans released.

Next meeting August 8. Detailed record by pouch arriving Dept Monday.

Gowen

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### 813. Telegram unnumbered from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, July 11, 1957

Unnumbered. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 68th with prepared statement. As he had repeatedly stressed, purpose of talks was for both sides to arrive at peaceful settlement of disputes between two countries. In this desire his side had put forth series of practical and feasible proposals each of which could lessen tensions and open up prospects of improved relations between China and America. But what had history of talks shown? My side had not only shown no intention of contributing to that realization, but had not abandoned its hostility toward China. My side was only interested in working up tension and stepping up threat of armed force against China. This willful policy of U.S. was increasingly

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1157. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Johnson. Sent via pouch. Received on July 18.

meeting with defeat. For example, a great number of Western countries relaxed embargo in face U.S. objections. U.S. policy of hostility against China did not conform to interests of peace or of American people. Even people in U.S. criticizing that policy.

2. Wang continued, in San Francisco, Secretary of State Dulles not only clung to that outworn policy but called for even more aggressive policy. American Secretary of State was not yet willing to reconcile himself to fact PRC had existed for eight years. His speech did not hide intention subverting and overthrowing PRC. Dulles called PRC passing phase and pledged self to contribute to this passing. Could this be called sincere desire for settlement disputes and relaxation tensions between two countries? U.S. not only unwilling renounce occupation Chinese territory Taiwan but had installed guided missile bases on Taiwan. An American squadron had intruded in Chinese territorial waters and 66 sorties of carrier-based planes violated Chinese air space. However, this U.S. policy of creating tension and threat of aggression against China could not achieve its ends.

3. Wang continued, not only was this policy opposed by Chinese people but it being condemned by all peaceful people. Even in Taiwan, under close control American aggressor, all patriotic people can no longer endure being enslaved nor countenance Taiwan being turned into American base; they have therefore risen in protest against this policy and against outrageous slaughter of Chinese people. 600 million people would never forget this and other bloody crimes committed by American aggressor against China.

4. Wang continued, after seizure of Chinese Territory Taiwan, my side has been proposing what it calls Renunciation of Force. During these negotiations my side had never slackened aggression against China, and continued set up bases for aggressive guided missile atomic warfare against China. My side continued create provocation incidents to increase tensions. Under these circumstances the Renunciation of Force proposal was a deceptive and hypocritical excuse. As long as U.S. did not change its policy of hostility and aggression tensions would not be relaxed, disputes would not be settled, relations would not be improved and there would be no results in our talks and the U.S. would be held entirely responsible for the consequences.

5. Wang continued, he had another matter to bring up. At previous meetings he had given examples of unreasonable obstructions. Last year on February 9 at the 36th meeting he had given me a list of names including Tseng Kuang-chih. Tseng had now returned to China but story he had to tell was appalling one. Wang had thought my side would have taken measures concerning, and give accounting of, individuals on that list. He understood Tseng taken away in handcuffs under orders Immigration Service and confined in solitary confinement

in mental institution. Until recently Tseng had been subject to deportation although he had not violated any laws. It is hard to understand under what authority so many have been detained, and, in the cases of Mr. Tseng and Mr. Liu, imprisoned in mental hospitals. Repetition of this kind of treatment shows US authorities pay no heed to our Agreed Announcement. This situation increases our anxiety concerning the fate of the 50 and the 32 people who not yet returned. Wang urged me impress on US authorities that they should stop violating Agreed Announcement and give accounting of those being detained. With regard to detention of Dr. Lin which he had mentioned last meeting he would like to hear any comments I had and would like to know whether US prepared to return property to owner.

6. I replied during past two years we had long and frank discussions of certain questions existing between our two countries. Although our differences unhappily remain deep and fundamental I believed he would share my view that it had nevertheless been desirable and useful to have such a direct exchange of views between us. We had though, at times, tended to digress from what both of us agreed was a fundamental matter, and I first wanted briefly to return to that this morning. I referred to the question as to whether we were going to permit the clash of our policies and in particular our differences with respect to the Taiwan area to lead to a clash of arms. He would recall that at the very beginning of our discussion of this subject I had proposed the simple first step of a reciprocal renunciation of force couched in terms that would make it clear that neither of us were renouncing any policy objectives that we considered ourselves legitimately entitled to achieve.

7. I continued, Wang had this morning again spoken of what he called the policy of aggression and hostility of U.S. government against his country. He could not ignore fact that from beginning these talks it was U.S. which had made proposal we renounce force as means achieve national policy objectives and especially with regard clash our policies in general and specifically with regard Taiwan area. From very beginning of the time when his authorities took control of Mainland China they exhibited policy of undisguised hostility toward my country and everything for which my country stood. This hostility not only extended to my country but also to countries with which my country stood in relationship of friendship and alliance. It was authorities of his country who had grossly mistreated U.S. officials and made impossible the maintenance of U.S. official establishments on territory under the control of Wang's authorities. It was the authorities of his country who expelled, mistreated and imprisoned Americans who attempted remain in territory under control Wang's authorities. U.S. never had threatened, and never would initiate the use of arms against Wang's country. It was Wang's country which had attacked U.S. forces in Korea

who were there on a lawful mission under the authority of the U.N. It was his authorities who had supported and fomented rebellion in the territory of countries friendly to the U.S. I would not take time further to review record but that record clear one of undisguised hostility of his country toward my country.

8. I continued it was with hope bringing about fundamental change in that situation and thus opening of way to peaceful settlement in those disputes that I had made my proposal for peaceful settlement of disputes between us. It not possible to ignore the fact that one of basic obstacles to progress our talks here and peaceful discussion and settlement of our problems continued to be unwillingness of his authorities to agree to this simple proposition. It was a source of deep disappointment and concern that they continued to insist on their intention to use force if necessary to achieve their policy objectives. This was basic cause of tension in the whole Far East which imposed a heavy burden on the people of the area. Neither those people nor the United States and its allies could ignore this threat nor fail to take such steps as were within their power to meet the possibility of its implementation. It was absurd to say that the steps taken by the U.S. and other like-minded countries to meet this threat were the cause of tension. The cause of tension came not from those who took reasonable and sensible precautions to defend themselves against the publicly announced threat of attack but rather from those who refused to renounce such threats. It was equally absurd to say that if those subject to such threats would only not take any precautions and supinely leave themselves defenseless against such threats there would be no tension. Of course, there would be no tension if all who were subject to threats in this world would meekly surrender to those who attempt to arrogate unto themselves the authority to tell peoples and countries how their lives should be ordered. However, it hard to believe that those who take such point of view understand the meaning of negotiation and settlement of differences by peaceful means between self-respecting sovereign countries.

9. I continued therefore essential first step remained removal of this threat, and tension it caused, by a reciprocal renunciation of force. This step was of such transcendental importance to the peaceful settlement of our differences that I considered that it deserved discussion as long as necessary to reach agreement rather than ignoring it or pretending that the problem did not exist. Neither can the problem be evaded by submitting numbers of drafts which reflected no serious attempt squarely to face the issue and then shift the discussion to other purely corollary problems. Such a course could not contribute to progress in our talks here.

10. I continued, as Wang knew, I had just returned from trip to U.S. I want him to know that my conversations there not only with

officials of my government but also with private individuals brought home to me depth of concern of American people over Americans still imprisoned in his country. They also concerned over failure give us that information about Americans still missing from hostilities in Korea which his authorities must have. Question of imprisoned Americans ought to have been and still could be short-run problem which need not require long discussions. All it required was that his authorities take those measures for their release that were envisaged in the Agreed Announcement. It was evident that none with whom I talked was able to understand the failure to carry out the promise contained in the Announcement. Neither could I. Chinese in U.S. desiring to return their country, continued be entirely free do so. In fact, to best of my knowledge at least 345 had done so since beginning our talks here.

11. I continued, in accordance with request made at our last meeting which Wang had repeated here this morning, I had looked into the matter of Dr. Lin Lan-ying who returned to Wang's country early this year. Contrary to the statements Wang said she now makes, she at no time prior to her departure made any allegation that she was in any way being obstructed or prevented from departing and very fact she did depart is best evidence that there was no such obstruction. At the time of her departure a search was made by the Customs Authorities—not by the FBI as Wang asserted—in accordance with customary procedure and with all customary safeguards to determine whether there was any attempted violation of law. It was found that Dr. Lin was, in violation of a long standing regulation of which she must have been perfectly aware, attempting to take with her an amount of U.S. dollar funds far in excess of any reasonable needs for the trip. In spite of this attempted violation of our laws and regulations no action was taken against her and she was permitted to proceed without hindrance. Excess funds she was attempting to remove from the country had not been confiscated as implied in Wang's statement but had rather been deposited to her credit in a blocked account. Further search was made only to determine whether she was attempting to remove additional matter or information in violation of U.S. law and rather than delay her departure she was told that written matter carried by her would subsequently be examined for such information. Not only is this a matter entirely within the competence and authority of my government but I had noted that Americans who had returned from Wang's country reported that Wang's authorities had very strictly limited the amount of funds they had been permitted take with them. Thus, I saw no grounds whatever for any complaint with regard Dr. Lin who, in spite of attempted violation of U.S. law, was freely permitted proceed to Wang's country.

12. I continued Wang had this morning mentioned and his radio had carried reports making entirely erroneous statements concerning Mr. Tseng Kuang-chih. Purport statements was after Tseng indicated desire return Wang's country, Tseng arrested and falsely handled as person mentally unsound. Facts of matter were quite different. Mr. Tseng entered U.S. on January 30, 1948 and originally entered as student Maryland University. In somewhat more than a year he showed signs of mental illness. Between June 1949 and March 1950 he was treated in Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore and Spring Groves State Hospital in Maryland. He improved and was released and entered into study at Ohio State University, then Illinois University, then Purdue University. Although visa for admission into US expired Sept. 1955, he was permitted remain. Although Wang had included his name on list given Feb. 9, 1956 as person who desired return Wang's country, Tseng himself in March 1956 formally and specifically applied for extension his stay in U.S. It became evident to authorities at Purdue University where he studying that he again becoming mentally ill. They made arrangements for his admission to Wabash Valley Sanatorium on April 18, 1956. At recommendation of doctors in that hospital, he was admitted to Logansport Indiana State Hospital on May 25, 1956. At time moved from Wabash to Logansport he placed under restraint at recommendation of doctors for own protection. The restraint immediately removed on admission Logansport Hospital. Any implication that this done on recommendation Immigration Service entirely false. It done entirely on recommendation doctors for own protection and those around him. Student advisor at Purdue remained in touch with him to see what could be done for him. After admission to hospital, he indicated to student adviser that he desired return to Wang's country. Student adviser communicated with Dept. of State and there was also communication with Indian Embassy concerning his case. Doctors treating Tseng certified not advisable nor was he competent to travel alone. Thus there arose question payment for attendant for him during his travel. Indian Embassy said not authorized pay for an attendant. I would not go into details, but in January of this year Mr. Tseng informed the Indian Embassy that in order to facilitate question of attendant, he had informed U.S. Immigration Service of desire leave country. Embassy replied they had no objection if he desired use facilities INS rather than Embassy. INS then arranged for an attendant to accompany him. INS paid cost of such an attendant as well as cost of travel. He now returned safely to Wang's country and arrived there. I thought handling this case by authorities my country showed utmost care in assisting him as well as facilitation his return to Wang's country. Rather than ill-considered complaints, I should have felt an expression of appreciation would be more in order. I regretted that cases of Americans imprisoned in Wang's country desiring to return



had not been as considerably handled as our authorities had handled cases Mr. Tseng and Dr. Lin. This problem of Americans remaining in prison in Wang's country was readily resolvable by his authorities so that further discussion of it between us would not be necessary. The solution of this problem would permit us to direct our undivided attention to the question of reciprocal renunciation of force, which remains fundamental to successful discussion of other items under second part our terms of reference.

13. Wang replied question of taking effective steps and means to relax tension Taiwan area and settling disputes between our two countries was at center of terms reference leading to present talks between us. In talking about causes and sources tension Taiwan area and disputes between our countries he had to flatly reject my statement which he could only consider arbitrary. It entirely reversed and obscured the facts. It failed to take into account facts of situation. Liberation of China and establishment of PRC entirely natural development of internal forces China and no foreign country should have any right to interfere in this affair.

14. Wang continued, since establishment PRC U.S. been pursuing policy downright hostility to China and policy which did not recognize existence of PRC. Furthermore, U.S. taken series steps in opposition to PRC. It was U.S. which had initiated policy embargo against China. It U.S. started aggression in Korea and brought about armed threat against his country. It U.S. who still occupied by armed force their territory Taiwan and established aggressive military bases against his country. It was U.S. which carried out threatening and aggressive activities around territory his country. It was U.S. which did everything it could deprive PRC of right take part in affairs of international community.

15. Wang continued, objective this series hostile policies and activities was interfere in internal affairs his country and as Dulles announced object of US was try subvert Wang's government. No amount statements could cover up the series arbitrary and gross violations of standards international conduct, and of Charter U.N., against Wang's country. Wang's country could not be shaken by such aggressive and hostile policies by U.S. China would exist forever and would become consolidated and stronger. Those who would suffer would be persons who tried play with fire in this respect.

16. Wang continued, today's situation was that U.S. stationing military bases on territory other countries. It was U.S. threatening and attempting subvert Wang's country rather than Wang's country trying subvert my government. It was no more than deception to present this sort of policy of hostility as being steps for defensive purposes. In point of fact people in Asia as well as all other places rising to protest against U.S. policy of creating tensions. This was underlying cause



present tension in Far East, and cause failure achieve relaxed situation there. This was reason he proposed discuss question relaxing tension in Far East. They on their part had made repeated efforts and made series of proposals in course talks in order that tension in Taiwan Area may be relaxed.

17. Wang continued, we had discussed for nearly two years and still had not achieved anything. He had always been dissatisfied with the situation. It not his side who stalling in this question, not his side who had digressed from this problem. Still remained to see whether serious efforts would be made in these talks to relax tension in Taiwan Area. In this regard no empty words would settle the problem.

18. I replied all I had to say was important thing not that we agree on past history. Important thing was we take new departure. I proposed that new departure two years ago. That departure was to make it unequivocally clear that we were not going to use force or threat of force to settle our differences. His government still publicly and in this room maintained threat use force if it could not otherwise achieve its objectives. Nothing that had been said could change that fact. Once that threat clearly and unequivocally removed so negotiations could take place free from that threat, attempts to resolve them could be undertaken with some hope of success. To say U.S. in conjunction with allies would renounce common sense measures taken to meet that threat was not serious attempt at negotiation, but rather a call to surrender to Wang's point of view. What I have asked and still asked was that the threat be renounced.

19. Wang replied, in course past two years he had repeatedly said we should take active steps to settle dispute in Taiwan area. They had time and again expressed dissatisfaction at fact meetings being stalled and problems remained unsettled. They had made various concrete proposals but these had not aroused either a response or an echo. I had mentioned need of taking up new departure—new starting point. This would be welcomed on his part. This would mean one should not further drag out these talks but take steps to push talks forward, to stop empty statements, and one should take concrete action. Even more important would be to see concrete action coming out from new departure I had referred to.

20. I replied, new departure I had referred to was renunciation threat force proposed by my side. It was departure he still refused to undertake. It was departure which was fundamental.

21. Wang replied I had said that relaxation tension in Taiwan area was fundamental problem to be dealt with between us. To this he agreed. Question remained by what formula disputes between us were to be settled. Any proposal for settlement this problem which violated sovereign rights of one side was unacceptable. Any proposal

to solve this question should be based on respect of sovereign rights. He had made this fully clear in course our discussion and in proposals his side put forth on renunciation force. Method of dragging out talks could not settle these problems between us. Now it remained for us to see what action U.S. would take to bring about genuine settlement this dispute.

22. I replied, first problem not question settling one way or other sovereign rights nor settling formulae or forums in which this matter may be discussed. I had tried to make it clear first question was to agree we were not going to fight—that is, that the threat to use force had been withdrawn. I had offered him various formulae for draft declarations which would enable him fully to preserve his position and enable him to pursue his policies without using threat of force. He had come back with various formulae and drafts which in themselves in the light of discussions here, and of public statements, made it clear he preserved right threaten and use force. He asked that I negotiate substance of question itself under that threat. I had tried make it as clear as I could this is what I could not and would not do. However, once that threat removed in clear and unequivocal statement we could then in that atmosphere discuss further steps to be taken.

23. Wang replied, in settlement tension in Taiwan area, the question of sovereign rights could not be put aside. If sovereign rights were discarded, then a state could no longer be considered a state. I had stated the central problem was avoiding war between us. But China not proposing to start a war with U.S. They were prepared to settle problems between us by just methods but this did not mean surrender to any side. It would not serve useful purpose to repeat old words which had been repeated many times. Repetition of old words and remarks did not constitute new departure. With respect my remarks this morning concerning Chinese civilians in U.S. he could not be satisfied with those remarks. He reserved comments for next meeting.

24. I had nothing more and suggested next meeting August 8. He agreed.

Gowen

**814. Letter 57 from Johnson to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 57

Geneva, July 11, 1957

Dear Ralph:

I want to thank you most heartily for your letter of July 5 and the very full enclosures which, together with your most welcome telegram on Tseng enabled me to be fully armed for today's meeting. As you will see I was able to smother him with detail on Tseng and he had no comeback whatever at today's meeting.

As far as comment on today's meeting is concerned, I have nothing to add to my telegram. I, of course, did not expect he would in any way overtly react to my effort to put across the point we would not necessarily stop the Talks if the Americans were released, and it is hard for me to tell whether it went across. It may not have, and I will work on this as opportunity arises. Tell the Secretary I greatly appreciated his personal message on this and will continue to play it as best I can. While it is only a factor in their failure to let them go, it is perhaps one that I will be able to remove.

It was good to have Ed here but was sorry to learn after his arrival that it meant again busting up his vacation.

With Ekvall now staying in Paris between meetings there will be no one here to receive messages, handle correspondence or sort out incoming material. (Incidentally, I told Wang that Popper would be the contact here for any messages between meetings.) Therefore, I have several suggestions for handling material along the lines of our conversation.

First, on the understanding that CA will screen and transmit to me all pertinent material from the FBIS, I suggest that FBIS be told no longer to transmit its file to me.

I would suggest that insofar as is practical a copy of such material be sent directly to me as well as to Ed as it appears without waiting for the now monthly letter.

I would suggest that press statements on our part, records of MAC meetings, speeches and similar unclassified material be similarly handled.

In general, it would be best that classified material such as the FBI reports on Dr. Lin or other classified material for which I may have a need in meetings continue to be sent to me here. This obviates the problem of my having to carry classified material with me on the plane.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

Also, please tell whoever handles it that they can cease sending me here the tear sheets from the Daily Summary but I would appreciate continuing to receive them at Prague.

I am asking Mrs. Gross, who is my secretary on a contract basis, to come in once a week to go through and sort out incoming mail, but what I suggest above will reduce its volume. I may well have other suggestions later.

With regard to Ekvall he has been told by the MA office in Paris that he should be in the States two months before his retirement date which is the latter part of February. They have told him that he should therefore plan to depart in December. Therefore, if we want to hold him through the January meeting DA should say something to the MA in Paris. So that both of us know where we stand I suggest you get someone to work on this right away with the DA and get the date definitely established.

Vreeland is also leaving but I have been able to arrange with the Consulate to have Cameron Le Clair replace him beginning next meeting.

I forgot to mention in my telegram, but you will notice from the full record that I threw in a short reference to the missing military personnel at today's meeting. I felt that in the context of mentioning my trip to the States and the press stories on the Congressional Resolution its omission by me at today's meeting would have been conspicuous.

I hope Walter Robertson is getting along all right. Give him my best.

Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson

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#### 815. Telegram 37 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, July 12, 1957, 10 a.m.

37. Reference Hong Kong Niact to Department 62, repeated Information London 5, Geneva 2.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1257. Confidential; Priority.

Johnson-Wang Talks.

Johnson left Geneva by air for Prague this morning. Reference telegram repeated Prague.

Gowen

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**816. Letter 71 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 71

Washington, July 18, 1957

Dear Alex:

I have just received your letter of July 11 and will not try to comment on it in detail at this time. Needless to say we will proceed to act on your various suggestions, none of which seems particularly difficult to accomplish.

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the Secretary, Mr. Berding and Mr. Robertson are meeting today with representatives of American press media to see whether a formula can be worked out which would permit limited travel by correspondents to Communist China without too seriously compromising our China Policy. Whether it will be possible to devise any effective safeguard against a gradual erosion of all travel restrictions, I rather doubt. However, it looks very much as if we will make the attempt.

If we should undertake a limited relaxation of our travel ban to permit correspondents to go to Communist China, do you see any advantage in announcing this to Wang at Geneva simultaneously with or prior to public announcement? Since we took a firm position last year that we would not authorize such travel so long as the Chinese Communists refuse to release the imprisoned Americans, it is hard to see how we could get any mileage out of announcing to Communist China that we are backing down on this point. On the contrary our action might simply confirm the Communists in their apparent belief that time is on their side and that we will eventually make the concessions they desire without their releasing the Americans or taking any other step which they might regard as concession to us. This of course would be the case whether we announced our action in the Geneva forum or not.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Martin.

We would appreciate your views on this as soon as possible. There is enclosed a draft press release which will give you an idea of the type of announcement which is being considered. It is by no means final and may undergo many further changes.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph N. Clough

**Enclosure**

**Draft Press Release No. 9<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, July 11, 1957

*DRAFT PRESS RELEASE*

The policy of the United States with reference to Communism in China, non-recognition, no commercial or cultural relations and related matters has been recently restated by the Secretary of State in his address of June 28, 1957, at San Francisco. In application of this policy, there are relevant laws and executive orders, notably the Trading with the Enemy Act and determinations there-under. Generally speaking, it is not consistent with United States policy, or lawful, that there be travel by Americans to the areas of China now under Communist control.

However, the Secretary of State has determined that, in view of the desirability of additional information respecting current conditions within China, it may prove consistent with the foreign policy of the United States that exceptionally, there be travel by a strictly limited number of American news representatives to the China mainland to permit direct reporting by them to the American people about conditions in the area under Chinese Communist control.

The Department of State is therefore willing on an experimental basis to issue passports not restricted as regards travel to and on the mainland of China to not more than ten to fifteen experienced professional American news representatives. These representatives will be designated, not by the Department, but by the major news media—newspapers, radio, television and magazines—as they have in other situations requiring a limitation of numbers. The Department notes that representatives of many news media have already suggested that a representative from each of the twelve organizations which maintained full-time American correspondents in China at the time of the Communist assumption of power be included in the designated correspondents, and

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<sup>2</sup>Official Use Only.

the Department is prepared to adopt this suggestion if there is substantial agreement by the major news media. The provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act and the regulations issued there-under will be suspended to the limited extent required by this experiment. The experiment will be carried out on the following assumptions:

(1) That the present validation of passports will be for a period expiring December 31, 1957.

(2) That those traveling to mainland China do so knowing that they face abnormal personal risks due to the failure of the Chinese Communist regime to treat American citizens in accordance with the accepted code of civilized nations.

(3) That all of the representatives designated by the major American news media on this basis receive Communist permission to enter the China mainland, with the understanding that they intend to travel, get information, and freely report as to real conditions in China. It is hoped that American correspondents in mainland China will be able to report on the condition and treatment of the Americans illegally held in Chinese prisons, as to whose fate there is deep concern on the part of the American nation. It is also to be understood that the United States will not accord reciprocal visas to Chinese bearing passports issued by the Chinese Communist regime.

(4) The Department emphasizes that the limited exception here suggested is upon an experimental basis. If for any reason it cannot be carried out substantially in accordance with the conditions stated above, or is otherwise found by the Department to have direct or indirect consequences adverse to the foreign policy of the United States, then the experiment will be discontinued.

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#### 817. Letter from Johnson to Clough<sup>1</sup>

Prague, July 26, 1957

Dear Ralph:

The couriers have just brought in your letter of July 18 and I am sending this reply back directly with them. I entirely agree that there is nothing to be gained by my making any statement to Wang on a partial

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret. Johnson signed the original "Alex." A copy was sent to Martin.

relaxation of our travel ban on correspondents for Communist China if that should take place.

On a hurried reading of the draft press release I am somewhat struck by the word "experiment". It appears in it several times. Would perhaps "trial period" be preferable?

Hurriedly yours,

U. Alexis Johnson

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**818. Letter 72 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 72

Washington, August 2, 1957

Dear Alex:

We have just received your letter of July 26 with your recommendation against mentioning at Geneva any partial relaxation which may take place in our ban on travel to Communist China. The results of the meeting to which I referred in my letter of July 18 were inconclusive as you will see from the enclosed memorandum of conversation. The Department has just written to all news organizations which maintain at least one full-time correspondent abroad, inquiring whether they would station a correspondent in China if it were possible to do so. It is hoped on the basis of the replies to reach a more realistic estimate of the number of American correspondents who might be stationed in Communist China on a more or less permanent basis. The matter will then be discussed further with the press.

Wang's comments on the Secretary's speech have been paralleled by other Chinese Communist statements, notably a speech to the National Peoples' Congress by Chang Han-fu (copy enclosed). Judging from these statements I would expect Wang to maintain his rather hard line at the next meeting. We have just received a report from a highly sensitive source to the effect that Mao Tse-tung in his speech of February 27 stated that the most appropriate time to establish diplomatic relations with the United States would be during the third 5-year plan (1962-1967), since the disparity between the two countries in economic power would be considerably reduced by that time. However, he added that the Formosa problem would have to be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Clough and Osborn. A copy was sent to Martin.



resolved first. This confirms indications we have received from other sources that the Chinese Communists do not expect any early progress in the direction of formal relations with the United States and are willing to bide their time.

A correspondent telephoned Mrs. Fecteau to tell her that the press was about to be permitted to send representatives to Communist China. Her immediate and spontaneous response, which was picked up by the wire services, was that if they went she wanted to go too and see her son. She has not yet made any request of the Department, but certainly if correspondents go we can expect immediate pressure from relatives of the prisoners to be allowed to do so.

I have sent you a copy of the memorandum of conversation with Mr. Dalal from the Indian Embassy concerning the impounding by Treasury of a sum of money from another departing Chinese, Hsiao Chi-mei. We have since furnished Mr. Dalal at his request copies of pertinent extracts from the Foreign Assets Control Regulations and the trade control regulations of the Department of Commerce. I have explained to him that these regulations apply to everyone alike and that there is nothing in the Agreed Announcement which requires us to discriminate in favor of returning Chinese with respect to export of goods or money to Communist China.

Defense is instructing Panmunjom to make a statement in the MAC on the missing 450. The text of the statement is the one you approved while in Washington of which I am enclosing a copy. We do not know yet when the UNC will make the statement, but we hope it will be before your September meeting.

At the request of Fathers McCarthy and Houle, the American Red Cross sent a telegraphic plea to the Chinese Red Cross in Peiping for the release of Father Wagner on humanitarian grounds. A curt message just received by the American Red Cross reads "Authorities contacted not consider release J.P. Wagner."

We have been in correspondence with John Dexter, who is being trained in Taiwan to replace Bob Ekvall as interpreter next January. Present plans are for him to leave Taiwan September 18th and receive an additional month's training in the Department's Language Services Division following his leave and before going to Geneva. We are negotiating with EUR in the hope that we can have him put on the EUR payroll as a regular member of the Consulate General staff, but with the understanding that he would be available to you as desired and that he would receive further language training at the Ecole des Interpretes between meetings and in addition to his regular duties. He is one of our most talented young Chinese language officers and has been working hard in preparation for this assignment. I am confident you will find him satisfactory, although I realize it will be quite a jolt to part with Bob, who has

the work so well in hand. We want John to have a week or two of consultation with Bob either in Washington or Geneva depending upon how the schedule of meetings is running at that time. The ideal thing would be for him to sit in with Bob at a meeting before he takes over on his own.

Mr. Robertson will be away the last two weeks of August and I am hoping to take off the last week myself. It would therefore be much more convenient for us if your September meeting could fall on September 12 rather than September 5th.

Regarding the sorting and preparation of material received in Geneva during your absences, I believe that if we keep the volume down to the necessary minimum, and follow your suggestion of sending copies whenever possible to Ed in London as well as to Prague, it should prove possible for Bob or Ed to arrive in Geneva a few hours ahead of you and complete the sorting in that time.

We have asked that the FBIS Daily Reports no longer be sent you, and will scan them here for items of interest to you. However, we asked that the ticker service for the few days before each meeting be continued, as the volume should not be too great, and as otherwise you might miss something of importance.

I believe that we have taken care of the other points you raised in your letter following the last meeting. However, we received only the original of that letter, and it had to be routed to the front office, where it seems temporarily to have disappeared. I hope you will remind your secretary to send us a carbon in the future, and if you have a copy of the last letter we would appreciate your enclosing it in your next.

Sincerely yours,

**Ralph N. Clough**

Enclosures:

1. Copy of memorandum of conversation of July 18 re Meeting with Radio and Press Representatives.
2. Copy of Text of speech by Chang Han-fu.
3. Copy of Draft Statement for use in MAC.
4. Copy of Exchange of Telegram between ARC and Chinese Communist Red Cross re Release of Fr. Wagner.
5. Copy of letter to Mr. Dalal with extracts from the Foreign Assets Control Regulations.
6. Copy of Memorandum of 8/2 to Mr. Clough on Currency & Commodity Controls on Chinese Aliens Departing for Communist China.

**819. Telegram 148 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 5, 1957, 8:53 p.m.

148. For Johnson.

Guidance for August 8 meeting:

1. Review course negotiations on renunciation force. When talks began situation existed particularly in Taiwan area which threatened peace. This situation still exists and in some respects threat increased. U.S. has from beginning insisted essential prerequisite to discussion other matters at issue is to remove this threat by reciprocal renunciation force. However, Chinese Communists have been unwilling for over year discuss seriously renunciation of force, having instead shifted discussion to side issues. Renunciation force deserves more serious consideration. Hence your statement last meeting you considered vital discuss long as necessary reach agreement.

2. Remind Wang he promised under Agreed Announcement take certain measures enable imprisoned Americans exercise right return. Only measures taken with regard any of Americans still remaining have had contrary effect. Challenge Wang to cite any measure taken by Chinese Communists to carry out Agreed Announcement with respect to Downey, Redmond, Fecteau, McCann, Wagner or MacCormack. It would have been simple matter for Chinese Communists demonstrate sincerity and good faith by release these prisoners had they desired do so. Such action even now would have favorable effect on atmosphere these talks.

3. Maintain position other matters also.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–557. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Osborn and Clough; cleared by Robertson in draft and by Jones.

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820. Telegram 138 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, August 8, 1957, 8 p.m.

138. For Johnson.

Two hour and five minute meeting this morning.

I opened with long statement reviewing renunciation of force discussions closing this portion of statement with "I am prepared to discuss this vital issue as long as necessary to reach agreement, and when this has been accomplished we can go on to discuss other topics under agenda item two." I concluded statement on implementation strongly noting no prisoners released since Dec 1955 prior to completion of sentence and asking him "cite one single measure" taken to carry out agreed announcement with respect to remaining six.

His reply on renunciation added up to no further interest or intention of seriously discussing unless and until basic US policy of "hostility" toward PRC changed. "Futile wishful thinking to expect PRC will ever recognize under guise of right of self-defense US occupation Taiwan." "If US not going give up policy of hostility and subversion and aggression against PRC and indulges in empty talk of renunciation of force this can only be termed as a deceiving tactic." He repeated usual charges on implementation alleging Tseng Kuang-chih "always desired to return" and was thrown into mental hospital as "act of reprisal" and to frighten other Chinese students; briefly mentioned Hsiao Chi-mei as example of "detaining funds to discourage return; and Yi Teh-yun who deported from New York March this year and "nearly lost life because serious stomach ailment not properly cared for during his detention."

During course give and take I returned hard to theme Americans had derived no benefit from agreed announcement and situation of imprisoned Americans remained same or even worse than situation prior to announcement. His refutation weak and consisted primarily of counter-attacking with respect Chinese in US. "Under circumstances in which Chinese residents in the US continue meet obstructions in departure one cannot demand anything extraordinary" with respect to Americans in China.

Next meeting Sept 12. Full record by pouch leaving Geneva August 10.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-857. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

**821. Despatch unnumbered from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, August 8, 1957

SUBJECT

China Talks—69th Meeting

1. I opened 69th with following statement:

a. "In looking over the record of our nearly two years' of negotiation on the vital topic of renunciation of force, I am concerned that despite the many months of discussion there has been no progress since early 1956. Indeed I might even say that with the submission of your draft of May 11, 1956 much of the progress which had been achieved before then seems to have been wiped out. I am deeply concerned with this because the threat to peace in the Taiwan area which prevailed when we first began discussion of this topic still exists and, in some respects, has increased. Your side has continued building up its armed strength in the Taiwan area while at the same time continuing to make clear that it will use this armed strength if necessary to achieve its policy objectives.

b. The basic views of my government as to the question of renunciation of force remain those which I set forth in our meeting on October 8, 1955. You will recall that I stressed that the U.S. was not proposing that either side abandon its views or give up the right peacefully to pursue its policies, or that either side renounce the right to defend itself. I simply sought, and I still seek, an agreement whereby both sides would renounce force as a means of pursuing their respective policies, both generally and particularly in regard to the Taiwan area. Such a reciprocal renunciation of force we regarded, and still regard, as an essential first step toward the peaceful settlement of differences between our two governments.

c. At our October 27 meeting you submitted a draft agreed announcement dealing with the subject of renunciation of force. As you will recall we found your draft deficient in its omission of any reference to the right of self-defense and in its failure to relate renunciation of force to the Taiwan area. We also felt that your suggestion for a foreign ministers meeting was, at best, premature at that stage when your side was still unwilling unequivocally to renounce the use of force with respect to the Taiwan area. In our draft agreed announcement of November 10 we attempted to use language which would be mutually agreeable, not

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–857. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Johnson. Received on August 12.

prejudicing the substantive position of either side and yet meeting the fundamental requirements. Thus our draft made it clear that renunciation of force would not prevent either side from peaceably pursuing its policies or deprive either side of the right of self-defense, but it would have application to the Taiwan area as well as general application.

d. With these two drafts before us we continued our discussion of the problem of renunciation of force during our 26th and 27th meetings and at our 28th meeting on December 1 you submitted a draft which was brief and couched in rather general terms. While this draft of December 1 did not entirely meet the requirements of the situation it did represent, we felt, a distinct step forward toward agreement. We were still disturbed, however, by the absence of specific reference in your December 1 draft to the Taiwan area or to the right of self-defense, and on January 12, 1956 we suggested two simple amendments to your draft designed to cover these two points.

e. In our meetings during the next six weeks much of our discussion centered around the two amendments which we had proposed at our January 12 meeting. You will recall that I drew a distinction between the claims and views of the two sides with respect to the situation in the Taiwan area and the question of renouncing force as an instrument of policy. Our proposals with respect to the draft declaration on renunciation of force were not designed, and are not now designed, to bind your side to an acceptance of our policies with respect to the Taiwan area any more than our agreement to such a declaration binds us to accept your policies respecting the Taiwan area. In an effort to reassure you that our proposed amendments did not seek to prejudice your policies with respect to Taiwan, we submitted on April 19 further proposals, revising those we had put forward on January 12.

f. Nevertheless, you declared our further efforts to meet your point of view unacceptable and in your arguments made it clear that what you objected to in our April 19 draft was really that it failed to prejudice the U.S. position—not that it prejudiced your side's position. You made it clear that your side would consider acceptable only a declaration which permitted it to continue to exploit the threat of the use of force. Then on May 11 you submitted a new draft announcement which wiped out completely the fairly extensive area of agreement which had seemingly been achieved by the submission of your December 1 draft. Your May 11 draft, unfortunately, included every element of your side's position to which we had expressed opposition together with new unacceptable points not previously put forward.

g. I have reviewed in some detail the course of our negotiations on renunciation of force because of my deep concern that we should not relax our efforts to reach agreement on this fundamental issue. Since the submission of your draft of May 11, 1956, which, as I have just pointed

out, represented an unfortunate retrogression in the progress of our negotiations we have made no progress on this subject, and I have felt that you have not been sincerely interested in reaching agreement on it, but rather have attempted to obscure our discussions by bringing up subsidiary side issues. This tactic will not get us anywhere, for only by resolving satisfactorily the issue of renunciation of force can we expect to make progress on other topics under item two of our agenda. As I said at our last meeting I am prepared to discuss this vital issue as long as necessary to reach agreement, and when this has been accomplished we can go on to discuss other topics under agenda item two.

h. Mr. Ambassador, it is unfortunate that nearly two years after we had reached an agreement under agenda item one I should still find it necessary to come back to that item in these meetings. It is difficult for the American people and I must confess for me, Mr. Ambassador, to understand how six of the Americans whose cases we came here two years ago specifically to discuss can still remain in prison in spite of our agreement. Once again let me stress, too, that it is not only a matter of American inability to understand how this situation can exist, but a matter of strong and deeply felt indignation on the part of all Americans that it does exist.

i. As far as I can see, Mr. Ambassador, if there have been any measures taken by your government since the agreed announcement respecting the Americans who remain imprisoned in your country, they would seem to have had an effect opposite to that which was clearly set out as your intention in the agreed announcement. Otherwise, how can it be explained that during the whole year of 1956 and up to the present in the year 1957, not a single imprisoned American citizen has been released by the authorities of your country until his full sentence was completed? Is this by any stretch of the imagination an indication that measures have been taken to help these unfortunate citizens return to their country? Is it possible that not one American who remained in your jails after December 1955 could be credited with good behaviour which might have enabled the authorities in the normal course of events (regardless of the agreed announcement or of these discussions) to have released the prisoner a few weeks or months before the expiration of his sentence? On the record of the past year and a half, it is difficult to escape the conclusion, Mr. Ambassador, that the agreed announcement solemnly made between us has in no way expedited the release of the imprisoned Americans. If this is not so, I would appreciate it if you could cite one single measure taken by the authorities of your government to carry out the agreed announcement with respect to Messrs. Downey, Redmond, Fecteau, McCann, Wagner or MacCormack.

j. Release of these imprisoned Americans, all of whom have served many years in jail already, would have been an action not only in keeping with the letter and spirit of this agreed announcement but also a

demonstration of sincerity and good faith on the part of your authorities. I profoundly regret that your side has not seen fit to take such action. Even now, however, release of these prisoners would have a most favorable effect on the atmosphere of our meetings here as we continue to discuss the other issues before us."

2. Wang replied. He had listened carefully to the review I had made of the two year old negotiations on which I had tried to draw a balance sheet for the past two years. However, he could discover no new factors or elements in the new statement which I had made at great length and taking great time. The essential issue before us is an old one, that is, how are we going to settle disputes between our two countries and how tensions between us in the Taiwan area are going to be relaxed. In the course of the negotiations we have disputed at great length our respective points of view on this issue. Now let us recognize that we could not bring about agreement in respect to the positions of the two sides. If we could have done so, he would assume we would have already reached agreement long before. However, to repeat old arguments and old positions gives no help to the present discussions.

3. Wang continued. They have agreed to the idea of making a declaration by the two sides on the renunciation of force. Indeed, they have put forward a number of drafts of such a declaration. The objective of any declaration must be to find ways and means for settlement of disputes between the two countries in the Taiwan area so that tension there could be relaxed. The proposals my side has put forward under cover of so-called renunciation of force, and unreasonable position contained therein have long been refuted by his side. Our side's attempts to get them to recognize the present situation of American occupation of Taiwan under cover of what we call right of self-defense are futile and wishful thinking.

4. Wang continued. During long discussions during the two years of these talks U.S. side has shown it does not have serious desire to improve Sino-American relations or relax tensions in the Taiwan area because our side continues to carry out a hostile policy toward China. Even in the course of these talks, our side has never ceased to create tensions in the Taiwan area and around the territory of his country. That is the fundamental problem which still exists.

5. If the United States is not going to give up a policy of hostility and subversion and aggression against the PRC, and indulge in empty talk of renunciation of force, this can only be termed as a deceiving tactic. He did not see how it would get us anywhere or give us any help in our present talk to repeat the old arguments made this morning.

6. Wang continued. I had suggested at the last meeting a new departure. However, he did not feel my statement this morning is prompted by the idea of a new departure.



7. Wang continued. Insofar as implementation of the agreement on the first item of the agenda is concerned, if anyone is dissatisfied it is his side. As is generally known, since the opening of the talks all Americans who desire to return have done so except criminal offenders serving prison terms, whereas on the U.S. side the Chinese who are imprisoned in jails there still remain in these jails without any change in their situation.

8. Wang continued. Our side consistently obstructs the return of the Chinese nationals who wish to return. Those persons who returned all spoke of the unreasonable obstruction by our authorities. Our authorities have employed many means of obstructing their return. One of the familiar patterns is when one of their citizens lets it be known that he wants to go, threats are made, political questions are asked, and he is even threatened with being sent to Taiwan or resort is made to inducements by offering him what is known as permanent residence. When the above threats failed, the next step is rough handling. The individual is detained for immediate deportation and is not allowed a reasonable time to prepare for deportation, including persons who are sick.

9. Wang continued. Hu Teh-yun, who was deported from New York in March of this year has experienced this suffering. Mr. Hu nearly lost his life as his serious stomach ailment was not properly cared for during his detention.

10. Wang continued. As to the practice of our authorities in putting Chinese students who want to go home in mental hospitals, Mr. Tseng Kuang-chih has provided a solid example. He must refute my explanation made at our last meeting on this case. Mr. Tseng Kuang-chih always desired to return. For this reason Wang gave me his name at last meeting. Yet instead of taking measures in accordance with the agreed announcement our authorities had to put him in hospital for fourteen months despite the fact that his studies and work were normal. Confining him for mental illness was evidently an act of reprisal. It also was to frighten other Chinese students who wanted to return. When our authorities failed to stop his leaving they retarded his departure.

11. Wang continued. In the case of Dr. Lin Lan-ying and Mr. Hsiao Chi-mei they also reported similar incidents.

12. Wang continued. He must point out this obstruction is the policy of our side and also violates our agreement and all humanitarian principles. He demanded an accounting 42 and 47 persons who still have not yet returned.

13. I replied that I regretted that I could not find in anything he had said here this morning the slightest indication that his government is willing to renounce its threat to use force if it could not otherwise obtain its policy objectives in the Taiwan area. This is the difficulty we

faced when came here to find a method of peacefully settling our differences and the difficulty we still face. No amount of words or misrepresentation of the plain words in the proposals we have put forward can change this fact.

14. I continued. With regard to the first item of our agenda he entirely ignored the genesis and history of our talks on this subject. We are not here to put forth propaganda statements for the public which obscure the issue, but we are here to discuss on the basis of facts and, between the two of us, to settle these issues.

15. I have tried calmly, objectively and frankly to deal with him on the questions that we face. A statement such as "since the opening of these talks all the Americans who desired to return have done so except for a few criminals serving sentences" does not contribute to a settlement of this issue. Both of us perfectly well know when we came here we were discussing precisely those Americans who were in prison. I accepted the proposals and suggestions he made which he said would expeditiously resolve the problem. As I have again pointed out this morning, rather than resolve, it appears to have worked in the opposite direction. Since December 1955 not a single prisoner has been released even a day before the completion of his sentence. I again pointed out, entirely apart even from the agreed announcement, it is common practice even under normal procedure for prisoners to be given time off for good behavior. However, each of these prisoners has been held right up to the last day of his sentence. I asked him this morning how the agreed announcement could be said in any way, under the most liberal or strained interpretation, be said to have been applied to them. I asked him to cite one single measure taken by his authorities with respect to the six who still remain in his prisons. I still await his answer.

17. I continued. With regard to the Chinese in the United States his vague, unsubstantiated and erroneous charges of obstruction to their return does not obscure two basic factors. The first fact is the Chinese who desire to do so are steadily and regularly returning to his country. To the best of our knowledge not less than 353 have returned since the beginning of our talks here. The second fact is that the very agency which he suggested for the purpose has not called to our attention a single case of any obstruction to departure.

18. I went on to say that such statements as "On the United States' side Chinese still imprisoned remain without any change in their situation", as he was well aware, did not correspond to the facts. Every Chinese in our prisons who desired to do so has been permitted to go home without regard to length of sentence and without regard to his eligibility for normal parole and release.

19. I continued. As far as Mr. Tseng is concerned, I pointed out that less than a year and a half from his entry into the U.S., that is, in

June 1949, he showed signs of and was treated for mental illness. I also pointed out to Wang that when Mr. Tseng asked to return to his country and it appeared that he was able to make a decision, he was given every assistance in doing so. The Indian Embassy with which he was in correspondence was kept informed of his case. Not only was he permitted to return but an attendant to care for him during his trip was furnished by the United States Government. As I said at our last meeting, rather than ill-founded complaints, an expression of appreciation for the care offered him would be in order.

20. I continued. As far as the Chinese returning to his country violating laws and regulations of the United States concerning the export of funds or regulations are concerned, all I can say is that they (no more than any other alien or American citizen) would not be permitted to do so. These long-standing laws and regulations are applicable to all persons. It is my understanding that his country has comparable laws and regulations which have been rigorously applied to Americans leaving his country. Dissatisfied as we may have been, I did not and have not raised this question with him. What I was interested in was that these Americans be permitted to return.

21. Wang replied with regard to the question of civilians he had already made it quite clear that U.S. residents are free to return without any obstruction. His position in this regard is exactly in conformity with the agreed announcement between us. Insofar as American civilian offenders are concerned the facts also have given evidence that of the 40 persons in this category at the beginning of our talks there now remain only six. We have noted that many Chinese are imprisoned in the United States. Of 34 persons whose names I gave him, there still remain 33 in prison.

22. Wang continued with reference to the question of an expression of their will, while these persons still are being kept in prison, he had made it clear that it was hard for him to believe persons in these circumstances are able to express their free will. The number of Chinese in the United States is very great. The number of Chinese students alone is about some 5,000 persons. The number of persons who have returned to his country is very small.

23. Wang continued. There are still many Chinese in the U.S. who desire to return and are not able to do so. Those who did return did not return easily but only after they have experienced all sorts of obstruction and all sorts of threats or inducements have they succeeded in coming home. Persons are even dealt with as mental patients without any reason at all and are handcuffed as criminals. No amount of words can cover up these facts. If any side is dissatisfied over this question, it is his side. It is his sincere hope that the American Government will

change this obstructive behaviour so that all Chinese who desire to do so can return without encountering any obstruction.

24. I replied that he had made to me the statement that American residents in China are free to return. As I recalled it, this was precisely the same statement he had made to me on August 2, 1955. We then discussed the question of Americans in prison. I had entered into the agreed announcement with a clear understanding that that would have an effect on their situation and enable them expeditiously to return. As token and confirmation of my understanding, on the same day as the agreed announcement, he announced to me the names of ten persons who were released. Since December 1955 not a one has been able to return prior to the full completion of his sentence.

25. I went on to say that I had asked him this morning and again asked him in what way had the agreed announcement been applied to or in any way affected the ability to return of those persons since December 1955 or those six who still remained. I found not the slightest evidence of what the effect had been, except apparently for the worse.

26. Wang replied that the action we had taken on this question of civilians wholly conformed with what they had said in public. Nobody can ever point out an incident in which an American resident in China has been obstructed in returning. This even extends to those former prisoners of war who refused repatriation at the end of the Korean war. Whenever any one of this group indicated he had changed his mind and wanted to return, they did everything they could to help him realize his wish.

27. Wang continued. Nobody could ever cite any evidence that they had either in the past or at present called the American criminal offenders in prisons ordinary civilian residents in China. There had been no change whatsoever in their policy or practice with regard to this group of criminal offenders. Any allegations or charges which did not conform to reality are not acceptable to his side.

28. Wang continued. In dealing with such an issue thought must be given to the situation existing on both sides. Under circumstances in which Chinese residents in the United States continue to meet obstruction in departing one could not demand anything extraordinary on his side's part. He had consistently been concerned with the question of improving the situation of residents abroad.

29. I replied that he would recall that when we were negotiating the agreed announcement he first asked for the inclusion of an exception for persons in prison. However, I had opposed this and finally we had agreed upon the elimination of any such reference. I had asked him and I again asked him in what way the agreed announcement had in the slightest affected American citizens in China as compared with the situation before its existence.

30. Wang replied that the matter is quite clear. They had never mixed up these two groups of Americans—ordinary American residents and American criminal offenders. This was quite clear and he presumed no such confusion will be consented in any other country.

31. I responded that he had not answered my question.

32. Wang replied that if I did not want to recognize a distinction between the two groups, that was unilateral thinking on the part of the U.S. If they had at that time settled on the basis that there was no distinction between ordinary Americans and American criminal offenders what would have been the use of entering into an agreement. They could have simply released everybody.

33. I responded by asking what the purpose of the agreement was.

34. Wang replied that the purpose of agreement was that ordinary residents and nationals of both countries could return to their countries freely. As a matter of fact, many Chinese in the U.S. who desire to return have as yet not been able to do so. This is a matter to which the United States government must give attention and carry out the agreement strictly. In addition to many Chinese imprisoned in the U.S., even innocent Chinese in the U.S. who have never offended against any law are still prevented from returning.

35. I replied that Wang said, before we ever entered into the agreement, what he called ordinary Americans could leave his country. But what he now seemed to be saying was that the agreed announcement did not and was not intended by his government to bring about any change in the situation which existed prior to the agreed announcement. All I could say was that this was flatly contradictory to my understanding and to the plain words of the announcement itself.

36. Wang replied that this was only an American statement. It was no use making such a statement. They always acted in accordance with the agreement. However, Americans who have offended against the laws of China must be dealt with in accordance with those laws.

37. As neither of us had anything further to say, I suggested September 5 for the next meeting. Wang countered by suggesting September 12 to which I agreed.

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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822. Letter 58 from Johnson to Clough<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 58

Geneva, August 8, 1957

Dear Ralph:

Well, another meeting went off just about as expected. I decided not to follow up more at today's meeting on renunciation but save it for the next meeting. Of course, the result will be that he will more flatly refuse to discuss it, but nevertheless think that I can write a pretty good speech on it tying back to what he said today. The same on implementation. He went further today than he has for a long time in taking the position that the agreed announcement did not apply to prisoners until they were released, and I can renew the attack next time on that. As always, any new ideas any of you may have will be welcomed.

He must be reading your mail to me. Frankly, I was going to disregard your suggestion for the next meeting on the 12th. As there did not seem too much new that would require attention from you and Walter, I thought it best to retain the four-week pattern, and I had personal plans involving my children and saving money on getting them back to the States that made it much better for me to meet on the 5th. I suggested the fifth, and he came back with the 12th, to which I, of course, agreed. Thus, once again I have been able to carry out the Department's thought on extending the period between meetings with the record of the meetings showing that the initiative has always come from him.

The sending of the material to me is working out fine and I have no further suggestions. As you will see from a separate despatch I am sending in, the Consulate here received a fearsome bawling-out from Communications on my having sent in the record of the last meeting in telegraph form, and I am, therefore, sending this one in by despatch form. If you do not get fast enough service on it at your end, I leave it to you to fight it out with Communications and tell me how to handle it.

I am not surprised at Mrs. Fecteau's reaction to the possibility of travel of correspondents. From my talk with her I am certain that you will be receiving the same thing from Mrs. Downey and it seems to me that if the correspondents' travel goes through it is going to be most difficult to resist the appeals of these two.

If Dexter is not going to arrive until January I presume that you will do the necessary with the Army to make sure that Ekvall can stay here until the January meeting.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex." The enclosure is printed as Document 814.

Thus the third year has begun. Regards to all.  
Sincerely yours,

U. Alexis Johnson

Enclosure:

1 copy of letter No. 57

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**823. Letter from Johnson to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, August 29, 1957

Dear Ralph:

Thanks very much for so promptly getting to me the text of the release on the travel of correspondents which I was very happy to see. I suppose that we should have anticipated the Peiping reaction which, I believe, was mostly triggered by the specific statement that we would not give reciprocity. They probably found this, together with the rest of the statement, too much publicly to swallow. The press have been so intent on the Department being their only block that they have utterly failed to take into consideration the possibility of Peiping not giving the visas. Thus, things have now been worked around to where they should be—that is, the controversy is between Peiping and the press, rather than between the Department and the press, and Peiping is really put on the spot. If they grant the visas they will appear publicly to a degree to be acquiescing in the Department's position as set forth in the statement. If they do not grant them, they will be incurring the rising wrath of the American press expressing its outrage at what it feels is a double-cross by Peiping. It seems to me the best thing for the Department to do is to sit quiet and let Peiping and the press fight it out. My guess is that Peiping will try to find a way out by again inviting a few correspondents (perhaps some on our list and some not) for a limited trip. However, this is certainly not going to make the press happy, particularly those that do not receive invitations. It seems to me that they have pretty much shut the door, at least for the time being, on granting visas to all twenty-four.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret. Johnson signed the original "Alex." A copy was sent to Martin.



As far as the next Geneva meeting is concerned it does not now seem likely Wang will take the initiative in raising the matter, except perhaps by oblique reference to the Department's statement in characterizing them as not civilized, etc., as another example of "hostility". I do not believe I should take the initiative in any way raising the matter, but if he should do so I would have considerable material for rebuttal that would fill up time. I could, of course, refer to his previous statement to me that they were not asking reciprocity for Chinese correspondents to visit the United States, and on the "civilized" aspect I could come back to implementation.

Of course, there may be further developments by the time of the next meeting that may change the picture, but I wanted to pass on these thoughts at this time.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson

P.S. After writing the above I have just seen in this morning's paper an August 27 Washington story quoting the Secretary as saying that we will "consider" applications of Chinese Communist correspondents. If the Secretary was correctly quoted this may put a somewhat different light on the possibilities of the subject coming up at the next meeting, and the desirability of my taking the initiative on it. I believe it is something on which I might make a little mileage. It certainly goes a long way to give Peiping a way out of the box in which they are now in if they want to use it. Of course, "consider" certainly does not mean we will grant any visas, but it would seem to me that it does mean we would accept applications to be "considered" on their merits and our laws and regulations. I know that you will send me at Geneva the full text of the Secretary's statement, which the article I have seen in the *Herald-Tribune* does not give, together with as much amplification as you can to enable me to handle it with Wang whether or not you want me to take the initiative. As far as the legal aspects are concerned the only thing I find in the Regulations is section (a) of 22 CFR 41.12 which contemplates the possibility of issuing visas to holders of passports of non-recognized governments. I suppose this frequently comes up in issuing visas to officials of non-recognized governments to attend the UN. However, I do not know of any case in which we have issued such a visa to non-officials although the principle would presumably be the same. Of course there is also the whole background of waivers being required for members of the Communist Party, etc. In the case of recognized Communist governments this has usually been handled by giving correspondents official visas which do not require a waiver. However, it would seem to me that this would be entirely out of the question in the case of an unrecognized government.

U.A.J.



**824. Letter 73 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 73

Washington, September 6, 1957

Dear Alex:

Your letter of August 29 was very timely reaching us yesterday in time to permit me to comment on it prior to your meeting next week.

I anticipate as you do that Peiping will eventually admit only a few American correspondents. However, they may now seek to use the reciprocity issue as leverage on us to admit Chinese Communist correspondents to the U.S. As you will see from the enclosed copy of the Secretary's August 27 press conference, the door to that possibility has been left ajar. So far no application for entry of a Chinese correspondent has been received.

The decision to authorize limited travel to Communist China by correspondents has greatly reduced the pressure on the Department over this issue. Some of the correspondents waiting in Hong Kong have criticized the wording of the Department's announcement as predisposing the Chinese Communists to reject the proposal but for the most part the onus now appears to be shifted to Peiping.

I think you are wise in not wishing to take the initiative in raising the travel issue with Wang at the next meeting. Wang may raise it taking the same line as the original Peiping reaction to our announcement. But his position is an awkward one and you will have no difficulty in handling it. It is possible that a Chinese Communist newsman will apply before the next meeting to be admitted to the U.S., in which case you could simply reiterate our position that such individual applications would be considered on their merits and in the light of the applicable U.S. laws and regulations.

We are trying to get a copy of the new law on fingerprinting passed by Congress last week but may not have it in time to enclose with this letter. Briefly it authorizes the Secretary of State and the Attorney General jointly to waive fingerprinting requirements in certain cases for persons coming to the U.S. as temporary visitors. This will make it possible to admit visitors from iron curtain countries and even from Communist China without fingerprinting and without declaring the individuals to be officials which as you point out would be out of the question in case of an unrecognized regime.

I enclose a copy of the order issued by the Federal District Court in the Powell-Schumann Sedition Case calling on the Chinese Communist courts for judicial assistance. This was sent by the court direct to Peiping. The Executive Branch of the Government did not participate in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. A copy was sent to Martin.

any way, and legal opinion in the Department is that such action has no bearing on the matter of recognition. Once the necessary showing has been made as to the availability of witnesses and the substance of their testimony, the Judge will have to decide whether he would be justified in dismissing the case should the Department continue to refuse the defense counsel a passport for travel to Communist China.

We have been assured by Major Hoffman in the Attache Branch in the Department of Defense that Bob Ekvall will be permitted to stay in Paris until mid-January next year. We will have Dexter in Geneva before that time.

In regard to Hu Teh-yuin, the deportee Wang alleged "nearly lost his life" because a serious stomach complaint was not properly cared for during his detention, Immigration and Naturalization Service has informed us there is no record of Hu's having complained of any illness during his detention prior to deportation. He surrendered himself in New York for deportation on March 12, and was held in the immigration detention center there for two days before being transferred to Los Angeles. The records of the center have been examined, and there is no record of his having reported any complaint. Between March 14 and March 16, when he boarded the President Cleveland in Los Angeles, Hu was confined at the Chula Vista camp. The records of that camp also show that Hu was in good health and registered no complaints. Medical service was freely available in both the New York camp and at Chula Vista. It is of course possible that Hu may have suffered from indigestion aboard ship, as this has been known to happen aboard the President line ships. However, if he did, he would have had the same medical attention that any other passenger would have received.

We have been considering the possibility of having Hammarskjold take up the cases of Downey and Fecteau in a letter to Chou En-lai, in line with your conversation with the Secretary General. This would involve, so far as we have tentatively thought it through here, making the following points: (1) Downey and Fecteau were under the jurisdiction and authority of the United Nations Command at the time of capture; (2) they were, accordingly, entitled to repatriation under the Korean Armistice Agreement, even though civilians; (3) however, their existence was concealed by the Chinese Communists until after the negotiations on repatriation at Panmunjom had been concluded; (4) by the time their existence was disclosed, we had already established a contact at Geneva which was considered an appropriate forum for arranging the return of the two men; (5) the two men were covered by our Agreed Announcement of September 10, and it was anticipated they would be released in accordance with that agreement, hence no separate representation was made on their behalf under the Armistice Agreement; (6) in view of the long lapse of time since the Agreed Announcement and the continued failure to release the men, we desire to remind the Communists of their responsibility to repatriate them

under the Armistice Agreement; and (7) it makes no difference whether the men are released under the Agreed Announcement or under the Armistice Agreement, but until they are released the Communists will be in flagrant violation of both agreements.

Defense has sent out to the UNC instructions for a new meeting of the MAC on the subject of the missing personnel. We have already forwarded you a copy of the draft statement sent out for the use of the UNC. We do not know yet when the meeting will be held, but presumably it will be in the near future. We will let you know as soon as the results of the meeting are received, so that you will be able to plan your next presentation to Wang on this issue. Of course, if the occasion arises in the meeting on the 12th, you should restate our position on the missing personnel item, but it will probably be wise to defer an extensive, detailed presentation until after the MAC meeting.

I would appreciate your comments on the approach to Hammar skjold, particularly with regard to the tie-in with the Korean Armistice Agreement. We are of course consulting with the other people involved here in Washington, both in NA and Defense, and the points outlined above are entirely tentative at this point.

Mr. Robertson has been away for nearly three weeks on leave and I have just returned to the office from two weeks off. Mr. Robertson will be back in time to participate in the preparation of the instructions for your next meeting. We do not anticipate any new departures. It is interesting to note the importance placed by the British on continuation of the talks as indicated by Ed's letter of August 20.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

**Ralph N. Clough**

Enclosures:

1. Court Order
2. Copy of letter to Congressman Alger
3. FBIS re "Offer to U.S. Newsman Termed 'Deception'."
4. Press Release No. 460 dated August 13, 1957, "Personal Message from Acting Secretary to American Citizens Contemplating Travel to Communist China."
5. Press Release No. 480 dated August 27, 1957—"Secretary Dulles' News Conference of August 27, 1957".
6. Two tickers dated Sept. 6 from Reuters

P. S. The News Division has just informed us that there is a ticker in advising that the Chinese Communists are allowing the students visiting Peiping to see the American prisoners held in Communist China. I am enclosing a copy and we will let you know by telegram of any further significant developments in this regard.

825. Telegram 244 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 10, 1957, 11:34 a.m.

244. For Johnson.

Guidance for September 12 meeting:

1. State that reciprocal renunciation force applicable to Taiwan area fully as essential today as when talks began two years ago. Refusal Chinese Communists renounce force and terminate their military threat in Taiwan area is fundamental obstacle to lasting peace.

2. Failure release remaining six Americans as required by Agreed Announcement continues constitute standing indictment Chinese Communists for not honoring public commitment. Again call attention Wang's gross distortion of record at last meeting in attempting distinguish between QUOTE ordinary Americans UNQUOTE and QUOTE criminal offenders UNQUOTE. Incontrovertible meaning of plain language Agreed Announcement is that all Americans have right leave Communist China expeditiously. No distinction stated or implied between Americans in prison and those out. Wang has in past admitted Announcement applied prisoners, who were only Americans under discussion when Announcement agreed on. Attempted previously without foundation assert term QUOTE expeditious UNQUOTE as applied prisoners had to be interpreted in light seriousness offense, behavior, etc. Now apparent even Wang unable any longer stretch term QUOTE expeditious UNQUOTE to encompass delay over two years, hence he attempting further distort Announcement.

3. If Wang raises question reciprocity re newsmen, remind him this reversal his position year ago when he stressed Chinese Communist invitation US newsmen not conditioned on reciprocal US action. If they now desire exclude American correspondents, that entirely matter their choice. If Wang requests assurances US will admit specific group of Chinese Communist newsmen or other exchange arrangement, advise him applications individuals will be accepted at any American Foreign Service post end considered on merits, like any other application.

4. If Wang mentions Hu Teh-yun and his alleged stomach complaint, tell him careful check of records at places Hu detained during four days prior deportation reveal no medical difficulty or complaint his part. Any illness which developed during voyage would have been treated by ship's medical staff on same basis as that any other passenger.

Dulles

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9-1057. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Osborn and Clough; cleared in draft by Robertson and Jones.

**826. Telegram 235 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 12, 1957, noon

235. From Johnson.

One hour twenty five minute meeting this morning mostly devoted to correspondents. Wang proposed and I rejected draft agreed announcement (full text by separate telegram). Under this PRC rpt PRC and USA “agreed to give permission, on an equal and reciprocal basis, for correspondents” to enter the respective countries. In rejecting I made exact statement in para 3 of Deptel 244 including last sentence. At close of meeting Wang stated they were going to release text draft agreed announcement but did not indicate timing.

Wang opened with long statement in hard tone referring to my “general repetition of worn-out arguments” at last meeting and general attempt to place blame for lack of progress on PRC, “consistently hostile attitude” of U.S. and leading into correspondents by reference to cultural exchange proposal September 22, 1956. “In spite of US obstacles” Stevens, Harrington and Worthy came to PRC and “completed their press coverage”. In spite of obstacles US youth delegation had also entered PRC and were being “warmly welcomed and with an abundance of good will”. “Does not this show that no official ban can prevent Chinese and American peoples from showing their demand for better contacts”. After nearly a year US had on August 22 under great pressure given permission certain number of correspondents visit PRC. “In same breath statement in entirely unreasonable terms refused accord reciprocal visas to Chinese newsmen. Subsequent statements have not altered this”. US August 22 statement set tasks for US correspondents in PRC and thus ulterior motive and US undisguised attempt interfere in PRC internal affairs all too clear. None could conceive PRC would accept August 22 statement which disregards reciprocity and equality. PRC believes exchange visits of correspondents is a practical and concrete step to improving Sino-American relations and therefore proposes agreed announcement. Text meets need for equality and reciprocity.

In reply I “found it astounding” that he had “entirely reversed” position he had taken last year when he had stressed PRC was not asking reciprocity for admission correspondents. Also under US laws and regulations impossible to assure reciprocity. Therefore in light these two facts statement reciprocity included August 22 statement. Also found

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1257. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

it astounding that he now characterized entry of US correspondents many of whom were same men to whom they had previously extended invitations as undisguised interference their internal affairs. However, if they now desire exclude US correspondents that entirely matter their choice. PRC has not previously raised question of reciprocity nor has any PRC correspondent applied for admission to US. "If any journalist from your country desires to enter the US he is entirely free to make application to any Foreign Service post for a visa and it will be considered on its merits just the same as any other visa application". "I am not in a position to enter into any agreement or understanding with you any more than I am with any other government that a full and equal number of correspondents be admitted to the US or that any particular individual will be granted admittance to the US. Neither do we make any such demand from your side. It is entirely up to your own decision as to whether you wish to admit any individual or any number of individuals". Purport his subsequent statement was that Department's statement on reciprocity in August 22 statement had entirely altered nature of questions and closed door on exchange visits of correspondents. Responsibility lies entirely with U.S.

I reiterated substance para 3 Deptel 244 and said that I expected they would consider application visas accordance their laws and regulations in same manner as US would do and that I would not attempt dictate their action any more than I would accept dictation from them our actions. If they decided refuse visas correspondents could not in any way shift responsibility to U.S. That was their own decision.

Full report of meeting follows by telegram.

Next meeting October 10.

**Gowen**

Note: Mr. Clough's office (CA) notified 9/12/10:40 a.m. EMB (CWO)

**827. Telegram 240 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, September 12, 1957, 5 p.m.

240. From Johnson.

1. Wang opened 70th today with statement that at last meeting I willfully tried present course two year talks in false light. My repetition old worn-out arguments was vain attempt shirk responsibility my side for dragging out talks. Facts before us are clear; namely with respect to agreement reached under first agenda item, my authorities during past two years have employed 101 means of obstruction to prevent those who can return from doing so and even those who have returned home met all kinds of obstruction.

2. Wang continued that on second agenda item he still protests our seizure of Taiwan and continued inadmissible interference in internal affairs. He added my side refuses to discuss Foreign Ministers conference, removal of embargo, cultural exchanges and peoples contacts. At same time threat peace by my side increases, tensions are continued by my side following hostile policy towards China. This is display complete lack of good faith toward his country. His side consistently worked for improvement Sino-America relations. With view to promoting tradition friendship, they have put forth proposals for cultural exchanges and human contacts at our 58th meeting.

3. Wang continued I will recall both sides agreed adopt measures promoting contacts between two nations. In an earlier move to demonstrate good faith, his government on own initiative permitted entry number US press representatives. They had believed that there was no reason why such a proposal of equality and mutual benefit should not be accepted. My side, however, refused discuss proposal and also refused permission enter. It thus clearly tells on which side Iron Curtain hangs after all. In spite of the obstacles, Stevens, Harrington and Worthy came to our country and completed press coverage. Recently the American Youth delegation visited China despite instructions and were warmly welcomed and with an abundance of good will. Does not this show that no official ban can prevent Chinese and American people from showing their demand for better contacts. Again does not this explain why US Government policy of preventing exchanges is bound to lead to an uproar and pressure on the part of the American people.

4. Wang continued. Nearly a year has passed since the proposal of the 22nd of September last year. On August 22 this year US

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1257. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.



Government made statement under great pressure permitting a certain number of newsmen visit China. In same breath press statement, in utterly unreasonable terms, refused accord reciprocal visas Chinese newsmen. Subsequent statements have not altered this. This press statement shows my government ignorance international practice and is an insult to China. That my government has an ulterior motive in sending newspapermen to China is all too clear. In its August 22 statement my government absurdly tried to specify the tasks of newsmen and instructed them to report on prisoners in China. This is virtually an undisguised attempt to interfere in Chinese internal affairs in telling US newsmen to serve American policy.

5. Wang went on. This move of the US Government, which it nominally passes for consent, in its true light it is a maneuver to dupe public opinion because no person of average intellect would conceive that China could accept such a move disregarding reciprocity and equality. His side absolutely cannot agree to unilateral decision of the US because it runs counter to desire of peoples for better relations and mutual understanding. They believe, however, that exchange of visits US newspaper correspondents is practical and concrete step capable of improving Sino-American relations. Based on their consistent policy will and in line with their proposal of 22 September 1956 he proposed that we discuss and adopt the following agreed announcement. (Text sent separately).

6. Wang continued. Adoption of above agreed announcement meets demands of peoples of both sides and meets desire of news correspondents for news coverage. Perusal of text of agreed announcement above will enable me to see that it promotes privilege of equality and reciprocity of both sides. He would like to hear any views I had.

7. I replied I would address myself first to statement he had made regarding the travel of correspondents. I said let me say I found it utterly astounding that he had entirely reversed position he took last year in this regard. I well recall that at time we discussed this last year he stressed to me that this invitation to American correspondents was not conditional reciprocal action by the US. I recalled that he made statement to me here and if I recollected rightly it was also made in public statement by his Government or press. Next point I wanted to make was that under our laws the US is not in any position to assure or guarantee full reciprocity. Therefore, in light of these two facts and in order that there can be no misunderstanding, the August 22 statement of Department of State made this fact clear.

8. I continued I found it incomprehensible and astounding that he now reversed his position and said that because reciprocity cannot be granted, he did not intend to permit the entry of American correspondents. I also found it astounding that he now characterized the



entrance of American correspondents into his country many of whom had previously been in receipt of invitations from the authorities of his country, as an undisguised attempt to interfere in his internal affairs. If it is the decision of his authorities to reverse their previous position and exclude American correspondents, that was of course a matter of his own Government's choice. As far as I was aware neither he nor his Government had ever previously raised the question of reciprocity nor has any journalist from his country ever applied for entry into the US. If any journalist from his country desired to enter the US he is entirely free to make application at any Foreign Service Post for a visa and it would be considered on its merits just the same as any other visa application. I was not in a position to enter into any agreement or understanding with him any more than I was with any Government, that a full and equal number of correspondents be admitted to US or that any particular individual would be granted admittance to US. Neither did we make any such demand from his side. It was entirely up to his own Government's decision as to whether he wished to admit any individual or any number of individuals.

9. Wang replied it is consistent belief of his side that exchange of visits is an important step toward gradually improving relations between two countries. The simple reason is that such mutual exchange of visits corresponds with the interests of both peoples and countries. Through such exchanges mutual understanding and trust can be expected to increase. It was in this spirit that his Premier made his statement at Bandung conference of 1955 that traditional friendship existed between Chinese and American peoples, and his Government has consistently worked in direction of improved relations between China and America. This attitude of his Government could be testified to by all proposals made during our talks of past two years. However, they found that insofar as matter was concerned, there are two entirely different attitudes and practices. In handling matters within realm of relations between our two countries, his Government has always acted in accordance with created international practice while he has always acted in contrary sense. In handling matters of Sino-American relations his Government has always worked to remove obstacles to intercourse and exchanges whereas US is consistently engaging in obstacles.

10. Wang continued, in their handling of Sino-American relationship they have always observed principle of equality and reciprocity, that is, the principle of mutual benefit whereas the US has always violated such a principle. He will just cite an instance. As I was probably aware, sometime during the Chinese Opera Company's tour of Europe, it had received an invitation to stage performances in the US. His authorities, in observance of principle of reciprocity immediately followed by an invitation to an American company to give performances in China. As a

result of obstruction on part of American Govt such an exchange could not be realized.

11. Wang continued. In order to develop mutual visits and contacts his govt in addition to 22 Sept proposal also on own initiative had given permission to American correspondents to visit China for news coverage. After stubborn obstructions and prohibitions on part of U.S. Government three American press representatives in person of Stevens, Harrington and Worthy succeeded in going there and completing their coverage. When they did so, they expected that following this step on their part the US would also take corresponding measures in this respect. Now the application of reciprocity in international intercourse is a matter of common knowledge familiar to everybody. He was afraid that I would not be able to quote any remarks of their side to effect that only American correspondents could enter China while no Chinese correspondents could enter US. Now the August 22 statement of my government says arrogantly in effect that only American correspondents are going to China while no Chinese correspondents will be allowed into US. Now anything in common between this statement and the friendly gesture indicated by his side? Such a haughty and arrogant statement by U.S. is an insult to Chinese people and Chinese people can in no way accept that.

12. Wang continued. Now it not his intention to enter into debate with me on US law. What he proposed and was interested in was mutual exchange of visits between Chinese and American people and mutual improvement of relations between two countries. It showed he recognized that no question can be resolved in international intercourse if we adopt an attitude of imposing one's decision on the other. The unilateral decision of the US Dept of State has not only caused great indignation on part of people of China but has also met with condemnation international public opinion.

13. Wang continued that proposal he made this morning would offer reasonable solution to question of news coverage by two countries. It was his hope that we would be able to make some progress on this matter. He believed that this step would bring something good in our talks.

14. I replied that I found it impossible to understand his position on the basis for what he called indignation. Some time ago his authorities indicated they desired visits of American newspaper correspondents. The US has now rpt now agreed to validate passports for such travel. The US was certainly not rpt not imposing anything on him. If his government has now changed its mind and decided to not grant visas that was entirely a matter for decision of his government. I could not and would not attempt impose decision on him that his government grant visas for these correspondents.

15. I continued. He said that August 22 statement said that only Americans could go to China and no Chinese could go to the US. The statement does not say anything of the kind. It simply says that the US is not in a position to accord reciprocity which is a legal fact I could not change. Only now for the first time so far as I knew has question of Chinese going to US even been raised. As far as I knew we never received even an application for anyone to go to US. As I had told him here this morning, if any individual or number of correspondents makes application, their applications would be considered on same basis as any other application.

16. I continued that he had spoken of his government as always one which had worked to remove obstacles and that the US always created obstacles. I was astounded that in face of record here that he could make such a statement. Even before we came here we made it entirely clear that major obstacle was that of imprisoned Americans in his country. We entered into an agreement that was supposed to resolve that problem. Yet in the face of the very exact words of that agreement and whole history of our talks here, he had temerity to allege that agreement does not even apply to the Americans that we were talking about. And in face of this he proposed even entering into further agreement.

17. I continued he surely could not believe that I or my government was that naive. We entered into the first agreement and here two years later the six Americans still in his prisons stand as an indictment of his government for not honoring its commitments. If his government really wanted to remove obstacles instead of talking about it, and really would honor the principle of reciprocity, this agreement would long since have been carried out and this obstruction removed. Appealing to supposed violations by the US which have no basis in fact, in no manner relieves his government of obligation to carry out this agreement. Vague and unsupported statements do not constitute facts nor take place of facts. Facts are that the very agency which he suggested for seeing that agreement carried out has not called our attention to a single violation in any way.

18. Wang continued that when we got to question of return of civilians, the principle of looking after interests of both parties still applied. From time we began talks to present, it can be said that almost all American residents in China including criminal offenders have returned to U.S. Whereas in US prisons alone, US is still holding some 30 Chinese there. It would be a distorted interpretation of agreement if one of sides always sees his own interest disregarding others interests. On question of exchange of visits between peoples of two countries, his side always maintained a clear cut position.

19. Wang continued, as far as whole question of correspondents was concerned, the measures taken by authorities his country last year to permit entry was one matter. The statement of August 22 of my government denying reciprocity was another matter. This step altered nature of problem and closed door on exchange of visits of correspondents. If our authorities insist on August 22 statement then the responsibility for obstructing visits of correspondents entirely lies on U.S. If the idea of simultaneous visits by correspondents is accepted, then he cannot see why the statement proposed this morning cannot be accepted.

20. I replied that all I could say was that it was entirely up to him whether his government wished to permit the visits or not. I had not and would not attempt to dictate to him on that any more than I would accept dictation from him. If his government decided not to grant visas, he was certainly not going to hear any protest from me. All I could do was to express surprise at the change in his decision and express even greater surprise that he could allege that the United States had dictated his decision.

21. I continued. The question of who is to be permitted entry into a country is certainly one of the oldest aspects of sovereignty that exists. It is up to his government to decide whom it would have enter into his country just as it is up to my country to decide who will enter the United States. If any Chinese correspondent applies for entry into the US his application will be considered according to our laws just as I expect his government would consider applications in accordance with its laws.

22. Wang replied by expressing his surprise as to why we could not come to an agreement on such matters. He stated that wording in their proposed announcement was very clear. Nothing in it imposed anything on any person. In order to make their position on whole question clear they would find it necessary to make text available to public. He regretted that I could not find myself able to accept the draft proposal made this morning.

23. Wang proposed next meeting 10 October. I agreed.

**Gowen**

**828. Letter 59 from Johnson to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 59

Geneva, September 12, 1957

Dear Ralph:

Finally, after these long months we again had a little excitement. Thanks very much for your prompt action on my phone call. I am glad everyone agreed it was best quickly to put out something here. I am also glad everyone agreed that I had done right by immediately turning down his proposal rather than temporizing on it in any way until next meeting. It seemed to me clearly within my instructions to do so, and I felt any temporizing could only lead to confounding the confusion.

I sent you the full record by telegraph as there is no courier until Saturday, the meeting was fairly short and I thought it best to let you know exactly what was said in case anything further arises. You will note that I became very sharp in tone toward the end on implementation, and that I did not bring up “renunciation”. As the meeting had developed I felt it better to end on this sharp note, and that to have gone any further into implementation or into renunciation would have been anti-climactic. I made no move to suggest the next meeting and he came up with that.

As far as the correspondents are concerned I do not believe they have entirely closed the door but have left themselves some freedom of action. If they were really intelligent, from their standpoint, instead of just attempting to act clever, they would now give visas to a few Americans, have a few Chinese apply to us, and then indicate they were waiting to see what we did before acting on the other American applications. At the same time they feel they have a very good theme in “reciprocity and equality”, particularly in Asian States and can be expected to play this hard.

They have just brought me in a Reuters ticker from Washington which I am enclosing. You can see this goes far beyond the line I was instructed to take today and is certainly no help to me here. I carefully avoided committing ourselves to admitting any correspondents, and indicated no interest in any agreed announcement on the subject whether the word “reciprocal” was used or not. I understood my instructions to refer to any “exchange arrangement”. If, as is likely, this issue is still alive by the time of the next meeting, I hope you will be sure that my instructions are as full and clear as possible.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.”

Incidentally, I wonder if we are perhaps entering into some semantic difficulty. As I interpreted, and I believe Peiping interpreted, our August 22 statement it meant that the U.S. would not give any visas to any correspondent bearing a Chinese Communist passport. As subsequently interpreted by the Secretary, we were prepared to accept applications from Chinese Communist correspondents but could not give any advance assurance as to whether any or what number would be approved. If we are in fact prepared to give favorable consideration to a qualified applicant it seems to me we are in fact giving reciprocity. In short, it does not seem to me as commonly used "reciprocity" necessarily involves one for one exchange. As a minor point in this connection, Bob and Ed have noted that the Chinese terms used for "equal and reciprocal" in his draft today are not the same as used for those terms in the "Five Principles". (I am enclosing a copy of the Chinese text.)

Would you have Ekvall's travel authorization 8-0200 of July 1 amended and his subsequent orders read so as to cover travel from any point in France on which he is on official duty to Geneva rather than just from Paris. Believe it or not he started his previous trip from Roquebrune which is closer and cheaper to Geneva than Paris, but Embassy, Paris refuses to pay him anything for it because his orders read only from Paris. Such are some administrative minds.

Regards to all.

U. Alexis Johnson

## Enclosure 1

### Copy of Reuters Ticker<sup>2</sup>

reut 51542

Following recd ES Washington:

An exchange of American and Chinese Communist correspondents may be worked out if China does not insist on the use of the word "reciprocal" in any agreement, informed sources said today.

Immediate State Dept reaction to the Chinese proposal at Geneva that American and Chinese reporters should be allowed to enter each others country on such a basis, was to go no further than the position recently expressed by Mr. J.F. Dulles the SecState.

A Department spokesman said: "if any Chinese Communist newsman applies for a visa, his application will be considered in the light of relevant laws."

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<sup>2</sup>No classification marking.

But informed sources indicated that the United States might eventually agree to exchange approximately equal numbers of reporters with China.

“If the Chinese would agree to avoid the word ‘reciprocal’ something probably could be worked out,” one U.S. official said.

“I don’t think it would be exactly twenty-five Americans for 25 Chinese, but the numbers could be nearly equal.”

**Enclosure 2**

**Chinese Draft<sup>3</sup>**

September 12, 1957

[The Chinese text is illegible.]

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<sup>3</sup>No classification marking.

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**829. Telegram 145 from Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, September 17, 1957, 4 p.m.

145. I have now received from Geneva text Wang’s September 16 press statement which I understand has been transmitted Department by USIS Geneva. My opinion statement does not introduce any new element and requires no reply except recommend Department reply to inquiries on his charges concerning Chinese in US by referring fact no representations yet received from Indian Embassy on single case alleged obstruction.

While CHICOMS now demanding US recognition principle “equality and reciprocity” with respect this matter, his statement strengthens my belief they not necessarily insisting on one for one exchange.

**Johnson**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1757. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London as telegram 8 to pass to Martin.

**830. Letter 74 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 74

Washington, September 27, 1957

Dear Alex:

We have been pondering the Communist actions with respect to the newsmen in order to reach some conclusions as to where we stand on this question and what we may expect from the Communists. I have embodied the results of our thought and discussion in the enclosed memorandum on which I would appreciate having your and Ed's comments. If you have any comment which you think might influence the formulation of the instructions for your next meeting, please telegraph them as a letter would probably not reach us in time. I expect to be writing again next week but wanted to get this memorandum to you earlier so that you would have more time to consider it.

Sincerely yours,

**Ralph N. Clough**

Enclosure:

Memorandum on Chinese Communist Actions with Respect to Newsmen.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Drafted by Clough. A copy was sent to Martin.



**831. Letter 75 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 75

Washington, October 4, 1957

Dear Alex:

I suspect the principal subject at your forthcoming meeting will be the newsmen issue. As pointed out in the memo attached to my letter of September 27, it seems doubtful that the Chinese Communists are in a hurry to resolve the present impasse. It seems more likely that for a while at least they will continue to exploit it in their propaganda and press you hard for some sort of recognition in principle of equal and reciprocal treatment for newsmen. We will try to anticipate possible moves on their part at the next meeting and make your instructions as complete as possible. We feel we are in a satisfactory position if we continue to refuse any general agreement by holding the door open for any Chinese Communist newsmen to apply for a visa if he wishes.

We have been informed by Justice that the Court has again denied Wirin's request that the Court order the State Department to issue him a passport valid for Communist China. The case has not yet reached the posture at which the Judge would have to decide whether the refusal of a validated passport to Wirin would justify dismissing the case. When that time comes, we have told Justice we will consider our position once more.

We have sent you a copy of Hammarskjold's message to Lodge that he was writing to Chou En-lai concerning Downey and Fecteau. I am not sanguine that this will accomplish anything but it certainly can do no harm. We still have no word from Panmunjom that the matter of the unaccounted for personnel has been taken up in the MAC. I think it is just as well for you not to make any elaborate presentation on this issue pending word from the MAC. I suppose it is possible that Wang will seek a little publicity after the next meeting if he should come up with some new proposal. If it seems appropriate to do so we could consult by telephone concerning a press release by you. We felt that your release last month was quite effective.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

**Ralph N. Clough**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. A copy was sent to Martin.

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832. Telegram 366 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 8, 1957, 4:04 p.m.

366. For Johnson.

Guidance for October 10 meeting:

1. Take Wang to task for increasingly evident Chinese Communist responsibility for preventing progress in talks. On September 10, 1955 they declared all Americans entitled expeditiously exercise right return. Instead of carrying out promptly this public commitment, they adopted specious argument that term QUOTE expeditiously UNQUOTE must be interpreted in light length sentence, behavior of prisoners. At last two meetings Wang even argued that Agreed Announcement applied only to QUOTE ordinary UNQUOTE not QUOTE offending UNQUOTE Americans. Plain words of announcement do not support this view and Wang well knows that at time announcement issued, U.S. concerned only about prisoners, hence announcement must have referred to them or been meaningless.

2. Communist responsibility for lack progress also apparent from refusal renounce use force. Reciprocal renunciation force applicable to Taiwan area merits full attention for whatever time necessary attain goal of terminating military threat to peace that area. Interests of two countries and world not served by introduction of subsidiary issues.

3. If Wang raises question newsmen's travel and his draft agreed announcement of September 12, reaffirm U.S. position applications individual newsmen for visas will be considered on individual case basis. If Communist China wishes approve or deny newsmen visas on group or blanket basis, that matter its choice. U.S. will act in accordance its own laws, subjecting applications individually to criteria specified in law.

4. If Wang presses for yes or no answer on principle reciprocity and equality or for assurance one or several Chinese Communist newsmen would be admitted, remind him U.S. newsmen applied individually for visas, that he himself stated these applications would be considered individually and we are only asking that Chinese Communist newsmen do the same. U.S. cannot approve visas in advance on blanket or hypothetical basis.

5. Your 190 considered in formulating above.

Dulles

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-457. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Osborn and Clough; cleared by Robertson and Jones and in S/S.

**833. Letter from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 8, 1957

Dear Alex:

I looked into the matter of a possible amendment for Bob Ekvall's travel authorization, along the lines of your letter of September 12, but it appears the administrative mind works the same in Washington as it does in Paris. The orders on which Bob travels to Geneva were issued by State, whereas his orders for travel within France are paid by Army; to have him perform a trip employing both sets of orders, however amended, would entail all sorts of budgetary complications involving overlapping agency responsibilities, which our administrative people would rather not contemplate. However, if Bob can work out some procedure acceptable to the Embassy in Paris, I will try to have our executive office take another look at the problem.

Best regards,

Sincerely yours,

**Ralph N. Clough**  
*Director for Chinese Affairs*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Unclassified; Official–Informal. Drafted by Osborn.

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**834. Telegram 347 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 10, 1957, 2 p.m.

347. From Johnson.

One hour twenty minute meeting this morning with no new developments.

I opened with statement along lines paragraphs 1 and 2 Deptel 366. Wang's reply was along familiar lines but with particular stress on "principles of equality, mutual benefit and reciprocity" and ended with correspondents which example of renewed U.S. violation of these principles. "PRC demands US subscribe to principle of equality and reciprocity." In reply I stressed US interested in substance not words and that facts of performance under September 10 agreed announcement as witnessed by UK and India glaring example PRC failure carry out their principles. Then made point paragraph 3 Deptel 366.

During course rebuttal Wang made statement that PRC had never tried prohibit Chinese correspondents going to US and Chinese correspondents make own decisions this matter which I picked up to reply that then there is apparently no problem, no Chinese correspondents having applied to go to U.S., apparently none desire to do so. Pointed out American correspondents travel to most countries of world including Communist countries and correspondents from most of those countries travel to U.S. without any agreements between governments. If any of those governments asked agreement similar that asked by PRC, our answer would have to be same as to PRC. At this point Wang conferred with aide and said he had nothing further.

I suggested next meeting November 7. Wang countered with November 14 and I accepted. Full report by pouch.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-1057. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

**835. Despatch unnumbered from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, October 9, 1957

SUBJECT

China Talks—71st Meeting

1. I opened 71st with following statement:

a. “Mr. Ambassador, in our last meeting you made the allegation that while your government has been the one which has always worked to remove the obstacles in the path of improvement of relations between our two countries, the United States Government was always creating such obstacles. I expressed my astonishment that you should feel it possible to make such a statement. It seems to me that the record of our 70 meetings since August 1, 1955 has demonstrated very clearly that it has been the attitude adopted by your authorities which has placed serious obstacles in the way of the improvement of relations.

b. When our talks first began I emphasized the vital importance attached by my government, and by the American people, to the question of the release of Americans imprisoned in your country. The first six weeks of our negotiations were taken up entirely with this subject and were culminated in the issuance of the Agreed Announcement of September 10. It was, as I have repeatedly pointed out, the understanding of my government that this Announcement applied to all Americans in the territory controlled by your authorities, including those who were imprisoned. No other interpretation can logically be placed either on the wording of the announcement, or on the negotiations which led up to its issuance.

c. It was our sincere hope that, with the issuance of the Agreed Announcement, a solemn commitment had been made by your authorities to eliminate one of the major sources of friction between our countries. Unfortunately, we were to be disappointed in this hope. Hardly had the Agreed Announcement been issued than you began to interpret it in such a way as to distort the clear meaning of the words used, and thus to try to excuse the failure of your authorities to implement the Announcement. You lost no time in making the specious argument that the term “expeditiously” must be interpreted in the light of the behaviour of the prisoners and of the seriousness of their alleged crimes, and so forth.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10-957. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Johnson. Received on October 17.

d. An even more serious distortion of the Agreed Announcement has been the argument which you have put forward during the last two meetings, as well as on previous occasions, that the announcement applies only to so-called ordinary Americans residing in China and not to those who are alleged to have committed offenses. Neither the words of the Announcement itself, nor the record of the negotiations leading up to it, support this argument. The clear intention of the Agreed Announcement was to bring about the expeditious release of all Americans who were against their will prevented from leaving your country, including most obviously those who were imprisoned. By their failure to implement this clear intention, your authorities deliberately sought to deprecate the value of agreements between us. Your authorities have thus been careful to maintain what they full well know is one of the principal obstacles to the improvement of relations between us and to progress in these talks. No amount of words can change these facts or obscure the full responsibility of your side.

e. In all frankness, Mr. Ambassador, I must also make the same indictment of your side on the question of the renunciation of the use of force. Again it has been the intransigent attitude adopted by your authorities which has prevented us from making progress on this vital matter. We dealt at considerable length at our meeting in August with this extremely important question and I do not propose to review today the various arguments which I put forward then. I do wish to stress, however, that in the view of my government the reciprocal renunciation of force with respect to the Taiwan area is a step which is fully as essential today as it was when these talks began more than two years ago. I earnestly wish to point out once again, Mr. Ambassador, that the refusal of the authorities of your country to renounce force and to terminate their military threat in the Taiwan area remains a fundamental obstacle to the attainment of lasting peace. The removal of this obstacle certainly merits our full attention for whatever time is necessary to achieve results. Introduction of subsidiary issues by no means serves the interests of our two countries nor of the world."

2. Wang replied. He had repeatedly pointed out during the course of the talks that in order to improve relations between our two countries, it is necessary that obstacles lying in their path must be removed. I had this morning referred to the record of our talks of the past two years. He might say that this record does not give any indication that the U.S. is making efforts to remove such obstacles in our relations. From this record of our talks it can be clearly seen that their complaints against us have been based on facts. They consider that relations between two countries must be based on equality, mutual benefits and reciprocity. The U.S., however, has consistently denied this basis. The principle of equality and reciprocity has been generally accepted as one of the bases

of international relations. He did not see any reason why our side should continue to object to it.

3. Wang continued. Let us take the question of returning civilians. His side has faithfully carried out the agreement of September 10, 1955 while my side has not, thus violating the principle of reciprocity. Now all those ordinary American nationals in China who desire to return have left. Even among the American prisoners, 34 have been released in advance or at the expiration of their terms. Yet Chinese in the U.S. who desire to return continue to encounter obstacles and persecution so that many cannot return. Nor do those Chinese prisoners in the U.S. enjoy similar lenient treatment as do those U.S. prisoners in China.

4. Wang continued. Next he wanted to take up the visits of newspaper correspondents. Last year his government took the initiative in admitting American correspondents. All those who wanted to do so did not succeed in coming due to obstructions placed by the U.S. Government. Three went and they succeeded in completing their coverage. On this score the U.S. has again failed to observe the principle of reciprocity. On August 22 my government had announced permission for American correspondents to enter China but flagrantly refused to announce permission for Chinese correspondents. The draft agreement introduced by his side at the last meeting called for reciprocity for newsmen to come and visit on a reciprocal basis. This was rejected by my side.

5. Wang continued by saying that on relations between China and the U.S. and on such concrete matters as cultural exchanges, human contacts, and visits of newspapermen, our side has violated the principles of equality and reciprocity, thus showing contempt of the principles in international relations. They consider that in Sino-American relations no question can be settled if one departs from this principle. In this respect they have consistently insisted on equality and reciprocity, and they resolutely demand that our side subscribe to this principle. Otherwise their side cannot unilaterally undertake commitments.

6. Wang continued. With regard to the renunciation of force, his position has always been that the relaxation of tension in the Taiwan area constitutes one of the vital aspects in the improvement of relations between China and America. Previously they had dealt at great length on the importance of this issue. The fact before us is that the Chinese territory of Taiwan is under the direction of the U.S. and peace in the Far East is disturbed by the attitude of the U.S. Government. His side has repeatedly put forward their views with regard to how this situation can effectively be resolved. It is now up to the U.S. to put forward concrete opinions if the U.S. is genuinely willing to respect the sovereignty of China and genuinely desires to contribute to peace in the Far East.

7. I replied. He had again this morning as in the past spoken much of the terms equality and mutual benefit and reciprocity. I told

him when we came here more than two years ago my interest and the interest of my government is in substance rather than words. At his suggestion we entered into an agreement more than two years ago which was supposed to embody the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and reciprocity. I could not see that that agreement has in any way insofar as implementation by his country is concerned demonstrated either equality, mutual benefit, or reciprocity. The evidence of this is not the unsupported statements of myself and of my government; the evidence is the impartial observations of the third parties named in that agreement to determine whether it was being carried out in good faith. With respect to his country the UK is witness to the fact that it has not even been able to carry out the subsidiary provision of that agreement. The UK is witness to the fact that for more than two years there has not been even any pretence of releasing the imprisoned persons who were subject to that agreement. Prisoners are now being held up to the very last day of completion of their sentences. I cannot see the slightest evidence of what he termed lenient treatment, much less any evidence of carrying out the terms of the agreement permitting these people to return to the U.S.

8. I continued. On the other hand the Government of India which was named by him in the Agreement with respect to its operations in the U.S. has not yet called to our attention a single case of obstruction to the return of any Chinese who desires to return to his country. The question, he full well knew, is not whether a majority of Chinese residing in the U.S. have returned to his country or whether a minority have returned. The question is whether those who desire to return have been and continue to be free to do so. The Government of India and the Indian Embassy in the U.S. are witness to the fact that they are able to do so.

9. I continued. Thus it is clear, not on the basis of my words but on the basis of impartial evidence to whose benefit that agreement has operated. However, apart from all this, his government full well knew even before we came here that the question of Americans imprisoned in his country and prevented from returning to the U.S. was one of the major obstacles to the improvement in our relations. The very terms of reference agreed upon by our two governments for these talks are witness to that fact. I have not and do not ask him to agree as to whether this position is right or wrong, but what I have asked him to recognize is that it is a fact. It is a fact of fundamental importance and a fact which is readily within the control of his government. I agreed to the proposal which he made for our agreed announcement on the subject on the understanding that his authorities would be willing and able to remove this block to the improvement of our relations. In spite of all this his authorities deliberately are maintaining this block to our relations. It is entirely impossible for me to understand why they continue



to do so. It is entirely impossible for me to reconcile this undisputed fact with progress for improvement in relations and improvement in these talks. I had most earnestly in every way I could think of attempted to make this clear to you.

10. I continued. With respect to correspondents it is a similar situation, that is, is his interest in words or is his interest in substance? I failed to see the ground for his complaint. As far as I knew no newspaper correspondents from his country had ever applied for entry into the U.S. In fact until a few weeks ago he never indicated any interest in the subject. As I told him at the last meeting, if it is the desire of any newspaperman to enter the U.S. his application will be accepted at any foreign service post throughout the world. His application will be considered on an individual case basis in accordance with our laws and regulations. If his authorities desired to approve or deny the applications for visas which have been made to him by U.S. correspondents whose passports have been validated for travel to his country, that is entirely a matter of their choice. If they wanted to deny all of them on a blanket basis or deny or approve them on an individual basis, that was entirely a matter of their choice. As far as the U.S. was concerned, under our laws, applications must be considered individually. I could see the basis for his complaint about this position or why it should prevent exchanges of newsmen.

11. I continued. As far as the question of renunciation of force was concerned, the situation still is that his authorities refuse to agree to an unconditional renunciation of force such as I had proposed. Their position still appears to be that they are asking the U.S. to surrender to their point of view with respect to the Taiwan area even while they continued to use the threat of force. I could not see in that position the slightest element of any willingness to settle disputes by peaceful negotiation or the slightest element of equality, mutual benefit, or reciprocity.

12. Wang replied. I had spoken a lot of words concerning mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity. All these words sounded quite all right to him whereas in substance the record of our talks shows that in the course of these talks I had always been telling the Chinese government to do this and to do that whereas the U.S. Government has never indicated its willingness to make any effort. Insofar as the agreement on civilians is concerned, the record shows that the U.S. side has always been telling the Chinese Government to take actions whereas the U.S. itself has not been taking actions to implement that agreement. Insofar as the release of prisoners is concerned according to my way of stating the matter it would seem that only the question of American prisoners is concerned while there is no question of Chinese prisoners. Such allegations do not conform with the actual situation.

13. Wang continued. With respect to the visit of newspaper correspondents, the official statement of my government indicated that it was

going to allow a certain number of American newsmen to go to China while it does not even try to conceal its refusal to give reciprocal treatment to Chinese newspapermen going to the U.S. All this shows that lip service to reciprocity does not mean reciprocity actually. With regard to the question of Chinese going to the U.S., this is entirely a matter for the Chinese correspondents to decide on because his government has never tried to prohibit or prevent the visits of correspondents as my government has done. Thus the Chinese correspondents can make their own decision on this matter. The question does not depend on the Chinese Government or on the Chinese correspondents but it is up to whether the U.S. is willing to observe the principle of reciprocity and equality.

14. I replied. Then apparently there was no problem. Apparently no Chinese correspondent desired to go to the United States as no one has made application to do so.

15. Wang continued. He had made it clear that it was not a question of this or that correspondent but was a question of whether the U.S. is going to observe the principles of equality and reciprocity in international affairs. They could not in any way accept the position of the U.S. which unilaterally refused to accord equality and reciprocity to Chinese correspondents. This position violated all standards of international behaviour.

16. I replied. We simply made it clear in view of the history of this question and in view of the legal framework in which we must operate that we could not be bound as a matter of right to permit, or to give advance approval, to a number of Chinese correspondents corresponding to a number of American correspondents which they might decide to admit to their country. If and when any Chinese correspondent makes application to go to the U.S. we are entirely willing to consider his application. He himself had said that application for visas to his country would also be considered individually.

17. I continued. United States correspondents travel to most of the countries of the world including those which have social and economic systems similar to his own, and correspondents from those countries travel to the U.S. In no case did I know of any agreement on reciprocity or equality nor has the U.S., for those countries, insisted on any such agreement. If they were to do so, we would have to give them the same answer I gave him here.

18. He then indicated he had no more to say.

19. I did likewise and suggested we meet again on November 7. Wang said he would prefer November 14. I agreed.

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

**836. Letter 60 from Johnson to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 60

Geneva, October 9, 1957

Dear Ralph:

As stated in my summary telegram, there was nothing new at this morning's meeting. He obviously had no new instructions, his performance was almost listless, and his replies entirely perfunctory. As you will also note he cut the meeting off short. I feel that given the situation I made out very well today and that his position on the correspondents was very weak. I think that they full well realized this and that they do not have much of a public issue unless and until Chinese correspondents apply for visas and are refused. I am surprised that this has not been done up until now but perhaps they did not have their "ducks lined up" and think that it is very likely that they will do so before the next meeting. It of course depends on what their principal objective is. They can hardly expect to be successful in making us formally and publicly retract the "reciprocity" issue. They have not been successful in rousing our own press to the fray. The press elsewhere seems to have a marked lack of interest in the whole subject now. However, if we were to turn down an application from one of their correspondents they would probably be successful in again arousing interest in the subject both in our own press and abroad. One can only speculate as to whether they really desire to have any American correspondents enter their country. If they do not, the present impasse may not be unwelcome to them and they might let it continue rather than take the risk of it being broken by our issuing visas to one or more of their correspondents.

Nevertheless, in connection with the possibility of some Chinese correspondents entering the United States I think that we should be prepared for the possibility of their attempting to contact some of the Chinese students, particularly those for whom they have names and addresses, and for the difficulties that may well ensue. Given past attitudes of the students I think that we can depend on most of them being unwilling to see correspondents, particularly one from Communist China, and of their attempting to use this as proof that we are "terrorizing" the students. If they do see any, I think that we can depend on the students taking at the best an ambivalent attitude on their reasons for not returning. I do not have any suggestions at the moment for meeting this problem but merely mention it as something we should think about.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Johnson who signed the original "Alex."

I was, of course, disappointed that the Department did not accept my suggestion from Prague for taking a little initiative in this field at today's meeting. Although the meeting went off well without it, I do not think it safe to assume that this will always be the case or that they will not take another initiative in this field. Frankly, as you know, I am not happy with consistently being in the position of responding to his initiatives and never having an initiative of my own to which he is required to respond. I have felt that this correspondents issue gave an opportunity for somewhat turning the tables on him.

As far as the next meeting is concerned I think we simply have to wait and see what they do or do not do between now and that time. I fully expected him to turn down the suggestion for November 7 for the next meeting as that is the 40th Soviet anniversary and will be given a big play throughout the bloc. However, I wanted to leave it to him to suggest a later date. I should mention a point Ed Martin called to my attention with regard to the memo enclosed with your letter to me at Prague. Neither of us have a copy here as we do not like to carry classified communications but it is the recollection of both of us that in the last paragraph there was a phrase which in effect credited Chinese Communists with forcing us to change our policy on the travel of newsmen. While it is true that Peking's issuance of invitations to American correspondents started the whole issue, it was not pressure from Peking that brought about a change in our policy but rather the pressure from our own press.

Incidentally, the amendment of Ekvall's travel authorization mentioned in the last paragraph of my letter of September 12 has not yet been made and his new orders came out in the same form so he has not yet been able to collect for his previous travel.

Kindest regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**

P.S. For your information there has been a change in the courier arrival here so that your letters arrive here Wednesday afternoons. Thus, if there is anything of special importance in your letter it would be good to make some mention of it in our guidance so that if the courier is late for any reason we can ask you to telegraph the substance.

**837. Letter 76 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 76

Washington, November 8, 1957

Dear Alex:

We have just emerged successful from a spirited encounter with the Chinese Communists supported by the rest of the Soviet bloc at the Red Cross Conference in New Delhi where the Communists endeavored to exclude the Republic of China. Since Ed was present there is no need for me to describe the affair in detail. It is possible that Wang may attack us at the next meeting for our activities there and we will cover this point in your instructions. We sent an official delegation to the Conference only after considerable debate within the Department and with strong misgivings on the part of FE. We felt it would establish an unfortunate precedent for the U.S. Delegation to be present officially with the Chinese Communists. However we did go on the basis that this was to be a unique, humanitarian, non-political meeting at which all those having a reasonable claim to be present would be admitted. We of course could not assent to seeing the Republic of China excluded and the final result of our efforts was the admission of the GRC at which the Chinese Communists and the other Communist regimes walked out.

Judge Goodman in the Powell-Schumann sedition case handed down an order on November 1 giving the U.S. 30 days in which to issue defense attorney Wirin a passport valid for travel to Communist China, failing which he would dismiss the case. I will enclose a copy of the order if we can secure a legible one. In the meeting today with L we decided that the overall interests of the U.S. Government would probably be best served by validating Wirin's passport. Not to do so would place the responsibility on the State Department for dismissal of the case. Now that we have validated passports of American newsmen, we feel that validating Wirin's passport would not appreciably decrease the pressure from others who desire to go to Communist China. He has reasons for going which are unique. I don't believe that validating Wirin's passport will necessarily lead to his admission to Communist China or the procurement of the evidence which he is seeking. The Chinese Communists in a letter dated October 30 rejected the court's request for judicial assistance from Chinese Communist courts on the "ground that there is no agreement for judicial assistance between the U.S. and the Peoples Republic of China". My guess is that Peiping will continue to play this case in such a way as to endeavor to force the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. A copy was sent to Martin.

U.S. in the direction of Government to Government arrangements or agreements. Final decision has not been made yet as to whether Wirin's passport will be validated but I believe it will be approved.

Another month has gone by and no Chinese Communist correspondent has applied for a visa. Their inaction supports the speculation in your letter of October 9 that they may not really desire to admit American correspondents to mainland China at this time. If this is the case we can expect Wang at the next meeting simply to repeat his old accusations that we refuse to grant equality and reciprocity and that no exchange can take place until this obstacle has been removed. I have a feeling that they take this insistence on reciprocity rather seriously and to the extent they feel their overall international position is growing stronger they will be less inclined to act with flexibility to bring about actions toward breaking down U.S. restrictions on relations with them unless such actions could be taken on a plane of equality and reciprocity. The aftermath of the "sputnik" may make them more adamant in this respect. The manner in which they handle future developments in the Powell passport case may afford some clues to their thinking.

I am enclosing another copy of our memo of September 30 on Chinese Communist motivations and intentions with respect to travel of Americans so that you will have one in Geneva. Of course it is true that it was pressure from the American press which brought about our change in policy on passports for correspondents and not Chinese Communist pressure. The intent of the last paragraph of the memo was to say that looking at it from Peiping's point of view since their rather clever and dramatic act of approving visas for a large number of American correspondents set in motion the whole train of events leading to our change in policy, they must give themselves a considerable share of credit for that result.

I sent you and Ed copies of a memorandum to Mr. Robertson regarding our position with respect to Chinese aliens sentenced to prison subsequent to May 31, 1956. In brief it seems to me we have to have a cut-off date beyond which we cannot go in offering Chinese aliens the choice of deportation to Communist China. If we were to make a continuing operation of extending the terms of the Agreed Announcement to Chinese aliens regardless of his date of sentence, we might get into a situation where any Chinese would have carte blanche to commit any crime in the book. Or so it might seem to Justice and to the various State authorities. At the same time, I feel we should not be deprived of our flexibility in this regard, and for that reason I recommended that we not state our position to Immigration and Naturalization Service at this time. So far as we know there is only the one case (Lee Poy) of a Chinese sentenced after May 1956 desiring to return to Communist China under

the terms of the Agreed Announcement. He does not appear to have brought his case to the attention of the Indians.

John Dexter, who is going to take Bob Ekvall's place as interpreter, is now in the Department on consultation. He intends to do some work with Language Service Branch here in the general techniques of conference interpreting, following which he will take a little leave before proceeding to Geneva. We hope he will be able to arrive in Geneva in time for the December meeting. It would be desirable, if you can work it out, to have Dexter sit in on the December and January meetings. It is up to you, of course, whether you wish to introduce Dexter at the December meeting as Ekvall's replacement, or to have him take La Claire's place for the December and January meetings. Although it is somewhat irregular, I should think it might serve as a demonstration of our continuing interest in the talks if you introduced Dexter frankly as Bob's replacement. It would also be more useful to Dexter if he could concentrate on following the interpreting rather than be required to take notes. We are having some trouble fitting Dexter in at a post convenient to Geneva. The only job which has been given serious consideration as a possible slot for Dexter at Geneva is the conference administration position formerly occupied by Bill Sabbagh, but this job is felt to be not entirely appropriate. The difficulty with assigning him to Bern or Zurich is the matter of his language training between meetings. As you know we are asking Ed to look into language training possibilities, but we are not too sanguine about those places.

As you will have noticed from the verbatim record of the 79th MAC meeting, the UNC opening presentation on the missing servicemen was based almost entirely on the draft statement which you saw here last May. There were a couple of unfortunate interpolations, however, which have given rise to some false impressions. In the latter part of the opening statement, it is noted that the Communist falsification of their "accounting" only strengthens the conviction widely held in the United States that American citizens are still being held. The USIA ticker on the MAC meeting misquoted this passage so that it appeared the U.S. Government shared this conviction. The other unfortunate statement in the UNC presentation was the reference to the 1,084 persons on the UNC list against whose names the Communists noted in their last "accounting" that they had no data. This gave rise to the mistaken inference in the USIA ticker and in some news stories that the figure 1,084 is the total number of missing servicemen for whom we are seeking an accounting. As you know, we regard the Communist accounting as unsatisfactory throughout, and not just with regard to the persons on whom they say they have no data.

On the whole, despite these unfortunate passages, I believe the meeting went pretty well. I do not see that the Communists offered us



any particular openings for exploitation at Geneva, but they did in their rebuttal concentrate somewhat more than formerly on the proper issue of an accounting.

Their stress upon the fact that the UNC has not yet submitted an accounting for their list of 98,000, if Wang takes the same line at Geneva, should give you the opportunity for the citation of additional individual cases by way of proving our contention that their accounting is completely unsatisfactory and hence does not meet the condition that we have set for rendering an accounting of their missing personnel.

Kindest regards,

Sincerely,

**Ralph N. Clough**

Enclosure:

1. Memo re "Chinese Communist Motives and Intentions with Respect to Travel of Americans".

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### **838. Telegram 497 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 12, 1957

497. For Johnson.

Guidance for November 14 meeting:

1. Reiterate continuing concern at failure Chinese Communists release imprisoned Americans despite commitment to do so over two years ago.

2. Express to Wang our deep regret Communist side in MAC at 79th meeting October 22 again refused account for UNC missing personnel. This refusal perform what even Communist side admits is obligation under Armistice Agreement demonstrates anew Chinese Communist contempt for sanctity agreements, as well as disregard humanitarian considerations. State that failure Communist side respond in MAC compels US raise again in Geneva forum. Cite individual cases from list to demonstrate falsification in previous Communist "accounting".

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1257. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough and Osborn; cleared by Robertson and Dulles in draft and by Henderson in substance. The time of transmission is illegible.



3. If Wang refers to Red Cross Conference, New Delhi, you should point out US concern with maintaining universal humanitarian character Red Cross as demonstrated by our attendance despite presence official delegations of various regimes we do not recognize. Communist walk-out demonstrated their fundamental disregard for basic humanitarian non-political character Red Cross. You may wish remark that scorn for basic principles Red Cross shown New Delhi consistent with Chinese Communist refusal admit ICRC representatives to their prison camps during Korean war.

4. Maintain position on newsmen if Wang raises issue. Decision solely in hands Chinese Communists whether they admit US newsmen or permit their newsmen apply US visas.

5. Maintain established position other issues.

**Dulles**

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### 839. Telegram 448 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 14, 1957, noon

448. From Johnson.

Uneventful one hour meeting this morning. Wang opened with statement on implementation which, together with his replies during give and take, was mildest yet made. Emphasis was on 50 of 56 names given me and 21 of 103 names I had given him not having returned as well as only one prisoner having returned. Allegations of obstruction based on experiences of those having returned. During course give and take for first time made statement "to say that there is this number of Chinese in US is not same as saying they all desire return or we want them all return."

In reply my statement on missing military personnel accordance para 2 Deptel 497, he refused enter into discussion stating I well knew their attitude that it was not in terms of reference talks. I, of course, stressed was "practical matter" between us and refusal discuss or attempt ignore problem could not solve it.

Next meeting December 12.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1457. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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**840. Despatch unnumbered from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, November 14, 1957

**SUBJECT**

China Talks—72nd Meeting

**1. Wang Opened.**

It had been more than two years since the two of us reached agreement on return of civilians but a majority of Chinese nationals are still prevented from returning to China. This raises a question of good faith. There are tens of thousands of Chinese nationals still in the U.S. Among these, students alone number more than 5000. These students left China many years ago and are now anxious to return to their homeland. Before we reached agreement our authorities were apparently detaining them. After we reached agreement our authorities are still trying to delay them by all sorts of obstructive tactics. At our meetings here he had given us 56 names. 50 of these have not yet returned. The U.S. has submitted 103 names of which 21 are yet to return. With regard to these 21 specific persons who have not returned the American side has failed to give an accounting. They have been continuously receiving letters from relatives of these unfortunate persons appealing for assistance to bring their sons home. He also takes note of the fact that of the 34 persons listed by the U.S. authorities, except in the case of one person, all the rest have not been returned. A sharp contrast arises between the failure of my authorities to carry out the Agreement and its implementation by his side. As the result of his side's faithful implementation of the Agreement, all those Americans who wanted to return have done so including among those, a majority of the criminal offenders who have been returned at the expiration or prior to the expiration of their sentences. He felt it incumbent upon himself to stress once again that since the Agreement was concluded between the two sides, both sides should honor the Agreement. It is hoped that the American Ambassador will impress upon his government that the Agreement must be carried out so that Chinese nationals can return to their country without further obstructions.

2. I replied. We agreed at the outset of our talks here insofar as the return of nationals of either side were concerned that what we were discussing was those who desired to return. In fact, that language is incorporated in our Agreed Announcement on that subject. As he himself

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-1457. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received on November 18.

pointed out here this morning, there are tens of thousands of Chinese nationals residing in the U.S.A. They had been residing there even before his authorities took control of the mainland of China. Most of them have been residing there for many years. With respect to the students, it is entirely understandable that many of them do not desire to return. He seemed to take the position that because they have not returned or because some of their relatives desire to have them return, they are prevented from returning by some mysterious obstructions imposed by my authorities. The fact of the matter is very clear on the face of it that those who have not returned have not done so because they do not desire to return. As I had pointed out to him many times, we have no desire nor reason to detain people in the U.S. against their will. He and his authorities continued to make vague unsupported statements that these people are being obstructed in returning. It is incredible to me that he finds it possible to make such statements in the face of the facts. The facts are that the very agency which he himself suggested has not called to our attention a single case of obstruction. The Chinese in the U.S. have continued to be entirely free to depart for his country if they desired to do so. The sole question—let me say the sole determining factor—is their own desire. He had again this morning presented various figures. With regard to the 56 names he had submitted to me, I had told him in the past and I told him again categorically this morning, they and every other Chinese are entirely free to leave the U.S. if they desire to do so.

3. I continued. He had talked about the figure of 103 and again misrepresented that figure. As I had told him at the time I gave him those names, they were not names of persons who necessarily desired to return to his country. They were names of persons, and I repeated this, they were names of persons to whom orders were issued preventing their leaving the U.S. during the Korean war for reasons of national security. The fact that such orders were issued or that I gave him their names here was not the slightest evidence that they desired to return. It had no relation whatever to their desires. It was a purely preventative measure and, as I told him at the outset of our talks here, those orders have been entirely withdrawn. The fact that the orders were withdrawn and the group was free to return any time it wanted to do so is established by his own statement that eighty-two in fact have returned. With regard to those in prison I outlined to him the measures which we had taken to determine their desires after he rejected the first proposal that I had made in this regard, and those who desired to return have done so regardless of the length of their sentences.

4. I continued. These are the facts with regard to the return of Chinese from my country to his country. They are not vague, unsupported allegations; neither are they unilateral statements on my part. They are facts known to all the world; they are facts established by

impartial evidence. If he continues to refuse to accept these facts, I can only draw my own conclusions as to the reasons.

5. I continued. The facts with regard to Americans in his country are equally clear. It is entirely clear and indisputable that of the 19 Americans in his prisons at the time of our Agreed Announcement and concerning which that Agreed Announcement said his authorities would adopt measures for expediting their return, after over two years six still remain in his prisons. It is a fact that since December 1955 not one American has been returned prior to serving the full sentence imposed upon him. It is the normal practice for every country of which I have knowledge to remit substantial portions of sentences for normally good behaviour of prisoners. Since having entered into the Agreement, these Americans seem to have been deprived even of this privilege. Thus, apart from the very serious and solemn question of obligation of his authorities under the Agreed Announcement, the position of these prisoners seems markedly to have worsened since the announcement of the Agreement. Apart from their obligations under the Agreement, the action of his authorities to continue to keep these persons in prisons is utterly in contradiction to professions of desire for settling of questions and improvement of relations between us. I and my government can only conclude this is a deliberate policy.

6. Wang replied. He made a statement this morning with regard to the tens of thousands of Chinese nationals residing in the U.S. including 5000 students, but this was not the same as saying that they wanted all these to return or that all wanted to return. What he had specifically made clear was that among these people, regardless of whether they were ordinary residents or students who were in the U.S. to acquire knowledge, many do desire to return to their homeland. That he had given me a limited list of specified persons explained the fact that these persons desired to return to their country. All these persons desired to return to their country. All these persons have expressed a desire to return, but have encountered difficulties in doing so. From the experiences of those Chinese who succeeded in returning recently is explained the fact that there exist various barriers and difficulties preventing their return. Some of those who have returned complain that once they made known their desire, they got in trouble with our authorities, who had them interrogated. There are cases in which my authorities tried to press persons who made known their desire to go to his country to go to Taiwan instead. There are cases in which persons whose desire to return to his country were given such short notice they got into trouble in making preparations to leave. There are cases of persons departing who have had their property sequestered. These circumstances and the possibility that they might encounter in departing some form of difficulty inhibited their nationals from making up their minds to return to his country.

7. Wang continued. With regard to the 103 whose names I submitted, the statement I gave this morning admitted the fact that those persons were prohibited from returning to his country. The fact that my authorities issued the order clearly explained the fact that there were persons prevented from returning. It was still a fact that 21 still were not able to return. Considering the points he had made this morning, he therefore again requested me to impress on my government to take measures necessary to remove all these obstacles so their nationals can in fact exercise their right to return to their country without obstruction.

8. I replied. It seemed to me that on the one hand he was complaining that we made persons go too quickly and on the other hand we prevented them from going. All I was asking of Wang—all I ever asked of Wang—is that Americans in prison who unquestionably desire to be released and return be permitted to do so.

9. Wang indicated he had nothing more to say.

10. I said I had something more to discuss this morning. I then read the following prepared statement:

“Mr. Ambassador, you will recall that at our 23rd and 24th meetings I discussed with you the question of American military personnel still missing from the Korean hostilities and concerning whom we had solid grounds for believing that your side must have information. You will recall that it was your position at the time that this matter should be taken up in the Military Armistice Commission in Korea. I pointed out that we were not concerned as to where the information was furnished but only in obtaining the information.

“I was pleased and encouraged that when, in accordance with your suggestion, the matter was again taken up by the United Nations Command in the Military Armistice Commission, your side accepted the lists of personnel which they had so long refused and promised to investigate the matter. I and my Government hoped that at long last your authorities had decided to liquidate this question by furnishing the requested information. However, this hope was sorely disappointed when at the 69th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission in February of last year the lists were returned with simply the notation, in the overwhelming majority of cases, of ‘no data’. In a lesser number of cases your side finally admitted that the men had been prisoners of your side but attempted to account for them by stating that they had escaped.

“Mr. Ambassador, as pointed out by the United Nations Command representatives at the 79th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission last month this information is simply not credible. Not a single one of these men has ever returned to our side and if they had in fact at one time escaped they must therefore have been recaptured or killed by forces of your side. If such was the case, forces of your side must have some record thereof and I cannot understand why they continue to refuse to furnish it to us. I also find it astonishing that your side would

list as having escaped a man such as Capt. Harry Moreland who, as I pointed out in our 64th meeting last January, had both legs amputated. I find it incredible that your side would be able to say that it had no data concerning a man such as Capt. Joseph S. Long, Jr. of the United States Air Force, who, a broadcast from your side in April 1952 said, was alive and a prisoner.

"However, when such facts were pointed out at the 79th Military Armistice Commission meeting last month, representatives of your side resorted to entirely irrelevant polemics rather than making any serious effort honestly to discuss the problem or to furnish the requested information which they have recognized is their obligation under the Korean Armistice Agreement.

"Mr. Ambassador, my purpose in again raising the question with you here this morning is not to make accusations or to engage in polemics, but rather to seek the cooperation of you and your authorities in liquidating this problem."

11. Wang replied. With regard to the question of missing personnel in the Korean War that I had again brought up this morning, he had made their attitude very clear in previous meetings. He did not consider this subject within the terms of reference of our talks. He therefore did not feel it was necessary to give a reply to me this morning.

12. I replied whether he considered it within the terms of reference or not, it is a practical matter at issue between us. It is not a problem that can be solved by sweeping it under the rug or doing nothing about it.

13. Wang said he had nothing more.

14. We agreed that our next meeting would be held on December 12.

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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#### 841. Letter 61 from Johnson to Clough<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 61

Geneva, November 14, 1957

Dear Ralph:

As you have seen Wang was today very mild and obviously just marking time. There was no slightest mention of New Delhi or anything

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-Informal. Sent via air pouch. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

else. You will note that I made the tone of my statement on missing military personnel somewhat milder than implied in the guidance telegram. If our purpose is really to get information on these men I still feel it is better with them and for the record to handle it, particularly in a closed meeting such as this, in that manner rather than simply as a propaganda blast. In any event the people in MAC seem fully capable of exploiting the propaganda blast approach.

I cited the case of Long as the best additional case I could find. I am somewhat confused on the now voluminous files on this subject here which Dave had well in hand. If he has the time, I would appreciate Dave dropping us a little note on any suggestions he may have based on his memory of what we have on hand here.

I think you are right in issuing a passport to Wirin.

The correspondents issue seems to be completely dead on all sides. I am sure that you are not, and I know that I am not, regretful that this is the case. It certainly confirms that Peiping has no interest in letting in American correspondents at this time. Incidentally, what has happened with respect to the returning American students? I have seen nothing whatever on it in recent weeks. You will have seen that I had the Tyler couple in Prague.

I think your memo on Chinese in prisons is good.

Ed is working on the question of an instructor for Dexter and I will let him tell you about that. I would be very glad if Dexter could arrive here by the December meeting. I entirely agree that the best thing to do is frankly to introduce him as Bob's successor and will do so.

With respect to Bob I did not receive your letter of October 8 regarding his travel orders until I arrived here this trip. I think that there may be a little misunderstanding as to the problem. It is not one of giving him State orders for travel within France, but rather of just having his State orders read so that they cover travel from any place in France that he may be to Geneva rather than just from Paris. As it now stands he is just not able to collect anything for his August trip. He was at Roquebrune on leave and instead of returning to Paris and originating his trip there, he went directly from Roquebrune to Geneva which was also cheaper for the Government. While the amount is not large he should be paid.

I was interested in talking to Ed and Dave Popper about the New Delhi show. I had no idea that they had gone down there.

Thanks very much for Ken Young's memo on his talk with the Pole. I found it most interesting for its other points as well as the one on China.

Regards to all.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

842. Letter from Martin to Clough<sup>1</sup>

London, November 19, 1957

Dear Ralph:

I am writing in response to the Department's telegram 3375 instructing me to investigate instruction in Chinese available at l'Ecole d'Interpretes at Geneva and Chinese tutors at Bern and Zurich, if any. On Thursday afternoon, November 14, Bob Ekvall and I interviewed Mrs. Paul Chu, Chinese teacher at l'Ecole d'Interpretes, and on Friday morning I talked to Madame Piguet at the school itself, which is part of the University of Geneva. Late Friday afternoon I flew to Zurich hoping to talk to Dr. Peng, the Chinese language teacher there. Though I was disappointed to find that he had left town with his entire family for a few days, I was able to discuss the problem with our Consul General, who had been totally ignorant of what it was all about, and to suggest certain questions be put to Dr. Peng by the Consulate General immediately upon his return to Zurich.

Both Ekvall and I were impressed with Mrs. Chu, the professor at l'Ecole d'Interpretes. Her *kuo yu* is spoken with a genuine Peiping accent and her English is fluent. Moreover, she claims to have had five years' experience in teaching Chinese, two at Geneva and three at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., where she received her M.A. Mrs. Chu is very much interested in the problem of interpreting and has a good opinion of her own abilities to teach it, which, I should say on a first impression, is well-founded. She teaches two classes on Saturday morning at l'Ecole d'Interpretes, one in interpreting and one in advanced conversation. These are the only advanced Chinese courses taught at the school. They cost only 12 francs per term.

Mrs. Chu would not commit herself to give private tutoring, although Ekvall and I judged that she probably would if presented with the actual opportunity. She felt that her two hours of instruction per week at the University would be sufficient for a good student to maintain his proficiency. While this may be somewhat optimistic, I personally doubt that one hour a day would be necessary in addition to the two hours on Saturday. If Dexter were to enroll in the two classes at the University, two or three hours per week of supplementary tutoring from Mrs. Chu would be more than adequate to meet his needs. Mrs. Chu indicated that she would charge 10 francs per hour for private tutoring. If Mrs. Chu is

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Official Use Only; Official-Informal. Martin signed the original "Ed." A copy was sent to Johnson in Prague.



unwilling to give private tutoring, there are one or two other Chinese in Geneva who could do so.

While I do not have the final answers on the situation in Zurich, my feeling is that probably Dr. Peng would be able to give Dexter the necessary practice, although I doubt very much that his professional qualifications and capabilities in teaching interpreting approach those of Mrs. Chu in Geneva. I hope that during this week you will receive a telegraphic report from Zurich as to Dr. Peng's capabilities and interest in doing the job. As it looks now, from the standpoint of maintaining and increasing his language and interpreting proficiency, Dexter should be assigned to Geneva. As you are aware, Bern has not turned up any potential instructors.

I feel that it is a mistake to assign Dexter to an already existing slot either at Geneva or Zurich, and the officers in charge of these posts are of like mind. The reasoning of the Consuls General is quite simple and, to my mind, understandable. Their offices do not suffer from an excess of slots to cover the work that has to be done. Thus they are not eager to accept an officer for one of these slots who is from the outset going to devote at best only  $3/4$  of his time to the job. In my own case, I can tell you frankly, that the Minister and others here are not at all happy about the amount of time I am away from my job at the Embassy. In effect, the Geneva assignment takes about  $1/4$  of my time, and of course recently the Delhi conference has taken me away for a much longer period. In my case the Geneva assignment is at least related to the work I do here, although, as I am sure CA is aware, I am supposed to be covering the work here of 5 or 6 other geographic offices in the Department as well as that of CA. In the case of Dexter, if he were to be assigned to Zurich, for example, which is purely a consular post, his work would be entirely unconnected with the Geneva meetings and the time spent on them and on language training would be a dead loss to the Consulate. An assignment like this would not be fair to the Consulate or to Dexter himself.

As for the Geneva assignment, I think it would be very unfortunate to put Dexter in a general service officer's slot. The only reason for Dexter's assignment and for his continued language training is that at Geneva we are maintaining some sort of tenuous diplomatic contact with the Chinese Communists. The history of the past 4–5 years has demonstrated that the Peiping regime has to be dealt with, at least at this minimum level, and I see no reason to believe that developments in the future will make it any more possible to refrain from having some dealings with the authorities who control some  $1/2$  billion of the world's population. Certainly our operation in Geneva is important enough to stand on its own feet, at least to the extent of providing the salary and perquisites of one full-time officer. I feel that developing Dexter and, I hope, several other language officers as first-class

interpreters-cum-negotiators will pay off in the long run regardless of who controls China. We are certainly never going to get back to the "Taipan" and "Legation quarter" days.

Thus I sincerely hope that another look can be taken at Dexter's assignment, as I do not think we should try to fit him into some pre-existing slot entirely unrelated to the real purpose of his assignment to Switzerland, which would not allow him to contribute his best either to the work of the local office or to our own operation. Why not frankly assign him to Geneva for the purpose of our operation and let his spare time be utilized for economic and political reporting, for cultivating contacts with Asian delegations assigned to Geneva and in other ways useful both to his own development and to the work of the Consulate General. Both Gowen and Popper have told me they could find plenty of useful work of this kind for him to do.

Sincerely,

**Edwin W. Martin**  
*First Secretary of Embassy*

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**843. Telegram 182 to Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 21, 1957

182. For Ambassador Only. Your tel 297.

We agree you should go ahead with December 12 meeting.

Would like your comment on following alternative methods continuing talks under consideration here: 1) Beam meet with Wang in Warsaw, 2) Rankin commute Geneva from Belgrade following assignment there, 3) talks be continued at lower level and conducted by Martin commuting to Geneva.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11-2157. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Howe (S/S), Henderson (O), and Elbrick (EUR). The time of transmission is illegible.

**844. Telegram 316 from Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, November 22, 1957, 1 p.m.

316. Deptel 182.

From substantive standpoint favor alternative which would designate another officer of ambassador rank for continuation talks at Geneva. However, suggest CHICOMS may identify Rankin with GRC to degree that would tend to prejudice his negotiations if and when CHICOMS may shift from present attitude. Therefore, suggest possibility Bonbright commuting Geneva from Lisbon. If this not feasible favor Beam meeting Wang in Warsaw. This would, of course, require Martin commute London-Warsaw (this appears practicable from airline schedules available here) and preferably assignment Dexter to Warsaw. If this done, believe we should also suggest to CHICOMS alternative of Martin meeting at Geneva with CHICOM representative on understanding consideration would be given again designating an ambassador if and when it appeared desirable.

Must anticipate Wang will require instructions before replying to me on any alternative that lowers level talks or moves them from Geneva. In this event Martin could remain at or return to Geneva to receive their reply and make agreement, including public announcement, for next meeting. In such case we could simply state following December 12 meeting that date next meeting will subsequently be announced. In event I just inform Wang of designation new ambassador for subsequent meetings, this could be included in announcement following meeting without making reference to my transfer from Prague unless that is otherwise publicly known at time. (I would prefer to postpone announcement my transfer from Prague until very shortly before my departure.)

In any event would appreciate December 12 meeting instructions also covering publicity aspects.

**Johnson**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–2257. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

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845. Letter 77 from Clough to Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Letter No. 77

Washington, November 26, 1957

Dear Alex:

I am enclosing an exchange of correspondence between Mrs. Downey and Mr. Robertson. Mrs. Downey's renewed request for permission to visit her son caused us to reconsider our policy of denying passports to relatives of prisoners for visits to Communist China. After weighing the various considerations we have decided to recommend to the Secretary that we authorize travel by those relatives of the six remaining prisoners who may wish to make the trip.

We recognize, of course, that this action will attract a good deal of publicity and will constitute another breach in our policy opposing travel by Americans to Communist China, particularly coming so soon after our approval of Wirin's travel. However, we felt that those relatives have a far stronger claim than could be put forward by any others who may wish to visit Communist China and we feel we could defend our policy against further encroachment. On the plus side there is the possibility that one or more of the prisoners might be released on the occasion of his relative's visit. I am not optimistic that this will happen, but at least we will have taken every possible step to bring about the release of those unfortunate people.

It is possible that the Communists may not desire such visits at this time or may seize upon our action to demand reciprocal rights for visits by relatives of Chinese prisoners in this country. I think we would have to oppose any such maneuver on their part and it would give us an opportunity to retell the story of our offer to release Chinese prisoners which leaves the Chinese Communists in a rather weak propaganda position.

In order to minimize the possibility of giving the Communists any pretext for accusing us of "inequality", "one-sidedness", "espionage", etc., we thought it would be best for the relatives to apply individually to the Chinese Communist Red Cross rather than for us to take it up at the Geneva talks.

In view of Hammarskjold's interest in this subject we would notify him before our action was made public.

I would appreciate receiving by telegram any comments you may have on this proposed course of action.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. A copy was sent to Martin and to Geneva.

Judging from Wang's behavior at the last meeting, the Chinese Communists have run out of ideas for the time being. I am enclosing a very interesting report from the British Embassy concerning a remarkable lecture given by Chou En-lai to the assembled chiefs of mission in Peiping. His statement that they are willing to go on talking at Geneva for 10 or 20 years if necessary indicates we need have no fear of an early break-off on their part.

We expect to have a decision from the Secretary soon on the method of carrying on the talks after your transfer. I expect to write you further on that before the next meeting.

Sincerely,

**Ralph N. Clough**

Enclosures:

1. Letter to Mr. Robertson from Mrs. Downey, Nov. 6, 1957
2. Letter to Mrs. Downey from Mr. Robertson, November 14, 1957
3. Telegram from Peking to Foreign Office dated Nov. 16, 1957

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#### 846. Telegram 199 to Prague<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 4, 1957, 4:06 p.m.

199. For Ambassador. Partial guidance for December 12 meeting:

1. Inform Wang you being transferred. State US desires continue talks Geneva and will designate Martin represent US. FYI You would not ask Wang designate another representative but we assume he would not wish continue himself under these circumstances and representative of appropriate rank would be appointed. END FYI

2. If Wang accepts you should propose limiting press announcement following meeting to usual statement of date next meeting. If Wang insists, announcement may also state "for administrative reasons" next meeting to be held between Martin and Chinese Communist representative. You may tell Wang you desire delay public announcement impending transfer until new appointment officially confirmed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-457. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Osborn and Clough; cleared by Jones. Also sent to Geneva for Ambassador Johnson as telegram 546 and repeated to London for Martin as telegram 4085.

3. If Wang states requires instructions before replying you should inform him reply should be addressed Martin at Geneva who will be empowered agree on date and public announcement regarding next meeting.

4. If Wang refuses continue talks on proposed basis, insisting on ambassadorial level, inform him we remain ready continue talks but cannot designate ambassador for this purpose this time. You should maintain this position even in unlikely event Wang threatens break. If Wang suggests alternative basis for continuing talks, you may inform him suggestion will be reported Department but that for number compelling reasons only feasible basis at this time is one proposed by you. FYI Department believes it unlikely Chinese Communists will break off talks, especially in view Chou's recent statement to foreign chiefs mission Peiping they ready continue talking ten or twenty years if necessary. In give and take you should be careful retain freedom action for US to propose restoring talks to ambassadorial level at some future time when this might be desirable END FYI.

5. Your announcement of change in US representation in talks should follow strong statement of US disappointment at Chinese Communist failure to live up to public commitment release all jailed Americans and their failure renounce force so that Wang will perceive connection between our disappointment at meager results of talks and our unwillingness to continue at ambassadorial level.

**Dulles**

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**847. Telegram 332 from Prague<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, December 6, 1957, 10 a.m.

332. Re paragraph 2 Deptel 199.

Announcements of next meeting customarily are to effect "two ambassadors will meet again . . .". As such statement would clearly be inaccurate believe it may be preferable for me take initiative in proposing announcement state "for administrative reasons" Martin will be US representative next meeting handling question CHICOM representative

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-657. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London for Martin only as telegram 17.

according to developments at meeting. In view of New York Times December 1 Washington story Department “contemplating” my transfer to Bangkok have received inquiries on future meetings with Wang from press representatives at Geneva and must expect flat inquiries after December 12 meeting even if question hedged or avoided in formal announcement of next meeting. Therefore, while I would have preferred further postpone news my departure from Prague, under circumstances believe it preferable for news Martin designation frankly be announced following December 12 meeting and matter be interpreted in context and manner our choosing by statement subsequently to be made by Department rather than permitting it leak out in piecemeal and probably distorted form. In reply to press inquiries following meeting would informally confirm I expected transfer from Prague but had no firm information on new assignment. Any additional information would have to come from Washington. If Wang does not accept Martin designation, asks time to receive instruction or otherwise no agreement is reached between us I will attempt obtain his agreement to simple statement that announcement concerning next meeting will subsequently be made or unilaterally make such announcement myself giving no information to press on expectation my transfer from here or our proposal for Martin’s designation. However, in this event must anticipate considerable press speculation.

Johnson

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**848. Letter from Martin to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

London, December 6, 1957

Dear Ralph:

It was with mild surprise that I received Deptel 4085 yesterday. While I was aware that Alex was being transferred, I had assumed that the Department would be arranging for some other Mission Chief in the area to carry on with the Geneva talks. I am, of course, flattered that the Department should repose enough confidence in me to designate me to continue them after Alex’s departure. However, I am somewhat dubious about the Chinese Communist willingness to carry on negotiations

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official–Informal. A copy was sent to Johnson at Geneva.

at my level at least for some time to come. While I claim no special competence in reading Chinese tea leaves, I thought I should communicate my preliminary reaction to your telegram as soon as possible.

I think it virtually inconceivable that Wang will agree to negotiate personally with me and unlikely that he will agree at the meeting to designate another representative. While I concur in your judgment that the Chinese Communists are unlikely to break off the talks, I think they may be willing to see them suspended indefinitely on the issue of the level at which they are to be conducted. They may argue that just because the talks have bogged down is no reason to put them on a lower level. Progress is less likely at a lower level (their line may run) than at the Ambassadorial level, while if we are really sincere in our desire to settle differences, we should agree to talks on the Foreign Minister level. Thus the Chinese Communists may well take the occasion of Alex's departure to renew their propaganda for Foreign Minister level meeting, though indicating willingness to continue at the Ambassadorial level. My guess is that they may hold to this position for some time, making clear that they are not breaking off the talks but simply waiting until we have seen fit to appoint another Ambassador to carry them on.

My feeling that the Chinese Communists are likely to hold out for Ambassadorial talks is based on the fact that I can see no great pressure on Peiping to agree to talks at a lower level, which would be a move in precisely the opposite direction to that advocated by them. While Chou En-lai told the Mission Chiefs in Peiping recently that his regime would be willing to carry on the talks for ten or twenty years, he did this, I think, in the context of his discussion of the so-called two-China policy. He was indicating on the one hand, that the Chinese Communists would not agree to such a policy even though negotiations at Geneva were to go on for ten or twenty years, and, on the other hand, that the Chinese Communists were very patient and would not be the ones to break off negotiations. I recall, too, that he referred specifically to the "Ambassadorial" talks and I can't see that there was anything in his remarks which indicated eagerness to carry these talks on at a lower level.

To say that I doubt that the Chinese Communists will accept lower level talks (at least for some time to come) is not to say that we should not make the pitch outlined in the telegram under reference. Looking back over the talks, I think it fair to say that they were quite productive for the first five months but not since then. While certainly some purpose has been served even during the period since December, 1955 (e.g. in connection with the stabilization of the situation in the Formosa Straits), its importance has probably diminished with time. In any event, after two years without appreciable progress it would seem appropriate to indicate our dissatisfaction in terms stronger than the



usual protests at the negotiating table. Alex's transfer provides us with such an opportunity.

I think we should anticipate the possibility that the Chinese Communists, having read the *New York Times* article of December 1, will have foreseen that Alex will say his farewells at the Thursday meeting and will have prepared their positions in advance to meet various contingencies. Thus they may have already decided that they will not consent to continue discussions at a lower level and will be prepared to explain their position to the press immediately after the meeting. While it is possible that they might even take this pretext to end the talks entirely, my feeling is (as indicated above) that they are more likely to stress their willingness to continue the talks but only at the Ambassadorial level. I think we should be prepared for such a contingency as this and have our reasons for designating me rather than an Ambassador ready to give the press.

Another contingency for which to prepare a press explanation is the one mentioned in paragraph three of the reference telegram. Under these circumstances we would have to explain to the press why no date was set for the next meeting, since absence of this information would inevitably lead to speculation that the talks had been broken off.

In case the talks do continue without interruption, I wonder whether I can carry them on effectively without assistance. Since I have seen no indication that the Department is contemplating providing me with an "advisor", I take it that you do not feel that at the present pace of the talks there is need for one. Certainly at the tempo of last month's meeting I think I could manage on my own but there would be no assurance that the meetings would continue at such a low key. Alex has apparently felt on the basis of his long experience that it was essential to have an advisor.

One final item: Am I correct in assuming that paragraph three of the reference telegram simply means that the Consulate General in Geneva will act as a postbox for me and that it is not contemplated that I will be staying on at Geneva?

I am sending a copy of this letter to Geneva so that I can discuss it with Alex and get his reactions, and in case you wish to cable your reactions to it there.

Sincerely yours,

**Edwin W. Martin**  
*First Secretary of Embassy*

**849. Telegram 556 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 10, 1957, 4:43 p.m.

556. For Johnson. Your 323 [332].

1. Concur your suggestion that you seek Wang's agreement to announcement Martin's designation following meeting. You may inform press informally you expect transfer from Prague but final decision next post not yet made. In response queries reasons for change in level representation at talks you should state any comment would have to come from Department.

2. In event Wang unwilling agree Martin designation at meeting seek his agreement on announcement of date next meeting or, if he refuses, propose statement that announcement as to date next meeting will be made later. Concur your recommendation that in these circumstances no repeat no comment be made to press concerning Martin designation or your transfer.

3. Mark any messages which contain references your transfer Limit Distribution for Henderson only.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1057. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Henderson and Jones.

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**850. Telegram 557 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 10, 1957, 4:44 p.m.

557. For Johnson.

Guidance for December 12 meeting:

1. Express dissatisfaction Chinese Communist continued failure permit return civilians desiring to do so. This question could have been settled in first week or even first day of talks by simple word and act their part. Should have been settled finally on September 10, 1955 when

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1057. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Clough; cleared by Robertson, the substance of paragraph 5 by Becker (L), and in draft by Dulles.

they agreed take measures permit Americans expeditiously exercise right to return. Yet six Americans remain in jail Communist China, 824 days later.

2. With regard question accounting for US military personnel missing unaccounted for from Korean hostilities, remind Wang he said at last meeting did not feel it necessary reply that question that morning. There been 50 meetings since question raised in talks. Surely on one those mornings he could have offered request his authorities investigate matter and furnish information.

3. On renunciation force, most fundamental practical matter at issue, Chinese Communist attitude past year and half been one of unwillingness even discuss seriously.

4. If Wang raises matter visits by relatives, state United States decided issue passports for such visits in view prolonged tragic separation six men from families and messages received by family members from Chinese Communist Red Cross inviting them to make trip. Decision whether or not apply for passports for such purpose up to individuals concerned. Number if any of persons who will apply not known. Any applying will be advised contact Chinese Communist Red Cross. If Wang seeks reciprocity agreement, reject and point out US not preventing any Chinese from departing US. If Wang refers to Chinese in jail in US remind him our earlier offer permit all return who desired and allow Indian Embassy confirm their wishes. Inform Wang that if Chinese Communists truly interested in reciprocity they should show reciprocity by removing all obstacles to departure remaining detained Americans as US did prior to August 1, 1955 regarding Chinese in US.

5. If Wang proposes agreement on mutual judicial assistance in connection projected visit Communist China by defense counsel in Powell-Schumann case, advise him such agreement impossible and unnecessary. If Chinese Communists choose withhold cooperation with defense counsel in collection evidence for defense Powell-Schumann, this their own responsibility. US Government has no responsibility this regard.

6. With reference arrangements for succeeding meetings, follow previous guidance (Department's 199 to Prague and also 556 to Geneva).

**Dulles**

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**851. Telegram 506 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 11, 1957, 11 a.m.

506. From Johnson. Re Deptel 557, Dec 10.

In absence of guidance to contrary I propose to handle press matters as follows:

In most likely event no agreement reached on next meeting, I will, preferably in agreement with Wang, inform press that announcement concerning next meeting will subsequently be made, that as I expect transfer from Prague I will not further participate in talks, and US has accordingly made proposal to Wang for conduct of future talks on which we awaiting PRC reply. Would point out that accordance agreement on confidential nature talks cannot give substance our proposal. In event agreement reached on next meeting with Martin as pointed out my reply from Prague to Deptel 546 it not rpt not possible for me propose to Wang "usual statement" to effect that two of us will again meet as this clearly not true. Therefore would propose announcement along lines second sentence para two Deptel 546 informally confirming to press after meeting that I will not again be meeting here because I expect transfer from Prague.

In event Wang issues public statement accusing US of attempting break off meetings or other such charges will promptly reply with statement of facts consulting Dept as seems desirable and leaving to Dept issuance of any extended reply.

In any above contingencies I will, of course, confine myself to statement I expect be leaving Prague without making any reference to possibility Bangkok appointment.

**Gowen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1157. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

**852. Telegram 563 to Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 11, 1957, 1:28 p.m.

563. For Johnson. Your 506.

1. Presume you now have Deptel 556.

2. Concur your proposed tactics in event Wang issues accusatory public statement following meeting.

3. In event no agreement on next meeting, Department believes preferable announcement follow lines paragraph 2 Department's 556. Appreciate would cause speculation, but believe such speculation more easily dealt with than that which would be stimulated by mention of US "proposal," and fact we awaiting reply.

4. Concur your proposed tactic in event agreement reached: i.e., propose announcement along lines second sentence paragraph 2 Department's 546, informally commenting to press as per last sentence first substantive paragraph your 506.

5. Unless you deem necessary because of unforeseen circumstances, see no need Martin remaining Geneva after meeting. Consulate General should transmit him any communication from Chinese Communists.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1157. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Osborn; cleared in draft by Robertson.

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**853. Telegram 510 from Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 12, 1957, 2 p.m.

510. From Johnson.

One hour fifty minute meeting this morning.

I opened with strong statement along lines paras 1, 2 and 3 Deptel 557, closing with statement on my transfer and designation of Martin.

Wang closely questioned me on designation Martin "as to whether U.S. was purposely changing level of Ambassadorial talks" and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1257. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

therefore “nature” of talks. I replied along lines para 4 Deptel 546 and Wang said would have to consult government. When, in reply my statement answer should be addressed Martin, he insisted reply only to me, I emphasized that as of close meeting today Martin was U.S. representative. He rejected my suggestion announcement be made concerning date next meeting and we finally agreed on announcement, that we had held 73rd meeting today and Ambassadors “stated an announcement would subsequently be made concerning the next meeting”.

He made proposal for agreed announcement on judicial assistance on basis “equality and reciprocity” and therefore “governments of two countries decided to appoint experts to start negotiations on substance and concrete arrangements of an agreement on judicial assistance between the two countries”. In original presentation and give and take laid heavy emphasis on fact U.S. District Court an instrumentality of U.S. Government had made request to PRC Ministry of Justice.

I, of course, rejected along lines paragraph 5 Deptel 557. He indicated they will issue public statement on this.

Full text draft agreed announcement on judicial assistance by separate telegram.

Full report of meeting being pouched Friday.

Gowen

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#### 854. Despatch unnumbered from Geneva<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 12, 1957

##### SUBJECT

China Talks—73rd Meeting

1. I opened 73rd meeting with prepared statement:

(a) Mr. Ambassador, when we first met here in August, 1955 again to discuss, among other things, the question of Americans in your country desiring to return to the United States but prevented from doing so, I pointed out to you the fundamental importance of this question to the future relations between our two peoples. I also pointed out to you that the question could have been settled even on the first day of our talks if your authorities had taken the simple and straightforward step

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12-1257. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Received on December 19.

of doing no more than matching the action that had been taken by my government with respect to the Chinese in the United States—that is, withdrawing all measures preventing their departure and permitting them to return. This would have permitted us promptly to proceed to the discussion of other questions in an atmosphere that would give greater hope of constructive results. However, your authorities refused to take this straightforward and reciprocal step and you insisted that I enter into public agreement with you on the subject. Although I saw no necessity for such an agreement, I concurred in your proposal, even including your proposal on third party representation in the U.S. I did this on the clear understanding, which was embodied in the specific words of the agreement, that this would promptly resolve the problem of Americans detained in your country. The agreement into which we entered on September 10, 1955 in fact specifically said that your authorities agreed to take measures to permit Americans (not just some Americans, but all Americans) expeditiously to exercise their right to return. Yet eight hundred and twenty four days after we entered into that agreement, Mr. Ambassador, six Americans still remain in your prisons. I have, in the past, and must again today express to you as solemnly as I can, the dissatisfaction of myself, my government and the American people with this absurdly long delay of your authorities in resolving this problem and in carrying out their pledged word in the first agreement ever reached between us.

(b) At our twenty-third meeting on October 27, 1955, I raised with you the question of the failure of your side to account for many U.S. military personnel still missing from the Korean hostilities. I pointed out to you that each of these men were last seen or heard from under circumstances indicating that he was either captured or killed by forces of your side and that your authorities should have information concerning them. I also pointed out many specific cases in which your official radio, as well as press, had specifically identified persons on the list as being prisoners of your side. Yet they were never returned nor was any report even received of their death. In the time that has elapsed during the fifty meetings that have taken place since that period, no satisfactory accounting of these men has been made in the Military Armistice Commission in Korea or here. Surely at one of these meetings it would have been very simple and straightforward for you to have offered to request your authorities to investigate the matter and furnish us information to which we are entitled not only on humanitarian grounds but also by the specific terms of the Korean armistice agreement. Yet you have not done so.

(c) Mr. Ambassador, at our 20th meeting on October 8, 1955 I made to you a proposal suggesting that we renounce in reciprocal terms the use of force in the settlement of issues between us, that is, either we were going to permit our disputes to lead to hostilities between us, or

we were going to express our joint determination to seek their settlement by peaceful means only. I pointed out the importance of any such declaration, especially with regard to the Taiwan area, and that such an agreement need not in any way prejudice the position of either side or the pursuit of its policies by peaceful means. Yet you have persisted in misinterpreting and misrepresenting this simple proposal which is in full accord with accepted standards of international conduct and for the past year and a half have not even been willing seriously to discuss it. Mr. Ambassador, this has also been a source of deep disappointment to me and to my country.

(d) Mr. Ambassador, as this is my last meeting with you it is a source of particularly keen disappointment to me this morning to have to recount this record of the failure of your authorities to live up to the first and only agreement reached between us as well as their failure to take any steps to resolve these other outstanding issues. When I came here almost two and one half years ago I had high hopes that your government would be promptly responsive to these few fundamental and mutually advantageous suggestions for the removal of obstacles to the improvement of our relations and thus establish an atmosphere in which other problems could profitably be discussed. I desire to inform you that I am being transferred from Prague to a new post and it will therefore not be possible for me further to carry on these talks with you. However, my government persists in its determination and willingness patiently to seek a settlement of our differences and accordingly desires to continue these talks here. To this end Mr. Edwin Martin will be designated as the United States representative."

2. Wang replied. The record of our talks of more than two years shows we have not done the duty given to us to settle the issues pending between our two countries. He came to these talks with me with great hopes. It is a fact that there existed a number of practical issues between our two countries. The existence of such issues between our two countries not only exerts an influence on the relations between our two countries, but also leads to the tense situation in the Far East. It was with the desire of resolving the issues between our two countries as well as to improve our relations that he had in the course of the entire talks made various concrete proposals to bring about this end. Yet he must point out that the Ambassador and the United States Government have not given sufficient attention to proposals that he has made.

3. Wang continued. The progress of our talks has suffered due to the policy of my government during the entire course of these talks to obstruct and drag on deliberately what we have started here. For this his side is extremely dissatisfied with the situation of these talks. And the responsibility for this state of affairs is not on his side at all.

4. Wang continued. At this morning's meeting he still would like to bring up and discuss with me another matter that is relative to the



relations between our two countries. In view of the fact that an American court has requested the Chinese Ministry of Justice for judicial assistance in connection with the Powell case, he now proposed on behalf of his government that our two countries conclude an agreement to render each other judicial assistance. On September 3, 1957 the United States District Court of Northern California corresponded directly with the Ministry of Justice of his country and put forth a request for judicial assistance for Mr. and Mrs. Powell and Mr. Schumann, all American citizens and editors of the "China Monthly Review". The Chinese authorities are willing to meet the request of the U.S. Court. However, in accordance with international practice, only after the two countries have reached agreement on judicial assistance, can assistance be rendered in specific cases in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. As a matter of fact the U.S. Government has concluded bilateral or multilateral agreements on judicial assistance with other countries. It can readily be seen that the procedure referred to above by the U.S. District Court is not in keeping with proper procedure. For this reason the Chinese Ministry of Justice was obliged to return the original request on October 30 of this year. Nevertheless, in its message of reply the Ministry of Justice specifically stated that if the Chinese and American governments reached agreement for judicial assistance the request in the Powell case would be eligible for consideration. Since the Chinese Ministry of Justice stated the aforesaid position, no step has so far been taken by the American authorities to promote a judicial agreement between our two countries. Yet on November 2 of this year the American State Department issued a passport valid for travel to China to Mr. Wirin, Powells' defense attorney, for the purpose of taking testimony. It is evident that in the absence of a judicial agreement, it would be impossible for Mr. Wirin to accomplish the purpose of taking testimony.

5. Wang continued. In order to resolve the question of judicial assistance in the case of the Powells as well as other cases which may be raised in either country in the future, he proposed that both sides make the following agreed announcement so that cases can be taken up speedily. It is hoped that I and my government would give careful consideration to this proposal.

6. Wang then handed me the following text:

"Agreed Announcement of the Ambassadors of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America Concerning Negotiations on Judicial Assistance. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree to announce:

In order to give each other judicial assistance on the basis of equality and reciprocity, the Government of the People's Republic of China

and the Government of the United States of America deem it necessary to reach an agreement on judicial assistance between the two countries. The Governments of the two countries decide to appoint experts to start negotiations on the substance and concrete arrangements of an agreement on judicial assistance between the two countries." End text.

7. I replied. As communications from his country to Mr. Wirin had indicated their intention of making a proposal of this kind, this matter has already been given careful consideration of my government. First let me point out that it is Mr. Wirin as the defense attorney for the defendants Powell who is seeking to obtain testimony in his country and not the U.S. Government and that the court was simply acting on Wirin's behalf. A passport has now been issued to Mr. Wirin for the purpose of taking the testimony he seeks on behalf of his clients. It is entirely up to the authorities of his country whether or not they desire to cooperate with Mr. Wirin in the collection of the evidence which he seeks. There is no responsibility of the U.S. Government in this regard. It is clearly not necessary to have a judicial assistance agreement such as he proposed to permit Wirin to take the testimony that he seeks. Countries commonly permit the taking of such testimony without intergovernmental agreements. I myself have often had experience in this regard. I was therefore authorized to inform him that the U.S. Government does not consider it possible to enter into such agreement and does not consider such an agreement necessary for the taking of such testimony.

8. Wang replied. He considered the response made by me to this question as not satisfactory. No matter who is going there to take testimony, the case is not one of an individual applying to the Chinese Ministry of Justice, but it is the District Court of Northern California that has made the request to the Ministry of Justice. Clearly this court is an institution of the United States and cannot be anything else. The statement has been made to the effect that an individual person may proceed to obtain testimony in a foreign country without the agreement of the government concerned. Such a statement cannot be regarded as correct. That statement does not conform even with the accords signed by the United States itself with foreign countries.

9. Wang continued. He just would cite one case. At the 6th Inter-American Conference held in Havana in 1928 a Bustamante code was adopted at that conference at which the U.S. was represented. Article 388 of this code states that every judicial step which a country has to take in another country will be carried out by letters consular or letters rogatory submitted through diplomatic channels. If, as I said, the possibility of judicial assistance existed without the necessity of agreement between the governments concerned, then this article in the Bustamante code in which U.S. has associated itself would appear to be irrelevant. Now the fundamental fact is that an institution of the U.S. has put forward such a request to his authorities and his authorities

have expressed willingness to meet this request so that it can be handled by proper channels and procedures. Since I had made a remark that it was not necessary for governments to reach agreement on the handling of judicial assistance and if this is the considered opinion of the U.S. does this mean that the U.S. no longer seeks such judicial assistance. If so, the U.S. has reversed its position.

10. I replied. I happened to have had personally considerable experience in this field while serving as consular officer at various posts. It is up to each country to determine for itself whether it will permit the taking of testimony within its territory and under what circumstances it will permit the taking of such testimony. Letters rogatory are merely one form for taking of such testimony. There are many other forms. It is up to the country in which the testimony is to be taken to determine in what form it may be taken and the courts in the country where the testimony is to be used to determine the acceptability of that form. The 1928 Havana Convention which he cited certainly has not supported the statement that testimony cannot be taken in the absence of such agreement. It merely agrees that letters rogatory will be the form. In the absence of agreements, it is up to each country to decide for itself. Mr. Wirin has been issued a passport at his request for the purpose of taking testimony in Wang's country. Whether Wang's government permits Wirin to do so and in what form it permits him to do so is entirely up to the decision of his authorities. It is not a matter in which the U.S. Government has responsibility.

11. Wang replied. There exist two forms of judicial assistance between two countries. One of the forms is to proceed in accordance with international practice. The other is to proceed not in accordance with international practice; one of the forms shows respect for the other country whereas the other form does not show such respect. One of the sides has requested judicial assistance from the other while at the same time it is not going to follow international practice in this regard. This cannot be considered as showing respect for another country. Suppose an official institution in China approaches a court of the U.S. Government. He would presume the U.S. Government would not agree to this procedure. His side has already made clear that they are ready and willing to consider the request made by the American court. But this matter must be handled and settled in accordance with proper procedures in this respect. Since I had made it clear that the U.S. will not consider entering into an agreement to cooperate on this matter, it appears that on the one hand the U.S. has made the request while on the other it refuses the acceptance of this request and its satisfaction. He much regretted the failure to reach an agreement on a matter on which his authorities were first approached by an American institution. It would appear that the U.S. Government has made up its mind not to resolve any issues between our two countries. He cannot but express

regret and dissatisfaction. He wants to make clear that they will take steps to make known their position in this matter.

12. Wang continued. I had just informed him of my transfer to a new post. He recalled that the present series of talks between us was started by the two of us and at one time was carried on by the Consuls General of our two governments in Geneva. Then, on the initiative of the U.S., the consular contacts were elevated to the present level of Ambassadors. He regretted that he had not been able to accomplish the tasks and hopes entrusted to us by our peoples and governments. One thing on which he wanted to be clear following my transfer whether my government is going to change nature talks at Ambassadorial rank.

13. I replied. There is no intent to change the nature of these talks. As I told him it is the desire of my government that they continue. However, compelling reasons do not make it possible for us to designate a person of Ambassadorial rank at this time for this purpose. As he knows, Mr. Martin is a senior and experienced officer of our foreign service who as he knew, except for a brief interval, has been connected with these talks from the beginning. He has the full confidence of the U.S. Government and it is the opinion of the U.S. Government that he is best able to carry them on at this time.

14. Wang replied. The purpose of his asking the question was to clarify the nature of the talks and not an expression of opinion on any individual person. With regard to my information he was not in a position to make a reply but he had to report back to his government. He will consult with his government and when any reply was received he would let me know.

15. I suggested that Mr. Lai or Mr. Chiu could address a letter to Mr. Martin at the Consulate General here. I added that Mr. Martin is authorized to agree to a time and place for the next meeting.

16. Wang replied that in any event he will communicate to me the opinion of his government about arrangements for the next step.

17. I commented that it might delay this as I might be leaving shortly.

18. Wang replied that they could communicate with me via Mr. Martin.

19. I stated that at the close of the meeting I was no longer the U.S. representative but that it was all right to address the letter to me if he [illegible in the original] as long as Mr. Martin gets it.

20. Wang replied that the important thing is that arrangements for these talks to continue is a matter to be decided by two not one party.

21. I stated that I was not arguing that point but that Martin is our channel.

22. Wang replied. He wanted to make it clear that he was not expressing an opinion on a person but that these talks at Ambassadorial rank

had been raised from consular rank and were known as Ambassadorial talks. Of course he welcomed Mr. Martin's designation, but as he understood it, Mr. Martin had not been given the rank of Ambassador. In this respect it involves a change in their nature and thus the talks cannot be considered as Ambassadorial talks. Again he wanted to state it does not involve any personal opinion against Mr. Martin. He personally appreciates Mr. Martin's ability and Mr. Martin certainly enjoys the U.S. Government's confidence. Mr. Martin is well informed on our problems.

23. Wang continued that he wanted further clarification. We began with Ambassadors who had their advisers. Each team was headed by an Ambassador. Now that I was being transferred and Mr. Martin designated, the talks cannot be considered as Ambassadorial but between advisers.

24. I asked whether we needed to raise the problem. The talks were being continued between the representatives of the two governments. As I told him previously, it was not possible to designate an Ambassador at this time.

25. Wang replied. He recalled that our association began in 1954. I would recall that after the talks between us were instituted I was unable to continue. I agreed to designate an administrative officer to continue the contact. As I was aware the talks were on the same level. If there is any change in the level, it involves a change in the nature of talks and the nature of the problems to be settled will be influenced. The nature or rank of diplomatic negotiations has a bearing on their ability to resolve problems in negotiations. For instance, matters handled at the supreme level between heads of government cannot be handled by foreign ministers.

26. I stated that I thought it was up to each government as to the authority and competence it gives to each representative. Mr. Martin will be diplomatic representative.

27. Wang replied that he had to consult his government on this matter and would give a reply when he had been informed.

28. I stated that the reply, however, should be addressed to Mr. Martin at the Consulate. I added that there was the matter of a press announcement. If we could give a date, there would be less press speculation. We could give a date without discussing the level. I would suggest "Representatives of the U.S. and the Peoples Republic of China will meet on January 9th". That is four weeks from today. If for any reason there is a change, that could subsequently be announced.

29. Wang replied, should we make announcement along this line, "Ambassador Johnson has been given a new appointment. For this reason the present talks between the two countries are suspended. The procedure for the future talks will subsequently be agreed between the two sides".

30. I stated that that presented a personal difficulty for me. He was the first to be told of my transfer. I had not yet informed the Czechoslovak Government. I would prefer that a statement on the future of the talks be made. What I had in mind was: "Ambassadors U. Alexis Johnson and Wang Ping-nan held their 73rd meeting today. They stated an announcement would subsequently be made as to the date of the next meeting."

31. When Wang appeared to demur at this, I suggested the substitution of "concerning" for "as to the date of".

32. Wang agreed.

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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#### **855. Letter 62 from Johnson to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 62

Geneva, December 12, 1957

Dear Ralph:

This is my final letter from the Geneva Ambassadorial talks. I cannot say that from a personal standpoint I am sad as the last year, in particular, has been very sterile. However, I am sad that more has not been accomplished.

As far as the future is concerned I feel that we may well be in for a long hiatus with their reply being that they stand ready to resume the talks at any time we appoint an Ambassador, but that they see no purpose in meetings at a lower level. Frankly, I do not feel that they will feel any pressure to take action along the lines of releasing additional prisoners to persuade us to resume at the Ambassadorial level. I think that their line will be that the sterility of our talks is an argument for the Foreign Minister level meeting rather than for reducing the level below Ambassadors.

You, of course, know that they are extremely sensitive on the subject of corresponding levels and we can be sure that even if they do agree to resume with Martin they will be very careful also to appoint a First Secretary, to correspond with Ed's rank in London. This will, in fact, mean that their man will be considerably below Ed in competence

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official-  
Informal. Johnson signed the original "Alex."

and authority as Ed would normally be a Counselor in any post but one such as London. Thus any meetings Ed may have will be on an even more routine level than those I have been having. I think, for example, that they will refuse even to enter into any discussion whatever of matters such as renunciation of force. This was foreshadowed by Wang's remarks today.

In any event it was clear that at today's meeting Martin's appointment was an eventuality for which they were in no way prepared. My main satisfaction from the meeting was that for the first time in two years I had the initiative with him.

I am sorry about the mix-up on the press guidance telegrams. When I received 557 I thought that was all there was and that I had better get our lines clear on press matters. Late that evening we received 556, long after I had sent out my message to you. It turned out 556 had been badly garbled in transmission and that they had been working all day to clear it. The press here are very unhappy with me but I am sticking to the line of no comment. Of course, with the upcoming NATO meeting in Paris and all the other news I don't think that the matter is going to make a very big splash any place.

I felt a little bit at a loss to expand on the theme of why a judicial assistance agreement was "impossible and unnecessary" and hope that I did not say any of the wrong things. I was also somewhat at a loss to handle his emphasis on a U.S. Court having communicated with the PRC and tried to shift it back to the subject of Wirin.

As a final note, my thanks and appreciation to you, Dave and the others in CA who have borne the brunt of the work of giving me such excellent backstopping. Give Walter Robertson my best and say that I am looking forward to seeing him soon.

Now signing off from Geneva.

Sincerely,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

P.S. We have arranged with the Consulate here promptly to telegraph to Ed and the Department anything the Chicoms send over. Ed will write you directly about the future administrative matters mentioned in your last letter to me. Incidentally, Ekvall has never got paid for that trip from France to here last summer. Can we not see that he gets paid before he leaves?

UAJ

PPS. I keep thinking of things. When I came here I was given \$300 (Frs. 1285.50) to be used for representation and any other such purposes. This amount of francs was simply given to me through the Consulate disbursing officer and it is my understanding that they required no accounting. There are Frs. 750.- remaining. Rather than returning them with perhaps the necessity of again requesting some such fund I am turning them over to Ed and if he doesn't use them he can turn them over to an Ambassador if one is again appointed. I have taken a receipt from Ed, of which I am enclosing a copy. If the Department wants anything else done with them he will, of course, do whatever he is instructed.

UAJ

Enclosure

**Receipt from Martin<sup>2</sup>**

Geneva, December 12, 1957

*RECEIPT*

Received from U. Alexis Johnson the sum of Swiss Francs 750.- representing official special funds of the United States Government for disbursement for approved official purposes.

**Edwin W. Martin**

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<sup>2</sup>No classification marking.

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**856. Letter from Johnson to Moorman<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 12, 1957

Dear General Moorman:

It now appears that today may well be the last meeting at which Lt. Col. Robert B. Ekvall will serve as interpreter for my talks with the Chinese Communists. Therefore, I desire to take advantage of this opportunity again to express to you and to the United States Army my most sincere appreciation for your courtesy and cooperation in making Col. Ekvall available for this long and arduous duty, as well as again

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. No classification marking. Moorman was in Paris. A copy was sent to the Department.



to express my high opinion of Col. Ekvall. I have most highly valued him not only as an exceptionally able interpreter but also for his advice on substantive matters. He has a keen and accurate sense of probable Chinese Communist reactions and of their psychology which has been very helpful to me. I greatly regret that he is required to retire from the Army and will thus no longer be available for this duty.

Sincerely yours,

**U. Alexis Johnson**  
*American Ambassador*

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**857. Letter from Martin to Clough<sup>1</sup>**

London, December 16, 1957

Dear Ralph:

An idea has occurred to me which I am sure has undoubtedly occurred to you or Dave now that the "Johnson-Wang talks" have come to an end after seventy-three meetings and almost 2½ years. This idea is that some sort of official recognition or award should be given Alex Johnson for a diplomatic feat which, if not unique in history, is hard to parallel in the annals of our country's diplomacy. The fact that Alex was holding down a Chief of Mission job which had nothing to do with the negotiations at Geneva makes his accomplishment the more noteworthy. The trekking back and forth from Prague to Geneva with all its attendant unsettling effects (which I have begun to appreciate having now done six months' commuting from London to Geneva) also increased the difficulties of his more than ordinarily tough negotiating assignment.

Of course I don't need to describe to you the merits of this particular case. I do feel, however, that some sort of an award or other recognition is not only highly merited by Alex, but would be the kind of thing which would boost esprit in the Service at large.

Sincerely yours,

**Edwin W. Martin**  
*First Secretary of Embassy*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal.

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858. Letter from Martin to Clough<sup>1</sup>

London, December 17, 1957

Dear Ralph:

We should probably wait to see what response comes from Peiping on our latest move before deciding the question of "advisers" which I raised in my last letter, and which you mentioned in your last letter to Alex. Nevertheless, I will give you my preliminary thinking, since I discussed it with Alex and he goes along with it.

In the event that the Chicoms agree to continue the talks with me as the United States representative, I think they will do so only on the basis of "equality," meaning that they will appoint a person of First Secretary rank to meet with me. As Wang made it clear in his reaction last Thursday to our proposal (and as one would expect on the basis of Chicom behaviour in general), any talks conducted on a First Secretary level will be routine in the extreme. I can't imagine the Communists being willing to discuss any policy question (e.g. renunciation of force) at that level; the best we could expect to get out of such talks would be information as to prisoners and welfare, etc. and precious little of that. In these circumstances, I would certainly question the need of an "adviser" of the caliber and rank of Dave Popper or Bob Rinden. Moreover, I feel (as does Alex) that assignment of Dave Popper would put an undue strain on the Consulate General at Geneva.

Thus, if the Communists do agree to go on with the talks with me and appoint someone of my level to carry this task out, I feel that, at least for the first meeting, I might simply take Cameron LaClair with me to shuffle documents and Sue Gross for the purpose of keeping the record, and Dexter for interpreting—as well as Ekvall, if the meeting is held in time. Alex agrees that the present system of having LaClair take what approaches a verbatim transcript is a rather inefficient hangover from the original idea of keeping the talks on an informal basis, and there is no reason why Sue shouldn't do it.

We were sorry not to have Dexter at the last meeting, since it appears unlikely there will be another in which he can overlap with Bob Ekvall. Bob will be available only until January 15. However, he should have his present travel orders extended in case we do have a meeting before then.

Sincerely,

**Edwin W. Martin**  
*First Secretary of Embassy*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official-Informal. Martin signed the original "Ed."

**859. Letter 1 from Clough to Martin<sup>1</sup>**

Letter No. 1

Washington, December 23, 1957

Dear Ed:

With Alex's departure as the American protagonist in the Geneva discussions, I decided it would only be fitting to start a new letter series of which this is No. 1.

Judging from the length of time it is taking Peiping to reply to our proposal to shift the talks down from the ambassadorial level, we must have presented them with a difficult decision. They may react in one of three possible ways: (1) break off the talks entirely with a violent blast at us; (2) inform us they desire to continue the talks but only when we appoint an ambassador to meet with them or (3) agree to continue the meetings as proposed by us. The first alternative I consider very unlikely. The second however is quite possible and appears to be Alex's choice as the most probable. We have prepared a draft press release for use in this eventuality and I enclose a copy. I should appreciate any comments or changes you may suggest. As you will see, the purpose of the release is to imply that the downgrading of the talks resulted from our dissatisfaction with the Chinese Communist response to our initiatives in the talks. At the same time we want to make clear that we are not breaking off the talks. That we have appointed an experienced officer to continue them and by not explicitly relating our action to failure of the Chinese Communists to do what we want them to, we leave the way open to appoint an ambassador whenever we consider it desirable to do so.

It is possible that the Chinese Communists may accept our proposal and appoint someone to meet with you. It seems to me that the likelihood of this happening diminishes as time passes without a response from Peiping.

It is probably premature as you suggest in your letter of December 17 to decide the adviser question until we know what the Chinese Communist response is. If you feel that you could manage with Cameron LaClair and Sue Gross that would of course simplify matters administratively. I suppose it is true that at a lower than ambassadorial level, the Communist statements at the meetings are likely to be even more routine and predictable than they have been in the past.

Orders are being written for Dexter to leave for Geneva the first week in January. We hope by that time to know what Peiping intends to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Official–Informal.

do. It would be very awkward to have spent a year and a half training Dexter as a Chinese interpreter just to have him assigned to Geneva as a general service officer with no interpreting to do. We had such a difficult time working out some way of assigning him to Geneva that we are reluctant to suggest delay at this point for fear the arrangement might break down.

I agree entirely with your suggestion that some sort of official recognition be extended to Alex for the unique contribution he has made at Geneva to our diplomacy. I discussed the matter with Sam Gilstrap of FE/EX who suggested a letter of commendation from the Secretary to be followed by a recommendation to the Awards Committee for a superior service award.

Whether or not the Chinese Communists decide to appoint someone to continue the Geneva talks with you, I am sure you will be pleased to know that Mr. Robertson has great confidence in your ability to carry on the discussions, and it was he who recommended to the Secretary that you be selected for the job.

With best wishes for a happy New Year to you and Emma Rose and the children,

Sincerely,

Ralph N. Clough

Enclosure<sup>2</sup>

#### DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

At the meeting in Geneva with the Chinese Communist representative on December 12, Ambassador Johnson informed him that he was being transferred and that the United States Government had designated his assistant, Mr. Edwin W. Martin, a senior Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American Embassy in London, as the United States representative in the talks. Mr. Martin is a Chinese language and area specialist with sixteen years' service, who was a member of Ambassador Dean's staff in the negotiations with the Chinese Communists in Korea in 1953-54. He took part in the conversations with the Chinese Communists in Geneva in 1954 concerning the Americans imprisoned in Communist China and was Ambassador Johnson's advisor at the outset of the ambassadorial talks which began in Geneva, August 1, 1955. He has served as Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the Department of State and has acted as Ambassador Johnson's assistant at the meetings in Geneva since July, 1957.

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<sup>2</sup>No classification marking. Drafted by Clough on December 22.

The Chinese Communists have announced that they are unwilling to continue the talks except at the ambassadorial level. The United States is not prepared at this time to designate an ambassador for this purpose. However, it should be emphasized that the United States is not breaking off the talks. Mr. Martin will meet with a Chinese Communist representative at any mutually agreeable time.

The ambassadorial level talks at Geneva convened on August 1, 1955, with the mission of settling, first, the question of the return of civilians desiring to do so. What seemed to be a satisfactory solution was reached on September 10, 1955, when the Chinese Communists publicly announced that they would take appropriate measures to permit Americans desiring to do so to return "expeditiously" to the United States. Now, nearly two and a half years later, six Americans are still held by the Chinese Communists. The next question the two Ambassadors took up was the matter of a mutual renunciation of force. The Chinese Communists, while stating that they accept the principle of the renunciation of force, refused to agree that it is without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self defense and that it is applicable to the Taiwan area. For the past year and a half, the Chinese Communists have refused even to enter into a substantive discussion looking toward a meaningful declaration of the renunciation of force. The American Ambassador has also repeatedly attempted to obtain from the Chinese Communist representative an accounting for the United States military personnel missing and unaccounted for from the Korean hostilities, as well as any other American personnel missing in or near Chinese Communist territory of whom the Communists have any knowledge. The Chinese Communist representative has not only refused to provide such an accounting, but has rejected this matter as a subject for discussion in these talks, insisting merely that his authorities are not now holding any American military personnel.